[G.R. No. 11263. November 2, 1916.

ELOISA GOITIA Y DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE  CAMPOS  RUEDA, defendant-appellee.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias  for appellant.

Sanz, Opisso & Luzuriaga  for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. MARRIAGE; NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION. — Marriage is something more than a contract, though founded upon
the agreement of the parties. When once formed a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change by
agreement, and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement but upon the law. The spouses must
be faithful to, assist, support, and live with each other.
2. HUSBAND AND WIFE; ACTION FOR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE. — The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal
abode by her husband without fault on her part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance
when he has no other remedy, notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is
obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own
home the one having the right to the same.
3. ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT. — The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and
treatment on the part of the husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance.

DECISION

TRENT, J  p:

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment
sustaining the defendants demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action,
followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
 It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendants' cannot be compelled to support the
plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the
defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home
of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:
"That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that
she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of
the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since
that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the
plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induced him
to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and
that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents."
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solmenities established by General
Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil.
Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is
formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng  vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the
nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and
obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes
those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they
may make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from
time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is
regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the
parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide
us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep.,
34). Articles 44 to 79 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands
by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo  vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
 "ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.
"ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the
management of the wife's property.)
"ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he changes his domicile or
residence.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her from
this duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
"ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the
preceding article.
xxx xxx xxx
"1. The consorts.
"ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the
pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the
same."
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife
to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the
spouses. The spouses must be faithful to assist, and support each other. the husband must live with and protect his wife.
The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he
removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a
fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his
wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute?
The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:
"That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897,
November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnished
subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled
to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right would be
opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally
 opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being
thereby restricted.
"Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there was any
reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to
furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to revive it; and inasmuch as
nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he
has not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of
thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support until,
owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with
the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with
her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present
case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other questions previously
cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed at this time."
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the Code "is
not absolute." But it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was
opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the
natural father of the child and had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support
had already been established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts, the two cases clearly
established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated
November 3, 1905. In this case Don Benso comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order not to prejudice his
wife conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave her all the
muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a
large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want.
Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for support and the revocation
of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her answer the wife
claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily
conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audiencia Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her
favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming
the judgment of the Audiencia Teritorial, said:
 "Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually obliged to
provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates
the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of their
living together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking
this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to the one who has no property
and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their
separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur
until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management
of his wife's property and of the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
"Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to
disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their the marriage bond and separate from each
other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the
Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties
inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity with good
morals, has established; and
"Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Dona Adela Galindo are not legally separated, it is
their duty to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the
former has need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode where it
is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property in order
therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without need of going to
his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not
violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal."
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the spouses separated
voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the
court says, "Should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married person to disregard the marriage
bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme court of Spain
rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was
compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife
seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October
16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband who had willfully and voluntarily
abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court, in reversing the judgment absolving the
defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
 "In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode,
although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the person responsible for this situation was his
wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is the party
abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he therefore finds
himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment
of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so
holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the
spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three
grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and enforceable in all
situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of the sort above described."
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905,
and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither spouse
can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the
injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this
jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have
already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law
governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of
1870. In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery
on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results
therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order
to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife
to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the
condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is
adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court
in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect
in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was
promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced. It is,
therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it
necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her
husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate
maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in
 a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent
from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of
the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern
to the state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek
protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of that term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty
made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace
and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of
assaulting her. the pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public
policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a
weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals
may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in
the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
|||  (Goitia y De la Camara v. Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, [November 2, 1916], 35 PHIL 252-263)
G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, 

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh
North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the
bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan
named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician
using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name
and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he
had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the
United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in
Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the
civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as
witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and
should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting
the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner
and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
 Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and
publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change
the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel
Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground
of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of
the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes
sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil
Code provides:
 ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.  – No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change
of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first
name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure.
In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
one’s legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications
in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s
primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally
done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was
also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as  clerical or typographical  errors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
 name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided
in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of
illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial
decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss
or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their
effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in
Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a
person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights
in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In
this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births.  – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth
or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local
civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth;
(b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of
the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. 29Thus, the
sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, 30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry
(and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent
to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female." 33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and
male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the
context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something
that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that
allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial
court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case
of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty
of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern
the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this
case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the
civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures
shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to
change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully
changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot
enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their
dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit
neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178221               December 1, 2010

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI, Petitioners, 

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special
Administrator, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the said decision, the
Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate
court) allowing herein petitioners and their siblings 4 to intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni.5 The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26, 2005, of
the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby
issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents and anyone acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the
assailed Orders. No costs.6

The antecedents are:

Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966. 7 He died without issue.8

On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration9 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s
estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court. 10

On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation 11 before the intestate court. In the Manifestation,
they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)—who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of
Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.12
The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the legal
spouse of the latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.

Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in
the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. 14 As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and
Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter. 15

To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following documents:

a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;16

b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;17 and

c.) Their respective proof of births.18

It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel
was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives.

The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator, however,
begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the
status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had
a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.

In its Comment to the Manifestation,19 the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who was
born on 14 February 1946.20 As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and
John Desantis.21 The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married." 22 The respondent posits
that the foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis.23

According to the respondent, Isabel’s previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved, made her
subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.24

On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement
proceedings.25 The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabel’s status as the legal
spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her
behalf.26

The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a previous marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis.27 It ventured on the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her
legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family from the social
condemnation of having a child out of wedlock.28

The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26 January
2006.29 Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court. 30

In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the intestate court to have
disregarded the probative value of Sylvia’s birth certificate. 31 The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvia’s
birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated—which includes the civil status of her
parents.32 Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.

The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the
marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the
latter marriage—the Isabel-Rodolfo union—is a nullity for being bigamous. 33 From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as
the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the
estate of Rodolfo.

Hence, the instant appeal.34

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing
the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.

The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:

One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari. 35 In nullifying the intestate court’s order,
the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion. 36 Rather,
it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo. 37
Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would have found that the
intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed orders. 38 Grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates between
Isabel and Rodolfo.39

Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of whether there was
sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there was
none.40 A proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage with
John Desantis.41

To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between Isabel and John
Desantis.42 The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend credibility to the position that no such marriage
ever took place.

Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove a marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis.43 In assessing the probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals should have taken
note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to "save face" and "not to embarrass their families,"
concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. 44

Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the Court of Appeals clearly
erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous.

We are not impressed.

First Argument

The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the intestate court gravely abused its
discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabel’s status as the legal
spouse of Rodolfo.

A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound
judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene. 45Otherwise stated, a
court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein. 46
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a case—the mistake is not
simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction
and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil
action for certiorari.

Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it examined the
evidence proving Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines whether
the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabel’s interest in Rodolfo’s estate—which, as already
mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence presented
by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the latter’s
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.

Second Argument

The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The
very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was
adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis
exists on record.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate.48 Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.49

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were
"married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child. 50 In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a
subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence,
unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested. 52In the case at
bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful statements made only in
order to "save face."53 They urge this Court to take note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the
illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.

The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the probative value
of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and
conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the
document on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.

Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated, supports
the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such
marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage
is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was dissolved results
in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their
siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9081               October 12, 2011

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants, 

vs.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against
Atty. Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in
office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal
advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then
prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa,
kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila
ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga
sumusunod:
 1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t bawat
isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;

2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin
Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama
sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina,
habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay
naninirahan;

4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito
ay pupunan ng ina;

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo)
ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling
pag-aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage,
started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took
possession of most of the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract
executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract.
She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was
illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-
time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. Omaña presented
Marantal’s "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by
Glindo. Omaña further presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the
document without Omaña’s knowledge, consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he
later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaña was not in her office when the
contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation 1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa’s desistance did not put an end
to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that
Omaña had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the
requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaña who first claimed that it was her
part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD
found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her
propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as a notary
public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD.

Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaña’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal
and Espinosa’s "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, 3 which is exactly
what Omaña did in this case.1avvphi1

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar
documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to
take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other; 5 ratifying a document
entitled "Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing
their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each
other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing
the right of action which each may have against the other; 7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership
dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-
CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract,
it only showed Omaña’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for
the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his
secretaries9 or any member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Omaña knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public
policy. Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s
notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this
Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, 

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision 1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment 2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in
Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccionalas minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution 3 of the appellate court, dated September 25,
2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of
Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
 On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which
was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of
accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information 5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
[City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon
motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional  as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayoras maximum. SO ORDERED.7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry
again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court
stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his
act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void  ab initiosince no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by
Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy
case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be
accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 13 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public
policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good
faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. 16 However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the
opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817)
IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of
good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He
highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not
be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant
case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith
and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a
second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but
flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 19 of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no
account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith
because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the
elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol
Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into
by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract. SO ORDERED. 21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code.
As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin
with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the
first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." 24 The records show that no appeal was taken from
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." 26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a
judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears
no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh
every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the
present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of
the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge
of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4904            February 5, 1909

ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.

Domingo Franco, for appellant.

Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September,
1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.

There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and
consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff
and the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice
of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by
the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the
presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice
on the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had
there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a
witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the
justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it
is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses
on that day.

The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally married on the day named.
The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The
evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named,
together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document above mentioned. Third.
The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita
Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita
Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace,
who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace were all present in
the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.

The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the peace
and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in
her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask
the consent of her parents to the marriage.

There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think, when properly considered, is
not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there
for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in her
company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every morning and that on one occasion the
plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori
is considered. She says that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to
the store of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the mother of the plaintiff
to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining some dress patterns; that
the mother gave her consent and the two rights left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went
directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one
came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice and went
to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.

The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after the
ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the
positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.

The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during her
first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned
to a future day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her collapse was due
to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the
municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies the claim of the appellant.
The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we are
satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said she
did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all
written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was
proven. No. 9 is as follows:

ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that we have
been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.

Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.

Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.

Yours,           ROSAL.

Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will not let me go there;
if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.

Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store,
because I don't like to go without Pacita.

The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.

Yours,           ROSAL.

It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the
afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before
the justice of the peace. It is as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

 ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see
that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.

Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the marriage at this
time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me this
morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist
on being married I must do it right.

Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.

I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.

Yours,           ROSAL.

Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.

ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer  Rosa, for the purpose of asking my
father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper, and, if he
does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must request his consent.

Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of no
importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.

It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the
plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the defendant during the
voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after
consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring the
cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the decision of the
court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the
defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
 No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.

Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing until
after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The
petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and
they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of
the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both
contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the
parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved,
such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the
marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in
marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized
the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that
they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied,
and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.

The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these allegations
was a statement that the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards
allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition in
regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment. After the trial had commenced
the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second amendment destroyed
completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but
by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what
he had intended to state. After argument the court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance
there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial
of the case without asking for a continuance.

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant.
G.R. No. 183896               January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, 

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision 2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-
CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24,
2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC
Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order
No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on
January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9,
1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate,
Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the
ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria
told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The
Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in
favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8,
1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve. 7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone
to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on
advice of his counsel.8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic
appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining
to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number,
namely 9969967, to any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and
May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas
and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez
(Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements. 15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before
the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it
was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the
marriage license with that office.17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the
bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that
this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further testified that he did not know
where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other
witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the
Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went
to their house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed
her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. 24 She
further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage
license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26

As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding
of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the
persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days
returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the
marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that
she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence. 28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during
the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those
around them at the time were Chinese.31

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had
been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As the marriage was not
one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was
acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to
cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER,
AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case
against him for bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo
Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
July 24, 2008.41

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3),
which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority
of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the
requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on
whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been
issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well
as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed
turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there
that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification
was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license
was issued and such other relevant data.44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a
certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the
marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not
appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification
used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that particular case,
the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not
appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that
the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed
located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does
not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to
apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the
other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not
reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in
securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to
a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that
office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a
valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, 47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar
that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of
Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had
been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect
the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been
issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote
the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellant’s
family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was
born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been
instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward
(appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does
not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article
35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. 51 Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.1âwphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he
seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that
they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license
cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling
the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201061               July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, 
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision 2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution 3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan
City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in
order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they
acquired the following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;
 (2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married
to Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She
then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity
of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of
the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the
subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally
named 37 properties in her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for
reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to
present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave
Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September
2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still
refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification
dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series
Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was
not issued to Benjamin and Sally. 5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy
status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal
support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were
both of legal age and did not ask for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of
her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37
properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including
Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to
Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any
actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner
of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased
from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s
right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying
Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.

Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724,
17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622,
194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636,
194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan
are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to
delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s
money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently,
petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her
collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and
possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by
them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go
Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition
and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March
15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties’ children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds
in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August
2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made
at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next
hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other
witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that
the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code.
The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they
were acquired by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive
properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be
shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with
Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and
prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26,
2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are
hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but
the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived
her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial court’s decision
regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her
evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court
abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. 9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November
2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally
that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled
hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even
subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be
presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain
that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she
was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28
November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right
to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was
delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s
denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as
Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial
court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties. 10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could
not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her
evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to
consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin
was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced
her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names of
Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March
1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that
only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568
did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly,
if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license.12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with
the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig; 13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives
Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; 14 and Lourdes J.
Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office. 15 The documentary and testimonial
evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover
her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as
Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982 18 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also
stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982. 19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March
1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of
February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s
decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands." 22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it
can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of
Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial
court stated:

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage
is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or
irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara
[CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under
Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous
because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner
cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would
be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community
of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his
or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally
which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial
court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective
spouses which included Sally x x x."25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin 27 with the descriptive title
"married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally 28 with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name
of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code. 30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the
failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically
labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. 32 In this case, we have
sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to
present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the
decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that
would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 94226. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants, 
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of
the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.

Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.

Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I,
Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio
P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were
charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of
cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5)
infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments.  2 A Reply to Answers of
Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional
Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant
Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent
Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4

The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from the
records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the
following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite
the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage
licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.

Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile
to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that
it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was
Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and
that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo,
however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had
instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he
failed to do so.

Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article
34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to
do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license
and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded
to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and
they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant
Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato
Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to
solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated
even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that,
at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
 2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized and the number of
documents notarized.

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when
in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they
have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen
(113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for
each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.

Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge are
entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held
responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as
solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the
custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial
fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are
duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary
Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by
complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.

Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by
complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for that month
since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6)
documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is
Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the
Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the
clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report,
and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.

3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court

Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court
the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy
reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed
because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.

Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was
appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to
sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor
of Tinambac.

Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which
has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends
that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He
claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a matter of honor and
prestige.

4. Cash bond issued without a receipt

It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed
by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued
a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years,
the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.

Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting
clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that
should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.

Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the
accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the
clerk of court.

5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners

Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex
Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody
of respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived
pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.

Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate
household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and the
accused therein remained at large.

6. Unlawful collection of docket fees

Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although
such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent
Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.

Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick leave)
who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that
she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in
any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she
remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.

On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his
Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed
the same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence
in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report
which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder
reproduce at length the material portions thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with
having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano
Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma
Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the number of the
marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting
parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the
marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as
he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages
the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not
sent either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.

The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage
license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9)
sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised
by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their
marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife believing that the
formal requisites of marriage were complied with.

Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly
did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date
stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.

With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge
Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the
contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he
was told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place
of the parties where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of
Tinambac.

The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage
certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished
a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His
uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others,
that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage
license and whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificate in front
of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization
of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those
pictures.

Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as
if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged
reasons given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of
deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not
solemnize their marriage.

With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their
marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The
contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).

In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano
was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit,
Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this
is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was
his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in
order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.

On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin,
this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the
marriage of the same couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his
instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and
that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.

This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a
marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only
made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge
Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under
exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require the parties to have a
marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the
marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were
not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under
Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one,
however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil.
179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting
parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.

With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita
Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did
not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that
actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-
examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told,
Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal
building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur.

With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by
them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other
aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and
signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).

Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no
marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was
asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage
was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay
and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not even know
that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.

Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D).
The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but
Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon
submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina,
however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.

Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting parties and their
witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he
assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their
marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose
was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times
everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).

This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting
parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband
and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to
sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).

The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure before
solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte
(Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge
Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge
Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).

Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4)
marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only
twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His
monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the
whole month (Exh. 7).

In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and
marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this
case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not
charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized
were all illegal.

The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the
Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and issuing the
corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the
monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.

The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents,
show that for said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio
Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows
that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month
(Exhs. Q to Q-45).

Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there
were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not, however,
present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid.
Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based on
how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or recorded in
the notarial register.

Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the correctness of the
monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to
have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already signed by respondent
Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close supervision in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally
responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA
517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."

On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly report of cases on
complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the
preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own
admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she
never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a
month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).

Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was
denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still
it is her duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.

The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was
supposed to be in custody, control and supervision of all court records including documents and other properties of
the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in
full control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).

The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however, also shows that
respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those documents notarized
during the month of July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she
received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she
only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.

For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although
the documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial
register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though
the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document
notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was
actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50
was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.

Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees
of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This
should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at
her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy
considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack
of marriage license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a
demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when solemnization fee
was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.

Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult
to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the
personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of
the court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees
(Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n
July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some
notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite
of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W,
FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).

It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount
of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash
bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably.

Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative case was already filed
(TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP,
Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8
to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it
were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one
year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of this case.

On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the court. It was only on
July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN,
p. 6; 1-4-94).

The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash
bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash
bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just
kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with)
the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would
settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an
order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).

Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary
receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she received. She further admitted that
some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt
marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official
receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she only
started issuing official receipts.

The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge
Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August 24,
1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I
and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought
to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was
bought and was not used yet.

The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on
installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents
presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by
the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time when she was
applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From
the time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it
was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29,
1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court
and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges
should avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).

With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge
Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however,
has no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of
respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.

Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them
escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused was
ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in
Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan
Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1,
0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal
jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely
testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.

Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have presented records from the
police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under
detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.

The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to
be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of
arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of
arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a
return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested
(Exh. 0-3).

Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one
of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted because the two other accused, Alano
and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly
jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take
custody of Alano.

The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he heard from the police
that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed
to bring to court Alano, the former should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to
court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only
later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this
case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion
that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could not present records or
other documentary evidence to prove the same.

The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and that
the filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence
presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against
farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants
cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on
collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.

Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as
it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part
Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent
a letter to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she would
submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).

Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt from the payment
of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be
submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February
4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12,
1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable officer.

In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show that respondent
Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte,
without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely
supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme
Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said
two (2) months were falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended
that he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or similar offenses
will be more severely dealt with.

The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he solemnized
without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were
solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was
not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a
marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of closely supervising his
clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly
report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases
only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to
check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It
was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).

In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of
July and September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the
notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees
of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized
issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on
October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt
(Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and
five months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or authority and redepositing it only on July
23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No.
5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-
1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for
requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed
against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal
Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.

It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by
order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for
Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or
provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ
Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25
November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be
deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made except upon
lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even
intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and
responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties
shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P.
Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was
held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be
deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular
Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash
 bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes
dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.

x x x           x x x          x x x

We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged
with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must
be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.  5 Integrity in a judicial
office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the
least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of
justice.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage
are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing
for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The
Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage
Law."9 This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be
modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to
heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status.
This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such
serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher
penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern
warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132955             October 27, 2006

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his
marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also
assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa,
Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that
threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior
to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child
died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4

In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, 5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner
wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner
knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed
for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

 1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced
the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned errors:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND
UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW. 7

The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b)
whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

The petition is partly granted.

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are
generally binding on this Court. 8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus –

To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly
characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than
four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained,
the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the
hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the
criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the
criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome
of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this
Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet
secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore,
understandable.

But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be
married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as
well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the
threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to
have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.

The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of
the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed,
appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way.
For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought
the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant
with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he
did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any
reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client
had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the
appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.

Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of
the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29,
1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa
City x x x.
 To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no controversy
regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the cross-examination of the
appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of
the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony
simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had
presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.

Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in his argument that if
indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she could not have a
premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is
complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not
affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he had a
sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man,
appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.

Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the appellee. During
his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the seven (7) letters that he sent
to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the appellant contained expressions of
love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct examination, however,
appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit
them because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the
admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can
only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the
validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to
cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds
for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since
the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage
must be upheld.9

We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s
may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in the
records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the award, the Court of
Appeals merely said thus:

It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as the
perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private respondent detailing her
alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.

In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:

In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish,
fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness
stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and
mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they
must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the
respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.

As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in
Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary
in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded
unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. 12 In the instant case, private respondent failed to
satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private
respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis. SO
ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013.]

[Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC]
 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,  petitioner, vs. JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2;
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C.
ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu City; CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City;
CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ,
Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D.
VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court
Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3,
Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA,
Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City,respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. It
requires that everyone involved in its dispensation — from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk — live up to the strictest
standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public service." 1

THE CASE

This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). 2 The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several
branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. 3 Certain package fees
were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages. 4

