01.1 Baron Et Al v. EPE Transport Inc

1/27/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 765
G.R. No. 202645. August 5, 2015.*

FORTUNATO R. BARON, MANOLO B. BERSABAL, and
RECTO A. MELENDRES, petitioners, vs. EPE
TRANSPORT, INC.** and/or ERNESTO P. ENRIQUEZ,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

on Certiorari; Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.—
Preliminarily, it should be pointed out that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not
routinely reexamine the evidence presented by the contending
parties. Nevertheless, the divergence in the findings of fact by the
LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and that of the CA on the
other — as in this case — is a recognized exception for the Court
to open and scrutinize the records to determine whether the CA,
in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that
petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must
satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it.—To justify the
grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must
satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of
discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law. It has also been held that grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. The existence
of such patent violation evinces that the assailed judicial or quasi-
judicial act is tainted with the quality of whim and caprice,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fe6e83df7f6f355dd003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
** “EFE Transport, Inc.” in some parts of the records.

346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Baron vs. EPE Transport, Inc.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals;

In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has held that the
onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if
dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the
employer; the failure to discharge such onus would mean that the
dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.—In a catena of
cases, the Court has held that the onus of proving that an
employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, his dismissal was
not illegal fully rests on the employer; the failure to discharge
such onus would mean that the dismissal was not justified and,
therefore, illegal. The doctrine can be traced back to the 1999 case
of Barros v. NLRC, 315 SCRA 23 (1999), where the Court denied
the employer’s argument that the seafarer voluntarily terminated
his employment (on the claim that he himself requested
repatriation), finding that since the fact of repatriation was not
disputed, “it is incumbent upon [the employer] to prove by the
quantum of evidence required by law that [the seafarer] was not
dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal;
otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified.”
Same; Same; Abandonment; Abandonment of work does not
per se sever the employer-employee relationship. It is merely a form
of neglect of duty, which is, in turn, a just cause for termination of
employment.—Abandonment connotes a deliberate and
unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to resume his
employment. Notably, “abandonment of work does not per se sever
the employer-employee relationship. It is merely a form of neglect
of duty, which is, in turn, a just cause for termination of
employment. The operative act that will ultimately put an end to
this relationship is the dismissal of the employee after complying
with the procedure prescribed by law.” For a valid finding of
abandonment, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the
failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
cause; and (b) clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative
factor and being manifested by some overt acts.
Same; Same; Same; An employee who forthwith takes steps to

protest his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said to have
abandoned his work, for it is well-settled that the filing by an
employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal is proof enough of his
desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of
abandonment.—In this case,

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no proof was adduced by respondents to prove their theory of

abandonment. Nothing on record would show that petitioners’
absence from work was deliberate and unjustified, with a clear
intent to sever the employment relationship. On the contrary,
such intention is belied by the fact that shortly after petitioners
ceased from working, they immediately instituted the complaint
for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith takes steps to
protest his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said to have
abandoned his work, for it is well-settled that the filing by an
employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal is proof enough of his
desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of
abandonment. Indeed, it would be illogical for petitioners to have
left their job and thereafter seek redress by filing a complaint
against their employer.
Same; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Voluntary
Arbitrators; Article 272 of the Labor Code provides that all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),
including violations of said agreement, are under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators.—What was referred to the grievance
machinery was the unfair labor practice case filed by the
petitioners before they were terminated, which contains issues
that are different and distinct from their cause of action for illegal
dismissal. It bears to note that Article 223(c) of the Labor Code, as
amended, is explicit that the LA shall refer to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration, as provided in the CBA,
those cases that involve the interpretation of said agreements.
Further, Article 272 of the same Code provides that all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of
the CBA, including violations of said agreement, are under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators. As such, petitioners cannot be

faulted in invoking the grievance machinery even after they had
been dismissed in compliance with the provisions of the CBA, to
which they were bound.
Same; Separation Pay; Since reinstatement is no longer
feasible in view of the enmity between the parties, the award of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is in order.—All told, since
petitioners’ abandonment was not proven by respondents in this
case, the NLRC correctly ruled that the former were illegally
dismissed. Consequently, the CA committed reversible error when
it held otherwise
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
** “EFE Transport, Inc.” in some parts of the records.

