Cases To Digest

1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of
City of Manila, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-2756 August 26, 1949
J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners,

vs.
EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3054 August 26, 1949
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente,
vs.
EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3055 August 26, 1949
LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3056 August 26, 1949
ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated,
petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
L-2044
Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta and Araneta for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto
Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vico and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for
respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae.
L-2756
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.

Claro M. Recto as amici curiae.
L-3054
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Antonio
Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici
curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo also as amici
curiae.
L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R.
Navarro as amici curiae.
L-3056
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico and
Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
TUASON, J.:
Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately
on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our
view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the
objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R. No. L-3054
and case G. R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and
L-2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of the procedural matters since the
decision in the cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of the procedure
followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.
R. No. L-2821.) The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President
avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and
L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance
of Manila for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of
the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive
Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma.
Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and
the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both official
refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the
Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order
No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The
petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista
Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from
disbursing this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226,
which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the
hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio
Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from
disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the
petitioners do not press the point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case
chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has
ceased to have any force and effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and it is to
this question that we will presently address ourselves and devote greater attention. For the
purpose of this decision, only, the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and
any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary to that hypothesis should be
understood as having been made merely in furtherance of the main thesis.
Act No. 671 in full is as follows:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR

INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President
is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1
hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create
new subdivisions, branches, departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to
abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase,
reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or
otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the
national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he
may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts;
and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him
under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated
hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise
provide.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention
of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be
subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions
offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a
limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined
within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary,
3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the
Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order
to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an
emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L.
R., 937, 938.).
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view.
The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the
principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its
powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony
with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the
delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited,
indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency
may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact
the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the
Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly
that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall
them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its
powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law.
Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:
It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies at
the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope
that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to be
maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of
the delegate; . . . .
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4
stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect
until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding
the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules
and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National
Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no
idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assemble failed
to make a provision for this termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the
effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the
rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in
that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the
ones already annulled by the legislature.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in
the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies
operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying
each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended
while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not
be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the
President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner,
between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in
two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the
country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house
rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief
Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the
measure.
Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the
inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the
President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action
or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which
the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting,
which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did
not think that the report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress Act No. 671 would
lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for
the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making
laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, of as
unimportant, as the initial one.
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act

No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and
in the carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special
session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not
its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his
autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would
become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law
upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was
necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify
that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his
autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of
the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air
attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can easily be discerned in
this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon
with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than
this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an
abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law
so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived
under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes
of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its
duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have
indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional requirements and limitations, with
the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison
d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a
period ending with the conventing of that body.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became
inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders
Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of
Congress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we
think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session,
the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate."
(Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to legislate
is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the question as to
which department of government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the
law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency
terminated is not in issue. As a matter of fact, we have endeavored to find the will of the
National Assembly—call that will, an exercise of the police power or the war power — and,
once ascertained, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as
in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it is
insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and
may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts
have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no
pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as
those under review. we take it that the respondents, in sustaining the validity of these executive
orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former Commonwealth and on
no other source. To put it differently, the President's authority in this connection is purely
statutory, in no sense political or directly derived from the Constitution.
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular
session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive
indication that they were self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be
eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19,
1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of
the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the mind of the
lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and
regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations
necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of
their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted,
and easily foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the
President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to issue new
ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced
against the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to
Acts Nos. 600 and 620.
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether war, in law or
in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the original
belligerents are still raging, the elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress
new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of
them, was desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency
Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged
in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the
enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the
impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for
immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The
war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had
the National Assembly been in a position to operate.
After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation
of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its
defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of
men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they
share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal.
The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the
time, not expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United
States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific
functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department —
unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed
standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in
a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of
constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the
various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon
"to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this decision, may, we trust, also
serve to answer the vehement plea that for the good of the Nation, the President should retain
his extraordinary powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the
late war harass the Philippines.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid any possible
disruption and interruption in the normal operation of the Government, we have deemed it best
to depart in these cases from the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions, and
to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take effect fifteen days from the date of the
entry of final judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to
section 2 of Rule 35. No costs will be charged.
Ozaeta, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C. J., concurring:

I agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tuason, except on the points hereunder
discussed.
I believe, on the one hand, that the emergency power of the President had ceased not in May
1946, when Congress held its regular sessions, as Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria
maintain, but on June 9, 1945, when Congress convened in a special session to consider general
legislation. The emergency contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, is "total emergency"
which means the state of actual war involving the Philippines, with the impending invasion and
occupation of our country by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization and
paralyzation of the Government, principally, the impossibility for the National Assembly to act.
This was the only reason and justification for the total relinquishment of legislative power by
Congress in favor of the Chief Executive under Commonwealth Act No. 671. Such
relinquishment was total because the emergency was also total. Clearly, therefore, the inability
of Congress to act was the soul of the law, and the moment such inability ceased, the total
emergency also ceased and the law likewise ceased to validly exist. On June 9, 1945, the
Congress of the Philippines convened in a special session "to adopt such measures as may be
necessary to meet the existing emergency" and "for the purpose of considering general
legislation." I hold that from that date, June 9, 1945, Congress was able and ready to act on all
matters, and the emergency powers delegated to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671,
naturally ceased to exist.
Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had ceased in June 1945, I am
not prepared to hold that all executive orders issued thereafter under Commonwealth Act No.
671, are per se null and void. It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been
issued in good faith and with the best of intentions of three successive Presidents, and some of
them may have already produced extensive effects in the life of the nation. We have, for
instance, Executive Order No. 73, issued on November 12, 1945, appropriating the sum of
P6,750,000 for public works; Executive Order No. 86, issued on January 7, 1946, amending a
previous order regarding the organization of the Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89,
issued on January 1, 1946, reorganizing the Courts of First Instance; Executive Order No. 184,
issued on November 19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat hunger; and other executive
orders appropriating funds for other purposes. The consequences of a blanket nullification of
these executive orders will be unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that before
nullifying them, other important circumstances should be inquired into, as for instance, whether
or not they have been ratified by the Congress expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes
have already been accomplished entirely or partially, and in last instance, to what extent;
acquiescence of litigants; de facto officers; acts and contrast of parties acting in good faith; etc.
It is my opinion that each executive order must be viewed in the lights of its peculiar
circumstances, and, if necessary and possible, before nullifying it, precautionary measures
should be taken to avoid harm to public interest and innocent parties.
To illustrate the foregoing proposition of individual consideration of specific cases, shall go into
a brief discussion of the executive orders involved in the cases now before this Court. With
regard to Executive No. 225 on general appropriation, I hold that the court should not declare it
null and void till Congress may have an opportunity to provide a substitute measure for the
sustenance of government. This view is predicated upon the principle of absolute necessity. Till
Congress may pass a valid appropriation act our government cannot survive without the
executive order in question. It would be absurd for this court to declare the cessation of an
emergency, and by that same declaration permit, if not abet, the formation of another
emergency which would be inevitable if, by reason of lack of appropriation, government shall
cease to function. In such cases, when apparently the provisions of our laws and Constitution
seem inadequate, the courts must go deeper even than the very Magna Carta itself and find
solution in the basic principles of preservation of government and of national survival, which in
the last analysis, are the very reasons for the existence of a Constitution. In such extreme cases,
as can come from the present situation, it would be the height of judicial imprecision to
preserve the form of the constitution, and at the same time permit the disruption and cessation
of the government which that same constitution so intricately designed and firmly established.
Thus, in the remedy of an evil, we shall cause a far greater one.
It may be argued that the course of action I am taking is founded upon fear, fear that Congress
will again fail to act on the matter of appropriation, and it may be asserted that the members of
the Congress are presumed to be as patriotic as the members of this Court, if not more, and that,
therefore, we may rest assured that they will not fail to fulfill their duty. I admit this to be true,
and accordingly, I ask what is then the hurry and necessity for nullifying the executive order on
appropriation which we are sure will soon be substituted by a valid appropriation act? Why not
defer judgment and wait until the special session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it
clearly sees it? I can find no reason against this suggestion except, perhaps, a desire to assert
judicial supremacy in a case where judicial statemanship is more necessary.
It is also true that the possibility that Congress will again fail to provide funds for the operation
of the government is a remote possibility. But there is no harm in providing for all the
possibilities, both near and remote. If that remote possibility never comes, well and good,
nothing is lost and the situation is saved. However, if the remote possibility does come, and it is
not impossible, and we had already nullified the executive order on appropriation, how will the
government function and survive? On the other hand, if we defer judgment upon the nullity of
such executive order, and that remote possibility does come, we still have the saving lifeline of
that executive order which may, perhaps, be tolerated to save the country from chaos, until a
more proper and adequate remedy can be secured.
With regard to the executive order appropriating funds for the conduct of the coming elections,
I uphold the same view as in the foregoing, namely, not in abdicating the power of this court to
pass upon the validity of an executive order, but to defer judgment upon such an order until the
legislature may provide a substitute measure. The reason for this is, likewise, absolute
necessity. Without such Executive Order we may have not elections in November. Elections are
the very essence of popular government for the establishment and preservation of which, our
Constitution has been consecrated. To permit the unwarranted abolition or even suspension of
elections, will surely result either in the denial of popular representation or in the perpetuation
in power of those already in office. Either result is revolting to our system of government.
Briefly stated, I hold that this court should neither ratify nor nullify this executive order, but
should defer judgment in the same manner and for the same reasons stated above in connection
with the executive order on appropriations. The Court, in these cases, is confronted not only
with bare issues of law, but with actual anomalous situations pregnant with possible dangers to
the nation, and it is the duty of the Court, as a dispenser of justice, to find a solution that is both
legal and realistic.
With reference to Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses, and Executive
Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines, I agree that they must be
held null and void upon the reason stated by Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria and also
upon those stated by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Alex Reyes.
My vote, therefore, is that the petitions must be granted in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, G. R. No. L-
2044; Araneta vs. Angeles, G. R. No. L-2756 and Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.
R. No. L-3055, and that judgment must be deferred in Rodriguez vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas,
G. R. No. L-3054 and Barredo vs. The Commission on Election, G. R. No. L-3056.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason. I wish to add, however the following
observations: Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the legislative intent is to make
Commonwealth Act No. 671, effective during the existence of the emergency contemplated
therein and that it is within the exclusive province of the political departments to determine
whether said emergency continues or has ceased to exist, I am of the conviction that, in view of
the formal and unmistakable declarations of both the Congress and the President, said Act No.
671, should be held as having lost its force and effect.
It is important to remember that the kind of emergency expressly spoken of in the Act is a total
emergency resulting from war and that the Act was passed at a time (December 16, 1941) when
there was factually a state of war involving the Philippines.
In section 1 of Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948, it was categorically declared
by the Congress that "since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, but not so
with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and who have not received any relief
for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the emergency created by the last
war as regards these was sufferers being still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as
to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force in a modified form." The President, in
turn, in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the
Republic) faces today are incidental passing pains artificially created by seasonal partisanship,
very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains that follow the thunderclaps
not later than November 8 of this year."
We thus have a formal declaration on the part of the Congress that the emergency created by the
last war exists as regards only those debtors whose war damage claims have not been settled by
the United States Philippine War Damage Commission (section 2, Republic Act No. 342),
patently meaning that said emergency is, at most, a partial emergency. It is needless to point out
that only a small portion of the Philippine population are debtors and not all of those who are
debtors are war damage claimants.
We also have the solemn declaration on the part of the President that the emergencies faced by
the Republic are incidental emergencies artificially created by seasonal partisanship, clearly
meaning that such emergencies not only are not total but are not the result of war.
If the emergency is, as admitted by the Congress, not total and, as admitted by the President, not
the result of the war, Commonwealth Act No. 671 has lost its basis and cannot legally give rise
to the executive orders herein involved. Indeed, it is not pretended that said orders are intended
to meet any emergency growing out of the last war. Lack of a budget, an appropriation for the
elections, or an import control law, has been brought about by the inaction of the Congress
unaffected by the last war, and such emergency, if it may be called so, is not of the kind
contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671.
The government has for four years since liberation been normally functioning; election had
been regularly held; a national census had been taken; Congress had held regular and special
session; "people travel freely most everywhere and more quickly, by land, sea and air, to an
extent that was not hitherto enjoyed," and "business is more brisk than ever, goods are plentiful,
our people even in the remotest communities and barrios of the country are better dressed, their
diet has been immensely improved, and they look more healthy than they ever did" (President's
fifth monthly radio chat, March 15, 1949); and the sporadic depredations of the outlaws in
isolated areas of the country are but the last paroxysms of a dying movement (President's State-
of-the-Nation Message, January 24, 1949), — all these certainly negative the existence of any
real (much less total) emergency.
That the Congress had heretofore recognized the cessation of the emergency is conclusively
established by the fact that it had assumed the task of directly enacting, during its past sessions,
measures dealing with all the matters covered by the specific legislative powers conceded to the
President in Commonwealth Act No. 671. This is in line with the fundamental reason for the
approval of said Act, as may be gathered from the following statement of President Quezon:
"When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was
most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open
on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which
reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The
assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that under
the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war." (The Good Fight, pp. 204-
205.) When President Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly meant factual war, a
situation that existed at the time of the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Indeed, the dissenters admit that any delegated power directly exercised by the principal is
considered withdrawn from the agent. A cursory examination of Commonwealth Act No. 671
will show that the legislative function therein specified had been discharged by the Congress.
The following illustrates the powers delegated in the Act and the measures enacted by the
Congress itself covering each:
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 —
(a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments,
offices, agencies or instrumentalities:
Republic Act No. 333 —
An Act to establish the Capital of the Philippines and the permanent seat of the National
Government, to create a capital city planning commission, to appropriate funds for the
acquisition of private estates within the boundary limits of said city, and to authorize the
issuance of bonds of the National Government for the acquisition of private estates, for the
subdivision thereof, and for the construction of streets, bridges, waterworks, sewerage and other
municipal improvements in the capital City. (Approved, July 17, 1948.)
(b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the
order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Departments:
Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize within one year the different
Executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and their instrumentalities of the government,
including the corporations owned or controlled by it. (Approved, October 4, 1946.)
(c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of

government and to abolish any of those already existing:
Commonwealth Act No. 732 —
An Act to create the Department of Foreign Affairs and to authorize the President of the
Philippines to organize said department as well as the foreign service of the Republic of the
Philippines. (Approved, July 3, 1946.)
(d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative
character:
An Act appropriating the sum of five million pesos to enable the national housing commission
to resume its functions" (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
An Act to appropriate funds to continue the payment of Retirement gratuities or pensions under
existing laws. (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
(e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence:
An Act to amend Section One of the Republic Act numbered eighty-one providing a new time
limit for the waiver of, and/or extension of the period, within which to perform, accomplish or
comply with, any term, condition, or stipulation required of locators, holders, lessees, operators
of mining claims or concessions, and of water rights and timber concessions with the mining
industry and the condonation of mining, specific and real estate taxes, under certain terms and
conditions. (Approved, June 1, 1948.)
Ley No. 321 de la Republica —
Ley que eleva los derechos de transferencia de ganado mayor, enmendado al efecto el articulo
quinientos veintiochos del Codigo Administrativo Revisado. (Apobada, Junio 9, 1948.)
(f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of
proceeds thereof:
An Act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines . . . . (Section 87 [e] No. 7.) Approved,
June 15, 1948.)
An Act appropriating such sums as may from time to time be released by the Central Bank
representing excess monetary reserves, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to issue
bonds, certificates or other evidences of indebtedness covering such amounts. (Approved, June
15, 1948.)
An Act creating the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. (Section 2 [f].) (Approved, Oct. 29,
1946.)
(g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal government to incur in overdrafts for
the purposes that he may approve:
Various Appropriation Acts.
(h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments of debts:
Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948.
(i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill
its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
The powers included in this subdivision (i) are of course covered by hundreds of other acts
approved by the Congress which, it cannot be denied, all tend to "enable the Government to
fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Moreover, the withdrawal
of the greater and more important powers may be presumed to have carried the accessory and
less important powers.
There is no merit in the contention that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted by virtue of
the war powers of the Congress. As the Act itself expressly states, its basis is section 26 of
Article VI of the Constitution which merely authorizes delegation of legislative powers to the
President in times of war or other national emergency. The phrase "in times of war or other
national emergency" is solely indicative or descriptive of the occasions during which the
delegation may be extended and does not classify the act of delegating legislative functions as a
war power. It must be borne in mind that said section 26 is peculiar to our Constitution, with the
result that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cited on behalf of the
respondents, expounding the theory that the exercise by the President of his war powers granted
by the Congress cannot be interfered with by the courts, are not controlling. Particularly, the
case of Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883, in which the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court was written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, cannot apply, for the further reason that
it merely involved the power of deportation which, even in our jurisdiction, is recognized, it
being the rule here that the courts cannot control the right of the Chief Executive to determine
the existence or sufficiency of the facts justifying an order of deportation. Upon the other hand,
the war power of the President is separately covered by section 10, paragraph (2), of Article
VII, and that of the Congress by section 25.
Article VI, of the Constitution, which are not invoked for the passage of Commonwealth Act
No. 671.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:.
The majority opinion holds that Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21, 1947; Executive Order
No. 192 dated December 24, 1948; and Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 both dated June 15,
1949 were issued without authority of law and therefore illegal and of no legal force and effect.
I concur only in the result. Ordinarily, such concurrence without comment or explanation would
be sufficient and satisfactory. However, in view of the radical difference between the reasons
had and given by the majority in arriving at the result and those entertained by me, and
considering the transcendental importance of these cases, not only because of the vast amounts
of public funds and the rights of citizens affected but also of the principles of law involved, and
the fact that not only the force and the effect of a law (Commonwealth Act No. 671) but also the
legality and the force and effect of numerous executive orders issued by several Presidents
during a period of about three years, affecting as they do not only citizens, their interest and
their properties but also the different departments and offices of the Government, I deem it my
duty to set forth my views and the reasons in support of the same.
There is a claim made about lack of personality of some of the parties-petitioners particularly,
the petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056. Much could be said for and against that claim,
but I am willing to brush aside all defenses and technicalities on this point in order to be able to
consider and decide the more important question of the legality of the executive orders involved
and whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force.
The aforementioned executive orders were issued on the straight of and by virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671. The majority holds that Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to
have any force and effect on May 25, 1946 when Congress first convened in regular session
after liberation. In This, I disagree for I believe and hold that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is
still in force and in effect. But despite this view, I am not of the opinion that the executive
orders under consideration were issued without authority.
Starting with Executive Order No. 62, we find that it deals with and regulates houses and lot
rentals. If the legislature had not already acted and legislated on this matter since the
promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 671, this would be a proper field for Presidential
action. However, the legislature had already promulgated Commonwealth Act No. 689 and
Republic Act No. 66, regulating house rentals and, as late as the month of May, 1947, Congress
passed House Bill No. 978 further amending Commonwealth Act No. 689. In other words, in
thus acting, the Legislature had already shown its readiness and ability to legislate on this
matter, and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential legislation or regulation under the
powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Not only this, but in issuing rules and
regulations in the form of executive orders under his delegated powers, the Chief Executive
merely acts as an agent of the legislature, his principal which made the delegation. As such
agent, he cannot go against the policy and expressed desire of his principal.
There are radical differences between Commonwealth Act No. 689, Republic Act No. 66, and
House Bill No. 978 on one side and Executive Order No. 62 on the other. That was the reason
why President Roxas vetoed House Bill No. 978, believing in good faith that it would not solve
and remedy the problem of house rentals as explained by him in his communication to the
House of Representatives of June 21, 1947, setting forth his views on the bill. The President
may not and could not substitute his opinion however excellent or superior for that of the
legislature on matters of legislation when Congress has already acted and expressed its opinion
and desire on the matter.
With respect to Executive Order No. 192, it will be remembered that Congress passed
Commonwealth Act No. 728, approved on July 2, 1946, authorizing the President to regulate,
curtail, control, and prohibit the exportation of certain products, merchandise and materials.
Under said authority the President issued Executive Order No. 3 dated July 10, 1946, later
amending section 2 of said Executive Order by issuing Executive Order No. 23 dated
November 1, 1946, regulating the exportation of certain products, materials and merchandise.
The important thing to consider is that section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 728 provided that
the authority it granted to the President shall terminate on December 31, 1948, that is to say,
that after said date the Executive could no longer validly regulate exports under said law. The
President, however, overlooked or ignored said injunction and invoking his emergency powers
under Commonwealth Act No. 671, promulgated Executive Order No. 192 regulating exports,
to take effect on January 1, 1949. What was said with regard to Executive Order No. 62 is
applicable to the lack of authority of the Executive to promulgate Executive Order No. 192,
namely, that on this matter of export control, the legislature had already withdrawn it from the
jurisdiction of the Executive under his emergency powers after the enactment of
Commonwealth Act No. 728. Any Presidential power or authority on the subject of export
control was derived from said Act. Not only this, but when in section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 728 the legislature terminated the authority given the President to regulate and control
exports on December 31, 1948 and failed or refused to renew said authority, the inference or
conclusion and that after said date Congress deemed any presidential regulation on exports
unnecessary and inadvisable. Therefore, in promulgating Executive Order No. 192 the Chief
Executive acted not only without legislative authority but also against the wishes and policy of
Congress. This he may not validly do.
With respect to Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the considerations made with regard to
Executive Orders Nos. 62 and 192 are equally applicable. By previously enacting necessary
legislation on the yearly Government appropriation and on the appropriation of funds for the
expenses incurred in national elections, Congress has shown its readiness and ability to cope
with the financial problems of the Government on this point. Republic Act No. 80, approved
October 22, 1946, appropriating funds for the operation of National Government from July 1,
1946 to June 30, 1947; Republic Act No. 156 appropriating funds for the fiscal year 1947-48
and Republic Act No. 320, the appropriation law for the fiscal year 1948-49 show that Congress
was in a position and able to provide for the yearly expenditures of the Government. And
Republic Act No. 73 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray election expenses on March 11, 1947;
Republic Act No. 147 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray expenses for the election of
provincial city and municipal officials and eight senators held on November 11, 1947, and
Republic Act No. 235 appropriating P100,000 for the special elections held on March 23, 1948,
to fill vacancies in Representative District No. 4 of Iloilo and No. 1 of Leyte, demonstrated the
ability of the Congress to appropriate money for election purposes. By so doing Congress had
tacitly and impliedly withdrawn this portion of the field where the President may under his
emergency power legislate or promulgate rules and regulations.
In this connection, it may be stated that in my opinion, the theory underlying the delegation of
emergency powers to the under Commonwealth Act No. 671 and the similar laws is that the
legislature because of the emergency resulting from the war, would be unable to meet in order
to legislate or although able to meet, because of the emergency, the ordinary process of
legislation would be too slow and inadequate and could not cope with the emergency. So, as a
remedy, the power and authority of legislation are vested temporarily in the hands of one man,
the Chief Executive. But as regards Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the legislature has
demonstrated that not only it could meet but also it could legislate on this point of
appropriations by approving general appropriation laws for the different fiscal years since
liberation as well as appropriations for the necessary funds for the different national and
provincial elections. Consequently, there no longer was any necessity for Presidential
legislation in this regard. Moreover, and this is not unimportant, the failure of the Legislature to
pass an appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949-50 and a law appropriating funds for the
elections in November, 1949 was not due to any emergency resulting from the war,
contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671, but rather and possibly due to lack of time and
because of the rather abrupt and adjourning of the last session of the Legislature last May.
As already stated, the majority holds that Act No. 671 ceased to have force and effect on May
25, 1946. The other view is that it is still in force. To me this is the main and the more important
issue involved in these cases. In fact the argument of the parties centered on this point. The
importance of this issue may readily be appreciated when it is realized that on its determination
is based, not only the validity or nullity (according to the theory of the majority opinion), of the
four Executive Orders now under consideration, but also of all the Executive Orders
promulgated under authority of Commonwealth Act No. 671 after May 25, 1946, up to the
present time. Its determination will also decide whether or not the President may still exercise
his emergency powers in the future on matters and subjects not heretofore withdrawn by the
Legislature. Because of my disagreement with the majority on this point, I deem it necessary to
explain and elaborate on my reasons for my disagreement.
For purposes of reference and to facilitate the same, I am reproducing Commonwealth Act No.
671 in full as well as section 26, Article VI of the Constitution on which said Act is based:

SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorize, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the heads of Executive Departments;
(c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of
government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend
the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes to
increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of
bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize
the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that
he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments of
debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated
provide.
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry our a declared national policy. (Section 26, Article VI, Constitution.)
I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says:
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention
of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be
sub-served, and its relation to the Constitution. (Page 5, majority opinion.)
The main thesis of the majority is that the only reason for the delegation of legislative powers to
the Chief Executive under the Constitution, such as was done under Commonwealth Act No.
671 was because due to the emergency resulting from the war, the Legislature could not meet to
enact legislation; that the moment of Legislature could convene there would no longer be any
reason for the exercise by the President of emergency powers delegated to him; that if, when the
Legislature could meet and actually is in session, the President is allowed to exercise his
delegated legislative powers, there would be the serious anomaly of two legislative bodies
acting at the same time, namely, the Legislature and the Executive, "mutually nullifying each
other's action" ; that the limited period fixed in Commonwealth Act No. 671 for its life and
effectiveness as required by the Constitution is the interval from the passage of said Act and the
moment that Congress could convene, not in special session where its power of legislation is
limited by the Chief Executive in his call for special session, but in regular session where it
could be free to enact general legislation; and that unless this automatic ending or cessation of
Act No. 671 is so held, there would be need of another Act or legislation by the Congress to
repeal Act No. 671 in which case, the Chief Executive may by his veto power effectively block
any effort in this direction.
I beg to differ with the foregoing thesis. I believe that, as I already had occasion to state though
incidentally, the real reason for the delegation of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is
not only because the Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency but also because
although it could and does actually meet, whether in regular or special session, it is not in a
position and able to cope with the problems brought about by and arising from the emergency,
problems which require urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more quickly
and expeditiously than about one hundred members of the Legislature, especially when they are
divided into legislative chambers. That is why in times of emergency, much as we in
democratic countries dislike the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel
dictator, transportation dictator, civilian evacuation dictator, etc., where the functions which
ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a legislative body, are entrusted under certain
limitations to one single official or individual.
Supposing that during a national emergency and while the Legislature is in session, the
legislators woke up one morning to find that there was extreme scarcity of imported food, fuel,
building materials, equipment required in agriculture and industry, etc., because of a monopoly,
hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation, private controls and profiteering, or that there
were wide-spread lockouts and strikes paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or
rampant espionage or sabotage endangering the very life and security of the nation. How much
time would it take the legislature to enact the necessary legislation in order to cope with the
situation and pass the necessary emergency measures?
We are familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is introduced in the
Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding committee, it is studied by said committee, which
in some cases holds public hearings; the committee discusses the bill and sometimes introduces
amendments; if the bill is not killed in the committee or shelved, it is submitted to the chamber
for study, discussion and possible amendment by all the members; it is finally voted and if
approved, it is sent to the other house where it undergoes the same process; and if it is finally
approved by both houses of Congress, it is submitted to the Chief Executive for his study and
approval or veto. All these may consume weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily,
many bills finally approved by the Congress could be sent to the President for approval or veto
only after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not overlook the fact that in
some cases for lack of time of due to disagreement among the legislators or between the two
houses of Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation law for the
fiscal year 1949-50, appropriation of funds for the election to be held in November, 1949,
contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, involved in the present cases, and the
proposed amendment to the Election Code etc. have not been passed by Congress in its last
session ending last May, 1949, which session lasted one hundred days. If we were to rely on the
ordinary process of legislation to meet a national emergency, by the time the necessary and
needed law is passed, the situation sought to be remedied, or the problem sought to be solved
may have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond legislation or any remedy. It
would be too late. It would be like locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen.
Now, for some retrospect. The Philippine National Assembly delegated its legislative powers
because of the existence of a state of national emergency as early as the year 1939. During its
second special session of that year, it promulgated the following laws:
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 494, authorizing the President of the Philippines to suspend until
the time of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, either wholly
or partially and under such conditions as he may deem proper, the operation of Commonwealth
Act No. 444, commonly known as the Eight Hour Labor Law;
(b) Commonwealth Act No. 496, authorizing the President to take over, for use or operation by
the Government, any public service or enterprise and to pay just compensation in the manner to
be determined by him and to prescribe and promulgate regulations he may deem essential to
carry out the purposes of the Act;
(c) Commonwealth Act No. 498 declaring a state of national emergency due to a state of war
among several nations and as a measure to prevent scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious
speculations, profiteering, etc. affecting the supply, distribution movement of foods, clothing,
fuel, building materials, agricultural equiptments etc. authorized the President to purchase any
of the articles or commodities available for storage, for re-sale or distribution, to fix the
maximum selling price of said articles or commodities and to promulgated such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary; and
(d) Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President in view of the existence of a state of
national emergency to reduce the expenditures of the executive departments of the Government
by the suspension or abandonment of service, activities, or operations of no immediate
importance.
At the time, September, 1939 the second world war was only in Europe, quite far from the
Philippines and had just begun. There was then no likelihood of the Philippines being involved
in the war until more than two years later, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then
free to meet either in regular or special session to enact legislation to meet the emergency. In
fact, it met in regular session in January, 1941 lasting 100 days and in January, 1941 for another
regular session of 100 days, excluding the several special session held during those two years.
And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the President under section 26, Article II
of the Constitution. This is clear proof that, contrary to the theory of the majority opinion, the
Legislature delegated legislative powers to the President even when it could meet and it actually
met several times.
After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to the President, the
Assembly in its fourthly special session on August 19, 1940 repeated and reiterated this practice
and policy by passing Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive
powers to the President in spite of the fact that the war was still far away in Europe and there
was no danger or prospect of involving the Philippines, and the Legislature was still free to
meet as in fact it met again in regular session in January, 1941. During its regular session begun
that month and year, instead of stopping or ending the legislative powers delegated to the
President, because according to the theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature was able to
meet, the Assembly allowed them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act No. 620 which
merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that all this, far from
supporting the view of the majority that the Legislature delegated legislative powers to the
President only because it could not meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view.
Now, let us consider the theory of the majority that it would be a great anomaly to have two
legislative bodies, the Legislature and the President to be acting at the same time, each
nullifying the acts of the other. I fail to see the suggested anomaly. In fact, under the view and
interpretation given by the majority of the delegation of contemplated the simultaneous
functioning of the Legislature and the President, both exercising legislative powers. And it is a
fact that there were several instances of the legislature and the President both validly and
simultaneously exercising legislative powers.
Under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 496 already referred to, approved on September 30,
1939, the power delegated to the President to prescribe rules and regulations he may deem
essential to carry out the purposes of the Act, namely, the taking over of and operation by the
Government of any public service or enterprise and to pay for the same, was to last until the
date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly. This means that,
during the regular session of the Assembly which begun in January, 1940 and lasted 100 days,
the President could exercise the emergency powers delegated to him. Again, under
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 the President could and indeed he exercised his
emergency powers during the regular session of the Assembly which began in January, 1941,
when President Quezon issued at least nine Executive Orders numbered 321, 333, 335, 337,
339, 340, 342, 344 and 345.
The same thing obtains under Commonwealth Act 671. Since under the view of the majority the
emergency power of the President granted him in Commonwealth Act No. 671 ended only on
May 25, 1946, then the extensive legislative powers delegated to the President under that Act
could be exercised and in fact they were exercised during the five special session of Congress in
the year 1945, which lasted a total of 84 days. During those special session of 1945, President
Osmeña issued several Executive Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers.
Is there further proof needed to show that the suggested and feared anomaly and impropriety of
the Legislature and the Executive both exercising legislative functions simultaneously, is more
fancied than real? The situation was contemplated and expressly intended by the Legislature
itself, evidently believing that said condition or state of affairs was neither anomalous nor
improper. There is to my mind really no incompatibility. At such a time and during the period
of their simultaneous functioning, the Legislature may perform its ordinary legislative duties
taking its time to study, consider, amend and pass bills, reserving to the President matters
requiring and demanding immediate action.
After all, it is for the Legislature to say whether it wants the President to exercise his emergency
powers at the same time that it is in session. It may validly and properly stipulate in its grant of
emergency powers that they be exercised when the Legislature is not in session. In fact, in one
instance, in Commonwealth Act No. 500, section 2, the Notional Assembly expressly provided
"that the authority herein given shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is not in
session." When in its other acts of delegation, like Commonwealth Act 671, the Legislature not
only fails to stipulate this condition, but on the contrary, contemplates Presidential exercise of
legislative powers simultaneously with the Legislature, it is to be presumed that the Legislature
intended it and saw nothing improper or anomalous in it, and it is not for the Court to pass upon
the supposed impropriety or anomaly.
As to the possibility of the Chief Executive validly and successfully nullifying the acts of the
Legislature, to me that is quite remote, if not impossible. As already stated at the beginning of
this opinion, the Chief Executive acting as an agent of the Legislative under his emergency
powers, may not go against the wishes and policies of his principal. He can only carry out its
wishes and policies, and where his acts and orders run counter to those of the Legislature, or
operate on a field already withdrawn because the Legislature had already acted therein, his acts
or Executive Orders must give way and will be declared void and of no effect, by the Courts, as
we are doing with the Executive Orders involved in these cases.
With respect to the claim of the majority opinion that unless the emergency powers were made
to end at the time the President made his report to Congress when it convened, it would be
necessary to enact new legislation to repeal the act of delegation, in which case the period for
the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, and uncertain, contrary to the constitutional
provision, I may say that the President was authorized by Act 671 to exercise emergency
powers "during the existence of the emergency," and not a day longer. To me that is a limited
period in contemplation of the Constitution. There would be no need for a new law to repeal the
Act of delegation, for said Act is self-liquidating. The moment the emergency ceases, the law
itself automatically ceases to have force and effect, and the Presidential emergency powers also
end with it.
Under my view, had the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, which we feared
and expected in December, 1941 failed to materialize either because the invasion was repelled
or because the Japanese high command at the last moment decided to by-pass the Philippines
and divert his forces further south to invade, say Australia, or if the Pacific war had ended as we
all or most of us then expected it to end sooner within weeks or months after its commencement
and that the emergency resulting therefrom had also ceased soon thereafter, Commonwealth Act
No. 671 would have automatically ceased to have force and effect right in the year 1942
without any affirmative act or law of the Legislature. There would be no point or reason for the
President to continue exercising emergency powers when there no longer was any emergency.
But under the view of the majority, emergency or no emergency even if Congress could meet in
special session to enact general legislation, the country must continue to be ruled by the
Presidential decree until the next regular session of Congress which may not come till may
months later. In my opinion this is not logical. To me the real and only reason and test for the
continuance of the exercise of emergency powers is the continued existence of the emergency,
not the inability of the Congress to meet in regular session.
The majority, and the parties who initiated these proceedings in court fear that the President
may promulgate rules and regulations contrary in purpose and effect to legislation enacted by
the Legislature; that he may reenact his rules and regulations after being repealed by the
legislature, and that he may even veto a bill passed by Congress repealing the Act of delegation
and ending his emergency powers. It is a fear not well founded. It runs counter to the
presumption that the Chief Executive like any other public official would perform his functions
and conduct himself in every respect for the good and welfare of the people and in accordance
with the Constitution. It is fear based on the presumption that the Legislature and the Chief
Executive are at loggerheads, working at cross purposes and that the President though acting as
a mere agent of his principal, the legislature, would brazenly repudiate his principal and even
challenge its authority, and that the Chief Executive is so much in love with his emergency
powers that he would perpetuate them by going as far as vetoing an act of Congress ending said
emergency powers. Let it be said to the credit of and in justice to the different Chief Executives
who have wielded these emergency powers, President Quezon, Osmeña, Roxas and the present
incumbent President Quirino, that no accusing finger has ever been pointed at them, accusing or
even insinuating that they have abused their emergency powers or exercised them for any
purpose other than the welfare of the country, or that they had maliciously acted contrary to the
wishes of the Legislatures. Even after liberation there has been no claim not even from the
Legislatures itself, to the knowledge of this Court, at least to that of the undersigned, that any
Chief Executive exercised his delegated powers, knowing that they had ended or had abused the
same.
There is no charge or insinuation that any of the Executive Orders which we are now holding to
be invalid were issued from the ulterior motives or to further and favor the political interest of
the President issuing them. It is admitted in the majority opinion that Executive Order No. 62,
seeking to regulate house and lot rentals was issued in good faith by President Roxas. Executive
Order No. 192 was issued to regulate exports, President Quirino presumably believing that
exports at this time still needed regulation and control as was formerly provided by Congress in
its Act No. 728, and that the matter was still within the field of his emergency powers as was
also mistakenly believed by President Roxas in issuing Executive Order No. 52. As to
Executive Order No. 226, it merely appropriated funds to defray the expenses in connection
with the holding of the national elections in November, 1949, without which, said election
could not be held. With respect to Executive Order No. 225, it merely continues in force
Republic Act 320 which appropriated funds for the last fiscal year inasmuch as Congress had
failed to pass a General Appropriation Act for the operation of the National Government for the
period beginning July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. There is no insinuation that any political
motives or purposes are involved in these Executive Orders.
I agree with the majority that since the Constitution provides that the delegation of legislative
powers by the Legislature should be done for a limited period, it is to be presumed that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. I even agree to its
definition of the word "limited." But I submit that Commonwealth Act No. 671 itself, limited its
operation and effectiveness to and make it coextensive with the duration of the emergency
resulting from the war and that furthermore, that duration is a limited period within the meaning
and contemplation of the Constitution. Surely the emergency resulting from the war
contemplated by the National Assembly when it acted Act No. 671 is not permanent or
indefinite. It is of limited duration. It may be long or it may be short; but it cannot be for
always. It has an end. Presumably the members of the National Assembly thought that the
emergency would not last as long as it did. The belief entertained at the time by not a few, in
fact by a great portion of the people here not excluding the legislators, was that the war with
Japan would be of short duration, a question of months at the longest; that American
reinforcements would come at the beginning of the year 1942 and drive away the invading
Japanese armies if they ever were able to occupy the Philippines and that, consequently, the war
as far as these islands were concerned and the resulting emergency would soon pass away. The
wisdom or lack of wisdom of the National Assembly in limiting or rather making the life and
effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671 coextensive with the resulting emergency, viewed
in the light of what had actually happened, cannot be passed upon this Court. So, as I see it, so
long as the emergency resulting from the War continues, Commonwealth Act No. 671 subsists
and so long the Chief Executive retains his emergency powers.
The majority believes that as already stated, Act No. 671 was in force only until Congress could
meet resume its legislatives functions. Naturally, this view is based on the theory that legislative
functions in times of emergency are delegated only because of the inability of the Legislative
Department to meet and exercise its functions. I believe I have successfully demonstrated the
flaw in this theory, not only by showing that the real reason underlying the delegation of
legislative powers is not inability of Legislature to meet but rather it inability to consider and
pass legislation in time to meet an emergency which requires as it does urgent and immediate
action and can be solved only by the exercise of legislative functions by one single responsible
individual, unhamppered by study and prolonged discussion by many members of the
legislative body, but also by the fact that although since 1939 when the second world war broke
out in Europe and for a period of more than two years thereafter, when the National Assembly
could still meet and in fact convened on several occasions and for hundreds of days in regular
and special session, nevertheless, it had been delegating legislative powers to the President.
The majority view finds no support in the law. Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution does
not impose this condition or requirement. The only important conditions imposed by the
Constitution are that there be a national emergency and delegation be for a limited period. The
same thing is true with Act No. 671 which makes the delegation. The only condition imposed
by section 2 of said Act is that the delegated powers be exercised during the emergency. Neither
in the Constitution nor in Commonwealth Act No. 671 is there any hint or insinuation, much
less express mention about the inability of the Legislature to meet. When every consideration
for clearness and for Executive and Judicial guidance loudly called for and demanded an
unequivocal and clear expression of Constitutional and legislative intent, both laws, the source
and basis of the emergency powers are conspicuously silent on this point. The only conclusion
is that neither the framers of the Constitution nor the members of the National Assembly had
thought of much less intended to impose this condition. To sustain the majority view would
require reading into the law what is not there. In further support of its view that emergency
powers may be exercised by the President only until the Legislature could meet, the majority
finds comfort in and cites section 3 of Act 671 which reads as follows:
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated by him under
the powers herein granted.
I fail to see anything in said section that warrants a holding that upon filing his report with
Congress, about the rules and regulation promulgated by him under his emergency powers
under Commonwealth Act 671, his emergency powers automatically ceased. I could well
imagine that under an act of delegation of legislative powers where the President is authorized
to perform one single act such as the suspension of the eight-hour labor law under
Commonwealth Act No. 494, or the reduction of the expenditures of the executive departments
of the National Government by the suspension or abandonment of services, activities or
operations of no immediate necessity under Commonwealth Act No. 500, when the President
has exercised his delegated authority and made his report to the Assembly as required by said
laws, the latter, as well as his delegated authority thereunder automatically ceased, for the
simple reason that nothing remains to be performed or done. However, treating of the grant of
extensive emergency powers as was done under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671
where said laws contemplated many different acts, rules and regulations of varied categories
and objectives and to be performed not at one at time or instance but at different times during
the existence of the emergency, as the need or occasion arose, there is no reason for the belief or
the holding that upon submitting a partial report, the whole law making the delegation including
his powers under it automatically ended. The legislature during the emergency might be able to
convene and naturally, the President will immediately make his report to it of the rules and
regulations promulgated by him up to that time; but if the emergency continued or even became
more serious, would it be reasonable to hold that his emergency powers ended right then and
there? Would it not be more logical and reasonable to believe that inasmuch as the grant and the
exercise of his emergency powers were motivated by and based upon the existence of the
emergency and since the emergency continued his work and responsibility were not ended and
that his partial report could not possibly affect the continuance of his emergency powers?
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 provides for the filing of a report with Congress by
the President as soon as that body convened. According to the majority opinion on that date the
whole Act No. 671 ceased to have force and effect. Under that theory, as soon as the Congress
convened in June, 1945, and it is to be presumed that President Osmeña, complying with his
duty, must have made his report of all the numerous Executive Orders he had issued so far,
perhaps including those issued by his predecessor President Quezon who because of his
premature death was unable to report his acts to Congress, the President automatically lost his
emergency powers. But the majority opinion qualifies this convening of the Congress, for it
says that it must be a regular session and not a special session, thereby extending the life of
Commonwealth act No. 671 one year longer, to May, 1946 when Congress held its first regular
session after liberation. I do not quite see the necessity or the reason for the distinction made
between the special and regular session, for at both sessions Congress could well receive the
report of the President. The reason given is that "in a special session Congress may consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." But as a matter of
fact, the first two special sessions called by President Osmeña in 1945, after liberation, each for
a period of thirty days were both to consider general legislation. So, actually there is no reason
for the distinction.
Furthermore, if it were the intention of the Legislature to fix the time at which Commonwealth
Act No. 671 would cease in its operation as of the date when the President could file his report
before Congress when it first convened not in special session but in regular session, it would
have expressly and unequivocally said so. In its other acts of delegation of powers when the
legislature wanted to have the report of the President at its regular session, it expressly and
explicitly said so. In section 3 of Commonwealth Act 494, in section 5 of Commonwealth Act
496, in section 6 of Commonwealth Act 498, in section 3 of Commonwealth Act 500 and in
section 4 of Commonwealth Act 600, the National Assembly provided that the President shall
report to the National Assembly within ten days after the opening of the next regular session of
the said Assembly of whatever acts have been taken by him under the authority of those Acts.
The Assembly left nothing for interpretation or speculation. In section 3 of Commonwealth Act
671, however, the same Assembly has not specified the kind of session before which the
President should make his report. It merely said that upon the convening of the Congress the
President shall report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him. We should make
no distinction where the law makes or calls for none. Here again, to support the majority
opinion would require reading into the law, section 3 of Act 671, something that is not there.
In case like the present where there is room for doubt as to whether or not Commonwealth Act
No. 671 has ceased to operate, one view (of the majority) being that it automatically ceased to
have any force and effect on May 25, 1946, the other view being that the law operated as long
as the emergency resulting from the war existed, the opinion of and the obvious interpretation
given by the legislature which enacted the law and made the delegation of powers and the
President to whom the delegation was made and who exercised said powers, should have much
if not decisive weight. We must bear in mind that we are not passing upon the validity or
constitutionality of a law enacted by the Legislature, in which case, the Court may find the act
invalid and unconstitutional if it is in violation of the basic law, regardless of the opinion or
interpretation given by the Legislature that passed it or of the Executive Department which may
be trying to enforce it. We assume that Act No. 671 is valid and constitutional. Here, we are
merely trying to ascertain the intention of the National Assembly as to the life and period of
effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Do the study and analysis of other acts of the Legislature similar to Commonwealth Act 671,
favor the view of the majority? The answer in my opinion is clearly and decidedly in the
negative. The majority cites the Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 to support the theory
that Commonwealth Act 671 automatically ceased to operate Congress met at its next regular
session. But the logical inference or conclusion to be drawn from these two acts is, in my
opinion, just the reverse. It is even fatal to the view of the majority as I shall attempt to show.
Let us consider Commonwealth Act 600 delegating extensive legislative powers to the
President, approved on August 19, 1940, which like Act 671 is silent as to any express
provision regarding its life or period of effectiveness, and as to how long the emergency powers
granted the President by it will last. Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 600 like section 3
of Act 671 provides that "the President shall within the first ten days from the date of the
opening of the Assembly's next regular session report to said Assembly whatever action he had
taken under the authority therein granted." Said section 4 of Act 600 is clearly and more
specific than section 3 of Act 671 in that it clearly specifies the next regular session whereas the
latter refers merely to the convening of Congress. But let us assume arguendo as contended by
the majority that "the convening of the Congress" mentioned in section 3 of Commonwealth
Act 671, referred to regular session. According to the majority opinion, under section 4 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as soon as the President made the report of the National
Assembly at its "next regular session" which was to be and was actually held in January, 1941,
Commonwealth Act 600 automatically ceased to operate and the President automatically lost
his delegated legislative powers. But this contrary to the very view of the National Assembly
which passed said Act 600. Commonwealth Act No. 620 of the National Assembly passed
during that "next regular session" and approved on June 6, 1941 merely amended section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 600, which enumerated the powers delegated to the Chief Executive. It left
the rest of the provisions and sections of Commonwealth Act 600 intact. So that, under section
4 (which was left intact) of Act 600, the President was still required to report to National
Assembly within the first 10 days from the date of the opening of its next regular session which
should have begun in January, 1942, despite the fact that he had already made a report to the
Legislature in January, 1941. Incidentally, this answer and refutes the contention of the majority
that the law of delegation of powers contemplated only one meeting of the Congress at which
the President was to report his acts of emergency, and that said report was to be the first and the
last.
Now, what inference may be drawn from this amending of section 1 only of Commonwealth
Act No. 600 by Commonwealth Act No. 620? The logical conclusion is that in promulgating
Commonwealth Act 620 on June 6, 1941, the National Assembly all along regarded
Commonwealth Act No. 600 which delegated legislative powers to the President as still in force
and effect despite the report filed with the Assembly by the President at the beginning of its
regular session in January, 1941. When the Legislature merely amends a section of a law,
leaving the rest of said law intact and unchanged, the logical inference and conclusion is that
the amended law was still in force because you cannot amend a law which is no longer in force.
The only thing that could be done with a law that has ceased to operate is to reenact it. But in
passing Commonwealth Act 620 in July, 1941, the Assembly did not reenacted Commonwealth
Act No. 600. By merely amending one of its sections, the Assembly, as late as June 1941,
considered said Act 600 as still effective and in operation and consequently, the emergency
powers of the President continued and subsisted despite his previously having made a report of
his actions in January 1941. This squarely refutes the theory that as soon as the President filed
his report on the exercise of his emergency powers with the Legislature, the Act making the
delegation ceased to operate and the President lost his emergency powers.
As I have already stated in the course of this opinion, in connection with another phrase of this
case from January to June, 1941, President Quezon had issued at least eight Executive Orders in
the exercise of his emergency powers, by authority of Commonwealth Act 600. From this it is
evident that he did not share the majority view, because despite his having made his report to
the Assembly in January, 1941, and even before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 620,
he believed and considered Commonwealth Act No. 600 as still in force after that date and that
he still retained his emergency powers.
Then, let us see what was the attitude and conduct of the Chief Executive and of Congress after
May 25, 1946, when according to the majority opinion Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to
operate. After May 25, 1946, two Presidents, Roxas and Quirino had issued numerous
Executive Orders based upon and invoking Commonwealth Act No. 671. Like President
Quezon, they also evidently were of the opinion that despite the meeting of the Legislature in
regular session the act delegating legislative powers to them (in the case of Roxas and Quirino
—Commonwealth Act No. 671) was still in force, that they still retained their emergency
powers and so proceeded to exercise them in good faith.
Congress also, evidently, believed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force and effect
after said date, May 25, 1946. In spite of the several legislative sessions, regular and special
since then and up to and including the year 1949, Congress has not by law or resolution said
anything questioning or doubting the validity of said Executive Order on the score of having
been promulgated after Commonwealth Act No. 671 had supposedly ceased to operate. Not
only this, but at least in one instance, Congress had by a law promulgated by it, considered one
of those supposed illegal Executive Orders promulgated after May 25, 1946, to be valid. I refer
to Republic Act No. 224 approved on June 5, 1948, creating the National Airport Corporation
which considered and treated as valid Executive Order No. 100, dated October 21, 1947, by
providing in section 7 of said Republic Act No. 224 for the abolishment of the Office of the
Administrator of the Manila International Airport established under the provisions of said
Executive Order No. 100 and the transfer of the personnel and funds created under the same
Executive Order to the National Airport Corporation. This Executive Order No. 100 which
appropriated public funds and therefore, was of a legislative nature must have been issued under
Commonwealth Act No. 671. It cannot possibly be regarded as having been promulgated by
authority of Republic Act No. 51, for said Act approved on October 4, 1946, gave the President
only one year within which to reorganize the different executive departments, offices, agencies,
etc. and Executive Order No. 100 was promulgated on October 23, 1947, after the expiration of
the one year period. Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge that during the last
session of Congress which ended in May, 1949, there was talk if not a movement in the
Congress to end the emergency powers of the President. Nothing concrete in the form of
legislation or resolution was done, for if we are to accept newspaper reports and comment, the
members of Congress or at least a majority of them were willing and satisfied to have the Chief
Executive continue in the exercise of his emergency powers until the end of 1949. All this leads
to no other conclusion but that Congress believed all along that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is
still in force and effect.
If Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect the question arises: how long and for
what period will said Act continue to operate? As I have already stated, I believe that the
delegation of emergency powers was made coextensive with the emergency resulting from the
war, as long as that emergency continues and unless the Legislature provides otherwise, Act
671 will continue to operate and the President may continue exercising his emergency powers.
The last and logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the emergency resulting from the
war passed or does it still exist? This is a fair and decisive question inasmuch as the existence of
the emergency is, my opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation or cessation of Act
671. The existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from the war is a question of
fact. It is based on conditions obtaining among the people and in the country and perhaps even
near and around it. It is highly controversial question on which people may honestly differ.
There are those who in all good faith believe and claim that conditions have returned to normal;
that the people have now enough to eat, sometimes even more than they had before the war; that
people nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and clothed and transported and
better compensated for their labor, and that the President himself in his speeches, chats and
messages had assured the public that normal times have returned, that the problem of peace and
order had been solved, that the finances of the Government and the national economy are
sound, and that there is an adequate food supply. It is therefore, claimed that there is no longer
any emergency resulting from the war.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite camp that conditions are
still far from normal; that the picture painted by the President in cheerful and reassuring colors
is based on over optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relief the
achievements of the administration, and so should be considered with some allowance; that we
are now importing more rice than before the war for the reason that many rice farms are idle
because of the farmer's fear of or interference by dissidents; that the problem of peace and order
is far from solved as shown by the frequent hold-ups, kidnapping, loothing and killings and
organized banditry not only in Luzon but also in the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas
before the war, the Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 officers and men could
provide complete protection to life and property and was adequate in all respects to enforce
peace and order, now this Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men, provided with modern
weapons and equipment and with the aid of thousands of civilians guards and of the Philippine
Army and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the dissidents who are well
organized, armed and disciplined even attack and sack towns and sometimes openly defy and
engage the armed Government forces; that as long as more than 100,000 firearms are loose and
in the hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly regular mysterious supply to
them of additional firearms and ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the
barrio folks in central Luzon and now, even in provinces bordering central Luzon whose parents
and relatives had been killed by dissidents, whose women folk had been outraged by the same
elements, whose homes had been looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected to
constant terror and peril, compelling them to leave their homes and their farms and evacuate to
and be concentrated in the poblaciones to live there in utter discomfort and privation, it is said
that it would be difficult to convince these unfortunate people that normalcy has returned and
that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the war. To further support the claim of the
existence of an emergency, the menace of communism not only at home, particularly in central
Luzon but from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is asserted that all this is a result of
the war.
I repeat that this question of the existence of an emergency is a controversial one, the decision
on which must be based on the ascertainment of facts, circumstances and conditions and the
situation obtaining in the country. This Court is not in a position to decide that controversy. It
does not have the facilities to obtain and acquire the necessary facts and data on which to base a
valid and just decision. Neither did it have the opportunity to receive the necessary evidence as
in a hearing or trial at which evidence, oral or documentary, is introduced. We cannot invoked
and resort to judicial notice because this refers to things of public knowledge, and not
controverted, whereas things, facts and conditions necessary for the determination of whether or
not there is still an emergency, are often not of public knowledge but require investigation,
accurate reporting and close contact with the people to be able to ascertain their living
conditions, their needs, their fears, etc.
To me, the department of the Government equipped and in a position to decide this question of
emergency are the Chief Executive and the Legislature. The first has at his command and beck
and call all the executive officials and departments. He has the Army, the Constabulary, Naval
Patrol, the Police of the cities and towns and the barrio lieutenants to inform him of the state of
peace and order and the security of the states. He has the Secretary of Education and all the
subordinates officers and the school officials under him to inform him as to whether or not there
is a school crisis or emergency as a result of the war. He has the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and his men to advise him as to the agricultural needs and the food supply of
the country. He has the Secretary of Finance and all the officials under him to inform him of the
finances of the Government and the economy of the country as well as the officials to advise
him of the land shipping transportation situation. In other words, the President is in a position to
determine whether or not there is still an emergency as a result of the war.
As to Congress, it is equally in a position and in fact it is the first to called upon to decide as to
the existence or non-existence of an emergency. According to the Constitution, section 24,
Article VI, either House of Congress may call upon the head of any department of the
Government on any matter pertaining to his departure. The members of Congress come from all
parts and the far corners of the country. They are supposed to be in close contact with their
constituents and know at first hand their needs, the way they live, etc. Congress therefore
should know. Moreover, it is the legislature that must first determine as to whether or not there
is a national emergency as a condition precedent to the delegation of its legislative powers.
Naturally, it is the one that is called upon to say when that emergency ceases.
Now, one will ask, what does Congress think about the emergency? Does it believe that it still
exists? To me the answer is YES. What has been said about the acts, conduct and attitude of the
legislature as to its belief that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force, are all applicable
and may be repeated to show that the Congress believes that the emergency resulting from the
war still exist. Under the theory that I maintain, Congress must be of the opinion that the
emergency still exists for the reason that as I have shown Congress believes that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and the life and the operation of said Act depends
upon and is coextensive with the existence of the emergency. To this may be added the attitude
and the belief of the President as to the continued existence of the emergency. It must be borne
in mind that Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorizes the President to exercise his emergency
powers only during the existence of the emergency. The inference is that before exercising his
emergency powers by promulgating an Executive Order he must first determine and decide that
the state of emergency still exists, for that is the condition precedent to the exercise of his
delegated powers. In other words, the two departments of the Government, the Legislative and
the Executive Departments, best qualified and called upon to determine whether or not the
emergency resulting from the war still exists have made manifest in their acts and attitude that
they believe that such emergency still exists. I may here state that on this question of
emergency, I entertain no personal opinion either way lacking as I do the means of deciding
fairly and justly. Neither has the Court. If the decision of the courts on question of fact involved
in a controversy are given due respect and weight and are binding, it is because such decisions
are based on evidence adduced and received after a hearing. No such hearing was held for the
purpose and no evidence been received. In other words, we have nothing in which to decide a
question of fact which is the existence or non-existence of emergency.
In view of the conclusion we have arrived at, finding these Executive Orders to be void and of
no effect, particularly Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 with the evident result that no funds
are appropriated for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year beginning July of this
year and for the expenses in the coming national election next November, one may inquire as to
what will happen or what is to be done. The answer or answers to this question lie with the
Chief Executive. Congress will not meet in regular session until next year. It is not for the court,
not even the undersigned to suggest the calling of a special legislative session to cope with the
perilous situation thus created, altho one may regard that as a logical remedy. But, should the
President call a special session and Congress for one reason or another fails to meet or though it
meets, for one reason or another it fails to pass an appropriation law, then a real crisis will have
ensued. I am confident that the Chief Executive, conscious of his responsibility as the Chief of
the nation would not just stand supine and idle and see the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines disintegrate and die. He would know what to do and he would do something
according to his sound discretion and in accordance with the law, statutory or otherwise and in
the discharge of his high executive powers, express or implied.
TORRES, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor on the existence of the emergency
powers. I reserve my opinion on the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226.
REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:
The main issue in these cases is whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941 prompted
the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671, delegating extraordinary powers to the President,
still existed at the time the Chief Executive exercised those powers by promulgating the
executive orders whose validity is now challenged.
On issue similar to the one just formulated there is a diversity of opinions. While some courts
would rather leave the determination of such issues to the political department of the
Government, others are for making the determination subject to judicial review. But the latest
ruling of the United States Supreme Court on the point accords with first view and declares that
"these are matters of political judgment for which judges have neither technical competence nor
official responsibility." (Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883.)
In any event the existence or non-existence of an emergency is a question of facts which may
not always be determine without the evidence by mere reference to facts within the judicial
notice. In the present cases, there has been no trial for the reception of proof, and I am not
aware that enough facts have been shown to justify the conclusion that the emergency in
question has already ceased. On the other hand, since the exercise of the emergency powers by
the President presupposes a determination of the existence of the emergency, the President must
be presumed to have satisfied himself in some appropriate manner that the emergency existed
when he issued his executive orders. Under the theory of separation of powers and in accord
with the latest ruling of the United States Supreme Court, it is not for the judiciary to review the
finding of the Executive in this regard. Judicial review would in such case amount to control of
executive discretion and place the judicial branch above a co-equal department of the
Government. Only in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of
the Government is judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution. But with the cold war still going on though the shooting war has already ended;
with the world still in turmoil so much so that the American Secretary of the State has declared
that "the world has never before in peace time been as troubled or hazardous as it is right now;"
with most of the industries of the country still unrihabilitated, so that a large proportion of our
food and other necessaries have to be imported; with a great portion of the population still
living in temporary quarters; with most of the war damage claims still unpaid; and with peace
and other conditions in the country far from normal, it would be presumptuous for this Court,
without proof of the actual condition obtaining in all parts of the Archipelago, to declare that
the President clearly abused his discretion when he considered the emergency not ended at the
time he promulgated the executive orders now questioned.
The majority opinion has skirted the issue of whether or not the question of the existence or
continuance of the emergency is one for the political department of the Government to
determine by restricting "the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the
Legislature was prevented from holding session due to enemy action or other causes brought on
by the war." I cannot subscribe to this narrow interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 671, for
in my opinion it is contrary to both the plain language and manifest purpose of that enactment.
The law invests the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the emergency
resulting from the war and it expressly says that the President is to exercise those powers
"during the existence of the emergency." The Act does not say that the President may exercise
the powers only when the Legislature is not session. Much less does it say that the emergency
powers shall cease as soon as the Legislature has convened in regular session. An emergency
resulting from a global war cannot end with the mere meeting of the Legislature. Neither may
be legislated out of existence. The Legislature, once it was convened, may, if it so desire,
revoked the emergency powers of the President, but it cannot by any form of legislative action
put an immediate end to the emergency itself. Well known is a fact that a deliverative body,
such as the Legislature, because of the time consumed in the study and discussion of a measure,
may not always act with the promptness which the situation requires so that in an emergency
there is really need for the concentration of power in one man. This may well be the reason why
Act No. 671 in express terms authorizes the President to exercise the emergency powers "during
the existence of the emergency" and not merely during the time that the Legislature could be in
session. For one thing to make the life of the emergency powers depend upon the inability of
the Legislature to meet is the same as to declare those emergency powers automatically ended
the moment they were conferred, for at that very moment of the Legislature that conferred them
was in session.
The argument that, unless the emergency powers of the President were made to cease the
moment Congress convened in regular session, we should be having two legislatures which
could mutually annul each other, will not stand analysis. In supposing that the President, in the
exercise of the emergency powers could "repeal or modify a bill passed by the Legislature," the
argument overlooks the fact that the emergency powers delegated to the President under Article
VI, section 26 of the Constitution could only authorize him "to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national policy." Only the Legislature (with the concurrence of the
President of course) may declare the President may not, under the Constitution, depart from it.
Moreover, unless the Presidential veto could be overriden, no bill approved by Congress could
become a law if the President did not want it. And if the President approves a bill and allows it
to become a law, surely he can have no reason for repealing it; while, on the other hand, there is
no point in his repealing that bill, because if there are enough votes to override his veto there
must also be enough votes to repeal his emergency powers.
The majority opinion has I think placed a rather forced construction upon section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 671, which provides that —
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
As may be seen, the above provision does not say that the President has to report only once, that
is, the first time Congress is convened, and never again. But the majority opinion wants to read
that thought into the law in order to bolster up the theory that the emergency powers of the
President would end as soon as Congress could convene in a regular session.
Invoking the rule of contemporary construction, the majority opinion makes reference to a
passage in President Quezon's book. "The Good Fight," to the effect that, according to the
author, Act No. 671, was only "for a certain period" and "would become valid unless re-
enacted." But I see nothing in the quoted phrases any suggestion that the emergency powers of
the President were to end the moment Congress was convened in regular session regardless of
the continuance of the emergency which gave birth to those powers. A more valid application of
the rule of contemporary construction may, I think, be made by citing the executive orders
promulgated by President Roxas by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Many of those executive
orders were issued after May 25, 1946 when Congress convened in regular session, an event
which, according to the majority opinion, automatically put an end to the emergency powers.
While we have adopted the republican form of government with its three co-equal departments,
each acting within its separate sphere, it would be well to remember that we have not accepted
the American theory of separation of powers to its full extent. For, profiting from the
experience of America when her Supreme Court, by the application many a New Deal measure
which her Congress had approved to meet a national crisis, our Constitutional Convention in
1935, despite the warning of those who feared a dictatorship in his country, decided to depart
from the strict theory of separation of powers by embodying a provision in our Constitution,
authorizing the delegation of legislative powers to the President "in times of war or other
national emergency." It is my surmise that this provision was intended to guard not only against
the inability to meet but also against its usual tardiness and inaction. We have proof of this last
in the last regular session of Congress, when this body failed to pass measures of pressing
necessity, especially the annual appropriation law and the appropriation for the expenses of the
coming elections.
It is said that the need for an appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949-1950 as well for the
coming elections is not an emergency resulting from the war. But I say that if the emergency
resulting from the war as contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671 still exists, as the
President believes it exists or he would not have issued the executive orders in question (and it
is not for the Court to change that belief in the absence of proof that the President was clearly
wrong) would it not be a dereliction of duty on his part to fall to provide, during the emergency,
for the continuance of the functions of government, which is only possible with an
appropriation law? What would be gained by issuing rules and regulations to meet the
emergency if there is no Government to enforce and carry them out? The mere calling of a
special is no guaranty that an appropriation law will be passed or that one will be passed before
the thousands of officials and employees who work for the Government have starved. It is,
probably, because of these considerations that the National Assembly, in approving
Commonwealth Act No. 671, specifically empowered the President, during the existence of the
emergency, "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative." And that Act has authorized the President during the existence of the
same emergency "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain in force this authority." Under this
specific provision, the appropriation for the expenses of the coming elections would, naturally,
come, for, without doubt, it is a measure to enable the Government "to fulfill its
responsibilities."
Consistently with the views above express, I am of the opinion that Executive Order No. 225,
appropriating funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic for the fiscal year
1949-50, and Executive Order No. 226, appropriating funds for the expenses of the coming
national elections in November, 1949, are valid so that the petition in G.R. No. L-3054, Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Treasurer of the Philippines, and the petition in G.R. No. L-3056, Antonio
Barredo, etc., vs. Commissioner on Election, et al., in which the said two executive orders are
respectively challenged, should be denied.
But Executive Order No. 62 (regulating rents) and Executive Order No. 192 (controlling
exports) stand on a different footing. The validity of Executive Order No. 62 can no longer be
maintained because of the approval by the Legislature of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and
Republic Act No. 66, which regulate the same subject matter and which, as an expression of the
national policy, can not be deviated from by the President in the exercise of the emergency
powers delegated to him by Commonwealth Act No. 671. The same is true with respect to
Executive Order No. 192 (controlling exports) in view of the passage of Commonwealth Act
No. 728, regulating the same subject matter, especially because section 4 of said Act terminates
the power of the President thereunder on December 31, 1948, if not sooner. Consequently, since
the validity of these executive orders (Nos. 62 and 192) can no longer be upheld, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. L-2044, L-2756 and L-3055, which seek to prohibit their enforcement, should be
granted.
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join in this opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes. I wish to add that I agree with Mr. Justice Bengzon
that petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 have no personality to institute the
proceedings.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
The majority feels that it has to decide the question whether the President still has emergency
powers; but unable to determine in which of the above cases the issue may properly be decided,
it grouped them together. When the eye or the hand is unsure, it is best to shoot at five birds in a
group: firing at one after another may mean as many misses.
It does not matter that the first two cases had been submitted and voted before the submission of
the last three. Neither does it matter that, of these last, two should be thrown out in accordance
with our previous rulings. The target must be large.
These cases could be, and should be decided separately. If they are, they may be disposed of
without ruling on the general question whether the President still has emergency powers under
Commonwealth Act No. 7671. How? This way, which is my vote.
1. L-2044, Araneta vs. Dinglasan; L-2756, Araneta vs. Angeles. The President has presently no
power to regulate rents, because his power to do so is granted by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600
and 620 which have lapsed. Under Commonwealth Act No. 671 he has no power to regulate
rents.
2. L-3056, Barredo vs. Commission, etc. Dismissed because petitioner has no personality to
sue. According to Custodio vs. President of the Senate et al., 42 Off. Gaz., 1243, a citizen and
taxpayer, as such, has no legal standing to institute proceedings for the annulment of a statute.
3. L-3054, Rodriguez vs. Treasurer. Dismissed, like the Barredo case. The private rights of
petitioner and of his partymen are affected only as taxpayers.
4. L-3055, Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs. Supposing that the President still has
emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that they include regulation of
exportation, inasmuch as the Congress has chosen to legislate on exports (Commonwealth Act
No. 728), it has thereby pro tanto withdrawn the power delegated to the President along that
field.
It is a sound rule, I believe, for the Court to determine only those questions which are necessary
to decide a case.
Although I am favorably impressed by the considerations set forth by Mr. Justice Montemayor
and Mr. Justice Reyes on the existence of emergency powers, I prefer to vote as herein
indicated.
I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions.
For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained. However, after rehearing,
the required number of votes was had, by resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows.
RESOLUTION
September 16, 1949
MORAN, C. J.:
Petitioners filed motions asking (1) that Mr. Justice Padilla be qualified to act in these cases; (2)
that the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice Perpecto before his death be counted in their favor; and
(3) that the opinion of the Chief Justice be counted as a vote for the nullity of Executive Orders
Nos. 225 and 226.
As regards the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, the Court is of the opinion that it must
not be considered, it having been presented after Mr. Justice Padilla had given his opinion on
the merits of these cases. As we have once said "a litigant . . . cannot be permitted to speculate
upon the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered."
(Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil., 374.)
Furthermore, the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had advised the President
on the question of emergency powers, does not disqualify him to act in these cases, for he
cannot be considered as having acted previously in these actions as counsel of any of the
parties. The President is not here a party.
All the members of this Court concur in the denial of the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice
Padilla, with the exception of Mr. Justice Ozaeta and Mr. Justice Feria who reserve their vote.
II
With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the
decision of these cases, it appears that Mr. Justice Perfecto died and ceased to be a member of
this Court on August 17, 1949, and our decision in these cases was released for publication on
August 26, 1949. Rule 53, section 1, in connection with Rule 58, section 1, of the Rules of
Court, is as follows:
SECTION 1. Judges: who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its
consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and
adjudication by any and all of the justices who are members of the court at the time when such
matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such justices were or not
members of the court and whether they were or were not present at the date of submission; . . . .
Under this provision, one who is not a member of the court at the time an adjudication is made
cannot take part in the adjudication. The word "adjudication" means decision. A case can be
adjudicated only by means of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value and
binding force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII, sections 11 and 12,
of the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296, section 21; Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of
Court). Promulgated means the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and
publication.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed and
promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision. As above indicated, the true decision of
the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so
signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a
member of the Court after deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the
time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is not
thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of
this Court, even after they have cast their vote, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the
last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what
they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In
consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and
conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breast of the
Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve
for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member
to prepare the decision binding unless and until duly signed and promulgated.
And this is practically what we have said in the contempt case against Abelardo Subido,1
promulgated on September 28, 1948:
que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte Suprema solo se considera decidido una vez
registrada, promulgada y publicada la sentencia en la escribania, y que hasta entonces el
resultado de la votacion se estima como una materia absolutamente reservada y confidencial,
perteneciente exclusivamente a las camaras interiores de la Corte.
In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the decisive point is the date of promulgation of
judgment. In that case a judge rendered his decision on January 14; qualified himself as
Secretary of Finance on January 16; and his decision was promulgated on January 17. We held
that the decision was void because at the time of its promulgation the judge who prepared it was
no longer a judge. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriquez, 37 Phil., 186.)
Another reason why the vote and opinion of the Mr. Justice Perfecto can not be considered in
these cases is that his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, has been allowed by this Court to take part
in the decision on the question of emergency powers because of lack of majority on that
question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to follow any opinion previously held by Mr.
Justice Perfecto on that matter. There is no law or rule providing that a successor is a mere
executor of his predecessor's will. On the contrary, the successor must act according to his own
opinion for the simple reason that the responsibility for his action is his and of no one else. Of
course, where a valid and recorded act has been executed by the predecessor and only a
ministerial duty remains to be performed for its completion, the act must be completed
accordingly. For instance, where the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly filed and
promulgated, the entry of that judgment which is a ministerial duty, may be ordered by the
successor as a matter of course. But even in that case, if the successor is moved to reconsider
the decision, and he still may do so within the period provided by the rules, he is not bound to
follow the opinion of his predecessor, which he may set aside according to what he may believe
to be for the best interests of justice.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late
Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases must be denied.
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla, Mr. Justice Montemayor, Mr.
Justice Alex. Reyes, and Mr. Justice Torres concur in this denial. Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr.
Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Tuason dissent.
III
In connection with the motion to consider the opinion of the Chief Justice as a vote in favor of
petitioners, the writer has the following to say:
In my previous concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the emergency powers vested in
Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased in June 1945, but I voted for a deferment of judgment
in these two cases because of two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need of
sustaining the two executive orders on appropriations as the life-line of government and (2) the
fact that a special session of Congress was to be held in a few days. I then asked, "Why not
defer judgment and wait until the special session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it
clearly sees it?"
It seemed then to me unwise and inexpedient to force the Government into imminent disruption
by allowing the nullity of the executive orders to follow its reglementary consequences when
Congress was soon to be convened for the very purpose of passing, among other urgent
measures, a valid appropriations act. Considering the facility with which Congress could
remedy the existing anomaly, I deemed it a slavish submission to a constitutional formula for
this Court to seize upon its power under the fundamental law to nullify the executive orders in
question. A deferment of judgment struck me then as wise. I reasoned that judicial
statesmanship, not judicial supremacy, was needed.
However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the purpose of remedying
the nullity of the executive orders in question appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to,
and do hereby, give my unqualified concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Tuason
declaring that these two executive orders were issued without authority of law.
While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved by the belief that the
positive compliance with the Constitution by the other branches of the Government, which is
our prime concern in all these cases, would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce
the opposite result because it would legitimize a prolonged or permanent evasion of our organic
law. Executive orders which are, in our opinion, repugnant to the Constitution, would be given
permanent life, opening the way to practices which may undermine our constitutional structure.
The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring opinion, would come to

