SECTION 3, ART.

III, MORFE vs MUTUC 1

9. G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968 unconstitutional, such constitutional violation must be
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMELITO R. clear and categorical.
MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-
appellants. Same; Police power; Various definitions and scope.—By
FERNANDO, J.: its nature and scope, police power embraces the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
education, good order, safety, or the general welfare of
Constitutional law; Presumption of validity of a law
the people (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. City Mayor of
prevails in the absence of evidence to rebut the
Manila, supra). It is that inherent and plenary power in
contrary; Case at bar.—In the absence of a factual
the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
foundation, or evidence to rebut the presumption of
the comfort, safety and welfare of society. (Rubi v. Prov.
validity of a law, such presumption of validity must
Board, 39 Phil. 600). Earlier Philippine cases refer to
prevail (Ermita-Malate, etc. v. Mayor of Manila, L-24693,
police power as the power to promote the general
July 31, 19567). In the present case, where Section 7 of
welfare and public interest (U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85) ;
Republi c A ct No. 30 19 is being vi ewe d by the l ow er
to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as
constitutional, "insofar as it required periodical submittal
may promote public health, public morals, public safety
of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and
and the general welfare of each inhabitant (U.S. v.
liabilitie of an official or employee of the government
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218); to preserve publi c ord er an
after he had once submitted such a sworn statement
d to pr event of against the state and to establish for the
upon assuming office," there was likewise no factual
intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good
foundation on which the nullification of said section of
manner and good neighborhood calculated to prevent
the statute could be based. Hence, on this ground alone,
conflict of rights (U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245).
the decision of the lower court declaring
"unconstitutional, null and void Section 7 of Republic Act
Same; The Anti-Graft Law was enacted under the police
No. 3019" could be reversed.
power of the state to promote morality in public
service.—What is under consideration is a statute (Rep.
Same; When requirement that evidence be
Act No. 3019) enacted under the police power of the
presented to reverse the presumption of validity or
state to promote moralit in public service necessarily
constitutionality may not be rigidly insisted.—Where the
limited in scope to officialdom. May a public official
nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance is
claiming to be adversely affected rely on the due process
readily apparent and the threat to constitutional rights,
clause to annul such statute or any portion thereof ? The
especially those involving the freedom of the mind, is
answer must be in the affirmative. If the police power
present and ominous, there should not be a rigid
extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public
insistence on the requirement that evidence be
or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can
presented to reverse the presumption of
invoke the protection of due process which permits
constitutionality in civil liberty cases. If the liberty
depri vation of property or liberty as long as such
involved were f reedom of the mind or the person, the
requirement is observed.
standard f or the validity of government acts is much
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
Same; Security of tenure under the Constitution is
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
protected by due process clause.—While the soundness
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. In
of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and
short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it
as such not amounting to property in its usual sense
is freedom that commands a momentum of respect;
cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the
when property is imperilled, it is the lawmakers'
proposition that from the standpoint of the security of
judgment that commands respect.
tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of
protection afforded by due process could rightfully be
Same; To declare a law unconstitutional, the
invoked.
infringement of constitutional rights must be clear,
categorical, and undeniable.—While in the attainment of
Same; A public official may avail himself of the
public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is
constitutional guarantee of due process to strike down
permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical,
a law which infringes his liberty.—If as is so clearly held
and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns,
by this Court, due process may be relied upon by a
the statute allows. In other words, to declare a law
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 2
public official to protect the security of tenure which in including the statement of the amounts and sources of
that limited sense is analogous to property, could he not income, the amounts of personal and family expenses,
likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
strike down what he considers to be an infringement of preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional
his liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority, the intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
answer must be in the affirmative. Even a public official
has certain rights to freedom the government must Same; There is no violation of the guarantee against
respect. To the extent then, that there is a curtailment unreasonable search and seizure in the requirement of
thereof, it could only be permissible if the due process periodical submission of one's financial condition.—The
mandate is not disregarded. constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure does not give freedom from testimonial
Same; Restriction upon liberty is allowable as long as compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every man
due process is observed.—Is this provision for a is under obligatio n to g ive testim ony that obligation
periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and can be exacted only under judicial sanctions. Merely
liabilities after he had filed one upon assumption of because there may be the duty to make documents
office beyond the power of government to impose? available for litigation does not mean that police officers
Admittedly without the challenged provision, a public may forcibly or fraudulently obtain them.
officer would be free from such a requirement. To the
extent then that there is a compulsion to act in a certain Same; The question of alleged infringement of the
way. his liberty is affected. It cannot however be denied nonincriminatory clause can be raised only in actual
that under the Constitution, such a restriction is cases.—No person shall be compelled to be a witness
allowable as long as due process is observed. against himself (Art. III, Sec. 1, Clause 18, Phil. Const.).
