Journal of Personality Disorders, 20(2), 126–138, 2006

 2006 The Guilford Press

PERSON, PERSONALITY, SELF, AND IDENTITY:

A PHILOSOPHICALLY INFORMED
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
Gerrit Glas, MD, PhD

Who is the person, or self, associated with personality disorder and its
treatment? How are we to account for a self conceptualized in terms of
schemas and representations, that at the same time—as self—scruti-
nizes these schemas and representations (as in cognitive therapy for
personality disorders)? Five approaches to personhood are examined:
metaphysical, empirical, transcendental, hermeneutical, and phenome-
nological. An elementary sense of selfhood is tied to all one’s experi-
ences and activities; this sense of self is experientially irreducible and
conceptually connected to a primordial form of self-relatedness. After
examining these issues, I formulate four provisional conclusions: (a) the
separation between person and roles (functions, personality features) is
a modern fiction—persons are not neutral bearers of roles and func-
tions; (b) the concept of personality in DSM-IV refers to nonhomoge-
neous behaviors such as feelings, moods, inclinations, temperaments,
and habits, and these behaviors differ with respect to their distance to
the core self; (c) there exists an enormous variety of ways of self-relating
and this variety may affect the contents of the core self under certain
circumstances; and (d) the concept of person may be primitive; that is,
irreducible and referring to a background of unity and integrity.

There is a paucity of reflection on the nature of personhood in personality

theory (Gabbard, 1997; West, 2003). Who is the person having a personal-
ity or a personality disorder? How is personality connected with person-
hood? What does it mean for the individual person to have a particular
personality disorder or personality traits? These questions are not merely
theoretical. For instance, does change of personality structure imply that
one has turned into a different, or an other, person? The question may
seem a little exaggerated; however, it is not far from what clinicians hear
and what patients sometimes think and say. Not only may patients have
concerns about losing control or being brainwashed in the course of treat-
ment, they also sometimes affirm that they have changed into other per-

From the Department of Philosophy, University of Leiden, The Netherlands and Zwolse Poort,
Zwolle, The Netherlands.
Address correspondence to Gerrit Glas, P.O. Box 110, 8000 AC Zwolle, The Netherlands;
E-mail: glasg@xs4all.nl

126
PERSON, PERSONALITY, SELF, AND IDENTITY 127

sons. Reports about these concerns emerged after the introduction of sero-
tonin reuptake inhibitors and were presented by Peter Kramer in his
Listening to Prozac (Kramer, 1993). Interestingly, some of Kramer’s pa-
tients reported that once they began medication therapy they became “who
they really were,” implying that while being in their initial state of person-
hood they already had some sense of their subsequent and more authentic
personhood, at least in such a form that it could be unpacked and recog-
nized at a later stage. So, are we talking about different persons, about
different states of personhood, or about different personalities? Or could
the alterations in personhood perhaps better be described in terms of a
change of self, or core self?
I take the notion of person here to denote the individual human being,
both in its singularity and in its quality of being a human person. Person-
hood, then, refers to being-a-person, whereas the term self refers to the
experiential side of personhood; that is, to the core self as (among others)
a form of basic self-awareness which at the same time reflects an elemen-
tary form of self-relatedness. In my use of the concepts of personality and
personality disorder I will not deviate from what usually is understood by
these terms.
The more-than-theoretical dimensions of the conceptual distinction be-
tween personhood, personality, and personality disorder also become appar-
ent in discussions about classification. Definitions of disorder articulate dis-
tinctions between disordered and just improper behavior. Psychiatrists,
lawmakers, and the general public may differ with respect to the question
of where to draw the boundary between evil and ill. Psychiatrists some-
times feel urged to treat persons with behavioral problems who do not con-
form to the definition of any personality disorder. Societal pressure may
lead to an inclination among psychiatrists to emphasize the objectivity and
value neutrality of the profession, in order to maintain as clear as possible
distinctions between personality disorder on the one hand and person-
hood and personality on the other hand. These pressures may contribute
to a tendency to exclude the concept of personality disorder from psychiat-
ric classification. For example, these issues play a significant role in Brit-
ish discussions about the distinction between mental illness and psycho-
pathic disorder (Kendell, 2002).
This dynamic in the classification debate can be understood from a con-
ceptual point of view. Persons can be evil, disordered personalities cannot;
that is, moral behavior can be attributed to persons, not to characters or
personalities. This is the way our language works and most people take
this as evidence for a deeply ingrained, normative intuition about the way
(our) reality is structured. If only persons—and not personalities—can be
bad, then one can understand why professionals, by focusing on disorder,
attempt or hope to avoid moral evaluation of the patient’s behavior. While,
this may sometimes be a successful strategy in individual cases, in the end
it is doomed to fail. First, there are personalities that seem to represent a
form of intrinsic badness, such as sadistic personality and some forms of
128 GLAS