pass should the said executive orders be immediately declared null and void, are still real. They
have not disappeared by reason of the fact that a special session of the Congress is not now
forthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in the hands of the Chief Executive and of
Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former the power to call a special session should the
need for one arise, and in the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriation act.
That Congress may again fall to pass a valid appropriations act is a remote possibility, for under
the circumstances it fully realizes its great responsibility of saving the nation from breaking
down; and furthermore, the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers may, if he so
desires, compel Congress to remain in special session till it approves the legislative measures
most needed by the country.
Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a permanent
way of life in this country, if each of the great branches of the Government, within its own
allocated spear, complies with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of
difficulties.
Our Republic is still young, and the vital principle underlying its organic structure should be
maintained firm and strong, hard as the best of steel, so as to insure its growth and development
along solid lines of a stable and vigorous democracy.
With my declaration that Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 are null and void, and with the
vote to the effect of Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Tuason
and Mr. Justice Montemayor, there is a sufficient majority to pronounce a valid judgment on
that matter.
It is maintained by the Solicitor General and the amicus curiae that eight Justices are necessary
to pronounce a judgment on the nullity of the executive orders in question, under section 9 of
Republic Act No. 296 and Article VIII, section 10 of the Constitution. This theory is made to
rest on the ground that said executive orders must be considered as laws, they having been
issued by the Chief Executive in the exercise of the legislative powers delegated to him.
It is the opinion of the Court that the executive orders in question, even if issued within the
powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of
law, in exactly the same manner as the judgments of this Court, municipal ordinances and
ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they have the force of law.
Under Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the only power which, in times of war or other
national emergency, may be vested by Congress in the President, is the power "to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Consequently, the executive
orders issued by the President in pursuance of the power delegated to him under that provision
of the Constitution, may be considered only as rules and regulations. There is nothing either in
the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or
regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very significant that in the
previous drafts of section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation"
were included among those that required for their nullification the vote of two thirds of all of
the members of the Court. But "executive order" and "regulations" were later deleted from the
final draft (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus
a mere majority of six members of this Court is enough to nullify them.
All the members of the Court concur in this view.
For all the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, and the
motion to include the vote of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases. And it
is the judgment of this Court to declare Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, null and void, with
the dissent of Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Reyes, upon the grounds
already stated in their respective opinions, and with Mr. Justice Torres abstaining.
But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in a normal operation of the

