The Open Door to Emptiness:

An Introduction to Madhyamaka Logic

 The Open Door To Emptiness
An Introduction to Madhyamaka Logic
by
Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche
Geshe Lharampa
Based on a part of
Mipham Rinpoche’s
Gateway to Knowledge
(Tib. mkhas pa’i tshul la ‘jug pa’i sgo)
Translated by
Shakya Dorje
Edited by
Michael L. Lewis
and
Clark Johnson, Ph.D.
Namo Buddha Publications
Copyright 2012 by Thrangu Rinpoche

All rights reserved. No part of this book, either text or art, may be reproduced in
any form, electronic or otherwise, without written permission from Thrangu
Rinpoche or Namo Buddha Publications.

These teachings were given in Kathmandu, Nepal in 1977.

Third edition published 2012 by Namo Buddha Publications.

Namo Buddha Publications

P. O. Box 778
Glastonbury, CT 06033
www.namobuddhapub.com
e-mail: info@namobuddhapub.com

Note
Tibetan words are given as they are pronounced, not spelled. Their actual
spelling can be found in the Glossary of Tibetan Terms.
We use the convention of BCE (Before Common Era) for “B.C.” and CE (Common
Era) for “A.D.” We also use the abbreviations Tib. for “Tibetan” and Skt. for
“Sanskrit.”
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Shakya Dorje for translating and Michael Lewis for
editing this work. We would also like to thank Karma Choephel, Jean Johnson, and
Linda Hebenstreit for going through this work and correcting it. We would also
like to thank Adam Pearcey for translating the root text on www.lotsawahouse.org
and allowing us to use this translation.
The cover photo is of the entrance to the Chakrasamvara mandala located under
Swayambhu in Kathmandu, Nepal.
 Table of Contents
Foreword to the Third Edition
Chapter 1. An Introduction to The Open Door to Emptiness
Chapter 2. The Insubstantiality of the Self
Chapter 3. Developing Certainty of the Insubstantiality of Self
Chapter 4. The Benefits of Understanding Non-Self
Chapter 5. The Insubstantiality of External Phenomena
Chapter 6. The First Madhyamaka Analysis: The Examination of Causes
Chapter 7. The Second Madhyamaka Analysis: The Examination of Effects
Chapter 8. The Third Madhyamaka Analysis: The Examination of the Essential
Nature
Chapter 9. The Fourth Madhyamaka Analysis: The Examination of All Sources
Appendix A: The Root Text of Four Analyses
Notes
The Glossary of Terms
The Glossary of Tibetan Terms
The Bibliography
About the Author
 Nagarjuna
Shown here with snakes over his head protecting him and a naga bringing up the
Prajnaparamita teachings from the depths of the waters.
 Foreword to the Third Edition
In this text on emptiness Thrangu Rinpoche gives a carefully reasoned
explanation of what emptiness is and why it is so important in understanding
Buddhism. In this weeklong teaching he did not have time to cover the foundation
to this topic. So in this foreword I would like to give some background with which
a Western student may not be familiar. First will be a brief description of how the
Middle-way or Madhyamaka school fits into the history of Buddhism and second,
how the development of the theory of emptiness is intertwined with the
philosophical theory of inherent nature.
T HE FOUNDA T ION VEHICLE
When the Buddha taught in India 400 years before our current era, his teachings
were not written down but were passed on by an elaborate memorization process.
The actual teachings of the Buddha were not like present Buddhist teachings with
their structured topics enumerating points and conclusions. Rather, the Buddha
traveled from town to town staying at wealthy patrons’ houses and answering
questions put to him by laypersons and his large entourage of students. The topics
of these questions were often quite random and the answers by the Buddha
differed depending on the understanding of the audience. However, his advanced
students carefully memorized these exchanges of the Buddha with members of
the audience. For about the next hundred years Buddhist monasteries were built,
housing hundreds of monks whose primary purpose was to preserve these
teachings by passing them down orally from teacher to pupil.
In 304 BCE King Ashoka became ruler of most of India and after several years of
being King, he embraced the Buddhist teachings and spread these teachings
throughout India. He had rock pillars with inscriptions on how to conduct oneself
as a Buddhist placed all over India. He sent emissaries to North Africa, Greece,
Syria, and the Emperor’s court in China. In Kandahar, Pakistan, for example, he
had a pillar inscribed in Aramaic (the language of Christ) and Greek. Ashoka’s son
Mahina collected and carried the Buddhist teachings to Sri Lanka (Ceylon) where
they were carefully written down and preserved in Pali―a language very close to
the language of the Buddha.
The Pali teachings became the first Buddhist “bible” and were known as the
sutras or “words of the Buddha.” They formed the basis of the Foundation Vehicle
(also called the Theravada or the Hinayana teachings). These teachings of the
Buddha began with his very first teaching on the Four Noble Truths given in
Sarnath, India in a deer park. These teachings did not discuss, as most religions do,
man’s relationship to God or gods, but began with the First Noble Truth that every
human being (in fact every being with a mind) has a life containing suffering, as
well as a strong desire to eliminate this suffering. In the next three Noble Truths
he explained where this suffering comes from and how one can eventually
eliminate it completely by becoming “enlightened”―or a much better translation
would be “awakened.” A fully awakened individual is able to transcend this cycle
of suffering called “samsara.”
 Previous to the Buddha’s life several Indian philosophies held that each person
had a self or ego (Skt. atman, Tib. dak) which according to the Bhagavad Gita is
“eternal, unborn, undying, innumerable, primordial, and all-pervading.” This self
is not our body or even our ordinary mind or personality, but rather a permanent
“soul” which goes as a reincarnation from one body to the next body at death. The
Buddha firmly rejected this doctrine of the self and instead taught the doctrine of
anatman (Tib. dakme) or “nonself” often called “selflessness” or “egolessness.” The
Buddha proposed that everything occurs because of cause and effect, and that the
mind of an individual is like an endless river of flowing impressions, thoughts,
and feelings that would not end abruptly with the death of a body, but would
continue to flow into the fetus of the next person in whom the individual is
reincarnated. This argument of the lack of a self, or the selflessness of a person, is
discussed at length in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this book.
The Foundation Vehicle teachings emphasize that suffering comes about
because of a false belief in a solid, real self. Because we falsely believe that we are
separate from other beings, we then believe we are more important than others
and therefore deserve more than others. The belief in this substantial self then
leads to negative emotions and traits, such as jealousy and anger, which in turn
lead to actions and beliefs whose outcome is not only suffering for ourselves, but
also suffering for others.
So the Foundation Vehicle emphasizes reversing this innate desire to cherish
ourselves more than others. We all carry around this story-line that we were born,
were raised in such and such a way, had these people who helped us and those
people who disliked us or treated us badly, that we like these things and don’t like
those things, and so on. It is as if we think of our mind and “I” and also those
around us as being substantial, real, and solid. The Buddhist practice for reversing
this incorrect egocentric view of a substantial self has traditionally been called
developing the “selflessness of self” or “egolessness.” Selflessness then is
developing the realization that the self or “I” is not a substantial entity, but a
mental construction. Selflessness, which is connected closely to compassion, is a
fundamental tenet of all schools of Buddhism.
The Foundation school also describes a selfless or an egoless person who is a
highly realized individual called an “arhat.” An arhat has complete and total
awareness of his or her actions and therefore has completely pure behavior.
Through careful meditation an arhat also develops the full realization of the
insubstantiality (selflessness of self) of a person. The Foundation school, while
believing the self to be insubstantial, or empty, believes, however, that outer
phenomena, such as mountains, houses, and individuals, are real and substantial
and not just mental constructs. The Foundation vehicle later became known as the
“first turning of the wheel of Dharma.”
T HE ABHIDHA RMA MOVEMENT
After King Ashoka spread Buddhism across India, the great meditators and
scholars began to systematize the Buddhist canon into concepts and categories.
Since individual human beings and outside phenomena appear to be
impermanent and continually changing, it is almost impossible to define anything.
For example, a cup can be round or square, it can be made of porcelain, tin, or,
clay, it can be any color, and so it can’t be really defined by its appearance. It is
also clear that everything arising or appearing in the real world is due to causes
and their effects. A child learns to read (the cause) and then his mind expands
with everything that he reads (the effect). Or a pumpkin seed is put in fertile
ground in spring (the cause) and a pumpkin appears in the summer (the effect).
The Buddhist scholars tried to reduce this flood of the variety of phenomena into
basic, irreducible elements. From this developed the Abhidharma (“original
dharmas”) teachings, which made lists of the entities (objects or thoughts) that had
a single irreducible essence called “dharmas” (not to be confused with Dharma
with a capital “D” which is the teachings of the Buddha).
For example, the Sarvastivada school posited 72 dharmas arranged into five
different types: (1) eleven material dharmas such as sounds and forms of the
external world; (2) one dharma of consciousness which they believed was
irreducible into any other factors; (3) forty-six mental dharmas such as faith,
shame, mental dullness, envy, and hatred; (4) fourteen dharmas that are qualities
of mind combined with body such as birth and old age; (5) and three
uncompounded dharmas such as space. The thrust of the Abhidharma philosophy
was to imply that one could reduce the whole universe into a small number of
basic building blocks. As Williams says, “The name given to these building blocks
which are said to be ultimate realities in the sense that they cannot be reduced
further into constituents is dharmas... The concept of self-existence or essence (Skt.
svabhava) was a development of Abhidharma scholars, where it seemed to
indicate the defining characteristic of a dharma.”1 An example is that there is a
dharma that is shared by all phenomena containing the earth element, which is
“solidity and hardness” and this quality then is the nature or the essence of these
phenomena.
During the time when Abhidharma theory was prevalent, great monastic
universities were established in India where large numbers of both Hindu and
Buddhist monks came together from many countries and studied, debated, and
wrote treatises on the nature of reality. One such monastic university was
Nalanda―the ruins of it are still visible today―which had 3,000 monks who came
from a dozen countries. In these universities several philosophical schools were
taught that suggested that most external phenomena, such as the human body or a
house, are composite objects with the characteristics of being impermanent and
made of many parts that combine and recombine into all kinds of appearances.
However, they theorized that if one were to take these objects and divide them into
smaller and smaller parts, one would eventually come to a single indivisible part,
which we now call an atom. They believed that while composite phenomena are
not real, these atoms are solid and real, or substantial. They did the same to the
concept of time, which obviously is impermanent and continuous. They postulated
that there was a small indivisible unit of time that could no longer be subdivided;
and so these very small units of time are real and substantial. These arguments
and their refutation are described in more detail by Thrangu Rinpoche in Chapter
5.
Philosophers both in the East and the West from the time of the Buddha up to
the time of the Madhyamaka school in 200 CE tried to describe phenomena in
terms of their essence or nature2 (Skt. svabhava, Tibetan rang zhin) rather than
their appearances. For example, fire has many different appearances, but the
nature of fire is hot and burning. Or an apple tree, an actual apple, and an apple
seed have very different appearances, but they all have the essence or nature of an
apple fruit. This way we could describe items more precisely than describing them
in terms of how they appear. A cup, for example, is said to usually be round and
have a handle and also has the basic characteristic or essence of being a container
whose purpose is for holding liquids to drink. This is the nature of the cup and its
nature is based on its purpose or what it was created for.
T HE MA DHY A MA KA SCHOOL
In the first century CE there arose a school of Buddhism that is called the
Madhyamaka in Sanskrit and Middle-way in English. This school challenged the
idea that there are real existing dharmas or substantial or real external
phenomena or indivisible real particles. In particular one person, Nagarjuna, is
credited with founding the Middle-way school and writing the major treatises
outlining the Middle-way interpretation of Buddhism. These became known as the
second turning of the wheel of Dharma.
Besides being a great scholar, Nagarjuna was also one of the eighty-four
mahasiddhas who were great practitioners of Mahamudra and who through their
practice were able to develop special powers (siddhis). Nagarjuna is said to have
gone into the Naga realm and brought back the Prajnaparamita teachings. These
extensive teachings outlined the insubstantiality of person and insubstantiality of
phenomena. There was, for example, the long Prajnaparamita of 25,000 verses, a
medium length Prajnaparamita of 8,000 verses, and the well-known Heart Sutra
of a few hundred words. These teachings were an elaboration of the teachings of
the Buddha concerning, in particular, the teachings on emptiness.
Nagarjuna wrote many works, but his most famous work is the Treatise on the
Middle Way (Skt. Mula-madhyamaka-karika). This work has been translated many
times into English, and also into many other languages, and is so detailed that it is
often studied for a full year in Tibetan monastic colleges called “shedras.” The
Madhyamaka or Middle-way teachings on emptiness were different from the
teachings of the first turning of the wheel of Dharma in that they posited that not
only is the self, or ego, empty of inherent nature, but all external phenomena,
such as trees, tables, and houses, are also empty of inherent nature. Furthermore,
the Middle-way school added the concept of two realities, sometimes called the
“two truths,” in which all composite phenomena were part of conventional reality
or conventional truth, and permanent, enduring phenomena were part of ultimate
reality or ultimate truth.
One of major problems for Westerners in understanding the Middle-way is
understanding the translation of the word “emptiness.” The teachings of the
Middle-way were originally written in Sanskrit. The Sanskrit word for “empty” as
in an “empty glass” is shuna and the quality of being empty is shunyata. However,
when Buddhists and Indian philosophers used shunyata to describe the nature of
reality, they did not mean entities were void of substance, but rather meant that
entities “lacked any inherent nature.”
When the word shunyata was translated into Tibetan, the translators chose to
translate it as tong-pa-nyi. The syllable tong means “empty” as in an empty glass
and pa means “the quality of.” However, the Tibetan translators then added the
syllable nyi. Tai Situpa says, “Then nyi is a very important part of the word, but I
don’t know whether that is translated as ‘ness’ or not, as emptiness. Nyi actually
means ‘that itself’... I think a good linguist could fix this problem in the future...”3
Westerhoff has pointed out, “emptiness is of course always the emptiness of
something, and the something Nagarjuna has in mind here is svabhava. Different
terms have been used to translate this word into English: ‘inherent existence’ and
‘intrinsic nature.’”4 Or as Hopkins has said in his Meditation on Emptiness,
“phenomena are empty of a certain mode of being called ‘inherent existence,’
‘objective existence’ or ‘natural existence.’”5
Understanding the idea of the “nature” or the “inherent existence” of
phenomena is difficult for Westerners to understand, because the concept of
“nature” or “essence” was abandoned by Western intellectual thinking at the time
of Locke and Hume some 500 years ago. In modern times we never ask, “What is
the inherent existence or nature of my car or of my spouse or of a buddha statue?”
Clearly, external phenomena do exist―we encounter this phenomenon every
day, but when we say that they are lacking in inherent nature, we mean that they
are insubstantial like a rainbow. Everyone can see a rainbow in the sky or a
reflection of the moon in a lake at night, so these two phenomena do exist because
we actually see them, but we also know that rainbows and reflections are “unreal”
in that they are insubstantial. Nagarjuna’s main point was that phenomena too are
insubstantial.
The Middle-way view is that outer phenomena do not have a substantial and
real nature; therefore, phenomena are said not to have intrinsic nature. Or to say it
another way, our perception of phenomena is a mental construction. Does saying
“phenomena are empty” mean simply that phenomena really don’t exist? No,
there are always appearances and these don’t just go away.
In Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 Thrangu Rinpoche presents a set of classical Middle-
way arguments showing logically that emptiness of self and emptiness of
phenomena are empty of inherent existence. This argument is based on “four
causes” and these causes are closely related to inherent nature. The Padmakara
Translation Committee explains it thus:
In the following discussion, the use of the word “cause” must be clearly
understood. Classical Western philosophy (for the present purposes, Aristotle
and the Schoolmen) speaks of four kinds of cause: material or substantial,
formal, efficient, and final. These may be defined using the example of a
sculptor carving a statue. The substance carved, e.g., the marble, is the
material cause; the shape and other features of the statue being carved are the
formal cause; the sculptor or, more immediately, the chisel acting on the
 marble is the efficient cause; and the purpose for the work itself (e.g., that it
will be used to adorn a public place) is the final cause. Although in modern
English, “cause” is normally used only in the third sense (efficient cause), in
the present context, and in Buddhist texts generally, it is used in the first
sense: substantial or material cause. For example, an acorn is the [material]
cause of the oak tree into which it develops.6
T HE IMPORT A NCE OF UNDERST A NDING EMPT INESS
Thrangu Rinpoche has been asked many times what the relevance is of
studying emptiness. His answer goes somewhat like this: First, the Buddha in his
first teaching on the Four Noble Truths stated that all sentient beings seek
permanent happiness in life. To achieve this happiness humans must work on
their attachment to a self and to phenomena around us. Second, the belief in being
a real, substantial person leads them to treat themselves as more interesting, more
important, and more valuable than others. Third, this treating themselves as more
important leads to the arising of negative emotions in their mind streams. These
negative emotions and thoughts such as pride protect one’s ego by having thoughts
such as “they shouldn’t have treated me that way” or “I know much more than
these people and they should therefore respect me.” Finally, these negative
thoughts lead to actions that through the law of karma keep beings firmly circling
in cyclic existence―samsara.
To break these habitual patterns that we have accumulated for countless
lifetimes, we must first conceptually realize that our self and outer phenomena
are inherently empty and therefore we do not need to become attached to
ourselves and all our samsaric activities. Also, understanding that samsara is non-
substantial and therefore illusory allows us to reduce our involvement with it and
to work instead on our own mind and begin helping others. This conceptual
realization is done by studying the Middle-way―more precisely the logical
arguments put forth first by Nagarjuna―that show us that our inner phenomena
of thoughts and feelings and the outer phenomena of rocks and trees are all
empty; that is, not having substantial, concrete existence. To be intellectually
thoroughly convinced that everything is empty is not enough to develop full
realization. Rather, we must also meditate on the mind to see for ourselves how
outer phenomena register in the mind to see that the mind is truly empty.
Once we have truly realized the empty nature of phenomena, we will be able to
see things as they truly are. With this realization we can then completely abandon
those behaviors that create temporary happiness and adopt only those behaviors
that lead to the true, complete happiness that is nirvana.
I once had a high lama (not Thrangu Rinpoche) tell me:
You know, being a rinpoche is an incredibly boring job. You get up early in the
morning and practice and have breakfast. Then you get a constant stream of
people coming to see you to tell you all their difficulties, all their problems, all
their worries. Many of them want you to tell them what to do about their
material circumstances, their confused personal relationships and so on.
Yet, when you are around rinpoches you see them happy and smiling and
laughing. Why is this? It is simply because they have realized the emptiness of
our samsaric world.
― Clark Johnson, Ph.D.
 Chapter 1: An Introduction to The Open Door to Emptiness
In approaching the subject of the Middle-way (Skt. madhyamaka) we must first
determine what this subject is. The Middle-way is uma in Tibetan and the word
uma means “the middle.” It is called “the middle” because it avoids extremes; in
this case, the extreme beliefs of eternalism and nihilism.7
The actual meaning of Middle-way is this direct, straightforward view that does
not fall into any extremes but is a view that at first is very difficult to understand.
Because in ordinary life we do not initially hold this view, the Middle-way is
taught. These instructions on the right view were first taught by Shakyamuni
Buddha and were later commented upon by various highly realized teachers. The
treatises of these commentators are referred to as “the shastras on Madhyamaka.”
This book will concern itself with these commentaries on the Middle-way. This
teaching on emptiness8 is presented so that students may begin to understand the
fundamental nature of reality, enter the practice path to realization, and
eventually attain freedom from suffering.
The Buddha Shakyamuni presented the Middle-way view many times in
different ways and all of these can be subsumed under the three turnings of the
wheel of Dharma. In the first turning shortly after the Buddha reached
enlightenment, the Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths in Sarnath, India to
many persons who didn’t have much experience with the Dharma. He taught that
all ordinary existence (Skt. samsara) is suffering, that this suffering results from
an individual’s own karma, and that this karma is created through the defiled
nature of our own mind.
Defiled mind or a mind filled with disturbing emotions (Skt. klesha), he said,
comes from our clinging to a notion of individual self or ego. Thus the Buddha first
taught there is suffering inherent in all existence, and he then showed that the
cause of this suffering is the ingrained habit we have of cherishing ourselves, and
finally he showed that it is possible for us to free ourselves from this suffering by
attaining nirvana.
In order to attain nirvana, it is not enough to have a desire or feeling that one
wants to attain it; one must practice the path diligently to reach the complete
cessation of suffering and the disturbing emotions. In this context, “the path”
means eliminating the clinging to a notion of ego or a self. By doing so, one can be
freed from the defilements of mind, freed from the necessity of creating
continuing karma, and thus be released from the necessity of continued rebirths
in the world.
In the first turning of the wheel of dharma, the Buddha did not specifically
teach emptiness, though he did indirectly suggest it. The lack of ego that he taught
in this turning was not the lack of self in an ultimate sense, but in the simpler
sense that there is no permanent, solid individual ego or self-nature.
Later, at Rajgir in Northern India, the Shakyamuni Buddha taught the second
turning of the wheel of dharma: the teachings on the lack of fundamental
characteristics. He taught the sixteen modes of emptiness such as outer
appearances are empty; the inner world of thoughts is empty; both outer and inner
events taken together are empty; and so on. In doing so, he demonstrated that not
only in the ordinary sense is there no self, but no inherent reality can ever be
found in anything, no matter how hard we look.
Later still, in Saravasti, India, the Shakyamuni Buddha taught the third turning
of the wheel of dharma, in which he revealed that emptiness is not merely a void
or nothingness, but an emptiness that gives rise to all phenomena and is
continually expressive. This third turning included teachings on Buddha-nature
(Skt. tathagata-garbha).
The distinction between the second and third turning is that in the second
turning teachings at Rajgir, the Buddha taught that all phenomena are empty,
meaning that all appearances of phenomena lack true existence. Whereas in
Saravasti in the third turning he taught that emptiness is a foundation upon which
all phenomena are based.
This is how the Buddha taught the correct view to sentient beings. He also
taught many methods for recognizing the true nature of reality and he taught how
to practice on the Mahamudra and the path of Dzogchen9 from the view of Middle-
way.
Of the three turnings of the wheel of dharma, the first teaching on the Four
Noble Truths is generally concerned with the Foundation Vehicle. The teachings
on the sixteen modes of emptiness were expanded upon by Nagarjuna in the
Treatise on the Middle Way and later by Chandrakirti in the Introduction to the
Middle Way and by Shantarakshita in the Ornament of the Middle Way and also by
Aryadeva in the Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas. These works clarified the view
of emptiness, as well as the true nature of phenomena.
After about 100 years, the Bodhisattva Maitreya gave Asanga five commentaries
in verse10 on the third turning of the wheel of dharma concerning Buddha-nature.
Asanga transmitted the teachings on these five works of Maitreya and wrote
commentaries on them. The view of the third turning of the wheel of dharma
developed from these explanations.
Nagarjuna and his pupil Aryadeva mainly did the description of emptiness
according to the second turning of the wheel of Dharma. These teachings are
called the Rangtong teachings in Tibetan. Rangtong literally means “empty of self,”
or that the true nature of all appearances is empty. The explanation according to
the third turning elaborated by Asanga is called the Shentong teachings, which
literally means “empty of other.” The Shentong teachings briefly emphasize that
emptiness itself is not merely empty, but expresses all the qualities of
buddhahood. The actual means for realizing the true nature of phenomena is no
different in the two systems; the only distinction between these two views is the
way in which emptiness is explained.11
In general, if we consider our own experience, we find that we have the five
perceptual aggregates of form, which are the external objects we perceive,
sensations, identification, formations, and consciousness. In examining these
aggregates, we can see that none of these is permanent. Our bodies were very
small when we were born and gradually grew larger. Now our bodies are aging
and will eventually deteriorate and die. So we can easily see that the body, which
is an example of form, is impermanent, and, similarly, sensations, formations, and
consciousness are also impermanent.
There are many different ideas about how we come to be born within this kind
of impermanent structure. Some people think that there is an omniscient
individual such as a god who is manipulating everything, causing people to take
birth here and there in this and that form. Other people feel that external scientific
forces in the world bring about birth in different places and varying conditions.
But Buddhism proposes quite a different theory. According to Buddhism,
everything occurs due to the karma which we have ourselves created.
I was born in Tibet and this was due to the force of karma created in my
previous lives. All of you were born in the West due to karma created in your past
lives. We were born at a time of particular instability, due to the strength of our
karma. So, although I was born in Tibet, my karma brought about my birth at a
time when conditions there were very unstable and would eventually force me to
come to India. Similarly, although you were born in the West, conditions brought
you here to this teaching in Kathmandu, Nepal. Our birth, and the various
conditions we experience, is a product of our own karma.
The reason for the creation of all this karma which brings about our existential
situation is that we have been continually acting out based on our disturbing
emotions of aggression, desire, pride, jealousy, and so on. We have been
impulsively acting out on these disturbing emotions or afflictions because we have
been clinging to the belief in a self. This false assumption that we are a real solid
self has been forcing us from one condition to another causing us many situations
of suffering. We can only be freed from this continuous cycle by understanding
that the nature of emptiness, the true nature of reality, is that there is no true
existence of an ego.
In considering this true nature that there is no substantial self, we can see that
reality must always be just as it is. Our not recognizing it, our misunderstanding of
the nature of reality, does not affect reality at all12. The true nature of reality has
been as it is from the very beginning. Since we seem to have been deluded about
the nature of reality, we might ask, “Even after recognizing the nature of reality, is
it not possible to become mistaken about it again, and slide back into delusion?”
This is not possible because a falling back into delusion would require a basic
impulse of ignorance. There would have to be some sort of feeling that emptiness
is unsatisfactory or unreal. But, having actually recognized emptiness, we find that
falling back does not occur because the experience of emptiness is a blissful state
of mind, continuously and brilliantly expressive of Buddha-qualities. By
experiencing emptiness, we are freed from the suffering of cyclic existence or
samsara and there is no impulse to stray into delusory perceptions again. When we
have actually recognized this true nature, we become convinced beyond the
possibility of reversion, no matter how much pressure is exerted by conditions or
by friends.
If the true nature itself were to change, there might then be some loss of
realization after it had been attained. But it is ridiculous to think that the true
nature of the universe undergoes transformation. For example, it would be absurd
to imagine that last year everyone was egoless, but now everyone has a real ego.
We can easily see that the true nature is unchanging and that there can be no
reversion from the enlightenment of buddhahood.
In the stories of the Buddha’s previous lives, we can find many examples
illustrative of how buddhahood is impervious to all obstacles and interference.
One such story is about a bodhisattva who was once born as a king named
Mahadatta. He had some insight into emptiness and this expressed itself as a great
impulse to give. So Mahadatta was always giving things away, making large
offerings, giving alms to poor people, and so on. One day while he was eating his
food, he noticed a beggar trying to collect alms and immediately told a servant to
give him some food. But before the servant could get to the door, the beggar began
to walk away. So Mahadatta himself jumped up and, grabbing his own plate of
food, ran out to give it to the beggar.
While he was chasing the beggar, he experienced a demonic vision and
suddenly saw in front of him a very hot hell, wherein the inhabitants were
suffering greatly. To one side of this hell was a demon who was inflicting great
suffering on these beings. The demon called out to Mahadatta asking him if he
knew why the beings were suffering. Mahadatta replied that he did not, but that
they were certainly suffering terribly. The demon then replied that all these
beings had defiled their family lineages. Their ancestors in previous lives had
worked hard and had done many things in order to accumulate family wealth, but
these people had given it away and had thus defiled their family lineages. Because
of having done this, they were reborn in hell.
Mahadatta stopped and thought about this for a minute and then said to the
demon, “Did the things they gave away help the people who received them?”
There is really only one answer to this because when we give people something, it
usually helps them. The demon replied, “Of course, what they gave helped the
recipients, but it caused the beings themselves to be reborn in hell.” Mahadatta
then said, “If the things I give away will help people, then take me to hell, then I’ll
continue to give things away in hell. If I go to hell for helping others, that is fine
with me.” The apparition then disappeared. This story shows that with the
perception of emptiness no obstacle can ever harm one’s basic understanding.
It is extremely important to understand emptiness because not understanding
emptiness prevents us from realizing the true nature of reality, which is hidden
from us by the two obscurations. These are the emotional obscurations of the
disturbing emotions such as anger, desire, and ignorance and the cognitive
obscurations such as dualistic thinking of “I” and “other.”
To purify or eliminate these two kinds of obscurations and to recognize the two
truths (the conventional truth and the ultimate truth), we must begin by
recognizing the insubstantiality of self and the insubstantiality of phenomena.
 Chapter 2: The Insubstantiality of Self
We will begin our examination of the Middle-way by examining the truth of there
being no substantial or independent self, or what is called the “egolessness of self.”
Almost all of us have the dualistic experience of some kind of agent behind our
actions, someone who is causing whatever we are doing and is a subject of our
experience—someone who is experiencing it. But, when we examine this with
analytic insight, we discover that there is actually no such experiencer or person
experiencing at all.
T HE SELF A S T HE AGGREGA T ES
The five aggregates (Skt. skandhas13) are compounds14 and have no independent
reality of their own. The five perceptual aggregates are form, feelings, concepts,
formation, and consciousness. These are processes of perception and we can see
that if each of the aggregates were an independent entity, there would have to be
many selves that exist inside us simultaneously because the aggregates of form,
feelings, concepts, formation and consciousnesses are all discrete, separable
appearance. If each aggregate possessed a real self, there would be many distinct
selves.
It is also fallacious to suppose that only one of the aggregates is the real self. For
example, if we examine the aggregate of form which is our body, we readily see
that it is not a unitary thing, but consists of a number of parts—arms, legs, torso,
and so on—each of which is in turn made up of smaller units. Thus no single unit
can be found for the aggregate of form.
The same is true of the other aggregates. If feelings were an independent entity
and were actually the self, there would have to be more than one self because
there are three basic types of feelings—happy, unhappy, and neutral.
Furthermore, feelings change from one moment to another so from the time we
awoke this morning to the time we went to sleep we would have had a number of
different selves. Something as impermanent and unstable as feelings could hardly
be the nature of our true self. Similarly, ideas, impulses and consciousnesses are
all compounds composed of a number of individual units and could not in
themselves be our true self.
The five aggregates are also in constant flux. The conditions prevailing at one
moment disappear and arise the next moment as something different. The five
aggregates are not fixed things, but are a flow of circumstances from one moment
to the next.
Thus we have the argument that the aggregates are all quite impermanent. If
they were a real solid self, there would have to be as many selves as there are
moments of time and there would be a huge number of selves rather than a
particular, single self. In short, it is absurd to think that there is a real, true,
independent self that is made of the aggregates.
Having determined that the five aggregates are not solid entities that make up
the self, we might conclude that there is, however, a solid self or “me” that is
distinct from these ever-changing five aggregates. But our experience is that all
our perceptions and all our conceptualizations arise from these five perceptual
aggregates, so we would have to propose a self that is a single uncompounded
entity that is independent of our perceptual experience and therefore would be
beyond thought. But all our experience of the world arises from these aggregates.
A self, or a soul, beyond the compounded aggregates would necessarily have to be
an existent entity that is uncompounded, non-experiential, and inconceivable. But
if there were such a self that was solid and real, how would happiness and
suffering in the ordinary world initially arise? A self beyond the aggregates would
not experience changing events of the aggregates and, like uncompounded space,
would be beyond contact, benefit, and harm. A self separate from the aggregates
would never be able to function in the ordinary world where things arise and fall.
We would never have experienced any of the compounded events that we
experience. Thus, there is no self beyond the aggregates.
T HE SELF OT HER T HA N T HE AGGREGA T ES
Another view of self that we might take is that of the Vatsiputriya school which
is an ancient Buddhist school in India. The Vatsiputriya view was that there is a
self, but this self is neither identical to the aggregates nor different from them; it is
neither permanent nor impermanent; the self or “I” is totally indescribable, but
nonetheless exists as an entity.
This position is also absurd. We cannot just opt for a situation in which things
that are impermanent are not permanent by virtue of their being a self. We cannot
simply say those things that exist can also be said to not exist. If there were a self, it
would have to be either uncompounded (i.e. single) or compounded, either
permanent or impermanent. These categories are mutually exclusive because no
category such as “neither impermanent nor permanent” or “neither unitary nor
compounded” is possible. Therefore, the view of the Vatsiputriya adherents of a
hypothetically real self must be incorrect.
We can see why the Vatsiputriya school was incorrect from a very simple
example. An object could be either yellow or blue, or it could be neither yellow
nor blue. In this case it would be quite logical for it to be neither because, for
example, it might be white. This is because yellow and blue are not specifically
antithetical. But, if we ask whether an object were either yellow or not yellow, a
third alternative is impossible. It might be either yellow or not yellow, but there is
no conceivable way for it to be neither yellow nor not yellow. No third alternative
is available when two propositions are specifically antithetical. Thus the self
postulated by the Vatsiputriyas as a solid and real entity cannot exist.
The Shakyamuni Buddha established the lack of any substantial existence from
twenty erroneous points of view (see chart on page 82). He said, first of all, that
form is not itself a reality; secondly, that form and self are not in manipulative
relationship with either form controlling self or self controlling form; thirdly, that
no self abides in form; and, fourthly, that form does not abide in any self. Applying
these same denials of self to the other skandhas makes up the remaining sixteen
proper views that refute mistaken positions. These twenty erroneous views of the
emptiness of self are like a mountain with twenty peaks. They all start with the
fundamental belief in an inherent self (the mountain) and then develop this
wrong idea in different ways (the peaks).
T HE CONDIT IONED VIEW OF SELF
For example, when a child is born, he or she does not need to be taught the idea
of an ego; the child will develop the view of being a single, solid entity
spontaneously. Even an animal, though unable to articulate its thoughts, has a
conception of self. Animals are not very intelligent, but they do conceive of
protecting their own existence. In fact, it is extremely difficult for any sentient
being to give up the idea of its own existence.
Besides our ordinary conditioning that we hold an innate belief in a solid self,
there are various religious beliefs teaching that there is actually a self. Not only
this, but there are scientific beliefs that people possess a self that is real and
resides in the brain.
SUMMA RY
The Buddha taught that individuals hold twenty mistaken views of existence of
the person. These twenty erroneous views that a person is a solid real entity can be
expanded to apply to views to the past, the present and the future making sixty
erroneous views of self. When we add the erroneous view that self is real and
substantial and the erroneous view that others are real and substantial to these
sixty views, we get the sixty-two incorrect views of a self that are mentioned in the
sutras.
There are innumerable ways in which we could arbitrarily designate some
kind of solid reality of self. Different religious sects have adhered to many such
views, and it is also possible that we might spontaneously develop some of them.
All of these views, however, can be shown to be erroneous by recognizing the
insubstantiality of an individual. We can summarize these theories for believing in
a solid self into four main arguments.
First, we might feel that, although there is no self that is perceptible, its
existence can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. If we go to a potter’s shop
and do not find the potter, but see his throwing wheel and potter’s implements, we
might think that the potter must be have been there. The potter was obviously
there, because his implements are all about. In this example, we could make an
inference that the potter certainly had been there, even though we had not
specifically seen him. Using the same logic, we might decide that there is a real
self due to circumstantial evidence. We might decide to take our own experience
as evidence and feel that because we eat, sleep, see things, and so on that this
implies the existence of the self. Many people who adhere to the reality of the self
use this logic, that to say there is no self is simply to deny what everyone always
acknowledges in their ordinary lives. When we say “my body,” “my food,” “my
house,” “my bed,” and so on we refer to ourselves in relation to all of these things.
If there were no self, all of these assertions and conventions would be
meaningless.
Second, let us examine the possibility that there might be a permanent self.
Believing something is permanent implies that it doesn’t change when things
around it change. If the self were solid and permanent, then anything we do—
such as virtuous or unvirtuous actions—wouldn’t change how we turn out. If there
were a permanent self, conditions could not vary. All these momentary
phenomena would be impossible under the conditions of a permanent self. If
there were a single, unitary self, all the various circumstances of the world could
not arise. So the oneness of reality would never give any opportunity for variance
of beings.
Third, let us examine the possibility that there is a god or gods who made
individual selves. But there also cannot be a universal manipulator who is
controlling everything, because if there were a god or supreme creator, how could
momentary impermanence and suffering arise? If there were any kind of
universal manipulator, there would never be any suffering or impermanence.

