William Pawlak

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William Pawlak

Honors Seminar Paper

19 March 2020

Populism and The Desire for Recognition: An Analysis of Populism through Philosophy and

Contemporary Events

“Can you not see [...] how your bourgeois cleverness, philosophical deism, easy

frivolousness, cosmopolitanism, tolerance, pleasantries, law of peoples, and whatever other

names you give to this stuff, would, once again, have made a miserable old man of the boy?”

– Johann Gottfried Herder, ​Another Philosophy of History​, 14.


1

There are few words that are able to provoke as much disagreement and ambiguity as

“populism” does. Although the term has become ubiquitous in academic journals, foreign affairs

articles, and speeches, there has yet to be a consensus on a single, definitive, explanation of what

this process really is. More often than not, it appears as a type of malediction rather than a

serious area of academic inquiry. This is largely because few serious works have attempted to

uproot the philosophic origins of a process considered by many to be a strictly political

phenomena, not an inherent product of human nature. This paper is meant to provide an

operative definition of the term derived from its philosophical provenance through the lense of

Kant, Hegel, Nietszche, and other notable philosophers. Doing this will reveal the allure of

populism in the post-modern world, its relevance to many societal ills (racism, xenophobia, hate

crimes, social inequality, etc.), and ways of diffusing its inimical consequences. It will prove

who we consider the supporters of populist leaders are not as hysterical as our imagination would

have us believe but are people struggling to maintain their dignity under strenuous circumstances

within a society that seems to have forgotten them. It will be more beneficial to understand

populism as a time when citizens of a community no longer consider the circumstances that give

meaning to the human existence – political standpoints, income levels, or societal ethics –

propitious for furthering optimal recognition.​ ​If these conditions were ameliorated for the equal

opportunity for recognition, the energies channeled into supporting populist urges may be

diverted into more beneficial outcomes that offer a greater probability of actualizing the

aspirations that give meaning to the human experience. It is the hope that posterity will rekindle

our faith in these aspirations that will lead us from the depravity political life has increasingly

been characterized by.


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Kant’s “Unsocial Sociability”:

Though the plethora of definitions that do exist in academia today are revelatory of an

increased interest and attention political events that is every bit as merited as the situation

warrants, such a profusion of terms has only served to obfuscate a comprehensive meaning of

what we call “populism” rather than rendering a universal clarity that can approximate a more

cohesive understanding. In its first use, the word “populism” was employed to describe anti-elite

tendencies of American politics during the 1950’s, of which contemporary strains of thought

have not entirely departed from.1 The term today is almost always associated with a public’s

response to official corruption and other political malpractices, which is what scholars such as

Aurelien Mondon, Dominika Kasprowicz, Agnieszka Hess, have sought to lend credence to.2

The other side of the spectrum posits theories emphasizing the salutary effects of certain

“populist” sentiments that can inculcate a more communitarian lifestyle as a response to the

overly liberal elements of democracy, such as what the Argentinian political theorist Ernesto

Laclau and the Dutch scholar Cas Mudde have both insinuated.3 To begin this paper, however,

we must start with its barest and most indisputable conclusion, that the “populist creates the

people from his or her understanding of what ‘the people’ should be, want and/or represent.”4

This notion of “the people” is not only the result of the particular circumstances of susceptible

communities but from a deeper, underlying motive that was first identified by the philosopher

Immanuel Kant.

1
Allcock, J. B. “‘Populism’: A Brief Biography,” 375.
2
Mondon, “Populism, the People, and the Illusion of Democracy,” 143; Kasprowicz and Hess, “Populism in Poland
– between demagoguery and demophilia,” 203.
3
Abromeit, “A Critical Review of Recent Literature on Populism,” 180.
4
Mondon, “Populism, the People, and the Illusion of Democracy,” 144.
3

Though it is certainly possible to trace the origins of how we may understand populism as

far back as the ideas of the ancient Greek philosophers, such a task would be far too cumbersome

for this paper and derogate the relevance of other thinkers who have more accurately

systematized the meaning of the term as it relates to contemporary affairs. Hence, it is proper to

start perhaps unexpectedly with the groundbreaking philosophy of Immanuent Kant. At first

glance, it does not seem the arguments of this philosopher are pertinent to the task at hand – after

all, he is known mainly for his revolutionary work in transcendentalist metaphysics that was

exhaustively delineated in his 800 page ​Critique of Pure Reason. ​In his early career, Kant was

concerned with ​a priori ​reasoning, a body of knowledge that was unequivocal, universal, and

necessary; these were self-evident truths grasped through intuition and irrespective of empirical

considerations. Unlike this astounding version of metaphysical knowledge able to be located in a

single voluminous book, however, Kant’s historical and political viewpoints are less advertent.

Students must laboriously track down the development of these thoughts through a collection of

other works the philosopher is less known for. Included in this category is an uncharacteristically

short essay titled “Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” the first major attempt by any

other philosopher (perhaps with the exception of Johann Gottfried Herder) of providing a

systematic analysis of human history and its purpose.

Kant sought to provide a purpose for the creation of human society and of man’s

acquiescence to norms, rules, and institutions. The centerpiece of this magnificent work was the

term “unsocial sociability,” used to describe the simultaneous need for, and yet also the innate

resistance to, society.5 Kant wrote, “Man has a propensity for living in society, for in that state he

5
Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” 31.
4

feels himself to be more than man [...] he also has, however, a great tendency to isolate himself,

for he finds in himself the unsociable characteristic of wanting everything to go according to his

own desires.”6 Humans require social interaction in order to feel themselves more than merely

sentient creatures. Yet, they synchronously isolate themselves for want of having everything

transpire according to their benefit and design. This ​amour propre​ – Jacque Rousseau's

definition to the same process– “awakens all of man’s powers” without which “humanity’s

excellent natural capacities would have lain eternally dormant.”7 It is only this desire that can

actuate the striving process necessary for positively impacting the course of human history that

can approximate the form of knowledge he knew humans were ultimately capable of. This

overwhelming sense of human worth – insofar as we are rational creatures endowed with a good

will – is just as much a product of the perfection of reason as it is the antagonism that brings us

into conflict with our peers. This primordial antagonism certainly does produce some negative

externalities – honor, pride, malice or what we may refer to as St. Augustine’s ​libido dominandi

– but such is the mark of a “wise creator,” not that of a primeval “malicious spirit.”8 Kant

inherently understood the difficulty of living by his own standards and by subsuming human

malfeasance into his method, mankind would evolve into a true “cosmopolitan” state governed

by human reasoning.

To a certain extent, “unsocial sociability” seems remarkably out of place in a philosophy

built predominantly on anodyne reason and Kant does not offer any further explanation of this

idea other than the few pages he devotes in his essay. Such a fact does not dampen its veracity

but only indicates Kant encountered one of philosophy’s perpetual dilemmas that many of his

6
Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” 32.
7
Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” 32.
8
Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” 32.
5

forebears were similarly plagued by: the problem of self-consciousness and self-worth. Kant’s

essay was the first real speculative attempt towards offering a cause for human history and its

natural endpoint derived from this dilemma, which was continued in his later writings such as his

“Speculative Beginning of Human History (1786)” and his theory of “Perpetual Peace (1795)​.”​

His avant-garde interpretation was revelatory in identifying what would be the central topics of

thought for succeeding generations that would provide in far greater detail the cause of this

“unsocial sociability” that was the source of mankind’s misery and advancement; it was

essentially what Kant construed “populism” to be during his own time that is still very much

present today. Still, numerous questions had yet to be answered. Was this something inherent to

human behavior or something far deeper embedded in the human consciousness? Was it simply a

matter of perfecting human reason or becoming a valued member of society? Such a question

would be answered by Kant’s student, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who offered a more

dynamic analysis of what self-worth really means and how populism would be fueled by these

desires.

Hegel and the “Desire for a Desire”:

It is very unfortunate that many Kantian scholars and historians have inexplicably

forgotten about or failed to properly acknowledge the prescience of the “Universal History with a

Cosmopolitan Intent.” Kant offered posterity the first interpretation of history that offered a

positive trajectory of human affairs based on human nature itself. Yet, all things taken into

consideration, Kant was less descriptive as to what this trajectory was pointing towards and how

it would produce the results he expected it would. Fortunately, the idea of “unsocial sociability”

piqued the interest of his student, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, which would become, it can
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be argued, the foundation for his life’s work. Hegel’s work offers the most systematic and

reductive standpoint of the need for human-worth and recognition that would furnish much of the

modern definition of populism other political scientists such as Francis Fukuyama have been so

apt to appropriate. Difficult for even the most intelligent students, Hegel takes his readers from

an infinitesimal framework for human behavior to a universal character that prefigures, he

thinks, an “end of history.” Hegel imbibed most of his mentor’s ideas but wanted to delineate

more succinctly the source behind Kant’s “unsocial sociability.” He believed in the Kantian

thesis that the mind was an active organ that shaped sensations into perceptions, then forming

ideas, but he was less confident that the perfection of human reasoning was history’s natural

endpoint. Rather, his answer departed from what his teacher had originally taught him, believing

that the key to learning human nature was not found in ​a priori​ reasoning but in the “desire for a

desire.”

