Lactantius The Theologian

Lactantius the Theologian
Gorgias Studies in Early Christianity and

Patristics
68
In this series Gorgias publishes monographs on Christianity and

the Church Fathers in the early centuries of the Christian era.
Gorgias particularly welcomes proposals from younger scholars
whose dissertations have made an important contribution to the
field of patristics.
Lactantius the Theologian
Lactantius and the Doctrine of Providence
Anthony P. Coleman
gp
2017
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ..................................................................................... v

Abbreviations .......................................................................................... vii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................. ix
Introduction .............................................................................................. 1
Chapter 1. Vita et Opera ........................................................................... 7
Chapter 2. Lactantius and Method ...................................................... 29
I. Method ........................................................................................ 29
II. Audience .................................................................................... 33
III. Sources ..................................................................................... 37
A. The Bible ............................................................................. 37
B. The Poets ............................................................................. 40
C. The Philosophers................................................................ 42
D. Oracular Literature ............................................................ 45
IV. Christian Truth ........................................................................ 54
Chapter 3. Lactantius and Divine Providence ................................... 61
I. Developing the Arguments ...................................................... 62
II. The Arguments for Divine Providence ................................ 64
A. The Argument from Consensus (E consensu
omnium) ............................................................................. 64
B. Responding to Opponents ................................................ 67
C. The Argument from Design (Ex operibus dei) ................. 74
D. The Argument from Absurd Consequences
(Ex gradibus entium).......................................................... 87
III. Conclusion ............................................................................... 88
Chapter 4. Lactantius’ Doctrine of God ............................................. 93
I. Theology of God ....................................................................... 93
A. God’s Oneness ................................................................... 94
B. God’s Transcendence ........................................................ 99
C. God’s Incorporeity (Excursus).......................................103
D. God as Eternal Mind .......................................................106
E. God and the Passions ......................................................109
v
vi LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN
II. God the Creator .....................................................................113

A. Creatio ex nihilo ...................................................................113
B. Refutation of Atomism....................................................117
C. Theodicy ............................................................................122
III. Conclusion .............................................................................134
Chapter 5. Lactantius’ Anthropology ................................................139
I. Anthropology and Providence in De opificio Dei..................140
A. Chapters 8–13 ...................................................................141
B. Chapters 14–19 .................................................................146
C. Conclusion .........................................................................151
II. A Systematic Treatment of Lactantius’ Anthropology ....154
A. The Creation and Composition of the Human
Person .............................................................................154
B. The Human Person in the Created Order ....................159
C. Status Rectus ........................................................................164
D. Vera Religio.........................................................................168
E. The Virtues, Immortality, and Justice ...........................174
F. Conclusion .........................................................................185
Chapter 6. Lactantius and Salvation History ....................................191
I. Theology of History ................................................................191
II. Soteriology...............................................................................203
A. Soteriology and the Virtues ............................................203
B. Christology.........................................................................210
C. Eschatology .......................................................................227
III. Conclusion .............................................................................231
Conclusion .............................................................................................235
Bibliography ..........................................................................................245
Opera Lactantii ...............................................................................245
Translations ..................................................................................245
Primary Literature........................................................................247
Secondary Literature ...................................................................249
Index .......................................................................................................269
ABBREVIATIONS
Bailey Bailey, Cyril, ed. Titi Lucreti Cari: De rerum natura. 3

vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947.
BT 1994 Heck, E. and A. Włosok, eds. Lactantius Epitome
Divinarum Institutionum. Biblioteca Teubneriana.
Stuttgart & Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1994.
BT 2005 ———. Lactantius Divinarum Institutiones Libri Septem,
Fasc. 1, Libri I et II. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Munich &
Leipzig: K. G. Saur, 2005.
Fasc. 2, Libri III et IV. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Berlin
& New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007.
Fasc. 3, Libri V et VI. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Berlin
& New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.
Fasc. 4, Liber VII. Biblioteca Teubneriana. Berlin &
Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011.
quot(s). direct quotation(s)
Clarke Clarke, G. W., ed. The Octavius of Minucius Felix. ACW
39. New York: Newman Press, 1974.
Corp. Herm. Festugière, A. J. and A. D. Noch, eds. Corpus Hermeti-
cum. 4 vols. Paris: 1946–1954.
DI Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones Libri Septem
Epi. Lactantius, Epitome Divinarum Institutionum
fr(s). fragment(s)
Hyst. The Oracle of Hystaspes. In J. Bidez and F. Cumont,
eds. Les mages hellénisés. 2 vols. Paris: 1938.
ID Lactantius, De ira Dei
vii
viii LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN
LS Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley, eds. The Hellenistic Phi-

losophers. 2 vols. Cambridge: 1987.
MP Lactantius, De mortibus persecutorum
OD Lactantius, De opificio Dei
Orac. Sib. Geffcken, J., ed. Die Oracula Sibyllina. Leipzig: 1902.
Pease Pease, A. S., ed. M. Tulli Ciceronis: De natura deorum. 2
vols. New York: Arno Press, 1979.
Usener Usener, H., ed. Epicurea. Stuttgart: 1966.
For all other abbreviations consult:

Fitzgerald, Allan, ed. Augustine through the Ages. Cambridge: Eerd-
mans, 1999. Pp. xxvii–xlii.
Hornblower, Simon and Anthony Spawforth, eds. The Oxford Classi-
cal Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Pp. xxix–liv.
Latin quotations have been slightly altered from the original text
for the benefit of readability [e.g., “v” = “u,” “j” = “i,” etc.].
The following texts have been consulted for the purposes of direct quotation:
ard Version. Edited by M. D. Coogan, et al. New York:

The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha, New Revised Stand-
Oxford University Press, 2001.

Bowen, Anthony and Peter Garnsey, trans. Lactantius: Divine Insti-
tutes. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003.
Blakeney, E. H., trans. and comm. Lactantius’ Epitome of the Divine
Institutes. London: SPCK, 1950.
Creed, J. L., trans. and comm. Lactantius: De mortibus persecutorum.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
McDonald, M., trans. Lactantius: The Divine Institutes. FC vol. 49.
Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1964.
———. Lactantius: Minor Works. FC vol. 54. Washington, DC:
CUA Press, 1965.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so too is it impossible for a project

of this nature to come to completion without the aid, guidance, and
support of innumerable people. First among these are the entire
faculty and staff in the Theology Department at Boston College
who have fostered my growth and development as a student,
teacher, and scholar. Among the many who could be mentioned,
Fr. Robert Imbelli and Dr. Margaret Schatkin deserve particular
attention. Fr. Imbelli has been a trusted mentor and friend to both
my wife and I for over a decade. His many outstanding qualities as
a teacher, scholar, and Christian have made a lasting impression
upon me. Dr. Schatkin, who was crucial to the foundation of this
project, has also been a great advocate for both my wife and I while
at Boston College. I shall always treasure her words of encourage-
ment and perseverance, and hold her enthusiasm for and apprecia-
tion of the saints and scholars of the early Church in high esteem. I
offer sincere gratitude to them both. This project also benefited
immensely from the insight, guidance, and direction of my disserta-
tion committee: Dr. Stephen F. Brown (chair), Dr. Douglas Finn,
and Fr. Gary Gurtler, S.J. I offer to them my deepest appreciation,
as well as to Dr. Richard Gaillardetz (Chair of the Department of
Theology at Boston College), for the generous gifts of their time
and effort in bringing this project to fruition. Likewise, Dr. Mat-
thew Steinfeld and the anonymous reviewers from Gorgias Press
provided many helpful, encouraging, and constructive comments
for this project. They have my sincere thanks for their contribu-
tions to the improvement of this work.
I am also grateful to many members of the wider academic
and religious community in Boston for their contributions to my
scholarly and spiritual formation, in particular, Fr. Romanus Cessa-
rio, O.P. (St. John’s Seminary), Fr. William Palardy (St. Agatha’s
Parish), Dr. Bruce Beck (Holy Cross School of Theology), Fr. John
ix
x LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN
J. Connelly (St. John’s Parish), and the parish community at Sacred

Heart in Newton Centre. The research for this project could not
have been done without the help of those who work in the O’Neill
Library at Boston College, in particular, Gail Lefebvre and the en-
tire Interlibrary Loan staff. I would also be remiss not to thank my
fellow graduate students Fr. Demetrios Tonias, Ph.D., Dr. Erin
Stackle, and Dr. Will Britt, inter alios, for their companionship and
support along this academic journey which we all shared.
Lastly, this work could not have been undertaken without the
unfailing love and support of the entire Coleman family, most es-
pecially, James C. and Anna Coleman, James N., Jennifer, J. Tyler
and Shane Coleman, Michael, Debra, Audrey and Elena Sundin,
and John and Lydia Taglieri. To my wife, AnneMarie Coleman,
belongs a gratitude and appreciation which cannot be circum-
scribed by the words on this page. I have been blessed to be able to
share this life with her and our three children: Moses Elias, Antony
Pio, and Nicolina Zélie Coleman. Ό φίλος ἐστίν ἄλλος ἐγώ. This
work is dedicated, under the protection of Ή Παναγία Θεοτόκος,
to tre donne benedette: Nicolina Volpe, Anna Coleman, and AnneMa-
rie Coleman.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so too is it impossible for a project

of this nature to come to completion without the aid, guidance, and
support of innumerable people. First among these are the entire
faculty and staff in the Theology Department at Boston College
who have fostered my growth and development as a student,
teacher, and scholar. Among the many who could be mentioned,
Fr. Robert Imbelli and Dr. Margaret Schatkin deserve particular
attention. Fr. Imbelli has been a trusted mentor and friend to both
my wife and I for over a decade. His many outstanding qualities as
a teacher, scholar, and Christian have made a lasting impression
upon me. Dr. Schatkin, who was crucial to the foundation of this
project, has also been a great advocate for both my wife and I while
at Boston College. I shall always treasure her words of encourage-
ment and perseverance, and hold her enthusiasm for and apprecia-
tion of the saints and scholars of the early Church in high esteem. I
offer sincere gratitude to them both. This project also benefited
immensely from the insight, guidance, and direction of my disserta-
tion committee: Dr. Stephen F. Brown (chair), Dr. Douglas Finn,
and Fr. Gary Gurtler, S.J. I offer to them my deepest appreciation,
as well as to Dr. Richard Gaillardetz (Chair of the Department of
Theology at Boston College), for the generous gifts of their time
and effort in bringing this project to fruition. Likewise, Dr. Mat-
thew Steinfeld and the anonymous reviewers from Gorgias Press
provided many helpful, encouraging, and constructive comments
for this project. They have my sincere thanks for their contribu-
tions to the improvement of this work.
I am also grateful to many members of the wider academic
and religious community in Boston for their contributions to my
scholarly and spiritual formation, in particular, Fr. Romanus Cessa-
rio, O.P. (St. John’s Seminary), Fr. William Palardy (St. Agatha’s
Parish), Dr. Bruce Beck (Holy Cross School of Theology), Fr. John
ix
x LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN
J. Connelly (St. John’s Parish), and the parish community at Sacred

Heart in Newton Centre. The research for this project could not
have been done without the help of those who work in the O’Neill
Library at Boston College, in particular, Gail Lefebvre and the en-
tire Interlibrary Loan staff. I would also be remiss not to thank my
fellow graduate students Fr. Demetrios Tonias, Ph.D., Dr. Erin
Stackle, and Dr. Will Britt, inter alios, for their companionship and
support along this academic journey which we all shared.
Lastly, this work could not have been undertaken without the
unfailing love and support of the entire Coleman family, most es-
pecially, James C. and Anna Coleman, James N., Jennifer, J. Tyler
and Shane Coleman, Michael, Debra, Audrey and Elena Sundin,
and John and Lydia Taglieri. To my wife, AnneMarie Coleman,
belongs a gratitude and appreciation which cannot be circum-
scribed by the words on this page. I have been blessed to be able to
share this life with her and our three children: Moses Elias, Antony
Pio, and Nicolina Zélie Coleman. Ό φίλος ἐστίν ἄλλος ἐγώ. This
work is dedicated, under the protection of Ή Παναγία Θεοτόκος,
to tre donne benedette: Nicolina Volpe, Anna Coleman, and AnneMa-
rie Coleman.
CHAPTER 1. VITA ET OPERA
Lactantius has left us few details concerning his life. 1 Our primary
ancient resource is Jerome’s De viris illustribus, which provides us
with the following biographical sketch:
Firmianus, who is also called Lactantius, a student of Arnobi-
us, during the reign of Diocletian was summoned with Flavius
the grammarian – whose books On medicine composed in verse
are extant – to Nicomedia to teach rhetoric. Because there
were few pupils, since it was a Greek city, he took himself to
writing. We have his Symposium, which he wrote as a young
man in Africa, and an Itinerary from Africa to Nicomedia writ-
ten in hexameters, another book which is called The Grammari-
an, and a most beautiful one On the wrath of God, and the Divine
Institutes against the nations in seven books, an epitome of the
1 For biographical information on Lactantius see especially Timothy

D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981), 11–14 with notes; Samuel Brandt, “Über die dualistischen
Zusätze und die Kaiseranreden bei Lactantius: III. Über das Leben des
Lactantius” Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien
120/5 (1890): 1–42; Paul Monceaux, Histoire littéraire de l’afrique chrétienne,
vol. 3 (Bruxelles: Culture et civilisation, 1963), 287–297; Jacques Moreau,
ed., Lactance, De la mort des persécuteurs. SC 39 (Paris: Cerf, 1954), 13–22;
Pichon, Lactance, 1–8; James Stevenson, “The Life and Literary Activity of
Lactantius,” Studia Patristica 1 (1957): 661–677; and Antonie Włosok,
“Lactance,” in vol. 5 of Nouvelle histoire de la littérature latine, ed. R. Herzog
and P.L. Schmidt (Paris: Brepols, 1993), 426–459. For an exhaustive bibli-
ography of secondary literature on Lactantius see Jackson Bryce, Bibliog-
raphy of Lactantius, http://www.acad.carleton.edu/curricular/CLAS/
lactantius/part_4.pdf (accessed 06/15/2017).
7
8 LACTANTIUS THE THEOLOGIAN
same work in one book without a title, two books Ad Asclepi-

adem, one book On persecution, four books of epistles Ad Probum,
two books of epistles Ad Severum, two books of epistles Ad
Demetrianum, his pupil, and one book to the same On the work of
God or the creation of man. In extreme old age he was tutor to
Crispus Caesar in Gaul, the son of Constantine who was later
killed by his father. 2
Building upon Jerome’s foundation, we are able to posit a date-of-
birth between 240 and 250 based on his description of Lactantius
being in ‘extreme old age’ (extrema senectute) at the start of his final
imperial commission. 3 The personal name Lactantius and the cog-
nomen Firmianus have attestations elsewhere in the works of Je-
rome, as well as those of Augustine. 4 His nomen, however, is not
mentioned in any of the ancient sources. Two options, Ce-
2 De viris illustribus 80 (Włosok, “Lactance,” 427): Firmianus, qui et

Lactantius, Arnobii discipulus, sub Diocletiano principe accitus cum Fla-
vio grammatico, cujus De medicinalibus versu compositi exstant libri,
Nicomediae rhetoricam docuit ac penuria discipulorum ob Graecam vide-
licet civitatem ad scribendum se contulit. Habemus ejus Symposium, quod
adolescentulus scripsit Africae, et Ὁδοιπορικόν de Africa usque Nicome-
diam, hexametris scriptum versibus, et alium librum, qui inscribitur
Grammaticus, et pulcherrimum De ira Dei et Institutionum divinarum
adversum gentes libros septem, et έπιτομήν ejusdem operis, in libro uno
ἀκεφάλῳ, et Ad Asclepiadem libros duos, De persecutione librum unum,
Ad Probum epistolarum libros quattuor, Ad Severum epistolarum libros
duos; Ad Demetrianum, auditorem suum, epistolarum libros duos et ad
eumdem De opificio Dei vel formatione hominis librum unum. Hic ex-
trema senectute magister Caesaris Crispi, filii Constantini, in Gallia fuit,
qui postea a patre interfectus est.
3 Most scholars have favored a date close to 250. One scholar rea-
sonably argues that the phrase ‘extrema senectute’ indicates an age of 70 or

older, which would favor a date closer to 240. See Oliver Nicholson,
“Lactantius on Military Service,” Studia Patristica 24 (1993): 177 n. 10.
4 E.g., Jerome Epistulae 58.10; 70.5; 84.7; Chronicon AD 317; etc.; Au-
gustine doc. Chr. 2.40.61; civ. Dei 18.23. For the ancient testimonia to Lactan-
tius see Samuel Brandt and Georg Laubmann, eds., L. Caelii Firmiani Lac-
tantii Opera Omnia, CSEL 27/1 (Vienna: 1893), 161–167.
1. VITA ET OPERA 9
lius/Caelius or Cecilius/Caecilius, are provided by the manuscripts

containing his works. 5 The oldest and most authoritative contain
the former, and only a very few manuscripts give the praenomen Lu-
cius. The sole manuscript of De mortibus persecutorum, however, re-
fers to the author as Lucius Caecilius – a factor in the delay of iden-
tifying Lactantius as its author. 6 Further, Monceaux has pointed out
that an inscription from Cirta, the provincial capital of Numidia
under Diocletian, mentions a L. Caecilius Firmianus who died at
the age of 25 – “a family member of the apologist no doubt.” 7
Thus, we are on firm ground in referring to the apologist as Lucius
Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius. 8
Jerome alone informs us of Lactantius’ education under the
rhetor Arnobius. 9 Arnobius, himself the author of a Christian apol-
ogetic work, was a teacher of rhetoric in the regional capital of Sic-
ca Veneria – a city in the province of Numidia approximately 100
5 See Brandt, “Über das Leben,” 2–4. On the manuscript traditions

see Samuel Brandt and Georg Laubmann, eds., L. Caelii Firmiani Lactantii
Opera Omnia, CSEL 19 (Vienna: 1890), xiii–lxxiv.
6 On identifying the Lactantian authorship of MP see especially
Pichon, Lactance, 337–360, and Brandt’s review of this monograph in Ber-

liner philologische Wochenschrift 23 (1903): 1223–1228. The manuscript,
C=Colbertinus, n. 2627, was discovered in 1678 by Abbé Raymond de
Folhac.
7 Monceaux (Histoire, 3:288): sans doubte à la famille de l’apologiste.
Cf. CIL 8.7241.

8 See also, in agreement, Timothy D. Barnes, “Lactantius and Con-
stantine,” Journal of Roman Studies 63 (1973): 39; Anthony Bowen and Peter
Garnsey, eds., Lactantius: Divine Institutes (Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press, 2003), 1; Jackson Bryce, The Library of Lactantius (New York: Gar-
land Publishing, 1990), 2–4.
9 De viris illustribus 80; Epistula 70.5. For a fine summary of Arnobius’
life and thought consult George McCracken, ed., Arnobius: The Case
Against the Pagans, ACW 7 & 8 (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1949),
1–57. For a more detailed study in English see Michael Simmons, Arnobius
of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1995).
miles southwest of Carthage. 10 Neither Arnobius nor Lactantius

mention the other in any extant work. The most noticeable omis-
sion occurs in Lactantius’ list of previous Latin Christian apologists
in Book 5 of the Divinae Institutiones (DI 5.1.22–28). At the very
least, Lactantius could not have read the Adversus nationes until his
composition of the Divinae Institutiones was nearly completed and
appears not to have read it at all. 11 Most likely, Lactantius was nev-
er aware of Arnobius’ conversion. 12 The latter clearly states that he
was an adult convert to Christianity (Adv. nat. 1.39; 3.24). Jerome
adds the further detail that Arnobius composed the Adversus na-
tiones, after being rebuffed by the local ordinary, in order to gain
entry into the Church. 13 While it has long been thought that Lac-
tantius was also an adult convert, he makes no similar confession to
10 The evidence is exiguous for the dates of Arnobius’ life. While his
date-of-birth may always remain a mystery, Brandt (“Über das Leben,” 40)
argues convincingly for a difference of only ten years between him and
Lactantius. See also Micka, The Problem of Divine Anger, 148 n. 6. The date
of 327 has been assigned by many as the date of Arnobius’ death – based
on a scribal error in Jerome’s Chronicon AD 327 – but that too, at best, is
reasonable conjecture. See Simmons, Arnobius, 47–50 with notes.
11 Simmons (Arnobius, 7, 93) dates the composition of Adversus na-
tiones to 302–305, just prior to Lactantius’ composition of the Institutiones

(305–310). There are certainly commonalities of language and expression,
and passages of similarity between Adversus nationes and the Lactantian
corpus, but nothing that demands Lactantius having firsthand knowledge
of the work. On this point see Brandt, “Über das Leben,” 19–20; Hugo
Koch, “Zu Arnobius und Lactantius,” Philol. 80 (1925): 467–472; Micka,
The Problem of Divine Anger, 152–153.
12 De ira Dei, written c. 316 after the Institutiones, addresses the topics
of divine providence and impassibility – two areas of obvious incongruity

between Lactantius and Arnobius – yet Arnobius remains unmentioned. It
seems reasonable to infer that had Lactantius read Adversus nationes, he
would not have remained silent about this work in ID.
13 Jerome Chronicon AD 327. It is clear that Adversus nationes was writ-
ten by a Christian neophyte. See Nicholson, “Military Service,” 177 n. 10.

Hence, the probability is low that Arnobius could have been a Christian
and in contact with Lactantius in Africa based on chronological considera-
tions.
1. VITA ET OPERA 11
that effect. The present author finds it likely that, after being reared
in the traditional cults, his catechesis began sometime during his
youth in Africa. 14
We can only speculate as to the circumstances of Lactantius’
early career as a teacher of rhetoric in Africa. He admits to being
always the professor and never the lawyer (DI 3.13.12; cf. 1.1.8).
The letter from Jerome to Aurelius of Carthage discovered by J.
Divjak places Lactantius in Africa Proconsularis, the same province
that was home to Cyprian and Tertullian. 15 Given the evidence for
Lactantius’ Numidian origin – the inscriptional attestation to his
cognomen and his rhetorical training with Arnobius – it seems like-
ly that Jerome is referring to the province in which Lactantius made
a name for himself professionally, rather than his place of birth.
Further, in view of his later imperial appointment, it is difficult to
imagine Lactantius not flourishing as a teacher in the educational
center and provincial capital of Carthage.
14 For those who maintain that Lactantius’ conversion took place at

Nicomedia see Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 13; Brandt, “Über das
Leben,” 14; Monceaux, Histoire, 3:290; and Włosok, “Lactance,” 429. For
those who prefer an African venue see P. McGuckin, “The Non-
Cyprianic Scripture Texts in Lactantius’ Divinae Institutiones,” VC 36
(1982): 185; Robert Ogilvie, The Library of Lactantius (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1978), 1; and Stevenson, “Life,” 666. The evidence for believing
that Lactantius’ Christian education began in Africa includes the follow-
ing: (1) his familiarity with the theological works of his fellow Latin Afri-
can apologists; (2) his appearance, while a Christian, at court in Nicomedia
during the winter of 302/3 (DI 5.4.1); (3) his command of Scripture –
employed when appropriate to his argumentation (cf. DI 4.5.3); (4) his
awareness of the African Novatians (DI 4.30.10–13); (5) his journey to
Nicomedia with the Christian grammarian Flavius (cf. Jerome Adversus
Jovinianum 2.6); and (6) the silence of Jerome in relation to an adult con-
version– which would suggest that catechesis occurred in an unremarka-
ble and ordinary fashion, i.e., during his youth. Augustine may allude to
his conversion in doc. Chr. 2.40.61.
15 Ep. 27.3.1 (CSEL 88, 132): Alioquin cum in vestra provincia tanti
in sanctas scripturas omnes fluxerunt, Tertullianus, Cyprianus, Lactantius,

me quasi arentem rivulum velle nunc ridiculum est.
Between 299 and 302 Lactantius was summoned by the em-

peror Diocletian (r. 284–305) to teach Latin rhetoric at Nicomedia
in Bithynia. 16 Though prone to earthquakes and sacked by the
Goths in 258, Nicomedia was made the eastern imperial capital by
Diocletian. It was the emperor’s favorite city, the one in which he
was proclaimed Augustus on November 20, 284, and Lactantius
tells us that Diocletian’s great desire was to make it equal to Rome
(MP 7.10). To accomplish such a grand feat would necessarily entail
importing professors to train young men to serve the state as advo-
cates and political bureaucrats. Although Latin rhetoric was largely
a carbon-copy of the Greek art, the one area of Roman innovation
was in the creation of a system for teaching law. 17 The Latin rhetor
in late-antiquity was a magister juris, a professor who instructed his
students in the forensic, as well as the deliberative and epideictic,
elements of oratory. Beginning in the second century, institutiones
and digesta had been written and collected for the benefit of those
pursuing higher education in jurisprudentia. This discipline intensi-
fied during the Severan dynasty (193–235) and was undertaken,
even in the Greek-speaking East, in Latin; hence the need to intro-
duce scholars such as Lactantius from the West. Constantine (r.
306–337) himself was at court in Nicomedia prior to 306, and may
have been one of his students. 18
16 In a rare autobiographical moment Lactantius mentions that he

witnessed “at that time, a temple of God destroyed.” DI 5.2.2 (BT 2009,
442): eodem tempore dei templum everteretur. This may refer to the
church at Nicomedia which was destroyed when Diocletian’s edict of
persecution was issued on February 23, 303 (See MP 12; Eusebius HE
8.2.4), or, more figuratively, to the purging of Christians from the military
in 299 by Diocletian and Galerius at Antioch (See MP 10; HE 8.1.7, 4.2–
4).
17 See, for example, Henri Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity,
trans. G. Lamb (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 284–

291.
18 Even if Constantine was not a formal student of Lactantius at Ni-
comedia, the two certainly met there. This explains Lactantius’ appoint-
ment to tutor Crispus. See Hubertus Drobner, The Fathers of the Church
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2007), 182; Karl-Heinz Schwarte,
1. VITA ET OPERA 13
Whether Jerome is correct in his assertion that Lactantius was

forced to withdraw from his chair due to a paucity of students
seems a moot point. Diocletian issued his first edict of persecution
against the Christians from Nicomedia on the Roman feast of the
Terminalia, February 23, in 303. 19 As a direct consequence, Chris-
tians were “deprived of all honors and status” 20 and Lactantius
would have been forced to resign. As someone with access to the
imperial court, this official pronouncement came as little surprise
to Lactantius. The relative tolerance enjoyed by Christians, which
had begun in 260 under Gallienus (r. 253–268), 21 was disturbed by
an incident in 299 which Lactantius relays. While accompanied by
his Caesar Galerius Maximianus (r. 293–311) at Antioch, Diocletian
attended a sacrifice at which the haruspices were unable to obtain the
desired effects from the innards of their victims. 22 The rite had
“Lactantius,” in Dictionary of Early Christian Literature, ed. S. Döpp and W.

Geerlings (New York: Crossroad, 2000), 366; Włosok, “Lactance,” 428.
19 On nature and consequences of the persecution edicts under Dio-
cletian see especially Timothy D. Barnes, “Constantine and Christianity:

ancient evidence and modern interpretations,” Journal of Ancient Christianity
(1998): 274–294; Geoffrey E. M. de Ste. Croix, “Aspects of the ‘Great’
Persecution,” HTR 47 (1954): 75–113; H. A. Drake, Constantine and the
Bishops (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 141–147, 162–
165.
20 MP 13.1 (SC 39, 91): carerent omni honore ac dignitate. Cf. HE
8.2.
21 Cf. HE 8.13; Barnes, “Constantine and Christianity,” 278–9.
22 On this incident see MP 10; DI 4.27.4–5; cf. HE 8.1.7, 4.2–4. On
the reliability of Lactantius as a historian of the persecutions see, inter alia,

Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 13–14, 19; id., “Constantine and Christian-
ity,” 285; Arnold H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284–602, 2 vols.
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 71; William H. C.
Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker, 1965), 489–491. On the date and location of this incident see
Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 18–19; P. S. Davies “The Origin and Pur-
pose of the Persecution of AD 303,” JTS, n. s., 40 (1989), 89–92. By all
accounts, Diocletian was a devout adherent to the traditional Roman pan-
theon. For example, consider his anti-Manichean Rescript of March 31,
been disturbed, and the demons scattered, by the presence of a few

Christians making the sign of the cross. After several vain attempts
to repeat the offering, Diocletian flew into a rage and ordered the
entire imperial household to sacrifice. Letters were then sent to
military ‘commanders’ (praepositos) ordering every soldier to sacrifice
or be discharged. Diocletian would have been satisfied with these
measures but, according to Lactantius (MP 11.3), was spurred to-
wards official persecution by Galerius. 23 In the winter of 302/3,
therefore, Diocletian summoned a concilium, first privately and then
with consultants, in order to debate and determine what the most
prudent course of imperial action should be in relation to the
“Christian question.” Lactantius says that not all of the participants
were acrimonious to the plight of Christians, but acquiesced to the
majority out of fear. 24 The most notably vitriolic were two un-
named critics whom Lactantius heard with his own ears (DI 5.4.1).
The identity of the first of these opponents, whom Lactantius
calls a philosopher, had long been in question. The recent scholar-
ship of Digeser and Schott, however, has convincingly demonstrat-
ed him to be Porphyry of Tyre, the disciple of Plotinus and teacher
of Iamblichus of Chalcis. 25 This opponent lobbied on behalf of
302. Cf. Timothy D. Barnes, “Sossianus Hierocles and the Antecedents of

the ‘Great Persecution,’” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 80 (1976):
246–250; id., Constantine and Eusebius, 20.
23 Cf. MP 11. Lactantius tells us that Galerius’ hatred of the Chris-
tians derived from his mother.

24 MP 11.6. An allusion to Constantine?
25 See esp. Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, “Lactantius, Porphyry, and
the Debate over Religious Toleration,” Journal of Roman Studies 88 (1998),

129–146; id., The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 93–107; Schott, Christianity, Empire,
and the Making of Religion, 177–185. For earlier supporters of this theory see
Henry Chadwick, The Sentences of Sextus (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1959), 141, 143; Robert L. Wilken, “Pagan Criticism of Christianity:
Greek Religion and Christian Faith,” in Early Christian Literature and the
Classical Intellectual Tradition, ed. W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken (Paris:
Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 130–134. Wilken argues for the identification
of Porphyry based on his Philosophy from Oracles rather than Against the
1. VITA ET OPERA 15
persecution because “‘it was the philosopher’s pre-eminent duty to

rescue people from error […].’” 26 His oratorical presentation, how-
ever, was ineffective. The audience considered him cruel for vocif-
erously attacking an already harassed minority (DI 5.2.10–11). The
second combatant is easily identifiable as Sossianus Hierocles, gov-
ernor of Bithynia in 303. Lactantius refers to him as a member of
the judiciary and “a prime mover of the persecutions.” 27 During the
concilium, he presented a pair of pamphlets entitled Φιλαληϑῖες
(Truth-Loving), addressed to Christians rather than against them in
order to avoid the appearance of hostility. 28 His criticisms ad-
dressed the contradictions contained in Scripture, the low status of
the apostles, and the miracles of Christ – placing them on or below
the level of Apollonius of Tyana. 29 After being subject to the sacrile-
gas litteras (DI 5.4.1) of these two men, Lactantius determined to
undertake a massive apologetic project against the cultured despis-
Christians. This is the argument which Digeser and Schott pursue. For the
limits of Lactantius’ dependence on Porphyry see S. Freund, “Christian
Use and Valuation of the Theological Oracles: The Case of Lactantius’
‘Divine Institutes,’” Vigiliae Christianae 60/3 (2006): 269–284. While it has
been demonstrated that Lactantius did not draw directly from Philosophy
from Oracles, other evidence still remains convincing for the identification
of Porphyry as the ‘unnamed philosopher.’ See above, especially Schott,
Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 177–185. For the belief that
Porphyry is not the ‘unnamed philosopher,’ based on an inapt characteri-
zation of him by Lactantius in DI 5.2.3–11, see Timothy D. Barnes,
“Porphyry Against the Christians: Date and the Attribution of Fragments,”
JTS, n. s., 24 (1973): 437–442; id., Constantine and Eusebius, 164–167, 174–
178; Joseph Bidez, Vie de Porphyre (Hildesheim:1964), 112 n. 2.
26 DI 5.2.5 (BT 2009, 443): ‘ante omnia philosophi officium esse er-
roribus hominum subvenire […].’

27 DI 5.2.12 (BT 2009, 444): et qui auctor in primus faciendae per-
secutionis fuit. Cf. MP 16.4.

28 DI 5.3.22. Eusebius identifies Φιλαλήϑη as a work by Hierocles in
Contra Hieroclem 1.
29 DI 5.2.12–3.26. Apollonius was a first century CE magician who
was worshipped by some. Cf. Cassius Dio 77.18.4; Strobaeus 1.3.96.

ers of Christianity in order “to overthrow in one attack all the ac-
cusers of justice everywhere who are writing or will have written.” 30
The first of Lactantius’ extant works, however, is not the
promised apologetic summa but its prolegomena, De opificio Dei
(hereafter = De opificio). This treatise is a guarded Christian apology
on behalf of divine providence. Given that Lactantius gives only a
cursory treatment of this topic at the start of the Divinae Institutiones,
while readily acknowledging that a Christian apology must begin by
discussing providence (DI 1.2.6; cf. Min. Fel. 5; 18), De opificio can
be viewed as the necessary prologue to the Divinae Institutiones. The
work is addressed to Lactantius’ pupil Demetrianus (OD 1.1; 20.1),
presumably the same person who received two books of non-
extant epistles. A fellow Christian, Demetrianus was then engaged
in ‘public service’ (publicae rei) (OD 1.4) and Lactantius hopes that
he will be able to continue in this profession undisturbed. The au-
thor himself has not been so fortunate (OD 1.1) and references to
persecution in the text establish 304 as an approximate date of
composition (cf. also OD 1.7).
This treatise was written so that, like Demetrianus, “the phi-
losophers of our sect, which we protect, might be better instructed
and taught in the future.” 31 All of Lactantius’ apologetic works
evince this concern for the training of eloquent defenders of the
Church. Especially in times of official persecution, Christians must
be able to refute the objections of their opponents based on shared
principles. Effective arguments can only be made when both par-
ties accept the evidence. In De opificio, therefore, Lactantius argues
for the existence of divine providence by examining the (often er-
roneous) positions of the philosophers and the intelligible structure
of nature. His thesis is that creation, by its order and intelligibility,
displays evidence of a most-provident God (providentissimus) (cf. OD
3.4). In particular, the human person is an exalted creature – en-
dowed with language and reason – whose attributes cannot be
30 DI 5.4.1 (BT 2009, 450–51): accusatores justitiae […] ut omnes,

qui ubique idem operis efficiunt aut effecerunt, uno semel impetu prof-
ligarem.
31 OD 1.2 (SC 213, 106): philosophi sectae nostrae quam tuemur in-
structiores doctioresque in posterum fiant.

1. VITA ET OPERA 17
reckoned to chance or fate, but must be gifts from an omnipotent

Creator. Offering no biblical quotations, Lactantius views himself
as completing the work first begun by Cicero in Book 4 of De re-
publica (OD 1.12–14). This method of arguing to advance Christian
doctrines using non-Christian sources will later be employed to
great ends in the Divinae Institutiones, to which he alludes in the clos-
ing chapter (OD 20.2–9). In De opificio this method has the added
advantage of concealing what needs to be hidden during a time of
great duress for Christians (OD 20.1).
Lactantius began work on his magnum opus, the Divinae Insti-
tutiones (hereafter = Institutiones), in 305. As we have seen, his liter-
ary activity was prompted by the events at Nicomedia during the
winter of 302/3. A more precise terminus post quem is fixed by the
author’s reference to a persecuted Christian withstanding torture
for two years (DI 5.11.15). Elsewhere in Book 5, there is an ex-
tended metaphor on the ferocity of Galerius (DI 5.11.5–10), and
Lactantius writes as if all the persecuting emperors were still alive
and awaiting God’s just judgment (DI 5.23.1–5). The latest possible
terminus ante quem, therefore, is 311; since the first persecuting em-
peror to die was the western Augustus Maximian (r. 293–310) in
July of 310. 32 Lactantius’ whereabouts during this period, however,
are far less clear. He certainly began composition of the Institutiones
in Nicomedia, 33 but abandoned the East in 305/6 for a safer mi-
32 This dating for the main text of the Institutiones has not been seri-
ously disputed since Heck. See Eberhard Heck, Die dualistischen Zusätze und
die Kaiseranreden bei Lactantius (Heidelberg: 1972), 144. For example, see
Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 291 n. 96; Elizabeth DePalma Digeser,
“Lactantius and Constantine’s Letter to Arles: Dating the Divine Institutes,”
JECS 2 (1994): 43–44; Ogilvie, Library, 2. Stevenson (“Life,” 669–673),
based on these and other considerations, argues that books 5 through 7
were composed prior to books 1 through 4. Even if this were the case
Lactantius certainly had the entire plan of the Institutiones in mind when he
began the project. See Digeser, “Constantine’s Letter,” 44; Heck, Die dual-
istischen, 146–147; Ogilvie, Library, 3.
33 The aforementioned incident of a persecuted Christian withstand-
ing torture for two years was witnessed by Lactantius at Nicomedia (DI
5.11.15). Cf. Timothy D. Barnes, “Lactantius and Constantine,” 40; Eliza-
lieu. 34 Where Lactantius ventured after leaving Nicomedia is debat-

ed. Consideration has been given to Italy, Gaul, Africa, and even
elsewhere in Asia Minor. 35 The most convincing argument to date
holds that he fled home to Africa, but this is not uncontested. 36
Wherever Lactantius went, he was safe. In the Institutiones, unlike De
opificio Dei, he feels free to zealously harangue those who adhere to
the traditional cults and, most especially, the persecuting authori-
ties. 37
The Institutiones mark the first attempt by a Latin scholar to
give a complete treatment of the entire content of the Christian
faith. In Lactantius’ own words, he is attempting to provide the
totius doctrinae substantiam, a reckoning of the entire body of Chris-
tian knowledge (DI 5.4.3). While others had authored apologies,
e.g., Tertullian, Minucius Felix and Arnobius, none prior to St. Au-
gustine sought to answer the objections of detractors and exposit
the tenets of Christianity in a single work. In this respect, the Insti-
tutiones can rightly be seen as the forerunner to De civitate Dei. Of
course, the Institutiones is no peer of De civitate Dei in relation to ei-
ther penetration of thought or scope of inquiry. But what is fore-
beth DePalma Digeser, “Lactantius and the Edict of Milan: Does it De-
termine his Venue?” Studia Patristica 31 (1997): 288.
34 See DI 5.2.2, where he speaks in the past tense of his time at Ni-
comedia. Cf. Barnes, “Lactantius and Constantine,” 40; Digeser, “Edict of

Milan,” 288; Oliver Nicholson, “Flight from Persecution as Imitation of
Christ: Lactantius’ Divine Institutes 4:18, 1–2,” JTS 40 (1989): 49. For pas-
sages in the DI which suggest composition in the West see Barnes, Con-
stantine and Eusebius, 291 n. 96.
35 E.g., Italy: Bowen and Garnsey, Lactantius, 3; Gaul: Brandt, “Über
das Leben,” 33–34; Vincenzo Loi, “Il libro quarto delle Divinae Institutiones
fu da Lattanzio composto in Gallia?” in Mélanges Christine Mohrmann.
Noveau recueil offert par ses anciens élèves (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1973), 61–79;
Ogilvie, Library, 2; Pichon, Lactance, 356; Africa: Barnes, Constantine and
Eusebius, 13, 291 n. 96; Davies, “Origin and Purpose,” 70; Asia Minor:
Nicholson, “Flight from Persecution,” 48.
36 See Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 291 n. 96. Conversely, see Ni-
cholson, “Flight from Persecution,” 48 n. 6.

37 Cf. DI 1 passim; 2.1–4, 6; 5.8, 23; etc.
1. VITA ET OPERA 19
shadowed is the form. Lactantius was not satisfied with merely re-
sponding to the arguments of Christianity’s attackers, but with con-
structing his own counter-offense by presenting the Christian faith
as the only religion with vera sapientia and the only philosophy with
vera religio. The structure of the Institutiones mirrors this desire both
to defend and to posit. In Books 1 through 3, pars destruens, Lactan-
tius refutes the errors of pagan religion and philosophy, while in
Books 4 through 7, pars construens, he examines the beliefs he deems
central to Christian thought and life. 38
In Book 1, De falsa religione, 39 Lactantius begins by demonstrat-
ing the oneness of God based on reason and the testimony of the
prophets, poets, philosophers and oracles. Following his discourse
on monotheism, Lactantius embarks on a refutation of polytheism.
Here we discover that Lactantius, like Cicero before him (cf. Nat.
D. 2.62; 3.50), explains the existence of the gods according to the
theory of Euhemerus. Drawing largely from Ennius’ Historia sacra,
Lactantius maintains that the gods were human beings whom the
poets elevated because of their notable deeds. These beings were
clearly not the one true God because they possessed human origins
and characteristics, and many committed horrendous acts of vio-
lence and vice. The cult of the pantheon emerged because people
venerated these heroes and leaders. As time elapsed, these figures
were elevated to the level of deities and every tribe could boast of
having a god as an ancestor or founder.
Book 2, De origine erroris, explores the reasons for adhering to
the traditional cults: namely, ignorance and tradition. Even the ed-
ucated among the pagans no longer believe in the Greco-Roman
pantheon, but continue to promote its cult because of blind adher-
ence to ancestral traditions. Human beings, however, are the acme
of God’s created order and were not made to worship that which is
below them. Forgetful of their own dignity, people drew away from
the worship of the transcendent and omnipresent and towards the
base and material. In the final chapters of this book, Lactantius
38 See Émile Amann, “Lactance,” DTC 8:2428.

39 Book titles in the Institutiones are not the work of a later editor, but
are present in the manuscripts themselves. Scholars generally agree on
their Lactantian authorship.
gives a summary of the Judeo-Christian creation account in order

to emphasize the integrity of the human person and acknowledge
the role of demons in the spread of idolatry and superstition.
The third book of the Institutiones, De falsa sapientia, contains
Lactantius’ refutation of philosophy. Though he makes use of phi-
losophers whose testimonies can support his arguments, Lactantius
claims that their disparate theses demonstrate that no particular
sect or philosopher has attained true wisdom. Rather, the philoso-
phers engaged in speculation and the praises often bestowed upon
them are undeserved. True wisdom, however, is something given
rather than something to be sought after. While certain philoso-
phers came nearer the truth than others, none could apprehend the
true wisdom to be found in the gift of God’s revelation. Conse-
quently, since philosophy is incapable of grasping true wisdom, it
cannot succeed in uniting wisdom and religion. According to Lac-
tantius, human beings were made for both true wisdom and true
worship. The former is necessary in order to know humanity’s ul-
timate end, the latter in order to obtain it. By its incapacity to unite
these two elements, therefore, philosophy fails to meet a funda-
mental human need.
Lactantius begins Book 4, De vera sapientia et religione, by giving
a brief summary of the preceding books on the inability of polythe-
ism and philosophy to unite wisdom and religion. He then com-
mences his positive exposition of Christianity by asserting that the
Christian faith contains the integration of wisdom and worship to
which the human person is called by nature. Chapters 5 through 21
present the life of Christ as God’s answer to humanity’s vice and
idolatry. He was sent by the Father to unite all peoples in true wor-
ship of the one God and be a model of the virtuous life. Unlike the
philosophers, Christ embodied the virtues which he preached and,
by being true man, showed humanity that the virtuous life is possi-
ble. The remainder of Book 4 answers the objections often posed
by critics of Jesus’ divine Sonship: such as why he should suffer,
the nature of his miracles, and the unity of the Godhead.
Lactantius opens Book 5, De justitia, by recalling the events
which lead him to author this work. In doing so, he is creating a
direct link between answering the objections of those who criticize
Christianity and the virtue of justice. His treatment of justice begins
not with philosophy but history. Lactantius gives a narrative history
of justice starting with the pagan myth of the Golden Age and con-
1. VITA ET OPERA 21
cluding with the persecution of Christians. His thesis is that justice

had reigned among humans when and while there was worship of
the one true God (cf. civ. Dei 19.21). Once the worship of God was
abandoned, people were then free to vie against one another in
contests of egoism and domination. Rather than being a disruption
to the Roman Empire, Christians are advocating for a return to the
state of justice which once inhabited the earth by worshipping the
one God. Hence, persecution of them is both absurd and contrary
to the dictates of justice.
Far from violating the ancient practice of disciplina arcana,
Book 6, De vero cultu, does not address the liturgical practices of
early Christians but, rather, the true worship offered to God by a
virtuous life. Much of this book is Lactantius’ rejoinder to Cicero’s
De officiis, and he begins by invoking the metaphor of the two paths
to describe the ways of virtue and vice (cf. Off. 1.32). The previous
discussion concerning justice is then revived as Lactantius exam-
ines the ‘duties’ (officia) towards God (i.e., pietas) and humanity (i.e.,
aequitas) which justice requires. The truly just person will do what is
right regardless of profit or personal safety. The virtues of ‘pa-
tience’ (patientia) and ‘innocence’ (innocentia), in particular, enable
him/her to endure the difficulties which accompany living a virtu-
ous life. In the second half of Book 6, Lactantius discusses the na-
ture and role of the passions in the moral life. The passions are
neither good nor evil in themselves, but should be directed – not
obliterated – towards what is good. Caution must be exercised,
however, while indulging the pleasures of the senses. Often vice
comes under the appearance of what is good and pleasing, while
virtue what is rough and arduous. But since God is invisible, the
greatest form of worship is the invisible sacrifice of virtue made in
the hearts of believers.
The final book of the Institutiones, De vita beata, concerns the
rewards which await those who worship God in justice and virtue.
The philosophers, once again, could not understand the end of
mankind and, consequently, were incapable of grasping the struc-
ture and meaning of the universe. Creation was made for the sake
of humanity; that we might know God through his effects, practice
the virtues and gain immortality. This is the fulfillment of the hu-
man person which God created and wills. He endowed the human
being with an immortal rational soul so that s/he might live with
him eternally. And just as God is the Creator of all that exists, so
too will he bring his creation to its divinely-ordained end in the

eschaton. In the second half of Book 7, Lactantius narrates in great
detail, and with much help from the Sibyls, the coming apocalypse
which awaits humanity in the near future. The Institutiones then
closes as it opened, with a laudatory dedication to the Emperor
Constantine. 40
Many scholars believe that Lactantius returned to Nicomedia
following the completion of the Institutiones and resided there be-
tween 311 and 313. 41 Certain passages from De mortibus persecutorum,
for example, would seem to suggest a firsthand knowledge of
events in the East. 42 Digeser, however, has ably demonstrated why
Lactantius need not have been in the East during this period. 43 Fur-
ther, it is much more likely that Lactantius was engaged by Con-
stantine to tutor his eldest son Crispus between 310 and 313. 44 The
presumptive heir to the throne of Constantine was endowed with
40 See note 47 below.

41 E.g., Davies, “Origin and Purpose,” 77, 81; Heck, Die dualis-
tischen,144; Monceaux, Histoire, 3:111, 121, 124, 130; Arne Søby Christen-
sen, Lactantius the Historian (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1980), 25,
56.
42 The events normally cited are the deathbed Palinode of Toleration
by Galerius in 311 (MP 34), the liberation of his friend Donatus, after six
years of captivity, from imprisonment in Nicomedia (MP 35.2–3), and
Licinius’ Rescript from Nicomedia in 313 (MP 48.2–12), a.k.a., the so-
called “Edict of Milan.” Using these passages as evidence of Lactantius’
presence in Nicomedia, however, is problematic. This would mean that he
traveled back to Nicomedia while active persecution was still underway.
Galerius’ Palinode was soon ignored after his death by the ascending
Maximinus Daia (r. 305–313) (MP 36), and thus, persecution endured in
the East until 313. In the West, on the other hand, toleration began in 306
under Constantine (with restitution) and the usurper Maxentius. On this
point see Barnes, “Constantine and Christianity,” 280–283.
43 See Digeser, “Edict of Milan,” 287–95.
44 Jerome, De viris illustribus 80; Chronicon AD 317. On this issue see
Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, “Constantine’s Letter,” 49–52. A key factor

in this assertion is Constantine’s use of the DI in his letter to the Synod of
Arles in 314.
1. VITA ET OPERA 23
the title of Caesar in 317 and would not have required Lactantius’
instruction after that point. There are also ancient precedents for a
scholar of Lactantius’ caliber to be entrusted with the tutelage of a
youth from a prominent family. 45 Certainly, Lactantius must have
viewed Constantine’s commission as a divine blessing. Jerome
mentions the poverty of his condition prior to it. 46 The jubilation
which he experienced over the favorable changes to his personal
circumstances, and to those of Christians in Constantine’s realm of
the empire, no doubt prompted Lactantius to work on the Con-
stantinian dedications (and interpolations) to the second edition of
the Institutiones at this time. 47 Lactantius’ milieu after this period
45 E.g., Gratian. See Brandt, “Über das Leben,” 32–33; Pichon, Lac-
tance, 356.
46 Chronicon AD 317 (CSEL 27/1, 162): sed adeo in hac vita pauper,
ut plerumque etiam necessariis indiguerit. This resonates well with the

image of someone who has been forced to flee his home and employ-
ment, and in his senescence has dedicated himself to extensive writing.
47 For a thorough analysis of the manuscript additions see Heck, Die
dualistischen. The additions to the authoritative main text, according to the

citation method of Heck and Włosok in Lactantius Divinarum Institutionum
Libri Septem (Munich & Leipzig: 2005–2011), are the following: The Con-
stantinian address of DI 1.1.13–16, and the dualist passage of DI 2.8.6
add.1–9, appear in R=Parisinus lat. (Regius) 1663, beginning of the ninth
century; S=Parisinus lat. 1664, twelfth-century with editorial work in the
fifteenth century; and g=Gothanus membr. 1 n. 55, fourteenth- or fif-
teenth-century. The Constantinian address of DI 7.26.10.11–17, and the
dualist passage of DI 7.5.27 add.1–17, appear in the latter two sources.
Brandt and Laubmann (CSEL 19, xxiii) regard the most authoritative co-
dex to be B=Bononiensis 701, fifth-century with revision in the early sixth
century. For the remaining manuscripts which also omit the passages in
question see, most recently, Digeser, “Constantine’s Letter,” 41 n. 34.
Since Pichon (Lactance, 23–29) most scholars agree that these passages
came from Lactantius himself. Since Heck (Die dualistischen, 37–39) most
agree that these passages were a later insertion by Lactantius. The dualist
“addition” in OD, cited as 19 bis1–5 in Michel Perrin, ed., Lactance:
L’ouvrage du dieu créateur, SC 213 (Paris: Cerf, 1974), appears in codices g
and P=Parisinus lat. (Puteani) 1662, third quarter of the ninth century.
Unlike the above, however, it seems much more likely that this passage is
remains uncertain, but presumably he spent the remainder of his

life under Constantine’s patronage at Trier.
After the forces of Constantine and Licinius (r. 308–324) de-
feated those of Maxentius (312) (MP 44) and Maximinus Daia (313)
(MP 47) respectively, Licinius published a rescript on behalf of
Constantine and himself from Nicomedia on June 15, 313 (MP
48.2–12; HE 10.5.2–14). This document granted “to all people the
freedom to follow whatever religion one wished,” 48 rescinded all
previous legal precedents to the contrary, and ordered the immedi-
ate restitution of corporately-owned church property. While this
did not mark the end of Christian persecution in the ancient
world, 49 it would now be the exception rather than the rule. Lactan-
tius, in order that none may fail to see the work of God’s provi-
dence in this most recent history, composed a pamphlet entitled De
mortibus persecutorum (hereafter = De mortibus). Written between 313
and 315, 50 De mortibus is a history of the lives and deaths of the
Roman emperors who persecuted the Christian church. The thesis
of this work is that “the highest God has displayed His virtue and
majesty in extinguishing and destroying the enemies of his name.” 51
The gruesome and horrific deaths which without fail befell the per-
a later redaction of, rather than an addition to, the original text. On this
matter see Perrin, SC 213, 86–94.
48 MP 48.2 (SC 39, 132): omnibus liberam potestatem sequendi reli-
gionem quam quisque voluisset.

49 E.g., by the same Licinius between 320 and 324 in the East, and
by Emperor Julian (r. 361–363).

50 On the dates see Barnes, “Lactantius and Constantine,” 46; id.,
Constantine and Eusebius, 13–14; J. L. Creed, ed., Lactantius: De mortibus perse-

cutorum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), xxxiii-xxxv; Digeser, “Constan-
tine’s Letter,”49. The last major event which Lactantius records is the
death of Maximinus Daia in the summer of 313. His portrait of Licinius,
favorable yet not without blemish, bespeaks of the period prior to 316;
after which time the animosity between Licinius and Constantine finally
erupted into violence.
51 MP 1.8 (SC 39, 79): virtutem ac majestatem suam in
ex<tinguen>dis delendisque nominis sui hostibus deus summus ostende-

rit.
1. VITA ET OPERA 25
secuting emperors are the evidence of God’s activity in human his-

tory. God permitted his disciples to experience tribulation in order
to display his justice by the total and utter destruction of the perse-
cutors.
Many scholars have noted the parallels which exist between
De mortibus and 2 Maccabees. 52 Rather than a contribution to the
tradition of Roman histories, such as those of Tacitus and Suetoni-
us, De mortibus is a work of consolation to his fellow Christians who
suffered at the hands of imperial tormentors. It is dedicated to a
confessor named Donatus who withstood torture and imprison-
ment at Nicomedia for six years (MP 1.1; 35.2; 52.5). The differ-
ence of genre between De mortibus and Lactantius’ apologetic works
accounts for the departure from his normally exquisite Ciceronian
style. One may, with J. Creed, refer to it as “a piece of epideictic
oratory devoted not to encomium but to vituperatio.” 53 Lactantius’
excoriation of the persecuting emperors also emphasizes the com-
plete and manifest defects of their entire personhood. In other
words, a persecutor will always be a vicious person and incapable
leader. The three qualities are inextricably united, and one intensi-
fies proportionately with the others. In relation to the division of
material, the vast majority of De mortibus, Chapters 7 through 51,
concerns the years 284 to 313: from the genesis of the tetrarchy to
the death of the last persecuting emperor, Maximinus Daia. Thus,
along with Eusebius’ Historia ecclesiastica, De mortibus remains an in-
valuable historical resource concerning this tumultuous and critical
period in Roman history.
Lactantius alludes to his next work, De ira Dei, in Book 2 of
the Institutiones (DI 2.17.4–5). This treatise specifically deals with
divine impassibility; a topic he could only treat in cursory fashion in
the Institutiones. In De ira Dei Lactantius defends the wrath of God
against those, especially Stoics and Epicureans, who find divine
anger contrary to God’s nature. It was written after persecution had
52 Cf. Creed, De mortibus, xxxviii; Moreau, SC 39, 62; Wilhelm Nestle,

“Die Legende vom Tode der Gottesverrachter,” AR 33 (1936): 246–269;
Jean Rougé, “Le De Mortibus Persecutorum, 5e livre des Macchabées” Studia
Patristica 12/1 (1976): 135–143.
53 Creed, De mortibus, xxxviii.
ended, 54 and intimates at the unrest which ensued following the

conflict between Constantine and Licinius in 316 (ID 24.12; 23.26).
Therefore, 316/7 can be asserted as an approximate date of com-
position. Both this work and De mortibus are dedicated to a Donatus
(ID 1.1). It is only an assumption, albeit a reasonable one, that
these dedicatees are the same person. Lactantius is never explicit.
Lactantius’ treatise on the wrath of God exemplifies the dia-
logue between biblical and Greco-Roman notions of the divine
which took place during the infancy of Christianity. Divine apatheia
was affirmed by some Christians, such as Arnobius (cf. Adv. nat.
6.2), but Lactantius argues for a doctrine of God consonant with
the biblical tradition without making use of scriptural evidence. He
argues directly against the philosophers who view anger as incom-
patible with the divine nature. The wrath of God, according to Lac-
tantius, is an essential part of God’s justice. Unlike the anger hu-
man beings experience, an emotion which springs from the pas-
sions, God’s anger is righteous indignation: “a movement of the
mind arising for the restraint of offences.” 55 Just as a parent disci-
plines a beloved child, God too disciplines mankind because of his
love. Furthermore, divine anger is the very basis for religion. With-
out it, there would be no reward for a virtuous life or reprimand
for a vicious one. Indeed, if God did not possess righteous anger,
there would be no need for religion at all. In addition to providing
us with greater insight into Lactantius’ doctrine of God, De ira Dei
also holds the distinction of being “the only monograph on that
subject left by the ancients.” 56
The final extant apologetic work we possess is the epitome
Divinarum Institutionum (hereafter = Epitome). This theological résu-
mé was dedicated to a friend named Pentadius who desired an
abridged version of the original tome (Epi. Pr.1). It was composed
‘long after’ (jam pridem) the Institutiones which suggests a range of
54 Cf. ID 16.4; Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 292 n. 99.

55 ID 17.20 (SC 289, 180): ira est motus animi ad coercenda peccata
insurgentis. Cf. civ. Dei 15.25.
56 Harald Hagendahl, Latin Fathers and the Classics (Göteborg: 1958),
70.
1. VITA ET OPERA 27
four to six years. 57 Therefore, Lactantius may have been at work on

the Epitome and De ira Dei concurrently. In 73 chapters, of which
chapters 15 through 19 are incomplete in the manuscripts, Lactan-
tius offers a compendium to the Institutiones that eliminates much of
the superfluity and repetitive quotations contained in the original.
Greek quotations, which were retained in their original language in
the Institutiones, appear in Latin in the Epitome. Additional sources
have been consulted as well, such as Plato’s Timeaus (Epi. 63.1, 9;
64.5) and certain passages from Scripture (Epi. 59.3; 60.3; 62.3;
67.4). In sum, the abbreviated and condensed format of the Epitome
lends itself to a greater degree of readability. Lactantius’ audience
must have preferred the prototype, however, as there are only three
manuscripts which contain this work. 58
The remaining works mentioned by Jerome – a Symposium, an
Itinerary and The Grammarian – are all lost, as are the collections of
epistles. Jerome claims that the epistles to Demetrianus firmly deny
the subsistence of the Holy Spirit, 59 and pseudo-Damasus found
the epistles he encountered far too vulgar. 60 Of his correspondents
Severus and Probus we know nothing except a few details concern-
ing a kinsman of the former. 61 In the Institutiones, Lactantius quotes
from a text on providence sent directly to him by its author, ‘our
Asclepiades’ (Asclepiades noster) (DI 7.4.17). This is surely the same
person who received two books from Lactantius, but nothing else
is known of him. Given the lack of evidence it is impossible to date
his collections of epistles with any degree of certainty. Omitted
from Jerome’s catalogue is De Ave Phoenice, a poem in 85 elegiac
57 Epi. Pr.1; cf. Stevenson, “Life,” 677.

58 The manuscripts of the Epitome are B, P, and T=Taurinensis Regii
Tabulari I. See note 47 above. Of the three, the latter is the most com-
plete.
59 Ep. 84.7; Comm. ad Gal. 2.4.
60 Jerome Ep. 35.1. On the authorship of this epistle see P. Nautin,
“Le premier échange épistolaire entre Jerome et Damase: lettres réelles ou

fictives?” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 30 (1983): 331–334.
61 See Jerome De viris illustribus 111. For the ancient fragments which
mention the non-extant works see Brandt and Laubmann, CSEL 27/1,
155–160.
couplets possibly written in the early 320’s. 62 Lactantius’ retelling of

the fabled story of the phoenix, while traditionally read through the
lens of Christian allegory, is deeply multivalent and suggests Con-
stantinian influence. A few fragments have also survived, 63 but Lac-
tantius’ desire to author two more apologetic works, a contra Judaeos
(DI 7.1.26) and a contra haereticos (DI 4.30.14; ID 2.6), went unful-
filled. There is no record of his death in any of the ancient testimo-
nia, but it would be difficult to imagine Lactantius enduring beyond
the year 325.
62See Jackson Bryce, “De Ave Phoenice and the religious policy of
Constantine the Great,” Studia Patristica 19/1 (1989): 19.
63 See Brandt and Laubmann, CSEL 27/1, 148–151, 157–8.
CHAPTER 2. LACTANTIUS AND METHOD
Prior to a detailed analysis of Lactantius’ use of the doctrine of

providence, it is important to examine his method of composition.
In an oblique way, Lactantius’ belief in providence is operative
even in discussing matters related to theological method. The apol-
ogist himself admits as much in affirming that one cannot discuss
other theological matters without also addressing the topic of prov-
idence throughout (DI 1.2.6). This chapter, therefore, addresses the
(I.) method, (II.) audience and (III.) sources of Lactantius’ writings
and will conclude with an excursus on (IV.) the apologist’s concep-
tion of Christian truth.
I. METHOD
Lactantius recognized that Christian apologetics in the Latin tongue
had been attempted before him. He mentions the contributions of
Minucius Felix, Tertullian and Cyprian, but his evaluation of their
work is not altogether positive. Both Minucius and Tertullian are
complimented for their skill of composition. The former, however,
had not the time to devote himself wholly to the subject, while the
latter “had little facility in eloquence, even less in adornment, and
very obscure.” 1 Lactantius wishes that Tertullian, in his Apologeti-
cum, had expounded the truths of the Christian faith rather than
merely respond to the attacks of others (DI 5.4.3). Cyprian, the
most distinguished of his predecessors, “had a natural genius, was
studious, smooth and clear – the greatest of virtues in language –
so that one could not discern whether elegance of language, suc-
1DI 5.1.23 (BT 2009, 440): in eloquendo parum facilis et minus

comptus et multum obscurus fuit.
29
cess in explanation, or power of persuasion came first.” 2 His audi-

ence, however, was limited to existing members of the Christian
flock. Cyprian spoke of mysteries known only to the Christian
faithful and, because of his own deeply profound knowledge of
Scripture, employed it as an authority where logic, philosophy or
history would have been more convincing and appropriate. In
short, Cyprian “was content with only those things which are the
substance of our faith.” 3
Learning from the deficiencies of his predecessors, Lactantius
seeks to exposit Christian doctrine in three ways. First, he main-
tains that the Christian apologist should be a person who possesses
the requisite command of language so as to persuade his audience
with pleasant speech. A common complaint levied against the early
Christians was that their scriptural literature lacked style and sub-
limity, and its advocates education and erudition. 4 To combat this
mean image Lactantius would employ the fruits of his classical edu-
cation to defend Christianity. “I can now use my great and plentiful
faculty to plead the cause of truth. Though truth can be defended,
as many often have defended it, without eloquence, nevertheless it
ought to be illuminated and indeed expounded with clarity and
splendor of words.” 5 Many of those to whom Lactantius directs his
defense would not respond favorably to an unpolished and banal
manner of speech (DI 5.1.21; 4.5.2). “To that point nothing is true
unless it is smooth on the ears, nothing is credible unless it pro-
2 DI 5.1.25 (BT 2009, 440–41): Erat enim ingenio facili copioso sua-
vi et, quae sermonis maxima est virtus, aperto, ut discernere non queas,
utrumne ornatior in eloquendo an felicior in explicando an potentior in
persuadendo fuerit.
3 DI 5.4.7 (BT 2009, 452): his solis contentus esset quibus fides
constat.
4 Cf. DI 5.1.15–21, 2.17; 6.21.4–5; Acts 4:13; Origen C. Cels. 1.27.29;
3.18.44; etc.
5 DI 1.1.10 (BT 2005, 3): nunc majore copia et facultate dicendi cau-
sam veritatis peroremus. quae licet possit sine eloquentia defendi, ut est a
multis saepe defensa, tamen claritate ac nitore sermonis inlustranda et
quodammodo disserenda est.
2. LACTANTIUS AND METHOD 31
vides pleasure; they weigh not by truth, but ornament.” 6 Further,

by employing fluid and lofty language Lactantius is not only pre-
senting the truth through a more receptive medium, but also using
a chief weapon of Christianity’s despisers against them (DI 3.1.2).
“Rim the cup of wisdom with honey from heaven, so that the bit-
ter remedy can be drunk unknowingly without giving any offense;
while the initial sweetness allures, the harshness of the bitter medi-
cine is hidden under the pretext of smoothness.” 7 Whereas philos-
ophy, oratory and poetry are honey hiding poison, true religion is
an acerbic quaff.
In addition to splendor of language, Lactantius believes that a
thorough and complete apology will not only tear down fallacious
arguments, but also build up the truths of the Christian faith. “He
proposes to attack the problem not merely with the reductio ad ab-
surdam that is characteristic of Tertullian and Arnobius, but with a
positive exposition of the Christian doctrine.” 8 The very title of the
Institutiones bespeaks his desire to establish a positive body of
knowledge akin to the institutiones civilis juris. 9 Just as there exists a
legal code for settling disputes between citizens, so too should
there be a divine law to guide believers away from the errors and
superstitions of this world and towards the blissful immortality of
the next life (DI 1.1.12; 1.1.21). Lactantius’ goal is to present the
totius doctrinae substantiam; a reckoning of the entire body of Chris-
tian knowledge (DI 5.4.3). Such a work would instruct believers less
formed in their faith and refute all possible opponents: past, pre-
6 DI 5.1.17 (BT 2009, 439): Adeo nihil verum putant nisi quod audi-
tu suave est, nihil credibile nisi quod potest incutere voluptatem; nemo
rem veritate ponderat, sed ornatu. Cf. 1.1.7.
7 DI 5.1.14 (BT 2009, 438–39): Circumlinatur modo poculum caeles-
ti melle sapientiae, ut possint ab imprudentibus amara remedia sine ulla

offensione potari, dum inliciens prima dulcedo acerbitatem saporis asperi
sub praetexto suavitatis occultat. Cf. Lucr. 1.936–950.
8 L. J. Swift, “Arnobius and Lactantius: Two Views of the Pagan Po-
ets,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 96

(1965): 445.
9 Cf. J. Stevenson, “Aspects of the Relations between Lactantius and
the Classics,” Studia Patristica 4/2 (1961): 500.

sent and future. “I decided I had to argue my case in such a way

that previous writers would be undone together with all their
works, and future writers would lose all opportunity of writing or
of responding.” 10 In Lactantius’ view, if more men of learning and
scholarship would but apply themselves to this task, to the exposi-
tion of truth, then false wisdom and religion would soon become a
distant memory (DI 5.4.8).
The final component of Lactantian apologetics concerns the
author’s source material. In his elucidation of the Christian faith
the rhetorician makes copious use of classical philosophers, poets
and oracles. 11 Unlike Cyprian, Lactantius intends to nurse his pagan
audience on the milk with which they are accustomed, i.e., their
own literature, before feeding them the meat of revelation. 12 On
demonstrating the existence of the one supreme God, for example,
Lactantius writes:
Let us come to the authors, and to prove the truth let us cite as
witnesses those who are often used against us: the poets and
philosophers. We must prove the unity of God from them, not
because they have knowledge of the truth, but because the
truth itself is so powerful that no one – not even a blind man –
10 DI 5.4.2 (BT 2009, 451): sic agendam mihi hanc causam putavi, ut
et priores cum suis omnibus scriptis perverterem et futuris omnem facul-
tatem scribendi aut respondendi amputarem.
11 On this topic see esp., Pichon, Lactance, 218–45; G. L. Ellsperman,
Learning (Cleveland: 1984), 67–100. Bowen and Garnsey, for example, in

The Attitude of the Early Christian Latin Writers toward Pagan Literature and
the most recent English edition of the Institutiones, detect either direct or
indirect quotations from among the following authors: Cicero (105), Ver-
gil (50), the Sibyls (45), Lucretius (25) and Seneca (22). The Bible, on the
other hand, in the conservative estimation of these scholars, is quoted 77
times. On the issue of what texts Lactantius might have possessed consult
R. M. Ogilvie, Library. On the influence of the pagan authors on the
thought of Lactantius see J. Bryce, Library.
12 DI 5.4.6; cf. 1.5.2; 1 Cor 3:2; Heb 5:12.
could help but see divine brightness when it pours itself upon
the eyes. 13
As we have seen, many educated pagans viewed Scripture as an
inferior form of literature; a similar charge cast doubt upon their
antiquity (DI 4.5.9). Therefore, the most effective apologetic meth-
od would be to support one’s arguments with testimonies from
extra-scriptural sources. These testimonia include, first, the poets and
philosophers, but also the quasi-divine works of oracular literature
such as Hermes Trismegistus, the Sibylline Oracles, Apollo and
even the Iranian text of Hystaspes. In appealing especially to the
latter sources, Lactantius believed their utterances to be irrefutable
by his opponents. 14 “What sort of proof could we better use
against [our adversaries] than to bind them with testimony from
their own gods?” 15
II. AUDIENCE
In the Institutiones, Lactantius makes clear that the members of his
intended audience are educated pagans, or docti, whom he hopes to
draw away from false wisdom and religion. The Institutiones begin
with Lactantius praising the classical philosophers who, forsaking
all worldly pleasures, pursued the lofty goal of attaining wisdom
13 DI 1.5.2 (BT 2005, 14–15): veniamus ad auctores et eos ipsos ad

veri probationem testes citemus, quibus contra nos uti solent, poetas dico
ac philosophos. ex his unum deum probemus necesse est, non quod illi
habuerint cognitam veritatem, sed quod veritatis ipius tanta vis est, ut
nemo possit esse tam caecus, quin videat ingerentem se oculis divinam
claritatem. Cf. DI 3.1.2–3.
14 DI 7.13.2. Cf. Cicero Part. or. 2.6. Also, Jeremy Schott rightly states
that Lactantius’ use of oracular literature parodies the method employed

by his opponent Pophyry in Philosophy from Oracles. See J. Schott, Christiani-
ty, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 81.
15 DI 1.6.17 (BT 2005, 28): quod genus probationis adversus eos
magis adhibere debemus quam ut eos deorum suorm testimoniis revin-

camus?
(DI 1.1.1–4). 16 These great men ultimately failed, however, because

truth and wisdom are gifts given to human beings by God and not
goals to be attained by one’s own effort. This divine gift of wisdom
has been given to all those who have received the Christian faith.
As a Christian teacher, therefore, it is Lactantius’ mission to share
true wisdom with those who are unacquainted with God’s revela-
tion. Although Lactantius mentions the need to guide the docti to-
wards true wisdom and the indocti towards true religion, it is evident
that the aim of the Institutiones is to lead the former to both true
wisdom and religion (DI 1.1.7). The philosophers, especially, are in
desperate need of guidance since their internecine quarreling has
virtually consumed their original goal of pursuing truth and virtue
(DI 1.1.24).
The question of audience is again addressed in Book 5, when
Lactantius gives what amounts to a second introduction to the Insti-
tutiones, i.e., a recapitulation of his goals and motives for writing.
Here we discover that his proximate motive for writing came from
witnessing the slanderous presentations of two prominent men (DI
5.4.1). The greater motive, however, is to present the case for
Christianity to all those governing authorities who persecute the
Christian Church. These people condemn Christians to death
without firm knowledge of Christian doctrine. Lactantius implores
them to read his treatise straight through and reserve judgment
until the end (DI 5.1.2). In doing so he hopes “to lead them from a
stupid conviction to the truth.” 17 But the seasoned author also has
realistic expectations as to the reception of his work. He recognizes
that the most likely reaction to his apology by a persecutor will be
derision and mockery (DI 5.1.1). Those who condemn Christians
to death do not wish to hear the truth. They are contended in their
sins and would rather put innocent people to death without hearing
evidence (DI 5.1.3–8, 9.6). But despite the acknowledgement that
his work may not resonate with Christianity’s more virulent oppo-
16 Lactantius most certainly has Cicero in mind when he speaks of

orators who retired in order to devote themselves to philosophy (DI
1.1.11; cf. Off. 1.2.4; 2.2.4; 3.2.5).
17 DI 5.1.8 (BT 2009, 437): hos ad veritatem ab inepta persuasione
traducere.
nents, the educated pagan in general remains Lactantius’ target au-

dience in the Institutiones (DI 5.1.8).
That Lactantius’ primary audience is a non-Christian one does
not, however, eliminate potential Christian readership; especially
since it was a common apologetic trope to address one’s defense to
non-Christian authorities while composing for a predominantly
Christian readership. 18 Lactantius admits that even if this tome
should fail to persuade any pagan readers, it would still have the
benefit of solidifying and reinforcing the faith of those Christians
who are in need of instruction (DI 5.1.9). Those whose faith “is
neither stable nor solid” 19 refers to Christians who have received a
classical education. Lactantius mentions that people who have at-
tained proficiency in letters often waver in faith (DI 6.21.4). By
composing his apology in the style of the great orators, in particular
Cicero, Lactantius hopes that these studiosi (DI 5.1.11) will become
scholars in truth and virtue, rather than literature. Finally, the apol-
ogist confesses that, should no one give ear to his plea, his con-
science rejoices at composing a work on Christian truth (DI 5.1.12).
Only in the Institutiones does Lactantius explicitly mention
composing a work for the sake of a non-Christian audience. His
other surviving works are all addressed to fellow Christians and it
would be difficult to imagine a majority of his readers, even of the
Institutiones, being non-Christians. The topic of Lactantius’ address-
ees has been discussed in the previous section, but what ought to
be emphasized here is what the consistent use of non-Christian
sources throughout Lactantius’ apologetic works tells us about his
intended audience. Though his treatises are all addressed to Chris-
tians they argue from evidence provided by reason, nature and
non-Christian literature.
The Epitome was written for the benefit of a Christian friend
who desired a more compact compendium to the Institutiones, the
fundamental aims and contents remaining the same as the original
tome. In De ira Dei, Lactantius is engaged in refuting the positions
of the Stoics and Epicureans concerning the existence and nature
of divine anger (ID 2.7). While this might suggest that his primary
18 Cf., e.g., Justin 1 Apol.; 2 Apol.

