For Atty Dimaano

1)
G.R. No. 183805. July 3, 2013.*

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, respondents.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of.—Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and
penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows: Art. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prision mayor shall
be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. The elements of the crime of
bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Same; Same; Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged
with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.—It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent
was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long
as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
Same; Same; He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.—The Court recently upheld the ruling
in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is
when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Same; Same; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability; It is a settled rule that the criminal
culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.—It is a settled rule that the
criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear then that the
crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage
with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Virgilio M. Capili for petitioner.
Marcelo Rempillo, Jr. for private respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July
24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y.
Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley
G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is
a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of
Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is
declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in
view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or
incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on
the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of
the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground
that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared
void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision
dated December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: “Karla Medina-Capili versus James
Wal-
ter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo,” a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying
the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision
is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among
others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the
issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case
would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties,
this Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the
accused as it appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley
G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City
which has declared “the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity” of the said second
marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s
decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same
was denied in a Resolution7 dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
1. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE
THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE
CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER
IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE
CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT,
AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES
X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS
ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE
SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS
APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE
IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE
OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME “CAPILI” IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043
DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE
SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES
IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the
second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)
that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were
present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent

was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999.
Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with
the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that
the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or
guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge
of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and
ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held
that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon
the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed
by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent.
Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does
not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
2)
G.R. No. 119063. January 27, 1997. *
JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and ADELA TEODORA P. SANTOS, respondents.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Prescription; While it is true that bigamy is a public offense, it is
entirely incorrect to state that only the State is the offended party in such case and, therefore, only
the State’s discovery of the crime could effectively commence the running of the period of
prescription therefor.—It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely incorrect to
state, as the petitioner does, that only the State is the offended party in such case, as well as in
other public offenses, and, therefore, only the State’s discovery of the crime could effectively
commence the running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC provides that
“[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . .” This rule makes no distinction between
a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the “offended
party, the authorities, or their agents.”
Same; Same; Same; It is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a
crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, which expressly provides that “[e]very person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable.”—Article 91 does not define the term “offended party.” We find its definition
in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as “the person against whom or against whose
property, the offense was committed.” The said Section reads as follows: SEC. 12. Name of the
offended party.—A complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known, and if there is no better way of identifying
him, he must be described under a fictitious name. More specifically, it is reasonable to assume
that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the
offender is civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that “[e]very
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” Invariably then, the private individual
to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
Same; Same; Same; Motions to Quash; Criminal Procedure; While there is no provision in the
new Rule 117 that prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal
liability, Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the old Rule 117.—The
petitioner’s contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information in Criminal Case
No. Q-92-27272 which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious.
Even People v. Alagao, which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided in
paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117, viz., (a) extinction of
criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His additional claim that the exception of extinction
can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the former Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its revision, is equally without merit. No repeal,
express or implied, of the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is no provision in the new
Rule 117 that prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability,
Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the old Rule 117.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is clear from Section 2 of Rule 117 that a motion to quash may
be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double
jeopardy are retained among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117,
it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such
grounds.—It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal
grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among
the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that
facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds. As a matter of fact,
inquiry into such facts may be allowed where the ground invoked is that the allegations in the
information do not constitute the offense charged.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A party cannot be allowed to disown statements he made under
oath and in open court when it serves his purpose—this is a contemptible practice which can only
mislead the courts and thereby contribute to injustice.—The petitioner likewise claims that the
factual bases of the private respondent’s motion to quash are inconclusive. The petitioner cannot
be allowed to disown statements he made under oath and in open court when it serves his purpose.
This is a contemptible practice which can only mislead the courts and thereby contribute to
injustice. Besides, he never denied having given the pertinent testimony. He did, however, term
it vague in that it was not clear whether the prior marriage which Eugenia Balingit disclosed to
him was that entered into by the private respondent with Reynaldo Quiroca. It is immaterial to
whom the private respondent was first married; what is relevant in this case is that the petitioner
was informed of a prior marriage contracted by the private respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Trips abroad which were brief, the accused returning to the Philippines
every time, do not constitute the “absence” contemplated in Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.—
The petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent’s several trips abroad as enumerated
in the certification of the Bureau of Immigration, and cites the second paragraph of Article 91 of
the RPC, viz.: “[t]he term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago.” We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not
constitute the “absence” contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the
private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner
discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still
the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Ricardo J.M. Rivera Law Office for petitioner.
Antonio P. Navarette for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming
the trial court’s order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on
prescription.
On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor’s
Office an “Affidavit of Complaint” charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora
1
P. Santos alias “Delia Santos,” with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by
R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October
1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter
that he would limit his action to bigamy. 2
After appropriate proceedings, Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla filed on 8 January 1992

with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an information, dated 15 November
3
1991, charging the private respondent with Bigamy allegedly committed as follows:
That on or before the 2nd day of February, 1957, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being previously united in lawful
marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without the said marriage having been dissolved, (or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with JOSE G. GARCIA, which marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of
the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-9227272 and assigned to Branch
83 of the said court. On 2 March 1992, the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash
alleging prescription of the offense as ground therefor. She contended that by the
petitioner’s admissions in his testimony given on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case No. 90-
52730, entitled “Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia,” and in his complaint filed with the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) on 16 October 1991, the petitioner discovered the
commission of the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), the period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom.
4
Thus, since bigamy was punishable by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty which
5 6
prescribed in fifteen years pursuant to Article 92 of the RPC, then the offense charged
prescribed in 1989, or fifteen years after its discovery by the petitioner.
The private respondent quoted the petitioner’s testimony in Civil Case No. 90-
7
52730 as follows:
Q No, no, just answer. What did you learn from her
(Eugenia) about the private respondent?
A That she has been married previously in case I don’t know
it. But she said she has been previously married, in fact I
saw her husband—Rey, a few days ago and they said,
“Baka magkasama pa silang muli.”
xxx
ATTY. EVANGELISTA:
Q When did Eugenia R. Balingit told [sic] that private
respondent was already married to another man?
A That was when I told her that we are separating now. I told
her in tagalog, “na maghihiwalay na kami ni Delia
ngayon.” “Ang unang tanong niya sa akin, “si Rey ba ang
dahilan,’ ang alam ko po, Rey ang dating boyfriend niya,
kaya ang sabi ko, ‘hindi po, Mario ang pangalan,’
napabagsak po siya sa upuan, sabi niya, ‘hindi na
nagbago.’ ”
Q When was that when you came to know from
EugeniaBalingit, the judicial guardian, that private
respondent was already married to another man when she
married you?
A That was when the affair was happening and I found out.
Q What year?
A 1974. 8
The portion of the complaint filed on 16 October 1991 before the CSC which the private
respondent alluded to, reads as follows:
1. 5.At the time the respondent married the herein complainant she never informed him that
she was previously married to a certain “REYNALDO QUIROCA” on December 1, 1951
wherein she used the name of “ADELA SANTOS” which was part of her true name
“ADELA TEODORA P. SANTOS” as per her genuine Baptismal Certificate issued by the
Parish of San Guillermo, Bacolor, Pampanga, a copy of the said Baptismal Certificate is
hereto attached as ANNEX “D”;
2. 6.x x x
3. 7.These facts were discovered only by the herein complainant in the year 1974 where they
separated from each other because of her illicit relations with several men continued use
of her alias name “DELIA,” without proper authority from the Courts; and committing a
series of fraudulent acts; her previous marriage to a certain “Reynaldo Quiroca” is
evidenced by a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, a copy of which
is hereto attached as ANNEX “F”; 9
In its 29 June 1992 order, the trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the
10
criminal case, ruling in this wise:

This court believes that since the penalty prescribed under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
for the offense of bigamy is prision mayor, which is classified as an afflictive penalty under Article
25 of the same Code, then said offense should prescribe in fifteen (15) years as provided in Article
92 of the Code. The complainant having discovered the first marriage of the accused to one
Reynaldo Quiroca in 1974 when he was informed of it by one Eugenia Balingit, the offense charged
has already prescribed when the information was filed in this case on November 15, 1991. The
argument presented by the prosecution that it was difficult for the complainant to obtain evidence
of the alleged first marriage, hence, the prescriptive period should be counted from the time the
evidence was secured will not hold water. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code specifically
provides, thus:
“The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered x x x”
it did not state “on the day sufficient evidence was gathered,” thus this Court cannot change the
requirements of the law.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above order on 26 August 1992, to which 11
he filed “numerous” supplements thereto, focusing on the private respondent’s many trips
abroad which the petitioner claimed suspended the running of the prescriptive period.
These trips were enumerated in the certification issued by Associate Commissioner
12
Ramon M. Morales of the Bureau of Immigration (BID), which reads as follows:
This is to certify that the name GARCIA/DELIA/S. appears in the Bureau’s files of
Arrivals and Departures as having the following travel records:
Departed for HKG on 06/03/77 aboard PR
Arrived from HKG on 07/02/77 aboard PA
Arrived from SYD on 07/09/77 aboard PR
Arrived from GUM on 06/14/80 aboard PA
Arrived from MEL on 07/17/81 aboard PR
Arrived from TYO on 05/20/83 aboard PA
Departed for HKG on 09/22/83 aboard PR
Arrived from SIN on 09/28/83 aboard PR
Departed for TYO on 04/30/84 aboard PA
Arrived from SFO on 07/03/84 aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 11/17/86 aboard UA
Arrived from LAX on 12/12/87 aboard UA
Departed for LAX on 11/30/87 aboard UA
Departed for CHI on 11/14/88 aboard UA
The trial court disallowed reconsideration of its 29 June 1992 order, finding “no urgent
or justifiable reason to disturb or set [it] aside.” As to the sojourns abroad of the private
respondent as shown in the certification, the trial court held that the same “is not that
kind of absence from the Philippines which will interrupt the period of prescription of the
offense charged . . .”13
The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as CA-
G.R. CR No. 14324. He contended therein that: (a) the trial court erred in quashing the
information on the ground of prescription; and (b) the counsel for the accused was barred
from filing the motion to quash the information against the accused. As to the first, the
14
petitioner argued that bigamy was a public offense, hence “the offended party is not the
first or second (innocent) spouse but the State whose law/policy was transgressed.” He
tried to distinguish bigamy from private offenses such as adultery or concubinage “where
the private complainant is necessarily the offended party,” thus, the prescriptive period
for the former should commence from the day the State, being the offended party,
discovered the offense, which in this case was on 28 August 1991 when the petitioner filed
his complaint before the Prosecutor’s Office. The petitioner added that the “interchanging
use” in Article 91 of the RPC of the terms “offended party,” “authorities,” and “their
agents” supports his view that the state is the offended party in public offenses.
Additionally, the petitioner referred to the general rule stated in People v.

