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1Perekonnaseadus (Family Law Act), adopted on 12.10.1994; entered into force 1.01.1995. – Riigi Teataja (The State Gazette) I 1994, 75,
1326; last amended: Riigi Teataja (The State Gazette) I 1997, 35, 538 (in Estonian).
2 Eesti NSV abielu- ja perekonnakoodeks (Estonian SSR Marriage and Family Code), adopted on 31.07.1969; entered into force 1.01.1970.
– ENSV Teataja (The ESSR Gazette) 1969, 31, lisa; last amended: Riigi Teataja (The State Gazette) 1992, 11, 168 (in Estonian).
3 See E. Salumaa et al. Perekonnaseadus (kommentaar) (Family Law Act (Commentary)). – Juridica, 1995, No. 1, p. 2 ff. (in Estonian).
advantageous position of the husband (the adoption of the husband’s family name as the marital
name) was repealed only in 1993.*4 Similarly, Dutch law waived only in 1957 its regulation
concerning the status of a married wife which resembled more that of a minor or custodian than that
of an equal partner.*5
Although the general concept of the Family Law Act of 1995 in the broadest sense also corresponds
to the modern understanding of family relations, the fact that a number of problems have arisen from
the aspect of practical application cannot be ignored. The main shortcoming of the present Family
Law Act is its low degree of regulation. The Act contains a large number of declarative provisions,
but frequently lacks specific private law bases for claims to enable a person court protection of his
or her interests and rights. Parts of the Act are more like a compilation of programme positions and
leave adjudicative bodies such a scope for decision that it is almost impossible to predict the outcome
of a specific case from the provisions of law. The second direct need to review the Family Law Act
of 1995 arises from the general reforms of civil law (including amendments to regulation of active
legal capacity in the draft General Part of the Civil Code Act). Thirdly, in co-operation with different
international organisations and family law jurists of other countries, the need has been revealed to
pay more attention to internationally accepted and applied family law institutions and rights of
action.*6 The time seems ripe to go on a second round and thoroughly review the applicable family
law.
Family law regulates the proprietary relations between persons mainly in two areas: the proprietary
relations of spouses and the proprietary relations arising from the right of guardianship (including
between parents and children). This paper focuses on the proprietary relations of spouses, and chiefly
on the statutory marital property relationship. As marital relations characterise a remarkable part of
subjects of private law, it can be said that marital property law affects the entire private law economic
turnover to a certain extent. Also, the arrangement of proprietary relations of spouses has a most
direct link to the law of obligations and the law of property, which in view of the current reforms in
Estonia renders the subject of marital property law highly topical.
4 See A. Lüderitz. Familienrecht. München: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1999, p. 11, paragraph No. 28.
5 See M. J. A. van Mourik. Huwelijksvermogensrecht (Marital Property Law). Zwolle: W. E. J. Tjeenk Willink, 1994, p. 14.
6 Such recommendations and principles mainly arise from international conventions (European Convention on Human Rights, other UN or
European Council conventions and recommendations, agreements of the Commission International d’Etat Civil, as well as agreements
concluded in the framework of the Hague Conference on Private International Law). International co-operation in family law largely takes
place today on the level of international private law harmonisation (mutual recognition of national acts, such as marriages or divorces, and
court judgements concerning maintenance and curatorship of children, etc.). Other co-operation projects mainly concern ensuring the rights
of children or other areas belonging to the field of constitutional law (equality of spouses in choosing the family name, etc.). In the area of the
main topic of this paper — marital property law — only one known agreement has been concluded under the Hague Conference on Private
International Law: Convention of 14 March 1978 on the law applicable to matrimonial property regimes, which Estonia has not joined.