19 DI 5.1.9 (BT 2009, 437): non est stabilis ac solidis.
audience consists of philosophers or educated pagans, the work is

addressed to a Christian. Lactantius is writing expressly for the
benefit of Donatus, so that “you yourself might not be deceived by
the influence of men who consider themselves wise.” 20 It would be
reasonable to infer that, like the aforementioned studiosi, Donatus is
an educated Christian with whom the opinions of the great philos-
ophers carry some weight. Beyond the addressee, however, Lactan-
tius is more explicit about his wider readership in De opificio Dei. In
composing this early work Lactantius openly bears in mind the
formation of Christian scholars (OD 1.2). He writes for the intellec-
tual and moral benefit of Christian teachers and preachers who are
given no hearing and are commonly rebuked. They are in need of
instruction and teaching, and Lactantius explicitly intends his trea-
tise to benefit this wider group of philosophi sectae nostrae (OD 1.2).
If convincing other Christians to believe in God’s providence
(as in De opificio Dei) or righteous indignation (as in De ira Dei) were
Lactantius’ only goals in composing these treatises then making use
of scriptural evidence would be the most appropriate and convinc-
ing form of argument. In confining himself to extra-biblical author-
ities, however, Lactantius is committing himself to educating the
Christian reader in effective apologetic practice. In this sense, I
would argue, the intended readership about which Lactantius is
explicit in De opificio Dei is also the case for all of his apologetic
works. His selection of source material implies that Lactantius is
concerned with educating Christian advocates for the public forum.
In particular, those Christians who share a certain level of erudition
and sophistication with the apologist, and who frequently come
into contact with persons either hostile to or ignorant of the Chris-
tian message. According to Lactantius, producing learned advocates
who could convincingly defend the faith to their peers, utilizing the
fruits of their education, is the great deficiency of Latin Christen-
dom (DI 5.1.21, 4.8). Therefore the apologist seeks to gather the
scattered remnants of truth dispersed among the classical authors
and present them in a comprehensive and cohesive body of
20 ID 1.2 (SC 289, 90): ne et ipse fallaris inpulsus auctoritate homi-

num qui se putant esse sapientes. There also existed Christians, most no-
tably Arnobius of Sicca, who denied the existence of anger in God.
knowledge to those who would proclaim the gospel to the gentes

(DI 7.7.1–4).
III. SOURCES
A. The Bible
Although, save for Book 4 of the Institutiones, the Christian Bible
lurks in the background of Lactantius’ compositions it remains the
standard of all truth and that “from which the font of holy religion
flows as its source.” 21 All of Lactantius’ non-Christian sources are
evaluated based on their resonance with sacred Scripture and
Christian doctrine. This is the apologist’s primary criterion for
measuring truth. Pedagogically, however, those who have not been
initiated into the Christian mysteries need first to receive primary
evangelization before reading Scripture. This is the case, first, be-
cause the Bible itself discourages an educated readership by its un-
adorned language. Scripture contains neither the sweetness and
refinement of poetry or rhetoric, nor the sophisticated argumenta-
tion of philosophy (cf. DI 3.1.11; 6.21.4). Rather, the Bible is the
written word of God. When God spoke he did so as the Author of
creation and Lord of his people: “not by argument, but by pro-
nouncement.” 22 Being the supreme teacher and pedagogue, God
conditioned his language to suit his audience of ancient Israelites.
These were ordinary folk and, consequently, biblical language is “in
common and simple words.” 23 As a result, many non-Christians
who conflate truth with eloquence are loath to read a text with
21 DI 4.5.9 (BT 2007, 324–25): ex quo fonte religionis sanctae origo

manaverit. Cf. 1.1.22; 6.24.31; 7.25.1. For an extensive treatment of Lac-
tantius’ understanding of the Bible see P. Monat, Lactance et la Bible: Une
propédeutique latine à la lecture de la Bible dans l’Occident constantinien (Paris:
Études Augustiniennes, 1982). It is also worth remembering that scriptura
sancta or litterarum divinarum to Lactantius does not signify the codified and
canonized text which the Christian West possessed after the Vulgate was
in wide usage. On the sources of Lactantius’ biblical quotations see P.
McGuckin, “Non-Cyprianic Scripture,” 145–63.
22 DI 3.1.11 (BT 2007, 203–04): non argumentari, sed pronuntiare.
23 DI 5.1.15 (BT 2009, 439): communi ac simplici sermone.
such a “short and stark” 24 tradition. The Bible is viewed by them as

“stupid and vulgar,” 25 and this assessment extends to its advo-
cates. 26 But, while acknowledging the need for more capable de-
fenders, Lactantius believes that aversion to the Bible is also part of
the divine economy. God willed that his revelation remain hidden,
obscure and unattractive until the coming of his Son; so that he
might reveal true wisdom to all peoples. 27 It was God’s plan that
“the mysteries of divine religion” 28 should be preserved by the Jew-
ish people and written in an arcane language until He Himself
could be our teacher. In doing so God ensured that his Word
would remain pure and uncorrupt from the alluring and seductive
language commonly used to mask lies (DI 3.1.3).
Secondly, the Bible discourages the novice reader because its
contents cannot be easily discerned. Lactantius views biblical study
as the final, and ultimate, step in Christian education. Given the
skepticism and derision with which some of his non-Christian con-
temporaries treated the Bible, it was obvious to Lactantius that en-
gaging sacred Scripture should initially be eschewed. Only when the
auditor is convinced of the basic truths of Christianity should s/he
be directed “to the most abundant and plentiful font of teaching
itself.” 29 The first step in proclaiming the truths contained in Scrip-
ture is to arrange and explicate the contents of revelation in a man-
ner more suitable to ordo disciplinae. This is precisely the task which
Lactantius has taken up in writing the Institutiones. Though he could
easily prove his theses using only biblical evidence, he opts instead
24 DI 3.1.11 (BT 2007, 203): breviter ac nude. Lactantius believes this

to be the primary reason why Scripture does not resonate with the educat-
ed classes. See DI 5.1.15–18.
25 DI 5.1.16 (BT 2009, 439): inepta vulgaria.
26 Cf. DI 5.1.18. In recalling the inflammatory speech of Sossianus
Hierocles, Lactantius quotes him as referring to the apostles as “‘dissemi-

nators of falsehood’” and “‘rude and unlearned.’” DI 5.2.17 (BT 2009,
445): ‘fallaciae seminatores’ […] ‘rudes et indoctos.’
27 Cf. DI 4.2.3, 8.8, 12.11, 15.30, 20.1, 3.
28 DI 4.8.2 (BT 2007, 332): divinae religionis sacramenta.
29 DI 1.1.22 (BT 2005, 5–6): ad ipsum doctrinae uberrimum ac
plenissimum fontem.
to give a rendering of Christian doctrine based on mutually ac-

ceptable sources.
The process of Christian education for the uninitiated is sys-
tematically described by Lactantius in his final apologetic work, De
ira Dei:
The first step is to understand the false religions and to cast off
the impious cults of things made by human hands. The next
step, then, is to perceive with the mind that there is one su-
preme God whose power and providence in the beginning
made the world and thereafter governs it. The third step is to
know his minister and messenger whom he dispatched to earth
and, by whose teaching, we are liberated from the error in
which we are held and involved, and instructed in the worship
of the true God; so that we might learn justice. 30
30 ID 2.2 (SC 289, 94): Primus autem gradus est intellegere falsas
religiones et abicere inpios cultus humana manu fabricatorum, secundus
vero perspicere animo quod unus sit dues summus, cujus potestas ac
providentia effecerit a principio mundum et gubernet in posterum, tertius
cognoscere ministrum ejus ac nuntium quem legavit in terram, quo docen-
te, liberati an errore quo inplicati tenebamur formatique ad veri dei cul-
tum, justitiam disceremus. As to the identity of the groups mentioned,
those who have been tossed from the first stage recognize that the pan-
theon of gods is fiction yet cannot bring themselves to worship the one
God. Instead, they remain content to marvel at the wonders of nature and
the universe. Lactantius mentions that he has refuted these individuals in
Book 2 of the Institutiones (ID 2.4). While he never names the specific sect
about which he is writing, we can deduce from the context that Lactantius
has the Epicureans primarily in mind. More broadly defined, however,
this group would include all materialists. See Tadeusz Maslowski, “The
Opponents of Lactantius [Inst. VII. 7, 7–13],” California Studies in Classical
Antiquity 7 (1975): 187–213. Abandoning the second stage are those who,
while acknowledging God’s unity and providence, nevertheless cannot
grasp other aspects of the divine nature, such as God’s justice. While we
can reasonably suggest that Lactantius is speaking in a veiled way about
the Stoics, other groups of philosophical monotheists would certainly also
qualify. Lastly, those thrown from the third stage have failed to accept
This journey of intellectual transformation is an arduous one due to

a luminescence of the truth. An individual is liable to be very easily
thrown from this path if not firmly grounded. Hence, Lactantius
takes great care to introduce new and foreign evidence to his audi-
ence only where other, more familiar, sources will not suffice. Such
is the case in Book 4 of the Institutiones, where the testimony of the
prophets is critical to Lactantius’ argument for Christ’s divine Son-
ship. For the most part the reader is reminded, at various points
throughout the Institutiones, to consult Scripture if s/he wishes to
know the whole truth on a given subject (e.g., DI 1.1.22; 6.24.31;
7.25.1; etc.). Lactantius’ lack of biblical evidence, therefore, is not
due to any ambiguity in the mind of the author in relation to its
authority. Rather, the apologist’s avoidance of scriptural quotations
is consistent with his pedagogical model of Christian learning.
B. The Poets
Lactantius certainly has an innate fondness for the great Latin po-
ets, especially Vergil, and his enthusiasm for them is unique among
early Christian apologists. What may appear surprising in Lactan-
tius’ overall treatment and use of the poets is his repeated defense
on their behalf. Those to blame for the proliferation of polytheism
and idol worship are not the poets, rather it is those who came af-
ter them. In true Roman fashion, Lactantius blames the Greeks for
the institution and proliferation of polytheistic cults based on the
works of the poets (DI 1.15.14). This occurred because the Greeks
read poetry in a manner which was contrary to its literary genre.
Lactantius sees the embellishment of the accomplishments of no-
ble men throughout history as a reasonable exercise of poetic li-
cense. Poets rarely completely fabricate the truth (DI 1.11.23, 30;
2.10.12), but what they recount is wrapped in figurative language
and metaphor. Poetry, therefore, needs to be read according to the
Christ’s role in salvation; either they reject him altogether or receive him
in a manner contrary to the faith (ID 2.6). Lactantius is most certainly
referring to Jews and heretics in this last entry.
literary form in which it was composed, i.e., figuratively and alle-

gorically. 31
The deference with which Lactantius treats older sources in-
clined him to employ this method of reading poetry first to Orphe-
us, “oldest of the poets, and equal to the gods themselves.” 32 In
examining the evidence among the poets for God’s oneness, Lac-
tantius asserts that Orpheus attests to it when he refers to God as
πρωτόγονον (first-born). Far from claiming that God was born, this
term was employed by the poet to signify that nothing came before
God and everything is descended from him. 33 Similarly, Orpheus
calls God Φάνητα (Appearer) because he existed when nothing else
did. Probing the works of poets using this method, Lactantius is
able to find further evidence for, inter alia, his Euhemerist theory of
polytheism, the deluge, and resurrection of the body.
Not all poetry, however, measures up to the standard of truth
even when read allegorically. Again, in relation to establishing the
unity of God, Homer is dismissed because he wrote about things
human rather than things divine. Hesiod probed the mystery of the
foundation of the universe in his Theogony, but began with chaos.
Never did he think to explain “where the chaos itself came from,
and when and how it began to exist.” 34 Vergil and Ovid, on the
other hand, do provide evidence for monotheism. The former “is
not far from the truth” 35 when he refers to God as mind (mentem)
and spirit (spiritum) (DI 1.5.11; quot. Aen 6.724–27). The latter was
also correct in calling God the “‘craftsman of the world’ and ‘mak-
er of things.’” 36 When these and other poets are in agreement with
31 This method of allegorical reading had already been in use among

the Stoics and Christians to interpret, respectively, the myths and Hebrew
Scripture.
32 DI 1.5.4 (BT 2005, 15): vetustissimus poetarum et aequalis ipso-
rum deorum.
33 DI 1.5.4; cf. E. Abel, Orphica (Leipzig: 1885), fr. 57.
34 DI 1.5.8 (BT 2005, 16): debuerit chaos ipsum unde quando quo-
modo esse aut constare coepisset.

35 DI 1.5.11 (BT 2005, 16): non longe afuit a veritate.
36 DI 1.5.13 (BT 2005, 17): quem ‘fabricatorem mundi’, quem ‘rerum
opificem’. Cf. Met. 1.57, 79.

Christian doctrine it is because they, like the philosophers, obeyed

reason and nature (DI 1.5.6, 14). While Lactantius does not rule out
the possibility of the poets reaching a portion of the truth by the
preservation and transmission of some divine oracle (DI 2.10.6), he
nevertheless stresses that the truths originating in the minds of the
poets are examples of human beings thinking and acting according
to their nature. 37
C. The Philosophers
Lactantius’ attitude towards philosophy is marked by ambivalence.
He does not seek to reconcile Christianity with philosophy in the
manner of Justin Martyr. But neither does he display the open hos-
tility towards philosophy that is indicative of Tertullian. Rather,
Lactantius takes a middle road; using the philosophers as witnesses
when they can help his arguments, but criticizing many of their
positions and undermining their teaching authority. The apologist’s
mission is to demonstrate that true wisdom lay within Christian
teaching and, to further this end, Lactantius must reveal the defi-
ciencies of the philosophers and unseat them as models of sapien-
tes. 38
Lactantius recognizes that this task is more difficult than the
one he similarly embarked upon in order to discredit polytheism
37 Lactantius is not advancing the Epicurean doctrine of prolepsis or

anticipatio. Cf. Cicero Nat. D. 1.44. Rather, he sees human beings as natu-
rally ordered to knowing God by the light of reason and through His ef-
fects. Cf. DI 2.1.14–19. His position is closer to that of the Stoics. Cf. Nat.
D. 2.4.
38 The philosophers Lactantius cites most frequently are all from the
Latin tradition. First and foremost among them is Cicero, whom Lactan-
tius calls perfect orator and supreme philosopher (DI 3.14.7). Cicero
serves Lactantius not only as a linguistic model and representative of the
Stoic and Eclectic schools, but also as an encyclopedic repository for the
history of philosophy. The other philosophers most often mentioned are
Seneca, the sharpest of Stoics (DI 1.5.26; cf. 1.7.13; 2.8.23; 6.24.14), and
Lucretius. The latter is considered a philosopher rather than a poet be-
cause he is the primary representative of the Epicurean school; with
whom Lactantius will battle vociferously.
and idolatry (DI 2.19.1). The philosophers are generally considered

more authoritative sources than the poets by virtue of their desire
for wisdom (DI 1.5.15) and their eloquence and erudition carry
much weight with the educated Greco-Roman reader (DI 2.19.4).
They are to be lauded for their aim of knowing the truth but, ac-
cording to Lactantius, their lofty goals are completely undermined
by their staggering lack of product (DI 3.1.7). The apologist ac-
counts for the philosophers’ failure to attain wisdom in two ways.
First, he asserts that the philosophers are mistaken because they
seek something which can only be possessed as gift.
Lactantius’ primary focus in Book 3 of the Institutiones, where
he offers his extended critique of the philosophers, is to demon-
strate that true wisdom is not present in philosophy. The philoso-
phers, he argues, by definition are seekers of wisdom rather than
the possessors of it (DI 3.2.3–4). From the multiplicity of their be-
liefs, it is apparent that no philosopher or philosophical school has
attained the wisdom which they all seek (DI 3.4.3–10). The dog-
matic schools erred in thinking that they possessed that which they
sought. The Skeptics were also in error by professing complete
ignorance; the assertion of which demonstrates that something can
be known (DI 3.5.5–8). In contrast to these two positions, Lactan-
tius argues that the human person occupies a middle position be-
tween ignorance and wisdom.
He does not fault the philosophers for wanting to discover
the truth; such is the natural desire of human kind (DI 3.1.7). But
to possess wisdom is rightly the province of God and God alone.
If human beings were able to attain wisdom by their own efforts,
then there would be no distinction between the human and the
divine (DI 1.1.5). Wisdom, therefore, must be given to humanity
from its divine source and author. Though some philosophers
came close to the truth, they were unable to grasp it because they
did not know the source of all wisdom (DI 1.5.28; 3.27.1). Because
of this, even when they spoke the truth, their teaching authority
was suspect because it lacked divine revelation (DI 3.27.1–3). In
other words, there is never the certitude of knowledge, only rightly
reasoned speculation. 39 Ultimately, therefore, the philosophers are

unsuitable guides in the quest to find divine wisdom because their
teachings rest on an unsure foundation.
The second piece of evidence which Lactantius offers in order
to undermine the authority of the philosophers is the division
which they present between wisdom and religion. Running
throughout the Institutiones like a leitmotif is Lactantius’ insistence
on the unity and indivisibility of wisdom and religion. The very
structure of the work bears Lactantius’ desire to establish Christian-
ity as the only religion with true wisdom, and the only philosophy
with true worship. In his estimation, all error can be traced back
either to false worship or false understanding (DI 3.1.9). He con-
cludes the introduction to Book 1 by offering his readers the fol-
lowing standard by which to evaluate the truths of philosophy and
religion: “neither should any religion be accepted without wisdom,
nor any wisdom approved without religion.” 40 Hence, worship of
the gods may provide a cultus, but it must be considered false be-
cause it fails to seek virtue and truth (DI 4.3.1–2; cf. 5.19.27–34).
Conversely, “because philosophy does not possess religion, that is,
ultimate piety, it is not true wisdom.” 41
39 The philosophers also may be correct in their opinions by sheer

coincidence (DI 3.3.12) or, as Lactantius says of Cicero, by “divining some
spiritual instinct.” DI 6.8.10 (BT 2009, 560): divinent spiritu aliquo in-
stincti. In DI 3.3 Lactantius outlines his epistemology. Scientia
(knowledge), he contends, always comes from without; in most cases
from physical objects through the five senses. Likewise, divine knowledge
or true wisdom is given to humanity by God. All other “knowledge” is
dubbed opinatio (opinion) because it lacks the authority of certitude. Phi-
losophy, therefore, “contains nothing certain, since nothing comes from
knowledge but is all derived from conjectures; with much of it varying and
diverse.” DI 3.27.3 (BT 2007, 297): nihil […] certi est, nihil quod a scientia
veniat, sed cum omnia conjecturis agantur, multa etiam diversa et varia
proferantur.
40 DI 1.1.25 (BT 2005, 6): neque religio ulla sine sapientia suscipien-
da sit nec ulla sine religione probanda sapientia.

41 DI 4.3.2 (BT 2007, 316): philosophia quia religionem id est sum-
mam pietatem non habet, non est vera sapientia. Cf. DI 3.28.1.
To their credit, the philosophers reached as far as the human

intellect is capable in recognizing the falsity of polytheism and idol-
atry, but they were incapable of establishing true religion (DI
2.3.23–25). Not knowing what constitutes true worship they in-
stead deemed all religions of equal value. This led either to absten-
tion from all forms of worship or persistence in the worship of the
gods; thereby falling into the same error which they condemned
(DI 2.3.12–13, 22). What they failed to recognize was man’s singu-
larly unique capacity to know and worship God. This is the ‘mys-
tery of the human person’ (sacramentum hominis), which separates
humanity from all other creatures and is the telos of the human per-
son (DI 3.10.6). The philosophers cannot be judged wise, therefore,
because they could not discover the truth of humankind’s natural
end. “In this one thing is all human wisdom: to know and worship
God. This is our doctrine, this is our maxim.” 42 By Lactantius’
standard, not recognizing the essential unity of wisdom and religion
eliminates the philosophers as potential guides towards the truth.
D. Oracular Literature
Replacing philosophy with Christian wisdom is but one aspect of
Lactantius’ apologetic goal. Similarly, the apologist seeks to substi-
tute polytheism and idolatry for Christian religion and worship. To
further this end, Lactantius believes that the gods themselves have
given evidence of the truth of Christianity. 43 On the one hand, their
evidence is similar to that of the poets and philosophers in that
they were all considered legitimate auctoritates when arguing via ex-
ternal proofs (Quint. 5.11; cf. 5.7). Cicero made use of such evi-
dence in various speeches. 44 In his Topica the great orator classifies
divina testimonia into two distinct types: oracles (orationes) and the
workings of the gods (opera divina) (Top. 77). The latter category is
broadly defined as the evidence gathered from the divine effects
42 DI 3.30.3 (BT 2007, 309): omnis sapientia hominis in hoc uno est,
ut deum cognoscat et colat; hoc nostrum dogma, haec sententia est.
43 On Lactantius’ use of oracular literature see Oliver Nicholson,
“Broadening the Roman Mind: Foreign Prophets in the Apologetic of

Lactantius,” Studia Patristica 36 (2001): 364–374.
44 E.g., Cat. 3.21; Lig. 19; cf. Har. resp.
contained in nature. This includes everything from the providential

order and beauty of the universe to the inspecting of animal en-
trails. The former refers to direct divine utterance recorded in
oracular literature. As part of his rhetorical inventio and amplificatio,
Lactantius selects and employs material taken from these oracular
sources in order to demonstrate the truths of the Christian faith.
Unlike the poets and philosophers, however, oracular litera-
ture is divine evidence. 45 Lactantius, for whom Christian revelation
possesses the greatest degree of certitude, presents divine proof to
his readers in the event that they may consider humana testimonia to
be fallible and uncertain. 46 He regards this evidence to be irrefuta-
ble by his opponents (DI 7.13.2). Not only does it suit Lactantius’
rhetorical devise of employing the same sources as were often used
against Christians (DI 1.5.2), but it is the testimony of the very dei-
ties of his opponents (DI 1.6.17). Given the unique nature of this
material from the perspective of a Christian, Lactantius on one oc-
casion refers to this evidence as simile divino (DI 1.6.1). He makes
use of this quasi-divine material by providing the reader with evi-
dence taken from the Hermetic corpus, the prophetic text of Hys-
taspes, the oracles of Apollo, and the Sibylline Oracles.
Lactantius knew the story behind the text of the Hermetica
from Cicero’s De natura deorum (3.56). He identifies the author with
the Egyptian god Thoyth, the last of five Mercuries (DI 1.6.3).
Though Hermes was a man – Lactantius debates whether including
him among the philosophers might not be more appropriate (DI
7.13.4) – his learning and erudition were so noteworthy that he was
worshipped as a deity and bestowed with the name Trismegistus
(thrice great). The works attributed to him were an eclectic collec-
tion of texts on philosophy, theology, astrology, alchemy and reli-
gious rituals collated between 100 and 300 C.E. What have survived
45 Cicero divides all testimonia into human and divine (Part. or. 6).
46 DI 1.6.6. Whether or not ancient docti found divina testimonia more
convincing than humana testimonia is uncertain. Cicero certainly employs
his fair share of divina testimonia in, for example, De natura deorum. Quintil-
ian however, writing from the perspective of forensic oratory, seems less
impressed: “It is rare, but not without utility.” Quint. 5.11 (LCL125, 454):
Id rarum est, non sine usu tamen.
from this diverse potpourri of late-antique thought, apart from

fragments and the Nag Hammadi excerpts, are eighteen discourses
and a Latin version of the Asclepius which exemplify the mystical
tradition of Neo-Platonism. 47 From these discourses Lactantius
primarily quotes the original Greek. 48 He knew some of the texts
which we now possess and also provides us with a few otherwise
non-extant fragments. 49 He also knew both a Greek version and
Latin translation of the Asclepius, under the title Λόγος Τέλειος (Per-
fect Discourse), which we do not possess. 50
47 For the text of the Hermentica see A. J. Festugière and A. D. Nock,

eds., Corpus Hermeticum, 4 vols. (Paris: 1945–54). An English translation of
the eighteen discourses, with the Asclepius, can be found in Brian P. Co-
penhaver, ed. Hermetica (Cambridge: 1992). An English translation of the
Nag Hammadi codices is located in James M. Robinson, ed. The Nag
Hammadi Library in English (San Francisco: 1990), 321–38. For an exhaus-
tive study consult A. J. Festugière La Révélation d’Hermes Trismégiste, 4 vols.
(Paris: 1949–54). On Lactantius and Hermes see Antonie Włosok, Laktaz
und die philosophische Gnosis (Heidelberg: 1960).
48 This, of course, raises the question of Lactantius’ knowledge of
Greek. As we have already seen, his philosophical learning came almost

entirely through Latin translations. See Pichon, Lactance, 222–27; Ogilvie,
Library, 78–83. For example, his account of Socrates’ last moments is tak-
en from Tusc. 1.99 rather than Ap. 42a (DI 7.2.10). He also displays a gen-
eral lack of knowledge in relation to the Christian theology of the Greek
East. His Logos Christology, for example, is derived from the Stoics, the
Hermetica, and Tertullian (DI 4.9.1–4; cf. Prax. 5.2–3; Apol. 21.10). The
divina testimonia, however, he almost always quotes in the original Greek
and he does so with acumen. Given, therefore, the elevated status of Lac-
tantius’ rhetorical career and his appointment to teach at Nicomedia, it
seems reasonable to affirm that Lactantius possessed enough formal train-
ing in Greek to allow him to converse on a quotidian level. It always re-
mained, however, very much a foreign tongue and not one in which Lac-
tantius felt comfortable conducting intense scholarly research.
49 See Corp. Herm., vol. IV, frs. 3a, 5a, 6, 7, 8a, 11a, 12a & b, 13, 14.
50 The extant Latin text of the Asclepius can be dated between the
years 353 and 420. It was first attested to by St. Augustine in civ. Dei 8.23–
24, 26.
The evidence which Hermes provides Lactantius relates prin-

cipally to God’s oneness and the divine nature of the Son. As to
the former, the Hermetica lends to Lactantius an element of negative
theology. He quotes Hermes as referring to God as unknowable
(DI 2.8.68), nameless (DI 1.6.4; 4.7.3), and parentless (DI 1.7.2;
4.8.5, 13.12). “‘God is one, and what is one needs no name. He that
is is nameless.’” 51 Hermes also vividly apprehended the generation
of the Word, stating that God “‘loved and cherished him as his
only son.’” 52 His profound knowledge of the Father and the Son
led Lactantius to believe that Hermes obtained his insight by the
summoning of demons (DI 4.27.19) – yet another reason why he is
to be counted among the oracles rather than the philosophers. 53 It
is Lactantius’ championing of the Hermetica for the purpose of
Christian apology that makes him unique and quite extraordinary in
relation to his peers. The value of the Hermetica was acknowledged
by Athenagoras, Tertullian, Clement and Origen, but none of them
integrate the Hermetic corpus into Christian doctrine with as much
dedication or élan as Lactantius.
Lactantius informs his audience that the seer Hystaspes was a
Medean king from ages past who was given a prophetic vision of
the end times. 54 The text of the oracle is non-extant but it can be
51 DI 1.6.4 (BT 2005, 22): ὁ δὲ ϑεὸς εἷς, ὁ δὲ εἷς ὀνόματος οὐ

προσδέεται. ἔστιν γὰρ ὁ ὢν ἀνώνυμος. Ascl. 20.
52 DI 4.6.4 (BT 2007, 327): ἠγάσϑη τε καὶ πάνυ ἐφίλησεν ὡς ἴδιον
τόκον. Ascl. 8.
53 It is also worth mentioning that two principles which are central
to Lactantius’ thought are also mentioned in conjunction with the Hermeti-

ca. First, that Christians refer to God as dominum et patrem is first men-
tioned in the Institutiones in relation to Hermes also doing so (DI 1.6.4; cf.
Corp. Herm. Ascl. 20). Second, Trismegistus is also invoked to support
Lactantius’ anthropology of θεοπτίαν or ‘godsight’ (DI 7.9.11; cf. Corp.
Herm., vol. IV, fr. 14).
54 DI 7.15.19. For the extant fragments of Hystaspes see J. Bidez and
F. Cumont, Les Mages Hellénisés, 2 vols. (Paris: 1938). For a detailed treat-
ment see J. R. Hinnells, “The Zoroastrian Doctrine of Salvation in the
Roman World,” in Man and His Salvation, ed. E. J. Sharpe and J. R. Hin-
nells (Manchester: 1973), 125–148.
affirmed to have originated from a Zoroastrian milieu; probably

from the first century B.C.E. or earlier. 55 Lactantius is our principal
source of information concerning Hystaspes and the text does
much to support Lactantius’ eschatological vision. The apologist
specifically mentions the prophet foreseeing the coming destruc-
tion of Rome and God’s ultimate judgment of humankind (DI
7.15.19, 18.2). He emphasizes the latter point by quoting directly
from the oracle: “‘the pious and the faithful will separate them-
selves from harm and, with weeping and wailing, stretch out their
hands to heaven and beg for Jove’s faithfulness; Jove will examine
the earth, hear the voices of men and extinguish the impious.’” 56
Aside from these explicit references, the influence of Hystaspes can
be detected throughout Lactantius’ treatment of the eschaton, for
example, in his narrative of the coming troubles before God’s
judgment, his reckoning of the duration of the world, and the idea
of fire being the medium for judgment and suffering. 57 As with the
Hermetic literature, no Patristic author fuses the oracle of Hys-
taspes with Christian doctrine to the same degree as Lactantius. 58
Were it not for him, reconstruction of this lost text would be im-
possible.
Apart from the above, rather eclectic, literature Lactantius also
employed the universally regarded oracle of Apollo to defend
Christianity. “Apollo indeed,” he writes “is certainly deemed most
divine and prophetic.” 59 Like Hermes, Lactantius offers evidence
55 See Hinnells, “Zoroastrian Doctrine,” 146.

56 DI 7.18.2 (BT 2011, 706): ‘pios ac fideles a nocentibus segregatos
[…] cum fletu et gemitu extenturos esse ad caelum manus et inploraturos
fidem Jovis; Jovem respecturum ad terram et auditurum voces hominum
atque impios extincturum.’ From this quotation we know that a Latinized
version and translation of Hystaspes was in circulation in Lactantius’ day.
57 See Hinnells, “Zoroastrian Doctrine,” 129–33.
58 The existence of the oracle is merely mentioned in passing by Jus-
tin (1 Apol. 20.1, 44.12) and Clement (Strom. 6.5.43).

59 DI 1.7.1 (BT 2005, 28): Apollo enim, quem praeter ceteros divi-
num maximeque fatidicum existimant. On the oracle of Apollo see espe-

cially Joseph Fontenrose, Didyma: Apollo's Oracle, Cult, and Companions (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988).
from the oracle of Apollo principally to confirm his arguments for

God’s unity and Christ’s divinity. He quotes the oracle at Colophon
as teaching that God “‘is self-born, untaught, without a mother,
undisturbed, not named by any word, [and] dwelling in fire.’” 60 Like
all the gods of the pantheon, Lactantius believes that Apollo was a
mortal (DI 1.10.3ff.). The oracular pronouncements which occur
under his name at various places, however, are the work of demons
(DI 1.7.9–10). It is they who prophesied as to the coming of the
savior, the miracles he would perform, and the suffering he was to
endure (DI 4.13.11–17, 15.6). The theology of Apollo which Lac-
tantius cites is often crude, but it demonstrates the apologist’s abil-
ity to carefully select profane material in order to support Christian
beliefs.
Lastly, the most prominent and often cited divina testimonia uti-
lized by Lactantius are the Sibylline Oracles. 61 The apologist him-
self played a pivotal role in transmitting to later generations the list
of ten Sibyls organized by Varro: the Persian, Libyan, Delphic,
Cimmeran, Erythrean, Samian, Cumean, Hellespontian, Phrygian
and Tiburtine (DI 1.6.11). The most famous collection of these
texts resided in Rome and Lactantius states that they were still
treasured and read publically – except for the secretly held Cumean
Oracle – in his own day (DI 1.6.13). In 83 B.C.E. this anthology was
destroyed when a fire consumed much of the Capitol. Attempts
were made to reconstruct the texts – Lactantius mentions that they
had become confused (DI 1.6.13) – and much Jewish and Christian
material was inserted into the collection. The apologist was well
aware of the critique that the Oracles had been corrupted by inter-
polators (DI 4.15.26–30; cf. Origen C. Cels. 7.52). His response is to
rely upon the authority of Cicero and Varro as to their authentici-
60 DI 1.7.2 (BT 2005, 28): αὐτοφυὴς ἀδίδακτος ἀμήτωρ
61 The definitive collection of Sibylline material is located in J. Geff-

ἀστυφέλικτος, οὔνομα μηδὲ λόγῳ χωρούμενος, ἐν πυρὶ ναίων.
cken, ed., Die Oracula Sibyllina (Leipzig: 1902). For an English translation
consult J. J. Collins, ed., Sibylline Oracles, Vol. 1 of The Old Testament Pseude-
pigrapha, ed. James H. Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 317–
472.
ty. 62 He therefore dismisses the allegation of Judeo-Christian tam-

pering without much ado. 63
Lactantius’ reliance upon the Sibyls to support his theological
claims is nearly ubiquitous. 64 The Sibyls unequivocally attest to
God’s oneness and providence, calling Him “one and highest of
all” and “the only god.” 65 Lactantius mentions that, on one particu-
lar occasion, a contingent was sent from Rome to Erythrae in order
to restore some of the destroyed Oracles. Among the verses re-
trieved was the following: “One god ruling alone, supremely great,
unbegotten.” 66 Likewise the Sibyls support Lactantius’ Euhemerist
account of the gods by providing their mortal genealogy (DI 1.14.8)
and attacking the cult of the pantheon (DI 1.15.15; 5.13.21). But
the most profound areas of Sybilline usage are in the fields of
Christology and Eschatology.
Of central import to Lactantius’ Christology is the belief that
Jesus of Nazareth was not deemed the Christ because he worked
miracles, but because he fulfilled the prophesies which foretold of a
coming Savior (cf. DI 5.3). The Sibyls, in conjunction with the He-
brew prophets, provide Lactantius with the evidence to support
this claim of Jesus’ prophetic fulfillment. They received revelations
of the Savior’s divine Sonship (DI 4.6.3, 5, 9), his Jewish origins
62 DI 4.15.27 (BT 2007, 370): Ciceronem Varronemque […] quarum

ex libris ista exempla proferimus. Qui auctores ante objerunt quam
Christus secundum carnem nasceretur.
63 Excepting Irenaeus and Origen, all of the early Patristic authors
shared Lactantius’ opinion.

64 Lactantius draws most heavily upon the third, considered the Ery-
threan, and eighth Oracles. He knew only Oracles 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and possibly

7. His versions of the Oracles are not those which have survived, but were
probably collected in the third century C.E. See Ogilvie, Library, 28; Ma-
rie-Louise Guillaumin, “L’exploitation des Oracles Sibyllins par Lactance et
par le Discours à l’Assemblée des Saints,” in Lactance et son temps, ed. J. Fon-
taine and M. Perrin (Paris: 1978), 185–202.
65 DI 1.6.15 (BT 2005, 27): μόνος εἷς πανυπέρτατος. DI 1.6.16 (BT
2005, 28): μοῦνος γὰρ ϑεός. See also DI 2.10.4, 11.18, 7.13.
66 DI 1.6.15 (BT 2005, 27): εἷς ϑεός, ὃς μόνος ἄρχει ὑπερμεγέϑης
ἀγένητος. Cf. Orac. Sib. 3.11–12.

(DI 4.13.21), miracles (DI 4.15.9–30), suffering (DI 4.16.17), cruci-

fixion (DI 4.18.15–20), and resurrection (DI 4.19.10). They also
acknowledge Christ’s second coming and his role as judge at the
end of days (DI 4.15.15; 7.18.5–8, 19.2, 24.1). Lactantius presents
the Oracles as proof texts, inundating the reader with testimony
from the Sibyls to corroborate the Hebrew Scriptures. This inter-
weaving of the Hebrew prophets with the Sibyls is aptly demon-
strated by the following pericope concerning Christ’s passion.
And this is what has happened as announced by the voices of
the prophets and the songs of the Sibyls. In Isaiah [50:5–6] it is
written: ‘I am not obstinate nor do I answer back. I have given
my back to the whip, my cheeks to the palms, and I do not
avert my face from the filth of spittle.’ Similarly David writes
in Psalm 34 [35:15–16]: ‘They gathered with whips around me
and knew me not. They were wicked and remorseless. They
tempted me and mocked me with laughter, and gnashed their
teeth over me.’ The Sibyl [Orac. Sib. 8.287–90] also demon-
strated this would happen: ‘Later he will come into the hands
of lawless and faithless men, and they will give blows to God
with unholy hands and poisonous spittings with polluted
mouths. Then he will stretch out his back and give it to the
whips.’ Further, about his silence which he firmly held unto
death, Isaiah [53:7] also says: ‘Like a sheep he was brought to
sacrifice and like a lamb to the shearers without a noise. Thus
he did not open his mouth.’ And the Sibyl [Orac. Sib. 8.292–94]
says: ‘Beaten, he was silent, lest anyone recognize what his
word is or whence he came, so that he may speak to the dead
and wear the crown of thorns.’ 67
67 DI 4.18.13 (BT 2007, 386–87): Haec autem sic futura fuisse et

prophetarum vocibus et Sibyllinis carminibus denuntiatum est. Apud
Esaiam ita scriptum invenitur: ‘Non sum contumax neque contradico.
Dorsum meum posui ad flagella et maxillas meas ad palmas, faciem autem
meam non averti a foeditate sputorum.’ (14) Similiter David in psalmo
XXXIIII: ‘Congregata sunt in me flagella et ignoraverunt, dissoluti sunt
nec compuncti sunt. Temptaverunt me et deriserunt me derisum, et stri-
derunt super me dentibus suis.’ (15) Sibylla quoque eadem futura mons-
Even where Lactantius fails to offer biblical evidence, however,

Scripture remains the pattern and standard of revelation. Such is
the case with the eschatological portrait he draws in the second half
of Book 7. Lactantius’ account is derived primarily from the books
of Revelation and Daniel but the Bible is never directly quoted.
Instead the vast majority of evidence is provided by the Sibyls.
They attest to the events which will precede the renewal of all
things, such as the fall of Rome (DI 7.15.18), God’s judgment over
the living and the dead (DI 7.20.2–5, 23.4) and Christ’s thousand
year reign of peace on earth (DI 7.24.12–15). But most importantly,
the Sibyls provide Lactantius with many details concerning the tu-
multuous state of affairs after Rome’s fall from power. According
to the Oracles, the earth will be ravaged in the not so distant future
by universal war, earthquakes, floods, disease and famine prior to
Christ’s second coming (DI 7.15–16). Although his apocalyptic
vision incorporates elements from outside the biblical canon, the
apologist believes that both the prophets of this world (saecularium
prophetarum) and heaven (caelestibus) were in agreement (DI 7.14.16;
cf. 7.15.14).
Unlike Apollo and Hermes, Lactantius refrains from account-
ing for the Sibyls’ divine knowledge through the presence of the
demonic. He states that “visions were placed before their eyes by
the divine spirit, and they saw things in their sight as if happening
and accomplished.” 68 The meaning of these visions went unrecog-
travit: Εἰς ἀνόμους χεῖρας καὶ ἀπίστων ὕστερον ἥξει, δώσουσιν δὲ ϑεῷ
φαρμακοέντα, δώσει δ’ εἰς μάστιγας ἁπλῶς ἁγνὸν τότε νῶτον. (16) Item
ῥαπίσματα χερσὶν ἀνάγνοις καὶ στόμασιν μιαροῖς ἐμπτύσματα
de silentio ejus, quod usque ad mortem pertinaciter tenuit, Esaias iterum

sic locutus est: ‘Sicut ovis ad immolandum adductus est et sicut agnus
coram tondentibus sine voce, sic non aperuit os suum.’ (17) Et Sibylla
supra dicta: Καὶ κολαφιζόμενος σιγήσει, μή τις ἐπιγνῷ, τίς λόγος ἤ πόϑεν
68 DI 7.24.9 (BT 2011, 723): Visiones enim divino spiritu offereban-

ἦλϑεν, ἵνα φϑιμένοισι λαλήσει· καὶ στέφανον φορέσει τὸν ἀκάνϑινον.
tur oculis eorum et videbant illa in conspectu suo quasi fieri ac terminari.
By contrast see Constantine’s Oration to the Saints, 18. In the case of Hys-
taspes, Lactantius gives no further information than to say that the apoca-
lyptic vision came to the ancient king in a dream (DI 7.15.19).
nized because only one taught by God can properly discern them.
The poets, for example, embellished these visions for their own
purposes without ever realizing their true significance. 69 The Ery-
threan Sibyl herself foresaw that she would be judged mad on ac-
count of her prophesies (DI 4.15.29; cf. Orac. Sib. 3.815–18). Per-
haps Lactantius thought the antiquity of the Sibyls gave them ac-
cess to knowledge which was once known to humankind in an age
of universal monotheism (cf. DI 5.5.3–14). He certainly views the
Sibyls as more reliable sources than his other divina testimonia, but
without the absolute certitude of biblical revelation. 70
The apologist was not alone in recognizing the value of the
Sibyls for the propagation of Christianity. Athenagoras, Tertullian,
Clement and Theophilus all made use of the Sibyls in their apolo-
getic works. But it was Lactantius who first systematically probed
the Oracles for material which paralleled Christian belief. Almost a
century after his death, Augustine would credit Lactantius with or-
ganizing and presenting the writings of the Sibyls in a manner
which suited Christian apologetics. 71 Later generations of Western
Christian theologians would be indebted to him for bringing the
Sibyls to the fore as praeparationes evangelii.
IV. CHRISTIAN TRUTH

Given the proliferation of non-Christian material in his apologetic
theology, one may reasonably inquire into the nature and content
of Lactantius’ evangelical message. In Book 7 of the Institutiones the
apologist provides us with a convenient summary of his gospel
proclamation while discussing teleology. The following passage
captures, in brief, what Lactantius considered to be the marrow of
Christian theology; one might call it his kerygma.
69 DI 7.24.10. Lactantius explicitly credits the Sibyls for Vergil’s in-

spiration in composing Ecl. 4 (DI 7.24.12). By exercising their license, the
poets also corrupted the Sibylline tradition concerning the nature of the
netherworld (DI 7.22.6; cf. Aen 6).
70 DI 1.6.6. See Nicholson, “Foreign Prophets,” 371 with n. 42.
71 civ. Dei 18.23. See also Oration to the Saints, 18, which bears much
Lactantian influence. Lactantius does not mention, however, the famous

acrostic from Orac. Sib. 8.217–50.
Now let us seal the whole argument briefly in outline. The rea-
son why the world was made was so that we might be born.
We were born so that we might acknowledge the world’s mak-
er and our God. We acknowledge and worship Him so that we
might receive immortality as a reward for our labors – the wor-
ship of God contains the greatest labors. We are granted im-
mortality as a reward so that we might serve the supreme Fa-
ther and Lord forever, becoming like the angels, and be God’s
eternal kingdom. This is the sum of it all: the secret of God,
the mystery of the world. Those who follow present pleasures
are quite alienated from this. They surrender themselves to
earthly and fragile things and they submerge their souls, which
were born for the sweetness of things celestial, into lethal
things as if mud and filth. 72
In this résumé the attentive reader cannot help but notice the strik-
ing lack of any belief particular and unique to Christianity. This is
hardly St. Paul’s gospel proclamation that “Christ died for our sins
in accordance with the scriptures” (1 Cor 15:3). Rather, this good
news is something with which the philosophers made contact (DI
7.7.14). Lactantius intimates that if any philosopher had understood
the entirety of the above summary then s/he would have grasped
the entire truth (DI 7.7.1; cf. 7.5.2). Elsewhere he states that “wis-
dom is perfect in the person if he knows that God is one, and that
all things were made by Him.” 73 The kerygma Lactantius proclaims
72 DI 7.6.1 (BT 2011, 668): Nunc totam rationem brevi circumscrip-

tione signemus. Idcirco mundus factus est, ut nascamur; ideo nascimur, ut
agnoscamus factorem mundi ac nostri deum; ideo agnoscimus, ut cola-
mus; ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus,
quoniam maximis laboris cultus dei constat; ideo praemio immortalitatis
adficimur, ut similes angelis effecti summo patri ac domino in perpetuum
serviamus et simus aeternum deo regnum. (2) Haec summa rerum est, hoc
arcanum dei, hoc mysterium mundi, a quo sunt alieni qui sequentes prae-
sentem voluptatem terrestribus et fragilibus se bonis addixerunt et animas
ad caelestia genitas suavitatibus mortiferis tamquam luto caenove demer-
serunt. Cf. Epi. 64.1.
73 DI 2.8.71 (BT 2005, 163): Perfecta est in homine sapientia, si et
deum esse unum et ab ipso facta esse universa cognoscat. See Arthur L.
is the fulfillment of the teleological design for which humanity was

created. Human beings were made to possess perfecta sapientia, and
the divine effects contained in nature were intended to lead us to
knowledge and worship of God. 74 Thus, Lactantius can castigate
idol worshippers and polytheists for committing wicked deeds that
they should know are contrary to human nature (DI 2.1.6).
Christian truth, however, is not merely a recapitulation of the
best of classical philosophy. While many thinkers were able to
grasp certain individual elements of Lactantius’ kerygma none were
able to conceive of the organic whole which makes up the totam
veritatem (DI 7.7.14). Christian revelation was indeed needed in or-
der to reveal the whole truth of the divine plan for salvation. 75 The
vocabulary Lactantius employs to describe God’s divine economy
(sacramentum, arcanum, mysterium) makes apparent the apologist’s be-
lief in the necessity of revelation. 76 “The truth, that is, the secret of
the supreme God who made all things, cannot be grasped by the
Fisher, “Lactantius’ Ideas Relating Christian Truth and Christian Society,”

Journal of the History of Ideas 43/3 (1982): 359.
74 More will be said of this when discussing Lactantius’ anthropolo-
gy. But, for now, it should be emphasized that Lactantius sees Christianity
as the consummation of our natural desires and aptitudes. Consequently,
and in light of his Gentile audience, the doctrinal elements of Christianity
which he stresses center on the anthropological and teleological.
75 One cannot help but hear echoes of Aquinas here. STh I, q. 1, a. 1
(Textum Leoninum): Quia veritas de Deo, per rationem investigata, a

paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum,
homini proveniret, a cujus tamen veritatis cognitione dependet tota
hominis salus, quae in Deo est. Ut igitur salus hominibus et convenientius
et certius proveniat, necessarium fuit quod de divinis per divinam
revelationem instruantur. Necessarium igitur fuit, praeter philosophicas
disciplinas, quae per rationem investigantur, sacram doctrinam per
revelationem haberi.
76 For a detailed study of Lactantius’ use of the word sacramentum see
Vincenzo Loi, “Per la storia del vocabolo ‘sacramentum’: ‘sacramentum’

in Lattanzio,” Vigiliae Christianae 18/2 (1964): 85–107.
mind and the senses which belong to it.” 77 “Truly unless someone
is taught it [i.e., the divine mystery and heavenly secret], no promise
can be known.” 78 Lactantius emphasizes the furtive nature of
Christian truth by often using these same terms to refer directly to
Sacred Scripture or its contents, 79 and to the revelation preserved
by the Jewish people. 80 Though human beings possess a natural
capacity to know God, divine truth always remains hidden unless
revealed by God.
In addition to being a divine mystery, Christian truth accord-
ing to Lactantius is a unified, integrated and indivisible whole. One
must possess it entirely in order to possess it at all. The revelation
of God’s truth is that He made and wills us to know and serve
Him. As the phrasing of the previously quoted excerpt illustrates,
Lactantius’ proclamation stresses God’s purpose, design and activi-
ty in creating the universe and, most especially, human beings. 81
Omission or neglect of any portion of this argument would be a
misapprehension of the entire system, an undermining of the entire
ratio of God’s divine plan. The philosophers, for example, “could
perceive neither the causes, nor the reasons, nor the results of this
divine work and counsel, so as to consummate the entire secret of
the truth and bring it likewise to some final conclusion.” 82 In this
77 DI 1.1.5 (BT 2005, 2): veritatis id est arcanum summi dei, qui fecit
omnia, ingenio ac propriis sensibus non potest comprehendi.
78 DI 2.3.21 (BT 2005, 122): divini sacramenti et caelestis arcani. id
vero nisi doceatur, aliquis scire nullo pacto potest.

79 E.g., arcanis religionis sanctae litteris (DI 2.9.1); prophetarum arcana
(4.20.1); divinis […] arcanis (4.27.19); arcanis sacrae scripturae (7.14.7); arcanis
sanctarum litterarum (7.15.1).
80 E.g., verae religionis sacramenta (DI 4.8.2); sanctum mysterium (4.12.11);
arcanum dei (4.14.17); arcanae illorum litterae (4.15.12); sacramentum dei (5.3.17).
81 See note 72 above. Notice the adverbs idciro and ideo, and the cor-
responding use of ut clauses. See also Maslowski, “The Opponents of

Lactantius,” 190.
82 Epi. 62.8 (BT 1994, 102): huius tamen divini operis atque consilii
nec causas nec rationes nec exitus perspexerunt, ut omne veritatis arca-
num consummarent atque aliquo veluti fine concluderent. Cf. DI 3.28.18–
19.
sense, while acknowledging fragments of the truth scattered among

them, Lactantius can affirm that the philosophers were ignorant of
the ‘wisdom of heaven’ (caelesti sapientia) (DI 3.15.4; cf. 3.1.14) and
far removed from the truth (DI 3.30.1; cf. Epi. 25.2).
Because the totam veritatem remains inaccessible to humanity, it
is necessary that those who have received Christian revelation teach
the uninitiated. “We, however, who have received the mystery of
true religion possess the truth by divine revelation, and we follow
God as the teacher of wisdom and guide to virtue. We invite all
people, without any discrimination according to age or sex, to par-
take of heavenly nourishment; for there is no sweeter food for the
soul than knowledge of the truth.” 83 As we mentioned in our exam-
ination of Lactantius’ relationship to philosophy, wisdom and truth
are attributes of God alone. Only those who have been educated by
God, who have received the truth from Him by divine revelation,
are capable of teaching wisdom and thus discerning the philosoph-
ical truth discovered by unaided human reason. “But if there exist-
ed someone who could have collected the scattered truth spread
among the sects into one and restored it into a single body, he
would certainly not disagree with us. But no one can do this unless
he is an expert in truth and knowledge, and one cannot know the
truth unless he has been taught by God.” 84 The Christian teacher,
then, must be a skillful and deft editor; discarding what is contrary
or superfluous to the gospel while skillfully and adroitly making use
of the sources available. No credit or pride can be taken in per-
forming this task however, as the teacher must always be mindful
83 DI 1.1.19 (BT 2005, 5): Nobis autem qui sacramentum verae reli-
gionis accepimus cum sit veritas revelata divinitus, cum doctorem sapien-
tiae ducemque virtutis deum sequamur, universes sine ullo discrimine vel
sexus vel aetatis ad caeleste pabulum convocamus. (20) Nullus enim suav-
ior animo cibus est quam cognition veritatis. Cf. DI 7.2.9.
84 DI 7.7.4 (BT 2011, 671): Quodsi extitisset aliquis, qui veritatem
sparsam per singulos per sectasque diffusam colligeret in unum ac redi-

geret in corpus, is profecto non dissentiret a nobis. Sed hoc nemo facere
nisi veri peritus ac sciens potest, verum autem scire non nisi ejus est qui sit
doctus a deo. Cf. DI 2.3.21. Similarly, Tertullian famously writes (Apol.
18.4): Fiunt, non nascuntur Christiani.
that s/he is not the author of this work. The pedagogue is merely
passing on what has already been handed over by the source of all
truth (ID 1.3; cf. DI 3.1.12).
CHAPTER 3. LACTANTIUS AND DIVINE
PROVIDENCE
In the previous section we concluded with an examination of the

kerygma of Lactantius. The good news, according to Lactantius, is
that God has made us for Himself. He created us to know and wor-
ship Him both in this life and for all eternity. God is the one Creator
of all that exists and He sustains and directs all things to fulfill their
proper ends. Those who have been created with an intellectual soul
God calls into communion with Himself, and all other created be-
ings fulfill their teleological ends by directing and aiding human be-
ings in knowing, loving and worshipping God. The essence of Lac-
tantius’ kerygma, then, is the very definition of the doctrine of provi-
dence; for “providence is God Himself considered in that act by
which in His Wisdom He so orders all events within the universe
that the end for which it was created may be realized.” 1 The gospel,
which Lactantius proclaims, is that of a supremely providential God
who wills the salvation of His creatures.
Several authors have already noted the centrality of the doctrine
of providence in Lactantius’ thought. 2 According to the apologist’s
own words, one can hardly discuss any doctrine at all without touch-
ing upon the topic of providence (DI 1.2.6). A distinction ought to
be made, however, between the uses of the doctrine of providence in
Lactantius. The African rhetorician is primarily an apologist rather
than a systematic theologian. Though he attempts to present the doc-
trinae totius substantiam (DI 5.4.3) of the Christian faith, he does so in a
manner much more suited to disputatio than to expositio. His use of
1 Leslie J. Walker, “Providence,” CE 12:510.