Alagao “that in resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or information[,] the
15
facts alleged in the complaint or information should be taken as they are.” The
information in this case mentioned that the bigamy was discovered in 1989. He admitted,
however, that this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the ground for the motion to
quash is prescription of the offense, as provided in Section 4 of the old Rule 117 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Nonetheless, he advanced the view that this exception is no
longer available because of the implied repeal of Section 4, as the amended Rule 117 no
longer contains a similar provision under the rule on motions to quash; and that granting
there was no repeal, the private respondent failed to introduce evidence to “support her
factual averment in her motion to quash,” which is required by Rule 117. He further
asserted that the factual bases of the motion to quash, viz., the petitioner’s testimony
in Civil Case No. 90-52730 and his complaint filed with the CSC are not conclusive
because the testimony is hearsay evidence, hence inadmissible, while the complaint is
vague, particularly the following portion quoted by the private respondent:
1. 7.These facts where discovered only by the herein complainant in the year 1974 when they
separated from each other because of her illicit relations with several men continued use
of her alias name “DELIA,” without proper authority from the Courts; and committing a
series of fraudulent acts; her previous marriage to a certain
1. “Reynaldo Quiroca” is evidenced by a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of

Manila, a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX “F”;
The petitioner alleged that the phrase “These facts” in said paragraph 7 does not clearly
refer to his discovery of the private respondent’s first marriage. Moreover, he doubted
whether the term “discovered” in the said paragraph was used in the sense contemplated
by law. At best, the petitioner theorized, the discovery only referred to the “initial,
unconfirmed and uninvestigated raw, hearsay information” which he received from
Balingit.
Finally, the petitioner reiterated that the prescriptive period was interrupted several
times by the private respondent’s numerous trips abroad.
As regards his second contention, the petitioner argued that the counsel for the private
respondent had already stated that he represented only Delia S. Garcia and not Adela
Teodora P. Santos. Consequently, the private respondent’s counsel could not ask for the
quashal of the information in favor of Adela Teodora P. Santos alias Delia Santos. The
petitioner opined that the counsel for the private respondent should have sought a
dismissal of the case in favor of Delia Garcia alone.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to the private respondent’s evidence and concluded
that the petitioner discovered the private respondent’s first marriage in 1974. Since the
information in this case was filed in court only on 8 January 1992, or eighteen years after
the discovery of the offense, then the 15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. It 16
further held that the quashal of an information based on prescription of the offense could
be invoked before or after arraignment and even on appeal, for under Article 89(5) of
17
the RPC, the criminal liability of a person is “ ‘totally extinguish[ed], by the prescription
of the crime, which is a mode of extinguishing criminal liability.” Thus, prescription is not
deemed waived even if not pleaded as a defense. 18
Undaunted, the petitioner is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari to

annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and to compel the respondent
court to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. He submits the
following assignment of errors:
BIGAMY IS A PUBLIC OFFENSE, CONSEQUENTLY, PRESCRIPTION SHOULD HAVE

BEEN COUNTED FROM THE TIME THE STATE DISCOVERED ITS COMMISSION;
II
A MOTION TO QUASH CANNOT ALSO GO BEYOND WHAT IS STATED IN THE

INFORMATION;
III
BY THEMSELVES, THE FACTUAL BASES OF THE MOTION TO QUASH ARE NOT ALSO
CONCLUSIVE;
IV
ASSUMING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTED IN 1974, SAID PERIOD HOWEVER

WAS INTERRUPTED SEVERAL TIMES.
We notice that except for the first two pages of the petition, the deletion of a few
paragraphs, the substitution of the term “petitioner” for “appellant,” and the deletion of
the contention on the counsel for the private respondent being barred from filing a motion
to quash, the herein petition is a reproduction of the Appellant’s Brief filed by the
petitioner with the Court of Appeals. Verily then, the instant petition is a rehash of an
old tale. However, the Court of Appeals failed to sufficiently address several issues raised
by the petitioner, most probably prompting him to seek redress from this Court. We
resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. The Office of the Solicitor General was the last to submit a
Memorandum for the public respondent. Both the private and public respondents ask for
the dismissal of this petition and the affirmance of the challenged decision.
Petitioner’s position is untenable. Denial then of this petition is all it merits.

We shall take up the assigned errors in seriatim.
I
It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely incorrect to state, as the
petitioner does, that only the State is the offended party in such case, as well as in other
public offenses, and, therefore, only the State’s discovery of the crime could effectively
commence the running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC
provides that “[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . .” This
rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then,
the discovery may be by the “offended party, the authorities, or their agents.”
Article 91 does not define the term “offended party.” We find its definition in Section
12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as “the person against whom or against whose property,
the offense was committed.” The said Section reads as follows:
19
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.—A complaint or information must state the name and
surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or
any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known, and if there is no better
way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of
a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of
Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that “[e]very person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.” Invariably then, the private individual to whom the
20
offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
This conclusion is strengthened by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
reads:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with a criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused. x x x
It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended
parties depending on the circumstances. 21
The petitioner even admits that he is the offended party in Criminal Case No. Q-92-
27272. The information therein, which he copied in full in the petition in this case,
22
describes him as the “offended party” who suffered “damage and prejudice . . . in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.” 23
The distinction he made between public crimes and private crimes relates not to the
discovery of the crimes, but to their prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear on this matter.
II
The petitioner’s contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information
in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is
palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alagao, which he cites, mentions the exceptions
24
to the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the
old Rule 117, viz., (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His
additional claim that the exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied
repeal of the former Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-
25
reproduction after its revision, is equally without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of
the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is no provision in the new Rule 117 that
prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability,
Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the old Rule 117. The
said Section 2 reads as follows:
SEC. 2. Form and contents.—The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his
counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the court shall
consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged. (3a, 4a, 5a). (italics supplied for emphasis)
It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal
grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as
among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily
follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds.
As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed where the ground invoked is
that the allegations in the information do not constitute the offense charged. Thus,
in People v. De la Rosa, this Court stated:
26
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information
do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the
basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, as
held in the case of People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, additional facts not alleged in the information,
but admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash.
Former Chief Justice Moran supports this theory. 27
In Criminal Case No. 92-27272, the trial court, without objection on the part of the
prosecution, allowed the private respondent to offer evidence in support of her claim that
the crime had prescribed. Consequently, the trial court, upon indubitable proof of
prescription, correctly granted the motion to quash. It would have been, to quote De la
Rosa, “pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to [the fact of prescription] and still
give due course to the prosecution of the case”—a technicality which would have meant
loss of valuable time of the court and the parties.
As noted by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, Jr., consultant of the Rules of Court Revision
Committee, the aforequoted Section 2 of the new Rule 117 on “factual and legal grounds”
of a motion to quash is based on the De la Rosa case. 28
III
The petitioner likewise claims that the factual bases of the private respondent’s motion
to quash are inconclusive. The petitioner cannot be allowed to disown statements he made
under oath and in open court when it serves his purpose. This is a contemptible practice
which can only mislead the courts and thereby contribute to injustice. Besides, he never
denied having given the pertinent testimony. He did, however, term it vague in that it
was not clear whether the prior marriage which Eugenia Balingit disclosed to him was
that entered into by the private respondent with Reynaldo Quiroca. It is immaterial to
whom the private respondent was first married; what is relevant in this case is that the
petitioner was informed of a prior marriage contracted by the private respondent.
Neither may the petitioner be heard to cast doubt on the meaning of his statements in
his sworn complaint filed before the CSC. We find no hint of vagueness in them. In any
event, he has not denied that he in fact discovered in 1974 that the private respondent
had been previously married.
Finally, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent’s several trips
abroad as enumerated in the certification of the Bureau of Immigration, and cites the
second paragraph of Article 91 of the RPC, viz.: “[t]he term of prescription shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.” We agree with the Court
of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute the “absence” contemplated in Article
91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the
Philippines.
Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the
aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed
well beyond the prescriptive period. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 14324 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
2.
G.R. No. 191566. July 17, 2013.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Motion to Quash; A motion to quash information is the
mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information.—As defined in Antone, 637 SCRA 615 (2010), “a motion to quash information is the
mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information.” It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The
fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is
whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the
information are not to be considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in
the information which is evident on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if
it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is
given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is
sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except when the
information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of.—An examination of the information filed against
respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of
bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit: (1) That the offender has been legally married; (2) That the first marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) That
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
507
VOL. 701, JULY 17, 2013 507
People vs. Odtuhan
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Pelaez, Gregorio, Gregorio & Lim for respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated
December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The
assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to and receive
evidence on respondent’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the
assailed resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993,
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and
Romeo F. Barza, concurring; Rollo, pp. 37A-47.
2 Id., at pp. 48-49.
3 Records, p. 8.
4 Id., at p. 7.
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Odtuhan
petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with
Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon
died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon
learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.7 She thus filed a Complaint-
Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed
as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
being then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed
to present evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that
the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two
grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished.12
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 144.
6 Records, pp. 15-19.
7 Id., at p. 5.
8 Id., at pp. 4-6.
9 Id., at pp. 1-2.
10 Id., at p. 1.
11 Id., at pp. 66-71.
12 Id., at p. 66.
509
VOL. 701, JULY 17, 2013 509
People vs. Odtuhan
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus
Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information — that there was a valid
marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been
dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon — constitute the crime
of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on
the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of
nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order15 dated
February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court16 before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the
information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and
void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.17
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to
and receive evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that
there is cogent basis in look-
_______________
13 Branch 27, Manila.
14 Penned by Judge Teresa P. Soriaso; records, pp. 104-105.
15 Records, pp. 121-122.
16 CA Rollo, pp. 2-26.
17 Id., at p. 9.
18 Rollo, p. 46. (Emphasis in the original)
510
People vs. Odtuhan
ing into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that
his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy
would be lacking.20 The appellate court further held that respondent is even better off
than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that
respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the
complaint for bigamy was filed against him.21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information,
considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense.22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY
ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST
MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT’S
_______________
19 466 Phil. 1013; 422 SCRA 376 (2004).
20 Rollo, p. 44.
21 Id., at pp. 44-45.
22 Id., at p. 46.
511
VOL. 701, JULY 17, 2013 511
People vs. Odtuhan
CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez
v. Cipriano,24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the
subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001,
respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground
of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004,
petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved
for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that
her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy
case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of
their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner
obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the
latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006,
an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted
petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their
marriage, respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007,
respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became
final and executory on May 15, 2007. On
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 16-17.
24 G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012, 684 SCRA 315.
25 G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307.
26 G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615.
512
People vs. Odtuhan
June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for bigamy against respondent which
the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the
above cases. As in Antone and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information on
the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal
liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA,
however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, “a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the information.” It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an
Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law.
Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered.27 To be
sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident
on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court
the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sus-
_______________
27 People v. Balao, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 565, 573; Go v. The Fifth Division,
Sandiganbayan, 549 Phil. 783, 805; 521 SCRA 270, 291 (2007).
28 Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341, 368.
29 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Section 4.
513
VOL. 701, JULY 17, 2013 513
People vs. Odtuhan
tained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed30 except when
the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy.31
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the
sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all
the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) hat the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally
married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that
respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with
Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to
_______________
32 Art. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
33 Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 330, 342; Teves v. People, supra note
25, at p. 312; Antone v. Beronilla, supra note 26, at pp. 627-628.
514
People vs. Odtuhan
Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license
is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the
information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the
second marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot
be raised in a motion to quash.34 It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the
very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller
examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the
proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document presented by
respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out
which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on
the hypothetical admission thereof.
Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his
marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration,
one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do
not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his
criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court’s
pronouncement in Morigo v. People36 where the accused therein was acquitted because
the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was
declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to
speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was
acquitted.
_______________
34 Antone v. Beronilla, supra note 26, at p. 628.
35 Id., at p. 627.
36 Supra note 19.
515
VOL. 701, JULY 17, 2013 515
People vs. Odtuhan
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been held in a number of cases that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s
ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope
that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
him.41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information
against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing
of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In
addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant,
_______________
37 Teves v. People, supra note 25, at p. 313.
38 Id., at pp. 313-314.
39 Montañez v. Cipriano, supra note 24, at p. 325.
40 Id., at pp. 325-326.
41 Teves v. People, supra note 25, at p. 314.
516
People vs. Odtuhan
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing
of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for
Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the
established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of
defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to
quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616
are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.
_______________
42 Id.
43 Antone v. Beronilla, supra note 26, at p. 632. (Italics in the original)
517
VOL. 701, JULY 17, 2013 517
People vs. Odtuhan
Notes.—It is settled that in considering a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the test is "whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as
defined by law. (Soriano vs. People, 611 SCRA 191 [2010])
Denial of a motion to quash is not appealable; It is an interlocutory order which cannot
be the subject of an appeal. (Zamoranos vs. People, 650 SCRA 304 [2011])
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having
all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistance of the first
marriage. (Montañez vs. Cipriano, 684 SCRA 315 [2012])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. Al
3)
G.R. No. 164435. September 29, 2009.*
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Husband and Wife; Prejudicial Questions; Penalties; He who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended
on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.—It is true that right after
the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings
on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to
Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted
that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a
ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the
CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis (336 SCRA 747 [2000]), the Court
categorically stated that: x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of
the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x x x x x x x x The reason is
that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x
Same; Same; Same; Annulment of Marriage; The moment a person contracts a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of
bigamy is already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage the
previous marriage which has not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction is deemed valid and subsisting.—The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy.
The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the
time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet
been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any
difference. As held in Tenebro, “[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.”
Same; Same; Penalties; Prescription; Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in fifteen years.—Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable
by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article
90 thereof provides that “[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years,” while Article 91 states that “[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Evidence; The party who raises a fact as a matter of
defense, such as prescription, has the burden of proving it.—Petitioner asserts that Uy had known
of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time.
Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The
defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to
establish the same, it remains self-serving. Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to
prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already
obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted
only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
their agents, as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.—
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals (233 SCRA 155 [1994]), “the prescriptive period for the
crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents],” as opposed to being counted
from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. Since petitioner failed to prove with
certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.
Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it
entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it
is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into
which it might be subdivided.—The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely
within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into
which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition
of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
Nelson A. Clemente for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its
Resolution2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No.
00-08-11:
INFORMATION
“The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of
BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo,
being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on
January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.”
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter,
trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