THE FACTS

On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team
created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City. 5 A female and male lawyer of the audit
team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard
on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized by other court
personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers then agreed
that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application process. Inside Branch 4, a woman
named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the marriage process could be
rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only
be dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three
thousand pesos (P3,000) only. 6 HSCATc
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a
formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis,
and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective comments. 7 The Court also suspended the judges pending
resolution of the cases against them. 8
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted its Memorandum
dated 29 August 2007 9 and Supplemental Report. 10 Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by
the judicial audit team. 11 The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were
solemnized under Article 34 12 of the Family Code. 13 The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of
solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts' custody. 14 There is also an unusual number of
marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. 15There were even marriages
solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. 16 The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60)
kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. 17Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more
than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City. 18
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government personnel, also reported the
following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking whether their
documents were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales afterwards; 19
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were also
"assistants" who would go over the couples' documents before these couples would be referred to Judge
Necessario. Retuya also narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of
marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents
of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis; 20
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted that after
the payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (P300), a different amount, as agreed upon by
the parties and the judge, was paid to the latter. 21 She admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos
 (P4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage of Moreil Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she
gave the payment to a certain "Mang Boy"; 22 THAECc
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage
licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those
towns were not strict about couples' attendance in the family planning seminar. She also admitted that
couples gave her food while the judge received five hundred pesos (P500) if the marriage was solemnized
inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one
thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for gasoline expenses if the marriage was celebrated outside the
chambers; 23
5) Marilou Cabañez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, or
Rosales. However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the audit team that during
the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage solemnization; 24
6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating team that
Judge Gil Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would produce a joint
affidavit of cohabitation form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries. The judge would then
receive an envelope containing money from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated"
marriage certificates; 25
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that couples looked for
Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang
bayad." 26 The excess of three hundred pesos (P300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as solemnization fee
went to a certain "sinking fund" of Branch 9; 27
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who
wanted to get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma  affidavit of joint
cohabitation for ten pesos (P10); 28 IaAEHD
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred couples to Branch 2,
Clerk of Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to the chambers of
Judge Necessario. 29 He informed the judge that the couple only had birth certificates. 30 The respondent
judge then inquired about their ages and asked them if they had been previously married then proceeded to
solemnize the marriage; 31 and
 10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize marriage
applications. 32 Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili
office because these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu. 33 She also added that while couples still
need to submit a certificate of attendance in the family planning seminar, they may attend it before or after
the filing of the application for marriage license. 34
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a resident of Panagdait,
Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fiancé wanted to set a marriage date.  35 Her younger sister who was
married in a civil wedding last year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the
wedding was scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their birth certificates. No marriage
license was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). According to Baguio-
Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under
Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera
claimed that they did not understand what that statement meant at that time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that the
situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fiancé.
Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit, she recounted how she and
her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006. While logging in at the entrance, they were
offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). The guard also offered to become
"Ninong" or a witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push through with the civil wedding at that
time. acTDCI
On 27 November 2007, the Court  En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta,
Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to comment
on the findings of the 14 August 2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b) directing the
Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c) requiring the court personnel listed
below to show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for their
alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
 5) Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8) Helen Mongaya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for
appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez, Local
Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b) directed the
Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy of the Supplemental Report of
the OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, to comment within fifteen (15) days from
notice on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9's court personnel received an amount in excess
of the P300 solemnization fee paid by couples whose marriages were solemnized by her. This amount goes to the court's
"sinking fund". 36 CacEID
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its Supplemental
Report, 37 the respondent judges argued the following:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to him by
contracting parties. 38 He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required affidavit
of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma  affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before he became a
judge. 39 He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an impediment to
marry. 40 He also asks the parties searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the contents of the affidavit and
the legal consequences of its execution. 41 The judge also denies knowledge of the payment of solemnization fees in
batches. 42 In addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of recording marriages on the logbook,
keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages monthly. 43
Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to inquire whether
the license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident. 44 The judge believes that it is not his
duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of
regularity of public documents. 45 The judge also outlines his own procedure in solemnizing marriages which involves: first,
the determination whether the solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of the affidavit of cohabitation and birth
certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate
of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers when the party is divorced; fourth, he then
asks the parties and their witnesses questions regarding cohabitation and interviews the children of the parties, if
any. 46 ITHADC
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial audit team during
the investigation an "entrapment". 47 She also claims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of
the issuance of the marriage license and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where
neither of the parties resided. 48 As to the  pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be faulted for
accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting experts. 49 The affidavits also enjoy the presumption
of regularity. 50 Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay. 51The respondent said that when
Baguio-Manera and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they affirmed the veracity of the
statements, particularly the fact that they have been living together for five years. 52 The judge also attributes the irregularity
in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks. 53
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. 54 He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who
evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license issued. 55 It is only when
there is no marriage license given that he ascertains the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to
marry. 56 As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with the fact that these are  pro
forma. He states that marriage certificates are required with the marriage license attached or the affidavit of cohabitation only
and the other documents fall under the responsibility of the local civil registrar. He surmises that if the marriage certificate did
not come with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document might have been inadvertently
detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil registrar. As to the payment of the docket fee, he contends that it
should be paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not before because judges will be pre-empted from ascertaining
the qualifications of the couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of Court. 57 The judge also argues
that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty. 58
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of
Suspension and Dismissal of Case. 59 This Court in a Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the suspension of the
respondent judges but prohibited them from solemnizing marriages until further ordered. 60 SCHTac
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with Waiver of Formal and/or
Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss. 61 In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion and
granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other economic
benefits from 9 July 2007. 62

THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA

 In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010, 63 the OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some
court employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing
marriages with questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a
mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of
gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of
the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
xxx xxx xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under
Article 34 of theFamily Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid and for
solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing
marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to
marry in lieu of the required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired
license. aSACED
xxx xxx xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel [that] prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any
or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions and for
giving false information for the purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing
her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
 DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service for providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit
of cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon
III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other
remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings
with the Judiciary. 64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabañez, for lack of merit.

THE ISSUE

The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most
severe penalty of dismissal from service. cTEICD

THE COURT'S RULING

The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported by the evidence on record
and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and responsibility of keeping
the faith of the public. 65 In Obañana, Jr.  v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people
in the Judiciary. 66
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The respondent judges and
court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales are all
guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure laid
down by law, particularly the Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the
solemnization process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the individual liabilities of the
respondent judges and court personnel vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the OCA against them.

Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario

The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred twenty-three (1,123)
marriages from 2005 to 2007. 67 However, only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were actually examined
by the judicial audit team. 68 Out of the 184 marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while
one hundred five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with license, forty-seven
(47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the marriages he
solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period of years. 69 There were also twenty-two (22)
marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license, certificate of legal capacity
to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 70 SIEHcA
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents such as marriage
licenses. 71 The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting parties appearing in the supporting documents differ
from the place where they obtained their marriage license. 72 The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and
superimpositions in the entries of residence. 73 Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of legal capacity to marry, a mere
affidavit was submitted by the parties. 74 Variations in the signatures of the contracting parties were also apparent in the
documents. 75
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code. These marriages
appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show minority of one or both of them during
cohabitation. 76 For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old
Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of Lapu-Lapu City. 77
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization fee but the
corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found. 78 The presence of the receipts implies that these marriages were
solemnized.

Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta

Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to 2007. 79 However, the logbook showed
that he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that he solemnized
five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75) under
Article 34 of the Family Code. 80This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized under Article 34 in a four-year
period. 81
There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as solemnizing officers
found in his custody. 82 There were also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code where one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during cohabitation. 83 To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the
marriage of Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old. 84
There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties were residents of Cebu
City. 85 The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign party's required certificate of legal capacity to
marry. 86 Lastly, there was no proof of payment of the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge
officiated. 87 STaIHc

Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis

Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage
certificates actually examined. 88 However, the monthly report of cases showed that she solemnized three hundred five (305)
marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007. 89 The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court
started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages. 90
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents such as the marriage
license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 91 In several instances, only affidavits
were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry. 92
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of the required
documents particularly the marriage license. 93 The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and superimpositions on
entries with regard to the parties' place of residence. 94 In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E.
Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying,
"THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it. 95
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage
requirements' authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the given address of
the parties. 96 These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were
married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu
City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage certificate showing that Secuya's
address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City." 97 DEcTCa
 Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales

Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to 2007 based on the marriage
certificates examined by the judicial audit team. 98 However, only three (3) marriages were reported for the same
period. 99 Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family
Code. 100 Thirty-eight (38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil registrar
of Barili, Cebu. 101 Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu. 102 Nine (9) or 13.64% were
from other local civil registrars. 103
There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for marriage license,
certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, joint
affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with
no corresponding marriage certificates. 104 He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland Weaver, an American citizen, to
two different persons within nine (9) months. 105 No copy of the required certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage or
the divorce decree was presented. 106
The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting documents such as the
certificate of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 107 He solemnized nine (9) marriages under
questionable circumstances such as the submission of an affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate
of legal capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as appearing in the marriage
documents, and the solemnization of the marriage on the same day the marriage license was issued. 108
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization fee of P300 was
paid. 109 On the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization fees were paid late. 110
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples
were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures,
corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties' place of residence. 111 These included indistinguishable
features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage
license. 112 These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In  Vega  v. Asdala, 113 the Court held that
inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness. cETDIA
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court,
in  Rodrigo-Ebron  v. Adolfo, 114 defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one's attention to a task expected of him and it
is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official
receipts for the solemnization fee were missing 115 or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different
dates. 116 The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application process
and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who
did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere
affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21
of the Family Code 117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the
documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of
parties to contract marriage. 118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of
the Family Code 119 with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such
as the minority status of one party. 120 The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages
ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by there submission of a pro forma joint affidavit
of cohabitation. 121 These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself. 122
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples where no
marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on the same
day the marriage was solemnized. 123
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage
license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point
to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the
moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In  People  v. Jansen, 124 this Court held that:
. . . the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been
issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has
fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. HEDaTA
 However, this Court also said in  Sevilla  v. Cardenas, 125 that "the presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the marriage
licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the certificate from the embassy of
the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges should have been more diligent in reviewing
the parties' documents and qualifications. As noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled with the
presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage license issuance.
The judges' gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the  Family
Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of
exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license. 126 Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should
be strictly but reasonably construed. 127 The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted  pro
forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one
of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.  128 The parties
should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage. 129
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family Code provides the requisites
for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; DCaEAS
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void  ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
 The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. 130 The actions of the judges have raised
a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the proper procedure or
check the required documents and qualifications. In  Aranes v. Judge Salvador  Occiano,  131 the Court said that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even an
iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro  v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn
to apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying
the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant
case. It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 132 cHAaCE
It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered Celerina Plaza, a personal
employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer services. 133 Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated in
his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when she found out
about the judicial audit. 134 In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the solemnization of marriages not as a
duty but as a business. 135 The respondent judge was suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for repeatedly
disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She was also fined the amount of
five thousand pesos (P5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC. 136 She was reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-
05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-001337. 137 Finally, in the very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon.
Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last 12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was
found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and gross ignorance of the law by
this Court. She was dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any,
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2 138 and 6 139 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence,
integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of
incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
integrity." 140 In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office,
a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of
justice. 141
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
 Liability of Other Court Personnel

The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following employees: SacTCA
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of grave
misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate the marriage and the
requirements on the same day of the lawyer's visit. 142 What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in
exchange for a fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from
soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions.
Mongaya's claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other offices as the usual
practice 143 is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum, "Monggaya deliberately gave false information for the
purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct." 144 Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense.
In  Villaceran  v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress
from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part of the
Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and
any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people's
trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that should
uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary. 145

Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court personnel. Her actions placed doubts on
the integrity of the courts. ECTSDa

Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cebu City, is guilty of gross
misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and demanded and accepted P4,000 from
them. 146 The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and
adopted by this Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate
her residence as Barili, Cebu. 147 The claim that she gave the amount to a certain Borces who was allegedly the real
facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the marriage. According to the OCA, when the couple went back for their
marriage certificate, they approached Rodriguez and not Borces. 148 When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage certificate
had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another marriage certificate. 149
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, merits a grave penalty. 150 Such penalty can be dismissal from service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the
required affidavit of cohabitation. 151 On the other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said affidavit
which according to Alesna costs P10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount involved in the transaction is minimal, the
act of soliciting money still gives the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making money out of judicial
transactions. 152
The Court said in  Roque  v. Grimaldo  153 that acts of court personnel outside their official functions constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The purpose of
this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia, Stenographer III of Branch 18, RTC,
Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the audit team that they received
food from couples they assisted. 154 This is in violation of Section 2 (b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in
transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA, they are admonished
considering that this is their first offense and the tips were of minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court held
that commission of an administrative offense for the first time is an extenuating circumstance. 155 DaEcTC
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports that Corazon Retuya
admitted initially that she received P5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary Grace Gabiana to secure necessary
documents. 156 The information was volunteered by Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple.
However, she denies this fact later on in her Comment. 157 Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as unclear and
lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit of the doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabañez. Cabañez was only implicated in
this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who attested that they paid a certain "Meloy" P1,200 for
the wedding under Article 34 of the Family through the assistance of Cabañez. 158 Cabañez denies that she was the one who
assisted the couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis.
Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy" not from Cabañez herself but from Baguio-Manera's younger sister. 159 When
Baguio-Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did not obtain confirmation that the said "Meloy" is Cabañez.
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive identification of Cabañez and finds merit in her
denial. 160
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against Judge Geraldine Faith A.
Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged sinking fund".
No evidence was presented as to the collection of an excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge Econg
or her staff had knowledge of such fund.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:
1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu
City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he
be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or -controlled corporation;
2.  Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICEwith forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation; EAHDac
3.  Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have
beenDISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if
any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
-controlled corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);
4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
-controlled corporation;
 5.  Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of violating
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation;
6.  Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cebu
City, GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for
inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation; EcAHDT
7.  Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8.  Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2 (b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning
that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
9.  Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma Valencia,
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and of violating Section 2 (b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu
City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabañez,
Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna,
should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the Supplemental Report dated 14
August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation with respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil
Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage licenses
and to take the necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant. HCSDca
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents' files that are with the Office of the Bar Confidant and
distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Office of the Court Administrator v. Necessario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, [April 2, 2013], 707 PHIL 328-364)

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO,  complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY,  respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGES; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH; NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
CONTRACT A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE. — There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the
law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law. In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for
the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages
not falling under Article 41."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN A. MARRIAGE CAN BE HELD OUTSIDE OF THE JUDGE'S CHAMBERS OR COURTROOM.
— Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage between
Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage
can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written
request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGES MAY SOLEMNIZE A MARRIAGE ONLY WITHIN HIS COURT'S JURISDICTION. — More importantly,
the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers
only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided
in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. A priest who is commissioned and
allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed
by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
4. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; IGNORANCE OF ELEMENTARY PROVISIONS OF THE LAW; CONSTITUTES
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. — The Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to lack of comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons
who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be
skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.
Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not
learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.