2 See Micka, The Problem of Divine Anger, 91; Loi, Lattanzio, 66–69;
Pease, “Caeli enarrant,” 193.
61
diverse non-Christian sources, his attentiveness to the eloquence of

language, and his desire to defend the Christian faith against her at-
tackers indicate that Lactantius’ mission is as an apologist first, a the-
ologian second. As such Lactantius both defends the doctrine of
providence against its detractors and uses the doctrine, once estab-
lished, to demonstrate other truths of the Christian faith. In this
sense one cannot simply isolate and exposit Lactantius’ arguments
for the existence of divine providence, but must examine the apolo-
gist’s theological vision as a whole and demonstrate how this doc-
trine functions within his system of thought.
Direct arguments for the existence of divine providence are
located throughout Lactantius’ works. It is the goal of the remain-
der of this chapter to present these passages in a systematic and
coherent manner in order to draw some conclusions about the
apologist’s use of the doctrine of providence. In this manner of
presentation one can already detect Lactantius’ reliance upon the
Stoic school for his material, especially the philosophical works of
Cicero. Lactantius quotes the great Latin rhetorician, whom he calls
“perfect orator and supreme philosopher,” 3 to support the doctrine
of providence more than any other tenet of Christian belief. 4 There
can be little doubt that Lactantius’ reliance upon the Stoic school is,
in part, due to its representation in the philosophical works of Cic-
ero. In Book 1 of the Institutiones, Lactantius writes that the doc-
trine of providence has been ably defended by the Stoics against
the Epicureans (DI 1.2.2–3, 6; cf. 2.10.15–16), and specifically men-
tions Cicero’s De natura deorum as worthy of consultation on the
matter (DI 1.2.3). It is through a Stoic lens, therefore, that we shall
examine Lactantius’ arguments for the existence of providence.
I. DEVELOPING THE ARGUMENTS

In late-antiquity, the topic of providence was a debated thesis
amongst the rhetorical schools. As an academic exercise, one por-
tion of a class would advocate for the Stoic position of pro while
3 DI 3.14.7 (BT 2007, 246): perfectus orator, […] summus

philosophus.
4 Cf. Bryce, Library, 212.
3. LACTANTIUS AND DIVINE PROVIDENCE 63
the other would support the Epicurean side of contra. 5 As a trained

rhetorician, Lactantius would have therefore been familiar with the
content and structure of the debate over providence. In Cicero’s
enumeration of the Stoic division of theological topica the issue of
divine providence comes third. This is articulated by the character
Balbus in De natura deorum 2.3: “First they teach that the gods exist,
next in what manner they exist, then that the world is governed by
them, and lastly that they care for human affairs.” 6 While Cicero
systematically organizes his theological exposition according to this
model, questions of the existence and providence of the gods are
often interrelated, and the same evidence could be employed to
demonstrate either thesis. 7 For example, according to Cicero, the
first step in establishing the existence of providence is to demon-
strate the existence of the gods – a subject he has already addressed
in the first of the topica. 8 Also, the well-ordered structure of the
universe is used to demonstrate both the existence of the gods and
that of providence (cf. Nat. D. 2.4; 2.98ff.), as is divination (cf. Nat.
D. 2.12; 2.162–63).
Accordingly, in his arguments for the existence of divine
providence Lactantius makes use of the same types of arguments,
or tropoi, employed by the Stoics to establish the existence of the
gods. The clearest articulation of these tropoi is to be found in two
sources: Cicero’s De natura deorum (2.4–12) and Sextus Empiricus’
Adversus mathematicos (9.60–61). While Lactantius knew only of the
former, and that in great detail, Sextus’ list is more representative
of the “orthodox” Stoic approach to the subject. 9 In the reckoning
5 Cf. Ibid.
6 Nat. D. 2.3 (Pease, 543–44): Primum docent esse deos, deinde
quales sint, tum mundum ab his administrari, postremo consulere eos
rebus humanis. Cf. Nat. D. 3.6.
7 Balbus says as much in Nat. D. 2.75.
8 Cf. Nat. D. 2.75. Just as the existence of the gods came under four
topics, so too divine providence falls into three sections: (1) that the gods
exist; (2) that all things are governed by nature; and (3) the wonder we
experience in examining creation.
9 See Keimpe Algra, “Stoic Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to
the Stoics, ed. B. Inwood (Cambridge: 2003), 161.

which Sextus provides, the tropoi for demonstrating the existence of

the gods are: (1) by general consensus (e consensu omnium); (2) by the
orderly motion of the heavens (ex operibus dei); (3) by the absurd
consequences of denying divine existence (ex gradibus entium); and
(4) by undermining the arguments to the contrary. 10 It is under
these categories that we will evaluate Lactantius’ arguments for the
existence of providence. Although many of his arguments may not
fit squarely into one particular category, this method will allow us
to view Lactantius’ defense of providence from within a tradition
that was very much part of the apologist’s intellectual horizon.
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR DIVINE PROVIDENCE
A. The Argument from Consensus (E consensu omnium )

The most effective tool which Lactantius employs to demonstrate
the existence of providence e consensu omnium is doxography, i.e., a
short philosophical history of a particular idea. His use of this
method has a double origin in popular rhetoric and in his mentor
10 Math. 9.60–61 (TLG): Οἱ τοίνυν ϑεοὺς ἀξιοῦντες εἶναι πειρῶνται

τὸ προκείμενον κατασκευάζειν ἐκ τεσσάρων τρόπων, ἑνὸς μὲν τῆς παρὰ
πᾶσιν ἀνϑρώποις συμφωνίας, δευτέρου δὲ τῆς κοσμικῆς διατάξεως, τρίτου
τελευταίου τῆς τῶν ἀντιπιπτόντων λόγων ὑπεξαρέσεως. The four types of

δὲ τῶν ἀκολουϑούντων ἀτόπων τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι τὸ ϑεῖον, τετάρτου δὲ καὶ
arguments for the existence of the gods given by Cicero (Nat. D. 2.4–12)
are: (1) the orderly motion of the heavens; (2) general consensus; (3) the
epiphanies of the gods; and (4) divination. Arguments (3) and (4) are ob-
viously tailored to suit Cicero’s Roman audience and, for a Christian apol-
ogist such as Lactantius, making use of the latter would be completely out
of the question. He does, however, cite the evidence of pagan divine ut-
terances, for example, in his treatment of the unity of God (cf. DI 1.6–7).
Lactantius makes use of their testimonia throughout the Institutiones when it
conforms to the truth of Christian doctrine. He sees pagan oracular and
quasi-divine literature, e.g., the Sibyls, Apollo, and Hermes Trismegistus,
as a vital source of irrefutable evidence which can build a broad consensus
(cf. DI 1.6.17; 7.13.2).
Cicero. 11 It illustrates the uniformity of belief in divine providence

among most classical philosophers, and thereby forms a consensus
argument. Since it is far easier to highlight the few who reject prov-
idence than to enumerate all who have affirmed it, two of Lactan-
tius’ doxographies list only the most notable dissenters. The first of
these passages is located at the start of the Institutiones:
The author of this opinion [i.e., denial of divine providence]
was Democritus, and Epicurus confirmed it. But Protagoras
had called the gods into doubt before that, and later Diagoras
who rejected them and a number of others thought the gods
did not exist. What was effected except that it might be
thought that providence does not exist? 12
This doxography is dependent upon Cicero, who opens his De
natura deorum along similar lines:
On this question, as it were, the vast majority have affirmed
the existence of the gods, which is the most probable view and
the one to which we are all led by nature; but Protagoras was
doubtful, and Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene
thought that they do not exist at all. 13
11 Cf. S. Casey, “Lactantius’ Reaction to Pagan Philosophy,” Classica

et Mediaevalia 32 (1980): 209; H. Hagendahl, “Methods of Citation in Post-
classical Prose,” Eranos 45 (1947): 117, 123.
12 DI 1.2.2 (BT 2005, 6–7): Cujus sententiae auctor est Democritus,
confirmator Epicurus. Sed et antea Protagoras, qui deos in dubium voca-

vit, et postea Diagoras, qui exclusit, et alii nonnulli, qui non putaverunt
deos esse, quid aliud effecerunt nisi ut nulla esse providentia putaretur?
Cf. Epi. 1.1–2.
13 Nat. D. 1.2 (Pease, 118–23): Velut in hac quaestione plerique,
quod maxime veri simile est et quo omnes [sese] duce natura venimus,
deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diagoras
Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. Franz Fessler, in Benutzung
der philosophischen Schriften Ciceros durch Lactanz (Leipzig, 1913), 9, also cites
dependence on Aca. 2.55 and 121 for the mention of Democritus. Cf.
Usener, 247, fr. 368.
Lactantius’ De ira Dei, a later work written to show that God’s

wrath is an integral part of His justice, contains a similar doxog-
raphy which relies on Cicero’s De natura deorum:
When the opinions of philosophers of former times were in
agreement about providence, when there was no doubt that
the world had been formed by God and reason and was ruled
according to a plan, first of all there arose in the time of Socra-
tes, Protagoras, who said that it was not clear to him whether
or not there was any divinity. […] But later Epicurus said that
there was a god, because it was necessary that there be in the
world something excellent, wonderful, and blessed, yet without
providence […]. In those times after philosophy had already
stopped flourishing, however, there arose a certain Diagoras of
Melos, who said there was no god whatsoever, and for this
opinion he was given the name ‘atheist,’ as was Theodorus the
Cyrenean. 14
In this case, Lactantius goes into greater detail about the philoso-
phers who rejected belief in providence. He mentions Protagoras’
banishment from Athens for impiety and the atheism of Diagoras
of Melos and Theodore of Cyrene. The latter two, he contends,
denied the existence of the gods simply because “everything had
been said and discovered already” 15 and they wished to be seen as
original thinkers by denying a universally accepted and unambigu-
ous doctrine.
14 ID 9.1 (SC 289, 120, 122): Cum sententiae philosophorum prioris

temporis de providentia consensissent nec ulla esset dubitatio quin mun-
dus a deo et ratione esset instructus et ratione regeretur, primus omnium
Protagoras extitit temporibus Socratis, qui sibi diceret non liquere utrum
esset aliqua divinitas necne.[…] (4) Postea vero Epicurus deum quidem
esse dixit, quia necesse sit esse aliquid in mundo praestans et eximium et
beatum, providentiam tamen nullam […]. (7) Verum his postea tempori-
bus quibus iam philosophia defloruerat, extitit Melius quidam Diagoras,
qui nullum esse omnino deum diceret ob eamque sententiam nominatus
est atheus, item Cyrenaeus Theodorus. Cf. Nat. D. 1.2, 63; Usener, 247, fr.
368; Min. Fel. 8.3.
15 ID 9.7 (SC 289, 122): omnibus iam dictis et inventis.
In Book 2 of the Institutiones, as part of his confirmatio to the

thesis that God created the world, Lactantius lists all of the philos-
ophers who throughout history have affirmed the existence of di-
vine providence. From the Seven Sages to Socrates and Plato, from
the Pythagoreans to the Stoics and Peripatetics, virtually all philos-
ophers and philosophical schools testify to the reality of provi-
dence. 16 But these philosophers are not alone. Divine testimony
also exists in both Christian and pagan circles. The Sibyls, Hermes
Trismegistus, and Christian Scripture are all of one mind in affirm-
ing the doctrine of providence.
Lastly, in addition to learned and divine authorities, the doc-
trine of providence is believed by “the testimony of all human be-
ings.” 17 Indeed, on this topic, ‘the testimony of all people and na-
tions’ (testamonio populorum atque gentium) (DI 1.2.4) are in total ac-
cord. Far from disproving Lactantius’ consensus argument, Protag-
oras, Epicurus and their followers succeed only in demonstrating
that they are “small and weak philosophers” 18: “These are the ones
who have calumniated the doctrine of providence, adhered to and
defended for so many ages by so many geniuses.” 19 Prior to them
philosophers were in agreement about providence and, even now,
few have presumed to deny a doctrine so obviously apparent (ID
9.1). Lactantius’ argument e consensu omnium, therefore, encompasses
not just the vast majority of philosophers, but all of humankind.
B. Responding to Opponents
The presence of those few dissenting voices, however, necessitates
a response and Lactantius directly addresses the arguments of two
philosophical schools that have questioned the existence of provi-
dence. In an isolated passage from Book 2 of the Institutiones, Lac-
16 DI 2.8.48 (BT 2005, 158): etiam inter philosophos paene universes

convenit; id enim Pythagorei Stoici Peripatetici. Cf. DI 1.5.21. To what
extent the Peripatetics, the disciples of Aristotle, actually affirmed provi-
dence is a matter for debate.
17 Epi. 1.2 (BT 1994, 2): omnium mortalium testimoniis.
18 ID 9.8 (SC 289, 122): minutos et inertes philosophos.
19 ID 9.7 (SC 289, 122): Hi sunt qui tot saeculis tot ingeniis adsertam
atque defensam providentiam calumniati sunt.

tantius responds to the argument of Cicero’s representative of the

Academy, the Skeptic Cotta. In a passage now absent from De natu-
ra deorum, Cotta seeks to undermine the Stoic belief in providence
by challenging its demonstrability from the effects of nature. 20 If
God created the universe, Cotta argues, He did so with the basic
material already in existence, like a craftsman or artisan. Therefore,
either this basic material must possess the capacity to organize itself
by nature or it was so ordered by God. Of these two options, the
former seems more likely, since one need not posit divine existence
in order to account for the universe.
To the Christian apologist, the unacceptable premise here is the
denial of creatio ex nihilo, upon which the entire argument rests. Lac-
tantius, however, wanting to refute this argument on its own merits,
concentrates his response on the meaning of the word ‘nature’: “For
if [nature] is capable of generation and creation, it therefore has rea-
son and on that account must be God. Nor can there be any other
name for His power, in which there exists both the providence for
thinking and the skill and capacity for creating.” 21 Based on the tasks
which Cotta has assigned to it, nature should more accurately be
called God; who “is endowed with sense, reason, providence, power
and virtue.” 22 Philosophers have often ascribed these attributes to a
host of names, whether “nature or aether, reason or mind, the neces-
sity of fate or divine law,” 23 but, rightly understood, they all refer to
God. Therefore, either nature does not possess the capacity to per-
petuate and order itself, in which case the existence of a providential
20 This portion of Lactantius’ text provides us with a valuable frag-

ment of the lacuna which begins at Nat. D. 3.65. Cf. DI 2.8.10–11. In fact,
Lactantius is the primary source of quotations from this non-extant por-
tion of the text. See also DI 2.3.2; ID 13.9–12, 19–21.
21 DI 2.8.21 (BT 2005, 153–54): si autem generandi et faciendi po-
tens est, habet ergo consilium et propterea deus sit necesse est, (22) nec
alio nomine appellari potest ea vis, in qua inest et providentia excogitandi
et sollertia potestasque faciendi.
22 DI 2.8.40 (BT 2005, 156): sensu ratione providentia potestate vir-
tute praeditus est.

23 DI 1.5.21 (BT 2005, 19): natura sive aether sive ratio sive mens
sive fatalis necessitas sive divina lex.

deity is necessary, or it contains these attributes innately, in which

case Cotta is merely calling God by another name. In either scenario,
the existence of a providential divinity is required. Seneca, whom
Lactantius calls the sharpest of all Stoics (DI 2.8.23; 1.5.26), under-
stood this perfectly when he wrote that “god himself is nature.” 24
The Stoics, at least, clearly understand that divine attributes must be
posited of a divine being.
Unlike the brief response to this Academic objection to prov-
idence, Lactantius’ dispute with the Epicurean school is ubiquitous
and protracted throughout all of his apologetic works. Epicurus is
the special target of Lactantius’ rhetorical venom and is referred to
by the author as, inter alia, “neither wise nor sane,” “stupefied and
crazy,” and “who sane and healthy is more crazily delirious than
any sick person.” 25 While Lactantius does praise him for his cri-
tique of the pantheon (DI 7.3.26), he finds Epicurus’ simultaneous
affirmation of divine existence and rejection of divine providence
to be the height of absurdity. The following excerpt from Book 3
of the Institutiones summarizes Lactantius’ general estimation and
opinion of Epicurean doctrine:
The gods do not care; neither wrath nor gratitude move them;
there are no penalties in the underworld to fear, because after
death souls die and there is no underworld whatsoever; pleas-
ure is the highest good; there is no human society; each person
considers only himself; no one loves another unless it suits his
own interest; the brave man fears neither death nor any pain,
since even if he is being tortured or burnt, he can say he cares
for nothing. Is it obvious why anyone would think to call these
men wise, when they ought to be called most appropriately
bandits? 26
24 DI 2.8.23 (BT 2005, 154): deus ipse natura est. Cf. D. Vottero, Lu-
cio Anneo Seneca: I Frammenti (Bologna, 1998), 198, fr. 84.
25 DI 3.17.18 (BT 2007, 262): nec sapientem […] nec sanum; DI
7.3.26 (BT 2011, 654): hebetes […] et insane; DI 3.17.29 (BT 2007, 264):
quo sano ac vigente nullus aeger ineptius deliravit.
26 DI 3.17.42 (BT 2007, 267): Deos nihil curare; non ira, non gratia
tangi; inferorum poenas non esse metuendas, quod animae post mortem
According to Lactantius, Epicurus’ denial of providence stems from

his experience of life’s incongruities. “Epicurus saw that good people
always face adversity, poverty, toil, exile and the loss of loved ones.
Bad people, on the other hand, are happy, increasing power, and
being bestowed with honors. He saw the innocent unsafe, and defa-
mation committed with impunity […]. He was most moved by the
fact that particularly religious people are stricken with grave evils.
Whereas those who neglect the gods altogether, or do not piously
worship, suffer little or no troubles.” 27 This led Epicurus to conclude
that providence does not exist, the gods are idle, and there is no ac-
countability for one’s actions aside from the natural outcomes of
human activity. Consequently, according to Lactantius, Epicurus and
his disciples advocated an ethical system which valued only earthy
pleasure, and eschewed any notion of virtue or duty: “[Epicureanism]
occidant nec ulli omnino sint inferi; voluptatem esse maximum bonum;
nullam esse humanam societatem; sibi quemque consulere; neminem esse
qui alterum diligat nisi sua causa; mortem non esse metuendam forti viro
nec ullum dolorem, qui etiamsi torqueatur, si uratur, nihil curare se dicat.
(43) Est plane cur quisquam putet hanc vocem viri esse sapientis, quae
potest latronibus aptissime commodari.Cf. Usener, 228, fr. 341; Usener,
318, fr. 523; Usener, 324, fr. 540; Usener, 339, fr. 601. Lactantius’ distor-
tion or cursory understanding of Epicurean doctrine has been noted. Cf.
S. Brandt, “Lactantius und Lucretius,” Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Päd-
agogik 143 (1891): 225–59; Casey, “Lactantius’ Reaction,” 209–10; J. Ste-
venson, “Aspects of the Relations,” 501. While his misrepresentations of
Epicureanism are the most pronounced of any philosophical school, Lac-
tantius is given to characterizing the tenets of pagan philosophy in a man-
ner which suits his polemical goal. See, for example, the omission of eu-
patheia in his treatment of the Stoic doctrine of the passions in DI 6.14–15.
Cf. M. Colish, The Stoic Tradition, vol. 2 (Leiden, 1985), 44–46.
27 DI 3.17.8 (BT 2007, 260): Videbat Epicurus bonis adversa semper
accidere, paupertatem labors exilia carorum amissiones, malos contra bea-

tos esse, augeri potentia, honoribus adfici; videbat innocentiam minus
tutam, scelera impune committi […]. (9) Maxime autem commovebat
hominess in primus religiosos gravioribus malis adfici, his autem, qui aut
deos omnino neglegerent aut non pie colerent, vel minora incommoda
evenire vel nulla. Cf. Usener, 248–50, fr. 370.
opposes studying for the lazy, liberates the greedy from public lar-
gesse, prohibits the slothful from agreeing to public works, the slug-
gish from exercise, the timid from military service.” 28 In short, for
Lactantius, the philosophy of Epicurus – especially in its moral di-
mension – represents l’esprit du paganisme. 29
At the root of Lactantius’ critique of the errors of Epicurus is
his belief that the gods exist without exercising any providential
care over creation. In De ira Dei, Lactantius argues that Epicurus’
denial of providence stems from his rejection of any analogy or
likeness between God and human beings other than corporeality.
“Firstly, [Epicurus’] opinion was that it is not fitting for wrath to be
in God. And when this seemed true and unassailable he could not
stop the consequences, because with one affection severed necessi-
ty itself compelled him also to remove the other affections from
God.” 30 The result of Epicurus’ paring away of divine attributes is a
28 DI 3.17.3 (BT 2007, 259): Desidiosum vetat litteras discere, avar-

um populari largitione liberat, ignavum prohibet accede ad rem publicam,
pigrum exerceri, timidum militare.
29 Lactantius’ first-hand knowledge of Epicureanism is derived from
Lucretius. On Lactantius and Epicureanism consult the following studies:

Samuel Brandt, “Lactantius und Lucretius,” 225–259; Bryce, Library, 223–
75; Antonietta Bufano, “Lucrezio in Lattanzio,” Giornale italiano di Filologia
4 (1951): 335–349; Francesco Giancotti, “Il preludio di Lucrezio, il trans-
posizionismo e Lattanzio,” Orpheus 1 (1980): 221–250; Hagendahl, Latin
Fathers, 48–76; Jolanda Nicolosi, “L’infusso di Lucrezio su Lattanzio,”
Raccolta di Studi di Letteratura cristiana antica 2 (1946): 5–18; Ogilvie, Library,
84–87; Emanuele Rapisarda, “La polemica di Lattanzio contro
l’epicureismo,” Miscellanea di Studi di Letteratura cristiana antica 1 (1947): 5–
20. Some scholars, most notably Rapisarda, have maintained that Lactan-
tius was a convert from Epicureanism. This seems unlikely given his harsh
treatment and cursory understanding of Epricurean doctrine. Stevenson,
for example, (“Aspects of the Relations,” 501) maintains that he did not
even understand Lucretius. The present author agrees with Hagendahl’s
assessment of this position; namely, that “scholars had better consign it to
oblivion” (Latin Fathers, 52).
30 ID 4.10 (SC 289, 102): Prima autem sententia fuit iram in deum
non convenire. Quod cum illi verum et inexpugnabile videretur, non po-
god who “has no will whatsoever, no action, in short, no govern-

ance which is worthy of a god.” 31 What Epicurus succeeded in do-
ing was to sever God from his divine activities, chief among them
being the creation and governance of the world.
Lactantius maintains that the nature of divinity necessarily en-
tails the power and exercise of divine providence; one cannot exist
without the other. “But if there are gods, then there is providence,
one cannot conceive of a god otherwise, whose property it is to
foresee.” 32 This argument for the existence of providence is essen-
tially an ontological one, the predicate (providence) being con-
tained in the subject (God). “What is so worthy or appropriate to
God as providence? But if He cares for nothing, provides nothing,
He has lost all divinity.” 33 In Cicero’s De natura deorum we find a
similar argument: “they that admit the gods exist must allow them
some activity, and outstanding activity at that; now nothing can be
more outstanding than the administration of the world; therefore
the world is administered by the wisdom of the gods.” 34 The flaw
in Epicurus’ reasoning, then, was to admit the existence of the gods
in the first place. If he wished to deny divine providence, he should
have also denied divine existence.
Since Epicurus rejected the doctrine of providence, he must
account for the presence of particular beings in some other manner
and does so by asserting that they sprang into existence spontane-
ously. “‘It is not the work of providence,’ [Epicurus] says, ‘for there
terat consequentia resecare, quia uno adfectu amputato etiam ceteros ad-
fectus adimere deo necessitas ipsa cogebat.
31 ID 4.3 (SC 289, 100): omnino nullam habet voluntatem, nullum
actum, nullum denique administrationem quae deo digna sit.

32 Epi. 31.2 (BT 1994, 42): Sed si sunt dii, est igitur providentia. Ali-
ter enim deus intellegi non potest, cujus est proprium providere.
33 ID 4.5 (SC 289, 100): Quid tam dignum, tam proprium deo quam
providentia? (6) Sed si nihil curat, nihil providet, amisit omnem divinita-
tem.
34 Nat. D. 2.76 (Pease, 745–46): qui deos esse concedant iis faten-
dum est eos aliquid agere idque praeclarum; nihil est autem praeclarius
mundi administratione; deorum igitur consilio administratur. See Nat. D.
2.77–80 for Cicero’s other arguments.
are seeds which float through space, and from their chance combi-
nation the universe was begotten and grows.’” 35 Similar to the Aca-
demic Cotta, Epicurus views the universe as emerging from nature
itself. For him, nature represents the whole of existence and is re-
sponsible for the generation of the world (cf. Nat. D. 2.82). But in
order to account for the origin and sustenance of the world, ac-
cording to Lactantius, nature must contain the divine attributes
associated with God.
Either they [Epicureans] did not know by whom the world was
made, or they wished to persuade people that no divine mind
was at work; thus their slogan that nature is the mother of all
things, as if to say that all things were born from their own
source. They plainly admit their foolishness in that one word.
For nature, without a divine providence and power, is absolutely
nothing. But if by nature they mean god, how perverse is it to
replace the name God with nature? If, on the other hand, nature
means reason or necessity or the condition of coming into be-
ing, since it has no sense in itself, a divine mind must exist
whose providence first gave birth to all things. 36
The standard Epicurean response to Lactantius’ argument is to say
that he assigns to nature attributes which it does not possess. Na-
ture does not plan, order or sustain living things, but was merely
responsible – through the spontaneous coming together of atoms –
35 DI 3.17.21 (BT 2007, 263): ‘Non est’ inquit ‘providentiae opus;

sunt enim semina per inane volitantia, quibus inter se temere conglobatis
universa gignuntur atque concrescunt.’ Cf. Lucr. 2.1048–66; 5.187–94,
416–31; DI 3.17.16–27.
36 DI 3.28.4 (BT 2007, 300): Illi enim cum aut ignorarent, a quo esset
mundus effectus, aut persuadere vellent nihil esse divina mente perfectum,
naturam esse dixerunt rerum omnium matrem, quasi dicerent omnia sua
sponte esse nata; quo verbo plane imprudentiam suam confitentur. Natura
enim, remota providentia et potestate divina, prorsus nihil est. (5) Quodsi
deum naturam vocant, quae perversitas est naturam potius quam deum
nominare? Si autem natura est ratio vel necessitas vel condicio nascendi,
non est per se ipsa sensibilis, sed necesse est mentem esse divinam, quae
sua providentia nascendi principium rebus omnibus praebeat.
for the conditions which made life possible. “‘There is no order,’

he [Epicurus] says, ‘for there is much that occurs other than it
should.’” 37 Lactantius’ response to this objection is to affirm the
intelligibility of the created order by illustrating the utility and beau-
ty of its structure, i.e., by the argument from design.
C. The Argument from Design (Ex operibus dei )
1. The Divinae Institutiones and De ira Dei

The most common arguments for the existence of providence are
those drawn from design or ex operibus dei. This tropos asserts that,
upon minimal reflection, human beings can infer the existence of
providence from the order, beauty, and utility of the universe. We
first encounter an argument of this kind in Plato (Tim. 30b; cf.
Diog. Laert. 3.24), and it is subsequently developed by Aristotle
(Phys. VIII; Meta. Λ). But whereas the Peripatetics focus on a god as
the cause of motion, the Stoics focus on a god as the cause of or-
der and reason. With this distinction in mind, it is apparent from
the substance of his arguments which school Lactantius relies upon
for his defense of providence. “For who can doubt of a providence
when he sees such an order and regularity to the heavens and the
earth, so that the universe is not only modeled to beauty, ornament
and wonder, but also that it might be for the utility of humankind
and the most advantageous convenience of all living things? Hence,
that which exists according to reason could not have a beginning
without rationality.” 38 In other words, the universe can be observed
as conforming to a well-ordered plan. But what is ordered accord-
ing to reason cannot be the product of something irrational. There-
fore, a rational being must be the author of the system that we per-
ceive in the universe.
37 DI 3.17.17 (BT 2007, 262): ‘Nulla’ inquit ‘dispositio est; multa

enim facta sunt aliter quam fieri debuerunt.’ Cf. Lucr. 5.195–234.
38 Epi. 1.3 (BT 1994, 2): Quis enim de providentia dubitet, cum vi-
deat caelos terramque sic disposita, sic temperata esse, <ut> universa non
modo ad pulcritudinem ornatumque mirabilem, sed ad usum quoque ho-
minum ceterorumque viventium commoditatem aptissime convenirent?
(4) Non potest igitur quod ratione constat sine ratione coepisse.
This cosmological argument for the existence of providence is

Lactantius’ fundamental answer to the Epicureans. 39 Those who
assert that all things have come about by chance and the haphazard
motion of atoms need only examine the workings of the universe
in greater detail. The following passage from Book 7 of the Institu-
tiones contains the essence of Lactantius’ response to Epicurus in
the form of an extended argument ex operibus dei:
[Epicurus] ruined what he had been right to see, and in his in-
ward ignorance of the entire plan he destroyed all reason, and
reduced the world and everything in it to the likeness of the
most vain dream, inasmuch as human activity would make no
sense. But truly we see that the world and all its parts are gov-
erned by a wonderful system, in the heavens the proportion
and uniformity in the various courses of the stars and lights of
heaven, the regular and remarkable delineation of the seasons,
the diverse fecundity of the land, the level plains, the ramparts
and mounds of the mountains, the viridity and fruitfulness of
the forests, the strong eruption of springs, the timely flow of
rivers, the rich and abundant spreading of the seas, the diverse
and useful aspirations of the winds and everything else, every-
thing exists according to a supreme plan. So who can be so
blind as to think that something which simply radiates the
wondrous provisions of a most providential plan was pro-
duced without a cause? If nothing can be nor come to be in
any way whatsoever without a cause, and if the providence of
God most high is manifest in the order and excellence, the
magnitude, the power, and the governance of things, then
those who said that providence does not exist are stupefied
and crazy. I would not disapprove if they spoke against the ex-
istence of the gods, but when they do so to speak of none, an-
yone not reckoning them mad is mad himself. 40
39 Cicero, as do many of the Stoics, makes similar use of this cosmo-

logical argument, drawing a parallel between the universe and a well-
ordered house (Nat. D. 2.15). Cf. 2.17; 3.26; Min. Fel. 18.4; DI 2.8.66.
40 DI 7.3.24 (BT 2011, 653–54): Corrupit ergo quod recte viderat et
totam rationem penitus ignorantia rationis evertit redegitque mundum et

To enumerate the catalogue of wonders taken from the universe

was a common tactic in demonstrating the existence of providence
derived from the Stoic school and adopted by early Christian apol-
ogists (cf. Min. Fel. 17.4–11; Theoph. Ad Autol. 1.6). Lactantius’
primary source for this narration is undoubtedly Cicero’s De natura
deorum, 2.98ff. Cicero cites the wonders of the universe as evidence
for the existence of providence not by way of a complex syllogism
but as the object of contemplation. “For we may now eschew sub-
tle disputation and, in a certain way, contemplate with the eyes the
beauty of the things of divine providence as we speak of their ar-
rangement.” 41 A thorough examination of the workings of the uni-
verse ought to convince one, according to Cicero, as to the exist-
ence of divine providence: “no one considering the whole earth
could doubt divine reason.” 42
omnia quae in eo geruntur ad similtudinem cujusdam vanissimi somnii,

siquidem rebus humanis ratio nulla subsistet. (25) Cum vero mundum
omnesque partes ejus ut videmus mirabilis ratio gubernet, cum caeli tem-
peratio et aequalis in ipsa varietate cursus astrorum luminumque caeles-
tium, temporum constans ac mira discriptio, terrarum varia fecunditas,
plana camporum, munimenta et aggeres montium, viriditas ubertasque
silvarum, fontium saluberrima eruptio, fluminum opportuna inundatio,
maris opulenta et copiosa interfusio, ventorum diversa et utilis aspiratio
ceteraque omnia ratione summa constent, quis tam caecus est ut existimet
sine causa esse facta in quibus mira dispositio providentissimae rationis
elucet? (26) Si ergo sine causa nec est nec fit omnino quicquam, si et pro-
videntia summi dei ex dispositione rerum et virtus ex magnitudine et po-
testas ex gubernatione nmanifesta est, hebetes ergo et insani qui providen-
tiam non esse dixerunt, non improbarem, si deos idcirco non esse dicerent
ut unum dicerent, cum autem ideo ut nullum, qui eos delirasse non putat,
ipse delirat. Cf. DI 1.2.5; ID 10.25, 50; Nat. D. 2.98ff.
41 Nat. D. 2.98 (Pease, 791): Licet enim iam remota s ubtiliate dispu-
tandi oculis quodam modo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum earum quas

divina providentia dicimus constitutas.
42 Nat. D. 2.99 (Pease, 795): nemo cunctam intuens terram de divina
ratione dubitaret. See also 2.4, 15, where this argument is used as evidence
for the existence of the gods.
Several times throughout the corpus of his works, Lactantius

offers the orderly system of the universe as proof of God’s provi-
dential design and care. In his cursory treatment of providence in
Book 1 of the Institutiones, the only evidence the apologist cites is
the wonder experienced from contemplating the universe. “For no
one is so ignorant, so stricken with illness, that raising one’s eyes to
heaven one cannot know that some providence exists – though one
may not know that it is the providence of God which controls all
that one sees – simply from the size of things, their movement,
order, utility, beauty and system; nor could it be otherwise. How
could that which is constructed with such wonderful reason be ar-
ranged if not by some superior plan?” 43 Again, while discussing the
merits and shortcomings of Socrates in Book 3 of the Institutiones,
Lactantius offers the ratio of the world as proof of divine provi-
dence. “For who cannot see that this world is governed, with such
a wondrous and perfect plan, by some sort of providence; because
there is nothing which can exist without some guide?” 44
Chapter 10 of De ira Dei contains one of Lactantius’ most
thorough critiques of the Epicurean doctrine of spontaneous gen-
eration. There again we encounter Lactantius’ use of the marvels of
the world to demonstrate the existence of providence. “For we see
that there is nothing in the entire world which does not have in
itself a great and marvelous system. Because this is above the un-
derstanding and skill of human beings, to what should this more
rightly be granted than divine providence?” 45 Once again Lactan-
43 DI 1.2.5 (BT 2005, 7–8): Nemo est enim tam rudis, tam feris mor-
ibus, quin oculos suos in caelum tollens, tametsi nesciat cujus dei provi-
dentia regatur hoc omne quod cernitur, aliquam tamen esse intellegat ex
ipsa rerum magnitudine motu dispositio constantia utilitate pulchritudine
temperatione nec posse fieri, quin id quod mirabili ratione constat consilio
majore aliquo sit instructum.
44 DI 3.20.13 (BT 2007, 279): Quis enim non sentiat hunc mundum
tam mirabili ratione perfectum aliqua providentia gubernari, quando-

quidem nihil est quod possit sine ullo moderatore consistere?
45 ID 10.25 (SC 289, 132): Videmus enim nihil esse in omni mundo
quod non habeat in se maximam mirabilemque rationem. Quae quia supra

tius specifically cites the order and beauty of the cosmos as evi-
dence of an intelligent Arranger. “Can he who sees things so great
and of such a kind think that they were brought into being with no
deliberation, no providence, no divine reason, but that such mar-
vels have been compacted from tiny and minute particles?” 46 His
argument in this portion of the chapter is that the existence of or-
der and intelligibility in the universe must have an origin; rationality
and order cannot be the outcome of a fundamentally irrational and
chaotic process. “If [nature] lacks sense or form, how can that
which has sense and form be made from it? Unless someone thinks
that the fabric of living things, so delicate and so wondrous, could
have been formed and animated by a non-sentient being, or that
the very sight of heaven so providently governed for the use of
living creatures, suddenly appeared in some way without a creator,
without an artificer.” 47
In this form of the argument from design two items are worth
highlighting, one in relation to style, the other to content. Stylisti-
cally, one might more properly refer to this evidence as contempla-
tive observation rather than formal argumentation. Like Cicero,
Lactanius considers the order of the universe to be sufficient evi-
dence in itself to convince those who doubt the existence of provi-
dence. As such, the apologist relies heavily upon his rhetorical
training to present these observations, often concluding with a
question. Again the influence of Cicero can be detected in this re-
gard. In De natura deorum, Cicero writes: “For what can be so plain
and apparent, when we behold and contemplate the heavens, that
hominis sensum et ingenium est, cui rectius quam divinae providentiae

tribuenda est?
46 ID 10.32 (SC 289, 136): Tanta ergo qui videat et talia, potest exis-
timare nullo effecta esse consilio, nulla providentia, nulla ratione divina,
sed ex micis subtilibus et exiguis concreta esse tanta miracula?
47 ID 10.35 (SC 289, 136): Si [natura] caret sensu ac figura, quomodo
potest ab ea fieri quod et sensum habeat et figuram? Nisi forte quis arbi-
tratur animalium fabricam tam subtilem tamque mirabilem a non sentiente
formari animarique potuisse aut istam caeli speciem tam providenter ad
utilitates viventium temperatum nescio quo casu sine conditore, sine arti-
fice subito extitisse.
there is some divine plan of most excellent intelligence by which

they are governed?” 48 With regard to content, the focus of these
observations relates specifically to the order of the universe. The
contemplation of this system (ratio, dispositio, temperatio) strikes the
observer as both beautiful and intelligible and arouses the belief
that an omnipotent mens must be responsible. Far from arguing for
belief in a personal God, Lactantius’ observations are intended to
convince one of the existence of a divine mind who is the source
and sustainer (gubernare, regnare, temperare) of the patterned cycle of
all that exists.
2. De opificio Dei
Lactantius’ most sustained treatment of the argument from design
can be found in his earliest extant work, De opificio Dei. In it the
author intends to complete the work begun by Cicero in De natura
deorum 2.98ff. (OD 1.13–14), where the Stoic Balbus gives a review
of the marvels of the universe which bespeak an intelligent crea-
tor. 49 While confining himself to the wonders of the human person
(cf. Nat. D. 2.134–53), Lactantius argues that a creature endowed
with such beauty of structure, utility of parts, and wisdom of mind
must have been fashioned – contra the Epicurean claim – by a
“most provident artisan.” 50 “From the very function of all the
members and the uses of the several parts we can understand with
what great power of providence each has been made.” 51
48 Nat. D. 2.4 (Pease, 546–47): Quid enim potest esse tam apertum
tamque perspicuum, cum caelum suspeximus caelestiaque contemplate
sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis quo haec regan-
tur?
49 For Cicero’s treatment of the human person in particular see
2.134ff. Lactantius also mentions drawing inspiration from a want to ex-

pand on what Cicero had written in the, now fragmentary, Rep. 4 (OD
1.12).
50 OD 11.2 (SC 213, 168): providentissimus artifex.
51 OD 1.16 (SC 213, 112): quia ex ipsis membrorum officiis et usibus
partium singularum quanta vi providentiae quidque factum sit.

In this work Lactantius provides the prolegomena to apolo-

getic theology, which he avoids at the start of the Institutiones. At
the beginning of Book 2 of the Institutiones Lactantius states:
Inasmuch as I am undertaking the duty of illuminating the
truth, I have not thought it necessary to address first that ques-
tion which seems to be the first by nature: whether providence
cares for all things or whether everything has been made or
generated by chance. 52
Lactantius deems providence to be the natural start of an apologet-
ic theology due to the precedents set by his forebears Minucius
Felix (Min. Fel. 17.4ff.) and Theophilus (Ad Autol. 1.4ff.). As for
avoiding the topic at the start of Institutiones, Lactanius offers us
two reasons: first, that the issue has been defended well by the Sto-
ics, in particular Cicero (DI 1.2.2–5), and second, that concentrat-
ing on the topic now would add redundancy to the text, since he
will have to address providence at various points throughout (DI
1.2.6). We may also surmise, however, that the devotion and intri-
cacy with which Lactantius treats providence in De opicifio also led
the apologist to consider this treatise a sufficient primer to his mas-
sive apologetic work. 53 As such, a more detailed examination of the
treatise is merited at this juncture.
After a brief introduction in which Lactantius mentions that
he is expounding on a theme from Cicero, 54 the apologist indicates
52 DI 1.2.1 (BT 2005, 6): Suscepto igitur inlustrandae veritatis officio

non putavi adeo necessarium ab illa quaestione principium sumere, quae
videtur prima esse natura, sitne providentia quae rebus omnibus consulat
an fortuito vel facta sint omnia vel gerantur.
53 Having already addressed the topic of providence in De opificio is
directly mentioned by Lactantius as a reason for omitting discussion of

the issue in DI 2.10.15.
54 OD 1.12–14. Lactantius states that Cicero gave a restricted treat-
ment of this topic in the now fragmentary book 4 of the Republica, and
that he attempted a more comprehensive treatment in De natura deorum
2.47ff. What differentiates Lactantius’ treatment in OD is that he will con-
centrate his argument on the intelligibility of the human body, rather than
the cosmos as a whole.
that his chief argument for the providence of God will be the ratio
of the created order – the utility and beauty of the arrangement of
creation. He begins by essaying the gifts earthly creatures possess
for the good of their survival (cf. Min. Fel. 17.10). Some animals
are strong, some are fast, some possess natural weapons, and some
can endure extremes of temperature. In other words, each creature
is endowed with certain protective qualities which aid the preserva-
tion of its species. Above these capacities, however, humanity alone
possesses the gift of reason. By possessing a rational soul the hu-
man person is “an eternal and immortal animal.” 55 Human beings
enter this world naked and unarmed, but the gift of wisdom pro-
vides them with the greatest capacity for self-defense. It would
therefore be superfluous for human beings to possess a skill or
physical endowment comparable to brute animals since they pos-
sess the powers of perception and speech. Taken as whole, the or-
der of creation is sustained by this balancing of gifts among crea-
tures in a manner which is both useful and aesthetically pleasing.
The existence of this system in nature leads Lactantius to conclude
that it is the deliberate product of a supreme Designer and that this
Designer endowed human beings with a gift that is His to give.
“God gave to man sense and reason so that from them it might be
apparent that we derive our being from Him, because He Himself
is intelligence, He Himself is sense and reason.” 56
Lactantius’ description of the protective capacities of creatures
– and the order which is produced by these properties – leads the
apologist to address two arguments which the Epicurean school
presents against the existence of this natural order and, by exten-
sion, divine providence. Their first objection is to humanity’s exalt-
ed place in the created order. According to Lactantius, the Epicure-
ans believe that nature has been very cruel to the human race. Far
from being the apex of the created order, human beings have the
most wretched of lives. They are by nature so weak and needy that
55 OD 2.9 (SC 213, 114): aeternum animal atque immortale.

56 OD 2.1 (SC 213, 112): Dedit enim homini[…]deus sensum atque
rationem, ut ex eo appareret nos ab eo esse generatos, qui ipse intel-
legentia, ipse sensus ac ratio est.
they go through life wailing and weeping “‘as those for whom in
life there remains only the passage of evils.’” 57
Lactantius responds first by recapitulating the intelligibility of
the natural order. A creature possessing certain natural defenses has
no need of intelligence. Likewise, a creature endowed with reason
would render great physical abilities superfluous. To claim that
humanity occupies a lowly station in life is to ignore the symmetry
in the natural order, which results from the human person’s capaci-
ty to reason. “For considering the state of things I recognize that
nothing should have been done otherwise. I do not say cannot,
because God is omnipotent. But it was necessary that His most
provident majesty brought about what was better and more
right.” 58 Secondly, it is obvious that humanity, by being endowed
with wisdom, has received the greater part of natural gifts. For eve-
rywhere one observes that human beings have dominion over the
other creatures of the earth. The elephant, for example, is among
the strongest of creatures yet can be made to serve human beings.
Anyone who deems the human condition to be lower than that of
beasts, therefore, ought to consider the words of Plato and “‘give
thanks to nature that he was born human.’” 59
The second Epicurean objection to the existence of provi-
dence is the fact that human beings suffer sickness and death. The
followers of Epicurus claim that if a providential order to the uni-
verse existed then man would not suffer illness and mortality. 60
57 OD 3.2 (SC 213, 116): cui tantum in vita restet transire malorum.
Quot. Lucr. 5.227. For this argument see Lucr. 5.223–27; Cic. Rep. 3.2.
For attestations to the contents of the non-extant portions of Cicero’s
Rep. see August. c. Jul. 4.12.60; civ. Dei 2.21.
58 OD 3.4 (SC 213, 118): Considerans enim condicionem reum intel-
lego nihil fieri aliter debuisse quam factum est, ut non dicam potuisse,
quia deus potest omnia, sed necesse est ut providentissima illa majestas id
effecerit quod erat melius et rectius.
59 OD 3.2 (SC 213, 116): naturae gratias egit, quod homo natus esset.
Quot. Plut. Vit. Mar. 46.

60 Cf. Lucr. 5.222ff. Lactantius may also be referencing a non-extant
work of Seneca, De immature morte. Cf. DI 1.5.26; 3.12.11; Perrin, SC 214,

269.
First, Lactantius responds that one cannot divorce sickness from

death; the former leads to the latter. For if mortality is the natural
lot of created beings then, naturally, they would be susceptible to
illness as well as death. “If [a living being] was of such strength that
disease and affliction could not approach it, neither could death,
because death follows disease.” 61 It is the course of nature, there-
fore, for bodily creatures to suffer disease as well as death. That all
people should live to a ripe old age without suffering the effects of
sickness or premature death would necessitate contravening the
natural order of creation. Thus, those who complain about illness
and untimely death merely mask their ultimate complaint, i.e., that
they wish to have been born immortal and eternal (OD 4.1, 11–12).
Second, Lactantius lays the blame for this Epicurean criticism
on the sect’s dogmatic denial of divine providence. Rather than rec-
ognizing the rational order of the life/death cycle in nature, the Epi-
cureans must invent instances where nature seems to falter and prof-
fer these as examples of the irrationality of the condition of nature.
By doing so, they are able to maintain that nature is not the product
of a divine plan. But, Lactantius argues, fervently holding to the de-
nial of providence means that Epicureans have committed them-
selves to a view of the natural world which prohibits them from rec-
ognizing its obvious intelligibility. “For when divine providence was
excluded from human affairs, it necessarily followed that all things
were born of their own accord. […] They had taken it for granted
that nothing was made by a divine mind. And they could not prove
this in any other way than to show that in some matters the system
of providence appeared to limp.” 62 To the apologist, the Epicureans
have allowed their denial of providence to cloud their judgment
about the reality of the natural order.
61 OD 4.3 (SC 213, 124): Nam si ejus [animal] roboris fieret, ut ad

eum morbus et aegritudo adire non posset, ne mors quidem posset, quo-
niam mors sequella morborum est.
62 OD 4.13 (SC 213, 128, 130): Exclusa enim de rebus humanis divi-
na providentia necessario sequebatur ut omnia sua sponte sint nata. […]

(14) adsumpserant enim nihil fieri mente divina. Quod ipsum non aliter
probare poterant quam si ostenderent esse aliqua in quibus videretur pro-
videntia ratio claudicare.
Lastly, Lactantius argues that sickness and frailty contribute to

the natural order by requiring human beings to live in communion
with one another. What order would there be if one were capable
of warding off all possible threats to one’s safety by oneself? If this
were the case, people would grow insolent and lose all sense of
humanity (OD 4.18). But since human beings are weak and subject
to affliction they seek the comfort of society and establish laws
(jura humanitatis) to govern themselves. 63 Hence death and illness
serve the social function of bringing people into closer communion
with one another. At the close of chapter 4, Lactantius gives a brief
introduction to the next section of his text (chapters 5–7). He
states that if he were to list all of the marvelous workings of provi-
dence, his treatise would be endless. Rather, he will confine himself
to the workings of the human body and, by demonstrating the utili-
ty and beauty of its arrangement, confirm that a supreme Mind
must be at work in its composition. In the next section, therefore,
he will give an overview of the body in relation to the question of
providence before examining it in detail (chapters 8–19). 64
Lactantius begins chapter five of De opificio by outlining the
form of the body in broad terms; offering little insights into the
purpose and utility of its various parts. The feet are extended from
the torso for walking, the spine is made up of separate bones for
bending, cartilage guards against the damage, which can be caused
by bone rubbing against itself, and so on. All of these features
demonstrate how “God wished to show his providence and power
in a marvelous variety of many things.” 65 As the apologist considers
this “wonderful system of providence” (OD 6.2), he is again drawn
to address Epicurean criticisms of the doctrine. Citing De rerum
63 For a more extensive discussion on the causes of social cohesion

see DI 6.10. Here Lactantius uses an argument of the Epicureans against
them, namely, that society was founded on the basis of fear and self-
preservation. Cf. Lucr. 5.1011ff.; Cic. Rep. 1.39; Sen. Ben. 4.18.
64 The structure and content of OD has been expertly treated by Pe-
ter Roots in “The De opificio Dei: The Workmanship of God and Lactan-
tius,” Classical Quarterly, n. s., 37/2 (1987): 466–86.
65 OD 5.13 (SC 213, 138): Deus enim qui providentiam et potestatem
suam multarum rerum mirabili varietate voluit ostendere.

natura (Lucr. 5.837–54), Lactantius is baffled that they should view

the chance coming together of atoms a more reasonable theory of
creation than the divine providence of an omnipotent Creator.
Having thus summarized the use of several of the body’s most
vital parts, the apologist supports his claim of a supreme Designer
by using the analogy of an architect (OD 6.5–6; cf. Nat. D. 1.19;
2.90, 141). Just as the specifications of a house are designed be-
forehand with the good of the structure in mind, likewise the parts
of the body were planned in advance for the good of the organism.
Each portion of the body can be observed as operating for the
benefit of the whole, each performs its own duty in support of the
creature’s overall teleological end. These qualities are the means by
which things exist. How could anyone think that things began to
exist before the means to exist came into being? In order for crea-
tures to exist, therefore, the parts, which constitute their existence,
must have been designed by an intelligent Creator with a view to-
wards their self-perpetuation.
The Epicureans claim, however, that the parts were in exist-
ence prior to their function: eyes existed before sight, ears before
hearing, legs before self-ambulation, etc. (cf. Lucr. 4.822ff.; DI
3.17.19). It was only after a period of time that “the knowledge of
their usefulness was born.” 66 Lactantius’ responds by again point-
ing out the system which exists in the natural world. If it were the
case that the functions followed the existence of the parts, then
why do all of the parts correspond to their uses throughout nature?
Why do all animals with eyes see through them, or all animals with
nostrils smell through them? There is a patterned uniformity in the
function of these organs that should not exist if their common
origin were “the chance combination of atoms.” 67 Since, then, all
bodily functions observe their own laws throughout nature, it is
evident that nothing was created by chance but rather, by a divine
plan (divinae rationis) (OD 6.14).
While an examination of the remainder of this text will be con-
ducted when we discuss Lactanius’ anthropology, through the first
66 Lucr. 4.854 (Bailey, 406): nata dedere suae post notitiam utilitatis.
Cf. OD 6.10.
67 OD 6.12 (SC 213, 142): fortuitis atomorum concursionibus.
seven chapters we can discern the apologist’s chief weapon in his

defense of providence against the Epicureans. Namely, that the uni-
verse and all of the creatures in it display an intelligibility in relation
to their structures and natural ends. All of Lactantius’ individual ar-
guments, which we have encountered, either make use of or defend
the pattern of existence to which the natural world can be observed
to conform. What distinguishes the apologist’s treatment of provi-
dence in De opificio from his other works is the amplification of the
teleological aspect of the argument from design.
In De opificio, Lactantius is not content to allow contemplation
of the order of the universe to be its own evidence. Rather, he re-
plies to the objections of the Epicureans by affirming the existence
of natural ends. Each creature is endowed with certain capacities
that allow it to endure. The proper use of reason, which human
beings possess and is the source of their natural superiority in the
created order, is the natural end of the human person. We observe
that organs and characteristics which are common to animal life all
correspond in their function and cooperate to ensure the good of
the entire organism. Further, these qualities not only provide for
the preservation of the creature but for the species as a whole.
Each species then exists in a relationship of symbiotic coherence to
such a degree that “it seems that the plan of the whole work would
not have endured at all, if the result was in any way different.” 68
Each species, each organism, and each individual quality seeks an
end and performs a function which it was designed to do. Only in
this way do living beings persevere and form the wondrous and
beautifully integrated whole of the natural world. This ordered pat-
tern of existence, in relation to both the whole and the parts, must
therefore be the result of an omniscient Designer who crafted each
aspect of creation to seek the end for which it was made. For Lac-
tantius, the teleology of the natural world “makes manifest that
nothing was created by chance, since the perpetual plan of divine
reason is observed.” 69
68 OD 7.11 (SC 213, 148): videatur omnio non constatura fuisse toti-
us operis ratio, si quicquam aliter esset effectum.
69 OD 6.14 (SC 213, 142): manifestum est nihil fortuito esse factum,
quoniam divinae rationis dispositio perpetua servatur.

D. The Argument from Absurd Consequences (Ex gradibus

entium )
While not taking the form of a standard reductio ad absurdum syllo-
gism, Lactantius does present two positions that, he argues, are the
natural outcomes of Epicurus’ rejection of providence. It would
perhaps be more appropriate, then, to refer to them as unaccepta-
ble rather than absurd consequences, though Lactantius would cer-
tainly consider them so. The first of these consequences is that de-
nial of providence results in a practical atheism. We have seen how
Lactantius attacked Epicurus for his illogical reasoning on this sub-
ject. For if “there is neither care nor providence in Him [God], nor
some thought nor any sense in Him, it follows that He does not
exist at all.” 70 If Epicurus had been willing to follow his premises to
their logical conclusions, Lactantius argues, he would have denied
the existence of the gods. The apologist mentions the claim, which
he derives from Cicero, that Epicurus did not, in fact, believe in the
gods but retained them in order to quell popular ill will (ID 4.7–8;
cf. Nat. D. 1.85, 123). Whether this assertion is true or not, howev-
er, does not alter Lactantius’ critique. The gods of Epirucus are so
aloof and stolid that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is as
if they do not exist. “By excluding providence and divine care, it
follows that you [Epicurus] should teach that God does not exist at
all. Instead you have reduced Him to a word, truly taken Him
away.” 71
What follows from this is the second absurd consequence,
namely, that religion is rendered useless and barren. For if the gods
care for nothing, feel nothing, and govern nothing, what use is
there in propitiation? Much of Lactantius’ argument on this front,
located in De ira Dei chapter 8, comes directly from De natura de-
70 ID 4.13 (SC 289, 102): quia nec cura sit in eo nec providentia, ergo
nec cogitationem aliquam nec sensum in eo esse ullum; quo efficitur ut
non sit omnino.
71 Epi. 31.3 (BT 1994, 42–43): Exclusa enim providentia curaque di-
vina consequens erat, ut non esse omnino deum diceres. Nunc eum verbo
reliquisti, re sustulisti.
orum 1.115–16. 72 “What honor is owed to one who cares for noth-
ing, who is an ingrate? Or is there any reason why we might be
bound to him who has nothing in common with us?” 73 While we
have neither the time nor space to explore the centrality of religion
in Lactantius’ thought at this juncture, suffice it to say, he believes
that religion is humankind’s defining characteristic. The ability to
know and worship our Creator is what separates us from all of cre-
ation (ID 7; DI 4.28; etc.). When religion is dissolved, therefore, as
it is when one denies the doctrine of providence, human beings
become no different from the beasts. 74 We are deprived of our per-
sonhood and that which makes us truly human.
Further, not only is the truth of religion destroyed thereby,
but also its utility. Religion loses its capacity to be a force beyond
the law that guides the ethical behavior of men and women if God
is disinterested in our moral lives (ID 8.10; cf. Nat. D. 1.77; Min.
Fel. 8.3). “For conscience greatly refrains people, if we believe that
our lives are in the sight of God; if we realize that not only what we
do is seen from above, but also if we suppose that what we think
or say is heard by God.” 75 In sum, for Lactantius, denying the doc-
trine of providence not only reduces God to an irrelevant hypothe-
sis but strips us of the natural dignity and value which we possess
by being human.
III. CONCLUSION
In this review of Lactantius’ treatment of the doctrine of providence,
several key features are worth noting. First, and most obvious, is
Lactantius’ reliance upon the Stoa, in particular Cicero’s De natura
72 See further parallels between ID 8.3 and Nat. D. 1.124 (quot.), ID

8.4 and Nat. D. 1.85, ID 8.6 and Nat. D. 1.3, and ID 8.10 and Nat. D.
1.118.
73 ID 8.3 (SC 289, 116): Quis honor deberi potest nihil curanti et in-
grato? An aliqua ratione obstricti esse possumus ei qui nihil habeat com-
mune nobiscum? Cf. Nat. D. 1.115–16.
74 A thesis no philosopher has ever dared maintain (ID 7.1).
75 ID 8.8 (SC 289, 118): Multum enim refrenat homines conscientia,
si credamus nos in conspectu dei vivere, si non tantum quae gerimus vide-
ri desuper, sed etiam quae cogitamus aut loquimur audiri a deo putemus.
deorum, for his source material. The consensus argument, which Lac-
tantius employs as evidence for the existence of providence, was a
common Stoic device and is found in Cicero’s De natura deorum (1.43;
2.5) to support the existence of the gods. 76 Both Velleius (the Epicu-
rean) and Balbus (the Stoic) make use of it, while Cotta (the Skeptic)
attacks the notion that universal consent can be given as legitimate
evidence (1.62; 3.11). We also find a similar parallel to Lactantius’
ontological argument, i.e., that providence is contained in the defini-
tion of God (ID 4.4–6), in De natura deorum (Nat. D. 2.76–78). As-
pects of this argument can be found among the earliest of the Stoic
fragments, and it is often articulated as an argument ‘of the better.’ A
common formulation runs thusly: ‘If the gods exist, they must pos-
sess the greatest of qualities. Quality x is greater than y (or not x).
Therefore, the gods possess quality x.’ In addition to providing his
own form of the argument, Cicero also transmits variants by Zeno
(Nat. D. 2.21) and Chrysippus (Nat. D. 2.16). 77
The arguments from design that we find in Lactantius take
two forms. The first is based on the wonder we experience when
examining the order of the universe. This form of the argument is
the most frequently cited evidence to support the existence of a
providential deity by ancient philosophers. 78 It can be well suited to
an author with rhetorical prowess by including a detailed account
of the workings of the universe. In this regard, it is in capable
hands with both Cicero (Nat. D. 2.98ff.) and Lactantius (DI 7.3.24–
26; etc.). Such verbose and prosaic elaboration is, however, not a
necessity, and both Lactantius and Cicero articulate this argument
in its simplest form as well. 79 Secondly, Lactantius articulates the
argument from design with an emphasis on the teleological pattern
76 Cf. Nat. D. 2.12–13 (with note in Pease, 579); Sen. Ep. 117.6; Ae-
lius Theon Progym. 12; Min. Fel. 8.1; 19.1ff. While most common to the
Stoics, Dragona-Monachou traces the origin of this type of argument back
to Socrates (The Stoic Arguments, 195).
77 For a version of this argument attributed to Cleanthes see Sextus
Math. 9.88. Cf. Cic. Nat. D. 2.33–36 (unattributed).

78 Cf. Dragona-Monachou, The Stoic Arguments, 88–89.
79 Cic. Nat. D. 2.4, 15 (attributed to Cleanthes), 87, 95 (attributed to
Aristotle’s lost De philosophia); DI 1.2.5; 3.20.13; ID 10; cf. Sen. Prov. 1.2–4.
observed in nature. This form of the argument from design is char-

acteristically Stoic. Cicero attests to this argument’s Stoic history
by, again, providing examples attributed to Zeno (Nat. D. 2.22) and
Chyrsippus (Nat. D. 2.17). In addition, Cicero’s own argument
from design incorporates a strong teleological component in his
treatment of the human person (Nat. D. 2.133ff.); which provided
Lactantius with the inspiration for De opificio Dei (OD 1.13). In
short, Lactantius’ defense of the doctrine of providence, in its gen-
eral aspect, is thoroughly Stoic in both form and content.
Next, we should ask why Lactantius places himself squarely
within the dialectical conflict between the Stoic and Epicurean
schools concerning the existence of providence. The most obvious
reason for doing so is that the apologist’s rhetorical training pro-
vided him with a plethora of material and ready-made arguments
originating from this debate. Thus, Lactantius’ vast knowledge of
Cicero, which he accrued by virtue of his education, could easily be
employed to defend the doctrine of providence. But aside from
academic convenience, placing himself in the context of this debate
conforms to Lactantius’ stated apologetic method in relation to his
use of sources. In other words, integrating himself into this dia-
logue allows Lactantius to draw his arguments from non-Christian
sources, which is one of the primary characteristics of his method.
One cannot forget that Lactantius the Christian author is, above
all, an apologist more than a systematic theologian or philosopher.
The anti-Christian slander of prominent Roman citizens prompted
him to compose the Institutiones (DI 5.4.1) and he is writing in the
hopes that this work may contribute to the end of Diocletian’s per-
secution (DI 5.1.2). Lactantius adopted the method of “citing those
who are customarily used against us” 80 and arguing from “fact and
proof” 81 rather than from the revealed authority of Scripture, à la
Cyprian (DI 5.1.24–28; 5.4.3–8), in order to maximize his potential
persuasiveness with the elite of Roman society. Therefore, situating
himself within the context of the Epicurean-versus-Stoic debate,
Lactantius has the opportunity to employ evidence which his audi-
ence of Roman docti would find most authoritative and compelling.
80 DI 1.5.2 (BT 2005, 14): citemus quibus contra nos uti solent.
81 DI 3.1.10 (BT 2007, 203): re et argumentis.
More specifically, the Stoic arguments for existence of providence

established for Lactantius a point of rapprochement between Chris-
tians and non-Christians on the most basic theological level. In ally-
ing himself with a philosophical school that valued this doctrine as
highly as Christians, Lactantius was assuring that – at least on this
topic – his appeal would not fall on deaf ears. This may not be the
most appropriate way to articulate Christian theology for a systemat-
ic theologian but, for an apologist, it is essential.
A concern does arise, however, over the context in which Lac-
tantius frames the issue of providence in relation to aggiornamento.
Was the debate between the Stoics and Epicureans over provi-
dence a milieu sufficiently up-to-date to speak to Lactantius’ audi-
ence? By late-antiquity, was not Epicureanism relegated to an ency-
clopedia entry in the history of philosophy, a relic of the past?
Scholars have noted that Epicureanism, with its mere fringe popu-
larity at the time of Lactantius’ writing, would have hardly consti-
tuted a clear and present threat to Christianity. 82 Intellectually, the
disciples of Plato and Plotinus rather than Epicurus and Lucretius
were posing the heaviest resistance. But Lactantius’ apologetic goal,
at least in the Institutiones, was to author a treatise that would “over-
throw in one attack all [the accusers of justice] everywhere who are
writing or will have written.” 83 He intended this work to serve as a
handbook of Latin Christian apologetics. It was authored with the
express purpose of addressing and outlining the foundations of
both Christian belief and non-Christian error. Throughout the
work, Lactantius explores the history of certain erroneous beliefs in
order to ‘dig up the weeds at their roots,’ so to speak. In this way,
both present and future authors will be deprived of the resources
and material with which to combat Christianity. To claim that Lac-
82 Colish, The Stoic Tradition, vol. 2, 47; B. Farrington, The Faith of Epi-
curus (London, 1967), 146; J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New
York, 1978), 10.
83 DI 5.4.1 (BT 2009, 450–51): accusatores justitiae […] omnes, qui
ubique idem operis efficiunt aut effecerunt, uno semel impetu profliga-
rem. Cf. DI 5.4.2.
tantius was living hopelessly in the past, therefore, overlooks the

author’s stated goals. 84
The presence of the doctrine of providence in all three of Lac-
tantius’ treatises, especially the devotion shown to this topic in De
opifico Dei, and the admission that this doctrine should rightly come
first in a summa apologiae indicate that Lactantius viewed the defense
of general providence as a priority of the highest order. Having
thus examined his arguments supporting this doctrine, we can now
explore the import of providence in relation to Lactantius’ theolog-
ical vision as a whole. In the coming chapters we shall examine why
the apologist thought that “it will be necessary for us to talk about
the cleverness of divine providence throughout this entire work
[i.e., the Institutiones].” 85
84 For this criticism, see Stevenson, “Aspects of the Relations,” 502.

Other reasons for Lactantius’ animosity towards Epicureanism are the
presence of Lucretius in the standard Latin curriculum and that Epicure-
anism represents all forms of atheism to Lactantius. Cf. Casey, “Lactan-
tius’ Reaction,” 217–19.
85 DI 1.2.6 (BT 2005, 8): de sollertia divinae providentiae per totum
hoc opus quod […] dicere nos necesse est.

CHAPTER 4. LACTANTIUS’ DOCTRINE OF
GOD
I. THEOLOGY OF GOD
In the previous chapter we examined the types of arguments for
the existence of providence, or tropoi, used by the Stoics and their
appearance in the works of Lactantius. We concluded by noting
Lactantius’ dependence upon the Stoa for his material, especially
Cicero’s De natura deorum, and the suitability of adopting Stoic ma-
terial in order to advance his apologetic goals. In short, making use
of Stoic arguments is congruent with Lactantius’ method of pro-
ceeding from what is commonly held and believed by all to what is
held in greater suspicion and dispute. Having thus examined the
arguments for providence of which Lactantius makes use, we can
now treat the individual tenets of Lactantius’ theology in order to
discover how the doctrine of providence functions throughout his
thought. The remainder of this work, therefore, will be divided
topically according to the length and depth with which Lactantius
treats various aspects of Christian theology. In other words, Lac-
tantius himself is determining which topics are addressed by virtue
of their import to his accounting of the Christian faith. Thus, this
chapter examines Lactantius’ doctrine of God, chapter 5 treats Lac-
tantius’ anthropology, and chapter 6 addresses Lactantius’ under-
standing of salvation history. Divisions in this chapter have been
made according to God’s attributes and His activity ad extra. Thus,
Part I, Theology of God, will be divided according to the following
topics: (A.) God’s Oneness, (B.) God’s Transcendence, (C.) God’s Incorpore-
ity, (D.) God as Eternal Mind, and (E.) God and the Passions. Similarly,
Part II, God the Creator, will discuss Lactantius’ doctrine of crea-
tion as expressed positively, (A.) Creatio ex nihilo, and by way of ne-
gation, (B.) Refutation of Atomism, as well as treat Lactantius’ account
of the existence of evil, (C.) Theodicy.
93
A. God’s Oneness
The terms that Lactantius most frequently uses to describe God all
stem from His oneness; from His singular and unique mode of
existence. Demonstrating God’s oneness and providence is Lactan-
tius’ chief theological aim, especially in composing the Institutiones,
and are topics to which he returns throughout his works. Monothe-
ism is the first issue given extended and systematic treatment in the
Institutiones (DI 1.3.1ff.), and the apologist affirms that perfect wis-
dom lay in the knowledge of God’s oneness and providence (DI
2.8.71). Further, in the description of his apologetic method, Lac-
tantius states that the first positive step in Christian education is to
acknowledge that God is the one Creator of the universe (ID 2.2),
and it was for the purpose of making His unity publicly manifest
that God withheld punishment of the persecutors of Christianity
until the appropriate time (MP 1.7). In short, God’s oneness and
providence form the essence of Lactantius’ kerygma. 1
In the Institutiones (DI 1.2.1–6), Epitome (Epi. 2.1–8), and De ira
Dei (ID 13.1–14.6), treatment of God’s oneness is accompanied by
discussion of providence. In the first two treatises, arguments for
providence precede those for monotheism so that Lactantius might
progress from a topic which he believes to be universally held and
clear, to an issue of considerable obscurity and varying opinion
(Epi. 2.1). The interconnection between these two doctrines is ap-
parent by the way in which the apologist phrases the question of
monotheism in the Institutiones: “Whether the world is governed by
the power of one God or many?” 2 In other words, given that Lac-
tantius has already stated his case for the existence of divine provi-
dence, he now asks whether it is more reasonable to attribute this
providence to one God or many. Lactantius begins his response to
this question by offering several arguments of his own prior to
submitting the testimony of other authors.
At the start of the Institutiones, Lactantius argues that the pos-
sibility of there being more than one God is excluded based on the
1See Chapter 2, IV. Christian Truth. Cf. DI 7.6.1.

2DI 1.3.1 (BT 2005, 8): Utrum potestate unius dei mundus regatur
anne multorum?
4. LACTANTIUS’ DOCTRINE OF GOD 95
definition of God; as such, one might call this Lactantius’ ontologi-

cal argument for God’s oneness. 3 “If God is perfect, which He
must be, He cannot be so unless He is one, so that all things are in
Him.” 4 Those who argue for the existence of a plurality of gods
must believe that each deity has a certain limited amount of power
and virtue; for absolute power and virtue cannot exist in multiplici-
ty. For example, a king who retains control over his entire kingdom
possesses complete power. But if there should be a rival king, then
the two rulers would share a power that is naturally diminished (DI
1.3.5–6). Since each singular deity possesses diminished power,
therefore, none of them can be the supreme God, “who is eternal
mind, who is indeed of consummate perfection and virtue in every
way.” 5 In order for God to exist, therefore, He must by definition
be one.
Lactantius then addresses a number of potential objections to
his argument that relate directly to the issue of providence. First,
some may claim that the divine operations are shared among the
gods and, in this way, they govern the world together (DI 1.3.10). If
this were the case, contends Lactantius, then their powers would
admittedly be diminished and incomplete since none of them could
govern the world alone. “Thus, the governance of the world neces-
sitates the perfect virtue of one being, rather than the weakness of
many.” 6 Further, some may say that the world is far too vast and
complex to be the work of a single deity. But, Lactantius argues,
the grand and intricate workings of the universe ought to inspire
them to believe in one supreme God, rather than a plurality of less-
er divinities. For if we acknowledge that the universe could only be
3 On the reasonableness of referring to this type of argument as on-

tological, i.e., as an anticipation of the argument eventually made by An-
selm of Canterbury (Pros. 2), see Dragona-Monachou, The Stoic Arguments,
46, 92–96.
4 DI 1.3.7 (BT 2005, 9): Deus vero si perfectus est, ut esse debet,
non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia.

5 DI 1.3.3 (BT 2005, 9): qui est aeterna mens, ex omni utique parte
perfectae consummataeque virtutis est.

6 DI 1.3.11 (BT 2005, 10): Ita fit, ut ad regendum mundum unis per-
fecta virtute opus sit quam imbecillitate multorum.

created and sustained by the greatest of beings, then a single per-

fect God, rather than many less than perfect deities, must be the
Author of the natural world.
In essence, the apologist is attempting to persuade his audi-
ence to alter the very way in which they conceive of divinity. Rather
than thinking of the gods as personifications of the elements of
nature or individual qualities, Lactantius exhorts his audience to
contemplate the existence of a being who possesses every good
quality perfectly, who transcends the natural finitude of the created
order and, only by being such, is capable of creating and sustaining
that order. Part of the difficulty, the apologist admits, is that recog-
nition of such a being is accompanied by an acknowledgement of
our own human limitations. The pantheon of deities can be easily
explained as the anthropomorphic embodiments of natural phe-
nomena or virtuous ideals, but a God who is incorruptible and
eternal (DI 1.3.9), in whom exists all things, will naturally transcend
the limits of human imagination and expression (DI 1.3.14). “In
these matters we lack the perception and the words, because the
human heart can put into earthly language neither the light of an
intelligence so great nor the explanation of things so lofty.” 7
Despite the limitations of the human intellect, however, Lac-
tantius believes that the providential governance of the world is
ample evidence for belief in God’s oneness. The universe, accord-
ing to the apologist, functions as a unified and organic whole. This
order would not be possible unless it was ultimately governed by
the providence of a single divine mind and will. As has already
been stated, if there were many divine powers none would possess
the absolute perfection of the one God. They would therefore nat-
urally come into conflict, and discord would ensue since none of
them could assert supremacy over the others (DI 1.3.17). But the
7 DI 1.3.15 (BT 2005, 11): Qua in re quoniam et sensu deficimur et

verbis, quia neque tantam intellegentiae lucem pectus humanum neque
explanationem tantarum rerum capit lingua mortalis. On God’s incom-
prehensibility and ineffability see DI 1.1.5, 8.1–3; 7.5.11; Epi. 3.1, 53.2;
OD 13.2; ID 1.9, 11.6, 11. On His incorruptibility see DI 1.3.23; 2.8.44;
7.2.6; Epi. 3.1, and for His eternal nature consult DI 1.3.3; 2.8.44; 4.12.16;
5.23.2; 7.2.6; Epi. 3.1.
universe exists as a harmonious and integrated whole and, hence,

cannot be governed by a multitude of gods. “It is necessary, there-
fore, for the world to be governed by a single will. For unless pow-
er over the individual parts is referred to one providence, the whole
cannot exist intact; each one [god] would care for nothing greater
than what pertained to him.” 8 To further illustrate this point Lac-
tantius offers two analogies. If an army has more than one com-
mander then organization is impossible. Though there are many
distinctions of rank within the military, all members of the army
must ultimately be subject to one authority in order to function as a
whole (DI 1.3.19; cf. Epi. 2.4–6). Similarly, affirming the existence
of many gods is akin to believing that there are many minds in the
human person, each commanding the charge of a respective body
part. The human person, however, is able to function precisely be-
cause there is one mind controlling the entire body, and the same is
true of the universe. “For the governance of nature, unless it will
be by a single being to whom the care of the entire whole is re-
ferred, the universe would be undone and ruined.” 9
This argument for the oneness of God, based on the provi-
dential order of creation, is repeated elsewhere in Lactantius’ cor-
pus. As one might expect, there is a parallel passage contained in
the Epitome that condenses the prolixity of the original. “It is not
possible for all things to exist unless everything is referred to the
One, unless the One has governance, unless the One guides the
bridle and, as it were, one mind directs all the members of the uni-
verse.” 10 If multiple deities governed the world, argues Lactantius,
then it would most closely resemble a state of chaos, if it came to
be at all, rather than a patterned order of existence (Epi. 2.5). In De
8 DI 1.3.18 (BT 2005, 11): Unius igitur arbitrio mundum regi necesse
est. Nisi enim singularum partium potestas ad unam providentiam refera-
tur, non poterit summa ipsa constare, uno quoque nihil curante amplius
quam quod ad eum proprie pertinet.
9 DI 1.3.19 (BT 2005, 12): naturae imperio nisi unus fuerit ad quem
totius summae cura referatur, universa solventur et corruent.

