Irreducible

Mind
TOWARD A
PSYCHOLOGY FOR
THE 21st CENTURY

EDWARD E KELLX
EMILY WILLIAMS KELLY,
ADAM CRABTREE, ALAN GAULD,
MICHAEL GROSSO & BRUCE GREYSON

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

LANHAM • BOULDER • NEW YORK • TORONTO • PLYMOUTH, UK
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Copyright © 2007 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

First paperback edition 2010

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kelly, Edward F.
Irreducible mind : toward a psychology for the 21st century I Edward F. Kelly, Emily
Williams Kelly, and Adam Crabtree.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
\. Psychology. I. Kelly, Emily Williams, 1949- II. Crabtree, Adam. III. Title.
BF12\.K38 2006
150--dc22 2006023474

ISBN: 978-0-7425-4792-6 (cloth: alk. paper)

ISBN: 978-1-4422-0206-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
ISBN: 978-1-4422-0207-8 (electronic)

en< The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSUNISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

 Dedicated to

F. W. H. Myers
a neglected genius of scientific psychology

and to

Ian Stevenson
and
Michael Murphy
two modern bearers of his intellectual legacy

"I had... often a sense of great solitude,

and of an effort beyond my strength"
(Myers, 1893/1961, p. 40)
 Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments Xlll

Introduction
(Edward F Kelly) XVll

Chapter 1: A View from the Mainstream: Contemporary Cognitive

Neuroscience and the Consciousness Debates
(Edward F Kelly) 1
The History of Cognitive Psychology: A Thumbnail Sketch 2
From James B. Watson to the Cognitive Revolution 2
Problems in Classic Cognitivism 11
The Second Cognitive Revolution: Connectionism and
Dynamic Systems 16
John Searle's Critique of Computational Theories of the Mind 21
Biological Naturalism: The Final Frontier 24
Problems with Biological Naturalism 25
Psi Phenomena 29
Extreme Psychophysical Influence 31
Informational Capacity, Precision, and Depth 32
Memory 34
Psychological Automatisms and Secondary Centers
of Consciousness 35
The Unity of Conscious Experience 37
Genius-Level Creativity 41
Mystical Experience 41
The Heart of the M ind 42
Conclusion 45

Chapter 2: F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body

Problem
(Emily Williams Kelly) 47
The Historical Context 47
The Roots of Scientific Psychology: Dualism, Mechanistic
Determinism, and the Continuity of Nature 48
Psychology as Science: A Fundamental Conflict 50
The Naturalization of Mind: Limiting Psychology 51
The Unresolved Dilemmas o f Psychology 54
An Attempted Solution: Methodological Parallelism 56
F. W. H. Myers: Purposes and Principles 59
Tertium Quid 62
Continuity 63
Empiricism 63
Expanding Psychology 64
Psychophysiological Concomitance 65
v
vi-Table of Contents

The Study of Subliminal Phenomena 66

The New Physics 68
Mind and Matter 69
An Expanded Naturalism 70
Myers's Theory of Human Personality 72
The Unity-Multiplicity Problem: "Unitary" versus "Colonial"
Views of Mind 74
An Expanded View of Consciousness 75
A Jacksonian Model of Mind 76
An Evolutionary View of Mind 78
The Subliminal Self: A "Tertium Quid" Theory of
Consciousness 80
The Permeable Boundary: A Psychological Mechanism 83
Evolutive and Dissolutive Phenomena 84
Automatisms and the Expression of Subliminal Functioning 87
A Law of Mental Causality 89
Methods for Psychology 90
Empirical Phenomena for the Study of Mind: An Introduction
to Human Personality 95
Chapters 2 and 3: Hysteria and Genius 97
Chapter 4: Sleep 101
Chapter 5: Hypnotism 104
Chapters 6 and 7: Hallucinations-Sensory Automatisms and
Phantasms of the Dead 108
Chapters 8, 9, and the Epilogue: Motor Automatisms, Trance,
Possession, and Ecstasy 111
Conclusion 1 14

Chapter 3: Psychophysiological Influence

(Emily Williams Kelly) 1 17
Psychosomatic Medicine 119
Psychoneuroimmunology 1 22
Mind and Disease 123
Bereavement and Mortality 124
Sudden and "Voodoo" Death 124
Possible Mechanisms Behind Psychological Factors
in Mortality 128
Mind and Health 129
Postponement of Death 1 29
Religion and Health 130
Meditation and Healing 131
Faith Healing 132
Placebo and Nocebo 139
Specific Physiological Changes Appearing Spontaneously 148
Sudden Whitening of Hair or Skin 148
False Pregnancy 149
Stigmata 1 52
 Table of Contents-vii

Phenomena Related to Stigmata 156

Specificity of the Wounds 1 59
Predisposing Characteristics 160
Hysteria 162
Multiple Personality and Dissociative Disorders 167
Specific Physiological Effects Induced Deliberately 175
Yogis 177
Specific Physiological Changes Induced by Hypnosis 179
Autonomic Effects 181
Sensory Effects 1 83
Hypnotic Analgesia 1 85
Skin Conditions: Healing 190
Allergies 190
Bleeding 191
Burns 192
Warts 193
Other Skin Diseases 196
Skin Conditions: Induction of Bleeding, Blisters,
and Markings 199
Attempted Explanations of Hypnotic Skin Marking
and Related Phenomena 209
Changes in Another Person's Body 218
Spontaneously Occurring Phenomena 219
Sympathetic Symptoms 219
Maternal Impressions 221
Distant Mental Influence on Living Systems 225
Community of Sensation 225
Suggestion at a Distance 226
Distant Intentionality Studies: Clinical 227
Distant Intentionality Studies: Experimental 230
Birthmarks and Birth Defects in Cases of the
Reincarnation Type 232
Conclusion 236

Chapter 4: Memory
(Alan Gauld) 241
Memory and the Brain 242
Trace Theories: General Issues 242
Modern Approaches: Cognitive 248
Modern Approaches: Neuroscientific 260
The Problem of Survival 281
Myers's Approach to the Problem of Survival 284
Problems of Personal Identity 286
Myers's "Broad Canvas" Revisited 293
Myers, Memory, and the Evidence for Survival 295
Conclusion 299
viii-Table of Contents

Chapter 5: Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness

(Adam Crabtree) 301
Historical Background 302
The Views of F. W. H. Myers 305
Related Views of Some Major Contemporaries 309
Pierre Janet 309
William James 312
Morton Prince 317
T. W. Mitchell 319
William McDougall 322
Sigmund Freud 327
Carl Jung 332
Psychological Automatism: More Recent Work 334
Ernest Hilgard 334
Stephen Braude 337
Unconscious Cerebration Revisited 340
Sociocognitive Theorists 341
The Cognitive Unconscious 345
Neurobiological Research 348
Automatism and Supernormal Phenomena 353
Automatism and Creativity 354
Sensory and Motor Automatisms and Mediumship 354
Automatism and Experimental Psi Research 361
Conclusion 363

Chapter 6: Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena

(Emily Williams Kelly, Bruce Greyson, and Edward F Kelly) 367
Near-Death Experiences: An Introduction 369
Explanatory Models of Near-Death Experiences 374
Psychological and Cultural Theories 374
Expectation 374
Birth Models 376
Depersonalization 377
Personality Factors 377
Physiological Theories 378
Blood Gases 379
Neurochemical Theories 380
Neuroanatomical Models 381
"Transcendent" Aspects 385
Enhanced Mentation 386
Veridical Out-of-Body Perceptions 387
Visions of Deceased Acquaintances 390
Converging Lines of Evidence 391
The Larger Context 394
Out-of-Body Experiences 394
Autoscopy 403
 Table of Contents-ix

Lucid Dreams 404

Apparitions 405
Veridical Apparitions 406
Collective Apparitions 407
Deathbed Visions 408
Mystical and Conversion Experiences 41 1
A Psychological Theory? 413
The Challenge of Near-Death Experiences 415
General Anesthesia 416
Cardiac Arrest 417
Conclusion 421

Chapter 7: Genius
(Edward F Kelly and Michael Grosso) 423
Myers's Theory of Genius: General Features and Scope 425
The Creative Process: A Descriptive Model 427
Myers's Psychology of Creative Inspiration 429
Continuity 430
Automatism 432
Calculating Prodigies 432
"Organic" Senses 433
Hallucinatory Syndromes 435
Automatisms in Genius 440
Genius in Automatists 447
Incommensurability 451
Non-Linguistic Symbolisms 451
Associationism and Its Limits 452
Coleridge and the Theory of Imagination 454
Psychoanalytic Theory: Primary and Secondary Process 457
The Crucial Role of Analogy and Metaphor 459
The Failure of Computational Theories of Analogy 460
Implications for Cognitive Theory 466
Summary 469
The Creative Personality 470
Genius and Mental Illness 470
Genius as Personality in Transformation 476
The Creative Nisus: A Drive Toward Wholeness 477
Art as Transformative 481
Transpersonal Roots of Genius 482
Creativity and Psi 483
Genius and Mysticism 484
Conclusion 492