348

and granted respondents’ certiorari petition. Thus,

following Article 293 of the Labor Code, as amended,
petitioners are entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
However, since reinstatement is no longer feasible in view
of the enmity between the parties, the award of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement is in order.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Law Firm of Talampas & Associates for
petitioners.
Neri & Bandilla Law Offices for respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated March 30, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated
July 11, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 115626, which annulled and set aside the Decision4
dated March 9, 2010 and the Resolution5 dated June 21,
2010 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC LAC Case No. 05-001320-09 and instead,
reinstated the Decision6 dated March 20, 2009 of the Labor

Arbiter (LA) in NLRC Case No. NCR-10-13893-08
dismissing the complaint of petitioners Fortunato R. Baron
(Baron), Manolo B. Bersabal (Bersabal), and Recto A.
Melendres (Melendres; collectively petitioners) for lack of
merit.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 28-51.

2 Id., at pp. 55-65. Penned by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan,
with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Francisco P. Acosta,
concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 68-69.
4 Id., at pp. 223-229. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Benedicto R.
Palacol, with Commissioners Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra and Nieves
Vivar-De Castro, concurring.
5 Id., at pp. 252-254.
6 Id., at pp. 188-192. Penned by Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez.

The Facts

Respondent EPE Transport Corporation, Inc. (EPE) is a
domestic corporation engaged in the operation of taxi units.
Petitioners were employed7 as EPE’s taxi drivers and were
paid on boundary system. They were members of the EPE
Transport, Inc. Drivers’ Union-Filipinong Samahang
Manggagawa (FSM), the exclusive bargaining agent of the
taxi drivers in EPE.8
Sometime in August 2008, Bersabal sought inquiry
from the company regarding the boundary rates imposed,
claiming that the same were not in accordance with the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).9 Instead of
clarifying the matter, Bersabal was purportedly told that
he was free to go if he did not want to follow company
policy, and that anyway, he has no more use to the
company.10 As a result, Bersabal, together with the other
EPE’s taxi drivers, filed on August 8, 2008, a complaint11
for violation of the CBA, unfair labor practice, refund of
overcharged boundary, and money claims against EPE, and
its President, Ernesto P. Enriquez (respondents), docketed
as NLRC Case No. NCR-08-11284-08 (CBA violation
case).12
Later in September 2008, Baron and Melendres equally
questioned the company about the overcharging of
boundary, for which they supposedly got the same
response. Thus, they filed a complaint13 for unfair labor
practice, refund of overcharged boundary, and attorney’s

fees against respondents,
_______________
7 Baron was hired on April 22, 2003, Melendres on February 18, 2003,
and Bersabal on March 1, 2005. Id., at p. 9.
8 Id.
9 See CBA dated February 16, 2006. Id., at pp. 158-165.
10 Id., at p. 32.
11 Id., at pp. 171-174.
12 The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter Enrique L. Flores, Jr. Id., at
p. 171; pp. 93 and 149.
13 Id., at pp. 166-169.

350

docketed as NLRC Case No. NCR-09-13285-08 (unfair

labor practice case).14 Three (3) days after, or on September
26, 2008, Baron claimed that he was no longer allowed to
use his taxi unit and prevented from entering EPE’s
premises. Melendres and Bersabal allegedly suffered a
similar fate on September 28, 2008 and October 1, 2008,
respectively.15 Consequently, petitioners filed on October 6,
2008, another complaint,16 this time for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice, separation pay, and attorney’s fees,
against respondents, docketed as NLRC Case No. NCR-
10-13893-08 (illegal dismissal case).
Meanwhile, in an Order17 dated October 15, 2008, the
complaint in the unfair labor practice case was dismissed
without prejudice, and the case was recommended to be
resolved before the grievance machinery.
In response18 to the complaint in the illegal dismissal
case, respondents denied that petitioners were dismissed
as the latter themselves failed to return to work.
Respondents claimed that petitioners were often called to
explain their “shortages” and “damage to vehicle,” as
reflected in their employment records,19 with no intention
of terminating their employment.20 That after they filed
separate complaints for violation of the CBA and unfair
labor practice, petitioners suddenly went on absence
without official leave (AWOL) and subsequently filed the

instant suit.21
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 166-169.