DECISION

ROMERO,  J p:
 The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He
has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence
in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his
actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC,
which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, " Antonio
Adapon  v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely
relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first
wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing
the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that:
"Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that Article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient
for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they
will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively
assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil
status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in
evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed
by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and
having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor
been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Italics added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of
law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it
was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect
or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles
7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
 "Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
. . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere,except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the marriage
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a
marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death,
(2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the
written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge.
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage
may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which
is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within
the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein
as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.
 Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the
cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply
them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.  6 It is not too much to
expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrate may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge,
the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a
deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be deat with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, [July 19, 1996], 328 PHIL 435-445)
 [G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.]

FILIPINA Y. SY,  petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY,  respondents.

Benjamin R. Razon  for petitioner.

Cariño & Gargantos Law Office  for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

On February 11, 1987, Filipina Sy filed a petition for legal separation. The action was later amended to a petition for
separation of property on the ground that her husband, Fernando Sy, abandoned her without just cause. Judgment was
rendered dissolving the conjugal partnership of gains and the court approved a regime of separation of properties based on
the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May, 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
against her husband in which the Regional Trial Court convicted him of a lesser crime of slight physical injuries. Petitioner later
filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the grounds
of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their
daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent. In 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to her husband Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. The
Regional Trial Court denied the petition. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent as cited by petitioner do not
constitute psychological incapacity, which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied
by the appellate court. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
 A marriage license is a formal requirement, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. Hence, the Court
concluded that the marriage between the petitioner and private respondent was void from the beginning. The issue on
psychological incapacity of private respondent was mooted by the conclusion that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized. 

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LITIGANTS CANNOT RAISE AN ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL; EXCEPTION;
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Although this Court has repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of instances, the Court has relaxed
observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote
substantive rights of litigants. The Court said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing,
the very reason for their existence would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular
case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. In the Court's view, the case at bar requires the Court
to address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between
the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their
effects according to existing law. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio.
2. CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGE; CONTRACTED WITHOUT A MARRIAGE LICENSE; DEEMED VOID FROM THE BEGINNING; CASE
AT BAR. — Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, the Court finds that indeed petitioner did not
expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license
was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly
applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and
private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The Court thus
concludes that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning.
 DECISION

QUISUMBING,  J p:

For review is the decision 1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition 3 for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy. llcd
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of
Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and
Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively. 5
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. 6
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two
children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father. 7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for
separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29,
1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. 8 Judgment was rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed by the spouses. 9 The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No.
88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the
dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him
to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family
computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando
pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband
started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from
hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a
Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent docketed as Civil Case No. 8973, on the
following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4)
abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to
petitioner and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992 Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in
her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to
the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as
manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her
without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the
marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from
the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter.15
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of
Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent,
as cited by petitioner do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the decision  17 of the Court
of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological
incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential
requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that
the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage.
And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record. 18
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21,
1996. 20
Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE
DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein
respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE
HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE
SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO
BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS
ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO. 22
In sum, two issues are to be resolved: cdll
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant
a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of
its celebration. It appears that according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of
their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.
 Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural
rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We
said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence
would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of
technicalities should not be subject to cavil. 25 In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity
of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that
here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial
court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained
in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate,
September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. 26 The date
of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. 27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in
open court, on January 22, 1993 during her direct examination, 28as follows:
ATTY. RAZON:
 In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY:
 Yes, sir.

November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth
certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. 29 These pieces of evidence
on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract
shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private
respondent ever resided in Carmona. 30
 Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in
her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and
the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on
September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that
the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates
on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character,
the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles
72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their
son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the
trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made
as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when
she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view,
therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. 33
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our
conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab void  for lack of a marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando Pampanga, dated
December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner
Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio  for lack of a marriage license at the time of
celebration. No pronouncement as to costs. cdrep
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Sy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127263, [April 12, 2000], 386 PHIL 760-771)
 [G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007.]

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA,  petitioner,vs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF

APPEALS,  respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J  p:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner's appeal and affirming the
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000,
dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage 3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. 4 They got married on the
same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a
marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham,
as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar
of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and
lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering
the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract 5 and its entry on file. 6
Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of
Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara
on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992. 7 Petitioner has a mistress
with whom he has three children. 8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage. 9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60. 10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as
support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs. 11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner's appeal. His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005. 12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had
not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties' marriage contract being a public document is
a  prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has
no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise
moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
 b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No.
7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was
not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this
Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals.(G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of
procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants. 14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage
license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them. 15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who
solemnized the marriage belongs. 16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification
states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"  17 but
their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80 (3) 18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code. 19
Article 53 of the Civil Code 20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
 The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the
court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In  Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held
that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license
that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño, 23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago
S. Carino as void ab initio.The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly
void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals, 24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case,
the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect
was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. 25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
 This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve. 26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business. 27 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by
no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act being
lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 28Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite. 29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and
respondent's marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period
for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. 30 An irregularity in any of the
formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. 31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that
the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible
to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping
of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract
from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, 32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was
not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it." 33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a
mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the
marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot
countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith. 34
 Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same
marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun
to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner's
testimony as follows —
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit
church.
WITNESS
I don't remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don't know if it is
good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a
Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
 That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract
issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor. 35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time.
Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect
attended the civil wedding. 36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner — that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel — will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. 37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing
officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance
of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements
of law. 38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. 39 Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February
2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, [August 28, 2007], 558 PHIL 192-208)
G.R. No. 133778             March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE
NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, 
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that
the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to
their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and
correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law
to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.  5 A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of
affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage
as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the
Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure
but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which
is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale
why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a
marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."  16 The only issue that
needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should
it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit
of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years
and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must
be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should
be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local
civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall
note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the
same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the
time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in
the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void
after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to
the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is
silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A
marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered
as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by
free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and
the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society
as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by
the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and
is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause
of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.]

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA,  J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question of law: Does a previous
final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition 1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of
San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 ofExecutive
Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision  2 dated
November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the
relief he is seeking." 3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution 4 dated June 11,
1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. HDICSa
 After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition 5 for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was
null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an
answer with a motion to dismiss 6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res
judicata and forum shopping.
In an order 7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent's motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order 9 dated January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER
PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS WIFE'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND
DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW. IHCSET
B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM
SHOPPING. 10
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the
present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either
were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar
the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of
the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
 On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that while the present suit is anchored
on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner
and respondent's marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent
thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the
rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP
4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the
absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the
marriage is being impugned on the ground of a party's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code? aIAHcE
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute
separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor
would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former
suit." 11
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the following
precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A
contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification
of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. 12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of
the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
 status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title
to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate
of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate; DcAaSI
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata. 13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by
prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its
concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving
a different cause of action. 14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is   final; (2) it
is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an orderon the
merits; and (4) there is — between the first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes
of action. 15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth
requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two
actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the
first case is a bar to the subsequent action. 16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of
his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was
anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the
present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license. CScTDE
 Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. 17 In both petitions, petitioner has the
same cause — the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of
action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the
key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent's marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration
of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner
impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound
by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and
heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to
sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. 18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of
his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals: 20
. . . the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of
the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes
of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A
party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed
and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first. prcd
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in
issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal.
The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and
upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to
recover for the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at
liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first
fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an
option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The
 losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and
financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. 21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC,
Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, [October 31, 2006], 536 PHIL 1049-1058)

[G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.

[G.R. No. 179474. March 28, 2008.]

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,  petitioner,  vs.  JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. [2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, [3] also dated
24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint [4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced
to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa's house, the latter being his landlady. Some
three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent
to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three
folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be
released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of
them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them
to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He
alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa's house. When he perused the same, he
discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they
had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. [5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while
her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990.
On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against
Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the
penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument. [7]

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds
that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24
November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose's version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose]
could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa]
but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he
will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed
was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken
in for a ride" by [Felisa.]

[Jose's] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife
when he wrote [Felisa's] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year
after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote
the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if
he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose's] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if
indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the
more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 [11] of the New Civil Code
which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the
time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at
the earliest instance. x x x.[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005,
the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment of marriage under Article 86 [14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled
that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The
Court of Appeals struck down Jose's appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the
action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the
force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until
February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed
the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose's assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 [16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa
had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing
that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave
credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted
that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps
to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose's argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 [17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one of
the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties' marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that
the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not
fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of
marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended
Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. [19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their
affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years
and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity -
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity - that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.
[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution [22] dated 10
May 2007, denying Felisa's motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before
this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and
set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a
separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court's Amended Decision. On 1
August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar
cases brought before it for resolution.[23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E. [24]
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.[25] She differentiates the case at bar
from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in
her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case
for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall
jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists
between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage by citing this Court's ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic's position that the falsity of the
statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied
with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so
must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties' marriage contract states
that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Jose's notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa's
name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay
City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose's company ID card,
dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa's name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar
of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by
the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the
fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. [30] This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, [31] whereby
the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage
license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. [32]

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To
wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (2) consular marriages, [33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. [34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. [36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other." [37] One of the
central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in
truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [38] but reasonably
construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will
not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto
that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written.
The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement
of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum
requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under
Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but
as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting
parties shall state the requisite facts [42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. [43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. [44] The
appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. [45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature.
A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. [46] Under Rule 45, factual
findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court's review. [47] It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this
rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit.
Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners' reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at
bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [49] Restated more
explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. [50] The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the
presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on
24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code [51] that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties' marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of
Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of
the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. [52] The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one
as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If
this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the
fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties
have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers
to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential
matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was
no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must
be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. [54] There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that
the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. [55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose's subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he
sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. [56] Jose and Felisa's marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void
marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. [57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is
unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
their criminal liability, if any. No costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 187462. June 1, 2016.]

RAQUEL G. KHO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and VERONICA B. KHO, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J  p:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218. The assailed
CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2,
in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
private respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC
of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now
deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare
whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent
supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the
marriage ceremony;
 4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually
took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in
the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance
only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had
not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told
to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming
marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage
license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null
and void for want of the most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized
sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither was it performed under
circumstances exempting the requirement of such marriage license;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due
notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche,
Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;
xxx xxx xxx 4
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification 5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of
a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer 6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action because
there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage
license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and
secured a marriage license which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern
Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.
 On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel
G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and
Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper
registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.
SO ORDERED. 7
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage license when
the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53 (4), 58
and 80 (3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed
Decision, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-
appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and purposes.
SO ORDERED. 8
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a presumption
that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also
ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in
the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution data January 14, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL
DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A
FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION
WITH RESPONDENT;
 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE
FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS
APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING
PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND
GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED
DECISION; and
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE
LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY
FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE. 10
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due credence to
petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent's
marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence but
rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of
petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by arguing
that the issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to
delve into these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing jurisprudence.
However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question
of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule,
nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
 (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record. 11
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage license
obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. 12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. 13

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. 14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of
exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4)
ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and
(7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
 Article 80 (3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage
license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the
essence of the marriage contract. 15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. 16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license
is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. 17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which they
presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any doubt
should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional
policy which protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage
license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño. 18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It
was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license
had been secured. 20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever
issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June
1, 1972." 21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent
has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges
such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition,
the Certificate of Marriage 22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license,
Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where
information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also
failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the statements
of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was
conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to
present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence. 23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the
only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it
cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect
the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued
and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla
v. Cardenas, 24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage
license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court considered the certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the
absence of a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite diligent search." The Court,
citing Section 28, 26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or
entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the
Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 27 this Court considered the marriage
of the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record of
such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased
is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr. 28
 Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas, 29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA 30 that, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by
the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in
their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the  Rules of Court does
not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No
such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. . . . 31
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject marriage
license which rendered the marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. 32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract
was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. 33 As cited above, Article 80 (3) of theCivil
Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of
exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less
than pure — that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it
may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under
the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City,
dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No.
464 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, [June 1, 2016])