7 Further to the provisions on marital property relationships, regulation of the obligation to maintain the family and the mutual right of
representation of spouses also plays an important role in the proprietary relations of spouses. These norms are to be distinguished from the
marital property regime, insofar as their content is not to define the real right status of property, but rather obligations under the law of
obligations, concerning which property relations are irrelevant. These obligations are also of such importance from the viewpoint of the family
as a whole that they should apply as preceptive norms to any arrangement of the proprietary relations of spouses, so that the possibility to
deviate from these under a marital property contract would be quite limited.
knows a large number of marital property regimes, which can be broadly generalised into two basic
models: separate property and joint property regimes. However, these do not occur in the pure form,
because the interests of the society and of an individual require a combination of the elements of both
models.*8
Within a legal order, marital property regimes divide into statutory property systems and those based
on a marital property contract.*9
A statutory marital property relationship regulates the proprietary relations of spouses only pursuant
to law, unless they have entered into a marital property contract in the required form or until the
statutory marital property regime is not terminated on other grounds (e.g. by court judgement).
The statutory marital property relationship is the most important property regime, the role and spread
of which in both Estonia and in foreign countries by far exceeds the role of all alternative marital
property relationships or those created by a marital property contract.*10 Although the relevant
statistics are not available in Estonia*11, it can be said that the vast majority of married couples do
not enter into a marital property contract, which is why the statutory marital property relationship
directly applies to the proprietary relations of the greatest number of married people. This requires
that the statutory property system should be particularly elaborated and balanced, because it governs
the relationships of people of most different proprietary positions.
8See C. Hegnauer, P. Breitschmid. Grundriss des Eherechts. Bern: Stämpfli Verlag AG, 1993, p. 209, paragraph No. 22.03 ff.; G. Hohloch.
Die Entwicklung des deutschen Familienrechts im europäischen und internationalen Zusammenhang. – Brennpunkte des Familienrechts.
Berlin: Rechtspraxis, 1998, pp. 108, 143 (a review of statutory marital property regimes in European countries).
9 See also Family Law Act subsection 8 (2).
10 For instance, in the Netherlands marital property contracts are concluded in ca 25–30% of marriages. This is considered to be one of the
highest rates in Europe. See M. J. A. van Mourik (Note 6), p. 75.
11 Information on concluded marital property contracts is available from the marital property register, but it should be kept in mind that
registration of marital property contracts in the register is not mandatory with respect to validity of the contracts — the contract is entered in
the register only at the request of a spouse. An entry in the marital property register is relevant for third parties (Family Law Act subsection
10 (6); Marital Property Register Act subsection 7 (2)). Summarised statistical data on the contracts entered in the marital property register
are also not available, as the registrars are the land registries acting in county and city courts (Marital Property Register Act subsection 2 (1))
and there is no common database.
12 From 1 January 1941 the Russian SFSR Code of Marriage, Family and Guardianship Laws applied in the territory of Estonia, section 10
of which provided similarly to the later ESSR Marriage and Family Code of 1 January 1970 that property acquired by spouses during marriage
is regarded as their joint property, while the property owned by the spouses prior to marriage remained their separate property.
13 Family Law Act subsection 14 (1), subsection 15 (1).
14 Limited community property in German: beschränkte Gütergemeinschaft; Errungenschaftsgemeinschaft or Errungenschaftsbeteiligung; in
Dutch: beperkte gemeenschap van goederen.
entails a fairly strong proprietary bond between the spouses. Any community property relationship
remarkably limits the spouses’ economic freedom to act and thus greatly interferes with the personal
sphere of spouses. Therefore, the question that needs to be answered first is whether the joining of
proprietary rights enables to protect the rights of all parties concerned better than other possible legal
structures do, and whether it thereby justifies the limitations characteristic to this property system.
Marital property systems creating joint property rights have been regarded as characteristic of the
social nature of marriage — they correspond to the understanding of marital cohabitation as a social
unit, which joins together both the personal and proprietary spheres of the spouses.*15 The concept
of community property directly relates to the notion that marriage is for life: having permanently
linked their fates, spouses agree to incur each other’s proprietary losses. This shows that community
property as a marital property regime does not intend to create flexible and differentiated solutions
for divorce or other cases of division of joint property, but is chiefly targeted at fixing the joint liability
of spouses during marriage. The great divorce rate, however, forces one to consider the need to
arrange the division of joint proprietary rights in an adequately efficient manner while having regard
to the reasoned interests of both parties.