Chapter 8: Mystical Experience

(Edward F Kelly and Michael Grosso) 495
Phenomenology of Mystical Experience: An Introduction 497
x-Table of Contents

The Problem of the Universal Core 503

Steven Katz and the Contructivist Backlash 511
The Problem o f Objective Significance 51 8
Stace's Philosophical Argument for Objective Significance 519
Empirical Arguments for Objective Significance 521
Mysticism and Genius 521
Mysticism and Supernormal Phenomena 525
Neurobiological Approaches to Mysticism 531
Mysticism and Temporal Lobe Epilepsy 531
Gellhorn and Ergotropic/Trophotropic Systems 534
The Model of d'Aquili and Newberg 537
James Austin's Zen and the Brain ( 1999) 539
Mysticism and Psychedelics 542
Psychodynamic Approaches to Mysticism: Toward a
Working Model 553
Freud and Jung 554
Myers and James 558
Opportunities for Further Research 563
General Considerations 563
Sources of Relevant Phenomena 565
Further Guidelines for Future Research and Theory 572
Conclusion 573

Chapter 9: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century

(Edward F Kelly) 577
Contemporary Reviews of Human Personality 577
A Re-assessment of Myers's Theory of Personality 581
Myers's Methodological Principles 582
Myers's Natural History of the Mind 584
Myers's General Theory of the Psyche: The Subliminal Self 585
Post-Mortem Survival 595
Myers's Generalized Concept of Evolution 599
Myers/James Filter Theory and Contemporary Science:
Toward Reconciliation 603
Non-Cartesian Dualist-Interactionist Models 607
Neutral-Monist Models 630
Summary and Prospectus 639

Appendix: An Introductory Bibliography

of Psychical Research 645
Introductory and General Scientific Literature 645
Spontaneous Case Studies 647
Philosophical Literature 648
Survival and Mediumship 648
Reincarnation 650
History of Psychical Research 651
 Table of Contents-xi

Meta-Analyses, Reviews and Selected Journal Articles on

Experimental Studies 652
DMILS (Distant Mental Influence on Living Systems) 652
Ganzfeld 652
Hypnosis and Psi 653
Statistics and Meta-analyses 653
The Psi Controversy 653

References 657

Index 759

About the Authors 800

 Preface and Acknowledgments

This book originated from a seminar directed to theoretical foundations of

scientific psychology, initiated in 1998 by Michael Murphy under the aus­
pices of the Center for Theory and Research of Esalen Institute. By the year
2000 our discussions had advanced to the point where we believed we could
demonstrate, empirically, that the materialistic consensus which undergirds
practically all of current mainstream psychology, neuroscience, and philos­
ophy of mind is fundamentally flawed. We therefore committed ourselves to
developing a book-length presentation which would systematically articu­
late and defend this point of view.
Our general strategy was to assess the overall state of psychology, as
it exists here at the beginning of the 21st century, from a perspective that
deliberately but selectively takes into account its first hundred-plus years of
organized scientific effort. The essential driving idea was to step backward,
the better to jump forward -" reculer pour mieux sauter." The tactical oppor­
tunity for this exercise was to be provided by the centennial of the publica­
tion in 1903 of an extraordinary book by a largely forgotten genius, F. W.
H. Myers, titled Human Personality. Deeply admired by William James and
other leading scholars of that period, this two-volume work is unquestion­
ably a great but neglected classic of our science. It advances an elaborate but
empirically supported theory of the constitution and functioning of human
beings, one that in many ways is sharply at odds with current mainstream
thinking, but one that we believe penetrates far closer to the empirical truths
of the matter. By framing the relevant issues in the context of Myers's work,
we thought, we would be able to justify and to some extent foreshadow what
we anticipate will become a major and vitally necessary reworking of cen­
tral parts of scientific psychology.
The basic plan of the book was to be threefold. First, we would provide
an exposition of Myers's theoretical and empirical contributions. Second,
we would systematically and critically examine subsequent research on a
variety of empirical topics that were central to the theoretical position he
developed. Finally, we would attempt to assess, in light of this review, where
things now stand in psychology and where we need to go. The goal through­
out would be not simply to celebrate Myers's project as he himself left it, but

XlII
xiv-Preface and Acknowledgments

to carry it forward in the context of relevant substantive and methodologi­

cal achievements of the intervening century.
The large book you hold in your hands realizes these intentions, to the
extent permitted by our collective capacities and knowledge. We missed our
original deadline, which seemed at first to lie in a far-distant future, by a full
three years. This was due not to lack of effort on our part but to the dimen­
sions of the task, which we seriously underestimated. The book could eas­
ily have become larger still. The subjects we discuss are individually com­
plex and deeply intertwined, with ramifications that proliferate endlessly in
interesting directions. Most chapters and even parts of some chapters could
easily become books in themselves, and some probably will. Many chapters
also deal with issues that lie at or beyond the currently recognized boundar­
ies of "accepted" science, and therefore pose special challenges for respon­
sible presentation. Despite their intrinsic difficulties, however, these diverse
materials combine to produce what we think is a compelling demonstration
that current mainstream opinion in psychology must change, and in direc­
tions that are both theoretically fundamental and humanly momentous. In
a nutshell, we are arguing for abandonment of the current materialistic syn­
thesis, and for the restoration of causally efficacious conscious mental life to
its proper place at the center of our science. We hope to catalyze the emer­
gence of an enlarged and reunified mainstream psychology, one that does
not systematically ignore-as the present-day mainstream does-many
large bodies of evidence deeply relevant to our most central and abiding
human concerns.
In the interest of effectively promoting this sea-change we have delib­
erately crafted our book for a primary audience consisting of advanced
undergraduate and early-stage graduate students, particularly students in
disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. These are the
future leaders of our field, and we want to reach them before they suffer
the "hardening of the categories" that all too often accompanies entry into
these highly specialized professions. To do so required that our material be
presented with a level of currency, detail, and rigor commensurate with that
of the other professional materials such persons are exposed to on a daily
basis, and we have attempted to meet that standard.
This has necessarily involved some difficult tradeoffs, however, for we
also wanted our book to be accessible to anyone of good general education
and intelligence who is seriously interested in its subject matter and willing
to make the necessary effort. We have tried to ease the burden for such per­
sons in various ways-for example by defining obscure or "jargon" terms,
providing interim summaries and abstracts, and relegating many points of
more technical or scholarly interest to parentheses and footnotes. However,
there is no escaping the fact that some parts of the argument, especially
parts of Chapters 1 , 4, 7, and 9, are likely to present difficulties, particularly
on first encounter. We implore such readers to be understanding and patient
with us and persistent in their own efforts, skipping over any particularly
 Preface and Acknowledgments-xv

challenging sections at first and returning to them later with a better sense
of how everything fits into the overall scheme.
Our book has the outward form of an edited volume but is atypical of
that genre. It is united throughout by a single theme, our collective drive
toward a broadly correct, though necessarily incomplete, scientific picture
of the mind as it relates to brain activity. This generalist impulse contrasts
sharply with the extreme specialization that characterizes the sciences and
other modern professions, and that is often especially pronounced in edited
books. Edited volumes in science often address narrow topics and consist
of pieces authored in hermetic isolation for small groups of specialists inter­
ested mainly in talking to each other. That is emphatically not the case with
the present work. The book as a whole and its chapters individually take
on big issues and seek to engage large numbers of readers. Several chapters
include two or more of us as authors, and all were generated not in isolation
but in conformity with an overall plan that emerged through group discus­
sions spanning a period of years.
Our collective professional experience covers a wide range in terms of
education, research, and teaching in psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience,
and philosophy, and all of us have had the opportunity to read and critique
every part of the book, usually in multiple versions. In addition to pooling
our own professional expertise in this way, we have sought critical feedback
on chapter drafts from outside volunteer readers including both professional
colleagues from various disciplines and more general readers representing a
diversity of backgrounds. Their efforts and suggestions have led to numer­
ous improvements throughout the book, for which we are grateful . We are
acutely aware that many gaps and imperfections remain, and we take full
responsibility for these. One of our main points is that what is most urgently
needed for further theoretical progress is more and better data of certain
critical and specified kinds; this, the greater good, seemed better served
by getting the book out now in reasonably finished form than by obsessing
further over potentially endless refinements.
Finally, we wish to acknowledge contributions from individuals who
have supported this project in various special ways. Among our "test-driv­
ers" we give particular thanks to Carlos S. Alvarado, William Barnard,
Frank Benford, Lori Derr, Ross Dunseath, Lorin Hollander, Fritz Klein,
Jeff Kripal, James Lenz, Cory Maxwell, Francis McGlone, Michael Mur­
phy, Margaret Pertzoff, Michael Schaffer, Ben Snyder, Ian Stevenson, Pim
van Lommel, and Ray Westphal. Seminar participants who have contributed
vigorously to the interdisciplinary conversations that helped shape the book
include Richard Baker, John and Alyce Faye Cleese, David Fontana, Owen
Flanagan, Arthur Hastings, Sean Kelly, Antonia Mills, Michael Murphy,
Gary Owens, Frank Poletti, Dean Radin, Will iam Roll, Bob Rosenberg,
Marilyn Schlitz, Charles Tart, Jim Tucker, and Eric Weiss. Frank Poletti
efficiently managed the logistics of our meetings, and Bob Rosenberg skill­
fully oversaw production of our digital version of Human Personality (see
p. xxx of our Introduction). Robert F. Cook provided translations of the
xvi-Preface and Acknowledgments