[ G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014 ]

DAVID A. NOVERAS, PETITIONER, VS. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88686,
which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They
resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot
two children, namely: Jerome T. Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and Jena T. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993.
David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. located at 1085
P1,693,125.00
Norma Street, Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. located at
P400,000.00
Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares located at Maria
P490,000.00
Aurora, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. located at Sabang
P175,000.00[3]
Baler, Aurora
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria Aurora, Aurora P750,000.00
USA
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly City, California $550,000.00 (unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings $3,000
Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00
Bank of America Checking Account $8,000
Bank of America Cash Deposit $10,000.00
Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00[4]

The Sampaloc property used to be owned by David's parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged
the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of P1.5 Million for the redemption of the
same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million. According to Leticia,
sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed
that David agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David's father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the P1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected
by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the
redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the
conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines. [5] David was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the
Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29
June 2005.[6] The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the
USA.[7]

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She
relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed
for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from
selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4)
David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of
P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses. [8]

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA
properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the
conjugal partnership.[9]

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity which can result into
the forfeiture of the parties' properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the
judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will
amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter's property rights over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the P2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their
property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras,
including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney's fees and litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against their conjugal
properties.
Corollary to the above is the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive legitimes. [10]

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded
to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership
of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issued by the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005.
The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom
said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph are hereby given to
Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering the said properties. Their share in the income from
these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half of January of each year,
starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in
paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
share in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half
of January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A. Noveras shall give them
US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The
monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his
financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of P410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby
ordered to pay P5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and P405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the
 respondent may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler,
Aurora, in a joint account to be taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made within the period
of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the
custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of
Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by them individually. [11]

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and personal status are those of
the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued
by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24 June 2005. Under their law, the parties' marriage had already
been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of
property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial
separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute community of property
because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the
Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should
apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national
law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial
separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot be forfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover,
the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for considering that she already
acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine
properties to David, subject to the payment of the children's presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89
of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine properties
between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children's presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both
spouses to each pay their children the amount of P520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailed Decision dated December 8, 2006 of
Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are hereby divided equally between
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children,
Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said
properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of
January, starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the amount of P520,000.00 to
their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the
receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter's names.
The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision and the
corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody of the Clerk of Court a quo within the same period, withdrawable only by the
children or their attorney-in-fact.

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of P1,040,000.00
representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
Registrar-General, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.[12]

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded
the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the
trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor
of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded
all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial
separation of conjugal properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the parties.
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,[13] we stated that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. [14]

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of
Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.[15]

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an
official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or
copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal
custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as
well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,[16] we relaxed the requirement on certification where we held that
"[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed
in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where
the divorce decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption [17] as the lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the
parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines.

Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial
court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage. An
exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided
in Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. [18]
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the
Family Code, to wit:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as
(4)
provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and
That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
(6)
improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of
properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention
of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.

In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been
going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said
respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the said petition can also be
considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. [19]

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court's
decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had
been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia
heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras.
Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed
as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. [20] Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was
granted by the California court in June 2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute community
regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following
procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
(1)
properties of each spouse.
The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said
(2) assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of
(4)
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits
shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to
(6) remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said
children.

At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made
by the Court of Appeals on the trial court's Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David
and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court
explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have
contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same
is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the
redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute
community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be
charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the
absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal
driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds
of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of P1,040,000.00.

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of
one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of
each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the
same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. [21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 183622. February 8, 2012.]

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN,  petitioner, vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,  respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO,  J p:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 and Resolution 2 regarding the issuance
of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his
first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 25 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Burgos, Pangasinan a Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
 On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc.
No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending. HcaDIA
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a
criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as
Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando
despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. 3 The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him
and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City
filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in
determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A,
the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando.
Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial
court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. 4
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
(CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration. HCEcaT
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on the ground of  litis
pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an "uninterested
person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a
better right to administer the decedent's properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence
before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the wrong
remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition
for Certiorari  was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the
CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for
the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata  in the other. A petition for letters of administration
is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant
or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a
subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the
estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner
was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a
party to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia  is wanting. The contention of the
petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules
requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person, for that
matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as
administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those
specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse,
the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage
certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie  evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that
the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by the
 petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a
judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the
petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has
not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of
the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party
and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the
trial court is in place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs. AacDHE
SO ORDERED. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. 6 She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating,
on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was
invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case
No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was
acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the
findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner
was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had
already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 7 wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
 divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. . . .
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 8 to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. CaTcSA
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from
him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that
the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. . . .
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, 9 to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself.Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to
be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
 The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated. TCaADS
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the
legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied
him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is
the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original
of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus,
judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial
 notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied) aTIEcA
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando's divorce under the laws of
the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to
the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be
issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is
undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 10 in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be
issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007
and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case
be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision. DcSEHT
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, G.R. No. 183622 (Resolution), [February 8, 2012], 681 PHIL 493-502)

[ G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007 ]

LOLITA D. ENRICO, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order, [1] dated 3 May
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its
Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents' Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of  Marriage.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed
with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.   Substantially, the
complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan. [3]  They begot seven
children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. [4]  On 1 May
2004, Trinidad died.[5]  On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. [6]  Six
months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away. [7]

In impugning petitioner's marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the requisite
marriage license.   They argued that Article 34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner
and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision.  Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter's death, or on 1 May 2004, which was
barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.  Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.  To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years
openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license.  From their union were born
Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively.  She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting
parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order, [9] granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action.  It cited
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,[10] dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis.  The RTC elucidated on
its position in the following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1)  Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides
in Section 2, par. (a)[11] that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.  The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife.  The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition
for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage.  The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such
petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them.  Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot
substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void. [12] (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED.  Accordingly, the
Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.  Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said motion,
the RTC rendered an Order [14] dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005.  Hence, the RTC reinstated the
complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for
holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter.   It
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living. [16] 
Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void.   The RTC
expounded on its stance, thus:

The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme
Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his
death.  The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the
new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has
rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages.  The Order further held that it is
only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage
and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule.  In view of
this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule.  To reconcile, the Court will have to determine
[the] basic rights of the parties.  The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be
prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional rights.  During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an
inchoate right over the property of the said parents.  Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should
solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void.  However, upon the death of the
parent his heirs have already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent.  Such vested right should not be
frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule.  Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. 
The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.

If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal
and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the
annulment of the marriage.  Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the
petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable
only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living.  Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void
marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b
the husband or the wife.  It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. [17]
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case. [18]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the
said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein. [19]

Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as
embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as
specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants
are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court. [20]  Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the
lower courts.  As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance.  Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the
RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. [21]  However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the
discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. [22]  Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its
failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a
pure question of law.

Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case.  A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal which
is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents' Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
father's marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that
the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.  The Court in Niñal recognized that
the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration. [23]  What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be
declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code.  As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner's
marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.  (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.  The coverage extends only to those marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. [24]

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling
in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application.  As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under
the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated
on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule.  Absolute sententil expositore non indiget.  When the language of the law is clear, no
explanation of it is required.  Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the
wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages.  Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages.  Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State.  The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.   Compulsory
or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.  On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo.  Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents.  While A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law.   They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can
still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but  upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.  Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio
B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter.  No costs.
SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 179922. December 16, 2008.]

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE

CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO
CARLOS II,respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family
Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the summary judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a
child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa,
Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot
159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by
Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or
less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No.
6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of
the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la
parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano,
el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la
parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are
now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The
said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of
land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel
between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in
favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil
Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court  a
quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property;
(d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity
in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject
real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued
that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's
marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another
woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was
the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth
of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract
evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo
II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another
case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas.
In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. [5]

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's
(petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite
marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late
Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest
thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds
to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos
II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II
and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring
Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered
REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as
ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial
court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a
declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine
issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The
first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion
of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively
dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived
together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter
is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case,
the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
(Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of
the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded
that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void  ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage
license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although
irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of
the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case
on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take
place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may
be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis
of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior
claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of
appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right
to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos
II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what
could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her
previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more
credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises
was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II.[8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying
petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned
marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated
and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or
has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a
serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for
judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and
conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.[9] (Underscoring
supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the
capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings
nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 [10] of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings.
In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of
the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in
cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of
nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took
effect on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for
nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions. [14] (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case.
The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the
parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered.[15]

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene
for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly,
even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid
down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the
merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.[16]

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10 -SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife .
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.  The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only
inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. [17] (Underscoring
supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They
are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of
their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can
and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. [18]

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the
heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to
deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. [19]

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15,
2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective
in its application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. [23]

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration. [24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. [25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.[26]

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not
the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. [27]

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married , or even in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who
can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions,  must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the
foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground
that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same. [29] (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. [30]

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child,
respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
 
 In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
(2)
descendants;
 
(3) The widow or widower;
 
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
 
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. [31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother,
does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the
New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to
the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes
succession by collateral relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. [33]

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner
would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is
finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of
the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes
petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent
Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the
final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality
to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be
found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,
[34]
 or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject
marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is
a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of
respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration
is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.[36]

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his
putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to
the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family
Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy  or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article
167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her
child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. [37]

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of
property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that
the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent
Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC
is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs. SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 158298, Aug 11, 2010 ]

ISIDRO ABLAZA v. REPUBLIC +

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother
solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner
whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed
marriage, had no right to bring the action.

Antecedents

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and
Leonila Honato.[1] The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract
between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due
to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without
any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real
party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.[2]

Ruling of the RTC

On October 18, 2000, [3] the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:

Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the petition for the following
reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted
between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on November
14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:

The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

In its decision dated January 30, 2003,[4] however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless
requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the
marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to
the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is
considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other
than those specified in the law file the case.

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition. More so that the
surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO.
117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE
REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties,
and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a
marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. [6] As a general rule, the nature of the
marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. [7] To illustrate, a marriage
between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code;
yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a
stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Codemarriage remains void, considering that the validity of
a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony. [8]

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-
10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on
March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.[9] Specifically, A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.[10]

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,[11] the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the
limitation, to wit:
 1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime
of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was
the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.  Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the
parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when.
Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,[12] the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the
declaration of the nullity of their father's marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a
marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and
explained how and when each might be impugned, thus wise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of
mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void,
it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death
of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Codeconnotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.[13]

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new  Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license
to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,[14] the
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is
basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. [15] Thus,
only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. [16] Interest within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible
on the ground of lack of cause of action.[17]

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano's brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was
as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the
right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the  Civil
Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased's estate. [18] Necessarily, therefore,
the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We reverse their error, in
order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano's surviving wife, [19] stood to be
benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages
celebrated under the old Civil Code required

a marriage license for their validity; [20] hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed
light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a
marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined
herein:

xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when
an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court  null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.[21]

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza,
namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between
the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on
November 26, 2009, and the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that
action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife
and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right
any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however, considering that Section
11,[22] Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment
to implead an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial court's) own initiative  at any stage of
the action and on such terms as are just."

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in
Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in
order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late
Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as
whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of
said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly. No costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 175367, June 06, 2011 ]

DANILO A. AURELIO, PETITIONER, VS. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari, [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the October
6, 2005 Decision [2] and October 26, 2006 Resolution, [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons,
namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage. [4] In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of
performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations.  In addition, respondent alleged that such state
of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony.  Hence, respondent prays
that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondent's petition are the following allegations, to wit:

x x x  The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of performing and
complying with their essential marital obligations.  Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the
marriage.  Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and
incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife.  
His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition.  He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family.  He
refused to foot the household bills and provide for his family's needs.  He exhibited arrogance.  He was completely insensitive
to the feelings of his wife.  He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their children.

Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely.  Her feelings change very quickly -
from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences.  Her tolerance for boredom was very low. 
She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment.  She cannot delay to gratify her needs.  She
gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely.  Their hostility towards each other
distorted their relationship.  Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of
their marriage.  Private respondent manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him.  The
psychological make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of
both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable.  Private respondent suffers
from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive
(negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a
marriage. [5]

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed
to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of
Article 36 of the Family Code.

On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order [7] denying petitioner's motion.

On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in an
Order [8] dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioner's motion, the RTC ruled that respondent's petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious
would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:

A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise
known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and
the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in
paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding
of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the
nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both parties. This, in turn, will
entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that
there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it
finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant
nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity. [9]
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari [10] under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.

On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. [11]

In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondent's complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of
a sufficient cause of action.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Court's consideration, to wit:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE
COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED
PETITIONER'S ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL
COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES. [12]

Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondent's complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this present
petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 [13] prohibits the filing of a motion to
dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of the arguments raised by
petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, [14] this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases
involving psychological incapacity, to wit:

(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the     plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. [15]

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements,
particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed
with to avoid delay.  Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. [16]

Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondent's petition are insufficient to support
a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed
to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in
the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition. [17]

First, contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged
in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and
respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and
expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability
for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave,
incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As
can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent's allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which
states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital
obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same
contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has
been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a
decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at
first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity.
Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.  Courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. [18] It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the
RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the
testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.

Given the allegations in respondent's petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [19]  Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that
the allegations contained in respondent's petition are insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss, the same is merely an error of judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari. [20]

Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioner's petition.  As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an
interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari.  Petitioner's remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as
defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the
decision in due time. [21] The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the
CA. [22]

WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED.  The October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159594               November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the declaration by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan of the nullity of the marriage between respondent Eduardo De
Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a marriage on the ground that the
alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.

Antecedents

Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. 3

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, 4 citing Catalina’s psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed
to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. 5 After conducting an
investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina. 6

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him;
that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of
doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her
paramour.7

Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based
on the tests she administered on Catalina, 8 Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder
that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that
rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. 9

Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, 10 whereby she admitted her psychological
incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that
she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to
live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold. 11

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is hereby
rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos de Quintos, a nullity under Article
36 of the Family Code, as amended.

2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage of the parties from the Civil
Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant
gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It
held that considering that the matter of determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts
like Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of Catalina’s psychological
incapacity.13
Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-
DE QUINTOS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.

On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that Eduardo proved
Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes
showed that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital obligations;"
and that Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified, sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint
and clearly explained by the trial court.

Issue

In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred because:

THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINA’S ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.

III

ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.

IV

GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

 V

THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE
OF CATALINA’S INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND
INCURABLE.14

The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid down by the
Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina); 15 and that Catalina’s refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take
care of her husband and their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations.

The OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the conjugal home were not grounds
under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the
marriage, while her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that
the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes
was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life, attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain
her alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological
incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that
he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.

The OSG postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and Eduardo’s overseas deployment that had required him to be
away most of the time created the strain in the couple’s relationship and forced her to seek her friends’ emotional support and
company; and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear children of
her own.

Issue

The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo
based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Ruling

We grant the petition for review.

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must
refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he
or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. 16

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 17 we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and
must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in
deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid down the following
guidelines in the later ruling in Molina,18 viz:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.

xxxx
 (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. x x x.19

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on
the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity
based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. 20 Indeed, the
incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, 21making it incumbent upon the petitioner to
sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 22

Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the gravity and severity of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the celebration of their marriage. 23
We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the gravity,
root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of
the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.

To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without Eduardo’s
consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even
established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was
self-serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to a court of law.

Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite
the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the
following portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by immaturity in several aspects of the
personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships, where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in
a relationship that involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not have the patience to
sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be attended to as they might end up doing things which
are often regrettable. These people however usually do not feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn
from their mistakes, and they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to the detriment of their own lives and that of their
families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot be expected to have lasting and successful
relationships as required in marriage. It is expected that even with future relationships, things will not work out.

Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be the background of the
developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as such.

xxxx

With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being concluded that
she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her as a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the
marriage is highly indicative of a very immature and childish person, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live up and
meet the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and
mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected
that this attitude and behavior of defendant will still change because her traits have developed through the years and already
ingrained within her.24

Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological
incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital information that the report missed out on.
Aside from rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the report and
court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have brought about such behavior on the
part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with
borderline personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic
marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity
could no longer be treated due to her having already reached an age "beyond maturity." 25

Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 26 We have explained this need in Lim v. Sta.
Cruz-Lim,27 stating:

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what
happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. 28

But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from
Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that
reason, Dr. Reyes’ report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary support for the conclusion that
the RTC and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological incapacity to perform her marital duties.

Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality
disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. 29
What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalina’s immaturity and apparent refusal to perform
her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. 30 To rule that such
immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a
disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state,
which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity. 31

Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo 32 that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations, viz:

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on
the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to
live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did
not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family
Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality
that made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. 33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not
adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.

Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based on his
admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince
her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part, 34 to wit:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG

Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos,
has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed that she is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did
you talk to your wife?

A No, sir.

Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this case you
filed against her, is it not?

A No, sir. I did not.

Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this case?

A None, sir.

Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of P50,000.00, please tell us, what
is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?

A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.

Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage?

A Yes, sir.

Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?

A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.

Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of marriage which you filed against
her?

A She does not opposed [sic], sir.

Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division of your conjugal properties?
A Yes, sir.

Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties, so that she will not pursue
whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed against her, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no longer around here?

A Yes sir, it could be.35

Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo.1âwphi1 To recall, she did
not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it
clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her
the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to
such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance
of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of
collusion between the spouses.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 36

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on
July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for
lack of merit. Costs to be paid by the respondent. SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 157649, Nov 12, 2012 ]

ARABELLE J. MENDOZA v. REPUBLIC +

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently
prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.

Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003, [1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza
(Dominic) as null and void.

Antecedents

Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been
next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were still in college she, at Assumption College while he, at
San Beda College taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy
ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of
pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991, [2] after which they moved to her place, although remaining
dependent on their parents for support.

When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioner's best friend to settle the hospital bills.
He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took
on various jobs to meet the family's needs, first as a part-time aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time
employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family's
expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child's educational needs).

On his part, Dominic sold Collier's Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from college before he started working
as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in 1994. [3] Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a
celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and their child's schooling because
his irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-
employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate
rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship. [4]

In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank
checks that he claimed would be for the car's insurance coverage. She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid
for the car's insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself,
forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.

To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his
employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and
incarcerated. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many
clients some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves. [5]

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things
over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her
family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based
on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the
petition.

Ruling of the RTC

In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor
Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence.

On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity, [6] holding in part:

xxx. The result of Dr. Samson's clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric Report she issued together with
one Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature, strong and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust
however, makes her vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also believes that marriage was a partnership "for
better and for worse", she gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On
the one hand, respondent was found to have a personality that can be characterized as inadequate, immature and
irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions of his misconduct established in childhood. His
childhood experiences of separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and
lifestyle.

She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him as a husband and father. Besides
from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man. [7]
The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and incurability, as set forth
in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),[8] were attendant, establishing Dominic's psychological incapacity, viz:

Gravity from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage
and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally
incapable of observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start
of the marriage respondent had left all the household concerns and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and
indulged in night outs with friends. This continued even when he finished his studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary
from the petitioner and worse, had the gall to engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is
respondent's propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic)
more often than not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.

Antecedence Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondent's personality disorder and it was only after marriage
that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondent's behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen.
His dishonesty and lack of remorse are mere extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to
respondent's childhood experiences of separation and emotional deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a
product of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence of the environment although its over manifestation appear only
after the wedding.

Incurability Respondent's personality disorder having existed in him long before he contracted marriage with petitioner, there
appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary means from such incapacity.

All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess the proper outlook, disposition and
temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate recourse of nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be
delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to be a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner. [9]
 Ruling of the CA

The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominic's personality traits either constituted
psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the  Family
Code; that the testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive, was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason
for the parties' separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic.[10]

On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC. [11] Specifically, it refused to be
bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioner's expert witness, holding:

It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondent's condition, assuming it is serious enough, was present
before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although petitioner's expert witness concluded that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated even before the parties' marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the
fact that the witness' findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the basis of information given by the petitioner herself,
who, at the time of the examination, interview, was already head strong in her resolve to have her marriage with the
respondent nullified, and harbored ill-feelings against respondent throughout her consultation with Dr. Samson. [12]

The CA held the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic's psychological affliction to be of such a
grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag,
[13]
 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[14] and Pesca v. Pesca,[15] the CA observed:

In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of
affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A person's inability to
share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are
indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured.

Even the respondent's alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychological incapacity, although it may
constitute adequate ground for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the
respondent is a criminal suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of his
marriage to petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation provided the respondent is convicted by final
judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than six (6) years. [16]

Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

Issues

Petitioner assails the CA's refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had presented in the
trial of the case, and the CA's reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the
report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied
the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal medical or
psychological examination was not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

We consider the CA's refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted. The CA
correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr.
Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic
was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner's expert; and that he also did not participate in the
proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-
serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.

Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order to verify the facts derived
from petitioner about Dominic's psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out,
however, that the only people she interviewed about Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred, as the following
testimony indicated:

Fiscal Zalameda
Q: So you're saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the time you interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding her marital problems which
A:
is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to condition herself regarding her problems, Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is concerned, would you say that
Q:
the petitioner would only tell you information negative against the respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by the petitioner, Sir.
And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by the petitioner, Madame
Q:
Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.[17]

In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samson's findings. The CA
rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with
the requirements set in Santosand Molina for the establishment of Dominic's psychological incapacity.

The CA's reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.

In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband." [18] But here, the expert's testimony on Dominic's
psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did
not examine Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other people's recollection and opinion for
that purpose.

In Hernandez, we ruminated that:

xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [19]

but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of
Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.

The Court in Pesca observed that:

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.[20]

Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical expert's testimony alone that was
crucial but rather petitioners' failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity
at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of
the marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:[21]

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable,
are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such
opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of the proceedings.

Petitioner's view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent spouse
therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his psychological incapacity [22] is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the
statement in Marcos ran as follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only  if the
totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the
presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein,
was the "presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists
tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented
and be weighed by the trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages. It
bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the
expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. [23]

We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of
the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and support. We have also held that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a person's psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate
an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights and obligations
between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

Accordingly, the RTC's findings that Dominic's psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and
incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of
such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of
remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or
to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of
immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity. [24]Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses
manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code.

Finally, petitioner contends that the Court's Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required,
and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be deemed to have become functus officio if not totally
disregarded.[25]

The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no longer
required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to
wit:

The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
a) Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.[26]
b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to
 file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may
require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State.
No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda. [27]
The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision
c) personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the
dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation. [28]
The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be
d) made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the
Solicitor General.[29]
An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
e) from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on the adverse parties.[30]

The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor
vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity those sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence
would succeed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 19,
2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17014             August 11, 1921

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.

Fisher & DeWitt for appellant.

Powell & Hill for appellee.

STREET, J.:

Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and
since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July
4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her
husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, this action was
initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered,
admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of
defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly
she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership;
(3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave
judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400
per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to
defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this court.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame
than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal
home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and weighed every line of the
proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with
a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt
the many miseries that have attended their married life. In view of the decision which we are to pronounce nothing will be said
in this opinion which will make the resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of
the mistakes of the past; and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of the spouses
has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any
person. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our
opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to
time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The
judgment must therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was without sufficient justification in
fact.