antisocial personality (cf. Goldberg, 1996). Second, excluding all forms of

evil behavior from psychiatric classification and treatment is only a theo-
retical option and would severely limit the efforts of the profession with
respect to many other people, like those suffering from schizophrenia, bi-
polar disorder, and/or addiction.

THE REDISCOVERY OF THE SELF

I now raise two other, slightly more theoretical, issues urging for a clarifi-
cation of the concepts: the recent resurgence of interest into the self and
its identity (Leary & Tangney, 2003a; Kircher & David, 2003), and the un-
solved and perennial question of whether there is an “I” or self apart from,
or behind, the bundle of the schemas and representations for which the
term self is used as a container.
First, the recent emergence of interest into the self and its identity may
be seen as an expression of unease with current conceptions of personal-
ity. These conceptions usually focus on distinct dispositions and traits,
without offering an idea of which capacity or agent binds all these disposi-
tions and traits together. Leary and Tangney (2003b, p. 3), for instance,
refer to previous decades as dedicated to the psychology of distinct func-
tions and capacities like learning (1950s), attitude (1960s), attribution
(1970s), and cognition (1980s). They signal a need for unifying constructs
and for a dynamic, process-oriented, and relational conceptualization of
personality. What, in particular, seems to be missing is the notion of a
mental capacity for self-reflection and, hence, self-regulation. Leary and
Tangney refer to the self as a “psychological apparatus” serving a “funda-
mental, essential quality” underlying attention, cognition, and executive
functioning: “the capacity for reflexive thinking.” Mischel and Morf (2003)
coin the term psycho-social dynamic processing system to refer to this self.
The vagueness of this concept of self is both a weakness and a merit. It
is obviously a weakness for a concept to lack clarity and precision; how-
ever, this may not be so much of a problem when the notion of self is
compared with successful scientific metaphors like stress, information,
and network. The merit of the concept of self is that it helps to keep self-
relatedness on the agenda of academic psychology and that it suggests
wholeness. This may encourage interdisciplinary research and thinking.
The second topic concerns the question of whether cognitive theories of
personality disorder and of personality disorder therapy can account for a
self that adopts a position with respect to self-schemas and self-represen-
tations. This point needs some clarification. Cognitive theories of personal-
ity describe the person or personality as a more or less ordered collection
of self-schemas and self-representations. These schemas organize behav-
ior, affect, and cognition. The representations make us aware of how we
perceive ourselves and give content to the attitudes toward ourselves and
others. In cognitive therapy the patient is asked to scrutinize these sche-
mas, attitudes, and representations by adopting an objective stance to-
PERSON, PERSONALITY, SELF, AND IDENTITY 129

ward them. This is, of course, difficult in itself, because these schemas,
attitudes, and representations belong to what is innermost to us. Behind
this looms a much larger, conceptual problem; that is, how to conceive a
self that adopts such an objectifying attitude. On the one hand, such a
self cannot be a different or second self, outside or beyond the schemas
and representations it is asked to scrutinize. Such a conception would
lead to infinite regress (i.e., to an endless series of selves behind previous
scrutinizing selves). On the other hand, such an objectifying self cannot
be completely identical to the self it has to investigate, for how would it be
possible for a self to gain insight into itself when the investigating self fully
coincides with the investigated self? Some distinction between investigator
and the investigated seems to be required in order to make investigation
possible at all.