15 Id., at p. 33.
16 Id., at pp. 138-140.
17 Id., at p. 170. Penned by Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol D. Del
Rosario.
18 See Joint Position Paper for the Respondents dated December 3,
2008; id., at pp. 146-153.
19 Id., at pp. 154-156.
20 Id., at p. 148.
21 Id., at p. 149.

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The LA’s Ruling

22
In a Decision dated March 20, 2009, the LA dismissed
petitioners’ illegal dismissal case for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter and lack of cause of action. The LA
gave more credence to respondents’ claim that it was
petitioners who failed to return to work after they filed
their respective complaints, noting that the latter had even
invoked the use of the CBA’s grievance machinery for the
resolution of their dispute, hence, could not have been
dismissed.23 Moreover, the LA held that it had no
jurisdiction over the ULP issue as the same was covered by
the provisions of the CBA that specifically called for the
operation of the grievance machinery in the resolution of
such dispute.24
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed25 to the NLRC, docketed
as NLRC LAC Case No. 05-001320-09.
The NLRC’s Ruling

26
In a Decision dated March 9, 2010, the NLRC reversed
and set aside the LA’s Decision and found petitioners to
have been illegally dismissed. Accordingly, it directed
respondents to present evidence of the average amount of
petitioners’ daily or monthly wages, after deducting the

boundary rates, for the computation of backwages, and
further awarded the payment of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement which it found to be no longer feasible.
However, petitioners’ claims for damages were denied for
lack of factual basis.27
In so ruling, the NLRC rejected respondents’ defense
that petitioners went on AWOL or had abandoned their
work,
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 188-192.

23 Id., at pp. 190-191.
24 Id., at pp. 191-192.
25 Dated April 27, 2009. Id., at pp. 193-211.
26 Id., at pp. 223-229.
27 Id., at pp. 228-229.

352

holding that no evidence was presented to show that the

latter were directed to report back for work.28 It added that
the intent to abandon work was negated by the filing of
petitioners’ previous complaints29 to correct what they
perceived were errors in the administration of the CBA,
rationalizing that an employee who takes steps to protest
his layoff cannot be said to have abandoned his work.30 It
further ruled that the unfair labor practice issue should not
have been resolved by the LA since the issue was deemed
impliedly removed by the dismissal of the complaint in the
unfair labor practice case, and that a reading of the
petitioners’ position paper31 in the instant suit showed that
it delved only on the issue of illegal dismissal.32
Respondents’ motion for reconsideration33 was denied in
a Resolution34 dated June 21, 2010; thus, they elevated the
matter to the CA on certiorari.35

The CA’s Ruling

In a Decision36 dated March 30, 2012, the CA set aside
the NLRC’s March 9, 2010 Decision and reinstated the LA’s
March 20, 2009 Decision.

The CA concurred with the LA that petitioners’
complaint in the illegal dismissal case failed to sufficiently
establish the fact of their dismissal.37 It observed that
petitioners failed to
_______________
28 Id., at p. 227.
29 Referring to NLRC Case No. NCR-08-11284-08 and NLRC Case No.
NCR-09-13285-08.
30 Rollo, p. 227.
31 See Position Paper for the Complainants (herein petitioners) dated
December 4, 2008; id., at pp. 141-145.
32 Id., at p. 150; p. 226.
33 Dated March 29, 2010. Id., at pp. 230-239.
34 Id., at pp. 252-254.
35 Dated August 27, 2010. Id., at pp. 123-136.
36 Id., at pp. 55-65.
37 Id., at p. 61.