Government, it is decreed, by the majority, of course, that this judgment take effect upon the
expiration of fifteen days from the date of its entry. No costs to be charged.
Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
FERIA, J., concurring:
The respondent in the cases G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 contend that the petitioners in said
cases can not institute an action to invalidate the Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226
promulgated by the President, because they have no interest in preventing the illegal
expenditures of moneys raised by taxation, and can not therefore question the validity of said
executive orders requiring expenditures of public money.
Although the Supreme Court, in the case of Custodio vs. President of the Senate, G. R. No. L-
117 (42 Off. Gaz., 1243) held in a minute resolution "That the constitutionality of a legislative
act is open to attack only by person whose rights are affected thereby, that one who invokes the
power of the court to declare an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional must be able to show
not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement," that ruling was laid down without
a careful consideration and is contrary to the ruling laid down in the majority of jurisdictions in
the United States that "In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the
requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only
persons individually affected, but also have taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditures of money raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditures of public moneys." (Am. Jur., Vol. 11, p.
761) All the members of this Court, except two, in taking cognizance of those cases, rejected
the respondents' contention, reversed the ruling in said case and adopted the general rule above
mentioned; and we believe the latter is better than the one adopted in said case of Custodio,
which was based on a doctrine adhered to only in few jurisdiction in the United States; because
if a taxpayer can not attack the validity of the executive orders in question or a law requiring the
expenditure of public moneys, one under our laws could question the validity of such laws or
executive orders.
After laying down the fundamental principles involved in the case at bar, we shall discuss and
show that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was no longer in force at the time the Executive Orders
under consideration were promulgated, because even the respondents in the cases G. R. Nos. L-
2044 and L-2756, in sustaining the validity of the Executive Order No. 62 rely not only on
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, but on
Commonwealth Act No. 671; and afterwards we shall refute the arguments in support of the
contrary proposition that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and, therefore, the
President may exercise now the legislative powers therein delegated to him.
PRELIMINARY
The Constitution of the Philippines, drafted by the duly elected representatives of the Filipino
people, provides in its section 1, Article II, that "The Philippines is a republican states,
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The
people have delegated the government authority to three different and separate Departments:
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. In section 1, Article VI, the legislative power to make laws
is conferred upon Congress; the executive power to faithfully executed the laws is vested by
sections 1 and 10 of Article VII, in the President; and the judicial power is vested by section 1,
Article VII, in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law, the
Supreme Court having the supremacy to pass upon "the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations."
The distribution by the Constitution of the powers of government to the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Departments operates, by implication, as an inhibition against the exercise by one
department of the powers which belong to another, and imposes upon each of the three
departments the duty of exercising its own peculiar powers by itself, and prohibits the
delegation of any of those powers except in cases expressly permitted by the Constitution. The
principle of the separation of the powers of government is fundamental to the very existence of
a constitutional government as established in the Philippines patterned after that of the United
States of America. The division of governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial
represents the most important principle of government that guarantees the liberties of the
people, for it prevents a concentration of powers in the hands of one person or class of persons.
Under the doctrine of separation of the powers of government, the law-making functions is
assigned exclusively to the legislative, and the legislative branch cannot delegate the power to
make laws to any other authority. But it must be borne in mind that what cannot be delegated is
that which is purely legislative in nature, not administrative. There are powers so far legislative
that may properly be exercised by the legislature, but which may nevertheless be delegated
because they may be advantageously exercised in proper cases by persons belonging to the
other departments of the government, such as the authority to make rules and regulations of
administrative character to carry out an legislative purposes or to effect the operation and
enforcement of a law. As illustrations of the proper exercise of the power of Congress to
delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations with the necessary details to carry
into effect a law, are Act No. 3155 empowering the Governor General then, now the President,
to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle (Cruz vs.
Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Act No. 3106 authorizing the Commissioner of the Public Service
Commission to regulate those engaged in various occupations or business affected with a public
interest, and to prescribe what the charges shall be for services rendered in the conduct of such
business (Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446); and the National Industrial Recovery
Act enacted by the Congress of the United States authorizing the President to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations to carry out the emergency measure enacted by Congress,
though a part thereof was declared unconstitutional for producing a delegation of legislative
authority which is unconfined, "and not canalized within banks to keep it from ever flowing."
Athough, in principle, the power of the Legislature to make laws or perform acts purely
legislative in nature may only be delegated by Congress to another authority or officers of either
the executive or judicial department when expressly permitted by the Constitution, no such
delegation is authorized by the State constitution or Federal Constitution of the Untied States. It
is a fact admitted by the attorneys and amici curiae for the petitioners and respondents in these
case that section 26, Article VI, our Constitution is unique and has no counterpart in said
constitutions, and for that reason not a single case involving a question similar to the one herein
involved has never been submitted to and passed upon by the courts of last resort in the United
States. The provision of our Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
It is important to observe that what the above-quoted constitutional provision empowers

Congress to delegate to the President, is not the power to promulgate rules and regulations of
administrative nature, for this may also be delegated at any time without necessity of an express
authority by the Constitution, but the power to promulgate rules and regulations purely
legislative in nature, leaving to the discretion of the President the determination of what rules or
regulations shall be or what acts are necessary to effectuate the so-called declared national
policy, for otherwise it would not have been necessary for the Constitution to authorize
Congress to make such delegation.
DEMONSTRATION
The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the President of the Philippines to promulgate
rules and regulations of legislative nature only (1) in times of war or (2) other national
emergency, such as rebellion, flood, earthquake, pestilence, economic depression, famine or
any other emergency different from war itself affecting the nation.
It is obvious that it is Congress and not a particular emergency and to authorize the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to cope with it. Therefore, if Congress declares that there exist
a war as a national emergency and empowers the President to promulgate rules and regulations
to tide over the emergency, the latter could not, because he believes that there is an economic
emergency or depression or any emergency other than war itself, exercise the legislative power
delegated to meet such economic or other emergency.
The Constitution requires also that the delegation be for a limited period or other authority so
delegated shall cease ipso facto at the expiration of the period, because to require an express
legislation to repel or terminate the delegated legislative authority of the President might be
subversive to the constitutional separation of powers in out democratic form of government, for
the President my prevent indefinitely the repeal of his delegated authority by the exercise of his
veto power, since the veto could be overridden only by two-thirds vote and it would be
extremely difficult to repeal it in subservient Congress dominated by the Chief Executive.
Besides, to provide that the delegated legislative powers shall continue to exist until repealed by
the Congress, would be delegation not for limited, but for an unlimited period or rather without
any limitation at all, because all acts enacted are always subjects to repeal by the Congress,
without necessity to providing so.
No question is raised as to the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 671 under which
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were promulgated by the President of the
Philippines according to the contention of the respondents. The question involved is the validity
(not constitutionality) of said executive orders, that is, whether or not the President had
authority to promulgate them under Commonwealth Act No. 671; and therefore the concurrence
of two-thirds of all the members of this Court required by section 10, Article VIII of the
Constitution to declare a treaty or law unconstitutional is not required for adjudging the
executive orders in question invalid or not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 671, which
read as follows:
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671

SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
hereof. Accordingly he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of procedure of the heads of the Executive Departments; (c) to create
new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of Government
and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations
which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase,
reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds
or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof (g) to authorize the
National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he
may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts;
and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to
fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take upon its approval, and the rules and regulations promulgated
provide.
Approved, December 16, 1941.
Taking into consideration the presumption that Congress was familiar with the well-known
limits of its powers under section 26, Article VI, of the Constitution and did not intend to
exceed said powers in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 671, the express provisions of
Commonwealth Acts. Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 as amended by 620 and 671, and those
of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by Republic Act No. 66 and Republic Acts Nos. 51
and 728, we are of the opinion, and therefore so hold, that the actual war in the Philippine
territory and not any other national emergency is contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671,
and that the period of time during which the President was empowered by said Commonwealth
Act No. 671 to promulgate rules and regulations was limited to the existence of such war or
invasion of the Philippines by the enemy, which prevented the Congress to meet in a regular
session. Such emergency having ceased to exist upon the complete liberation of the Philippines
from the enemy's occupation, Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased to be in force and effect
at the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress in 1946, before the
promulgation of said executive orders, and hence they are null and void.
In view of the existence of a state of national emergency caused by the last world war among
several nations of the world, the second National Assembly during its second special session
passed the following acts: (a) Commonwealth Act No. 494 authorizing the President until the
adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, to suspend the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as the "Eight-Hour Labor-Law," when in his
judgment the public interest so required, in order to prevent a dislocation of the productive
forces of the country; (b) Commonwealth Act No. 496 delegating to the President the power
expressly granted by section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution to the State "until the date of
adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, to take over solely for use or
operation by the Government during the existence of the emergency any public service or
enterprise and to operate the same," upon payment of just compensation; (c) Commonwealth
Act No. 498, authorizing the President, among others, to fix the maximum selling prices of
foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements, machinery, and
equipment required in agriculture and industry, and other articles or commodities of prime
necessity, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary in the public
interest, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law until the date of the
adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly; (d) Commonwealth Act No.
499 providing that until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National
Assembly, any sale, mortgage, lease, charter, delivery, transfer of vessels owned in whole or in
part by a citizen of the Philippines or by a corporation organizes under the laws of the
Philippines, to any person not a citizen of the United States or of the Philippines, shall be null
and void, without the approval of the President of the Philippines; and Commonwealth Act No.
500 authorizing the President to reduce the expenditure of the Executive Department of the
National Government by the suspension or abandonment of services, activities or operations of
no immediate necessity, which authority shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is
not in session. All these Commonwealth Acts took effect upon their approval on September 30,
1939, a short time after the invasion of Poland by Germany.
During the fourth special session of the second National Assembly, Commonwealth Act No.
600, which superseded the above-mentioned emergency power acts, was passed and took effect
on its approval on August 19, 1940. This Act No. 600 expressly declared that the existence of
war in many parts of the world had created a national emergency which made it necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to safeguard the integrity of the
Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage,
lawlessness, and all supervise activities, by preventing or relieving unemployment, by insuring
to the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply, etc. To carry out this
policy the President was "authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the
force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the National
Assembly," which rules and regulations may embrace the objects therein enumerated. And the
National Assembly in its regular session commencing in January, 1941, in view of the fact that
the delegated authority granted to the President by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498,
500, and 600 was to terminate at the date of the adjournment of that regular session of the
National Assembly, passed Act No. 620 which took effect upon its approval on June 6, 1941,
amending section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600 by extending the delegated legislative
authority of the President until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the
Congress of the Philippines, instead of the National Assembly, the Constitution having been
amended by substituting the Congress of the Philippines for the National Assembly..
Although Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, provides
that "the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force
and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the
Philippines," it is evident that this limitation was intended to apply, not only to the effectivity of
the rules and regulations already promulgated, but specially to the authority granted to the
President to promulgated them, for the following reasons: First, because Commonwealth Act
Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, and 500 had expressly limited the authority of the President to exercise
the delegated power while the Assembly was not in session until the date of the adjournment of
the next regular session of the National Assembly, and there was absolutely no reason
whatsoever why the National Assembly, in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended,
which superseded said Act, would not impose the same limitation on the authority delegated in
Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended in compliance with the requirement of the
Constitution; secondly, because it would have been useless to give the rules and regulations the
effect and force of law only until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the
Congress, if the President might, after said adjournment, continue exercising his delegated
legislative powers to promulgate again the same and other rules and regulations; and lastly,
because to construe Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Act No. 620, otherwise would
be to make the delegation not for a limited but for an indefinite period of time, in violation of
the express provision of section 26, Article VI of the Constitution.
All the above-mentioned Acts Nos. 494, 496, 499, 500, and 600 before its amendment show
that it was the intention or policy of the National Assembly, in delegating legislative functions
to the President, to limit the exercise of the latter's authority to the interregnum while the
National Assembly or Congress of the Philippines was not in session until the date of the
adjournment of the next regular session thereof, which interregnum might have extended over a
long period of time had the war in Europe involved and made the Philippines a battle ground
before the next regular session of the Congress had convened. And the authority granted to the
President of Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended, had to be extended over a long period of
time during the occupation because, before the meeting of the next regular session of the
Congress, the Philippines was involved in the war of the United States and invaded and
occupied by the Japanese forces. And the President was authorized to exercise his delegated
powers until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress, for the
reason that although during the next regular session a bill may be passed, by the Congress, it
would not become a law until it was approved, expressly or impliedly, by the President during
the period of twenty days after it shall have been presented to him.
The reason of the limitation is that if Congress were in position to act it would not be necessary
for it to make such legislative delegation to the President, for Congress may in all cases act,
declare its will and, after fixing a primary standard or yardstick, authorize the President to fill
up the details by prescribing administrative rules and regulations to cope with the actual
conditions of any emergency; and it is inconceivable that there may arise an emergency of such
a nature that would require immediate action and can not wait, without irreparable or great
injury to the public interest, and action of the legislative in regular or special session called by
the Chief Executive for the purpose of meeting it. If in the United States they could withstand
and have withstood all kinds of emergency without resorting to the delegation by the legislative
body of legislative power to the Executive except those of administrative nature, because no
such delegation is permitted by the States and Federal constitution, as above stated, there is no
reason why the same can not be done in the Philippines. The frames of our Constitution and the
national Assembly that enacted Commonwealth Act No. 671 are presumed to be aware of the
inconvenience and chaotical consequences of having two legislative bodies acting at one and
the same time.
It is true that Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not expressly say that the President is
authorized to promulgates rules and regulations until the date of the adjournment of the next
regular session of the National Assembly or Congress as the above-quoted Commonwealth
Acts; but it is also true that it clearly provides that "pursuant to the provisions of Article VI,
section 26, of the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the
emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the
national policy declared"; and that the definite and specific emergency therein referred to is no
other that the "state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines", declared in
the title of said Act No. 671, that was the reason for which the President was "authorize to
promulgate rules and regulations to meet resulting emergency." It is obvious that what Act No.
671 calls "total emergency" was the invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy or
Japanese forces which, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, had already landed
in Philippine soil and was expected to paralyze the functioning of the Congress during the
invasion and enemy occupation of the Philippines.
The mere existence of the last world war in many parts of the world which had created a
national emergency made it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers was not
called total emergency by Commonwealth Act Nos. 600 and 620, because it had not yet actually
involved and engulfed the Philippines in the maelstrom of war. It does not stand to reason that
the authority given to the President to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature by
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 600 and 620 was to terminate at the date of
the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the Philippines in 1946, but those
granted to the President by Commonwealth Act No. 671 under the same war emergency should
continue to exist indefinitely even after the Congress of the Philippines had regularly convened,
acted, and adjourned in the year 1946 and subsequent years. Besides to give such construction
to Act No. 671 would make it violative of the express provision of section 26, Article VIII, of
the Constitution, under which said Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted, as expressly
stated in said Act, and which permits the Congress to authorize the President, only for a limited
period during a war emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry into effect a
declared national policy.
By the special session of the first Congress of the Philippines commencing on the 9th day of
June, 1945, called by the President for the purpose of considering general legislation,
Commonwealth Act No. 671 did not cease to operate. As we have already said, the emergency
which prompted the second National Assembly to enact Commonwealth Act No. 671
delegating legislative powers to the President, was the inability of Congress to convene in
regular session in January of every during the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese
Imperial forces. The National Assembly could not have in mind any special session which
might have been called by the President immediately after liberation, because the calling of a
special session as well as the matters which may be submitted by the President to Congress for
consideration is a contingent event which depend upon the possibility of convening it and the
discretion of the President to call it, and the matters he will submit to it for consideration;
because it is to be presumed, in order to comply with the provision of section 26, Article VI of
the Constitution, that it was the intention of the National Assembly to fix a limited period,
independent of the President's will, during which he is authorized to exercise his delegated
legislative power.
The object of section 3 of Act No. 671 in requiring the President to report "as soon as
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines all rules and regulations
promulgated by him under the powers therein granted" is to inform the Congress of the contents
of said rules and regulations so that the latter may modify or repeal them if it sees fit to do so,
inasmuch as, according to section 4 of the same Act, "the rules and regulations promulgated
hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress shall otherwise provide." And although
said section 3 does not specify whether in regular or special session, it is evident that it refers to
the next regular and not to the special session of the Congress, because as a rule a special
session is called to consider only specific matters submitted by the President to Congress for
consideration, and it would be useless to submit such report to the Congress in special session if
the latter can not either modify or repeal such rules and regulations; and besides, it is to be
presumed that it was the intention of the National Assembly in enacting section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 671 to require the submission of a report to the next regular session of
the Assembly or Congress, as provided in section 4 Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 620, which required a similar report, for there was absolutely no
plausible reason to provide otherwise.
Our conclusion is corroborated by the fact that section 3 of Act No. 671 only requires the
President to submit the report, "as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress" and
not to submit a report to the Congress every time it convenes, in order to inform the Congress
thereof so that the latter may modify or repeal any or all of them, for under section 4 of the
same Act "such rules and regulations shall continue in force and effect until the Congress shall
otherwise provide." It is obvious that the convening of the Congress referred to in said section 3
is the next regular session of the Congress after the passage of Act No. 671, and not any other
subsequent session; because, otherwise, it would not have required that it shall be submitted to
the Congress as soon as practicable and the purpose of the law already stated in requiring the
submission of the report would be defeated; and if it were the intention of said Commonwealth
Act No. 671 to authorize the President to continue promulgating rules and regulations after the
next regular session of the Congress, it would have required the President to submit to the
Congress each and every time it convenes a report of the rules and regulations promulgated
after his previous reports had been submitted.
Furthermore, our conclusion is confirmed by the legislative interpretation give to

Commonwealth Act No. 671 by the same Congress in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 728
which took effect on July 2, 1946, authorizing the President to regulate, control, curtail, and
prohibit the exploration of agricultural or industrial products, merchandise, articles, materials
and supplies without the permit of the President until December 31, 1948 as expressly provided
in section 4 thereof, because it would not have been necessary for the Congress to promulgate
said Act No. 728 if the President had authority to promulgate Executive Order No. 62 in
question on January 1, 1949, under Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contended by the
respondents; and Republic Act No. 51, approved on October 4, 1946, authorizing within one
year the different executive departments, business, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities
of the government, including corporations controlled by it, would not have been passed by the
Congress if Commonwealth Act No. 671 under consideration was then still in force, for section
2 (b) and (c) of said Act No. 671 authorizes the President to reorganize the Government and to
create new subdivisions, branches, department offices, agencies or instrumentalities of
government, and to abolish any of those already existing.
REPUTATION
There is no force in the argument that the executive orders in question are not valid, not because
the promulgation of the acts above mentioned and of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended
by the Republic Act No. 66 on rentals, the appropriation acts or Republic Act Nos. 1, 156, and
320 for the years 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49, and of the Republic Acts Nos. 73, 147, and
235 appropriating public finds to defray the expenses for the elections held in 1947 and 1948,
shows that the emergency powers granted by Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased
to exist, but because Congress "has shown by their enactment its readiness and ability to
legislate on those matters, and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential legislation or
regulations under the powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671." If the Congress was
ready and able to legislate on those matters since 1946 and for that reason the executive orders
herein involved are null and void, there is no valid reason for not concluding that the emergency
powers of the President has ceased to exist it did not, legislate on all matters on which the
President was granted and delegated power to legislate by the Commonwealth Act No. 671.
And if Commonwealth Act No. 671 continues to be in force and effect in so far as it grants
delegated legislative powers to the President and declares the national policy to be carried out
by the rules and regulations the President is authorize to promulgate, the mere promulgation of
the acts above described can not be considered as an implied repeal or withdrawal of the
authority of the President to promulgates rules and regulations only on those matters, and the
adoption of a contrary policy by the Congress, because implied repeal is not favored in statutory
construction, and the national policy referred to in section 26, Article VIII of the Constitution is
to be declared by the Congress in delegating the legislative powers to the President, in order to
establish the standard to be carried out by him in exercising his delegated functions, and not in
repealing said powers.
As we have already said, section 26, Article VI of the Constitution expressly empowers
Congress, in times of war and other national emergency, to authorize the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy, and therefore it is for
the National Assembly to determine the existence of a particular emergency declare the national
policy, and authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature to
carry out that policy. As the Commonwealth Act No. 671 that the existence of war between the
United States and other countries of Europe and Asia which involves the Philippines is the
emergency which made it necessary for the National Assembly to invest the President with
extraordinary powers to promulgate rules and regulations to meet the resulting emergency from
the actual existence of that war which involved the Philippines, the President cannot, under said
Act No. 671, determine the existence of any other emergency, such as the state of cold war, the
continued military occupation of the enemy country, and the economic and political instability
throughout the world, cited by the respondents, and promulgate rules and regulations to meet
the emergency; because obviously it is not for the delegate but for the delegation to say when
and under what circumstances the former may act in behalf of the latter, and not vice-versa.
The theory of those who are of the opinion that the President may determine "whether the
emergency which on December 16, 1941, prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No.
671 delegating extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the time the Chief
Executive exercised those powers," is predicated upon the erroneous assumption that said
Commonwealth Act No. 671 contemplated any other emergency not expressly mentioned in
said Commonwealth Act. This assumption or premise is obviously wrong. Section 1 of said Act
No. 671 expressly states that "the existence of the war between the United States and other
countries of Europe and Asia which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary power in order to meet the resulting emergency." That is the war
emergency. Ant it is evident, and therefore no evidence is requires to prove, that the existence
of the war which involved the Philippines had already ceased before the promulgation of the
executive orders in question, or at least, if the last war has not yet technically terminated in so
far as the United States is concerned, it did no longer involve the Republic of the Philippines
since the inauguration of our Republic or independence from the sovereignty of the United
States.
It is untenable to contend that the words "resulting emergency from the existence of the war" as
used in section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 should be construed to mean any emergency
resulting from or that is the effect of the last war, and not the war emergency itself, and that
therefore it is for the President to determine whether at the time of the promulgation of the
executive orders under consideration such emergency still existed, because such contention
would make Act No. 671 unconstitutional or violative of the provisions of section 26, Article
VI of the Constitution. This constitutional precept distinguishes war emergency from any other
national emergency, such as an economic depression and others which may be the effect of a
war, and empowers the Congress in times of war and other national emergency, to be
determined by Congress itself as we have already said and shown, to authorize the President,
for a limited period that may short or of the same duration but not longer than that of the
emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the policy declared by the Congress
in order to meet the emergency. To construe Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contended would
be to leave the determination of the existence of the emergency to the discretion of the
President, because the effects of the war such as those enumerated by the respondents are not
determined or stated in said Act and could not have been foreseen by the Assembly in enacting
said Act; and because it would make the delegation of powers for an in definite period, since
such an emergency may or may not become depression, effect of the first world war, took place
in the year 1929, or about ten years after the cessation of hostilities in the year 1919; and by no
stretch of imagination or intellectual gymnastics may the failure of the Congress to appropriate
funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950,
and to defray the expenses in connection with the holding of the national election on the second
Tuesday of November, 1949, be considered as an emergency resulting from the last war.
In the enactment of emergency police measures, the questions as to whether an emergency

exists is primarily for the legislature to determine. Such determination, although entitled to
great respect, is not conclusive because the courts, in such cases, posses the final authority to
determine whether an emergency in fact exists. (American Jurisprudence, Vol. XI, page 980.).
No case decided by the courts of last resort in the United States may be cited in support of the
proposition that it is for the President to determine whether there exist an emergency in order to
exercise his emergency powers, and "it is not for the judiciary to review the finding of the
Executive in this regard." There is none and there cannot be any. Because, as we have already
stated at the beginning of this opinion, and we are supported by the above quotation from
American Jurisprudence, the power to pass emergency police legislation in the United States
may be exercised only by the legislature in the exercise of the police power of the State, and it
can not be delegated to the Executive because there is no provision in the State and Federal
constitutions authorizing such delegation as we have in section 26, Article VI, of our
Constitution. As we have already said before, the only legislative power which may be
delegated to the Executive and other administrative bodies or officers in the United States is the
power to promulgate rules and regulations of administrative nature, which does not include the
exercise of the police power of the State.
The ruling laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Ludecke vs. Watkins,
92 Law ed., 1883, quoted by the respondents and dissenters in support of the proposition that
"only in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the
government is judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution," has no application to the present case; because the question involved in the
present case is not a political but a justiciable question, while the question in issue in said
Ludecke case was the power of the court to review "the determination of the President in the
postwar period that an alien enemy should be deported, even though active hostilities have
ceased," and it was held that it was a political question and, therefore, was not subject to judicial
review.
CONCLUSION
In view of all the foregoing, we have to conclude and declare that the executive orders
promulgated by the President under Commonwealth Act 671 before the date of the adjournment
of the regular session of the Congress on the Philippines in 1946 are valid, because said
Commonwealth Act was then still in force; but the executive orders promulgated after the said
date are null and void, because Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to be in force in
so far as the delegation of powers was concerned. Therefore, are null and void the Executive
Order No. 192 promulgated on December 24, 1948, on the control of exports from the
Philippines; the Executive Order No. 225 dated June 15, 1949, appropriating funds for the
operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1,
1949 to June 30, 1950; and the Executive Order No. 226 promulgated on June 15, 1949,
appropriating the sum of six million pesos to defray the expenses in connection with, and
incidental to, the holding of the national election to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1949.
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and
DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the
respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the
first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as
follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most
number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the
following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA

QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of
which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este
dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in
the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest",
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of
the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to
prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be
presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after
confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the
aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ
prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings
of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the
Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution,
whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to
them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission
can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power
to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected
and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and
paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein
raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the
respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of
the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting
its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of
protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to
adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the
same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with
jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme
Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election
of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed,
could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of
election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by
the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior
tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on
March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last
day for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the
Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution,
by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said
respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of
January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the
jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period
within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction
over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution,
endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be
article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended
thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition
from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress
of the united States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent
Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case"
by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal
propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming
to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy.
However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading
the issue. Being a case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty
to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be
doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question
of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent
of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative
power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the
further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the
Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in
the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is
essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other
than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds
for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The
Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment
of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility,
but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole,
under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions
provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more
than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of
the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is
not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing
must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . .
. aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must
the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of
Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935,
confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral
Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for
the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after
December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is
mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave

constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our
country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is
thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer
hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and
even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of
constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries
which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law.
This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct
prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the
Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine
the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this
power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia
(arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic,
February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931)
especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our
case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we
to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our
constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework?
To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of
the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel
for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article
VI of the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this
constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted
it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par.
5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as
follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to
emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court
has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding
contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-
committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of
Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive
officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate
impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of
hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the
Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest
corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to
be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case
the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications
consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two
senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two
representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of
two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to
the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the
Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting
the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted,
as to each House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest
number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest
number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as

proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the
Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in
favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral
Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on
Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made
further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a
bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934,
reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all
cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second
largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof
the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on
the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the
power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by
reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party.
The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46),
thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by
the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of
said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style
Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention,
agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the
words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-
partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57,
58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political
parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which
are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of
proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership.
One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was
denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and
investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to report their
proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election
petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and other
evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the
form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other
mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was
adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a
committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called an
open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named
was required to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the
committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of
membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year
1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere
party questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for
Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his
office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks,
of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of decency
and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house
were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more
serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George
Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for
the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a
bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in
parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to
the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective
causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is
scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite
sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by
the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested
election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity
between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon
themselves the partial management of the very business, upon which they should determine
with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill
which met with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of
April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of
which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of
commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or
statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy,
may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement,
which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been
entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De
Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk
of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new
system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of
one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-
partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to
two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance
with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become
imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as
amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s.
2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring
Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI,
p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the
Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house,
are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests
against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the
Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of
Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13,
1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly
in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of
February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art.
43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the
legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential
elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the
two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a
contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol.
19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members
elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices
of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The
decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting
separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of
America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of
that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United
States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship
of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their
majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the
history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they
deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with
the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their
own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the
world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which
the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of
some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved
by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of
the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and
"ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining
to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as
the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the
majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in
the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is,
to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision
(section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative
Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it
is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the
National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission
and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be
filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in
such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to
the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of
our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but
a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to
time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare
authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to
render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to
act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The
power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably
lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is
obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner
regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the
national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its
acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission
in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed
out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138,
139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission
may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the
disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But
the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power
that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the
remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as
much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to
it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All
the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes,
and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action
must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends
for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional
agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of
human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however
illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are
considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the
intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in
section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year.
The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does
appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved
a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to
the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court
the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were
respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the
effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the
National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation
in such cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral
Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be
followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was
not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3,
1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests
was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be
"the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation
by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have
been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in
its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the
protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not
required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of
fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-
elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
(No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the
United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his
seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting
such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of
office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs.
21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is
adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted
elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being
informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the
Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a
writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may
require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision
of the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or
amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec.
166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the
Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members
should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a
law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of
formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each
house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose
election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting
off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested
(Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89;
Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin
[Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs.
Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp.
1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First
Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones
Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the
reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to
prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional
provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And
what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the
medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof,
the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear
and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the
rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests
against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and
bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom
no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of
its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that
the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the
time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as
a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the
present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is
an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO
PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be borne by
everyone, and the more man enjoys the advantages of society, the more he ought to hold
himself honored in contributing to those expenses.
-Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781)
French statesman and economist

Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education,
increased emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax
benefits … these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted.
Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its extensive constitutional power of
review, cannot probe. The petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom of
the law, but also perceived constitutional infirmities in its passage.
Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments
notwithstanding, petitioners failed to justify their call for the invalidity of the law. Hence, R.A.
No. 9337 is not unconstitutional.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and
3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950.
House Bill No. 3555 was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House
Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill, in substitution of House Bill No. 1468,
which Representative (Rep.) Eric D. Singson introduced on August 8, 2004. The President
certified the bill on January 7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On January 27, 2005, the
House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading.
House Bill No. 3705 on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced by Rep.
Salacnib F. Baterina, and House Bill No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras. Its
"mother bill" is House Bill No. 3555. The House Committee on Ways and Means
approved the bill on February 2, 2005. The President also certified it as urgent on
February 8, 2005. The House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third
reading on February 28, 2005.
Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No. 19504 on
March 7, 2005, "in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873, taking into
consideration House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705." Senator Ralph G. Recto sponsored Senate Bill
No. 1337, while Senate Bill Nos. 1838 and 1873 were both sponsored by Sens. Franklin M.
Drilon, Juan M. Flavier and Francis N. Pangilinan. The President certified the bill on March 11,
2005, and was approved by the Senate on second and third reading on April 13, 2005.
On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of
Representatives for a committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed
bills.
Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No.
3555, House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, "after having met and discussed in
full free and conference," recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate did
on May 10, 2005, and with the House of Representatives agreeing thereto the next day,
May 11, 2005.
On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was
transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came
R.A. No. 9337.
July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337. When said date came, the Court issued
a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders,
enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing the law.
Oral arguments were held on July 14, 2005. Significantly, during the hearing, the Court
speaking through Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, voiced the rationale for its issuance of the
temporary restraining order on July 1, 2005, to wit:
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . But before I go into the details of your presentation, let me just tell you
a little background. You know when the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a
TRO at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon. But before that, there was a lot of complaints aired on
television and on radio. Some people in a gas station were complaining that the gas prices went
up by 10%. Some people were complaining that their electric bill will go up by 10%. Other
times people riding in domestic air carrier were complaining that the prices that they’ll have to
pay would have to go up by 10%. While all that was being aired, per your presentation and per
our own understanding of the law, that’s not true. It’s not true that the e-vat law necessarily
increased prices by 10% uniformly isn’t it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : No, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : It is not?
ATTY. BANIQUED : It’s not, because, Your Honor, there is an Executive Order that granted
the Petroleum companies some subsidy . . . interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : That’s correct . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : . . . and therefore that was meant to temper the impact . . . interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . mitigating measures . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : As a matter of fact a part of the mitigating measures would be the
elimination of the Excise Tax and the import duties. That is why, it is not correct to say that the
VAT as to petroleum dealers increased prices by 10%.
J. PANGANIBAN : And therefore, there is no justification for increasing the retail price by
10% to cover the E-Vat tax. If you consider the excise tax and the import duties, the Net Tax
would probably be in the neighborhood of 7%? We are not going into exact figures I am just
trying to deliver a point that different industries, different products, different services are hit
differently. So it’s not correct to say that all prices must go up by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : You’re right, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Now. For instance, Domestic Airline companies, Mr. Counsel, are at
present imposed a Sales Tax of 3%. When this E-Vat law took effect the Sales Tax was also
removed as a mitigating measure. So, therefore, there is no justification to increase the fares by
10% at best 7%, correct?
ATTY. BANIQUED : I guess so, Your Honor, yes.
J. PANGANIBAN : There are other products that the people were complaining on that first day,
were being increased arbitrarily by 10%. And that’s one reason among many others this Court
had to issue TRO because of the confusion in the implementation. That’s why we added as an
issue in this case, even if it’s tangentially taken up by the pleadings of the parties, the confusion
in the implementation of the E-vat. Our people were subjected to the mercy of that confusion of
an across the board increase of 10%, which you yourself now admit and I think even the
Government will admit is incorrect. In some cases, it should be 3% only, in some cases it
should be 6% depending on these mitigating measures and the location and situation of each
product, of each service, of each company, isn’t it?
J. PANGANIBAN : Alright. So that’s one reason why we had to issue a TRO pending the
clarification of all these and we wish the government will take time to clarify all these by means
of a more detailed implementing rules, in case the law is upheld by this Court. . . .
The Court also directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda.
G.R. No. 168056