​ egel argued that the


Starting first at the molecular level of what makes humans ​human, H

fundamental necessity of life was not the perfection of unadulterated reason but bare ​desire,​ an

act or a will to do something or “negate” the object of that desire to suit the subject’s needs and

interests.9 To eat food, for example, a person has to destroy the food through the process of

cooking, eating, and digesting. “The (conscious) desire of a being,” in the words of the Hegelian

scholar Alexandre Kojeve, “is what constitutes that being as I.”10 At the same time, however, the

“I” created by the satisfaction of such a desire will have the same nature as the things toward

which that desire is directed.11 A person who desires only to eat will never attain

self-consciousness because the object of the desire (food) is finite, destructible, and insufficient

9
Kojeve, ​Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,​ 4.
10
Kojeve, ​Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,​ 3.
11
Kojeve, ​Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,​ 6.
7

to prove the subject he or she is that which they think they are. This is characteristic of animal

life, not that of an independent, thinking person.12 To attain self-consciousness, therefore, is to

desire something that can exceed the physical constraints it has been placed under and reveal an

objective reality other than itself. Therefore, desire must be directed towards ​another​ desire – as

Hegel termed it “negating negation” – and we attain a bit of our own self-consciousness by being

desirous of objects only other humans wish to obtain.13 What was the ultimate truth to Kant was

the “spirit” of Hegel, the process of an independent self-consciousness realizing its autonomy

through interaction with other people and, in doing so, eventually realize perfect freedom and

independence.14 This was way more than the “unsocial sociability” Kant had postulated but a

more cogent understanding of the tension between inelcutable elements of the human mind that

produce populist urges.

Humans necessarily need other people to placate their desires not so much to obtain

things or have a better life in an Aristotelian sense, but to simply feel they are active and valued

members of a community. “Self-consciousness is not yet mind’s consciousness of itself,” Hegel

incisively noted, “at that level it is only the worth of the subject that is in question.”15 Taken in

its literal form, ​humans desire to be desired.​ For the purposes of describing this behavior here,

we may term this the “desire for recognition,” the conscious acknowledgement of one person

towards the value another person thinks he or she has. When we refer to the process of populism

today, we actually describe the public’s “desire for recognition,” a demand for respect and

esteem they feel their work has entitled them to. Hegel described this behavior in an extended

12
Kojeve, ​Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,​ 6.
13
Hegel, ​Phenomenology of Spirit,​ 118.
14
Hegel, ​Phenomenology of Spirit,​ 110.
15
Hegel, ​Philosophy of Right, 8​ 0.
8

analogy known as the “Master-Slave dialectic,” where two persons encounter each other but

neither wishes to “recognize” the other as a self-consciousness (a “being-for-self”). Since such

an act would be tantamount to denying their own self-worth, the standoff eventually becomes a

fight to the death between the two persons, resulting in a winner (the master) and the loser (the

slave). As Hegel wrote, “they must engage in the struggle, for they must raise their certainty of

being for ​themselves​ to truth.”16 The master has affirmed his “being-for-self” by winning this

struggle and the slave is spared death in order to acknowledge the superiority of the master by

doing his bidding and providing goods for his consumption. Neither the master nor the slave,

however, have fully reached self-consciousness. For the slave, he doesn’t know what it is to be

human, having lost the fight-to-the-death struggle, but he is not also an animal, for no animal

exists for the servitude of another. His clash with the master evinced the “terror” of being killed

and in that fear the slave first learns the value of life (the first negation). With this in mind, the

products he creates for the master are not absolutely negated as the food of the animal but are

molded and changed through his own creativity. The products of the slave’s labor ​become

something other than what they were originally, and in doing so, the slave starts believing he can

do the same with his existence as well. Embedded with the idea of absolute freedom (the second

negation), the slave gradually overcomes his cowardly existence and develops a

self-consciousness that is eventually recognized by the master who, valuing the work of the

slave, transforms his servitude into a coequal partnership.

Taken in an historical view as Kojeve intended, what was the self-consciousness of the

individual steadily becomes the “spirit” of a culture, its steady realization of its own freedom and

16
Hegel, ​Phenomenology of Spirit 1​ 10.
9

the demand to apply that freedom.17 This does not necessarily mean liberal democracy (which

Hegel certainly did not support) such as what some other professors have insinuated (notably

Francis Fukuyama) but a society’s realization of its inherent potential which it can then use to

continue the dialectical process of history. This history would culminate and reach its natural

endpoint in the “state,” the apogee of objective right that can make freedom a reality for its

citizens.18 When this fails to occur, populism arises when citizens feel their rulers haven’t

regarded them equitably in a manner consistent with what they deserve. Taking this into

consideration, populism serves as a salutary development for the actualization of the dignity of

members within a community, an ancillary part towards the “end of history.” Hegel himself

thought the popular spirit of Germany in the aftermath of its disastrous war with Napoleonic

France augured this final state. Yet, succeeding thinkers were skeptical that human nature would

follow this linear path, and whether change in and of itself was something more preferable to

what it was prior.

Nietszche and the “Will to Power”:

Hegel’s aspirations for the “state” presaged a new epoch for European history that would

see its growing posperity and its eventual ruin. If any historical parallel can be found for

describing the behavior (or as I should say the “spirit”) of current society, it would be Europe

during the late nineteenth century. Up to this time, Europe had undergone fundamental structural

changes that pierced every fabric of society ranging from material wealth (which was the most

salient), population growth (the highest ever recorded), and political liberalism. If a person from

the 1700’s were to go back in time to the 1600’s, he would see little change in the rigid,

17
Hegel, ​Philosophy of History, ​40.
18
Kojeve, ​Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,​ 69.
10

monarchical, caste society that was predominant throughout Europe. If that same person were to

jump ahead into the 1800’s, however, he would discover an unrecognizable place brimming with

values, attitudes, and behaviors hitherto unknown to him. The twin industrial revolutions coupled

with a boom in population growth brought the nascent capitalist spirit to its full potential.

Economic data indicates that per capita gnp – the total economic output for every European –

increased by 120 percent between 1830 and 1913.19 In the early nineteenth century, technological

improvements in the manufacture of textiles and steel were complemented by monumental

advances in transportation systems which made Europe a productive, interconnected continent by

the end of the nineteenth century. Exports rose from 9.4 percent in 1860 to 14 percent in 1913.20

This progress was facilitated by a boom in population growth, which provided additional

labor/capital to be used by the expanding economies of European states. By 1913, Europe stood

at 481 million people from only 205 million in 1800 with a life expectancy above the age of

fifty, a marked improvement from previous centuries.21 Considering what it was hundreds of

years before, it is easy to appreciate Europe’s maturity at the dawn of the 20th century. Having

harnessed the power of technological improvements to drastically improve the quality of life for

millions of people and seemingly putting an end to the incessant warfare that had plagued the

continent for decades previously, it stood poised to acclaim the “end of history” Hegel dreamt of.

However, there was one eccentric philosopher in the hills of Switzerland who did not believe so.

Friedrich Nietszhe made it his mission to warn people that the “end of history,” the universal

mutual recognition of others for their intrinsic worth as enforced by the state, was not something

they should necessarily hope for.