This constitutional provision gives the accused immunity
Same; Standard of due process that freed the law from from any attempt by the prosecution to make easier its
the imputation of legal infirmity.—There is no task by coercing or intimidating him to f urnish the
controlling and precise definition of due process. It evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but only
furnishes though a standard to. which governmental if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, only if he f reely chooses to. Or he could remain silent,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. and the prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk.
What then is the standard of due process which must Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may be
exist both as a procedural and as a substantive requisite documentary. Neither then could the accused be
to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental ordered to write, when what comes f rom his pen may
action for that matter, from the imputation of legal constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. Moreover,
infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers or
to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter.
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and What the above provision seeks to prevent is
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. Necessarily
requirement, official action must not outrun the bounds then, the protection it affords will have to await the
of reason and result in sheer oppression. existence of actual cases, be they criminal, civil, or
administrative (Suarez v. Tengco, L-17113, May 23,
Same; The disclosure of information does not 1961). Prior to such stage, there is no pressing need to
infringe the right of a person to privacy.—It cannot be pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that
said that the challenged statutory provision calls for there is an infringement of the non-incrimination clause.
disclosure of information which infringes on the right of
a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational Same; Court does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
relationship such a requirement possesses with the justice or expediency of legislation.—This Court does
objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice, or
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to expediency of legislation (Angara v. Electoral
say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, Commission, 63 Phil. 139). It is not the province of the
is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the
emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further bounds of propriety and common sense. That is
compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities,
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 3
primarily and exclusively a legislative concern (People v. We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse
Carlos, 78 Phil. 535). the lower court.
___________________________________________________________
1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. For in this
Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and employees action for declaratory relief filed with the Court of First
from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the Instance of Pangasinan on January 31, 1962, plaintiff,
tone of morality in public service. It was declared to be after asserting his belief "that it was a reasonable
the state policy "in line with the principle that a public requirement for employment that a public officer make
office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft office and thereby make it possible thereafter to
or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 2 Nor determine whether, after assuming his position in the
was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such a grave public service, he accumulated assets grossly
problem in the public service that unfortunately has disproportionate to his reported incomes, the herein
afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An earlier plaintiff [having] filed within the period of time fixed in
statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any the aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the
property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any prescribed sworn statement of financial condition,
public officer or employee. 3 assets, income and liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the
provision on the "periodical filing of sworn statement of
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and financial condition, assets, income and liabilities after an
Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, officer or employee had once bared his financial
either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his condition, upon assumption of office, is oppressive and
assumption of office "and within the month of January unconstitutional." 6
of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and
the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true the assurance of the privacy of the individual as may be
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, inferred from the prohibition against unreasonable
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his search and seizure and self-incrimination were relied
income, the amounts of his personal and family upon. There was also the allegation that the above
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the requirement amounts to "an insult to the personal
next preceding calendar: . . ." 4 integrity and official dignity" of public officials, premised
as it is "on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption"
In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical that they are "corrupt at heart" and unless thus
submission "within the month of January of every other restrained by this periodical submission of the
year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and statements of "their financial condition, income, and
liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his expenses, they cannot be trusted to desist from
financial condition upon assumption of office was committing the corrupt practices defined. . . ." 7 It was
challenged for being violative of due process as an further asserted that there was no need for such a
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful provision as "the income tax law and the tax census law
invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in also require statements which can serve to determine
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure whether an officer or employee in this Republic has
construed together with the prohibition against self- enriched himself out of proportion to his reported
incrimination. The lower court in the decision appealed income." 8
from sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of
repute of a court of first instance. For it, such Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then
requirement of periodical submission of such sworn Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of Justice as
statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the defendants, where after practically admitting the facts
permissible limit of the police power and is thus alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion of law
offensive to the due process clause. and as one of the special affirmative defenses set forth:
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 4
"1. That when a government official, like plaintiff, accepts Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed sufficiently
a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind
assumed the obligation to give information about his or the person, the standard for the validity of
personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting,
office but during the time he continues to discharge but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights
public trust. The private life of an employee cannot be of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure
segregated from his public life. . . ." 9 The answer likewise is wider."