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VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 353

name the person/s who prevented them from reporting for

work or from using their taxi units. Also, the statement
that “they were free to go if they did not want to follow
company policy” neither automatically amount to
dismissal; nor can it be interpreted as a termination of
their employment.38 Hence, since their absence from work
was not authorized, the CA concluded that it was
petitioners who had unilaterally decided to cut their ties
with respondents. Moreover, it pointed out that petitioners’
agreement to seek redress before the company’s grievance
committee is inconsistent with their claim for illegal
dismissal.39
Dissatisfied, petitioners’ moved for reconsideration40
which was, however, denied in a Resolution41 dated July
11, 2012; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether

or not the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in finding petitioners to have been
illegally dismissed.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, it should be pointed out that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.42 The Court
is not a trier of facts43 and does not routinely reexamine
the evidence pre-
_______________
38 Id., at p. 62.
39 Id., at p. 63.
40 Motion for reconsideration not attached to the Rollo.
41 Rollo, pp. 68-69.
42 See Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
43 Dimagan v. Dacworks United, Incorporated, 677 Phil. 472, 480; 661
SCRA 438, 445 (2011).

354

sented by the contending parties.44 Nevertheless, the

divergence in the findings of fact by the LA and the NLRC,
on the one hand, and that of the CA on the other — as in
this case — is a recognized exception for the Court to open
and scrutinize the records to determine whether the CA, in
the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling
that petitioners were illegally dismissed.45
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the
court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the
discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion
connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in

contemplation of law.46 It has also been held that grave
abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.47 The existence of such patent violation
evinces that the assailed judicial or quasi-judicial act is
tainted with the quality of whim and caprice, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Tested against these considerations, the Court finds that
the CA committed reversible error in granting respondents’
certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding petitioners to have been illegally
dismissed. The NLRC’s ruling cannot be equated to a
capricious
_______________
44 Samar-Med Distribution v. NLRC, G.R. No. 162385, July 15, 2013,

701 SCRA 148, 158.
45 Supra note 43 at p. 480; pp. 445-446.
46 See Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. v. Hipe, Jr., G.R. No. 204699,
November 12, 2014, 740 SCRA 330.
47 Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
202202, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574, 599-600.

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and whimsical exercise of judgment since its

pronouncement of illegal dismissal squares with existing
legal principles.
In a catena of cases, the Court has held that the onus of
proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if
dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the
employer; the failure to discharge such onus would mean
that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.48
The doctrine can be traced back to the 1999 case of
Barros v. NLRC,49 where the Court denied the employer’s
argument that the seafarer voluntarily terminated his
employment (on the claim that he himself requested
repatriation), finding that since the fact of repatriation was
not disputed, “it is incumbent upon [the employer] to prove
by the quantum of evidence required by law that [the
seafarer] was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the

dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be
unjustified.”50
In the 2001 case of Sevillana v. I.T. (International)
Corp.,51 the Court later elucidated that Article 277(b) of the
Labor Code — which places upon the employer the burden
of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a valid
or authorized cause — does not distinguish whether the
employer admits or does not admit the dismissal:
When the NLRC declared that the burden of proof in dismissal

cases shifts to the employer only when the latter admits such
dismissal, the NLRC ruled erroneously in disregard of the law
and prevailing jurispru-
_______________
48 Supra note 44; Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v.

Acuña, 492 Phil. 518; 452 SCRA 422 (2005); Asia Pacific Chartering
(Phils.), Inc. v. Farolan, 441 Phil. 776; 393 SCRA 454 (2002); National
Bookstore, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 235; 378 SCRA 194 (2002);
and Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corp., 408 Phil. 570; 356 SCRA 451
(2001).
49 373 Phil. 635; 315 SCRA 23 (1999).
50 Id., at p. 640; p. 27.
51 Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corp., supra.

356

dence on the matter. As correctly articulated by the Solicitor

General in his Comment to this petition, thus —
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden of
proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a
valid or authorized cause on the employer. It should
be noted that the said provision of law does not
distinguish whether the employer admits or does not
admit the dismissal.
It is a well-known maxim in statutory construction that where
the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish.
(Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., 104 Phil. 688, 690
[1958])
Moreover, Article 4 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor.—All doubts

in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing
rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor.
In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA (248 Phil. 762, 776
[1988]), this Honorable Court held:
When the conflicting interest of labor and capital
are weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter must be
counterbalanced by the sympathy and compassion
the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This
is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity — and the
right — to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate
but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate
on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but
its active and equal partner.
Thus, it is clear that petitioner was illegally dismissed by
private respondent Samir Maddah.

