20 BAR The British Army Review 158: Autumn 2013 BAR The British Army Review 158: Autumn

BAR The British Army Review 158: Autumn 2013 21

Infantry Tactics as a
Science - Liddell Hart
an Apostle of the
Adaptable Force?
Major Gerry Long looks at the influence of Captain
Liddell Hart on the concept of the Adaptable Force
in Army 2020

It should be the duty of every soldier to the concussion of a nearby exploding artillery shell to
reflect on the experiences of the past, in be evacuated to England before the year was out but
the endeavour to discover improvements, he was back in the trenches in time to be wounded
in his particular sphere of action, which are and gassed on the Somme the following July. He was
practicable in the immediate future.1 evacuated to England again and spent the remainder
of the war recovering and training the citizen soldiers in
Men Who Fight On Foot the U.K. He remained in the Army until he was placed on
Few professions are as intolerant of the questioner as half-pay by a medical board in 1924 as a result of the
the military. Most armies succeed largely through the injuries he’d sustained in the war. He retired in 1927 but
predictability born of obedience and it is because of this his experiences in the trenches left a lasting impression
that armies tend to worship conformity. Indeed the whole on him and became the source of inspiration and
idea of doctrine is based upon an ideal of conformity compulsion for the rest of his life.
Soldiers from 9 Platoon, C Company, 3 Rifles based at FOB Zeebrugge, conduct counter-IED Patrols to certain shared principles. The negative side of such An army survives and grows, physically, intellectually
around the area of Kajaki Dam, accompanied by Afghan National Army and Police forces.
Photo Sergeant Rob Knight RLC Crown Copyright beliefs is that seniority and ascribed experience are and spiritually through its risk-takers. Risk-takers
frequently confused with possession of superior truth.2 challenge the comfortable warmth of the status quo; they 1
Liddell Hart, B.H.,
Suggestions on the
One person who questioned this concept of superior are willing to trade their potential within the hierarchy Future Development
truth after the First World War was Basil Henry Liddell for accepting a degree of responsibility the bureaucracy of the Combat Unit,
the Tank as a Weapon
Hart. Liddell Hart was born in Paris in 1895, the son of finds distasteful.3 So when Captain Liddell Hart presumed of Infantry, RUSI
Journal,1919, p 666
an English clergyman serving a parish of expatriates. to postulate on a new science of infantry tactics, he did
In 1913 young Liddell Hart went up to Cambridge, to not go unchallenged. The British Army for many reasons Swain, Richard, M. Lt
2

Col, B. H. Liddell Hart;

Corpus Christi College. The following year his formal such as tradition, financial stringency, and military policy Theorist for the 21st
Century, U. S. C. G. S.
education was cut short by the outbreak of the First failed to grasp this new science. Between the wars, the C. Fort Leavenworth,
1986
World War. He received a temporary commission in the British Army was pulled in many different directions with
King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI) and went all the reformers only offering extremes. Faced with this 3
http://regimentalrogue.
com/papers/auftrags.
out to France in 1915. He was injured sufficiently by all-pervading change, it would appear that the bulk of htm
22 BAR The British Army Review 158: Autumn 2013 BAR The British Army Review 158: Autumn 2013 23