“On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs.
“A,,”“A-1,” “H,” “H-1,” “H-2,” “O,” “O-1,” pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN
dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J.
Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. “F,” “R,” “R-1”).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora
Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on
November 26, 1979 (Exhs. “D,” “J,” “J-1,” “Q,” “Q-1,” pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church
wedding in Manila (Exh. “E”).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City x x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their
marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria
Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX
(6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum. This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the
nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their
property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order
dated 2 August 2001.”3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo
were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta
Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo
and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had
prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated
July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted
marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael
Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the
presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her
marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy
had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated
March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void
ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final
and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its
Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4 denied
reconsideration and ruled that “[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the
said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy.”5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING
WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING
THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE
SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO
ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA
S. JARILLO.
CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS
UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed
jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner
moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed
involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for
suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA
struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated
that:
“x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and
in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of
a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x”7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:
“The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy
cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt
in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.”9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of
the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of
bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the
nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.10 As held in Tenebro, “[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.”11
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision
mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article
90 thereof provides that “[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in fifteen years,” while Article 91 states that “[t]he period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents x x x.”
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978;
hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as
a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to
produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it
remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was
incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already
obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to
present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own
mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire
belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly
observed that:
“x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother—the person who allegedly actually told
Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory
testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is
hearsay.”13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 “the prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents],” as opposed to being
counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner failed
to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense
is, therefore, ineffectual.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under
the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum
penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances
are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision
mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1
day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore,
correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision
mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10
years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to

Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment 17 to be void ab initio on account of
the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to
manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower
courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004
4)
G.R. No. 206284. February 28, 2018.*
REDANTE SARTO y MISALUCHA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of.—For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following
elements must concur: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante,
it is incumbent upon him to show that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro’s
country’s national law.—It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof
lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action. Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him
to show that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro’s country’s national law.
Stated differently, Redante has the burden of proving the termination of the first marriage prior
to the celebration of the second.
Same; Same; Foreign Laws; Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is
mandatory considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial
notice of foreign laws.—A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not
have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may
be required before the effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction. Recognition
of the divorce decree, however, need not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that
purpose. Philippine courts may recognize the foreign divorce decree
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
549
VOL. 856, FEBRUARY 28, 2018 549
Sarto vs. People
when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. Before the
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which
the divorce was secured is mandatory considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be
expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws. For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact,
a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in
consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value
only after it is presented and admitted in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Divorce Decrees; The divorce decree and foreign law may be proven
through (1) an official publication or (2) copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody
of said documents.—To prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them
must present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven through (1)
an official publication or (2) copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody of said
documents. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was
satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro — whether
an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends it
— and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained.—This
certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against Redante. First,
the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and jurisprudence. As
discussed previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself
as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification. Second, assuming the certificate of
divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was not accompanied by a certification issued
by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada,
550
Sarto vs. People
as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was
presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably determined whether the subject divorce
decree was in accord with Maria Socorro’s national law. Further, since neither the divorce decree
nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly
secured by Maria Socorro — whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a
limited divorce which merely suspends it — and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry
could not also be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity
to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. His liability for bigamy is, therefore,
now beyond question.
Obias, Ramos, Rosario & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
MARTIRES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 31 July
2012 Decision1 and the 6 March 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 32635, which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 26, Naga City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 finding petitioner Redante
Sarto y Misalucha (Redante) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 18-26. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices Japar B.
Dimaampao and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 29-30.
3 Records, pp. 151-157.
551
VOL. 856, FEBRUARY 28, 2018 551
Sarto vs. People
The Facts
On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly
contracting two (2) marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro),
and the second, without having the first one legally terminated, with private complainant
Fe R. Aguila (Fe). The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against
Redante on 4 June 2007. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about December 29, 1998, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with one Ma. Socorro G. Negrete, as evidenced by hereto attached
Certificate of Marriage mark as Annex “A,” and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there, willfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with FE
R. AGUILA-SARTO, herein complaining witness, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During his arraignment on 3 December 2007, Redante entered a plea of “not guilty.”
Pretrial ensued wherein Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages but
interposed the defense that his first marriage had been legally dissolved by divorce
obtained in a foreign country.
On 22 May 2008, the defense filed a motion to allow the taking of Maria Socorro’s
deposition considering that she was set to leave the country on the first week of June
2008.5 This was granted by the RTC in its Order,6 dated 26 May 2008. Maria Socorro’s
deposition was taken on 28 May 2008.
_______________
4 Id., at p. 1.
5 Id., at pp. 78-79.
6 Id., at p. 80.
552
Sarto vs. People
On 22 August 2008, the prosecution moved for a modified or reverse trial on the basis
of Redante’s admissions.7 The RTC granted the motion in its Order,8 dated 27 August
2008, wherein the defense was directed to present its case ahead of the prosecution.
Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented Redante and Maria Socorro as witnesses. Their testimonies,
taken together, tended to establish the following:
Redante and Maria Socorro, both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur, were married on 31
August 1984 in a ceremony held in Angono, Rizal.9 Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro
left for Canada to work as a nurse. While in Canada, she applied for Canadian citizenship.
The application was eventually granted and Ma. Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship
on 1 April 1988.10 Maria Socorro then filed for divorce in British Columbia, Canada, to
sever her marital ties with Redante. The divorce was eventually granted by the Supreme
Court of British Columbia on 1 November 1988.11
Maria Socorro came back to Buhi, Camarines Sur, sometime in 1992 for a vacation.
While there Redante’s mother and grandparents, who were against the divorce, convinced
her and Redante to give their marriage a second chance to which they acceded. Their
attempts to rekindle their romance resulted in the birth of their daughter on 8 March
1993 in Mandaluyong City. In spite of this, Redante and Maria Socorro’s efforts to save
their marriage were futile.12
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 100-101.

8 Id., at p. 103.
9 TSN, 28 May 2008, p. 7.
10 Id., at p. 4.
11 Id., at p. 7; Records, p. 36, Exh. (3).
12 Id., at p. 10.
553
VOL. 856, FEBRUARY 28, 2018 553
Sarto vs. People
Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was
previously married to Maria Socorro who, however, divorced him. 13 Despite this
admission, their romance blossomed and culminated in their marriage on 29 December
1998 at the Peñafrancia Basilica Minore in Naga City.14 They established a conjugal home
in Pasay City and had two children. Their relationship, however, turned sour when Ma.
Socorro returned to the Philippines and met with Redante to persuade him to allow their
daughter to apply for Canadian citizenship. After learning of Redante and Maria
Socorro’s meeting and believing that they had reconciled, Fe decided to leave their
conjugal home on 31 May 2007.15 On 4 June 2007, Fe filed a complaint for bigamy against
Redante.16
Meanwhile, Maria Socorro married a certain Douglas Alexander Campbell, on 5
August 2000, in Chilliwack, British Columbia, Canada.17
The defense presented a Certificate of Divorce18 issued on 14 January 2008, to prove
the fact of divorce.
Evidence for the

Prosecution
The prosecution waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and presented

instead, the Marriage Contract19 between Redante and Maria Socorro, to prove the
solemnization of their marriage on 31 August 1984, in Angono, Rizal; and the Marriage
Contract20 of Redante and Fe to prove the solemnization of Redante’s second marriage on
29 December 1998, in
_______________
13 TSN, 27 October 2008, pp. 7-8.

14 Id., at p. 3.
15 Id., at p. 10.
16 Records, pp. 3-4.
17 TSN, 28 May 2008, p. 8.
18 Records, p. 36, Exhibit “3.”
19 Id., at p. 34, Exh. “A.”
20 Id., at p. 35, Exh. “B.”
554
Sarto vs. People
Naga City. The prosecution also adopted the Certificate of Divorce21 as its own exhibit for
the purpose of proving that the same was secured only on 14 January 2008.
The RTC’s Ruling
In its judgment, the RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of bigamy. The trial court ratiocinated that Redante’s conviction is the only reasonable
conclusion for the case because of his failure to present competent evidence proving the
alleged divorce decree; his failure to establish the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and
his admission that he did not seek judicial recognition of the alleged divorce decree. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Redante Sarto y Misalucha guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby sentenced him an
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prisión correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor, as maximum.22
Aggrieved, Redante appealed before the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Judgment. The appellate court
ratiocinated that assuming the authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of
Divorce, since the order of divorce or the divorce decree was not presented, it could not
ascertain whether said divorce capacitated Maria Socorro, and consequently Redante, to
remarry. It continued that Redante failed to present evidence that he
_______________
21 Id., at p. 36, Exh. “C.’’

22 Id., at p. 157.
555
VOL. 856, FEBRUARY 28, 2018 555
Sarto vs. People
had filed and had secured a judicial declaration that his first marriage had been dissolved
in accordance with Philippine laws prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to
Fe. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant Redante
Sarto y Misalucha of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400, is AFFIRMED.23
Redante moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its 6 March
2013 Resolution.
Hence, the present petition.
On 26 June 2013, the Court issued a Resolution24 requiring the respondent Republic of
the Philippines to file its comment.
The OSG’s Manifestation
In compliance with this Court’s resolution, the respondent, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)25 advocating
Redante’s acquittal. The OSG argued that the RTC had convicted Redante solely because
of his failure to provide evidence concerning the date when Maria Socorro acquired
Canadian citizenship. It observed that Maria Socorro failed to provide the exact date
when she acquired Canadian citizenship because of the loss of her citizenship certificate
at the time she took the witness stand. The OSG claimed, however, that Redante was
able to submit, although belatedly, a photocopy of Maria Socorro’s Canadian citizenship
certificate as an attachment to his appellant’s brief. The said certificate stated that Maria
Socorro was already a Canadian citizen as early as 1 April 1988; hence, the divorce decree
which took effect on 1
_______________
23 Rollo, p. 26.
24 Id., at p. 34.
25 Id., at pp. 43-55.
556
Sarto vs. People
November 1988 is valid. The OSG further averred that substantial rights must prevail
over the application of procedural rules.
Issue
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY FOUND
PETITIONER REDANTE SARTO y MISALUCHA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF BIGAMY.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Elements of bigamy; bur-

den of proving the termina-
tion of the first marriage.
For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1) that
the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a second
or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.26
Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, put forth the
defense of the termination of his first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained abroad
by his alien spouse.
It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies with the
party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense
of an
_______________
26 Antone v. Beronilla, 652 Phil. 151, 166; 637 SCRA 615, 627-628 (2010).
557
VOL. 856, FEBRUARY 28, 2018 557
Sarto vs. People
action.27 Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him to
show that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro’s country’s national
law.28 Stated differently, Redante has the burden of proving the termination of the first
marriage prior to the celebration of the second.29
Redante failed to prove
his capacity to contract
a subsequent marriage.
A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to