10 Epi. 2.3 (BT 1994, 3): Nec potest aliter rerum summa consistere,
nisi ad unum cuncta referantur, nisi unus teneat gubernaculum, nisi unus
frena moderetur regatque universa membra tamquam mens una.
ira Dei, Lactantius again addresses the issue of God’s oneness. In

this version of the argument from providence the apologist omits
discussion of the alternative to monotheistic providence, i.e., how
governance of the cosmos would appear if it were in the care of the
gods, and instead focuses solely on the divine requirements for
order within the sphere of creation. Since all of nature harmonizes
into a unity, he asserts, “the God dwelling in the world is one; for
the whole body cannot be ruled and inhabited except by a single
mind. It is necessary, therefore, that all divine power be in the One
by whose nod and command all things are governed.” 11 He also
attempts to convince his audience of God’s unity by relying more
heavily on analogy. “It is not possible, therefore, for there to be
many rulers in this world, nor many lords in one house, nor many
pilots on one ship, nor many leaders in a herd or flock, nor many
kings in one swarm [of bees]. Neither is it possible for there to be
many suns in the sky, nor many souls in one body, even as the nat-
ural world harmonizes into a unity.” 12
In the Epitome and De ira Dei, Lactantius also recapitulates his
ontological argument for God’s oneness. In the former, the onto-
logical argument follows that from providence. Consequently, it
adopts a bit of the character of the argument from providence. The
governance of the world, according to Lactantius, requires an om-
nipotent and intelligent God. A multitude of deities, however, will
naturally possess limited individual powers and therefore be unable
to care for creation as a whole. “None of them [the gods] can be
called omnipotent, which is the true name of God, because he [the
deity] will only be able to care for what is in himself, but what is in
11 ID 11.5 (SC 289, 144): unum esse mundi habitatorem deum, si-
quidem corpus omne nisi ab una mente incoli regique non potest. (6)
Omnem igitur divinam potestatem necesse est in uno esse cujus nutu et
inperio regantur omnia. Cf. Epi. 2.4.
12 ID 11.4 (SC 289, 144): Non possunt igitur in hoc mundo multi
esse rectores nec in una domo multi domini nec in navi una multi guber-
natores nec in armento aut grege duces multi nec in uno examine multi
reges, sed ne in caelo quidem multi soles esse poterunt sicut nec animae
plures in uno corpore: adeo in unitatem natura universa consentit.
another he will not dare to manage.” 13 The true God, therefore, is

the being who is able to control all things throughout creation by
His omnipotence, rather than individual aspects of the natural
world. In De ira Dei, Lactantius’ ontological argument precedes that
from providence. In fact, the two arguments are so seamlessly wo-
ven together that it is difficult to know where one ends and the
other begins. The naturally limited capacities of a multitude of dei-
ties are again cited as the reason for their not fulfilling the defini-
tion of God, “in whom power and consummate might can be nei-
ther lessened nor altered.” 14 Consequently, based on these limita-
tions, the gods are eliminated as possible sources of the providen-
tial order of the world (ID 11.4–5).
B. God’s Transcendence
After providing the reader with his own arguments for God’s one-
ness in the Institutiones, Lactantius then employs the testimony of
various sources to support his thesis. 15 In addition to giving evi-
dence in favor of monotheism, these sources succeed in elaborating
on Lactantius’ doctrine of God as a whole; so much so that by
summarizing their content for the Epitome, the apologist gives us a
convenient résumé of his doctrine of God: “God, therefore, is one,
perfect, eternal, incorruptible, impassible, subject to nothing, Him-
self possessing all things, [and] governing all things. Neither the
power of the senses, the human mind, nor the eloquence of mortal
tongues can describe Him. He is far loftier and greater than is pos-
sible for the thoughts and words of humankind to comprehend.” 16
13 Epi. 2.6 (BT 1994, 3–4): Nullus igitur eorum poterit omnipotens
nuncupari, quod est verum cognomentum dei, quoniam id solum poterit,
quod in ipso est, quod autem in aliis, nec audebit attingere. On God’s
omnipotence see DI 1.1.15, 8.7, 19.3; 7.20.11, 26.5.
14 ID 11.3 (SC 289, 144): in quo vis et potestas consummate nec mi-
nui potest nec augeri.

15 See Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Divine Providence, A. The
Argument from Consensus. Cf. Nat. D. 2.5; Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the
Making of Religion, 82.
16 Epi. 3.1 (BT 1994, 4): Unus igitur deus est, perfectus aeternus, in-
corruptibilis impassibilis, nulli rei potestative subjectus, ipse omnia possi-

The negative attributes which Lactantius assigns to God (incorrupti-

bilis, impassibilis, incomprehensibilis) were no doubt influenced by the
Greek sources which the apologist cites in support of God’s one-
ness. With the exception of Orpheus, whom Lactantius counts
among the poets (DI 1.5.4–7), these sources all fall within the cate-
gory of divina testimonia, 17 and the evidence of their influence can be
seen in the author’s transmission of these texts in their original lan-
guage. Three words of particular import which Lactantius retains in
the Greek all pertain to God’s transcendence: ‘nameless’
(ἀνώνυμος), ‘unbegotten’ (ἀγένητος), and ‘self-begotten’
(αὐτογενής).
That God does not possess a proper name Lactantius attrib-
utes to Hermes Tresmigistus. “Should anyone require His name, he
[Trismegistus] says it is ‘nameless,’ since He does not need a proper
name because He is one. These are the words themselves: ‘god is
one, he that is one need not be named, for he that is is name-
less.’” 18 Names are needed, according to Lactantius, to indicate a
distinction between things of a similar kind. But since there is only
one omnipotent, omniscient and perfect Creator, a proper name
would be superfluous. In fact, ‘deus’ is God’s proper name (DI
1.6.5). This is in contrast to the cult of the gentiles where, for the
purposes of assigning divinity to the powers of nature, “they [phi-
losophers] erred in being led by common religious custom to trans-
fer a human name to a god.” 19 Referring to God as ‘nameless’
(ἀνώνυμος), therefore, signifies His singularly unique mode of ex-
dens, omnia regens, quem nec aestimare sensu valeat humana mens nec
eloqui lingua mortalis. Sublimior enim ac maior est quam ut possit aut
cogitatione hominis aut sermone comprehendi. On God’s impassibility
see also DI 1.3.23; 2.8.44.
17 See Chapter 2, III. Sources, D. Oracular Literature.
18 DI 1.6.4 (BT 2005, 22): Ac ne quis nomen ejus requireret,
ἀνώνυμος esse dixit, eo quod nominis proprietate non egat, ob ipsam scili-
cet unitatem. Ipsius haec verba sunt: ὁ δὲ ϑεὸς εἷς, ὁ δὲ εἷς ὀνόματος οὐ
προσδέεται · ἔστιν γὰρ ὁ ὢν ἀνώνυμος. Cf. Corp. Herm., vol. 4, fr. 3a; Ascl.
20; Ex 3:14; Epi. 4.5.
19 DI 1.11.38 (BT 2005, 49): vulgari consuetudine religionis inducti
erraverunt, quod in deum nomen hominis transtulerunt.

istence and, thereby, distinguishes Him from both the natural order
of finite creatures and the anthropomorphic deities of the Greco-
Roman pantheon.
The belief that God transcends the created order of being is
commonly expressed in Patristic theology by the word ἀγένητος or
ἀγέννητος, i.e., ‘unbegotten.’ 20 In Book 1 of the Institutiones, Lactan-
tius maintains fidelity to the Greek by quoting the word directly
from the Sibylline Oracles on two occasions. The first instance is
preceded by Lactantius’ description of the history and nature of the
Oracles (DI 1.6.6–14). He concludes the tale of their journey to
Rome by quoting the Erythrean Sibyl on God’s oneness: “In these
verses, which the envoys brought to Rome, we find this testimony
to the one God: ‘One god, who rules alone, the greatest, unbegot-
ten.’” 21 This evidence is also summarized in a parallel passage from
the Epitome: “‘there is one god,’ they [the Sibyls] say, ‘the source,
the creator, the parent, not generated by anything, but begetting
himself […].’” 22
When Lactantius uses the term ἀγένητος again, later in Book 1
of the Institutiones, the testimonies of Apollo and Seneca support
those of the Sibyl. “Truly it is impossible to have been created un-
less existence began at some time. Thus it follows that because
nothing was made before Him, He created Himself from Himself
before all things. Therefore, Apollo calls him ‘self-grown,’ and the
Sybil ‘self-begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ and ‘unmade.’ This is what
Seneca, that sharp man, saw in his Exhortations. ‘We,’ he says, ‘con-
sider ourselves from another. Thus we look back to someone else
to whom we may attribute what is the best in ourselves. By another
we were born, by another we were instructed; but god himself
20 For an examination of the word ἀγένητος in Patristic theology

consult G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: 1952), 37–54.
21 DI 1.6.15 (BT 2005, 27): In his ergo versibus quos Romam legati
attulerunt de uno deo haec sunt testimonia: εἷς ϑεός, ὃς μόνος ἄρχει,
ὑπερμεγέϑης ἀγένητος. Quot. Orac. Sib. fr. 1.7, 17; cf. Theoph. Ad Autol.
112c.
22 Epi. 5.3 (BT 1994, 7): ‘unum deum esse’ testantur, ‘principem
conditorem partentem, non ab ullo generatum, sed a se ipso satum […]’.

made himself.’” 23 Further evidence of God’s self-generation is pro-

vided by Apollo, who describes God as “‘self-grown, untaught,
unmothered [and] undisturbed,’” 24 Hermes Trismegistus, who calls
God “‘unfathered,’ because his origin is not from another,” 25 and
Orpheus, for saying that God is “‘first-born,’ because nothing was
begotten before Him, yet all things were begotten from Him.” 26
Taken together, the Greek terminology that Lactantius em-
ploys illustrates two aspects of God’s transcendence. First, the
terms used in reference to God’s self-origination, such as ‘self-
begotten’ (αὐτογενής), or ‘self-grown’ (αὐτοφυής), signify God’s
reliance upon nothing other than Himself for His existence. God’s
mode of being is absolute, perfect and unchanging. As such, de-
pendence on contingent creatures would infringe upon His perfec-
tion. “Neither His origin nor His birth depends upon any other
thing which could dissolve him by its alteration. He exists from
Himself, as we said in Book 1, and for that reason He is of such a
kind as He wished Himself to be: impassible, immutable, incor-
ruptible, blessed and eternal.” 27
23 DI 1.7.13 (BT 2005, 31–32): Verum quia fieri non potest, quin id
quod sit aliquando esse coeperit, consequens est ut, quoniam nihil ante
illum fuit, ipse ante omnia ex se ipso sit procreatus, ideoque ab Apolline
αὐτοφυής, a Sibylla αὐτογενής et ἀγένητος et ἀποίητος nominatur. Quod
Seneca homo acutus in Exhortationibus vidit. ‘Nos’ iniquit ‘aliunde pende-
mus. Itaque ad aliquem respicimus, cui quod est optimum in nobis
debeamus. Alius nos edidit, alius instruxit; deus ipse se fecit.’ Cf. Fonten-
rose, Didyma, 223–25, fr. 51; Orac. Sib. fr. 1.7, 17; Vottero, I Frammenti,
202, fr. 87.
24 DI 1.7.1 (BT 2005, 28): αὐτοφυὴς ἀδίδακτος ἀμήτωρ
ἀστυφέλικτος. Cf. Fontenrose, Didyma, 223–25, fr. 51.

25 DI 1.7.2 (BT 2005, 27–28): ἀπάτορα […] quod origo illi non sit
aliunde. Cf. Corp. Herm., vol. IV, fr. 4a.

26 DI 1.5.4 (BT 2005, 15): πρωτόγονον […], quod ante ipsum nihil sit
genitum, sed ab ipso sint cuncta generata. Cf. Abel, Orphica, fr. 57.
27 DI 2.8.44 (BT 2005, 157): nec orts ac nativitas ejus ex aliqua re al-
tera pendet, quae illum mutata dissolvat. Ex se ipso est, ut in primo dixi-
mus libro et ideo talis est qualem esse se voluit, impassibilis immutabilis
Second, the negative attributes listed in relation to God’s asei-

ty, such as ‘unbegotten’ (ἀγένητος), or ‘unmade’ (ἀποίητος), con-
note His lack of origin in the created order. Everything in the tem-
poral world derives its being from another source. But God, being
perfectly self-subsistent, has no source of being other than Himself.
His mode of existence cannot be attributed to any cause within the
temporal order of being. Thus, it can be said that God is “that
which is not made,” 28 since ‘to be made’ implies causality within
the order of creation. “He is the one, only, free and highest God;
lacking origin because He Himself is the origin of created be-
ings.” 29 God’s existence, therefore, is neither contingent upon nor
derived from finite beings.
C. God’s Incorporeity (Excursus)

Though the topic of God’s corporeality diverts us, for the moment,
from an examination of the divine attributes which stem from
God’s oneness as articulated in Book 1 of the Institutiones, it is nev-
ertheless worthy of an excursus at this point. Such is the case be-
cause the matter has not been without recent debate and a few
words of clarification are certainly in order. 30 In Book 7 of the Insti-
incorruptus beatus aeternus. Cf. DI 1.7.13. On God’s impassibility and

immutability see also DI 1.3.23; 2.8.38; Epi. 3.1.
28 DI 2.8.44 (BT 2005, 157): qui factus non est.
29 DI 4.29.12 (BT 2007, 430): Unus est enim, solus, liber, deus sum-
mus, carens origine, quia ipse est origo rerum.

30 Marcia Colish maintains that Lactantius believes that “God has a
material nature” (The Stoic Tradition, vol. 2, 40). Cf. G. Verbeke, L’Évolution
de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoicïsme à S. Augustin (New York: 1987), 469–82.
As evidence Colish cites the following passage from DI 2.9.16 (BT 2005,
166): Nam cum virtus dei sit in calore et igni, nisi ardorem vimque ejus
admixta umoris ac frigoris materia temperasset, nec nasci quidquam nec
cohaerere potuisset, quin statim conflagratione interiret quidquid esse
coepisset. Vincenzo Loi interprets this statement as referring to God’s
power (virtus, vim), rather than His nature (Lattanzio, 130). The present
author agrees with his assessment. Cf. Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian
Tradition. Volume One: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451) (Atlanta:
John Knox, 1975), 196.
tutiones, on two occasions, Lactantius plainly states his belief in

God’s incorporeity. The first instance occurs amid a refutation of
Stoic pantheism, and Lactantius declares that God is “separated
from a body and free.” 31 The apologist next mentions God’s incor-
poreity in an argument defending the immortality of the soul. “But
if God is incorporeal, invisible and eternal, then it is not credible
that the soul is destroyed.” 32 Similarly, when describing how it is
possible that souls can be tormented after death, Lactantius states
that only God has the power to do so since both souls and God
“live only in the spirit.” 33 The evidence for Lactantius’ belief in
God’s incorporeity often appears in connection with the incorpore-
ity of the soul. For example, in his attack on the Greco-Roman
cult, the apologist affirms that true worship is the praise of a pure
soul because an incorporeal God has no use for corporeal sacrifices
and idols (DI 6.25.7). A parallel passage from the Epitome contains
the essence of this argument more succinctly: “But just as it is nec-
essary to sacrifice corporeal things to the corporeal, so too it is
necessary to sacrifice incorporeal things to the incorporeal.” 34 In De
ira Dei, the apologist also cites Pythagoras as confirming belief in
one incorporeal God (ID 11.14; cf. Cic. Nat. D. 1.27; Min. Fel.
19.6).
Lactantius does, however, vehemently disagree with those
who would affirm that God has no ‘form’ (figura/forma) (ID 2.5,
18.13). He ascribes belief in a formless deity to the Stoics, and the
apologist demurs at offering a rebuttal to their position due to the
constraints of time and space (ID 18.13). He fails to elaborate on
31 DI 7.3.4 (BT 2011, 649): a corpore soluta et libera. Cf. Tusc. 1.66.
32 DI 7.9.7 (BT 2011, 676): Quodsi est deus et incorporalis et invisi-
blis et aeternus, ergo non idcirco interire animam credibile est.
33 DI 7.21.2 (BT 2011, 714): in solis spiritibus vivunt. Lactantius is
explicit about the incorporeity of both. DI 7.21.2 (BT 2011, 714): a solidis
et corporalibus nullam vim pati possunt.
34 Epi. 53.1 (BT 1994, 80): Sed sicut corporalis corporalia, sic utique
incorporali incorporale sacrificium necessarium est.

precisely what he means by ‘form’ and why it ought to be ascribed

to the divine nature. 35
The immediate context of his remark is in relation to the hu-
man person being made in the ‘likeness’ (similtudinem) of God. Lac-
tantius states that this likeness is not in relation to God’s form but
His ‘spirit’ (animo) (ID 18.13). “If it belongs to God to think, to
understand, to foresee, to excel, and these things the human person
alone possesses from all living creatures, he was made therefore in
the likeness of God.” 36 The distinction that Lactantius draws in this
passage between God’s forma/figura and animo is not, however,
without ambiguity. Elsewhere the apologist affirms that the human
person is made in the ‘form’ (figuram) and ‘image’ (figmentum) of
God (DI 6.12.30). What is clear from these excerpts is that the
terms forma and figura did not possess codified and uniform mean-
ings for Lactantius. Rather, their signification is determined by the
specific context in which they are used. 37
As mentioned, in the text from De ira Dei chapter 18, Lactan-
tius’ immediate concern is with the Stoic claim of God’s formless-
ness. What Lactantius most likely has in mind is the Stoic-
Epicurean debate concerning God’s form and whether God has a
corporeal human form, the Epicurean claim, or is formless, the
Stoic position (cf. Nat. D. 1.48, 76, 90; 2.70ff.). Nowhere does the
apologist affirm the Epicurean belief in God’s anthropomorphic
35 In the scholastic era Thomas Aquinas will give a formal explana-

tion. Cf. STh I, q. 3, a. 2 (Textum Leoninum): Est igitur per essentiam
suam [deum] forma; et non compositus ex materia et forma.
36 ID 18.14 (SC 289, 186): Si deo subjacet cogitare sapere intellegere
providere praestare, ex omnibus autem animalibus homo solus haec ha-

bet, ergo ad dei similitudinem factus est.
37 Vincenzo Loi points out that Lactantius is using the words figura
and forma as synonyms. The Greek equivalents, however, connoted re-

spective philosophical meanings. Figura, or σχἦμα, simply expressed the
relationship between parts to each other and to a whole. Forma, or μορφή,
on the other hand, Christian authors adopted at an early stage to signify
God’s concrete existing reality (Lattanzio, 39). Cf. Prestige, God in Patristic
Thought, 13ff.
figure. 38 The divine formlessness of the Stoics, however, did not

account for God’s aseity but placed the divine nature within the
realm of the cosmos. 39 Lactantius must have viewed affirmation of
God’s form, therefore, as a counter to Stoic pantheism. 40 Indeed,
Lactantius believes that form is given to nature by God and is not
something which nature per se possesses. “But to say, as others do,
that the world was brought about by nature, which lacks sense and
form, this is quite truly absurd.” 41 If divine form exists inde-
pendently from both nature and the human person, therefore, it is
reasonable to suggest that, at least in De irae Dei, Lactantius is using
the terms forma and figura to signify God’s transcendent self-
subsisting reality, accepting neither the Epicurean nor the Stoic
sense of ‘form.’
D. God as Eternal Mind

In Book 1 of the Institutiones, Lactantius also employs the humana
testimonia of the poets and philosophers as part of the amplificatio to
his thesis that God is one. Aside from Orpheus, the Greek poets
offer little help in this regard (DI 1.5.3–7). Homer was concerned
primarily with the human rather than the divine, and Hesiod was
too frightened to probe more deeply into the truth of creation (DI
1.5.8–10). The best of Latin poets, however, supply Lactantius with
evidence of a providential divinity. Vergil is nearest the truth in
calling God ‘mind’ (mentem) and ‘spirit’ (spiritum) (DI 1.5.11; quot.
Aen 6.724–27), and acknowledging His presence in all of creation
(DI 1.5.12; quot. G. 4.221–24). Ovid offers similar evidence for
God’s creative activity, calling Him the “‘craftsman of the world’
and ‘maker of things.’” 42
Turning to the philosophers, Lactantius’ evidence is derived
primarily from a doxographical survey provided by Cicero (Nat. D.
38 By comparison, see Pseudo-Clem. Hom. 16.19.

39 Cf. Nat. D. 1.36; 2.46; Diog. Laert. 7.148.
40 On Lactantius’ rejection of Stoic pantheism see DI 2.5.7ff.; 7.3.1ff.
41 ID 10.34 (SC 289, 136): At enim, sicut alii dicunt, natura mundus
effectus est quae sensu et figura caret. Hoc vero multo est absurdius.
42 DI 1.5.13 (BT 2005, 17): quem ‘fabricatorem mundi’, quem ‘rerum
opificem’. Cf. Met. 1.57, 79.

1.25ff.) and filtered through Minucius Felix (Min. Fel. 19.3–14).

Though in De natura deorum this doxography is articulated through
the voice of the Epicurean Velleius for the purpose of refutation,
both Minucius Felix and Lactantius (DI 1.5.15–27; Epi. 4.1–5; ID
11.11–15) employ it to support belief in one God. 43 The first phi-
losopher to be mentioned by Lactantius is Thales of Milteus, one
of the famed Seven Sages, who asserts that God is the ‘mind’
(mentem) responsible for the creation of life from water (DI 1.5.16;
cf. Epi. 4.3; ID 11.12; Nat. D. 1.25; Min. Fel. 19.4). Likewise, Py-
thagorus believes that God is the animating and rational principle
(animus) diffused throughout all of nature from which all beings
draw life (DI 1.5.17; cf. Epi. 4.3; ID 11.12, 14; Nat. D. 1.27; Min.
Fel. 19.6). “Anaxagoras says that God is an infinite self-moving
mind,” 44 and Antisthenes affirms that there is only one being who
is God by nature, the Creator of the universe (DI 1.5.18; cf. ID
11.14; Min. Fel. 19.7). Chrysippus and Zeno, the early pioneers of
the Stoa, also support Lactantius’ thesis. The former states that
God is “the force of nature endowed with divine reason,” 45 and the
latter refers to God as “natural and divine law.” 46 Aristotle, despite
contradicting himself in many places, also acknowledges that the
world is ultimately governed by one ‘mind’ (mentem) (DI 1.5.22; cf.
Epi. 4.2; ID 11.15 ; Nat. D. 1.33; Min. Fel. 19.9). Plato is given the
final place of honor in this enumeration. He is especially credited
for his clarity of thinking in affirming the unity of God under the
name of God, rather then under one of the many pseudonyms em-
ployed by other philosophers (DI 1.5.23; cf. Epi. 4.1; ID 11.11, 13;
Nat. D. 1.30; Min. Fel. 19.14; Pl. Ti. 28c).
With this survey complete Lactantius now turns his focus on
philosophers from the Latin tradition. The apologist states that his
43 Cf. Pease, 203–04; Clarke, 265 n. 236; Hermann Diels, ed., Doxo-
graphi Graeci (Berlin & Leipzig: 1929), 531–50.
44 DI 1.5.18 (BT 2005, 18): Anaxagoras deum esse dicit infinitam
mentem quae per se ipsa moveatur. Cf. Nat. D. 1.26; Min. Fel. 19.6.
45 DI 1.5.20 (BT 2005, 19): nateralem vim divina ratione praeditam.
Cf. Epi. 4.3; Nat. D. 1.39; Min. Fel. 19.10–11.

46 DI 1.5.20 (BT 2005, 19): naturalem divinamque legem. Cf. Epi.
4.3; ID 11.15; Nat. D. 1.26; Min. Fel. 19.10.

mentor, Cicero, acknowledges the existence of God on several oc-

casions (DI 1.5.24). Specifically, Lactantius cites De legibus for call-
ing God ‘supreme’ (supremum) (DI 1.5.24; cf. Cic. Leg. 1.22), and
provides two quotations to further illustrate Cicero’s insight; nei-
ther of which directly address the issue of monotheism. The first
quotation is taken from Balbus’ argument for the existence of
providence in De natura deorum: “‘Nothing is superior to god. It is,
therefore, necessary that the world be governed by him. God is
subject or obedient to nothing in nature. He, therefore, governs all
of nature himself.’” 47 Lest there be any confusion over the nature
of this providential divinity, Lactantius inserts an additional quota-
tion concerning Cicero’s definition of God. According to the great
rhetorician, God is “‘mind liberated from things and free, separated
from all mortal accretions, perceiving and moving all things.’” 48
Lastly, Seneca describes God as the ‘leader’ (rectorem) of the uni-
verse, “‘the god of all the gods,’” 49 who guides and is extended
throughout all of creation. 50
Lactantius admits that the findings of the poets and philoso-
phers may be inconclusive in that they fail to establish a uniform
understanding of the divine nature (DI 1.5.21). In fact, many of the
authors cited do not directly address the issue of monotheism at all.
While they may differ on their particular names for God, however,
Lactantius argues that they are all unambiguously clear in attrib-
uting to a single supreme being the providential order of the uni-
verse (DI 1.5.21). In other words, while they may be deficient in
their understandings of certain aspects of the divine nature, they all
47 DI 1.5.24 (BT 2005, 20): ‘Nihil est praestantius deo, ab eo igitur

mundum regi necesse est. Nulli igitur est naturae obediens aut subjectus
deus. Omnem ergo regit ipse naturam.’ Quot. Nat. D. 2.77; cf. Pease, 747;
Epi. 4.3.
48 DI 1.5.25 (BT 2005, 20): ‘mens soluta quaedem et libera, segregata
ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens.’ Cf. C. Vitelli, ed.

M. Tullii Ciceronis Consolationis fragmenta (Mondadori: 1979), 50, fr. 21; Cic.
Tusc. 1.66.
49 DI 1.5.26 (BT 2005, 21): ‘deorum omnium deum.’ Cf. Vottero, I
Frammenti, 176, fr. 61.

50 DI 1.5.27; cf. Epi. 4.3; Vottero, I Frammenti, 200, fr. 86a.
agree that providence is a divine attribute exercised by a being who

is fundamentally one. Further, because the existence of providence
is the defining activity of this being, it is most appropriately de-
scribed as ‘eternal mind’ (aeterna mens) (DI 7.3.4; cf. Tusc. 1.66); since
order is the product of intelligence and will. Thus, in this portion
of his argument, nearly all of Lactantius’ sources abound with the
language of rationality (e.g., ratio, mens, intellegere, cognitare).
Beyond the passages that we have examined from Book 1 of
the Institutiones, Lactantius repeatedly argues from the providential
order of creation to the existence of God as eternal mind. For ex-
ample, in chapter 2 of Book 1, the apologist commends the Stoic
school for its belief that “it would not have been possible for the
world to be made or to endure without divine reason, unless it is
governed by ultimate reason.” 51 Likewise, in his attack on the phil-
osophical schools that reject the doctrine of providence, Lactantius
maintains that “it is necessary for a divine mind to exist which, by
its providence, all things are first given life.” 52 And in De ira Dei,
Lactantius employs his rhetorical skills to ask his audience if “it is
possible to think that they [the wonders of the world] were brought
about by no plan, no providence, no divine reason?” 53 Thus, Lac-
tantius consistently argues from the doctrine of providence towards
a concept of God which organically emerges from it; namely, God
as the necessary aeterna mens who created and governs the universe.
E. God and the Passions

Before examining Lactantius’ doctrine of God as it relates to His
activity ad extra, i.e., the doctrine of creation, a more thorough ex-
amination of the topic of divine impassibility is worth noting. Lac-
tantius found this issue vexing enough to author an entire treatise
on the passions in God and, as we shall see, the doctrine of provi-
51 DI 1.2.2 (BT 2005, 7): nec fieri mundum sine divina ratione
potuisse nec constare, nisi summa ratione regeretur.
52 DI 3.28.5 (BT 2007, 300): necesse est mentem esse divinam, quae
sua providentia nascendi principium rebus omnibus praebeat.

53 ID 10.32 (SC 289, 136): potest existimare nullo effecta esse consil-
io, nulla providentia, nulla ratione divina. On God’s rationality see also DI
1.8.2–3; 7.3.4; OD 2.1; ID 10.31–36, 24.6.
dence figures prominently in the apologist’s defense of God’s

wrath.
As mentioned above, impassibility is a quality Lactantius be-
lieves God must possess in order to be God. By definition, God is
a being of complete and utter perfection and, as such, is one, eter-
nal, immortal and transcendent. “If the name of God is supreme
power, He must be incorruptible, perfect, impassible and subject to
nothing.” 54 Based on such reasoning, however, Lactantius’ teacher
and fellow apologist Arnobius concluded that anger is incompatible
with divine perfection (cf. Adv. nat. 7.5). According to Cicero, Ar-
nobius’ conclusion is congruent with the universal opinion of clas-
sical philosophy. “All the philosophers agree that […] god is never
angry or harmful.” 55 Lactantius authored De ira Dei with the opin-
ions of these philosophers, especially the Epicureans, specifically in
mind. 56 He is concerned with the influence they exert over individ-
uals with a certain degree of education (ID 1.2) and, because their
mistaken notion of divine anger “overthrows the condition of hu-
man life,” 57 Lactantius feels compelled to address the issue.
The doctrine of providence supports Lactantius’ defense of
God’s anger most acutely when addressing the Epicurean claim
that God possesses neither anger nor kindness. According to the
apologist, Epicurus’ desire to affirm an impassible and completely
self-subsistent God led him to exclude any possible likeness or
analogy between God and human beings, excerpt for corporeality.
According to Epicurus, God “‘is blessed and incorruptible because
54 DI 1.3.23 (BT 2005, 13): Nam si deus nomen est summae potesta-
tis, incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus impassibilis nulli rei subjectus. Cf.
2.8.44; Epi. 3.1.
55 Off. 3.102 (LCL 30, 378): Commune est omnium philosophorum
[…] numquam nec irasci deum nec nocere.

56Cf. ID 1.1–4. Nowhere does Lactantius mention heterodox Chris-
tians as a possible target of rebuke.

57 ID 1.2 (SC 289, 90): ad evertendum vitae humanae statum.
he cares for nothing, he has neither concern for himself nor does
he display it for others.’” 58
Lactantius believes that Epicurus’ theological view is the natu-
ral outcome of not wanting to attribute wrath to God. Once Epicu-
rus had excluded the possibility of anger in God, “he could not
stop the consequences, because with one affection severed necessi-
ty itself compelled him also to remove the other affections from
God.” 59 Lactantius argues that Epicurus’ position cannot be true
because it denies God the important divine activites most proper to
Him. 60 If God possesses neither kindness nor wrath, and if He
cares for nothing, then providence is also not counted among His
attributes. “But if there are no affections in God, because whatever
is affected is weak, then neither is there care for anything nor prov-
idence in Him.” 61 Further, providence is such an integral part of
God’s divine activity that denying it renders the definition of God
unintelligible. What is God if not the provident Creator and Sus-
tainer of the world? “What could be greater, what could be more
exalted than to assign to God’s administration than the governance
of the world? […] What is so worthy or appropriate to God as
providence? But if He cares for nothing, provides nothing, He has
lost all divinity.” 62 In essence, God without divine providence is
58 ID 4.2 (SC 289, 98): beatus est et incorruptus, quia nihil curat
neque ipse habet negotium neque alteri exhibet. Cf. Usener, 243–44, fr.
365; Nat. D. 1.45, 85; DI 3.12.15.
59 ID 4.10 (SC 289, 102): non poterat consequentia resecare, quia
uno adfectu amputato etiam ceteros adfectus adimere deo necessitas ipsa
cogebat.
60 See Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Divine Providence, B. Re-
61 ID 4.12 (SC 289, 102): Quod si nullus adfectus in deo est, quia
sponding to Opponents.
quidquid adficitur inbecillum est, ergo nec cura ullius rei nec providentia
est in eo.
62 ID 4.4 (SC 289, 100): Et quae maior, quae dignior administratio
deo adsignari potest quam mundi gubernatio […]. (5) Quid tam dignum,
tam proprium deo quam providentia? (6) Sed si nihil curat, nihil providet,
amisit omnem divinitatem. Qui ergo totam vim, totam substantiam deo
tollit, quid aliud dicit nisi deum omnino non esse? Cf. 17.4; Nat. D. 2.76.
tantamount to no God at all. If “there is neither care nor provi-

dence in Him, nor some thought nor any sense in Him, it follows
that He does not exist at all.” 63 In eliminating all of the affections
in God, therefore, Epicurus has rendered God an impotent hy-
pothesis.
If God must possess affections in order to be God, then, what
sort of affections does He possess? Lactantius believes that both
wrath and kindness must be in God, the former flowing from the
latter (ID 6.1), because of His providential care over creation and
especially for human beings. “If He truly has care over the world,
then God cares for the life of a person and takes notice of the
deeds of individuals, and earnestly wishes that they be wise and
good. This is the will of God, this is the divine law; which those
who follow and observe are dear to God. It is therefore necessary
that God be moved by wrath against one who violates and spurns
this eternal and divine law.” 64
The divine wrath to which Lactantius refers, however, is not
to be equated with the passionate and intemperate emotion human
beings often experience. This is where the philosophers erred,
many of whom could not distinguish between righteous indigna-
tion and the desire for vengeance. Seneca, for example, defined
anger as “‘the desire to avenge injury,’” 65 and Posidonius, Aristotle
and Cicero provide similar definitions (ID 17.13, 20; cf. Arist. De
an. 403a; Cic. Tusc. 4.21). These accounts of anger cannot be appli-
cable to God, however, since God cannot be injured in any way
(ID 17.14). Righteous indignation, on the other hand, Lactantius
63ID 4.13 (SC 289, 102): quia nec cura sit in eo nec providentia, ergo
nec cogitationem aliquam nec sensum in eo esse ullum; quo efficitur ut
non sit omnino.
64 ID 17.4 (SC 289, 174): Si vero mundi curam gerit, curat igitur ho-
minum vitam deus et singulorum actus animadverit eosque sapientes ac

bonus esse desiderat. (5) Haec est voluntas dei, haec divina lex; quam qui
sequitur, qui observat, deo carus est. Necesse est igitur ut ira moveatur
deus adversus eum qui hanc aeternam divinamque legem aut violaverit aut
spreverit.
65 ID 17.13 (SC 289, 178): cupiditas ulciscendae injuriae. Cf. Sen. Ira
1.2.
defines as “a movement of the mind arising for the restraint of

sins.” 66 This God possesses in order to chastise and purify those
who transgress His divine law. Just as a father reproves the mem-
bers of his household in order to instill discipline and foster virtue,
so too does God correct and restrain the wicked in order to estab-
lish justice (ID 17.16–17).
There are affections that God does not possess, such as ‘lust’
(libido), ‘fear’ (timor), ‘greed’ (avaritia), ‘grief’ (maeror), and ‘envy’ (in-
vidia), because they are vicious. But those affections which we
reckon virtues, such as ‘righteous indignation’ (ira in malos), ‘love of
the good’ (caritas in bonos) and ‘mercy’ (miseratio), exist in God in way
which is perfectly ‘just and appropriate’ (proprios et justos) (ID 16.7)
to Himself. All of the affections, as human beings experience them,
can be either good or bad. They exist as part of the gift of reason
and can be used in a manner that is either congruent with or con-
trary to reason (ID 17.12). Lactantius analogically applies divine
anger to God, therefore, in a way similar to all of the virtues. It is
counted among the greatest of human qualities to be ‘wise’ (sapere),
‘intelligent’ (intellegere) and ‘foreseeing’ (providere), and these virtues
are credited to the God who made humanity in His own image (ID
18.14; cf. Gn 1:26–27). Thus righteous indignation, a virtue that is
part of the gift of reason, should also be attributed to God. Lactan-
tius maintains divine impassibility, therefore, by analogically attrib-
uting divine anger to God as a virtue of the divine mens stemming
from His providential love for humanity.
II. GOD THE CREATOR
A. Creatio ex nihilo
When examining Lactantius’ doctrine of creation one must keep in
mind the distinction between the apologist’s refutatio and expositio.
Because his positive theology of creation is more easily treated in
conjunction with his theodicy and anthropology, what will be ad-
dressed in this section is derived from Lactantius’ refutation of er-
66 ID 17.20 (SC 289, 180): motus animi ad coercenda peccata insur-

gentis.
roneous theories of creation. What will emerge from these argu-

ments is Lactantius’ doctrine of God as it relates to His activity ad
extra. It should come as no surprise, then, that what is revealed
about God in the act of creation resonates well with the analogy of
God as aeterna mens which we have already encountered.
Lactantius’ belief in God’s creation of the world from nothing
is mentioned on several occasions throughout his works (DI 1.3.13;
2.5.5; 7.27.5; ID 10.16; Epi. 22.2). An extended treatment of the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is given in Book 2 of the Institutiones as
part of the apologist’s presentation of Judeo-Christian cosmology.
In this portion of the text, Lactantius first acknowledges that the
poets provide little support since their creation accounts begin with
chaos (DI 2.8.8; cf. 1.5.8; Ov. Met. 1.7ff.). Surprisingly, many of the
philosophers have fallen into the same error – including Cicero (DI
2.8.9)! In the now lost portion of De natura deorum, through the
voice of the Skeptic Cotta, Cicero argues that a providential ac-
count of creation is in no way demonstrable from the effects of
nature (DI 2.8.10–11; cf. Pease, 1229). For if God created the cos-
mos He most likely did so by ordering already existing material, like
a craftsman or shaper of wax. 67 Lactantius first suggests that Cicero
consult his own works for convincing material in support of the
doctrine of providence. “For no one can refute Cicero as vehe-
mently as Cicero.” 68
The apologist then turns his attention towards Cotta’s under-
standing of the divine nature. In Lactantius’ estimation, by asserting
that it is more probable that God created the world from pre-
existing material, Cotta has failed to understand the definition of
God. First, Cotta conceives of God as a being who is, essentially,
superhuman rather than divine. If God created the universe in the
same way that human beings create objects of art, then no qualita-
tive difference exists between God and humanity (DI 2.8.17). Hu-
man beings would differ from God only in relation to their acci-
dents rather than their substance, argues Lactantius, which cannot
67 See Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Divine Providence, B. Re-
68 DI 2.8.13 (BT 2005, 152): Nec enim poterit ab ullo Cicero quam a
sponding to Opponents.
Cicerone vehementius refutari.

be the case. Further, since God is He “who by necessity is perfect

in virtue, power and reason,” 69 He not only transcends the capaci-
ties of human nature but also those of every existing being. But if
God were in need of existing material in order to create then His
‘power’ (virtutis) would be imperfect and flawed (DI 2.8.17). If God
exists and is perfect, then He must have created the universe from
nothing lest His perfection be compromised. “For it is wrong for
God to have created from something else because from Himself
and in Himself are all things.” 70
Lactantius then responds to the claim that nature is self-
generating and self-organizing. If this were the case, according to
Lactantius, then Cotta is merely referring to God by another name.
“For if it [nature] is capable of generation and creation, it therefore
has reason and on that account must be God. Nor can there be any
other name for His power, in which there exists both the provi-
dence for thinking and the skill and capacity for creating.” 71 If ‘na-
ture’ possesses the capacities to create intrinsically, then it is merely
a synonym for ‘God.’ If it does not possess the capacity to create,
however, then the activity of God is necessary for the act of crea-
tion. In either case, God, who “is endowed with sense, reason,
providence, power and virtue,” 72 is the Author of creation. The
Stoics who identified God with nature, such a Seneca, were at least
clear-sighted enough to realize that only a divine agent could create
(DI 2.8.23).
Having demonstrated the impossibility of matter being self-
generating, the apologist then turns his attention to the idea of pre-
existing matter. Lactantius excludes the possibility of pre-existing
69 DI 2.8.19 (BT 2005, 153): quem necesse est perfectae esse virtutis
potestatis rationis.
70 DI 2.8.29 (BT 2005, 155): Quia nefas est deum aliunde aliquid mu-
tari, cum ex ipso vel in ipso sint omnia.

71 DI 2.8.21 (BT 2005, 153–54): si autem generandi et faciendi po-
tens est, habet ergo consilium et propterea deus sit necesse est, (22) nec
alio nomine appellari potest ea vis, in qua inest et providentia excogitandi
et sollertia potestasque faciendi.
72 DI 2.8.40 (BT 2005, 156): sensu ratione providentia potestate vir-
tute praeditus est.

matter on the grounds that, should matter have an existence inde-

pendent of God, then both God and matter would be eternal be-
ings (DI 2.8.31). Two diametrically opposed and contrary forces
cannot exist eternally, however, because “unity is the nature of the
eternal.” 73 Therefore, either God created matter or matter created
God. Of these two possibilities, only God has the capacity to cre-
ate, because He alone possesses ‘sense’ (sensu), ‘providence’ (ratione
provisum) and ‘will’ (voluntatem) (DI 2.8.33–35). The ability to create
necessarily implies the existence of a creative agent who possesses
the cognitive capacity to create, the ability to provide for creation,
and the will to act. God, not matter, possesses these characteristics
and therefore, only God can be the Creator of the world. Further,
we observe in all living creatures of the natural world an element of
the gift of ‘reason’ (ratione) (DI 2.8.36; cf. ID 7.10). If matter does
not possess reason, however, then it cannot be the source of rea-
son either in the natural world or in God. “Therefore, God was not
born from matter because what is endowed with sense cannot
come from the insensible, nor the wise from the irrational, nor the
impassible from the passible, nor can one lacking a body arise from
the corporeal. Rather, matter is from God.” 74
Lactantius also makes further arguments against the eternity
of matter based on the nature of material existence. Everything that
is material is, by nature, corruptible; and everything that is cor-
ruptible was born at some time. Since, therefore, the material of
creation was born at some time, it is necessary that its origin be
found in that which is immaterial, eternal and transcendent. The
source for matter must therefore be “some perceiving and foresee-
ing agent, an expert at creating. This can be no one other than
God.” 75 In addition, that which is eternal is also unchangeable. If
matter existed eternally then it could not have been altered in the
73DI 2.8.32 (BT 2005, 155): aeterni natura sit simplex.

74DI 2.8.38 (BT 2005, 156): Non ergo deus ex materia, quia sensu
praeditum ex insensibilis, sapiens ex bruto, impatibile de patibili, expers
corporis de corporali numquam potest oriri, sed material potius ex deo
est.
75 DI 2.8.39 (BT 2005, 156): aliquem sentientem providum peritum-
que faciendi. Is est profecto nec ullus alius quam deus.

act of creation. But since the world is comprised of material beings,

matter was most certainly altered by the act of creation. Matter,
therefore, cannot be eternal (DI 2.8.42). Rather, He who created
matter is eternal, unchangeable and impassible (DI 2.844). “God
alone, therefore, is He who is not made. For that reason He can
destroy anything, but He Himself cannot be destroyed.” 76
In lieu of explicit philosophical support for the doctrine of cre-
atio ex nihilo (DI 2.8.9), the apologist next provides his audience
with doxographical confirmation of the doctrine of providence. He
does so because, having argued for the impossibility of the pre-
existence and self-generative capacities of matter, and given the
existence of God (DI 2.8.11), Lactantius views the doctrine of
providence as his final argument in favor of creatio ex nihilo. In other
words, if God is responsible for the intelligible order in the created
world, He must also be responsible for the material of creation.
Thus, Lactantius mentions that not only is divina testimonia – i.e.,
Hermes, the Sibyls and the prophets – in support of divine provi-
dence, but also virtually all of the philosophers (philosophos paene
universos), such as the Seven Sages, the Pythagoreans, Stoics, Peripa-
tetics, Socrates and Plato (DI 2.8.48). Given the broad consensus
among these respected authorities, and the arguments which Lac-
tanius has provided, Cotta’s initial comment concerning the greater
likelihood of God creating from pre-existing matter appears to
have turned on its head (DI 2.8.50; cf. 2.8.10–11). “For it is more
credible that matter was made by God, because God can do all
things, rather than not, because nothing can be made without
mind, reason and deliberation.” 77
B. Refutation of Atomism
Given the near unanimity among philosophers as to the existence
of providence (DI 2.8.48), those few dissenting voices become all
the more apparent. Lactantius believes that the alternative to a
76 DI 2.8.44 (BT 2005, 157): Solus igitur deus est qui factus non est,
et idcirco destruere alia potest, ipse destrui non potest.
77 DI 2.8.52 (BT 2005, 159): Credibilius est enim materiam potius a
deo factum, quia deus potest omnia, quam mundum non esse a deo fac-
tum, quia sine mente ratione consilio nihil fieri potest.
providential theory of creation lies in the atomist physics of Leu-

cippus, Democritus and Epicurus. 78 For Lactanitus the choice is
clear: either the world was created by divine providence or is the
result of a random coming together of atoms (ID 10.1); there is no
tertium quid. Several parallels exist between Lactantius’ defense of
creatio ex nihilo and his refutation of atomism. The principal differ-
ence between the two arguments is that, in the case of creatio ex
nihilo, Lactantius is refuting a position in which the existence of
God is presupposed (DI 2.8.11). In his attack on Atomism, howev-
er, no such presupposition is given.
Lactantius’ most sustained critique of Atomism is located in
chapter 10 of De ira Dei. The apologist first attributes the theory of
atoms to Leucippus (cf. Diog. Laert. 9.90; Pease, 363). According
to Lactantius, Leucippus was the first to believe that the world is
composed of ‘minute seeds’ (minuta semina) which come in all forms
of shape and cannot be divided – hence the word atomus (‘uncut’)
(ID 10.5; cf. Nat. D. 1.66; Lucr. 1.528ff.). These particles haphaz-
ardly fly through the ‘void’ (inane), like dust in the sun (cf. Lucr.
2.114ff.), and the existence of material beings is attributed to their
random unions and dissolutions (ID 10.9; cf. Lucr. 1.215ff.;
2.1048ff.). “From these things the world itself came together.” 79
Lactantius’ identification of the Atomists as a uniform group, ra-
ther than individual philosophers, is here manifest by his attribu-
tion of atomist theory to Leucippus. The apologist is, in fact, para-
phrasing excerpts from Lucretius to explain the theory of atoms.
The credit for these beliefs is given through the voice of their orig-
inator, however, in order to portray the Atomists as a collective and
isolated group of “two or three vain calumniators.” 80
In response to the Atomist theory of creation, Lactantius first
asks where these atoms came from. What is their ‘origin’ (origo) and
who or what is responsible for their ‘plan’ (ratio) (ID 10.11; cf. DI
3.17.21)? The implication, which Lactantius leaves unsaid, is that
78 Cf. DI 3.17.23. Lactantius’ antipathy towards atomism, especially

as articulated by Lucretius, is manifest and ubiquitous. See Maslowski,
“The Opponents of Lactantius,” 187–213.
79 ID 10.9 (SC 289, 126): Ex his etiam mundus ipse concretus est.
80 ID 10.47 (SC 289, 140): duobus tribusue calumniatoribus vanis.
these material particles – if they exist – must be the product of a

Creator. But the apologist does not dwell on the origin of these
seeds; rather he challenges their capacity to form intelligible ob-
jects. If the fortuitous coming together of atoms created the world,
he states, then we should find many creatures springing into exist-
ence spontaneously throughout the natural world. In the order of
creation, however, parents produce similar offspring: birds come
from eggs, corn from cornstalks, etc. (ID 10.13). “From whence it
is apparent that nothing is made from atoms because each and eve-
ry thing has a fixed and particular nature, its own seed, its own law
given from the beginning.” 81 Even Lucretius, in the sole mention
of him by name in this chapter, attests to the existence of the im-
mutable parent-offspring cycle in nature (ID 10.16; quot. Lucr.
1.205–07).
Lucretius, however, does not always remain so hidden in Lac-
tantius’ refutations. Elsewhere in his corpus, Lactantius responds
directly to the Roman poet. According to Lactantius, Lucretius
states that living creatures emerged from the earth, or ‘nature,’ only
once and with the ability to propagate. Since these creatures pos-
sessed the capacity to reproduce, therefore, nature simply stopped
creating them (DI 2.11.3; cf. Lucr. 5.793–96, 826–36). Lactantius
replies by stating that, if indeed living creatures were born in such a
fashion, then the existence of providence is inevitable (DI 2.11.5).
For, in Lucretius’ estimation, plants and animals emerged from the
earth with no natural parents, but with their parts already arranged
so as to conform, ready-made, to the conditions of their environ-
ment. This set of fortuitous circumstances, however, is so unlikely
to occur by chance that it beckons the existence of a ‘rational’ (ra-
tione) and ‘foreseeing’ (provisum) Agent (DI 2.11.6). We observe in
living creatures an order, a beauty, and a utility that must be the
product of a careful arrangement and plan (ID 10.22). If we ob-
serve these qualities existing in a work of art, we attribute them to
the skill of a great artist. How much more, then, should we credit
the Artifex who made living, breathing and thinking creatures (ID
81ID 10.15 (SC 289, 128): Unde apparet nihil ex atomis fieri,
quandoquidem una quaeque res habet propriam certamque naturam, su-
um semen, suam legem ab exordio datam.
10.26–27)? Therefore, “it is necessary that someone divine with a

capacity for reason foresaw [the creation of living things]. But who
can foresee if not God?” 82
For the sake of argument, however, Lactantius concedes that
material existence is made up of atoms. If this is so, he asks, “by
what plan, in what arrangement of the confused heap did the atoms
assemble themselves?” 83 The intricate marvels of nature cannot be
the product of chance, but must be the result of ‘planning’ (consilio),
‘providence’ (providentia), and ‘divine reason’ (ratione divina) (ID
10.32; cf. DI 2.11.6). The formation of material beings can only be
due to an agent who possesses both the ‘will’ (voluntatem) and
‘knowledge’ (scientiam) to create (ID 10.34; cf. DI 2.8.33–35). “Who
can that be if not God?” 84 Some would claim, however, that nature
itself is the organizing principle behind the arrangement of atoms.
On the one hand, replies Lactantius, if nature does not possess the
faculties of intellect and will, then it simply does not meet the re-
quirements of a creative agent (ID 10.37). If, on the other hand,
nature is granted the capacities of ‘planning’ (consilio), ‘reason’ (ra-
tione), ‘skill’ (virtute) and ‘power’ (potestate), then it ought rightly to be
called God (ID 10.38; cf. DI 2.8.21).
Lactantius’ final critique of atomism in this chapter, before
enunciating the humana testimonia of the philosophers, is that it does
little to explain the existence of the rational soul. For if the body of
the human person is derived from the earth (ID 10.43; Gn 2:7),
“where is the human mind, so clever and so intelligent, believed to
have sprung from.” 85 Even Cicero acknowledges that no origin can
be found in the material world for the existence of the ‘rational
soul’ (animo) (ID 10.45–46; quot. Tusc. 1.66). But reason can only
come from reason (ID 10.52; DI 2.36–38). Since reason exists both
82 DI 2.11.8 (BT 2005, 175): necesse est ut aliquis divina nescio qua
ratione providerit. Quis autem potest providere nisi deus?
83 ID 10.31 (SC 289, 134): Quo igitur consilio, qua pactione de con-
fuse acervo se atomi congregaverunt […]?

84 ID 10.37 (SC 289, 136): Quis igitur potest esse nisi deus? Quot.
Nat. D. 2.16.
85 ID 10.42 (SC 289, 138): unde igitur mens humana tam sollers, tam
intellegens orta esse credetur?

in the human soul and in the order and governance of the world, it
therefore must be provided by a ‘foreseeing Creator’ (provido artifice)
(ID 10.51). Lastly, Lactantius once again supplies a confirmatio to his
belief in providence by mentioning the eminent philosophers who
share it. The Seven Sages, Pythagorus, Zeno, Socrates, Plato and
Aristotle affirm that “the world is governed by divine providence,
just as it was made [by divine providence].” 86
To the modern reader, Lactantius’ criticisms of Atomism may
appear wanting. What concerns the apologist most, however, is
Atomism’s inability to explain the intelligibility of the created order.
If creation occurred fortuito (OD 6.1) then the natural world ought
to act in a correspondingly haphazard and irrational manner. The
chance coming together of atoms should yield creatures with no
discernable telos, which come into existence and go out of existence
like gusts of wind. In other words, Lactantius’ criticism is that At-
omism, while it may offer some explanation of the origin of the
universe, provides no insight into the structure of the universe as it
exists in human experience. It cannot account for the observable
pattern of life by which creatures act according to their own good
and, consequently, Lactantius believes that the intelligible structure
of the natural order is the best rebuke to the claims of Atomism
and chance-driven creation. Thus, we find many common argu-
ments between his defense of creatio ex nihilo and his refutation of
Atomism, including a final doxography (DI 2.8.48–49; ID 10.47–
49).
The result of this argumentation is a portrait of God as, above
all, “the divine and eternal mind, separated from a body and
free.” 87 God, who is Reason itself (OD 2.1), “planned the wonder-
ful works of providence, constituted them by His virtue, perfected
them by His reason, and now sustains them by His spirit [and]
86 ID 10.47 (SC 289, 140): divina providentia mundum regi sicut et

factus est.
87 DI 7.3.4 (BT 2011, 649): deus est divina et aeterna mens, a cor-
pore soluta et libera. Cf. Tusc. 1.66.

guides them by his power.” 88 Human beings have the capacity to

discover this by virtue of the well-ordered pattern of creation. The
intelligibility of this order, its internal coherence, demands that it be
the product of a “skillful and perceiving Leader.” 89 In this way,
Lactantius’ doctrine of God qua Creator mirrors his amplicatio to the
thesis that God is one. In other words, he proceeds from effect to
cause in order to demonstrate the existence of God as divine Rea-
son. Once again the existence of providence functions as the apol-
ogist’s primary evidence for understanding creation as a reflection
of the divine mens. Lactantius would no doubt have agreed with
Hopkins that “the world is charged with the grandeur of God.” 90
C. Theodicy
1. In the Authoritative Texts

The problem of evil is a topic not easily tred upon in the works of
Lactantius. This is the case because, unlike St. Augustine (cf. conf.
7.18–19; civ. Dei 11.22; 12.7), Lactantius does not possess a priva-
tion theory of evil, a lack of which leads to an undeniable dualism.
In addition, the presence of dualist interpolations to the authorita-
tive texts of the Institutiones (DI 2.8.6 add.1–9; 7.5.27 add.1–17) and
De opificio Dei (OD 19 bis) only contribute to Lactantius’ heterodoxy
on this count. While most scholars now agree that these insertions
came from Lactantius himself, an effort will nevertheless be made
to distinguish between the interpolations and the authoritative texts
so that a final analysis may be conducted between these two
sources. 91
Lactantius’ cosmology is best described by a phrase that he at-
tributes to the philosophers and poets: ‘the concord of discord’
88DI 1.8.2 (BT 2005, 32): mirifica opera providentia excogitavit, vir-
tute constituit, ratione perfecit, nunc autem spiritu sustentet, potestate
moderetur.
89 ID 10.51 (SC 289, 142): perito ac sentiente rectore.
90 Gerard Manley Hopkins, “God’s Grandeur,” in Gerard Manley
Hopkins: The Major Works, ed. C. Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2009), 128.
91 See Chapter 1, n. 47.
(discordi concordi) (DI 2.9.17; cf. Sen. Q Nat. 7.27.4). It is permeated

with references to contrary and complementary powers existing in
tension in order to form the universe: the heavens and the earth,
the light and the darkness, the day and the night (DI 2.9.2–5). This
is particularly true of fire and water. The passive counterparts, wa-
ter and cold, temper fire and heat (DI 2.9.16). Mortal life emerges
from and is dependent upon these elements (DI 2.9.21, 24); which
is why they are included in the marriage rite. 92 “All living creatures
are composed of body and soul; the material body is in wetness,
the soul in heat.” 93 Fire, therefore, is the celestial element in which
God’s power exists (DI 2.9.16). The capacity to make use of fire
signifies that human beings are “a heavenly and immortal crea-
ture,” 94 capable of knowing and worshipping God (DI 2.9.26). And
whereas fire is always reaching skyward, a symbol of its divinity,
water is always in search of the lowest ground, a symbol of death
and mortality (DI 2.9.26). From these elements “God marvelously
planned to sustain and bring forth all things.” 95
Contradictory forces were already at work, however, even pri-
or to the creation of the universe. Before God made the world He
“produced a spirit like Himself, who was endowed with the virtues
of God the Father” 96 and referred to as His Son (DI 4.6.1). All
things were then created through this incorruptible spirit (DI 2.8.7),
who is co-equal to the Father in ‘virtue’ (virtute) and ‘might’ (majes-
tate) (DI 4.6.2) and “is perfect in providence, reason and power.” 97
92 DI 2.9.21. Although Lactantius is not explicit, he is certainly refer-

ring to a Roman (non-Christian) ceremony. Cf. Loi, Lattanzio, 146.
93 DI 2.9.22 (BT 2005, 167): Cum enim constet omne animal ex an-
ima et corpore, materia corporis in umore est, animae in calore. For a

Stoic accounting of these complimentary elements in creation see Nat. D.
2.25–32.
94 DI 2.9.25 (BT 2005, 167): caeleste atque immortale animal.
95 DI 2.9.15 (BT 2005, 166): mirabiliter deus ad sustentanda et gi-
gnenda omnia excogitavit.

96 DI 2.8.3 (BT 2005, 148): produxit similem sui spiritum, qui esset
virtutibus patris dei praeditus.

97 DI 2.8.7 (BT 2005, 151): providentia et ratione et potestate perfec-
tus est.
God then ‘made’ (fecit) another being in whom divinity was not to
abide (DI 2.8.4) – that He did so through the Son is explicitly stated
in a textual addition (DI 2.8 add.4). This second spirit, out of jeal-
ousy for the relationship between the Father and the Son, turned
from good to evil of its own freewill (DI 2.8.4–5). Again, it is only
through a textual addition that Lactantius explicitly states that, un-
like the first spirit, the second was created liable to corruption (DI
2.8 add.4). This second being, whom the Greeks call ‘slanderer’
(διάβολον), attempts to lure human beings away from their immor-
tal destiny (DI 2.12.17; cf. 6.4.2). He is the ‘lord of this world’ (dom-
inator ille terrae), the commander of demons (DI 2.14.2–3), whom
God permits to exist so that we might learn virtue (DI 6.4.17).
Lactantius’ solution to the problem of evil hinges on this last
point, namely, that evil exists in order for human beings to acquire
virtue. “Why does God allow these things and not bring aid against
such evil errors? So that evil might fight against good, so that vices
might vie against virtues, so that He might have some to punish
and others to honor.” 98 According to Lactantius, good and evil
exist in a symbiotic relationship; one can neither be known nor
exist without the other. Therefore, since our eternal salvation rests
upon our mastery of the virtues God wills this dichotomy to exist
until His return at the eschaton (DI 2.17.1). Since Lactantius makes
this argument repeatedly in the authentic works (DI 2.17.1; 3.29.16;
5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12), two examples ought to suffice in order to
demonstrate the point. In De ira Dei, chapter 13, Lactantius makes
this argument while addressing an Epicurean critique of God’s
providence. Epicurus, he claims, states that if God permits evil to
exist then He is either ‘weak’ (imbecillus) because He cannot remove
evil, or ‘envious’ (invidus) because He can and chooses not to re-
move evil (ID 13.21; cf. Usener, 252–53, fr. 374; Pease, 127; Min.
Fel. 12.2). Epicurus’ argument, notes Lactantius, has puzzled many
philosophers who have defended the doctrine of providence (ID
13.22). The truth, however, is that God is neither feeble nor pusil-
lanimous, but permits evil to exist for the preservation of wisdom
98DI 2.17.1 (BT 2005, 195): cur ergo deus haec fieri patitur nec tam
malis succurrit erroribus? Ut mala cum bonis pugnent, ut vitia sint adversa
virtutibus, ut habeat alios quos puniat, alios quos honoret.
and virtue. Since wisdom consists in knowledge of good and evil,

and virtue consists in perseverance against evil, to remove all evil
would necessitate the elimination of wisdom and virtue. It is
through these two gifts, however, that we gain the summum bonum
of immortality (ID 13.23). To suffer through life’s hardships, there-
fore, is but a small price to pay in order to reach our eternal and
everlasting home (ID 13.25).
Similarly, this argument is contained in chapter 29 of the Epit-
ome; which corresponds to chapter 17 in Book 2 of the Institutiones.
In this passage the apologist affirms the necessity of the existence
of evil for the preservation of virtue. “If vice is evil because it at-
tacks virtue, and virtue is good because it punishes vice, it is there-
fore not possible for virtue to exist without vice. If one removes
vice, the merits of virtue are also removed.” 99 In order to further
support this thesis Lactantius gives an extended quotation from
fellow Ciceronian Gellius’ Attic Nights (Epi. 24.5–10; cf. Gell. NA
7.1.1–6; LS, vol. 2, 330–31). The excerpt from Gellius, however,
primarily consists of an additional quotation from the non-extant
Περὶ Προνοίας (On Providence) of Chrysippus; thereby revealing the
Stoic nature of this argument. 100 Confirming Lactantius’ reasoning,
Chrysippus states that “‘nothing is more wholly absurd than this:
those who might say that good could exist if evil did not exist as
well […].’” 101 All of the virtues are defined in relation to their op-
posites: justice to injustice, temperance to intemperance, prudence
to imprudence (Epi. 24.8). If one should remove the opposite, then
one must remove them both entirely (Epi. 24.9). Hence it is the
wisdom of God, states Lactantius, that placed these opposites in
99 Epi. 24.3 (BT 1994, 30–31): Si vitium ex eo malum est, quia virtu-
tem inpugnat, et virtus ex eo bonum est, quia vitium adfligit, ergo non
potest virtus sine vitio consistere et, si vitium sustuleris, virtutis merita
tollentur. Cf. DI 2.17.1.
100 It should be noted that Epitome 24.5–10 is not listed in Stoicorum
Veterum Fragmenta by von Arnim. A reference to this passage ought to

accompany the entry from Gellius NA 7.1.1–6 in volume II, fr. 1169.
101 Epi. 24.6 (BT 1994, 31): ‘nihil prorsus’ […] ‘istis insulsius, qui
opinantur bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala […]’. Cf. Gell.
NA 7.1.2.
tension with one another; so that human beings would strive and
struggle to achieve immortality through virtue (Epi. 24.11).
2. In the Interpolations to the Main Text

The dualist interpolations to the authoritative texts confirm Lactan-
tius’ cosmology of opposition and, once again, point directly to the
role of virtue as the impetus for this duality. 102 Since it is both ger-
mane to this topic and has yet to be translated into any English
version, a quotation of the complete interpolation from De opificio,
chapter 19, is worth reproducing at this point.
[God] gave to [the human person] and established a most
wicked Adversary and deceitful spirit, with whom one may
fight in this earthly life without any security of rest. I shall ex-
plain briefly why God appointed this vexation of the human
race. Before all things He willed there to be discord and for
that reason the truth is not commonly apparent, but He re-
vealed the smallest amount of it. This discord contains all the
secrets of the world. It is that which makes virtue possible (vir-
tue not only exists, but also shows forth, because it cannot ex-
ist unless it has something to compare), and in conquering it
one might put into practice or display one’s strength.
Now victory without struggle is not possible, just as virtue it-
self is not possible without an enemy. That is why virtue was
given to human beings, it established for one an opposite from
the Enemy, lest one’s nature be destroyed by virtue being slug-
gish on account of idleness. The reason for all these things is
in the Enemy, so that one might stand firm against strikes and
blows. One may come to the highest summit only if a prudent
hand, constantly agitated, is fighting the struggle to secure
one’s salvation. For God does not want the journey to His
immortal beatitude to be delightful. Therefore to those He
would give virtue He first gave the Enemy, by whom the souls
of human beings were sent cupidity and vice. He is the author
102For a detailed study of the dualist interpolations in Lactantius

consult Eberhard Heck, Die dualistischen.
of errors and the engineer of all evil. Just as God calls human
beings to life, so too does he that he might snatch and lead
them to death. This is who either induces and deceives those
who study truth or, if he cannot by fraud and diligence, wears
on the strong soul and attempts to weaken it by powerful vig-
or. He vexes and murders with unspeakable words and detest-
able plots. And yet just as he overthrows many, many he leaves
nourished and humble. 103
Much of the content of this passage is also contained in the dualist
interpolations from the Institutiones (DI 2.8.6 add.1–9; 7.5.27 add.1–
17). In the interpolation from Book 7, rather than probing into the
cosmological sources of good and evil, Lactantius again focuses on
the necessity of both for the existence of virtue. “For virtue cannot
exist without the opposite having been created, nor can the
103 OD 19 bis 1 (SC 213, 210, 212): Dedit ei et constituit adversarium

nequissimum et fallacissimum spiritum, cum quo in hac terrestri vita sine
ulla securitatis requie dimicaret. Cur autem deus hunc vexatorem generi
hominum constituerit breviter exponam. (2) Anteomnia diversitatem vo-
luit esse ideoque vulgo non aperuit veritatem, sed eam paucissimus rev-
elavit: quae diversitas omne arcanum mundi continent. Haec est enim
quae facit esse virtutem, quae scilicet non modo esse, sed ne apparere
quidem, quia virtus esse non poterit, nisi fuerit compar aliquis, in quo
superando vim suam vel exerceat vel ostendat. (3) Nam ut victoria
constare sine certamine non potest, sic nec virtus quidem ipsa sine hoste.
Itaque quoniam virtutem dedit homini, statuit illi ex contrario inimicum,
ne virtus otio torpens naturam suam perderet. Cujus omnis ratio in eo est,
ut concussa et labefacta firmetur nec aliter ad summum fastigium possit
venire nisi prudenti manu semper agitate se ad salutem suam dimicandi
tenore fundaverit. Noluit anim deus hominem ad immortalem illam beati-
tudinem delicato itinere pervenire. (4) Daturus ergo virtutem dedit hostem
prius qui animis hominum cupiditas et vitia inmitteret, qui esset auctor
errorum malorumque omnium machinator, ut quoniam deus hominem ad
vitam vocat, ille contra ut rapiat et traducat ad mortem. (5) Hic est qui aut
inducit et decipit eos qui veritati student, aut si dolo et studiis non quive-
rit, virile gerit animam qua sublimium vigorem labfactare conetur, infanda
dictum et execrabilia moliens: vexat, interficit, et tamen ut prosternit mul-
tos, sic a multis victus prostratusque discedit.
strength of good appear at all except by comparison with evil.” 104

Thus God established the discord between good and evil so that
one might achieve victory in the conflict between good and evil by
means of virtue (DI 7.5.27 add.5; cf. OD 19 bis 3). The entire ‘sys-
tem’ (ratio) of virtue, therefore, rests upon this coming together of
opposites (DI 7.5.27 add.6).
Lactantius then answers several questions related to the exist-
ence of good and evil in prelapsarian human existence. He states
that, even prior to knowing the difference between good and evil,
Adam and Eve lived in a reality made possible by the duality be-
tween good and evil. This is because, from the moment of their
creation, the first human beings were a composite of soul and
body, spirit and earth, eternity and temporality (DI 7.5.27 add.8).
They therefore existed in a world composed of both positive and
negative elements but, since they lived in ‘a place of bliss’ (in beati-
tudinis loco), they had knowledge of neither good nor evil (DI 7.5.27
add.10). What was altered after the Fall was their ability to recog-
nize the duality present in the created order. Once Adam and Eve
received this knowledge, and understood that they had previously
existed ‘in the context of good alone’ (in solo bono), they were ban-
ished from Eden (DI 7.5.27 add.11). What was made possible by
Adam and Eve’s first sin, however, was the gift of wisdom; “for
wisdom cannot exist without evil.” 105 Thus, as long as Adam and
Eve lived without sin, they also lived – like children – without wis-
dom (DI 7.5.27 add.11; cf. ID 13.16–17). We might say, therefore,
that Lactantius considered Adam and Eve’s prelapsarian state as
devoid of moral evil but, to the extent that they existed in a world
made possible by the coming together of contrary elements, their
existence was conditioned by natural evil.
This interpolation closes with another exposition on the ne-
cessity of the existence of both good and evil. Since the existence
of evil is tied to our corporeality, a complete divorce from this sys-
104 DI 7.5.27 add.2 (BT 2011, 665): Nulla enim virtus esse poterat,
nisi diversa fecisset, nec omnino apparere vis boni potest nisi ex mali
comparatione.
105 DI 7.5.27 add.11 (BT 2011, 666): Sapientia igitur constare sine
malo non potest.

tem of opposition is only possible after death. Only then will the
human person be both wise and free from evil, just as God is (DI
7.5.27 add.12). But until that time, humanity occupies a divinely
ordained middle ground between good and evil, virtue and vice (DI
7.5.27 add.14). Wisdom is therefore needed to navigate this tumul-
tuous state because, often, those things that appear good to the
senses are temptations towards evil. Conversely, many bodily evils
can camouflage the real goods that lay hidden beneath them; such
is the case, most poignantly, with martyrdom (DI 7.5.27 add.14–
16). But, again, this is all part of the design of God, “so that [one]
might obtain virtue and virtue might grant one’s immortality.” 106
In Book 2, Lactantius is more detailed about the cosmic ori-
gins of the duality established by God. Prior to the formation of
the world, God set into opposition two contradictory forces, i.e.,
“in the beginning He created good and evil.” 107 The first and sec-
ond spirits, which emanated from God, are “the two sources for
these things.” 108 They have respective control over good and evil,
and the combination of and conflict between these two elements
accounts for everything in the world (DI 2.8.6 add.2). God created
the nefarious spirit so that evil might have an origin other than
Himself; since evil cannot proceed from an ever-loving and benev-
olent God (DI 2.8.6 add.6). Again, the pattern of God’s purpose in
creating this duality is for the sake of virtue. “One cannot under-
stand and perceive the good without the avoidance and shunning
of evil, nor can evil be avoided and conquered without the aid of
having understood and perceived the good. It was necessary, there-
fore, for evil to be made so that good might be made.” 109 Thus,
before the creation of the human person, God created good and
106 DI 7.5.27 add.17 (BT 2011, 668): ut virtutem caperet et ei virtus

sua immortalitatem daret.
107 DI 2.8 add.3 (BT 2005, 147): fecit in principio bonum et malum.
108 DI 2.8.6 add.2 (BT 2005, 149): duos fontes rerum.
109 DI 2.8.6 add.5 (BT 2005, 150): Nam neque bonum comprehendi
ac percipi potest sine declinatione ac fuga mali nec malum caveri ac vinci
sine auxilio comprehensi ac percepti boni, necesse igitur fuerat et malum
fieri, ut bonum fieret.
evil so that virtue might exist and be humanity’s path towards sal-
vation.
3. Analysis
After examining both the authoritative texts of Lactantius and their
interpolations on the problem of evil it must first be said that the
apologist’s dualistic world-view is consistent and ubiquitous
throughout his works. In other words, the dualist additions to the
Institutiones and De opificio do not constitute a radical departure from
an otherwise orthodox Christian cosmology and theodicy. Lactan-
tius’ argument that God permits the existence of good and evil for
the sake of virtue, and ultimately our salvation, is to be found in
nearly every book which he authored (DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16;
5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12, 5.27 add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3).
While this argument, in itself, may conform to Christian orthodoxy
when answering the question of why God permits evil to exist, it
becomes problematic when Lactantius considers the sources, the
ontological natures, of both good and evil. Lacking a privation the-
ory of evil, Lactantius must account for the existence of evil sub-
stantially. He therefore places the responsibility for the existence of
evil largely at the feet of the Adversarius, the second spirit who em-
anated from God (DI 2.12.17, 14.2–3; 6.3.14, 4.2, 17, 6.5; 7.24.5).
God, however, does not simply permit evil to exist but actively cre-
ates, sustains and is ultimately responsible for the mutual existence
of both good and evil (ID 15.2; Epi. 63.4–5). Thus Lactantius
writes: “God simultaneously determined good and evil.” 110
To the apologist, the alternative to this dualist perspective is a
cosmology and ontology which must account for the existence of
evil without God. In other words, if the origin of evil does not ulti-
mately reside in God, then evil has an eternal existence all its own.
This very point is addressed in an argument unique to the Epitome,
which would correspond roughly to chapter 4 of Book 7 in the
Institutiones. In nature, Lactantius observes, there exists a commin-
gling of good and evil. If God created only that which is good, then
110 ID 15.2 (SC 289, 164): Simul deum proposuisse bonum ac ma-
lum.
evil must possess an existence independent of God. By having its

own existence, therefore, evil must be more eternal than good and,
hence, superior to good (Epi. 63.3). But if evil is not superior to
good then either God created neither of them or “they flowed
from a single source.” 111 Since, therefore, it is more rational that
God should be the Creator of everything rather than nothing, He
indeed “joined all things good and bad.” 112 For Lactantius, the all-
encompassing providence of God must account for the entire reali-
ty of the created order. The existence of evil, therefore, must in
some way take its origin from within the divine mens and function
so as to advance God’s providential design. Hence, “God pre-
served the Adversary for us so that we might receive virtue.” 113
Lactantius’ position on the existence of evil is not fundamen-
tally rooted in his cosmology, however, but in his ethics. The dual-
ism, which the apologist transplants into the realm of metaphysics,
takes its origin from the concrete and experiential structure which
he observes in the moral life: the battle between good and evil, vir-
tue and vice, persecuted and persecutor. His dualist perspective
may be characterized, therefore, as primarily an ethical dualism de-
rived from the Stoic school. 114 When Lactantius attempts to con-
struct a cosmology from within this hermeneutic, one which gives
ontological priority to the oneness of God and His providence, the
apologist is fundamentally inconsistent when it comes to address-
ing the issue of the ontological fons of evil. Though God hates evil,
He nevertheless allows this dualist model of existence to endure so
that good might come from it (ID 15.2). He also created a spatial
and temporal existence in which a dualist structure is a constitutive
element (DI 2.9). In this regard, the existence of evil can be seen as
the natural consequence of being spatially and temporally condi-
111 Epi. 63.4 (BT 1994, 104): ex uno fonte fluxerunt.