THE ACTIVE AND THE EXPERIENTIAL SELF

Our last problem is old and has been shaped in numerous forms. William
James, for instance, thought of a distinction within the stream of con-
sciousness, a portion abstracted from the rest (James, 1890, vol. I, p. 297).
Psychologists would later call this self the “core self.” The core self mani-
fests itself in sensations, feelings, images, and, most notably, in a sense of
continuity. It is not a thing in the world, or an inner entity, or mere fiction,
but—reduced to its most elementary form—a collection of sensations and
feelings. Therefore, the core self refers, first and foremost, to a core sense
of self.
Two problems emerge with this picture of the self. First, it is unclear
how feelings and sensations by themselves would be able to relate to sche-
mas and representations, let alone to adopt an attitude toward something
in the inner world. How could feelings and sensations ever bring about
changes in the inner world of schemas and representations? Suggesting
this is just wrong grammar. The sensations of the core self refer to a sense
of constancy and continuity within the realm of experience. In its most
primitive form the subject of these experiences behaves and is described
as a passive recipient. Adopting an attitude, criticizing one’s schemas and
self-representations, and trying to mould them in a suitable direction—
these are all activities referring to an agent, or a person, or at least some-
thing that does the job. It is unclear how sensations could do such things,
even if one does not endorse the rather passive view of sensations as pre-
sented here. Therefore, the Jamesian picture of a portion of the stream of
consciousness perceiving other parts of the stream precludes the question
of agency.
The second problem is the other side of this coin. If the self is described
as an active agent instead of as a passive recipient, like in many recent
approaches of the self, the uniqueness and individuality of this agent or
self could become jeopardized. For instance, Leary and Tangney (2003b)
talk about a “psychological apparatus” and Mischel and Morf (2003) about
130 GLAS

a “psycho-social dynamic processing system.” In spite of the emphasis on

dynamics, malleability, and active construing, these approaches are in
danger of reifying the self by holding it for an inner entity (compare, for
instance, their use of terms like apparatus and system). This in its turn
easily leads to infinite regress. For, if the selfhood of experiences is de-
duced to the workings of an inner processing system, then the selfhood of
the processing system itself should be guaranteed. For this guarantee
there is no other option than the hypothesis of an other, higher order pro-
cessing system, which in its turn induces a sense of self in the first pro-
cessing system; with this the infinite regress is a fact.

CONCEPTIONS OF THE SELF

We are now at the heart of the discussion about the self. In the previous
section we discovered two selves: a core self, which is experiential and
consists of a set of feelings that are felt as particularly mine; and the self
as an agency that is capable of adopting an attitude toward the inner world
of images, phantasy, thoughts, feelings, and their underlying schemas.
The problem is how to combine, or integrate, these two views.
In the search for an answer I will first broaden the scope of the discus-
sion and review possible approaches to the nature of the self. Then, I dis-
cuss the notion of personal identity. After these explorations the issue of
agency in the midst of an experiential flux will be reformulated in terms of
a variety of forms of self-relatedness. I will again mainly concentrate on
conceptual issues.
It is my belief that there are basically five approaches to the self: meta-
physical, empirical, transcendental, hermeneutical, and phenomenologi-
cal (for a similar approach, see Zahavi, 2003; cf. also Strawson, 1999).
Within each of these approaches there may still be other variants.
In the metaphysical approach the self is seen as a substance, as an en-
during, active, and immaterial thing or entity. The self is here identical to
personhood, or, to being a person, or the soul. This approach dominated
Greek and Mediaeval philosophy, was rephrased by Descartes in his the-
ory of the mind as res cogitans, and still has its defenders in Neo-Thomist
circles (Moreland & Rae, 2000). More mundane forms of this approach are
present in folk theories of the mind and in current psychological explana-
tions of the self. The metaphysical approach has been criticized for a num-
ber of compelling reasons. It is speculative. It is inclined to reify theoretical
constructions. It runs into difficulties with respect to the body-soul (or
body-self) interaction. And it does not have a solution for the question of
how to tie first person pronouns and adjectives to abstract concepts like
mind or soul. How could Descartes’ thinking substance be a self, or myself?
The empirical approach has been most radically defended by David
Hume. It has many philosophical and psychological adherents today, es-
pecially in Anglosaxon philosophy of mind (Glover, 1988). Empiricists take
PERSON, PERSONALITY, SELF, AND IDENTITY 131

