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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN
ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E,
KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196305

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,

vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197221

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197280

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS
NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as
Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.

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 x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197282

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197392

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197454

JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271;
(b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante
ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng
Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R.
No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order
(TRO) is still existing and effective.

These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act
(RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional
elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second
Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected
officials.

The Motions for Reconsideration

The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of their motion:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL
ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.

II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.

III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT (R.A. 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE
LAWS.

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 IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.]1

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:

I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE

CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B) THE ARMM IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE,
POWERS AND AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN APART FROM
TRADITIONAL LGUs.

II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE AND
REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN ARMM INDUBITABLY
PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT
MOMENTARY OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND
MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY.

III. THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES NOT
EXTEND TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED WITH SUPERVISORY
POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE AWESOME POWER TO APPOINT AND
REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING ELECTIVE POSITIONS.

IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE HOLDOVER OF ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS
PENDING THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR SUCCESSORS.

V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF
OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC
ACTS.

VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF ¾ VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE
ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE LAW.

VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT

OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT UNDULY EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION.

VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS
NOT MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM,
AND THE ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN ANALOGOUS
CAUSE WARRANTING COMELEC’S HOLDING OF SPECIAL ELECTIONS.2 (italics supplied)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:

I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION SINE QUA
NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE.

THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE
1992 ELECTIONS AND TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.

IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE FRAMERS, AND APPLYING THE SAME TO
ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE
FOREMOST RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

xxxx

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 II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT RA 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WAS
COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED
PRECISELY TO AMEND RA 9054.

xxxx

III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE 2/3
VOTING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

xxxx

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A
PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY IN AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT.

xxxx

V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF

ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

xxxx

VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT
OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.3 (italics and underscoring supplied)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:

A.

ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH APPOINTMENT
OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE
OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO
A PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT
CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON
APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN "INTERIM MEASURE".

B.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs
FOR THE ARMM REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

C.

THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION,
AND BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER AN ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE
SOONEST POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM REGIONAL OFFICIALS
MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO. 9054.

D.

WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST
IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO SHALL
SERVE UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013 SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS.4

Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:

a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply to the ARMM elections;

b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican democracy which, by constitutional mandate,

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 guides the governance of the Republic;

c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from the
House of Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be ratified in a plebiscite;

d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold their offices even after their terms are over and
non-elective individuals getting into the vacant elective positions by appointment as OICs, the holdover option
is the better choice;

e) the President only has the power of supervision over autonomous regions, which does not include the
power to appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials; and

f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately from the national and local elections as this will
make it easier for the authorities to implement election laws.

In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:

(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local
elections?

(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?

(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?

(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?

(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of
ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?

(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory powers over
autonomous regions?

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the motions for lack of merit.

Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections

The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local
elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local
elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which state:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for
six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

xxxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

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 The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.

To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the discussions of the Constitutional
Commission:

MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will temporarily indicate as
Section 14. It reads: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL
OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF
JUNE 1992."

This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action taken by the
Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: "THE SENATORS,
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER
THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."

I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the
incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission
for Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next
election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently,
any synchronization of election which is once every three years.

So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should
not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete
their term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in
1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will
be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections
in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the local officials
and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three
years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the
President and another six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and
12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the
first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the
Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?

MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in
order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved — the first national and local officials
to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing.
That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years and continue
beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992,
the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12
shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we
shall have an election every three years.

So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections every
three years which was already approved by the body.

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 Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

xxxx

MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and Vice-
President in 1992.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials
with the election of the President?

MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision of
the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.

MR. GUINGONA. Yes.

MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the
municipal officials.5 (emphases and underscoring ours)

The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly – there was to be a single
election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers
were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective,
highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.

We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,6 where we unequivocally stated that "the
Constitution has mandated synchronized national and local elections."7 Despite the length and verbosity of their
motions, the petitioners have failed to convince us to deviate from this established ruling.

Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the
above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.