Fourth, let us examine the possibility that there could be an eternal self or
atman that is pervasive. Space is pervasive and never changes, but if a self were
pervasive like space, there would never be any relational qualities such as near
and far, separation and connection, self and other, virtue and nonvirtue. Because
of the singular quality of pervasiveness, all of the individual details of the world
would not occur. Therefore, we can see that these notions of a god or universal
reality presented above are all absurd.

Questions
Question: You say there is no permanent self. But there might be an impermanent
self from time to time, say in each lifetime.
Rinpoche: If there is sometimes a self and not a self at other times as you have
posited, when there is a self, where is it? Is it one of the aggregates? Is it related to
one of the aggregates? Or is it separate from all the aggregates?
Question: The self seems to be the central point or controller of all the aggregates.
Rinpoche: This, then, falls into the Vatsiputriya view that there is a self which can
never be described as being either the same as the aggregates or distinct from the
aggregates.
Question: Can we get a clear definition of what is self?
Rinpoche: We always think about a self; we always think, “I want some food,” “I
want to do this,” “I want to be happy,” and so on. This “I” that we are always
thinking of and referring to is what we designate as a “self.” Although we always
refer to it, if we examine carefully, we can never find such an “I.” It does not exist
as a solid entity.
Question: That’s on the ultimate level or truth. But on the conventional level,
aren’t there “I” and “others?”
Rinpoche: Yes. All the teachings on the “non-self” concern the ultimate level, not
the conventional level. They are taught for the purpose of allowing disciples to
recognize the nature of reality in order that they can meditate on it and attain
realization.
In practicing meditation we must always meditate on the ultimate level, because
the conventional truth is composed of illusory manifestations. The ultimate level
or reality is the fundamental nature; in order to meditate on the fundamental
nature, we study the teachings on “not-self.”
Question: Could we say that the self was not compounded phenomena?
Rinpoche: This would not suffice because we are always acting and doing things
in the world. If there were a self characterized by not being compounded, it would
have nothing to do with the self that we always refer to, because the self we
always refer to has a relational aspect, in terms of “I want to eat,” “I want to do
this,” and so on. If there were an uncompounded self, then it would have nothing
to do with the self of which we are always conceiving.
Question: What if I killed someone and I said in court that I did not do it because I
did not believe in a self?
Rinpoche: In ultimate terms, there was no one who was killed, no one who did the
killing, no one who was arrested and taken to court, and no one who was put in
prison. On the conventional level, someone was killed, someone killed him and
someone was taken to court and put in jail.
Question: So isn’t it just the link between conventional and ultimate truth that we
are looking for?
Rinpoche: The conventional factors manifest by themselves. What we have to do
in meditation is to clear them of all our erroneous notions and feelings. We
meditate on the ultimate nature in order to recognize the true nature of nonself.
The conventional factors arise by themselves and we do not have to meditate on
them.
There is a traditional example of going into a dark room and seeing a rope, but
thinking that it is a snake. We react with fear and panic because we have
misperceived reality. So if we were to meditate on the conventional reality i.e. on
the misperception that the rope is a snake, we would only increase our fear. We
should meditate on ultimate reality, which is the understanding that it is just a
rope.
Question: If there is no self, who is this one who is doing all these things?
Rinpoche: The idea of an agent, that someone is doing all this, is a result of our
basic belief in a substantial self. If we do not have this basic idea of a self, then we
cannot conceive of anyone doing anything. The basic idea of a self comes from
attributing reality to something or other. We can see its absurdity by analysis.
For example, if I hold up my hand everyone will say this is clearly a hand and it
exists. But if I analyze carefully I see this hand is made up of five fingers. Is the
thumb a hand? No. Is the index finger a hand? No. And so on with each finger. We
may then say that a hand exists because it is a combination of fingers. But if we
take a finger, we see that it is made of a nail, skin, the first joint, and so on. By
continually applying this analysis, we begin to see that a “hand” is not a real solid
entity, but rather it is a conceptual designation that our mind puts on this and calls
it “a hand.” When we apply this to what we think of as “our self,” we find out that
what we call “self” or “I” is a huge collection of parts that are constantly changing.
But just like the hand, our mind and other individuals take this huge collection for
a solid, real entity, which we call a “self.”
Question: If there were nothing there in the first place, nothing would abide by
itself.
Rinpoche: We cannot deny the experience of the aggregates. The aggregates seem
to be there, but our recognition of the aggregates is not particularly stable. Every
moment we have a new experience of them.
 Chapter 3: Developing Certainty of The Insubstantiality of Self
These teachings are being given according to the Gateway of Knowledge by
Jamgön Ju Mipham Namgyal, often called Mipham Rinpoche. The Gateway of
Knowledge has many sections on astrology, the Abhidharma, and so on. At the back
of the text there is a section on the four cardinal principles of Buddhism: the
suffering of existence, the impermanence of compounds, the peace of nirvana,
and the lack of self-existence. This fourth principle on the lack of self-existence is
a concern of the Middle-way, which we are studying.
The teaching on non-self is a discussion that applies to the level of the ultimate,
not relative or conventional truth. The purpose of approaching this teaching on
non-self is to develop the appropriate meditation on the true nature of reality. It is
meaningless to meditate on anything other than the ultimate nature of reality.
In general, most religious and spiritual traditions believe in a self. It is a
fundamental feature of Buddhism that it does not believe in the validity of any
notion of a self. This means that in trying to discover this supposed self15 we can
never find any such entity. There is no such thing as the self. The purpose behind
examining non-self is to demonstrate that all of our projections, all our disturbing
emotions or defilements (Skt. kleshas), come from an erroneous notion of a self to
which we are continually grasping. If we can get to the point of recognizing that
this notion is a fallacy, we can cut off defilements at the root and purify our mind.
If we cannot do this, the defilements will be unending.
The impossibility of there being an individual self in the body, speech, or mind
and the impossibility of there being a self in any particular thing, or of there being
a self distinct from everything, has already been discussed. What do you think
about these points? What kind of ideas do you have about them? What do you
think about this situation? Do you think there must be some kind of self in one or
the other of the skandhas? Do you think there must be some kind of self that is
distinct from the skandhas? Do you think it might be possible that there is no such
thing as a self at all?16