the British Army merely re-trenched into conservatism theory and The Expanding Torrent, Liddell Hart’s focus mind a number of rules emerged; the importance of
and the warmth and comfort of what it knew best - remained on the action of infantry in the tactical arena.6 the use of cover, rapidity of movement and the vital
colonial policing. Throughout his works such as The Future of importance of low-level commanders using their initiative
Infantry, Liddell Hart made specific and practical always in an attempt to move forward. The need was
Infiltration as a Science suggestions for the infantry. He advocated the adoption for the low-level commander without waiting for further
However Liddell Hart continued to push at the of a framed rucksack for individual load carrying, along orders to reinforce success rather than follow orders and
boundaries of military doctrine and especially the with tips on the carriage of webbing. When it came to reinforce the attack option that was failing; this was of
infantry arm.4 When Liddell Hart spoke of a science drill, he argued that tactical training should commence course a dramatic departure from contemporary doctrine.
of war he used the term science in the manner of the before square bashing so as not to diminish the Now the goal of the infantry attack was a continuous
social scientist not the physicist - history therefore was soldiers innate tactical instincts. Liddell Hart’s application and progressive infiltration of the enemy position thereby
his laboratory. His central idea was the Man-in-The- of his Man-In-The-Dark theory into practical tactics, preserving the infantry as the decisive arm of the army.8
Dark theory of war that likens the functions of combat envisioned the ideal infantry battalion, company, or
to a blindfolded man attempting to hit or guard a blow platoon, resembling a human tank, comprising both The Future of Infantry
from an opponent. The Man-in-The-Dark had to seek offensive power and protective armour. Its offensive The Infantry’s ability to move throughout every locality
his enemy, find his way to a vulnerable spot, fix his foe power rested in its arms, legs, and its weapons and and fire from every position remains the foundation
in place, and deliver the knockout blow, then move to manoeuvring power. The protective armour was stone of the infantry’s value and no doubt an important
exploit his success. Particular emphasis was given to represented by the use of open formations, such as a reason for its continued existence as a viable combat
the act of fixing his opponent before delivering the diamond or square, which prevents more than one of arm. Liddell Hart understood this more than most, but Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart by Bassano
decisive blow. the sub-units being surprised by the enemy, and so like all soldiers he was a man of his time, framed by whole-plate glass negative, 17 January 1927.
Given by Bassano & Vandyk Studios, 1974, National
His second major theory was, The Expanding affords time for the remainder to manoeuvre to take the his experience and at times imprisoned by it. However, Portrait Gallery Photographs Collection, NPG x19202
Torrent system of attack, which was an attempt to enemy in flank. he strove to look beyond the blinkers of his experience
develop a systematic way for his reorganized tactical In contrast to the German infiltration tactics of 1918, (sometimes unsuccessfully) and look into the future. cavalry minded general, that the army’s former methods
4
In this he was assisted units to carry out continuous progressive infiltration. which were predicated on the combination of the initial Added to all this experience was the weight of were inapplicable and wasteful of force under modern
by perhaps the premier
trainer of Infantry of Early in the development of this idea he stressed the special storm troops or assault troops to disrupt and historical analysis which shows that groups of foot conditions. The outstanding change was the realization
his time General Ivor
Maxse & the main
importance of initiative on the part of subordinate follow on conventional infantry to echelon through to soldiers remain to this day among the most powerful that the force of an attack does not increase in
champion of the leaders in terms similar to those used to describe the clear sectors of advance, Liddell Hart’s scheme combined and influential forces on the battlefield. An important proportion to the numbers of men thrown at it; that
armoured concept JPC
Fuller. German technique of Auftragstaktik.5 While continuing the two functions and assigned both to light role infantry corollary to this thesis, however, is that the overall progress can only be made by intelligent manoeuvre
5
‘Auftragstaktik’ - an
to insist that the attacker, at any level of command, units. His goal was a tactical procedure which could operational effectiveness of the infantry arm is of fire power, to a position of advantage.
obscure German should push reserves through at points of weakness be carried out simultaneously by several echelons of determined fundamentally by the performance of its
word related to an
approach to warfare, (known as soft spots) both to maintain the pressure on command acting as interdependent and subordinate smallest units and their leaders. To think of a division of The Revival of Infantry
nearly untranslatable
into English, difficult the enemy and to encircle enemy strongpoints. This new working parts of a vast machine.7 Speed of 30 companies, then, is to gain a clearer understanding The First World War proved to even the most
to explain, probably
even more difficult
theory recognized the need to secure the flanks of any advance was provided by each higher echelon exploiting of the fighting essence of infantry.9 Liddell Hart had just unimaginative of British Officers that increasing the
to comprehend. penetration, indeed to widen the breach simultaneously opportunities and gaps located by subordinate units. such an understanding and his basic building block was numbers beyond a certain density added nothing to the
Best exampled as
“The concept of in proportion as the penetration is deepened. Liddell The tactical battle was envisioned as a set of the section, the unit of command, which represented effectiveness of the attack or defence, but only resulted
Auftragstaktik or
“mission tactics”
Hart compared this process of progressive widening simultaneous encircling manoeuvres in which some the largest number of men who can be directly in greater casualties, not unlike the first day of the
… made it the to the wearing away of a channel by a swift torrent of sub-elements fixed enemy strong points by fire while controlled in action by a single leader. The section, Somme. Liddell Hart rightly foresaw the attack not as
responsibility of
each German officer water, hence the name, The Expanding Torrent. It is others moved through gaps between strong points to however, was viewed as incapable of tactical sub- series of dense lines of men armed with a bayonet, but
and NCO … to do
without question or important to note that in both the Man-in-The-Dark outflank or enfilade the enemy. With this picture in division, and therefore ... limited to frontal action. widely dispersed combat teams containing comparatively
doubt whatever the It was the platoon10 which was the combat unit, defined few men, but well equipped with the ability to bring Liddell Hart, B.H.,Ten
8