many French and Italian passages in Human Personality as well as the

translation of Theodore Flournoy's review, for the digital version of Human
Personality. John Cleese rescued us from periodic despondency and finan­
cially supported the mechanics of book production. Faye Joseph and Gary
Owens provided additional financial support for book production, and the
Institute for Noetic Sciences provided support for our meetings. Nancy L.
Zingrone generated our camera-ready copy, including the index. Lori Derr,
Dawn Hunt, and Martha Stockhausen provided invaluable help in track­
ing down references. We thank our associates from Rowman & Littlefield,
especially Stanley Plotnick, Jon Sisk, and our editor Art Pomponio, for
taking strong interest in this project and then sticking with it despite the
many subsequent changes in book content and organization that delayed
its completion. Above all we thank Michael Murphy for initially conceiving
this project, for bringing us together in the spectacularly stimulating envi­
ronment of Esalen, and for his apparently limitless reserves of comradeship,
wit, and wisdom.
 Introduction

Edward F. Kelly

The central subject of this book is the problem of relations between the
inherently private, subjective, "first-person" world of human mental life and
the publicly observable, objective, "third-person" world of physiological
events and processes in the body and brain.
Scientific psychology has been struggling to reconcile these most-basic
dimensions of its subject matter ever since it emerged from philosophy near
the end of the 19th century. Both were fully present in William James's
monumental Principles of Psychology (1 890b), the earliest English-language
survey of the new academic discipline that is still widely cited today. James
explicitly acknowledged the normally intimate association between the men­
tal and the physical, and he systematically and sympathetically rehearsed
what little was then known or surmised about the brain. Unlike many of
his scientific contemporaries, however, James resisted premature and facile
attempts at neural reductionism. When he recognized limitations on the
physiological side, he was content to record his psychological observations
and await further progress in neurophysiology. The bulk of the Principles
therefore consists of masterful expositions, relying heavily on sophisticated
observation of his own inner workings, of central properties of mental life
such as attention, imaginatiori, the stream of consciousness, volition, and­
at the heart of everything-the self (Leary, 1990).
James's person-centered and synoptic approach was soon largely
abandoned, however, in favor of a much narrower conception of scientific
psychology. Deeply rooted in earlier 1 9th-century thought, this approach
advocated deliberate emulation of the presuppositions and methods-and
thus, it was hoped, the stunning success-of the "hard" sciences, especially
physics. James was barely in his grave when J. B. Watson (1913) published
the founding manifesto of radical behaviorism, the logical culmination of
this tradition. Psychology was no longer to be the science of mental life, as
James had defined it. Rather it was to be the science of behavior, "a purely
XVII
xviii-Introduction

objective experimental branch of natural science" (p. 1 58). It should "never

use the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, introspectively
verifiable, imagery, and the like" (p. 166). Its task was instead to identify
lawful relationships between stimuli and responses: "In a system of psycho 1-
ogy completely worked out, given the response the stimuli can be predicted;
given the stimuli the response can be predicted" (p. 167).
Watson's doctrine quickly took hold, and for the next half-century
mainstream American psychology deliberately avoided contact with issues
of the sort most important to James. It largely abandoned the first-person
perspective of the investigator trying to understand things from within,
and adopted almost exclusively that of an external observer whose task
it is to predict and control the behavior of a material object, an opaque
"black box," the experiential interior of which psychological science can
and should ignore. Indeed, the success of physical science could be viewed
as resulting in part precisely from its having in a similar way stripped from
its subject matter all traces of purpose and teleology. In hopes of carrying
through Watson's program of discovering units and laws in terms of which
all behavior might ultimately be explained, most psychologists thus turned
to narrowly behaviorist experimental studies-sometimes of humans but
more commonly of simpler organisms, and typically in artificially simpli­
fied environments.
The inward dimension of psychology did not altogether disappear,
however. The old introspectionist schools l ingered on for a while, and intro­
spection continued to play a significant role in areas such as psychophys­
ics and the mainly European movements known as Gestalt psychology and
phenomenology. During the same years in which behaviorism was seizing
control of the American scientific mainstream, people such as Janet, Freud,
Jung, and their followers were elaborating the various schools of depth psy­
chology or "dynamic psychiatry" (Ellenberger, 1 970). Even in the darkest
days of the early behaviorist period-the rabid and monolithic "Age of The­
ory" (Koch & Leary, 1985)-major figures such as Morton Prince, Henry
Murray, Gordon Allport, and Gardner Murphy steadfastly defended the
complexities of human mind and personality against simplistic reduction­
ist onslaughts. More recently, schools of "humanistic" and "transpersonal"
psychology have also emerged which openly aspire to bring the deeper parts
of human personality back within the framework of scientific psychology.
It cannot be denied, however, that for most of psychology's first century
these dissident movements have had to wage an uphill battle at or some­
times beyond the margins of the discipline.
The ascendancy of the behaviorist juggernaut thus essentially frag­
mented the traditional subject-matter of scientific psychology as envisioned
by pioneers such as James, and left the fragments in the care of distinct,
poorly integrated, and sometimes even mutually antagonistic professional
sub-specialties. That the deep divisions it created remain with us even today
is conspicuously exemplified by the 1 989 schism within the American Psy­
chological Association, which reaffirmed a fundamental split between the
 Introduction-xix

experimental and clinical dimensions of the field. These divisions represent,

we contend, something much deeper than the ordinary process of special­
ization within an otherwise unified scientific discipline. Rather, they reflect
the continuing failure of scientific psychology to come fully to grips with the
inescapably dual nature of its subject matter-in short, with the mind-brain
problem that lies at the heart of our discipline.
This has begun to change, however, in part because of the maturation
of mainstream psychology itself. The 20th-century co-evolution of main­
stream psychology with developments in allied fields such as neuroscience
and philosophy of mind began with progressive refinement, but ultimately
rejection, of its original behaviorist formulations, which fell by the wayside
as their defects and limitations were progressively identified and articulated.
Starting in the 1950s, however, a more sophisticated form of behaviorism
arose, uniting the philosophical doctrine of functionalism with the logical
theory of Turing machines and the applications technology provided by the
digital computer. As described in more detail in the following chapter, this
"Computational Theory of the Mind" (CTM) liberated cognitive science
from the most oppressive strictures of radical behaviorism and has domi­
nated the mainstream ever since. It also is currently driving what appears to
many observers and participants to be an ever-deepening and unquestion­
ably successful marriage between psychology and neuroscience.
Any contemporary discussion of mind-brain issues must certainly take
into account the enormous advances made during the past century in our
understanding of the brain. New manifestations of mind appear everywhere
to be closely associated with modifications of structure or process in brains.
In evolution, for example, we see an overall correlation across animal spe­
cies between behavioral complexity and the level of organization of the ner­
vous system. The rapid post-natal mental development of the human infant
likewise is associated with massive structural and functional changes in its
maturing brain. And as human adults we are all familiar with numerous
facts-the normal daily fluctuations of consciousness and the effects of mild
cerebral trauma induced by alcohol and other psychoactive substances,
fatigue, thumps on the head, and so on-that also reflect in a general way
this dependence of mind upon brain. But what about the details?
In recent decades brain researchers have begun "opening up the black
box," deploying a formidable array of increasingly sophisticated clinical,
pharmacological, biochemical, genetic, neurosurgical, electrophysiologi­
cal, and behavioral methodologies in efforts to understand what brains
can do and how they do it. The last 20 years in particular have witnessed
the emergence of an entire family of new "functional neuroimaging" tech­
niques such as high-resolution electroencephalography (EEG), functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and positron emission tomography
(PET), which allow researchers to observe with ever-increasing temporal
and spatial precision subtle physiological processes taking place in the inte­
rior of intact and functioning human brains.
xx-Introduction

These techniques have yielded a torrent of new information about the

brain. Scientists and philosophers confronting the mind-body problem even
as recently as a century ago knew only in a relatively global and undiffer­
entiated fashion that the brain is the organ of mind. Today we know a great
deal more, although our knowledge undoubtedly remains in many respects
extremely primitive relative to the brain's unimaginable complexity. We
know a lot about the structure and operation of neurons and even lower­
level constituents. We also know a lot about the structural organization of
the brain, its wiring diagram, and thanks mainly to the new imaging tech­
nologies we have begun to learn a fair amount about itsfunctional organiza­
tion, the manner in which complex patterns of neural activity are mobilized
and coordinated across spatially separated regions of the brain in conjunc­
tion with ongoing experience and behavior.
The empirical connection between mind and brain seems to most
observers to be growing ever tighter and more detailed as our scientific
understanding of the brain advances. In light of the successes already in
hand, it may not seem unreasonable to assume as a working hypothesis that
this process can continue indefinitely without encountering any insuperable
obstacles, and that properties of minds will ultimately be fully explained
by those of brains. For most contemporary scientists, however, this useful
working hypothesis has become something more like an established fact, or
even an unquestionable axiom. At the concluding ceremonies of the 1990s
"Decade of the Brain," for example, Antonio Damasio (1999) encapsulated
the prevailing view:

In an effort that continues to gain momentum, virtually all the functions

studied in traditional psychology-perception, learning and memory,
language, emotion, decision-making, creativity-are being understood in
terms of their brain underpinnings. The mysteries behind many of these
functions are being solved, one by one, and it is now apparent that even
consciousness, the towering problem in the field, is likely to be elucidated
before too long.'