Questions
Question: There must be a kind of self because you hear stories about beings like
the bodhisattvas who developed the thought of enlightenment through lifetime
after lifetime in a continuity. There must be something there that continues
whether we call it a self or not.
Rinpoche: There are many stories, but where is the self that is the self in all these
stories? If it were in one of the aggregates, then the bodhisattvas could not progress
from one lifetime to another lifetime—so it could not be in one of the aggregates.
This is similar to the example of going to the potter’s shop. We might think from
observing a bodhisattva working for sentient beings from lifetime to lifetime that
there must be a self, even if no one has seen it. But this does not prove the
existence of a self. Unless we can find some sort of self, we cannot prove its
existence by mere circumstantial evidence.
Question: There is a state called “self-realized.” Can there be a stage called “self-
realized” if there is no self to realize? What do you mean by “self?”
Rinpoche: It is not necessary that there be a self in order for us to have the idea of
a self. We might be wrong. For instance, in the ordinary world if someone
describes something in accordance with the way things are then we generally say
that the person is right. If someone feels that things are the way they are not, we
say he is wrong. There is always a possibility of being wrong.
For instance, if I sit here and think, “A lot of people have come here today,”
everyone will agree with me. On the other hand, if the room were empty, and I
saw many people in the room, then I would be wrong. Although these things
might appear to me, they would be mere illusory appearances. The nature of the
self is similar to this. It seems to be there, but actually it is not.
The Buddha gave eight examples of how something could appear but have no
substantial reality, like the reflection of the moon in water, the reflection of one’s
own face in a mirror, a mirage in an empty plain, the illusory appearances created
by people who do magic and so on. These are examples of things that appear to us
and others, but which have no reality other than the fact that someone sees them,
such as hallucinations, rainbows, and so on. For example, a hundred people
standing on the shore of a calm lake at night will see the moon in the lake even
though the moon is not really there in the lake, but merely a reflection. The self is
similar in that although there seems to be some kind of self, actually no real self
can ever be found.
Question: Is there a mind?
Rinpoche: At the ultimate level of there being no solid reality at all, there is no
mind. But if one has recognized only that there is no self-nature in individuality,
there is nothing wrong with feeling that there is a self in the mind.
Question: How did all this karma get started?
Rinpoche: We create karma because of the illusory appearances that we
experience. Karma functions in this conventional level and we experience the
results of karma within the same conventional reality. If we examine the true
nature we discover that, actually, no karma has been created, nor have the results
of any karma been experienced.
Question: Is there any karma?
Rinpoche: On the conventional level of truth there is karma. On the ultimate level
there is not.
We begin by listening to the idea that there is really no self and try to understand
what is meant by this idea. Then, we must contemplate it and examine our
experience and try to find where this self is and we realize that actually there is no
solid self to be found. Then after this, we can practice the meditations of
Tranquility and Insight and actually recognize the selfless nature. Because
grasping at the notion of an ego is the root of all disturbing emotions, in
recognizing selflessness, all the disturbing emotions dissolve by themselves. We do
not have to give up anything in particular to attain realization.
Question: Who is the one who is looking to find out what is the self, what is non-
existent? Who can look if no one is there?
Rinpoche: Although there is no self on the ultimate level, at the moment we are in
the frame of reference of thinking that there is a self. So, starting from this frame
of reference, we work within it and start to look for the self.
Question: This idea of self itself, which is only an idea, is going to look for itself? Is
that what you mean to say?
Rinpoche: Yes. We have this notion of self and this notion of there being a self
beginning to look for itself. In looking for itself, we are gradually able to recognize
that it is an erroneous notion. In recognizing that it is an erroneous notion, we
arrive at the view of the lack of an inherent self.
Suppose I had a statue and was worried about someone stealing it. Further
suppose that I put it into a box and locked it up and then went away and forgot that
I had put the statue away. When I came back, I saw that the statue was not where
it was supposed to be. Then, I think Lodro has stolen my statue. I might decide to
go into Lodro’s room and take all of Lodro’s things out of his drawers, look at
everything on his altar, and try to find the statue. I would not find my statue
because Lodro didn’t steal it in the first place. So, I might try to find some
alternative and might think that maybe I had made a mistake. Then going through
all my own things I find the statue in the box. As soon as I found the statue in the
box, the idea that Lodro had stolen my statue would vanish immediately.
Question: If you find out that you do not exist, what is the use of going on?
Rinpoche: In merely recognizing that there is no substantial self, that the belief in
a self is erroneous, we do not completely counteract the habitual clinging to a
notion of self. This is because from all our many previous lifetimes, we have
become habituated to clinging to this notion of self. Merely recognizing that there
is no substantial self will not make the notion of self vanish.
However, by getting to the point of recognizing lack of self and meditating on this
selfless nature, we can gradually reach and develop insight into the
insubstantiality of self and cut off all our erroneous notions. However, because we
cling to this notion of a self, we continue to aggrandize this self, to work for our
own benefit over others. By eliminating the incorrect notion of a self we develop
the desire to impartially work for the benefit of all sentient beings spontaneously,
as in the activities of a Buddha.
In considering the substantial self, it is important to make a clear distinction
between the self itself and the mere attribution of self. The “self” refers to some
inherent nature, some real thing, which is the own being of the individual. The
attribution of self, or the clinging to an idea of self, is the idea we have that we
really exist. Everybody is thinking, “I am,” “Here I am,” etc. No one can deny that
the attribution of self is an experience. The question arises whether or not this
attribution of self corresponds to any reality. If it corresponds to a reality, then the
idea “I am” is a correct idea. If it does not, if there is no genuine self to whom it
corresponds, if there is no reference for this notion of self, then this attribution of
self is meaningless.
In looking for the nature of self, we are looking for the self itself, to see if there is
any corresponding reality to this fundamental notion we have that causes us to
attribute a self.
Question: What motivation does one have to help another sentient being if the self
is non-existent?
Rinpoche: Although we do not perceive a self in this level of understanding, either
in ourselves or in other sentient beings, nonetheless, the experience of suffering
does occur. When the bodhisattva perceives that others are suffering, the
bodhisattva’s compassion arises in relation to the suffering, but not in reference to
a specific self or specific sentient being. The compassion of a bodhisattva relates to
experiential suffering.
Question: Is suffering destroyed with the destruction of the realization that the self
is non-existent?
Rinpoche: When we attain insight into the lack of self, we no longer suffer.
However, the suffering of other sentient beings is not pacified. The experience of
each sentient being is distinct.
When the Buddha attained realization, sentient beings continued to suffer until
they too had attained realization. The Buddha also recognized that other sentient
beings are experiencing the delusive appearance of suffering, but the Buddha
himself was not deluded or confused by it.
Question: If I came to realize the non-existence of the self, what would prevent me
from committing a non-virtuous action right after that realization? For instance, I
read in a religious book that because of emptiness no one is really killed. What
would prevent me from committing an unvirtuous action like going out and
killing someone?
Rinpoche: Virtuous action is a method for attaining the correct realization of no
true self. Unvirtuous action aggrandizes and solidifies this notion of a self. In
recognizing the actual lack of self, why would you commit any unvirtuous action?
How would you benefit by it? If there is no self, there is nothing to benefit. There
would never be any impetus to kill someone because killing could not benefit
anything and neither would it harm anything.
In reference to the religious book you read, it would seem to me that it represents
a tradition of selflessness “of the mouth.” Although there is the intellectual notion
of selflessness, there is no insight into this selflessness. This is apparent because a
true Dharma book will not advise actions that benefit a self. If the book advises
actions benefiting a self, it is still subtly attributing a self, not selflessness.
Question: So, if there is no motivation to kill, is there also no motivation to do
good?
Rinpoche: This is not completely the case because in recognizing that there is no
real self, we also recognize the suffering that is still being experienced by so many
others. Although the ordinary impulse to benefit a particular individual does not
occur because we do not recognize an individual, in recognizing selflessness we
still tend to relate to the suffering experienced by others and to have compassion
for them.
For example, if a man got drunk and started to shout and throw his weight
around, hit people, and so on, nobody would really get angry with him. People
would just be very warm and compassionate, pat the drunk on the back and advise
him to cool off a bit. This is because, being drunk, he would not really be in
command of his faculties. Someone sober would have no particular reason to get
angry with him; he would just try to calm him down. Similarly, someone who has
recognized selflessness has a compassionate and loving feeling towards sentient
beings who are continually creating their own suffering through their own
delusions.
If somebody sober came up here and picked up my cup and threw it to the ground
and broke it, I would get angry with him. But if a drunk were staggering around
and threw the cup on the ground and broke it, I would just think that he was
drunk and that he broke the cup. Similarly, when someone who has the insight
into selflessness views the experience of all beings, he or she sees that they are just
confused and deluded; they continue to create all kinds of suffering for
themselves. From this perspective, the enlightened person has an especially strong
feeling of compassion for all these beings who are creating their own suffering
through their own delusions.
Question: If someone understands non-self from an undeluded point of view, how
does he or she function in the world? If you do not get involved with ordinary
things, taking them to be real, how would you function?
Rinpoche: The condition of recognizing insubstantiality of self is certainly quite
functional. The Shakyamuni Buddha attained this recognition and then gave a vast
number of Dharma teachings. He brought innumerable beings to realization,
spread the Dharma far and wide, and benefited all sentient beings. He seemed to
be quite functional.
In recognizing the true nature that there is no substantial self, we relate to the
ultimate level of reality. We can still relate in terms of ordinary worldly
appearances and function within the field of the arising of various appearances.
We need not take ultimate reality naively, in the sense that it seems to annihilate
appearances. Appearances still arise and we can still relate to them.
Question: Isn’t it a bit paradoxical to relate on one level to the conventional
existence of self and then carry in the back of your mind a dual structure of
conventional self and ultimate non-self?
Rinpoche: The two are not specifically opposed to each other. In this ordinary
world of wearing clothes, eating food and so on, we relate to appearances, to the
mundane world as it seems to be. In relating to the ultimate nature, realization of
buddhahood, we recognize that there is no real nature in any of this and it is all
fundamentally empty.
Question: So is it correct to say that you look upon this mundane world as a kind of
dream, yet when you wake up from the dream you realize there is no basis for any
event in the dream. Is that the way you go through life?
Rinpoche: Yes, that is more or less it. When we are dreaming, we can think that
we are dreaming, and eventually we will wake up. In working in the world, we
may think this is some kind of illusory appearance similar to a dream and at some
point we will wake up to the realization of buddhahood. The realization of
buddhahood is slightly different from waking up from a dream, but they are quite
similar.
 Chapter 4: The Benefits of Understanding Non-Self
In the discussion on the view of the insubstantiality of a self, or selflessness, we
will now discuss the special qualities and benefits of the understanding of non-
self.
NON-SELF A S A BA SIS FOR LIBERA T ION
If there were a real self, liberation would be impossible. If the self were actually
a real thing, we would become attached to it. If there were something there to
become attached to, we would not be able to give up attachment to it. With the
proposition that there is such a thing as a real self, we cut off the possibility of
liberation.
Furthermore, if there were a real self we would become attached to ourselves,
and from this thinking we would begin to think and feel, “This is mine,” “I have
this,” “I am doing this,” “This is not mine,” “He is doing that,” and so on, thus
discriminating between ourselves and others. We would become attached to a self
and thus place ourselves in ordinary samsara. This would effectively deny us the
possibility of attaining realization.
On the other hand, if there is no actual self, there is the potential for liberation
because there is no real self to be attached to. With no real solid self it is possible to
release oneself from attachment to “I” and “other” and attain realization and
freedom from suffering.
Someone might ask, “If there is no self, how can there be any reason for us to do
virtuous actions and avoid actions that are unvirtuous?”
We can see that these are not in any way connected with the view of self or non-
self. In denying that there exists any kind of self, we are not denying the empirical
experiential qualities of the successive flow of different modes of the aggregates,
or the successive experiences and impressions that we receive. We create various
forms of karma, with good karma coming from doing virtuous actions and
negative karma from performing unvirtuous actions. From these various positive
and negative activities, there will later arise various effects or results. For instance,
if I killed someone, even if that action brought no effect in this lifetime, I might be
reborn in a hell realm. This flow of the creation and fruition of karma continues
based on the flow of conditions and results of virtuous and unvirtuous actions.
Whether we decide that a self has an inherent reality or not has no bearing on
what happens within this cycle. There are different views concerning this cycle’s
fundamental nature, but they do not affect its function. So holding a view of self or
non-self does not affect the idea of virtuous and unvirtuous actions and their
results.
SEVEN ANA LY SES OF A CA RT
Let us now consider the example of a cart. Shakyamuni first used the example
of the cart in a sutra, in a rather brief form.17 Later on, Chandrakirti expanded this
example and explained its significance in full. The example is an illustration of
how and why there is no self. We can see that a cart is a very useful object. It has a
particular function that everyone can agree on: it is used to carry things from one
place to another. But if we examine a cart, we see that this “cart” is merely a
designation that we have placed on it, a convenient mental label and there is no
truly existent cart.
(a) First, we could examine its parts. We can see that it has wheels, a bed, a
railing, and a harness pole. But each of these things is merely what it is—the
wheel is not the cart, nor is the bed the cart, nor is the railing the cart, nor is the
pole the cart. Each of these things is just itself; the wheel, the pole, and so on are
not the cart. If we take it completely apart, we will no longer have a cart.
(b) Furthermore, if we were to look for a cart elsewhere, we would never find a
cart separate from its parts. If we were to take the cart completely apart, there
would be no cart at all; we would be left with nothing other than the parts that
once were the cart. It is useful to refer to a collection of aggregates as a thing, such
as a “cart.” Nonetheless there is nothing really there that is the cart, because a
“cart” is merely a functional designation or label for an arrangement of parts.
(c) Since the identity of the cart as a cart is merely an imputation with no
actuality behind it, there can never be any real connection of possession between
the “cartness” of the cart and its parts, so there is no actual cartness. Taking
another example of a man having good qualities: if there is no man, there can be
no good or bad qualities.
(d) Similarly, we can see that the parts of the cart could not be dependent on or
held together by any sort of “cartness” or reality to the cart. If there were, we
should be able to isolate the cartness or the true nature of the cart. Since there is
no such thing to isolate, we can see that the parts that make up the whole are not
dependent on any essential quality that actually is the whole thing, in this case,
the cart.
(e) If we were to turn this around and say that the essential nature of the cart is
dependent on the parts, we can see that if this were so, when the parts were
assembled some additional factor, the essential nature of the cart, would have to
appear. But this does not happen. When we put the pieces of something together,
nothing new appears; there are only the pieces that are put together. So we can see
that there is no essential nature dependent upon the parts.
This discussion is based on what is called in the Middle-way the “seven
analyses,” which we have discussed through the example of the cart. These seven
logical arguments are:
(1) There is no essential reality in a thing as a whole, just as there is no reality
in a cart as a whole.
(2) There is no reality that is distinct from the sum of the parts assembled.
(3) There is no real possession of a whole by its parts, or of parts by an
imagined whole, just as cartness, which does not truly exist, cannot possess
parts or vice versa.
(4) There is no reality on which the parts are dependent.
(5) There is no reality dependent on the parts.
(6) There is no true self to the mere collection of parts, just as the parts of a
cart randomly assembled do not constitute a cart.
 (7) There is no reality in the shape of an object when the parts are correctly
assembled, just as there is no “cartness” in the shape of the cart as separate
from the parts of the cart that go to make up that shape.
By applying these seven ways of examining the cart, we can see that there is no
actual reality that we can say is the cart. Nonetheless, we have designated a
particular collection of separate parts as a cart, and this designation is
conventionally accepted and is quite functional because we can use the cart for
various purposes. So, on the conventional level of reality we can recognize that a
cart is a mere designation and we can say that the cart exists. On the ultimate level
of reality, we know that this cart is just a label and the cart has no inherent reality
as a cart.
SEVEN ANA LY SES W IT H T HE SELF
These seven analyses are equally applicable to the self in relation to the mental
aggregates. None of the individual aggregates are the self: First, there is no self
which is distinct from the aggregates, nor is there a self between the designation of
ourselves and the numerous qualities which we consider to be ours. Second, there
is no self on which the various factors of our experience are based, nor is there a
self which is based on the various factors of our experience. And third, there is no
self in the mere composite of the aggregates, nor is there a self in the shape or
structure of the aggregates as they are collected together.
So, by examining our aggregates and our experience in this way, we can see
that, just as there is no true cartness to the cart, so there is no real self in ourselves.
We have self-nature only in that we have arbitrarily designated ourselves as being
here, as being existent. Just as we have decided for functional purposes that a
group of objects put together in a certain fashion is a cart, so we have decided that
the various skandhas will be known collectively as a self. But if we try to apply the
seven analyses to find the self that we have designated, we will discover no reality
either among or apart from this “self.”
In regard to this, the Shakyamuni Buddha said in a sutra that the feeling of
one’s own self-existence is just a kind of demonic mind-form, something which
has arisen without any basis in reality and which just causes us trouble. It is a
view which can be held only in blatant contradiction to the way things are,
namely, that in this collection of various aggregates which we experience the
concept of self has no absolute reality at all; there is not even anything which can
be referred to validly as “a sentient being.”
We have designated a compound as being something in itself, something in its
own right, when in reality it is no more than a collection of a number of parts.
Because it is convenient and useful to do so, we describe a particular group of
aggregates as a sentient being, but this does not mean that any actual sentient
being truly exists.
This was what Shakyamuni Buddha expressed in the example of the cart—that
there is no true self-nature. Based on this assertion, Chandrakirti further
expounded the teaching of non-self.
 T HE EXIST ENCE OF PHENOMENA
To discover if there is any reality to appearances, we must first examine the
issue from two points of view: whether there is any true reality in the things
themselves and whether there is any such reality apart from the things
themselves. Then we should apply the seven analyses to external phenomena.
This way we will see that there is no self in ordinary worldly appearances.
Still, we might feel that there must be some sort of reality behind the ordinary
experiences that we undergo, the things we see, hear, and feel, just because they
do actually appear. Simply because we experience them, we might assume that
phenomena, at least in their component parts, must necessarily have some sort of
true existence. However, the mere fact of experience does not justify us in
assuming the objects of such experience are inherently real.
For example, if we look into a mirror, we see the reflection of a face, yet there is
no particular reality to the face in the mirror. The image in the mirror is a mere
product of conditions, in this case, the proximity of a face to the mirror and the
presence of light in the room. From the conjunction of these conditions, we see a
face in the mirror, yet this face is not truly existent.
Even though a face of a person is not a truly existent thing, the face in the
mirror is certainly an experience; we see the face in the mirror. Similarly, when
we go to sleep, we may dream frightening and terrible things or beautiful and
happy things. We may have a very long dream and pass through vast periods of
time, but on waking find that this dream was only a few minutes long, from an
external viewpoint. Or we may go to sleep and dream for a long time, but in the
experience of the dream this time might seem very short. In the dream we might
see elephants and cars and planes, or visit different places, but these objects are
not real things. Yet, certainly they appear and we do perceive them. The same
applies to hallucinations that some people have in that they often seem to be
completely real but empirically these appearances have no reality.
Thus we can see that the sheer fact that we experience an appearance does not
confer valid existential status to the objects of the experience. On the other hand,
neither can we deny that these appearances have any existence at all, or say that
they are not there because we still experience them. To say that they are merely
not there would be as absurd as to say that we experience them and therefore they
must exist.
All of this is taught according to the sutras in which Buddha Shakyamuni gave
examples, examples that were later expanded in Introduction to the Middle Way
by Chandrakirti.
 Chapter 5: The Insubstantiality of External Phenomena
T HE FOUR MIDDLE-WA Y ANA LY SES
Let us now turn to the “four analyses of Madhyamaka.” From our own experience
we can see that things do not arise arbitrarily, but rather arise from a specific
cause.18 The first analysis is to examine the cause or the source of something. We
look for the cause of any given thing in accordance with the seven analyses
previously enumerated, to see (a) if the thing comes from itself, (b) from
something other than itself, (c) from something between itself and the parts which
make it up, or (d) neither itself nor something other than itself. We find that there
is no factor independent of interdependent arising that can be rightly designated
as the specific source of any phenomenon. This is referred to as the “vajra splinter”
because with this one analysis we can recognize the emptiness of everything from
the great Mt. Meru right down to the smallest atom.
The second Middle-way analysis is to examine the results or outcomes of the
various causes to see how they came about and what their nature or essence is. In
examining the outcome of any given cause, we can see that there is no particular
truly existent thing which can be designated as the effect, but neither is the effect
a mere nothingness, for effects do occur. Conventionally speaking, resultant
conditions appear, but from an ultimate point of view there has never been any
result to any action and there are no truly existent causes. The Indian scholar,
Jnanagarbha, first formulated this argument.
The third analysis of the Middle-way is examining the essential quality of
phenomena to see if an external object is a single thing or many things. This
analysis suggests that an essential quality of any object cannot have the nature of
many things, because it would then be two different things, and not possess the
unitary essential quality; nor can any object be a single thing, because it would
then not be an aggregate (Skt. skandha), which are all multiple, thus making this
object with a single nature unknowable.
The fourth analysis is to recognize the interdependent nature of external
phenomena. This interdependent nature is similar to the idea of relativity. If we
are standing on a hill, the hill we are standing on is “here” and the hill we see in
the distance is the hill “over there.” But if we go over to the other hill, the hill we
are then standing on is the hill “here,” and the hill we were standing on before is
the hill “over there.” Similarly, things that are based on interdependence on other
objects do not have an inherent nature but are always dependent on
circumstances. In other words they are mental constructs such as large-small,
good-bad, dark-light, etc. These are the four analyses of Madhyamaka.
T HE NONEXIST ENCE OF PHENOMENA
In our conventional life the objects we experience are the result of particular
causes and conditions. To say that they are simply not there is to deny something
that is true, like saying that what is over there is not there. To say that phenomena
do not exist at all is absurd, because we still experience them. So they cannot be
totally non-existent. But according to the Buddhist view, all these phenomena exist
in a relative, conditioned fashion, based on prevailing conditions.
The Foundation schools maintain that our experience is based on the
conditioned production of compounded entities. These compounds are mere
designations having no reality of their own. They are made up of elements that are
extremely small: the finest possible analyzable particles and the finest possible
analyzable moments or units of time. According to this incomplete attitude toward
emptiness, all external objects and internal thoughts are built up of small
irreducible units with the help of appropriate conditions. These small real
indivisible particles and real moments of time do, however, exist.
The Mind-only (Skt. Chittamatra) school of the Mahayana maintains that all
experience is a projection of mind occurring as a result of previous karma. Due to
the ripening of karmic seeds, we project our world, which then functions in
conformity with the way it is projected, but which in itself is empty of any reality.
This school holds that the external world is not real; however, the mind that
perceives phenomena is real.
The Foundation tradition of Buddhism holds that small particles (atoms) and
units of time are solid and real. The Mind-only tradition holds that phenomena are
empty, but that the mind is inherently real. These two positions still cling to a
partially false notion of some kind of self-nature of phenomena.
The Middle-way or Madhyamaka school, however, does not adhere to any
concept of essential nature at all. In none of the experience of the aggregates is
there anything truly real; if we examine the basic nature of reality, we cannot find
anything that constitutes the essence of that reality.
But this does not imply that everything is simple nothingness. The lack of a solid
reality allows for the expression of all kinds of experiences. When investigating
the ultimate nature, we discover that there is no fundamental characteristic, no
essential reality, no solid reality to anything, so it is said that all things are empty,
that there is no true reality at all. However, emptiness is not distinguishable from
the appearance of the phenomena we experience. These phenomena themselves
are not separated from the ultimate nature, so our basic experience in the relative
is emptiness or the lack of reality in everything.
The conventional level of reality is concerned with the way all appearances and
experiences arise and the ultimate level of reality is concerned with the lack of a
solid reality in everything. These two levels of reality are inseparable; they are not
two different things, but rather an integrated whole. This is the basic viewpoint of
Madhyamaka as expounded by Nagarjuna and it is a description of the actual
viewpoint on reality of an enlightened buddha.
In approaching philosophical studies, the Tibetan masters say we should first
“jump like a tiger.” This means that we should first get a general view of the
situation. A tiger, when he jumps across a chasm, springs immediately and lands
on the other side almost at once. So we should first get a general feeling for what
the logical arguments and their conclusions are.
Then, they say, “Crawl like a turtle.” This means that we should go over all the
details of each argument and try to see each specific point involved so that we can
understand everything in detail, just as a turtle takes one step after another very
slowly, carefully going over each piece of terrain.
Then, they say, “Look back like a tiger seeing where he has leapt.” Having
gotten a general appreciation of the arguments, and having gone over all the
specific details, we should again think about how it all fits together and what the
arguments are like as a whole when all details are in place.
So now we will look at these four analyses of the Middle-way in greater detail.
 Chapter 6: The First Middle-Way Analysis
The Examination of Causes
I. T HE EXA MINA T ION OF CA USES
The first of these logical arguments is called the “vajra splinters” or sometimes
“the tiny vajra.” The root text of these four analyses written by Mipham Rinpoche
can be found in Appendix A. This argument is compared to a vajra because a vajra
is indestructible and can cut through anything. This refers specifically to
examining the source or where things come from. There are many ways to reach
the realization of emptiness such as working on it gradually in stages, realizing it
all at once, recognizing it by way of metaphors, and so on. Up to now this
viewpoint has been described in general terms. Now we are going to approach the
first analysis of the Middle-way known as “the vajra splinters” and also “refuting
the notion of arising,” in a more thorough fashion. The first Middle-way analysis is
to examine the causes or sources of various phenomena. In our ordinary
experience we see that any given object or situation derives from something else.
For instance, if we have a seed and plant it, the seed grows into a plant; if we hit
our hand, we feel pain; and so on.
Now if one condition truly comes from another, we ought to be able to locate
this arising or manifestation of the condition. Examining conditions in order to
find the point of their arising is one method for gaining an understanding of
emptiness, for we soon realize that no real arising can be found.
If a condition were to arise from another condition, there are four basic
possibilities:
(a) The effect having the same nature as its cause,
(b) The effect being completely different from its originating cause,
(c) The effect being produced partly from itself and partly from a condition of
a different nature, or
(d) The effect being produced neither from itself nor from anything else.
These are the fundamental alternatives of how something could arise; aside from
these four propositions, there does not seem to be any other conceivable way that
something might arise.
Emptiness is not an easy idea to grasp at first. Because it is complicated, we will
approach the notion of emptiness from the standpoint of how effects arise from
causes. We do this because phenomena certainly function according to a
predictable successive pattern with one condition arising out of another.
Nonetheless, the actual arising itself can never be discovered because on the
ultimate level there is no reality to arise. But by a careful analysis we can gain an
intellectual understanding of emptiness, which is very useful. If we have an
intellectual understanding of emptiness, we can then develop faith and trust that
meditation on emptiness is useful and does lead to realization.
In the practice of Mahamudra or Dzogchen meditation it is very helpful to have
an intellectual understanding of the correct view of reality, which is emptiness.
Indeed, it is very difficult to meditate on emptiness directly unless such an
understanding of emptiness is first developed. If we do not have an intellectual
understanding of emptiness, then when we meditate, it is easy to make the
mistake of taking some similar experience in our meditation as being emptiness.
But if we have already developed an intellectual understanding, we will tend to
not make errors in our meditation on the dharmata or true reality. Examining the
source of particular conditions, and seeing that these conditions appear to function
successively without any actuality, facilitates the growth of this understanding.
According to the Middle-way, it is necessary to understand the two truths: the
conventional truth or level of reality involving appearances and the ultimate truth
or level of reality concerning how phenomena really are. If we have an
understanding of cause and effect, but have not an understanding of emptiness,
we will still cling to a false belief of the inherent reality of external phenomena
and will not attain liberation.
On the other hand, if we cling to believing that the ultimate truth of emptiness
is real and ignore the conventional truth of appearance and experience, we will
fall into the nihilistic view that everything is totally meaningless and that no
virtuous or unvirtuous actions exist. Rather than understanding things as they
actually are we will simply be denying experience, as in the previously mentioned
example of believing that since there is no self, it is permissible to kill, make war,
and so on, because no real person is killed. This last example of a false view does
not take into account the integral nature of conventional appearances and ultimate
reality and hence is called emptiness “of the mouth,” where one says that things
are empty, but where there is no real insight into the ultimate nature of
emptiness. The ultimate nature of emptiness does not run counter to the
conventional truth and it does not interfere with the truth of the function of
appearances.
A. SOMET HING ARISING FROM IT SELF
Now we are going to examine the four possible propositions about how one
condition could arise from another. The first possibility is that something might
arise from itself. But we can see that a particular phenomenon, which is an effect
of a certain cause, does not have to reoccur. The effect is already there so it does
not have to duplicate itself all over again by arising from itself. This can be
illustrated by the example of a child. Once a child is born, it does not have to be
born again. It would be absurd to imagine that a phenomenon having once
appeared, would ever need to recreate itself.
If we were to accept the proposition that something arose out of itself, we can
see that this would lead to a continuous, uninterrupted process of re-becoming. If
there were some necessity for anything to create itself again, just as it was, then
the duplicated phenomenon would presumably have the same necessity to
recreate itself again, and we would have an infinite regression with all
appearances unendingly reproducing themselves over and over again. But this
never happens in the real world. Things such as the seasons or the growth of
animals and plants tend to function cyclically, not in a linear fashion. But things
rarely recreate themselves exactly, because if they did nothing would ever change;
one condition would lead to the same condition, which would lead to the same
condition throughout time.
But in fact, if we plant a seed it grows up into something different: the tree
grows into a sapling, then the sapling grows into a big tree, the tree develops
branches which have leaves, and eventually it produces seeds which can be
planted and which can grow into more trees. Thus, one condition leads to what
generally seems to be quite a different condition and eventually gets around to the
first condition, and by that time it is different from the condition that preceded it.
So, conditions certainly do not come from something that is just themselves;
conditions do not simply repeat themselves identically.
Nonetheless, in ancient India there was a school of philosophy called the
Samkhya school in which the adherents maintained that an entity could arise out
of itself or reproduce itself if the cause and effect had the same nature. Even
though the Samkhya philosophy is not particularly widespread today, some people
might tend to arrive at these conclusions by themselves. It is therefore necessary
for us to ascertain that conditions cannot arise out of sameness and simply
reproduce themselves.
We can take the example of the potter’s clay. The potter takes some clay, kneads
it, and then puts it on his wheel. In working with it on the wheel, he transforms it
into all kinds of cups, vases, pots and other clay objects. The substance itself is still
the same matter or nature, being just clay, but the appearances created by the
potter are quite different in the process. Or we could also take the example of a
rice seed. If we plant a rice seed it will grow into a plant, go through various stages,
and eventually yield a rice seed again. The Samkhya school actually used these
examples to explain their viewpoint that, in accordance with these examples,
although the appearance of particular phenomena might change, phenomena in
cyclic relationship are all of the same nature. This, however, cannot be the case.
If we look at a rice plant and a rice seed, they seem to be quite different things.
The plant is tall and green, the seed is small and pale; they have different shapes
and different colors. If we were to consider that they were the same thing, we
might as well think the same about other phenomena which nobody considers the
same, but which resemble each other as much as a grain of rice does a rice plant—
for instance, water and fire, or virtuous and unvirtuous actions. Certainly no
phenomena that are so dissimilar can be exactly the same thing, or share the same
essence or nature, as was asserted by the Samkhya philosophers.
Someone might ask, “Doesn’t the cyclic relationship of rice and the rice plant
imply that they are somehow of the same essence or nature?” No, this is not the
case. If you have a river, for instance, the river continues to flow in a cyclic
relationship. Yet the water in the river is never the same; there is no water there
that is the river, because the water is continually flowing down and away. A
“river” is a mental construct or designation for a continuous flow, but there is no
particular substance that is always there that is the river.
Even without reading commentaries and learning logic, an average farmer can
tell that a rice plant and a grain of rice could not be the same thing, that a cause
and an effect could not be identical, because the cause is destroyed in order that
the effect, the plant, may arise.
If we have some rice, we cannot just let the rice sit there and hope to get rice
plants—we have to plant the rice. When the rice plant grows, the rice seed is
eventually destroyed in the process of producing that plant. Similarly with any
situation, in order to arrive at an effect, the originating cause must disappear.
So anyone who just works in the world can tell you that the cause and the result
cannot be the same; the cause is always eliminated in producing the result. Even
without a strong basis of logic, an ordinary working person can tell you right away
that the cause and the result could not be the same thing.