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4,
5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods
and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes
a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions
contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following
conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of
the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
ISSUES
The Court defined the issues, as follows:

PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the
NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC;
and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following
provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article III, Section 1
RULING OF THE COURT
As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of value-
added tax (VAT), as the confusion and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a fallacious notion of
its nature.
The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or
lease of goods or properties and services. Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller of
goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer, with the seller acting merely
as a tax collector. The burden of VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and
ultimately, the end-consumers.
In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or
business it engages in, without transferring the burden to someone else . Examples are
individual and corporate income taxes, transfer taxes, and residence taxes.
In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in existence, albeit in
a different mode. Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax computed under the "cost
deduction method" and was payable only by the original sellers. The single-stage system was
subsequently modified, and a mixture of the "cost deduction method" and "tax credit method"
was used to determine the value-added tax payable. Under the "tax credit method," an entity can
credit against or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its
purchases, inputs and imports.
It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 273, that
the VAT system was rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or 10% on all
sales using the "tax credit method."
E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law, R.A. No. 8241 or the
Improved VAT Law,17 R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997,18 and finally, the
presently beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also referred to by respondents as the VAT Reform Act.
The Court will now discuss the issues in logical sequence.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
I. Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
A. The Bicameral Conference Committee

Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference
Committee exceeded its authority by:
1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A.
No. 9337;
2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;
3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited
against the output tax; and
4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds
of taxes in addition to the value-added tax.
Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference
Committee. It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline
are intrinsic in any legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the
power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation,
either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order." Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3)
of the Constitution provides that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings."
Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of
procedure, the respective rules of each house of Congress provided for the creation of a
Bicameral Conference Committee.
Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides as
follows:
Sec. 88. Conference Committee. – In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on
the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference
committees of both chambers.
In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere
to and support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they
materially impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to the House for the latter’s
appropriate action.
Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. – . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report
prior to the voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the
same manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third and final reading.
Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:
Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10) days after their composition. The
President shall designate the members of the Senate Panel in the conference committee with the
approval of the Senate.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement
of the changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of
the members of each House panel, voting separately.
A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a reconciled
version thereof with the explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be attached to
the report.
The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not
addressed by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find
themselves in disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the other house in
a legislative bill. Given that one of the most basic powers of the legislative branch is to
formulate and implement its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its members, may the
Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies with its internal rules or how it
conducts its business of passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the issue is not
whether provisions of the rules of both houses creating the bicameral conference
committee are unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral conference committee has
strictly complied with the rules of both houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction
conferred upon it by Congress.
In the recent case of Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary,20 the Court En Banc, unanimously
reiterated and emphasized its adherence to the "enrolled bill doctrine," thus, declining therein
petitioners’ plea for the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. Assailed in said case
was Congress’s creation of two sets of bicameral conference committees, the lack of records of
said committees’ proceedings, the alleged violation of said committees of the rules of both
houses, and the disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the compromise bill
submitted by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such irregularities in the
passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.
Striking down such argument, the Court held thus:

Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this
case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules
of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the
House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the COURTS HAVE NO CONCERN. Whatever doubts there may be as to
the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its
ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply
with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate,
courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that
"Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure."21
(Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege
irregularities committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting
provisions in the House and Senate bills. Akin to the Fariñas case, the present petitions also
raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference committee on matters regarding
Congress’ compliance with its own internal rules. As stated earlier, one of the most basic and
inherent power of the legislature is the power to formulate rules for its proceedings and the
discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business
expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the sole concern of Congress to instill
discipline among the members of its conference committee if it believes that said members
violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court
cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of Congress, thus, the
Court is wont to deny a review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of
government.
Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary
of Finance, the Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the
practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this
question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each
house." To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It
seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee
to be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the proceedings of
the bicameral conference committees, the Court deems it necessary to dwell on the issue. The
Court observes that there was a necessity for a conference committee because a
comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and Senate
Bill No. 1950 on the other, reveals that there were indeed disagreements. As pointed out in
the petitions, said disagreements were as follows:
House Bill No. 3555 House Bill No. 3705 Senate Bill No. 1950
With regard to "Stand-By Authority" in favor of President
Provides for 12% VAT on Provides for 12% VAT in Provides for a single rate of
every sale of goods or general on sales of goods or 10% VAT on sale of goods
properties (amending Sec. properties and reduced rates or properties (amending
106 of NIRC); 12% VAT for sale of certain locally Sec. 106 of NIRC), 10%
on importation of goods manufactured goods and VAT on sale of services
(amending Sec. 107 of petroleum products and raw including sale of electricity
NIRC); and 12% VAT on materials to be used in the by generation companies,
sale of services and use or manufacture thereof (amending transmission and
lease of properties Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12% VAT distribution companies, and
(amending Sec. 108 of on importation of goods and use or lease of properties
NIRC) reduced rates for certain (amending Sec. 108 of
imported products including NIRC)
petroleum products (amending
Sec. 107 of NIRC); and 12%
VAT on sale of services and
use or lease of properties and a
reduced rate for certain
services including power
generation (amending Sec. 108
of NIRC)
With regard to the "no pass-on" provision
No similar provision Provides that the VAT Provides that the VAT
imposed on power generation imposed on sales of
and on the sale of petroleum electricity by generation
products shall be absorbed by companies and services of
generation companies or transmission companies and
sellers, respectively, and shall distribution companies, as
not be passed on to well as those of franchise
consumers grantees of electric utilities
shall not apply to residential
end-users. VAT shall be
absorbed by generation,
transmission, and
distribution companies.
With regard to 70% limit on input tax credit
Provides that the input tax No similar provision Provides that the input tax
credit for capital goods on credit for capital goods on
which a VAT has been which a VAT has been paid
paid shall be equally shall be equally distributed
distributed over 5 years or over 5 years or the
the depreciable life of such depreciable life of such
capital goods; the input tax capital goods; the input tax
credit for goods and credit for goods and
services other than capital services other than capital
goods shall not exceed 5% goods shall not exceed 90%
of the total amount of such of the output VAT.
goods and services; and for
persons engaged in retail
trading of goods, the
allowable input tax credit
shall not exceed 11% of
the total amount of goods
purchased.
With regard to amendments to be made to NIRC provisions regarding income
and excise taxes
No similar provision No similar provision Provided for
amendments to several
NIRC provisions
regarding corporate
income, percentage,
franchise and excise
taxes
THE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS IN THE HOUSE BILLS AND

THE SENATE BILL were with regard to:
(1) what rate of VAT is to be imposed;
(2) whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution
companies should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the Senate bill, or both the
VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT
imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in
the House bill;
(3) in what manner input tax credits should be limited;
(4) and whether the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes, percentage, franchise and
excise taxes should be amended.
There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the House and
Senate bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the rules of both houses
of Congress to act on the same by settling said differences and/or disagreements.
The Bicameral Conference Committee acted on the disagreeing provisions by making the
following changes:
1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear from the
Conference Committee Report that the Bicameral Conference Committee tried to bridge the gap
in the difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the Senate, and the various rates with
12% as the highest VAT rate proposed by the House, by striking a compromise whereby the
present 10% VAT rate would be retained until certain conditions arise, i.e., the value-
added tax collection as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds 2 4/5%, or National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds 1½%, when the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance
shall raise the rate of VAT to 12% effective January 1, 2006.
2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation,
transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers or whether both
the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the
VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products may be passed on to consumers, the Bicameral
Conference Committee chose to settle such disagreement by altogether deleting from its Report
any no pass-on provision.
3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or not, the
Bicameral Conference Committee decided to adopt the position of the House by putting a
limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax, although it
crafted its own language as to the amount of the limitation on input tax credits and the manner
of computing the same by providing thus:
(A) Creditable Input Tax. – . ..

Provided, The input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or
business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread
evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate
acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds one million
Pesos (₱1,000,000.00): PROVIDED, however, that if the estimated useful life of the capital
good is less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be
spread over such shorter period: . . .
(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. – If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the
input tax, the excess shall be paid by the VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the
output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters: PROVIDED
that the input tax inclusive of input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be
credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT any input tax attributable to zero-rated sales by a VAT-
registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue
taxes, . . .
4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate income tax,
franchise, percentage and excise taxes, the conference committee decided to include such
amendments and basically adopted the provisions found in Senate Bill No. 1950, with some
changes as to the rate of the tax to be imposed.
Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the
Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing
provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term "settle" is synonymous to "reconcile"
and "harmonize." To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference
Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b)
decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be
carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the
disagreeing provisions.
In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on
disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing
provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign to the subject
embraced by the original provisions.
The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10% VAT
wanted by the Senate is retained until such time that certain conditions arise when the 12%
VAT wanted by the House shall be imposed, appears to be a compromise to try to bridge the
difference in the rate of VAT proposed by the two houses of Congress. Nevertheless, such
compromise is still totally within the subject of what rate of VAT should be imposed on
taxpayers.
The no pass-on provision was deleted altogether. In the transcripts of the proceedings of the
Bicameral Conference Committee held on May 10, 2005, Sen. Ralph Recto, Chairman of the
Senate Panel, explained the reason for deleting the no pass-on provision in this wise:
. . . the thinking was just to keep the VAT law or the VAT bill simple. And we were thinking
that no sector should be a beneficiary of legislative grace, neither should any sector be
discriminated on. The VAT is an indirect tax. It is a pass on-tax. And let’s keep it plain and
simple. Let’s not confuse the bill and put a no pass-on provision. Two-thirds of the world have
a VAT system and in this two-thirds of the globe, I have yet to see a VAT with a no pass-
though provision. So, the thinking of the Senate is basically simple, let’s keep the VAT
simple.26 (Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Teodoro Locsin further made the manifestation that the no pass-on provision "never really
enjoyed the support of either House."27
With regard to the amount of input tax to be credited against output tax, the Bicameral
Conference Committee came to a compromise on the percentage rate of the limitation or cap on
such input tax credit, but again, the change introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee
was totally within the intent of both houses to put a cap on input tax that may be
credited against the output tax. From the inception of the subject revenue bill in the House of
Representatives, one of the major objectives was to "plug a glaring loophole in the tax policy
and administration by creating vital restrictions on the claiming of input VAT tax credits . . ."
and "[b]y introducing limitations on the claiming of tax credit, we are capping a major leakage
that has placed our collection efforts at an apparent disadvantage."
As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on taxes other than the value-added tax proposed in
Senate Bill No. 1950, since said provisions were among those referred to it, the conference
committee had to act on the same and it basically adopted the version of the Senate.
Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee
were germane to subjects of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. Such being the
case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. In the earlier cases of
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Court
recognized the long-standing legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample
latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino
case, it was held that:
. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can
propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot
propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of
Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case
the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.
(Emphasis supplied)
B.) R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the "No-
Amendment Rule"
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Petitioners’ argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to
add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three
readings is in effect a circumvention of the "no amendment rule" (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its ruling in the Tolentino case
that:
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee’s Report in these cases must have
undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .
Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first
time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers ONLY TO THE PROCEDURE
TO BE FOLLOWED BY EACH HOUSE OF CONGRESS with regard to bills initiated in
each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its
concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any
further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this
would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional
power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the
Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference
Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been
acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
C.) R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on Exclusive
Origination of Revenue Bills
Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC provisions on
corporate income taxes and percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer to the following
provisions, to wit:
Section 27 Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation

28(A)(1) Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation
28(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
34(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
116 Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT
117 Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage
119 Tax on franchises
121 Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries
148 Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels
151 Excise Tax on mineral products
236 Registration requirements
237 Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices
288 Disposition of Incremental Revenue
Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate
from the House. They aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding
Sections 106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC, while House Bill No. 3705 proposed
amendments only to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the NIRC; thus, the other
sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended but which amendments were not found in
the House bills are not intended to be amended by the House of Representatives. Hence,
they argue that since the proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such
amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
The argument does not hold water.
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that
initiated the move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added
tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No.
1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also
amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of
provisions not dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being
amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing
the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the
House?
The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court
held, thus:
To begin with, it is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to
"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that
the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as
a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute –
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law – must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not
only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House
superior to the Senate.
Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its
own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate
in the House.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach
the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in
Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes.
Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation
on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue
bill.
Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that had not
been touched in the House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the House in initiating the
subject revenue bills. The Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1468, the very first House bill
introduced on the floor, which was later substituted by House Bill No. 3555, stated:
One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting task of
solving the country’s serious financial problems. To do this, government expenditures must be
strictly monitored and controlled and revenues must be significantly increased. This may be
easier said than done, but our fiscal authorities are still optimistic the government will be
operating on a balanced budget by the year 2009. In fact, several measures that will result to
significant expenditure savings have been identified by the administration. It is supported with a
credible package of revenue measures that include measures to improve tax administration and
control the leakages in revenues from income taxes and the value-added tax (VAT). (Emphasis
supplied)
Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared that:
In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all
acknowledged that on top of our agenda must be the restoration of the health of our fiscal
system.
In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually achieve a
balanced budget by the year 2009, we need to seize windows of opportunities which might
seem poignant in the beginning, but in the long run prove effective and beneficial to the overall
status of our economy. One such opportunity is a review of existing tax rates, evaluating the
relevance given our present conditions.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is
to bring in sizeable revenues for the government
to supplement our country’s serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and
control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house
bills were transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of
national perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can
provide for ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by
distributing the burden across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the
consumers. The sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph Recto on why the provisions on income tax
on corporation were included is worth quoting:
All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise ₱64.3 billion in
additional revenues annually even while by mitigating prices of power, services and petroleum
products.
However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only ₱48.7 billion amount is from
the VAT on twelve goods and services. The rest of the tab – ₱10.5 billion- will be picked by
corporations.
What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and the
consumer. Why should the latter bear all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation be only on
the burden of the consumer?
The corporate world’s equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax from 32 to
35 percent, but up to 2008 only. This will raise ₱10.5 billion a year. After that, the rate will
slide back, not to its old rate of 32 percent, but two notches lower, to 30 percent.
Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this emergency
provision that will be in effect for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house in order. This fiscal
medicine will have an expiry date.
For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the length of their
sacrifice brief. We would like to assure them that not because there is a light at the end of the
tunnel, this government will keep on making the tunnel long.
The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big business
will be there to share the burden.
As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made
on provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills
which is to raise revenues for the government.
Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes germane to
the reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on
consumers. Considering that certain goods and services which were subject to percentage tax
and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt, the consumer would be burdened more as they
would be paying the VAT in addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend these
sections to soften the impact of VAT. Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said:
However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise tax on
bunker fuel, to lessen the effect of a VAT on this product.
For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for a VAT.
And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to destroy
the VAT chain, we will however bring down the excise tax on socially sensitive products such
as diesel, bunker, fuel and kerosene.
What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left hand what
was taken from the right. Rather, these sprang from our concern of softening the impact of
VAT, so that the people can cushion the blow of higher prices they will have to pay as a result
of VAT.
The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration which are
necessary for the implementation of the changes in the VAT system.
To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and
purposes of the house bills, which is to supplement our country’s fiscal deficit, among others.
Thus, the Senate acted within its power to propose those amendments.
CONCLUSION
It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an enema, a
first-aid measure to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither blind nor is it
turning a deaf ear on the plight of the masses. But it does not have the panacea for the malady
that the law seeks to remedy. As in other cases, the Court cannot strike down a law as
unconstitutional simply because of its yokes.
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and that
the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the
judicature may not correct, for instance, those involving political questions.
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of
remedies for all political or social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has
judiciously allocated the powers of government to three distinct and separate compartments;
and that judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the independence of the three,
and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian
of the others and that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either by
impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.100
The words of the Court in Vera vs. Avelino101 holds true then, as it still holds true now. All
things considered, there is no raison d'être for the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.
WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.
There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A.
No. 9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon
finality of herein decision.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE CONCURRING
AND DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
While I still hold on to my position expressed in my dissenting opinion in the first VAT
cases,1 I partly yield to the application to the cases at bar of the rule on "germaneness" therein
enunciated. Thus, I concur with the ponencia of my highly-esteemed colleague Mme. Justice
Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez except as regards its ruling on the issue of whether Republic Act
No. 9337 violates Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution.
R.A. No. 9337 primarily aims to restructure the value-added tax (VAT) system by broadening
its base and raising the rate so as to generate more revenues for the government that can assuage
the economic predicament that our country is now facing. This recently enacted law stemmed
from three legislative bills: House Bill (HB) No. 3555, HB No. 3705, and Senate Bill (SB)
1950. The first (HB No. 3555) called for the amendment of Sections 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,
and 111 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) as amended; while the second (HB No.
3705) proposed amendments to Sections 106, 107, 108, 110, and 114 of the NIRC, as amended.
It is significant to note that all these Sections specifically deal with VAT. And indubitably,
these bills are revenue bills in that they are intended to levy taxes and raise funds for the
government.2
On the other hand, SB No. 1950 introduced amendments to "Sections 27, 28, 34, 106, 108, 109,
110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 125, 148, 236, 237, and 288" of the NIRC, as
amended. Among the provisions sought to be amended, only Sections 106, 108, 109, 110, 111,
112, 113, 114, and 116 pertain to VAT. And while Sections 236, 237, and 288 are
administrative provisions pertaining to registration requirements and issuance of receipts

commercial invoices, the proposed amendments thereto are related to VAT. Hence, the
proposed amendments to these Sections were validly taken cognizance of and properly
considered by the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC).
However, I am of the opinion that the inclusion into the law of the amendments proposed in SB
No. 1950 to the following provisions (with modifications on the rates of taxes) is invalid.
Provision Subject matter
Section 27 Rate of income tax on domestic corporations
Section 28(A)(1) Rate of income tax on resident foreign corporation
Section 28(B)(1) Rate of income tax on non-resident foreign corporation
Section 28(B)(5-b) Rate of income tax on intra-corporate dividends received by non-resident
foreign corporation
Section 34(B)(1) Deductions from gross income
Section 117 Percentage tax on domestic carriers and keepers of garages
Section 119 Tax on franchises
Section 148 Excise tax on manufactured oils and other fuels
Obviously, these provisions do not deal with VAT. It must be noted that the House Bills
initiated amendments to provisions pertaining to VAT only. Doubtless, the Senate has the
constitutional power to concur with the amendments to the VAT provisions introduced in the
House Bills or even to propose its own version of VAT measure. But that power does not
extend to initiation of other tax measures, such as introducing amendments to provisions on
corporate income taxes, percentage taxes, franchise taxes, and excise taxes like what the Senate
did in these cases. It was beyond the ambit of the authority of the Senate to propose
amendments to provisions not covered by the House Bills or not related to the subject matter of
the House Bills, which is VAT. To allow the Senate to do so would be tantamount to vesting in
it the power to initiate revenue bills -- a power that exclusively pertains to the House of
Representatives under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Moreover, Sections 121 (Percentage Tax on Banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries) and
151 (Excise Tax on Mineral Products) of the NIRC, as amended, have been included by the
BCC in R.A. N0. 9337 even though they were not found in the Senate and House Bills.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,3 the Court described the function of a conference
committee in this wise: "A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or
it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits
the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill."
The limitation on the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions was laid down
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.4 There, the Court, while recognizing the power of a
conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either
in the House bill or in the Senate bill, held that the exercise of that power is subject to the
condition that the said provision is "germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills."
As pointed out by the petitioners, Tolentino differs from the present cases in the sense that in
that case the amendments introduced in the Senate bill were on the same subject matter treated
in the House bill, which was VAT, and the new provision inserted by the conference committee
had relation to that subject matter. Specifically, HB No. 11197 called for the (1) amendment of
Sections 99,100,102,103,104,105,106,107, 108, 110, 112,115, 116, 236,237, and 238 of the
NIRC, as amended; and (2) repeal of Sections 113 and 114 of the NIRC, as amended. SB No.
1630, on the other hand, proposed the (1) amendment of Sections 99,100,102,103,104,105,107,
108, 110, 112, 236, 237, and 238 of the NIRC, as amended; and (2) repeal of Sections 113, 114,
and 116 of the NIRC, as amended. In short, all the provisions sought to be changed in the
Senate bill were covered in the House bill. Although the new provisions inserted by the
conference committee were not found in either the House or Senate bills, they were germane to
the general subject of the bills.
In the present cases, the provisions inserted by the BCC, namely, Sections 121 (Percentage Tax
on Banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries) and 151 (Excise Tax on Mineral Products) of
the NIRC, as amended, are undoubtedly germane to SB No. 1950, which introduced
amendments to the provisions on percentage and excise taxes -- but foreign to HB Nos. 3555
and 3705, which dealt with VAT only. Since the proposed amendments in the Senate bill
relating to percentage and excise taxes cannot themselves be sustained because they did not take
their root from, or are not related to the subject of, HB Nos. 3705 and 3555, in violation of
Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the new provisions inserted by the BCC on
percentage and excise taxes would have no leg to stand on.
I understand very well that the amendments of the Senate and the BCC relating to corporate
income, percentage, franchise, and excise taxes were designed to "soften the impact of VAT
measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden across all sectors instead of putting it
entirely on the shoulders of the consumers" and to alleviate the country’s financial problems by
bringing more revenues for the government. However, these commendable intentions do not
justify a deviation from the Constitution, which mandates that the initiative for filing revenue
bills should come from the House of Representatives, not from the Senate. After all, these aims
may still be realized by means of another bill that may later be initiated by the House of
Representatives.
Therefore, I vote to declare R.A. No. 9337 as constitutional insofar as it amends provisions
pertaining to VAT. However, I vote to declare as unconstitutional Sections 1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 16,
17, and 18 thereof which, respectively, amend Sections 27, 28, 34, 117, 119, 121, 148, and 151
of the NIRC, as amended because these amendments deal with subject matters which were not
touched or covered by the bills emanating from the House of Representatives, thereby violating
Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution.
CONCURRING AND
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The main opinion of Madam Justice Martinez exhaustively discusses the numerous
constitutional and legal issues raised by the petitioners. Be that as it may, I wish to raise the
following points, viz:
First. Petitioners assail sections 4 to 6 of Republic Act No. 9337 as violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power. These sections authorize the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the value-added tax (VAT) rate to
12% effective January 1, 2006, upon satisfaction of the following conditions: viz:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 ½%).
The power of judicial review under Article VIII, section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution is limited
to the review of "actual cases and controversies."1 As rightly stressed by retired Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, this requirement gives the judiciary "the opportunity, denied to the
legislature, of seeing the actual operation of the statute as it is applied to actual facts and thus
enables it to reach sounder judgment" and "enhances public acceptance of its role in our system
of government."2 It also assures that the judiciary does not intrude on areas committed to the
other branches of government and is confined to its role as defined by the
Constitution.3 Apposite thereto is the doctrine of ripeness whose basic rationale is "to prevent
the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements."4 Central to the doctrine is the determination of "whether the case