19
Blanning, ​The Nineteenth Century, ​82.
20
Blanning, ​The Nineteenth Century, ​101.
21
Blanning, ​The Nineteenth Century, ​86.
11

It is tempting to become infatuated with the auspicious trends of the nineteenth century

without perceiving the more opaque, deleterious elements of European society, elements

Nietzsche saw in his own time as a decadent, increasingly effete generation that traded its dignity

for pecuniary rewards, the tranquility and ​arete​ of monarchy for the vagaries of democracy, and,

most importantly, recognition of genuine superiority for universal belittlement. Nietzsche’s

views aligned strongly with that of Hegel’s (no matter how much the former criticized the latter),

that life for humans was ineluctably a question of struggle. Yet, what Hegel termed the “desire

for recognition” Nietzsche promulgated as the “will to power,” a collection of unconscious

drives that did not end in an harmonious outcome.22 Where Nietszche differed from Hegel was

his contention that power over others, much like the cruel competition social darwinism

​ ismissive of any form of


espoused, was not a means to an end but ​an end in and of itself. D

altruism or outlook that espoused it (especially Christianity), only those capable of attaining

superiority over others were those whom we should consider ​as superior ​– hence the inspiration

for the “supermen” Nietzsche mesmerized his audience with in his most famous book, ​Thus

Spoke Zarathustra.23 “The wretched are alone the good; the poor, the weak, the lowly, are alone

the good,” Nietszhe declaimed, “but the aristocrats, you men of power, you are to all eternity the

evil, the horrible, the covetous, instantiate, the godless.”24 To require strength “not express itself

as strength,” Nietszhe argued, “is just as absurd as to require of weakness that it should express

itself as strength.”25

22
Nietzsche, ​Beyond Good and Evil​, 7.
23
Nietzsche, ​Thus Spoke Zarathustra,​ 20.
24
Nietzsche, ​On the Genealogy of Morality,​ 7.
25
Nietzsche, ​On the Genealogy of Morality,​ 13.
12

Nietzsche has too often fallen into disrepute amongst other philosophers and historians

for his provocative statements and his stance against the overwhelming achievements of the

nineteenth century. It is still difficult to describe his philosophy in definitive terms; his works

read more as extended recriminations, especially against the liberal philosophers of his day (of

whom Schopenhaur was his prime target) than providing anything substantively new. However,

he did raise an important question concerning whether mutual recognition was actually

preferable. ​“What is the point of living,” one can ask, “if everyone were treated the same?” The

striving of the slave in the master-slave dialectic was due to the slave’s ​discontent with himself, a​

feeling which then harnessed the labor and creativity to be worthy of the respect equal to the

master.26 Mutual recognition, Nietszhe argued, would take away this discontent, the impetus for

all human achievement, for what could a human possibly ​want t​ o achieve if they were merely

treated equal in every circumstance; the “desire to be recognized as superior to others,” as

Fukuyama inferred, “is necessary if one is to be superior to oneself.”27 The society that was

brimming with technological improvement and broadening political enfranchisement in

Nietszhe’s day was losing sight of what made it great. Such a world was painstakingly killing

religion, art, poetry, history, and philosophy, the products of human development that were the

resultants of the clash between master and slave and the desire for recognition. Hegel’s “end of

history” was approximating the “last man,” the antithesis to the supermen of his imagination, the

loss of culture and the increase of decadence which heralded a society of apathetic, impassive,

and indolent persons bereft of the creativity and virtue of their forebears. Nietszche understood

the problem of sustaining the clash between master and slave, of protecting the ambition that

26
Fukuyama, ​End of History,​ 304.
27
Fukuyama, ​End of History,​ 304.
13

made life meaningful. Whether this fear was unfounded, many would agree it wasn’t (and still

isn’t), but what Nietszche did underestimate was the versatility of human behavior that did not

accord to the bellicose reality he thought life on earth was.

Primordial Position and Value as a Consequence of Desire:

Each person is given an infinite amount of choices throughout their lifetime. In order for

decisions to have been made, an equal amount of forgone possibilities must have also existed,

choices that must not have been as valuable or important to make (for they would have been

chosen in place of the preferred determination if such were the case). Hegel never seems to have

envisaged a scenario where people could choose their particular bondage, of who or what to

render service to, something his dialectic never fully explains. Given the infinitude amount of

choices one must make and the equal number of forgone opportunities, there must be something

governing our actions that is not entirely rational – at least not to any bystander – but also allows

us to traverse the vagaries of life in the best manner we see fit. Recognition may be a part of this

calculus, maybe even the overarching ​raison d’etre ​for why we make these decisions, but this

cannot explain entirely the heterogeneity of human passion. Nietszche’s “will to power” is

equally inadequate at providing an answer to this problem (and thankfully so), as no person can

imagine human beings possessed exclusively of predacious tendencies without also a conduit for

human morality that is not only in the “pejorative sense.” Nietzsche ironically problematized his

own beliefs by animalizing human beings according to a single principal desire alone. The only

other conclusion remaining is a type of recognition that cannot indefinitely be satiated,

something that with each achievement only invigorates the desire for more. Society today

desperately needs an Hegelian interpretation adapted to current circumstances, the rational


14

pursuit of ​maximum r​ ecognition that is as much a consequence of the individual’s ambition as it

is the societal circumstances under which he or she finds themselves in. It is a primordial

position, one that propels all of a person’s actions and endeavors, which never entirely desists.

The “primordial position,” if we may call it that, is an inherent quality that incentivizes

individuals to choose the particular occupation and activities they think will reap the highest

accolades amongst their peers. People engage in certain behaviors to conjure in others the

attributes they want for themselves, as in Adam Smith’s version of sympathy, but this does not

necessarily presuppose conformity.28 A person can engage in the most vile, iniquitous, and

disreputable conduct against any public consensus of propriety if they feel it will solicit some

renown; a criminal can commit illegal acts to the same extent that a Wall Street executive trades

stock, both being in search of the optimal recognition circumstances will allow. Their activities

are not a “desire to be desired” in a rigid Hegelian sense, but a desire for intrapersonal ​value

which money can never buy – “value as a consequence of desire” it can also be interpreted as. It

is not that nature endowed its creations with an ambition inequitably distributed, or that affinity

is the only factor in a person’s vocation, but that perceptions of success and merit vary according

to each person. Talent plays little part in this decision but rather acts as an ancillary attribute that

is either compatible or incompatible with the goal in mind; there can be no telling of how much

wasted effort has been spent on futile goals in the course of human history. A person’s latitude to

make these choices, however, varies indisputably on their social position, which therein lies the

problem of populist tendencies and Emile Durkheim’s fear of societal ​anomie​. Little argument

needs to be made on how social handicaps inhibit preferred decision-making, yet people often

28
Smith, ​Theory of Moral Sentiments​, 15.
15

underestimate the emotional toll this has on those unfortunate enough to bear such burdens.

When a person is denied, through no fault of their own, the possibility to be recognized as how

they wish to be seen, they will either begrudgingly accept the conditions under which they find

themselves in or fault society itself as the cause of their plight. Populist urges take root from the

failed aspirations of its citizens, who begin to realize they have been sold empty promises that

only certain groups of people can attain, whether it be the rich, educated, or the low-born, but

that are superficially advertised to all.

Populism is one possible way for society to cope with a significant shift in the

opportunities for recognition by attempting to reconfigure accepted attitudes and behaviors – its

“spirit” – either according to radical ideas of future development or anachronistic conceptions of

what made past societies great. Each successive tide of history enlarges the number of these

possibilities, albeit with the concomitant result that other modes of behavior are steadily

diminished. People are forced to question the efficacy of their chosen occupations as a means of

satisfying the primordial position and reconsider the legitimacy of the approbation they formerly

confided themselves as possessing. In many cases, they ultimately realize that this is no longer

the case. There exist today too many disconsolate persons who clearly realize not a single outlet

exists to direct all one’s effort and assiduous care that is capable of remitting any modicum of

esteem or value. The worth of the individual suddenly vanishes and with it a lasting indignance

and caustic cynicism will be born. It will either give rise to the most morose of temperaments or

the most implacable anger, an anger that the world is experiencing today and struggling to cope

with.
16

Part II: Anger and Anomie

Looking back at history, the world today is not very unlike the world of Nietszche. As

numerous authors have written, the world is generally becoming more wealthy, peaceful,

healthy, and (or as I should say “was” until the last decade) also the most democratic than it has

ever been. Extreme poverty, for example, has fallen from a whopping 90 percent to a current 10

percent and the proportion of people killed annually in wars is less than a quarter of what it was

in the 1980’s, a seventh of what it was in the 1970’s, an eighteenth of what it was in the 1950’s,

and roughly half a percent of what it was during the Second World War.”29 Two thirds of all

countries today, furthermore, are considered “democratic” with elected representatives drawn

from universal suffrage, a monumental achievement considering the plenitude of autocratic

regimes and constitutional monarchies of the early twentieth century.30 Such progress can be

substantiated by a litany of facts and statistics which prove the overall positive trajectory.