That an enormous amount of methodological and substantive progress

has been made by scientific psychology in its first century can hardly be
denied, and I do not mean to deny it. But what sort of root conception of
human mind and personality has so far emerged from all this effort? There
are many rapidly shifting cross-currents and variations of detail amid the
welter of current views, but to the extent that any provisional consensus has
been achieved by contemporary mainstream scientists, psychologists and
neuroscientists in particular, it is decidedly hostile to traditional and com­
monsense notions and runs instead along roughly the following lines: We
human beings are nothing but extremely complicated biological machines.
Everything we are and do is in principle causally explainable from the bot-

I. This quotation and others in this book that do not list a page number were
taken from sources published on the internet without specific pagination.
 Introduction-xxi

tom up in terms of our biology, chemistry, and physics-ultimately, that is,

in terms of local contact interactions among bits of matter moving in strict
accordance with mechanical laws under the influence of fields of force.2
Some of what we know, and the substrate of our general capacities to learn
additional things, are built-in genetically as complex resultants of biological
evolution. Everything else comes to us directly or indirectly by way of our
sensory systems, through energetic exchanges with the environment of types
already largely understood. Mind and consciousness are entirely generated
by-or perhaps in some mysterious way identical with-neurophysiological
events and processes in the brain. Mental causation, volition, and the "self"
do not really exist; they are mere illusions, by-products of the grinding of
our neural machinery. And of course because one's mind and personality
are entirely products of the bodily machinery, they will necessarily be extin­
guished, totally and finally, by the demise and dissolution of that body.
Views of this sort unquestionably hold sway over the vast majority
of contemporary scientists, and by now they have also percolated widely
through the public at large.3 They appear to be supported by mountains of
evidence. But are they correct?
The authors of this book are united in the conviction that they are not
correct-that in fundamental respects they are at best incomplete, and at
certain critical points demonstrably false, empirically. These are strong
statements, but our book will systematically elaborate and defend them.
Our doubts regarding current psychological orthodoxy, I hasten to add,
are at least in part shared by others. There seems to be a growing unease
in many quarters, a sense that the narrowly physicalist contemporary
approach to the analysis of mind has deflected psychology as a whole from

2. Newton's law of universal gravitation, insofar as it implies instantaneous action

at a distance, appears to conflict with this characterization of physical causation,
and indeed this feature greatly troubled Newton himself. The idea that matter could
influence other matter without mutual contact was to him "so great an Absurdity
that I believe no Man who has in philosophical matters a competent Faculty of
thinking, can ever fall into it" (Newton, 1687/1964, p. 634). Newton himself pre­
sumed that this difficulty could eventually be removed-as indeed it was, more than
two centuries later, with the appearance of Einstein's theory of relativity.

3. Just as this introduction was being drafted, a lengthy cover story on "mindl
body medicine" appeared in the September 27, 2004, edition of Newsweek. This
article exemplifies throughout the attitudes I have just described, and it culminates
i n a full-page editorial by psychologist Steven Pinker, author of How the Mind Works
(1997), decrying what he terms "the disconnect between our common sense and our
best science." Pinker further advises Newsweek's massive readership that contrary
to their everyday beliefs "modern neuroscience has shown that there is no user [of
the brain]. The soul' is, in fact, the information-processing activity of the brain.
New imaging techniques have tied every thought and emotion to neural activity."
These statements grossly exaggerate what neuroscience has actually accomplished,
as this book will demonstrate.
xxii-Introduction

what should be its most central concerns, and furthermore that mainstream
computationalist/physicalist theories themselves are encountering funda­
mental limitations and have nearly exhausted their explanatory resources.
The recent resurgence of scientific and philosophic interest in consciousness
and altered states of consciousness, and in the deep problems which these
topics inherently involve, is just one prominent symptom, among many oth­
ers, of these trends.
Even former leaders of the "cognitive revolution" such as Jerome Bruner,
Noam Chomsky, George Miller, and Ulric Neisser have publicly voiced dis­
appointment in its results. Chomsky in particular has railed repeatedly and
at length against premature and misguided attempts to "reduce" the mind
to currently understood neurophysiology. Chomsky (1993), for example,
pointed out that empirical regularities known to 1 9th-century chemistry
could not be explained by the physics of the day, but did not simply disap­
pear on that account; rather, physics eventually had to expand in order to
accommodate the facts of chemistry. Similarly, he argued, we should not
settle for specious "reduction" of an inadequate psychology to present-day
neurophysiology, but should instead seek "unification" of an independently
justified level of psychological description and theory with an adequately
complete and clear conception of the relevant physical properties of the
body and brain-but only if and when we get such a conception. For in
Chomsky's view, shared by many modern physicists, advances in physics
from Newton's discovery of universal gravitation to 20th-century develop­
ments in quantum mechanics and relativity theory have undermined the
classical and commonsense conceptions of matter to such an extent that
reducibility of mind to matter is anything but straightforward, and hardly
a foregone conclusion.
Several contemporary state-of-the-art surveys in psychology-for
example, Koch and Leary (1 985), Solso (1997), and Solso and Massaro
( l 995)-provide considerable further evidence of dissatisfaction with the
theoretical state of things in psychology and of a widely felt need to regain
the breadth of vision of its founders, such as William lames. Solso and Mas­
saro (1995) remark in their summing-up that "central to the science of the
mind in the twenty-first century will be the question of how the mind is
related to the body" (p. 306) and that "the self remains a riddle" (p. 31 1).
David Leary's (1990) essay on the evolution of lames's thinking about the
self begins by documenting the remarkable degree to which the Principles
had already anticipated most of the substance of subsequent psychological
investigations of the self. He then goes on, however, to emphasize that later
developments in lames's own thought-developments completely unknown
to the vast maj ority of contemporary psychologists-contain the seeds of
an enlarged and deepened conception of the self that can potentially secure
its location where lames himself firmly believed it belongs, at the very center
of an empirically adequate scientific psychology. From still another direc­
tion, Henri Ellenberger (1970) ends his landmark work on the discovery of
the unconscious with a plea for reunification of the experimental and clini-
 Introduction-xxiii

cal wings of psychology: "We might then hope to reach a higher synthesis
and devise a conceptual framework that would do justice to the rigorous
demands of experimental psychology and to the psychic realities experi­
enced by the explorers of the unconscious" (p. 897).
As will become apparent, our book wholeheartedly endorses this his­
torically conscious, ecumenical, and reintegrative spirit. Before proceeding
with its very unusual substance, however, we must set forth certain meth­
odological principles that have guided us throughout, and that we strongly
encourage our readers to adopt as well.
First and perhaps foremost is an attitude of humility in relation to the
present state of scientific knowledge. Although we humans indisputably
have learned a great deal through systematic application of our scientific
methods, and are learning more at an accelerating rate, we undoubtedly
still have a long way to go. There is surely a great deal about the physical
world in general, let alone brains, minds, and consciousness, that we do not
yet understand. Furthermore, our intimate familiarity with the basic facts
of mental life-including, for example, our ability to direct our thoughts to
states of affairs in the external world, and indeed the fundamental fact of
consciousness itself-should not be confused with understanding, or blind
us to the deeply puzzling and mysterious character of these phenomena.
The self-assurance, even arrogance, of much contemporary writing on these
subjects seems to us wholly unjustified and inappropriate. From this point
of view many old scientific books and papers that purport to explain fea­
tures of mental life in terms of hypothetical brain processes make fasci­
nating reading, because of the many ultra-confident pronouncements they
contain which in hindsight we know to be false. Future readers of many
present-day books and papers about brain, mind, and consciousness, we
believe, are l ikely to experience similar reactions.
Second, we emphasize that science consists at bottom of certain atti­
tudes and procedures, rather than any fixed set of beliefs. The most basic
attitude is that facts have primacy over theories and that beliefs should
therefore always remain modifiable in response to new empirical data. In
the forceful words of Francis Bacon (1620/1960), from the beginning of the
scientific era: "The world is not to be narrowed till it will go into the under­
standing . . . but the understanding to be expanded and opened till it can take
in the image of the world as it is in fact" (p. 276).
Although all scientists presumably endorse this idea in principle, there
are complications and subtleties in practice, because "facts" and theories
are strongly interdependent. As remarked long ago by philosopher F. C. S.
Schiller (1905), "for the facts to be 'discovered' there is needed the eye to see
them" (p. 60). Many of the issues discussed in this book revolve around well­
documented empirical phenomena-facts, we will insist-that have been
systematically ignored or rejected by mainstream scientists who find them
too discordant with prevailing views to take seriously.
This is a tricky and delicate business, however; for when current scien­
tific opinion hardens into dogma it becomes scientism, which is essentially
xxiv-Introduction