situation required, as Commandants of the

he personally saw it. Soldiers from 2 Royal Tank Regiment and 1st Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers take part in a Combined Arms as containing all the weapons with which infantry firepower (as well as smoke to cover the approach) to Combat Unit, RUSI
Omission and inactivity Demonstration Day at Copehill Down in order to enhance understanding of combined arms and tactical actions. Journal, 1919, p 293-4
were considered worse Photo Corporal Kellie Williams RLC Crown Copyright
can be armed without losing their essential the point of attack. The aim was to manoeuvre into a
than a wrong choice 9
English, John, A., On
of expedient. Even
mobility.11 position of advantage and find the enemy’s weakness. Infantry, Praeger, New
disobedience of orders Liddell Hart’s theory was based on the decisiveness Liddell Hart envisaged that, in any large action, the York, 1981, p xvii
was not inconsistent
with this philosophy.” of the attack being made with maximum force; this infantry section would be restricted to a definite sector 10
Since the 1920’s Pl/Sec
English, John, A., 1981, Battle Drills have been
On Infantry, Praeger, success was predicated upon the enemy already being of the front, at first sight; therefore, it will be confined to the bed rock of ‘low
New York fixed. Hence the manoeuvre body would not necessarily a purely frontal attack. But modern destructive weapons level doctrine’ http://
regimentalrogue.com/
6
Swain, pp 16-17 be the largest. In his vision it would be the last had forced a wide dispersion of the combatants on the misc/1928_Infantry_
Section_Leading.pdf
7
Liddell Hart, B.H., The straw which breaks the camel’s back that was battlefield; this dispersion rendered possible penetration
Soldier’s Pillar of Fire by Liddell Hart, B.H., Ten
11

Night, The Need for a

the great truth in his battle tactics. Infantry tactics in by the fire teams & sections between gaps in the enemy Commandants of the
Framework of Tactics, his view had been thrown into the melting pot by the defensive positions. It was the role of the section, Combat Unit, RUSI
Journal of the RUSI, Journal, LXIV, 1919,
LXVI, 1921, p 622. realization, forced upon even the most conservative platoon, and company commander in turn by exploiting p 288
24 BAR The British Army Review 158: Autumn 2013 BAR The British Army Review 158: Autumn 2013 25

