Flick1992 Triangulation
Flick1992 Triangulation
0021-8308 $2.50
UWE FLICK
I. INTRODUCTION
Denzin’s earlier conception of triangulation is not only the most discussed and
quoted one. It also has been objective of most critique on triangulation in
general. For example ethnomethodologist David Silverman (1985, p. z I )
criticizes Denzin’s assumption of a “master reality in terms ofwhich all accounts
and actions are to be judged. This casts great doubt on the argument that
multiple research methods should be employed in a variety of settings in order
to gain a “total” picture ofsome phenomenon (..). Putting the picture together
is more problematic than such proponents of triangulation would imply. What
goes on in one setting is not a simple corrective to what happens elsewhere -
,each must be understood in its own terms”. Here is argued -ifwe think a little
further - that Denzin neglects the basic idea of triangulation, that was the
starting point of the discussion in Webb et al. (1966)- the reactiveness of
methods or in other words: That every method constitutes the subject under
study in a specific way. Not before users of triangulation make allowance for this
problem sufficiently, they can ignore the following critique by Fielding &
Fielding (1986,p. 33): “Multiple triangulation as Denzin expounded it, is the
equivalent for research methods of ‘correlation’ in data analysis. They both
represent extreme forms of eclecticism”.
Both critiques point at Denzin’s conception of triangulation as a strategy of
validation in the classical sense of the meaning, which assumes one reality and
one conception of the subject under study independent of the special methodical
approach - in Denzin’s words “the same phenomenon”. Thus Fielding and
Fielding (1986,p. 33) condense their critique of Denzin’s conception in the
following programmatic argumentation: “Theoretical triangulation does not
necessarily reduce bias, nor does methodological triangulation necessarily
increase validity. Theories are generally the product ofquite different traditions
so when they are combined, one might get a fuller picture, but not a more
‘objective’ one. Similarly different methods have emerged as a product of
different theoretical traditions, and therefore combining them can add range
and depth, but not accuracy”. Central point of these critiques is the technicistic
conception of triangulation in Denzin’s program. Although he suggests
triangulating theoretical perspectives, too, his concept of methodological
triangulation as a strategy aiming at validity neglects theoretical differences
between methods and the way each of them constitutes the research object. In
the idea of playing methods off against each other and in the idea of the same
Triangulation Revisited ‘79
phenomenon, not only the complexity of triangulation in general but also the
potentials of this strategy are simplified and artificially reduced.
New Question5
Periods of re-discovery
Ifwe want to have a look at qualitative research in Germany, first ofall we have
to distinguish sociology and other social sciences on one hand and psychology
on the other hand. While all those sciences can look back on a long tradition in
using understanding as a n epistemological principle (see Bergold & Flick I 987
for this topic) and all of them at some time have started to ignore those
traditions, there are great differences in the renaissance of qualitative research
in each case. In the social sciences we consider an import of the discussion in the
North-American sociology in the sixties concerning ethnomethodology, sym-
bolic interactionism, ethnography and so on to Germany. O n the detour of the
Triangulation Revisited 181
import of this discussion we see also a rediscovery of their theoretical sources as
phenomenology and the sociology of understanding by Alfred Schiitz, Max
Weber and Georg Simmel. First hints on the new methods in the USA were
given in the late sixties by Jiirgen Habermas ( 1967).More attention was paid to
them in the beginning of the seventies, when a group of sociologists from
Bielefeld (among them for example Fritz Schiitze) translated, commented and
published basic papers of Blumer, Garfinkel, Sacks, Cicourel and Wilson
(Arbeitsgruppe Bielefelder Soziologen 1973). Then a discussion on the
relevance of the “interpretive paradigm” started and some more collections of
translated basic papers on qualitative research in the USA followed
(Weingarten et al. I 976, Hopf & Weingarten I 979, Gerdes I 979). In this period,
the conception of the research process proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967)
with the ideas ofdeveloping theories in empirical research instead ofonly testing
them and of abandoning theoretical preconceptions of the subject under study
as far as possible played an important role in the discussions (Hoffmann-Riem
I 980, Kleining I 982).
In German psychology, on the other hand, this renaissance of qualitative
research was long time ignored. Not before the middle of the eighties at least
some psychological books on these topics (seeJiittemann 1985,Bergold & Flick
1987)were published in Germany.
