LAGMAN v.

MEDIALDEA
G.R. Nos. 243522, 243677, 243745 & 243797

THE ANTECEDENTS:
 On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a
state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole
of Mindanao to address the rebellion mounted by members of th e Maute Group and Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG), for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days.
 On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives his
written Report, citing the factual events and reasons that impelled him to issue the said
Proclamation. Both Houses expressed their full support to the Proclamation, finding no
cause to revoke the same. Three (3) consolidated petitions were filed subsequently
assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis.
 On July 18, 2017, the President requested Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, which extended Proclamation No. 216 until December
31, 2017.
 Acting on the recommendations of the Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary
Delfin N. Lorenzana and the then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff
General Rey Leonardo Guerrero in a letter dated December 8, 2017, the President again
asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to extend the Proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. Thereafter, four (4)
consolidated petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of the second extension of
Proclamation No. 216.
 Before the expiration of the second extension of Proclamation No. 216 or on December 4,
2018, Secretary Lorenzana in a letter to the President, recommended the third extension of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019. Thereafter, the
President requested for the third extension of Proclamation No. 216 through a letter
containing essential facts indicating that rebellion still persists in Mindanao and that public
safety requires the continuation of martial law in the whole Mindanao which the Congress
approved through Resolution No. 6.

THE ISSUES:
The following are the issues to be resolved as identified by the Court:
A. Whether there exists sufficient factual basis for the extension of martial law in Mindanao.
1. Whether rebellion exists and persists in Mindanao.
2. Whether public safety requires the extension of martial law in Mindanao.
3. Whether the further extension of martial law has not been necessary to meet the
situation in Mindanao.
B. Whether the Constitution limits the number of extensions and the duration for which
Congress can extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
C. Whether Proclamation No. 216 has become functus officio with the cessation of Marawi
siege that it may no longer be extended.
D. Whether the manner by which Congress approved the extension of martial law is a political
question and is not reviewable by the Court En Banc.
1. Whether Congress has the power to determine its own rules of proceedings in
conducting the joint session under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
2. Whether Congress has the discretion as to how it will respond to the President’s request
for the extension of martial law in Mindanao - including the length of the period of
deliberation and interpellation of the executive branch’s resource persons.
E. Whether the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or extension there of may be reversed by a finding of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Congress. If so, whether the extension of martial law was attended
by grave abuse of discretion.
F. Whether the allegation of human rights violations in the implementation of martial law in
Mindanao is sufficient to warrant a nullification of its extension.

THE RULING OF THE COURT:

A. The Court need not make an independent determination of the factual basis for the
proclamation or extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The Court is not a fact-finding body required to make a determination
of the correctness of the factual basis for the declaration or extension of martial law
and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. It would be impossible for the Court to go
on the ground to conduct an independent investigation or factual inquiry, since it is not
equipped with resources comparable to that of the Commander-in-Chief to ably and
properly assess the ground conditions. Thus, in determining the sufficiency of the factual
basis for the extension of martial law, the Court needs only to assess and evaluate the
written reports of the government agencies tasked in enforcing and implementing
martial law in Mindanao.
A.1. The Court ruled that rebellion exists and persists in Mindanao arguing that
rebellion, within the context of the situation in Mindanao, encompasses no
definite time nor particular locality of actual war and continues even when
actual fighting has ceased. Therefore, it is not restricted as to the time and locality
of actual war nor does it end when actual fighting has ended. As a result, rebels have
become more cunning and instigating rebellion from a distance is now more
attainable, perpetrating acts of violence clandestinely in several areas of Mindanao.

A.2 The Resolutions coming from the Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC) of
Region XI (Davao City) and Region XIII (Caraga), the Provincial Peace and Order
Council (PPOC) of the Province of Agusan Del Norte, Agusan del Sur and Dinagat
Islands, and the Office of the Governor, Province of Saranggani, expressing support
for the President’s declaration of martial law and its extension, reflect the public
sentiment for the restoration of peace and order in Mindanao. Importance must
be given to these resolutions as they are in the best position to determine their needs.
Citing the Brief of Amicus Curiae of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. in Justice Velasco, Jr.’s
Dissenting Opinion in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the demands of public safety
is determined through the application of prudential estimation, thus:

The need of public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence of
rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense. Its existence
can only be determined through the application of prudential estimation of
what the consequences might be of existing armed movements.