112 Epi. 63.5 (BT 1994, 104): omnia enim complexus est et bona et
mala.
113DI 6.4.17 (BT 2009, 542): nobis adversarium deus reservavit […],
ut possemus capere virtutem.
114 See Loi, Lattanzio, 145–52; Michel Perrin, L’homme antique et chré-
tien: L’anthropologie de Lactance, Théologie historique 59 (Paris: Beauchesne,

1981), 352–56.
tioned creatures. Lactantius appears unable to reconcile the fact

that in this cosmological model God can be seen as the Author of
evil. Rather, what concerns the apologist most is his belief that
God willed humanity to be composed of conflicting elements so as
to battle virtue against vice for the gift of immortal beatitude (DI
7.5.18).
Contrasting the authoritative texts with their interpolations
does little to alleviate the tension that Lactantius has created in this
regard. Though there are instances where omissions of an interpo-
lated text contribute to a more orthodox reading of a particular
passage, the dualist structure that pervades Lactantius’ work re-
mains nonetheless intact. For example, Lactantius describes the
origin of the human person in the following manner: “Humanity
was created from these diverse and combating elements just as the
world was created from [good and evil,] light and darkness, life and
death.” 115 Omitting the phrase ‘from good and evil’ (ex bono et malo)
may preserve the orthodoxy of this particular passage, but it does
so by the margin of a razor’s edge. The cosmological dualism by
which the universe was created still remains, even if the identifica-
tion of evil with the dark/corporeal/mortal element is merely im-
plied rather than explicit. There also remain other authentic passag-
es where either direct correlation is made between these elements
or God is stated to be the source of evil (ID 15.3; Epi. 63.4–5).
These excerpts need to be tempered, however, with Lactantius’
repeated claims that the Adversarius is the “‘head and cause of these
evils.’” 116 The greatest obstacle to a precise understanding of Lac-
tantius’ theodicy, therefore, is the apologist’s own deficiencies in
the field of metaphysics.
Further, not only are the interpolations not solely responsible
for Lactantius’ heterodoxy in the field of cosmology, but on at least
two occasions they interject a note of orthodox thought that would
115 DI 2.12.7 (BT 2005, 178–79): Ex rebus ergo diversis ac repugnan-

tibus homo factus est sicut ipse mundus [ex bono et malo,] ex luce ac
tenebris, ex vita et morte. The bracketed portion of this quotation is an
interpolation to the main text. Cf. ID 15.3.
116 DI 2.8.2 (BT 2005, 147): ‘caput horum et causa malorum.’ Quot.
Verg. Aen 11.361; cf. DI 2.12.17, 14.2–3; 6.3.14, 4.2, 17, 6.5; 7.24.5
have otherwise been absent. The first of these instances has already
been mentioned, that is, Lactantius’ distinction between the incor-
ruptible nature of the Son and the corruptible nature of the Diabo-
lus (DI 2.8 add.4). While the difference between the Son and angelic
creatures will be addressed more fully elsewhere in the Institutiones
(e.g., DI 4.8–10), the interpolation serves to abate a juxtaposition of
equality between the first and second spirits which could otherwise
be read very easily into the cosmological account in Book 2, chap-
ter 8. Similarly, Lactantius also makes a statement concerning the
mutual co-existence of good and evil which contains the echoes of
an anti-Gnostic invective. “[The person], therefore, who wishes us
to exist in the context of good alone, desires especially that we live
without the bodies in which evil resides.” 117 Since living amid the
contrary elements of good and evil is constitutive of the entire cre-
ated order, and is not the product of two mutually eternal and ab-
solute forces, it is apparent to the apologist that simply eschewing
the bodily cannot be the solution to the problem of evil. The desire
to do so, in fact, is a rejection of the divinely created and providen-
tial order which God deliberately constructed for the benefit of
humanity (DI 7.4.19). The flesh needs to overcome temptation by
acquiring virtue, not by being eradicated (DI 6.15.2, 7).
In the final analysis, while the ethical dualism present in the
interpolations resonates with the rhetoric of Lactantius’ moral and
anthropological thought as a whole, the subordinated metaphysical
dualism of these passages succeeds only in contributing to the am-
biguity that surrounds his cosmology. For example, in the interpo-
lation to Book 2 of the Institutiones, Lactantius mentions “in the
beginning [God] created good and evil,” 118 and that “it was neces-
sary, therefore, for evil to be made so that good might be made.” 119
117 DI 7.5.27 add.13 (BT 2011, 667): Qui ergo vult nos in bono esse
tantum, id potissimum desiderat, ut sine corpore vivamus, in quo est ma-
lum. Among the heterodox Christian sects of his day, Lactantius mentions
by name the Phrygians, Novatians, Valentinians, Marcionites and An-
thropians (DI 4.30.10).
118 DI 2.8 add.3 (BT 2005, 147): fecit in principio bonum et malum.
119 DI 2.8.6 add.5 (BT 2005, 150): necesse igitur fuerat et malum fie-
ri, ut bonum fieret.

In the same passage, however, the apologist states that “since it was
not right that evil might proceed from God, for He cannot make
what is contrary to Himself, He made one who is the inventor of
lies […]. [God] willed there to appear one contrary to His vir-
tues.” 120 The one in question is, of course, the Adversarius; who with
the Son are “the two sources for these things which oppose and
combat each other.” 121 Thus, on the one hand, Lactantius wishes to
attribute the duality present in nature to God’s eternal plan. But, on
the other hand, he also wants the Adversarius to bear the responsi-
bility for being the fons of evil. The dualist interpolations therefore
reflect Lactantius’ ubiquitous ambivalence on the topic of theodicy
that exists as the result of a subordinate dualism and cannot be re-
solved on the metaphysical level. Lactantius cannot account for the
existence of evil in an intellectually satisfying or consistent way be-
cause he cannot reconcile the ultimate reality of God and His prov-
idence with the substance of evil. In short, Lactantius’ lack of a
privation theory of evil is the determining factor in his inconsistent
and conflicting metaphysical drama.
III. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to overestimate the degree to which Lactantius’ theol-
ogy of providence impacts his doctrine of God and vice versa.
When treating the topic of God’s oneness, Lactantius always sur-
rounds his arguments with evidence of the existence of providence.
In two prominent places (DI 1.2.1–6; Epi. 2.1–8), Lactantius first
argues for the existence of providence and then proceeds to build
upon this foundation to argue for the existence of a single-
provident Creator; thus arguing from effect to cause. In another
portion of his corpus (ID 13.1–14.6), his arguments for the exist-
ence of providence and a single foreseeing Deity are so intertwined
as to be nearly indistinguishable. In all of these passages, Lactantius
120 DI 2.8.6 add.6 (BT 2005, 150): Et quoniam fas non erat, ut a deo
proficisceretur malum – neque enim contra se ipse faciet –, illum consti-
tuit malorum inventorem […]. Ab eo contraria virtutibus suis voluit oriri.
121 DI 2.8.6 add.2 (BT 2005, 149): duos fontes rerum sibi adversarum
inter seque pugnantium.

argues that a multitude of deities could not be responsible for the

well-ordered pattern of creation. Rather, since the cosmos can be
observed as conforming to the design of an organic whole, it must
be the product of a single mind and will. This leads Lactantius di-
rectly to a concept of God as ‘divine reason’ (divina ratione) (DI
1.5.20). By operating from within the boundaries of the doctrine of
providence in order to articulate his theology of God as aeterna
mens, Lactantius is committing to his apologetic goal of arguing so
as to attract the widest possible audience. The apologist does not
articulate his theology of God, therefore, beginning with the attrib-
utes of God contained in Scripture, but beginning with the evi-
dence contained in nature that can be discerned by human reason.
According to this method, God can be understood, not as the
‘Lord of History,’ but as Governor of the universe.
This same method of argumentation is present in Lactantius’
treatment of the passions in God. Without recourse to sacred
Scripture, which would provide the author with ample evidence of
God’s righteous indignation, Lactantius begins by affirming the
existence of divine providence. The apologist then argues that if
God is the providential Ruler of creation then He must care espe-
cially for the apex His creation, the human person (ID 17.4). Fur-
ther, if God cares for the human person then He must be moved
by righteous indignation at humankind’s vices and by love at hu-
mankind’s virtues (ID 16.7). Arguing from the existence of provi-
dence to divine attributes, in addition to being apologetically sound
and logically coherent, also possesses an anthropological value for
Lactantius. It supports his belief that human beings have the natu-
ral capacity to know that God exists and is the one Ruler of the
cosmos. The humana testimonia, which Lactantius provides, demon-
strates that “men of the highest genius attained, and nearly grasped,
the truth.” 122 Unfortunately, since they did not possess the whole
truth, i.e., revelation, they were led astray in thinking that other
gods existed, and that human beings ought to worship what is be-
neath them (DI 1.5.28). Had these authors been attentive to the
conclusions to which they were led by reason and nature, however,
122DI 1.5.28 (BT 2005, 21): summo ingenio viros attigisse veritatem
ac paene tenuisse.
they would have understood clearly that God is the one Creator
and Governor of the universe (DI 1.5.14). Though, in His essence,
God “is incomprehensible both to the eyes and to the mind,” 123
human beings were created to know Him through His effects (DI
7.5.4).
Lastly, in relation to Lactantius’ theology of God, one ought
also to note the different theological methods represented in Lac-
tantius’ source material. The Greek divina testimonia, for example,
Lactantius accepts and treats as oracular evidence on the inner life
of God. The Sibyls and Hermes, according to Lactantius, can speak
of God’s transcendence, in a way that unaided human reason can-
not, due to their direct connection with the supernatural. It is no
coincidence, therefore, that their findings attest more categorically
to God’s oneness than Lactantius’ humana testimonia, and are much
more in keeping theologically with the via negativa. The evidence of
the poets and philosophers, on the other hand, Lactantius employs
so as to argue for an analogical understanding of God as divine and
eternal Reason. Though lacking God’s revelation, the human mind
is capable of pursuing the via positiva, of reasoning from effect to
cause, and coming to an understanding of God as the Author of
creation and providence. In short, Lactantius makes use of both
the way of negation and the way of analogy in order to demon-
strate God’s attributes, and does so based on the type of sources he
employs.
The doctrine of providence also plays a pivotal role in Lactan-
tius’ defense of God as the Creator of the universe. While much of
Lactantius’ defense of the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is
spent refuting alternative views, the apologist bases his positive
argument for this doctrine on the consensus among philosophers
as to the existence of divine providence (DI 2.8.48). That is to say,
since Lactantius has already demonstrated God’s existence and
oneness, it is this one omnipotent and provident Deity who must
be responsible for the creation of the world, just as He is responsi-
ble for its governance. The most significant opposition to this view
of creation is the Atomist account of the world’s coming to be.
Lactantius refutes this position, again, by citing the orderly pattern
123 Epi. 53.2 (BT 1994, 80): est et oculis et mente incomprehensibilis.
of the universe as evidence that the world could not have originat-
ed in a fortuitous and haphazard manner. Should the Atomist ac-
count of creation be correct, then the world ought not to conform
to the intelligible and well-structured pattern to which, in fact, it
does correspond. Just as with his arguments for God’s oneness,
therefore, Lactantius demonstrates that the one God is responsible,
not just for the order of the universe, but also its creation by pro-
ceeding from effect to cause beginning with the providential struc-
ture of the universe.
Lastly, the doctrine of providence is operative, yet in a more
latent manner, in Lactantius’ account of the problem of evil. The
reason for Lactantius’ dualist cosmology can be traced directly back
to his lack of a privation theory of evil. Given the absence of this
theory to his thought, the apologist must account for the existence
of evil in way that gives priority to God’s providence. In other
words, evil must, in some way, find its origin in God and conform
to His providential plan for humankind. The answer, which Lac-
tantius iterates repeatedly throughout his works, is that God per-
mits evil to exist in order for virtue to exist. Without both good
and evil, it is impossible for virtue to exist. Since it is through the
practice of virtue that the human person merits salvation, God
permits the existence of evil for the ultimate good of the human
person (cf. DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12, 5.27
add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3). Thus, even the existence
of evil serves God’s plan for the redemption of humankind. The
only alternative to this view, according to Lactantius, would be an
account of the world in which evil possesses an existence of its
own apart from God. Because of the apologist’s insistence that
God is the sole Author and Governor of all of creation, this alter-
native view of evil’s origin is unacceptable (cf. Epi. 63). But despite
the limitations this cosmology presents when examined in relation
to Christian orthodoxy, it resonates well with the teachings of the
Stoa (cf. Epi. 24). In this way, Lactantius constructs his theodicy
according to the same apologetic method as he demonstrated
God’s oneness and other attributes, i.e., by making use of sources
mutually agreeable to both Christians and educated Roman docti.
Lactantius’ method of accounting for the existence of evil also
builds upon the foundation he has already laid in previous argu-
ments. That is to say, Lactantius begins with the providential order
of creation, then proceeds to articulate the characteristics of the
divine being based on the evidence contained in nature. Further,

having demonstrated God’s oneness and providential care for the
world, Lactantius must now account for the existence of evil in a
manner that is consistent with what he has already established. In
Lactantius’ doctrine of God, therefore, the doctrine of providence
is not only the point from which the apologist begins, but it is a
determining factor in that which proceeds from it.
CHAPTER 5. LACTANTIUS’
ANTHROPOLOGY
The topic of anthropology looms large in the corpus of Lactantius. 1

It seems appropriate, therefore, to treat this subject in two forms.
First, this chapter will address the topics of anthropology and prov-
idence as they appear in De opificio Dei, a work which Lactantius
devoted to those subjects. In De opificio, Lactantius authored an
entire treatise in order to demonstrate that the human person was
created “by the supreme God, Creator and Maker of all things,
whose divine providence and most perfect virtue cannot be com-
prehended by the senses nor expressed in words.” 2 As proof of this
thesis, the apologist examines the beauty and utility of the human
person and argues that a creation of such planning and ‘order’ (ra-
tio) must be the product of divine providence (OD 1.16). Since De
opificio is dedicated to the twin themes of providence and anthro-
pology, it is appropriate that we treat the material in the body of
the work as a whole, i.e., chapter 8 and following, to demonstrate
Lactantius’ use of anthropology to defend the doctrine of provi-
dence. Second, a more systematic, synthetic and integrated view of
Lactantius’ anthropology will be treated in the section that follows.
1 For an entire monograph on the subject see Perrin, L’homme an-

tique. Perrin argues that anthropology is the center of Lactantius’ thought,
at least based on the works which have survived (L’homme antique, 533).
2 OD 1.11 (SC 213, 110): a summo illo rerum conditore atque artifice
deo, cujus divinam providentiam perfectissimamque virtutem nec sensu

comprendere nec verbo enarrare possible est.
139
I. ANTHROPOLOGY AND PROVIDENCE IN DE OPIFICIO

DEI
Lactantius’ primary targets in De opificio are the Epicureans who
deny the existence of divine providence. As we have seen, the
standard Epicurean explanation of the origin of the universe is in
“the chance combination of atoms.” 3 The cosmos was formed by
the random coming together of particles, which eventually lead to
the spontaneous generation of organic life. What this theory lacks,
according to Lactantius, is an adequate accounting of the intelligi-
ble order (ratio) of creation. If the formation of the world occurred
in a haphazard and fortuitous manner, states the apologist, then the
structure of the universe ought to reflect this by existing in a simi-
larly random and unintelligible way at the present moment (OD
6.12–14). The best evidence against the atomistic theories of the
Epicureans, therefore, is the intelligible and patterned structure of
creation. In De opificio, Lactantius pursues this line of argumentation
by examining the human person in particular. Inspired by a similar
technique employed by his mentor, Cicero (OD 1. 12–13; cf. Nat.
D. 2.134–53), the apologist reviews the constitutive elements of the
human person in order to demonstrate that they fulfill functions
that serve the good of the whole. 4 These teleological observations
support Lactantius’ belief in divine providence by exemplifying the
intelligibility of the entire created order. In other words, human
beings can apprehend that things act for an end. By illustrating the
uses and designs of the various parts of the human person, Lactan-
tius is demonstrating their conformity with the patterned order of
creation and, in doing so, citing them as evidence in support of a
providentially governed universe.
3 OD 6.12 (SC 213, 142): fortuitis atomorum concursionibus.

4 Peter Roots convincingly argues that “the taking on of the mantle
of Cicero determines the whole character of the opif. and, indeed, that the
treatise is very closely modeled on the ND, being intended to supplement
and improve on it” (“De Opificio,” 472).
5. LACTANTIUS’ ANTHROPOLOGY 141
A. Chapters 8–13
After responding to Epicurean arguments against the existence of
divine providence in chapters 2 through 7 of De opificio, Lactantius
begins his examination of the human person in chapter 8. 5 The
apologist starts his exposition by indicating that the status rectus of
the human form distinguishes humankind from the rest of creation,
and points us towards the heavens in contemplation of our divine
Creator (OD 8.2–3; cf. Nat. D. 2.140). The more formal similitude
which the human person bears to its Creator resides in the ‘mind’
(mens); which is placed on top of the head so as to signify its domi-
nance both over the body and other earthly creatures (OD 8.3).
Perception occurs by the mind’s apprehension of objects through
the senses. For this purpose, God fashioned the sense organs, such
as the ears and eyes, on the face. The eyes especially have been
paired by their Creator so as to form a beautiful symmetry (OD
8.6–7). Their function is to be a visual conduit to the mind; for
through the eyes the mind perceives exterior objects (OD 8.10–11).
There are those, however, who remain skeptical as to the reliability
of the senses in general and the eyes in particular (OD 9.1; cf. Lucr.
4.379–470). Lactantius affirms, however, that examples of the eyes
being deceived – a favorite rhetorical tool of those who wish to
question the reliability of the senses – do not prove that the senses
are unreliable (OD 9.5). When the sense organs seem to fail, it is
either a defect of the organ (e.g., in the case of blindness), a misuse
5 Peter Roots has pointed out that OD, chapters 2–7, correspond to
Nat. D., book 1, in that they both provide the Epicurean view of provi-
dence with refutations. Similarly, OD, chapters 8–13, correspond to Nat.
D., book 2, in that they both provide a teleological account of the parts of
the human body. While the entirety of Nat. D., book 2, is devoted to the
Stoic arguments for the existence and providence of the gods, Cicero’s
teleological account is located in 2.133–50. The final correspondence is
between OD, chapters 14–19, and Nat. D., book 3, based on the skeptical
critique of providence. In OD, chapters 14–19, this skeptical critique oc-
curs in relation to the more speculative and contestable qualities of the
soul. Lactantius’ exposition proceeds along skeptical lines in that he lists
the opinions of others on obscure matters, then concludes with what can
be known for certain. See Roots, “De Opificio,” 480.
of the organ (e.g., in the case of looking at things too closely), or an

impairment of the mind (e.g., in the case of insanity) (OD 9.5). Not
being mindful of the objects of vision, i.e., not judging the infor-
mation which is being given through the eyes correctly, does not
prevent those objects from being seen and, consequently, does not
cast doubt upon the reliability of the senses. Perception occurs be-
cause the eyes act as a window for the mind and, in this way, the
mind and will are to be distinguished from the eyes. 6 The ability of
the eyes to accurately transmit exterior objects is so great, in fact,
that they must be the product of “the ineffable power of divine
providence.” 7
Lactantius’ exposition then addresses the other parts of the
head, the ‘summit of entire divine work’ (totius divini operis quasi cul-
men) (OD 10.10), which are the mediums for the five senses. The
nose is most useful for breathing, sensing odor and secreting mu-
cus (OD 10.7). God constructed the nose, however, in such a way
so as not to detract from the beauty of the face. “How wonderfully
and how great the divine plan by which God built these things.” 8
Just as the nose contains two nostrils, God constructed the entire
human person in a bifurcated manner, with two eyes, ears, hands,
feet, and two chambers in the heart (OD 10.10–11). This symmetry
not only aids one’s capacity for motion and sensory perception, but
also contributes to the ‘marvelous beauty’ (decoremque admirabilem)
(OD 10.10) of the body. Unlike the aforementioned body parts,
however, there exists one mouth on the face located below the
nose in a transverse manner. The utility of the mouth is to be
found, with the tongue, teeth, and lips, in its capacity to take in
food and utter speech. On account of the latter ability, the tongue
is referred to as the “interpreter of the mind.” 9 It also aids in eating
and drinking, and is where the sense of taste is located (OD 10.20).
The teeth contribute to the utterance of speech as well, and are
most useful in the mastication of food. Lest all of these parts be
6 OD 8.11–12. For the contrary view see Lucr. 3.359–69.

7 OD 8.16 (SC 213, 154): ineffabilis divinae providentiae virtus.
8 OD 10.7 (SC 213, 160): Quas ipsas deus quam mirabili, quam divi-
na ratione molitus est.

9 OD 10.13 (SC 213, 162): interpres animi. Quot. Lucr. 6.1149.
exposed, and to aid in the act speaking, God fashioned the lips to
cover the mouth and “how handsomely He separated [them].” 10
Lactantius concludes his treatment of the head by again extolling
the beauty of the parts of the body (OD 10. 21).
At this point it ought to be mentioned that Lactantius’ ex-
tended exegesis on the organs which relate to the senses in chap-
ters 8 through 10 is due to the apologist’s belief that the ‘mind’
(mens) is the ruler of the body, and is to be distinguished from the
sense organs which serve it. 11 Lactantius borrowed this view from
Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes: “For there is no sense in the body,
but […] there are certain avenues which pierce from the seat of the
soul to the eyes, ears, and nose.” 12 The distinction between the
mind and the senses is important for Lactantius in view of the case
that the apologist will make for the immortality of the soul (OD
19). If perception is located strictly in the bodily senses, and not in
the soul or mind, then it would necessarily cease when the body
dies. But the sense organs are the ‘servants’ (ministeriis) of the mind
(OD 8.5); which is the true seat of government of the entire human
person (OD 5.6). Thus, since perception is not co-terminus with
the senses, but resides in the soul, it does not end with the cessa-
tion of bodily life. “When, however, there will be nothing besides
the soul, no physical thing will prevent perceiving whatever there
is.” 13
The final section of chapter 10 of De opificio examines, in brief,
the remaining parts of the exterior of the human body. The hands
are worthy of much praise as they are the “ministers of reason and
wisdom.” 14 The hand is completed by the fingers in such a way that
it is difficult to determine whether beauty or utility should be ac-
10 OD 10.19 (SC 213, 164): quam decenter interscidit!

11 See Roots, “De Opificio,” 476–78.
12 Tusc. 1.46 (LCL 18, 54, 56): neque est enim ullus sensus in corpo-
re, sed […] viae quasi quaedem sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares a sede
animi perforatae.
13 Tusc. 1.47 (LCL 18, 56): cum autem nihil erit praeter animum, nul-
la res objecta impediet quo minus percipiat quale quidque est.

14 OD 10.22 (SC 213, 166): rationis ac saptientiae ministris. Cf. Nat.
D. 2.150; Pease, 939.

corded to them first (OD 10.22). The joints of the fingers make
them most suitable for grasping objects, with the thumb acting as
the “leader and moderator of them all.” 15 The majesty of the chest
also reflects the dignity of the human person. God created it to be
broad and upright “because being full of reason given from heaven
it ought not to be lowly or unbecoming.” 16 The breasts and nipples,
too, hold a quality of beauty and utility; especially in women who
nurse their offspring by use of them (OD 10.27). Lastly, below the
chest lays the stomach, which in women is the location of the fetus.
It is also here that the navel is not unbecomingly placed; which,
through the umbilical cord, the fetus is nourished by its mother
(OD 10.27).
In chapter 11 Lactantius begins his examination of the interior
parts of the human person. These organs, since they are concealed,
do not exhibit the same beauty as do their exterior counterparts.
They are, however, exceedingly wondrous in their functionality. In
the center of the body the ‘most provident Creator’ (providentissimus
artifex) (OD 11.2) designed a receptacle to digest food and liquids,
and from which to disseminate their nutrients to the rest of the
body. Just as the body is sustained by the consumption of food and
liquids, the ‘soul’ (anima) is sustained by the act of breathing which
takes place, above the stomach, in the lungs. 17 In order to facilitate
15 OD 10.24 (SC 213, 166): rector omnium atque moderator.

16 OD 10.26 (SC 213, 168): quia plenum rationis a caelo datae humile
aut indecens esse non debuit.
17 OD 11.3. Across his works, Lactantius does not establish a clear
distinction between the soul as ‘life-principle’ (anima) and the soul as

‘mind’ (animus), i.e., he often uses the words interchangably. In fact, the
issue of whether the anima is the same as the animus will be addressed in
chapter 18 of De opificio. In this portion of the text, however, Lactantius is
clearly speaking of the ‘soul’ (anima) as a life-principle. This life-principle
is incorporeal (OD 11.6), yet resides in the lungs (11.3), and is nourished
by air (11.5). While Lactantius prefers the dualistic language of corpore atque
anima (11.3) to describe the composition of the human person, therefore,
it is probably more accurate to refer to his anthropology as tripartite; with
the human person being composed of ‘body’ (corpore), ‘soul’ (anima or ani-
mus) and spirit (spiritus or anima). On this point see Perrin, SC 214, 342–43;
eating and drinking, there exists a pipe that travels from the stom-
ach to the mouth (OD 11.6). Likewise, and so that human beings
would have the capacity for speech, ‘divine skill’ (divina sollertia)
(OD 11.11) fashioned a separate pipe for breathing which extends
from the lungs both to the nostrils and to the mouth (cf. Nat. D.
2.136). Once ingested, food travels from the stomach through the
intestines; which digests food and carries their nutrients throughout
the body (OD 11.16). Rather than proceed through the same intes-
tinal tract as food, however, excess liquid gathers in the bladder
from the stomach (OD 11.18). Taken as a whole, the entire diges-
tive system is a ‘marvelous work of God’ (mirificum dei opus) (OD
11.16) displaying a ‘most fine construction-plan’ (ratio subtilissima)
(OD 11.18).
Lactantius next examines the human reproductive system be-
ginning with the male. Here we find the apologist victim of the
prevailing physiology of late-antiquity, as he affirms that the right
and left testes produce male and female semines respectively (OD
12.3; cf. Arist. Gen. an. 763b28–764a2). Similarly, in females, the
right ovary is masculine and the left feminine (OD 12.5). This natu-
ral complementarity appears throughout the entire human body:
“in all things the right part of the body is masculine, the left is fem-
inine.” 18 The remaining account of the act of conception, and the
causes of a child’s gender and characteristics related to gender, Lac-
tantius clearly attributes to Aristotle via Varro (OD 12.6); perhaps
in recognition of the speculative nature of such matters. But de-
spite the lack of certainty regarding human knowledge of the pro-
cess of conception, the natural complementarity of male and fe-
male in the act of procreation is a wondrous ‘institution of God’
(institutum dei) (OD 12.15). The etymology of the words ‘man’ (vir)
and ‘woman’ (mulier) reflect this complementarity in that they are
derived from the words ‘strength’ (virtus) and ‘softness’ (mollitia;
comp. mollier) (OD 12.16–17; cf. Varro Ling. 5.73; Cic. Tusc. 2.43).
Loi, Lattanzio, 187. To avoid ambiguity, I have attempted to include the

original Latin words for ‘soul’ (anima/animus) or ‘mind’ (animus/mens) while
addressing these matters.
18 OD 12.3 (SC 213, 178): omnino in toto corpore pars dextera mas-
culina est, sinistra vero feminina. Cf. Hippoc. Aph. 5.48.

And God’s ‘most skillful arrangement’ (sollertissime comparatum) (OD

12.18) can be found also in a child’s nursing from the milk-
producing breasts of its mother. “Nothing else would have been
suitable for the wise creature than to draw nourishment from the
heart.” 19 Lactantius omits further discussion of the sexual organs
out of a sense of modesty (OD 13.1), but not without issuing a de-
nunciation of those who would abuse their proper use. Lactantius
warns those individuals who might profane and debase “the divine
and admirable work of God, created and provided for the propaga-
tion of succession […]; so that they seek nothing from the most
holy institution other than vain and sterile pleasure.” 20
To conclude his exposition of the body parts which ‘reason
can understand’ (ratio intellegi potest) (OD 13.9), Lactantius then ad-
umbrates the lower extremities. The buttocks provide a well-
needed cushion for sitting. The thighs are strong and thick to sup-
port the weight of the upper-body. The knees provide a joint for
self-ambulation. The calf muscle both strengthens and adorns the
lower leg. The feet, the ‘foundations of the entire work’ (totius operis
quasi fundamenta), were made extended by the ‘marvelous Creator’
(mirificus artifex) (OD 13.6) so as to bear much weight. Lastly, the
toes are separated from each other for the sake of beauty only, ra-
ther than utility (OD 13.7). Taken together, what person could
claim that the human body lacks either ‘design or beauty’ (ratione aut
pulchritudine) (OD 13.2)?
B. Chapters 14–19
The third section of De opificio is dedicated to those parts of the
human body with an uncertain nature and/or function. What, Lac-
tantius cites as an example, can be understood of the spleen or the
liver (OD 14.4)? These organs are internal and cannot be observed
19 OD 12.17 (SC 213, 182): Nec enim decebat aliud quam ut sapiens
animal a corde alimoniam duceret. The appropriateness lay in the belief
that the ‘soul’ (animus/mens) resides in the heart (cf. Tusc. 1.18; Tert. De
anim. 15.3–6); though Lactantius questions this wisdom (cf. OD 16.3).
20 OD 13.2 (SC 213, 184): divinum et admirabile dei opus ad propa-
gandum successionem inexcogitabili ratione provisum […], ut iam nihil

aliud ex re sanctissima petant quam inanem et sterilem voluptatem.
performing their functions while the subject is still alive. Their pur-
pose, therefore, remains hidden (OD 14.6). The voice is another
example Lactantius cites to demonstrate the limits of human un-
derstanding. Though some believe that the voice is located in the
mouth, it more likely originates in the chest (OD 15.1–2; cf. Nat. D.
2.149). The truth of the matter, however, resides with God (OD
15.3, 5). So that the reader may not be induced into thinking that
the author possesses answers to questions beyond his capacity, the
apologist avers that he will henceforth only provide the opinions of
others concerning such matters (OD 16.2). The one truth Lactan-
tius can avow with certainty concerning all of the parts of the body
is that, since they are all a part of the living human organism, they
all ‘contain’ (habere) the ‘soul’ (anima). 21
In relation to the ‘mind’ (animus) and ‘soul’ (anima), Lactantius
believes that their activity is beyond the grasp of human reason and
“is known only to the Creator who alone knows His work.” 22 Cer-
tain philosophers have suggested that the seat of the ‘mind’ (mentis)
is in the chest (OD 16.3; cf. Tusc. 1.18ff.; Tert. De anim. 15.3–6).
Others have suggested, and with good reason, that it resides in the
brain (OD 16.4; cf. Tusc. 1.19ff.); for nothing could be more appro-
priate “than that which moderates the whole by reason to be high-
est, just as the Lord and Ruler of the world Himself is.” 23 While
Lactantius appreciates the soundness of the latter argument (OD
16.6), he ultimately refrains from making a definitive judgment on
the matter in this portion of the text (OD 16.11; cf. 8.3). The one
position regarding the mind that can be effectively eliminated,
however, is the belief that the mind does not exist at all (OD 16.13;
21 OD 14.9. Here, again, we see Lactantius using the word anima as a

synonym for the ‘life-principle.’ His belief that the anima resides in the
lungs (OD 11.3), but is spread throughout the body, accords with the Sto-
ic view. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.156–57.
22 OD 14.9 (SC 213, 190): scire nisi artifex cui soli opus suum notum
est.
23 OD 16.4 (SC 213, 194): esse sublimius quam id quod universum
ratione moderetur, sicut ipse mundi dominus et rector in summon est. In

OD 8.3 Lactantius seems rather definitive that the ‘mind’ (mens) is located
in the head.
cf. Tusc. 1.20, 51). Aristoxenus taught that what we call the mind is
merely the harmonious working of the body; like the strings of an
instrument which, when plucked, play music. Lactantius uses this
analogy against the philosopher by stating that the mind is not like
music but, rather, like the player of the instrument (OD 16.17).
Without a mind to guide it, the human body would be but an un-
used instrument. The most finely tuned strings do not produce
music of their own accord, but need something they do not contain
– i.e., a rational subject – in order to move them. Aside from ex-
cluding the possibility of the ‘mind’ (mentis) not existing, Lactantius
again remains ambivalent as to where it might reside. It may even
be diffused throughout the entire body as Xenocrates supposed
(OD 16.12; cf. Tusc. 1.20). The existence of the mind in the human
person does, however, lead one to marvel at the ‘divine plan’ (divina
ratione) (OD 16.8) that enabled human beings to possess a rational
soul. Further, it also leads one to ponder the magnitude of God’s
divine reason; for if the human mind possesses such a great power
of sense and apprehension, how much greater is the “divine mind
of God which guides every part of the world, rules all things and
moderates all things, is everywhere present and everywhere dif-
fused.” 24
As to the nature of the ‘soul’ (anima), Lactantius claims that
the only certainty is that it is immortal; “since whatever lives and is
always moved by itself, and can neither be seen nor touched, must
be eternal.” 25 Many philosophers have speculated as to the nature
of the ‘soul’ (anima) – whether it is blood, or fire, or wind – but
there is no consensus. 26 It seems that it is nourished by blood, for
24 OD 16.10 (SC 213, 196): divina mens dei per universas mundi
partes intent discurrit et omnia regit, omnia moderator, ubique praesens,
ubique diffusa.
25 OD 17.1 (SC 213, 198, 200): quoniam quidquid viget moveturque
per se semper nec videri aut tangi potest, aeternum sit necesse est. Cf. Cic.
Rep. 6.27; Tusc. 1.53–55. In this portion of the text it is again clear that
Lactantius is referring to the ‘soul’ (anima) as a principle of life.
26 OD 17.2; cf. Tusc. 1.18–19. Lactantius also states that the Latin
words for ‘soul’ (anima/animus) are derived from the Greek word for
‘wind’ (ἄνεμος) (OD 17.2).
when the body is emptied of blood then life is extinguished, but is

not itself blood (OD 17.3). Likewise, though the absence of body
heat marks the end of life, the ‘soul’ (anima) cannot itself be fire; for
it is endowed with “sense perception, cannot be seen, and does not
burn. Whence it is apparent that the soul is that which is like unto
God.” 27 And again, though the ‘soul’ (anima) seems to be nourished
by the air, it cannot itself be ‘breath’ (spiritum); for the ‘soul’ (anima)
is present in the human person at the moment of conception prior
to the drawing of any breath (OD 17.7; cf. Tert. De anim. 27.1ff.).
Thus, Lactantius concludes, though we cannot know the precise
nature of the soul, human reason can discover what it is not (OD
17.6, 9).
The next topic the apologist addresses is whether or not the
‘soul’ (anima) is to be considered the same as the ‘mind’ (animus)
(OD 18.1). On this topic there is no consensus among philoso-
phers. Some claim that the two are the same “because neither can
one live without sensing nor sense without life.” 28 Others, howev-
er, believe that the two are not identical. This point is illustrated by
the fact that it is possible for a person to possess a ‘soul’ (anima)
without a ‘mind’ (mentem); for example, in the case of insanity (OD
18.3). Further, it is argued, death puts the ‘soul’ (anima) to rest just
as sleep puts the ‘mind’ (animus) to rest. Hence the two are not
identical (cf. Tert. De anim. 12.1–6). Though he would seem to fa-
vor the latter arguments, Lactantius is not explicit about which
opinion he prefers. The apologist merely passes on to the last issue
to be addressed; namely, from whence the ‘soul’ (anima) arises (OD
19.1).
Despite acknowledging that the question of the origin of the
‘soul’ (anima) is an uncertain one, Lactantius quite definitively ex-
cludes the possibility that it should arise from a person’s parent or
parents. He does so based on the principle that matter cannot, of
its own nature, generate spirit (cf. Tusc. 1.65–67). “It is possible for
a body to be born from bodies, because something is conferred
27 OD 17.4 (SC 213, 200): sensu acta est et videri non potest et non
adurit. Unde apparet animam nescio quid esse deo simile.
28 OD 18.2 (SC 213, 204): quod neque vivi sine sensu possit nec sen-
tiri sine vita. Cf. Lucr. 3.421ff.

from both, but a soul cannot be born from souls, because no thing
can result from a thing that cannot be grasped.” 29 The essence of
the human person lays in his/her incorporeal and immortal soul
(OD 19.9). That which is incorporeal and immortal cannot repro-
duce because reproduction is the generation of that which is bodily
and mortal. It is the ‘result’ (decedere) of ‘physical stuff’ (re). Since the
‘soul’ (anima) is not of a corporeal and mortal nature, however,
there is no ‘stuff’ (re) to impart or transmit. That which is incorpo-
real and immortal can only come from the source of incorporeity
and immortality, i.e., God. The soul of a human person, therefore,
can only come directly from God. 30 “It is [God’s] gift that we
breathe, that we live, that we flourish.” 31
Lactantius concludes his examination of the human person
by marveling at the creation God has made. “Great indeed is the
strength, great the reason, great the mystery of the human per-
son.” 32 The sublimity of God’s work should encourage, therefore,
all people to seek virtue. By endowing human beings with wisdom,
God wished that they might use this ‘heavenly and remarkable gift’
(munere caelesti atque praeclaro) (OD 19.8) to enter into communion
with Himself, to become ‘like unto God’ (similis deo) (OD 19.9; cf.
17.4). This is accomplished by fulfilling of the natural end of the
highest capacity of the human person. It is through the exercise of
virtue, by eschewing earthly pleasures for the sake heavenly wis-
29 OD 19.2 (SC 213, 208): Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest,

quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque, de animis anima non potest, quia
ex re tenui et incomprehensibili nihil potest decedere. Cf. Cic. Luc. 1.39.
30 OD 19.4. Lactantius is quite ahead of the curve in condemning
Traducianism from the Christian persepective (cf. August. an. et or. 1.25;
Jer. Ep. 126.1; 144.7). Tertullian, for example, does not refute it as a pos-
sible theory for the origin and transmission of souls (cf. De anim. 19.6;
26.4; 27.1–5; 40.1).
31 OD 19.5 (SC 213, 208, 210): illius munus est quod spiramus, quod
vivimus, quod vigemus. It is as true for every human being as it was for
the first human being, according to Lactantius, that God ‘inbreathes the
soul’ (inspiratio animae) (OD 19.5; cf. Gn 2:7; DI 1.11.42; 2.11.19, 12.3).
32 OD 19.9 (SC 213, 212): Magna est enim vis hominis, magna ratio,
magna sacramentum.
dom, that the human person fulfills its natural end and ‘merits
eternal life’ (merebitur sempiternam) (OD 19.10; cf. 19.8).
C. Conclusion
In chapters 1 through 7 of De opificio, Lactantius responds directly
to individual arguments against the existence of divine providence
made by the Epicureans. 33 In order to bolster his claim that the
world could not have been created without divine providence, in
chapters 8 through 13, Lactantius examines the parts of the human
body which, by their beauty and utility, suggest that they were made
by a ‘most provident Creator’ (providentissimus artifex) (OD 11.2).
Playing the part of Balbus in Cicero’s De natura deorum (cf. Nat. D.
2.133–50), Lactantius surveys the human body, indicates the func-
tions for which certain parts were designed, and marvels at the
beauty they display in fulfilling their natural ends. The repetition of
these qualities, i.e., beauty and utility, is consistent throughout these
chapters (OD 8.1, 5–8, 13; 10.4, 7, 10, 12, 18–27; 11.1; 13.3, 5, 7),
and are seen as a direct rebuttal against those who would affirm
that the creation of the human person occurred in a random and
haphazard manner (cf. OD 6.1, 12). In this regard, Lactantius has
taken up the Stoic mantle of defending the existence of providence
against Epicurean claims to the contrary. 34 Indeed, Stoic anthro-
pology as transmitted through the works of Cicero provides Lac-
tantius with a basic outline of the composition of the human per-
33 For a detailed analysis see Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Di-
vine Providence, C. The Argument from Design (Ex operibus Dei), 2. De Opi-
34 Although Brandt argues that this is due to the influence of the

ficio Dei.
Corpus Hermeticum rather than the Stoics (cf. Corp. Herm. 5.1–11; DI
2.10.14), Roots has rightly and ably returned the focus of the question of
Lactantius’ sources in OD back to Cicero’s work – in particular Nat. D.
See Roots, “De Opificio,” 466–86. In Roots’ estimation, the primary
sources for OD are “Varro, Lucretius and Cicero plus, probably, a gram-
matical reference work” (“De Opificio,” 486). On the Hermetic scholarship
see S. Brandt, “Über die Quellen von Laktanz’ Schrift ‘De opificio dei,’”
Wiener Studien 13 (1891): 270ff.; L. Rosetti, “‘De Opificio Dei’ di Lattanzio
e le sue fonti,” Didaskaleion 6 (1928): 195–200; cf. Perrin, SC 213, 48ff.
son. This is especially true of Lactantius’ belief that the ‘mind’

(mens) is not co-terminus with the sense organs, but uses the senses
in order to perceive the external world (OD 5.6; 7.10; 8.5; 16.6); the
senses themselves being credible transmitters of external experi-
ences (OD 8.10; LS, vol. 1, 315, fr. G; 316, fr. M). That the mind is
the seat of government of the entire body corresponds to the Stoic
notion that the highest part of the soul is the ‘commanding faculty’
(ἡγεμονικόν) of the body (LS, vol. 1, 315, frs. E-H). Further, the Stoics
believed that this ‘part of the soul’ (μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς) continues to exist
after the death of the body (OD 17.1; Tusc. 1.46–47; Diog. Laert. 7.157;
LS, vol. 1, 318, fr. W), and that the ‘soul’ (anima) resides in the lungs
(OD 11.3; LS, vol. 1, 315, fr. G), but its activity and influence is
spread throughout the body (OD 14.9; Diog. Laert. 7.156–57; LS
vol. 1, 314, fr. B; 316, fr. K; Tert. De anim. 14.5).
Stoic anthropology and psychology, however, are not beyond
dispute when it comes to those parts of the human person that are
not easily discovered by human reason. In chapters 14 through 19
of De opificio, Lactantius feels free to correct a number of Stoic po-
sitions regarding the nature of the soul. For example, Lactantius
affirms that the ‘soul’ (animus) has an incorporeal nature (OD 16.11;
17.1; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.156; LS, vol. 1, 272, frs. C-D), and therefore
cannot be the parent of another soul. 35 The apologist questions the
standard Stoic belief that the ‘mind’ (mens) resides in the chest or
heart (OD 16.3; cf. Tusc. 1.18ff.; Tert. De anim. 15.3–6; LS, vol. 1,
314, fr. D) and, in fact, finds the head or brain a more likely place
for the sedem mentis (OD 8.3). Lactantius eschews the Stoic identifi-
cation of the ‘soul’ (anima) with fire or breath (OD 17.3–6; cf. Diog.
Laert. 7.156; LS, vol. 1, 282, fr. H; 315, frs. E, G), and refuses to
confirm the Stoic distinction between the ‘soul’ (anima/ψυχὴν) and
the ‘mind’ (animus/ἡγεμονικόν) (OD 18.1; Diog. Laert. 7.138–39;
LS, vol. 1, 315, fr. F; 316, fr. K). Thus, while the Stoics certainly
provide Lactantius with a conceptual framework for demonstrating
the existence of providence via an examination of the human per-
35 OD 19.2. Although Lactantius finds support for this position in

Cicero. Cf. Tusc. 1.65–67; Luc. 1.39. For an excellent treatment of the Sto-
ic doctrine of the soul consult A. A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism,”
Phronesis 27 (1982): 34–57.
son, they are by no means beyond reproach and cannot be said to

possess a knowledge of things that belongs to God alone (OD
15.5).
As in his other works, Lactantius’ method in De opificio is to
make use of extra-revelatory sources in order to defend Christian
belief – in this case, the doctrine of providence. In this regard, the
Stoics have provided Lactantius with a wealth of material at the
ready to employ against the detractors of providence. But also con-
sonant with Lactantius’ method is the belief that the philosophers
are ultimately unsuitable guides in the quest for true wisdom. No
sect possesses the fullness of truth and, because of this, they undo
themselves with their bickering and erroneous positions (OD 20.2–
3). The ‘philosophers of our sect’ (philosophi sectae nostrae) (OD 1.2),
as Lactantius calls them, therefore need to be trained and prepared
to answer those philosophers whose instruction can be detrimental
to the truth of faith (OD 1.2–3). Further, in order to be effective at
answering the critiques of opponents, this training needs to be
philosophical in nature so as to refute erroneous beliefs based on
mutually acceptable sources (OD 20.1–2). Apropos of this method,
De opificio defends the doctrine of providence by skillfully, yet criti-
cally, making use of the philosophical sources at Lactantius’ dispos-
al.
Lactantius’ primary goal in De opificio is not to author a treatise
on ‘Lactantian psychology,’ but to defend the doctrine of provi-
dence by examining the intelligible – i.e., the useful and beautiful –
parts of the human person. If these parts work for ends that can be
known by human reason, and if they display an aesthetic quality,
then they must, according to Lactantius, be the product of an intel-
ligent Creator. But, as chapters 14 through 19 illustrate, there are
some parts of the human person which reason cannot understand.
Though the modern Christian reader may wish that Lactantius pos-
sessed a clearer grasp of some matters in relation the soul, the
apologist repeatedly acknowledges the limits of the human mind in
expounding on matters only God can rightfully know. “The human
person itself cannot be touched, nor seen, nor comprehended, be-
cause it is concealed beneath that which is seen.” 36 De opificio, there-

fore, both defends the doctrine of providence by examining the
intelligible structure of the human person and, in doing so, demon-
strates that the human person is not reducible to its constituent
parts. 37 Those parts of the human person that cannot be under-
stood by reason do not offer proof that the human person is con-
fined and limited by the bodily senses. Rather they support the
view that the essence of the human person transcends the mortal
and corporeal realm (OD 19.9), and inspire one to marvel at the
designs of divine providence by which they were created (OD 16.9–
10). By writing a treatise in defense of providence, and by citing the
human person as the primary evidence in support of this belief,
Lactantius has provided his audience with the sources, method, and
introductory content necessary to understand what he will later
write in the Institutiones (OD 20.4–9; DI 1.2.6). In short, De opificio
serves as prolegomena to the Institutiones by addressing the topic
Lactantius acknowledges must come first in any grand apology. 38
II. A SYSTEMATIC TREATMENT OF LACTANTIUS’

ANTHROPOLOGY
A. The Creation and Composition of the Human Person

Lactantius begins his formal examination of the human body by
first stating that God is the Creator of the human person (OD 8.2).
In the Institutiones we find that this point is not beyond dispute, as
some of the poets claimed that human beings were fashioned out
of clay by Prometheus (DI 2.10.5; cf. Hor. Carm. 1.16.13–16; Hyg.
36 OD 19.9 (SC 213, 214): Nam ipse homo neque tangi neque aspici
neque comprehendi potest, quia latet intra hoc quod videtur. Cf. OD 14.1;
15.3; 16.11.
37 Cf. Roots, “De Opificio,” 481.
38 DI 1.2.1. It must be noted that one of Lactantius’ reasons for not
addressing the doctrine of providence in any extended manner at the start

of the Institutiones is that it had already been tackled by ‘people of clarity
and eloquence’ (hominibus argutis et eloquentibus) (DI 1.2.6). While he most
certainly has Cicero in mind for this compliment, could Lactantius not
also be alluding to his own treatment of the subject in OD?
Fab. 142; Stat. Theb. 8.305, 11.468). The poets were correct con-
cerning the terrestrial origin of the human body, but erred never-
theless in relation to the agent of creation. This admixture of truth
with fancy is typical of the license which poets take. “The poets are
not wont to speak lies entirely, but wrap and obscure what they say
in figures of speech.” 39 Since they did not have recourse to sacred
Scripture, the poets transmitted the tale of humanity’s creation ac-
cording to a diluted version of the truth originating with the
‘prophets’ (prophetarum). 40 The genesis of the myth ascribing the
formation of the human person to Prometheus, argues Lactantius,
stems from his occupation as a sculptor. “Prometheus was the first
to have formed the likeness of the human person from the soft and
moldable mud; from him first came the art of making statues and
images […]. The truth has thus been disguised by falsehood. That
which was created by God began to be attributed to a person who
imitated the divine work.” 41 The ancient sculptor was the son of
Japetus (DI 2.10.8) and a contemporary of Jupiter (DI 2.10.12), and
therefore, since he was himself a man, could not have created the
first human beings. 42 Further, Prometheus was also the father –
according to one version of the Greek myth – of Deucalion; the
only man to be saved from the great flood. 43 Yet how could the
earth have been filled with people destroyed by the deluge if the
39 DI 2.10.12 (BT 2005, 170): poetas […] non omnino mentiri solere,
sed figuris involvere et obscurare quae dicant. Cf. DI 1.11.23, 30.
40 DI 2.10.6. Here Lactantius may be alluding to Hermes (DI 2.10.14;
cf. Corp. Herm. vol. I, 1.12ff.; vol. IV, fr. 8a) and/or the Sibylline Oracles
(cf. Orac. Sib. 8.445).
41 DI 2.10.12 (BT 2005, 170, 171): primum omnium Promethea si-
mulacrum hominis formasse de molli ac pingui luto ab eoque primo na-

tam esse artem statuas et simulacra fingendi […]. (13) Sic veritas fucata
mendacio est et illud quod a deo factum ferebatur, homini, qui opus divi-
num imitates est, coepit adscribi.
42 On Lactantius’ Euhemerist account of the gods see Chapter 6, I.
Theology of History.
43 DI 2.10.10; cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.17.3. Lactantius admits that
the poets, again, have mixed the truth with poetic fiction in their version
of the flood narrative (DI 2.10.11).
father of the only male survivor was humanity’s creator (DI

2.10.10)? It was most assuredly God, therefore, who created human
beings from the mud of the earth (DI 2.10.13; cf. Gn 2:7).
In confirmation of this thesis, Lactantius cites various sources
that have affirmed God’s creation of the human person. Hermes,
the Sibyl and sacred Scripture all attest to this truth (DI 2.10.14,
11.18; cf. Corp. Herm. vol. I, 1.12ff.; vol. IV, fr. 8a; Orac. Sib. fr. 5;
Gn 1:26–27; 2:7). The Stoics also supported this view “when they
discussed providence,” 44 and Cicero in particular deserves special
praise for his apprehension of humanity’s divine Creator (DI
2.11.17). “‘This foreseeing, sagacious, manifold, sharp-witted,
mindful creature, laden with reason and counsel which we call the
human being, was made by the supreme god in outstanding fash-
ion.’” 45 In contrast to the evidence of the Stoics on this topic, how-
ever, Aristotle believed that the world had always existed and that
human beings always have and always will exist (DI 2.10.17; cf. Cic.
Luc. 2.119; Tusc. 1.70; Arist. Cael. 268a1–b10). But, responds Lac-
tantius, all things in nature are born, live and die. This universal
pattern demonstrates that there must have been an instant when
the human person first came into being; for that which is mortal
cannot exist apart from this cycle. “Because [the human person]
exists it is apparent that he began at some time; for nothing can
exist without a beginning. And because he begins it is apparent that
he will cease to be at some time; for that which is made mortal
cannot be immortal.” 46 Despite Aristotle’s belief to the contrary,
therefore, the overwhelming majority of divine and human testi-
44 DI 2.10.15 (BT 2005, 171): cum de providentia disserunt.

45 DI 2.11.16 (BT 2005, 176): ‘Animal hoc providum sagax multiplex
acutum memor plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem,
praeclara quadam condicione generatum esse a supremo deo.’ Quot. Cic.
Leg. 1.22. Cf. 1.27; Nat. D. 2.133; Rep. 4.1.
46 DI 2.10.22 (BT 2005, 172–72): Nam quoniam est, apparet ali-
quando coepisse – esse enim nulla res sine exordio potest –, et quia
coepit, apparet quandoque desiturum; nec enim potest id totum esse im-
mortale quod ex mortalibus constat.
mony agree, and the voice of reason declares “the God who made
all things created the human person.” 47
In creating the human person God fashioned a composite re-
ality. The duality present in all of creation is no less present in the
human person, who consists of ‘body’ (corpore) and ‘soul’ (anima)
(DI 2.9.22), ‘spirit’ (spiritum) and ‘earth’ (terreno) (DI 7.5.13). “When
the body was made, [God] breathed into the creature from the liv-
ing source of His own spirit – which is eternal – so that it could
bear a likeness to the world itself, which is constructed from con-
trary elements. For it is composed of soul and body, i.e., like heav-
en and earth, since the soul by which we live comes from God it is
from heaven, and the body from the earth, having been formed, as
we said, from the mud.” 48 In being a composite reality, the human
person is at once a microcosm and a ‘bridge’ (pontem) (DI 3.6.4). It
embodies the diverse elements of the universe – spirit and earth,
good and evil, wisdom and ignorance – in itself (DI 7.5.13), while
at the same time mediating between these modes of existence.
“Whence we have something in common with God and crea-
tures.” 49
By incarnating both the celestial and the earthly, the human
person also manifests within its ontological nature the existential
choice between good and evil (DI 7.4.12). Humankind’s physical
nature consists of earthly material drawn towards what is base and
lowly, while its spiritual nature consists of heavenly material at-
tracted to the transcendent and eternal. “We are made from two
equally opposing parts, soul and body, one which is ascribed to
heaven because it is light and intractable, the other to earth because
47 DI 2.11.14 (BT 2005, 171): Deus igitur rerum omnium machinator

fecit hominem.
48 DI 2.12.3 (BT 2005, 177–78): Ficto enim corpore inspiravit ei
animam de vitali fonte spiritus sui qui est perennis, ut ipsius mundi ex
contrariis constantis elementis similtudinem gereret. Constat enim ex ani-
ma et corpore, id est quasi ex caelo et terra, quandoquidem anima qua
vivimus velut e caelo oritur a deo, corpus e terra, cujus e limo diximus
esse formatum. Cf. DI 2.11.19; Gn 2:7.
49 DI 3.6.3 (BT 2007, 213): unde nobis et cum deo et cum animali-
bus est aliqua communitas.

it is comprehensible, one is constant and eternal, the other weak

and mortal. Good adheres to one, therefore, and evil the other.” 50
This division is necessarily so. God deliberately willed that the hu-
man person be a composite being and be naturally drawn by these
elements in opposite directions for the purpose of meriting salva-
tion (DI 7.4.12). “Because the human person is made from two
elements, body and soul, one of which is earthly and the other
heavenly, human beings have been assigned two lives. One life is
temporal, which pertains to the body, and the other is eternal,
which belongs to the soul. […] The former is earthly, like the body,
and thus finite. The latter is truly of heaven, like the soul, and thus
has no end. We receive the former first by being born, the latter we
receive by knowledge. For the virtues are not given by nature, but
because God wanted us to vie for our lives in life.” 51
The divine element of the human person, that which separates
it from the remainder of creation, is the product of God’s desire to
create a being in His own ‘image’ (imaginis) (DI 2.10.3; cf. Epi. 22.2;
Gn 1:27) and after His own ‘likeness’ (simulacrum) (Epi. 36.3; cf. DI
6.10.1; 7.4.3; ID 13.13). God created the human person, on the one
hand, from the mud of the earth; from which Lactantius reckons
the word ‘human’ was derived. 52 On the other hand, God created
human beings with a capacity for reason and intelligence: an ‘icon’
50 ID 15.3 (SC 289, 164): nos ex duobus aeque repugnantibus com-

pacti sumus, anima et corpore, quorum alterum caelo ascribitur quia tenue
est et intractabile, alterum terrae quia comprehensibile est; alterum so-
lidum et aeternum est, alteri fragile atque mortale. Ergo alteri bonum ad-
haeret, alteri malum. Cf. DI 3.12.1.
51 DI 7.5.16 (BT 2011, 662): Nam quia homo ex duabus rebus cons-
tat, corpore atque anima, quorum alterum terrenum est, alterum caeleste,
duae vitae homini attributae sunt, una temporalis, quae corpori adsignatur,
altera sempiterna, quae animae subjacent. […] (17) illa terrena est sicut
corpus et ideo finitur, haec vero caelistis sicut anima et ideo terminum no
habet; illam primam nescientes accipimus, hanc secundum scientes: virtuti
enim, non naturae datur, quia volvit nos deus vitam nobis in vita compa-
rare. For more on this motif see above under “Theodicy.”
52 The apologist considers the word homo, ‘human being,’ to come
from the word humus, ‘mud’ (DI 2.10.3; cf. Gn 2:7).

(εἰκών) of Himself (DI 2.10.4; quot. Orac. Sib. 8.402), and ‘most
holy living creature’ (sacrosanctum animal) (DI 6.20.17). “Then [God]
made for Himself a sensible and intelligent likeness that is in the
form of His image; which nothing can surpass in perfection.” 53 The
content of the imago Dei, i.e., the quality in humanity that contains
the divine likeness, is the gift of reason or wisdom (ID 10.41). “If it
belongs to God to think, to understand, to foresee, to excel, and
these things the human person alone possesses from all living crea-
tures, he was made therefore in the likeness of God.” 54
B. The Human Person in the Created Order

Being made in the imago Dei, humanity occupies an exalted place in
the order of creation. “[God] breathed wisdom into [the human
person] alone, so that he might subjugate all things to his dominion
and authority, and make use of all of the world’s blessings.” 55 Be-
cause human beings possess wisdom they are endowed with au-
thority over the created world (DI 7.4.16). In this way the human
person participates in the providence of God by ruling over crea-
tion just as God governs and sustains the cosmos. “Great, right
and wonderful, therefore, is the strength and reason and power of
the human person. God made the world itself and all things for
him to have so great an honor; so that he might command all
things.” 56 So as to signify this noble vocation, and to confirm hu-
manity’s position as the apex of His creation, humankind was the
53 DI 2.10.3 (BT 2005, 168–69): Tum fecit sibi ipse simulacrum sen-
sibile atque intellegens, id est ad imaginis suae formam, qua nihil potest
esse perfectius.
54 ID 18.14 (SC 289, 186): Si deo subjacet cogitare sapere intellegere
providere praestare, ex omnibus autem animalibus homo solus haec

habet, ergo ad dei similitudinem factus est.
55 ID 13.13 (SC 289, 156): inspiravit ei sapientiam soli, ut omnia im-
perio ac dicioni suae subjugaret omnibusque mundi commodis uteretur.

Cf. 14.2; OD 8.3; Gn 1:26–28.
56 DI 7.4.16 (BT 2011, 657): Magna igitur et recta et admirabilis est
vis et ratio et potestas hominis, propter quem mundum ipsum et universa

quaecumque sunt deus fecit tantumque illi honoris habuit, ut eum praefi-
ceret universis.
last of all creatures to be made by God (DI 2.8.63; cf. Gn 1:26–31).

“‘A creature holier than these, more capable of lofty thoughts, and
which had dominion over the rest was yet missing. The human
person was born.’” 57 God deliberately established this hierarchy of
creation for the benefit of humankind; so that human beings might
recognize their status in the order of the natural world. “All things
are subject to [the human person] so that he himself might be sub-
ject to God, his Maker and Creator.” 58
Supporting Lactantius’ belief in humanity’s preeminent role in
the cosmos is the Stoic idea that the world was created for the ben-
efit of humankind. 59 “If someone were to consider the administra-
tion of all the things of the world, he would know for sure how
true are the words of the Stoics who say that the world was con-
structed for our benefit.” 60 In observing the order of the universe
one can see that all things providentially work to support and pro-
mote human flourishing. Therefore, reckons the apologist, God
created the world for the sake of humankind. “God made the
world for human beings. He who does not see this is not much
different from a beast. Who contemplates the heavens except the
human person? Who marvels at the sun, the stars, and all of God’s
works except the human person? Who cultivates the earth? Who
harvests its fruit? Who navigates the sea? Who has dominion over
the fish, the birds, and the quadrupeds except the human person?
God, therefore, made all things for the human person because all
57 DI 2.8.64 (BT 2005, 161): ‘sanctius his animal mentisque capacius

altae deerat adhuc et quod dominari in cetera posset, natus homo est.’
Quot. Ov. Met. 1.76–78.
58 ID 14.2 (SC 289, 162): idcirco ei cuncta subjecta sunt ut fictori
atque artifici deo esset ipse subjectus.