However, this process has not been easy, and general statistics such as these can often mask the

more repellent aspects of modern society which warrant greater attention in understanding why

populism has become so prominent today. A concatenation of economic dislocation, political

turbulence, immigration, and other factors have played major roles in enervating the dignity of

ordinary people so much so that they are now pursuing outcomes that stymie the progressive tide

of history and constrain the choices available to their fellow citizens.

29
Pinker, ​Better Angels of our Nature,​ 323.
30
Pew Research Center, “Despite global concerns about democracy, more than half of countries are democratic,”
​https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/​ [accessed 16
March 2020].
17

Modern Capitalism and Anomie:

Increases in wealth are derived from multiple synchronous processes that are sometimes

difficult to understand but relatively simple to recognize. The sophistication of a country’s

economy, whether it be gauged in gross domestic product (GDP) or GDP per capita, is generally

predicated on the specialization of its division of labor. Products are produced more efficiently

when different tasks are allocated amongst a workforce which, because of this division, can then

produce high quality goods at lower cost. This fact was elucidated to readers centuries ago when

the moral philosopher Adam Smith wrote his monumental ​On the Wealth of Nations​ arguing

against the mercantile, monopolistic economies of Europe​. ​Improvements in technology

complement this process by increasing the efficiency of individual workers, freeing up existing

labor spent in unproductive industries to pursue more lucrative enterprises. However, with new

technologies also comes new ​tasks and responsibilities​ which need to be filled in order to keep

the process moving forward.

Globalization and automation require a generation of educated, professional, and

tech-savvy workers who know how to realize the vast potential of new technologies. Job

dislocation, therefore, is not only an inexorable side-effect of this process but an essential

requirement for economic progress to be made, a reality that can be a hard pill to swallow for

many people. People whose jobs have been affected by these twin processes still work incredibly

hard for their wages and take pride in what they are able to achieve given the opportunities

available to them. The dignity they derive from the long hours spent doing these jobs (many of

which are quite dangerous), they feel, are not adequately recognized by their fellow citizens who

barely notice them. In the words of Katherine Cramer, a political scientist at the University of
18

Wisconsin-Madison, many workers understand their plight to be the fault of, “guilty and less

deserving people, not as the product of broad social, economic, and political forces.”31 Events

such as the financial crisis of 2008 and the growing levels of income inequality in America

corroborate these viewpoints.

Hopefully in the time that this paper is being written, society would have not forgotten

the tumultuous financial crisis of 2008 and the lasting effect this event has had on the American

economy. These effects are too extensive and intricate to be discussed in this paper and other

sources with far more expertise and knowledge on the matter are more adept at informing readers

of the consequences this economic downturn produced. However, what is surprising (and too

often overlooked) in the aftermath of this event was the treatment of those responsible. Not a

single high-level CEO was charged in connection to the financial collapse or faced federal

convictions and jail time.32 In fact, most of them received huge year-end bonuses such as Joseph

Cassano of AIG Financial Products, who required a 99 billion dollar bailout and received a 34

million dollar bonus to himself or Robert Rubin of Citibank who received a 10 million dollar

bonus even though his company required 63 billion dollars in federal funds to stay afloat.33 The

reprobate actions of these men, as well as those of many other Wall Street executives, strongly

substantiate the view that the “elite” have profited from the struggles of the American working

class – 9 million people would eventually lose their jobs as a result of the financial crisis.34

Studies suggest that there were sharp increases in political polarization and fragmentation not

only in the US in the aftermath of the financial crisis but also in Europe as well. Such

31
Fukuyama, ​Identity: The Demand for Dignity and The Politics of Resentment,​ 88.
32
Junger, ​Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging​, 129.
33
Dvorak, “Poor Year Doesn’t Stop CEO Bonuses.”
34
Junger, ​Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging​, 129.
19

fragmentation was viewed clearly with the rise of the Tea Party, an ultraconservative movement

stemming largely from the failed Republican bid for the 2008 Presidency and the Wall Street

Movement that burst onto the scene in 2011. Less salient was the share of economic

conservatives, drawn primarily from gallup polls, which had risen to 46 percent by May of 2012

with the liberal share increasing by only 20 percent.35 In Europe, far-right and right-wing

populist parties more than doubled their vote share in many advanced economies, including

France, the UK, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Japan.36 This pattern continues

as economic inequality continues to ossify political boundaries today.

Many economists and historians have a penchant for quantifying economic success with

modes such as GDP or GDP per capita. Though these mechanisms are useful to a certain extent,

they are unable to reveal the disparities in income that make advanced economies, especially the

US, susceptible to populist urges. As of 2017, US GDP is valued at 19.39 trillion dollars which,

divided by the number of its population (GDP per capita), amounts to over 59,000 dollars – data

is still being compiled for years 2019 and 2020 with a slight increase.37 However, data indicates

only ten percent of the US population’s incomes have kept at or above this amount of money.38

The top one percent of household income, on the other hand, have seen their incomes increase

dramatically, witnessing a cumulative increase of over 229 percent from the year 1980.39 The top

.01 percent of earners have seen a cumulative increase in their wages by 400 percent since 1980.

35
Mian et al. “Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises,” 5.
36
Funke et al. “Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870-2014,” 14.
37
The World Bank. “GDP - United States,” ​https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US
[accessed 16 March 2020].
38
Leonhardt, “How the Upper Middle Class is Really Doing,”
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/opinion/income-inequality-upper-middle-class.html​ [accessed 16 March
2020].
39
Gould, Elise, “Decades of Rising Inequality in the US: testimony before the US House of representatives.”
https://www.epi.org/publication/decades-of-rising-economic-inequality-in-the-u-s-testimony-before-the-u-s-house-o
f-representatives-ways-and-means-committee/​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
20

40
In short, only ten percent of the working population in the US is benefitting from the US

economy. The lack of income growth among the middle class is so large that other countries,

such as Britain, Canada, Spain, and Sweden have all surpassed the rate of median income growth

since the early 2000’s; the United States no longer has the highest average income.41 The stark

nature of these estimates cast into doubt the validity of the American dream that many people

have worked their entire lives to achieve. Knowing the rules are somehow no longer in their

favor has conjured a deep ressentiment that has now found ample expression through attacks

against the “elite” establishment, the leadership of President Donald Trump, and the treatment of

foreign nationals and migrants.

Growing Dissatisfaction:

Considering the economic dilemma globalization engenders, it is unsurprising key

deficits in public trust exist towards the federal government in many countries, especially the

United States. Working-class people feel increasingly alienated by a society who seemingly

neither needs them nor particularly wants them. In the words of Francis Fukuyama, this

“perception of invisibility,” the idea that they are “invisible” to politicians, the elite, and the

media, has led many people below the median income gap to attribute their enervated economic

and social status to the connivance of the “elite” establishment of policymakers and beneficiaries

of the world economy. In one of Cramer’s polls a respondent stated, “‘they [Washington D.C.] is

a country unto itself... They haven’t got a clue what the rest of the nation is up to, they’re so

40
Leonhardt, “How the Upper Middle Class is Really Doing,”
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/opinion/income-inequality-upper-middle-class.html​ [accessed 16 March
2020].
41
Leonhardt, and Quealy, “The American Middle Class Is No Longer the World’s Richest,”
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/upshot/the-american-middle-class-is-no-longer-the-worlds-richest.html
[accessed 16 March 2020].
21

absorbed in studying their own belly button.’”42 Sentiments such as these typify the growing

disillusionment towards the US political institution which, given the lingering ramifications of

the financial crisis, the growing income inequality, and pervasive political malpractices such as

gerrymandering and lobbying, is not fatuous to any extent.