B. SOMET HING ARISING FROM SOMET HING COMPLET ELY DIFFERENT

Let us consider the proposition that something might arise from a cause that is
totally different from it, like a child being born from its mother, or a plant growing
from a seed.
If we consider the flow of causes and effects in ordinary terms, it certainly
seems that the effects have a nature different from their causes. We can say in
ordinary terms that the effect is different from the cause, but this is so only on the
conventional level. The proposition of an effect being completely different from its
cause or “production from other” cannot stand the test of logic.
If the cause and its results are totally distinct from each other, then for one thing
to have this relationship, the two, cause and effect, would happen together; that is,
they would have to exist at the same time.
But the cause of anything always occurs prior to its effect. When the result
occurs, the source has already disappeared. For instance, if you plant a seed, a
plant will grow from the seed; but by the time the plant begins to grow, the seed
has already been consumed. So the cause and its effect are not co-existent. We can
never find both the cause and the effect existing at the same time, which shows
that they are distinct from each other.
If the cause of something and its effect co-existed, then there would be no need
to attribute the idea of “cause” to one of these factors at all. The effects would
already be there; they would not have to come from anywhere, and so could not
have been caused by whatever we might consider to be the source.
For instance, if two people are born already, there is no need for one of them to
be born as the child of the other, since both of them have already been born.
Similarly, if two phenomena co-exist, one cannot be the source of the other. Hence,
there are no grounds for considering the result to be truly other than the source.
Furthermore, while identity might yield some consistency in relationship, if the
effect were completely different from the cause there would be no consistency.
That is, no cause-effect relationship could obtain between two totally disparate
entities. Not only would we get a plant from seeds, we might get plants from iron
or we might get darkness from a candle, and so on. Because “otherness” entails an
arbitrary relationship, if results were totally other than their sources, events would
arise with no particularly consistent structure whatever. Since this is not what we
observe—we observe very consistent results arising from a specific cause—the
notion that results can be completely unrelated to their causes must be a fallacy.
Some people might tend to feel that this argument does not completely refute
the possibility of something resulting from a cause that is totally distinct from
itself. There might be some kind of purpose in the cause, which would express
itself in the effect, and if so there is no specific need for an entity arbitrarily
arising, even if the cause and the results are totally distinct.
This notion is fallacious. There would seem to be some sort of consistent
structure to the arising or manifestation of phenomena. For example, rice does not
grow from barley seeds, or from stones, or from flower seeds; it only grows from
rice seeds. It would appear that there is a kind of structure to the arising of
phenomena, a consistency which some would say arises out of the purpose or
nature of an object.
Even so, seeds are not the same as a plant—it is beyond any doubt that they are
very different things. When the seed is planted, when the cause of something
occurs, the seed disappears before the effect or resultant event, like a plant, occurs.
Since the cause disappears before the result occurs, there can be no actual purpose
or flow. We can observe particular events in this cycle, but there is no particular
nature or purpose we can see aside from the cause and effect.
This is not to deny that the cause of a particular event leads to its result
consistently with respect to its ordinary mode of functioning. In the arising of
various appearances it certainly seems that events occur in accordance with
various sources consistently, in a linear fashion. Events function in this manner
and if we examine the actual nature of the situation we will recognize that this is
merely a mode of functioning; there is no actual flow of circumstance, or any
purpose behind functioning that can be pointed to as a real thing. This
demonstrates that, there can be a continuous cycle of cause and effect but it has no
ultimate reality to it, it is of the nature of emptiness—empty of any kind of solid
reality whatever.
To consider the question of purpose from another point of view, just as the seed
which we plant no longer exists at the time of the growth of the plant, if a cause
(the seed) had a particular purpose, that purpose could not exist at the time of the
result (the plant). For example, if there were a very great silversmith who lived 600
years ago and he had the purpose of making a great necklace, and we had some
silver now, there is no way that the silversmith who was alive 600 years ago had a
purpose or could ever relate to our silver. There is no way, even though he may
have had a great motivation to create beautiful things out of silver, that he could
relate to a piece of silver that we have now, because the man who had the purpose
of making the necklace died long ago. Just so, if the substance of the result and the
supposed purpose involved in the source are not co-existent, no purpose could
ever, in itself, produce any result. Since all causes disappear before their results
occur, no notion of purpose could ever connect them. Hence the notion that there
is some sort of conscious purpose connecting events is a fallacy—a mental
fabrication.
To consider a further perspective on the same question of whether a cause and
effect could have a completely different nature, we might say that although the
cause disappears before the effect occurs, this still might take place in the same
manner where putting an object on an old fashion scale on one side cause the
other pan to automatically go up. Similarly, we might suggest that when the cause
disappears the result arises, with the cause disappearing as the following result
arises. But such a proposition would not stand the test of our ordinary experience,
for we do not find in the world a direct physical causal relationship in events, but
only conditioned situations in which effect occur. There are a number of examples
to illustrate this.
First, when a teacher teaches a pupil to recite something, for instance, the
teacher’s knowledge does not leave the teacher and go to the pupil. The teacher
does not give anything in particular to the pupil and, because they have different
consciousnesses, the pupil’s knowledge and the teacher’s knowledge are not the
same and do not exactly correspond to each other, as do the rising and falling of
pans of a scale. Yet if they were to recite exactly the same words, no difference
between them could be discerned.
Second, if we look in a mirror, we will see our own face, although nothing
happens to our face when we see the reflection in the mirror. Nonetheless, we see
our face just as it is. Nothing in particular happens to our face due to this
circumstance, the reflection is just brought about due to the conjunction of certain
circumstances such as the position of the mirror, the presence of the face, and the
presence of light.
Third, if we have a seal with a design on it and we stamp something with it, the
stamp reproduced is always exactly the same as the markings on the seal. This,
however, does not affect the seal because nothing has to come off the seal; the seal
does not have to be destroyed in order to produce the stamp. But, due to the
conjunction of various conditions such as the seal, the ink, the object being
stamped, and the pressure with which it is applied, the resulting condition (the
stamped paper) occurs without the necessity of anything happening to the seal (the
cause).
Fourth, if we have a magnifying glass and we focus the sunlight on a piece of
paper, we do not have to take anything out of the glass to light it. Sunlight, by
itself, will not ignite the material, but due to the presence of particular conditions
of the sun and the magnifying glass the paper will begin to burn.
Fifth, if we talk in an empty room or shout in a cave, we may hear an echo. The
echo does not affect our speech and our speech remains the same. The shout may
be no different from our speech when there was no echo, yet due to the presence
of appropriate conditions of a room or a cave, an echo occurs.
These are examples of the fact that results or effects arise based on particular
conditions, but the results are not necessarily physically caused by those
conditions.
The psychological significance of this is that mind and the external objects that
are perceived could not occur simultaneously, because cause and effect cannot
occur simultaneously. That is, if we see a yellow object, the yellow that we see and
the mind believing it is “yellow” could not be occurring simultaneously. Nor could
the notion of “yellow” of the external material object and the perception of yellow
in the mind be the same, because these two “yellows” have different inherent
natures. Rather, external objects trigger the psychological events of thinking,
understanding, or recognizing. These mental perceptions thus occur based on the
right secondary conditions such as it being daytime and the person has his eyes
open and has good vision, but there is no direct physical cause and effect to
internal perceptions which are not specifically brought about by anything
external.
So if we look at ordinary circumstances, it seems as if one thing arises out of
another; things seem to arise in some order. But, if we examine the mode of
arising of different situations, we see that the notion of that kind of arising is a
fallacy because no arising can ever be discovered in the examples of mirror,
stamp, or echo.
The idea that conditions arise out of something else is just a very general
principle that more or less applies if we take a functional view. But if we examine
carefully to find out where exactly this arising is, there is no specific kind of
arising to be discovered. So in practicing the path, it is said that we must collect
vast amounts of merit to reach realization. However, if we were to examine the
path as to whether it is necessary to collect a great deal of merit, we could not
specifically find the relationship between the collection of merit and realization.
Because all phenomena are essentially empty of any substantiality, even the
collection of merit is just an ordinary notion.
Also on close examination, we find there is no arising of external appearances.
If appearances have no arising, they can also have no resting and there is nothing
actually annihilated when they disappear. The notion that things arise, and rest
there, and disappear again is fundamentally absurd.
These two facts—that all appearances arise in our field of experience and also
appear to be actually there, and that on the ultimate level there is no arising, no
resting, and no passing away of appearances—are not contrary. It is much like the
example of dreams. If we were to go to sleep and dream of an elephant, this dream
would have been brought about by various conditions and the elephant would
have seemed real to us. However, if upon waking, we were to ask, “Now, where is
the elephant I just dreamed about?” or “Where are the parents of the elephant I
dreamed about?” it would be absurd. It would be meaningless because no actual
elephant existed. We experienced seeing an elephant in the dream due to
particular conditions of sleeping, and the elephant wasn’t there in the conditions
of waking.
Similarly, all phenomena occur due to particular conditions involved in
appearances. When they seem to arise, they do so without any real arising or any
real abiding or any real passing away, but arise as a mere appearance because
there is no solid reality that can ever be discerned.
By examining appearances in this fashion, we can see that all phenomena, that
is all that appears, are devoid of any essential quality of their own and have no
inherent reality. They do not come from themselves or from anything identical to
themselves or from anything distinct from themselves. There is no way in which
any essential reality can be attributed to anything at all. This is the teaching on the
arising of phenomena out of something completely distinct from themselves.
C. SOMET HING ARISING BOT H FROM IT SELF A ND FROM SOMET HING ELSE
Let us consider the possibility that an effect occurs due to both a cause identical
to the thing itself and also a cause due to something completely different from the
thing itself.
Having already considered a cause identical to the effect does not exist and a
cause completely different from the effect does not exist, these two events might
occur together to make a different outcome. This, however, could not be the case
because the cause which was identical would be subject to the arguments against
something arising from itself and the cause which was different would be subject
to the arguments refuting the idea that something could arise from a cause totally
different from itself. Such a position would have the flaws of both previous wrong
views.
D. SOMET HING ARISING FROM NO CA USE
The fourth alternative that we are going to consider in this first analysis of
examining the arising of phenomena is the possibility that phenomena arise
neither from themselves nor from something different, in other words, arise from
no cause whatever. This view was asserted by the Carvaka school of ancient India.
According to this school, phenomena occur simply according to their own natures,
with no particular cause and no particular result. Since there is no cause and no
effect, there would be no such things as virtuous and unvirtuous actions that
would lead to favorable or unfavorable circumstances.
The Carvakas, who held views similar to the hedonists in ancient Greece, gave a
number of examples to illustrate this view. For instance, they said that when it
rains, mushrooms grow. We cannot find the source for the mushrooms, but
whenever it rains, mushrooms grow. The Carvakas give this as one example of
there being no cause or effect. They maintained, for example, that the wind blows
the dust everywhere, so there is no result to this action. In other words, they
maintain that when the cause (the wind) hits the dust, the dust is dispersed
anywhere with no particular order or effect.
They further said that things merely obey their own innate nature. For instance,
a seed is round and since no one has made the seed round, it is round due simply
to its own nature. Similarly, a thorn is sharp due to its sharp essence; the thorn did
not come from any external or internal cause, it is just the way it is. Similarly, they
said that no one had to paint the peacock, nor did the peacock have to develop its
own colors, but, merely according to the nature of the peacock, it has its distinctive
coloring.
The Carvakas also said the sun rises in the east in the morning and no one has
to pull it up; the Ganges flows to the sea and no one has to pull it down. Everything
just obeys its own nature; so there is no cause for anything and there are no results
of anything; with everything being arbitrary. These views of the Carvakas lead to
their notion that the arising of all phenomena is completely arbitrary and has no
cause or reason.
The Carvakas explained, for example, that merely the physical union of male
and female factors at conception causes the appearance of a mind in a human. Just
as if we put grain and yeast together, we will automatically get something that has
the potential to make someone drunk. Similarly, when there is the union of the
two physical factors at the time of conception, a consciousness automatically
develops.
The Carvakas gave a further example of an old, very poor beggar who decided
that he wanted to become rich. He went into the forest and found the paw of a
dead wolf and made many footprints on the road with the wolf’s paw. Then he
called a large group of villagers around and said that he had seen a wolf demon in
the area and it had left tracks on the road. The beggar then said that he was going
to get rid of the demon in seven days. The people were to put all of their food and
belongings outside and then go inside and lock their doors. On the seventh day the
beggar did his ceremony, the people went inside, put everything outside and
locked their doors. The beggar then stole everything and became rich.
The Carvakas said, “The Buddha is much like this. In order to become famous
and well known, he has preached a doctrine that made him famous and well
known, though it does not have much merit. Actually, there is no previous lifetime
and no future lifetimes. The Buddha claims that he sees such things, but he has
preached this doctrine just to aggrandize himself.”
The Carvakas, obviously, didn’t like the Shakyamuni Buddha very much. They
maintained that everything ends; when we die, the body dissolves into the four
elements and the mind just vanishes. So the correct thing to do with this life is to
do whatever we want to do; whatever makes us happy. The Carvakas also had “the
one analysis” that proves everything. This analysis proved there could be no
previous life because we cannot see it and there could be no future life because
we cannot see it and there could be no hell because we cannot see it and there
could be no pure realms because we cannot see it. In other words the “one
analysis” of the Carvakas was simply if you cannot see it, it doesn’t exist.
According to Buddhism, however, this is a totally unacceptable view. In
Buddhist thinking, everything has to originate from some kind of cause, that is,
everything has to come from some previous condition. For anything to occur there
must be a basic causal condition and appropriate secondary conditions. For
example, if in summer there are seeds in the ground (the cause) and there is rain,
rich soil, and warm conditions (secondary conditions), plants will grow (the effect
or result). In the winter, even though there may be seeds in the ground, there are
no appropriate secondary conditions and the seeds will not grow. In a more
immediate example, on the table in front of me there are no plants growing
because there are no causal conditions of a seed being present or any appropriate
secondary conditions of soil, water, etc. on the table. There being neither a cause
nor secondary causal conditions nothing will occur.
The common observation of the consistency of phenomena can show that there
must be some causal condition and secondary conditions involved in bringing
about events. For instance, in the pot on the windowsill there are flowers growing.
This is because seeds were planted in the pot and they were watered. No flowers
grew on the table where there were no seeds, no soil, and no water. If everything
arose arbitrarily, it would do so in no particular order. There would be no more
reason for flowers to grow out of flower seeds in a pot than there would for flowers
to grow out of a piece of wood with no soil. Since the seeds would not be a
necessary condition for the growth of plants if everything were arbitrary, whether
or not there were seeds would make no difference to whether or not there were
plants. This is absurd.
As for the question of previous lives, we can see that our mind goes on in a
continuum based on thoughts or mental appearances. We have present mind
forms based on the thoughts we had yesterday, the day before, a week ago, and so
on. Mind is a continuous flow like a river. Furthermore, each person experiences
his own mind, his own thoughts, as a continuum. We never seem to suddenly
experience a new mind, or another mind; rather, we experience the same
continuum of mind.
If we trace this back, we can see that when we were born our mind was already
there as a continuum which had come from the period in the womb. Since we do
not see any disjunction in this continuous flow of mind, where did the mind come
from at the moment of conception? If it had suddenly appeared at that point, it
would deny our whole experience in life, so it must have come from a previous
life. If you plant a seed, a sprout grows. The seed came from a similar plant, which
came from a seed, which came from a plant, etc. No seed spontaneously occurs
without a plant being part of a continuum. Not even mushrooms occur
spontaneously; they come from spores. Without spores, there would be no
mushrooms. So our mind had to come from somewhere.
As for future lives, we can see that if there is a cause it will eventually produce
a result. Take the mind, for example. We have a mind today and need not fear that
there will be no mind tomorrow. We know from experience that having a mind
today means that there will be a mind tomorrow and the next day and the day
after that. The mind is not in danger of suddenly disappearing for no reason.
Or take the example of a candle. If the candle is lit, it burns. Its light will not just
disappear for no reason; having been lit, it will continue to burn. Similarly, since
mind continues in an endless continuum, when we die we will certainly continue
to have a mind. Since mind inevitably yields a result, that mind will give rise to
another mind, which will continue beyond the moment of death. We can thus see
that the mind continues after death, so there must be some kind of future lifetime.
The Carvakas’ “one analysis” is not particularly convincing. The mere fact that
something is not seen does not prove its non-existence. If this were the case, a
blind man could rightly say, “I do not see anything at all, therefore nothing exists.”
If we accept this line of reasoning we deny the validity of inference. Using that
logic if we have not seen our heart, lungs and other internal organs they must not
exist. Conversely, if we maintain that, although we cannot directly see the lungs
and heart, we can see our body and the body depends on the existence of the lungs
and a heart. So we can infer we have a heart and lungs even if we have not
visually seen them. This is the same line of reasoning used to demonstrate the
existence of past and future lives. If we accept the validity of this line of reasoning,
we must accept the existence of past and future lives.
Logically examining the possibility of past and future lives to gain an
intellectual appreciation of the continuum from lifetime to lifetime is analogous to
the case of a traveling businessman. When a businessman goes to another country
with his goods, he is not particularly concerned with the country in which he finds
himself. He is there to sell his goods. He looks for new kinds of goods to take back
to his home country. He does not think much about his welfare in the foreign
country because he plans a speedy return home. Similarly, by gaining an
intellectual appreciation of the continuum of lifetime to lifetime, we develop a
feeling, much like that of the businessman in another land, that we are here on a
temporary visit and will soon be moving on to the next lifetime. In other words, we
have a feeling that this lifetime is in no way permanent. By gaining this
perspective, we considerably reduce our attachments to this life and this is quite
beneficial.
SUMMA RY
We have now presented refutations for the four possible causes of phenomena
arising: (a) phenomena arise from themselves or something of identical nature, (b)
phenomena arise from something completely different from their nature, (c)
phenomena arise partly from themselves and partly from something with a
different nature, (d) phenomena arise neither from themselves nor from
something of a different nature (that is, arising without any cause).
We can thus see that there is no way for anything to arise: nonetheless, things
continue to appear. That is, on the conventional level of reality things arise or
appear due to a primary cause and the necessary secondary conditions necessary
for that event to come to fruition. If we examine how anything arises or appears in
our consciousness, it becomes obvious that this arising is an absurdity and that all
appearances of phenomena are empty having no inherent reality of its own.
In the ultimate sense if there is no way for anything to arise, it follows that there
is no way for anything to stay, to abide. There is nothing actually there, nor is there
anything that can pass away. In the Buddhist commentaries this is called “the
horns of a rabbit.” Rabbits have no horns. If rabbits have no horns, the length of
time for horns to grow on a rabbit is meaningless, as is any talk about a rabbit
losing his horns. According to this example, we can see that since there is no way
for things to arise on the ultimate level, there can be no abiding or passing away of
phenomena. All appearances are mere appearances like images in a dream that
occur but have no solid reality in themselves.
Just as there is no abiding of phenomena, then neither can there be an arising
of phenomena, nor can there be a ceasing of phenomena. On the ultimate level
everything is totally beyond any conception whatever. This is what is meant by
saying that everything is of the nature of emptiness; in other words, it is beyond
any kind of conception.
This argument was presented in a very brief form in Treatise on the Middle
Way by Nagarjuna and was later expanded upon and presented in great detail by
Chandrakirti in his Introduction to the Middle Way. The discussion presented here
is an abridgment of Chandrakirti’s arguments.