That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on
synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional
mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially
organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is
not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as
it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what
actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite
future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption,
a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be
progressive and not static.8

To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government," clearly shows the intention of the Constitution
to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article,
which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.

The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading
"Local Government" indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the
forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the "local governments," and does not make a
distinction between the "local government" and the "regional government," is particularly revealing, betraying as it
does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of

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 government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units,
still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments,
it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.

The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections,
the ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local elections.

In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever possible, the words used in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed."9 Applying this
principle to determine the scope of "local elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local," as understood in its
ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something
"that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision."
Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao,
fall within this definition.

To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not
enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.10

RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054

The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA No.
9054.

We cannot agree with their position.

A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections;11 it does not
provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM
elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or
revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA
No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.

We reiterate our previous observations:

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA
No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first
ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No.
8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM
elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not
amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections
would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the
date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not
among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a
plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with
this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied
in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.12 (emphases supplied)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no lacuna in RA No. 9054 as regards the date of
the subsequent ARMM elections. In his estimation, it can be implied from the provisions of RA No. 9054 that the

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 succeeding elections are to be held three years after the date of the first ARMM regional elections.

We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the court may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An
omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later
wisdom may recommend the inclusion.13 Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in
it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the omission.14
Providing for lapses within the law falls within the exclusive domain of the legislature, and courts, no matter how
well-meaning, have no authority to intrude into this clearly delineated space.

Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153
to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already established that the
supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 905415 is unconstitutional for violating
the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.

The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the
legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down
such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:16

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within
its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication
by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself
or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures
or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]

Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided
there is quorum.17 In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than
the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which
we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands
of, future legislatures.18

We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he stated:
"Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively
and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress’ amendatory powers. One Congress cannot
limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than
what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher vote
threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the Constitution."19

Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad

Similarly, we struck down the petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite requirement20 applies to all amendments of
RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.]" We
interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must
provide for in the Organic Act21 – require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.

The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with the plebiscite requirement is to
recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the people.

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 While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, we
disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No.
9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all
amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective, this would
lead to impractical and illogical results – hampering the ARMM’s progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws
that timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the
costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.

Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in giving the President the power to
appoint OICs to take the place of the elective officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic
structure of the government, and thus requires compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No.
9054.

Again, we disagree.

The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which reads:

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.

We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic structure of the ARMM regional government.
On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it
recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these
offices to "perform the functions pertaining to the said offices."

Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision

The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the
regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM
regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is
no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a
holdover capacity.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which provides:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:

Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years,
which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon
of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the autonomous region shall continue
in effect until their successors are elected and qualified.

The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have
already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term
limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit
elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to
extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for
local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.

Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One significant
difference between the present case and these past cases22 is that while these past cases all refer to elective

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 barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution,
the present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution.

Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely
Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.23

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to suppress
the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly
acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the
wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the
legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional
government which arise from the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.

COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections

Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently
empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the
COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.24 Although the
legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the
power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances
provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of the following provisions:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing,
whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a
date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension
of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any
of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on
the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases and
underscoring ours]

As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances
where elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of
unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous
circumstances.

In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.

More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no
authority to set a different election date.

Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this Court can compel the
COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order to

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 synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor
the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three years.

President’s authority to appoint OICs

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to appoint pertains only to appointive positions
and cannot extend to positions held by elective officials.

The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature.25 Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935
Constitution provides:

(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads
of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest
the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [emphasis
ours]

The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is
the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are
enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is
empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing
for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the first group of
presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments, as made evident in the following
exchange:

MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after "captain" and x x x delete "and all" and
substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.

MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear
that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.26

The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.

The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint."27 The
second sentence acts as the "catch-all provision" for the President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact
that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature.28 The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is
further demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s power to appoint officials whose appointments are not
even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not
provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by
appointment.

Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s appointment power should be strictly construed

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 and must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.29 Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in
the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the President’s appointment power thus rests on clear
constitutional basis.