The next step was in the late seventies the beginning of an independent
methodological discussion in German sociology which led to developing new
methodologies which also set standards for the methodological discussion in
general. O n one hand the “narrative interview” was proposed by Fritz Schiitze
(1983) as a specific method of collecting data aiming for the stimulation of
autobiographical narrations of biographical processes. This method is mainly
used in the context of biographical research. The development of this method
and the discussion it stimulated are one reason for that most of the discussion on
qualitative methods in Germany and most of the practical research is centred
around interviews, while participant observation here never played a role as
important as in the United States and in the history ofqualitative research. For
the application of interviews, the narrative interview was discussed as the most
consequent way ofgiving way for the respondent’s point of view, because the
main demand for the interviewer is not to interrupt or disturb the respondent’s
narration.
A second method developed in the German discussion is that of “objective
hermeneutic” proposed by Ulrich Oevermann and colleagues (1979). This
method of inlerpreling data is aiming for latent structures ofsense by interpreting
verbal protocols ofinteraction and other sorts of text. It is based on theoretical
conceptions of psychoanalysis? Levi-Strauss, Piaget, Bourdieu, Chomsky and
others and mainly makes a difference between the subjective meaning ofactions
and interactions on one hand, which could be reported by the respondent, and
their objective or latent sense on the other hand, which only can be seized by
I 82 Uwe Flick
extensive interpretations. With its exhaustiveness of interpretive effort and
rigor, this approach was discussed as the most consequent way of interpreting
any sort of data, mostly everyday interactions, but also written texts, pictures,
interviews and so on (see also Denzin 1989b for discussions of these methods).
A third prominent approach developed in the German discussion on
qualitative methods, this time in psychology, is reconstructing subjective
theories (see Groeben 1990). Here, after a half-standardized interview, a
graphique representation technique is learned and applied by the respondent,
who is studied, to visualize the contents and structures of his/her subjective
theory in the way he or she sees it. This procedure aims for grounding data on
the consensus with the respondent and is therefore also discussed by using labels
as “communicative validity” or “dialogue consensus’’ (see Scheele I 991).
Finally, many studies in German qualitative research are influenced by
ethnomethodology and especially by conversation analysis (Bergmann I gg I ).
But this discussion, which had its strongest influence on the general discussion
on qualitative research in the early eighties, kept very close to Anglo-american
discussions.
Now, after a period of importing discussions from United States sociology,
and a period of developing genuine methods and, in some aspects rather
radical, methodological discussions concerning the “right” way of qualitative
research, in the late eighties, a period of wide-spread application of qualitative
methods in empirical studies in sociology, pedagogy and -with some delay -
also in psychology followed. These developments have recently been docu-
mented in great detail (see Flick el al. 1991) and some manuals have been
published by German authors (Spohring I 989, Lamnek 1988, 1989). Finally,
the discussion on criteria for the evaluation of research and results obtained by
qualitative methods has been intensified (see Gerhardt 1985, Flick 1987, Kvale
1991).
Fig. I .
B,: Hmrn, well, your grandfather came to us (Kt: yes), ne, he seemed to be very
worried about you?
K , : Yeah, I was feeling quite bad
B,: Yes, what was the matter at that time?
K , : In May, (.) you know, I drank too much a couple ofdays in a series and then I was
feeling so0 bad, because of the circulation (B,: hmm), well everything, what you-,
break out of sweat (Bi: hmm) raving of the heart, uuuh, burning eyes and
everything, anyhow, and I didn’t feel like laughing at all
B,: And then your grandfather also said, uh, well (.) your family doctor had said,
meanwhile you are in a very urgent danger of death. Do you have an urgent
organic-
K,: Wellwell, danger of death
B,: complaints?
K,: not really, ne? (B):hmm) There’s just my fear, if I carry on that way, that still
might come, (B,: hmrn) and that must not really happen, you know. I don’t lay
any stress on this (B,: hmm) and therefore it’s kind of a thing about drinking in
my case.
B,: How did it begin?
Triangulation Revisited ‘87
If we have a look at this opening sequence of a consultation, we see that the
counselor does not start with the general exploration (“How did it begin?”)
immediately. This would be a typical action at this point, as the other examples
analyzed make clear. Here she doesn’t go the usual way before clearing up step
by step, whether there is a n urgent situation given in the client’s case. This
would imply an acute demand of action -for example to present the client to a
physician in the team (B, is a social worker). Ifwe have a look at her subjective
theory, it -as Schiitz says “at one look - monothetically” ( I 972) makes clear,
why the counselor at this point first communicatively - and that means in the
sense ofSchiitz again (1972p. I 50) “polythetical1y”- runs through the process
of clearing documented in the course of the interaction. Step by step she
discusses all the hints for an urgent situation with the client - the fear of the
grandfather and the reported statement of the family doctor. Not before
clearing up these points successively, she can turn to the ‘normal’ making of
relationship and trust. In her subjective theory this process of experience is
condensed in the conceptional meaning-coherence “client comes in a situation
of urgence (which hinders) development of trust”. So we can find in our
example the following structure of sense resulting of comparable experiences in
the counselor’s subjective theory (see Flick 1989, p. 377 for the complete
subjective theory):
trust between
counselor always has in mind to D client and counselor
observe if any strange, suspicious
facts appear because ofwhich she has
Fig. 2 .
Trust between
client and counselor
Fig. 3.
Together with some other concepts, these concepts show that three topics
play an important role in this counselor’s subjective theory on trust in relations
with clients:
‘90 Uwe Flick
- first, the conflicts between taking the viewpoint of the client and the
bureaucratic tasks and interests of the institution and
- second, the image of the ‘‘client in a bad situation” and
B,: But, what’s the matter now in this moment? Uhh, Mrs X (official in the welfare
office) now has sent you to us (Ku:yes!) with what, with which consideration? Well,
what does Mrs X think, that you should d o here?
K,: Well, she knows that I am an epileptic, they know that and I a m an alcoholic, they
know that, only, that it is dangerous, when I drank nothing, yeaah? then I lie, uh,
then I am laid upon the street (B*:humm) and that’s the fear, I, I, I, that is the fear,
simply, that I pass out, (B2:Yeah, and-), some days ago again once more. (..)
B,: Back to your epileptic attacks. Are you interested in clearing that really up once?
And that you are correctly adjusted with medicine then? (K*:Yes) There is at the
University Hospital AAA, there a specialised service-
K,: Could you write that down for me?
B,: I can do that
K,: Yeah, that’s nice
B,: I’ll write it down for you, uhh, could you tell me once more, where you live?
K,: 45, E.-Street that’s in Berlin 67 (B2: 65?) 67, Berlin 67
B,: Yeah, but E-Street?
K,: Berlin 45, eheh, 45, E-Street, 45 E-Street, that is Berlin 67, well, in the district
B,: That’s really weird, then Mrs. U. would be responsible for you, well (..). I have to
check that out again before (..) hababab, E,- wait a moment, that was which
number, 45, or what?
K,: 45, E-Street, that is the district Berlin 67 (..)
B,: 45, E-Street, yeah, yeah, there Mrs U. responsible, I wouldn’t, I am not at all
responsible (..)
B,: You know, for today, I could have made it, but that will last longer, that will take a
while, I think, before it gets going. So, would you please come with me.
Ifwe have a brieflook at this excerpt ofcounseling, we can see the counselor’s
efforts to realize a helping and trustful relationship with the client according to
Triangulation Revisited ‘9’
the concepts in his subjective theory. Thus, he offers the client to organize a
specialized diagnostic of his problems (alcohol, epilepsy) after clearing the
client’s own viewpoint, who was sent by some other institution (the welfare
office). I n his attempt to offer a helping relationship with some permanence and
stability, the counselor does not succeed. But this failure is not a personal failure
of the counselor, nor is it a result of the client’s specific participation in the
interaction. The counselor fails with his attempt because of the way
responsibilities in the institution are organized: responsibilities for cases are
distributed according to the clients’ addresses, and so the counselor finally has
to pass this client to his colleague, who is responsible for that part of the street
and of the district where the client lives. This shows exemplarily the difficulties of
counselors in this institution to put their good ideas into practice with real
clients. These difficulties lead to recurrent professional dilemmas in attempts to
realize -as in this example -subjective maximes or ideals and -as in the first
example -to apply professional routines as counseling in their usual way in this
specific context. So, to find the reasons for the divergence between the
counselors’ subjective viewpoints on trust in this context and the ways of
realizing them in concrete interactions, we have to focus on the institutional
context.
We find these dilemmas on all of the levels on which we studied the problem of
trust in counselor-client-relationships:
- On the level of the historical changes in the shift from force and control to
case against the interests of other persons and institutions and in the
bureaucratic necessities and limits helping interventions are confronted
with;
- and on the level ofsubjective theories in which these conflicts and problems
f \
Counseling Interactions
subjective theory
Fig. 4 .
D r U w e Flick
Technische Universitat Berlin
Institut fur Psychology
Dovestr. 1-5
1000 Berlin 10
Germany
NOTES
I Although Denzin himself (Denzin I 989a) now takes a somehow different position in
many points, his earlier propositions still are the basis for most of the recent discussions
on triangulation especially in Germany (Spohring I 989, Lamnek 1988). So, we will first
deal with this earlier position of Denzin and the critics related to it and later on have a
look at his reactions to these critics.
REFERENCES