In 2016, the year Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, a poll

showed roughly 80 percent of Americans were dissatisfied with the Federal Government.43 More

recent gallup polls have determined that only a mere 35 percent of the US populace trusts the

government to handle domestic issues.44 An international study conducted by the Pew Research

Center concluded that across 27 countries surveyed, 54 percent think most politicians in their

country are corrupt and only 35 percent agree that elected officials care what ordinary people

think.45 This study also found that the people who say the national economy is in bad shape are

more likely to be dissatisfied with the way democracy is working; those most critical of the

establishment and less faithful in democracy are more likely to have experienced economic

hardships such as unemployment.46 “In 26 nations,” the report stated, “unhappiness with the

current functioning of democracy is more common among those who believe the statement

“‘elected officials care what ordinary people think’ does not describe their country well.”47

42
Fukuyama, ​Identity: The Demand for Dignity and The Politics of Resentment,​ 88.
43
Elving, Ron. “Poll: 1 in 5 Americans Trust the Government.”
https://www.npr.org/2015/11/23/457063796/poll-only-1-in-5-americans-say-they-trust-the-government​ [accessed 16
March 2020].
44
Brenan, Megan. “Americans' Trust in Government to Handle Problems at New Low,”
https://news.gallup.com/poll/246371/americans-trust-government-handle-problems-new-low.aspx​ [accessed 16
March 2020].
45
Wike et al. “​Publics satisfied with free speech, ability to improve living standards; many are critical of institutions,
politicians,”
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/publics-satisfied-with-free-speech-ability-to-improve-living-standa
rds-many-are-critical-of-institutions-politicians/​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
46
Wike et al. “Many Across the Globe Are Dissatisfied With How Democracy Is Working,” 21.
47
Wike et al. “Many Across the Globe Are Dissatisfied With How Democracy Is Working,” 10.
22

Considering these revelations, it is hardly surprising that nonwhites, poorer, and less educated

individuals, and younger adults have lower levels of personal trust than other Americans.48 This

trust enervates the bonds that hold society together, making the connections between them not a

matter of mutual recognition but of Nietzsche's “will to power” over their fellow citizens. If

citizens are increasingly feeling alienated by their own government, greater opposition and “the

will to power” will be exhibited towards people who are not formally citizens of those

governments.

Immigration, Sovereignty, and Identity:

Immigration is the quintessence of the desire for dignity because it forces societies to

reevaluate what it means to be a “citizen” and, in so doing, the value this status should confer.

The character of Western Europe and the United States has certainly been affected by large-scale

immigration, both of which have pursued conservative and generally illiberal measures that have

catalyzed a new, multi-polar, and outwardly nationalistic world. Hegel’s “Master-Slave ''

dialectic can be used far more effectively in explaining resistance to immigration than any other

method.

The first assumption related to immigration that has largely been invalidated is the idea

that immigration poses inimical effects for the recipient country’s economic performance.

Common accusations include fears of immigrants stealing jobs from natural-born citizens,

utilizing services that drain the federal budget, committing crimes at higher rates than

natural-born citizens, or, more commonly, bringing views and values that are incompatible with

those of the recipient country. Such beliefs transgress numerous unequivocal economic

48
​Rainie and Perrin​. ​“Key Findings about Americans’ Declining Trust in Government and Each Other.”
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/22/key-findings-about-americans-declining-trust-in-government-an
d-each-other/​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
23

principles and modern research, which has largely refuted these viewpoints. Recent research, for

example, has revealed that immigrants lower the price of services such as child-care, gardening,

and cleaning services, benefitting tremendously the people to use such services.49 One study has

even concluded that since the infusion of immigrants actually lowers the price of goods and

services by increasing the division of labor, every citizen regardless of education level stands to

benefit financially.50 Furthermore, it has been shown in the United States that immigrants are not

a drain on the federal budget since the taxes that immigrants and their children pay, such as

income, sales, and property taxes, actually exceed the costs of the services they use. A 2007

Congressional Budget Office Report projected that a path to legalization for unauthorized

immigrants would produce a surplus of 15 billion dollars from greater receipts of social security

payroll taxes.51 Granted, many state and local governments more affected by immigration are

bound to have greater expenses, though there is little reason why these states cannot receive

greater federal aid.

Having elucidated the potential benefits that immigration brings, it is hard to imagine

why some people would choose to believe in farcical evidence of the contrary. What keeps many

people accepting these spurious claims, however, is their faith in the worth and recognition that

citizenship affords. People can take great pride in the historical and cultural heritage of a country

so being a citizen of that country means a great deal to them; it is not so much the material

benefits that are involved in citizenship than the standing and reputation that citizenship implies.

49
Greenstone and Looney, “Ten Economic Facts About Immigration,”
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/ten_economic_facts_about_immigration​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
50
Greenstone and Looney, “Ten Economic Facts About Immigration,”
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/ten_economic_facts_about_immigration​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
51
Congressional Budget Office, ​Cost Estimate: Senate Amendment 1150 to S. 1348, the Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2007,​ 2.
24

So, it is natural for some incredulity to be expressed towards foreign people and illegal

immigrants who want to reap the economic benefits of other countries but not undergo the

struggle of becoming a citizen in those countries (though it is much more difficult for a foreigner

to become a naturalized citizen than it is to be born into citizenship). Immigrants have yet to

prove their worth to the society they wish to occupy and to be considered equal to them (by

allowing illegal immigrants to reside in the host country without repercussion) would denigrate

the dignity that naturalized citizens believe themselves to possess. In the words of one expert, the

immigrant is a “symbol of loss of sovereignty and/or identity,” and the “agent of an invasive

stratagem aimed at the displacement and/or replacement of the autochthonous population by

either a new culture/civilisation or a multicultural mix whereby the original population would be

defiled or destroyed.”52 The anger and hatred for immigrants represents the fear of “losing” the

country that naturalized citizens believe they’ve worked hard to build; as the Blauner hypothesis

suggests, citizens do not want to inherit the perceived weaknesses of people from areas that were

conquered in the past and which currently experience political instability in the present.53 This is

perhaps why the southern border of the United States receives a disproportionate amount of

attention despite data revealing most illegal immigrants simply overstay their visas through

ulterior entry points.54 This can also explain more than any economic or social reason why

resistance to immigration has been so widespread in Europe and the United States.

Nowhere has immigration elicited as widespread criticism and opprobrium as it has in

Europe following the mass exodus of immigrants and refugees from war-torn areas in the Middle

52
Mondon, “Populism, the People, and the Illusion of Democracy,” 144.
53
Blauner, ​Racial Oppression in America, 5​ 2.
54
Greenstone and Looney, “Ten Economic Facts About Immigration,”
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/ten_economic_facts_about_immigration​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
25

East and Africa. The highest recorded number of arrivals was in 2015 with over 1,015,078 new

immigrants, the majority of whom arrived in Germany and Sweden via Greece and Turkey.55 The

European Commission determined that in 2018, the number of people residing in an EU Member

State with citizenship of a non-member country was 22.3 million, roughly 4.4 percent of

Europe’s population.56 Therefore, it is unsurprising many populist parties and associations

originally began solely for the purpose of extraditing these individuals. Such was the case in

Germany, where the Pegida movement – otherwise known as the “Patriotic Europeans against

the Islamisation of the West” – took off in October of 2014. What became a movement that

thousands of people attended and millions more were exposed to originally began as a Facebook

page of disgruntled local citizens (specifically a football league) in southern Germany.57 In

France, Marine Le Pen’s ​National Front h​ as expressed its desire to make France “more French”

by restricting immigration.58 Across the channel in the United Kingdom, immigration was

reportedly a top concern for 46 percent of survey respondents; this statistic has since been

subsumed under the current and contentious Brexit debates.59 Perhaps the most salient example

of populist politics built heavily on immigration has been the Five Star movement in Italy. In

2017, Italy received 67 percent of the new EU arrivals and the Italian government has gone so far

as to not only block illegal immigrants from arriving in Italy but also prosecuting humanitarian

55
Clayton et al. “​Over One Million Sea Arrivals Reach Europe in 2015,”
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html​ [accessed
16 March 2020].
56
“Migration and Migrant Population Statistics.”
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics​ [accessed
16 March 2020].
57
Dostal, “The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?” 524.
58
Nossiter, “Marine LePen Leads Far Right Fight to make France ‘More French.’”
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/europe/france-election-marine-le-pen.html​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
59
​“UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern.”
https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-a
nd-level-of-concern/#kp1​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
26

organizations that care for those who make the perilous journey through the Meditteranean Sea

to safe harbors in Europe.60 Such actions have largely succeeded due to growing dissatisfaction

towards the EU, which lacks the authority and legitimacy to pursue a unanimous immigration

policy for all of its member states. A study found that while most Europeans associate the EU

with “peace and prosperity,” they still view it as “inefficient” and not understanding of the needs

of ordinary citizens, which is then highly indicative of increased levels of distrust.61 So, the

growing resistance towards immigration coupled with the seeming ineptitude of the EU has

produced circumstances conducive to populist attitudes and urges, which are by no means absent

from the United States as well.