Questions
Question: In the example of the traveling businessman, what is analogous to the
homeland?
Rinpoche: The future lifetime is what corresponds to the homeland. If a
businessman were to go a foreign land and not concern himself with his business
affairs but just have a good time, he would spend all his money. When he got back
to his own country, he would have neither his original capital nor goods for sale
and would become poor and have a very difficult time. If we do not concern
ourselves with our future lives in this present lifetime, we will find ourselves in
very unfavorable circumstances later on.
Question: Which came first, the flower or the seed?
Rinpoche: I have also heard the question, “Which came first, the chicken or the
egg?” In all my reading I’ve never found any answer to which came first. But
certainly for a very long time, chickens have been born from eggs and chickens
have laid eggs and flowers have grown from seeds and flowers have given rise to
seeds. In general, cyclic existence or samsara is infinite, having no beginning, so
there is no beginning to any particular succession of phenomena. No matter what
phenomenon we examine we can see that it came from some cause. If we
examine that cause we find that it came from another cause. No matter what we
examine we find this unending series of causes and effects. Therefore, there is no
first cause.
Whether or not there is an end to cyclic existence depends on what point of view
we consider it from. If we think of ordinary experiences in cyclic existence, the
ordinary samsaric world, it is quite impossible to think of an end to cyclic
existence. For there to be an end to cyclic existence totally, we would have to bring
all sentient beings to full realization, which is very difficult. But, in terms of our
own personal lives, there is a potential of ending cyclic existence with the
realization of buddhahood. If we have a rice seed, the seed came from a rice plant,
which came from a seed, which came from a plant, which came from a seed, in an
unending succession stretching back through a long period of time. If we take that
seed and burn it, its potential to produce a plant is destroyed.
Question: Isn’t there some problem of duality there with a mind that goes on and
on and a body that stops?
Rinpoche: It’s not really a problem, because it’s not a question of the body being
annihilated but only of the connection between body and mind being broken.
When the body is left behind, the mind continues on to a future lifetime with the
body being left behind as mere matter. It may be burned, but even so there remain
ashes. Those ashes can be scattered on the ground and will continue as a physical
phenomenon.
Question: Then mind and body are of different categories?
Rinpoche: Yes. The body is perceptible in ordinary physical terms—we can feel it,
touch it, and so on. Mind is not physically perceptible. At the moment, body and
mind are occurring simultaneously, but they are, even now, quite distinct.
Question: When and how does the mind go from a dead body to a new one? Is it at
the moment of conception?
Rinpoche: What usually happens is that the body is afflicted with some kind of
disease so that the mind can no longer remain attached to it. So the mind leaves
the body and death occurs. The body deteriorates. Then, sometimes very quickly
and sometimes after a short period of time, the mind perceives another body,
identifies with that body as “this is my body” and thus forms an attachment to the
body. That relationship of attachment is the sense in which the mind and body are
connected.
According to the scriptures, semen cannot enter an ovum unless there is also an
attaching mind present, that is, a mind is a necessary condition for impregnation.
So it would seem logical that at the moment of conception, when the semen enters
the ovum, the mind becomes attached to that physical form. From the moment of
conception, the being is alive.
Question: That sounds as though the mind is choosing the body.
Rinpoche: In fact, there is no choice involved. When the mind becomes separated
from a body, the visions that appear to it are extremely disturbing and erratic and,
due to the disturbance and confusion caused by these appearances, the mind has
virtually no possibility to make any kind of choice.
Question: Since there is one mind to one body and the world population is
increasing all the time, does this mean that certain animals with good karma are
taking higher rebirth and beings from other planets or world systems are taking
rebirth in our plane of existence?
Rinpoche: My opinion on the matter is that nowadays the number of desire objects
in our world has increased greatly as compared with the past, but in spite of this
the general level of happiness of sentient beings seems to be declining rapidly.
Since the happiness of our world is declining, it is much easier in karmic terms to
be reborn in our world.
In ancient times, although there were very few kinds of desirable material
objects, it is said that beings were quite happy. So it would seem that, if the quality
of being were generally higher in the world, it would be harder to gain rebirth
here and there would therefore be fewer beings in the world due to it being
harder to get into. In fact, in ancient times, when beings were happier, there were
far fewer people. Now, when people are much more unhappy, there are more of
them.
Question: So where are the reincarnated lamas (Tib. tulkus) coming from?
Rinpoche: Do you think they are new ones? Sentient beings go from one birth to
another, from one realm to another. Some humans die and are reborn as animals
or in other, distant human realms. Some animals die and are reborn as humans. If
you catch a fly in a vase and stop up the top, the fly will keep flying around in the
vase. It will fly up to the top, down to the bottom, around in the middle and keep
on moving—its exact position will fluctuate greatly. Just so, sentient beings wander
from one realm to another, from the highest realms to the lowest, but as long as
they are caught in cyclic existence, they continue to move around. So the
Shakyamuni Buddha referred to sentient beings as “movers,” because they go from
one condition to another. They are never in the same condition, they just keep on
moving.
Question: But the Buddha also said that the highest rebirth we can take is as a
man or woman because only from the human state can we reach enlightenment.
So the fact that the world population is increasing would seem to indicate that
more and more sentient beings are accumulating the merit to come back as men
and women.
Rinpoche: The Shakyamuni Buddha referred to the precious human rebirth as the
most favorable state of incarnation. Mere possession of a human body does not
constitute precious human rebirth.
The extremely favorable kind of rebirth that the Buddha meant was not merely a
human body, but a human body with the potential to practice Dharma. It is the
potential to practice Dharma that is difficult to obtain and very precious. Not every
human birth is a precious human rebirth, because there are a huge number of
people who are born human, but who have no connection with the Dharma. The
increase in the number of humans who have no potential to practice Dharma is no
sign of increasing merit at all.
Question: But more and more lamas are going to the West and more and more
people are coming to Dharma.
Rinpoche: Possibly the general Dharma is increasing, but the Dharma of
realization, the spread of people actually attaining realization, is certainly not. In
the time of the Shakyamuni Buddha, there were 500 arhats in one small area.
Now, in any area, try to find even one arhat.
Question: From a spiritual point of view, is family planning right or wrong?
Rinpoche: I have no fixed opinion on the matter. All details of karma are
perceptible only to the Buddha. Personally, I see no great fault in preventing
conception. But, of course, once conception has occurred, to kill the fetus would be
to destroy a sentient being, to commit an act of killing, and would be an
unvirtuous action. But I cannot see much non-virtue in the prevention of
conception.
Question: But don’t you prevent a mind from taking rebirth?
Rinpoche: Is it then unvirtuous to be a nun? For instance, a woman who could
have had five children but by becoming a nun before she had any children she
would have prevented five beings from taking human rebirth. Would that be an
unvirtuous action?
Question: Maybe that is why the Buddha was reluctant to allow the ordination of
women to begin with and said that the Dharma would disappear 500 years earlier
because the order of Nuns was formed.
Rinpoche: The Shakyamuni Buddha said that if women were not permitted to
take ordination the Dharma would last longer, but that if women were ordained,
although the Dharma would not last as long, it would be much more widespread.19
 The Twenty Types of Emptinesses
(Tib. tong pa nyi shu)
1. Emptiness of internal phenomena
2. Emptiness of external phenomena
3. Emptiness of internal and external phenomena
4 Emptiness of emptiness
5. Emptiness of the great
6. Emptiness of ultimate phenomena
7. Emptiness of compounded phenomena
8. Emptiness of uncompounded phenomena
9. Emptiness that is beyond extremes
10. Emptiness of that which has no beginning or end
11. Emptiness of that which is not to be abandoned
12 Emptiness of nature or essence (Tib. rang dzin)
13. Emptiness of all phenomena
14. Emptiness of individual characteristics
15. Emptiness of what can’t be perceived
16. Emptiness of the lack of truly existent identity
17. Emptiness of a thing
18. Emptiness of a lack of a thing
19. Emptiness of inherent nature
20. Emptiness of other nature
 Chapter 7: The Second Middle-Way Analysis
Examining Effects
In these teachings we are discussing the Madhyamaka or the Middle-way, also
known as “the true nature of reality.” This Middle-way is sometimes referred to as
the Prajnaparamita or “mother of all the Buddhas,” because it is the sole basis for
realization. Only with true insight into the transcendent nature of the
Prajnaparamita, which is the Middle-way view, can freedom from samsara be
obtained and nirvana be realized.
The Middle-way view of Prajnaparamita is the cause, “the mother,” of all the
Buddhas. To understand this view and gain some appreciation for it, we have been
looking at the four analyses of emptiness taught by the ancient panditas of India.
We have already discussed the examination of the first analysis of the cause of
phenomena according to the teachings of Chandrakirti. Now let us consider the
second analysis of results according to the teachings of Jnanagarbha.
In general, we should never feel that in gaining insight into emptiness, the
ultimate nature of reality, we are going to reach a mere nothingness, in which
there is no karma, no appearance, no thing at all. Such a nothingness does not
exist. Having examined the arising of phenomena, we should conclude not that
phenomena do not arise at all, but rather that there is no solid real thing arising.
This is quite relevant to the theory of karma, for if there were a solid objective
reality to the arising of phenomena rather than emptiness, karma would be
impossible. This is because if a particular cause were present, the result would
have to be produced automatically. With the result having to be produced
automatically, there would be no way for a cause to produce a long-term result, for
instance, in future lives. So the principle of emptiness does not refute the law of
karma, but supports it. When we gain insight into the true nature, the way
phenomena really are, we do not abandon the law of karma, but rather gain a
great deal of trust in the law of karma because it is supported by emptiness.
Take the example of looking into a mirror. If something real had to pass from
your face to the mirror, if your real face had to enter a mirror before you could see
the reflection, reflections in mirrors would not be possible. However, given the
appropriate conditions, reflections arise with there being no substantial connection
between cause (your face) and effect (the reflection).
Because of this empty quality of the connection between the cause, the
secondary conditions, and the effect for us it is possible to create karma in this
lifetime and to experience its fruition at some remote time such as in another
lifetime.
Let us now examine the four possible resultant conditions which are the effects
of cause-and-effect from the four-fold logic of the Middle-way: (a) the effects
already exist when the phenomena arise, or (b) the effects do not exist when the
phenomena arise, or (c) the effects both exist and do not exist when the
phenomena arise, or (d) the effects neither exist nor do not exist when the
phenomena arise.
 A. T HE EFFECT S ALREA DY EXIST WHEN T HE PHENOMENA ARISE
It is obvious that resultant conditions could not exist at the point of arising, for if
they did, they would have to exist prior to their causes and we would see
something quite different from our ordinary experience. For instance, if this were
true, the mature head of rice would have to be there before it came to fruition
because having inherent existence, it would already have been there before it
arose. Furthermore, if what existed had still to recur, then any existent thing
would have to occur in the same form again and again. Since we do not perceive
such a state of affairs in the real world, we can see that results could not be
existent at the point of their arising.
B. T HE EFFECT S DO NOT EXIST WHEN T HE PHENOMENA ARISE
If the results were non-existent at the point of their arising, they would be like
horns of a rabbit. But things that are nonexistent never occur. For instance, the
horns of a rabbit or the son of a barren woman obviously do not occur. So if
resultant conditions were non-existent at the point of their arising, they would
never occur.
The argument that prior to the occurrence of a particular effect, there was a
non-existence of that effect which then is transformed into existence at the point
of arising can be refuted by reference to the mutual exclusiveness of being and
nothingness. There is no way for something that does not exist to suddenly
transmute into existence, for appearances do not occur without a cause out of
nothing at all. Rather they appear in dependence on previous conditions and
causes. The notion that whatever obviously did not exist has come into existence is
a mere intellectual construct, a projection about a particular situation having no
genuine reality. For instance, it is incorrect to say that before planting there was no
grain in the field and now the grain is growing there that this demonstrates
something coming out of nothing. The notion of a consistent time sequence to
events and the idea that the field now is the same as the previously empty field, is
merely our own designation of the situation with there being no actual connection
between the two.
Similarly, there is no way for something to exist and later to pass into
nothingness. Both of these viewpoints of existence coming from nothingness and
existence going into nothingness are fallacious because in real life one thing
always follows another based on the right conditions. In ordinary terms it certainly
seems to be true, yet it is just something we impute to circumstances and there is
no reality to it at all. Actually there is no way for existence to pass into nothingness,
or for nothingness to suddenly produce existence.
I am now forty-five.20 In ordinary terms, I think that I am the same person who
was born forty-five years ago. However, if I examine the situation, it seems absurd
to think that I could be the same person I was forty years ago at the age of five.
That person forty years ago was quite small; I am much, much bigger. Forty years
ago I looked different, acted differently, thought differently, in fact, there is no
noticeable identity I can find to justify saying that I am the same individual who
was there forty years ago. If we want to connect two such dissimilar phenomena,
we might as well connect the whole of samsara and say that everything is just the
same, that it is all one.
Any notion of things arising out of nothingness, or passing into nothingness, is
just a post factum judgment. That is, in observing a particular, previously
unnoticed phenomenon we imagine that it has newly come to be or we fail to
observe a previously noticed phenomenon and we suppose that it has ceased to be.
This is merely a mental construct with no actual reality behind it. There is no
arising of phenomena or passing away of phenomena and there is no abiding of or
lack of abiding of appearances; there is no self-nature or lack of self-nature in
phenomena. Everything that appears is mere appearance with no essence at all.
In the final analysis there is nothing that can be said about phenomena. We
cannot validly indicate any arising, any passing away, any coming, any going, any
increase, any recognition, or any obscuration of anything. Everything that appears
is mere appearance without further identifiable characteristics.
If it is argued that unless conditions which already exist or non-existent
conditions can occur, there would be no appearances at all, this is also not so. All
appearances and all resultant conditions are illusory with no nature of their own,
based on previous conditions that were equally illusory. This continuum of
occurring appearances is unerring in so far as nothing ever occurs from outside of
it; everything always occurs within this illusory structure of successive causes and
conditions. If we examine the details of these conditions, we will find that they
possess no solid reality that we can isolate or discover—they all have the same
nature as hallucinations.
C. T HE EFFECT S BOT H EXIST A ND DO NOT EXIST WHEN T HE PHENOMENA ARISE
If there is no arising of either resultant conditions that already exist or of
resultant conditions that do not exist, there can be no arising of conditions that
both exist and do not exist since both terms of such a proposition have already
been refuted.
D. T HE EFFECT S NEIT HER EXIST NOR DO NOT EXIST WHEN T HE PHENOMENA ARISE
Similarly, the proposition that resultant conditions neither exist nor do not exist
is an absurd alternative, for there is no situation that we can describe as “neither
existence nor non-existence.” This is only a verbal possibility and this corresponds
to nothing that is actually real. Thus everything that occurs is totally beyond any
conception, beyond any possibility of intellectual description.
It might seem that this denial of existence, non-existence, both and neither, this
denial of the ultimate validity of any proposition or concept whatsoever, is merely
another variety of the final alternative, in which both being and nothingness have
been denied at once—but this is not so.
SUMMA RY
In order to develop an intellectual appreciation of emptiness, the discussion has
been arranged in this four-fold fashion. First, because most people feel that things
exist, the arguments showing that there is no existent quality to resultant
appearances are presented. Since these arguments tend to lead people to feel that
results do not exist at all, the refutation of total non-existence is the next argument
put forward. Then, because this argument tends to persuade people that conditions
neither exist nor do not exist, the argument that refutes such a position is
propounded.
This analysis enables us to gain an intellectual appreciation of emptiness and a
recognition that this emptiness is not an absolute nothingness, a void. Also, this
complete voidness is not the kind of emptiness in the practice of meditation
leading us to the condition beyond mind in which the true nature of reality is
actually recognized. For this realization the mind must first be pacified using
shamatha meditation. Then, in the recognition of fundamental awareness—
fundamental emptiness—non-discriminating wisdom arises as a brilliant light in
which the world of appearances is recognized. With non-discriminating wisdom
we do not perceive phenomena as dualistic subject and object, but rather in a
nondualistic, intuitive cognition.
 Chapter 8: The Third Middle-Way Analysis
Finding the Essential Nature of One and Many
Let us now discuss the third Middle-way analysis found in the classical Indian
commentaries on emptiness. Shantarakshita, a great Indian scholar and yogi who
through his practice is said to have attained the ability to extended his life to the
age of 999 years old developed this perspective. During his long life he composed
many commentaries on Buddhist philosophy and various sutras with his most
famous work being the Ornament to the Middle Way.
In the eighth century CE Padmasambhava introduced the teachings of the tantra
into Tibet. The sutra teachings were disseminated somewhat earlier in Tibet,
primarily by Shantarakshita, who came and ordained the first monks in Tibet.
This third Madhyamaka analysis of Shantarakshita, which we are going to discuss,
is the examination of the essential nature of phenomena.
This method of Shantarakshita is the easiest way to understand emptiness
because there is only one thing to understand—are things single or multiple21?
From this analysis we can understand the emptiness of everything—the emptiness
of mind, the emptiness of phenomena, and the emptiness of the connection
between mind and phenomena.
For this reason Mipham Rinpoche, the great Nyingma scholar, in his
commentary to the Ornament to the Middle Way said that Shantarakshita’s single
analysis is like the thunderbolt of Indra, which he could hurl to earth destroying
whole cities.
ARE PHENOMENA SINGLE OR MULT IPLE
Shantarakshita's analysis begins by examining the essential quality or nature
(Skt. svabhava) of phenomena to see if phenomena have the nature of being a
single entity or the nature of being an entity that is more than one. Nothing can be
simultaneously unitary and multiple. Also, if there were any essential quality at
all, to say that it was neither single nor multiple would be to deny the very
essential quality that we were trying to affirm. Such a proposition would be self-
contradictory. There are only two possibilities: that any essential quality either be
single or be multiple.
In looking for this essential quality of all compounded and uncompounded
things, we can see that multiple is based on units. We cannot have many things
unless we first have one. A number of things is always composed of a number of
single things and it follows that unless there were first one, then there could be
not be many. So we will examine the question of whether or not there is a unitary,
essential reality to everything.
In general, experience consists of external appearances and subjective internal
experiences of mind. First, when we consider external appearances, we can see
that no appearances have a unitary nature. If we look at a mountain or hill, it
appears to us to be a single entity, but it actually is a collection of trees, shrubs,
rocks, and earth. Or we can examine something like a vase. A vase has a base and
a neck and an opening, so the notion that a vase is just a vase or that a hill is just a
hill, is basically a false intellectual conception. Or take the example of an elephant.
While we might say there is a single elephant, if we look at the elephant we see it
has feet, a trunk, a torso and a head, and so on. So we see the various parts of the
elephant, but no particular single quality or part is the elephant itself. Thus
everything that appears as a single object to us conceptually, when carefully
analyzed, is really a compound made of many elements.
In the same way, nothing that we designate as a single thing, such as a memory,
a chair or a vase is in reality a single unitary thing at all but is made up of many
different single objects. Even our own bodies are composed of separable parts;
under analysis no single quality by which the whole can be identified is ever
found.
In short, we can see that all phenomena are compounds; there is no unitary
essential quality to anything. Everything we experience, all that appears, is
analyzable into smaller and smaller parts. The designation “single unit” is merely
a convenient mental label for what is, in fact, a collection of parts, of particles. This
demonstrates what we call the emptiness of outer phenomena because all objects
are actually a mental designation, not a real solid object.
Even if we examine outer and inner phenomena in terms of tiny indivisible
particles, we find they are not truly indivisible or unitary. As Vasubandhu said in
his Compendium of Knowledge, if compounds are composed of tiny particles that
we call atoms, then these particles must relate to other particles in such a manner
as to build up compounds. In relating to other particles, they must do so in terms of
directions. That is, each particle would have another particle to the east of it, to the
west of it, to the north, and to the south, as well as having a particle above it and
below it. By relating to a number of other individual particles, any given particle
would be showing more than a single characteristic because it would have an
eastness, westness, northness, southness, and so on revealing its own compound
nature. Therefore, it could not itself be an indivisible, unitary particle. Thus, the
notion of unitary, indivisible particles as the building blocks of the world is a
fallacy.
Alternatively, we could propose that these smallest particles have no quality of
directionality, but connect with only one other particle in a total relationship.
However, by examining how this would play out we can see that this too could not
be the case. If two particles were interconnected in such an integral fashion, one
particle would have to exactly pervade the space of the other; for if it did not, this
would show the two particles were of a compound nature. A third particle would
also have to pervade exactly the original particle, and so on with all the particles in
samsara. Thus, the totality of existence would be subsumed in one particle. Such a
particle would include more particles, but would get no bigger because the
particles would take up the same space. It could not serve as a basis for the
building up of compounds; it would not show the multiplicity of characteristics
observable in our world.
So, in examining objective appearance in this way, it becomes obvious that
there is no essential quality to any of it. There being no essential quality in any of
the appearances which nonetheless occur, we may conclude that all is emptiness.
 Now turning to internal phenomena, the nature of the mind, we all tend to feel
that we have a single, real mind that experiences and recognizes things. But if we
examine the experience of mind, we see that there is not a single thing that is the
mind we are said to have. Consciousness has many different components, from
awareness of visual objects (forms, shapes and colors) to awareness of sounds,
tactile consciousness, taste consciousness, and mental consciousness, and these are
all separate parts or functions of the mind. Each type of consciousness recognizes a
particular field of experience. Thus each of these six consciousnesses functions in
a somewhat independent way from the others. So the mind too is not a single,
unitary thing, but a compound object, just as all external objects are compounds.
It is sometimes said22 that there are eight consciousnesses: the five sensory
consciousnesses, the mental consciousnesses, the klesha consciousness, and the
ground consciousness (Skt. alaya-vijnana). From these all appearances and mind
forms arise. The klesha consciousness, which clings to the notion of ego or “I,” and
the ground consciousness, which stores information from the other six
consciousnesses, are sometimes held to be independent modes of consciousness.
For our purposes though, it is much easier to posit just six consciousnesses.
More specifically, we can see that visual consciousness, for instance, has the
potential to perceive various objects. For instance, if we look at a piece of yellow
cloth, we see yellow; if we look at a snowy mountain we see white. We also
experience the objects of visual awareness in succession, seeing first one thing and
then another, and so on, with prior appearances disappearing at the moment the
succeeding appearances occur. Thus visual consciousness is multiple and
successive and has many different potential objects; so it cannot be a single,
unitary thing.
Examining the successive manner in which consciousness perceives objects, we
might be led to believe that each “flash” of awareness, each moment of
consciousness, is a fundamental unit of time, comparable to the indivisible
particles of matter already discussed. However, if we could ever isolate such a
single unit of time, we would see that it could only occur within a framework of
ongoing consciousness because awareness is never static, and hence each moment
would have to relate to a previous moment and a future moment. That is, such a
moment would not be an inseparable whole but rather would consist of three
parts: the parts relating to a previous moment, the present moment, and the future
moment; with “present” being “past” in relation to the future moment.
So there is no unitary, essential quality, no single identifiable reality, in either
the external world that appears to us or in the subjective mind. Finally, there is no
reality in activity or functioning. If we decide to go to Kathmandu, for example, we
might think that the activity of going, the function we would be performing by
going, has some essential reality of its own. Or if rain falls, we might feel that,
although there is really no rain as such, because what we call rain is only
innumerable drops, yet there is a reality to the activity of the rain which is the
falling of the rain. However, this is not the case, for there is no valid way to isolate
and designate as real any function or activity. That is to say, the falling of the rain
cannot be isolated from the rain itself, nor can going to Kathmandu be separated
or isolated into the individual going and Kathmandu. These activities are actually
only small changes in the mode of being of a particular compound agent and not
separate things at all. Therefore, an activity cannot be isolated and identified as a
unitary thing.
Finally, we might decide that some uncompounded entity like space has a
fundamentally real, inherent existence. Space is not a compound, it does not
consist of different parts and so we might very well imagine it to have some sort of
essential quality. But in actuality no uncompounded entity exists in and of itself,
not even as a mere appearance. If we make a square with our fingers, we might
refer to a square space, but in fact, there is no square space there at all. We simply
fail to recognize our hands for the moment and suddenly think we see a square
space there. But space is not a thing in itself; it merely seems to occur as the
negation of particular appearances, in this case our hands. Similarly, the space in a
room seems to appear real but when we negate the appearance of the walls there
is no separate thing that is this space.
Thus we can conclude from the foregoing analysis that there is no way there
can be any particular single real nature or essential quality to anything. And if
there is no single real nature, there also could not be any multiple real nature,
because multiplicity is based on single units. If there is no single unit there can be
no multiple. These being the only possible alternative modes in which a real
nature or quality might exist, we can see from this one method of examination
that there is no self in any appearance, no self in any dharma, no essential nature
to anything at all.
This concludes the discussion of the third analysis of Madhyamaka, an
examination to find the essential quality according to the Ornament of the Middle
Way of Shantarakshita.
 Chapter 9: The Fourth Middle-Way Analysis
The Examination of All Sources
The fourth analysis of Madhyamaka is the examination of phenomena following
Nagarjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way. In this analysis we examine sources,
results, and the true nature in a procedure developed as a whole.
First, we can see that all phenomena or occurring events do not arise out of an
inherent true nature, but rather arise from a cause and secondary conditions that
permit this cause to yield a particular effect. Nowhere in our field of experience do
we meet arbitrarily occurring events or phenomena without a cause. Phenomena
have no discoverable essence or real nature, but appear due to causes and
conditions without any solid reality, like reflections in a mirror. Phenomena,
having no solid real nature, are not eternal; but neither are they merely nothing.
They do not come from anywhere, nor do they go anywhere. There is no real
arising of them, nor is there any actual passing away of them. They do not exist
independently, but occur interrelated due to the presence of sources and
appropriate conditions. Thus all phenomenal occurrences are beyond any possible
conception.
An example of the arising of phenomena often given is a reflection of a statue of
Vajradhara in a mirror. If we examine the image of Vajradhara in a mirror, we can
see that there is no real thing in the mirror, yet it really appears to be there and so
it is not a mere nothingness. The reflection does not come from anywhere in
particular; if we turn the mirror over, there is nowhere it has gone. We cannot
observe any real appearance arising in its occurrence or any genuine passing away
in its disappearance. No independent solid reality can be ascribed to the image
reflected in the mirror. The reflection, like the whole of our experience, cannot
adequately be described in conceptual terms.
Phenomena are merely an unending succession of momentary arising of
appearances, structured in a particular fashion, having no independent existence.
They are not describable by any of the four propositions of existing, non-existing,
both existing and not-existing and being neither existing nor non-existing—either
in their causes or in their effects. No particular real point of their arising can even
be discovered, and partial notions about them, such as that they are permanent or
impermanent, and so on, are all inadequate to describe their actual nature. This
unreal, apparent existence of reflections in the mirror is simply appearances
occurring due to causes and conditions. And these conditioned appearances are in
no way distinct from the fundamental emptiness, which has already been
described.
Thus, in the view of Middle-way, the truth of suffering, the truth of the cause of
suffering, as well as eating, sleeping and other ordinary worldly activities are all
equally devoid of any essential nature of their own. They occur through
conditioned arising without having any fundamental reality whatsoever. Only if
phenomena are actually empty can the world as we experience it appear. If
emptiness were something completely distinct from our common experience,
there would be no way for any of that experience to have occurred in the first
place. Emptiness is not isolated from our ordinary experience, nor is it in any way
divorced from the Four Noble Truths and the path to freedom from suffering.
Now all these forms of conditioned arising which, as we have demonstrated by
means of the four analyses of the Middle-way, have no fundamental reality,
nevertheless arise as if they were actually there, just as an elephant in our dream
really seems to be there. But if we examine conditions in the world—examine how
they arise, examine their fruition, and look for their essential quality—we will see,
that things have no solid reality; they merely occur due to particular conditions.
Nagarjuna discusses these points in greater detail in the Treatise on the Middle
Way.
Just as someone locked in a prison has no way to escape except by opening the
cell door, so we who are caught in the realm of the suffering of cyclic existence
have no way to free ourselves except through recognizing the fundamental nature
of reality, which is emptiness. Recognizing this fundamental nature of reality is
sometimes called “the three liberating factors.” These factors are: (1) that no real
cause can ever be discovered; (2) that resultant conditions have no true nature of
their own; and (3) the recognition of the essentially empty quality of all
appearances. By apprehending the truth of these three factors, we can gain
understanding and attain freedom from samsara.
This supreme view of emptiness unites the conventional truth and the ultimate
truth. That is, Middle-way emptiness is not blank nothingness, a mere void; rather
it is a total potentiality that gives rise to all the appearances that occur to sentient
beings.
To attain realization one must have an integrated view of the conventional and
ultimate levels of reality. This supreme field of insight, the dharmadhatu, or in
English “expanse of dharmas” or “expanse of phenomena,” is often referred to as
the “mother of all buddhas and bodhisattvas.” Just as a mother gives birth to
children, so insight into the fundamental nature produced all the enlightened
beings of the past, present, and the future.
The fundamental nature of the universe is the union of emptiness and
appearance where everything is empty, but also in this emptiness arise all
appearances. Even though in the preceding text we have tried to describe how this
is true, the union of emptiness and appearances is indescribable and its
understanding transcends all logical statements.
If we rest in meditative awareness of this non-discriminating wisdom, which is
beyond conception, and we also recognize that all dharmas are like illusions,
dreams, or reflections having no fundamental reality, then when we come out of
our meditation, we will develop confidence in the correct view—the union of the
conventional and ultimate levels of reality. This is the great tool given to us in the
transcendent knowledge of the Prajnaparamita.
This tool of transcendent knowledge might be illustrated in the following way:
if we want to go from here to Kathmandu, we should first try to find out which
direction Kathmandu is from our present position. Having determined that, we
would then know which way to go to get there and could give other people proper
directions as well. Transcendent knowledge is like a map showing us the way.
 If we attain true insight into the true nature, as expressed by arising of
appearances, then we will be able to demonstrate the true nature of emptiness to
all sentient beings. If insight into emptiness has no direct relation to appearances,