59 On this point see Cic. Nat. D. 1.23; 2.37, 133, 154–62; Fin. 3.67;
Off. 1.22; Luc. 2.120. Cicero mentions this idea in relation to Chrysippus,
with whom it probably originated. Cf. Gell. NA 7.1; LS, vol. 2, 330, fr. Q;
Pease, 949; Clarke, 344 n. 536.
60 ID 13.1 (SC 289, 150, 152): Si consideret aliquis universam mundi
administrationem, intelleget profecto quam vera sit sententia Stoicorum,

qui aiunt nostra causa mundum esse constructum. Cf. DI 2.8.63; 7.3.4;
Epi. 63.7.
things yield to the needs of the human person.” 61 God could not
have made the world for Himself, states the apologist, because He
is in no way dependent upon the world for His existence. “[God]
can exist without the world, just as He did before it, and God uses
none of the things in it or generated by it.” 62 The world must have
been created, therefore, for those living creatures that benefit from
its existence. Further, it is clear that other living things exist for the
sake of humankind because human beings care for and are served
by the rest of creation. Since, therefore, the human person has do-
minion over all other creatures, and since “[other creatures] do not
perceive the plan of the world as the human person does,” 63 the
world and all it contains must have been created for the benefit of
humankind. “The most high God established [these things] not for
His own sake, because He needs nothing, but for the human per-
son who might use them fittingly.” 64
There can be little doubt that Lactantius is once again relying
on the philosophical material provided by his mentor Cicero for
this argument. The natural wonders of the world, according to Cic-
ero, serve those beings with an intellectual nature – “for it is reason
which exceeds all things” 65 – and thus the world was created for
gods and human beings (Nat. D. 2.133, 154). Upon closer examina-
tion of the ways in which the natural world is suited to meet human
61 Epi. 64.3 (BT 1994, 106): Fecit deus mundum propter hominem.
Hoc qui non pervidet, non multum distat a pecude. Quis caelum suspicit
nisi homo? Quis solem, quis astra, quis omnia dei opera miratur nisi ho-
mo? Quis colit terram? Quis ex ea fructum capit? Quis navigat mare? Quis
pisces, quis volatilia, quis quadrupedes habet in potestate nisi homo?
Cuncta igitur propter hominem deus fecit, quia usui hominis cuncta cesse-
runt. Cf. ID 13.1–6.
62 DI 7.4.8 (BT 2011, 656): potest esse sine mundo, sicut fuit antea,
et iis omnibus quae in eo sunt quaeque generantur deus ipse non utitur.
Cf. Min. Fel. 32.2.
63 DI 7.4.10 (BT 2011, 656): non sentiunt mundi rationem, sicut ho-
mo.
64 DI 7.4.19 (BT 2011, 658): Instituit ergo summus deus non propter
se, quia nihilo eget, sed propter hominem, qui iis congruenter uteretur.
65 Nat. D. 2.133 (Pease, 896): ratio est enim quae praestet omnibus.
needs, however, Cicero concludes that the recipients of these bene-

fits are primarily human beings rather than gods (Nat. D. 2.154–
62). Lactantius also takes from Cicero the primary Academic cri-
tique of this Stoic position. Why, asks Cicero, if God created the
world for humankind are there so many things that work to hu-
manity’s detriment (DI 7.4.11; quot. Cic. Acad. Pr. 2.120; cf. ID
13.9)?
In answer to this question Lactantius states that the responses
of the Stoics were severely lacking (ID 13.10). They claimed that
the utility of a great number of things remains unknown and that,
over time, the necessity of their existence for humankind will be
discovered (ID 13.10; cf. Sen. Q Nat. 7.30.5). But, replies the apol-
ogist, this argument simply fails to address the question of why, if
all things were created for the benefit of humanity, evil exists in the
world. Referring to evil as a yet unknown good merely masks the
reality of its existence. 66 In response to the Academics, Lactantius
once again affirms the necessity of evil for the sake of wisdom. 67
“[The human person] was given wisdom, therefore, so that he
would know the nature of good and evil and might exercise the
power of his reason in desiring good and turning away from evil.
[…] Unless evil exists, which is to be avoided and by which one
can distinguish from what is good and useful, wisdom is not need-
ed.” 68 The existence of evil serves humankind because without it
66 ID 13.12. Lactantius is using the Stoics as the proverbial “straw

man” in his critique of their efforts to explain the problem of evil. Seneca,
for example, does argue that many evils are merely “unknown goods,”
and that they are for the moral benefit of those whom they afflict. But he
also adds that evils which an individual suffers can serve the good of the
whole (Prov. 2.2). Lactantius was most certainly aware of a wider range of
Stoic responses to the problem of evil than he is letting on here (cf. DI
5.22.12; Epi. 24.4–9).
67 ID 13.16; DI 7.4.13–15. Cf. DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4;
6.4.17; 7.5.27 add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3. For further discus-
sion of the problem of evil in Lactantius see Chapter 4, II. God the Crea-
tor, C. Theodicy.
68 DI 7.4.13 (BT 2011, 657): Idcirco enim data est illi sapientia, ut
cognita bonorum malorumque natura et in appetendis bonis et in malis

wisdom – which is what separates human beings from other living

creatures (DI 7.4.13.14; cf. OD 2.2–8) – would cease to exist. God
therefore established evil, like all things, for the benefit of humani-
ty.
The Stoics rightly apprehended that in the natural world the
human person is the greatest beneficiary of the fruits of creation,
especially in possessing the gift of reason, and therefore that the
natural world exists for the sake of humankind. But, lacking divine
revelation, the Stoics were at a loss to explain why human beings
were created as the apex of the natural world (DI 7.3.14, 4.2; Epi.
63.7). If the philosophers had been able to answer this question,
they would have apprehended the entire ‘mystery of the human
person’ (sacramentum hominis) (DI 7.5.2). According to Lactantius,
God established the contradictory elements that make up the
world’s existence – good and evil, spirit and matter –so that human
beings might “come to the inexpressible reward of eternal life with
the greatest difficulty and through mighty labors.” 69 God created
human beings for two purposes: to fill and subdue the earth, and to
endow them with immortality in recompense for living virtuously
(DI 7.5.15; cf. Gn 1:28). By combining matter and spirit in the
composition of the human person, God ensured that virtue would
not come easily. Rather, these two dimensions fight and quarrel
with one another, with the goods of the soul and those of the body
battling for supremacy (DI 7.5.23). But humankind’s fulfillment,
the end for which it was created, is to be found in shunning bodily
temptations and pursuing wisdom and virtue; i.e., knowing and
living according to the good. What the philosophers did not know,
what they could not have known, is that a life of earthly fulfillment
in wisdom and virtue brings forth the reward of heavenly fulfill-
ment: a life of knowing and worshipping God ‘in eternal beatitude’
(in aeternum beatus) (DI 7.5.27).
declinandis vim suae rationis exerceat. […] (14) Nisi ergo essent mala,
quae caveret, quae a bonis utilibusque distingueret, non esset ei sapientia
necessaria. Cf. ID 13.14.
69 DI 7.5.9 (BT 2011, 660): aeterna vitae ineloquibile praemium cum
summa difficultate ac magnis laboribus pervenirent.

C. Status Rectus
Central to Lactantius’ anthropology is the meaning which the apol-
ogist gives to the bipedal stature of the human person. 70 Lactantius
offers the status rectus of the human person as proof of its divine
origin and telos on several occasions throughout his works. 71 In De
opificio, as elsewhere, this motif serves to establish humanity’s
unique place within the created order. “And so the human person
alone possesses right reason, and a sublime stature and counte-
nance, in common with God the Father, which testifies to his
origin and maker.” 72 Unlike the rest of creation, the human person
has been given the gift of wisdom, which allows him/her to recog-
nize the existence of reason both in the universe and its Author.
“The human person, however, with an upright stature and sublime
face raised to the contemplation of the world, compares his coun-
tenance with God; and reason knows reason.” 73 Therefore, it is the
capacity to know and worship God that is most clearly signified by
humanity’s erect posture.
In the final book of the Institutiones, while combatting the er-
roneous opinions of Epicurus (DI 7.5.4, 7), Lactantius again cites
70 This is a standard philosophical tropos which was readily adopted

by Christian apologists. Cf. esp. Cic. Nat. D. 2.37, 140; Leg. 1.26; Justin 1
Apol. 1.55; Min. Fel. 17.2; Ire. Adv. Haer. 1.24.1; Cypr. Ad Dem. 16. For an
exhaustive list of citations see Pease, 914–15. Lactantius cites two sources
for this idea, Ovid (DI 2.1.15; quot. Met. 1.84–86) and Hermes (DI 7.9.11;
cf. Corp. Herm., vol. 4, fr. 14), who refers to this capacity as ϑεοπτίαν,
‘godsight.’ For secondary literature on the subject see especially Loi, Lat-
tanzio, 137; Perrin, L’homme antique, 68–69 with notes; Antonie Włosok,
Laktanz und die philosophische Gnosis (Heidelberg: 1960), 182, 221.
71 Cf. OD 8.2, 10.26, 19.10; DI 2.1.15, 2.23, 18.1; 17.9, 18.1; 3.10.11,
12.26, 20.11, 27.16, 28.16; 7.5.6, 20, 9.11; ID 7.5, 14.2, 20.10; Epi. 20.4ff.,
25.1, 65.4.
72 OD 8.3 (SC 213, 150): Hominis itaque solius recta ratio et sublimis
status et vultus deo patri communis ac prximus originem suam fictorem-

que testator.
73 ID 7.5 (SC 289, 112): Homo autem, recto statu, ore sublimi ad
contemplationem mundi excitatus, confert cum deo vultum, et rationem

ratio cognoscit.
the human person’s erect posture as evidence of its exalted place in

the order of creation. “What clearer argument could be offered that
God made the world for human beings, and that the human person
was made for its own sake, than that out of all living creatures [the
human person] alone was formed with its eyes directed towards
heaven, face gazing towards God, countenance shared with its Par-
ent, so that it might be seen that God enkindled the human person
to contemplation of Him by lifting it up from the mud as with an
outstretched hand.” 74 Contrary to Epicurus’ belief that God did not
create the world for humankind (DI 7.5.4; cf. Usener, 250, fr. 371;
Lucr. 5.165–67), Lactantius offers the status rectus of the human per-
son as proof of its singular and unique status in the order of crea-
tion. Since human beings are the only creatures capable of contem-
plating their Creator, as their erect stature signifies, they are un-
doubtedly the summit and reason for creation itself.
The apologist also employs this trope to support many other
theses contained throughout his works. Early in the Institutiones, this
motif is used in order to demonstrate that idolatry is contrary to
human nature. For the human person is endowed with a spiritual
and rational soul, and ought never to offer worship to what is
composed of earthly matter. “When our one and only Parent
formed the human person, He made an intelligent animal capable
of reason. Raising him from the ground, God lifted him to the con-
templation of his Creator.” 75 The stature of the human person em-
bodies the natural desire to seek what is above and on this account,
reckons Lactantius, the human being “is called ἄνϑρωπον by the
74 DI 7.5.6 (BT 2011, 659): Quod planius argumentum proferri po-

test et mundum hominis et hominem sua causa deum fecisse, quam quod
ex omnibus animantibus solus ita formatus est, ut oculi ejus ad caelum
directi, facies ad deum spectans, vultus cum suo parente communis sit
videaturque hominem deus quasi porrecta manu allevatum ex humo ad
contemplationem sui excitasse?
75 DI 2.1.15 (BT 2005, 112): Parens enim noster ille unus et solus
cum fingeret hominem id est animal intellegens et rationis capax, eum

vero ex humo sublevatum ad contemplationem sui artificis erexit. Cf. ID
20.10.
Greeks, because he looks above.” 76 Though many creatures can

view the sky, only the human person possesses an upright posture
by an act of divine providence that signifies his destiny to know
and worship God (DI 2.1.17; cf. 2.2.23, 17.9, 18.1). Worship of
artificially made objects and non-sentient nature, therefore, forces
the human person to stoop to the ground, i.e., to venerate that
which is below it in the order of creation. “Let us adore and wor-
ship nothing other than the name of our one Maker and Parent,
who has fashioned the human person in an unbending manner, so
that we might know that we are called to what is above and heav-
enly.” 77
When Lactantius’ apologetic aim shifts towards the false opin-
ions of the philosphers, he again employs the status rectus motif to
combat the skepticism of the Academy. In contrast to the Socratic
claim that “‘what is above us is nothing to us,’” 78 Lactantius offers
the upright stature of the human person as evidence that humanity
was born to contemplate its origin and destiny. If the skeptical po-
sition were true, the apologist argues, human beings would be no
better than animals; attending to what is base and earthly. But by
our erect stature we are “raised up to contemplation.” 79 We were
created with this posture in order to marvel at the providential or-
der of the cosmos, its “wonderful and perfect system,” 80 and there-
76 DI 2.1.16 (BT 2005, 112): ἄνϑρωπον Graeci appellaverunt, quod

sursum spectet. Cf. Epi. 20.9. Lactantius understands the word to be a
combination of ἀνά (upwards), ἀϑρέω (to look), and πρόσωπον (face). Cf.
Włosok, Laktanz, 148; Perrin, L’homme antique, 408.
77 DI 2.17.9 (BT 2005, 165–66): nihilque aliud adoremus, nihil cola-
mus nisi solius artificis parentisque nostri unicum nomen, qui proterea
hominem rigidum figuravit, ut sciamus nos ad superna et caelestia provo-
cari.
78 DI 3.20.10 (BT 2007, 279): ‘quod supra nos, nihil ad nos.’ Cf. DI
3.28.16–17; Epi. 32.3; Min. Fel. 13.1. Lactantius attributes this quotation
to Socrates. Tertullian, however, ascribes it to Epicurus (Ad nat. 2.4.15). It
was most likely proverbial. See Clarke, 240–41.
79 DI 3.20.11 (BT 2007, 279): contemplationem sumus excitati. Cf.
ID 14.2.
80 DI 3.20.13 (BT 2007, 279): mirabili ratione perfectum.
by to recognize that it is the product of a supreme ‘Leader’ (modera-
Similarly, this trope appears in Lactantius’ critique of the phi-

tore).
losophers in general. Paramount to the apologist’s argument that

the philosophers are unsuitable guides in the quest for wisdom is
his firm belief in the unity and indivisibility of wisdom and reli-
gion. 81 The two are so indivisibly linked that, according to Lactan-
tius, “neither should any religion be accepted without wisdom, nor
any wisdom approved without religion.” 82 The philosophers, how-
ever, cannot be of any help in attaining the truth because they did
not grasp the importance of religion in this vital unity. “For if we
behold the heavens it is surely for no other reason than religion; if
religion is removed, there is no rational connection between us and
the heavens. Accordingly, one must either behold the heavens or
sink down to the earth. We cannot fall to the earth, even if we de-
sired to do so, because of our erect stature. We must behold the
heavens, therefore, to which the nature of the body tends.” 83 The
status rectus of the human person, then, testifies to the importance
of religion by being a physical manifestation of the human inclina-
tion towards the divine.
From the foregoing exposition it is clear that the status rectus
motif is used by Lactantius primarily as evidence that the natural
fulfillment of the human person is to be found in religion, i.e., in
knowing and worshipping the transcendent Creator. “It is [the hu-
man person] alone who, possessing sense and the capacity for rea-
son, can know God, who can admire His works, perceive His vir-
tue and power. For that reason he has been endowed with counsel,
81 For a fuller discussion of this argument see Chapter 2, III.

Sources, C. Philosophers.
82 DI 1.1.25 (BT 2005, 6): neque religio ulla sine sapientia suscipien-
da sit nec ulla sine religione probanda sapientia.

83 DI 3.10.10 (BT 2007, 232): Si enim nobis in caelum spectandum
est nhil utique aliud quam ob religionem, si religio tollitur, nulla nobis
ratio cum caelo est. (11) Itaque aut eo spectandum est aut in terram pro-
cumbendum. In terram procumbere ne si velimus quidem possumus, quo-
rum status rectus est. (12) In caelum igitur spectandum est, quo natura
corporis provocat.
mind and prudence. And on that account he alone out of all living
things is upright of body and rigid of stature, so that he seems to
have been raised to the contemplation of his Parent. ” 84 In this
quotation, God’s providential intent in creating humanity with an
upright statue is made clear by Lactantius’ grammatical style. His
repeated use of adverbs denoting purpose (ideo, idcirco) and corre-
sponding ut clauses, stress the teleological nature of the human
form. In other words, an erect posture is the product of a deliber-
ate design that physically manifests a spiritual reality; namely, that
in religion one discovers the true meaning of the human person.
“Whoever strives to safeguard the mystery of the human person
and desires to grasp the reason for his nature, let him raise himself
from the ground and direct his eyes to heaven with an erect
mind.” 85
D. Vera Religio
By virtue of the gift of reason, the human person can know and
worship God. It is this unique characteristic of human life which
the status rectus signifies. Lactantius believes, therefore, that humani-
ty’s natural fulfillment is to be found in religion. Religion alone, i.e.,
knowing and worshipping God, is the singular virtue that separates
humankind from all living creatures and must, therefore, be the
natural end of humanity’s highest capacity. “Therefore, as Cicero
says, ‘there is no animal except the human being who possesses any
knowledge of God.’ For it has been instructed in wisdom, so that it
alone understands religion. This is the extraordinary or only differ-
84 ID 14.2 (SC 289, 162): Solus est enim sentiens capaxque rationis
intellegere possit deum, qui opera euis admirari, virtutem potestatemque
perspicere; idcirco enim consilio mente prudentia instructus est, ideo solus
praeter ceteras animantes recto corpore ac statu fictus est, ut ad contem-
plationem partentis sui excitatus esse videatur; ideo sermonem solus acce-
pit ac linguam, cogitationis interpretem, ut enarrare majestatem domini sui
possit, postremo idcirco ei cuncta subjecta sun tut fictori atque artifice
deo esset ipse subjectus. Cf. DI 3.20.11.
85 DI 2.18.1 (BT 2005, 198): Quicumque igitur sacramentum hominis
tueri rationemque naturae suae nititur obtinere, ipse se ab humo suscitet et

erecta mente oculos suos tendat in caelum.
ence between human beings and the dumb animals.” 86 In De ira

Dei, Lactantius lists many of the qualities that are thought to be sui
generis to humankind only to find traces of them in the wider animal
kingdom. Speech, for example, is thought to be unique to human
beings, but there are many species of animals that communicate
amongst themselves using their own sounds (ID 7.7–8; DI 3.10.2).
An element of intelligence can also be found in other creatures,
such as ants and bees, “which plan and provide for the future.” 87
But there is no trace or vestige of religion in any creature outside of
the human family. “We alone of all creatures sense the divine
strength and power, while in others there is no knowledge of
God.” 88
The uniqueness of the human capacity to know and worship
God, argues Lactantius, indicates that humankind’s natural end is
to be found in religion. “The greatest good of the human person is
in religion alone.” 89 Religion succeeds in fulfilling the human per-
son’s natural end by uniting the perfections of humanity’s greatest
capacities. In other words, for Lactantius, true religion is a union of
wisdom (knowing God) and virtue (worshipping God). Just as the
cult of the pantheon is to be regarded as empty because it lacks
wisdom, so too the teachings of the philosophers are to be consid-
ered false because they lack virtue or ‘ultimate piety’ (summam pie-
tatem) (DI 4.3.1–2). “Worship of the true God, and no other thing,
is wisdom. Indeed, God is the highest and Creator of all things;
who made the human person after His likeness. Therefore He gave
reason solely to human beings from out of all the animals, so that
they yield honor to Him as Father and fear Him as Lord. And by
86 ID 7.6 (SC 289, 112): Propterea « nullum est animal, ut ait Cicero,
praeter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei ». Solus enim sapien-
tia instructus est ut religionem solus intellegat, et haec est hominis atque
mutorum vel praecipua vel sola distantia. Quot. Leg. 1.24; cf. DI 3.10.7.
87 ID 7.10 (SC 289, 114): quam ratio et providentia futuri. Cf. DI
3.10.3–4.
88 ID 7.14 (SC 289, 114): soli omnium divinam vim potestatemque
sentimus, in illis autem nullus sit intellectus dei. Cf. DI 2.3.14.

89 DI 3.10.1 (BT 2007, 230): Summum igitur hominis bonum in sola
religion est.
this piety and obedience they merit the reward of immortality. This
is the true and divine mystery.” 90
Lactantius traces the etymology of the word religio to the verb
religare, ‘to bind or fasten,’ because humankind is bound to God by
the virtue of piety (DI 4.28.3, 12). This etymological reading of
religio directly conflicts with the explanation provided by Cicero,
who derives religio from relegere, ‘to re-read.’ 91 In a passage quoted by
Lactantius, Cicero explains that those found frequently in the tem-
ple praying for their children ‘to survive’ (superesse) were referred to
as ‘superstitious’ (superstitiosi), whereas those who diligently ‘consid-
ered’ (retractarent) and ‘studied’ (relegerent) the worship of the gods
were deemed ‘religious’ (religiosi). Lactantius is astonished at “this
interpretation, which is inept,” 92 and suggests that what distin-
guishes superstition from religion is the object of worship rather
than the disposition of the worshipper. “Religion is undoubtedly
the worship of what is true, superstition the worship of what is
false.” 93 Therefore, according to Lactantius, vera religio is found
“where the one God is worshipped, of course, where all life and
action returns to the one beginning and the one end.” 94
The wisdom contained in vera religio, the knowledge which ac-
companies true piety, is the recognition of God as both ‘Lord’ (do-
minus) and ‘Father’ (pater). The pairing of these titles to describe
how the pious individual relates to God is an integral part of Lac-
90 Epi. 36.2 (BT 1994, 50–51): Nam deum verum colere, id est nec
aliud quidquam [quam] sapientia[m]. (3) Ille enim summus et conditor
rerum deus, qui hominem velut simulacrum suum fecit, idcirco utique soli
ex omnibus animalibus rationem dedit, ut honorem sibi tamquam patri et
<timorem> tamquam domino referret et hac pietate atque obsequio im-
mortalitatis praemium mereretur. Hoc est verum divinumque mysterium.
91 DI 4.28.4–5; quot. Nat. D. 2.71–72. St. Augustine agrees with Lac-
tantius’ etymology (vera rel. 55.111; retr. 1.13.9), though he is also aware of
Cicero’s interpretation (civ. Dei 10.3; retr. 1.13.9).
92 DI 4.28.6 (BT 2007, 425): Haec interpretatio quam inepta sit.
93 DI 4.28.11 (BT 2007, 427): Nimirum religio veri cultus est, super-
stitio falsi.
94 DI 4.3.7 (BT 2007, 317): scilicet ubi deus colitur unus, ubi vita et
actus omnis ad unum caput et ad unam summam refertur.

tantius’ view of religion and a major contribution of the apologist

to Christian thought. 95 This motif appears throughout Lactantius’
works in his discussions of God’s unity (DI 1.6.4, 7.3; Epi. 2.2),
religion (DI 4.3.13, 4.2, 6, 11, 28.12; Epi. 36.3; ID 24.2), justice (DI
5.18.14; Epi. 51.1, 54.4), repentance (DI 6.24.4), and providence
(DI 2.27.5; ID 19.6). Lactantius first makes mention of God as
Lord and Father while citing the work of Hermes Trismegistus in
support of monotheism: “[Hermes] calls [God] by the names we
use: ‘Lord and Father.’” 96 These titles for God become almost axi-
omatic for Lactantius when the apologist exposits the nature of
true wisdom and religion. By Book 4 of the Institutiones Lactantius
has already demonstrated God’s unity (Book 1), the falsity of the
polytheistic worship (Book 2), and the folly of philosophy (Book
3). Building upon that foundation, Lactantius next examines the
content of true wisdom and finds it in the knowledge that God is
one, i.e., in vera religio. “Wisdom is in religion and religion in wis-
dom. They cannot be separated because to be wise is nothing other
than honoring the true God with just and pious worship.” 97
The human person, by virtue of being the only portion of
God’s creation endowed with the gift of reason, has the potential
to apprehend God’s unity and, by doing so, to acknowledge that
He is the one Father and Lord of all that exists (Epi. 36.3). It is in
this knowledge that wisdom exists (DI 2.8.71; 3.30.3). Further, to
understand God’s paternity and dominion over the universe is to
recognize one’s relationship to God within this dynamic existence.
In other words, if God is the Father and Lord of the cosmos then
we – His only creatures capable of apprehending this wisdom – are
‘bound’ (religemur) to Him. Human beings are obliged to offer God
95 The theme of God as dominus et pater appears in Tertullian (Apol.

34), as does the concept of vera religio (Apol. 24), but these ideas are devel-
oped extensively by Lactantius. Cf. Digeser, “Constantine’s Letter,” 36–7;
Włosok, Laktanz, 232–46.
96 DI 1.6.4 (BT 2005, 22): nominibus appellat quibus nos ‘dominum
et patrem.’ Cf. Ascl. 20; DI 1.7.3.

97 DI 4.3.10 (BT 2007, 317): Idcirco et in sapientia religio et in reli-
gion sapientia est. Ergo non potest segregari, quia sapere nihil aliud est
nisi deum verum justis ac piis cultibus honorare.
the veneration and worship that is due to Him as the one Father
and Lord of creation. “Worship must therefore be given to the
One who can truly be called Father. The same One must also be
Lord because He can forgive and, thus, also punish.” 98 What hu-
man beings owe to God is akin to what is owed the Roman paterfa-
milias by the members of his household (DI 4.3.16–18). The pater-
familias is a father because he has sired his children, and a lord be-
cause he is the master of his servants. This does not mean that his
powers are divided but, rather, that he is both father and lord over
his entire household. In fact, mentions Lactantius, when a son
reaches adulthood he is manumitted like a servant and, conversely,
when a servant is freed he takes the last name of his master like a
son (DI 4.3.17). The paterfamilias, therefore, has the ‘double power’
(duplici potestate) of being both a father and a lord. Similarly, since
God both created and gives order to all that exists, He is the one
Father and Lord of the universe. And just as the members of a
household owe the paterfamilias both their affection and obedience,
so too ought we to love God because He is Father and obey Him
because He is Lord. “God is one since He sustains the role of both
of Father and Lord. We ought to love Him because we are His
children, and fear Him because we are His servants.” 99
True worship for Lactantius is the disposition of the human
person towards God as both Father and Lord. Just as true wisdom
is in knowing God’s unity, true worship demonstrates this
knowledge by loving God as Father and fearing Him as Lord. Wis-
dom and worship, therefore, are inextricably linked. They cannot
be divided since wisdom is related to worship as knowing is to do-
ing. Wisdom naturally comes prior since perception precedes ac-
tion, but the two are joined together to form vera religio, i.e., in re-
turning to God what is owed Him (DI 4.4.3). Just as creation flows
from God’s gratuitous act of self-giving, the human person returns
98 DI 4.3.14 (BT 2007, 318): Unus igitur colendus est, qui potest vere
pater nominari; idem etiam dominus sit necesse est, quia sicut potest in-
dulgere, ita etiam coercere.
99 DI 4.4.2 (BT 2007, 320): Deus autem, qui unus est, quoniam
utramque personam sustinent et patris et domini, et amare eum debemus,

quia filii sumus, et timere, quia servi.
to God what is His due by apprehending His oneness (true wisdom)

and offering Him love and obedience (true worship). This exitus-
reditus cycle is the very pattern of religion for Lactantius. “This is
the condition of our birth, that we might offer just and deserving
obedience to the God who created us, that we might acknowledge
and follow Him alone. We are tied and bound by this chain of piety
to God; from whence the term religion received its name.” 100 To
love God as a Father and obey Him as Lord is to fulfill the rela-
tionship whereby the human person is tied to God by virtue of
being a homo sapiens, i.e., a rational creature. “Because God has
bound the human person to Himself and tied him to piety, it is
necessary for us to serve Him as Lord and obey Him as Father.” 101
Since wisdom and worship are united in the one movement of
piety, Lactantius rejects the possibility that vera religio can be found
where the two are divided. “Neither can religion be separated from
wisdom nor wisdom severed from religion; because it is the same
God who we should both understand, which is wisdom, and hon-
or, which is religion.” 102 Thus the standard for vera religio is that it
contain both knowledge and worship of the one God. “Where,
however, wisdom is inseparably joined together with religion each
is necessarily true; because we ought to be wise in worship – i.e., to
know what and how we might offer worship – and in being wise to
100 DI 4.28.2 (BT 2007, 424–25): Hac enim condicione gignimur, ut

generanti nos deo justa et debita obsequia praebeamus, hunc solum nove-
rimus, hunc sequamur. (3) Hoc vincula pietatis obstricti deo et religati
sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen accepit. Pope John XXIII uses Lactantius’
description of religion in DI 4.28.2–3 to support the cause of religious
liberty. Since being religious is such a vital part of being human, argues
Pope John, governments ought to respect the conscience of the individual
person on such matters. Cf. Pacem in Terris 14.
101 DI 4.28.12 (BT 2007, 427): quod hominem sibi deus religaverit et
pietate constrinxerit, quia servire nos ei ut domino et obsequi ut patri

necesse est.
102 DI 4.4.2 (BT 2007, 320): Non potest igitur nec religio a sapientia
separari nec sapientia a religion secerni, quia idem deus est qui et intellegi
debet, quod est sapientia, et honorari, quod est religionis.
worship – i.e., to fulfill the obligation and action that we know.” 103
Since the union of wisdom and worship is a necessary precondition
of vera religio, Lactantius eliminates both philosophy and the wor-
ship of the gods as possible candidates. While particular philoso-
phers might have acknowledged God’s oneness and providence,
because philosophy has failed to offer God the veneration that He
deserves, true wisdom cannot reside in philosophy (DI 4.3.2–3).
Similarly, since animal sacrifice and idolatry are the forms of wor-
ship in the cult of the gods rather than the shaping of the inner
affections of the human person towards God, it cannot be regard-
ed as true worship (DI 4.3.1–2). Further, the defining characteristic
of the element of worship in vera religio, i.e., loving God as Father
and obeying Him as Lord, was known to neither group (DI 4.4.6).
Though individuals such as Plato or Cicero may have apprehended
God’s unity, neither they nor any other philosopher could be said
to offer God the affection and devotion, i.e., the worship, that vera
religio demands (DI 4.4.6). Given the criteria he has established,
Lactantius submits that vera religio is to be found in the Christian
religion alone (DI 4.30.11). “Ours, the true religion, is firm and sol-
id and immutable, because it teaches justice, because it is always
with us, because its worship is entirely spiritual, because it treats the
mind itself as its sacrifice.” 104
E. The Virtues, Immortality, and Justice

Being the only creature endowed with the gift of reason, argues
Lactantius, the human person was created for religion. Vera religio,
i.e., the fulfillment of humankind’s religious capacity, is in knowing
that God is one (true wisdom) and in loving Him as Father and
obeying Him as Lord (true worship). Further, Lactantius believes
103 DI 4.3.6 (BT 2007, 316–17): Ubi autem sapientia cum religion in-
separabili nexu cohaeret, utrumque esse verum necesse est, quia et in
colendo sapere debemus, id est quid nobis et quomodo sit colendum, et in
sapiendo colere id est re et actu quod scierimus implere. Cf. DI 6.25.7;
Epi. 36.5.
104 DI 5.19.30 (BT 2009, 513): Nostra vero religio eo firma est et so-
lida et immutabilis, quia justitiam docet, quia nobiscum semper est, quia
tota in animo colentis est, quia mentem ipsam pro sacrificio habet.
that it is through the exercise of the virtues that we offer God true
worship. “This is the religion of heaven, not that which consists of
corruptible things but of the virtues of the soul which arise from
heaven. This is true worship, by which the mind of the worshipper
is itself offered to God as an immaculate victim.” 105 The virtues are
the concrete ways in which human beings demonstrate their love
and obedience to God as Father and Lord. “It is the first duty of
justice to recognize God, to fear Him as Lord and to love Him as
Father; for He is the same One who created us, who animated us
with life-giving spirit, who nourishes us, and who preserves us. He
has the authority to chasten us, not just as Father but also as Lord,
having power over life and death. Hence the human person owes
to Him a twofold honor, i.e., love and fear.” 106 In true Roman fash-
ion, Lactantius places the practice of vera religio squarely within the
bounds of the cardinal virtues, especially justice. 107
Lactantius believes that the virtues begin in the emotions. The
emotions were implanted in the human person by the ‘marvelous
providence’ (mirabili providentia) of God so that they might be the
seat of either virtue or vice (DI 6.15.9). The Stoics were in error for
believing that the goal of the virtuous life is the eradication of the
emotions (DI 6.14.8, 15.3). They affirmed that the emotions them-
selves, i.e., desire, joy, fear, and sorrow, be replaced in order to be
virtuous. Thus they substituted desire with inclination, joy with
gladness, and fear with apprehension; sorrow being eliminated en-
tirely (DI 6.15.10–11). According to Lactantius, the Peripatetics
105 DI 6.2.13 (BT 2009, 532): Haec est religio caelestis, non quae
constat ex rebus corruptis, sed quae virtutibus animi qui oritur e caelo, hic
versus et cultus, in quo mens colentis se ipsam deo immaculatam victi-
mam sistit. Cf. DI 6.24.26–31, 25.7; Epi. 53.3–4.
106 Epi. 54.4 (BT 1994, 82): Primum autem justitiae officium est
deum agnoscere eumque metuere ut dominum, diligere ut patrem. Idem

enim, qui nos genuit, qui vitali spiritu animavit, qui alit, qui salvos facit,
habet in nos non modo ut pater, verum etiam ut dominus licentiam verbe-
randi et vitae ac necis potestatem, unde illi ab homine duplex honos, id est
amor cum timore debetur.
107 On the relationship between justice and religion see especially
Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.161, Nat. D. 2.71–72.

were nearer the truth by attempting “to demonstrate how provi-

dentially and necessarily God, or nature as they put it, armed us
with our emotions.” 108 First, by redefining the emotions the Stoics
have merely substituted vocabulary. They failed to demonstrate a
qualitative difference between the emotions and those qualities that
have replaced them. Desire begins with inclination, joy is the ex-
pression of gladness, and apprehension arises out of fear (DI
6.15.15). What the Stoics have described with their nuanced terms
are, in fact, the emotions properly moderated – not eliminated –
which is precisely the Peripatetic position (DI 6.15.16–17). Second,
the nature and power of virtue is in “the endurance of evil.” 109 If
the emotions were not inclined to good or evil, virtue or vice, then
virtue could not exist at all. “Where there are no vices, nor are
there any virtues; just as there is no victory where there is no adver-
sary. So it is that good cannot exist without evil in this life.” 110 The
emotions are necessary parts of the virtuous life because it is
through them that the human person is drawn towards what is
good and repulsed by what is evil (DI 6.15.10; cf. August. civ. Dei
14.8). What determines the character of a person, states Lactantius,
is not the emotions themselves but how they are directed (DI
6.16.11; cf. Epi. 56.3–7; August. civ. Dei 9.5). “It is good that the
emotions be moved in the right direction, and bad in the wrong
direction.” 111 Thus one might feel lustful desires most intensely, but
if lust is confined within marital chastity then there is no fault in it.
Similarly, a lustful desire may be slight, but if this desire is indulged
outside of the marriage covenant then it is a grievous vice (DI
6.16.9). The virtuous person, therefore, is the one who, under-
standing that the emotions are part of the human person’s God-
108 DI 6.15.2 (BT 2009, 590–91): ostendere, quam providenter et

quam necessario deus sive natura – sic enim dicunt – his nos armarit ad-
fectibus.
109 DI 3.11.9 (BT 2007, 234): in malorum perferentia.
110 DI 6.15.7 (BT 2009, 592): Ubi ergo vitia non sunt, ne virtuti
quidem locus est, sicut ne victoriae quidem, ubi adversaries nullus est. Ita
fit ut bonum sine malo esse in hac vita non possit.
111 DI 6.16.8 (BT 2009, 596): Sic moveri adfectibus in rectum bonum
est, in pravum malum.

given nature (DI 6.15.2–3, 9), exercises them in accordance with

right action; i.e., directs them to their proper ends.
Even when the emotions draw a person in the wrong direc-
tion, however, they ought not to be considered bad in themselves,
but as providing the opportunity to exercise virtue. Virtue, accord-
ing to Lactantius, consists primarily of strength of character; their
nature and power residing in “the endurance of evil.” 112 In this re-
gard, the presence of both good and evil is necessary in order to
exercise virtue. “For this reason the first stages of transgression
[i.e., improper feelings or emotions] are not enough for God to cast
down punishment, but provide the human person with the oppor-
tunity to exercise his military service for the sake of virtue; which,
unless agitated and strengthened by continual vexation, cannot be
perfect because virtue is perfected by the strength of evils and in-
vincible patience. Hence if there is no adversary, there is no vir-
tue.” 113 The argument that good and evil both exist necessarily so
that the human person might acquire virtue permeates all of Lac-
tantius’ written work. 114 In the apologist’s view, good and evil exist
in a symbiotic relationship for the moral advancement of the hu-
112 DI 3.11.9 (BT 2007, 234): in malorum perferentia. Cf. DI 3.8.36.

Though he makes use of their arguments against the Stoic belief that the
emotions should be eradicated, Lactantius does not agree with the Peripa-
thetics in reckoning virtue as the mean between excess and defect or the
habit of living well (cf. DI 6.15.5; Epi. 56.2; Arist. Eth. Nic.1104b4–
1108b18). Virtue, as strength of character, is most naturally displayed un-
der conditions of conflict, either internal or external, according to Lactan-
tius.
113 DI 3.29.16 (BT 2007, 307): Idcirco enim in primordiis transgres-
sionis non statim ad poenam detrusus a deo est, ut hominem militia sua
exerceat ad virtutem; quae nisi agitetur, nisi vexatione adsidua roboretur,
non potest esse perfecta, siquidem virtus est perferendorum malorum
fortis atque invicta patientia. Ex quo fit ut virtus nulla sit, si adversarius
desit. Cf., esp., 4.4.15–17; 5.19.25–26; 6.4.18, 15.7; OD 19 bis 3–5; Epi.
24.3.
114 See Chapter 4, II. God the Creator, C. Theodicy, 3. Analysis. Cf. DI
2.8.6 add. 1–9, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4–8, 22.2–4; 6.3.13, 5.12, 15.5–9, 20.3,
22.2; 7.1.18, 5.27 add. 1–17; Epi. 24.2–11; ID 20.2; OD 19 bis 1–5.
man person, i.e., so that one might possess virtue, since it is impos-
sible for virtue to be acquired without resistance, without the
struggle of combating evil, without the allure of pleasures which
can lead to vice. “By the most ingenious workings of providence
human beings have been given an infinite desire and propensity to
fall into vice; so that to display one’s virtue one might always com-
bat desire as if it were an internal enemy.” 115 Evil and vice, there-
fore, are necessary components of the moral life which God has
established for the good of the human person (DI 2.17.1; 6.22.2;
Epi. 24.11).
Because acquiring virtue necessitates a contrary force against
which it might be exercised, argues Lactantius, the virtuous life
itself cannot be the ultimate end, or summum bonum, of the human
person. The apologist arrives at this conclusion by first establishing
the following criteria for the summum bonum: it must belong to the
human person alone, it must belong to the ‘soul’ (animus) alone,
and it must be attained through virtue and knowledge (DI 3.9.1).
Given these parameters, Lactantius quickly eliminates the possibil-
ity that humankind’s greatest good can be found in the goods of
the body (DI 3.8.3–23). While the gift of reason is seen by many to
be a unique attribute of humankind, the summum bonum cannot be
found in knowledge alone because knowledge is not sought aim-
lessly, but is directed towards achieving some practical end (DI
3.8.24–25). Further, while the summum bonum certainly requires the
use of reason, all knowledge is not of equal value. The type of
knowledge which one seeks must be of the greatest and highest
object in order to participate in the summum bonum (DI 3.8.28–29).
Virtue is also a necessary component of the greatest good but is
not the summum bonum itself (DI 3.8.32). Virtue, i.e., the capacity to
endure pain and shun pleasure, exists in order to attain an end ra-
ther than being the end in itself (DI 3.11.9–15). “[Virtue] is a good
and certainly a universal good. But it is not the blessed life because
115DI 6.20.3 (BT 2009, 613): Homini vero sollertissimi artificis prov-
identia dedit voluptatem infinitam et in vitium cadentem, quia proposuit ei
virtutem, quae cum voluptate semper tamquam cum domestic hoste
pugnaret.
its power and nature lies in enduring evil, so it, in fact, cannot be
the greatest good.” 116
The Stoics rightly affirmed that virtue alone produces the
‘blessed life’ (vitam beatam), but erred in identifying the blessed life
with the virtuous life here on earth (DI 3.12.12, 27.4). The summum
bonum, however, “must be perfect so that there might be nothing
which can vex it, or diminish it, or change it.” 117 Thus the summum
bonum is not the virtuous life of this world, but the blessed life of
immortality (DI 3.12.18). In this regard, virtue is the means of
achieving that perfection but is not the end itself. “If, however,
virtue is to be sought – as is rightly said by [the philosophers] –
because the human person is born to live in virtue, there should be
another better hope to bring a great and valuable solace from the
evils and labors which accompany the virtues.” 118 The virtuous life
produces the greater hope of immortal beatitude. In fact, without
this hope the virtuous life makes little sense to Lactantius. “Will
virtue lose its reward or, rather, will it perish? By no means! But it
will receive its recompense at God’s judgment, and will live and
flourish always. Take that away and nothing can be as useless in
human life, nothing can be shown to be as stupid, as virtue.” 119
That the virtuous life would be rewarded by God, and would
find its true telos in the immortal life of bliss, is something the phi-
losophers did not realize (DI 5.17.16). Though some philosophers,
116 DI 3.11.9 (BT 2007, 234): quin et bonum sit et omnium certe bo-
num. Sed si beata esse non potest, quia vis et natura ejus in malorum per-
ferentia posita est, non est profecto summum bonum. Cf. 3.8.36.
117 DI 3.12.15 (BT 2007, 237): perfecta esse debet, ut nihil sit quod
eam vexare aut minuere aut immutare possit.

118 DI 6.9.22 (BT 2009, 564–65): Si autem virtus, ut ab iis rectissime
dicitur, capessenda est, quia constet ad eam nasci hominem, subesse debet
spes aliqua major, quae malorum et laborum, quos perferre virtutis est,
magnum adferat praeclarumque solacium. Cf. 3.8.32; August. civ. Dei 19.4.
119 DI 5.18.9 (BT 2009, 505): Perdetne suum praemium virtus aut
potius peribit ipsa? Minime, sed et mercedem suam deo judice accipiet et
vivet ac semper vigebit. (10) Quae sit tollas, nihil potest in vita hominum
tam inutile, tam stultum videri esse quam virtus. Cf. 6.9.18; 7.1.3; Epi.
30.1.
especially Plato (DI 7.8.2), rightly affirmed the immortality of the

soul, they did not grasp that immortal beatitude is not a conse-
quence of the nature of the soul but a reward given by God and
reserved for those who have endured in virtue through the trials of
this mortal life (DI 7.5.20). Ultimately, the philosophers failed to
recognize that immortal beatitude is the summum bonum of all hu-
mankind, and the end for which human beings were created (Epi.
24.11). God made humankind, “first, so that an infinite power of
souls could be begotten and could fill the entire earth with its mul-
titude; second, so that virtue would be set before the human per-
son, i.e., the toleration of evils and labors, through which one
might obtain the prize of immortality.” 120 Thus the life of immortal
beatitude is the true end of the human person. “The one supreme
good is therefore immortality; we were born and formed from the
beginning to seek it […], [and] virtue leads us to it.” 121 While Lac-
tantius believes that endurance in virtue merits immortal beatitude
(DI 4.25.10; OD 19.10), the apologist also affirms that only God
possesses the capacity to bestow this reward upon the virtuous per-
son (DI 6.9.23; 7.5.20). The perfection of the human person there-
fore depends entirely upon God. It is God who rewards those who
have lived virtuous lives with immortal beatitude after their deaths
(DI 7.10.8; Epi. 24.11; cf. August. civ. Dei 19.10). Further, since
achieving the reward for living virtuously depends solely upon the
generosity of God, the virtue that most directly affects the life of
bliss – the one upon which the attainment of the summum bonum
depends – is justice in particular.
Justice, according to Lactantius, “is the supreme virtue or the
source of virtue.” 122 The apologist holds this virtue in such esteem
120 DI 7.5.15 (BT 2011, 661–62): Primum, ut infinita vis animarum

gigneretur omnemque terram multitudine oppleret, deinde, ut proponeret
homini virtutem id est tolerantiam malorum ac laborum, per quam posset
praemium immortalitatis adipisci.
121 DI 7.8.1 (BT 2011, 673): Unum est igitur summum bonum im-
mortalis, ad quam capiendam et formati a principio et nati sumus […], ad

hanc nos provehit virtus.
122 DI 5.5.1 (BT 2009, 453): ipsa est summa virtus aut fons est ipsa
virtutis.
that he dedicated an entire book of the Institutiones to its exposition.

In book 5, after recounting the history of justice on earth (DI
5.5.1–8.11) and making several impassioned appeals to end the un-
just persecution of Christians (DI 5.1.1–4.8, 9.1–13.21), Lactantius
examines the nature of justice itself. Justice is divided into two vir-
tues: piety, which is the virtue of rendering to God what is His due,
and equity or fairness, which is the virtue of rendering to other
human beings what is their due. “Piety and equity are [justice’s] two
veins. All justice arises from these two sources; in the first is its
head and origin, in the second all its power and reason.” 123 These
two sources are so inextricably linked that justice cannot exist
without them both. “Even though justice embraces all of the vir-
tues at once, there are two principles which cannot be separated or
torn apart from it, piety and equity.” 124 While some philosophers
were able to grasp God’s unity, none of them had any idea about
how to worship God and, hence, lacked piety. And since they did
not possess piety, neither did they possess justice; which is its
source (DI 5.14.12–14). This is the reason why, states Lactantius,
Carneades was able to overturn justice so easily. 125 “If justice is
worship of the true God […], then the philosophers did not know
justice.” 126
123 DI 5.14.11 (BT 2009, 489–90): Pietas vero et aequitas quasi venae
sunt ejus, his enim duobus fontibus constat tota justitia. Sed caput ejus et
origo in illo primo est, in secundo vis omnis ac ratio.
124 DI 5.14.9 (BT 2009, 489): Justitia quamvis omnes simul virtutes
amplectatur, tamen duae sunt omnium principales quae ab ea divelli sepa-

rarique non possunt, pietas et aequitas.
125 DI 5.14.8. Carneades of Cyrene (c.214–c.129) was a Skeptic and
founder of the New Academy. In 155 he was sent to Rome as an ambas-

sador from Athens with the Stoic Diogenes and the Peripatetic Critolaus.
While in Rome he caused a stir by arguing both for and against the exist-
ence of justice on consecutive days. For Lactantius’ use of Carneades’ see
DI 5.14.1–8, 16.2–17.34. For the source of the tale and Carneades’ argu-
ment see Macrob. Sat. 1.5 and Cic. Rep. 3.8–31; the latter of which Lactan-
tius quotes from extensively.
126 Epi. 51.1 (BT 1994, 75): Nam si justitia est veri dei cultus […],
nescierunt ergo justitiam philosophi.

The two sources of justice, piety and equity, are exercised

through acts of ‘religion’ (religio) and ‘humanity’ (humanitas), and are
founded upon relationships of ‘obligation’ (officiis). 127 These obliga-
tions exist by virtue of our creation and stem from God’s universal
paternity and lordship. “But since the human person alone has
been given wisdom so that he might know God, and this alone
distinguishes the human person from non-rational creatures, justice
itself is bound by a double obligation: one is owed to God as Fa-
ther, the other to the human person as brother; for we are all chil-
dren of the same God.” 128 Since these obligations exist as a condi-
tion of our birth, and their proper fulfillment is achieved through
the exercise of justice, Lactantius affirms that humankind was in-
deed born for justice. “‘But of all things considered by the disputa-
tion of the learned, nothing is truly as remarkable as the clear un-
derstanding that we were born to justice.’” 129 To satisfy the obliga-
tions of justice, i.e., to practice and endure in the virtue to which all
human beings have been called, is the universal vocation of hu-
mankind. Further, in living out this vocation faithfully human be-
ings not only fulfill the natural ends for which they were created,
but also their supernatural ends; for it is principally by exercising
justice that the human person is rewarded by God with the gift of
immortal beatitude. “It is justice alone that gives birth to eternal life
for the human person, and eternal life is bestowed only by God.” 130
127 Throughout book 6 of the Institutiones, Lactantius is in dialogue

with Cicero’s De Officiis.
128 Epi. 29.5 (BT 1994, 40): Sed quoniam soli homini sapientia data
est, ut deum intellegat, et haec sola hominis mutorumque distantia est,

duobus officiis obstricta est ipsa justitia: unum deo debet ut patri, alterum
homini velut fratri; ab eodem enim deo geniti sumus. Cf. Epi. 54.4–5; DI
6.10.1; ID 14.5.
129 DI 6.25.9 (BT 2009, 638): ‘sed omnium […] quae in hominum
doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto praestabilius quam

plane intellegi nos ad justitiam esse natos.’ Quot. Cic. Leg. 1.28; cf. Epi.
29.7.
130 DI 7.14.2 (BT 2011, 693): solam esse justitiam, quae vitam homini
pariat aeternam, et solum deum, qui aeternae vitae praemium largiatur. Cf.
ID 24.8; Epi. 64.7.
The first of these virtues, piety, consists of knowing God and

offering Him proper worship (DI 5.14.11; cf. Nat. D. 2.153; Corp.
Herm. 9.4). This definition of piety, it should be noted, is identical
to Lactantius’ description of vera religio and, in fact, the apologist
conceives of vera religio as the true expression of piety and justice.
“True religion is nothing unless it exists in virtue and justice” 131 In
true apologetic fashion, Lactantius is claiming the virtue of justice
for Christianity by redefining the proper object of its head and
source, piety. “The plan of the human person is thus, if one is wise,
made plain: his chief characteristic is humanity. What is humanity if
not justice? What is justice if not piety? And piety is nothing other
than acknowledging God as Parent.” 132 With the object of piety
focused on the one God, Lactantius then makes piety the sine qua
non of justice. If one errs in relation to the proper object of piety,
either by not recognizing God’s unity or by not offering Him the
worship He is due, then one can neither know nor practice justice.
“The sum of things turns, therefore, on the recognition and wor-
ship of God. In this is the hope and salvation of all human beings.
This is the beginning of wisdom, that we might know who our true
Father is and that we might follow Him as the only debt of pie-
ty.” 133 Justice is so dependent upon piety that Lactantius often
identifies religion and piety with justice itself. “Justice is nothing
other than the pious and religious worship of the one God.” 134
The vital role which piety plays in the virtue of justice has sig-
nificant consequences for the praxis of the virtuous life. Once piety
is properly understood as the knowledge and worship of the one
131 DI 6.25.7 (BT 2009, 638): Nulla igitur religio vera est nisi quae
virtute ac justitia constat.
132 DI 3.9.19 (BT 2007, 229): Expedita est igitur hominis ratio, si sa-
piat; cujus propria est humanitas. Ipsa humanitas quid est nisi justitia?
Quid justitia nisi pietas? Pietas autem nihil aliud quam dei parentis agnitio.
133 DI 6.9.24 (BT 2009, 565): Ergo in dei agnitione et cultu rerum
summa versatur, in hoc est spes omnis ac salus hominis, hic est sapientiae
gradus primus, ut sciamus, qui sit nobis verus pater, eumque solum pietate
debita prosequamur.
134 DI 5.7.2 (BT 2009, 460): justitia est, quae nihil aliud est quam dei
unici pia et religiosa cultura. Cf. DI 6.5.19; Epi. 29.6, 51.1.

God, then the virtues themselves take on a different character.

Some actions considered vicious are transformed into virtues by a
true understanding of piety. Desire, for example, which is reckoned
a vice by the Stoics, becomes a virtue when directed towards things
celestial (DI 6.17.10). Other actions regarded rightly as virtues also
become more fully understood in light of true piety. The Stoics
correctly identify constancy as a virtue, but it is truly a virtue only if
properly understood as fidelity to God above all else (DI 6.17.24).
“Thus it happens that neither the virtues nor the exact extent of
the virtues can be known or possessed by any person at all es-
tranged from the religion of the one God.” 135 A right understand-
ing of piety also radically changes the nature of the other virtue
associated with justice, equity or fairness.
The just person exercises equity most especially by practicing
‘humanity’ (humanitas). “[Humanity] is a virtue proper to the just
and pious worshippers of God because it alone contains the reason
for communal life.” 136 The key to understanding the practice of
humanity, according to Lactantius, is never to perform good works
with the expectation of earthly rewards (DI 6.12.2). “Is the preserv-
ing of humanity something other than loving a human being be-
cause he is a human being and we are all the same?” 137 Whereas
Cicero claimed that charitable works ought to be given in modera-
tion to deserving people, Lactantius believes that “that is just, pious
and humane which is done without hope of return. This is ‘true
and genuine justice […].’” 138 Actions that characterize the practice
of humanity include hospitality to the poor, ransom of captives,
135 DI 6.17.29 (BT 2009, 602–03): His rebus efficitur, ut neque vir-
tutes neque virtutum exactissimos limites nosse aut tenere possit omnino
quisquis est a religione dei singularis alienus.
136 DI 6.10.2 (BT 2009, 566): Quae virtus propria est justorum et cul-
torum dei, quod ea sola vitae communis continet rationem.

137 DI 6.11.1 (BT 2009, 571): Id autem ipsum, conservare humanita-
tem, quid aliud est quam diligere hominem, quia homo sit et idem quod
nos sumus?
138 DI 6.11.13 (BT 2009, 573): Id enim juste, id pie, id humane fit,
quod sine spe reciendi feceris, haec est ‘vera illa et germana justitia […]’.
Quot. Cic. Leg. 1.48; cf. DI 6.17.18; Cic. Off. 2.52–54.
care of widows, orphans, and the sick, and burial of the dead (DI
6.12.1–41). Since piety views God as the one Father of all creation,
all human beings are understood to be God’s children and, hence,
should relate to each other as brothers and sisters (DI 6.10.1, 14.17;
Epi. 29.5, 54.4–5). “What, therefore, or where, or what sort of
thing is piety? Truly it exists where people know nothing of war,
maintain concord with all, are friends even with enemies, love all
human beings like brothers, know how to restrain anger, and
soothe all indignation of the soul with tranquillizing modera-
tion.” 139 Conversely, in the absence of piety, the most that human
effort can hope to achieve is not equity but expediency (DI 6.9.2).
This is the case because justice and equity, if not based on a proper
understanding of piety, can appear to be a sort of foolishness (DI
5.14.2). The virtues provide no ultimate motivation for goodness
without the hope of immortal beatitude for those who persevere in
them (DI 6.9.18). Thus, anyone who believes that justice is con-
fined to this mortal realm, and that the virtues die along with the
individuals who possess them, “will necessarily depart from the
rule of justice.” 140 Justice, therefore, and within it piety, is a sine qua
non for possessing the virtues; which are themselves necessary for
attaining eternal beatitude.
F. Conclusion
The doctrine of providence is everywhere present in Lactantius’
understanding of the human person. According to the apologist,
God created the human person for the purpose of enjoying com-
munion with Him, knowing and worshipping Him for all eternity
(DI 3.9.14; 7.5.15, 6.1, 26.5; ID 14.1–4). Being created for this end,
God constructed the world, and humanity itself, in order to achieve
139 DI 5.10.10 (BT 2009, 473): Quae ergo aut ubi aut qualis est pie-
tas? Nimirum apud eos qui bella nesciunt, qui concordiam cum omnibus
servant, qui amici sunt etiam inimicis, qui omnes homines pro fratribus
diligent, qui cohibere iram sciunt omnemque animi furorem tranquilla
moderatione lenire.
140 DI 5.18.3 (BT 2009, 503): a justitia regula discedat necesse est.
On piety’s determinative effect upon a person’s character see Chapter 6, I.

Theology of History.
this goal. God created the human person in His own ‘image’ and
‘likeness,’ endowed with the capacity to know and worship Him
(DI 2.10.3–4; 6.10.1; 7.4.3; Epi. 22.2, 36.3; ID 18.14). Evidence in
the natural world of the human person’s supernatural origin and
end is found, most especially, in the human person’s ‘upright stat-
ure’ (status rectus). 141 “It is [the human person] alone who, pos-
sessing sense and the capacity for reason, can know God, who can
admire His works, perceive His virtue and power. For that reason
he has been endowed with counsel, mind and prudence. And on
that account he alone out of all living things is upright of body and
rigid of stature, so that he seems to have been raised to the con-
templation of his Parent.” 142 The providential structure of the uni-
verse, and humankind’s unique position among all created beings,
were designed in order to draw the human person to a knowledge
of the one God by the use of reason (DI 7.4.10–16; Epi. 64.3; ID
13.1, 14.2). The perfection of humankind’s greatest capacities,
therefore, is to be found in knowing (wisdom) and worshipping
(virtue) the one God; the union of which Lactantius refers to as
‘true religion’ (vera religio). Like the cosmos, however, God created
the human person from within the context of the struggle between
good and evil, virtue and vice, so that he might come to know Him
and merit eternal beatitude through wisdom and virtue. 143 Hence,
though human beings were created to know and worship the one
God, He ensured that such an endeavor would not be free from
141 Cf. OD 8.2, 10.26, 19.10; DI 2.1.15, 2.23, 18.1; 17.9, 18.1; 3.10.11,
12.26, 20.11, 27.16, 28.16; 7.5.6, 20, 9.11; ID 7.5, 14.2, 20.10; Epi. 20.4ff.,
25.1, 65.4.
142 ID 14.2 (SC 289, 162): Solus est enim sentiens capaxque rationis
intellegere possit deum, qui opera euis admirari, virtutem potestatemque

perspicere; idcirco enim consilio mente prudentia instructus est, ideo solus
praeter ceteras animantes recto corpore ac statu fictus est, ut ad contem-
plationem partentis sui excitatus esse videatur; ideo sermonem solus ac-
cepit ac linguam, cogitationis interpretem, ut enarrare majestatem domini
sui possit, postremo idcirco ei cuncta subjecta sun tut fictori atque artifice
deo esset ipse subjectus. Cf. DI 3.20.11.
143 Cf. DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12–13, 5.27
add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3.

labor and discipline. But those who persevere in vera religio will not
only fulfill their natural ends but, in doing so, will merit the reward
of their supernatural ends, i.e., the immortal life of divine bliss (DI
6.2.13, 24.26–31, 25.7; Epi. 53.3–4.).
Lactantius’ anthropology is thoroughly teleological and, as
such, thoroughly providentially oriented. In order to emphasize this
point, it may be valuable to examine once again the passage from
Book 7 of the Institutiones that represents Lactantius’ kerygma.
the mystery of the world. 144
The essence of Lactantius’ kerygma, as can be discerned from the
foregoing chapter and the above periscope, is that God has provi-
dentially created the human person for a supernatural end. Lactan-
tius’ kerygma is the “good news” that God has created humanity for
Himself, to know and worship Him in this life and the next. In the
above passage, as he does elsewhere (cf. DI 3.20.11; ID 14.2), Lac-
tantius underscores the teleological nature of this anthropology
grammatically by his use of adverbs denoting purpose (ideo, idcirco)
and corresponding ut clauses. As with De opificio Dei, therefore, the
arcanum dei, hoc mysterium mundi. Cf. Epi. 64.1.
doctrine of providence accompanies Lactantius’ anthropology

throughout his works.
Lastly, as with his defense of the doctrine of providence and
his concept of God as aeterna mens, Lactantius’ anthropology incor-
porates much from the Stoic school. This is especially true con-
cerning Lactantius’ belief that humankind is the apex of the created
order and that all other creatures were brought into existence in
order to serve humankind. 145 The Stoics also give support to Lac-
tantius’ belief in God’s authorship of the human person (DI
2.10.15, 11.17), the human person being composed of diverse and
conflicting elements, the necessary existence of these diverse ele-
ments for the preservation of virtue and wisdom, 146 the status rectus
of the human person, 147 and the human person’s fulfillment in a life
of virtue (DI 3.8.32; 6.9.22, 25.9; Epi. 29.1–7; Cic. Leg. 1.28). Build-
ing upon this foundation, Lactantius then adds the supernatural
end for which humankind was created, i.e., to know and worship
God eternally. In other words, the apologist adds supernatural final
causality to this Stoically influenced and teleological-driven anthro-
pological scheme: (1) the life of virtue should find its ultimate ful-
fillment in the immortal life of bliss, and (2) unbeknownst to the
Stoics, God created human beings to this end. “They [the Stoics]
bring to light no reason as to why the human race was created or
formed by God. It is our duty, therefore, to explain the mystery of
the world and the human person.” 148 Because it is congruent with
Stoic anthropology in many regards, Lactantius’ Christian anthro-
pology is able to meet the needs of his apologetic goals, of making
use of non-Christian sources and building a consensus between
Christians and non-Christians alike. Once again, in Lactantius’ an-
thropology we find an example of the consummate apologist mak-
145 See note 71 above.

146 See Chapter 4, II. God the Creator, C. Theodicy, 3. Analysis. Cf. al-
so DI 2.9.17; Epi. 24.6; Sen. Q Nat. 7.27.4; Gellius NA 7.1.1–6.
147 See note 82 above. Cf. also Nat. D. 2.37; Pease, 914.
148 DI 7.3.14 (BT 2011, 651–52): Illi [Stoici] enim nullam rationem
afferebant, cur humanum genus vel creatum vel constitutum esset a deo.
Nostrum hoc officium est, sacramentum mundi et hominis exponere.
Emphasis added.
ing use of the sources available to him, correcting what is in err,

and bringing what is lacking to completion and fulfillment.
CHAPTER 6. LACTANTIUS AND SALVATION
HISTORY
The final chapter of this work addresses God’s providential inter-

vention into history in order to bring about the salvation of human
beings. As we shall see, Lactantius views all of human history as
salvation history. Since the human person was created in order to
know and worship God, the story of the human person is a tale
about a creature who, at times, lives according to his nature and, at
times, does not. The denouement of this drama occurs when God
directly intervenes into this story by the sending of His Son; there-
by calling the human person to return to his true nature and signal-
ing history’s final act. This chapter is therefore divided between (I.)
Lactantius’ theology of history and (II.) Lactantius’ soteriology. The
latter division is composed of sections that treat (A.) Lactantius’
understanding of the role of the virtues in soteriology, (B.) his
Christology, and (C.) his Eschatology.
I. THEOLOGY OF HISTORY
Lactantius’ theology of history begins halfway through Book 1 of
the Institutiones, immediately following his arguments in defense of
monotheism. Its placement at this juncture of the work reflects
Lactantius’ desire to read human history in terms of fidelity to, or
dissidence from, worship of the one true God. Having established
that the world and all of its creatures are under the divine guidance
of one God, Lactantius now seeks to explain the existence and pro-
liferation of polytheistic cults. The apologist does so by construct-
ing a universal history of religions that posits the existence of an
191
ur-monotheism from which human beings have strayed. 1 In direct

contrast to the tribal and ethnic cults of the pantheon, Christianity
is seen as a replevin of this original and catholic vera religio which
fulfills the natural human desire to know and worship God.
Lactantius begins his universal history of religions by affirm-
ing the mortal nature of the deities of the Roman pantheon.
Though many people regard them as gods, the Roman deities hard-
ly embody the attributes that constitute true divinity, such as incor-
poreity, immutability and virtue. Rather, the gods are engendered
and reproduce by coition (DI 1.8.5–6). Hercules, renowned for his
virtue and deemed a god, was in fact a slave to his vices and obvi-
ously mortal (DI 1.9.1–11). Jupiter, acknowledged as the head of
the pantheon (optimus maximus), committed virtual parricide, de-
bauchery and adultery. 2 There are sundry tales of the Roman deities
illustrating their mortal natures and vicious lives, thereby proving
that they are not truly divine (DI 1.10.1–9).
Lactantius credits the theory that the gods were actually ele-
vated heroes to Euhemerus of Messene (DI 1.11.33), the author of
the non-extant Ιερὰ ἀναγραφή (Sacred History). In the Latin-
speaking West, this work was popularized by its translation and
insertion into the Historia (Annals) of Ennius, which accounts for
its greater resonance among the Latin apologists than their Greek
counterparts (cf. Cypr. De idola 1–5; Tert. Apol. 10.3ff.; Min. Fel.
21.1ff.; Arnob. Adv. nat. 1.37). Lactantius, who provides us with
more quotations from the non-extant Historia than any other single
author, 3 uses the mortal genealogies of the gods provided by Enni-
us as written testimonia to their human origin and nature. For exam-
ple, the war between the gods and the Titans, according to Ennius,
1 On this point see especially the excellent work of Schott, Christiani-

ty, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 96–101. Schott finds the genesis of
this belief, from the Christian perspective, in Romans 1:18–32.
2 DI 1.10.10–14. Lactantius’ singling out of Jupiter and Hercules in
particular is no coincidence. The founding Augusti of the tetrarchy, Dio-

cletian and Galerius, had adopted the titles Jovius and Herculius respec-
tively. Cf. Pan. Lat. 10(2).21, 11(3)10.5.
3 Cf. DI 1.11.34–35, 45–46, 63–65, 13.2, 14, 14.2–7, 10–12, 15.31,
18.11, 22.21; 5.1.5.