a position contrary to that of metaphysicians by denying any independent

status to the self. There is no such thing as a self, just as there is no
referent for the term I. Some empiricists reduce the self to a series of per-
ceptions or to some experiential by-product of one’s states of mind. Others
plainly deny the existence of a self and describe it as linguistic illusion
(Dennett, 1991). Still others admit the term I by giving it the status of an
indexical or index word (Ryle, 1949). Indexicals (now, here, I) are contentless
terms that provide spatio-temporal anchor points for one’s propositions. The
indexical I refers then to concrete persons in particular situations; yet all
empiricists agree that there is no self apart from, within, or above the per-
son. The empiricist approach has been criticized for its sceptical conse-
quences. If the self is mere fiction, then we are left with a catalogue of more
or less typical features of the individual. However, is it possible to isolate
features that can serve as absolutely certain criterion for personal identity
(see the next paragraph for a short discussion of criteria for personal iden-
tity)? Or, if not, would that mean the end of the notion of personal identity?
The transcendental approach has a predilection for the term ego, or I,
instead of self. The transcendental I, or ego, is the necessary condition of
the possibility for experience at all. This ego is not a datum, but a neces-
sary presupposition for knowing. What does this mean? Immanuel Kant,
the main proponent of this approach, observed that every act of perception
and thought is accompanied by a sense of self: it is me who thinks, ob-
serves, experiences, and so on. This me, however, cannot be observed. It
is a quality of experience and of acts of thinking and perceiving which
points to a fundamental presupposition: the presupposition of an I as
point of reference of my impressions and sensations. This point of refer-
ence is a formal concept; that is, the ego as principle of identity and of
continuity. There is no positive knowledge of this ego possible. Criticisms
that have been levelled against the transcendental approach are that its
notion of self is too abstract and that it suggests a contextless and ahistor-
ical view of the I.
The hermeneutical approach has different faces (Phillips, 2003; Ricoeur,
1992). I take it here to refer to a framework of thinking in which the self
is seen as narrative construction. The underlying idea is basically that
man is a self-interpreting being and that self-interpretation is practiced by
telling stories and by listening to stories of others. Human beings have,
in other words, no immediate self-knowledge. They know themselves by
appropriating what they express and/or perform. By doing so, they be-
come a whole. The problem with the narrative approach is twofold (cf.
Glas, 2003). First, by putting so much emphasis on wholeness and integ-
rity it cannot account for the fact that there are parts of one’s life that
cannot and never will be integrated, for instance, intrusive and painful
events and acts for which one can only feel shame. Second, by concentrat-
ing on construction the narrative approach does not solve the conceptual
problem at issue (i.e., how to account for a self that performs all the con-
132 GLAS

struction and interpretation). If the self is the result of a process of con-

struction, who, then, is the self that performs this construction? And if
there is no such self, does this mean that the self is an epiphenomenon of
a process that takes place behind the subject’s back?
This brings us to the final approach, which is phenomenological. Phe-
nomenologists, at least phenomenologists of a certain kind, argue that
each of the previous approaches ignores one important fact: the experien-
tial reality of the sense of self. This sense of self is something that is given.
It is not construed. Its underlying structure can be investigated. And it
can be equated with the so-called first-person perspective. The expression
first-person perspective refers to the fact that it is only me who can feel,
perceive, and think in the way I am feeling, perceiving, and thinking (Na-
gel, 1986). It is the subjective correlate of Kant’s transcendental ego, the
accompanying me or mineness of all one’s feelings, thoughts, and acts.
It is important to see that this me or self does not place itself beyond or
over against the stream of consciousness. It is a first-person awareness of
the stream while at the same time being part of it. The phenomenal self
entails, therefore, consciousness of experiences in their “first-personal
mode of givenness” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 59). It is important to see the subtle
difference with what has been said before about the core self. The core self
was described as a bundle of perceptions, thoughts, and inclinations. The
phenomenal self is not such a bundle, and it cannot be identified as such
a bundle or as one of the elements of it because it only denotes a certain
quality of mental contents, the quality of mineness.
The second step is then to equate this first-person-givenness of experi-
ence with an elementary form of selfhood. The term selfhood does not refer
here to a differentiated image of oneself, but to the self-referentiality of
human activities and experiences per se. Human beings can have no other
pains than their own; their feelings and inclinations are theirs, at a funda-
mental level. This selfhood is also called ipseity (ipse = oneself) (Ricoeur,
1990). Ipseity refers to self-relatedness as a structural feature of human
existence and indicates the essential mineness of my experiences.
We can now see why the concept of a phenomenal self could be of impor-
tance with respect to the question of how the two selves—the self as agent
and the experiencing self—could be related. The phenomenal self is an
experiencing self; in this experience an elementary form of self-relatedness
(selfhood; ipseity) is revealed. This revelation of self-relatedness is not
identical to agency; however, this structure of self-relatedness is so funda-
mental, that it could perhaps be used to rephrase the concept of agency
and to alleviate the obsession for both self-initiation and self-observation.
Due to space considerations, I cannot pursue the philosophical implica-
tions of this suggestion here, however. If it bears any truth, self-relatedness
could be seen as offering the dynamic background of virtually all human
experiences and activities. Instead of being attributed to some internal
mechanism (cf. the issue of self-initiation), the dynamism of self-related-
ness could be accounted for in terms of a dependence of self-relatedness
PERSON, PERSONALITY, SELF, AND IDENTITY 133