The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective
positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution,30 which merely grants the President the power of
supervision over autonomous regions.

This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s appointment power. There is no incompatibility between
the President’s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the
President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law."31 This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter
or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter."32

The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their
belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the
petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the
President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The provision states:

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are
replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the
President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are
more apparent than real.

RA No. 10153 as an interim measure

We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but within the context it was
enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to
synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to
postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM
with governance in the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008
and the assumption to office – twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the synchronized elections
on May 13, 2013.

In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address the problem
created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in
a holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next
ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his
appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the
vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already
established the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.

In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that
synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of reasonableness in
responding to the challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In other words, "given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability
of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the

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 choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as
allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for
Congress to make?"33

We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well
as the community’s choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the adoption of this measure is a
matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us. Moreover, the
implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim measure is comparable to the interim measures
traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President appoints officials holding elective offices upon the creation of
new local government units.

The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus
Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called
the Sangguniang Pampook).34

Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion dated December 21, 2011, question the
propriety of the appointment by the President of Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon Karon as acting
Vice Governor of the ARMM. They argue that since our previous decision was based on a close vote of 8-7, and
given the numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the President, in recognition of the principle of
judicial courtesy, should have refrained from implementing our decision until we have ruled with finality on this case.

We find the petitioners’ reasoning specious.

Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies only to lower courts in
instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper
for a lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical considerations.35 In other words, the principle of
"judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be
rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.36
Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President, who represents a co-equal branch of government.
To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which our whole system of
government is founded upon.

Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect
of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there is
concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the case,37 a
decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be
respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the voting, "the
probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be granted."38

Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues that
since motions for reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our October 18, 2011 decision in
the present case, the TRO we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective. He
further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our October 18, 2011 decision pending resolution of
the motions for reconsideration "borders on disrespect if not outright insolence"39 to this Court.

In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC,40 where the Court held that while it had already
issued a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and executory, and can also be the subject of
a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance,41 where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for
manifesting its intention to implement the decision of the Court, noting that the Court had not yet lifted the TRO
previously issued.42

We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a subject of a motion for reconsideration
filed to assail our decision. It does not follow, however, that the TRO remains effective until after we have issued a

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 final and executory decision, especially considering the clear wording of the dispositive portion of our October 18,
2011 decision, which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153
for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we
issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.43 (emphases ours)

In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and the present case. While it may be true that
Tolentino and the present case are similar in that, in both cases, the petitions assailing the challenged laws were
dismissed by the Court, an examination of the dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that the Court
did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case, we expressly lifted the TRO issued on
September 13, 2011. There is, therefore, no legal impediment to prevent the President from exercising his authority
1âwphi1

to appoint an acting ARMM Governor and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in RA No. 10153.

Conclusion

As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 presents in his motion,
that our Decision has virtually given the President the power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in the event that
the elections of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.

We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.

This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal circumstances which led to the enactment
of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to
grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent
ARMM elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special elections and shorten the
terms of elective local officials for less than three years.

Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
officials, there is no legal proscription which prevents these specific government officials from continuing in a
holdover capacity should some exigency require the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan
elections. Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and
UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

I reiterate my Dissenting Opinion I reiterate my Dissenting Opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I maintain my vote joining the dissent of Justice

Velasco DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

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 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN (On Official Leave)
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice

I maintain my dissent
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I join the Dissent of J. Carpio

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On Leave)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
On official leave.
**
On leave.
1
Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, p. 1221.
2
Id. at 1261-1263.
3
Id. at 1345-1383.
4
Id. at 1174-1175.
5
V Record of the Constitutional Commission, October 3, 1986, pp. 429-431.
6
G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417, and 100420, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750.
7
Id. at 762.
8
See Ruben, Statutory Construction, 5th ed., 2003, p. 435, citing Roman Cath. Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc.
v. Land Reg. Com., et al., 102 Phil. 596 (1957).
9
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 884 (2003).

10 Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 593,
citing Adasa v. Abalos, G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007, 516 SCRA 261, 280, and Philippine Free Press,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 510 Phil. 411, 433 (2005).