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Time and again we have ruled that where there is no showing

of a clear, valid[,] and legal cause for termination of employment,
the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. The
burden is on the employer to prove that the termination of
employment was for a valid and legal cause. For an employee’s
dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause
and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.52 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, on this score, case law states that the employer
must not rely on the weakness of the employees’ evidence
but must stand on the merits of their own defense.53
Here, petitioners asserted that they were
unceremoniously dismissed after they charged respondents
of violating the CBA before the NLRC. Notably,
respondents did not refute such absence from work
but averred that it was petitioners that went on AWOL and
abandoned their jobs after they filed their unfair labor
practice complaint.
Abandonment connotes a deliberate and unjustified

refusal on the part of the employee to resume his
employment.54 Notably, “abandonment of work does not per
se sever the employer-employee relationship. It is merely a
form of neglect of duty, which is, in turn, a just cause for
termination of employment. The operative act that will
ultimately put an end to this relationship is the dismissal
of the employee after complying with the procedure
prescribed by law.”55
_______________
52 Id., at pp. 583-584; pp. 466-467.

53 AFI International Trading Corporation v. Lorenzo, 561 Phil. 451,
456; 535 SCRA 347, 353 (2007); Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 558 Phil. 209,
221; 531 SCRA 461, 470 (2007); and Great Southern Maritime Services
Corporation v. Acuña, supra note 48 at p. 531; p. 437.
54 Tan Brothers Corporation of Basilan City v. Escudero, G.R. No.
188711, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 583, 591.
55 De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. NLRC, 364 Phil. 91, 102; 304
SCRA 448, 458-459 (1999).

358

For a valid finding of abandonment, two (2) elements

must concur, namely: (a) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable cause; and (b) clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with
the second element as the more determinative factor and
being manifested by some overt acts.56

In Dimagan v. Dacworks United, Inc.,57 the Court
elucidated that absence must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply
does not want to work anymore. Mere absence or failure
to report for work is not tantamount to
abandonment of work.
In RBC Cable Master System and/or Cinense v.
Baluyot,58 the Court has recently held that the employer
has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment without any intention of returning.59
In this case, no proof was adduced by respondents to

prove their theory of abandonment. Nothing on record
would show that petitioners’ absence from work was
deliberate and unjustified, with a clear intent to sever the
employment relationship. On the contrary, such intention
is belied by the fact that shortly after petitioners ceased
from working, they immediately instituted the complaint
for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith takes
steps to protest his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said
to have abandoned his work, for it is well-settled that the
filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal is
proof enough of his desire to return to
56 De Guzman v. NLRC, 564 Phil. 600, 610; 540 SCRA 21, 31 (2007).
57 Supra note 43 at p. 482; pp. 447-448, citing Hodieng Concrete
Products v. Emilia, 491 Phil. 434, 439; 451 SCRA 249, 254 (2005), further
citing Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506, 516; 413 SCRA
162, 168-169 (2003).
58 596 Phil. 729; 576 SCRA 668 (2009).
59 Id., at pp. 739-740; pp. 677-678.

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work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.60

Indeed, it would be illogical for petitioners to have left their
job and thereafter seek redress by filing a complaint
against their employer.
Moreover, petitioners, prior to the filing of the illegal
dismissal case, filed cases against respondents to correct
what they perceived as errors in the administration of the
CBA, i.e., the CBA violation case and the unfair labor
practice complaint. This bolsters the supposition that they
actually desired to continue with their employment as they
were enforcing their rights under the CBA. In fact, it would
not be amiss to state that if respondents truly believed that
petitioners had abandoned their job, they could have sent
notices or show-cause letters requiring them to report for
work or explain their absences with a warning that their
failure to do so would be construed as abandonment. The
records are, however, bereft of any indication that
respondents did so.
Finally, it is apt to clarify that petitioners’ submission to