In the US, where the majority of its citizens are overall dissatisfied with democracy,

President Trump has made has made the task of occluding the flow of illegal immigration on the

southern border a top priority. Trump’s stand against illegal immigration can best be summarized

with his now well-known (and much reviled) statement, ​“They’re bringing drugs. They’re

bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”62 Unfortunately, this

rhetoric has been matched by a plenitude of active policy measures such as travel bans (as in the

case of 2017 against numerous Middle Eastern countries), the ongoing operations of ICE, and,

most seriously, the detention of thousands of migrants at the Southern border. An Inspector

General Report conducted in May of 2019 identified squalid living conditions, overcrowding,

60
“Migration to Europe in Charts,” ​https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44660699​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
61
Wike, Fetterolf, and Fagan, “Europeans Credit EU With Promoting Peace and Prosperity, but Say Brussels Is Out
of Touch With Its Citizens,”
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/19/europeans-credit-eu-with-promoting-peace-and-prosperity-but-say-
brussels-is-out-of-touch-with-its-citizens/​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
62
Lee, “Donald Trump’s false comments connecting Mexican immigrants and crime.”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
27

and lacking health standards for those detained.63 Under a new Trump measure, migrants would

have to seek asylum claims in the countries they pass through prior to reaching the United States,

a measure that the President intimidated the Guatemalan government into accepting.64 Under this

new rule, there would essentially be an end to asylum seekers at the US southern border but

would increase the burden of host countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, and other South

American states.65 The alacrity which the President has displayed for these measures and the

woeful indifference he has exhibited towards the plight of those affected have sharpened the

public’s opinion with immigration becoming, as the results of one gallup survey showed, the top

overall issue at 27 percent, up from 23 percent in 2016.66 These statistics reveal that populists do

not necessarily have to win large amounts of supporters to put the spotlight on a topic of their

choosing.

The measures implemented by countries such as the United States, Italy, and the UK are

unlikely to provide a permanent solution to the increase in worldwide immigration, which is

projected to continue well into the twenty-first century. This will provide populists with ample

political ammunition in the years to come, making it difficult if not impossible for the topic to

dissipate entirely. The vitriolic stances towards immigration are also synchronous with an overall

rise in hate crimes perpetrated by racist, right-wing extremist groups, which are symptomatic of

efforts towards reframing socially acceptable behavior ... and persons.

63
Office of Inspector General, ​Management Alert–DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged
Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley (Redacted),​ 2-4.
64
Miroff, “Trump administration to begin sending asylum seekers to Guatemala as soon as this week.”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
65
Miroff, “Trump administration to begin sending asylum seekers to Guatemala as soon as this week.”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/​ [accessed 16 March 2020].
66
Jones, “Mentions of Immigration as Top Problem Surpass Record High.”
https://news.gallup.com/poll/261500/mentions-immigration-top-problem-surpass-record-high.aspx​ [accessed 16
March 2020].
28

Violence and Hate crimes: A Worrying Increase

Populism thrives where there exists a general lack of consensus as to what norms, values,

and beliefs ​should b​ e accepted. Many people in the US, for example, are uncertain as to what

constitutes “offensive” language (by a margin of nearly 51 percent) and a majority of people do

not believe that there is agreement as to what constitutes “racist” or “sexist” language as well (61

and 65 percent respectively). This disillusionment has spurred the rise of alternative subcultures

and internet meeting places that provide a conduit for venting frustration, often with dire results.

A study from the California State University’s Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism

noted, “As many Americans have become increasingly distrustful in the efficacy and integrity of

the institutions of their pluralistic democracy [and] new alternative subcultures and the internet

have offered a place of refuge for those feeling left behind.”67 Some of these cultures, it must be

acknowledged, have fomented the most bigoted opinions responsible for a rise in hate crimes

both in the United States and Europe.

Hate crimes are defined by the FBI as “crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based

on race, gender or gender identity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.”68 The

majority of hate crimes reported in the United States during 2017 fell under the

“race/ethnicity/ancestry” category (58 percent to be exact), the overall total representing an

increase of 17 percent from the previous year.69 An analysis of hate crimes reported in US major

cities from 2017 to 2018 has also found significant spikes of hate crimes in the cities of Los

67
Levin and Reitzel, “Report to the Nation: Hate Crimes Rise in U.S. Cities and Counties in Time of Division and
Foreign Interference,” 32.
68
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Hate Crime Statistics,” ​https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/hate-crime
[accessed 17 March 2020].
69
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “2017 Hate Crime Statistics.”
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/topic-pages/incidents-and-offenses​ [accessed 17 March 2020].
29

Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Dallas, Austin, San Francisco, Fort Worth, Seattle,

Washington, D.C., Louisville, Sacramento, Miami, New Orleans, and Cleveland, with each city

reporting a decade-high rise.70 A 2018 Department of Justice report did not reveal any departure

from this alarming trend, a year the Anti-defamation League's Center on Extremism concluded

was the fourth-deadliest year for domestic extremist – affiliation with right-wing, left wing, or

islamist movements – events on record since the 1970’s.71 Data has found that the majority of the

extremist-related murders from 2009 to 2018, such as Robert Bowers, the perpetrator of the

“Tree of Life” Synagogue shooting or Nikolas Cruz and the infamous Parkland High School

massacre, were perpetrated by right-wing extremists (over 73 percent).72 These criminals began

“not as hardened bigots” but were susceptible to exploitation by the “purported facts of those

who are bigots, particularly by those [who] promote a strain of Euro-nationalism, Islamophobia

and anti- Semitism as a bulwark against national security threats, demographic change, and a

degradation of traditional American culture.”73 Whether it be Robert Bower’s contributions to

the online chat forum ​Gab​ or Patrick Crusius’s online manifesto warning of the “hispanic

invasion” prior to his murder of twenty innocents, disaffected individuals have found refuge in

the dark corners of the web that accept and support their racist, intolerant, and largely

misogynistic opinions.74 These beliefs obfuscate the line between freedom of speech and

70
Levin and Reitzel, “Report to the Nation: Hate Crimes Rise in U.S. Cities and Counties in Time of Division and
Foreign Interference,” 3.
71
US Department of Justice, “Hate Crime Statistics,” ​https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/hate-crime-statistics
[accessed 17 March 2020]; Anti-Defamation League. “​Right-Wing Extremism Linked to Every 2018 Extremist
Murder in the U.S., ADL Finds,”
https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/right-wing-extremism-linked-to-every-2018-extremist-murder-in-the-us-adl
-finds​ ​[accessed 17 March 2020].
72
Anti-Defamation League, “Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2018,”
https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2018​ [accessed 17 March 2020].
73
Levin and Grisham, “Special Status Report: Hate Crime in the United States,” 14.
74
Ohlheiser and Shapira, “​Gab, the white supremacist sanctuary linked to the Pittsburgh suspect, goes offline (for
now),”
30

criminal intent, all of which has been amplified by the relative ease of firearms possession in the

United States. Though right-wing extremism has been more acute in the United States, it is also

apparent in Europe as well.

In Europe, the people exposed to hate crimes are disproportionately immigrants and

foreigners. Though these crimes are not as deadly as the shootings in the US, they are still

becoming prevalent and increasingly more violent. The 2015 stabbings of three people of Middle

Eastern descent at a school in the city of Trollhattan, Sweden, a small town with a history of hate

crimes, has been the most horrific attack to date.75 However, most hate crimes in Europe are less

overt, yet receive the tacit sanctioning of politicians and authorities. Matteo Salvini, a prominent

far-right Italian politician known for his anti-migrant rhetoric is credited with saying in an

interview the need for a “mass cleansing” in Italy of its illegal immigrants, and there has been a

significant spike in violence towards immigrants, including shootings, attacks on minors and

murders in Italy.76 In the UK, Prime minister Boris Johnson has compared the burka to a

letterbox, prompting an increase in Muslim women to reportedly feel unsafe.77 Most

conspicuously, however, has been the treatment of foreigners and Jews in Hungary under the

leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban. There, he has only led timid efforts at restraining the

extremist and openly anti-semitic Jobbik party, which directs paramilitary organizations such as

the “Hungarian Guard” to patrol Roma neighborhoods and Hungary’s border in search of “gypsy

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/28/how-gab-became-white-supremacist-sanctuary-before-it-
was-linked-pittsburgh-suspect/​ ​[accessed 17 March 2020]​; Ailworth et al.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lost-in-life-el-paso-suspect-found-a-dark-world-online-11565308783​ [accessed 17
March 2020].
75
Taylor, “Swedish school worker killed trying to protect students in racial attack hailed as hero.”
76
Dieng, “Street by Street: Systematic Dehumanization in Europe,” 2.
77
Saner, “‘It Has Made Us Unsafe’”
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/14/unsafe-muslim-women-fear-abuse-boris-johnson-burqa​ [accessed
17 March 2020].
31

crime” and illegal migrants. These efforts perpetuate state-sanctioned violence against

immigrants and foreign peoples that is fueled by corrosive, apoplectic desires of racial

purification and national pride. The stance against foreigners of different nationalities and

ethnicities, however, has only been matched by an increasing resistance towards Europe’s

perennial scapegoat, Judaism.