a type of fundamentalism, a secular theology, and no longer science. As

William James (1896) remarked, "science means, first of all, a certain dis­
passionate method. To suppose that it means a certain set of results that one
should pin one's faith upon and hug forever is sadly to mistake its genius,
and degrades the scientific body to the status of a sect" {p. 6).4 Although
this may seem uncontroversial, even trite, it is easily and often forgotten.
The history of science is therefore replete with the sad spectacle of scien­
tists-sometimes even very prominent scientists talking about their own
scientific specialties-issuing what later prove to be profoundly erroneous
judgments. For example, Badash (1972) studied the last third of the 1 9th
century, when a "malaise of completeness" pervaded the physical sciences.
James Clerk Maxwell commented in 1871 that "the opinion seems to have
got abroad, that in a few years all the great physical constants will have
been approximately estimated, and that the only occupation which will
then be left to men of science will be to carry on these measurements to
another place of decimals" (p. 50). In 1894 his American counterpart A. A.
Michelson declared that "it seems probable that most of the grand underly­
ing principles have been firmly established and that further advances are
to be sought chiefly in the rigorous application of these principles to all the
phenomena which come under our notice" (p. 52). But the next year brought
the discovery of X-rays, and within the decade radioactivity, the electron,
quantum theory, and relativity would shake the foundations of physical
knowledge. Misjudgments of this magnitude-and many further examples
could easily be adduced-should certainly give pause to anyone tempted to
presume that today's science defines the limits of the possible.
Although facts have primacy, not all facts are of equal importance. The
ones that should count the most, relative to a given problem, are obviously
those that can contribute most to its solution. A useful principle that provides
orientation and helps guide the search for such facts was stated as follows by
Wind (1967): "It seems to be a lesson of history that the commonplace may
be understood as a reduction of the exceptional, but the exceptional cannot
be understood as an amplification of the commonplace" (p. 238). This les­
son has not penetrated contemporary cognitive science, which deals almost
exclusively with the commonplace and yet presumes-extrapolating vastly
beyond what in reality are very limited successes-that we are progress­
ing inexorably toward a comprehensive understanding of mind and brain
based on classical physicalist principles. This serene confidence seems to us
unwarranted. It is now evident, for example, that chess-playing computer
programs represent progress toward real intelligence in roughly the same

4. The degradation feared by James is exemplified by media figure Michael

Shermer, editor of Skeptic magazine, in an opinion piece appearing in Scientific
American (June, 2002). There Shermer not only overtly embraces scientism, appar­
ently unaware of the generally derogatory connotations of this term, but goes on to
characterize leading contemporary scientists in quasi-religious terms: "This being
the Age of Science, it is scientism's shamans who command our veneration."
 Introduction-xxv

sense that climbing a tree represents progress toward the moon. This book
will apply Wind's principle by focusing upon a variety of psychological phe­
nomena that any adequate theory of mind and consciousness will have to
accommodate, but that we believe cannot be satisfactorily accommodated
within the current explanatory framework of cognitive science. This in turn
will motivate an effort to identify an expanded framework capable of over­
coming these limitations.
Our own empiricism is thus thorough-going and radical, in the sense
that we are willing to look at all relevant facts and not just those that
seem compatible, actually or potentially, with current mainstream theory.
Indeed, if anything it is precisely those observations that seem to conflict
with current theory that should command the most urgent attention. As
James (190911986) put it: "When was not the science of the future stirred to
its conquering activities by the rebellious little exceptions to the science of
the present?" (p. 375). Or again (James, 1 890-189611910):

Round about the accredited and orderly fact s of every science there ever
floats a sort of dust-cloud of exceptional observations, of occurrences
minute and irregular and seldom met with, which it always proves more
easy to ignore than to attend to . . . . Any one will renovate his science who
will steadily look after the irregular phenomena. And when the science is
renewed, its new formulas often have more of the voice of the exceptions in
them than of what were supposed to be the rules. (pp. 299-300)

The contribution of anomalies such as radioactivity and the photoelectric

effect to the rise of quantum theory amply confirms the wisdom of this
remark.
To qualify for this navigational role, of course, the relevant facts should
also be suitably well-attested, and this caveat provides considerable scope
for exercise of personal judgment. Science must always seek an appropri­
ate balance between liberalism and conservatism in the admission of new
observations, and it tends naturally and appropriately toward conservatism,
amplified in proportion to the depth to which the new observations appear
to conflict with expectations based on current understanding. Contrary to
the popular mythology of science, however, such judgments often fall short
of its professed ideals of dispassionate and open-minded evaluation of evi­
dence.
Real science is saturated, like all other human endeavors, with human
fai lings. It is often portrayed, and likes to portray itself, as reliably marshal­
ing the intellectual virtues of reason and objectivity against retreating forces
of religion, authority, and superstition-Galileo's treatment at the hands
of the Catholic Church providing a hackneyed example. But especially in
more recent times, opposition to new scientific ideas comes principally from
other scientists, and often on less than satisfactory grounds (B. Barber, 1961;
Kuhn, 1962). Harvey's theory of the circulation of the blood and discoveries
by Lister, Semmelweiss, and Pasteur related to the germ theory of disease
and the importance of sterilization in hospital environments were at first
xxvi-Introduction

bitterly resisted by their medical colleagues. Lord Kelvin strongly resisted

Maxwell's formulation of the laws of electromagnetism, and he never gave
up his belief that atoms are indivisible (B. Barber, 1 961). Scalp-level record­
ing of brain stem evoked potentials is now used routinely to verify the integ­
rity of sensory pathways in neonates and major-surgery patients, but its
developer Don Jewett has described vividly the difficulties he experienced
early on in funding and publishing this work, which conflicted with what his
reviewers thought they knew about the behavior of electrical potentials in
biological tissue. Wegener's geophysical theory of plate tectonics was simi­
larly ridiculed for decades before being empirically confirmed. Many other
examples of this sort could easily be cited. Pioneer of quantum mechanics
Max Planck (1950) was perhaps only slightly exaggerating when he said: "A
new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and mak­
ing them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and
a new generation grows up that is familiar with it" (pp. 33-34).
This issue of scientific resistance has proved especially troublesome for
one particular family of observations among the many kinds we draw upon
in developing the central argument of this book-namely, observations
adduced in the course of over a century of effort by workers in "psychical
research" and its somewhat desiccated modern descendant, "parapsychol­
ogy." My co-authors and I wish therefore to state immediately and unequiv­
ocally our own attitude toward this still-controversial subject. The irration­
al incredulity that remains characteristic of mainstream scientific opinion
in this area seems to us a remarkable anomaly that will provide abundant
and challenging grist for the mills of future historians and sociologists of
science. Sufficient high-quality evidence has long since been available, we
believe, to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the basic
"paranormal" phenomena, at least for those willing to study that evidence
with an open mind.5
Our Appendix contains an annotated bibliography providing useful
points of entry into this large and complex literature. I hasten to add that
this literature is uneven and imperfect, like any other scientific literature,
and that our endorsement does not extend to all parts of it equally. What we
do insist upon, however, is that this scientific literature is something entirely
different from what one routinely encounters in checkout lines at the super-