then anyone who attained such insight would have no perception of other sentient
beings and would therefore never teach and the teaching of emptiness would
never spread.
A merely intellectual understanding of the unity of appearance and emptiness
does not empower us to be able to demonstrate such emptiness to others. Only
with direct insight into the fundamental nature can we begin to demonstrate to
beings this fundamental emptiness that is, in itself, brilliantly expressive. So the
understanding of emptiness is the source and the reality of the whole Mahayana
path of realization of buddhahood.
CONCLUSION
We have now discussed the lack of any essential reality in the mundane self
from the point of view of conditioned arising and by means of the example of the
cart. We have also examined the lack of any true, inherent reality in all
phenomenal appearances, by looking for their point of arising, analyzing their
resultant conditions, and searching for their essential nature. We examined
everything according to the four different approaches found in the classical
Sanskrit scriptures. Mipham Rinpoche brought these together in a single text
called the Gateway to Knowledge.
In general, we come to know things in three ways: by direct perception, by
inference, and by authoritative report. To develop insight into the nature of reality
Buddhist practitioners should not accept a report from just anyone, but should rely
on the teachings of individuals who have outstanding qualities and realization. To
achieve this understanding of the direct insight into the true nature of reality, we
must first listen to and study the logical arguments that explain this nature. Thus,
to develop the direct perception from the practice of Mahamudra, we have to first
develop a proper understanding of Mahamudra. This support from the teachings
contained in this book and others helps us in our practice of Mahamudra, which
then leads to direct insight into the fundamental nature of reality.
T HE DEDICA T ION
I have taught a little of the correct view of Madhyamaka and I urge you all to
pray that whatever merit you have created by trying to understand this correct
view will not go merely to benefit yourselves alone, but be distributed to all beings,
so that all may attain complete and perfect realization.
 The Twenty Wrong Views of Self
(Tib. dag ta nyi shu)
The twenty wrong views of self are:
1. The skandha of form as a self
2. The view of self as possessing form
3. The view of self as abiding in form
4. The view of form as abiding in the self
5. The view of feeling as a self
6. The view of self as possessing feeling
7. The view of self as abiding in feeling
8. The view of feeling as abiding in self
9. The view of perception as the self
10. The view of the self as possessing perception
11. The view of the self as abiding in perception
12. The view of perception as abiding in the self
13. The view of compositional factors as the self
14. The view of the self as possessing compositional factors
15. The view of the self as abiding in compositional factors
16. The view of compositional factors as abiding in the self
17. The view of consciousness as the self
18. The view of the self as possessing consciousness
19. The view of the self as abiding in consciousness
20. The view of consciousness as abiding in the self.
These twenty views were originally developed by Haradata.
 Appendix A: Root Text of the Four Great Madhyamaka Arguments
by Mipham Rinpoche
Translated by Adam Pearcey23
The four great logical arguments of the Middle Way are:
1. The investigation of the cause: the Diamond Splinters
2. The investigation of the result: refuting existent or non-existent results
3. The investigation of the essential identity: “neither one nor many”
4. The investigation of all: the Great Interdependence
I. INVEST IGA T ION OF T HE CA USE: T HE DIA MOND SPLINT ERS
A. SOMET HING ARISING FROM IT SELF
On a mere conventional level, it is indeed true that an effect is produced from a
cause, but, if investigated on the ultimate level, production cannot be observed. If
production capable of withstanding logical analysis did exist, it must necessarily be
a production by means of one of the following four extremes: self, other, both or
neither (or causeless). But these are unreasonable.
As it is said in the Treatise on the Middle Way24:
Not from self, not from other,
Not from both and not from neither—
Not for any entity at all anywhere,
Is there ever any production.
Why? For a thing to be produced from itself is illogical because once something
exists with its own particular identity, it is pointless for it to arise once again. It is
like a child who has already been born and is not born again. If a seed, for
example, were produced over again, it would be produced again and again
without end. There would be no opportunity for the development of the other
stages, such as the sprout, the stalk and so on.
According to the Samkhyas who assert self-production, in the same way that
different manifestations, such as vases, can be created from the single nature of
clay, seeds and so on are of a single nature, and abandon their seed-like
manifestation as they are transformed into the manifestation of a sprout. If it is
claimed that the various stages such as those of the seed and sprout are one, in
spite of the fact that they have distinctions in terms of existing or not existing
presently, color, shape and so on, then that is open to invalidation by consequential
reasoning, since it would follow that fire and water, or virtue and evil, must also
be one.
You might think that a seed and sprout are not equivalent to fire and water
because they belong to the same continuum. Yet a “continuum” is merely an
imputation based on the uninterrupted resemblance of momentary phenomena,
and does not really exist.
As it says in the Introduction to the Middle Way:
If one supposes that what has already been produced is reproduced,
 Then the actual arising of a sprout and so on will never be discovered.
The seed would go on reproducing itself until the end of the world.
For you, there can be no difference between the seed as the active cause
And the sprout in terms of shape, color, flavor, capacity or ripening.
If this seed of yours is no different from the sprout,
Then whilst the seed exists, there is nothing one might call “sprout,”
Or else, since they are identical, whilst the sprout exists
How could that [i.e. the seed] be apprehended? It is untenable.
And:
Only once the cause has disappeared does one see the effect,
So the claim that they’re the same is rejected even by the world.
It is not only according to treatises, but also the direct experience of worldly
beings that the effect follows the disappearance of the cause, and so since even
they would not accept the cause to be the same as the effect, self-production does
not exist on either of the two levels of truth.
B. SOMET HING ARISING FROM SOMET HING COMPLET ELY DIFFERENT
You might agree that production from self is illogical, and think that just as a
child is born from its mother and a sprout is produced from its seed, production
can only occur from something “other.” It is indeed true that cause and effect are
labeled as “other,” but this is not a self-production that can be proven logically.
If the cause were proven to be inherently different from the effect, then the
effect would not need to depend on the cause, and both would be equal in terms of
their capacity. While something exists, it is unnecessary for it to be produced from
something else, just as two people who have already been born are not dependent
upon one another.
If one thing were to arise from another, it would follow that anything could
arise from anything else, like darkness arising from a butter lamp and so on, given
that there is no difference in terms of their being other.
It is said [in the Introduction to the Middle Way]:
If things could arise on the basis of something “other,”
Well then, thick darkness should come from flames.
And:
For the cause and effect to be entirely “other,”
Is never feasible.
If the cause and effect were entirely other,
Causes would be just the same as non-causes.
Then you might say, “In the case of anything truly different such as light and
darkness and so on, cause and effect would be unpredictable. But seeds and
sprouts and so on have an uncommon acting causal relationship of influencer and
influenced, and so the preceding cause produces a subsequent effect. And so there
is no question of anything arising from anything else, like darkness from flames
and so on.”
Then, it is said [in the Introduction to the Middle Way]:
You do not accept that barley, stamens, Kimshuka and so on
Can produce a rice sprout, because they lack the capability,
They are not within the same continuum, and are not similar.
It is the same for the rice seed, we say, because of being “other.”
In the same way that barley and flowers, stones and so on can not be included
within the same continuum as the cause of a rice sprout or be said to be of “similar
type,” so too, the barley seed and its sprout, if they are established as truly “other”
from the perspective of ultimate analysis, cannot ultimately belong to the same
continuum.
Even though this does not affect the ultimate conclusion that it is wholly
unacceptable for a thing’s own producers to belong to its same continuum, it is
acceptable to classify a producer as belonging to the same continuum on the
conventional level, based on the ultimately incontrovertible point that things are
not inherently ‘other’, but arise in interdependence.
Moreover, since at any given time, either the seed or the sprout will be non-
existent, having not yet arisen or already ceased, how could it be feasible for them
to be “influencer” and “influenced.” These are mere imputations.
You might say, “Although the seed and sprout do not exist at the same time,
there is no fault because they arise and cease like the up and down movements of
a pair of scales.” If this is your claim, then while the seed is ceasing, it is
approaching destruction and although it exists in the present, it does not remain in
the next instant. And the sprout, while it is in the process of arising, is approaching
production so it does not exist at the same time as the seed. So there never could be
any contact between the two, and the example of the scales is meaningless.
A Treatise on the Middle Way says:
If the eye consciousness already exists as other than its own simultaneous
producers,
Such as the eye and the co-emergent perception and so on,
What need is there for it to be produced?
If it does not exist, then the faults of this were already explained.
If eye consciousness already existed as something other than its own producers
such as the eye faculty and the visual object and so on, and also its concurrent
mental states such as sensation and perception, then there would be no need for
its production. If it did not exist already, then these could not be something “other.”
Therefore, the mind and mental states and the four elements that exist at the
same time are merely labeled as causes and effects, whilst if the mind and mental
states and so on were produced inherently as something truly “other,” that would
entail the faults already described.
So, regarding production such as that of the sprout from the seed, the Acharya
Nagarjuna said:
From a seed that is destroyed or intact,
The sprout is not produced,
 So you taught that all production
Is just like magical creation.
As it is said, the appearances of dependent origination cannot withstand logical
analysis, and when investigated using reasoning that inquires into the ultimate,
not even the slightest so-called “production” may be observed. Yet, when left
unanalyzed, just like the appearances during a dream, a sprout appears to be
produced from a seed. This is simply the way in which the conventional is
presented.
Similarly, at a merely conventional level, the continuum of similarity is said to
remain and cease, but ultimately, since no arising is observed in the beginning,
there can be no true ceasing at the end nor any abiding in the interim. Thus things
are devoid of arising, dwelling and ceasing.
Therefore, appearances—when viewed from the perspective of the non-
paradoxical unity of the two truths—are just like the examples of an illusion,
dream, city of gandharvas, reflection of the moon in water and so on.
When analyzing in this way, using ultimate reasoning, because of the crucial
point that all phenomena lack inherent existence, seeds and sprouts and so on can
not be established as having any essential identity, whether as truly identical,
‘other’ or whatever.
Others (the proponents of real entities within the Buddhist tradition) may say:
“Although the other three types of production—self-production and so on—may be
refuted, if we do not accept production from other, won’t we be contradicting the
normal conventions of the world, such as the fact that sprouts arise from seeds and
butter from curd?” There is no contradiction. In reality, if we apply reasoning, then
not only at an ultimate level, but also conventionally speaking, arising is never
really observed. If production were observable and proven conventionally, then it
would follow that conventionally true phenomena such as the aggregates and
elements would become immune to ultimate analysis. It would also follow that
ultimate or truly existent arising would not be refuted. And it would follow that
the equipoise of noble beings would become a cause for destroying previously
existent conventional phenomena, which would lead to the extreme of
deprecating the existent by labeling it non-existent. In any case, what is claimed is
not possible.
In short, from the perspective of ultimate analysis, no phenomena whatsoever
may be observed that are established as genuinely existent, whilst from the
perspective of reasoning inquiring into the conventional, things are observed. That
these two points are consistent, and established as a single reality is the assertion
of the followers of the Middle-way beyond extremes.
Yet those who speak of real entities disagree, for they consider emptiness and
dependently originating appearance to be mutually opposed. They believe that
whatever is refuted by ultimate analysis must be completely non-existent even on
a conventional level, just like the horns of a rabbit. Or else, that whatever exists
conventionally, such as pillars and vases, could never be refuted by ultimate
reasoning. They conceive of some independent object of negation separate from
the conventional phenomena that are the basis of negation and they consider
emptiness—which for them is the refutation of a separate phenomenon called
“true existence”—and appearances, the basis for that refutation, to be directly
opposed to one another, like the total non-existence of the horns of rabbits and the
real existence of the horns of cattle. Asserting this to be a unity, by mentally
‘binding’ these two to an entity such as a vase is tantamount to claiming that
emptiness is an affirming negation, and in the end it does not even go beyond the
views of the proponents of true entities. This point has already been well made by
the great logicians of the past.
C. SOMET HING ARISING FROM BOT H IT SELF A ND FROM SOMET HING ELSE
The Samkhyas who speak of primal substance and an almighty god assert
production from both self and other, but this carries the faults mentioned in both
the earlier positions. As it is said [in A Treatise on the Middle Way]:
Production from both is inherently unreasonable,
Because it would entail the problems already explained.
So, this position is unacceptable from the perspective of either of the two truths.
D. SOMET HING ARISING FROM NO CA USES
As for the assertion that there is no arising from self, from other or from both,
but that there could be production without any cause, it is said [in the Introduction
to the Middle Way]:
If the world were devoid of any cause, then it might be apprehended
Like the fragrance and color of a blue lotus in space,
Yet this world is apprehended in all its rich variety,
And so, just like one’s own mind, it should be known to arise from causes.
This has already been refuted in more detail above, in the context of the
philosophical schools [the Gateway to Knowledge] where it was shown how it
entails either permanent existence or non-existence.
In this way, when analyzing using the logical arguments that refute production
from the four extremes of self, other, both and neither, no phenomenon
whatsoever may be seen to arise in the beginning, and therefore to possess the
other features of remaining in the middle or ceasing in the end. And so the
conceptual elaborations of the eight extremes25 such as ultimate arising and so on
are pacified with regard to these unceasing mere relative appearances, and this
should be understood as the unity of appearance and emptiness. This is taught
more elaborately in the Introduction to the Middle Way.
SUMMA RY [REFUT A T ION OF PRODUCT IONS FROM FOUR A LT ERNA T IVES]
When analyzed, production cannot be established as occurring in any of these
four possible ways: (1) several causes producing a single result, (2) several causes
producing several results, (3) a single cause producing several results or (4) a single
cause producing a single result.
You might think that it is only possible for several distinct causes, such as the
object of a visible form, the unimpaired sense faculty, the immediately preceding
mental attention, an unobstructed appearance and accommodating space, to
produce the result of a single visual consciousness.
In which case, since several distinct causes produce only a single result, the
object, faculty and so on do produce the visual consciousness, but it must follow
that there can be no other cause for its singularity. Similarly, as long as a single
cause is incapable of producing a single effect, there is no cause for singularity or
plurality, one-ness or many-ness. And since there is no knowable phenomenon
that does not fall into either category (of one or many), whatever is singular or
plural must either remain that way forever or never come into being at any time
or place. This is because there is no cause for being singular or plural.
You might think that several causes produce several effects, the immediate
intention of wishing to look producing the visual consciousness of a mental nature,
the support of the eye faculty producing the apprehension of the object, and the
apparent object such as a vase producing its own particular mental features. In
that case, since it would be produced by these various causes, it would have the
various features just described, such as having a mental nature and so on, and so
that eye consciousness would become many, equal in number to its aspects
described above. If that is accepted, then the resultant visual consciousness is not
produced by these causes such as the intention and so on. The particular aspects
such as the mental nature, the endowment with the features of the object and so
on are produced individually, but the one who possesses these aspects, the visual
consciousness itself, has no cause and is therefore not produced by anything.
You might respond by saying that the apprehension of the object and the other
aspects are not separate, in the sense that they are nothing other than
consciousness. But then it would be meaningless to call this “several causes
producing several effects.” It becomes “several causes producing a single effect,”
and the problems involved in such an assertion, i.e. because one and many are
uncaused, things must be either permanently existent or non-existent, have been
explained above.
You may think that there is still no fault because the aspects and the possessor
of these aspects are of the same essential identity, and only labeled as separate
based on conceptual distinctions. In that case the causes, such as attention, would
perform their function for the conceptual distinctions, the imputed phenomena
such as the mental nature and so on, but the substantially existent consciousness
itself would not be produced by any cause, and so consciousness would be
causeless.
If you claim that the essential identity of the effect is one, but its aspects are
multiple, then this leads to the fault of the qualities being separate from that
which possesses them.
You might consider that the single cause of a blue flower produces several
effects, such as that flower’s own subsequent “similar type” and the visual
consciousness of sentient beings, for example. The question is: does that cause, i.e.,
the flower, perform this production by itself exclusively, without relying on any
other factors, or is it done together with other assisting factors, such as the
faculties? In the first case of production by itself alone, since it would not be able
to produce a plurality, this implies causeless production. Similarly, since one cause
also can not perform the function of producing one effect, then it follows that the
single and the multiple must both lack causes, and once again there is the fault of
production occurring without any cause, as explained above.
If the object, like the blue [flower], produces the visual consciousness in
dependence on other causes, such as the appearance, sense faculty, attention and
so on, and you say that it has been produced by other causes as well, the result will
cease to be singular, because it will possess several features or qualities that have
been produced by the various causes, such as the object, faculty and attention.
Then, it might be said that a single cause only produces its own single result. If
that were the case, then since a cause such as the eye faculty could only produce
the result of its own subsequent “resemblance,” and could never perform the
function of producing anything else, such as a visual consciousness directly
apprehending an object, there would be no cause for beings’ visual or auditory
consciousnesses and so on, and so these effects would be impossible, with the
absurd consequence that everyone would be deaf and blind.
As it says in the Two Truths of the Middle Way [by Jñanagarbha]:
Several things do not produce just one thing,
And many things do not create a multiplicity.
One thing is not produced by many things.
And from a single thing, a single thing is not produced.
This was stated in accordance with such reasoning.
Moreover, other arguments might be given in response to one who asserts that
several causes, such as the appearance, faculty and attention, give rise to a single
result, such as visual cognition. [For example,] even if it is granted that the
resultant eye consciousness does not have several qualities and is singular, it is
impossible for any knowable phenomenon to be truly singular, as in the case of a
visual consciousness devoid of its accompanying mental states, such as the ever-
present states and so on.
You might think that many causes produce many effects, but then since it
would be impossible for several causes to produce only a single effect, it would be
quite meaningless to speak of a gathering of several causes. When singular
phenomena cannot be established, the “many” that they go together to produce
will not be established either, and will not exist.
The assertion that one cause produces several effects is also unsound, since it
presupposes a single cause that cannot be divided into parts, and this is impossible.
It can be seen that a single cause such as a seed would be incapable of producing
its effect, the sprout, without relying upon other conditions, such as earth, water,
warmth, time and so on.
It is also not the case that a single cause gives rise to a single effect, since this is
contrary to direct experience, namely the successive production of a variety of
effects like the sprout, the flower, the fruit and so on, from a variety of causes and
conditions such as the seed, water, fertilizer, heat, moisture and so on.
Therefore, when thoroughly examining, a truly singular phenomenon that
lacks a plurality of features or qualities cannot be established at all, whether as a
causal or resultant entity. And without any such singular phenomenon, then the
plural too, which must necessarily be composed of the singular, must also be non-
existent.
Nevertheless, in the case of a thing such as a sprout, even though it consists of
several parts such as its color and shape and so on, they are still labeled as one
thing, i.e. a sprout, based on their similarity of type and so forth. And also in the
case of a single phenomenon such as a particle, when dividing it according to its
features, such as substance and direction, it is labeled as multiple. Yet it is simply
through the power of dependent origination or “dependent definition”, that these
are conventionally designated as causes and effects. When analyzing with ultimate
reasoning, they cannot be established according to any of these four alternatives of
single, multiple, etc., and therefore since these conventional entities do not
withstand investigation, they should be understood to be just like the appearances
during a dream.
Although this reasoning is sometimes called “the investigation of both the cause
and the effect: refuting production according to the four alternatives” thus giving a
total of five great logical arguments—and ultimately there is no real contradiction
in explaining it that way—it seems reasonable to include it within the category of
investigation of the cause, so that there are a total of four great logical arguments.
There are also other arguments which investigate the cause, effect and identity,
such as, for example, the division into the three times of past, present and future,
i.e., the result that was produced in the past has already arisen and has now
ceased, so it is not produced. The result of the future has not yet arisen in the
present, and so it is not produced. And finally, the present result has already been
established as its own identity and so it would be meaningless for it to be produced
again.
II. T HE SECOND MA DHY A MA KA ANA LY SIS: EXA MINING EFFECT S
Regarding the effect that is produced, if one examines whether it is an existent
effect that arises or a non-existent one, or one that is both or neither, the Treatise
on the Middle Way says:
If it is something existent, what need is there for its production?
But if it does not exist, what could be done to it?
If it is both [existent and non-existent], what can be done?
And if neither, what can be done?
A. T HE EFFECT S ALREA DY EXIST WHEN T HE PHENOMENA ARISE
If you consider that the result to be produced is something existent which
develops, this is unreasonable. Why? If it is existent, then it must exist having
already established its own identity as a sprout and so on, and being existent, it
would be unnecessary for it to be produced anew. It is just like a grain of barley,
which, having ripened once, does not need to ripen all over again. If something
already existent still needed to be produced then that would lead to the fault of
production continuing ad infinitum.
 “Well then,” you might think, “It is something non-existent that is produced.”
But in that case, it would be impossible to produce. For example, even if someone
were to go to great lengths to assemble hundreds of causes and conditions, they
would still never be able to produce the non-existent horns on the head of a rabbit.
B. T HE EFFECT S DO NOT EXIST WHEN T HE PHENOMENA ARISE
You might think that the effect, such as the sprout, was formerly non-existent,
but is made anew into something existent by the causes such as the seed. It is not
so. Since existent and non-existent are mutually contradictory, they could never
combine on the basis of a single entity. In terms of actual entities, there are no
phenomena whatsoever that were formerly non-existent, and later changed into
something existent. Causes and conditions could not transform unconditioned
space, for example, into the identity of a conditioned, existent phenomenon.
Thus, simply on a conventional level, effects appear based on causes. Formerly,
prior to the gathering of their causes and conditions, they did not appear, and now,
when the causes and conditions are assembled, they do. The mind relates these
two stages to one another, and then there is the merely conceptual statement,
“This did not exist before, but now it is arising!”
Similarly, one mentally relates earlier and later occasions and, in relation to a
given phenomenon, thinks, “This existed previously, and then it did not exist.”
Thus, the phenomena that are conventional entities simply appear by the force
of dependent origination, and in reality there are no existent phenomena
whatsoever that transform into non-existent ones, and there are no non-existent
phenomena that transform into existent ones.
It is similar in the case of conditioned formations arising anew and finally
ceasing, or the continua of “similar type” remaining and not remaining, the
perception of an existent self of the individual or phenomena and the perception
of no-self. The explanation is similar to that given in the case of existent and non-
existent phenomena. They are all merely appearances on the conventional,
relative level, and ultimately, they are empty of their own essential identity. At the
level of the genuine nature of things, there is no observation of any features such
as the transformation of something existent into something non-existent or non-
existent into existent, of any going or coming, arising or ceasing, increasing or
decreasing.
C. T HE EFFECT S BOT H EXIST A ND DO NOT EXIST WHEN T HE PHENOMENA ARISE
You might wonder how it is that production of results should be asserted, given
that neither existent nor non-existent effects are produced, and that, aside from
these two, no third mode of production is possible. It is asserted that the arising of
effects is nothing other than the undeceiving appearance of dependent origination,
and when analyzed as to whether it is existent or non-existent, it is not established
in any way whatsoever, but is just like the example of a magical illusion and so on.
It is impossible for a knowable phenomenon to be both existent and non-
existent, since these two are directly opposed to one another. And it is also
impossible for a phenomenon to be neither existent nor non-existent, because it is
impossible for there to be some third option in between these two directly opposed
positions.
“Well then,” you might think, “just as it is impossible here to have the option of
neither, there cannot be this option of ‘neither’ in the context of freedom from
conceptual elaboration of the four extremes, such as existing, not existing and so
on.” And, you might think, “Just as in the assertion made without specifying ‘not
existent and not non-existent’, it is impossible for there to be a third option
between direct opposites, so the natural state can be understood through the two
negations, and there is nothing meaningful in defining what ‘nothing whatsoever’
means. Thus, apart from the rather deceitful position of asserting nothing at all,
our own tradition does not make any kind of definite statement about how things
are.” This might be how spiritually immature beginners think it is, but it is not like
that at all.
D. T HE EFFECT S NEIT HER EXIST NOR DO NOT EXIST WHEN T HE PHENOMENA ARISE
As long as one still maintains a basis for conceptual reference, there cannot
possibly be an apprehension that does away with the four extremes altogether.
Therefore, whatever assertions are made by applying particular distinctions—like
saying, “There is no snake in this house, but there is a vase”—they are conceptual
references involving particular conceptual ideas, and so they are not beyond the
realms of ordinary conceptual thought. In the actual state of simplicity, in which
all conceptual focus has subsided, there are no assertions or conceptual references
whatsoever with regard to the four extremes. Even so, it is quite unlike the dull
confusion of not having realized ultimate reality, or a state of unconsciousness. It is
a state difficult to express by words or through examples, which is—as it says in
Rahula’s Praise to the Great Mother Prajñaparamita—beyond words, beyond
thought and beyond description. It is simplicity that is discerned by means of one’s
own individual awareness, in which all doubts have been cut through: a non-
conceptual primordial awareness free from dualistic perceptions, but naturally
luminous like the shining sun.
III. T HIRD MA DHY A MA KA A NA LY SIS: FINDING T HE ESSENT IA L NA T URE OF NEIT HER ONE NOR MA NY
To begin with, there is an analysis of the essential identity of all conditioned
and unconditioned phenomena to determine whether or not there is true
singularity. In the case of those conditioned phenomena of the five aggregates
possessing physical form, there is a division into above, below, the cardinal and
intermediate directions and the centre. Through this, it can be seen that, for
something such as a vase, singularity is simply a conceptual notion applied to the
various features that are the basis for such an imputation. True singularity is not
established, and the same applies in the case of its component parts. The body and
the limbs are also divided into parts in the same way.
In short, all that possesses physical form and is composed of material particles
may be broken down to its basis, which is the infinitely small particle. And,
according to the logic explained before, for that most subtle particle to be
surrounded by particles in the various directions, it must have sides, which means
it must have parts, and so on, in an infinite regression. If not, then however many
subtle particles are gathered together, they could never grow any larger. Thus, all
phenomena with material form lack true singularity.
In addition, the eight or the six collections of consciousness can not be
established as truly singular since they consist of various cognitive acts and mental
states, take various features as their focus, and arise in different forms from the
gathering of the four conditions, and then cease.
By analyzing everything that has the nature of arising and ceasing deriving
from its own causes, even the subtlest indivisible moment cannot be established,
and so all phenomena included within mind and matter lack any true singularity.
As for non-concurrent formations, they are simply imputations made upon the
‘occasion’ of mind and matter, and so they lack any essential identity.
Unconditioned phenomena are imputations made with regard to the eliminated
aspects of objects of negation, and are also lacking in any essential identity.
In short, all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena cannot be shown to
have any true singularity, and since this is not established, plurality that is made
up of what is singular must also remain unestablished. And so, since there is no
mode of true existence aside from being truly singular or plural, it must follow
that individuals and phenomena are proven to be without inherent identity, just as
it is explained more elaborately in the Ornament of the Middle Way.
IV. ANA LY SIS OF ALL SOURCES: T HE LOGICA L ARGUMENT OF GREA T INT ERDEPENDENCE
All phenomena do not come into being through their own inherent identity, but
as a result of the coming together of causes and conditions, and when there are no
conditions they do not arise. Even at the time when they appear, they appear
whilst lacking any inherent existence, since they are like reflections, brought
about by causes and conditions. Free from any conceptual elaborations such as
being permanent or non-existent, going or coming, arising or ceasing or being one
or many, they appear whilst lacking true reality.
When evaluating in this way, using reasoning investigating the ultimate in
accordance with the actual nature of things, they are found to be mere unfailing
dependent arising. Otherwise, if they were truly established in any way, such as
arising according to the four extremes or four alternatives, or being existent or
non-existent, or permanent or impermanent etc., then that would be inappropriate
as an explanation for the conventional, and would result in a deprecation of all
conventions.
According to the Middle-way tradition, for which the unreal illusory
appearances of dependent origination and emptiness arise in the same reality, all
the conventions of mere appearance are extremely reasonable. This being so, the
conventions of the world, as well as the supermundane conventions of the Four
Truths, Three Jewels and so on, are all perfectly established.
This king of reasonings, the Great Interdependence, includes all the other types
of ultimate logic, such as the Diamond Splinter and so on, because they are all
concerned with the seemingly real, unexamined appearances of dependent
origination. When analyzed, no causes, effects or essential identities whatsoever
can be established. The extensive variations of this logic that investigates the
meaning of dependent origination are to be found in the Root Verses of the Middle
Way and elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, at the conventional level, cause, effect and inherent identity appear
in that way, and are labeled with such conventions. Ultimately, causes, effects and
inherent identities lack any true nature, being emptiness with the identity of the
three doors of liberation. The emptiness in which the two truths are inseparably
united like this is the dharmadhatu, the object to be realized through the path of
the Middle Way. It is the supreme of all that might be realized, the “mother” of the
victorious buddhas and their heirs.
This point concerning equalness in which the truths of appearance and
emptiness are indivisible is just like the sphere of space, and is beyond the realm
of conceptual thought, unimaginable and inexpressible, yet with non-conceptual
wisdom, it can be meditated in the manner of pure self-knowing awareness.
During the post-meditation phase, one has the confident certainty that all things
appear yet lack true reality, just like the examples of a magical illusion, dream,
reflection, magical creations and so on. And, with the wisdom that thoroughly
discerns the two truths, one is brought to an undeluded realization concerning all
the categories of the ground, path and fruition.
Through comprehending the meaning of emptiness in this way, all the
enlightened qualities of the path and fruition of the Great Vehicle will arise.
Taken from Mipham Rinpoche’s mkhas ‘jug, with supplementary material from
Khenpo Nüden’s commentary.
Translated and edited by Adam Pearcey, 2005
 Notes
(By Clark Johnson, Ph.D.)