6. LACTANTIUS AND SALVATION 193
was actually a civil war in Crete between the forces of Jupiter, right-
ful heir to his father Saturn’s throne, and those of his uncle Titan
(DI 1.14.10). Lactantius thus accounts for the existence of the pan-
theon by affirming a Euhemerist account of their origins.
Lactantius believes that the deification of heroes and kings is
the product of civilization. Since life was rustic and uncivilized pri-
or to the establishment of the rule of law, citizens wished to honor
those figures responsible for the founding of civic order. The
origin of the cult of the pantheon was therefore born as an expres-
sion of gratitude towards deceased leaders and as an example of
good governance for present rulers (DI 1.15.1–5). In support of
this theory, and revealing its Stoic character, Lactantius quotes Cic-
ero’s De natura deorum: “‘And in many states it can be known that
[…] the memory of strong men was made holy in accordance with
the honor of immortal gods.’” 4 The cults of worship, which
emerged from these honors, were then passed on from one genera-
tion to the next until the fame of the greatest of heroes became
known throughout the world. Similarly, cults also began to emerge
in local communities so that every town, city and nation possessed
its own penates (DI 1.15.7–10). “Just as Egypt worships Isis, the
Moors Juba, the Macedonians Cabirus, the Carthaginians Urania,
the Latins Faun, the Sabines Sancus and the Romans Quirinus in
the same way does Athens worship Minerva, Samos Juno, Paphos
Venus, Lemnos Vulcan, Naxos Bacchus, and Delos Apollo. Thus
various rites were upheld by peoples and countries for as long as
the people wished to give thanks to their leaders and could not dis-
cover what other honors might be offered for the life of the
dead.” 5 Polytheistic worship is therefore the mark of tribal and cul-
4 DI 1.15.6 (BT 2005, 63–64): ‘Atque in plerisque civitatibus intellegi

potest […], virorum fortium memoriam honore deorum immortalium
consecratam.’ Quot. Nat. D. 3.50. Lactantius also quotes Nat. D. 2.62 (DI
1.15.5). While Lactantius agrees with the Stoics on this point, he neverthe-
less attacks the allegorizing tendency of the school for reckoning the gods
as personifications of nature rather than human beings (DI 1.12.1–10,
17.1–5).
5 DI 1.15.8 (BT 2005, 64): ut Aegyptus Isidem, Mauri Jubam, Mace-
dones Cabirum, Poeni Uraniam, Latini Faunum, Sabini Sancum, Romani

tural particularity; that is to say, it is fundamentally ‘ethnic’ rather

than universal. 6
A surprising element in Lactantius’ attack on the cult of the
gods is the apologist’s reluctance to criticize the poets as promoters
of polytheistic worship. They certainly joined this tradition by re-
galing their audiences with fanciful tales (DI 1.15.13), states Lactan-
tius, but rarely do poets completely fabricate the truth (DI 1.9.8,
11.23, 30; 2.10.12). On the contrary, they are given to embellish-
ment and poetic license, but such are the tools of their craft. The
poets ascribe divinity to human beings in order to add beauty and
color to their poetry, not to seduce their audiences into polytheistic
beliefs (DI 1.11.36). One must read poetry, therefore, with an un-
derstanding of metaphor and allusion, lest one be deceived into
thinking that these paeans refer to gods rather than human beings
(DI 1.11.23–25).
Moreover, expounding the works of the poets enables Lactan-
tius to find ample evidence in support of his Euhemerist account
of the gods. For example, Ovid writes of Saturn’s journey by boat
to the river Arno (DI 1.13.6; quot. Fast. 1.233–34), and Vergil
claims that he united the disparate people surrounding Latium into
one kingdom (DI 1.13.9; quot. Aen 8.321–23). While these poets
were in err concerning Saturn’s divine status, states Lactantius, they
nevertheless accurately described the events of his life; demonstrat-
ing his wholly human nature (DI 1.13.10). The poets are, on the
whole, trustworthy witnesses of the people and events they de-
scribe, but their works should always be interpreted in a manner
that is consistent with their literary genre, i.e., allegorically.
An example par excellence of Lactantius’ Euhemerist reading of
poetry that supports his theology of history is the famous myth of
Quirinum, (9) eodem utique modo Athenae Minervam, Samos Junonem,

Paphos Venerem, Vulcanum Lemnos, Liberum Naxos, Apollinem Delos.
(10) Sic per populos atque regiones varia sacra suscepta sunt, dum ho-
mines grati esse in suos principes cupiunt et quos alios honores vita caren-
tibus deferant, invenire non possunt.
6 Cf. Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 97.
the ‘Golden Age’ (aureum saeculum). 7 To Latin speaking audiences

this legend concerning the reign of Saturn was popularized, inter
alia, in the works of Vergil (Ecl. 4; G. 2.538–60; Aen 6.792–93;
8.319–29) and Ovid (Met. 1.88–114; Fast. 1.263–76). According to
the poets, the Golden Age refers to the conditions of humanity’s
earliest existence. Justice and equity among persons were character-
istic of human life in this epoch, as were peace, leisure and prosper-
ity (cf. Ov. Met. 1.88–114). In the Virgilian account, these condi-
tions were made possible by the reign of Saturn, who gathered the
scattered tribes of Latium and gave them laws (Aen 8.321–23).
“Under his reign was the so-called Golden Age, for he ruled the
people in serene peace.” 8 Lactantius maintains that this idyllic state
is not to be thought of as a pious myth, but the condition of the
world when human beings worshipped the one true God. “This
indeed is not poetic fiction, but may be taken as true.” 9
Lactantius believes that the Golden Age spoken of by the po-
ets refers to the condition of humankind prior to the introduction
of polytheistic cults. He is not identifying the classical myth with
the biblical account of paradise in Eden, but rather with the ‘histor-
ical’ event of Saturn’s reign. 10 According to Lactantius, Saturn was
the final king to rule prior to the introduction of polytheistic cults.
7 On this topic see Louis J. Swift, “Lactantius and the Golden Age,”
The American Journal of Philology 89/2 (1968): 144–56.
8 Verg. Aen 8.324–25 (LCL 64, 82): Aurea quae perhibent illo sub
rege fuere saecula: sic placida populos in pace regebat.

9 DI 5.5.3 (BT 2009, 453): Quod quidem non pro poetica fictione,
sed pro vero habendum est.

10 According to Lactantius, Saturn was born c. 1500 B.C.E. (DI
1.23.5). By comparison, the apologist estimates that the fall of Troy took
place c. 1170 B.C.E. (DI 1.23.4; cf. Epi. 19.6). On Lactantius’ use of dates
see Oliver Nicholson, “The Source of the Dates in Lactantius’ Divine Insti-
tutes,” JTS 36 (1985): 291–310. It should be noted that Lactantius’ charac-
terization of Saturn has changed due to his apologetic goals. In his at-
tempt to display the mortality and vice of the gods Lactantius viewed Sat-
urn as a cruel murderer (DI 1.12.1–2). Now that his goal is to demonstrate
the historic primacy of monotheism, Lactantius treats Saturn as the last
monarch to maintain the cult of the one God (DI 5.6.11).
He and the citizens of his state adhered to the primordial ur-

monotheism of humanity’s earliest religious experience. As long as
this worship continued Saturn presided over his kingdom in a state
of perfect justice. There was neither discord nor war, and people
shared all of the bountiful gifts of the earth amongst one another. 11
Human life was characterized by the exercise of ‘kindness’ (humani-
tas), ‘fairness’ (aequitas) and ‘mercy’ (misericordia) (DI 5.6.4). The ex-
istence of these qualities in human society, states Lactantius, neces-
sarily entails worship of the one God. For just as justice cannot be
separated from ‘fairness’ (aequitas), neither can it be separated from
‘piety’ (pietas) (DI 5.14.9). To live in a just world is therefore to live
in a society that embraces the worship of the one true God (cf.
August. civ. Dei. 19.17, 21). Worship of God is the only cause of “a
person caring for other people and knowing that he is tied by a
bond of fraternity, for God is ‘father of all.’ […] This is certainly
justice and this is the Golden Age.” 12 Hence, during the reign of
Saturn, “God was certainly worshipped.” 13
In addition, once Jupiter drove out his father out of his own
kingdom, and the worship of God was replaced with emperor wor-
ship, people were overcome by a sense of greed (DI 5.5.9, 6.1).
They fought with one another over personal possessions, sought to
subject weaker parties to servitude, and what was once shared by
many was now claimed by an elite few (DI 5.6.1–2). This behavior
was prompted, and the Golden Age ended, by Jupiter himself. His
tyranny, violence and avarice banished justice from among the
people. 14 The root cause of these evils was Jupiter’s abandonment
11 Although, adds Lactantius, this does not mean that there was no
private property; simply that every person was generous to the extent of
providing for all (DI 5.5.7).
12 DI 5.6.12 (BT 2009, 459): homo hominem carum habeat eumque
sibi fraternitatis vinculo sciat esse constrictum, siquidem ‘pater idem om-
nibus’ deus est […]. (13) Haec est profecto justitia et hoc aureum saecu-
lum. Quot. Lucr. 2.992.
13 DI 5.5.3 (BT 2009, 453): deus utique colebatur. Cf. Epi. 20.1.
14 Again, one cannot help but hear veiled criticisms of Diocletian in
Lactantius’ attack on Jupiter’s reign (DI 5.6.6–13), promotion of emperor

of vera religio, thereby turning the people towards impiety (DI 5.6.6).
Once worship of God ceased, little by little evil habits became
more the custom (DI 5.6.10). Thus, while Jupiter’s reign may have
marked the end of the Golden Age of monotheism, the moral and
spiritual degeneration Lactantius describes occurred gradually and
in separate parts of the world.
Ignorance of vera religio began with Noah’s son Ham who, af-
ter being cursed, did not follow his father in worship of the one
true God (DI 2.13.6; cf. Gn 9:25–27). Though Shem and his off-
spring, the Hebrews, preserved worship of God the descendants of
Ham, the Canaanites, were responsible for allowing vera religio to fall
into desuetude (DI 2.13.7–8; cf. Gn 10:6, 15–20). The descendants
of Ham, the Egyptians, were the first to worship the celestial ele-
ments of nature (DI 2.13.10). From Canaan and Egypt, the cult of
nature spread across the known world until, recently, temples were
built as places of sacrifice and statues were made as objects of ven-
eration. The shift from the worship of nature to the cult of the
pantheon originated on Crete with either Jupiter’s grandfather
Melisseus, according to Didymus of Alexandria, or Jupiter himself,
according to Ennius (DI 1.22.18–28). But, in either case, Lactantius
believes that worship of the gods had endured not longer than
1,800 years by his own day (Epi. 19.6). The apologist holds the
Greeks primarily responsible for the proliferation of polytheistic
cults. The institution of the cults began with them, and the rest of
the civilized world followed their lead out of sheer admiration (DI
1.15.14). The cult of the gods is therefore the newest religious de-
velopments that emerged only after ‘knowledge of God’ (notitia Dei)
had been lost (DI 2.13.12–13).
The propagation of these cults was then enhanced by the in-
tercession of demons. These demons are the fruits of salacious re-
lationships between angels and human women (DI 2.14.2; cf. Gn
6:1–4). Since they belong neither to heaven nor to the underworld,
they serve the Diabolus by tempting human beings into perdition
(DI 2.14.11; cf. Epi. 22.9–11). As enemies of God and the truth,
they attempt to goad human beings into worshipping them as dei-
worship (5.5.9) and being extolled in ‘evil panegyrics’ (malos panegyricis)

(1.15.13).
ties. Their goal is to divert people from vera religio and, consequent-
ly, to join them in an eternal life severed from God (DI 2.16.9).
“These are the ones who taught [human beings] to form images
and likenesses, so that the minds of people might turn away from
worship of the true God. They made replicas of the countenance
of dead kings, adorned them with exquisite beauty, and had them
stationed and consecrated. They adopted their names like some
characters.” 15
However, the greatest ruse which demons play on human be-
ings is through oracular pronouncements. Since they understand
‘God’s designs’ (dispositiones Dei) by their quasi-divine nature, de-
mons are privy to a certain amount of knowledge with regard to
the course of future historic events (DI 2.16.14; cf. 14.6). They then
share this knowledge with human beings in order to ingratiate
themselves to the people. They promise to protect families and
nations as long as temples are built and sacrifices are made in their
honor (DI 2.16.14–15). The cult of the pantheon is then spread by
the nefarious workings of demons performing miracles and utter-
ing portents under the names of the gods. “By this craftiness and
skill they have abolished knowledge of the one true God among all
of the nations.” 16
According to Lactantius’ reading of human history, abandon-
ment of the worship of the one God is responsible for all of hu-
manity’s ills (DI 5.8.11). The apologist directly correlates ignorance
of vera religio with the moral and social degeneration of humanity
(DI 5.5.13–14; cf. 6.9.2, 17.29). “People are evil and unjust because
they worship the gods. Evil increases in human affairs every day
because God, the maker and ruler of the world, has been forsaken.
Impious religions were accepted against what is right because, final-
15 DI 2.16.3 (BT 2005, 190): Hi sunt qui fingere imagines et simula-

cra docuerunt, qui ut hominum mentes a cultu veri dei averterent, effictos
mortuorum regum vultus et ornatos exquisita pulchritudine statui conse-
crarique fecerunt et illorum sibi nomina quasi personas aliquas induerunt.
Cf. Epi. 23.4.
16 DI 2.16.20 (BT 2005, 195): Hac versutia et his artibus notitiam dei
veri et singularis apud omnes gentes inveteraverunt.

ly, you do not allow God to be worshipped, or only by a few.” 17

Further, Lactantius believes that knowing and worshipping the one
true God is the determinative factor in one’s ethical life. One could
not be wrong about religion, ‘the head of all things’ (rerum omnium
caput), and lead a virtuous life in every other regard (DI 5.9.23).
Since religion is the ‘summit’ (summa) of human experience, falsa
religio will invariably lead to the disintegration of one’s moral char-
acter. Conversely, it is impossible for a practitioner of vera religio to
be vicious in every other respect. In short, religion imparts a ‘pat-
tern’ (regula) upon one’s life; the truth or falsity of which deter-
mines one’s ethical character (DI 5.9.24). This belief is demonstrat-
ed, in Lactantius’ mind, by the mutual behavior of Christians and
non-Christians. With mellifluous oratorical skill, the former rhetor-
ician states that it is ‘not his people’ (non enim de nostro) who are
brigands, pirates, pillagers, poisoners, and murders of parents,
spouses, and children (DI 5.9.15). Rather, “our entire religion is
about living free from stain and blemish,” 18 and “our people do
nothing other than what is fair and good.” 19
Despite their virtuous behavior, however, Christians were per-
secuted at the time of Lactantius’ writing. The apologist therefore
had to answer the specific charge that God cares not for Christians
because He allows them to suffer. Lactantius offers three possible
explanations for the ongoing persecution of the Church. First, he
begins by invoking the “wise and almost divine” 20 words of Seneca.
The sharpest of Stoics (DI 1.5.26) observed that God permits the
vicious to live in luxury and indulgence because He deems them
unworthy of correction. The good, however, God loves, and He
17 DI 5.8.5 (BT 2009, 462–63): homines ideo malos et injustos esse,

quia dii coluntur, et ideo mala omnia rebus humanis cottidie ingravescere,
quia deus mundi huius effector et gubernator derelictus est, quia susceptae
sunt contra quam fas est impiae religiones, postremo quia ne coli quidem
vel a paucis deum sinitis.
18 DI 5.9.21 (BT 2009, 470): cujus omnis religio est sine scelere ac
sine macula vivere.

19 DI 5.9.22 (BT 2009, 470): nostros autem nihil aliud operari nisi
aequum et bonum.
20 DI 5.22.11 (BT 2009, 522): sapienter ac paene divinitus.
sends them many trials and tribulations so that they might acquire
and practice virtue (DI 5.22.12; cf. Sen. Prov. 1.6; 2.5–6; 3.3). “From
this we know that God cares for us, because when we sin He gets
angry.” 21 Second, and in keeping with the theme that God reproves
those whom He loves, there is historical precedent for God permit-
ting His chosen people to suffer. God created many adversaries for
the ancient Israelites as punishment for straying from His divine
law (DI 5.22.14–15), and as opportunities to strengthen their virtue
and refine their devotion (DI 5.22.17). As the successores Judaeis (DI
5.22.14), therefore, Christians should expect to be chastened and
purified by hardships until “those who receive power beyond the
limits fitting for human beings are punished by the judgment of
God.” 22 Lastly, while the persecutions endure they bring a great
many people to the Church (DI 5.22.18; cf. Tert. Apol. 50; Scap. 5).
Thus God may allow Christians to suffer so that “the people of
God are increased.” 23
Lactantius’ explanation of the suffering of Christians again
highlights his view of human history as the story of obedience and
disobedience to the worship of the one true God. Like St. Paul, the
apologist believes that the responsibility for abandoning vera religio
lies entirely with human beings. “For though they knew God, they
did not honor him as God or give thanks to him […]. And since
they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a
debased mind and to things that should not be done” (Rom 1:21,
28). The human person was created in order to know and worship
God (DI 7.5.4). At the earliest stage of human history, in conformi-
ty with God’s providential design, all shared the ‘knowledge of
God’ (notitia Dei). As human history progressed, worship of God
began to erode; until, finally, ‘the mystery of true religion’ (verae
religionis sacramenta) resided only with the oft-recalcitrant Jewish
people (DI 4.8.2, 14.17). The result of the loss of knowledge of
God was the spread of vice and corruption among human beings.
21 DI 5.22.13 (BT 2009, 523): Ex quo intellegimus esse nos deo cu-
rae, quibus, quoniam peccamus, irascitur.
22 DI 5.23.2 (BT 2009, 525): Punientur enim judicio dei qui accepta
potestate supra humanum modum.

23 DI 5.22.18 (BT 2009, 524): dei populus augeatur.
But just as the Golden Age of ur-monotheism disappeared with the

introduction of polytheistic cults, so too can it also reappear by
returning to the worship of God.
The coming of the Son marks the beginning of God’s restora-
tion of the Golden Age by calling all nations to the worship of
Himself through His ‘messenger’ (nuntium) (DI 5.7.1). “The Golden
Age therefore returns in its beauty and was indeed brought back to
earth, but few recognize justice, which is nothing other than pious
and religious worship of the one God.” 24 The knowledge of God,
which enabled the Golden Age to exist, had long been lost among
the gentes. The life, death and resurrection of God’s Son, however,
brought this knowledge back to humanity. The Golden Age, the
epoch in which human beings lived in perfect justice, is therefore
once again available to all those who seek the face of the one true
God. “Remove all the evil thoughts from your hearts and at once
this Golden Age will return to you. But you cannot have it unless
you begin to worship the true God.” 25 Far from simply being a relic
of the past, Lactantius interprets the Golden Age as any state in
which justice reigns by the worship of God. “If God alone were
worshipped, there would be no dissensions or war, people would
know that they are children of the one God and united by a sacred
and inviolable bond of divine necessity.” 26
Lactantius not only views humanity’s past and present
through the lens of worship of the one God, but also its future.
Although, with the coming of His Son, God has restored justice to
the few, He nevertheless wills the division between good and evil,
virtue and vice, to remain in existence. God does this in order for
human beings to acquire virtue, which cannot exist without both
24 DI 5.7.2 (BT 2009, 460): Rediit ergo species illius aurei temporis et
reddita quidem terrae, sed paucis adsignata justitia est, quae nihil aliud est
quam dei unici pia et religiosa cultura.
25 DI 5.8.3 (BT 2009, 462): Deponite omnem malam cogitationem
de cordibus vestris, et statim vobis tempus illud aureum revertetur: quod

aliter consequi non potestis, quam si deum verum colere coeperitis.
26 DI 5.8.6 (BT 2009, 463): Quodsi solus deus coleretur, non essent
dissensiones at bella, cum scirent homines unius se dei filios esse, ideoque
divinae necessitudinis sacro et inviolabili vinculo copulates.
good and evil (DI 5.7.4). By enduring evil through the exercise of
‘patience’ (patientia), the human person is brought to ‘absolute per-
fection’ (absolutam perfectam) (DI 5.7.8). In this way, God wills the
salvation of human beings through the acquisition of virtue (DI
5.7.4). But while evil is necessary to achieve the good of virtue, the
continued existence of the admixture of good and evil, the retained
diversitas, prevents Lactantius from claiming that the Golden Age
has returned to earth in an unqualified and univocal sense (DI
5.7.10). The true Golden Age, in which God alone will be wor-
shipped and justice will preside among the people, will only return
when God removes all evils from the earth at the eschaton (DI
4.12.21).
In Lactantius’ millennialist vision of the eschaton, Christ will re-
turn to earth to rule for one thousand years in justice and peace
while the Diabolus is held captive (DI 7.24.1–5). Christ will establish
a holy city from whence he will rule (DI 7.24.6). The righteous dead
will be resurrected and act as governors over the living (DI 7.24.3).
The earth will be abundantly fruitful and God will be known and
worshipped by every nation (DI 7.24.12–15). This is the Golden
Age of which the poets spoke. Lactantius believes that the Sibyls
were the recipients of this revelation, who then transmitted their
visions to the poets. In the process, their oracles were misinterpret-
ed as visions of the past rather than prophecies of the future (DI
7.24.9–10). Vergil however, following the Cumean Sibyl, does not
make this mistake and rightfully foretells of the time when “the
earth will be subject to God.” 27 It is curious that the apologist
should so readily identify the Golden Age of the poets with the
eschatological future given his use of the motif in describing the ur-
monotheism of the past. It appears that Lactantius is more com-
fortable making use of the motif of the Golden Age where he
deems it applicable to his apologetic argument, rather than render-
ing a complete and exhaustive interpretation of the myth in a single
place. This is further evidence of the apologist’s priority of disputatio
over expositio in theological discourse.
27DI 7.24.11 (BT 2011, 724): subjecta erit deo terra. Cf. DI 7.24.11–
12; Orac. Sib. 7.139–49; quot. Verg. Ecl. 4.21–22, 28–30, 38–41, 42–45.
This lack of consistency in Lactantius’ use of the Golden Age,

his positing its significance at once to the past and again to the fu-
ture, is perhaps also evidence that the non-Christian testimonia
which he used to support his vision of history was of secondary
consequence to the content of the vision itself. That is to say, Lac-
tantius’ use of the Golden Age is an apologetic devise to illustrate
his theology of history to a non-Christian audience. 28 For Lactan-
tius, human history is an exitus from God and reditus to God. The
period in between these two modes of being is more than an inter-
im; it is an interregnum. It is an era in which God is not acknowl-
edged and worshipped as the one Ruler of the universe. Since the
human person was created in order to know and worship God,
when the rightful Sovereign of humanity remains dishonored, dis-
order ensues in His kingdom in the form of sin and lawlessness.
But, conversely, when human beings act according to their nature
and recognize God as their Lord and Father, the fruits of this order
are justice and peace. “You want justice to remain on earth amid
the worship of the gods, that arrangement is in no way possible.
[…]. All of these evils on earth, as I have said, would not exist if
everyone was united to God’s law, if all people behaved as our one
people do.” 29 Lactantius’ theology of history, therefore, is a living
narrative in support of his anthropology. His interpretation of hu-
man history is evidence that the flourishing of human beings takes
place when they act according to their nature; which is to know and
worship the one true God.
II. SOTERIOLOGY
A. Soteriology and the Virtues

Lactantius believes that the life of beatitude is granted by God to
those who have persevered in virtue (cf. DI 3.8.32; 5.18.9; 6.9.18,
22; 7.1.3; Epi. 30.1; etc.). This belief appears most commonly in
28 See Swift, “Golden Age,” 155–56.

29 DI 5.8.4 (BT 2009, 462–63): Vos autem manente cultu deorum
justitiam desideratis in terra, quod fieri nullo pacto potest. […] (8) Non
esset igitur, ut dixi, haec omnia in terra mala, si ab omnibus in legem dei
conjuraretur, si ab universis fierent quae unus noster populus operatur.
connection with Lactantius’ arguments for immortality as the sum-

mum bonum. In order to demonstrate that the life of virtue should
be sought, and is neither a fruitless ideal nor an end in itself, Lac-
tantius states that the virtues are the means to attaining the summum
bonum of immortality. If the hope of immortality is taken away
from the virtuous life, the apologist argues, then practicing the vir-
tues is folly (cf. DI 5.18.10; 6.9.18; 7.1.3). The greatest good, there-
fore, is not the life of virtue per se, but the immortal life of bliss is
attained by a life of virtue. “The reward of virtue is the life of bliss
if virtue, as it is rightly said, creates the life of bliss. It is not, there-
fore, for its own sake that virtue is sought, but for the life of bliss;
which is attained necessarily by virtue.” 30 From within the context
of this argument, the apologist’s goal is not to demonstrate that
one’s salvation is achieved through the exercise of the virtues, but
that the virtuous life is to be lived in the hope of attaining a greater,
in fact the greatest, good. In the seventh and last book of the Insti-
tutiones, however, Lactantius expounds on the salvific end of the
virtuous life from within the wider context of his entire kerygma.
It is again appropriate at this point to reiterate the résumé of
Lactantius’ kerygma which the apologist provides in chapter 6 of the
final book of the Institutiones.
30 DI 3.12.12 (BT 2007, 237): Ergo virtutis praemium beata vita est,
si virtus, ut recte dictum est, beatam vitam facit. (13) Non est igitur ut
aiunt propter se ipsam virtus expetenda, sed propter vitam beatam, quae
virtutem necessario sequitur. Cf. 3.27.13; 5.17.16, 18.1–11; 6.9.18–23; Epi.
30.1, 59.1.

While in the above quotation Lactantius nowhere mentions the life
of virtue, the apologist consistently affirms that true worship of
God, which alone merits the reward of the blessed life of immortal-
ity, lies in the practice of the virtues. 32 This is especially true in rela-
tion to the virtue of justice: “the supreme virtue or the source of
virtue.” 33 It is through the practice of justice that the human person
comes to know that God is one and to worship him as Father and
Lord. “It is the first duty of justice to recognize God, to fear Him
as Lord and to love Him as Father; for He is the same One who
created us, who animated us with life-giving spirit, who nourishes
us, and who preserves us. He has the authority to chasten us, not
just as Father but also as Lord, and the power over life and death.
Hence the human person owes to Him a twofold honor, i.e., love
and fear.” 34 For Lactantius, then, the virtuous life, the exercise of
true justice, and the practice of vera religio are all inextricably linked.

arcanum dei, hoc mysterium mundi. Cf. Epi. 64.1. See also Chapter 2, IV.
Christian Truth; Chapter 5, II. A Systematic Treatment of Lactantius’
Anthropology, F. Conclusion.
32 Cf. DI 4.25.10; 5.17.16; 6.9.18–20; 7.5.20, 10.6; Epi. 30.1, 69.7; OD
19.10; ID 19.2. See also Chapter 5, II. A Systematic Treatment of Lactan-

tius’ Anthropology, E. The Virtues, Immortality, and Justice.
33 DI 5.5.1 (BT 2009, 453): summa virtus aut fons est ipsa virtutis.
34 Epi. 54.4 (BT 1994, 82): Primum autem justitiae officium est deum
agnoscere eumque metuere ut dominum, diligere ut patrem. Idem enim,

qui nos genuit, qui vitali spiritu animavit, qui alit, qui salvos facit, habet in
nos non modo ut pater, verum etiam ut dominus licentiam verberandi et
vitae ac necis potestatem, unde illi ab homine duplex honos, id est amor
cum timore debetur.
To be virtuous one must practice justice, and to be just one must

know and worship the one God. “If one serves God as Lord and
Father, this attendance, this homage, this devotion, is the consum-
mation and perfection of justice.” 35 And since vera religio and true
justice cannot be separated, it is according to an individual’s prac-
tice of justice on earth that God will determine his/her reward in
the life to come. “God is to be worshipped, therefore, so that
through religion – which is justice – the human person might re-
ceive immortality from God.” 36 It is here where Lactantius’ an-
thropology and soteriology meet. For Lactantius the exercise of
justice is the greatest expression of humankind’s true nature. “If a
person who was truly wise were to ask for the reason of his birth,
he would readily and boldly reply that he was born to worship the
God who created us; so that we might serve Him. To serve God is
nothing other than to protect and preserve justice by good
works.” 37 Further, the fulfillment of the human person on earth,
i.e., the practice of justice, leads directly to the human person’s ul-
timate fulfillment, i.e., the blessed life of immortality. “It is justice
alone that gives birth to eternal life for the human person, and
eternal life is bestowed only by God.” 38
Like all of the elements of his kerygma, Lactantius believes that
the human person being created in order to attain the life of im-
mortal beatitude is the work of God’s providence. In fact,
knowledge of this truth, knowledge of the end for which the hu-
35 DI 6.25.16 (BT 2009, 640): Quodsi deo, patri ac domino, hac ad-
sidvitate, hoc obsequio, hac devotione servierit, consummata et perfecta
justitia est. Cf. DI 6.2.17.
36 Epi. 64.7 (BT 1994, 107): Colendus est igitur deus, ut per religio-
nem, quae eadem justitia, accipiat homo a deo immortalitatem.

37 DI 3.9.14 (BT 2007, 228–29): Quare si quis hominem qui vere sa-
piat interroget, cujus rei causa natus sit, respondebit intrepidus ac paratus
colendi se dei gratia natum, qui nos ideo generavit, ut ei serviamus. (15)
Servire autem deo nihil aliud est quam bonis operibus tueri et conservare
justitiam.
38 DI 7.14.2 (BT 2011, 693): solam esse justitia, quae vitam homini
pariat aeternam, et solum deum, qui aeternae vitae praemium largiatur. Cf.
ID 24.8; Epi. 64.7.
man person was created, is the ‘linchpin’ (cardo rerum) of the entire
‘mystery of the human person’ (sacramentum hominis); without which
the truth concerning human nature is lost (DI 7.5.2). The human
person was created “so that he might understand [God’s] work,
have a sense of admiration and proclaim verbally the providence of
its arrangement, the plan of its creation, and the virtue of its com-
pletion. The sum of these things is this: that one worship God.” 39
But in order to attain the life of bliss, in order to worship God in
immortal beatitude, one must endure the evils of mortal life by per-
severing in virtue. 40 This, too, has been providentially ordered by
God. God has deliberately established contrary forces in the world,
i.e., good and evil, with which the human person might contend in
order to acquire virtue and, thereby, merit immortal life. By God’s
design good and evil coexist in the world “so that virtue would be
39 DI 7.5.4 (BT 2011, 659): ut esset qui opera ejus intellegeret, qui
providentiam disponendi, rationem faciendi, virtutem consummandi et
sensu admirari et voce proloqui posset. Quorum omnium summa haec
est, ut deum colat. cf. Usener, 250, fr. 371; Lucr. 5.165–67.
40 Lactantius most certainly does not possess an Augustinian concept
of grace. In fact, he comes rather close to the position that one can earn
immortality through a life of virtue (cf. DI 4.25.8; 7.5.19). But two things
ought to be noted which balance this belief. First, it is true that from Au-
gustine’s De natura et gratia we know that Lactantius was among the au-
thorities which Pelagius cited in his De natura. But the quotations from
Lactantius which Augustine states were used by Pelagius do not pertain to
the believer ‘earning salvation by virtuous works.’ Rather, they concern
the issue of Christ’s sinlessness (DI 4.24.12, 25.10). The bishop of Hippo,
while not condemning the quotations outright, nevertheless suggests that
their author – whom Augustine states was unnamed – might want to con-
sider being more theologically precise in his use of language (nat. et gr. 71).
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Lactantius states that though the
virtuous life is the means of attaining salvation, only God can bestow im-
mortality as its ‘prize’ (praemium) or ‘reward’ (merces) (DI 7.5.20, 27, 14.2;
Epi. 24.11, 64.7). In other words, the life of immortality is not something
which human beings can bring about exclusively through their own pow-
ers, it must granted to them by the one who ‘alone possesses it’ (solus pos-
sidet) (DI 7.20.27).
set before the human person, i.e., the toleration of evils and labors,
through which one might obtain the prize of immortality.” 41 It is
by God’s will, therefore, that evil exists in order for virtue to exist,
and for virtue to exist so that, by means of it, human beings might
be granted immortality as a reward for their labors. “On this ac-
count, therefore, God desires the worship and honor of Himself as
Father by the human person […]. The piety of the human person
by which he honors God brings about this prize; that he might be
in eternal beatitude and in the presence of God and with God al-
ways.” 42
The centrality of the doctrine of providence in Lactantius’ ker-
ygma is such that, prior to summarizing the content of his kerygma in
Book 7 of the Institutiones (DI 7.6.1–2; cf. Epi. 64.1), the apologist
finds it necessary, once again, to give a defense of the doctrine of
providence.
[Epicurus] ruined what he had been right to see, and in his in-
ward ignorance of the entire plan he destroyed all reason, and
reduced the world and everything in it to some likeness of a
most vain dream, inasmuch as human activity would make no
sense. But truly we see that the world and all its parts are gov-
erned by a wonderful system, in the heavens the proportion
and uniformity in the various courses of the stars and lights of
heaven, the regular and remarkable delineation of the seasons,
the diverse fecundity of the land, the level plains, the ramparts
and mounds of the mountains, the viridity and fruitfulness of
the forests, the strong eruption of springs, the timely flow of
rivers, the rich and abundant spreading of the seas, the diverse
41 DI 7.5.15 (BT 2011, 661–62): ut proponeret homini virtutem id est

tolerantiam malorum ac laborum, per quam posset praemium immortalita-
tis adipisci. This argument appears throughout the corpus of Lactantius.
See Chapter 4, II. God the Creator, C. Theodicy. Cf. DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1;
3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12, 5.27 add.5; Epi. 24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3.
42 DI 7.5.27 (BT 2011, 664): Propterea igitur coli se deus expetit et
honorari ab homine tamquam pater […] pietatem hominis qua deum

honoraverit hoc adficit praemio, ut sit in aeternum beatus sitque apud
deum et cum deo semper.
and useful aspirations of the winds and everything else, every-

thing exists according to a supreme plan. So who can be so
blind as to think that something that simply radiates the won-
drous provisions of a most providential plan was produced
without a cause? If nothing can be nor come to be in any way
whatsoever without a cause, and if the providence of God
most high is manifest in the order and excellence, the magni-
tude, the power, and the governance of things, then those who
said that providence does not exist are stupefied and crazy. I
would not disapprove if they spoke against the existence of the
gods, but when they do so to speak of none, anyone not reck-
oning them mad is mad himself. 43
This impassioned and somewhat literary recounting of the wonders
of the universe that bespeak of divine providence is the founda-
tional evidence of Lactantius’ kerygma. From the belief that the
world is governed by divine providence, the apologist argues – in
step with the Stoics – that the world was created for human beings;
43 DI 7.3.24 (BT 2011, 653–54): Corrupit ergo quod recte viderat et

totam rationem penitus ignorantia rationis evertit redegitque mundum et
omnia quae in eo geruntur ad similtudinem cujusdam vanissimi somnii,
siquidem rebus humanis ratio nulla subsistet. (25) Cum vero mundum
omnesque partes ejus ut videmus mirabilis ratio gubernet, cum caeli tem-
peratio et aequalis in ipsa varietate cursus astrorum luminumque caeles-
tium, temporum constans ac mira discriptio, terrarum varia fecunditas,
plana camporum, munimenta et aggeres montium, viriditas ubertasque
silvarum, fontium saluberrima eruptio, fluminum opportuna inundatio,
maris opulenta et copiosa interfusio, ventorum diversa et utilis aspiratio
ceteraque omnia ratione summa constent, quis tam caecus est ut existimet
sine causa esse facta in quibus mira dispositio providentissimae rationis
elucet? (26) Si ergo sine causa nec est nec fit omnino quicquam, si et pro-
videntia summi dei ex dispositione rerum et virtus ex magnitudine et po-
testas ex gubernatione nmanifesta est, hebetes ergo et insani qui providen-
tiam non esse dixerunt, non improbarem, si deos idcirco non esse dicerent
ut unum dicerent, cum autem ideo ut nullum, qui eos delirasse non putat,
ipse delirat. Cf. Chapter 3, II. The Arguments for Divine Providence, C.
The Argument from Design, 1. The Divinae Instituiones and De Ira Dei; DI 1.2.5;
ID 10.25, 50; Nat. D. 2.98ff.
the only creatures capable of apprehending God’s providence at

work in the universe. 44 Lactantius then takes the further step of
affirming that good and evil both exist for the ultimate good of
humankind (DI 7.4.11–19); which is the attainment of immortality
(DI 7.5.1–27). In other words, without the doctrine of providence,
without first acknowledging that the world was created and is gov-
erned according to the ‘providence of God most high’ (providentia
summi dei), Lactantius’ kerygma is rendered null and void at its initial
stage, and the first step in understanding the ‘plan of the world’
(rationem mundi) is lost (DI 7.3.26, 4.10).
B. Christology
Lactantius makes clear, especially in his kerygma: soteriology is the
fulfillment, the perfection, of human anthropology. “The one su-
preme good is therefore immortality; we were born and formed
from the beginning to seek it […], [and] virtue leads us to it.” 45
Thus far in our examination, however, Christ’s unique role in
bringing about salvation has been overlooked. Lactantius’ own ker-
ygma makes not a mention of Jesus Christ (DI 7.6.1; Epi. 64.1), and
Lactantius acknowledges that his own apologetic method prohibits
him from using Scripture unless it is absolutely necessary (DI
4.5.3). In book 4 of the Institutiones, after eliminating the possibility
that vera religio might be found in either Roman religion or classical
philosophy, the apologist finally expounds on the life and teachings
of Jesus Christ. He maintains that God, in His providence, did not
abandon humankind to discover the truths of salvation – i.e., Lac-
tantius’ kerygma – on its own. Rather, in the fullness of time, God
sent his only Son so that he might “establish God’s temple and
teach justice.” 46 The following quotation sums up nicely Lactantius’
account of the divine pedagogy at work in the life of Christ:
44 DI 7.4.1–10; Cf. Chapter 5, II. A Systematic Treatment of Lactan-

tius’ Anthropology, B. The Human Person in the Created Order.
45 DI 7.8.1 (BT 2011, 673): Unum est igitur summum bonum im-
mortalis, ad quam capiendam et formati a principio et nati sumus […], ad

hanc nos provehit virtus.
46 DI 4.10.1 (BT 2007, 337): constitueret deo temlum doceretque jus-
titiam.
When God saw the evil, and how great the worship of false
gods had spread throughout the world, so that soon His name
would almost be erased from human memory – indeed, even
the Jews, who alone were entrusted with the secret of God,
abandoned the living God, were entrapped in worshipping im-
ages, and led astray by deceitful demons so as not to want to
turn back to God despite the rebukes of the prophets – He
sent His Son, the prince of angels, to human beings; so that he
would turn them from vain and impious worship to knowledge
and worship of the true God, and likewise lead their minds
from foolishness to wisdom, from iniquity to works of jus-
tice. 47
Lactantius believes that his kerygma contains the entire ‘secret of
God’ (arcanum dei) and ‘mystery of the world’ (mysterium mundi) (DI
7.6.2). And though many and various philosophers have grasped
individual portions of it, neither has there been nor can there be
anyone who could grasp the ‘entire truth’ (totam veritatem) without
the aid of divine revelation (DI 7.7.14). “We, however, who have
received the mystery of true religion by divine revelation, since it be
the truth, follow God as teacher of wisdom and guide to virtue.” 48
And since no one is capable of coming to knowledge of the totam
veritatem by reason alone, neither is anyone able to live up to its de-
mands – i.e., the life of virtue – because knowledge precedes action
(DI 6.5.11, 6.11, 9.8–24). The mission of Jesus Christ, therefore, is
47 DI 4.14.17 (BT 2007, 363): Deus enim cum videret malitiam et fal-
sorum deorum cultus per orbem terrae ita invalvisse, ut jam nomen ejus
ex hominum memoria fuisset paene sublatum – siquidem Iudaei quoque,
quibus solis arcanum dei creditum fuerat, relicto deo vivo ad colenda fig-
ment inretiti daemonum fraudibus aberrassent nec increpiti per prophetas
reverti ad deum vellent -, filium suum principem angelorum legavit ad
homines, ut eos converteret ab impiis et vanis cultibus ad cognoscendum
et colendum deum verum, item ut eorum mentes a stultitia ad sapientiam,
ab iniquitate ad justitiae opera traduceret.
48 DI 1.1.19 (BT 2005, 5): Nobis autem qui sacramentum verae reli-
gionis accepimus cum sit veritas revelata divinitus, cum doctorem sapien-
tiae ducemque virtutis deum sequamur. See Chapter 2, IV. Christian
Truth.
primarily pedagogical. Christ is the doctor justitiae, who reveals the

totam veritatem about God, the world, and humankind. Jesus’ status
as pedagogue, however, is not isolated to the realm of knowing.
The goal of Jesus’ ministry is to bring human beings back to the
worship of the one God. He accomplishes this task by revealing
the truth and, thereby, leading human beings to virtue. Jesus’ minis-
try is therefore aimed at action rather than contemplation. What
human beings learn from Jesus the pedagogue is not simply the
nature of justice, but the praxis of justice. For this reason, doctor
justitiae is one of Lactantius’ most frequently used titles for Jesus,
and certainly the title most unique to the author.
When recounting the divine pedagogy at work in the life of
Christ, Lactantius repeatedly refers to the salvific role of Jesus in
terms of leading humankind to justice. “When the most high God
and Parent of all wished to transmit His religion, He sent a teacher
of justice from heaven, so that new worshipers might be given a
new law in him or through him.” 49 This ‘new law’ (novam legem)
both reveals the truth to human beings and provides for them a
way in which to live out this truth. “Our Father and Lord, who […]
saw the errors of humankind, sent a guide who opened the path of
justice for us.” 50 Further, by sending the doctor justitiae to humanity,
God inaugurated the restoration of the just order, the ‘Golden Age’
(aureum tempus), which comes as a result of worshipping the one
God. “God, however, like a most indulgent parent, when the last
age was drawing near, sent a messenger who restored that old age
and brought back justice from exile; lest humankind remain thor-
oughly and perpetually aggrieved by errors. The Golden Age there-
fore returns in its beauty and was indeed brought back to earth, but
few recognize justice, which is nothing other than pious and reli-
49DI 4.13.1 (BT 2007, 352): Summus igitur deus ac parens omnium
cum religionem suam transferre volvisset, doctorem justitiae misit e caelo,
ut novis cultoribus novam legem in eo vel per eum daret. Cf. DI 4.14.17.
50 DI 7.27.5 (BT 2011, 733): Pater enim noster ac dominus, qui […]
perspectis erroribus hominum ducem misit qui nobis justitia viam pande-
ret.
gious worship of the one God.” 51 The relationship between acquir-

ing the knowledge of the totam veritatem and practicing justice, i.e.,
that the former is meant to lead to the latter, is nowhere more
clearly stated than in Lactantius’ account of Christian education.
The final step in the education of a Christian “is to know [God’s]
minister and messenger whom He dispatched to earth and, by
whose teaching, we are liberated from the error in which we are
held and involved, and instructed in the worship of the true God;
so that we might learn justice.” 52 The Jesus of Lactantian Christol-
ogy, therefore, is not simply a revealer of divine truths; the
knowledge of which is itself the means to one’s salvation. Rather,
for Lactantius, Jesus is the ‘master and teacher’ (magistro ac doctori)
who gathers a people that he might lead to God through justice (DI
4.26.22). “Since Christ came to earth prepared with virtue and jus-
tice, or better yet, because he is virtue itself and justice itself, he
descended so that he might teach this and form humankind. When
the teaching office and ambassadorship of God were performed,
because of his virtue which he both taught and lived, he merited
and made possible belief in God by all nations.” 53 Since the prac-
tice of justice is that which determines humankind’s salvation (DI
7.14.2; ID 24.8; Epi. 64.7; etc.), and since human beings can neither
know nor practice justice without divine aid (DI 6.6.28, 17.29; etc.),
51 DI 5.7.1 (BT 2009, 459–60): Sed deus ut parens indulgentissimus

appropinquante ultimo tempore nuntium misit, qui vetus illud saeculum
fugatamque justitiam reduceret, ne humanum genus maximis et perpetuis
agitaretur erroribus. (2) Rediit ergo species illius aurei temporis et reddita
quidem terrae, sed paucis adsignata justitia est, quae nihil aliud est quam
dei unici pia et religiosa cultura.
52 ID 2.2 (SC 289, 94): cognoscere ministrum ejus ac nuntium quem
legavit in terram, quo docente, liberati an errore quo inplicati tenebamur

formatique ad veri dei cultum, justitiam disceremus.Cf. Chapter 2, III.
Sources, A. The Bible.
53 DI 4.16.4 (BT 2007, 373): Qua virtute ac justitia quoniam Christus
instructus venit in terram, immo vero quoniam ipse virtus et ipse justitia
est, descendit, ut eam doceret hominemque formaret. Quo magisterio ac
dei legatione perfunctus ob eam ipsam virtutem, quam simul et docuit et
fecit, ab omnibus gentibus et meruit et potuit deus credi.
it was therefore necessary for the salvation of humankind that God

send His Son among human beings as the doctor justitiae.
One should also avoid reckoning Lactantius’ Christology as
clearly fitting the “Jesus as moral exemplar” model due to Jesus’
divine nature. Lactantius’ pre-existence Christology is hinted at in
Book 2 of the Institutiones, but is elaborated upon in greater detail in
Book 4. 54 Prior to the creation of the universe, God “begat a holy
and incorruptible spirit whom He called the Son.” 55 Though God
later ‘created’ (creavisset) many other angels, “there is a great differ-
ence between this Son of God and the other angels.” 56 God’s Son,
His ‘first-born’ (primogenitum), is equal to Him in ‘virtue and majes-
ty’ (virtute ac majestate) (DI 4.6.2; cf. 2.8.3; Epi. 37.3), and His true
name is known only to the Father; not to any angel (DI 4.7.1).
God’s Son is the eternal Word spoken by the Father. This is more
appropriately signified by the Greek word logos than the Latin sermo;
“for logos signifies both word and reason, because [the Son] is the
voice and wisdom of God.” 57 Since the Father has given everything
that is His over to the Son, he “is virtue, he is reason, he is the
Word of God, he is wisdom.” 58 In the Son these divine attributes
co-inhere because, in God, there is no distinction between His
Word and His power (DI 4.29.6).
54 Cf. DI 2.8.1–7 with adds. See also Chapter 4, II. God the Creator,
C. Theodicy.
55 DI 4.6.1 (BT 2007, 325): sanctum et incorruptibilem spiritum ge-
nuit, quem filium nuncuparet. Cf. Epi. 37.1.

56 DI 4.8.7 (BT 2007, 334): magna inter hunc dei filium ceterosque
angelos differentia est. When pushed to be more specific about the differ-
ence between the Son and the angles, Lactantius states – after acknowl-
edging that such things are beyond the scope of the human mind – that
sacred Scripture refers to the angels as God’s breath (spiritus), whereas the
Son is God’s voice (voce) (DI 4.8.6–11; cf. Heb 1:7–14). See P. McGuckin,
“Lactantius as Theologian: An Angelic Christology on the Eve of Ni-
caea,” Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa 22 (1986): 492–497
57 DI 4.9.1 (BT 2007, 336): λόγος enim et sermonem significant et ra-
tionem, quia ille est vox et sapientia dei.

58 Epi. 37.2 (BT 1994, 51): est virtus, hic ratio, hic sermo dei, hic sa-
pientia. Cf. 1 Cor 1:24.

Because the Son “is perfect in providence and reason and

power,” 59 God created the entire universe through him (Epi. 37.4;
quot. Jn 1:3). The Son is the ‘counsellor’ (consiliatore) and ‘artificer’
(artifice) of creation (DI 2.8.7). That God’s Son should have such a
role in the formation of the universe, according to Lactantius, is
attested to by extra-biblical sources as well as sacred Scripture. 60
“Thus Trismegistus calls him ‘God’s craftsman’ and the Sibyl ‘advi-
sor,’ because he was given such wisdom and virtue by God the Fa-
ther so as to use his counsel and handiwork in the making of the
world.” 61 These same sources affirm that God’s Word, through
whom God created all things, is also to be reckoned as God. 62 It
should not be supposed, however, that Christians worship two
gods. The Father and the Son are one God “because there cannot
be the Father without the Son, nor can the Son be separated from
the Father. Indeed, one cannot be called a father without a son, nor
can a son be generated without a father.” 63 Because of the unity
between the Father and the Son, in order to worship the Father
one must worship the Son. There is no other way to the Father
save through the Son. “One who thinks he worships the Father
alone, so as not to worship the Son, does not worship the Father.
One who accepts and adopts the name [of the Son], however, truly
59 DI 2.8.7 (BT 2005, 151): providentia et ratione et potestate perfec-

tus est.
60 On Lactantius’ scriptural evidence for the pre-existence of the Son
see DI 4.6.6–8; quot. Prv 8:22–31; DI 4.8.14–16; quot. Ps 33:6; 45:1; Eccl
24:3–4; Jn 1:1–3.
61 DI 4.6.9 (BT 2007, 329): Idcirco illum Trismegistus δημιουργὸν
τοῦ ϑεοῦ et Sibylla σύμβουλον appellat, quod tanta sapientia et virtute sit
instructus a deo patre, ut consilio ejus et manibus uteretur in fabricatione
mundi. Quot. Corp. Herm. Ascl. 26; Orac. Sib. 8.264; cf. Epi. 37.2; quot.
Corp. Herm. 1.9; Orac. Sib. 8.264.
62 DI 4.6.4–5; quot. Corp. Herm. 5.1; Orac. Sib. 3.775; 8.329; fr. 1.5; cf.
Ascl. 8; Epi. 37.2–6; quot. Corp. Herm. Ascl. 8; Orac. Sib. fr. 1.6; Orac. Sib.
8.329.
63 DI 4.29.3 (BT 2007, 428): quia nec pater a filio potest nec filius a
patre secerni, siquidem nec pater sine filio nuncupari nec filius potest sine
patre generari.
worships the Father and the Son together; because the Son is the
ambassador, messenger, and high priest of the Father. He is the
gate of the great temple, the path of light, the guide to salvation,
and the entrance to life.” 64 The necessity of worshipping the Father
through the Son because of the inseparable communion between
the Father and the Son is stated clearly and precisely by Lactantius
in his Epitome.
Nevertheless, it must not be held that [the Father and the Son]
are two gods; for the Father and the Son are one. The Father
loves the Son and bestows on him all things. The Son is faith-
fully obedient to the Father, and does not will anything save
from the Father. One certainly, and by necessity, cannot divide
such as this. Thus, they might be called two, but in substance,
will, and faith they are one. Therefore, the Son is in the Father
and the Father is in the Son. One honor must be paid to both
as to one God and, even though it is divided into two cults, the
division itself is overcome by the inseparable bond. He aban-
dons himself who separates the Father from the Son or the
Son from the Father. 65
When God was to inaugurate humankind’s redemption, it was
therefore most fitting that He should send His Son; thereby re-
deeming humanity through the same agent as He created humanity.
64 DI 4.29.14 (BT 2007, 431): Qui solum patrem se colere putat, sicut
filium non colit ita ne patrem quidem. (15) Qui autem suscipit et nomen
ejus gerit, is vero cum filio simul et patrem colit, quoniam legatus et nun-
tius et sacerdos summi patris est filius. Hic templi maximi janua est, hic
lucis via, hic dux salutis, hic ostium vitae. Cf. DI 4.14.2–3.
65 Epi. 44.4 (BT 1994, 65–66): Nec tamen sic habendum est, tam-
quam duo sint dii. Pater enim ac filius unum sunt. Cum pater filium diligat
omniaque ei trabuat et filius patri fideliter obsequatur nec velit quidquam
nisi quod pater, non potest utique necessitudo tanta divelli, ut duo esse
dicantur, in quibus et substantia et voluntas et fides una est. (5) Ergo et
filius per patrem et pater per filium.Unus est honos utrique tribuendus
tamquam uni deo et ita dividendus est per duos cultus, ut division ipsa
compage inseparabili vinciatur. Neutrum sibi relinquet, qui aut patrem a
filio aut filium a patre secernit.
It was according to God’s providential plan that, when humankind

was in utter ruin – denying the existence of the transcendent, wor-
shipping the elements of the earth which are below them, and giv-
ing themselves over to vice and injustice (DI 4.1.3–6) – that He
should send His ‘great leader’ (ducem magnum) to unite wisdom and
religion in his very person (DI 4.2.5–6). Through the incarnation of
the Son, the Father calls human beings of every nation back to
worship of Himself. It is most appropriate that this mission be ac-
complished through the incarnation of the Son so that it would be
God’s very Word “who would be the master of God’s teaching and
bringing the secret of heaven to humankind.” 66 The incarnation of
the Word occurred in a manner reflective of the communion be-
tween the Father and the Son. Just as God the Father is called ‘fa-
therless’ (ἀπάτωρ) and ‘motherless’ (ἀμήτωρ) because He is with-
out origin, so too is the Son called ‘motherless,’ in that He origi-
nates from the Father, and ‘fatherless,’ in that his advent on earth
occurred without the intervention of a human father (DI 4.13.2–5;
cf. Corp. Herm., vol. 4, fr. 4a; DI 1.7.2; 4.8.5; Epi. 2.2, 4.4). Thus,
“he was made Son of God through the spirit and made man
through the flesh, i.e., both God and man.” 67
It was according to God’s divine plan that the Son should be-
come incarnate in ‘the form of a man and mortal condition’ (figura
hominis et condicione mortali) so that, living according to the virtue
which he preached, “he would rise from the dead and offer the
hope of conquering death to humanity; for whom he took on flesh
and was born.” 68 In answering the question of why God needed to
become human in order to effect redemption, Lactantius once
again concentrates his arguments on the pedagogical; i.e., on the
necessary conditions of the ‘perfect teacher’ (doctor perfectus). If
Christ came simply as a man, then his teachings would contain no
66 DI 4.8.8 (BT 2007, 334): quod ille magister futurus esset doctrinae
dei et caelestis arcani ad homines perferendi.
67 DI 4.13.5 (BT 2007, 353): Factus est dei filius per spiritum et ho-
minis per carnem, id est et deus et homo.

68 DI 4.10.1 (BT 2007, 337–38): resurgeret et homini, quem induerat,
quem gerebat, et spem vincendae mortis offerret et ad praemia immortali-

tatis admitteret.
credibility, no certainty. The doctrines of a teacher who was simply

human would not only be left open to doubt and criticism, but –
supposing the perfection of his/her doctrines – the teacher could
in no way live up to them. “Even if he/she possessed great virtue,
he/she could not possess it supremely, sufficient to resist all vice;
the material of which [i.e., vice] is contained within. So it is that an
earthly teacher cannot be perfect.” 69 On the other hand, if Christ
came solely as God, then his teachings would be deemed impossi-
ble for human beings to live by, the divine fiat of an authoritarian
lawgiver (DI 4.23.8). “Now if [Christ] came to human beings as
God, […] he certainly could not teach virtue as God because, lack-
ing a body, he will not do what he teaches and thus will not be per-
fect in his teaching. […] The master and teacher of virtue must be
most like humanity so that, in conquering sin, he teaches the hu-
man person that sin can be conquered by him.” 70 It was necessary,
therefore, for the doctor perfectus to be both God and man. “He was,
therefore, both God and man, existing as the middle between God
and humanity – hence the Greeks call him ‘Mediator’ – so that he
could lead human beings to God; i.e., to immortality. For if he had
only been divine, as said above, he could not present humanity
with examples of virtue. But if he had only been man, he could not
lead human beings to justice.” 71
69 DI 4.24.4 (BT 2007, 404): Et si maxime possit, summam tamen

virtutem capere nequeat et omnibus vitiis resistere, quorum materia in
visceribus continetur. Eo fit, ut terrenus doctor perfectus esse non possit.
Cf. DI 4.32.3–10.
70 DI 4.24.6 (BT 2007, 405, 406): Nam si veniat ad homines ut deus,
[…] ipse certe deus virtutem docere non poterit, quia expers corporis non
faciet quae docebit ac per hoc doctrina ejus perfecta non erit. […] (12)
oportet magistrum doctoremque virtutis homini simillimum fieri, ut vin-
cendo peccatum doceat hominem vinci ab eo posse peccatum. Cf. DI
4.24.19; Epi. 45.1–5.
71 DI 4.25.5 (BT 2007, 409–10): Fuit igitur et deus et homo, inter
deum atque hominem medius constitutus – unde illum Graeci μεσίτην

vocat –, ut hominem perducere ad deum posset id est ad immortalitatem,
quia si deus tantum fuisset, ut supra dictum est, exempla virtutis homini
Christ’s status as the divine pedagogue, therefore, is contin-

gent upon his personhood. Christ could not be the doctor justititia
unless he was both human and divine. Thus, while Lactantius’ sote-
riology may lack a satisfaction theory of atonement – i.e., Christ’s
passion and cross are largely demonstrations of Jesus’ virtue which
serve as pedagogical examples – it is not because the apologist de-
nies Jesus’ divine origin. 72 Many scholars have maintained, howev-
er, that Lactantius’ pre-existence Christology resonates with Arian-
ism. 73 This position is based, essentially, on two points: first, Lac-
tantius’ quoting of Proverbs 8:22–31 in DI 4.6.6–8 and, second, the
resonance of DI 4.29.12 with Novatian’s De Trinitate 31.1–2. 74 The
first point is regarded as evidence of Lactantius’ subordinationist
Christology simply because “the Arians were so fond of using
[Proverbs 8:22–31] in their arguments.” 75 The flaw in this reason-
ing, of course, is that it would place every ante-Nicaean Christian
theologian who quoted Proverbs 8:22–31 in the category of proto-
Arian; a rather sweeping judgment which fails to consider the con-
text in which the quotation is used and the source from which it is
most likely derived. Lactantius employs Proverbs 8:22–31 to sup-
port of Jesus’ identity as God’s divine Wisdom made flesh, not to
praebere non posset, si homo tantum, non posset homines ad justitiam

cogere. Cf. Gal 3:19–20; 1 Tm 2:5; Heb 8:6.
72 Concerning the cross, Lactantius states plainly that from it ‘God
was suspended’ (dei suspensus est) (DI 4.18.12).

73 Cf. V. Loi, Lattanzio, 203–07; A. Grillmeier, Christ in the Christion
Tradition, vol. 1, 201–02; B. Studer, “La sotériologie de Lactance,” in Lac-

tance et son temps, ed. J. Fontaine and M. Perrin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1978),
253–69; A. Bowen and P. Garnsey, Lactantius: Divine Institutes, 232 n. 18.
74 My claim that there are two pieces of evidence which support a
subordinationist reading of Lactantius’ Christology takes into account Fr.

McGuckin’s critique of this position. In other words, Fr. McGuckin has
already adequately addressed what might be seen as other evidence of
Lactantius’ subordinationist Christology. Cf. P. McGuckin, “The Chris-
tology of Lactantius,” Studia Patristica 17/2 (1982): 813–20. The present
author concurs entirely with Fr. McGuckin’s analysis.
75 A. Grillmeier, Christ in the Christion Tradition, vol. 1, 202. See also
note 150 on the same page.

demonstrate that the Son was ‘made’ (condidit) (DI 4.6.6). Further,
though Tertullian – a theologian from whom Lactantius drew
much and who was given to subordinationism (adv. Prax. 9.2; 10.1)
– does quote a portion of Proverbs 8:22–31 (adv. Prax. 7.1, 3), it is
far more likely that Lactantius derived this quotation from Cypri-
an’s Ad Quirinum (Testim. 2.1.1). The latter text is a catena of scrip-
tural passages from the Hebrew Bible meant to demonstrate
Christ’s divinity to a Jewish audience. Lactantius made use of the
passages contained in Ad Quirinum extensively throughout Book 4
of the Institutiones. 76 In fact, if there is any genre of early Christian
literature that Book 4 of the Institutiones mirrors in both content and
form, it is an Adversus Judaeos. 77 Simply inserting a scriptural passage
– known at a later date! – by Arians is hardly, therefore, sufficient
evidence in itself to warrant that Lactantius be given the label of
subordinationist.
The observation that DI 4.29.12 corresponds remarkably to
Novatian’s De Trinitate 31.1–2 is certainly an accurate one if the
periscopes are isolated. 78 In the former passage, Lactantius states:
“He is the one, only, free and highest God; lacking origin because
He Himself is the origin of created beings and in Him are bound
76 For an exhaustive list of Lactantius’ use of Ad Quirinum in Book 4

of the Institutiones see BT 2011, 773–74. On this topic, see also, P.
McGuckin, “Non-Cyprianic Scripture,” 145–63.
77 Cf. P. McGuckin, “Non-Cyprianic Scripture,” 154–55. While time
prevents us from exploring Lactantius’ Christology in greater depth, an

important point to note is the apologist’s consistent argument that Jesus
ought to be reckoned as the messiah not because he worked miracles, but
because in his life, death, and resurrection he fulfilled the messianic
prophecies contained in both the OT and non-scriptural divina testamonia
(cf. DI 5.3.1–26). As a result, Book 4 of the Institutiones is rife with scrip-
tural and non-scriptural quotations which, according to Lactantius, find
their fulfillment in the person and work of Christ. This method of
demonstration aligns well with an Adversus Judaeos; which is precisely the
case with Cyprian’s Ad Quirinum.
78 Cf. Loi, Lattanzio, 205.
together, at the same time, the Son and all things.” 79 In the latter
passage, Novatian remarks: “God the Father is, therefore, the
Former and Creator of all things. He alone knows no origin. He is
the invisible, infinite, immortal, eternal, and one God; to whose
magnitude, majesty, and virtue, I would not say nothing is shown,
but nothing can be compared. From Him, when He willed it, the
Son, the Word, was born.” 80 The similarities between these two
periscopes, which are certainly present in relation to content, are
such that one would not necessarily attribute the source-
dependence of one upon the other, and there is little evidence
which shows that Lactantius even knew of Novatian’s treatise. 81 In
fact, when viewed in their respective contexts, it appears much less
likely that Lactantius had Novatian’s treatise in mind when formu-
lating his thoughts about the relationship between the Father and
the Son. In chapter 31 of De Trinitate, Novatian, like many subordi-
nationists after him, equates the fullness of divinity with being ‘un-
begotten’ (non genitus). If the Word, like the Father, was ‘without
origin’ (sine origine), then there would be two gods (31.8). Novatian’s
purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate the Word’s divine status
by affirming that he has no source of origin other than the Father
(31.13), while at the same time preserving Christian monotheism by
asserting that only the Father is the one, unbegotten, God (31.20–
79 DI 4.29.12 (BT 2007, 430): Unus est enim, solus, liber, deus sum-
mus, carens origine, quia ipse est origo rerum et in eo simul et filius et
omnia continentur. For another possible source of inspiration for this
passage, although without making mention of the Son, see Cic. Tusc. 1.66.
80 Novatian, De Trinitate 31.1 (PL 3): Est ergo Deus Pater omnium
institutor et creator, solus originem nesciens, invisibilis, immensus, im-

mortalis, aeternus, unus Deus; cujus neque magnitudini, neque majestati,
neque virtuti quidquam non dixerim praeferri, sed nec comparari potest.
(2) Ex, quo, quando ipse volvit, Sermo Filius natus est.
81 The greatest possible link between Lactantius’ work and No-
vatian’s De Trinitate is their common use of the word verbum, instead of

sermo, in quoting John 1:1 (DI 4.8.16; 6.25.12; De Trin. 30.17). In more
concrete terms, however, Lactantius’ use of verbum in this instance simply
means that his source for John 1:1 was not Cyprian, but neither was it
necessarily Novatian. Cf. R. M. Ogilvie, Library, 105.
21). When referring to the Word as ‘God,’ therefore, Christians are

not equating the Son with the Father, but referring to the Word’s
divine origin, the divinity granted to him by the Father, and his
communion with the Father (31.17, 20). “Whence the true and
eternal Father is seen as God.” 82
Lactantius, on the other hand, is not concerned with such
lofty and speculative theological dogmas. The language which No-
vatian uses to describe the relationship of origin between the Fa-
ther and the Son – e.g., non genitus (31.7) unigenitus (31.14) primogeni-
tus (31.14) – appears sparingly in the works of Lactantius. 83 The
adjectives which Lactantius uses to describe God – e.g., solus, liber,
summus, carens origine – as well as the Son and all of creation being
contained in Him (DI 4.29.12), are not attributed specifically to the
person of the Father, as they are in Novatian’s De Trinitate (31.10–
14), but to God or the divine nature in general. The apologist’s goal
has little to do with parsing the nuances of binitarian theology. Ra-
ther, he merely seeks to emphasize the co-equal status of the Fa-
ther and the Son in such a way as to make worship of the Son nec-
essary for salvation. “The Father, therefore, makes the Son and the
Son makes the Father; between them there is one mind, one spirit,
one substance. […] Since, then, the mind and will of the one is the
other or, better yet, since one mind and will is in both, each merits
to be called the one God; because whatever is in the Father flows
to the Son and whatever is in the Son descends from the Father. It
is not possible, therefore, to worship the one almighty God except
through the Son.” 84 When placed into their mutual contexts, there-
82 Novatian, De Trinitate 31.20 (PL 3): Unde unus Deus ostenditur

verus at aeternus Pater.
83 Of the three terms mentioned, Lactantius uses only the word pri-
mogenitum to refer to the Son’s origin (DI 4.6.2, 11.7). But he also uses the
same word – as derived from the Orphica – to describe the nature of the
Father (DI 1.5.4, 7). Thus, the apologist is not using this term with the
same precision as Novatian.
84 DI 4.29.4 (BT 2007, 428, 430–31): Cum igitur et pater filium faciat
et filius patrem, una utrique mens, unus spiritus, una substantia est. […]
(13) Quapropter cum mens et voluntas alterius in altero sit vel potius una
in utroque, merito unus deus uterque appellatur, quia quidquid est in
fore, these two passages – which at first glance appear very similar
– can be seen as excerpts in two very different theological argu-
ments. 85
Lastly, maintaining a subordinationist Christology would have
undermined Lactantius’ entire apologetic goal of portraying Christ
as the doctor perfectus. Again, the thrust of Lactantius’ argument is
that the doctor perfectus must be both human and divine. Christ’s di-
vinity gives authority to his teaching. Christ’s humanity demon-
strates that his teaching can be lived. “The Mediator came there-
fore, i.e., God in the flesh, so that the flesh could follow him and
he might rescue humankind from the death which rules over the
flesh. On this account he clothed himself in the flesh so that by
taming the desires of the flesh he might teach that sin is not a ne-
cessity, but a matter of temptation and will.” 86 Fundamentally, Lac-
tantius conceived of his own Christology as consistent with the
universal and catholic Church; a Church which Christ himself
founded and, in which, the Father and Son are worshipped togeth-
er. This is Lactantius’ primary concern, that the unity between the
Father and the Son be acknowledged in such way as to demand the
worship of them both as to one God; such worship as occurs only
in the Church. Any further detail as to their eternal relationship is
patre, ad filium transfluit, et quidquid est in filio, a patre descendit. (14)

Non potest igitur summus ille ac singularis deus nisi per filium coli. It
should be noted that Novatian also refers to the Father and the Son as
sharing a ‘common substance’ (substantiae communionem) (31.20). This is
further evidence that determining the orthodoxy of ante-Nicean authors
based simply on their use of Nicean and post-Nicean Trinitarian ‘key
words’ is less than helpful.
85 It is also worth mentioning that Lactantius refers to the Novatian-
ists as heretics in DI 4.30.10. It seems hard to imagine that the apologist

would knowingly adopt the subordinationist Christology of the founder of
a sect which, in his estimation, had ‘ceased being Christians’ (Christiani esse
desierunt) (DI 4.30.10).
86 DI 4.25.8 (BT 2007, 410): Itaque idcirco mediator advenit id est
deus in carne, ut caro eum sequi posset, et eriperet hominem morti, cujus
est dominatio in carnem. Ideo carne se induit, ut desideriis carnis edomitis
doceret non necessitatis esse peccare, sed propositi ac voluntatis.
beyond the scope of the apologist’s aim. “[The Church] is the

house of the faithful, the immortal temple, in which if one does not
sacrifice, he/she cannot obtain the prize of immortality. Christ was
the maker of this great and eternal temple, thus it is necessary for
him to have the eternal priesthood in it; nor can one come into the
sight of God except through him who established the temple.” 87
According to Lactantius, therefore, the person and work of
Christ is neither simply didactic nor should it associated with sub-
ordinationism. It is Christ who, by being both God and man, is the
doctor perfectus. In his teaching he revealed the knowledge of the one
God (vera sapientia), and by his life of virtue he demonstrated how
the one God is to be worshipped (verus cultus). Thus true wisdom
and true worship find their embodiment, their enfleshment, in the
person of the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ. 88 In the words of Fr.
McGuckin: “For Lactantius, Christ is the personal atonement of
Religion and Wisdom.” 89 Further, just as human beings are brought
to knowledge of the one God by Jesus’ teachings – i.e., by Christ’s
munus as prophet –, so too are they lead to God through the
Church which Jesus founded and in which he holds the eternal
high priesthood – i.e., through Christ’s munus as priest. Only in the
Church can one come to know Jesus’ teachings and exercise the
proper worship that is God’s due; namely, worship of the Father
and the Son together. “It is only the catholic Church, therefore,
which has retained true worship. She is the source of truth, the
house of the faithful, and the temple of God. If one should not
enter her or if one should exist away from her, one is separated
87 DI 4.14.2 (BT 2007, 360): Haec est domus fidelis, hoc immortale
templum, in quo si quis non sacrificaverit, immortalitatis praemium non
habebit. (3) Cujus templi et magni et aeterni quoniam Christus fabricator
fuit, idem necesse est habeat in eo sacerdotium sempiternum, nec potest
nisi per eum qui constituit ad templum et ad conspectum dei perveniri.
88 One should recall here Lactantius’ criteria for truth which he ar-
ticulates at the start of the Institutiones. DI 1.1.25 (BT 2005, 6): neque reli-
gio ulla sine sapientia suscipienda sit nec ulla sine religione probanda sa-
pientia.
89 P. McGuckin, “The Christology of Lactantius,” 814.
from the hope of life and salvation.” 90 The priesthood of Christ

was demonstrated nowhere more perfectly than at his crucifixion.
“The cross exalted [Jesus] in both deed and symbol, so that his
majesty and virtue might be noticed by all through his passion. For
when he extended his hands for the yoke, he in fact spread his
wings eastward and westward, under which all nations from both
parts of the world might gather to find rest.” 91 Similarly, Christ
founded the Church as an eternal temple so that, through her, he
“might summon all nations to true religion.” 92
As for Jesus’ munus as king, from whence the title of Christ
has been given to him (DI 4.7.7–8; Epi. 37.9), this will be fulfilled at
his second coming. “God has established that Christ would come
to earth twice, first so that he might proclaim the one God to the
nations, second so that he might reign.” 93 Because Jesus fulfilled his
earthly mission to teach humankind justice by conquering the pas-
sions, not only has God granted to him victory over death, but vic-
tory over all of creation. Quoting Daniel 7:13–14, Lactantius ap-
plies this apocalyptic vision of ‘the son of man’ (filius hominis) to the
person of Jesus, who “is liberator, and judge, and avenger, and
king, and God, and whom we call Christ.” 94 While the details of
Christ’s second coming will be addressed in the section below, it
90 DI 4.30.11 (BT 2007, 433): Sola igitur catholica eccelsia est, quae
verum cultum retinet. Hic est fons veritatis, hoc domicilium fidei, hoc
templum dei. Quo si quis non intraverit vel a quo si quis exierit, a spe
vitae ac salutis alienus est.
91 Epi. 46.5 (BT 1994, 67–68): Adeo illum crux et re et significatione
exaltavit, ut omnibus majestas ejus ac virtus cum ipsa passione notuerit.