5. The popular terms for the main classes of relevant phenomena are "extrasen­
sory perception" (ESP) and "mind-over-matter" or "psychokinesis" (PK). ESP is
sometimes broken into subtypes such as "telepathy" (direct or unmediated aware­
ness of the mental state or activity of another person), "clairvoyance" (of distant
events or objects), and "precognitionlretrocognition" (of future/past events). It is
widely recognized by researchers, however, that these familiar terms are unduly
theory-laden and may not correspond to real differences in underlying process.
Many researchers therefore prefer the more neutral terminology introduced by
Thouless and Wiesner (l947)-"psi" for paranormal phenomena in general, occa­
sionally subdivided into "psi gamma" for the input side and "psi kappa" for the
output side.
 Introduction-xxvii

market or in the flood of sensationalized drivel invading our TV and movie

screens. The public credulity that enables this industry to thrive is deplor­
able, and we ourselves deplore it, but this has no bearing on the underlying
scientific issue as to whether psi phenomena really exist as facts of nature.
It seems to us axiomatic that no intellectually responsible person, and
especially no responsible scientist, should feel entitled to render opinions on
this subject without first taking the time and trouble to study the relevant
literature. This axiom is regularly violated, however, and in this connection
we wish to comment briefly but more generally on the behavior of outside
critics of this field, without being drawn into a discussion that could very
easily become a book in itself.
The fundamental issue was incisively framed by American philosopher
C. J. Ducasse (1969) as fol lows:

Although the evidence offered by addicts of the marvelous for the reality
of the phenomena they accept must be critically examined, it is equally
necessary on the other side to scrutinize just as closely and critically the
skeptics' allegations of fraud, or of malobservation, or of misinterpreta­
tion of what was observed, or of hypnotically induced hallucinations. For
there is likely to be just as much wishful thinking, prejudice, emotion, snap
judgment, naivete, and intellectual dishonesty on the side of orthodoxy,
of skepticism, and of conservatism, as on the side of hunger for and belief
in the marvelous. The emotional motivation for irresponsible disbelief is,
in fact, probably even stronger-especially in scientifically educated per­
sons, whose pride of knowledge is at stake-than is in other persons the
motivation for irresponsible belief. In these matters, nothing is so rare as
genuine objectivity and impartiality of judgment-judgment determined
neither by the will to believe nor the will to disbelieve, but only by the will
to get at the truth irrespective of whether it turns out to be comfortably
familiar or uncomfortably novel, consoling or distressing, orthodox, or
unorthodox. (p. 35)

In our informed and considered opmlOn, the critiques of psychical

research that have so far been offered by outside observers mainly demon­
strate the validity of Ducasse's concerns, and routinely though not invari­
ably fail to meet normal standards of scholarly practice. These tendencies
were already ful ly apparent to William James, who took psychical research
far more seriously than most present-day psychologists realize (James, 1986;
G. Murphy & Ballou, 1960; E. Taylor, 1996), and they have scarcely abated
in the subsequent century. We will not dwell on these controversies here,
but have included in the Appendix some pointers to recent literature that
illustrates their strange character.
We do, however, want to highlight here one particular critical strategy
that has been very commonly and inappropriately employed. Most critics
implicitly-and some, like Hansel (1966, p. 19), explicitly-take the view
that psi phenomena are somehow known a priori to be impossible. In that
case one is free to invent any scenario, no matter how far-fetched, to explain
away ostensible evidence of psi. Because there are no perfect laboratory
xxviii-Introduction

experiments-nor, for that matter, perfect "spontaneous" cases involving

psi experiences occurring outside of a laboratory-any positive result what­
ever can be discredited in this way, and thus any potential accumulation of
evidence aborted.6 The extent to which many critics have been willing to
pursue this strategy reveals the depth of their emotional commitment to
current scientific orthodoxy, and is to us nothing short of amazing. Contrast
this with the attitude expressed by James (1920): "I believe there is no source
of deception in the investigation of nature which can compare with a fixed
belief that certain kinds of phenomenon are impossible" (p. 248). Can there
be any doubt which is the scientifically more responsible attitude?
One further point needs to be drawn out in this connection. Many crit­
ics also seem to presume that words like "paranormal" or "supernormal"
are synonymous with "supernatural." That is not the case, however. Psi
phenomena (and certain other unusual phenomena that we will discuss in
this book) are in our view inconsistent only with the current materialis­
tic synthesis, summarized by Broad (1962) in the form of widely accepted
"basic limiting principles." They do not obviously or necessarily conflict
with more fundamental laws of nature, and indeed to claim such a conflict
is to presume that we already know all the relevant laws, which hardly seems
likely. The authors of this book emphatically do not believe in "miracles,"
conceived as breaches of natural law. Our attitude is that these seemingly
anomalous phenomena occur not in contradiction to nature itself, but only
in contradiction to what is presently known to us of nature. The phenomena
we catalog here are important precisely because they challenge so strongly
the current scientific consensus; in accordance with Wind's principle, they
not only invite but should command the attention of anyone seriously inter­
ested in the mind.
Finally, we also wish to make clear immediately that in our view
"empirical" research includes but is by no means limited to experimental
research. Laboratory research using random samples of subjects, control
groups, and statistical modes of data analysis can be wonderfully useful,
but obsession with this as the only valid means of acquiring new knowl­
edge readily degenerates into "methodolatry" (Bakan, 1967), the method­
ological face of scientism. Laboratory experimentation certainly does not
exhaust the means of obtaining valid and important information. Detailed
case studies of special individuals, such as persons displaying rare cognitive
skills or having unusual neurological deficits, have often provided unique
insights and indisputably can play a valuable role in the evolution of scien­
tific understanding. Pertinent modern examples here are the investigations
by Luria (1968) and Sacks (1987) of persons displaying prodigious abilities
of memory and calculation. Conversely, the experimental literature itself is
replete with examples of supposedly "rigorous" laboratory studies which

6. Statistically knowledgeable readers will recognize that critics of this type are
acting in effect like Bayesians who have assigned a prior probability of zero to the
existence of psi phenomena (see also Radin, 2006).
 Introduction-xxix

were in fact performed under conditions that guaranteed their failure from
the outset. A good example here is provided by the many superficial studies
of "meditation" carried out by unsympathetic investigators, using as their
subjects random samples of undergraduates having little if any experience
or interest in meditation (M. Murphy & Donovan, 1997; M. A. West, 1987;
see also our Chapter 8).
With these methodological principles in mind, we turn now to the sub­
stance of our book. In our opinion, the most systematic, comprehensive,
and determined empirical assault on the mind-body problem ever carried
out in the suggested spirit, during the entire long history of psychology, is
summarized in F. W. H. Myers's (1903) undeservedly neglected two-volume
work Human Personality (henceforth, HP). Myers's friend and colleague
William James (1901) declared that "through him for the first time, psychol­
ogists are in possession of their full material, and mental phenomena are
set down in an adequate inventory" (p. 16). Gardner Murphy (1954) praised
"the heroic accumulation of data and amazing integration which the work
represents" (p. iv). Ellenberger (1970) described Myers as "one of the great
systematizers of the notion of the unconscious mind" (p. 314) and his book
as "an unparalleled collection of source material on the topics of somnam­
bulism, hypnosis, hysteria, dual personality, and parapsychological phe­
nomena, . . . contain[ing] a complete theory of the unconscious mind, with its
regressive, creative, and mythopoetic functions" (p. 788). James and various
other writers have suggested that to the extent Myers's views are upheld by
subsequent research he could rank with Charles Darwin in terms of the
character, scope, and originality of his contributions. Myers also powerfully
influenced many leading thinkers of the day, including both William James
and Pierre Janet, but like James and Janet themselves he was soon pushed
aside by the virulent behaviorism nascent at that period . However, just as
James and Janet have undergone a major renaissance in recent years, as
their central concerns and ideas have begun to reanimate the psychological
mainstream, we believe that Myers's work deserves both wider recognition
and careful re-examination for the light it can shed on the current situation
in psychology.
The balance of our book attempts to fur ther these aims. Chapters 1 and
2 provide essential background. We begin by reviewing modern develop­
ments in cognitive science, calling into question the ability of physicalist/
computationalist models of the mind in any of their current forms to deal
adequately with the most basic, central, and pervasive phenomena of mind
and consciousness. We also identify a variety of specific empirical phenom­
ena, and a variety of critical aspects of human mental life, that appear to
resist or defy understanding in terms of the currently prevailing physicalist
conceptual framework. The central objective of this exercise is to reduce
whatever confidence in that framework readers may in itially have, and thus
to provide justification for revisiting the broader and deeper framework
elaborated over a century ago by Myers, James, and their colleagues.
xxx-Introduction