1. Williams, Paul Mahayana Buddhism, p. 14-15.

2. The concept of nature was prevalent in Greece at the time of Alexander the
Great’s invasion of Pakistan and India in 326 BCE. This was about a century after
the Buddha passed away, and his tutor Aristotle wrote the famous book
Metaphysics which began with the first line, “All men by nature have the desire
for knowledge” showing how important the concept of nature was.

Aristotle argued that one must define objects and since their appearances are all
different ie a cup can be made of porcelain, plastic, or metal, be square or
round, have a handle or not, etc, one must rely on the object’s nature or
essence. Aristotle proposed four types of causes which outline the essence of an
object: (1) the form of the object or the formal cause, (2) the matter of the object
or the material cause, (3) the agency that brings about the object or the efficient
cause, and (4) the purpose of the object or the final cause. This final cause
(Greek telos) is, for example, the nature of a grain of rice that allows it to
become a rice plant.

This concept is still an important and widely used concept in Hindu and
Buddhist philosophy to this day.
3. Chamgon Kenting Tai Situpa Emptiness and Voidness. Thar Lam magazine, April
2011, page 4.
4. Westerhoff, Jan Christoph. Nagarjuna. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (2011) online at www.plato.stanford.edu.
5. Hopkins, Jeffrey Meditation on Emptiness. Wisdom Publications, 1996, page 9.
6. Padmakara Translation Committee. Introduction to the Middle Way:
Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara with Commentary by Jamgon Mipham.
Shambhala, 2002, page 360.
7. The extreme of eternalism is to hold the view that we possess an indestructible
“soul” which is a real and solid entity that passes from one lifetime to the next.
The extreme of nihilism is that everything is empty and therefore there is no
karma so we might just do whatever we want without considering its effects on
ourselves or others.
8. The root text that Thrangu Rinpoche is basing his commentary on is Mipham
Rinpoche’s Entrance to the Way of the Learned. This root text was translated by
Adam Pearcey. His translation can be found on the website as The Four Logical
Arguments on www.lotsawahouse.org.
9. Mahamudra is one of the fundamental meditations of the Kagyu lineage. It is
characterized by not doing elaborate practices, but involving looking directly
 into the mind. It is similar to the Nyingma lineage’s meditation of Dzogchen.
See Thrangu Rinpoche’s The Essentials of Mahamudra for a more complete
description of Mahamudra meditation.
10. The five works of Maitreya were received by Asanga when he went to the
Tushita pure realm and they are:
The Ornament of Clear Realization
The Uttaratantra
The Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras
Differentiating the Middle from the Extremes
Differentiating Dharma from Dharmata
Asanga also wrote commentaries on each of these texts. Thrangu Rinpoche has
also written commentaries on four of these five texts. They are given in the
bibliography.
11. The Shentong (“empty of other”) and Rangtong (“empty of self”) is a distinction
made only in Tibet and cannot specifically be found in the Indian Buddhist
literature. The Rangtong view, to greatly simplify, is that everything is empty
and therefore the third turning of the wheel of dharma, which believes in a
permanent Buddha-nature, was not quite correct (but rather a provisional
view). This view is mainly held by the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism. The
Shentong school holds that Buddha-nature pervades all sentient beings and so
all these beings have the potential to reach enlightenment. This view is taught
in the third turning of the wheel of dharma, and so the Shentong school holds
that the third turning is the definitive most complete teaching. The Shentong
school is held mostly by the Kagyu and Nyingma schools and this is the
viewpoint that Thrangu Rinpoche takes in The Open Door to Emptiness. Both
Rangtong and Shentong schools agree that on the conventional level of reality,
all things are empty of inherent existence.

This difference between Rangtong and Shentong is explained in much greater

detail in Hookham’s The Buddha Within and in Brunholzl’s Center of the Sunlit
Sky.
12. Buddhists hold a view quite opposite to common sense or that held in the West;
they believe that the world we perceive is not really an accurate reflection of
reality, but rather is just an illusion or an appearance. What we perceive is
relative or conventional truth or reality (Tib. kunzop), while an enlightened
person can see the world “as it really is;” as its absolute or ultimate truth or
reality (Tib. dondam). Ordinary beings see external phenomena as solid and real
and experience existence as the continual ups and downs of samsara, while
ultimately, external phenomena are not this at all; they are empty.
13. Aggregates (Skt. skandha) literally means “heaps” or “piles” as in a pile of rocks.
These are basically all the constituents in the world. The first aggregate is form
and this applies to all external objects that can be perceived through the senses.
The last four aggregates are mental processes for analyzing the world around
 us. First, a visual image, sound, taste, smell, or touch contacts the sense faculty
of the individual. This is the first aggregate of “form.” Second is the aggregate of
feeling in which mental representations of form are automatically classified as
beautiful, pleasant, or desirable or as ugly, threatening, or undesirable, or as
simply neutral. The sense perception itself, of course, is none of these—it is
simply a sensory perception. Third, the sensory perception is identified so one
identifies the perception as “a chair” or “my wife” or the like. This aggregate has
been translated as “identification” or “discrimination” and this process, of
course, involves past experience. After the sensory perception is identified, it is
connected with previous conditioning and habitual patterns in the fourth
aggregate, which is translated as “formation.” So we not only identify the object,
but all our past history with the object and what it is related to is part of this
perception. The last aggregate is “consciousness” and this occurs when the
perception enters the sixth mental consciousness as a mental object. Although
we can divide these aggregates up as distinct units intellectually, they are
actually a continuous, indivisible process of perception.

The point here is that we have each of the skandhas arising for each visual,
auditory, gustatory, etc. sensation so there are thousands of distinct processes
going on at any one time in our “mind,” rather than the experience of a simple
unitary mind which is our conventional experience of self.
14. In Buddhist logic there is strong emphasis on phenomena which are a
composite and those which are not composite. For example, a tree, house,
person’s body, or cup is a composite phenomenon because it is made up of
many smaller elements. A cup, for example, is made up of paint, a finish, and
clay, which is made up of silicon and oxygen. When the cup is left alone for
hundreds of years, it breaks into small pieces and it thrown away and
eventually ends up in the earth as its constituent elements. Because it is a
composite, it is therefore impermanent and not eternal and is empty of any true
nature i.e. the “cupness” or function of a cup is eventually destroyed and it
eventually becomes the nature of dust. Buddha-nature, on the other hand, is not
a composite of anything and therefore is permanent and enduring.
15. There is an issue of terminology that often confuses persons who have not
studied the Middle-way teachings. When we say, “trying to discover the self”
and later conclude that “you cannot find the self because it is non-existent”
what this means in this text is not that the “self”(Tib. dak) is the body as when
we say, “This is me” pointing to our body. Rather, “self” refers to the huge story
line we develop to explain ourselves and our thoughts, which begins at birth
and continues all the way to death. The story-line is like: “I was born to my
parents who were like this and that and they taught me so and so and I always
liked such and such people because these people loved and liked me and I don’t
like these people and situations because I wasn’t respected because of so and so.
I have these good traits of such and such, but don’t like persons and situations
that are like so and so.”
 This story line, which each person carries around and believes to be true and
correct and real, is actually, on careful examination, simply a mental
construction. The actual self is continuously changing and different when
viewed by other people. Obviously this “self” exists, but it exists in the same way
a reflection of the moon appears on a lake or a rainbow. So we can say the “self”
appears because everyone experiences a self, but like a rainbow it is
insubstantial which is a better word than non-existent. This is the doctrine of
“non-self” or “selflessness” or the “egolessness of self” (Tib. dakme where dak
means “self” and me means “not”).
16. Thrangu Rinpoche allows his students to develop certainty about emptiness by
having the students ask questions and he answers them—a well-known
technique of debate practiced daily in Tibetan monastic colleges. In the West we
know this as the Socratic method.
17. This sutra is called the Questions of King Melinda in the Pali texts and is said to
be an encounter between the yogi Nagasena and Meander, a Greek king of
Bactria (modern Pakistan).
18. In Buddhist logic there is an emphasis on everything having a primary cause or
causal condition (Tib. gyu), secondary or supporting conditions (Tib. khyen) and
finally an effect (Tib. de bu). For example, if we have an oak tree it did not come
from nowhere, but it had to have a primary cause, which is the acorn. But the
acorn alone did not cause an oak tree to grow, because it also had to have the
supporting conditions of soil, water, sunlight, the right temperature, etc. In the
four analyses of the Middle-way the first analysis is of this causal condition and
the second analysis is of the effect, often called the “result.”

The Abhidharma actually describes six different kinds of causes and four
different kinds of supporting conditions and one result. These are studied
extensively in Tibetan monastic colleges and are used in their daily debates on
philosophical matters.
19. This should not be taken as meaning that women cannot achieve
enlightenment to the same degree as men. In fact, Rinpoche has said many
times that reaching enlightenment depends only upon having a mind and
making the effort to practice the Dharma and that there is absolutely no
difference in that regard between men and women.
20. Thrangu Rinpoche was born in 1933.
21. Thrangu Rinpoche gave a seven-day teaching on Shantirashita’s One and Many
analysis in Crestone, Colorado in 2010.
22. The Foundation schools hold that there are six consciousnesses, as do some of
the Mahayana schools, but the Mind-only or Chittamatra school of Mahayana
Buddhism holds that there are eight consciousnesses. These are explained in
greater detail in Thrangu Rinpoche’s Transcending Ego: Distinguishing
Consciousness from Wisdom.
23. This is the root text and we have simply added headings in small caps to make
it conform to Thrangu Rinpoche's text.
24. For those not familiar with Madhyamaka or Middle-way logic this is the four-
fold reasoning introduced by Nagarjuna. In the very first verse of the Treatise of
the Middle Way, the central thesis on the Madhyamaka, it says: “Nowhere are
there entities that have originated from themselves, from another, from both, or
from no cause at all.” This one sentence is considered the essence of the Middle-
way and is actually the “vajra splinter.”

In condition of (a) the effect having the same nature as its causes: in this context
it means that a grain of rice and the rice plant have the same inherent nature
and the Samkhya school would argue that the cause is the rice seed and the
effect is the rice plant. Since the seed and plant obviously have the same
inherent nature of “rice,” the rice plant just appears with no cause and effect.
This is called “something arising from itself.”

In condition (b) the effect having a completely different nature from its effect:
we could argue that a mother (the cause of the birth) who is a woman and
mature has a completely different nature (essence) than a helpless newborn
male child.

In condition (c) the root text (see appendix A) says that the Samkhya school
holds basically that everything has an inherent essence and it is a creator who
imbues this substance with the qualities that differentiates the substance into
the vast variety of phenomena. This does not make logical sense because we
have already proved that phenomena don’t arise from themselves and also don’t
arise from anything else, so it couldn’t arise out of both of these conditions.