the company’s grievance machinery does not disprove
illegal dismissal. What was referred to the grievance
machinery was the unfair labor practice case filed by the
petitioners before they were terminated, which contains
issues that are different and distinct from their cause of
action for illegal dismissal. It bears to note that Article
223(c)61 of the Labor Code,62 as amended, is explicit that
the LA shall refer to the
_______________
60 MZR Industries v. Colambot, G.R. No. 179001, August 28, 2013, 704
SCRA 150, 161.
61 Formerly Article 217(c). As renumbered pursuant to Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 10151, entitled “An Act Allowing the Employment of
Night Workers, thereby Repealing Articles 130 and 131 of Presidential
Decree Number Four Hundred Forty-Two, as Amended, Otherwise Known
as the Labor Code of the Philippines” (approved on July 26, 2010).
62 Presidential Decree No. 442 entitled “A Decree Instituting a Labor
Code thereby Revising and Consolidating Labor and Social Laws to Afford
Protection to Labor, Promote Employ-

360

grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, as

provided in the CBA, those cases that involve the
interpretation of said agreements. Further, Article 27263 of
the same Code provides that all unresolved grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the
CBA, including violations of said agreement, are under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. As such,
petitioners cannot be faulted in invoking the grievance
machinery even after they had been dismissed in
compliance with the provisions of the CBA, to which they
were bound.
All told, since petitioners’ abandonment was not proven
by respondents in this case, the NLRC correctly ruled that
the former were illegally dismissed. Consequently, the CA
committed reversible error when it held otherwise and
granted respondents’ certiorari petition. Thus, following
Article 29364 of the Labor Code, as amended, petitioners
are entitled to reinstatement and backwages. However,

since reinstatement is no longer feasible in view of the
enmity between the parties, the award of separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement is in order.65
_______________
ment and Human Resources Development and Insure Industrial Peace

Based on Social Justice” (approved on May 1, 1974).
63 Formerly Article 261.
64 Formerly Article 279.
ART. 293. Security of Tenure.—In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.
65 See Polyfoam-RGC International Corporation v. Concepcion, G.R.
No. 172349, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 148, 164.

361
VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 361

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated March 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated
July 11, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
115626 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision dated March 9, 2010 and the
Resolution dated June 21, 2010 of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC LAC Case No. 05-001320-
09 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,

Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Notes.—Where the employee prays for an award of

separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, he forecloses
reinstatement as a relief by implication. (De Guzman vs.

National Labor Relations Commission, 540 SCRA 21
[2007])
The alternative relief for union members who were
dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike is the
payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
(Visayas Community Medical Center [VCMC] vs. Yballe,
714 SCRA 17 [2014])

——o0o——
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1/27/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 765

G.R. No. 202645. August 5, 2015.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals;

Same; Same; Same; An employee who forthwith takes steps to

VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 347

no proof was adduced by respondents to prove their theory of

panel of voluntary arbitrators. As such, petitioners cannot be

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and granted respondents’ certiorari petition. Thus,

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

reinstated the Decision6 dated March 20, 2009 of the Labor

1 Rollo, pp. 28-51.

practice, refund of overcharged boundary, and attorney’s

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

docketed as NLRC Case No. NCR-09-13285-08 (unfair

without official leave (AWOL) and subsequently filed the

14 Id., at pp. 166-169.

VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 351

The LA’s Ruling

The NLRC’s Ruling

petitioners’ daily or monthly wages, after deducting the

22 Id., at pp. 188-192.

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

holding that no evidence was presented to show that the

March 20, 2009 Decision.

VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 353

name the person/s who prevented them from reporting for

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sented by the contending parties.44 Nevertheless, the

refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in

44 Samar-Med Distribution v. NLRC, G.R. No. 162385, July 15, 2013,

VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 355

and whimsical exercise of judgment since its

seafarer] was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the

When the NLRC declared that the burden of proof in dismissal

48 Supra note 44; Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v.

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dence on the matter. As correctly articulated by the Solicitor

Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor.—All doubts

VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 357

Time and again we have ruled that where there is no showing

Abandonment connotes a deliberate and unjustified

52 Id., at pp. 583-584; pp. 466-467.

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

For a valid finding of abandonment, two (2) elements

In this case, no proof was adduced by respondents to

VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 359

work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.60

Finally, it is apt to clarify that petitioners’ submission to

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, as

are entitled to reinstatement and backwages. However,

ment and Human Resources Development and Insure Industrial Peace

VOL. 765, AUGUST 5, 2015 361

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,