In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the defendant's cross-complaint. To
begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil
society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation by the wife against
the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce.
Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her
husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda,
35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such
obligation, (Mercado vs.Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at
large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the
wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and fraught
with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate
maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and
separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held
that an action for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when the reasons for it are
imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a proceeding can be maintained also
appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State of South Carolina, where judicial divorces have
never been procurable on any ground, the Supreme court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate
maintenance, where it is impossible for her to continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has more than
once rejected the petition of the wife for separate maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-
treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am.
Dec., 597; Boyd vs.Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)

Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where cruelty on
the part of the husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the following eloquent words, — which
are perhaps even more applicable in a proceeding for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction where, as here, a divorce cannot
be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and this, too, after the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal
prosecution for that crime. Said he:

That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is admitted, but the question occurs, What is
cruelty? . . .

What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are not accompanied with bodily
injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil
attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to
legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but
still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may
exist on the one side as well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an
injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both
must suffer in silence. . . .

The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. Humanity is the second virtue of courts, but
undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its views merely
to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a question easily decided upon first impressions. Every body must
feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each other, who cannot live together with any degree of
harmony, and consequently with any degree of happiness; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings,
much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has said that married persons shall not be legally separated upon
the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. . . .

To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if it were, it would not be difficult to
show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true wisdom, and that real
humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind. For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to
dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individual, yet it must be
 carefully remembered that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people
understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know cannot shake off; they become good husbands and good wives form the
necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes. . .
. In this case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general
good. (Evans vs.Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)

In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well founded and none of the relief sought
therein can be granted.

The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B.
Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an obligation, both moral
and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with him. The only question which here arises is as to the character and
extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.

The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part of the
complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and
live with him as a wife according to the precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in unqualified
terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the
present writer is aware, the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for the court to
make such an order.

Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt
to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of
one of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the
doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal
rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical
Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were
found to warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by process of contempt in case of disobedience,
requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even
by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir James
Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to
the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced
by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884)
abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case
of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the
character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a
peremptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish
Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In
other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the  Audencia Territorial de
Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of
the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile
was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of
her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the
return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt,
entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.

Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared
that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished
that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of
either instance. So ordered.
 [G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000.]

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,  petitioner, vs.  ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and
JANE DOE,  respondents.

[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO,  petitioner, vs.  COURT OF

APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.

Singson Valdez & Associates for E. Ilusorio.

Roxas Delos Reyes Laurel & Rosario for P. Ilusorio.
Agcaoli Law Offices  for S. Ilusorio-Yap.
Roco Bunag Kapunan & Migallos and Lito M. Patajo for E. Bildner.

SYNOPSIS

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age who possessed extensive property valued millions of pesos. He is married to
Erlinda Kalaw. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Makati City when he is in Manila, and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he is in Baguio City,
while Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from the United States, he stayed with
Erlinda in Antipolo City for about five months. During that period, his health deteriorated allegedly because of an overdose of
medicine that was given to him by Erlinda. On May 31, 1998, from Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City.
Instead he lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati City. Consequently, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano. After due hearing, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, but
Erlinda was given visitation rights. Both parties elevated the case to this Court. Erlinda sought the reversal of the dismissal of
her petition, while Potenciano wanted to annul the visitation rights of Erlinda.
This Court ruled that the evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86
years of age, or under medication, does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge
on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus
possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts
to see or live with. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run
against his fundamental constitutional right. Finally, no court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live
with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice. TAIESD

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; HABEAS CORPUS; COULD NOT BE ENFORCED AGAINST MARITAL RIGHTS. — Marital rights including
coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. . . . No court is
empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a
writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and woman's free choice.
2. ID.; ID.; COVERAGE. — A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
3. ID.; ID.; DEFINED. — "Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to,
and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." It is a high prerogative, common-
law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause.
It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over another person.
4. ID.; ID.; SPEEDY AND EFFECTUAL REMEDY TO RELIEVE PERSONS FROM UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT. — A writ of habeas
corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from
the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
5. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
6. ID.; ID.; TO JUSTIFY THE GRANT THEREOF, ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY MUST BE ACTUAL AND EFFECTIVE. — To
justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention
or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. . . .
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio's mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having
answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the
capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with.
The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to
Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people.
With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals.
8. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARITAL RIGHTS; AWARD OF VISITATION RIGHTS TO A WIFE IS A VIOLATION OF RIGHT
TO PRIVACY OF A SANE HUSBAND. — With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, PotencianoIlusorio may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to
say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent
with the finding of subject's sanity.
 9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY OF CONTEMPT IS NOT PROPER. — When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it
also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such
assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary. The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a
parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

DECISION

PARDO,  J p:

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no.
Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas
corpus. LLjur
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, 1 or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. 2
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner
at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." 3
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may
be imprisoned without sufficient cause. 4 It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising
legal custody over another person. 5
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio 6 is to reverse the decision 7 of the Court of Appeals and its resolution 8 dismissing the
application for habeas corpus  to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the
wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio 9 is to annul that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the
visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
 Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years,
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty
(30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium,
Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age
52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5)
months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an
overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition 10 for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter's advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City
and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents 11 refused petitioner's demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioner's manifestation, respondents Erlinda
K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place,
his guards and Potenciano Ilusorio's staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to
Potenciano Ilusorio's wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof,
under penalty of contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; . . .
 "(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the herein petition
for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention
of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED." 12
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, 13 or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. 14 It is
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. 15
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. 16
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. 17 The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. 18
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano  Ilusorio’s liberty
that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. LibLex
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland
Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to
seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio's mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind,
having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on
his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members
but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have
no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his
fundamental constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where
Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of
contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right
of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives
visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs. LLjur
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Ilusorio v Bildner, G.R. Nos. 139789 & 139808 , [May 12, 2000], 387 PHIL 915-924)
G.R. No. 164790             August 29, 2008

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and LORELIE B. SOLIDUM, Branch Manager, Cubao Branch, petitioner, 
vs.
GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband for support is not qualified to be his beneficiary.

The principle is applied in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), awarding benefits
to respondent Gloria de los Santos.

The Facts

Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, were married on April 29, 1964 in Manila. Less than
one (1) year after, in February 1965, Gloria left Antonio and contracted another marriage with a certain Domingo Talens in
Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with him until 1983. They had three children: Alain
Vincent, Arlene, and Armine.
In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US). On May 8, 1986, she filed for divorce against Antonio with the
Superior Court of Orange, Sta. Ana, California. On May 21, 1983, she executed a document waiving all her rights to their
conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce was granted on November 5, 1986.

On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their union produced one child, May-Ann N. de los
Santos, born on May 15, 1989. On her part, Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant, an American citizen, on July 11, 1987, in
the US.

On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended his records at the Social Security System (SSS). He changed his beneficiaries from Mrs.
Margarita de los Santos to Cirila de los Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de los Santos; and from Erlinda de los
Santos to Armine de los Santos.

Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on began receiving monthly pension. He died of
respiratory failure on May 15, 1999. Upon his death, Cirila applied for and began receiving his SSS pension benefit, beginning
December 1999.

On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s death benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied
because she was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio. The SSS letter of denial dated September 1, 2000 stated:

We regret to inform you that your claim is denied for the following reason/s:

We received documents showing that you have remarried in the United States to one Larry T. Constant. You were also
the one who filed for petition for dissolution of your marriage with the deceased member, which was in fact granted by
the Superior Court of California, County of Orange.

These circumstances are sufficient ground for denial as the SSS law specifically defines beneficiaries as " the dependent
spouse, until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted and illegitimate children who
shall be the primary beneficiary." x x x2

SSC Disposition

Gloria elevated her claim to the Social Security Commission (SSC). On February 12, 2001, she filed a petition to claim death
benefits, with a prayer that she be declared the rightful beneficiary of the deceased Antonio. 3
The SSC motu proprio impleaded Cirila as respondent in the case, it appearing that she was another claimant to the death
benefits of Antonio. Upon receipt of the summons, Cirila moved to dismiss the petition of Gloria. She argued that Gloria had no
personality to sue because the latter is neither a dependent nor a beneficiary of Antonio, as evidenced by the E-4 form
accomplished and submitted by him when he was still alive. Gloria had also remarried an American citizen in the US. And that
she, Cirila, was the true and legal wife of Antonio.

Cirila likewise reasoned out that the authority to determine the validity of the two marriages of Antonio lay with the regular
courts. Since Gloria had already filed for settlement of the intestate estate of Antonio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
the petition she filed with the SSC should be considered as forum shopping.

Gloria opposed the motion to dismiss. She contended that her marriage to Larry Constant was not the subsequent marriage
contemplated under the Social Security Law (SS Law) 4 that would disqualify her as a beneficiary; that the decree of divorce
issued by a foreign state involving Filipino citizens has no validity and effect under Philippine law. Lastly, Gloria remonstrated
that there was no forum shopping because the petition she filed before the RTC did not involve the issue of her entitlement to
SSS benefits.

The SSC denied the motion to dismiss. After submission of position papers from both sides, it issued a Resolution, dated
February 13, 2002,5 dismissing Gloria’s petition with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that May-Ann de los Santos, daughter of Antonio and private
respondent Cirila de los Santos is the secondary beneficiary of the former and as such, she is entitled to the balance of
her father’s five-year guaranteed pension.

Accordingly, the SSS is hereby ordered to compute the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension less the amount
of P21,200 representing the total of the monthly pensions and dependent’s pension previously received by private
respondent Cirila Nimo and minor May-Ann de los Santos, respectively, and to pay the latter, through her natural
guardian Cirila Nimo, the difference between the two amounts, if any. If there was overpayment of pension, the private
respondent is hereby ordered to forthwith refund the amount thereof to the SSS.

The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.6
The SSC deemed that Gloria abandoned Antonio when she obtained a divorce against him abroad and subsequently married
another man. She thus failed to satisfy the requirement of dependency required of primary beneficiaries under the law. The
Commission likewise rejected her efforts to use the invalidity of the divorce, which she herself obtained, to claim benefits from
the SSS for her personal profit.

However, despite all the sophistry with which petitioner, through her counsel, sought to justify her acts in the USA, the
petition must fail. The petitioner, who was primarily responsible for obtaining the decree of marital dissolution from an
American court, now wishes to invoke the very invalidity of her divorce and subsequent marriage in order to lay hands on
the benefit she seeks. It is sheer folly, if not downright reprehensible, for the petitioner to seek to profit from committing
an act considered as unlawful under Philippine law. This Commission will not allow itself to be used as an instrument to
subvert the policies laid down in the SS Law which it has sworn to uphold at all times. x x x 7 (Emphasis added)

The SSC added that since the marriage of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter was likewise not a qualified beneficiary. The
fruit of their union, May-Ann, was considered as an illegitimate child and qualified as a secondary beneficiary. May-Ann was
entitled to 50% of the share of the legitimate children of Antonio in accordance with Section 8(k) of the SS Law. 8 However,
considering that the legitimate children of Antonio have reached the age of majority, May-Ann is the only remaining qualified
beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100% of the benefit.

R.A. No. 8282, which is the law in force at the time of retiree Antonio’s death on May 15, 1999, provides as follows:

"Section 12-B. Retirement Benefits. x x x

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled
to receive the monthly pension. Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries and he dies within sixty (60)
months from the start of his monthly pension, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit
equivalent to the total monthly pensions corresponding to the balance of the five-year guaranteed period, excluding
the dependents’ pension." (Emphasis supplied)

Since Antonio de los Santos retired on March 1, 1996, and began receiving monthly pension since then, the
determination of who his primary beneficiaries were at that times should be based on the relevant provisions of the
applicable prevailing law then, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, which is quoted hereunder:

"Section 8. Terms Defined. x x x

 xxxx

(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children who shall be the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents, and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the
absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designed by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary."
(Emphasis supplied)

Applying these provisions to the case at hand, May-Ann de los Santos as the illegitimate child of Antonio and Cirila is
considered her father’s secondary beneficiary who, in the absence of a primary beneficiary x x x, becomes entitled to the
balance of the five-year guaranteed pension as Antonio died just three (3) years after he began receiving his retirement
pension, pursuant to Section 12-B par. (d) of the SS Law, as amended. 9

CA Decision

Gloria appealed the above SSC Resolution to the CA. She insisted that she, as the legal wife, was the qualified beneficiary to
Antonio’s death benefits.