the status of a marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have
an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts
may be required before the effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this
jurisdiction.30 Recognition of the divorce decree, however, need not be obtained in a
separate petition filed solely for that purpose. Philippine courts may recognize the foreign
divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.31
Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove it as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving
the for-
_______________
27 Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 735; 366 SCRA 437, 451 (2001).
28 Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil. 493, 500; 665 SCRA 487, 496 (2012).
29 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 656; 336 SCRA 747, 755 (2000).
30 Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524, 546; 700 SCRA 69, 101 (2013).
31 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 223 Phil. 357; 139 SCRA 139 (1985); Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 642 Phil. 420, 432-
433; 628 SCRA 266, 281-282 (2010); Noveras v. Noveras, 741 Phil. 670, 682; 733 SCRA 528, 540 (2014).
558
Sarto vs. People
eign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory considering that Philippine
courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws. 32 For the
purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be
presented and admitted in evidence. This is in consonance with the rule that a foreign
judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is presented and
admitted in evidence.33
In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking
them must present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court.34 Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may
be proven through (1) an official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the
officer having legal custody of said documents. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country, the copies of said documents must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.35
Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the
existence of the divorce as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of
his subsequent marriage to Fe.
Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence
presented by the defense to prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued
by the
_______________
32 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 576; 514 SCRA 607, 613 (2007).
33 Supra note 28 at p. 499; p. 495.
34 ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin, 647 Phil. 43, 50; 632 SCRA 528, 535 (2010).
35 Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 28; San Luis v. San Luis, 543 Phil. 275, 294; 514 SCRA 294,
313-314 (2007).
559
VOL. 856, FEBRUARY 28, 2018 559
Sarto vs. People
registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14 January 2008. Said certificate
provides:
In the Supreme Court of British Columbia
Certificate of Divorce
This is to certify that Ma. Socorro Negrete SARTO and Redante M. SARTO who were
married at ANGONO, RIZAL, PHILIPPINES on August 31, 1984 were divorced under the
Divorce Act (Canada) by an order of this Court which took effect and dissolved the marriage
on November 1, 1988.
This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against
Redante. First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules
and jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact
of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere
certification. Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce
decree, it was not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine
diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule
132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it
could not be reasonably determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with
Maria Socorro’s national law.
Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was
satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro —
whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited
560
Sarto vs. People
divorce which merely suspends it36 — and whether such divorce capacitated her to
remarry could not also be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that
he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. His
liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.
This Court is not unmindful of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Indeed, in Republic v. Orbecido III,37 a case invoked by Redante to support his cause, the
Court recognized that the legislative intent behind the said provision is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse under the laws of his or
her country. The Court is also not oblivious of the fact that Maria Socorro had already
remarried in Canada on 5 August 2000. These circumstances, however, can never justify
the reversal of Redante’s conviction.
In Orbecido, as in Redante’s case, the alien spouse divorced her Filipino spouse and
remarried another. The Filipino spouse then filed a petition for authority to remarry
under paragraph 2 of Article 26. His petition was granted by the RTC. However, this
Court set aside said decision by the trial court after finding that the records were bereft
of competent evidence concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of the alien
spouse. The Court reiterated therein the rules regarding the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it, as well as the necessity to show that the
divorce decree capacitated his former spouse to remarry.38
Finally, the Court notes that the OSG was miserably misguided when it claimed that
the sole reason for the RTC’s judgment of conviction was Redante’s failure to provide evi-
_______________
36 Supra note 27 at pp. 735-736; p. 452.

37 509 Phil. 108, 114; 472 SCRA 114, 120-121 (2005).
38 Id., at p. 116; p. 123.
561
VOL. 856, FEBRUARY 28, 2018 561
Sarto vs. People
dence, during trial, of the date Maria Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship.
An examination of the 18 May 2009 judgment would reveal that the trial court
rendered the said decision after finding that there was lack of any competent evidence
with regard to the divorce decree39 and the national law governing his first wife,40 not
merely because of the lack of evidence concerning the effectivity date of Maria Socorro’s
naturalization. Thus, even if the Court were to indulge the OSG and consider Maria
Socorro’s citizenship certificate, which was a mere photocopy and filed belatedly, it would
not have any effect significant enough to produce a judgment of acquittal. The fact that
Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly acquired prior
to the celebration of the second marriage still subsists.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision, dated 31 July 2012, of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 32635 which
affirmed the 18 May 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City,
in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Redante
Sarto y Misalucha is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy and
is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prisión correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión
mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
_______________
39 CA Rollo, p. 19.
40 Id., at p. 21.
562
Sarto vs. People
Notes.—A foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is
proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. (Bayot vs. Court
of Appeals, 570 SCRA 472 [2008])
An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree — if the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse
is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. (Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA
266 [2010])
——o0o——
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 461
Manuel vs. People
5)
G.R. No. 165842. November 29, 2005. *
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Criminal Law; Bigamy; The reason why bigamy is considered
a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.—The reason
why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law. The phrase “or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” was incorporated in the Revised
Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that “in consonance with the
civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the
judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for
bigamy.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements; Family Code; Declaration of Nullity; Bigamy is
consummated on the celebration of the second or subsequent marriage; Under the Family Code,
the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.—For the accused to be held
guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally
married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having
been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsis-
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
462
Manuel vs. People
tence of the first marriage. Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second
marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an
essential element of a felony by dolo. On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there
are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first
marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved
by a court of competent jurisdiction. As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals and Mercado v. Tan, under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration
of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be
a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent—actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.—As
gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit
when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent.
Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the
words “with malice” do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included
in the word “voluntary.” Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act
without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission
defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law
presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man
intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the
contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a
consideration of the whole evidence. For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must
be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a
valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo—such defense negates malice or criminal
intent.—The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of
463
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 463
Manuel vs. People
fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; One accused of bigamy has the burden of
adducing in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of the first
spouse as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code; The phrase “or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words.—It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense
that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that
his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975.
He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive
death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article
41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted
in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private
complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The
petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden. The phrase “or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the
spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely
because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on
mere testimony is found incredible.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement of judicial declaration of presumptive death is
also for the benefit of the State—the laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the
interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive
nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.—The requirement of judicial declaration is
also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the “State shall
464
Manuel vs. People
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.” Marriage is a
social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society
require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance
only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages
are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil
marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage—two
willing spouses and an approving State.—In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil
marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new
relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so
serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most
positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse
after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of
the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that
the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the
first spouse. Indeed, “men readily believe what they wish to be true,” is a maxim of the old jurists.
To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other
to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic
facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals. Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second
marriages. Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily
capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the
absent spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he
or she must institute summary pro-
465
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 465
Manuel vs. People
ceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice
to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse; The Court rejects petitioner’s contention
that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second
marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy.—With the effectivity of the Family
Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was
reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee
spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio: In contrast, under the 1988 Family
Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the
following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike
the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the
spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable
the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged
with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of
eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code
proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.—The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the
amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform
466
Manuel vs. People
to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; Requisites; Moral damages may be awarded in favor of
the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7
of the Civil Code and analogous cases.—Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An
award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be
an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second,
there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the
award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the
Civil Code. Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases
enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the
private complainant/offended party, the guilty party is liable to the offended party for moral
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.—The law does
not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has
suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise,
467
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 467
Manuel vs. People
there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 and
analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some
others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.) Indeed, bigamy is
not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may
be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the
petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation
to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Rights; Elements.—According to Article 19,
“every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This provision contains what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The
standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good
faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.—Article 20 speaks
of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth
in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. If the provision does not provide a remedy for its
violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper. Article 20 provides that “every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.” On the other hand, Article 21 provides
that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.” The latter
provision is adopted to remedy “the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even
468
Manuel vs. People
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight
to prove for specifically in the statutes.” Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable
provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The accused’s collective acts of fraud and deceit
before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate, and
with malice and caused injury to the latter, and the fact that she did not sustain any physical
injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.—In the present case, the petitioner courted
the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even
brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the
same assurance—that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the
petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her
lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless
deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by
day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and
support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and
humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband. The Court rules
that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with
the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter.
That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Because the private complainant was an innocent
victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.—Because the
private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not
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Manuel vs. People
barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not
prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald: Where a person is induced by the
fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal
offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him
in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation
by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to
marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that
she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him
would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages.
The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship
and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and
condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be
recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am.
Rep. 336.

Albert M. Rasalan for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
1
in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877,
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Rebecca
De Guia-Salvador, concurring; Rollo, pp. 28-41.

470
Manuel vs. People
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3,
2
convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
“That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being
then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the
existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY TO LAW.” 3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus
Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the
Province of Rizal. He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City
4
sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for
a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was
39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to
another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in
having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her
that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They
were married on April 22, 1996
_______________
2 Penned by Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.

3 Records, p. 1.
4 Exhibit “B,” Records, p. 7.
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Manuel vs. People
before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch
61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single.”
5
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their
joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City.
However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house
only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from
Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes,
6
left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously
married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. She was so 7
embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married
when they exchanged their own vows. 8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she
worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He
informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to
marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed
that she had a “love-bite” on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified
that he declared he was “single” in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed
in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
_______________
5 Exhibit “A,” id., at p. 6.

6 TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
7 Exhibit “B,” Records, p. 7.
8 TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
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Manuel vs. People
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she
threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975
and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her
again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer
valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six
(6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed
to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way
of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that
Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-
year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the
ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu, the trial court further ruled that even if the
10
private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter
would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable
for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private
complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He
insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for
one to be criminally liable for a felony. He
_______________
9Records, pp. 111-116.

58 Phil. 817 (1933).
10
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Manuel vs. People
was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only
out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court
should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view,
the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Peñalosa and Manahan,
11
Jr. v. Court of Appeals. 12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith
and reliance on the Court’s ruling in United States v. Enriquez were misplaced; what is
13
applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco, the OSG further posited that as
14
provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even
assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to
judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage; the matter should be submitted to the
proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private complainant’s
knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense
against the State and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial
court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with
modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41
of the Family Code should apply. Before
_______________
11 1 Phil. 109 (1902).

12 G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
13 32 Phil. 202 (1915).
14 G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
474
Manuel vs. People
Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial
declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited
the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan and Domingo v. Court of Appeals to support
15 16
its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby
MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.” 17
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting
that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED

THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER
ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT

AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN
FACT AND IN LAW. 18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the
felony, i.e., that the marriage
_______________
15 G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

16 G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
17 Rollo, p. 41.
18 Rollo, pp. 14-15.
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VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 475
Manuel vs. People
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married
Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been “absent” for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of
the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the
first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years,
whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death
with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by
operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the specified period and the
present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able
to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge
of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family
Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as the two
requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that
he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390
of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective.
Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a
judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further
asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a
judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a
requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage. The petitioner,
likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor
of the private complainant. The private complainant was a “GRO” before he
476
Manuel vs. People
married her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took
care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit
relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA
affirming the petitioner’s conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the
evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic
v. Nolasco. 19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el anterior,
será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. x x x
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie
of marriage established by law. The phrase “or before the absent spouse had been
20
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”

was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the
impression that “in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of
death after an absence of a number of
_______________
Supra, at note 14.

19
CUELLO CALON, DERECHO PENAL REFORMADO, VOL. V, p. 627.

20
477
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 477
Manuel vs. People
years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a
justification for bigamy.”21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent
marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is 22
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must
23
be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential

element of a felony by dolo. On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are
24
only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the
first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until
lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. As the Court ruled in Domingo v.
25
_______________
21 AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. III, p. 497 (1988 ed.) (emphasis supplied).
22 Id., at p. 634.
23 People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 247 (1935).
24 . . . “Tres son los elementos esenciales del mismo; el vinculo matrimonial anterior, la celebración de nuevo
matrimonio antes de la disolución de ese vinculo anterior, y por ultimo, la intención fraudulenta, que constituye
la criminalidad misma del acto. Este ultimo elemento no lo consigna el articulo, por hallarse indudablemente
embebido en ese principio anterior a todos los Codigos, e inscrito en el frontispicio del nuestro (Art. I.), que donde
no hay voluntad, no hay delito. x x x” (CODIGO PENAL REFORMADO, TOMO 5, 560) Groizard is of the view
that bigamy may be committed by culpa.(id., at p. 558).
25 DERECHO PENAL REFORMADO, VOL. 1, pp. 629-630.
478
Manuel vs. People
Court of Appeals and Mercado v. Tan, under the Family Code of the Philippines, the
26 27
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and
declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a
new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. He 28
explained that:
. . . This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the
principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject believes that
the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence, and
if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts
a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of
the many years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his
endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no
fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime. 29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a
felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot
exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is
deemed voluntary. Although the words “with malice” do not appear in
30
_______________
26 Supra, at note 16.

