EN BANC

[G.R. No. 83767. October 27, 1988.]

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D.

ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE
G. ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G.
JALOSJOS, EVA R. ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY,
VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F.
OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M. PAREDES, JR.,
VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO,
and FERNANDO R. VELOSO , petitioners, vs. THE SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL , respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO

ITS RULES (SEC. 24), NOT FEASIBLE. — The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's
Rules (Section 24) — requiring the concurrence of ve (5) members for the adoption of
resolutions of whatever nature — is a proviso that where more than four (4) members
are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three
(3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to t the situation created by the petition for
disquali cation, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the
contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disquali cation is not sought. We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the
suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that
in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPIRIT BEHIND THE PROPORTION OF SENATORS TO JUSTICES AS
MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL. — It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a
Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election,
returns and quali cations of Senators. Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the
fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 — an unmistakable indication that the "legislative
component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial
election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPOSED MASS DISQUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS SHOULD NOT
BE COUNTENANCED; REASONS. — The proposed mass disquali cation, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators. To our mind, this is the overriding
consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public
interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental
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 law. Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of
Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI DOES NOT LIE;
TRIBUNAL DID NOT ACT WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — The charge that the
respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents
referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and
principle in dismissing the petition for disquali cation or inhibition led by herein
petitioners.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring :
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI NOT THE PROPER
REMEDY. — Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET
Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the three (3)
Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute more than a
bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the considerations of public policy and fair play
raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted concerning the mixed
"judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral Tribunals would appear to be
substantially met and served. This denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached
and not compelled by certiorari.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO , J : p

This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying,
respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disquali cation or Inhibition and their Motion
for Reconsideration thereafter filed.LLphil

On October 9, 1987, the petitioners led before the respondent Tribunal an

election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was
at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators,
namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres
R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A.
Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but
including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal
replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned
as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) led with the respondent Tribunal a
Motion for Disquali cation or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the
hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are
interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V.
Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had led a Petition to Recuse and
later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on
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 essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the
same contest, thereafter led his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the
motion for disquali cation or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also led and
oral arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards
issuing the Resolutions now complained of. Cdpr

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from
participating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent Tribunal in both SET
Case No. 002-87 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest led by
Augusto S. Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative
respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the
norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disquali cation
sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the foundation of
the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and
constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's
Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of
the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) — requiring the
concurrence of ve (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —
is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disquali ed, the remaining
members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice,
and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to
t the situation created by the petition for disquali cation, this would, in the context of
that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would
remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither
unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most
fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and quali cations of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman."

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by

both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components commonly share the
duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
quali cations of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this
proposition when it held that said provision ". . . is a clear expression of an intent that all
(such) contests . . . shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators')
peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of course, is that the
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 constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process
of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of
Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2
to 1 — an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. prcd

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any

Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without
inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disquali cation, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the
performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the rst of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all 24 Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at
stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
disquali cation may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their
trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of
the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively. LexLib

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of
Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its
disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it
acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disquali cation or
inhibition led by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. prLL

SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., took no part.

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 Separate Opinion
FELICIANO, J ., concurring :

I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his opinion for the
Court. I would merely like to carry forward however slightly the analysis found in the
penultimate paragraph of his opinion.
Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET
Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the three (3)
Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute more than a
bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the considerations of public policy and fair play
raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted concerning the mixed
"judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral Tribunals would appear to be
substantially met and served. This denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached
and not compelled by certiorari. LLjur

Footnotes
1. Page 2, Resolution of public respondent Tribunal of May 27, 1988; p. 25, Rollo.

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