Ultimately, it is the Commander-in-Chief, aided by the police and military, who is

A.3 In the initial as well as in the extensions of the Proclamation, the President’s decision
was based on the reports prepared by the different specialized agencies of the
Executive branch charged with external and internal security of the whole country.
These were the same reports submitted to Congress which were deliberated on, no
matter how brief the time allotment was for each of the law makers’ interpellation. Yet
the evidence or basis to support the extension of martial law passed through the
scrutiny of the Chief Executive and through several more of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The Court must remember that it is called upon to
rule on whether the President, and this time with the concurrence of the two
Houses of Congress, acted with sufficient basis in approving anew the extension of
Martial Law. It must not fall into or be tempted to substitute its own judgment to
that of People’s President and the People’s representatives. It must not forget that
the Constitution has given it separate and quite distinct roles to fill up in our
respective branches of government.
B. The sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law in Mindanao must be
determined from the facts and information contained in the President’s request, supported
by reports submitted by his alter egos to Congress. These are the bases upon which
Congress granted the extension. The Court cannot expect exactitude and preciseness of
the facts and information stated in these reports, as the Court’s review is confined to
the sufficiency and reasonableness thereof. While there may be inadequacies in some
of the facts, i.e., facts which are not fully explained in the reports, these are not reasons
enough for the Court to invalidate the extension as long as there are other related and
relevant circumstances that support the finding that rebellion persists and public
safety requires it.

Contrary to Monsod, et. al., the Court need not make an independent determination of
the factual basis for the proclamation or extension of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court is not a fact-finding body
required to make a determination of the correctness of the factual basis for the
declaration or extension of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. It
would be impossible for the Court to go on the ground to conduct an independent
investigation or factual inquiry, since it is not equipped with resources comparable to that
of the Commander-in-Chief to ably and properly assess the ground conditions.

C. Proclamation No. 216 has not become functus officio with the cessation of the Marawi
siege because rebellion was not necessarily ended by the cessation of the Marawi siege.
Rebellion in Mindanao still continues, as shown by the violent incidents stated in reports
to the president, and was made basis by Congress in approving the third extension of
martial law. These violent incidents continuously pose a serious threat to security and the
peace and order situation in Mindanao.
Be it noted that rebellion is a continuing crime. It does not necessarily follow that with
the liberation of Marawi, rebellion no longer exists. It will be a tenuous proposition to
confine rebellion simply to a resounding clash of arms with government forces. It was
held in Lagman v. Pimentel III that:

We recognized that “rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds,”

D. The manner by which Congress approved the extension of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political question that is
not reviewable by the Court.
 D.1 No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress
the right to promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings, to wit:

Section 16. (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of
all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

D2. In Pimentel, Jr., et.al v. Senate Committee of the Whole, this constitutionally-vested
authority is recognized as a grant of full discretionary authority is recognized as a
grant of full discretionary authority to each House of Congress in the formulation,
adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is
generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, EXCEPT on a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a
denial of due process.

E. The Court cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any
constitutional violation. Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress
in promulgating its rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Cruz (Ret.) v. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, et. al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted
power deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It should be
added that there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.

F. The alleged human rights violations in the implementation of martial law in Mindanao
is not sufficient to warrant a nullification of its extension. All forms of human rights
violation and abuses during the implementation of martial law and suspension of powers
should not go unpunished. While it is recognized that, in the declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the powers given to officials
tasked with its implementation are susceptible to abuses, these instances have already
been taken into consideration when the pertinent provisions on martial law were
drafted. Safeguards within the 1987 Constitution and existing laws are available to
protect the people from these abuses.