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 11
Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054 provides:

Section 7. First Regular Elections. — The first regular elections of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and members of the regional legislative assembly under this Organic Act shall be held
on the second Monday of September 2001. The Commission on Elections shall promulgate rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the conduct of said election.

The election of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) set forth in Republic Act
No. 8953 is hereby reset accordingly.

The funds for the holding of the ARMM elections shall be taken from the savings of the national
government or shall be provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
12
Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, pp. 1035-1037.
13
Ruben, supra note 8, at 74, citing Morales v. Subido, etc., 135 Phil. 346 (1968).
14
Id., citing People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950).
15
Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 provides: "Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this
Organic Act may be re-amended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3)
of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately."
16
32 Phil. 36, 49 (1915), citing Lewis' Southernland on Statutory Construction, section 244.
17
CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 16(2) states: "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide."
18
See The City of Davao v. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Davao City, 504 Phil. 543 (2005), citing 59
C.J., sec. 500, pp. 899-900.
19
Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, pp. 1084-1085.
20
Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 provides: "Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall
become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such
amendment or revision."
21
These include: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the region’s judicial system, i.e., the
special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and (c) the grant and extent of the
legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.
22
Adap v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 403; Sambarani v.
COMELEC, 481 Phil. 661 (2004); and Montesclaros v. Comelec, 433 Phil. 620 (2002).
23
Guekeko v. Santos, 76 Phil. 237 (1946).
24
See CONSTITUTION, Article IX(C), Section 2.
25
Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National Police Commission v. Hon. Alejandro S. Urro, in his
capacity as the new appointee vice herein petitioner Hon. Luis Mario M. General, National Police
Commission, and Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National Police Commission v. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, thru Executive Secretary Leandro Mendoza, in Her capacity as the appointing power,
Hon. Ronaldo V. Puno, in His capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and
as Ex-Officio Chairman of the National Police Commission and Hon. Eduardo U. Escueta, Alejandro S. Urro,
and Hon. Constancia P. de Guzman as the midnight appointee, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011.

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 26
II Record of the Constitutional Commission, July 31, 1986, p. 520.
27
CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 16.
28
Pimentel, Jr. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, 509 Phil. 567 (2005).
29
Id. at 573, citing Sarmiento III v. Commissioner Mison, 240 Phil. 505 (1987).
30
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed.
31
Bito-onon v. Hon. Yap Fernandez, 403 Phil. 693, 702 (2001), citing Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August
4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 141.
32
Drilon v. Lim, supra, at 140-141.
33
Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, pp. 1057-1058.
34
Section 35. Filling of vacancy. - Pending an election to fill a vacancy arising from any cause in the
Sangguniang Pampook, the vacancy shall be filled by the President, upon recommendation of the
Sangguniang Pampook: Provided, That the appointee shall come from the same province or sector of the
member being replaced.
35
Rep. of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), 525 Phil. 804 (2006).
36
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 387, 394 (1988).
37
Section 1(a), Rule 12 of the 2010 Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides: SECTION 1. Voting
requirements. – (a) All decisions and actions in Court en banc cases shall be made upon the concurrence of
the majority of the Members of the Court who actually took part in the deliberations on the issue or issues
involved and voted on them.
38
Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, p. 1440.
39
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, September 23, 1994, Minute Resolution.
40
G.R. Nos. 107854 and 108642, July 16, 1993, 224 SCRA 631.
41
G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873, and 115931, August 25,
1994, 235 SCRA 630.
42
The Court, in its Minute Resolution dated September 23, 1994, stated thus:

The Court calls the attention of respondents of the fact that the temporary restraining order issued on
June 30, 1994 was effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court. Although
the petitions in connection with which the TRO was issued were subsequently dismissed, the decision
is not yet final and the TRO previously issued has not been lifted xxx because the TRO in these cases
was expressly made effective until otherwise ordered by this Court. (Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, p. 1426;
emphasis ours.)
43
Rollo, G.R. No. 196271, p. 1067.

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