The following chapter summarizes the contributions of F. W. H. Myers

to empirical investigation of the mind-body relation. It begins with a brief
summary of the relevant 19th-century intellectual background that suggests
why Myers and his type of synoptic approach were ultimately ignored by the
nascent materialist psychology. After outlining the purposes and principles
in which Myers's work was rooted, the chapter goes on to describe Myers's
theoretical model of human personality and consciousness, a model that
is the most fully worked out example (so far) of "filter" or "transmission"
theories of mind (James, 1898/1 900; Schiller, 1891/1894), according to which
mind is not generated by the brain but instead focused, limited, and con­
strained by it. The chapter also includes a description of the methodological
principles and empirical phenomena which Myers considered essential for a
fully comprehensive and adequate science of psychology.7
The next six chapters constitute the empirical heart of the book. We
focus in detail on selected large classes of psychological phenomena, sev­
eral of which were investigated in considerable depth by Myers himself, that
appear especially challenging to contemporary mainstream views and capa­
ble of yielding new insight into the nature of the mind-brain connection. We
do not attempt to review these topics exhaustively, but discuss them selec­
tively in relation to their bearing on this central issue. In so doing, we also
begin to assess the degree to which Myers's views have been sustained and
confirmed, or must be modified or discarded, in light of subsequent work.
Following Myers's own practice, we attempt to lead readers by degrees and
without obvious discontinuity from phenomena which, though challenging,
are well established and seem at least potentially compatible with current
orthodoxy, to phenomena which in our view are just as well or nearly as well
established, but clearly cannot be accommodated or understood without
radical revision of our most fundamental theoretical ideas. The principal
topics we discuss include extreme forms of psychophysiological influence,
empirical and conceptual difficulties with current "trace" theories of mem­
ory, psychological automatisms and secondary streams of consciousness,
the family of "near-death" and "out-of-body" experiences and related phe­
nomena, genius-level creativity, and the world-wide psychological phenom­
enon of "mystical" experience.
In the final chapter we attempt to re-assess Myers's theory of human
personality and to draw out additional implications of this book for future
psychological theory and research. We underscore that Myers and James
made the most comprehensive effort to date to analyze the mind-body rela-

7. This chapter provides a useful introduction to Myers, but it is no substitute for

the real thing. With the hard cover version of Irreducible Mind, we included a CD
containing the entire text of Human Personality in Microsoft Reader ebook format,
as well as its most significant contemporary reviews and translations of all foreign
text. This digital version and the reader are freely available at the Esalen website
(http://www.esalenctr.org/display/hp_ctr.cfm) or through the University of Virginia
Electronic Text Center (http://etext.lib.virginia.edu).
 Introduction-xxxi

tion empirically, and we urge scientific psychology to return to its great

central problems with a comparably synoptic empirical approach, but sup­
ported now by the tremendous methodological and technical advances
achieved in the intervening century. We further argue that Myers's theoreti­
cal scheme and the empirical phenomena he deployed to support it have held
up remarkably well, and at many points have been substantially reinforced
by subsequent research. Remaining difficulties and weaknesses, however,
are also pointed out, together with critical opportunities and problems
for further investigation. Finally, we attempt to show how the theoretical
framework elaborated by Myers and James, although certainly incomplete
and imperfect, can be reconciled with leading-edge contemporary physics
and neuroscience, and prefigures an enlarged scientific psychology that can
potentially overcome the historical fragmentation sketched above.
 Chapter 1

A View from the M ainstream:

Contemporary Cognitive Neuroscience
and the Consciousness Debatesl

Edward F. Kelly

The central contention of this book is that the science of the mind has
reached a point where multiple lines of empirical evidence, drawn from a
wide variety of sources, converge to produce a resolution of the mind-body
problem along lines sharply divergent from the current mainstream view.
The goal of the present chapter is to set the stage by sketching the evolu­
tion of mainstream psychology itself over the past hundred years, empha­
sizing modern developments and assessing critically where things presently
stand.
The territory to be covered is vast and complex, so my account will
necessarily be telegraphic and selective, and strongly colored by personal
interests and experience-hence, "A View. . ,," The center of perspective
throughout is that of a working experimental psychologist, one whose pro­
fessional experience includes psychology of language, human functional
neuroimaging studies using both high-resolution EEG and fMRI methods,
single-unit neurophysiological work in animals, and experimental parapsy­
chology. I regret that I can claim only amateur-level acquaintance with rele­
vant contemporary literature in philosophy of mind and language, although
I recognize its value and unlike most of my fellow psychologists have made
significant efforts to acquaint myself with it. The recent upsurge in efforts

1. This chapter updates and greatly expands on views more tentatively expressed
in E. F. Kelly ( 1979). I wish to express thanks to Lisette Coly and the Parapsychol­
ogy Foundation for permission to use parts of that earlier essay. Thanks also to
Alan Gauld for especially helpful comments on earlier drafts of this one.
2-Chapter 1

to bring these complementary perspectives simultaneously to bear on our

central subject matter in a systematic and mutually informed way seems to
me altogether welcome, and long overdue. 2

The History of Cognitive Psychology: A Thumbnail Sketch

The following three sections summarize the history of mainstream psychol­

ogy in the English-speaking world from the advent of behaviorism to the
present. So brief a sketch must necessarily be impressionistic, but I believe
it is faithful to the main outlines of the subject as it has developed so far, and
would be so regarded by most workers in the field. Useful general sources
for readers wanting additional historical detail include Flanagan (1991), H.
Gardner (1985), and Harnish (2002).

From James B. Watson to the Cognitive Revolution

The history of scientific psychology in the 20th century can be charac­

terized, somewhat cynically perhaps, as a movement toward progressively
less unsatisfactory analyses of the mind. I will pass quickly over the first half
of this history. Noam Chomsky remarked parenthetically during a lecture
on linguistics in 1964 that in his opinion the first half century of American
experimental psychology would end up as a footnote in the history of sci­
ence. That was a characteristically provocative Chomsky remark, but even
then it seemed more right than wrong. The historian of psychology Sigmund
Koch, an early advocate of behaviorism who evolved into perhaps its most
ferocious critic, has repeatedly derided the simplistic scientism of the pe­
riod, and marveled at the degree to which behaviorism, having sprung into
existence under the banner of a "consoling myth of natural science rigor
and systematicity," had so often "proceeded to liquidate its subject matter"
(Koch & Leary, 1 985, p. 942). During its heyday, from perhaps the 1920s
to the late 1 950s, behaviorism enjoyed extraordinary, almost monolithic,
institutional and professional power. Even as late as 1990, the chairman of
psychology at a major American university, in a symposium celebrating the
centennial of the Principles ofPsychology, characterized lames's great book
as mainly i llustrating what psychology should not be; its positive attributes
consisted mostly of those few scattered passages where lames's observations
corresponded to truths revealed by real psychology-the natural science
devoted to analysis and control of behavior (Kimble, 1990).
Certainly one of the chief lessons to be derived here is that entire gen­
erations of industrious and able scientists can be captured by an ideology

2. The symposium recorded in Bock and Marsh (1 993) provides an outstanding

example, and one we have tried collectively to emulate.
 A View from the Mainstream-3

that is fundamentally unsound. I do not mean to say that behaviorism was

all bad. Its central methodological impulse, emphasizing the importance of
systematic empirical observation and measurement, was certainly healthy
and remains so today. Even on that front, however, the early behaviorist
program was unnecessarily narrow. Encouraged by the verificationist doc­
trine associated with the Vienna school of logical positivism (Ayer, 1952),
behaviorists simply outlawed in principle all reference to anything not di­
rectly observable from the third-person standpoint. Stimuli, responses, and
their supposedly lawful connections exhausted the scientifically legitimate
subject matter. Even ignoring the often considerable difficulties in defining
exactly what constitutes "a stimulus" or "a response," however, this meth­
odological asceticism was not warranted by any independently established
conception of the nature of science. Indeed, philosophers of science soon
abandoned verificationism in its narrowest construction, recognizing that
even classical physics, the archetypal science, did not hesitate to postulate
entities and processes that could not be observed directly, but only through
their lawful connections to other things that could.
The experimental psychology that began to evolve after Watson's 1913
manifesto can be viewed as a kind of operationalization of 19th-century
associationist theories of the mind, in which "ideas" were replaced by be­
haviors, and complex behaviors were imagined as arising from simple ones
through processes of conditioning and reinforcement. The bulk of this work
was carried out with simpler organisms such as rats and pigeons, on the view
that everything necessary for scientific psychology was present there, and in
more accessible form. From the principles that emerged from such studies,
it was hoped, we would eventually be able to build a psychology capable of
accounting for all the complexities characteristic of human behavior. This
specifically included what Descartes had insisted is uniquely ours, and a
defining attribute of the mind-our use of language. A few mainstream be­
haviorists such as Edward Tolman and Egon Brunswick suggested that even
the behavior of rats running their mazes might be guided by some sort of
inner representation or map, but these suggestions were largely ignored.
Methodological behaviorism was subsequently reinforced for a time by
a companion philosophical doctrine called logical or analytical behavior­
ism, which received perhaps its fullest expression in the influential book by
Ryle (1949). It shared Watson's objective of exorcising the mind, "the ghost
in the machine," but sought to achieve this objective by redefining men­
talistic terms in terms of overt behavior, or dispositions to such behavior.
Having a pain, for example, was to be construed as literally consisting in
crying out, reaching for the aspirin, and so on. This relentlessly third-per­
son approach to the mind seemed consistent with, and supportive of, the ac­
tual practices of behaviorist psychologists, but its problems as a philosophic
doctrine soon became apparent. 3 It proved extremely difficult in practice