27 Supra, at note 15.
28 ALBERT, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, p. 819 (1932 ed.).
29 Id.
30 L.B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK ONE, p. 37 (13th ed. 1993).
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Manuel vs. People
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word “voluntary.” 31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal
excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission32
defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the
law presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that
33
every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence
of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt
exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. 34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both
an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. 35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in
1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is
presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private
36
complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married
the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is
a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
_______________
31 United States v. Peñalosa, 1 Phil. 109.

32 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME 1, p. 302.
33 People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d. 798; 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
34 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 1, p. 203.
35 Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
36 Marbella-Bobbis vs. Bobbis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747.
480
Manuel vs. People
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already
dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of
his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article
41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner
acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the
private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such
case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase “or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment
of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as
protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because
he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere
testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the “State shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.” Marriage is a social institution of the
highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the
marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the
manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages
37
are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing
_______________
People v. Bitdu, supra, at note 10.

37
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Manuel vs. People
essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society
by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the
community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and
an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the
State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid
marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may
well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of
death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse after the lapse
38
of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the
declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof
that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse. Indeed, “men readily believe what they wish to be true,” is a
maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one
of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital
relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals. Only with such
39
proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages. Thus, 40
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent
not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable
of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the
41
absent spouse.
_______________
38 Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134 Md. 453, 107 A. 185 (1919).

39 WHARTON CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 2, 2377 (12th ed., 1932).
40 Id.
41 Id.
482
Manuel vs. People
The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for
bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide—
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after
an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
1. (1)A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
2. (2)A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;
3. (3)A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any
necessity of judicial declaration. However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended
42
the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the
_______________
42 TOLENTINO, THE NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. I, p. 690.

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Manuel vs. People
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. 43
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first
44
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus,
before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute
summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
45
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio: 46
“In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse
of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the
time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court
to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in
relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.”
_______________
43 Emphasis supplied.
44 The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) took effect on August 4, 1988.
45 Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996, 259 SCRA 129.
46 G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 201.
484
Manuel vs. People
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely
to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal
of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the
rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela that, for purposes
47
of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for
its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse
to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In In Re Szatraw, the
48 49
Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because
he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof
of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would
have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined.
The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because
he or she had not been heard from in
_______________
47 64 Phil. 179 (1937).
48 Id., at p. 83.
49 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
485
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 485
Manuel vs. People
seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary
period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and
remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it
should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless
act. The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death
50
of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court declared that the words “proper
51
proceedings” in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized
by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration
or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines, the52
Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an
absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that “the provision of Article
349 or “before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment reached in the proper proceedings” is erroneous and should be considered as
not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has
not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared
presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous.
He maintains that the supposition is not true. A second marriage is bigamous only when
53
the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of
_______________
50 Id., at p. 463.
51 98 Phil. 574 (1956).
52 107 Phil. 381 (1960).
53 AQUINO, REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. III, p. 490.
486
Manuel vs. People
the Civil Code are not present. Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the
54
view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration
of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute
bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should
not give rise to bigamy. Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view
55
that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she
contracts a second marriage. 56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy;
the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
57
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse
is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of
the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
. . . Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the
present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order
not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
_______________
54 Id., at p. 497.
55 PADILLA, COMMENTS ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. IV, p. 717-718.
56 THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1981 ED., VOL. II, p. 906.
57 Republic v. Nolasco, supra, at note 19.
487
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 487
Manuel vs. People
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present
spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in
the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
latter’s reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal
prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial
declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in
contracting a second marriage is already established.
58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who
wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is
now authorized for purposes of remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules
of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory
examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The
judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause
“before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x” should be
disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there
is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death
of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy. 59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent

authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be
dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could
_______________
HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, pp. 48-49.

58
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, pp. 62-63 (1992 ed.).
59
488
Manuel vs. People
then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. Before such
60
declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done
in good faith. Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the
61
ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however,
appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, “which requires a
summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before
the other spouse can remarry.”
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles
239 to 247 of the same Code. 62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains
that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate
court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc, where an award of moral damages for
63
bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant
failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding
that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy
is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not
proscribed from awarding moral damages
_______________
60 REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, p. 633 (1st ed., 2000), citing Lukban v. Republic, supra.
61 Id., citing People v. Reyes, CA-G.R. No. 12107-R, June 30, 1955, and People v. Malana, CA-G.R. No. 5347,
January 30, 1940.
62 SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 358.
63 CA-G.R. No. 22573-R, April 23, 1959.
489
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 489
Manuel vs. People
against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following
ruling in People v. Bondoc:
. . . Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el articulo
2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de
estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta
enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquí los
daños de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados. 64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the
law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award for 65
moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated
in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. 66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases
enumerated in Article 2219,
_______________
64 Article 2217, Civil Code.

65 Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr., G.R. No. 142029, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 261.
66 Id., at p. 266.
490
Manuel vs. People
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
“Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
1. (1)A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

2. (2)Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
3. (3)Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
4. (4)Adultery or concubinage;
5. (5)Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
6. (6)Illegal search;
7. (7)Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
8. (8)Malicious prosecution;
9. (9)Acts mentioned in article 309;
10. (10)Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and
sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where
the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising
out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for
the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 and analogous cases (which refer to those
67
cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other

respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.) 68
_______________
TOLENTINO, NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. II, p. 658, citing People v. Plaza, 52 O.G. 6609.
67
Id.
68
491
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 491
Manuel vs. People
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code
in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private
complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21
of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.” This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following: act
with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for
abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
70
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article
20 provides that “every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.” On the other hand, Article
21 provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages.” The latter provision is adopted to remedy
_______________
69 Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16.
70 Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA
778.
492
Manuel vs. People
“the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes.” Whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of
the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of
each case. 71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to
marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house
of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance—that he
was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated
in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and
dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful
husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were
married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and
heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series
of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the
private complainant, who changed her status from a single woman to a married woman,
lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married
lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned
out was not her lawful husband. 72
_______________
Id.
71
Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.E. 675 (1933).

72
493
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 493
Manuel vs. People
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice
and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar
to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab, the New Jersey Supreme
73
Court ruled:
x x x The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent.
See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all
recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the
ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and
mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct.
1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div.
1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but was
willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma
v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, “Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts,”
70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant’s bigamous
marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and “ashamed to go
out” but “couldn’t sleep” but “couldn’t eat,” had terrific headaches” and “lost quite a lot of weight.”
No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury’s reasonable allowance of $1,000
punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298
(App. Div. 1955).
74
The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the fam-
_______________
135 A.2d 657 (1957).

73
Id., at p. 662.
74
494
Manuel vs. People
ily as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she
is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy
would not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald: 75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in

consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which
is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for
damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899]
1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said
that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby
the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been
assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a
crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground
for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to
assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for
such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v.
Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal
relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the
defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation
have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17
L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blos-
_______________
75 Id., at pp. 611-612.

495
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 495
Manuel vs. People
som v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411.
Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that
the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the
defendant’s misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations distinguish this case from cases in which
the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one
who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958. 76
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of
P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
Notes.—A subsequent pronouncement that the accused’s marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a charge for concubinage—he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy. (Beltran vs. People, 334 SCRA 106 [2000])
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity—only
competent courts have such authority. (Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, 336 SCRA 747 [2000])
_______________
164 N.E. 609 (1929).

76
496
Domondon vs. Sandiganbayan
Where the second marriage of a person was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel v. Sempio-
Diy (1986), during which time the prevailing rule was found in Odayat v. Amante, 77
SCRA 338 (1977), People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954) and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033 (1957), there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack
of license and consent, before such person may contract a second marriage. (Ty vs. Court
of Appeals, 346 SCRA 86 [2000])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights r
6)
G.R. No. 188775. August 24, 2011.*

CENON R. TEVES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO
R. BONGALON, respondents.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements.—Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states: The penalty
of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2. That
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage; and 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.—It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the
crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration
of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a mar-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
308

Teves vs. People
riage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Same; Same; Same; The finality of the judicial declaration of the nullity of previous marriage
of the accused cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.—Settled is the
rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and
from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the
time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for
determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001
when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the
date of the bigamous marriage.

R.R. Mendez & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review seeks the reversal of the 21 January 2009 decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31125 affirming in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City in Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006.
The RTC decision2 found petitioner Cenon R.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato. Jr., and Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a
member of this Court) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; CA Rollo, pp. 75-86.
2 Records, pp. 156-162.
309
VOL. 656, AUGUST 24, 2011 309
Teves vs. People
Teves guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.
The Facts
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and
Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Metro
Manila.3
After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the
Philippines for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband
had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To verify the information,
she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of
Marriage4 indicating that her husband and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December
2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint5 accusing petitioner of
committing bigamy.
Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information6 which reads:
“That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to the present, in the municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said Cenon R. Teves being previously united in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992
with Thelma B. Jaime and without the said marriage having legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlaw-
_______________
3 Id., at p. 13.
4 Id., at p. 11.
5 Id., at p. 6.
6 Id., at p. 2.
310

Teves vs. People
fully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Edita T. Calderon, who knowing of the
criminal design of accused Cenon R. Teves to marry her and in concurrence thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cooperate in the execution of the offense by marrying
Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the existence of the marriage of the latter with Thelma B.
Jaime.”
During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
130, Caloocan City, rendered a decision7 dated 4 May 2006 declaring the marriage of
petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality8 issued
on 27 June 2006.
On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Cenon
R. Teves, also known as Cenon Avelino R. Teves, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the Information
dated June 8, 2006. Pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.”9
Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of
Appeals contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or
liability had already been extinguished. He also claimed that the trial court erred in
finding him guilty of Bigamy despite the defective Information filed by the prosecution.10
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 82-90.
8 Id., at pp. 91-92.
9 Id., at p. 162.
10 CA Rollo, p. 25. Appellant’s Brief.
311
VOL. 656, AUGUST 24, 2011 311
Teves vs. People
On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated August 15, 2007 in
Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.”11
On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the

decision.12 This however, was denied by the CA in a resolution issued on 2 July 2009.13
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, “there
is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.”14 He differentiates
a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits
that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second
marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined.
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan15 is
inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was
initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In petitioner’s case, the
first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in
court.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law that
would sustain petitioner’s contention.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:
_______________
11 Id., at p. 85.
12 Id., at pp. 89-99.
13 Id., at pp. 114-115.
14 Rollo, p. 24
15 G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
312
Teves vs. People
“The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.”16
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct
in affirming the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with
Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage
with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality
of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June
2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or
subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity.
Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.17
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention
that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first
mar-
_______________
16 Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004 423 SCRA, 272, 279 citing Reyes, L.B.,
the Revised Penal Code, Book II, 14th Ed., 1998, p. 907.
17 CA Rollo, p. 62.
313
VOL. 656, AUGUST 24, 2011 313
Teves vs. People
riage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.18
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which
drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to
a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before
they can be allowed to marry again.19
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for
the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void,
marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.20
In numerous cases,21 this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subse-
_______________
18 Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572, 579.
19 Id., at pp. 579-580.
20 Id., at p. 582, citing J.A.V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook of the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 46 (1988).
21 A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010, 615 SCRA 186, 198-199, Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador
against Sps. Noel and Amelia Serafico citing Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004, 422 SCRA
376; Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 194818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572; Terre v. Terre, A.C. No.
2349, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 7; Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, No. L-53703, 19 August 1986, 143 SCRA 499; Vda. De
Consuegra v. Gov-
314
Teves vs. People
quent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply
evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was
filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the
Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted,
such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision
nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot
be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or
inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and
eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is
against its simple letter.
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or
Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining prescription.22 The crime of
bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second
marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous
marriage.
_______________
ernment Service Insurance System, No. L-28093, 30 January 1971, 37 SCRA 315; Gomez v. Lipana, No. L-
23214, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 614.
22 De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101630, 24 August 1992, 212 SCRA 823, 830.
315
VOL. 656, AUGUST 24, 2011 315
Teves vs. People
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision
dated 21 January 2009 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Peralta** and Mendoza,*** JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—The pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question in a prosecution for concubinage or bigamy. (Marbella-Bobis vs.
Bobis, 336 SCRA 747 [2000])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights r
G.R. No. 181089. October 22, 2012.*