In the condition (d) where the effect arises neither from itself nor from
anything else, which is held by the Carvaka school, this basically violates the
assumption that there is cause and effect in the world. Without cause and effect
there is no karma, and this is why Carvakas can say there is no right or wrong
and so we can do anything we want with no consequences beyond what we get
caught at.
25. The eight extremes are arising, ceasing, permanence, non-existence, coming,
going, plurality and singularity.
 Aryadeva
Aryadeva was born in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) in the 3rd century of our era. He was
Nagarjuna’s closest disciple and helped clarify the Madhyamaka view. He is
known for writing the Four Hundred Verses (Skt. catusataka), which was in
sixteen chapters.
 The Glossary of Terms
Abhidharma The Buddhist teachings are often divided into the Tripitaka: the
Sutras (teachings of the Buddha), the Vinaya (teachings on conduct), and the
Abhidharma, which is the analyses of phenomena that exist primarily as a
commentarial tradition to the Buddhist teachings.
afflicted consciousness The seventh consciousness. It has two aspects: the
immediate consciousness, which monitors the other consciousnesses making
them continuous, and the klesha consciousness, which is the continuous
presence of self. See consciousnesses, eight.
aggregates, five (Skt. skandha) Literally, “heaps.” The five aggregates are called
“form and name.” The first aggregate is form, which is all external objects that
can be sensed. The second to fifth skandhas are “name,” which are mental
processes the external sensations undergo in the mind. The second aggregate is
feeling where the sensation is judged pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. The third
aggregate is perception where the objects are identified based on past
experience. The four aggregate is formation in which the perception is
compared to all previous experiences with it. The fifth aggregate is
consciousness.
alaya consciousness See consciousnesses, eight.
analytical insight In the sutra tradition one begins by listening to the teachings,
which means studying the Dharma. Then one contemplates the Dharma using
analytical insight. Finally, there is actual meditation which is free from concept.
anatman (Skt., Tib. dakme) Nonself. The belief that a person or self is insubstantial
(or selfless) rather than a substantial solid entity.
arhat Accomplished Foundation vehicle practitioners who have eliminated the
emotional obscurations. They are the fully realized shravakas and
pratyekabuddhas.
Aryadeva (3rd century CE) The closest pupil of Nagarjuna who became his heir.
He was born in Sri Lanka and wrote the Catuhsha-kate.
Asanga A fourth century Indian philosopher who founded the Chittamatra or
Yogacara school and is known for revealing the five works of Maitreya. His
brother was Vasubandhu.
Ashoka (ruled 272 to 231 BCE) A king who first conquered almost all of India and
then converted to Buddhism. After this he propagated the Buddhist teachings
throughout India and sent Buddhist emissaries to other countries.
atman (Skt., Tib. dak) A permanent self. The concept of atman which is a
permanent, unchanging self which goes from body to body in reincarnation can
be traced back to the vedas before the birth of the Buddha.
bodhichitta Literally, “the mind of enlightenment.” There are two kinds of
bodhichitta: absolute bodhichitta, which is completely awakened mind that sees
 the emptiness of phenomena, and relative bodhichitta which is the aspiration to
practice the six paramitas and free all beings from the suffering of samsara.
bodhisattva Literally, “one who exhibits the mind of enlightenment.” Also an
individual who has committed him or herself to the Mahayana path of
compassion and the practice of the six paramitas to achieve buddhahood to free
all beings from samsara.
Carvakas A philosophical school in India which didn’t believe in an afterlife, that
all things happen naturally without divine intervention, that religion was solely
invented by man, and therefore humans should simply enjoy any sensual
pleasure they desired.
Chandrakirti (600 to 650 CE) A Indian Buddhist scholar of the Madhyamaka school
who is best known for founding the Prasangika sub-school and writing two
treatises on emptiness using logical reasoning.
Chittamatra school or Mind-only school. A school founded by Asanga in the
fourth century. One of the four major schools in the Mahayana tradition and its
main tenet (to greatly simplify) is that all phenomena are mental events.
cognitive obscurations See the obscurations, two.
consciousnesses, sensory These are the five sensory consciousnesses of sight,
hearing, smell, taste, touch, and body sensation. These consciousnesses appear
when the body comes in contact with a sight, sound, smell, taste, or touch.
These consciousnesses do not evaluate the sensory input, which is done by the
sixth mental consciousnesses.
consciousnesses, eight These are the five sensory consciousnesses of sight,
hearing, smell, taste, touch, and body sensation. The sixth is mental
consciousness, seventh is the afflicted consciousness, and eighth is the ground
consciousness.
conventional or relative truth There are two truths or realities: relative and
ultimate. Conventional reality or truth is the perception of an ordinary
(unenlightened) person who sees the world as solid and real with all his or her
projections based on a false belief in self.
defilements See disturbing emotions.
dharma When not capitalized, it refers to phenomena.
Dharma When capitalized, it refers to the teachings of the Buddha.
dharmas In the Abhidharma teachings it was proposed that there were certain
factors both physical and mental which had inherent nature. Each school had a
different list of these universal factors into which everything could be classified.
dharmadhatu The all-encompassing space, unoriginated and without beginning,
out of which all phenomena arise. The Sanskrit means “the essence of
phenomena” and the Tibetan means “the expanse of phenomena” but it usually
refers to the emptiness which is the essence of phenomena.
disturbing emotions (Skt. klesha) The emotional obscurations (in contrast to
intellectual obscurations) which are also translated as “afflictions” or “poisons.”
The three main disturbing emotions are attachment, aggression or anger, and
ignorance or delusion. The five disturbing emotions are the three above plus
pride and envy or jealousy.
Dzogchen This is known also as the “great perfection” or atiyoga. It is the highest
of the nine yanas according to the Nyingma tradition.
egolessness or selflessness of self See insubstantiality of self.
egolessness or selflessness of phenomena See insubstantiality of phenomena.
eight consciousnesses see consciousnesses, eight.
mahasiddha A practitioner who has a great realization. These were particularly
Vajrayana practitioners who lived in India between the eight and twelfth
century and practiced tantra. The biography of some of the most famous is
found in The Eighty-four Mahasiddhas.
emotional obscurations See obscurations, two.
emptiness (Skt. shunyata) Also translated as voidness. The Buddha taught in the
second turning of the wheel of dharma that external phenomena and the
internal phenomena or the concept of self or “I” are insubstantial and therefore
are “empty.”
Foundation Vehicle Also called Hinayana. The term refers to the first teachings of
the Buddha, which emphasized the careful examination of mind and its
confusion. Also known as the Theravada path.
Four Noble Truths The Buddha began teaching with a talk in India at Sarnath on
the Four Noble Truths. These are the truth of suffering, the truth of the cause of
suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path. These truths are the
foundation of Buddhism.
geshe (Tib.) A scholar who has attained a doctorate in Buddhist studies. This
usually takes fifteen to twenty years to attain.
ground (Skt. alaya) consciousness According to the Mind-only school this is the
eighth consciousness and is often called the “store-house” or “alaya”
consciousness and has the function of storing all the latent karmic imprints of
experience. See consciousnesses, eight.
Indra The chief god of the realm of desire and said to reside on the top of Mt.
Meru.
insubstantiality of self This doctrine asserts that when one examines or looks for
the person or self, one finds that it is insubstantial or “empty.” This doctrine
holds that a person does not possess a self (Skt. atman) as an independent or
substantial self. This position is held by most Buddhist schools.
insubstantiality of phenomena This doctrine asserts that when one examines
things or phenomena, one finds that external phenomena are empty, i.e. they
 do not have an independent or substantial nature. This position is not held by
the Foundation schools, but is the main premise of the Mahayana schools.
jnana (Tib. yeshe) Enlightened wisdom which is beyond dualistic thought.
Jnanagharba (8th century CE) A great Buddhist scholar who became a famous
Svatantrika scholar. He was known for being a great debater and for composing
the Madhyamaka-satyadvaya-karika.
Kagyu (Tib.) One of the four major schools of Tibetan Buddhism. It was founded by
Marpa. The other three are the Nyingma, the Sakya, and the Gelug schools.
karma Literally “action.” Karma is a universal law stating that when one does a
wholesome action, one’s circumstances will improve and when one does an
unwholesome action, negative results will eventually occur from the act.
khenpo (Tib.) A title of someone who has completed many years’ study of
Buddhism. It can also mean an abbot of a monastery.
klesha (Skt.) See disturbing emotions.
Mahamudra Literally, “great seal” meaning that all phenomena are sealed by the
primordially perfect true nature. This meditative transmission emphasizes
perceiving mind directly rather than through contemplation or rational
analysis.
Mahayana Literally, the “great vehicle.” The teachings of the second turning of the
wheel of Dharma, which emphasize emptiness, compassion, and universal
buddha-nature.
Maitreya In this work refers to the bodhisattva Maitreya who lived at the time of
the Buddha. Maitreya is presently residing in the Tushita pure realm until he
becomes the fifth buddha of this eon.
Manjushri A meditational deity representing discriminative awareness (prajna)
known for knowledge and learning. Usually depicted as holding a sword in the
right hand and scripture in the left.
Middle-way (Skt. Madhyamaka) The most influential of the four schools of Indian
Buddhism founded by Nagarjuna in the second century CE. The name means it
is the middle way between eternalism and nihilism. The main postulate of this
school is that all phenomena—both internal mental events and external
physical objects—are empty of any inherent nature. The school uses extensive
rational reasoning to establish the emptiness of phenomena.
Mipham Rinpoche (1846-1912) Great Nyingma master who was an integral part of
the Rime movement. He wrote 320 Dharma works and helped renew an interest
in Mahamudra and Dzogchen.
Nagarjuna An Indian scholar in the second century CE who founded the
Madhyamaka school, which emphasized emptiness.
nirvana Literally, “extinguished.” Individuals live in samsara and with spiritual
practice they can attain a state of enlightenment in which all false ideas and
 conflicting emotions have been extinguished. This state is called “nirvana.”
Nyingma (Tib.) The oldest school of Buddhism based on the teachings of
Padmasambhava and others in the eighth and ninth centuries CE.
obscurations, two These are (1) the cognitive obscurations, mainly not
recognizing the emptiness of self and phenomena and (2) the emotional
obscurations, which are mainly the disturbing emotions of attachment,
aggression, and ignorance.
Padmasambhava (Tib. Guru Rinpoche) He was invited to Tibet in the ninth
century CE and is known for pacifying the non-Buddhist forces and founding
the Nyingma lineage.
pandita A great scholar.
Prajnaparamita sutras These teachings were made popular by Nagarjuna in the
second century CE and known for introducing the concept of a bodhisattva and
the concept of the insubstantiality or emptiness of phenomena. The earliest and
most well known text is the Prajnaparamita in 8,000 verses.
Rangtong School (Tib.) The Middle-way school was divided in Tibet into two
major schools: the Rangtong, which maintains voidness is devoid of inherent
existence and Shentong, which maintains voidness is indivisible from
luminosity.
rinpoche (Tib.) Literally, “very precious” and is used as a term of respect for a
Tibetan guru.
Shakyamuni Buddha The Shakyamuni Buddha, often called the Gautama
Buddha; refers to the latest Buddha who lived between 563 and 483 CE.
samadhi Also called “meditative absorption” or “one-pointed meditation.” This is
the highest form of meditation and is the result of complete concentration.
Sarvastivada school A Foundation vehicle school which means “everything
exists” and held there were real existing dharmas and also small indivisible
particles like real atoms.
Shamatha or Tranquility meditation (Tib. shinay) This is basic sitting meditation
whose main purpose is to train the mind to rest evenly and calm down so it can
remain wherever it is placed.
Samkhya One of six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy. It bases its philosophy
on the Samkhya Karika written around 200 CE. It holds the view that all objects
of knowledge can be enumerated into twenty-five categories of phenomena.
They believe in the “fundamental principle” which is inseparable, permanent,
and pervades all phenomena.
Shantarakshita (eighth century C.E.) An abbot of Nalanda University who was
invited by King Trisong Detsen to come to Tibet. He established Samye
Monastery and thus helped introduce Buddhism in Tibet.
Shentong school (Tib.) The Madhyamaka or Middle-way school was divided in
 Tibet into two major schools: the Rangtong, which maintains voidness is devoid
of inherent existence and Shentong, which maintains voidness is indivisible
from luminosity.
skandha Literally, “heaps.” See aggregates.
shunyata Usually translated as voidness or emptiness. The Buddha taught in the
second turning of the wheel of dharma that external phenomena and internal
phenomena or the concept of self or “I” have no real existence and therefore are
“empty.”
sutra teachings The Foundation and Mahayana texts which are the words of the
Buddha. These are often contrasted with the tantras, which are the Buddha’s
Vajrayana teachings and the shastras, which are commentaries by great masters
on the words of the Buddha.
tantra One can divide Tibetan Buddhism into the sutra tradition and the tantra
tradition. The sutra tradition primarily involves the academic study of the
Mahayana sutras and the tantric path primarily involves practicing the
Vajrayana practices. The tantras are primarily the texts of the Vajrayana
practices.
tathagata-garbha Literally, “essence of tathagata” which is usually translated as
Buddha-nature or buddha essence. It is the seed or essence of enlightenment
possessed by all sentient beings and which allows them to have the potential to
attain buddhahood.
tulku (Tib., Skt. nirmanakaya) A manifestation of a buddha that is perceived by an
ordinary person. The term has commonly been used in Tibet for a discovered
rebirth of any teacher.
ultimate or absolute truth There are two truths or views of reality—conventional
truth, which is seeing things as ordinary beings do with the dualism of “I” and
“other” and ultimate truth, which transcends duality and is seeing things as
they are.
vajra (Tib. dorje) Usually translated “diamond like.” This may be an implement
held in the hand during certain Vajrayana ceremonies, or it can refer to a
quality that is so pure and so enduring that it is like a diamond.
Vajradhara (Tib. dorje chang) The name of the dharmakaya Buddha. Many of the
teachings of the Kagyu lineage came from Vajradhara.
Vasubandhu Indian scholar in the 4th century CE who was brother of Asanga and
wrote the great Foundation vehicle work the Abhidharma-kosha, an
commentary on the Abhidharma still extensively studied in Tibet.
Vatsipatriya One of the early eighteen Foundation vehicle schools named after its
leader Vatsipatra. It was part of the Aryasarvastivadin sect. This group separated
from the other sects in the third century BCE and was condemned because they
believed that there was a self that was the basis for rebirth and karma but was
not part of the five aggregates.
wheel of dharma The Buddha’s teachings correspond to three levels: the
Foundation, the Mahayana and the Vajrayana with each level being one turning
of the wheel.
yogi A Buddhist practitioner who has chosen an unconventional path of practice.
 The Glossary of Tibetan Terms
Pronunciation (Tibetan Transliteration): Sanskrit/English
dak (bdag) self
dak me (bdag med) non-self
dag ta nyi shu (bdag lta nyi shu) 20 views of self
de bu (‘bras bu) effect
dorje (rdo rje) vajra
Dorje Chang (rdo rje chang) Vajradhara
dzogchen (rdzogs chen) dzogchen
geshe (dge bshes) geshe degree
Guru Rinpoche (gu ru rin po che) Padmasambhava
gyu (rgyu) primary cause
Kagyu (bka’ brgyud) Kagyu school
khenpo (mkhan po) scholar
khyen (rkhyen) second. condition
nyingma (rnying ma) Nyingma
Rangtong (rang strong) Rangtong
rang zhin (rang bzhin) nature
Shentong (gzhan strong) Shentong
shedra (bshad grva) monastic college
shinay (zhi gnas) Samantha
tong pa nyi (stong pa nyid) emptiness
tong pa nyi shu (stong pa nyid shu) 20 emptinesses
uma (dbu ma) Madhyamaka
yeshe (ye shes) wisdom
 Books by Thrangu Rinpoche
The Three Vehicles of Buddhist Practice. This book gives an overview of the
Hinayana, Mahayana, and Vajrayana as it was practiced in Tibet. Namo Buddha
Publications, 1998.
The Middle-Way Meditation Instructions of Mipham Rinpoche. This great
Tibetan scholar who actually stayed for awhile with the previous Thrangu
Rinpoche at his monastery describes how one develops compassion and then
expands this to bodhichitta and eventually develops prajna or wisdom. Namo
Buddha Publications, 2000.
The Four Foundations of Buddhist Practice. There are four thoughts one should
contemplate before practicing precious human birth, impermanence, karma,
and the downfalls of samsara. Namo Buddha Publications, 2011.
Transcending Ego: Distinguishing Consciousness from Wisdom. This book,
which includes the original text of the Third Karmapa and Thrangu Rinpoche’s
commentary, describes in detail the eight consciousnesses and how these
transform into the five wisdoms at enlightenment. Namo Buddha Publications,
2001.
The Practice of Tranquillity and Insight. This book is a practical guide to the two
types of meditation that form the core of Buddhist spiritual practice. Ithaca:
Snow Lion Publications, 1993
The King of Samadhi. This book is a commentary on the only sutra of the Buddha
that discusses Mahamudra meditation. It is also the sutra that predicted the
coming of Gampopa. Rangjung Yeshe Publications, 1994.
The Songs of Naropa. This book tells the story of the life of Naropa and analyzes
in detail his famous Summary of Mahamudra which lays out the path of
Mahamudra meditation by the guru whose succession of students went on to
found the Kagyu lineage. Rangjung Yeshe Publications, 1997.
Shentong and Rangtong. The teachings on emptiness divided into two divisions in
Tibet—Rangtong, which followed Nagarjuna closely and Shentong, which
followed the third turning closely. Namo Buddha Publications, 2011.
FOR A LL OF RINPOCHE’ S BOOKS SEE W W W .NA MOBUDDHA PUB.COM
 The Bibliography
SUT RA S
The Questions of King Melinda from the Pali text.
The sutra describes an encounter between the Greek Bactrian King and a yogi
named Nagasena. This is translated in Max Müller’s The Sacred Books of the East.
SHA ST RA S A ND OT HER T EXT S
Aryadeva
Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas (Skt. Catu-shatakashastra-karika).
This treatise can be found in the Tengyur. Aryadeva was Nagarjuna’s closest
disciple and this work is an important exposition of the Madhyamaka. It has been
translated as Aryadeva’s Four Hundred Stanzas on the Middle Way by Ruth Sonam
(Snow Lion Publications, 2008).
Brunnholzl, Karl
The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition, Snow Lion
Publications, 2004.
A detailed description of the Middle-way from the point of view of the Kagyu
lineage, emphasizing the Shentong tradition.
Chandrakirti
Introduction to the Middle Way (Skt. Madhyamaka-vatara)
One of the most celebrated Indian works on the study of emptiness written in
verse in ten chapters with each chapter corresponding to a bodhisattva level. It was
written to supplement Nagarjuna’s Prajnanama-mula-madhyamaka-karika and is
considered the principle text of the Madhyamaka Prasangika view.
This treatise has been translated with Mipham’s commentary on it by the
Padmakara Translation Group as Introduction to the Middle Way (Shambhala,
2002).
Dowman, Keith
Masters of Mahamudra (SUNY Press, 1986).
A translation of the Tibetan text which gives the lives of the eighty-four
mahasiddhas who all achieved awakening by practicing Mahamudra.
Hookham, S. K.
The Buddha Within (SUNY Press, 1991).
This book is an extensive analysis of Buddha-nature and discusses the Rangtong
and Shentong position. It also gives a translation of Jamgon Kongtrul’s commentary
on the Uttaratantra.
Jnanagarbha
Differentiation of the Two Truths (Skt. Madhyamaka-satyadvaya-karika)
The classic text on distinguishing conventional from ultimate truth. It has been
translated as Commentary on the Distinction between Two Truths of the Middle
Way by Malcolm David Eckel, (SUNY Press, 1987).
Maitreya
Differentiation of the Middle Way from the Extremes (Skt. Madhyanta-vibhanga)
A treatise elucidating what is empty and what is not empty.
Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras (Skt. Mahayana-sutralamkara)
This text gathers together a vast array of Mahayana sutras and explains them
very extensively. It has not been translated into English.
The Uttaratantra Shastra (Skt. Mahayana-tantra-shastra)
This text describes Buddha-nature in seven chapters and outlines the arguments
of the third turning of the wheel of dharma. Translated by Katia and Ken Holmes
with a commentary by Thrangu Rinpoche as The Uttaratantra: A Treatise on
Buddha Essence (Zhyisil Chokyi Ghatsal Publications, 2004).
Ornament of Clear Realization (Skt. Abhisamaya-lakara)
A description of the ten bodhisattva levels and the five paths. Published with a
commentary by Thrangu Rinpoche as The Ornament of Clear Realization (Zhyisil
Chokyi Ghatsal Publications, 2005).
The Differentiation of Dharma from Dharmata
This text describes the characteristics of dharmata or “pure being” and contrasts
it to dharma or phenomenal existence. Published with a commentary by Thrangu
Rinpoche as Distinguishing Dharma & Dharmata (Zhyisil Chokyi Ghatsal
Publications, 2004).
Mipham Rinpoche
Gateway to Knowledge (Tib. mkhas pa’i tshul la jug pa’i sgo zhes bya ba’i bstan
bcos bzhugs so)
This large ten-volume text is a great compendium of knowledge. The first three
volumes have been translated by Erik Pema Kunsang in Gateway to Knowledge
(Rangjung Yeshe Publications).
Nagarjuna
Treatise on the Middle Way (Skt. Prajnana-mamula-madhya-maka-karika)
This treatise is found in the Tengyur. It is the foundation of the Madhyamaka
school and has been translated by F. J. Streng in his Emptiness: A Study in Religious
Meaning (Abingdon Press, 1967).
Santina, Peter Della
Madhyamaka Schools in India, (Motilal Banarsidass, 1986)
A book that traces the Middle-way philosophy from its beginnings in India
through to the differences between the Prasangika and Svatantrika schools.
Shantarakshita
Ornament of the Middle Way (Skt. Madhyamaka-lamkara)
This text can be found in the Tengyur. It has been translated into English by the
Padmakara Translation Group as The Adornment of the Middle Way:
Shantarakshita’s Madhyamaka-lankara with Commentary by Jamgon Mipham by
James Blumenthal (Shambhala, 2005).
Thrangu Rinpoche
The Essentials of Mahamudra: Looking Directly at the Mind (Shambhala, 2004). 
 This book covers Rinpoche’s five-year commentary on the Moonlight of
Mahamudra by Tashi Namgyal.
Transcending Ego: Distinguishing Consciousness from Wisdom (Namo Buddha
Publications, 2004).
A commentary on the Third Karmapa’s short treatise on the eight
consciousnesses that turn into the five wisdoms upon reaching enlightenment.
Vasubandhu
Compendium of Knowledge (Skt. Abhidharma-samuccaya).
This work is a summary of the vast Abhidharma literature and is still used in
Tibet today to study this complex subject. It is found in the Tengyur.
Williams, Paul
Mahayana Buddhism (Routledge, 1989 and 2009).
A detailed survey of Mahayana Buddhism.
 About the Author
The Very Venerable Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche was born in Kham in 1933. At
the age of five he was formally recognized by the Sixteenth Karmapa and the
previous Situ Rinpoche as the ninth incarnation of the great Thrangu tulku.
Entering Thrangu monastery, from the ages of seven to sixteen he studied reading,
writing, grammar, poetry, and astrology, memorized ritual texts, and completed
two preliminary retreats. At sixteen, under the direction of Khenpo Lodro Rabsel,
he began the study of the three vehicles of Buddhism while staying in retreat.
At twenty-three Rinpoche received full ordination from the Karmapa. When he
was twenty-seven he left Tibet for India at the time of the Communist military
takeover. He was called to Rumtek, Sikkim where the Karmapa had his seat in
exile. At thirty-five Rinpoche took the geshe examination before 1500 monks at
Buxador monastic refugee camp in Bengal and was awarded the degree of Geshe
Lharampa. On his return to Rumtek he was named Abbot of Rumtek monastery
and the Nalanda Institute for Higher Buddhist studies at Rumtek. He has been the
personal teacher of the four principal Karma Kagyu tulkus: Shamar Rinpoche, Situ
Rinpoche, Jamgon Kongtrul Rinpoche, and Gyaltsab Rinpoche.
Thrangu Rinpoche has centers in Asia, Europe, and North America and has
traveled extensively throughout the world to teach. In 1984 he spent several
months in Tibet where he ordained over 100 monks and nuns and visited several
monasteries. In Nepal, Rinpoche founded the Thrangu Tashi Choling monastery
and the Shree Mangal Dvip boarding school, for the general education of lay
children and young monks, in Boudha; Thrangu Tara Abbey, a monastic college
for nuns, in Swayambhunath; the Thrangu Tashi Yangtse monastic college, retreat
center and medical clinic at Namo Buddha, east of the Kathmandu Valley; and the
Thrangu Shekhar retreat center in Bhaktapur, just below a cave where Tibetan
yogi Milarepa practiced. He has completed the Vajra Vidya monastic college near
Deer Park in Sarnath, India, where Shakyamuni Buddha gave his first teaching on
the Four Noble Truths. In North America Rinpoche is the abbot of Gampo Abbey,
Nova Scotia, Canada and has established the Thrangu monastery in Vancouver,
B.C., Canada and the Vajra Vidya retreat center in Crestone, Colorado, USA.
Thrangu Rinpoche is one of the most highly regarded masters of Mahamudra
meditation. He has touched the lives of students from all parts of the world
through his compassionate presence, his immense knowledge, and his way of
making even complex teachings attainable. Because of his vast knowledge of the
Dharma he has been appointed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama to be the personal
tutor for the Seventeenth Gyalwang Karmapa.
For more information about Thrangu Rinpoche’s life and activities please see
www.rinpoche.com.
Thrangu Rinpoche’s books are available in print at
www.namobuddhapub.com.
###
 Table of Contents
Foreword to the Third Edition
Chapter 1. An Introduction to The Open Door to Emptiness
Chapter 2. The Insubstantiality of the Self
Chapter 3. Developing Certainty of the Insubstantiality of Self
Chapter 4. The Benefits of Understanding Non-Self
Chapter 5. The Insubstantiality of External Phenomena
Chapter 6. The First Madhyamaka Analysis: The Examination of Causes
Chapter 7. The Second Madhyamaka Analysis: The Examination of Effects
Chapter 8. The Third Madhyamaka Analysis: The Examination of the Essential
Nature
Chapter 9. The Fourth Madhyamaka Analysis: The Examination of All Sources
Appendix A: The Root Text of Four Analyses
Notes
The Glossary of Terms
The Glossary of Tibetan Terms
The Bibliography
About the Author