15 Also see the preamble of the ESSR Marriage and Family Code (adopted on 31.07.1969): “The Soviet marriage and family legislation shall
actively contribute to the final clearance of family relations of economic considerations /…/” (author’s accentuation — K.K.).
16 Exceptions are provided in section 15 of the Family Law Act. These are property acquired during marriage as gift or by succession, as well
as property acquired after the factual termination of conjugal relations, and personal effects.
17 See as a typical example the judgement of the Tartu Circuit Court of 5 May 1999 No. II-2-128/99 (a spouse exchanged the apartment owned
by the spouse prior to marriage for contribution in a dwelling association — as the exchange took place after marriage, the circuit court regarded
the contribution as the joint property of spouses). It is worth mentioning that the prevalent interpretation of the Marriage and Family Code
applicable prior to entry into force of the Family Law Act was different despite the similar texts of section 20 of the earlier law and section
14 of the present Act. Money received from sale of separate property also remained the personal, i.e. separate property of one spouse. Also
items acquired for money belonging as separate property to one of the spouses were regarded as the separate property of that spouse. See J.
Ananjeva, E. Salumaa. Eesti NSV abielu- ja perekonnakoodeks: kommenteeritud väljaanne (Estonian SSR Marriage and Family Code:
commented issue). Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1974, p. 39 (in Estonian).
18 Family Law Act subsection 19 (2) 3).
19 As cars are movables subject to registration — Family Law Act subsection 17 (4).
The court may, at its own discretion, deviate from the principle that property acquired prior to
marriage is the separate property of spouses and property acquired during marriage is their joint
property.*20 Therefore, the division of property rights upon division of joint property is largely
unpredictable until actual division. It is apparent that the existing statutory marital property law has
no common and clear methodology to predict which part of property is to be divided as the joint
property of spouses and which part is assigned to the sole ownership of one spouse upon division.
22 The benefit of a thing (the fruit) is defined in section 23 of the Law of Property Act (see also section 61 of the new draft General Part of
the Civil Code Act). This covers both the natural and civil fruits of a thing — fee from granting use of a thing to a third person (rent, licence
fees, etc.), dividends, interests, late interests, etc. There are, however, exceptions to the inclusion of benefits in basic property (see below).
composition of the basic property of a spouse is exhaustively set out by law, acquired property can
also be defined negatively — it is the property which is not the basic property of the spouse.
Besides the above basic principles, the regime to be applied to items of property and the division
methods of acquired and basic property are also allowed to be defined otherwise under a marital
property contract. Spouses may provide in a marital property contract that certain types of things
(e.g. securities), which are acquired during the property acquisition regime, belong with the basic
property of the spouses.*23
It is important to say that the purpose of the above categories of property is mainly for calculations.
The calculations are based on the value of property that determine the size of the potential mutual
rights of claim; the question here is not in the rights of ownership to any specific items of property.
As opposed to the statutory regime of the presently applicable law, the given property system allows
to focus on the dynamics of proprietary relations in the economic sense, i.e. it takes account of the
actual changes that have taken place in the proprietary status of a spouse during the marital property
regime.
23 By explanation, it should be mentioned that this concerns items of property that are not acquired on account of a spouse’s basic property
(e.g. securities are purchased for wages).
24 Family Law Act subsection 17 (3)–(5).
(b) if the disposal or the assumed obligation concerns the dwelling in which the family jointly
resides, as well as the substantial property belonging with the dwelling (ordinary furnish-
ings).