denied that there was a violation of his constitutional
rights against self-incrimination as well as unreasonable Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for
search and seizure and maintained that "the provision of Reconsideration in the above case, we expressly
law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a
it impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of situation where the nullity of a statute, executive order,
his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat
to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest to constitutional rights, especially those involving the
or general welfare in honest and clean public service and freedom of the mind, present and ominous." 14 In such
is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power." 10 an event therefore, "there should not be a rigid
insistence on the requirement that evidence be
On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for presented." Also, in the same Resolution, Professor
judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all his Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when freedom of the
material allegations were admitted. Then on March 10, mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a
1962, an order was issued giving the parties thirty days momentum of respect; when property is imperiled, it is
within which to submit memoranda, but with or without the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This
them, the case was deemed submitted for decision the dual standard may not precisely reverse the
lower court being of the belief that "there is no question presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases,
of facts, . . . the defendants [having admitted] all the but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within
material allegations of the complaint." 11 the due process clause. 15

The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the 2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above
lower court declaring "unconstitutional, null and void requirement for a periodical submission of sworn
Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it required statement of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of
periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial liberty protected by the due process clause.
conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or
employee of the government after he had once Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of
submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 there is an
office; . . . ." 12 enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful in
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association penalized by existing law. They include persuading,
v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was the holding of this inducing, or influencing another public officer to
Court that in the absence of a factual foundation, the perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
lower court deciding the matter purely "on the pleadings regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or
and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity an offense in connection with the official duties of the
must prevail." In the present case likewise there was no latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
factual foundation on which the nullification of this influenced to commit such violation or offense;
section of the statute could be based. Hence as noted requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift,
the decision of the lower court could be reversed on that present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself, or for
ground. any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the government and any other
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity,
however, for as likewise made clear in the above Ermita- has to intervene under the law; requesting or receiving
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 5
directly or indirectly any gift, present, or other pecuniary After which come the prohibition on private individuals,
or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any 19 prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and prohibition on
person for whom the public officer, in any manner or Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this requirement
capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or of a statement of assets and liabilities, that portion
obtain, any Government permit or license, in requiring periodical submission being challenged here.
consideration for the help given or to be given; 22 The other sections of the Act deal with dismissal due
accepting or having any member of his family accept to unexplained wealth, reference being made to the
employment in a private enterprise which has pending previous statute, 23 penalties for violation, 24 the
official business with him during the pendency thereof vesting of original jurisdiction in the Court of First
or within one year after its termination; causing any Instance as the competent court, 25 the prescription of
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or offenses, 26 the prohibition against any resignation or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, retirement pending investigation, criminal or
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or pending a prosecution, 27 suspension
administrative or judicial functions through manifest and loss of benefits, 28 exception of unsolicited gifts or
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable presents of small or insignificant value as well as
negligence; neglecting or refusing, after due demand or recognition of legitimate practice of one's profession or
request, without sufficient justification, to act within a trade or occupation, 29 the separability clause, 30 and
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for its effectivity. 31
the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any
person interested in the matter some pecuniary or Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft
material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was precisely aimed
favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
favor of or discriminating against any other interested corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the
party; entering, on behalf of the Government, into any public service. It is intended to further promote morality
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly in public administration. A public office must indeed be
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal
officer profited or will profit thereby; having directly or to be pursued commands the assent of all. The
indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in any business, conditions then prevailing called for norms of such
contract or transaction in connection with which he character. The times demanded such a remedial device.
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity or in which
he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from The statute was framed with that end in view. It is
having any interests; becoming interested directly or comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and
indirectly, for personal gain, or having a material interest explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices
in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a were prohibited and penalized. More than that, an effort
board, panel or group of which he is a member, and was made, so evident from even a cursory perusal
which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. One such
votes against the same or does not participate in such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it becomes
action; approving or granting knowingly any license, much more difficult by those disposed to take
permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not advantage of their positions to commit acts of graft and
qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, corruption.
permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere
representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified While in the attainment of such public good, no
or entitled and divulging valuable information of a infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there
confidential character, acquired by his office or by him must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable,
on account of his official position to unauthorized that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows.
persons, or releasing such information in advance of its More specifically, since that is the only question raised,
authorized release date. 18 is that portion of the statute requiring periodical
submission of assets and liabilities, after an officer or
employee had previously done so upon assuming office,
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 6
so infected with infirmity that it cannot be upheld as What is under consideration is a statute enacted under
valid? the police power of the state to promote morality in
public service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom.