on relatedness to others. Others, like my parents, have begun with me.

According to Sören Kierkegaard (1849/1983), the self is a relation, which
relates to itself, and, by relating to itself, is related to something, a power,
outside itself. Being oneself is, instead of coinciding to oneself, responding
to a difference in oneself—a difference between who I am and who I was;
between who I am and whom I could become; between how others see me
and how I perceive myself. Agency is then expressed as the way this differ-
ence, this otherness in oneself, is dealt with.

PERSONAL IDENTITY
Who is the person that is addressed in psychotherapy of personality disor-
der? This is the question that led my investigation. I have followed a path
that is both suggested by clinical experience and by the recent burst of
literature on the self in academic psychology; that is, a path leading to
what has been called the core self. Some of the conceptual problems that
are associated with this concept have been discussed above, and I have
reviewed five philosophical approaches to the self that broaden the scope.
Although none of these approaches offered a full and clear-cut answer to
the question of the relation between the experiencing and acting self, the
focus of the discussion became sharper. Before proceeding, one should
briefly investigate another, more usual path—a path that is defined by the
concept of personal identity (for, it is obvious, that the who of the patient
is a person that has to be identified).
The concept of personal identity is usually divided into two forms: iden-
tity as singularity (numerical identity) and identity as a series of qualities
that make it possible to identify the individual as belonging to a particular
type or kind or class of individuals (qualitative identity). Singularity refers
to uniqueness. Uniqueness in its turn is based on discreteness; that is, on
the fact that there is only one who is me (him, her). Numbers are discrete
entities and for this reason this form of identity is usually called numerical
identity.
Singularity does not refer, therefore, to something distinctively human.
Tables, trees, and dogs are, as individual entities, also singular. Singular-
ity is of tremendous importance in the identification of individual persons
(fingerprints, DNA); however, it does not provide an answer to the question
of what it is that makes a person a person. For this reason, the philosophi-
cal discussion about personal identity has primarily been concentrated
on qualitative identity—on the qualities (features, characteristics) that are
necessary and/or sufficient for calling a person a person. These qualities
refer to what human beings share. They focus on sameness and similarity.
Ricoeur (1992) has coined the term idem-identity for this type of identity.
Idem-identity refers to sameness; ipse-identity to selfhood or self-relatedness.
Numerous attempts have been made to define the qualitative identity of
persons. A discussion of these attempts would lead us far beyond what
is relevant for our discussion about personality and personality disorder.
134 GLAS

