Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife

(Articles 68-73, Family Code)

1. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda, 35 Phil 252 (1916) [Art. 68]

Facts:
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA and JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA (the parties) were legally married in the
city of Manila and lived together for about a month. One month after their marriage, the defendant
demanded from the plaintiff that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs.
However, the plaintiff refused to perform any of his demands. Due to her refusal, the defendant
maltreated her by inflicting physical injuries upon her face and different parts of her body. The defendant
demanded her to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff filed
an action against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. The case was dismissed and
the plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance, however, the latter ruled that the defendant cannot be
compelled to support the plaintiff except in his own house and it is by virtue of a judicial decree granter
her divorce or separation from the defendant. Hence, the plaintiff appealed before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant can be compelled to support the plaintiff outside their conjugal home.
(YES)

Ruling:
The husband's obligation to support his wife continues, and he can be compelled to provide
support outside the conjugal home when moral, legal, or justifiable causes exist that make
separation necessary. This ruling ensures that the duty of support, which is central to marriage, is
maintained in the interest of justice and public order.

Article 143 of the Civil Code states:

The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding
article:
1. The consorts.

Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease and the
failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them. The rule that the husband who is obliged to
support his wife, at his option, may choose to pay her a fixed pension or receiving and maintaining her in
his own home is not absolute. The Supreme Court of Spain held in its decision that it is not absolute to
prevent cases wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right
or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the the party
enjoying the maintenance. The right of selection must be understood as being restricted.

The Court emphasizes the legal and moral obligation of a husband to support his wife, an obligation that
is inherent in the institution of marriage. This duty is not primarily based on the terms of the marriage
contract but rather on a natural and legal expectation of the husband’s role. The state takes this duty
seriously and will not allow a husband to avoid his responsibility through wrongful actions that force his
wife to leave the marital home for protection.

A judgment for separate maintenance is a legal remedy that requires the husband to continue
supporting his wife while they live apart, but it is not considered a debt or penalty in the traditional sense.
Instead, it is a mandate from the state requiring the husband to fulfill his duty. The state enforces this to
maintain public order and protect the wife, especially in cases where the husband's conduct is harmful,
such as making degrading demands or committing acts of violence.

The Court also clarifies that such a judgment for separate maintenance does not undermine the sanctity
or inviolability of marriage. The partial separation is tolerated as a way of safeguarding public peace and
morality but does not dissolve or impair the marriage itself. Even with the decree for separate support, the
wife is not placed in the legal position of a single woman (*feme sole*), meaning she remains married,
and the marriage contract remains intact. The state prioritizes preserving public order and the moral
integrity of the marriage over the husband's right to end his duty of support.

2. Arroyo vs. Vazquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil 54 (1921) [Art. 68]

Facts:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together
as man and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the intention
of living separate from her husband. Mariano’s efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in
vain. Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and
live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had
been compelled to leave because of the cruel treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree
of separation be declared and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate
maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that
the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him.

Issue: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other (NO)

Ruling:
The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized
in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. From this consideration it
follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears
that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the
fault of the husband.

It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course, where the property rights of one
of the pair are invalid, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory
part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the
judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that
Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she
is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without
special pronouncement as to the costs of either instance.

3. Illusorio v. Bildner (Children), G.R. No. 139789 & 139808, 12 May 2000 [Art. 68]

Facts:
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Out of
their marriage, the spouses had 6 children. On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the
United States, he stayed with Erlinda for 5 months in Antipolo City. The Children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin),
alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York, USA. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition for guardianship
over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed
with the court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She
alleged that respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City, CA order for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioner’s
manifestation to allow visitation rights to Potenciano.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a married person in order to compel
cohabitation (NO)

Ruling:
No. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint and relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. The court dismisses the
petition for lack of merit. No cost. In G.R. No. 139808, the court grants the petition and nullifies the CA
insofar as it gives visitation to the respondent.

Evidence does not show that Potenciano is being restrained by his children. He simply does not want to
love Erlinda. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any
other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s
free choice.

The grant of visitation rights to Erlinda is not proper. This case did not involve the right of a parent to visit
a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
 Property Relations Between Husband and Wife
(Articles 74-87, Family Code)
1. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012 [Art. 76]

Facts:
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233.

On July 9, 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency
of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty
of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on May 24, 2001 the conviction of both accused but modified the
penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the award of
civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary
basis.

In its place, however, the Court made an award of P15,000.00 each by way of temperate damages. In
addition, the Court awarded P50,000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them. The
decision became final and executory on October 1, 2001. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the
deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real
properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of
sale on execution were issued. On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to
quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal
assets of Melecia. On September 16, 2002 the RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for
reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on March 6, 2003.

Issue: Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed
upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case (YES)

Ruling:

Under Article 76 of the Family Code, marriage settlements can only be modified before the marriage,
unless specific exceptions apply. Efren and Melecia, married before 1988 under the Civil Code's conjugal
partnership of gains, cannot modify their property regime after the marriage. The exceptions for
post-marriage modifications—such as legal separation, reconciliation, or judicial separation of
property—do not apply to them.

The conjugal partnership of gains, as defined by Article 142 of the Civil Code, allows spouses to place the
fruits of their separate property and income into a common fund, but they retain ownership of their
separate properties. Changing their marriage settlements after the Family Code took effect in 1988 would
violate their vested property rights. Despite loose admissions suggesting an absolute community of
property, the lack of evidence of a prenuptial agreement supports the conclusion that Efren and Melecia
were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. The Family Code's provisions on the conjugal
partnership of gains apply, but without prejudice to any rights vested under the Civil Code.
Under the Family Code, particularly Article 122, the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held
liable for Melecia's civil liability in the murder case. Although personal debts and criminal indemnities
imposed on one spouse are generally not charged to the conjugal partnership, they may still be enforced
against the partnership assets if the offending spouse (Melecia in this case) has no exclusive property of
her own. Efren does not dispute that Melecia lacks exclusive property, so her civil liability may be charged
to the conjugal partnership, provided the responsibilities outlined in Article 121 have first been covered.

Article 121 enumerates several obligations for which the conjugal partnership is liable, such as the
support of the family, debts contracted for the benefit of the partnership, taxes, repairs, and educational
expenses. Once these are addressed, the partnership assets may be used to satisfy Melecia's civil
liability. Furthermore, Article 122 clarifies that at the time of liquidation, the spouse who caused the liability
(Melecia) shall be charged for what has been paid from the conjugal assets.

Thus, even though Efren contends that their conjugal assets should not be liable for Melecia's civil
indemnities, the Family Code provisions allow such enforcement without prior liquidation of the
partnership, and any payment from these assets will later be charged to Melecia during liquidation.

2. Valencia v. Locquiao, G.R. No. 122134, October 3, 2003 [Art. 83]

Facts:
This case involves a dispute over a 4,876-square-meter parcel of land in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, originally
owned by spouses Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao. In 1944, they executed a deed of donation
propter nuptias (a marriage gift), written in Ilocano, transferring the land to their son Benito Locquiao and
his bride Tomasa Mara in consideration of their impending marriage.

After the death of Herminigildo and Raymunda, their children, including Benito and Romana, took
possession of various properties, but disagreements over the distribution of certain lots led to a Deed of
Partition in 1973, which excluded the disputed land. A Deed of Compromise Agreement was later
executed in 1976 to resolve the disagreements.

In 1983, petitioner Constancia Valencia, daughter of Romana, filed an action to annul Benito and
Tomasa’s title to the land, claiming fraud and irregularities in the donation and title registration. Benito
responded by filing an ejectment case to remove Constancia from the land. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) dismissed Constancia’s complaint, citing prescription and laches, and upheld the validity of the
donation. The court also affirmed the decision in the ejectment case, ordering Constancia to vacate the
property.

The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which consolidated the cases and upheld the RTC's
decision. The court ruled that the action for annulment had prescribed, as it was filed more than 15 years
after the issuance of the title, exceeding the 10-year prescriptive period for reconveyance. The appellate
court also found that the donation propter nuptias was valid despite the alleged lack of formal acceptance,
as the marriage between Benito and Tomasa constituted substantial compliance with legal requirements.
The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting them to seek review by the Supreme
Court.

Issues:
a. WON the donation propter nuptias is authentic; (YES)
b. With respect on the formal requirements of donation propter nuptias, which one shouldbe
followed? OLD OR NCC? (Old)
 c. WON the action or complaint for annulment of title had already prescribed (YES)
Ruling:
a. YES. The certification (Certification that there was no notarial record for the year 1944 of Cipriano
V. Abenojar who notarized the Inventario Ti Sagut on May 22, 1944) is not sufficient to prove the
alleged inexistence or spuriousness of the challenged document. The appellate court is correct in
pointing out that the mere absence of the notarial record does not prove that the notary public
does not have a valid notarial commission and neither does the absence of a file copy of the
document with the archives effect evidence of the falsification of the document. The failure of the
notary public to furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a ground for disciplining
him, but certainly not for invalidating the document or for setting aside the transaction therein
involved. Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the heirs of Lucio Locquiao were not allocated any
more sharein the deed of partition since they received theirs by virtue of prior donations or
conveyances.

b. Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of
donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2,
which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned there under need be
in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance “is not
necessary for the validity of these donations.” Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.

(OLD CC – marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the
prescribed form => VALID donation propter nuptias.).

Since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only
on August 30, 1950. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the
determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the
donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, still even the implied acceptance
of a donation propter nuptias suffices under the NCC.

c. Viewing petitioners’ action for reconveyance from whatever feasible legal angle, it is definitely
barred by prescription. Petitioners’ right to file an action for the reconveyance of the land accrued
in 1944, when the Inventario Ti Sagut was executed. It must be remembered that before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950, the Old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed
prescription. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for recovery of the title to, or
possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within ten years after the
cause of such action accrues. Thus, petitioners’ action, which was filed on December 23, 1985, or
more than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of donation on May 22, 1944, was
clearly time-barred.

Even following petitioners’ theory that the prescriptive period should commence from the time of
discovery of the alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be the same. As early as May 15, 1970,
when the deed of donation was registered and the transfer certificate of title was issued,
petitioners were considered to have constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud, following the
jurisprudential rule that registration of a deed in the public real estate registry is constructive
notice to the whole world of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. As it is now settled that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property allegedly
registered through fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title, the action filed on December 23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.
 3. Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971 [Art. 87]

Facts:
Appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee
Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation
was executed. After the death of Felix, Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of an affidavit of
self-adjudication executed and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon. Cornelia cites Art. 133 which provides that “Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void.” The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was
valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering
Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

Issue: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship (YES)

Ruling: Yes. While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. It is a fundamental principle in
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is
written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is too prevent
the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there
is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations
in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The lack of validity of the
donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the
disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister
to the other half.

The Court reasoned that the public policy behind the prohibition on donations during marriage, which is to
prevent undue influence between the spouses, extends equally to common-law relationships. The
rationale is that such relationships, often marked by greater influence of one partner over the other, pose
the same risk of undue influence. Therefore, the donation made between common-law spouses, in this
case, was declared void, just as it would have been if the parties were legally married.

4. Arcaba v. Vda. de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683, November 22, 2001 [Art. 87]

Facts:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in
Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property.
Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him after his
retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba,
to take care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco.
Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed
that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper
and that Francisco was too old for her. A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an
instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together
with his house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten
years.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are
nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law
wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared
void under Article 87 of the Family Code. (YES)

Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one
in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The respondents provided evidence that
Cirila and Francisco deported themselves as husband and wife since Cirila admitted that she and
Francisco resided under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same
bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of
caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated,
these are an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, a sanitary permit to
operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate, and the death certificate of Francisco.

Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and
void

5. Perez Jr. v. Perez-Senerpida, G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021 [Art. 87]

Facts:
Spouses Eliodoro and Adelita were the registered owners of a parcel of land in Olongapo City. The
spouse had two children Avegail and Adonis. Prior to his marriage with Adelita, Eliodoro was married and
had several children, one of whom was Nicxon Perez Sr., who sired Nicxon Jr.

On October 29, 1995, a sworn statement denominated as Renounciation (sic) and Waiver of Rights
(RWR) was executed by Adelita in favor of her husband Eliodoro. In 2004, Eliodoro donated their land to
his grandson, Nicxon Jr., without the conformity of Adelita. In February 2005, Eliodoro filed against
Adelita petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial
court granted the petition and the judgment became final and executory in July 2005. Eliodoro
died in 2008 and, a year later, an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs was executed.
In 2010, Avegail brought an action of annulment of donation of the land donated by Eliodoro to Nicxon
Jr. on the ground that it was prejudicial to her interest because it affected her future inheritance or
legitime.
Issue: Whether or not the donation made by Eliodoro to Nicxon Jr., without the consent of Adelita, void?
(YES)

Ruling: **Is the donation made by Eliodoro to Nicxon Jr., without Adelita's consent, void?**

Yes, the donation is void.

The Supreme Court emphasized that even if Eliodoro and Adelita's 1975 marriage had been valid, the
donation would still have been prohibited. This is because **Article 98 of the Family Code** prevents
either spouse from donating community property without the other's consent.

However, since their marriage was declared void under **Article 36** of the Family Code, their property
relations were instead governed by **Article 147**, which applies to individuals living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage. Although Article 147 does not explicitly bar one party from donating
property acquired during cohabitation without the other’s consent, the donation in question was still
deemed void.

The donation, which Adelita executed in favor of Eliodoro in the form of a **Renunciation and Waiver of
Rights (RWR)**, violated **Article 87 of the Family Code**. This provision prohibits any donation or grant
of gratuitous advantage between spouses during marriage and extends to common-law relationships,
such as that between Eliodoro and Adelita, whose marriage was void. The RWR lacked "material
consideration," meaning Adelita did not receive anything in return for waiving her rights over the property,
making the transaction a gratuitous act, which is not allowed by law. .

The courts correctly ruled that the RWR was void due to the absence of material consideration. While
Nicxon claimed that Adelita had received her share of the conjugal partnership in 2005, the RWR was
executed in 1995, a decade earlier. Therefore, at the time Adelita waived her rights, she had not received
anything of value in exchange.

Finally, the Court emphasized that if the law prohibits one party from disposing of their share in property
acquired under the special co-ownership governed by Article 147 without the other’s consent, then it
logically follows that a donation of the **entire** property under such co-ownership, made without
consent, must also be considered void. Eliodoro donated the said parcel of land to [Nicxon] without the
conformity of Adelita, thus acquiring no consent of the latter required by Article 147. This rule protects the
integrity of property rights within such relationships, preventing exploitation or manipulation between
parties.

[Distinguish ordinary co-ownership and “special co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Special Co-ownership: As long as the cohabitation lasts and the co-ownership exists, no disposition inter
vivos of such undivided share can be validly made by one party without the consent of the other. Care
and maintenance is recognized as a valuable contribution which will entitle the contributor to half of the
property acquired. Since the property is presumed to have been acquired through their joint work and
industry, both spouses are co-owners of the said property in equal shares.]
 Absolute Community of Property
(Articles 88-104, Family Code)
1. Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015 [Art. 92, 94, & 96]

Facts:

Respondent Shirley Nuega and her partner Rogelio purchased a residential lot sometime in 1989, prior to
their marriage in 1990. Shirley alleges that it was purchased through her exclusive funds while working
abroad as a domestic helper. On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the
subject property. The following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she received
information that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home.
Shirley filed a case for Concubinage and Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property with the RTC.
Despite the pendency of the case and Shirley appraising interested buyers not to deal with Rogelio
because of a pending case filed against the latter, Rogelio still sold the property to petitioner Josefina
Nobleza without the respondent’s consent. Meanwhile, the RTC granted the petition for legal separation
and enjoined Rogelio from selling, encumbering or in any way disposing or alienating any of their
community property including the subject house and lot before the required liquidation

Issue:
1. Is the subject property part of the community property despite being bought with respondent’s
exclusive funds? (YES)
2. Is the sale made by Rogelio to Josefina Nobleza valid? If not, who is liable for reimbursement of
the purchase price to the seller? (YES)

Ruling:
1. YES. The property is part of the community property. Actual contribution is not relevant in
determining whether a piece of property is community property for the law itself defines what
constitutes community property. The community property shall consist of all the property owned
by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. The only
exceptions are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family Code; and (2)
those excluded by the marriage settlement. The subject property does not fall under any of
the exclusions provided in Article 92 of the Family Code, it therefore forms part of the
absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution
to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name appears in
the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio. Citing Quiao
v. Quiao, the SC held whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form
the common mass of the couple's properties.
2. NO. The sale is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code as the sale was made without the
consent of the other spouse or authority of the court. Under Art. 96, in the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
 shall be void. Finally, Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of property
shall only be "liable for x x x [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited x x x.". There being no
evidence on record that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family,
respondent cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.

2. Flores v. Spouses Lindo, Jr., G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011 [Art. 96]

Facts:
Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000 and secured it with a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage covered property in the name of Edna and her husband, Enrico
Lindo, Jr. Edna likewise signed a Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and Enrico as his
attorney-in-fact. She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all of which were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. Flores then filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage with damages. The
RTC ruled that Flores was not entitled to judicial foreclosure as the Deed was without the consent and
authority of Edna’s husband. The Deed was executed on October 31, 1995, while the Special Power of
Attorney was executed by Enrico only on November 4, 1995.

Accordingly, the mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code. The RTC, however, ruled that
Flores may still recover the loan through a personal action against Edna, but that it had no jurisdiction
over the said personal action which should be filed where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

Petitioner filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages. Edna alleged that Enrico was not a party to
the loan because it was contracted by her without Enrico’s signature. They also prayed for the dismissal
of the case on grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and forum shopping. The RTC ruled that res
judicata will not apply to rights, claims, or demands that, though growing out of the same subject matter,
constitute separate or distinct causes of action. The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It noted
that Flores allowed the earlier decision of the RTC to become final and executory without asking the
courts for alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that the petitioner merely relied on the
declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to observe the
rules and settled jurisprudence on the multiplicity of suits, closing the petitioner’s avenue for recovery of
the loan.

Issue: Whether or not the promissory note and deed of mortgage are void (YES)

Ruling:

YES. Under the law and Article 124 of the Family Code, the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly and that mortgage of property within the community or the
conjugal partnership is void if done without the consent of the other spouse. For the case at bar, the
presence of a Special Power of Attorney should cure the defect however, it was executed days after Edna
entered into the mortgage, therefore, the SPA rendered no purpose and the contract void.

The Court holds that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Edna Lindo is **void** due to
the absence of consent from her husband, Enrico Lindo, Jr., as required by Article 96 of the Family
Code. The mortgage pertains to conjugal property and cannot be validly executed without the consent of
both spouses. Since Edna executed the Deed on October 31, 1995, but the Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) from Enrico was only executed on November 4, 1995, the lack of prior consent renders the Deed
void ab initio.
However, the promissory note itself remains **valid**. Although the mortgage is void, the principal
obligation under the promissory note, which evidences the loan of ₱400,000, still exists. Article 124 of the
Family Code allows for the personal obligation of the debtor to persist despite the nullity of the mortgage.
Edna Lindo is thus liable to pay the loan amount to Arturo Flores, and the validity of the promissory note
remains intact as it constitutes an independent obligation.

### **Conclusion:**

1. The **Deed of Real Estate Mortgage** is void due to the lack of consent from Edna's husband, Enrico
Lindo, Jr.
2. The **Promissory Note** is valid, and Edna Lindo remains liable for the repayment of the loan amount.
3. Arturo Flores may pursue a **personal action** against Edna for the recovery of the loan amount,
independent of the void mortgage, as the jurisdictional issues raised in the previous cases do not negate
Edna's obligation to repay the debt.

The case is remanded for further proceedings to establish the amount due under the promissory note and
to address any defenses Edna may assert regarding the debt.

3. De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968 [Art. 101]

Facts:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant was married in Bacolod on February 1938 and begotten
6 children. They acquired several parcels of land and were engaged in various businesses. The plaintiff
filed an action against her husband for the separation of their properties. Specifically, she prayed for (1)
separation of property, (2) monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment
of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her
also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always
visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he
was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal
dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal
home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named
Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might
squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine. LC ruled in favor of Estrella.

Issue: Whether or not there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and

whether or not there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
(NO)

Ruling:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the family. To
be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and with the
intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. The law provides that there must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement
butalso amount to financial and moral desertion. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full
meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of
his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to
his wife. In the case at bar, the Court believed that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and
children permanently. Thus, the SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the
husband as an administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration.

In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter. If there is only physical
separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal
abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and
efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the
case at bar, we are not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation of property.

4. Spouses Zapanta v. Rustan Commercial Corporation, G.R. No. 248063, September 15, 2021

Facts:
Rustan Commercial Corporation (RCC) operates a chain of department stores and issues gift certificates
for its merchandise. Nilda Eleria Zapanta served as RCC's credit and collection manager, responsible for
credit accommodations, discount card applications, and debt collection processes. In 2001, RCC's
Internal Audit revealed discrepancies in the Credit & Collection Department's records, particularly
concerning gift certificate purchases under the name "Rita Pascual." Investigations found that Nilda had
approved gift certificates worth **₱78,120,000.00** for Rita Pascual, who turned out to be fictitious. Nilda
allegedly sold these gift certificates to third parties at discounted rates, without proper documentation, and
kept the proceeds.

The investigation showed that Nilda failed to follow RCC's procedures for gift certificate transactions,
personally handled the Rita Pascual account, and circumvented standard processes. Evidence included
testimony from Alberto Flores, who purchased gift certificates from Nilda. The court deemed Nilda’s
actions fraudulent, as she misappropriated funds intended for RCC. On February 10, 2003, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) granted RCC a writ of preliminary attachment against Nilda and her husband,
German Zapanta. On September 15, 2016, the RTC ruled that Nilda was liable to pay RCC
**₱78,120,000.00** for actual damages, an additional **₱2,811,489.50** for litigation costs, and
**₱8,093,148.95** as attorney's fees (10% of the total damages). The RTC found substantial evidence of
fraud against Nilda, noting her direct involvement in managing the fictitious account and intercepting
necessary documents, which led to a permanent attachment of her properties to satisfy RCC's claims.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's ruling on March 26, 2019, concluding that the Zapantas
were not deprived of due process, as they had multiple opportunities to present their defense. The CA
also ruled that the evidence against Nilda was overwhelming, confirming her fraudulent scheme and
misappropriation of funds. The CA subsequently denied the Zapantas' motion for reconsideration. This
case illustrates significant procedural failures by Nilda, whose attempts to cover up her fraudulent
activities resulted in substantial damages to RCC.

Issue: Whether German, as the husband of Nilda Eleria Zapanta, can be held liable for the obligations
arising from the fraudulent activities committed by Nilda despite not knowing of his wife’s fraudulent acts
(YES)

Ruling:
The Court finds that German V. Zapanta, as the husband of Nilda Eleria Zapanta, was correctly
impleaded in the collection suit filed by Rustan Commercial Corporation (RCC). Although the allegations
primarily focus on Nilda's responsibility for the unpaid account associated with one Rita Pascual, the
inclusion of German as a party to the suit aligns with Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states
that spouses shall sue or be sued jointly. This principle is grounded in the notion that both spouses are
co-administrators of the community property under the absolute community of property and conjugal
partnership regimes as provided by the Family Code.

Specifically, Article 94(3) of the Family Code indicates that the absolute community of property
shall be liable for debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other, to the extent that the family may have benefitted.

Similarly, Article 121(3) states that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other, again to the extent that the family may have
benefitted.

Impleading German was appropriate since RCC sought the attachment of properties that may constitute
part of their community property. However, this does not imply that both spouses bear equal liability for
the debts arising from the collection suit. To bind the absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, actual benefit to the family must be proved. In this case, despite a lack of information on
the specific property regime of the Zapantas, it is evident that German cannot evade joint and
solidary liability for the obligations stemming from Nilda's fraudulent activities, which involved pocketing
the proceeds from the sale of RCC's gift certificates. Without any evidence suggesting otherwise, it is
presumed that the proceeds benefited the family, thus rendering their community property liable for the
obligations incurred by Nilda.

5. Delgado v. GQ Realty Development Corp, G.R. No. 241774, Sept. 25, 2019 [Art. 91]

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco was married to Carmencita Chuidian-Delgado, with whom he had five children. After
Carmencita's passing on January 15, 1983, he entered a relationship with Victoria Quirino Gonzales, the
daughter of former President Elpidio R. Quirino. Victoria, previously married to Luis Gonzales, had four
children with him. Francisco claimed he purchased a condominium unit (Unit 12-C, Urdaneta Apartments)
using his own funds, intending for it to be held in the name of Victoria’s corporation, GQ Realty
Development Corporation, to attract potential investors. Francisco and Victoria married on June 20, 1987,
but Victoria passed away on November 29, 2006. After her death, Francisco discovered that Victoria's
children had transferred the subject property to respondent Rosario, prompting him to file a complaint
seeking reconveyance based on an implied trust.

The respondents contended that GQ Realty was established solely to hold Victoria’s properties and was
not intended to attract investors. They asserted that Victoria was financially comfortable after Luis's death
and did not need to engage in business. Respondent Rosario claimed that the subject property was
initially intended for her, but a unit swap occurred. Prior to their marriage, Francisco and Victoria executed
an Ante-Nuptial Agreement stating their properties would remain separate, which the respondents argued
extinguished any claims Francisco had over the property.

On July 12, 2007, Francisco filed a complaint for reconveyance. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
dismissed the complaint on January 29, 2014, citing affirmative defenses of prescription and waiver
based on the Ante-Nuptial Agreement. The RTC found that Francisco's action was time-barred since he
filed the complaint more than 20 years after the property was registered under GQ Realty. It also noted
that the Ante-Nuptial Agreement clearly indicated that any properties owned by Victoria would remain
hers exclusively. The Court of Appeals (CA) acknowledged that the RTC erred regarding the prescription
of the complaint, as Francisco was in continuous possession of the property. However, the CA upheld the
dismissal based on the waiver of claims due to the Ante-Nuptial Agreement, concluding that it clearly
stipulated that Victoria's properties remained her own. Ultimately, the CA denied Francisco's appeal,
partially affirming the RTC’s dismissal, primarily on the ground of waiver, highlighting the complexities
surrounding property rights in familial relationships and agreements.

Issue: Whether or not Francisco, in executing the Ante-Nuptial Agreement, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise, extinguished his alleged interest over the subject property (YES)

Ruling:

The Court rules that petitioner Francisco waived, abandoned, and extinguished any alleged interest in the
subject property through the execution of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement with Victoria Quirino Gonzales. The
issue at hand is whether Francisco, in executing the agreement, relinquished his claimed rights over the
property. According to Rule 6, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court, an affirmative defense can bar recovery
by the claimant, even while admitting the material allegations of the claimant's pleading. In this case, the
respondents did not file a Motion to Dismiss; instead, they pursued a Motion for Preliminary Hearing to
substantiate their affirmative defense. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found that the execution of the
Ante-Nuptial Agreement by Francisco and Victoria effectively waived any alleged claims Francisco had
over the subject property.

The Ante-Nuptial Agreement explicitly states a "complete separation of property" between the parties. It
outlines that all properties owned by Francisco would remain his exclusive property and that any gifts
bestowed upon Victoria would become her exclusive property. Furthermore, it asserts that neither party
shall acquire any interest in the properties of the other or the other’s late spouse. Even hypothetically
admitting Francisco's claim that he purchased the subject property using his own funds, the Court
concludes that the act of registering the property under GQ Realty constituted a gift to Victoria. Francisco
himself indicated that the property was purchased to support Victoria during her illness and to facilitate
her desire to live near her daughter, Rosario.

Evidence suggests that GQ Realty primarily functions as a holding company for Victoria's assets, with
minimal independent business activity. Francisco's admission that GQ Realty "would only appear as the
buyer on paper" reinforces the understanding that the property was intended for Victoria. The intent to
protect Victoria’s interests is further supported by the personal nature of the agreement, which was
drafted by Francisco. Had he intended to carve out an exception for properties held in the name of GQ
Realty, he could have easily included such a provision. The absence of clarity in this regard suggests that
he intended to encompass all gifts made to Victoria.

The complaint fails to provide substantial evidence to counter the presumption of regularity attached to
the title of the property, which is currently in the name of Rosario. Furthermore, Francisco has not
demonstrated any formal agreement or evidence indicating that he maintained an interest in the subject
property after its purchase. The Court acknowledges that altruistic motivations, such as true love and
affection, can drive individuals to make decisions that may not align with traditional legal interpretations.
Francisco’s articulated intent to provide for Victoria and his subsequent actions further solidify the
understanding that the subject property was meant as a gift.
In conclusion, the Court finds no error in the RTC and Court of Appeals' determination that Francisco
waived his alleged rights over the subject property by executing the Ante-Nuptial Agreement. The legal
framework surrounding the agreement, along with the circumstantial evidence indicating that GQ Realty
served as a mere conduit for Victoria's assets, leads to the inevitable conclusion that Francisco's interest
in the subject property has been unequivocally extinguished. The ruling is thus affirmed.

Under Rule 16, Section 6, if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal
provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of
the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

In the instant case, the respondents did not file any Motion to Dismiss. Instead, they filed a Motion for
Preliminary Hearing so that the RTC could receive evidence and thereafter decide whether the affirmative
defenses raised by the respondents are meritorious. According to the RTC and the CA, the respondents
were able to prove their affirmative defense that the alleged claim of Francisco over the subject property
has been deemed waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished when he executed the Ante-Nuptial
Agreement. In this regard, the Court holds that Francisco indeed waived, abandoned, or extinguished his
alleged rights over the subject property.

6. Muller v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006 [Art. 99 (4) -> Art. 137]

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany in 1989.
The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent's parents but decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal and the construction of a house. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of
petitioner. The spouses eventually separated.

The respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of
property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between
them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it
was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds. Thus-- however, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by
gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property.

The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community
of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as
the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that
inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by
the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides
that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The
respondent appealed. RTC dismissed the petition because of the constitutional prohibition, however the
CA revered the decision due to there beingnothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from
acquiring the same (reimbursement of the construction)
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to reimbursement on the money used for the
construction of the house in Antipolo (NO)

Ruling:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and
expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property
titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained. Save for the exception provided in cases of
hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not
even an ownershipin trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the
fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition Consequently, the
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's decision, affirming that the respondent is not entitled to
reimbursement for the costs associated with the land and the construction of the house.

Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)

Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code.

7. Hapitan v. Spouses Lagradilla, G.R. No. 170004, Jan. 13, 2016 [Art. 89]

Facts:

Between September and December 1994, Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan issued 31 checks totaling
₱510,463.98 to Warlily Lagradilla, all of which were dishonored due to "account closed." On January 6,
1995, Warlily and her husband, Jimmy Lagradilla, filed a civil case against Esmeralda, her husband Nolan
Hapitan, and others, seeking preliminary attachment of their property as security for any potential
judgment.

The Lagradillas claimed that they had made several demands for payment and that Esmeralda and Nolan
had promised to transfer title of their property to them. However, they discovered that Esmeralda and
Nolan had executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to Ilona, Nolan's sister, allowing her to sell the
same property. The Lagradillas alleged that this sale to the Spouses Terosa was fraudulent and that
Esmeralda and Nolan intended to leave the country to defraud their creditors.

Esmeralda admitted her debt but claimed it arose from Nolan's failure to support her financially and
losses in her jewelry business. She also stated that she revoked the SPA before the sale occurred. Nolan
and Ilona denied wrongdoing, asserting that Esmeralda alone incurred the debts and was abandoning
their son.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) later ruled in favor of the Lagradillas, declaring the sale to the
Spouses Terosa null and void, and ordered Esmeralda and Nolan to pay the owed amount, along
with damages.
Nolan and Ilona appealed, but the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision. Subsequently,
Warlily executed a Waiver of claims for ₱125,000.00, which Nolan and Ilona argued should modify the
earlier decisions. They later submitted an Amicable Settlement agreeing to pay ₱425,000.00 to resolve
the case. The CA denied their motion for reconsideration, leading to this petition from Ilona, who
contended that the Waiver warranted a modification of the previous ruling.

Issue: Whether or not the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement are valid (NO)

Ruling:

The waiver executed by Warlily is deemed invalid/ First, a waiver involves the voluntary relinquishment of
a known legal right; however, Warlily's waiver cannot affect the validity of the Deed of Sale because
it pertains to property rights that she does not legally own or have a rightful claim to. Additionally,
while individuals can generally waive rights related to their property, this is contingent on the rights being
personally owned, intended for their benefit, not infringing on the rights of others, and not prohibited by
law or public policy. In this case, the property in question does not belong to Warlily, making her waiver
inapplicable. Furthermore, the lower courts have established that the sale was nullified due to fraud, a
finding that is both factual and legal. This means that the parties cannot simply agree to disregard the
nullity through a waiver. Ultimately, the existence of fraud undermines the validity of the sale, rendering
any subsequent waiver ineffective in altering that determination.

In determining the validity of the Amicable Settlement signed by Nolan, it is crucial to recognize that Nolan
cannot unilaterally waive or dispose of the rights he and Esmeralda hold over the house and lot sold to
the Spouses Terosa. The Amicable Settlement purports to challenge the lower court's finding of the sale's
nullity, effectively affirming its validity and consequently waiving their rights over what the lower courts
identified as their conjugal property.

Such a waiver or disposal of rights by Nolan is expressly prohibited by law. Under Article 124 of the
Family Code, any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must be made with the written consent
of both spouses; failure to obtain such consent renders the disposition void. Additionally, Article 89 of
the Family Code stipulates that no waiver of rights, interests, or shares in the conjugal
partnership can occur during the marriage, except in cases of judicial separation of property.
Esmeralda did not provide her consent to Nolan disposing or waiving her right to the house and lot in the
Amicable Settlement, as she explicitly objected to it through her pleadings filed before the courts.
Furthermore, Esmeralda expressed disbelief that Nolan would want the CA to reverse its decision when
its ruling, saving Nolan and Esmeralda's conjugal property, is favorable to him.

Despite the Amicable Settlement's invalidity, it serves as evidence of the payment made by Nolan and
Ilona amounting to P425,000.00. Both Jimmy and Warlily acknowledged receipt of this amount, as
indicated in their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration/Modification and their Comments to the
Answer to the Manifestation and Motion filed with the Court of Appeals, wherein they attached a copy of
the receipt as an annex. Therefore, the amount of P425,000.00 shall be deducted from the total amount
owed to Jimmy and Warlily, as it has been duly acknowledged and substantiated.
NOTES:

● Marriage Settlement - or ante nuptial contract, is a contract which is entered into before, but in
contemplation and in consideration of marriage, whereby the property relations of the spouses
during the marriage are fixed and determined