MERLINDA CIPRIONA MONTAÑEZ, respondent, vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA
CIPRIANO, complainant.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of; It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.―The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has
been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.
Same; Same; The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage.―At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still
subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence,
the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that
she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent
was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged
were sufficiently alleged.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order and resolution of the Regional Trial Court
of San Pedro, Laguna, Br. 31.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
316
Montañez vs. Cipriano
Jose Marlon P. Pabiton for petitioner.
Robert Sison for respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the
Order1 dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the Information for
Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC
Resolution2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On
January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married
Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the
RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with
Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36
of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the
RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage
of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on
October 13, 2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the
first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a
Complaint7 for
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 54-55; Per Judge Sonia T. Yu-Casano.
2 Id., at pp. 52-53.
3 Id., at p. 60.
4 Id., at p. 62.
5 Id., at pp. 66-68.
6 Id., at p. 69.
7 Id., at p. 71.
317
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 317
Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached
to the complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23,
2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that
respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On
November 17, 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the
RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-
SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one
SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not
been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that
her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there
was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983;
that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore
wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of
bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment 13 arguing that the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage
_______________
8 Id., at p. 72.
9 Died on May 27, 2007; id., at p. 59.
10 Id., at p. 75.
11 Id.
12 Id., at pp. 80-81.
13 Id., at pp. 82-83.
318
which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been
annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent’s
argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more
first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was
absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent’s claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that
while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only
discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence,
prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was
not applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the
Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and be-
_______________
14 Id., at p. 84.
15 G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122; 391 Phil. 809 (2000).
16 Mercado v. Tan, supra, at p. 133; at p. 824.
17 Rollo, pp. 85-87.
319
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 319
came final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the
Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to
remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior
marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered
quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second
marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing
law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was
ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the
first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the
effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on
the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a
second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not
prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the
annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by
respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling,
among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent’s
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 88-89.
320
marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never
existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be
considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following
issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code
and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a
valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of
the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of
the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of
securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage
ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the
annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC’s dismissal of the
Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial
proceedings filed before us.20 Notwithstanding, we will
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 8-9.
20 Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions.―The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. xxx It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent
321
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 321
give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla,21 the
offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the
RTC’s dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA
dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been
filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in
all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due
course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the government were
not properly represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order
ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the
one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the
plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this
technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had
done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and
adopted as
_______________
the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in
all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is
a party.
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General
and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and
exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.
21 G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615.
322
its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) 22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it
did, praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition
filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred
in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy.―The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b)
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration
of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.24
_______________
22 Antone v. Beronilla, supra, at p. 623.
23 Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 461, 477; 512 Phil. 818, 833-834 (2005).
24 Id., at p. 833.
323
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 323
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with
Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting
as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus,
all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the
Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused’s marriage with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab
initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was
never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been
declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there was only one
marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. 25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent’s first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of
nullity of respondent’s first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy
filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime
of
_______________
25 Rollo, p. 80.
26 Supra note 15, at p. 133; at p. 824.
324
bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the
first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage
was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of
a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it
is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects
is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner,
and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31
_______________
27 G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.
28 Id., at p. 568.
29 Id.
30 G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272; 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
31 Id., at p. 284; at p. 744.
325
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 325
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the
accused’s conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the
crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been declared null and
void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was
still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would
not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the
first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the
essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this
case where the declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not
agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a
second mar-
_______________
32 G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236.
33 Supra note 30.
34 Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, February 23, 1968, 22 SCRA 731, 734; 130 Phil. 745, 748 (1968).
326
riage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.35
Anent respondent’s contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were
contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that
since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the
applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), 37 instead of Article 40 of the
Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before
a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious
and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the
Family Code itself provides that said “Code shall have retroactive
_______________
35 Id.
36 G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 24.
37 Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages.―Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage
as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
327
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 22, 2012 327
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.” The Court went on
to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of
Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage
is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite―usually the marriage license―and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the
first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
_______________
38 Jarillo v. People, supra note 36, at pp. 25-26. (Citation omitted)
328
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,** Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, order and resolution set aside.
Notes.―Under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already
been consummated. (Antone vs. Beronilla, 637 SCRA 615 [2010])
The elements of bigamy are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and 4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. (Teves vs. People, 656 SCRA 307
[2011])
――o0o――
_______________
** Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1343 dated October 9, 2012.
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights rese
Filed by prior subsisting spouse
1.
G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.*

MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; For Philippine courts
to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court.—For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs
to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
70
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is
not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.—A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15
of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.—A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status,
71
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 71
Fujiki vs. Marinay
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the
rules of evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”—Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
“presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.” Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that “the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external
to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Divorce; While the Philippines does not have a divorce
law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or
her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.—Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
43 Phil. 43 (1922), Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves
the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.72
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact.”—Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010), this Court declared
that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”
Civil Law; Marriages; Parties; When Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage; The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.—Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife”
— it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage
are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.73
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 73
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Parties; Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage.—Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen
has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries; A petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage.
A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.—To be sure, a
petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the
corresponding civil registry is located.” In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. However,
this does not
74
Fujiki vs. Marinay
apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Foreign Judgments; Divorce;
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.—Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial
to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse” under the laws of his or her country. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
Same; Same; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Divorce; Foreign Judgments; The principle
in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
75
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 75
Fujiki vs. Marinay
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy; If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the
foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.—The principle in Article 26
of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file
a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country.
If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Same; Same; Same; Bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.—Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A
critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Conflict of Law; Philippine courts will only determine
(1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines;
and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
76
Fujiki vs. Marinay
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.—Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
“presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.” Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs
to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.—The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not
a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, “[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Br. 107.
Lorenzo U. Padilla for petitioner.
77
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 77
Fujiki vs. Marinay
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011
of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)” based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
2 In Pasay City, Metro Manila.
3 See Rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage between
Maria Paz Galela Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010. Translated by
78
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
_______________
Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office (see Rollo, p. 89).
4 Id.
5 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
6 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
79
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 79
Fujiki vs. Marinay
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.—
(a) Who may file.—A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue.—The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the
date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in “gross violation” of
the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC which provides that “[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements
may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.”8 Apparently, the RTC took the
view
_______________
7 The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN from the active civil
docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to the petitioner the amount of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the Sheriff’s Trust Fund.
8 Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:
80
Fujiki vs. Marinay
that only “the husband or the wife,” in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment
is a special proceeding, which “seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact,”9 and
_______________
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.—(1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the cause
of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime governing
their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a
provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration
of community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and
certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through
an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be
authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-
consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit
to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition.
9 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See Rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration).
81
VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013 81
Fujiki vs. Marinay
not a civil action which is “for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong.”10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1)
the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the
fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended
that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that “a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.” To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, “[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize
that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage.”14 Fujiki had
_______________
10 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
11 FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
12 Rollo, p. 56.
13 FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
14 Rollo, p. 68.
82
Fujiki vs. Marinay
material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the “procedural implementation”
of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The
Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the “successful petitioner for divorce or annulment
of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.” 17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to “marriages,” “judgments of
annulments of marriage” and “judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning”
are subject to cancellation
_______________
15 Enacted 26 November 1930.
16 CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
17 Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage.—All civil officers and priests or ministers authorized to
solemnize marriages shall send a copy of each marriage contract solemnized by them to the local civil registrar
within the time limit specified in the existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local civil registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each of the contracting parties,
their ages, the place and date of the solemnization of the marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses,
the full name, address, and relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons who
gave their consent to the marriage, and the full name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the
marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names of the parties divorced or
whose marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of the court, and such other details as the regulations to be
issued may require.
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or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment
of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
“gravely erred” when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue.
Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of
jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its
own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the “trial
court cannot preempt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.”20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial
court should not have “immediately dismissed” the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In
its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner,
in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its
two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as
_______________
18 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.—Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
19 273 Phil. 1; 195 SCRA 641 (1991).
20 Id., at p. 7; p. 646. See Rollo, pp. 65 and 67.
21 Rollo, p. 47.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
a “third person”22 in the proceeding because he “is not the husband in the decree of divorce
issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized,
x x x.”23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that “[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal
of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x
which is Sec. 2(a) x x x.”24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v.
The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court
in Braza ruled that “[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x.”26 Braza emphasized that the “validity of marriages
as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x.”27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a “jurisdictional ground”
to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum
shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
_______________
22 Id., at p. 46.
23 Id., at p. 48.
24 Id.
25 G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.
26 Id., at p. 641.
27 Id., at p. 643.
28 See Rollo, p. 49.
29 Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:
Contents and form of petition.—x x x
xxxx
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
Hence, this also warranted the “immediate dismissal” of the petition under the same
provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the

Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition
for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
“pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x
be set aside” and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
_______________
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and
certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through
an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be
authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-
consul or consular agent in said country.
xxxx
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition.
30 Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.
31 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.
32 Rollo, p. 137. The “Conclusion and Prayer” of the “Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment)” of the
Solicitor General stated:
In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements provided
in A.M.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave
v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases
of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal
bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the “injured spouse” who should be given a
legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this
Court
_______________
No. 02-11-10-SC should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-
68582 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
33 G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.
34 Id., at p. 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General, pp. 8-9. See Rollo, pp. 132-
133.
35 Rollo, p. 133.
36 G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.
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held that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact.”37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay,
who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record “[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons” in the
civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, “[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences
upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x.”38 The Japanese Family Court judgment
directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a
fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that “[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.”41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed
from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that
he inflicted any form of violence on
_______________
37 Id., at p. 287.
38 Rollo, p. 133.
39 G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.
40 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000).
41 De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at p. 169.
42 Supra note 30.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the
rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declara-
_______________
44 Id.
46 Id.
47 Supra note 33.
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tion of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition
is bigamy.”48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only
needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more
specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
_______________
48 Supra note 33 at p. 655.

49 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state.—Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer,
if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order, is as follows:
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is “to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues.”57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case
_______________
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon
the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
50 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Secs. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra note 36 at p. 282.
51 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.
52 Id., Sec. 6.
53 Id., Sec. 9.
54 Id., Secs. 11-15.
55 Id., Secs. 17-18.
56 Id., Secs. 19 and 22-23.
57 Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386; 455 SCRA 397, 412 (2005) citing EUGENE SCOLES & PETER HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
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on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that “[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.”59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status,
_______________
58 Id.
59 Id., at p. 386.
60 CIVIL CODE, Art. 17. x x x
xxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a “presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.” Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that “the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
_______________
61 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at p. 386; p. 412. “Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks
to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of
defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes,
and — in a larger sense — to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all
law: ‘rest and quietness.’ ” (Citations omitted)
62 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at p. 382; pp. 407-408. “The rules of comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries.” (Citations omitted)
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Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have
a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
_______________
63 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
64 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil.
723; 366 SCRA 437 (2001); Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, supra.
65 FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment,
it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s
life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State
has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.”67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
_______________
66 Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register.—A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces;
(f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of
name.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.—Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
67 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at p. 287.
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Sec. 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree
of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported “in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family”70 and preserving the property regime of
the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends
_______________
68 FAMILY CODE, Arts. 35-67.
70 FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
71 See supra note 69.
72 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law x x x.”
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
further to relational rights recognized under Title III (“Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife”) of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot “diminish,
increase, or modify” the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive
right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized
by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On
the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife”75 ― it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Arti-
_______________
74 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
75 Emphasis supplied.
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cle 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime.
Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads
to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse
does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly
an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-
Llave ruled that the prior spouse “is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage
not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of
_______________
76 REVISED PENAL CODE (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prisión mayor shall
be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
77 See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.
78 RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute
it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxxx
79 Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest.―A real party in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.”80 Being a real party in interest,
the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of
the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a “trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages” in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the
“validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action” to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and chil-
_______________
80 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
81 Supra note 25.
82 Supra note 25.
83 See supra note 68.
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dren,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for
decla-
_______________
84 FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a
written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody
and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material
welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX.
It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
85 FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by
Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified
of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.―(1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition
and Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
86 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
ration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may
be filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding civil registry is located.” 87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign
_______________
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.―(1) Within one month after receipt of
the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the
court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The
parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of
the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall
dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall
be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
87 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.
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judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse”89 under the laws of his or
her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his
or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Phil-
_______________
88 509 Phil. 108; 472 SCRA 114 (2005).
89 Id., at p. 114; p. 121.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
ippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country
where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based
on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse
“should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.”91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated
— the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree
and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for
the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No.
_______________
90 223 Phil. 357; 139 SCRA 139 (1985).
91 Id., at p. 363; p. 144.
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02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot
decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of
the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are
limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen
of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the
Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already “presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties.” Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the
judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry.
The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent
event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an
_______________
92 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).
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Fujiki vs. Marinay
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal
Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, “[t]he term of prescription
[of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago.”
_______________
93 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions.—In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.
Rule III, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.—x x x
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil
action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court
trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-
examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which
cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action
based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
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Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections
4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, order reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Resort to foreign jurisprudence is proper only if no local law or jurisprudence
exists to settle the controversy. (Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs.
Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., 608 SCRA 215 [2009])
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws
— the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. (Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 [2010])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book S
3.
G.R. No. 200233. July 15, 2015.*
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; The crime of bigamy does not necessarily entail the joint liability of
two (2) persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one (1) of them is valid
and subsisting.—The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two
persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and
subsisting. As explained in People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., 64 SCRA 518 (1975): In the crime of
bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous
undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a
co-accused.
Same; Same; Accomplices; The second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only
as an accomplice.—People v. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698 (1961), holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice
Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person, whether man or
woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful
wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.” There-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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Santiago vs. People
fore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Same; Same; Penalties; Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the
penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prisión mayor, which has a duration of six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that
of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, prisión
correccional, which has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years.—Under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prisión
mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal
participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree, prisión correccional, which has a duration of six months and one
day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four
years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto
mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
Same; Same; Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.—
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants
to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the
presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. In this case, petitioner has
consistently questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that
marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.
Same; Same; It is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded.”—It is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal
56
Santiago vs. People
act upon which the cause of action is founded.” If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi
causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted
by the courts. As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in
issue.
Same; Same; No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.”—No less
than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” It must be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. In keeping therefore with this fundamental
policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Aguila, Aguila & Aguila Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G.

Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 72322 convicting her of bigamy.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 56-70, 72-73; the CA Decision dated 21 September 2011 and Resolution dated 5 January 2012
were penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Michael P.
Elbinias and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 75-83, 85-86; the RTC Decision dated 21 May 2010 and Order dated 24 June 2010 were penned
by Judge Celso O. Baguio of RTC Branch 34, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija.
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Santiago vs. People
The Facts
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G.
Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded
“not guilty,” while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela
Galang since 2 June 1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-
year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-
in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone
who was “without responsibility.”7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an
accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was
still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction
for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but
in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang,
testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March
and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of
Santos. Petitioner denied this
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Santiago vs. People
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or
after she had already married Santos.
The RTC’s Ruling
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the
subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang
that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April
1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not
known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
celebration of their marriage.”9 Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G.

Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prisión Correccional as minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prisión Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
_______________
8 Id., at p. 80; RTC Decision, p. 6. See also Records, pp. 269-270, 117; the appointment papers of petitioner
showed that she worked as a faculty member of Divina Pastora College, and the Death Certificate of Nicanor
Santos indicated that he was a laborer.
9 Id., at p. 83; RTC Decision, p. 9.
10 Id.
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Santiago vs. People
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was
void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license
if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and
Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their
marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and
void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that
theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to
accused Santos, something this court can not do. The best support to her argument
would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage.
Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.
The CA’s Ruling
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof
beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the
former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses’ narration.
It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license,
the
_______________
11 Id., at p. 86; RTC Order, p. 2.
60
Santiago vs. People
appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of
her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for
bigamy.12
The Issues
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant
case, because she was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage. But in the main, she
argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of
the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall
under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not
previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She
alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four
years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she
posits that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent
advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising
factual issues as regards her husband’s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner’s
denial of any knowledge of Santos’s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible
testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew
about the subsisting marriage.
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 70, 73; CA Decision, p. 15, CA Resolution, p. 2.
13 No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079.
14 Id., at pp. 152-169; Comment filed on 23 August 2012 by the Office of the Solicitor General.
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Santiago vs. People
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
In Montañez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence
of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v.

Nepomuceno, Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous
subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible
as an accomplice.
_______________
15 G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012, 684 SCRA 315.
16 159-A Phil. 771; 64 SCRA 518 (1975).
17 111 Phil. 291; 1 SCRA 698 (1961).
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Santiago vs. People
The Ruling of the Court
The penalty for bigamy and

petitioner’s knowledge of
Santos’s first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who
marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting.
As explained in Nepomuceno:18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused
without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had
knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be
included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s
marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage
as shown by the totality of the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting
and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their
disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not
know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the
legal wife of Santos.
_______________
18 People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., supra note 16 at p. 775; pp. 522-523.
19 Rollo, pp. 64-68, CA Decision dated 21 September 2011,

pp. 9-13; Rollo, pp. 80-81; RTC Decision dated 21 May 2010, pp. 6-7.
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Santiago vs. People
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual
findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by
the CA. Indeed, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves
great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the
expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling
that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower
courts’ imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the
CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prisión correccional as
minimum to prisión mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong.
Archilla21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only
as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority
in criminal law, writes that “a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly
consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty
as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.”22 Therefore, her conviction should only be
that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal
in the crime of bigamy is prisión mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day
to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice,
the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prisión
correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being
_______________
20 People v. Arcilla, 326 Phil. 774; 256 SCRA 757 (1996).
21 People v. Archilla, supra note 17 at p. 293; p. 700.
22 Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two, p. 979 (2012), citing Viada, 3 Cod. Pen.
274.
23 Revised Penal Code, Art. 52.
64
Santiago vs. People
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two
months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,24 petitioner shall
be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months
imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner

resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If
the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter
of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal
case.26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her
marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential
requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that
it could not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the
attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
_______________
24 Act No. 4103 (1965).
25 De la Cruz v. Ejercito, 160-A Phil. 669; 68 SCRA 1 (1975); Zapanta v. Montesa, 114 Phil. 1227; 4 SCRA
510 (1962); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960); and People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935).
26 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648; 336 SCRA 747 (2000).
27 Rollo, p. 77, RTC Decision, p. 3; Records, pp. 311-312, Motion for Reconsideration filed by Santiago before
the RTC, pp. 2-3.
28 Family Code, Art. 3.
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Santiago vs. People
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and
facts,29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for
review,30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and
Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is
purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union
was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a
marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five
years before their marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in
February 199632 and that after six
_______________
29 Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan, 242 Phil. 519; 159 SCRA 1 (1988).
30 People v. Flores, Jr., 442 Phil. 561; 394 SCRA 325 (2002).
31 Republic v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553; 550 SCRA 435 (2008).

32 The TSN dated 13 June 2002, p. 3 reflected that petitioner met Santos in 1996; but according to the TSN
dated 10 August 2004, she clarified in her additional direct testimony that she met Santos in 1993. In both
cases, she only knew Santos for less than five years prior their marriage on 29 July 1997.
66
Santiago vs. People
months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from
the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in
Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with
her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her
previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question
the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who
sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each
other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have
cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact.
Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before
the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at
least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie
was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the solemnizing officer
stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal

case of a deliberate act to put a
flaw in the marriage
_______________
33 Id., at p. 4.
34 Id., at pp. 7-8.
35 TSN, 24 October 2002, p. 14.
36 Id., at p. 2.
37 Records, p. 88. Certified True Copy of the Certificate of Marriage between Nicanor F. Santos and Leonila
G. Santiago.
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Santiago vs. People
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the
misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be
acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit
marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such
as bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and
sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal laws on bigamy
should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals “to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.”
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so
would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one
who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
cause of
_______________
38 Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 723; 423 SCRA 272 (2004).
39 Id., at p. 744; p. 284.
40 Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, 16 October 2013, 707 SCRA 584.
68
Santiago vs. People
action is founded.”41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which
involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the
courts.42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
controversy in issue.43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this
criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been
secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves
perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were
exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had
already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In
violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while
knowing fully well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation
requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height
of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.
_______________
41 Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 851; 476 SCRA 461, 495 (2005).
42 Acabal v. Acabal, 494 Phil. 528; 454 SCRA 555 (2005).

43 Muller v. Muller, 531 Phil. 460; 500 SCRA 65 (2006).
44 Revised Penal Code, Arts. 349-352. Art. 350 punishes the crime of illegal marriages as follows:
Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws.— The penalty of prisión correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the
provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment.
If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation or
fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.
69
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Santiago vs. People
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for

bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license.
In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife,
Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their
marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day
before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in
order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently
secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as
basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De
Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” 45 It
must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.46 In
keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of
petitioner for bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G.
Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prisión correccional as
maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
_______________
45 Constitution, Article XV, Sec. 2.
46 Supra note 40.
70
Santiago vs. People
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with modification.
Notes.—Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. (Lasanas vs.
People, 727 SCRA 98 [2014])
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty for bigamy is prisión
mayor. (Id.)
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
3.
G.R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004
SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceño at the Manila City Hall
before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in
1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal
home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also
discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida
Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.4 On May 18, 1995, a
case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court
judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared
however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10,
1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his
commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as
maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed but
AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of age
and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as Minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was
contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.8 It
is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information.9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the
title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every
element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must be determined by reference to the
definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while
his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal
place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally
married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967 which has not been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas
Abunado on January 10, 1989 which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and sometime in the month of
January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner
contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioner’s
submission, therefore, that the information was defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect
was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised.12 It should be
remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which
are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity.13 All of
these have been sufficiently established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to
object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on
appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the effect of
absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he entered into a
bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a
pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is committed
against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the
person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial
question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency
of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would
only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that
his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be based
on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left
by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,21 which is a mitigating circumstance under
Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years and one (1)
day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term should be taken from prision correccional in any of its
periods which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135,
finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.
4.
G.R. No. 207406. January 13, 2016.*
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of.—Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code: ARTICLE 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the
prosecution must prove all of the following elements: [first,] that the offender has been legally
married; [second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and [lastly,] that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Same; Same; Marriage License; To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, “the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.”—The fourth requisite — the marriage
license — is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides. The marriage license represents the state’s “involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.” To prove that a
marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, “the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.”
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
599
VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 599
Vitangcol vs. People
Same; Same; Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an
element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code (RPC) becomes useless.—Should
the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy,
Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. “[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do
is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the
first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first.” Further, “[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite — usually the marriage license — and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the
first marriage is void.”
Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),
the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On the
other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the RPC for the offense.—Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the other
hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has the discretion to
impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty.
As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered. The imposable penalty
for bigamy is prisión mayor. The penalty next lower to that is prisión correccional. Prisión
correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years; hence, the minimum
penalty can be any period within this range. As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the
range of prisión mayor in its medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. Prisión mayor in its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to
10 years.
600
Giselle Lou M. Cabahug-Fugoso for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial

declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage
without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the
nullity of the first marriage.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals’
Decision2 dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the Decision4 of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.5 Norberto was sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 9-26.

2 Id., at pp. 29-37. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and concurred in by
Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon (Chair) and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez of the Eleventh Division.
3 Id., at pp. 46-47. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and concurred in by
Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon (Chair) and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez of the Eleventh Division.
4 Id., at pp. 48-58. The Decision dated September 1, 2010 was penned by Presiding Judge Aida Rangel-
Roque.
5 Id., at p. 58.
601
VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 601
prisión correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as
maximum.6
In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
charged Norberto with bigamy.7 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-
VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity with
the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to
and at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to
the said GINA M. GAERLAN.
Contrary to law.8
Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9
According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo
(Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3)
children.10
After some time, Alice “began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously
married to another woman[.]”11 She
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 36-37, Court of Appeals Decision.