involves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all."5 The ripeness requirement must be satisfied for each challenged legal
provision and parts of a statute so that those which are "not immediately involved are not
thereby thrown open for a judicial determination of constitutionality."6
It is manifest that the constitutional challenge to sections 4 to 6 of R.A. No. 9337 cannot hurdle
the requirement of ripeness. These sections give the President the power to raise the VAT
rate to 12% on January 1, 2006 upon satisfaction of certain fact-based conditions. We are
not endowed with the infallible gift of prophesy to know whether these conditions are certain to
happen. The power to adjust the tax rate given to the President is futuristic and may or may not
be exercised. The Court is therefore beseeched to render a conjectural judgment based on
hypothetical facts. Such a supplication has to be rejected.
Second. With due respect, I submit that the most important constitutional issue posed by the
petitions at bar relates to the parameters of power of a Bicameral Conference
Committee. Most of the issues in the petitions at bar arose because the Bicameral Conference
Committee concerned exercised powers that went beyond reconciling the differences between
Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555. In Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance,7 I ventured the view that a Bicameral Conference Committee has limited powers and
cannot be allowed to act as if it were a "third house" of Congress. I further warned that unless
its roving powers are reigned in, a Bicameral Conference Committee can wreck the lawmaking
process which is a cornerstone of the democratic, republican regime established in our
Constitution. The passage of time fortifies my faith that there ought to be no legal u-turn on this
preeminent principle. I wish, therefore, to reiterate my reasons for this unbending view, viz:8
Section 209, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate provides:
In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision
of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both
Houses which shall meet within ten days after their composition.
of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
(Emphasis supplied)
The counterpart rule of the House of Representatives is cast in near identical language. Section
85 of the Rules of the House of Representatives pertinently provides:
In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or
joint resolution, the differences may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
x x x. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments to the subject measure. (Emphasis supplied)
The Jefferson’s Manual has been adopted as a supplement to our parliamentary rules and
practice. Section 456 of Jefferson’s Manual similarly confines the powers of a conference
committee, viz:
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them …
and may not include subjects not within the disagreements, even though germane to a question
in issue.
This rule of antiquity has been honed and honored in practice by the Congress of the United
States. Thus, it is chronicled by Floyd Biddick, Parliamentarian Emeritus of the United States
Senate, viz:
Committees of conference are appointed for the sole purpose of compromising and adjusting
the differing and conflicting opinions of the two Houses and the committees of conference alone
can grant compromises and modify propositions of either Houses within the limits of the
disagreement. Conferees are limited to the consideration of differences between the two
Houses.
Congress shall not insert in their report matters not committed to them by either House, nor
shall they strike from the bill matters agreed to by both Houses. No matter on which there is
nothing in either the Senate or House passed versions of a bill may be included in the
conference report and actions to the contrary would subject the report to a point of order.
(Emphasis ours)
In fine, there is neither a sound nor a syllable in the Rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to support the thesis of the respondents that a bicameral conference committee
is clothed with an ex post veto power.
But the thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can wield ex post veto power does not
only contravene the rules of both the Senate and the House. It wages war against our settled
ideals of representative democracy. For the inevitable, catastrophic effect of the thesis is to
install a Bicameral Conference Committee as the Third Chamber of our
Congress, similarly vested with the power to make laws but with the dissimilarity that its laws
are not the subject of a free and full discussion of both Houses of Congress. With such a vagrant
power, a Bicameral Conference Committee acting as a Third Chamber will be a constitutional
monstrosity.
It needs no omniscience to perceive that our Constitution did not provide for a Congress
composed of three chambers. On the contrary, section 1, Article VI of the Constitution provides
in clear and certain language: "The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives …" Note that in
vesting legislative power exclusively to the Senate and the House, the Constitution used the
word "shall." Its command for a Congress of two houses is mandatory. It is not mandatory
sometimes.
In vesting legislative power to the Senate, the Constitution means the Senate "… composed of
twenty-four Senators xxx elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines …"
Similarly, when the Constitution vested the legislative power to the House, it means the House
"… composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members xxx who shall be elected from
legislative districts xxx and those who xxx shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The Constitution thus, did
not vest on a Bicameral Conference Committee with an ad hoc membership the power to
legislate for it exclusively vested legislative power to the Senate and the House as co-equal
bodies. To be sure, the Constitution does not mention the Bicameral Conference Committees of
Congress. No constitutional status is accorded to them. They are not even statutory creations.
They owe their existence from the internal rules of the two Houses of Congress. Yet,
respondents peddle the disconcerting idea that they should be recognized as a Third Chamber of
Congress and with ex post veto power at that.
The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can exercise law making power with ex
post veto power is freighted with mischief. Law making is a power that can be used for good or
for ill, hence, our Constitution carefully laid out a plan and a procedure for its exercise. Firstly,
it vouchsafed that the power to make laws should be exercised by no other body except the
Senate and the House. It ought to be indubitable that what is contemplated is the Senate acting
as a full Senate and the House acting as a full House. It is only when the Senate and the House
act as whole bodies that they truly represent the people. And it is only when they represent the
people that they can legitimately pass laws. Laws that are not enacted by the people’s rightful
representatives subvert the people’s sovereignty. Bicameral Conference Committees, with
their ad hoc character and limited membership, cannot pass laws for they do not represent the
people. The Constitution does not allow the tyranny of the majority. Yet, the respondents will
impose the worst kind of tyranny – the tyranny of the minority over the majority. Secondly, the
Constitution delineated in deft strokes the steps to be followed in making laws. The overriding
purpose of these procedural rules is to assure that only bills that successfully survive the
searching scrutiny of the proper committees of Congress and the full and unfettered
deliberations of both Houses can become laws. For this reason, a bill has to undergo three (3)
mandatory separate readings in each House. In the case at bench, the additions and deletions
made by the Bicameral Conference Committee did not enjoy the enlightened studies of
appropriate committees. It is meet to note that the complexities of modern day legislations have
made our committee system a significant part of the legislative process. Thomas Reed called the
committee system as "the eye, the ear, the hand, and very often the brain of the house."
President Woodrow Wilson of the United States once referred to the government of the United
States as "a government by the Chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress …" Neither
did these additions and deletions of the Bicameral Conference Committee pass through the coils
of collective deliberation of the members of the two Houses acting separately. Due to this
shortcircuiting of the constitutional procedure of making laws, confusion shrouds the enactment
of R.A. No. 7716. Who inserted the additions and deletions remains a mystery. Why they were
inserted is a riddle. To use a Churchillian phrase, lawmaking should not be a riddle wrapped in
an enigma. It cannot be, for Article II, section 28 of the Constitution mandates the State to adopt
and implement a "policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest." The Constitution could not have contemplated a Congress of invisible and
unaccountable John and Mary Does. A law whose rationale is a riddle and whose authorship is
obscure cannot bind the people.
All these notwithstanding, respondents resort to the legal cosmetology that these additions and
deletions should govern the people as laws because the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report was anyway submitted to and approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The submission may have some merit with respect to provisions agreed upon by the Committee
in the process of reconciling conflicts between S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197. In these
instances, the conflicting provisions had been previously screened by the proper committees,
deliberated upon by both Houses and approved by them. It is, however, a different matter with
respect to additions and deletions which were entirely new and which were made not to
reconcile inconsistencies between S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197. The members of the
Bicameral Conference Committee did not have any authority to add new provisions or delete
provisions already approved by both Houses as it was not necessary to discharge their limited
task of reconciling differences in bills. At that late stage of law making, the Conference
Committee cannot add/delete provisions which can become laws without undergoing the study
and deliberation of both chambers given to bills on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd readings. Even the Senate
and the House cannot enact a law which will not undergo these mandatory three (3) readings
required by the Constitution. If the Senate and the House cannot enact such a law, neither can
the lesser Bicameral Conference Committee.
Moreover, the so-called choice given to the members of both Houses to either approve or
disapprove the said additions and deletions is more of an optical illusion. These additions and
deletions are not submitted separately for approval. They are tucked to the entire bill. The vote
is on the bill as a package, i.e., together with the insertions and deletions. And the vote is either
"aye" or "nay," without any further debate and deliberation. Quite often, legislators vote "yes"
because they approve of the bill as a whole although they may object to its amendments by the
Conference Committee. This lack of real choice is well observed by Robert Luce:
Their power lies chiefly in the fact that reports of conference committees must be accepted
without amendment or else rejected in toto. The impulse is to get done with the matter and so
the motion to accept has undue advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing
unpalatable provisions rather than prolong controversy. This is the more likely if the report
comes in the rush of business toward the end of a session, when to seek further conference
might result in the loss of the measure altogether. At any time in the session there is some risk
of such a result following the rejection of a conference report, for it may not be possible to
secure a second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal chance to
develop more strength.
In a similar vein, Prof. Jack Davies commented that "conference reports are returned to
assembly and Senate on a take-it or leave-it-basis, and the bodies are generally placed in the
position that to leave-it is a practical impossibility." Thus, he concludes that "conference
committee action is the most undemocratic procedure in the legislative process."
The respondents also contend that the additions and deletions made by the Bicameral
Conference Committee were in accord with legislative customs and usages. The argument does
not persuade for it misappreciates the value of customs and usages in the hierarchy of sources of
legislative rules of procedure. To be sure, every legislative assembly has the inherent right to
promulgate its own internal rules. In our jurisdiction, Article VI, section 16(3) of the
Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings x x x." But it
is hornbook law that the sources of Rules of Procedure are many and hierarchical in character.
Mason laid them down as follows:
xxx
1. Rules of Procedure are derived from several sources. The principal sources are as follows:
a. Constitutional rules.
b. Statutory rules or charter provisions.
c. Adopted rules.
d. Judicial decisions.
e. Adopted parliamentary authority.
f. Parliamentary law.
g. Customs and usages.
2. The rules from the different sources take precedence in the order listed above except that
judicial decisions, since they are interpretations of rules from one of the other sources, take the
same precedence as the source interpreted. Thus, for example, an interpretation of a
constitutional provision takes precedence over a statute.
3. Whenever there is conflict between rules from these sources the rule from the source listed
earlier prevails over the rule from the source listed later. Thus, where the Constitution requires
three readings of bills, this provision controls over any provision of statute, adopted rules,
adopted manual, or of parliamentary law, and a rule of parliamentary law controls over a local
usage but must give way to any rule from a higher source of authority. (Emphasis ours)
As discussed above, the unauthorized additions and deletions made by the Bicameral
Conference Committee violated the procedure fixed by the Constitution in the making of laws.
It is reasonless for respondents therefore to justify these insertions as sanctioned by customs and
usages.
Finally, respondents seek sanctuary in the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to bar any judicial
inquiry on whether Congress observed our constitutional procedure in the passage of R.A. No.
7716. The enrolled bill theory is a historical relic that should not continuously rule us from the
fossilized past. It should be immediately emphasized that the enrolled bill theory originated in
England where there is no written constitution and where Parliament is supreme. In this
jurisdiction, we have a written constitution and the legislature is a body of limited powers.
Likewise, it must be pointed out that starting from the decade of the 40s, even American courts
have veered away from the rigidity and unrealism of the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill.
Prof. Sutherland observed:
Where the failure of constitutional compliance in the enactment of statutes is not discoverable
from the face of the act itself but may be demonstrated by recourse to the legislative journals,
debates, committee reports or papers of the governor, courts have used several conflicting
theories with which to dispose of the issue. They have held: (1) that the enrolled bill is
conclusive and like the sheriff’s return cannot be attacked; (2) that the enrolled bill is prima
facie correct and only in case the legislative journal shows affirmative contradiction of the
constitutional requirement will the bill be held invalid; (3) that although the enrolled bill
is prima facie correct, evidence from the journals, or other extrinsic sources is admissible to
strike the bill down; (4) that the legislative journal is conclusive and the enrolled bills is valid
only if it accords with the recital in the journal and the constitutional procedure.
Various jurisdictions have adopted these alternative approaches in view of strong dissent and
dissatisfaction against the philosophical underpinnings of the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill.
Prof. Sutherland further observed:Numerous reasons have been given for this rule.
Traditionally, an enrolled bill was "a record" and as such was not subject to attack at common
law. Likewise, the rule of conclusiveness was similar to the common law rule of the
inviolability of the sheriff’s return. Indeed, they had the same origin, that is, the sheriff was an
officer of the king and likewise the parliamentary act was a regal act and no official might
dispute the king’s word. Transposed to our democratic system of government, courts held that
as the legislature was an official branch of government the court must indulge every
presumption that the legislative act was valid. The doctrine of separation of powers was
advanced as a strong reason why the court should treat the acts of a co-ordinate branch of
government with the same respect as it treats the action of its own officers; indeed, it was
thought that it was entitled to even greater respect, else the court might be in the position of
reviewing the work of a supposedly equal branch of government. When these arguments failed,
as they frequently did, the doctrine of convenience was advanced, that is, that it was not only an
undue burden upon the legislature to preserve its records to meet the attack of persons not
affected by the procedure of enactment, but also that it unnecessarily complicated litigation and
confused the trial of substantive issues.
Although many of these arguments are persuasive and are indeed the basis for the rule in many
states today, they are not invulnerable to attack. The rule most relied on – the sheriff’s return or
sworn official rule – did not in civil litigation deprive the injured party of an action, for always
he could sue the sheriff upon his official bond. Likewise, although collateral attack was not
permitted, direct attack permitted raising the issue of fraud, and at a later date attack in equity
was also available; and that the evidence of the sheriff was not of unusual weight was
demonstrated by the fact that in an action against the sheriff no presumption of its authenticity
prevailed.
The argument that the enrolled bill is a "record" and therefore unimpeachable is likewise
misleading, for the correction of records is a matter of established judicial procedure.
Apparently, the justification is either the historical one that the king’s word could not be
questioned or the separation of powers principle that one branch of the government must treat
as valid the acts of another.
Persuasive as these arguments are, the tendency today is to avoid reaching results by artificial
presumptions and thus it would seem desirable to insist that the enrolled bill stand or fall on the
basis of the relevant evidence which may be submitted for or against it. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, as far back as the 1940s, Prof. Sutherland confirmed that "x x x the tendency seems to be
toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule
leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative
source of information.
Third. I respectfully submit that it is only by strictly following the contours of powers of a
Bicameral Conference Committee, as delineated by the rules of the House and the Senate,
that we can prevent said Committee from acting as a "third" chamber of Congress. Under the
clear rules of both the Senate and House, its power can go no further than
settling differences in their bills or joint resolutions. Sections 88 and 89, Rule XIV of the Rules
of the House of Representatives provide as follows:
Sec. 88. Conference Committee. – In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on
the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference
committees of both chambers.
In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere
to and support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they
materially impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to the House for the latter’s
appropriate action.
Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. - . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
...
The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report
prior to the voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the
same manner and procedure as it votes a bill on third and final reading.
Section 35, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate states:
Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference
committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10) days after their composition. The
President shall designate the members of the Senate Panel in the conference committee with the
approval of the Senate.
of the changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of
the members of each House panel, voting separately.
The House rule brightlines the following: (1) the power of the Conference Committee
is limited . . . it is only to settle differences with the Senate; (2) if the differences
are substantial, the Committee must report to the House for the latter’s appropriate action; and
(3) the Committee report has to be voted upon in the same manner and procedure as a bill on
third and final reading. Similarly, the Senate rule underscores in crimson that (1) the power of
the Committee is limited - - - to settle differences with the House; (2) it can make changes or
amendments only in the discharge of this limited power to settle differences with the House;
and (3) the changes or amendments are merely recommendatory for they still have to be
approved by the Senate.
Under both rules, it is obvious that a Bicameral Conference Committee is a mere agent of the
House or the Senate with limited powers. The House contingent in the Committee cannot, on
its own, settle differences which are substantial in character. If it is confronted with
substantial differences, it has to go back to the chamber that created it "for the latter’s
appropriate action." In other words, it must take the proper instructions from the chambers
that created it. It cannot exercise its unbridled discretion. Where there is no
difference between the bills, it cannot make any change. Where the difference is substantial, it
has to return to the chamber of its origin and ask for appropriate instructions. It ought to be
indubitable that it cannot create a new law, i.e., that which has never been discussed in either
chamber of Congress. Its parameters of power are not porous, for they are hedged by the
clear limitation that its only power is to settle differences in bills and joint resolutions of the
two chambers of Congress.
Fourth. Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the following acts of the
Bicameral Conference Committee constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and should be struck down as unconstitutional nullities, viz:
a. Its deletion of the pro poor "no pass on provision" which is common in both Senate Bill No.
1950 and House Bill No. 3705.
Sec. 1 of House Bill No. 37059 provides:
Section 106 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 106. Value-added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties. –
xxx
Provided, further, that notwithstanding the provision of the second paragraph of Section 105 of
this Code, the Value-added Tax herein levied on the sale of petroleum products under
Subparagraph (1) hereof shall be paid and absorbed by the sellers of petroleum products who
shall be prohibited from passing on the cost of such tax payments, either directly or
indirectly[,] to any consumer in whatever form or manner, it being the express intent of this
act that the Value-added Tax shall be borne and absorbed exclusively by the sellers of
petroleum products x x x.
Sec. 3 of the same House bill provides:
Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties. –
Provided, further, that notwithstanding the provision of the second paragraph of Section 105 of
this Code, the Value-added Tax imposed under this paragraph shall be paid and absorbed by the
subject generation companies who shall be prohibited from passing on the cost of such tax
payments, either directly or indirectly[,] to any consumer in whatever form or manner, it
being the express intent of this act that the Value-added Tax shall be borne and absorbed
exclusively [by] the power-generating companies.
In contrast and comparison, Sec. 5 of Senate Bill No. 1950 provides:
Value-added Tax on sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties. –
x x x Provided, that the VAT on sales of electricity by generation companies, and services of
transmission companies and distribution companies, as well as those of franchise grantees of
electrical utilities shall not apply to residential end-users: Provided, that the Value-added Tax
herein levied shall be absorbed and paid by the generation, transmission and distribution
companies concerned. The said companies shall not pass on such tax payments to
NAPOCOR or ultimately to the consumers, including but not limited to residential end users,
either as costs or in any other form whatsoever, directly or indirectly. x x x.
Even the faintest eye contact with the above provisions will reveal that: (a) both the House bill
and the Senate bill prohibited the passing on to consumers of the VAT on sales
of electricity and (b) the House bill prohibited the passing on to consumers of the VAT on sales
of petroleum products while the Senate bill is silent on the prohibition.
In the guise of reconciling disagreeing provisions of the House and the Senate bills on the
matter, the Bicameral Conference Committee deleted the "no pass on provision" on both
the sales of electricity and petroleum products. This action by the Committee is not
warranted by the rules of either the Senate or the House. As aforediscussed, the only power of a
Bicameral Conference Committee is to reconcile disagreeing provisions in the bills or joint
resolutions of the two houses of Congress. The House and the Senate bills both prohibited the
passing on to consumers of the VAT on sales of electricity. The Bicameral
Conference Committee cannot override this unequivocal decision of the Senate and the
House. Nor is it clear that there is a conflict between the House and Senate versions on the "no
pass on provisions" of the VAT on sales of petroleum products. The House version contained
a "no pass on provision" but the Senate had none. Elementary logic will tell us that while
there may be a difference in the two versions, it does not necessarily mean that there is a
disagreement or conflict between the Senate and the House. The silence of the Senate on the
issue cannot be interpreted as an outright opposition to the House decision prohibiting the
passing on of the VAT to the consumers on sales of petroleum products. Silence can even be
conformity, albeit implicit in nature. But granting for the nonce that there is conflict between
the two versions, the conflict cannot escape the characterization as a substantial difference.
The seismic consequence of the deletion of the "no pass on provision" of the VAT on sales of
petroleum products on the ability of our consumers, especially on the roofless and the
shirtless of our society, to survive the onslaught of spiraling prices ought to be beyond quibble.
The rules require that the Bicameral Conference Committee should not, on its own, act on this
substantial conflict. It has to seek guidance from the chamber that created it. It must receive
proper instructions from its principal, for it is the law of nature that no spring can rise higher
than its source. The records of both the Senate and the House do not reveal that this step was
taken by the members of the Bicameral Conference Committee. They bypassed their principal
and ran riot with the exercise of powers that the rules never bestowed on them.
b. Even more constitutionally obnoxious are the added restrictions on local government’s
use of incremental revenue from the VAT in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9337 which were not
present in the Senate or House Bills. Section 21 of R.A. No. 9337 provides:
Fifty percent of the local government unit’s share from VAT shall be allocated and used
exclusively for the following purposes:
1. Fifteen percent (15%) for public elementary and secondary education to finance the
construction of buildings, purchases of school furniture and in-service teacher trainings;
2. Ten percent (10%) for health insurance premiums of enrolled indigents as a counterpart
contribution of the local government to sustain the universal coverage of the national health
insurance program;
3. Fifteen percent (15%) for environmental conservation to fully implement a comprehensive
national reforestation program; and
4. Ten percent (10%) for agricultural modernization to finance the construction of farm-to-
market roads and irrigation facilities.
Such allocations shall be segregated as separate trust funds by the national treasury and shall be
over and above the annual appropriation for similar purposes.
These amendments did not harmonize conflicting provisions between the constituent bills of
R.A. No. 9337 but are entirely new and extraneous concepts which fall beyond the median
thereof. They transgress the limits of the Bicameral Conference Committee’s authority and
must be struck down.
I cannot therefore subscribe to the thesis of the majority that "the changes introduced by the
Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and
harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly
foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions."
Fifth. The majority further defends the constitutionality of the above provisions by holding that
"all the changes or modifications were germane to subjects of the provisions referred to it for
reconciliation."
With due respect, it is high time to re-examine the test of germaneness proffered in Tolentino.
The test of germaneness is overly broad and is the fountainhead of mischief for it allows the
Bicameral Conference Committee to change provisions in the bills of the House and the Senate
when they are not even in disagreement. Worse still, it enables the Committee to introduce
amendments which are entirely new and have not previously passed through the coils of
scrutiny of the members of both houses. The Constitution did not establish a Bicameral
Conference Committee that can act as a "third house" of Congress with super veto
power over bills passed by the Senate and the House. We cannot concede that super veto
power without wrecking the delicate architecture of legislative power so carefully laid down in
our Constitution. The clear intent of our fundamental law is to install a
lawmaking structure composed only of two houses whose members would thoroughly
debate proposed legislations in representation of the will of their respective constituents. The
institution of this lawmaking structure is unmistakable from the following provisions: (1)
requiring that legislative power shall be vested in a bicameral legislature; 10 (2) providing for
quorum requirements;11 (3) requiring that appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of public debt, bills of local application, and private bills originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives;12 (4) requiring
13
that bills embrace one subject expressed in the title thereof; and (5) mandating that bills
undergo three readings on separate days in each House prior to passage into law and prohibiting
amendments on the last reading thereof.14 A Bicameral Conference Committee with
untrammeled powers will destroy this lawmaking structure. At the very least, it will diminish
the free and open debate of proposed legislations and facilitate the smuggling of what
purports to be laws.
On this point, Mr. Robert Luce’s disconcerting observations are apropos:
"Their power lies chiefly in the fact that reports of conference committees must be accepted
without amendment or else rejected in toto. The impulse is to get done with the matters and
so the motion to accept has undue advantage, for some members are sure to prefer
swallowing unpalatable provisions rather than prolong controversy. This is more likely if
the report comes in the rush of business toward the end of the session, when to seek further
conference might result in the loss of the measure altogether. At any time in the session there is
some risk of such a result following the rejection of a conference report, for it may not be
possible to secure a second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal
chance to develop more strength.
xxx xxx xxx
Entangled in a network of rule and custom, the Representative who resents and would resist this
theft of his rights, finds himself helpless. Rarely can be vote, rarely can he voice his mind, in
the matter of any fraction of the bill. Usually he cannot even record himself as protesting
against some one feature while accepting the measure as whole. Worst of all, he cannot by
argument or suggested change, try to improve what the other branch has done.
This means more than the subversion of individual rights. It means to a degree the
abandonment of whatever advantage the bicameral system may have. By so much it in
effect transfers the lawmaking power to small group of members who work out in private
a decision that almost always prevails. What is worse, these men are not chosen in a way to
ensure the wisest choice. It has become the practice to name as conferees the ranking members
of the committee, so that the accident of seniority determines. Exceptions are made, but in
general it is not a question of who are most competent to serve. Chance governs, sometimes
giving way to favor, rarely to merit.
xxx xxx xxx
Speaking broadly, the system of legislating by conference committee is unscientific and
therefore defective. Usually it forfeits the benefit of scrutiny and judgment by all the
wisdom available. Uncontrolled, it is inferior to that process by which every amendment is
secured independent discussion and vote. . . ."15
It cannot be overemphasized that in a republican form of government, laws can only be enacted
by all the duly elected representatives of the people. It cuts against conventional wisdom in
democracy to lodge this power in the hands of a few or in the claws of a committee. It is for
these reasons that the argument that we should overlook the excesses of the Bicameral
Conference Committee because its report is anyway approved by both houses is a futile attempt
to square the circle for an unconstitutional act is void and cannot be redeemed by any
subsequent ratification.
Neither can we shut our eyes to the unconstitutional acts of the Bicameral Conference
Committee by holding that the Court cannot interpose its checking powers over mere violations
of the internal rules of Congress. In Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et al., 16 we ruled that when
the violations affect private rights or impair the Constitution, the Court has all the power,
nay, the duty to strike them down.
In conclusion, I wish to stress that this is not the first time nor will it be last that arguments will
be foisted for the Court to merely wink at assaults
on the Constitution on the ground of some national interest, sometimes clear and at other times
inchoate. To be sure, it cannot be gainsaid that the country is in the vortex of a financial crisis.
The broadsheets scream the disconcerting news that our debt payments for the year 2006 will
exceed Pph1 billion daily for interest alone. Experts underscore some factors that will further
drive up the debt service expenses such as the devaluation of the peso, credit downgrades and a
spike in interest rates.17 But no doomsday scenario will ever justify the thrashing of the
Constitution. The Constitution is meant to be our rule both in good times as in bad times. It is
the Court’s uncompromising obligation to defend the Constitution at all times lest it be
condemned as an irrelevant relic.
WHEREFORE, I concur with the majority but dissent on the following points:
a) I vote to withhold judgment on the constitutionality of the "standby authority" in Sections 4
to 6 of Republic Act No. 9337 as this issue is not ripe for adjudication.;
b) I vote to declare unconstitutional the deletion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of