The CA agreed with the SSC in its determination that the marriage of Gloria and Antonio subsisted until his death and the
subsequent marriages contracted by both of them were void for being bigamous. But contrary to findings of the SSC, the CA
found that being the legal wife, Gloria was entitled by law to receive support from her husband. Thus, her status qualified
Gloria to be a dependent and a primary beneficiary under the law. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and the appealed Resolution dated
February 13, 2003, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent SSS is DIRECTED to compute the amount of
benefits to which petitioner is entitled under the law. 10

Issues

Petitioner SSS and the concerned Branch head present a lone issue for Our consideration: THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS STILL QUALIFIED AS A PRIMARY BENEFICIARY OF DECEASED
SSS MEMBER ANTONIO, UNDER SECTION 12-B IN RELATION TO SECTION 8(e) and (k) OF THE SS LAW. 11
The controversy revolves on who between respondent Gloria, the first wife who divorced Antonio in the US, or Cirila, the
second wife, is his primary beneficiary entitled to claim death benefits from the SSS.

Our Ruling

At the outset, let it be recalled that in 2005, this Court ruled in Dycaico v. Social Security System12 that the proviso "as of the
date of retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act No. 8282, 13 which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries," is
unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses. For ready reference, the concerned provision is
reproduced below:

SECTION 12-B. Retirement Benefits. – (a) A member who has paid at least one hundred twenty (120) monthly
contributions prior to the semester of retirement and who (1) has reached the age of sixty (60) years and is already
separated from employment or has ceased to be self-employed or (2) has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, shall
be entitled for as long as he lives to the monthly pension; Provided, That he shall have the option to receive his first
eighteen (18) monthly pensions in lump sum discounted at a preferential rate of interest to be determined by the SSS.

xxxx

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to
receive the monthly pension; Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries and he dies within sixty (60) months from
the start of his monthly pension, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the
total monthly pensions corresponding to the balance of the five-year guaranteed period, excluding the dependents’
pension. (Emphasis added)

In deciding that death benefits should not be denied to the wife who was married to the deceased retiree only after the latter’s
retirement, this Court in Dycaico reasoned:

x x x In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by persons solely
to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other spouse.

x x x However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivor’s pension based on whether
the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said
marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., "provide meaningful protection to
 members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden." x x x 14

That said, the reckoning point in determining the beneficiaries of the deceased Antonio should be the  time of his death. There
is no need to look into the time of his retirement, as was the course followed by the SSC in resolving the claim of respondent.
We note, however, that considering the circumstances of this case, the Dycaico ruling does not substantially affect the
determination of Antonio’s beneficiaries.

The SS Law clearly and expressly provides who are the qualified beneficiaries entitled to receive benefits from the deceased:

"Section 8. Terms Defined. – For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise,
have the following meanings:

xxxx

(e) Dependents – The dependents shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed
and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or
while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and

(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.

xxxx

(k) Beneficiaries – The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent
illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of
the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In
their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of
the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent against the deceased Antonio was not binding in
this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.15 The divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria while she was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the
policy against absolute divorces. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio.

However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find that she is still  disqualified to be his primary
beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio.

Social Security System v. Aguas16 is instructive in determining the extent of the required "dependency" under the SS Law. In
Aguas, the Court ruled that although a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, whether one is actually dependent
for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. 17

Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died and lived with other men, was not dependent
upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the entire period.

Said the Court:

In a parallel case involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined a dependent as "one who derives
his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or
sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS
law likewise defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the member or
pensioner." In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until
her husband died, and lived with other men, was not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise,
during that entire period. Hence, the Court denied her claim for death benefits.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be
"dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the
husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent
on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself. 18

Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate occasions, to live with two different men. The
first was in 1965, less than one year after their marriage, when she contracted a second marriage to Domingo Talens. The
second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the US, obtained a divorce, and later married an American citizen.
In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her deceased husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Social
Security Commission is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO

MOLINA,  respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Juanito A. Orallo  for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; CONFINED TO THE MOST
SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDER. — In Leouel Santos  vs. Court of Appeals,this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity ...and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;NOT A MERE OUTRIGHT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT IN PERFORMANCE OF MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OR
INCOMPATIBILITY; CASE AT BAR. — On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could
not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor
its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 36. — The following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
 PADILLA, J.,Separate Statement:
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; EXISTENCE OF GROUND DEPEND
ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE; TRIAL JUDGE MUST TAKE PAINS IN EXAMINING FACTUAL MILLIEU AND APPELLATE COURT
MUST AVOID SUBSTITUTING ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT. — I concur in the result of the decision penned
by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all
fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual millieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J.,Separate Opinion:
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; OPPOSING AND CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES IS NOT
EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. — The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling, upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect  by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCAPACITY SHOULD NOT BE THE RESULT OF MENTAL ILLNESS. — I would add that neither should
the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity,
there is a resultant defect or vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
VITUG, J.,Concurring Opinion:
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; OTHER GROUNDS SHOULD BE
READ ALONG WITH IT IN DETERMINING ITS IMPORT. — In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article
36, one must also read it along with, albeit  to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that
would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. — In fine, the term psychological incapacity," to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:First,the incapacity must be psychological or
mental not physical, in nature; Second,the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering mutual help and support; Third,the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although
its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and Fourth,the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN,  J p:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs.  Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the
present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the  Family
Code.
 
 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on
the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner
of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was
estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
"1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
 5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife."
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present
any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by
the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof
to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 5a heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added its own opinion
that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our
civil laws on personal and family rights . . .." It concluded that:
"As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses
to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the
instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made."
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos  vs. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity ...and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
Sison testified: 8
"COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to
annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
 Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
 The Court has no more questions."
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill
pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part and of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it
merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. lexlib
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice
Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of
the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed
up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
 (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the  Family Coderequires
that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the  Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
 "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the  defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos,we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. SO ORDERED.
|||  (Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, G.R. No. 108763, [February 13, 1997], 335 PHIL 664-693)
[G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.]

MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO,  J p:
 The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition
for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated
31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese
Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing
the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —
 (a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Venue. — The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. . . .

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court
based its dismissal on Section 5 (4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions
for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2)
the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void
on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35 (4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujiki's view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of
the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2
(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in
the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable.
Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil
Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a
copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. CaAIES
Fujiki's motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited  Dacoycoy
v. Intermediate Appellate Court  19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to
the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court
should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially
complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The
trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e., lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2 (a) and
4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband
in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, . . . ."  23 On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4
(Venue) . . . as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court . . .
which is Sec. 2 (a) . . . ." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in  Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under
Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages . . . ." 26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of
entry] . . . ." 27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this
also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
 On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC's "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with . . . A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC . . . be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue
to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited  Juliano-Llave v.
Republic  33 which held that Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In  Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained: SCHATc
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always
be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected
by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, 36  this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."  37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the  Civil Code.In other words,
"[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person's legal
capacity and status . . . ." 38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
 Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro 39 and  Niñal v. Bayadog 40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition. 45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki. 46 ScTaEA

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in  Juliano-Llave v. Republic, 47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy." 48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50 EaISTD
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial
court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,  51 the service of
summons, 52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-trial, 54 the trial 55 and the judgment of the
trial court. 56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case on the merits. In  Mijares v. Rañada, 58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable
on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court
of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition
and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. ECcTaS
Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits,  i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62
Since 1922 in  Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of
a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry
when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or
a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the
Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State
has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact." 67 AIaHES
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1.  Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
 Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives
from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances)68 his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These
property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"  70 and
preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of
the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law. DHSCTI
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife" 75 — it refers to the husband or the wife
of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus,
the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If anyone can file a
criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality
to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
 When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order
to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In  Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of theRules of
Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] . . . can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC
relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. EAcTDH
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement
of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, 83 support  pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No.
8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In  Republic v. Orbecido, 88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of
the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her
country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court's decision in Van
Dorn v. Romillo 90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served." 91 IDETCA
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the
marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign
spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation
where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35 (4) of the  Family Code and Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case
was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago." CcHDSA
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, [June 26, 2013], 712 PHIL 524-558)

[G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, respondent.

 DECISION n

PERALTA, J  p:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the
September 18, 2014 Decision 1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a
week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo
marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and
issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28-March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for
purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed
questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the proper action
should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract x x x;
 3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced Japanese husband are no
longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former
husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order
that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer
her husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides to be remarried,
she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage
between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that
she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO. 4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the
documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28-March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. 5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
 On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo
in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
including marriages." 6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v.
Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. 7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed
the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr. 8 where the marriage
between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10
2. Consistent with Articles 15 11 and 17 12 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. 15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known
as The Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. 16 Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued
on July 17, 1987. 17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article
26. 18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code  Revision Committee (Committee), but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. 19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It authorizes our
courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. 21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. 22Under
the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts. 23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former
because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. 24 The aim was that it would
solve the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien
husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again. 25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III: 26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of  obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
 celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry. 27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition and enforcement of the divorce decree
rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "in order that it
would not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
said entry of marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin 28 and Van Dorn 29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,
respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter.
Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the
latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground,
among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband
moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that
the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity — not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse — to support the Agreement's enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien
spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's
Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the
foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x. 30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband, who is
a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and
to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his
part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws
of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the
same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and
 to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given
legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al. 32 and Medina v. Koike. 33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a
judgment from Japan's family court, which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese
national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status
as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested
in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
 operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband
and Wife") of theFamily Code. x x x 34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted.
Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in accordance
with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent
with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al. 35 and Garcia v. Recio, 36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law,
which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect,
as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary ruling will subvert not
only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court
is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein
the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in
the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers. 37 "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure." 38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do
so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. 39 Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out
such ends and purposes. 40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.: 41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and
lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the
law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where
the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. 42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in
like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is
not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State
may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would
cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference
stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution. 45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. 46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to
prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest. 47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. 48 It includes the right of procreation, the right to marry,
the right to exercise free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to
vote. 49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.  51 It
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former
to take precedence over the latter. 52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the
President, which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection clause. 54 Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well
as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to
contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and
void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the
national law of the foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the
Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized
even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing for divorce based on these
grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she
should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all
is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms
now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have
been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case
as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners,
opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings
against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was shown to support what he intends to
prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputably
presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong, 57 that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, 58 that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns, 59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and
fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, 61 and that the law has been obeyed. 62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral
conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is
presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and
that they are more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the
motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their
 right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children
or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only
valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. 64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because
Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA.
   Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
   Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS.
   Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is
to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON.
   Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social
institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he mentioned the issue of
divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS.
   No, my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON.
   No, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS.
   Thank you. 66
 Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant
an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue
of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. 67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of
the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and
provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year
prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to
make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity. 68 When the Philippines was liberated and the
Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. 69 From
August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obtained by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute
absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116, 71 1062, 72 2380 73 and
6027 74 were filed in the House of Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled  "An Act Instituting
Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the
House Committee on Population and Family Relations on February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third
Reading — with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute
divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
 g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during
the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in
vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of the
petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more than two (2) years, either or both spouses
can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age
or over but below twenty-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21), such party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband or wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge
of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
 f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be
incurable.

Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening
after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for
absolute divorce is filed, and reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not
the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transitions from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage
beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact
a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and
family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of our laws should be
based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated. 75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also
limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple
terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion. 76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry
nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. 77 While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. 78 It is in
this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development. 79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. 80 To Our mind, the State
cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless
victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if
not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-
Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 "), R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No.
10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in
protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of
the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first
avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the
meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital"
affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant
to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication
and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages
are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world,
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not
found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and,
at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. 84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis 85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such
a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in
fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice
are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done
even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err
by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxx xxx xxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every
case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. 87 A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 88
 The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize
and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice. 89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven. 90 Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. 91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of
an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court
allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan
of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these
documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the
Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce. 93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a written act
of the foreign court. 94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
 x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations
of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her
former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12,
2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDEDto
the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED. |  (Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, [April 24, 2018])