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid May a public official claiming to be adversely affected
exercise of the police power? In the aforesaid Ermita- rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or
Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a reaffirmation of its any portion thereof? The answer must be in the
nature and scope as embracing the power to prescribe affirmative. If the police power extends to regulatory
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, action affecting persons in public or private life, then
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the
It has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as protection of due process which permits deprivation of
"that inherent and plenary power in the state which property or liberty as long as such requirement is
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, observed.
safety and welfare of society." 34
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office
Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the is a public trust and as such not amounting to property
power to promote the general welfare and public in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no
interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation to persons and disputing the proposition that from the standpoint of
property as may promote public health, public morals, the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution
public safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant; the mantle of protection afforded by due process could
36 to preserve public order and to prevent offenses rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly held in Lacson
against the state and to establish for the intercourse of v. Romero, 42 in line with the then pertinent statutory
citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and provisions 43 that procedural due process in the form of
good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of an investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing
rights. 37 In his work on due process, Mott 38 stated that and an opportunity to defend himself must be observed
the term police power was first used by Chief Justice before a civil service officer or employee may be
Marshall. 39 removed. There was a reaffirmation of the view in even
stronger language when this Court through Justice
As currently in use both in Philippine and American Tuason in Lacson v. Roque 44 declared that even without
decisions then, police power legislation usually has express provision of law, "it is established by the great
reference to regulatory measures restraining either the weight of authority that the power of removal or
rights to property or liberty of private individuals. It is suspension for cause can not, except by clear statutory
undeniable however that one of its earliest definitions, authority, be exercised without notice and hearing."
valid then as well as now, given by Marshall's successor, Such is likewise the import of a statement from the then
Chief Justice Taney does not limit its scope to Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the
curtailment of rights whether of liberty or property of Court in Meneses v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the
private individuals. Thus: "But what are the police powers reinstatement directed in the decision appealed from
of a State? They are nothing more or less than the does not bar such appropriate administrative action as
powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the behaviour of petitioners herein may warrant, upon
the extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes compliance with the requirements of due process."
a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or to
establish courts of justice, or requiring certain To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending
instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce the mantle of the security of tenure provision to
within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same employees of government-owned or controlled
power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the corporations entrusted with governmental functions
power to govern men and things within the limits of its when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v. Montelibano,
domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley and Burdick were of 46 it stressed: "That safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of
a similar mind. 41 security that they would hold their office or employment
during good behavior and would not be dismissed
without justifiable cause to be determined in an
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 7
investigation, where an opportunity to be heard and be in the affirmative. Even a public official has certain
defend themselves in person or by counsel is afforded rights to freedom the government must respect. To the
them, would bring about such a desirable condition." extent then, that there is a curtailment thereof, it could
Reference was there made to promoting honesty and only be permissible if the due process mandate is not
efficiency through an assurance of stability in their disregarded.
employment relation. It was to be expected then that
through Justice Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule
Court could categorically affirm: "As the removal of and restraint the exception, the question raised cannot
petitioner was made without investigation and without just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine case, Rubi
cause, said removal is null and void. . . ." v. Provincial Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include
It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
of the applicability of due process guaranty to be personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Viña, 48 where the dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
opinion of Justice Endencia for the Court contained the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right
following unmistakable language: "Evidently, having of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
these facts in view, it cannot be pretended that the endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
constitutional provision of due process of law for the are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance
removal of the petitioner has not been complied with." with this case therefore, the rights of the citizens to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work
Then came this restatement of the principle from the where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus compelled to to pursue any avocation, are all deemed embraced in the
conclude that the positions formerly held by appellees concept of liberty. This Court in the same case, however,
were not primarily confidential in nature so as to make gave the warning that liberty as understood in
their terms of office co-terminal with the confidence democracies, is not license. Implied in the term is
reposed in them. The inevitable corollary is that restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
respondents-appellees, Leon Piñero, et al., were not greater good, the peace and order of society and the
subject to dismissal or removal, except for cause general well-being. No one can do exactly as he pleases.
specified by law and within due process. . . ." 49 In a still Every man must renounce unbridled license. In the
later decision, Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court, through words of Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty
Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality of the is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided
constitutional principle of due process cannot be by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of
allowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation" of an the individual."
employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from service —
without hearing — upon a doubtful assumption that he The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief
has admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil Service Justice Hughes, liberty in a social organization, 52
rules." Equally emphatic is this observation from the implying the absence of arbitrary restraint not immunity
same case: "A civil service employee should be heard from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed
before he is condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this in the interest of the community. 53 It was Linton's view
rule with such unrelenting grasp that by now it would that "to belong to a society is to sacrifice some measure
appear trite to make citations thereof." of individual liberty, no matter how slight the restraints
which the society consciously imposes." 54 The above
If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, statement from Linton however, should be understood
due process may be relied upon by public official to in the sense that liberty, in the interest of public health,
protect the security of tenure which in that limited sense public order or safety, of general welfare, in other words
is analogous to property, could he not likewise avail through the proper exercise of the police power, may be
himself of such constitutional guarantee to strike down regulated. The individual thought, as Justice Cardozo
what he considers to be an infringement of his liberty? pointed out, has still left a "domain of free activity that
Both on principle, reason and authority, the answer must cannot be touched by government or law at all, whether
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 8
the command is specially against him or generally of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and
against him and others." 55 oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public
officials and employees to file such sworn statement of
Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn assets and liabilities every two years after having done
statement of assets and liabilities after he had filed one so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not
upon assumption of office beyond the power of susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no
government to impose? Admittedly without the unconstitutional exercise of police power.
challenged provision, a public officer would be free from
such a requirement. To the extent then that there is a 4. The due process question touching on an alleged
compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way
It cannot be denied however that under the Constitution, in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the
such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is provision on the periodical submission of a sworn
observed. statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the
constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the
an observance of due process. That leads us to an inquiry constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
into its significance. "There is no controlling and precise from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The
to which governmental action should conform in order right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each freedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most
due process which must exist both as a procedural and comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
as substantive requisite to free the challenged civilized men." 58
ordinance, or any action for that matter, from the
imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does
It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, not likewise compel respect for his personality as a
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, unique individual whose claim to privacy and
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To interference demands respect. As Laski so very aptly
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation,
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is
sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those private, and the will built out of that experience personal
strivings for justice' and judges the act of officialdom of to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he
whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will of
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] others, he ceases to be master of himself. I cannot
traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a believe that a man no longer master of himself is in any
narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content real sense free." 59
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions
based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express
inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.' recognition of privacy, specifically that of
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly communication and correspondence which "shall be
or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." 56 inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or when
public safety and order" 60 may otherwise require, and
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to implicitly in the search and seizure clause, 61 and the
ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public liberty of abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such
service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call statutory requirement of further periodical submission
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 9
of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities deserves to system of limited government, safeguards a private
be further looked into. sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
In that respect the question is one of first impression, no can control. Protection of this private sector —
previous decision having been rendered by this Court. It protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of
is not so in the United States where, in the leading case the individual — has become increasingly important as
of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice Douglas, speaking modern society has developed. All the forces of a
for five members of the Court, stated: "Various technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy
association contained in the penumbra of the First and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of life marks the difference between a democratic and a
soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the totalitarian society." 66
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and said that the challenged statutory provision calls for
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The disclosure of information which infringes on the right of
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government relationship such a requirement possesses with the
may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the assent to an objection of such character. This is not to
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds,
deny or disparage others retained by the people." After is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to
referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further
64 Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities,
that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is including the statement of the amounts and sources of
a legitimate one." income, the amounts of personal and family expenses,
and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional
which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional
invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; 5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that
rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone insofar as the challenged provision requires the
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial
guarantees." 65 It has wider implications though. The condition, it would be violative of the guarantees against
constitutional right to privacy has come into its unreasonable search and seizure and against self-
own.1äwphï1.ñët incrimination?

