City of Manila v. Laguio (455 SCRA 308)
City of Manila v. Laguio (455 SCRA 308)
City of Manila v. Laguio (455 SCRA 308)
sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beer houses, night clubs, day clubs, super
clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels, and inns in the Ermita-Malate area.
The owners and/or operators of said establishments were given three months from the date of
approval of the ordinance within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any
place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area.”
The purpose of the Ordinance was to curb the “immoral” establishments in the area, thereby
putting an end to prostitution, adultery, fornication in the City of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is constitutional.
HELD: No. The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it
is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
Police power requires that it must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, and
that the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights, a violation of the due process clause.
Assuming arguendo that the Ermita-Malate area teems with establishments which the City
Council may lawfully prohibit, it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification
sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted under the
accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which
are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
Finally, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and
inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial
distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance, thus it also
violates the equal protection clause.