Other disposals do not presumably concern the welfare of the other spouse (who is not the owner of
the property) and the rest of the family to such an extent as to justify the imposition of restrictions
on disposal in the form of the obligation to obtain the consent of the other spouse. The lack of consent
is also elaborated (voidness of transaction), but a possibility is provided to replace a missing consent
with a later approval. At the same time, the restrictions on disposal of the entire property of a spouse
or the bulk of it, as well as restrictions on the disposal of the object used as a dwelling, are planned
to be absolute: acquisition in good faith by third parties is excluded in such transactions.
25 Family Law Act subsection 17 (2), Law of Property Act subsection 70 (6), section 71 ff.
26In case of a statutory joint property relationship, a spouse can, in such case, only apply for division of joint property in a court under
subsection 18 (5), but this does not constitute termination of the proprietary relationship: property acquired after division of joint property
will still be the joint property of spouses (subsection 18 (6)); the court cannot impose any other marital property regime for the spouses or
oblige the spouses to enter into a marital property contract.
actual effect of transactions between the spouses is different from that probably desired by the spouses
in their proprietary relations.*27
Problems have also arisen from the applicable Family Law Act in determining the legal proprietary
regime in the case when an item that belonged with the joint property of spouses is desired to be
given to one spouse so that it would thereafter form a part of the separate property of that spouse. In
such case, the law provides for the possibility to enter into a marital property contract*28, while the
applicability of section 16, pursuant to which the spouses could, during their marriage, fully or partly
divide the joint property in any form, which can be done only in respect of specific items of property,
remains unclear. In the first case (marital property contract) the result would be that in case of a
mutual transaction between the spouses, the result would be the applicability of significantly stricter
formal requirements than those generally provided for the same transaction (e.g. sale of a car)
(notarised contract, entry in the marital property register in view of third parties). On the other hand,
if joint property were permitted to be partly or fully divided under an agreement between the spouses
in any form at any time during marriage, this may cause a situation in which the spouses are formally
in a joint property relationship (i.e. they have not entered into a marital property contract within the
meaning of section 9 of the Family Law Act), but have already divided all property pursuant to section
16. In such case, the provisions of neither the statutory marital property relationship nor the marital
property contract fulfil their function, while third parties, including creditors, have no idea of the
arrangement of proprietary relations between the spouses. A danger arises that the proprietary
interests of the spouses themselves as well as those of creditors are damaged. However, such
agreements must be regarded as permissible under the wording of section 16 of the presently
applicable Family Law Act, insofar as the generally used interpretation methods do not yield a
different result.
Due to the above problem, difficulties have arisen in practice concerning taxation of the mutual
transactions of spouses.*29 Under tax law, the actual economic nature of a transaction serves as the
basis and economic categories are applied (income and expense, accompanied by an actual change
in the status of the property). As mentioned above, the bases of the Family Law Act of 1995 are the
opposite when it comes to determination of joint property.
27However, the spouses still have the possibility to enter into a marital property contract, which can set out that property acquired from the
other spouse will belong to the separate property of the first spouse (see Family Law Act subsection 9 (1) 2)).
28 See the previous notes with reference to subsection 9 (1) 2) of the Family Law Act.
29See e.g. judgement No. 3-3-1-57-00 of the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of 15 January 2001 (Riigi Teataja (The State
Gazette) III 2001, 3, 22) (in Estonian).