Criteria for personhood that have been proposed are, among others: bodily
identity, brain identity, memory, and psychological connectedness or con-
tinuity (Noonan, 1990). Others, like Parfit (1984), have denied the rele-
vance of the whole topic by stating that “what matters is not personal iden-
tity” (p. 217). Parfit and others show a predilection to support their
arguments with thought experiments, from simple fission cases (fission of
the two hemispheres and transplanting them in two other bodies) to highly
complicated situations with teletransportation of brains and brain halves
to other worlds (Hofstadter & Dennett, 1981). Other philosophers have
criticized this method by pointing to the limitations of thought experiments
(Wilkes, 1988).
The concern about criteria for personhood is typically an Anglosaxon
debate, and is generally discussed using the conceptual tools of analytic
philosophy. Participants to this debate are currently inclined to question
the possibility of finding sufficient or necessary criteria for personhood.
Continental philosophers, like Ricoeur (1992) and Taylor (1989), would
say that this is no wonder. Asking for criteria for personhood is simply
asking the wrong question. Any set of criteria at best defines what a person
is, not who he is. To know what it is to be a person, is an issue that cannot
be separated from the question about whom this question is raised. The
search for criteria for personhood by analytic philosophers is executed
from a third person perspective (i.e., from a perspective that describes per-
sons as objects or as facts in the world); however, personhood is not a
quality or feature belonging to a neutral bearer or owner of that quality or
feature. In human beings the relationship between owner and feature is
itself a defining feature. It is, for instance, marked by self-concern (a wis-
dom of Leibniz). Criteria of personhood bear relevance, because they per-
tain to me or him or her. In the search for the who of personhood, the first
person perspective cannot be left out. Who I am is not a fact about me,
but should be phrased in terms of from where I come and what I am up
to. If this is true, we are back to the point where we left our discussion
about the self. For questions about who the person is who is addressed in
the psychotherapy of personality disorders, one is typically answered by
referring to a self with a story and with core values and with shortcomings
and with gaps in that story.

DISCUSSION: SELF, IDENTITY, AND PERSONALITY

Let me summarize where we are and try to draw some conclusions. I
started with the question of who the person is in personality disorder and
its treatment. This question was both epistemological and existential. Both
aspects could in fact hardly be separated. Background issues, the redis-
covery of the self, the problem of how to conceptually integrate the active
and the experiential self, and philosophical approaches to the self and to
personal identity were discussed. I now have to come back to personality
and personality disorder. Who is the person in personality disorder?
PERSON, PERSONALITY, SELF, AND IDENTITY 135

What has been said so far is sufficient to question a dominant view of

the human person. According to this view the person is a neutral bearer
of functions, roles, attitudes, and inclinations. The person relates to these
functions and roles in an instrumental way (Taylor, 1989). Self-knowledge
is gained in a subject-object relationship in which the person occupies the
position of subject, and the functions and roles occupy the position of ob-
ject. Current theorizing, for instance, in cognitive-behavioral theory under-
scores this instrumental view, which itself is part of a much larger, techni-
cal worldview. I realize that this picture is overly schematic and one-sided,
but in its one-sidedness it may help elucidate an important aspect of the
current Zeitgeist—the separation between the person and her roles—
which in its turn influences the way our professions are shaped and ac-
counted for. Personality disorder has become a condition that has to be
repaired.
Other conceptions of personhood have been discussed, most notably
those that lay emphasis on self-relatedness and on a core sense of self. In
my discussion of the phenomenal self it appears that even the most ele-
mentary forms of self-awareness can be conceptualized as entailing self-
relatedness. I emphasized the dynamic nature of this self-relatedness and
suggest that it is so fundamental that it could perhaps lead to another
conception of agency.
The relevance of this conception in this context is that it could contrib-
ute to a view in which self-relatedness at the level of the phenomenal self
forms the basis for a whole spectrum of modes of self-relatedness. Further
investigation might then reveal that this spectrum of forms of self-related-
ness shows a certain order. One might, for instance, discern a physical,
an emotional, and a cognitive I-self relationship. Some forms of self-relat-
edness would then appear to exist in an implicit, others in a more explicit,
form. Some would be totally embedded in the stream of consciousness;
others would form islands in the stream. Some forms of self-relatedness
would appear to reflect mature, others immature, stages of development.
In the end there would arise a highly differentiated picture of ways of self-
relatedness in which the dynamics of self-relating would express itself in
the opening-up of functions, dispositions, attitudes, schemas, and so on.
What does this mean for the relation to one’s personality? First, if the
separation between the person and his roles should be seen as a modern
fiction, then the separation between person and personality should also
be reconsidered. This would imply, for instance, that it is simplistic to say
that one is a person and that one has a personality. The separation be-
tween being a person and having a personality—and its concomitant di-
chotomy between evil and ill—suggests an instrumental view of the hu-
man person: A view in which the person describes his personality from a
third person perspective and in which personality is discussed in terms of
a project and of development and repair. As we have seen, however, the
vocabulary of relating to oneself is much richer than this technical lan-
guage suggests. Every sensitive clinician would understand what a well-
136 GLAS