the pro poor "no pass on provision" on electricity to residential consumers as it contravened the
unequivocal intent of both Houses of Congress; and
c) I vote to declare Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9337 as unconstitutional as it contains
extraneous provisions not found in its constituent bills.
G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,
FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J.
BUCHHOLZ petitioners,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen
cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private petitioner's specifically question
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that they have no personality to oppose reopening. The
three-pronged contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed outside
the 40-year period next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition was not
published; and (3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public land in question, have court
standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:
On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case No.
1, GLRO Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted by the Director of Lands in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio. It is not disputed that the land here involved (described in
Plan Psu-186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in that
case on November 13, 1922.
On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims. His prayer was that the land be
registered in his name upon the grounds that: (1) he and his predecessors have been in
actual, open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since
Spanish times, or before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his predecessors
were illiterate Igorots without personal notice of the cadastral proceedings aforestated
and were not able to file their claim to the land in question within the statutory period.
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr.,
and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm
lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square
meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959, and for 14,771 square
meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.
On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.
On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied private petitioners' right to
intervene in the case because of a final declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962
in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance of Baguio] which declared that
such tree farm leases were null and void.
On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred that said declaratory
relief judgment did not bind them, for they were not parties to that action.
On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed
petitioners to cross-examine the witnesses of respondent Lutes.
On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private petitioners' opposition to
his reopening petition. On October 25, 1962, private petitioners' rejoinder was filed.
On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners' opposition to the
reopening. A motion to reconsider was rejected by the court on November 5, 1963.
On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the
petition to reopen. This motion was adopted as its own by the Reforestation Administration.
They maintained the position that the declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding
on those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24, 1964. On April 6, 1964,
private petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit the City's motion as well as the April
6, 1964 motion to dismiss made by private petitioners.
On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction. 1 They then questioned the cadastral
court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen and the latter's order of August 5, 1963
dismissing private petitioners' opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction upon a P500-bond.
Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30, 1965. The court held that
petitioners were not bound by the declaratory judgment heretofore hated. Nevertheless, the
appellate court ruled that as lessees, private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of
the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.
Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966, respondents moved to dismiss
the petition before us. On August 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave
due course.
1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings?
First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.
The title of the Act reads —
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE
BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED
WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
Section 1 thereof provides —
SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral
proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the same, but for some
justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit
established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims,
have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby
granted the right within five years 2 after the date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition
for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two
hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and the competent
Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government through the
Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said court shall find that all conditions herein
established have been complied with, and that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof have
been paid from the time when land tax should have been collected until the day when the
motion is presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been
taken on such parcels. 3
We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land registration case
where oppositors were "foreshore lessees of public land", a principle was hammered out that
although Section 34, Land Registration Act, 4 "apparently authorizes any person claiming any
kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, ... nevertheless ... the
opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and
not at all subordinate to, the rights of the Government." 5 The opposition, according to
the Leyva decision, "must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of
the public domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent upon the duly authorized
representatives of the Government to represent its interests as well as private claims
intrinsically dependent upon it."
But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding under the provisions of
the Land Registration Act. Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present issues of
ownership. The case at bar, however, stands on a different footing. It involves a special statute
R.A. 931, which allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared"
or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right,
however, is made to cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such of said parcels of land
as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
6
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." The lessee's right is
thus impliedly recognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers the present case clear from
the impact of the precept forged by Leyva. So it is, that if the land subject of a petition to reopen
has already been leased by the government, that petition can no longer prosper.
This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. The reopening
petition there filed was opposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of public land
holding revocable permits issued by the government. We struck down the petition in that Case
because the public land, subject-matter of the suit, had already been leased by the government
to private persons.
Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the lessees alone, but
through the Director of Lands. But we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet violations
of R.A. 931 if we entertain the view that only the Director of Lands 7 can here properly oppose
the reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees be left at
the mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court close its eyes to the fact of lease
that may be proved by the lessees themselves, and which is enough to bar the reopening
petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation should happen. The point is that,
with the fact of lease, no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931.
From this standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.
The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes the more patent
when we take stock of their averment that they have introduced improvements on the land
affected. It would seem to us that lessees insofar as R.A. 931 is concerned, come within the
purview of those who, according to the Rules of Court, 8 may intervene in an action. For, they
are persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties." 9 In the event herein private petitioners are able to show that they are legitimate lessees,
then their lease will continue. And this because it is sufficient that it be proven that the land is
leased to withdraw it from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it beyond the reach of a
petition for reopening. 10
In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the
cadastral court should have ruled on the validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases — on
the merits. Because there is need for Lutes' right to reopen and petitioners' right to continue as
lessees to be threshed out in that court.
We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the necessary
personality to intervene in and oppose respondent Lutes' petition for reopening.
2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under R.A. 931, should have
been published in accordance with the Cadastral Act.
To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of this Court in De
Castro vs. Marcos, supra, involving exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the question. We
there held, after a discussion of law and jurisprudence, that: "In sum, the subject matter of the
petition for reopening — a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia — was already embraced
in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral
court already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The petition, therefore, need not be
published." We find no reason to break away from such conclusion.
Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the November 13, 1922
decision in the Baguio Townsite Reservation case to show, amongst others, that the land here
involved was part of that case. Petitioners do not take issue with respondent Lutes on this point
of fact.
We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the cadastral court below
over petitions to reopen, as in this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.
3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral court have power to
reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes?
The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April
12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen
on July 25, 1961.
It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the
proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been
declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of
parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue
of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act."
There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body.
It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on constitutional grounds. No
charge has been made hero or in the courts below that the statute offends the constitutional
injunction that the subject of legislation must be expressed in the title thereof. Well-entrenched
in constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions will not be entertained by courts
unless they are "specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued." 11 At any rate it
cannot be seriously disputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is expressed in its title.
This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.
Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult to stray
away from the true path of construction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we seek.
The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a moment forget, is to determine legislative
intent. In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all interpretation is to
ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced." 12 In
varying language, "the, purpose of all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true
intention of the law." 13 They "are only valuable when they subserve this purpose." 14 In fact,
"the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the
law." 16 By this, we do not "correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due
course to" its true intent. 17
It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression
in the law 18 or where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative
intent, 19 the title thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will. Reason
therefor is that the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to
legislative intention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific
constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 21 In such case, courts "are compelled
by the Constitution to consider both the body and the title in order to arrive at the legislative
intention." 22
With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that confronts us. We take
another look at the title of R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE
PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE
TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT
PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT." Readily to be noted is that the title is not
merely composed of catchwords. 23 It expresses in language clear the very substance of the law
itself. From this, it is easy to see that Congress intended to give some effect to the title of R.A.
931.
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of R.A. 931 aforesaid —
from which surfaces a seeming inconsistency between the title and the body — attended
Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's predecessor. That prior law used the very same
language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this circumstance. Had the
legislature meant to shake off any legal effects that the title of the statute might have, it had a
chance to do so in the reenactment of the law. Congress could have altered with great facility
the wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.
It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more
thoroughly read than the act itself, and in many states is the subject of constitutional
regulation." 24 The constitutional in jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must be expressed
in the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because "the Constitution does not exact
of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill." 25 Reliance,
therefore, may be placed on the title of a bill, which, while not an enacting part, no doubt "is in
some sort a part of the act, although only a formal part." 26 These considerations are all the more
valid here because R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of congressional debate in the House
from which it originated as House Bill 1410, 27 and in the Senate. 28
The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it
authorizes court proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." That
title is written "in capital letters" — by Congress itself; such kind of a title then "is not to be
classed with words or titles used by compilers of statutes" because "it is the legislature
speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a deduction that the phrase last quoted from
R.A. 931 — "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" — was but inadvertently omitted from
the body. Parting from this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title and body.
In line with views herein stated, the title belongs to that type of titles which; should be regarded
as part of the rules or provisions expressed in the body. 30 At the very least, the words "by virtue
of judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law stand in equal importance to the phrase in
Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted."
Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider the choice of construction we must
give to the statute does not need such reflection. We lean towards a liberal view. And this,
because of the principle long accepted that remedial legislation should receive the blessings of
liberal construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A. 931 is a piece
of remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the
Act, had no legal means of perfecting their titles. This is plainly evident from the explanatory
note thereof, which reads:
This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or claimant who has any interest in
any parcel of land which has been declared as public land in cadastral proceeding for failure of
said person or claimant to present his claim within the time prescribed by law.
There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels of land have not had the
opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their claims in the
corresponding cadastral proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for other reasons and
circumstances which are beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, said persons or claimants
have no more legal remedy as the effectivity of said Act expired in 1940.
This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said persons or claimants with
meritorious claims or interests in parcels of land may seek justice and protection. This bill
proposes to give said persons or claimants their day in court. Approval of this bill is earnestly
requested.
In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted
to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Legal
technicalities should not abort the beneficent effects intended by legislation.
The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may
be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue
of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act."
Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision
on which was rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.lawphi1.nêt
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral court's
orders of August 5, 1963, November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null
and void and the cadastral court is hereby directed to admit petitioners' oppositions and proceed
accordingly. No costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 109404 January 22, 1996

FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of
amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior
to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"?
This is the major question raised in the instant Petition seeking to set aside the Decision of the
respondent Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed
the order of the respondent HLURB dated September 1, 1987.
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and his co-
owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed
by the Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority rendered a
resolution on January 17, 1979 inter alia ordering petitioner to cease and desist from making
further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by him.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the
Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses
Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended
payment of his amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses
Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was registered. Private respondent further
alleged that he suspended his payments because of petitioner's failure to develop the village.
Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for
reconveyance of the lot to him.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to
cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed private respondent's complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957,
ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development and to reinstate private respondent's
purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other, "it appearing that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 269546 has been issued to . . . spouses Rodolfo and Ad(e)lina Relevo . . . , the
management of E & S Delta Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the
complainant-appellant (herein private respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests
computed at legal rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid."
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of
time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from judgments or final orders of the
. . . Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . " However, in order to
hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half
years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy
justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in applying
P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified
private respondent's non-payment of his amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the
land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976,
said law cannot govern the transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his
discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts
executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading authority on statutory
construction stressed:
The intent of a statute is the law. . . . The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the
primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the
legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although
it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a
statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. . . . In construing statutes the
proper course is to start out and follow the trite intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense
which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy
and objects of the legislature.1 (emphasis supplied.)
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and
the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D.
957 was enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless
citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of "unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers", and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its
preamble, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent
human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of
life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and
maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and
other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot
buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to
different innocent purchasers for value;2 (emphasis supplied.)
From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and unarguable that the legislative
intent must have been to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate
retrospectively even upon contracts already in existence at the time of its enactment. Indeed, a
strictly prospective application of the statute will effectively emasculate it, for then the State
will not be able to exercise its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices
perpetrated under or in connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to have
been entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very subdivision lot buyers
sought to be protected by said law. It is hardly conceivable that the legislative authority
intended to permit such a loophole to remain and continue to be a source of misery for
subdivision lot buyers well into the future.
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are certain of its
provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive
effect and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D.
957's enactment:
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the
facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water
supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or
condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of
advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or
condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. — In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or
disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or
developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its
obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this
Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is
filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or, developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding
provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree.
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a buyer in a
subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in
favor of the owner or developer, when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer,
desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit
for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount
paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon
at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive Secretary, the application of P.D. 957
to the contracts in question will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the contracts themselves,
which expressly provides:
(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to subdivide, develop and improve the entire
area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands subject of
this contract is a part in accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 6561, S-
66 and the Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply with and abide by all laws,
rules and regulations respecting the subdivision and development of lots for residential
purposes as may be presently in force or may hereafter be required by laws passed by the
Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the Bureau of Lands, the General
Registration Office and other government agencies. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that
Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from
making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision
project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.
(Such incomplete development of the subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual
and statutory obligations on the part of the subdivision-owner had been established in the
findings of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the respondent Executive Secretary in
his assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also gave due weight to the
following matters: although private respondent started to default on amortization payments
beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he had already incurred three consecutive
arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the cancellation option available
to him under the contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in timely fashion but delayed until
May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts. But by that time the land
purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the provisions of P.D. 957, promulgated on
July 12, 1976. (In any event, as pointed out by respondent HLURB and seconded by the
Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization payments incurred by private respondent had
been effectively condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the latter's tolerance of the defaults for
a long period of time.)
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's contention that respondent Secretary exceeded his
jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondent's payments on Lot 12 although
(according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the complaint. Respondent Secretary
duly noted that the supporting documents submitted substantiating the claim of non-
development justified such order inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment of
amortizations on said Lot 12.
Finally, since petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the (Executive Secretary's) Decision
dated March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said decision had
become final and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated
February 12, 1987, which provides that "(d)ecisions/ resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof . . . , unless a motion for reconsideration thereof
is filed within such period."
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition is DENIED
due course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-2756 August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners,

G.R. No. L-3054 August 26, 1949

G.R. No. L-3055 August 26, 1949

LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-3056 August 26, 1949

Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.

Act No. 671 in full is as follows:

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:

As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act

Ozaeta, J., concurs.

MORAN, C. J., concurring:

PARAS, J., concurring:

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 —

Republic Act No. 333 —

Republic Act No. 51 —

(c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of

Commonwealth Act No. 732 —

Commonwealth Act No. 709 —

Commonwealth Act No. 710 —

Republic Act No. 215 —

Ley No. 321 de la Republica —

Republic Act No. 265 —

Republic Act No. 266 —

Republic Act No. 85 —

Various Appropriation Acts.

Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948.

MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:.

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says:

TORRES, J., concurring:

REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions.

September 16, 1949

The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring opinion, would come to

All the members of the Court concur in this view.

But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in a normal operation of the

FERIA, J., concurring:

It is important to observe that what the above-quoted constitutional provision empowers

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

Approved, December 16, 1941.

Furthermore, our conclusion is confirmed by the legislative interpretation give to

In the enactment of emergency police measures, the questions as to whether an emergency

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005