Nam quod extendit in patibulo manus, utique alas suas in orietem occi-
dentemque porrexit, sub quas universae nationes ab utraque mundi parte
ad requiem convenirent. Cf. DI 4.26.33–34.
92 DI 4.14.1 (BT 2007, 360): universas gentes ad religionem veram
dei convocaret. Cf. DI 1.1.19–20.

93 DI 4.12.14 (BT 2007, 349): sit a deo constitutum, ut idem Christus
bis adveniat in terram, semel ut unum deum gentibus nuntiet, deinde rur-
sus ut regnet.
94 DI 7.19.4 (BT 2011, 709): est enim liberator et judex et ultor et rex
et deus, quem nos Christum vocamus. Cf. Dn 7:13–14.

should suffice here to note that his munus as king, which he won by
his teaching and virtue, awaits fulfillment at the eschaton. “At that
time evil will be removed from all things human [and] the golden
age, so called by the poets, will arise; i.e., a time of justice and
peace.” 95 Thus, while the name of Christ is absent in much of Lac-
tantius’ work, this does not mean that he plays a lesser role in
God’s providential plan for humanity. On the contrary, Jesus is
central to Lactantius’ theology.
Christ’s role in salvation history, however, is related by Lac-
tantius according to his apologetic method. Lactantius treats Jesus
in a way which is similar to his use of Scripture, i.e., he reserves the
use and discussion of specifically Christian sources and topics until
his exposition demands that they be addressed. In practical terms
this means withholding the revelation of the incarnation of the
Word until the final stage of Christian education (cf. ID 2.3).
Though this method may strike the contemporary Christian as
counter-intuitive, Lactantius is concerned with articulating the
Christian faith to his audience of Roman docti in the manner to
which they will be most receptive (ordo disciplinae); not in the man-
ner which Christians themselves would find most coherent (ordo
doctrinae). If one were to take into account the entire breadth of
salvation history, however, one would find that, for Lactantius, the
person of Christ stands at the summit of God’s divine plan for
humanity. In Christ wisdom and religion are united in a single per-
son. He reveals the one God to humankind and, in doing so, the
demands of justice in relation to the one God. Further, he lived out
this teaching by his own conquering of sin, and founded the com-
munity in which others might do the same; thereby bringing to
humanity the means of salvation. Lastly, his coming marks the be-
ginning of God’s direct intervention into all of human history at
the eschaton. For the brief time in between Christ’s first and second
coming “the holy people are being formed by the teaching and pre-
95DI 4.12.21 (BT 2007, 352): tunc sublato de rebus humanis omni
malo aureum saeculum ut poetae vocant, id est justum ac pacificum tem-
pus orietur.
cepts of God.” 96 Thus, the entire sweep of human history is

brought to its fulfillment, to its divine telos, in the person and work
of Christ. Precisely how this will be accomplished is the subject our
next section.
C. Eschatology
Lactantius begins his exploration into Eschatology midway through
the seventh and final book of the Institutiones. 97 Here we discover
that the rhetorician follows the millennialist path pioneered by Ire-
naeus, Justin and Tertullian. 98 As one scholar has noted, Lactantius’
eschatological writings are “the high point of chiliasm in the
West.” 99 In other words, few approach the length and detail with
which Lactantius proclaims the coming millennial reign of Christ.
His explication begins with a confession that the world is in
its senescence (DI 7.14.3; cf. Lucr. 2.1144–74; Corp. Herm. Ascl. 25–
26). God created the cosmos in six days (cf. Gn 2:1), and since
“‘before your eyes, Lord, one day is just as a thousand years,’” 100
the temporal finitude of the earth’s presently constituted order
must last for six thousand years. According to the calculations Lac-
96 DI 7.14.13 (BT 2011, 696): sanctus populus doctrina et praeceptis

dei ad justitiam figuratur.
97 For a recent commentary on Book 7 of the Institutiones see Stefan
Freund, Laktanz, Divinae Institutiones Buch 7: De Vita Beata. Einleitung,

Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009); see also Hed-
wigis van Rooijen-Dijkman, De vita Beata, het 7e boek van de Divinae Institu-
tiones van Lactantius: Analyse en bronnenonderzoek (Assen: 1967).
98 In De viris illustribus, 18, Jerome conveniently lists many of the Pa-
tristic millennialists: i.e., Papias, Irenaeus, Apollinaris of Hierapolis, Ter-

tullian (cf. adv. Mar. 3.24–6), Victorinus of Pettau and Lactantius.
99 Charles Hill, Regnum Caelorum (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2001), 41.
Quot. G. G. Blum, “Chiliasmus II. Alte Kirche,” TRE 7: 731.

100 DI 7.14.9 (BT 2011, 695): ‘ante oculos tuos, domine, mille anni
tamquam dies unus.’ Quot. Ps 90:4. For further millennial readings of Ps

90:4 see 2 Pt 3:8; Pseudo-Barnabus Ep. 15.4; Victorinus of Pettau De fabri-
ca mundi 6; Irenaeus Adv. Haer. 5.23.2; Justin Dialogue with Trypho 81.3; et al.
tantius accepts, no more than two hundred of these years remain. 101
Further, just as God rested on and sanctified the seventh day (cf.
Gn 2:2), at the terminus of six thousand years God will inaugurate
a millennial Sabbath; where “all evil will be abolished from the
earth and justice will reign for a thousand years.” 102
The events that precipitate the millennial Sabbath are as nu-
merous as they are unpleasant. They will begin with the fall of Ro-
man imperial dominance. 103 Ten rulers will emerge to fill the politi-
cal vacuum and constant civil strife will ensue. A prince from the
north will then assert himself over this decemvirate, destroying
three of its members, forming an alliance with the remaining lead-
ers, and transferring the seat of power from Rome to the east. 104
The reign of this tyrant will be marked by military conquest, natural
disasters en masse, and celestial catastrophes (DI 7.16.5–11). During
this horrific period people “will pray to God and He will not hear
them, they will desire death and it will not come.” 105 The human
101 DI 7.25.5. On the dating which Lactantius uses see Theophilus of

Antioch Ad Autol. 2.29. See also Nicholson, “The Source of the Dates,”
291–310.
102 DI 7.14.11 (BT 2011, 695): malitia omnis aboleatur e terra et reg-
net per annos mille justitia.

103 DI 7.15.11–16. Lactantius, like Tertullian (cf. Apol. 32.1), views
the fall of Rome as an ominous and highly undesirable event despite his
antagonism towards the political authorities for the persecution of Chris-
tians (cf. DI 7.25.6–8). This sentiment is shared neither by the Sibyls (Orac.
Sib. 8.1–16, 165–73) nor Hystaspes (Hyst. fr. 13a).
104 DI 7.16.3. On the ten rulers see Rv 13:1; 17:12; Dn 7:8, 24; Tert.
De resurrection carnis 24.18; 25.1; Ire. Adv. Haer. 5.26; et al. On the signifi-
cance of the mysterious figure from the north, a clue may be located in
prophetic literature, where bad things tend to come from the north (cf. Jer
1:13–15; Ez 1:4). On the catalogue of horrendous events see Orac. Sib.
2.21–24; 4.152–57; 5.179; 8; Corp. Herm. Ascl. 25; Hyst. fr. 14. On the em-
pire moving to the east see Orac. Sib. 3.350–55; 4.145–48; 8.9–165; Hyst.
fr. 13a.
105 DI 7.16.12 (BT 2011, 703): orabunt deum et non exaudiet, opta-
bitur mors et non veniet. Cf. Rv 9:6; 15:18; Orac. Sib. 2.306–11; 3.544; 7.5,
103, 123; 8.350–65; Corp. Herm. Ascl. 24–25.
race will be decimated, and even two thirds of the cultoribus dei will
perish (DI 7.16.14; cf. Rv 9:15, 18; Orac. Sib. 3.544; 7.123). At the
same time a great prophet of God will arise to work miracles and
will convert many people to the worship of the one God (DI
7.17.1–2; Cf. Rv 11:3–14; Justin Dial. 49; Orac. Sib. 2.187–95). At
the end of his ministry, a king from Syria will kill the prophet who
will exceed all previous evils (DI 7.17.2–3). This second despot,
whom Lactantius elsewhere refers to the anti-Christ (DI 7.19.6),
will also possess the power to perform wonders. He will severely
persecute the worshippers of God; forcing them to flee into the
desert. This tyrant will proclaim himself to be the Christ, emblazon
a mark upon his disciples and lay waste to the earth for 42
months. 106 The denouement of his reign of terror will be a siege
against the righteous in the desert; where God will finally answer
the prayers of the faithful. At that moment, Christ will descend
from the skies accompanied by a host of heavenly angels and inex-
tinguishable fire. 107 The anti-Christ alone from among the nefarious
forces will survive the barrage of this heavenly assembly. He will
repeatedly renew his offensive against the celestial army “until the
fourth war brings about the conquering of all the impious.” 108 At
this time the princeps daemonum himself will be captured and re-
strained (DI 7.24.5; cf. Rv 20:2).
106 DI 7.17.7–8. Cf. Rv 13:11–18; Orac. Sib. 3.63–70. On the duration

of 42 months see Rv 13:5. On the similarities between DI 7.17 and Rv 11
and 13 consult David Aune, Word Biblical Commentary: Revelation, vol. 2
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 590–93, 726–28.
107 DI 7.19.5. Quot. Orac. Sib. 3.652; 5.107–10; 8.326; Hyst. fr. 15;
Corp. Herm. Ascl. 26; cf. Rv 19:11–21. No other Patristic author does more
than merely mention the existence of Hystaspes (cf. Justin 1 Apol. 20.1,
44.12; Clement Strom. 6.5.43). For an analysis of the Oracle of Hystaspes
in Patristic authors, largely Lactantius, see John R. Hinnells, “The Zoroas-
trian Doctrine,” 125–48.
108 DI 7.19.6 (BT 2011, 710): donec quarto proelio confectis omni-
bus impiis debellatus. Quot. Orac. Sib. 3.618; 8.224; cf. Rv 19:11–21; Mt
24:29–31; Justin 1 Apol. 1.52.
With justice and peace secured, those who worshipped the

one God will be resurrected and judged by Christ. 109 This reckon-
ing will be determined according to people’s ‘actions’ (opera). “If the
good and just ones are more numerous and profound, then they
are given a life of bliss. If the bad ones should prevail, however,
they are condemned to punishment.” 110 The means by which this
judgment occurs is a literal trial by fire. A divine conflagration,
which burns but does not consume (cf. Ex 3:2), will scorch and
torment those whose sins are too great but leave the virtuous un-
harmed. 111 Once this process is completed, with only the righteous
remaining, Christ will rule over the earth for one thousand years
with the resurrected faithful acting as judges. Justice and peace will
prosper, the natural world will become abundantly fecund and se-
rene, and all shall honor their king as Lord in this heavenly city he
has established. 112 Nearing the end of the millennium, however, the
princeps daemonum will be released from his prison, gather many to
his sinister cause, and make war upon the civitas sancta. 113 God’s
109 DI 7.24.1. This is the first resurrection of only those who wor-
shipped the one God. Quot. Orac. Sib. 3.741–43; 4.40–43; 8.81–83, 241–
42, 413–16; fr. 4; cf. Rv 20:4–6; Tert. De res. 25; adv. Mar. 3.24–26.
110 DI 7.20.6 (BT 2011, 712): si plura et gravia fuerint bona justaque,
dentur ad vitam beatam, si autem mala superaverint, condemnentur ad

poenam.
111 DI 7. 21.6–7. Cf. Rv 20:14; 21:8; Tert. Apol. 48.4, 13–15; Hyst. fr.
16; Orac. Sib. 2.253–56; 8.410–11.

112 DI 7.24.2, 6–8. Cf. Rv 20:1–6. On the natural conditions of the
earth during Christ’s millennial reign see Is 11; Ez 47:12; Am 9:13–15; etc.
To support belief in a thousand year duration of earthly bliss Lactantius
quotes Verg. Aen 6.719–21, 748–51; Ecl. 4.21–22, 28–30, 38–45; Orac. Sib.
3.619, 787; 5.281. For an analysis of how Lactantius employs the pagan
myth of the Golden Age to this belief see Swift, “Golden Age,” 144–56.
113 DI 7.26.1; cf. Rv 20:7. Concerning those who rally around the
prince of demons: Lactantius mentions that Satan’s legions will be com-

prised of those who were ruled by the resurrected just (DI 7.26.1). Hence,
they must be the descendants of those who were alive at Christ’s second
coming (cf. DI 7.24.3), for all those alive at that time would have been
judged at the first resurrection. Thus it is possible, during Christ’s millen-
final wrath will then be unleashed upon the unfaithful. For three
days, while the people of God take shelter under the earth, hail-
storms of fire will consume the treacherous adversaries until they
are no more (DI 7.26.2; cf. Ez 38:20, 22). For the remaining seven
years of the millennium, only the people of God will remain. They
will live in peace and serenity until the second, general resurrection
of all the dead occurs; “at which time the unjust will be expelled to
eternal torment.” 114 At the terminus of the millennium will be the
consummation of all things. “The world will be renewed by God
[…] and God will transform humankind unto the likeness of an-
gels,” 115 serving and worshipping Him forever.
III. CONCLUSION
This last chapter has addressed Lactantius’ understanding of salva-
tion history. Lactantius views all of human history through the lens
of salvation history. The human person, according to Lactantius, is
a ‘heavenly creature’ (caeleste animal), endowed with intelligence and
reason (DI 2.1.14–15), who was created by God with these capaci-
ties in order to know and worship Him. Since this is the end for
which humankind was created, to be ignorant of the one God and
to worship ‘the work of fingers’ (opera digitorum) (DI 2.1.19) is to act
contrary to human nature. Accordingly, when Lactantius interprets
human history it is through this anthropological lens. Since know-
ing and worshipping God is the end for which humankind was cre-
ated, Lactantius maintains that in their earliest history human be-
ings, being closer in time to their actual creation, knew and wor-
shipped the one God. This ur-monotheism is the true ‘natural reli-
gion,’ it is the religion to which humankind was led in conformity
nial reign on earth, for people to bear offspring and – for these individuals
– to be converted to the cause of the Adversarium.
114 DI 7.26.5 (BT 2011, 729): in qua excitabuntur injusti ad cruciatus
sepiternos. Cf. Rv 20:12–15; Justin Dial. 81.4; Orac. Sib. 3.649–51; et al. At
the second or general resurrection (publica omnium resurrection) all of the
dead shall be judged.
115 DI 7.26.5 (BT 2011, 729): renovabitur mundus a deo […]. Et
transformabit deus homines in similtudinem angelorum. Cf. Mt 22:30; Mk

12:25; Lk 20:36; Tert. De res. 62.
to its nature. As time progressed, however, human beings gradually

fell away from the knowledge and worship of the one God and,
thereby, grew more and more isolated from justice. Since justice is
“the source of virtue” 116 from which all other virtues flow, aban-
donment of justice also led to the proliferation of every vice across
the human spectrum. God, however, seeing the pitiable condition
into which humanity had fallen, sent His Son in order to draw peo-
ple back to Himself by giving them the knowledge and the means
by which they might practice justice. In this way, i.e., by living a life
of virtue and justice, the human person is able to merit the reward
for which he was created; namely, a life of immortal beatitude,
knowing and worshipping God for all eternity (DI 7.14.2). Not
much time remains, however, for humanity to return to the
knowledge and worship of the one God. In less than two centuries
(DI 7.25.5), God’s Son will return to earth to reign for a thousand
years, after which, the entire cosmos will be transformed by God.
When that occurs, all of creation will be brought to its final perfec-
tion, and the blessed will be ‘in the likeness of angels’ (in similitudi-
nem angelorum) and will “always be in the sight of the Almighty.” 117
As mentioned above, Lactantius’ theology of history is a living
demonstration of his anthropology. Though Lactantius does not
explicitly make this comparison, there is an interesting parallel to be
noted between the cosmology and anthropology advocated by Lac-
tantius and that of the philosophical school against which he never
tires of rattling, the Epicureans. One of Lactantius’ chief critiques
of the Epicurean denial of providence is that if this doctrine is de-
nied then there is no accounting for the well-patterned order of
creation. The random and haphazard coming together of atoms
could in no way produce a universe with such intelligibility, utility,
and beauty. If providence did not exist, in other words, the result
ought to be chaos and a “formless void” (Gn 1:2) devoid of struc-
ture. Similarly, when the human person acts as if he were not prov-
identially designed to know and worship God, then the chaos of
vice reigns within him. In this analogy, human history after the dis-
appearance of ur-monotheism resembles Epicurus’ ‘chaos of mat-
116 DI 5.5.1 (BT 2009, 453): summa virtus aut fons est ipsa virtutis.
117 DI 7.26.5 (BT 2011, 729): semper in conspectu omnipotentis.
ter’ (materiae confusa) (DI 1.5.8), an age dominated by evil habits,

ignorance, and blindness (DI 5.6.10).
God’s providential will, however, cannot be thwarted. Human
beings were created in order to know and worship God. They were
born for justice (DI 3.9.19; 6.25.9; cf. Cic. Leg. 1.28; Epi. 29.1–7).
By His direct intervention into human history, through the incarna-
tion of His Son, God has endeavored once again to bring justice to
humankind. Christ’s role in salvation, therefore, is to return human
beings to God by returning them to themselves, to their true na-
tures, to the piety that ‘binds’ (religat) them to God because they are
rational creatures. Christ’s work in his first coming, then, is funda-
mentally restorative. This restoration, however, is but preparation
for final transformation. Christ’s first coming, according to Lactan-
tius, inaugurates the beginning, rather than the end, of the restora-
tion of justice. It ushers in a new Golden Age which, at the time of
the apologist’s writing, was to find its ultimate perfection at Christ’s
second coming in the not-so-distant future. Christ came to restore
humankind’s natural end, i.e., justice, as preparation for receiving
its supernatural end, i.e., the immortal life of bliss.
Since this chapter treats Christian salvation history, it is far
from difficult to find God’s providence at work in the events re-
counted. But the firm connection to be noted in what has been
addressed is between salvation history, the doctrine of providence,
and anthropology. Although Lactantius is an apologist rather than a
systematician, when the topics he treats are examined systematical-
ly, as has been done here, one can discern the pattern of the posi-
tive theological structure which Lactantius is constructing. Lactan-
tius begins by defending of the doctrine of providence and, once
defended, uses providence as evidence for what he believes are the
most essential divine attributes – this is especially true of God’s
oneness and status as aeterna mens. The apologist once again uses
the evidence of providence to confirm that God is the sole Creator
of all that exists, including humankind. With a plentitude of testi-
mony found in the natural world, Lactantius then demonstrates
that the human person was created in order to know and worship
his Creator; that is, created for justice. This is precisely what char-
acterizes human existence at its earliest history but, having forgot-
ten the knowledge and worship of God, humankind fell into igno-
rance and vice. It was necessary, therefore, for God Himself to
raise up humankind from the lowly status to which it had sunk by
acting contrary to its nature, contrary to the providentially-designed

way in which it was created. The end of salvation history, therefore,
is the fulfillment of providence. It is God entering into human his-
tory in order to bring about the perfection of the creature who is
made to know and love Him eternally.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this work has been to examine the role of the doctrine
of providence in the theology of Lactantius. Prior to this examina-
tion, however, consideration was given to understanding Lactan-
tius’ goals and method as an apologist. Lactantius expressly men-
tions in the Institutiones that his goal in writing this grand apology is
“to overthrow in one attack all the accusers of justice everywhere
who are writing or will have written.” 1 The apologist is inspired to
compose this work by the very real and immanent threat posed to
Christians by those in political power who condemn the innocent
without providing an opportunity for their defense (DI 5.1.2). In
order to defend Christians against these attacks, Lactantius believes
that an apologist must expose the errors of Greco-Roman religion
and philosophy, and allow the truths of Christianity to shine forth.
Lactantius’ goal, as he tells us in the Institutiones, is to “demonstrate
human wisdom to be nothing and, consequently, show the mistak-
en and the wanderer the way to immortality.” 2 Lactantius’ method,
therefore, is twofold: ‘to defend and build up’ (defendere et instituere)
(cf. DI 5.4.3). As the title of the Institutiones suggests, the apologist
is not merely concerned with the tearing down of fallacious argu-
ments, but also with the constructing of a positive Christian theol-
ogy; in the apologist’s own words, the totius doctrinae substantiam (DI
5.4.3). Because of his need to exposit the Christian faith in resonat-
ing manner with a non-Christian audience, however, Lactantius
1 DI 5.4.1 (BT 2009, 450–51): accusatores justitiae […] ut omnes, qui

ubique idem operis efficiunt aut effecerunt, uno semel impetu profliga-
rem.
2 DI 1.1.6 (BT 2005, 2): humanam sapientiam nullam esse monstra-
ret et erranti ac vago viam consequendae immortalitatis ostenderet.
235
must construct this theology in a way which will appeal to the sen-
sibilities of the Roman docti. Therefore, the apologist is committed
to defending and expositing the Christian faith using eloquent
speech and, until necessity demands its inclusion, holding back on
the use of Judeo-Christian evidence in his arguments. In this way,
Lactantius aims to be heard by the widest possible audience or, as
one author has put it, at a “cross-cultural consensus.” 3
According to Lactantius’ own goals and method, therefore,
Christians and non-Christians alike must agree upon the founda-
tion of his theological project. The doctrine of providence is such a
principle; having already been ably defended by the Stoics and oth-
er philosophers (DI 1.2.2), and being the topic which should natu-
rally come first in any apology (DI 1.2.1). Lactantius believes that
the first positive step in Christian education, after the falsehood of
Roman religion is recognized, “is to perceive with the mind that
there is one supreme God whose power and providence in the be-
ginning made the world and thereafter governs it.” 4 Thus, in order
to establish the doctrine of providence as the fundamental principle
in his positive theology, Lactantius adopts many of the arguments
already provided by the Stoic school and, in particular, those found
in the works of his mentor Cicero. 5 In Chapter 3 we examined
these arguments according to their division in Stoic theology and
demonstrated that the importance of this doctrine is underscored
by Lactantius’ consistent and ubiquitous defense of it throughout
his apologetic works. 6 Further, not only has this doctrine been de-
3 Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 93.

4 ID 2.2 (SC 289, 94): Primus autem gradus est intellegere falsas reli-
giones et abicere inpios cultus humana manu fabricatorum, secundus vero
perspicere animo quod unus sit dues summus, cujus potestas ac providen-
tia effecerit a principio mundum et gubernet in posterum. On this point
see Schott, op. cit., 82 with n. 22.
5 See especially Chapter 3, III. Conclusion.
6 For example, the consensus argument (DI 1.2.2; 2.8.48–52; Epi.
1.2; ID 9.1–7); responding to opponents (DI 2.8.10–47, 53–71; 3.17.7–43,

28.4–5; Epi. 31.1–6; ID 4.1–15); the argument from design (DI 1.2.5;
3.20.13; 7.3.24–26; Epi. 1.3–4; ID 10.25–35; OD 2.1, 3.2–6, passim); the
argument from absurd consequences (ID 4, 8; Epi. 31.3).
CONCLUSION 237
fended by many non-Christian docti, but also by ‘the testimony of

all people and nations’ (testamonio populorum atque gentium) (DI 1.2.4).
By making providence the foundation of his theological institutum,
therefore, Lactantius is maintaining his primary apologetic goal of
securing for himself the widest consensus possible among Chris-
tians and non-Christians alike.
With the doctrine of providence serving as a foundation
which many can agree upon, Lactantius then proceeds to argue for
a doctrine which is considered much more disputable, but which
Lactantius views as the defining dogma of the Christian faith, i.e.,
God’s oneness. Having demonstrated the existence of providence,
Lactantius is able to use providence as evidence for the existence of
one supreme God who is its Author (DI 1.2.1–6; Epi. 2.1–8; ID
13.1–14.6). God’s oneness is the defining characteristic of the divine
nature for Lactantius – the apologist affirms that wisdom is perfect
in the person who acknowledges God’s oneness and providence
(DI 2.8.71) – and, once he has demonstrated God’s oneness, Lac-
tantius thenmakes use of the doctrine of providence in arguing for
other divine attributes, most notably divine anger. 7 This a posteriori
method of arguing for the existence of divine attributes leads Lac-
tantius to characterize God, above all, as ‘eternal mind’ (aeterna
mens) (DI 7.3.4; cf. Tusc. 1.66), as the divine reason and will respon-
sible for the providential order of the universe. This portrait of the
divine, once again, resonates well with the Stoic conception of god,
and Lactantius freely draws from their representative Cicero to
support this characterization. 8 Lactantius employs the same meth-
od of argumentation in order to establish God’s activity ad extra.
Given that he has already demonstrated that God is the one Au-
thor of providence, the apologist rejects the possibility that creation
could have occurred in any way apart from His providence (DI
2.8.8–71). The evidence of providence makes it particularly clear
7 ID 4, passim. See also Micka (Divine Anger, 112–13) who agrees that
the doctrine of providence is both the central tenet of Lactantius’ theolo-
gy and the basis for his affirmation of the existence of righteous indigna-
tion in God.
8 See, inter alia, DI 1.5.20–27, 8.2–3; 7.3.4; Epi. 4.3; ID 10.31–36,
11.15, 24.6; OD 2.1; cf. Cic. Nat. D. 1.26, 39; 2.77; Tusc. 1.66.
that only a divine Mind could arrange and sustain the well-ordered
pattern of creation (DI 2.8.48–52, 11.3–8; ID 10.31–47). Even the
existence of evil, Lactantius believes, can be observed to conform
to a providentially guided system. Evil exists for the benefit of hu-
mankind, without which virtue – the means of salvation for the
human person (DI 4.25.10; 5.17.16, 18.1–117.5.20; Epi. 24.11, 29.7,
30.1, 64.1, 7; OD 19.10) – cannot exist. 9
In treating the doctrine of providence in relation to anthro-
pology, the first item to be observed is that Lactantius authored an
entire treatise, De opificio Dei, in defense of providence. This work
argues that the beauty and utility present in the human person, in
each of his parts as well as the whole, bespeaks of his formation by
‘a most provident Creator’ (providentissimus artifex) (OD 11.2). Given
that Lactantius begins the Institutiones with only a cursory discussion
of the doctrine, while readily acknowledging that a Christian apolo-
gy must begin by treating providence (DI 1.2.6; cf. Min. Fel. 5; 18),
De opificio can be viewed as the necessary prologue to the Divinae
Institutiones in this regard. In De opificio and throughout his works,
Lactantius’ treatment of anthropology is thoroughly teleological.
The human person is able to apprehend the ends for which things
were created. In the case of the human person, what can be dis-
cerned is the exalted place within the created order that he occu-
pies. Borrowing yet again from Stoic anthropology, Lactantius af-
firms that human beings are the apex of the created order and that
all other created things exist in order to serve them. 10 The quality
that humans possesse that establishes their position atop the creat-
ed order is the capacity to know and worship their Creator. Physi-
cal evidence of this quality can even be found in the ‘upright stat-
ure’ (status rectus) of the human person. 11
9 DI 2.8.6 add.3, 17.1; 3.29.16; 5.7.4; 6.4.17; 7.4.12, 5.27 add.5; Epi.
24.3; ID 13.24; OD 19 bis 3.
10 DI 7.4.8–19; Epi. 64.3; ID 13.1; cf. Cic. Nat. D. 1.23; 2.37, 133,
154–62; Fin. 3.67; Off. 1.22; Luc. 2.120; Gell. NA 7.1; LS, vol. 2, 330, fr.
Q; Pease, 949; Clarke, 344 n. 536.
11 OD 8.2, 10.26, 19.10; DI 2.1.15, 2.23, 18.1; 17.9, 18.1; 3.10.11,
12.26, 20.11, 27.16, 28.16; 7.5.6, 20, 9.11; ID 7.5, 14.2, 20.10; Epi. 20.4ff.,
25.1, 65.4. While Lactantius identifies this idea with Ovid (DI 2.1.15; quot.
CONCLUSION 239
Since the human person is the only creature capable of know-

ing and worshipping his Creator, the highest natural end of the
human person must be in doing so. 12 The human person, therefore,
was created in order to know and worship God, i.e., created for vera
religio. True religion is a union of true wisdom (an apprehension of
God’s oneness) and true worship (a life of virtue lived in loving
obedience to God). What the philosophers were unable to grasp
concerning this anthropology, however, is that by living a life of
virtue the human person not only satisfies his natural end, but also
merits the reward of his supernatural end, i.e., a life of immortality.
This is the ultimate end for which human beings were created and
which forms the essence of Lactantius’ teleologically-centered and
providentially-driven kerygma.
Lactantius not only uses the beauty and utility of human person to
demonstrate the existence of providence, therefore, but yet again
Met. 1.84–86) and Hermes (DI 7.9.11; cf. Corp. Herm., vol. 4, fr. 14), he no
doubt found it also in Cicero (Nat. D. 2.37, 140; Leg. 1.26).
12 DI 2.3.14; 3.10.7; Epi. 36.2–3; ID 7.6–14; cf. Cic. Leg. 1.24.

arcanum dei, hoc mysterium mundi. Cf. Epi. 64.1.
uses the doctrine of providence, once proven, in order to show

what constitutes the human person’s natural and supernatural ends.
Further, by making the above proclamation concerning the nature
and destiny of the human person his central teaching, rather than a
doctrine more unique to Christianity, Lactantius once again uses
providence to advance a theological truth which can appeal to both
Christians and non-Christians alike.
In order to provide historical verification of his belief that
human beings are providentially designed to know and worship the
one God, Lactantius constructs a universal history that posits the
existence of an ur-monotheism at the dawn of human history.
Human beings, living in conformity with their natures, knew and
worshipped the one God at the earliest stage of their existence.
Monotheism, therefore, is the natural and universal religion of hu-
mankind rather than the debasing and ethnically sectarian cults of
the pantheon. Once the latter practices began to flourish, however,
sin and vice also began to spread exponentially among human be-
ings. Seeing the great depths to which human beings had fallen,
God sent his Son into human history so that they might return to
their natures by honoring and worshipping Him. This process of
restoration, which began with the sending of His Son to earth, will
be brought to fulfillment upon Christ’s second coming. After
Christ has reigned on earth for a millennium all of the living and
the dead will be judged. God will then transform the cosmos and
bring it to its final perfection. The blessed will then live in com-
munion with God for all eternity.
In conformity with his apologetic method, Lactantius holds
off discussing the ministry of Jesus until Book 4 of the Institutiones
after his critique of Roman religion and philosophy is complete. He
similarly delays treating the eschaton until Book 7, the final book of
the Institutiones. While discussing both Christology and Eschatology,
Lactantius once again places them within the context of God’s
providence. The coming of the Son to earth marks the beginning
of God’s direct intervention into human history in order to bring
the entire cosmos to its final perfection. Prior to this consumma-
tion, however, it is the mission of the Son to gather a people to
himself and restore them to their natural ends; so that they might
find and enjoy their supernatural ends at the eschaton. Lactantius’
Christology, therefore, is solidly placed within the context of bring-
ing the human person to the perfection for which he was designed.
CONCLUSION 241
Even more explicitly, Lactantius deemed the doctrine of provi-

dence so vital to his Eschatology that he included yet another ex-
plicit defense of it in Book 7 of the Institutiones just prior to his ex-
position of the last things (DI 7.31–26). For the apologist the doc-
trine of providence supports belief in the eschaton because the last
day can only be brought about without the intervention of a provi-
dent God who wills the perfection of His creation. Thus, despite
not being able to cite as evidence for his Christology and Eschatol-
ogy many of the philosophers upon whom he had relied previous-
ly, 14 Lactantius treats these doctrines as extensions of the doctrine
of providence. They are the ways in which God sees to the execu-
tion of His providential will for the human person.
It has been the goal of this work to demonstrate the centrality
of the doctrine of providence in the works of Lactantius. In doing
so, it has endeavored to identify the doctrine as that which func-
tions as the grundaxiom of Lactantius’ positive theology. At the gen-
esis of his apologetic works Lactantius defended the doctrine of
providence and continued to do so throughout them all. Once de-
fended, the providential governance of the world, and especially
the human person, provided Lactantius with evidence to support
his other theological arguments. And when reckoning salvation
history, Lactantius interpreted its events, both past and future,
through the lens of humankind’s fidelity to its own nature, to the
providentially-designed ends for which they were created. By em-
ploying the doctrine of providence to support and integrate his
entire theological system in this way, Lactantius has made the
linchpin of his theology a doctrine that finds common ground
among both Christians and non-Christians. Thus, his positive theo-
logical project is supported and guided by a doctrine that serves his
apologetic aim. That Lactantius was an apologist first and foremost
14The non-Christian authorities which Lactantius cites in support of

his Christology and Eschatology are largely taken from divina testimonia.
There is some evidence, however, of Stoic influence in Lactantius’ treat-
ment of the eschaton. Cf. Jean Doignon, “Le placitum eschatologique attri-
bué aux Stoïciens par Lactance (Institutions Divines VII, 20): Un exemple
de contamination de modèles littéraires,” Revue de Philologie 51 (1977): 43–
55.
is not an original assessment of the North African rhetorician. The

aim of the present work, however, has been to analyze Lactantius’
written work and to demonstrate that there exists a concept that
gives form, coherence, and structure to his theology. Though Lac-
tantius may have found the tearing down of fallacious arguments a
task more easily performed – or more necessary to the plight of
Christians – than the building up of Christian teaching, he nonethe-
less articulates a positive Christian theology; with the doctrine of
providence serving as its foundational and determinative princi-
ple. 15
Perhaps twenty years ago or so, scholars of late-antiquity in-
creasingly began to recognize Lactantius’ import as an early fourth
century Christian advocate. 16 Like the study of late-antiquity as a
whole, scholars from many disciplines can examine the works and
impact of Lactantius from the perspectives of their respective fields
and by utilizing various heuristic tools. The present work has
sought to contribute to this body of knowledge in relation to Lac-
tantius’ theology and apologetic method. Further study may make
use of its contributions to relate these aspects of Lactantius’
thought to his wider religious and socio-cultural context. The apol-
ogist was active at a decisive time and place in Christian history
amid dyer crises, emerging hopes, and developing ideas. The role
and influence of Lactantius both during and after these events, and
in various milieux (e.g., religious, political, intellectual, etc.), remains
to be explored further. Many recent studies have already appeared
which do just this, and scholarly interest in the apologist continues
to grow. 17 It is the hope of the present author that this work may
15 One may recall Jerome’s comments regarding Lactantius: “would

that he could have supported our [teaching] as easily as he destroyed for-
eign [teaching]!” Ep. 68.10 (CSEL 27/1, 164): utinam tam [doctrina] nos-
tra affirmare potuisset quam facile aliena destruxit!
16 Though they should not be viewed in isolation, the monographs
of H. A. Drake and E. DePalma Digeser deserve specific recognition for

their roles in this renewal of interest. See their entries in the bibliography,
as well as a combined review of these texts: R. L. Wilken, “In Defense of
Constantine,” First Things 112 (2001): 36–40.
17 The recent monograph by Blandine Colot is particularly worthy of
CONCLUSION 243
be of use to scholars wishing to examine in greater detail the

thought and legacy of this Latin-speaking Christian. He was, in his
lifetime, a member of a persecuted minority and a voice in the cor-
ridors of power, an author in exile and an imperially-appointed tu-
tor, a lover of Cicero and Constantine, an apologist and a theologi-
an.
mention in this regard. See B. Colot, Lactance: penser la conversion de Rome au

temps de Constantin (Firenze: Olschi, 2016). Scholars from various disci-
plines have also taken recent interest in Lactantius’ contribution to the
development of the concept of religious liberty. See J. R. Bowlin, “Toler-
ance Among the Fathers,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 26 (2006):
3–36; E. G. Wallace, “Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradi-
tion,” Penn State Law Review 114/2 (2009): 485–570; P. Hartog, “Religious
Liberty and the Early Church,” Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal 17 (2012):
63–77; A. P. Coleman, “Lactantius and ‘Ressourcement’: Going to the
Sources of Religious Liberty in the Civic Order,” Vox Patrum 34 (2014):
209–219.
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INDEX
ANCIENT AUTHORS, NAMES, AND SOURCES

Academics 68, 69, 162, 166, 158, 159n55, 160, 163,
181n125 192n1, 197, 200, 210, 211,
Adam (and Eve) 128 214, 215, 219, 220, 221n81,
Aelius Theon 89n76 225–32
Apollinaris of Hieropolis Cabirus 193
227n98 Cassius Dio 15n29
Apollo, Oracle of 33, 46, 49, Christians 6, 12–17, 21, 23,
50, 53, 64n10, 101, 102, 193 25, 26, 30, 34–37, 41n31, 46,
Apollonius of Tyana 15 48n53, 91, 137, 181, 188,
Anaxagoras 107 199, 200, 215, 222, 223n85,
Anselm of Canterbury 95n3 226, 235–37, 240–42
Antisthenes 107 Chrysippus 89, 107, 125,
Aristotle 67n16, 74, 89n79, 160n59
107, 112, 121, 145, 156, Cicero 1, 2, 4, 5, 17, 19, 21,
177n112 25, 32n11, 33n14, 34n16, 35,
Aristoxenus 148 42, 44n39, 45, 46, 47n48, 50,
Arius (Arians) 1, 219, 220 51n62, 62, 63, 64n10, 65, 66,
Arnobius 3n9, 9–11, 18, 26, 68, 72, 73, 75n39, 76, 78–80,
31, 36n20, 110, 192 82n57, 84n63, 85, 87–90, 93,
Augustine 8, 11n14, 21, 99n15, 104–108, 110–112,
26n55, 47n50, 54, 82n57, 114, 118, 120, 123n93, 125,
122, 150n30, 170n91, 176, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146n19,
179n118, 180, 196, 207n40 147, 148, 150n29, 151–52,
Athenagoras 48, 54 154n38, 156, 160n59, 161,
Bacchus 193 162, 164n70, 168, 169n86,
Balbus (from Nat. D.) 63, 79, 170, 174, 175n107, 181n125,
89, 108, 151 182–84, 188, 193, 209n43,
Barnabus (pseudo-) 227n100 221n79, 233, 236, 237,
Bible, The (Scripture) 11n14, 238n10, 239, 243
15, 25, 27, 30, 32, 33, 37–40, Cleanthes 89
41n31, 52, 53, 55, 57, 67, 90, Clement of Alexandria 48,
100n18, 113, 120, 135, 49n58, 54
150n31, 155, 156, 157n48, Clement (pseudo-) 106n38
269
Constantine 1n4, 7n1, 8, Galerius 12n16, 13, 14, 17,

11n14, 12–14, 15n25, 17, 18, 22n42, 192n2
22–24, 26, 28n62, 37n21, Gallienus 13
53n68, 54n71, 171n95, Gellius 125, 160n59, 188n146,
242n16, 243 238n10
Cotta (from Nat. D.) 68, 69, Gnostics 133
73, 89, 114, 115, 117 Gratian 23
Crispus (son of Constantine) Ham 197
8, 22 Hercules 192
Critolaus (the Peripatetic) Hermes Trismegistus 33, 46–
181n125 49, 53, 64n10, 67, 100, 102,
Cyprian 11, 29, 30, 32, 37n21, 117, 136, 151n34, 155n40,
90, 164n70, 192, 220, 156, 164n70, 171, 183, 215,
221n81, 217, 227, 228, 229n107,
Damasus (pseudo-) 27 239n11
Decretum Gelasianum 1 Hesiod 41, 106
Democritus 65, 118 Hippocrates 145n18
Deucalion 155 Homer 41, 106
Diagoras 65, 66 Horace 154
Didymus of Alexandria 197 Hyginus 154–55
Diocletian 2, 7, 8n2, 9, 12–14, Hystaspes, Oracle of 33, 46,
90, 192n2, 196n14 48, 49, 53n68, 228–29
Diogenes (the Stoic) 181n125 Iamblichus 14
Diogenes Laertius 74, 106n39, Irenaeus 51n63, 164n70, 227,
118, 147n21, 152 228n104
Dionysius of Halicarnassus Isis 193
155n43 Japetus 155
Donatus (friend of Lactantius) Jerome 1, 2, 7–11, 13, 22, 23,
22n42, 25, 26, 36 27, 150n30, 227n98, 242n15
Ennius 19, 192, 203 Jesus (Christ) 6, 15, 18n34,
Epicurus (Epicureans) 25, 35, 20, 40, 50–53, 55, 103n30,
39n30, 42n37–38, 62, 63, 201, 202, 207n40, 210–27,
65–67, 69–75, 77, 79, 81–87, 229, 230–33, 240
90–92, 105–07, 110–12, 118, Jews 28, 40n30, 57, 200, 211,
124, 140, 141, 145, 151, 220
164–66, 208, 232 Juba 193
Euhemerus (Euhemerism) Julian 24n49
19, 41, 51, 155n42, 192–98 Juno 193
Eusebius of Caesarea 7n1, Jupiter 155, 192, 193, 196, 197
11n14, 12n16, 13, 14n22, 15, Justin Martyr 35n18, 42,
17n32, 18, 24, 25, 26n54 49n58, 164n70, 227, 229,
Faun 193 231n114
Flavius (the Grammarian) 7,
11n14
INDEX 271
Lactantius, passim (direct quota-

tions listed in bold)
1.5.28 135n122
Ad Asclepiadem (non-extant)
1.6.4 48n51,
8, 27
100n18,
De Ave Phoenice 27, 28n62

171n96
Ad Demetrianum (non-extant)
1.6.15 51n65,
8, 16, 27
51n66,
DI 17–22, et passim
101n21
1.6.16 51n65
1.1.5 57n77 1.6.17 33n15
1.1.6 235n2 1.7.1 49n59,
1.1.10 30n5 102n24
1.1.19 211n48 1.7.2 50n60,
1.1.19–20 58n83 102n25
1.1.22 38n29 1.7.13 102n23
1.1.25 44n40, 1.8.2 122n88
167n82, 1.11.38 100n19
224n88 2.1.15 165n75
1.2.1 80n52 2.1.16 166n76
1.2.2 65n12, 2.3.21 57n78
109n51 2.8.2 132n116
1.2.5 77n43 2.8 add.2 129n108
1.2.6 92n85 2.8.3 123n96
1.3.1 94n2 2.8 add.3 129n107,
1.3.3 95n5 133n118
1.3.7 95n4 2.8 add.5 129n10109
1.3.11 95n6 2.8.6 add.2 134n121
1.3.15 96n7 2.8.6 add.5 133n119
1.3.18 97n8 2.8.6 add.6 134n120
1.3.19 97n9 2.8.7 123n97,
1.3.23 110n54 215n59
1.5.2 33n13, 2.8.13 114n68
90n80 2.8.19 115n69
1.5.4 41n32, 2.8.21–22 68n21,
102n26 115n71
1.5.8 41n34 2.8.23 69n24
1.5.11 41n35 2.8.29 115n70
1.5.13 41n36, 2.8.32 116n73
106n42 2.8.38 116n74
1.5.18 107n44 2.8.39 116n75
1.5.20 107n45, 2.8.40 68n22,
107n46 115n72
1.5.21 68n23 2.8.44 102–
1.5.24 108n47 03n27,
1.5.25 108n48 103n28,
1.5.26 108n49 117n76
2.8.48 67n16 3.20.10 166n78

2.8.52 117n77 3.20.11 166n79
2.8.64 160n57 3.20.13 77n44,
2.8.71 55n73 166n80
2.9.15 123n95 3.27.3 44n39
2.9.16 103n30 3.28.4–5 73n36
2.9.22 123n93 3.28.5 109n52
2.9.25 123n94 3.29.16 177n113
2.10.3 159n53 3.30.3 45n42
2.10.6 155n40 4.3.2 44n41
2.10.12 155n39 4.3.6 174n103
2.10.12–13 155n41 4.3.7 170n94
2.10.15 156n44 4.3.10 171n97
2.10.16 156n45 4.3.14 172n98
2.10.22 156n46 4.4.2 172n99,
2.11.8 120n82 173n102
2.11.14 157n47 4.5.9 37n21
2.12.3 157n48 4.6.1 214n55
2.12.7 132n115 4.6.4 48n52
2.16.3 198n15 4.6.9 215n61
2.16.20 198n16 4.8.2 38n28
2.17.1 124n98 4.8.7 214n56
2.17.9 166n77 4.8.8 217n66
2.18.1 168n85 4.9.1 214n57
3.1.10 90n81 4.10.1 210n46,
3.1.11 37n22, 217n68
38n24 4.12.14 225n93
3.6.3 157n49 4.12.21 226n95
3.9.14 206n37 4.13.1 212n49
3.9.19 183n132 4.13.5 217n67
3.10.1 169n89 4.14.1 225n92
3.10.10–12 167n83 4.14.2–3 224n87
3.11.9 176n109, 4.14.17 211n47
177n112, 4.15.27 51n62
179n116 4.16.4 213n53
3.12.12–13 204n30 4.18.13–17 52–53n67
3.12.15 179n117 4.24.4 218n69
3.14.7 62n3 4.24.6 218n70
3.17.3 71n28 4.24.12 218n70
3.17.8, 9 70n27 4.25.5 218–
3.17.17 74n37 19n71
3.17.18 69n25 4.25.8 223n86
3.17.21 73n35 4.28.2–3 173n100
3.17.29 69n25 4.28.6 170n92
3.17.42–43 69–70n26 4.28.11 170n93
INDEX 273
4.28.12 173n101 5.18.9–10 179n119

4.29.3 215n63 5.19.30 174n104
4.29.4 222n84 5.22.11 199n20
4.29.12 103n29, 5.22.13 200n21
221n79 5.22.18 200n23
4.29.13–14 222– 5.23.2 200n22
23n84 6.2.13 175n105
4.29.14–15 216n64 6.4.17 131n113
4.30.11 225n90 6.8.10 44n39
5.1.7 31n6 6.9.22 179n118
5.1.8 34n17 6.9.24 183n133
5.1.9 35n19 6.10.2 184n136
5.1.14 31n7 6.11.1 184n137
5.1.15 37n23 6.11.13 184n138
5.1.16 38n25 6.15.2 176n108
5.1.23 29n1 6.15.7 176n110
5.1.25 30n2 6.16.8 176n111
5.2.5 15n26 6.17.29 184n135
5.2.12 15n27 6.20.3 178n115
5.2.17 38n26 6.25.7 183n131
5.4.1 16n30, 6.25.9 182n129
91n83, 6.25.16 206n35
235n1 7.3.4 104n31,
5.4.2 32n10 121n87
5.4.7 30n3 7.3.14 188n148
5.5.1 180n122, 7.3.24–26 75–
205n33, 76n40,
232n116 209n43
5.5.3 195n9, 7.3.26 69n25
196n13 7.4.8 161n62
5.6.12 196n12 7.4.10 161n63
5.7.1–2 213n51 7.4.13–14 162–
5.7.2 183n134, 63n68
201n24 7.4.16 159n56
5.8.3 201n25 7.4.19 161n64
5.8.4 203n29 7.5.4 207n39
5.8.5 199n17 7.5.6 165n74
5.8.6 201n26 7.5.9 163n69
5.8.8 203n29 7.5.15 180n120,
5.9.21 199n18 208n41
5.9.22 199n19 7.5.16–17 158n51
5.10.10 185n139 7.5.27 208n42
5.14.6 181n124 7.5.27 add.2 128n104
5.14.11 181n123 7.5.27 add.11 128n105
5.18.3 185n140 7.5.27 add.13 133n117
7.5.27 add.17 129n106 53.2 136n123

7.6.1–2 55n72, 54.4 175n106,
187n144, 205n34
205n31, 62.8 57n82
239n13 63.4 131n111
7.7.4 58n84 63.5 131n112
7.8.1 180n121, 64.3 161n61
Grammaticus (non-extant)
210n45 64.7 206n36
7, 27
7.9.7 104n32
ID 25–28, et passim
7.14.2 182n130,
206n38
7.14.9 227n100 1.2 36n20,
7.14.11 228n102 110n57
7.14.13 227n96 2.2 39n30,
7.16.12 228n105 213n52,
7.18.2 49n56 236n4
7.19.4 225n94 4.2 111n58
7.19.6 229n108 4.3 72n31
7.20.6 230n110 4.4–6 111n62
7.21.2 104n33 4.5 3n10
7.24.9 53n68 4.5–6 72n33
7.24.11 202n27 4.10 71–72n30,
7.26.5 231n114, 111n59
231n115, 4.12 111n61
232n117 4.13 87n70,
Epi. 26–27, et passim

7.27.5 212n50 112n63
7.5 164n73
1.2 67n17 7.6 169n86
1.3–4 74n38 7.10 169n87
2.3 97n10 7.14 169n88
2.6 99n13 8.3 88n73
3.1 99– 8.8 88n75
100n16 9.1 66n14
5.3 101n22 9.4 66n14
24.3 125n99 9.7 66n14,
24.6 125n101 66n15,
29.5 182n128 67n19
31.2 72n32 9.8 67n18
31.3 87n71 10.9 118n79
36.2–3 170n90 10.15 119n81
37.2 214n58 10.25 77–78n45
44.4–5 216n65 10.31 120n83
46.5 225n91 10.32 78n46,
51.1 181n126 109n53
53.1 104n34 10.35 78n47
INDEX 275
10.34 106n41 10.7 142n8

10.37 120n84 10.13 142n9
10.42 120n85 10.19 143n10
10.47 118n80, 10.22 143n14
121n86 10.24 144n15
10.51 122n89 10.26 144n16
11.3 99n14 11.2 79n50
11.4 98n12 12.3 145n18
11.5 98n11 12.17 146n19
13.1 160n60 13.2 146n20
13.13 159n55 14.9 147n22
14.2 160n58, 16.4 147n23
168n84, 16.10 148n24
186n142 17.1 148n25
15.2 130n110 17.2 148n26
15.3 158n50 17.4 149n27
17.4–5 112n64 18.2 149n28
17.13 112n65 19.2 150n29
17.20 26n55, 19.4 150n30
113n66 19.5 150n31
18.14 105n36, 19 bis 1–5 127n103
Itinerary (non-extant) 7, 27
159n54 19.9 150n32,
MP 8, 9, 12–14, 15n27, 22, Ad Probum (non-extant) 8,

154n36
24–26, 94 27
Ad Severum (non-extant)
8, 27
1.8 24n51
OD 16–18, et passim Symposium (non-extant) 7,

48.2 24n48
27
Leucippus 118
1.2 16n31
Licinius 22n42, 24, 26

1.11 139n2
Lucretius 31n7, 32n11, 42n38,

1.16 79n51
70n26, 71n29, 73n35, 74n37,

2.1 81n56
82, 84n63, 85, 91, 92n84,

2.9 81n55
118, 119, 141, 142, 149n28,

3.2 82n57,
151n34, 165, 196n12,

82n59
3.4 82n59
4.3 83n61 207n39, 227
4.13–14 83n62 Macrobius 181n125
5.13 84n65 Maxentius 22n42, 24
6.12 85n67, Maximian 17
140n3 Maximinus Daia 22n42, 24, 25
6.14 86n69 Melisseus 197
7.11 86n68 Minerva 193
8.3 164n72 Minucius Felix 16, 18, 29,
8.16 142n7 66n14, 75n39, 76, 80, 81, 88,
89n76, 104, 107, 124, Sibylline Oracles, The 4, 22,

161n62, 164n70, 166n78, 32n11, 33, 46, 50–54, 64n10,
192, 238 67, 101, 102, 117, 136, 155,
Montanists (Phyrgians) 156, 159, 202, 215, 228–31
133n117 Simon Magus 1
Nestorius 1 Shem 197
Noah 197 Skeptics (Skepticism) 43, 68,
Novatian (Novatians) 11n14, 89, 114, 141n5, 166,
133n117, 219–23 181n125,
Origen 30n4, 48, 50, 51n63 Socrates 47n48, 66, 77, 89n76,
Orpheus 41, 100, 102, 106, 117, 121, 166
222n83 Sossianus Hierocles 15
Ovid 41, 106, 114, 160n57, Statius 155
164n70, 195, 239n11 Stoics 4, 25, 35, 39n30, 41n31,
Papias 227n98 42n37–38, 47n48, 62, 63,
Paul of Tarsus 55, 200 67–70, 74–76, 79, 88–91, 93,
Pelagius 1, 207n40 95n3, 103n30, 104–07, 109,
Pentadius (friend of Lactantius) 115, 117, 123n93, 125, 131,
26 137, 141n5, 151–53, 156,
Peripatetics 67, 74, 117, 175, 160, 162, 163, 175–77, 179,
176, 177n112, 181 181n125, 184, 188, 193, 199,
Plato (Platonism) 27, 47, 67, 209, 236–38, 241
74, 82, 91, 107, 117, 121, Strobaeus 15n29
174, 180 Suetonius 25
Plotinus 14, 91 Tacitus 25
Plutarch 82n59 Tertullian 11, 18, 29, 31, 42,
Porphyry 14, 33n14 47n48, 48, 54, 58n84,
Posidonius 112 146n19, 147, 149, 150n30,
Prometheus 154, 155 152, 166n78, 171n95, 192,
Protagoras 65–67 200, 220, 227, 228, 230,
Pythagoras (Pythagoreans) 231n115
67, 104, 107, 117, 121 Thales of Milteus 107
Quintilian 45, 46n46 Theodorus of Cyrene 65, 66
Quirinus 193 Theophilus 54, 76, 80,
Sancus 193 101n21, 228n101
Saturn 193–96 Thomas Aquinas 56n75,
Seneca 32n11, 42n38, 69, 105n35
82n60, 84n63, 89, 101, Titan(s) 192, 193
102n23, 108, 112, 115, 123, Urania 193
162, 188n146, 199, 200 Varro 50, 51n62, 145, 151n34
Seven Sages, The 67, 107, 117, Vergil 32n11, 40, 41, 54n69,
121 106, 132n116, 194, 195, 202,
Sextus Empiricus 14n25, 63, 230n112
64, 89n77
INDEX 277
Velleius (from Nat. D.) 89, Vulcan 193

107 Xenocrates 148
Venus 193 Zeno of Citium 89, 90, 107,
Victorinus of Pettau 227 121
INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS

Abel, E. 41n33, 102n26 Davies, P.S. 13n22, 18n35,
Algra, K. 63n9 22n41
Amann, É. 19n38 De Ste. Croix, G.E.M. 13n19
Arnim, J. 125n100 Diels, H. 107n43
Aune, D. 229n106 Digeser, E.D. 2n8, 14, 15n25,
Bailey, C. 85n66 17n32, 18, 22, 23n47, 24n50,
Barnes, T.D. 7n1, 9n8, 171n95, 242n16
11n14, 13n19, 13, 14n22, Divjak, J. 11
15n25, 17, 18, 22n42, 24n50, Doignon, J. 241n14
26n54 Döpp, S. 13n18
Bidez, J. 15n25, 48n54 Dragona-Monachou, M.
Bowen, A. 9n8, 18n35, 89n76, 89n78, 95n3
32n11, 219n73 Drake, H.A. 13n19, 242n16
Bowlin, J.R. 243n17 Drobner, H. 12n18
Brandt, S. 7n1, 8n4, 9, 10, Farrington, B. 91n82
11n14, 18n35, 23n45, 23n47, Fessler, F. 65n13
27n61, 28n63, 70n26, 71n29, Festugière, A.J. 47n47
151n34 Fisher, A. 56n73
Bryce, J. 7n1, 9n8, 28n62, Folhac, R. 9n6
32n11, 62n4, 63n5, 71n29 Fontaine, J. 51n64, 219n73
Bufano, A. 71n29 Fontenrose, J. 49n59, 102
Calvin, J. 1, 2n5 Frend, W.H.C. 13n22
Casey, S. 65n11, 70n26, Freund, S. 15n25, 227n97
92n84 Garnsey, P. 9n8, 18n35,
Chadwick, H. 14n25 32n11, 219n73
Charlesworth, J.H. 50n61 Geerlings, W. 13n18
Clarke, G. 107n43, 160n59, Geffcken, J. 50n61
166n78, 238n10 Giancotti, F. 71n29
Coleman, A.P. 1n5, 243n17 Grillmeier, A. 103n30,
Colish, M. 70n26, 91n82, 219n73, 219n75
103n30 Guillaumin, M.-L. 51n64
Collins, J.J. 50n61 Hagendahl, H. 26n56, 65n11,
Colot, B. 242n17 71n29
Copenhaver, B. 47n47 Hartog, P. 243n17
Creed, J.L. 24n50, 25 Heck, E. 17n32, 22n41,
Cumont, F. 48n54 23n47, 126n102
Hennecke, E. 1n1
Herzog, R. 7n1 89n76, 107n43, 108n47, 114,

Hill, C. 227n99 118, 124, 143n14, 160n59,
Hinnells, J.R. 48n54, 49n55, 161n65, 164n70, 188n147,
49n57, 229n107 238n10
Hopkins, G.M. 122 Perrin, M. 23n47, 24n47,
Inwood, B. 63n9 51n64, 82n60, 131n114,
Jones, A.H.M. 13n22 139n1, 144n17, 151n34,
Kelly, J.N.D. 91n82 164n70, 166n76, 219n73
Koch, H. 10n11 Phillips, C. 122n90
Labriolle, P. 1 Pichon, R. 1, 7n1, 9n6,
Laubmann, G. 8n4, 9n5, 18n35, 23n45, 23n47, 32n11,
23n47, 27n61, 28n63 47n48
Loi, V. 3n9, 18n35, 51n64, Prestige, G.L. 101n20,
56n76, 61n2, 103n30, 105n37
105n37, 123n92, 131n114, Rapisarda, E. 71n29
145n17, 164n70, 219n73, Robinson, J.M. 47n47
220n78 Roncalli, A.G. 173n100
Long, A.A. 152n35 Rooijen-Dijkman, H. 227n97
Marrou, H. 12n17 Roots, P.A. 84n64, 140n4,
Maslowski, T. 39n30, 57n81, 141n5, 143n11, 151n34,
118n78 154n37
McCracken, G. 9n9 Rosetti, L. 151n34
McGuckin, P. 11n14, 37n21, Rougé, J. 25n52
214n56, 219n74, 220, 224 Schmidt, P.L. 7n1
Merton, T. 1, 2n6 Schneemelcher, W. 1n1
Micka, E. 3n9, 10, 61n2, Schoedel, W.R. 14n25
237n7 Schott, J. 2n8, 4n11, 14,
Mirandola, P. 1 15n25, 33n14, 99n15, 192n1,
Monat, P. 37n21 194n6, 236
Monceaux, P. 7n1, 9, 11n14, Schwarte, K.-H. 12n18
22n41 Sharpe, E. J. 48n54
Moreau, J. 7n1, 25n52 Simmons, M. 9n9, 10n10–11
Nautin, P. 27n60 Søby Christensen, A. 22n41
Nestle, W. 25n52 Stevenson, J. 7n1, 11n14,
Nicholson, O. 2n8, 8n3, 17n32, 27n57, 31n9, 71n29,
10n13, 18, 45n43, 54n70, 92n84
195n10, 228n101 Swift, L. 31n8, 195n7,
Nicolosi, I. 71n29 203n28, 230n112
Noch, A.D. 47n47 Usener, H. 65n13, 66n14, 70,
Ogilvie, R. 11n14, 17n32, 111n58, 124, 165, 207n39
18n35, 32n11, 47n48, 51n64, Verbeke, G. 103n30
71n29, 221n81 Vitelli, C. 108n48
Pease, A.S. 3n9, 61n2, 63n6, Vottero, D. 69n24, 102n23,
65n13, 72n34, 76, 79n48, 108n49
INDEX 279
Walker, L. 61n1 Wilson, R. McL. 1n1

Wallace, E. 243n17 Włosok, A. 7n1, 8n2, 11n14,
Wilken, R.L. 14n25, 242n16 13n18, 23n47, 164n70,
Wilson, H. 1n3 166n76, 171n95

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Gorgias Studies in Early Christianity and

In this series Gorgias publishes monographs on Christianity and

Lactantius and the Doctrine of Providence

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ISBN 978-1-4632-0723-6 ISSN 1935-6870

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Table of Contents ..................................................................................... v

II. God the Creator .....................................................................113

Bailey Bailey, Cyril, ed. Titi Lucreti Cari: De rerum natura. 3

LS Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley, eds. The Hellenistic Phi-

For all other abbreviations consult:

ard Version. Edited by M. D. Coogan, et al. New York:

Oxford University Press, 2001.

Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so too is it impossible for a project

J. Connelly (St. John’s Parish), and the parish community at Sacred

Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so too is it impossible for a project

J. Connelly (St. John’s Parish), and the parish community at Sacred

1 For biographical information on Lactantius see especially Timothy

same work in one book without a title, two books Ad Asclepi-

2 De viris illustribus 80 (Włosok, “Lactance,” 427): Firmianus, qui et

sonably argues that the phrase ‘extrema senectute’ indicates an age of 70 or

lius/Caelius or Cecilius/Caecilius, are provided by the manuscripts

5 See Brandt, “Über das Leben,” 2–4. On the manuscript traditions

Pichon, Lactance, 337–360, and Brandt’s review of this monograph in Ber-

Cf. CIL 8.7241.

miles southwest of Carthage. 10 Neither Arnobius nor Lactantius

tiones to 302–305, just prior to Lactantius’ composition of the Institutiones

of divine providence and impassibility – two areas of obvious incongruity

ten by a Christian neophyte. See Nicholson, “Military Service,” 177 n. 10.

14 For those who maintain that Lactantius’ conversion took place at

in sanctas scripturas omnes fluxerunt, Tertullianus, Cyprianus, Lactantius,

Between 299 and 302 Lactantius was summoned by the em-

16 In a rare autobiographical moment Lactantius mentions that he

trans. G. Lamb (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 284–

Whether Jerome is correct in his assertion that Lactantius was

“Lactantius,” in Dictionary of Early Christian Literature, ed. S. Döpp and W.

cletian see especially Timothy D. Barnes, “Constantine and Christianity:

the reliability of Lactantius as a historian of the persecutions see, inter alia,

been disturbed, and the demons scattered, by the presence of a few

302. Cf. Timothy D. Barnes, “Sossianus Hierocles and the Antecedents of

tians derived from his mother.

the Debate over Religious Toleration,” Journal of Roman Studies 88 (1998),

persecution because “‘it was the philosopher’s pre-eminent duty to

roribus hominum subvenire […].’

secutionis fuit. Cf. MP 16.4.

was worshipped by some. Cf. Cassius Dio 77.18.4; Strobaeus 1.3.96.

30 DI 5.4.1 (BT 2009, 450–51): accusatores justitiae […] ut omnes,

structiores doctioresque in posterum fiant.

reckoned to chance or fate, but must be gifts from an omnipotent

lieu. 34 Where Lactantius ventured after leaving Nicomedia is debat-

comedia. Cf. Barnes, “Lactantius and Constantine,” 40; Digeser, “Edict of

cholson, “Flight from Persecution,” 48 n. 6.

38 See Émile Amann, “Lactance,” DTC 8:2428.

gives a summary of the Judeo-Christian creation account in order

cluding with the persecution of Christians. His thesis is that justice

too will he bring his creation to its divinely-ordained end in the