these gaps to change their sector of the battle from a decisive arm of the tactical battle, and therefore still intelligently applied in accordance with the operations in the future.
mere bludgeon fight into manoeuvre battle, thus fulfilling had a significant role to play in any future war. His belief nature of the ground and the particular Rigid adherence to battle drills in training and with
the principle of economy of force by striking from an was that men on foot retained an offensive utility born tactical situation. There were many occasions the added expectation of the Auftragstaktik approach
unexpected direction against an unguarded spot. of a unique loco-mobility and a distinct tactical threat when unnecessary casualties resulted from on operations needs to complement each other and not
In the infantry attack he foresaw that the left that could not be duplicated by a machine.15 In his New poor leadership because junior leaders blindly be at odds.
forward platoon of a company might find or make a Model Army, he provided a vision of a balanced and followed a set drill and failed to apply it with The traditional set piece battle called for soldiers
12
The effective
application of
gap whilst the right platoon was held up. It would then much more mobile force of any army which existed common sense.24 to master their instinct for self-preservation and be
Auftragstaktik press straight ahead, whilst the company commander anywhere in 1920s or 1930s. Some of the details would willing to make whatever sacrifice was necessary to win.
is dependent on
individual willingness moved his manoeuvre platoons towards the gap. The change over the coming years as technology advanced Conclusion Massed in tight formations they advanced into withering
and capability to
apply unique solutions held-up platoon is still engaged with the enemy, when and as the conditions under which armies would have to What can the British Army learn from Liddell Hart’s defensive fire without flinching or making any evasive
when crises arise.
The readiness of
the company commander had passed through the gap. fight changed. But for all the improvement in antitank theories today? First it can steer away from turning efforts, regardless of potential consequences.
all ranks to depart He would, therefore, send one of his manoeuvre platoons weapons, communications, airframes and vehicle a deaf ear to those who would push against current However the adoption of defensive works, by their
from the plan once
it no longer supports forward to take over the frontage of the held-up platoon, design, and all their capabilities, his essential framework doctrinal norms. Second the Army must avoid falling very nature, promoted a very different psychological
the Commander’s
desired end-state is
and carry on the advance in its place. remained firm; his overarching principles lay at the heart into a manifested form of FOB25 induced myopia. The stance from the soldier and those behind these defensive
essential and must be Likewise the battalion commander would infiltrate of what he saw as the infantry in the military art. rays of enlightenment can easily be blacked out in an works were encouraged to take every precaution from
assumable by each
level of command. An his manoeuvre company through the gap made by an Liddell Hart’s vision also foresaw the adaptable era of financial constraint and we must avoid repeating unnecessary carelessness. Once the soldier became used
Army must accept that
continued teaching of advancing forward company to expand the front and force by arguing that all Regular infantry and the best the barren period of the 1930s both doctrinally as well to doing everything to promote survival behind defences,
unthinking obedience
to issued tasks is no
replace the forward company whose advance is checked Territorial Infantry units should be trained as elite light as economically. a new psychological model had been created that was
longer acceptable or delayed. Thus any gap will be progressively enlarged infantry, specially equipped and trained for their offensive There could therefore be real benefit to the Army, led instinctively carried over into the open battlefield. What
because it does not
support an evolution to and deepened on the initiative of each successively role. Their basic TTP16 would be the expanding torrent by the Director of Combat, in re-examining the training was done, could not be undone and the face of
Auftragstaktik, perhaps
best defined in English
higher commander. The battle tactics of infantry would system by which the infantry groups would create objectives and enabling objectives of our low-level battle had been irreversibly changed.26 Liddell Hart
as initiative in line therefore become automatic and depend less and less opportunities for the newly developed mounted arm to commanders in the section attack in line with recent understood this change more than most and did better
with the higher intent
defined end state. on fresh orders from superiors in the rear not unlike exploit.17 Liddell Hart’s Battle battalion would comprise 3 operational experience. The Army needs to ensure that than most to understand that as war moves on so must
13
This manifest itself the German Army employment of Auftragstaktik.12 Companies,18 an HQ element and around 500 men.19 At it continually reinvigorates small unit and low-level the soldier. His vision set down in numerous writings
in popular culture
with the likes of
Moreover, artificial geographical objectives would its heart was mobility, to be successful the battalion must commander tactical training and should seek to promote including the 1921 Infantry Training pamphlet still
Blackadder Goes Forth, therefore be restored to their right position as mere be able to move quickly against its foe and be able to initiative, decision-making and effective use of ground by resonates today. Much of his teaching can still be seen
& in literature with the
likes of Allan Clarke’s stepping stones in the advance. Each respective phase close with the enemy in the face of incoming fire. those under training at all levels. A renewal of this type ninety years on in the Platoon level pamphlets of today.
‘Donkeys’
of the attack, fixing and decisive manoeuvre would be Training the infantry for this New Model Army of training for the section in regards to tactics would The essential thread in all of these subjects is the goal,
14
Liddell Hart B.H., carried out against each successive resistance, whilst the should start with the individual at the tactical level reaffirm the validity of the Army’s recent operational implied or explicit, that war, when necessary, should be 22
Currently, the Infantry
Paris, Or the Future Battle School, Derring
of War, Truber & Co, expanding torrent would ensure that the momentum focusing on the use of ground and employment of experience, and ensure that our low-level commanders waged at the least possible cost. That was the essential Lines, Brecon.
London,1925, p 9
of the attack was not lost or delayed by the clearing of weapon systems. The parade ground ‘square bashing’ are prepared for Mission Command approach to idea to which Liddell Hart devoted his life’s work. 23
Liddell Hart’s views
Liddell Hart B.H.,The enemy defensive positions. could wait so as not to undermine the building up of were echoed by a
15