informed patient with borderline personality disorder would mean when

she said: “I am Miss Borderline,” instead of “I have borderline personality
disorder”.
Second, this reconsideration of the large variety of behaviors that the
term personality refers to should be taken into account more systemati-
cally. Some of these behaviors are closer to the core self than others. Feel-
ings of inferiority and shame, for instance, are closer to the core self than
impulsivity or lack of frustration tolerance. Some criteria for personality
disorder refer to habits and dispositions with stability over time, like im-
pulsivity or orderliness; other criteria refer to moods swings and to fleeting
feelings. The DSM-IV criteria for personality disorder are nonhomogeneous
in this respect (APA, 1994). And all these criteria vary with respect to their
distance to the core self.
Third, the way persons relate to their core self also varies considerably
within the person, between persons, and depending on the circumstances.
This variety of self-relating may in its turn affect the contents of the core
self. Some of the dominant feelings and moods are only sometimes closer
to the core self. There are times that the borderline patient feels he is re-
jected and abandoned and feels that this is a defining characteristic of his
existence; at other times these negative feelings seem to have completely
disappeared. The conceptual solution is then to call the core self itself un-
stable and to consider this instability as the defining characteristic. This
conceptual meta-position, however, is not consequently maintained when
the moods and feelings that manifest the instability are also included in the
list of defining features, such as is the case in the DSM-IV definition of bor-
derline personality disorder (BPD) (APA, 1994). Therefore, both the instabil-
ity and the expression of this instability define what it is to have BPD.
There is an enormous variety of ways of self-relating. Some persons are
more inclined than others to adopt an investigative attitude and to make
their relatedness toward their inclinations and behaviors explicit. Some
would like to adopt such an attitude, but are overwhelmed by negative
feelings when doing so. Who the person thinks he or she is, depends on
the way he or she positions herself. This positioning is embedded in a soci-
etal matrix and is determined by power relationships, biophysical and so-
cioeconomic factors, and the fate of culture at large. There is, in short,
no fixed, Archimedian point from which the relationship toward oneself is
maintained.
This non-Archimedian view brings us, finally, back to the person. The
question of who the person with personality disorder is, has been addressed
from different viewpoints. At a fundamental level, basic self-awareness
and self-relatedness are conceptually compatible. Ontologically this coin-
cidence of self-awareness and self-relatedness remains a mystery. This
was, in fact, the background of the emphasis on the givenness of this expe-
rience. On the other end of the spectrum—the perspective of the fully de-
veloped person—there emerged a picture of self-relatedness in a wide vari-
ety of complementary ways: with respect to functional modes (biological,
PERSON, PERSONALITY, SELF, AND IDENTITY 137

TABLE 1. Overview of Selves and Types of Self-Relatedness

Phenomenal self
➣ Basic self-awareness
➣ Self relatedness
↓
The fully developed person
➣ functional differentiation
䊊 biological self-relatedness
䊊 emotional self-relatedness
䊊 cognitive self-relatedness
➣ self-relatedness in terms of distance to the core self
䊊 distance of core feelings to core self
䊊 distance of moods to core self
䊊 distance of stable patterns of behavior to core self
䊊 distance of automatic or repetitive behavior to core self
➣ temporal differentiation
䊊 present and past
䊊 present and future
➣ positioning of the “I,” depending on
䊊 local circumstances
䊊 biography
䊊 social context
■ intimate relations
■ societal influences
■ power relationships
䊊 cultural patterns