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States.
such is accorded recognition independently of its 67 In that case, petitioner Davis was convicted under an
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of information charging him with unlawfully having in his
constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson possession a number of gasoline ration coupons
is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government representing so many gallons of gasoline, an offense
has always included the idea that governmental powers penalized under a 1940 statute. 68 He was convicted
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of both in the lower court and in the Circuit Court of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions Appeals over the objection that there was an unlawful
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and search which resulted in the seizure of the coupons and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his that their use at the trial was in violation of Supreme
life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a Court decisions. 69 In the District Court, there was a
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 10
finding that he consented to the search and seizure. The It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an
Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb that finding allegation that this statutory provision offends against
although expressed doubt concerning it, affirming the unreasonable search and seizure clause would be
however under the view that such seized coupons were futile and unavailing. This is the more so in the light of
properly introduced in evidence, the search and seizure the latest decision of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno, 73
being incidental to an arrest, and therefore reasonable where this Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, after
regardless of petitioner's consent. stressing that the constitutional requirements must be
strictly complied with, and that it would be "a legal
In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme heresy of the highest order" to convict anybody of a
Court, through Justice Douglas emphasized that the violation of certain statutes without reference to any of
Court was dealing in this case "not with private papers its determinate provisions delimited its scope as "one of
or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
never became the private property of the holder but Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity, of the domicile
remained at all times the property of the government and the privacy of communication and correspondence.
and subject to inspection and recall by it." 70 He made . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
it clear that the opinion was not to be understood as the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw
suggesting "that officers seeking to reclaim government the so-called general warrants.
property may proceed lawlessly and subject to no
restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the right to inspect It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee
under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general against unreasonable search and seizure has been
search of his papers for the purpose of learning whether shown to exist by such requirement of further periodical
he has any coupons subject to inspection and seizure. submission of one's financial condition as set forth in the
The nature of the coupons is important here merely as Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
indicating that the officers did not exceed the
permissible limits of persuasion in obtaining them." 71 Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater
plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation
True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice of the non-incrimination clause. According to the
Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy joined, critical of Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be a
what it considered "a process of devitalizing witness against himself." 74 This constitutional provision
interpretation" which in this particular case gave gives the accused immunity from any attempt by the
approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or
expressing the regret that the Court might be "in danger intimidating him to furnish the evidence necessary to
of forgetting what the Bill of Rights reflects experience convict. He may confess, but only if he voluntarily wills
with police excesses." it. He may admit certain facts but only if he freely
chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent, and the
Even this opinion, however, concerned that the prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search is not solely testimonial in character. It may be
and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonial documentary. Neither then could the accused be
compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every man ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may
is under obligation to give testimony. But that obligation constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover,
can be exacted only under judicial sanctions which are there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers or
deemed precious to Anglo-American civilization. Merely effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter.
because there may be the duty to make documents 78
available for litigation does not mean that police officers
may forcibly or fraudulently obtain them. This protection In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection
of the right to be let alone except under responsible based on the guaranty against self-incrimination is far
judicial compulsion is precisely what the Fourth from decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason
Amendment meant to express and to safeguard." 72 stated: "What the above inhibition seeks to [prevent] is
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts." 79
 SECTION 3, ART. III, MORFE vs MUTUC 11
Necessarily then, the protection it affords will have to to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override
await, in the language of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom
existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or of the law." 85
administrative." 80 Prior to such a stage, there is no
pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion
sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the non- in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 86 that only
incrimination clause. What was said in an American State congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of
decision is of relevance. In that case, a statutory the action taken may be the basis for declaring a statute
provision requiring any person operating a motor invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
vehicle, who knows that injury has been caused a person separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the
or property, to stop and give his name, residence, and respective authority of each department and confined its
his license number to the injured party or to a police jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
officer was sustained against the contention that the intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a
information thus exacted may be used as evidence to matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
establish his connection with the injury and therefore judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence
compels him to incriminate himself. As was stated in the to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender
opinion: "If the law which exacts this information is should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants
invalid, because such information, although in itself no submit their controversy precisely to maintain
evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
crime against the informant, then all police regulations prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the
which involve identification may be questioned on the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
same ground. We are not aware of any constitutional objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom
provision designed to protect a man's conduct from cannot be sustained.
judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But,
even if a constitutional right be involved, it is not WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19,
necessary to invalidate the statute to secure its 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and void Section
protection. If, in this particular case, the constitutional 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it requires periodical
privilege justified the refusal to give the information submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions,
exacted by the statute, that question can be raised in the assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the
defense to the pending prosecution. Whether it would government after he had once submitted such a sworn
avail, we are not called upon to decide in this statement . . . is reversed." Without costs.
proceeding." 81

6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the

allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its
face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being
unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the
language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not
the province of the courts to supervise legislation and
keep it within the bounds of propriety and common
sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern." 83 There can be no possible objection then to
the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws
do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts
merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether
or not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they, according