Next Great War, The certain extent by Battle

Royal Engineer Journal the soldier’s fieldcraft skills as the value was in the skill Drill foremost exponent
XXXVIII, 1924, p 98 Maj L Wigram, who
New Model Army of the individual fighter rather than the sheer weight also embraced the need
16
Tactics, Techniques & for infiltration, http://
Procedures.
The First World War had a profound effect on the of numbers.20 The infantry soldier is less of a technician Operation Tor Shezada (Black Prince) conducted by Combined Force Nad-e Ali (CF NDA) connection.ebscohost.
British social and military psyche which still casts a than a field craftsman. This is the title of honour to which to clear insurgents in Saidabad involved UK troops and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). com/c/articles/3864492/
17
Liddell Hart B.H., The Photo Corporal Gary Kendall RLC Crown Copyright lionel-wigram-battle-
Future of Infantry, Faber shadow to this day.13 The cost of the victory and the he should aspire in the profession of arms.21 drill-british-army-
& Faber, London, 1923, second-world-war.
p 49 depression of the interwar years produced a widespread The training of the infantry through battle drill has
disillusionment, which was reflected in the popular undoubtedly served us well since its inception in the Notes From Theatres
24

18
His major reason of War, No. 16, North
for keeping a culture with a wave of anti-militarism and pacifism. First World War. Indeed, its greatest value through the Africa November 1942-
Battalion small was May 1943; The War
that he foresaw Liddell Hart argued against this popular view stating various Battle Schools22 over the years has been instilling Office, October, 1943.
the cost of properly
equipping one to his
that war was an inevitable condition of human social dash and determination into our troops and low-level 25
Forward Operation
specifications would life, unlikely to disappear just because men of good commanders. The best results have always been obtained Base, the FOB myopia
be counterproductive. is not unlike the trench
Liddell Hart, The Future will wished it to do so. Therefore if war was inevitable, at platoon level and below with regards to battle drill, fixation post the Great
of Infantry, Faber & War (& the Redoubt
Faber, London, 1933, pacifism was not the solution. What was necessary was but training up to company level has also proved useful. fixation after the
p 47 intelligent preparation and intelligent conduct of those What Liddell Hart alluded to however, is that low level Crimea), you cannot
pass an Army Trg Area
19
24+47, Liddell Hart, wars which occurred, in order to limit the ravages and, commanders should not regard battle drill as a universal without coming across
The Future of Infantry, a myriad of FOBs
Faber & Faber, London, by scientific treatment, ensure the speedy and complete panacea23 to be applied in every situation.
1933, p 65-77 26
Nosworthy, Brent,
recovery of the patient.14 Battle drill training aims at teaching the Roll Call of Destiny,
20
Ibid, p 63 Liddell Hart’s treatment of the patient was to hold basic ‘strokes, and thus represents only the The Soldiers Eye View,
Perseus Books, New
21
Ibid, p 64 firm to the view that the infantry would remain the first rung in the ladder. The drills must be York, 2008, p230