emotional, cognitive); with respect to the distance of one’s behaviors to the

core self; with respect to one’s life history; and with respect to the position
of the I as point of reference in the expression of self-relatedness (see Table
1). The most intriguing aspect of this enormous variety is, perhaps, that it
takes shape against a background of unity and integrity which is more
intuited and felt than conceptually grasped. Perhaps, one must say, with
Peter Strawson (1959), that the concept of the person is primitive, that is,
irreducible, not in the sense of some ephemeral quality, but as a reality
which is undeniable or given. In the end, I think, personhood cannot be
reduced to some basic experience or to self-relatedness as a formal charac-
teristic; nor to conforming to a certain criterion for personal identity; nor
to the complexity and structural coherence of a list of functions, capaci-
ties, and mental states. The mystery about the issue will probably never be
completely solved, and better so, perhaps; however, mystery differs from
confusion.

REFERENCES

American Psychiatric Association. (APA). Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness ex-

(1994). Diagnostic and statistical man- plained. Boston: Little, Brown.
ual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Fuchs, T. (2002). Der Begriff der Person in
Washington DC: Author. der Psychiatrie [The concept of the
Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P.M.S. (2003). person in psychiatry]. Nervenarzt, 73,
Philosophical foundations of neurosci- 239–246.
ence. Malden, UK: Blackwell. Gabbard, G. O. (1997). Finding the “person”
138 GLAS

in personality disorders. American Jour- tury of the self in psychology. In M. R.

nal of Psychiatry, 154, 891–893. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Hand-
Glas, G. (2003). Idem, ipse, and loss of the book of self and identity (pp. 15–43).
self. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychol- New York: Guilford.
ogy, 10, 347–352. Moreland, J. P., & Rae, S. B. (2000). Body
Glover, J. (1988). I: The philosophy and psy- and soul: Human nature and the crisis
chology of personal identity. London: of ethics. Downers Grove, IL: InterVar-
Penguin. sity Press.
Goldberg, C. (1996). Speaking with the devil: Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Ox-
A dialogue with evil. New York: Viking. ford: Oxford University Press.
Hofstadter, D. R., & Dennett, D. C. (Eds.). Noonan, H. W. (1990). Personal identity. Lon-
(1981). The Mind’s I. New York: Basic. don: Routledge.
James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Ox-
New York: Henry Holt. ford: Oxford University Press.
Kendell, R. E. (2002). The distinction be- Phillips, J. (2003). Psychopathology and the
tween personality disorder and mental narrative self. Philosophy, Psychiatry,
illness. British Journal of Psychiatry, & Psychology, 10, 313–328.
180, 110–115. Ricoeur, P. (1992) Oneself as another (K. Bla-
Kierkegaard, S. (1983). The sickness unto mey, Trans.). Chicago: The University
death: A Christian psychological expo- of Chicago Press.
sition for upbuilding and awakening Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Chi-
(H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Eds. and cago: The University of Chicago Press.
Trans.). Princeton: Princeton Univer- Strawson, G. (1999). The self and the
sity Press. (Original work published SESMET. In S. Gallagher & J. Shear
1849). (Eds.), Models of the self (pp. 483–
Kircher, T., & David, A. (Eds.). (2003). The 518). Exeter, UK/Charlottesville, VA:
self in neuroscience and psychiatry. Academic Imprint.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals: An essay
Kramer, P. (1993). Listening to Prozac: A psy- in descriptive metaphysics. London:
chiatrist explores antidepressant drugs Routledge.
and the remaking of the self. London: Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The
Penguin. making of the modern identity. Cam-
Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (Eds.). bridge: Cambridge University Press.
(2003a). Handbook of self and identity. West, S. G. (2003). Towards finding the per-
New York: Guilford. son in the data of personality. Journal
Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (2003b). The of Personality, 71, 299–318.
self as an organizing construct in the Wilkes, K. V. (1988). Real people: Personal
behavioral and social science. In M. R. identity without thought experiments.
Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Hand- Oxford: Clarendon Press.
book of self and identity (pp. 3–14). Zahavi, D. (2003). Phenomenology of self. In
New York: Guilford. T. Kircher & A. David (Eds.), The self
Mischel, W., & Morf, C. C. (2003). The self in neuroscience and psychiatry (pp.
as a psycho-social dynamic processing 56–75). Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
system: A meta-perspective on a cen- versity Press.