creditors and damaging the spouse who has no debt obligations. If joint property were liable for joint
debts only, this would damage the interests of creditors. But if a creditor has to file a claim against
a spouse’s part of joint property to satisfy a claim, the marital joint property would be divided on the
grounds of circumstances completely unrelated to marriage. Such a “prerequisite” also makes it more
difficult for a creditor to satisfy claims.*30
Pursuant to the applicable Family Law Act, a spouse is liable for his or her proprietary obligations
with his or her separate property and the part of joint property that would belong to him or her if joint
property were divided. This implies that if the separate property of the spouse is not sufficient to
cover the liability, joint property has to be divided, including at the creditor’s request (through a
bailiff). Such a solution cannot be regarded as fair to the other spouse (who is not the debtor), because
the joint proprietary rights of that spouse and the spouse who is a debtor would be interfered with on
grounds not related to the conjugal relationship. During execution proceedings, the right of the other
spouse to possess, use and dispose of joint property is not guaranteed.*31
To determine for which obligations a spouse is primarily liable with his or her separate property and
for which obligations primarily with joint property, the Family Law Act sets out the assumption of
obligations in the family’s interests as the sole criterion (subsection 20 (2)). This is a provision that
can be extremely broadly interpreted and its application is apparently not limited to transactions
necessary to satisfy certain everyday needs, but also extend to greater investments (e.g. borrowing
to buy immovable property), which depending to factual circumstances may benefit the family (and
hence be in the interests of the family) or vice versa — damage the family (be against the interests
of the family). It appears that completely different bases play a role in the creation of joint proprietary
rights and obligations under the presently applicable statutory property regime. Whilst any property
acquired during marriage (including property acquired on account of separate property) becomes
joint property, obligations become joint only insofar as they have been assumed “in the family’s
interests”. This can be seen as an imbalance, because the statutory marital property regime does not
practically enable to increase the separate property of either spouse by natural methods during
marriage.*32
4. Conclusions
One can assume from the above that community property, or otherwise said, joint ownership
established by the statutory marital property law, is not necessary to protect conjugal cohabitation
and the proprietary interests of family members from the legal aspect. Preservation of the property
used to the family’s benefit (such as the joint dwelling of the family, household property, etc.) can
also be ensured by other means (such as restrictions on disposal).*34 This also covers events when
the property that serves as the basis for such family life belongs under the sole ownership of one
spouse and such events that the joint property regime established by the Family Law Act of 1995
does not take into account.
The main shortcoming of the community property relationship in view of today’s economic and social
relations is the excessive overlapping of the proprietary spheres of spouses, which in turn gives rise
to complicated liability relations. It seems the most expedient to introduce such an arrangement of
marital property that leaves the proprietary spheres of spouses more separate than they are presently,
i.e. independent from the other spouse’s acts that affect the status of the property. At the same time,
events where the contributory acts of both spouses are required for a transaction would be limited to
situations of decisive importance to both spouses and the family. The scope of the mutual proprietary
rights and obligations of spouses should reflect both of their contribution to the increase in the
family’s property. As regards the proprietary relations of spouses, it is also important to proceed from
certain economic criteria — as opposed to the ideological foundations of the ESSR Marriage and
Family Code that served as the main example for the presently applicable Family Law Act.
A suitable opportunity to take account of the above aspects in an integral and balanced manner is
offered by the draft Civil Code of 1940 in its acquired property offset relationship provided as the
statutory marital property regime. The task in itself is not to change labels, but to try to avoid the
shortcomings of the present marital property law.
The intended statutory marital property relationship described in this paper may, in its accounting
details, seem more complicated and stolid than the joint property system provided in the Family Law
Act of 1995. However, the fact that the law does not expressly provide for several decision criteria
of joint property law and gives courts a high degree of discretion, does not mean that it is easy for
courts to divide joint property in practice. Rather, clear rules help to avoid disputes.
Considering the multitude of marital property regimes and their richness in variations, one has to
admit that it is not possible to create an ideal marital property system that would fully take account
of the interests of all married couples and third persons concerned. Therefore, marital property law
has to leave space for freedom of contract, which deserves discussion in a separate paper.
34 The same concerns the provisions of subsection 19 (2) of the Family Law Act of 1995, according to which the division of proprietary rights
of spouses can be made dependent on the children’s interests also. Such a solution cannot be regarded as relevant insofar as this favours a
vagueness in the proprietary relations of spouses. Maintenance of children and all-round protection of their interests must be ensured separately
from the proprietary rights of spouses, taking into account the systems of family law.