Only decades after the horrific conditions of the Holocaust, the systemic elimination of

Jews and other undesirables within German occupied territory during the Second World War,

Europe has become a place increasingly unsafe for Jews. Just this past year, French officials

have reported a 74 percent increase in offenses against Jews, and German reports acknowledge

that there has been an increase of 60 percent in similar attacks against Jews as well, an account

which reportedly marks a 10-year high with 1,646 incidents this past year, 43 of which were

physical altercations.78 The most egregious case has been in Viktor Orban’s Hungary, which has

pursued a state-sanctioned ridicule campaign against the Jewish Hungarian business magnate

George Soros.79 Conspiracy theories attributing Soros to the financial crisis of 2008 are a key

feature of Orban’s party, which has earned widespread attention and acceptance by many

Hungarian citizens. Furthermore, a 28-nation Eurobarometer report in 2018 revealed a

significant discrepancy between perceptions of antisemitism between the Jewish community, 89

percent of whom believe discrimination against Jews has increased, and the general public, of

whom only 36 percent believe it had; Europe is becoming generally ignorant of the struggles

78
Henley, “Anti Semitism rising sharply across Europe, latest figures show”
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/feb/15/antisemitism-rising-sharply-across-europe-latest-figures-show
[accessed 17 March 2020].
79
Kingsley, “​Anti-Semitism Is Back, From the Left, Right and Islamist Extremes. Why?”
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/world/europe/antisemitism-europe-united-states.html​ [accessed 17 March
2020].
32

Jews face each day, especially as harrassment and hate speech, the EU Fundamental Rights

Agency declared, is becoming the new “normal.”80 Part of this rise, it is true, is caused by the

influx of Middle Eastern refugees into Europe beginning in 2013, yet statistically far-right,

native citizens have perpetrated more violence against Jews.81 Though some may continue to say

that the link between anti-semitism and populist politics remains tenuous, examples such as

Hungary and the rise of attacks on Jews in Europe reveal that this correlation is becoming proven

each day, portending a a darker reality for Jews which immigrants, foreigners, and the capitalist

“elite,” are having to come to grips with.

Adam Smith’s Solution: Education

Populism has real effects on a nation’s character. Like any addictive drug, it is a trend

that feels good and liberating in the short term but if pursued to its furthest extent, results in a

masochistic desire for a bygone future that is simply not attainable. Many other luminaries have

offered erudite appraisals of this situation though without an attendant solution – studies range

from naive to woefully pessimistic. Since the provenance of populism can be found in

philosophy, it is fitting that we return to that subject for a solution to the same topic, this time

from a different philosopher, Adam Smith.

The genius of Smith, who is known mainly for his groundbreaking work in formulating,

synthesizing, and defending capitalist economics, is that the philosopher diagnosed the problems

his own ideas created and included a way to rectify them while remaining loyal to the tenets he

laid down. Smith believed that human behavior was best defined by interpersonal relationships

rather than human logic or rationalism. In a similar vein with the “desire for a desire,” Smith

80
“Perceptions of Antisemitism,” 6.
81
“Perceptions of Antisemitism,” 6.
33

wrote that people want to inspire in others the feelings they want to associate with themselves

and, because of which, comport themselves according to societal norms and values; instead of

fighting, people can treat each other equitably for mutual benefit.82 Whereas for Hegel this was a

desire for recognition, to Smith this was a mutual relationship built on sympathy, with each party

acting with decorum so as not to be affiliated with any disreputable characteristics. Under this

“sympathy principle,” there would be a “society of perfect liberty” where the government did not

have to intrude on the lives of its citizens and law and order would be upheld by the approbation

or disapprobation of its members towards each other. This, coupled with economic liberalism,

would allow society to reach its highest material reward and ethical standards. However,

capitalism to Smith was not as much a liberative process as it was an oppressive one, which

enslaved humans to new mechanical, prosaic occupations that were denuded of any human care

or creativity. He lamented, “the man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple

operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has

no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for

removing difficulties which never occur.”83 Capitalism and the division of labor were tragic

phenomena that anesthetized man and his capacity for ingenuity and creativity; it seems

Nietszche was right when he lambasted the loss of culture during his time. “The torpor of his

mind,” Smith described the modern man, “renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing

a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment.”84

In embracing industrialization, which substitutes creative work for anodyne, mechanical duties,

man loses his intellectual, social, and martial faculties, and in return gains a skeptical, pessimistic

82
Smith, ​Theory of Moral Sentiments, ​17.
83
Smith, ​The Wealth of Nations​, 988.
84
Smith, ​The Wealth of Nations​, 987.
34

outlook of progress. His disconsolate temper renders him unable to appreciate anything new, but

rather only the halcyon days of the past before industrialism had wreaked its ugly head. Such

feelings are not far from populist rhetoric which stresses a past, idyllic society that has been

ruined by the vices of modernity such as corruption, social and economic inequality, or job

dislocation. The solution to this quandary, Smith articulated, could not be found in more laissez-

faire capitalism (no matter how much capitalists will continue erroneously to support) but in the

state-supported functions.

No government stands to prosper from allowing unbridled capitalism without ensuring

measures of protecting the working populace from its iniquities. A restive, angry population is

not a formula for stable governance. Smith argued that state-funded education was an antidote

for the moral decay eventuated by industrialism and it was the government’s responsibility to

ensure the laboring classes were proficient first in the most rudimentary subjects such as reading,

writing, science, and geometry.85 By inculcating an appreciation for these subjects in addition to

requiring military and gymnastic activities, Smith believed, a society could retain its civic ​virtu.

Francis Fukuyama took this argument a step further, noting that education not only prevents the

enervation of a society’s values but that it also strengthens them through realizing a fight to the

death is not necessary for proving one’s worth. “The last man at the end of history,” Fukuyama

wrote, “​knows b​ etter than to risk his life for a cause, because he recognizes that history was full

of pointless battles [...] the loyalties that drove men to desperate acts of courage and sacrifice

were proven by subsequent history to be silly prejudices.”86 Education allows people to realize

the futility of life-or-death struggle, that mutual recognition of a person’s dignity is more salutary

85
Smith, ​The Wealth of Nations​, 990.
86
Fukuyama, ​The End of History and the Last Man​, 307.
35

than internecine conflict. As one expert notes, “high levels of education, indicating a certain

intellectual or cognitive competence, constitutes a factor of tolerance.”87 Indeed, knowledge and

reasoning skills tend to favor an acceptance of differences and the adoption of more tolerant

attitudes over negative stereotypes. Perhaps when populists learn that lower-priced products

actually increase a person’s income, that the loss of unproductive industries provide new

opportunities for more lucrative enterprises, that the quixotic days of the past are irretrievably

gone, or that the immigrants they denigrate ​have​ ​dignity too​, they can jettison whatever prejudice

they hold, and look towards to progress with anticipation and excitement. An equitable education

system, the first step for achieving this equanimity, is very challenging to erect in today’s

circumstances.

Education is not only necessary for understanding the business cycle but also facilitates

the primordial position of a nation’s citizenry by offering a greater range of beneficial ways to

pursue their right to recognition. The overall quality of the US education system – and in other

countries affected by populism – is generally inequitable however, ranked by the Organization

for Economic Cooperation and Development between Argentina and the United Kingdom. 38.88

The percentage of 25-34 year olds in 2017 who had completed a bachelor’s degree was an

average 26 percent, though this is unevenly distributed across regions, with a whopping 43

percent gap between the state with the highest tertiary (associate or bachelor’s degree)

educational attainment and the state with the lowest, a gap seconded only by the Russian

87
Coenders and Scheepers, “The Effect of Education on Nationalism and Ethnic Exclusionism: An International
Comparison,” 315.
88
​“Education At A Glance,”
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/data/education-at-a-glance/educational-attainment-and-labour-force-status_
889e8641-en​ [accessed 17 March 2020].
36

Federation.89 The availability and quality of education in the United States is based heavily on

which state a person lives no less than birth. In West Virginia, a state dependent heavily on the

coal industry, only 17.5 percent of its residents have a bachelor’s degree or higher compared to a

state such as the District of Columbia, with a whopping 50 percent or Maryland and