7 Id., at pp. 29-30, Court of Appeals Decision, and p. 48, Regional Trial Court Decision.
8 Id., at p. 48, Regional Trial Court Decision.
9 Id., at p. 30, Court of Appeals Decision, and p. 48, Regional Trial Court Decision.
10 Id., at p. 30, Court of Appeals Decision.
11 Id.
602
eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M.
Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the
National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy
against Norberto.12
On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved
sometime in 1987.13 “After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice]
decided to get married in 1994.”14
Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had
a “fake marriage”15 with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless,
despite Norberto’s revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding.
Thus, Norberto and Alice were married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three
children.17
Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice
was having an affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing
Alice in a phone conversation with her paramour.18
Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to
end the affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may
incur if she continued seeing her paramour.19
Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the
criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.20
_______________
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
16 Id.
18 Id., at p. 31.
19 Id.
20 Id.
603
VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 603
Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting
valid marriage with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted
Norberto of bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused

Norberto Abella Vitangcol GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prisión mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prisión mayor as
maximum imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but
modified the penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION of the penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced.
Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and
four (4) months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prisión mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.22
_______________

604
Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution dated June 3, 2013.24
Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment 25 to which
Norberto filed a Reply.26
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. 27 He presents
as evidence a Certification28 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which
states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor
and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite
of marriage — the marriage license — the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his
first marriage.29
In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an
element of the crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that requirement. 30 Stating that
“[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused[,]”31 Norberto prays for
his acquittal.32
The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid
marriage with Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The
prosecution likewise proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 38-44.

24 Id., at p. 47, Court of Appeals Resolution.
25 Id., at pp. 168-179.
26 Id., at pp. 195-205.
27 Id., at pp. 19-24, Petition.
28 Id., at p. 119. The Certification was dated March 19, 2008.
29 Id., at pp. 19-24, Petition.
30 Id.
31 Id., at p. 24.
32 Id.
605
VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 605
was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage was subsisting, Norberto
contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage would have been
valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be convicted
of bigamy.33
The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A.
Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and
exculpates him from the bigamy charge.
The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that
there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere
certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second
marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a
nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision from any trial
court nullifying his first marriage.
Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 349. Bigamy.—The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the
following elements:
_______________
33 Id., at pp. 170-177, Comment.
606
[first,] that the offender has been legally married;
[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code;
[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.34
The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina
because the civil registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of
the marriage license allegedly issued in their favor.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court
correctly convicted him of the crime charged.
Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was
solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became
effective on August 3, 1988.35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines36 govern the validity of his first marriage.
Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any
of which renders the marriage void from the beginning:37
_______________
34 Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 723, 738; 423 SCRA 272, 279 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En
Banc].
35 Memo. Circ. No. 85 (1988).
36 Rep. Act No. 386 (1949).
37 Civil Code, Art. 80 provides:
Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
607
VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 607
Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The fourth requisite — the marriage license — is issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.38 The marriage license
represents the state’s “involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.”39
_______________
(1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by the male and female respectively, even
with the consent of the parents;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages;
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;
(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81;
(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of either
of them;
(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in Article 82.
Article 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those
under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar
of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
39 Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192, 202; 531 SCRA 446, 454 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third
Division].
608
To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, “the law requires
that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or
at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties.”40
Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus,
Cavite, which states:
[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage
License and License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on
the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR.
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41
This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized
without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No.
8683519 does not exist.42
Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the
marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract between
petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first
marriage.44 This “should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as
to [the] absence of any record of the marriage[.]”45
_______________
40 Id., at pp. 203-204; p. 455.

41 Rollo, p. 119.
42 See Sevilla v. Cardenas, 529 Phil. 419, 429; 497 SCRA 428, 438 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First
Division].
43 Rollo, p. 48, Regional Trial Court Decision.
44 Supra note 34 at p. 740; p. 281.
45 Id.
609
VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 609
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage.47 As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification
that states that the marriage license “cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear
from [the local civil registrar’s] records.”48
This court held that “[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil
registrar] being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.”49 This court further said that “[u]naccompanied by
any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’ sufficiently proved that [the local civil
registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the contracting parties.”50
The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case
for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The
certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being
no prosecution for bigamy
_______________
46 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257 [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
47 Id., at p. 258.
48 Id., at p. 259.
49 Id., at p. 262.
50 Id. Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 29 is renumbered to Rule 132, Sec. 28.
Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 28 provides:
Rule 132. Presentation of Evidence
....
B. Authentication and Proof of Documents
SECTION 28. Proof of lack of record.—A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
610
involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been
issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the
purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the
presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case.
We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license
cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or
was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully
aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is not
basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.
A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages
are concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or
consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade
prosecution.
This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.51 In Cariño, the
marriage contract between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no
marriage license number.52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no
record of any marriage license issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.53 This court
declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for having been solemnized without a
marriage license.54
In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license
number freely and voluntarily
_______________
51 403 Phil. 861; 351 SCRA 127 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
52 Id., at p. 869; p. 133.
53 Id.
54 Id., at p. 870; pp. 133-134.
611
VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 611
signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was
entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and
seventeen (17) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first
marriage as spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no
marriage license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.
This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of
the Civil Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a
valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage.
The admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution
suffices to discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage
exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a
certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot be found is not
enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was issued.
The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage
contract.55 There is no evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious
or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the
licenses issued before or after the document in question still exists in the custody of the
civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these
vital documents. This would have shown whether there was unfettered access to the
originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the proper judicial
conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.
_______________
55 Rollo, p. 52, Regional Trial Court Decision.
612
This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by
petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that there is no marriage license.
At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s
function without the context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith
could not find the marriage license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the
marriage license did not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license was issued.
However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage
contract duly executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing
officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise be
applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract
exists.
Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty
amounting to a deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion — although this
is not always the case — that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to
achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance
of which is within the discretion of a government employee. The temptations for the
employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which he knows the accused
will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an accused. Much of
the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the
demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own
judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using
both, we have no reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.
613
VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 613
II
Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without
a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was
not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively
dead under the Civil Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore,
present in this case.
As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that:
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity,
the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.58
_______________

Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent
court.
57 130 Phil. 745; 22 SCRA 731 (1968) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
58 Id., at p. 750; p. 735.
614
The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in
wording Article 40 of the Family Code:59
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of

the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. “[A]ll that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a
bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
first.”60 Further, “[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a
requisite — usually the marriage license — and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption
that the first marriage is void.”61
59 See Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 654; 336 SCRA 747, 752 (2000)
[Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by
this court En Banc as petitioner insists.62
The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that
he subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last element
of bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is
presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married
_______________
60 Id., at p. 654; p. 753.

61 Id.
62 Rollo, pp. 209-216, Motion to Refer the Case to the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc.
63 Id., at p. 48, Regional Trial Court’s Decision.
Alice without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void.64
With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted
of the crime charged.
III
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may
be imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term
of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a
minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty.
As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered.65
The imposable penalty for bigamy is prisión mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that
is prisión correccional. Prisión correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years;67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.
As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prisión mayor in its
medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prisión mayor in
its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.
Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four
(4) months of prisión correc-
_______________
64 See Jarillo v. People, 617 Phil. 45, 53; 601 SCRA 236, 246 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
65 Act No. 4103, Sec. 1, as amended by Act No. 4225.
66 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 349.
67 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 27.
616
cional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum.
The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously
computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.
Nevertheless, “[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
‘to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]’”68 we lower the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty to six (6) months and one (1) day of prisión correccional.
Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day of prisión correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión
mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ Decision dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in C.A.-G.R. CR
No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prisión
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with modification.
Notes.—Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
_______________
68 People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, 117 (1933) [Per J. Butte, En Banc].
617
VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 617
and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
(Lasanas vs. People, 727 SCRA 98 [2014])
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. (Id.)
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All

5.
G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014
NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of
bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29, 2002,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for bigamy under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000 in
Criminal Case No. 49808 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo
solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a marriage
license.4 The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to
excuse the lack of the marriage license.5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their
marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo
City.6 They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies
were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates.8 In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de
facto because of irreconcilable differences.9
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony
solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate
reflected the civil status of the accused as single.10
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro
in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the
RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing
his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and
her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting
the award of damages. In support of his complaint, he further alleged, among others, that:
He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was officiated by Hon. Carlos B.
Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith
attached as Exhibit "A" and made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose
Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo City Registrar. Machine copy of
the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Annex "B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except some personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in
Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult and
seek treatment by the defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was treated by the
defendant and the subsequent treatments were performed by the defendant at her residence in
Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment made being on a continuing basis;
xxxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to Iloilo City. They went to Dainty
Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to
sign the marriage contract, which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based on a false
affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to Barangay Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which
marked the start of a married life rocked with marital differences, quarrels and incompatibilities, without
love, but under the uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should he not follow her;
xxxx
During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the plaintiff, fabricate stories against
him and displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect her marital obligations even committed infidelity, which
psychological incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the petitioner to live separately from
defendant since 1982 up to the present.12
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo
City.13 After due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on
October 20, 1998 in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with
Socorro Patingo and without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with Josefa
Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo
City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment in Civil Case No.
23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage
between him and Socorro valid and legal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint filed by the
plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against the defendant, Socorro Patingo, considering that the marriage
between them is valid and legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his wife, the defendant in this
case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of ₱3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her answer
with counterclaim on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code and every month
thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.16
The accused appealed to the CA.17
Ruling of the RTC
On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in Criminal Case No. 49808,
disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering him
to serve an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.18
Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC
thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license,
affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element of
bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his
favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE,
for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He argues that the RTC and the
CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil
law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one
could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if
Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent
marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in
Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good faith and lack
of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2)
that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The
ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a
valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor affidavit of
cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be
treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually,
he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v.
Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had
been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of
Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v.
Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect.28
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding
that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation
and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element of
bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his
favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE,
for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He argues that the RTC and the
CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil
law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one
could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if
Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent
marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in
Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good faith and lack
of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2)
that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The
ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a
valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license nor affidavit of
cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be
treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually,
he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v.
Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had
been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of
Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v.
Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect.28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code,
to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now
the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before
a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution
by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in
petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the
filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following
petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the
offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing
of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent
upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and
eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is against its simple
letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime of bigamy was
1âwphi 1
consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being
first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his
marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction.30 "What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy,"
according to People v. Odtuhan:31
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it beheld as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the
records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the
institution of the criminal complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second marriage
with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his
complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed against him,
thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the accused’s subsequent
marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he
submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court has explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage."33
The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34 x x x Nollora may not impugn his [subsequent]
marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening
the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro
v. Court of Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. With neither an
aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the imposable
penalty is the medium period of prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one day to 10 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within
the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense, which is from
six months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum, as
imposed by the RTC, was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 29,
2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

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1)

G.R. No. 183805. July 3, 2013.*

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

After appropriate proceedings, Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla filed on 8 January 1992

criminal case, ruling in this wise:

Ramon M. Morales of the Bureau of Immigration (BID), which reads as follows:

Additionally, the petitioner referred to the general rule stated in People v.

1. “Reynaldo Quiroca” is evidenced by a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of

Undaunted, the petitioner is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari to

BIGAMY IS A PUBLIC OFFENSE, CONSEQUENTLY, PRESCRIPTION SHOULD HAVE

A MOTION TO QUASH CANNOT ALSO GO BEYOND WHAT IS STATED IN THE

ASSUMING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTED IN 1974, SAID PERIOD HOWEVER

Petitioner’s position is untenable. Denial then of this petition is all it merits.

offender is civilly liable is the offended party.

G.R. No. 191566. July 17, 2013.*

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of

G.R. No. 206284. February 28, 2018.*

REDANTE SARTO y MISALUCHA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

Evidence for the Defense

7 Id., at pp. 100-101.

Evidence for the

The prosecution waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and presented

13 TSN, 27 October 2008, pp. 7-8.

The RTC’s Ruling

Aggrieved, Redante appealed before the CA.

The CA’s Ruling

21 Id., at p. 36, Exh. “C.’’

The OSG’s Manifestation

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Elements of bigamy; bur-

A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to

36 Supra note 27 at pp. 735-736; p. 452.

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877,

De Guia-Salvador, concurring; Rollo, pp. 28-41.

convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

2 Penned by Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.

5 Exhibit “A,” id., at p. 6.

8 TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.

9Records, pp. 111-116.

Jr. v. Court of Appeals. 12

11 1 Phil. 109 (1902).

14 G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.

its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT