Rizal v. Naredo Digest

Kathleen F.
Cruz
Ricardo Rizal v. Leoncia Naredo

G.R. No. 151898
March 14, 2012
Doctrine: All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.
Facts: Herein petitioners Ricardo Rizal, commenced Civil Case No. 7836 against
Matias Naredo (Matias), Valentin Naredo (Valentin) and Juana de Leon (Juana)
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Laguna involving the accretion of two
(2) hectares of land to Lot No. 454 of the Calamba Estate.
To satisfy the money judgment in Civil Case No. 7836, the provincial sheriff of
Laguna levied upon Lots Nos. 252 and 269 of the Calamba Estate, together with the
house erected on Lot No. 252. After the petitioners posted the required bond, the
provincial sheriff proceeded with the auction sale on April 7, 1951. The petitioners
were declared the highest bidders. A final deed of sale was issued to them on April
15, 1952. Although the CFI ordered that the petitioners be placed in possession of
Lots Nos. 252 and 269 and Matias and Valentin be ejected therefrom, it did not evict
Marcela and Leoncia from Lot No. 252 since they were not parties to Civil Case No.
7836.
After the aforesaid judgment in Civil Case No. 9908, the petitioners filed Civil Case
No. 36-C against Marcela and Leoncia for partition, accounting and recovery of
possession of Lot No. 252. The parties then entered into a Compromise Agreement
whereby the parties acknowledged that they owned Lot No. 252 in common, with
3/5 thereof as the interest of the petitioners and the other 2/5 belonging to therein
defendants Marcela and Leoncia. Said Compromise Agreement was approved by the
CFI Branch VI, Laguna, in an Order dated December 1, 1971. Ten years after or on
August 11, 1981, Marcela and Leoncia, assisted by their husbands, instituted Civil
Case No. 299-83-C assailing the Compromise Agreement. Thereafter, on September
26, 1984, Marcela and Leoncia instituted Civil Case No. 792-84-C, for enforcement
of judgment, partition and segregation of shares with damages over Lot No. 252. On
September 21, 1987, the petitioners filed a Complaint before the RTC for the
immediate segregation, partition and recovery of shares and ownership of Lot No.
252, with damages.
The CA dismissed the appeal. The CA found that the appellants' brief neither
contained the required page references to the records, as provided in Section 13 of
Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; nor was it specified, both in the prayer and in the
body of the complaint, the specific amounts of the petitioners' claim for actual,
moral, exemplary and compensatory damages, as enunciated in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the ruling in the
Manchester Case regarding docket fees.
Ruling: No. However, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a new title in the name of
the petitioners over their 3/5 allocated portion, we believe that Section 81 44 of P.D.
No. 1529 does not bar the belated registration of the compromise judgment in Civil
Case No. 36-C.
The petitioners alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. 1153-87-C 20 that they
suffered actual loss from the time they had been deprived of their share of 3/5 on
Lot No. 252 by the respondents, as well as moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. However, the only claims they specified in
their prayer were for the attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 and P500.00
for every court appearance of the counsel.
In Siapno, 21 the complaint alleged in its body the aggregate sum of P4,500,000 in
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, but the prayer portion did not
mention these claims, nor did it even pray for the payment of damages. This Court
held that such a complaint should be dismissed outright; or if already admitted,
should be expunged from the records. The Court explained that the rule — requiring
the amount of damages claimed to be specified not only in the body of the pleading
but also in its prayer portion — was intended to put an end to the then prevailing
practice of lawyers where the damages prayed for were recited only in the body of
the complaint, but not in the prayer, in order to evade payment of the correct filing
fees. As held by the Court in Manchester :
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
In Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion , the Court laid down the following
rules as regards the payment of filing fees:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.
It cannot be gainsaid from the above guidelines that, with the exception of pauper
litigants, without the payment of the correct docket or filing fees within the
reglementary period, jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action will
not vest in the trial court. In fact, a pauper litigant may still have to pay the docket
fees later, by way of a lien on the monetary or property judgment that may accrue
to him. Clearly, the flexibility or liberality of the rules sought by the petitioners
cannot apply in the instant case.

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Kathleen F.

Ricardo Rizal v. Leoncia Naredo

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