Massachusetts with 36 and 39 percent respectively.90 The latter two states have some of the

highest gdp per capita in the entire nation, while West Virginia has one of the lowest. With a 31

percent rise in prices for undergraduate tuition, fees, room, and board at public institutions

between 2006 and 2016 and a 26 percent rise for prices at private nonprofit institutions after

adjustment for inflation, many citizens from poorer states and communities cannot afford the

rising costs of education that are needed for capitalism to work.91 If society chooses to push

forward its material acquisitions without enfranchising the losers of capitalism, a new era of

factitious politics will be the inexorable result, an outcome that can further loosen the social

bonds that have connected citizens together previously. Supporters of populist leaders often

resemble the least educated of their peers who, in many cases, cannot afford the costs of tertiary

education.92 As one pundit emphatically noted, “by rewarding already-privileged young people

and then adding to the advantages they enjoy as adults, higher education has become the primary

mechanism of class stratification in the United States.”93 Though academics and economists are

correct when they say capitalism benefits everyone, it ignores the reality that many people have

89
“Overview of the United States,” ​https://statisticalatlas.com/United-States/Overview​ [accessed 17 March 2020].
90
“Overview of the United States,” ​https://statisticalatlas.com/United-States/Overview​ [accessed 17 March 2020].
91
The National Center for Education Statistics, “Tuition Costs of Colleges and Universities.”
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76​ [accessed 17 March 2020].
92
​“NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll National Tables October 1st, 2018,”
http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NPR_PBS-NewsHour_Marist-Poll_USA-NOS-and-Tables
_1810021305.pdf#page=3​ [accessed 17 March 2020].
93
Scialaba, “How Elite Universities are Hurting America,”
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/2015-03-01/class-and-classroom​ [accessed 17 March 2020].
37

to work harder than others for the money they make, which disparages their idea of being treated

equally and fair; it is an affront to their dignity.

The Primordial Position and Equality:

If the welfare of a community is predicated on the realization of the individual members’

primordial positions, which sets the aim upon which maximum recognition and esteem can be

conferred, it is of the public interest to establish incentives for this pursuit that is of salutary

effect for ​all its ​members. The primordial position, though inherent to all human beings, is

amenable based upon the extent to which the subject thinks the means at his or her disposal for

pursuing optimal recognition are feasible; a criminal bent upon doing harm to the collective

good, for example, can only be dissuaded from committing such pernicious acts if he or she no

longer believes it will solicit the acknowledgement they think it can. The changing nature of

societal approbation is more to credit with decreased criminality than the power of coercion. If

this was not the case, as it certainly was in some societies, the indomitable spirit of our inherent

antagonism – the “will to power” in true Nietzschean fashion – will spurn the most perfidious of

conduct regardless of the deterrents a society can employ. The greater portion of populists today

are the result of the unfortunate (but by no means mistaken or erroneous) idea that their

masochistic acts offer the only conduit for the esteem and privilege their more affluent,

well-gifted peers retain as well. Their acts are as much evil, nefarious, or any other punitive

description people have become too fond of making, as they are emblematic of the society that

(they feel) has wronged them, that has reserved its accolades exclusively for the high-born at the

expense of others who exhibit the same desire but are barred from endeavoring to do similarly.
38

The driving process of the philosophy of history is as of yet difficult to describe let alone

formulate. If we are to take the logic of Hegel’s philosophy of history to its maximum extent, it

would not mean the fulfillment of this recognition necessarily ​but the uninhibited opportunity to

pursue it​, the complete liberation of the individual towards the pursuit of maximum recognition

without any purposeful obstructions. Of course history is full of these obstructions, and any

student of history can recall with little difficulty the intransigent forces of society that have

always stood ready to inhibit the progressive tides that have always overcome them. It must be

that the ​volte-face​ of these forces is as a result of the same desire. There is, contrary to what

many people expect, a limit as to how “free” the affluent and well-born are. Though their

pecuniary rewards offer them no shortage of artificial esteem, the insular nature of this group

renders it quite difficult to do anything of real acclaim – there can only be so much money to

accumulate until one feels no less different because of it. In time, their freedoms will appear as

nugatory as the circumstances under which the lower classes are forced to endure, a feeling that

will allow a modicum of compassion hitherto not tolerated for the struggles of the common

people. Therefore, they must search outside the confines of their social strata, to others who have

failed to reach a similar endpoint or were unfairly prevented from doing so. In time, for example,

the low factory worker eventually becomes the hero of the working class, the members of which

are steadily considered valuable members of society. Likewise, the agents of mobilization will

assume a position of greater responsibility and esteem – that is, only if they are allowed to

become the beneficiaries of the system as well.

The lifespan of a particular time of history is based on the extent to which it can provide

new outlets of esteem to its successors. A chasm appears when these possibilities diverge, when
39

traditional notions of societal approbation no longer seem appealing to the majority of its

citizens. This process, if it is not unanimous (which it invariably isn’t), will produce a set of

negative externalities which will form a threat to the pre-existing system, which will fight back

with the same fervor as the ressentiment of the lower classes. If it succeeds, it will only succeed

in the short term and shackle its members to a set of expectations already deemed to be

illegitimate. Regardless of which side of the political spectrum they subscribe to,the proponents

of populist leaders feel themselves no longer able to pursue that which they think worthy of their

respect and acknowledgement. Political malfeasance, or what we call populism, is an attempt to

reconfigure what is socially acceptable. In this light, a clearer understanding of populism can

finally be systematized, which can be defined as:​ a time when citizens of a community no longer

consider the circumstances that give meaning to the human existence – political standpoints,

income levels, or societal ethics – propitious for furthering optimal recognition which they then

seek in the exclusive idea of “the people.”​ ​The only remaining solution to the more pejorative

tendencies of the primordial position and of populist urges is a collective effort by society to

amend the aspirations of its members towards beneficial outcomes. This must not be arbitrary or

left on the whim of capitalist cycles. Rather, circumstances must be such that everyone has the

equal opportunity to pursue that which their inherent dispositions posit, and bear all the

hardships attendant to such aims without any undue or gratuitous obstructions. This is what

Hegel intimated but never fully grasped the significance of when he argued the public authority

as a “middle term between an individual and the universal possibility, afforded by society, of

attaining individual ends.”94 Freedom from excessive physical and financial burdens is the only

94
Hegel, ​Philosophy of Right, 1​ 15.
40

way to reinvigorate the “spirit” of society that prevents the “last men” of Nietzsche’s

well-founded fear and embraces the love of struggle the human existence naturally is.

Conclusion: A Way Out?

If populist leaders and their proponents can capture the state apparatus, they could do

irreparable damage to liberal norms and values, a fact many people in both the United States and

Europe are slowly coming to understand. The danger of this circumstance is that populist leaders

seek to perpetuate the conflict between what they perceive to be decadent, corrupt elements of

society that may engender inimical consequences such as economic stagnation, foreign policy

fiascos, or hate crimes. As previous sections of this paper have elucidated, none of this is to say

that proponents of populism are wholly guilty for their ill-conceived beliefs however. If

anything, they need to be educated on the futility of their intransigence, and provided the

opportunity to become better versions of themselves, something extraordinarily difficult in the

United States, a country renowned for its equality under the law but not for its equality of

opportunity. If they do not have this chance, there will be nothing other than society itself they

will see as responsible for their plight and the proper object of their anger and retribution.

An accurate understanding of the human condition is necessary for an equally effective

interpretation of populism. Inherent in each person is a sense of dignity, a form of self-worth that

is reliant on the acknowledgement of other people. However, macro-economic processes are

making that desire harder to achieve for millions of people who feel their concerns have not been

received by traditional political institutions. It is up to the current generation of citizens to

understand the vagaries of economic capitalism and channel the desire for dignity into beneficial

outcomes. People who have been dislocated by globalization require adequate education,
41

training, and preparation to participate in the global economic freedoms only some have

benefitted from. The result will not only be a more equitable prosperity but also a society whose

“spirit” is characterized less by hate and anger and more by brotherhood and camaraderie. What

is required is not immediate mutual recognition for everyone persey, but the ​opportunity ​for all

to benefit from the world economy and ​work f​ or the recognition they feel they deserve. If people

do not have this opportunity, they will seek more nefarious ways of satisfying this desire, which

this paper has sought to explain the consequences of. It is our goal to actualize the aspirations

that make the human experience meaningful in a way that understands populism’s role in

engendering social change and its ineluctable part of the human story. The choice for this

decision is left to the current generation which possesses just as much the ability to change its

ways as they do the capacity to make this situation worse.


42

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