3. For lucid and accessible discussions of the various philosophic positions brief­
ly canvassed in this section see for example the books of Church land ( 1988), Heil
( 1998), Kim (1 998), and Searle ( 1992).
4-Chapter 1

to specify, in finite detail and without covert reference to other mentalistic

terms, the behavioral conditions in terms of which the original mentalistic
terms were to be redefined. From a more commonsense point of view it also
seemed to leave out precisely the things that are most important to us as hu­
man beings-in particular mental causation and our subjective conscious
experience. We all know, for example, that pain and pain behavior simply
are not the same thing. One can have a pain but not show it, or act as if in
pain without actually being in pain. For these and other reasons analytical
behaviorism fell generally out of favor, although echoes are still heard to­
day-a primary source being Ry!e's student Daniel Dennett (1991).
Logical behaviorism gave way in the 1950s and 1960s to a family of
positions known collectively as identity theory. Its basic doctrine is that the
apparent correlation between mental states and brain states is to be inter­
preted in one particular way. Specifically, it holds that the relevant mental
and physical states are in some sense identical, the same things viewed as it
were from inside versus outside. This is regarded not as a logical necessity,
but as a fact that we have discovered empirically, through advances in psy­
chology and neuroscience, just as we have discovered that the morning star
and the evening star are one and the same.
The identity doctrine came in two forms: The first and stronger form,
formulated by writers such Herbert Feigl (1958), U. T. Place (1956), and J.
J. C. Smart ( 1959), holds that mental states can be subdivided into discrete
natural kinds or types, and that each of these types can be identified with
a corresponding type of neural process. A stock example is the supposedly
general relationship between "pain" and "excitation of c-fibers." The weak­
er form of identity theory claims only that each individually occurring or
token mental state is identical with some corresponding brain state. Note
that type identity entails token identity, but not vice-versa.
Type-identity is a strong and interesting philosophic thesis which im­
plies the possibility of reduction, and for these reasons many physicalists
welcomed it; but it is certainly false. Quite apart from the difficulties of
isolating appropriate "natural kinds" or types in either mental life or brain
processes, it is certain that many such mental types, if they existed, would
arise under wildly varying neurophysiological conditions. For example, lin­
guistic behaviors involve mainly the left hemisphere in right-handed adults,
but a mixture of both hemispheres or even mainly the right hemisphere in
left-handers. The mind-brain system is in general enormously adaptable or
"plastic." For example, superior general intelligence and linguistic function­
ing have been observed in a man whose entire left hemisphere had been
removed at age 5Y2 for control of seizures (A. Smith & Sugar, 1975). Fully
functioning adults are also occasionally discovered who altogether lack
maj or neural structures such as the corpus callosum or cerebellum, struc­
tures that are usually thought to be required for such functioning. In some
well-studied cases of hydrocephalus, normal or even exceptional mental
functioning has been found in persons who have only 3-5% of the normal
volume of brain tissue (R. Lewin, 1 980). And to take a still more extreme
 A View from the Mainstream-5

case, high-level forms of learning and memory are certainly present in the
octopus, an invertebrate whose nervous organization is radically different
from ours. It even lacks a hippocampus, the one structure that everyone
agrees plays an essential role in mammalian memory systems (Chapter 4).
Type identity, therefore, has had little appeal for psychologists and neu­
roscientists, who undoubtedly gravitate in the vast majority-to the extent
they think about such things at all-to some sort of token-identity view. This
was essentially the position advocated by James in The Principles, although
he disavowed atomism in all forms and took pains to insist that the level at
which the intersection is appropriately sought is that of whole momentary
states of consciousness and whole momentary states of the brain. Token
identity, on the other hand, has had relatively little appeal for philosophers.
Among other things it creates a new and serious problem: If the same men­
tal state, say a certain belief, can exist in combination with different sorts of
physical states in brains, what is it about all those physical states that makes
them "the same" as their common mental counterpart?
A philosophic response to this problem is the doctrine known as func­
tionalism, first formulated by Hilary Putnam (1967).4 Having rejected type
identity, on grounds that a given mental state might conceivably occur in
extraterrestrial beings, or more relevantly in computers, Putnam went on to
propose a novel solution to the problem just noted. His basic idea was to re­
conceptualize mental states once again, this time not in terms of what they
are made of, but in terms of what they do, their causal role in the functional
economy of whatever sort of creature or entity is in question. Just as "cut­
ting tools" can be implemented using rocks, metals, or laser beams, mental
states are to be conceived as "multiply realizable"-that is, potentially in­
stantiated in a variety of physical forms including not only token biological
states of one or many brains, but also in computers and other suitable kinds
of complex physical systems. On this view mental states become simply Xs,
defined by their causal relations to stimuli, to other mental states, and to
responses, and they can be identified as similar states to the extent they
perform similar roles in their respective causal networks.
I will make only a few brief comments on this doctrine, which in various
forms has dominated the philosophy of mind for almost 40 years. First, as
originally formulated it was inherently and fundamentally third-person and
behavioristic, albeit a refined behaviorism that admits the possibility of com­
plex causal processes-mental causes, in effect-mediating between stimuli
and responses. Like the earlier forms of behaviorism, it initially avoided all
reference to consciousness and subjective features of mental life. This was
widely felt to be unsatisfactory, however, and a large part of the subsequent
history of functionalism consists of strained attempts to "naturalize" first­
person phenomena of these sorts. Second, although functionalism readily
affiliates itself with both physicalism in general and token identity theories
in particular (and in most of its adherents probably still does), such affilia-

4. But note that Putnam himself subsequently abandoned functionalism, becom­

ing one of its severest critics; see Putnam ( 1988/1 998).
6-Chapter 1

tions are not an essential or inherent aspect of the doctrine. J. Fodor (l981a),
for example, pointed out that functionalist principles might perfectly well
apply to the operations of immaterial minds and the like, should any such
things exist. Finally, it is fair to say, I think, that functionalism arose not
so much sui generis in philosophy, but rather as a response to some exciting
new developments which had already occurred within scientific psychology
itself, and with which Putnam was certainly well acquainted. In any event,
it was the confluence of these streams that defined the emergence of the 20th
century's most distinctive contribution to mind-brain theory, the "Compu­
tational Theory of the Mind" (henceforth, CTM). I turn now to the psycho­
logical dimensions of this story.
By the late 1950s discontent with behaviorism was rapidly spreading, as
its inherent limitations became increasingly apparent. An influential paper
by Lashley (1951) had exposed fundamental difficulties in the attempt to ex­
plain complex behavior, notably human linguistic behavior, in terms of l in­
ear chains of stimuli and responses. B. F. Skinner, the leading behaviorist,
responded to this challenge, but his book on verbal behavior was subjected
to a destructive and widely circulated review by Chomsky (1959). Most sig­
nificantly of all, perhaps, a comprehensive state-of-the-science review orga­
nized by Sigmund Koch under the auspices of the American Psychological
Association and the National Science Foundation resulted in a sweeping,
6000-page, six-volume indictment of the entire behaviorist platform (Koch,
1959-1963).
At the root of these discontents was a recognition that the old asso­
ciationist explanatory principles, and their behavioral translations, were
in principle unable to cope with the hierarchically organized and orderly
character of human language and cognition. We needed a richer concept
of mechanism. And as it happened, possible means of overcoming these
limitations were just then becoming available, due to fundamental develop­
ments in the theory and practice of computation.
The old concept of a "machine"-and perhaps for most of us still the
everyday concept-is that of a physical contraption which transforms en­
ergy by means of pushes and pulls involving gears, pulleys, shafts, levers,
and so on. The fundamental insight underlying the modern developments
is the recognition that these physical arrangements are really of secondary
importance. The essential attribute of the machine is rather that its normal
behavior is bound by rule. This insight opened the way to an enormous en­
richment of our concept of mechanism, beginning with the contribution of
logicians and mathematicians in the 1930s and 1 940s and continuing into
the present day. These developments, moreover, immediately began to have
a profound impact on scientific psychology.
For example, it was quickly recognized that machines can transform
data or "information" as well as energy, and that a machine can in prin­
ciple utilize information about its performance to regulate its own behavior.
These ideas had immediate and urgent practical application in the construc­
tion of servo-controlled antiaircraft systems during World War II, but pos-
 A View from the Mainstream-7

sible theoretical implications for the understanding of behavior were also

apparent. Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow (1943), for example, argued
that from the point of view of an external observer a device constructed
on this principle of "negative feedback" behaved purposively-that is, as a
teleological mechanism. Thus, mechanism appeared to penetrate one of the
last strongholds of old-fashioned vitalist thinking.s
These analogies were developed much more systematically by Wiener in
his influential book Cybernetics, significantly subtitled Control and Commu­
nication in the Animal and the Machine. In addition to providing a general
analytic theory of feedback control processes, Wiener (1961) provided nu­
merous examples of physiological phenomena that seemed to fall within the
province of the theory. Nevertheless, the direct applications of cybernetic
theory at this level remained relatively limited. The real power of the ideas
emerged later on, in conjunction with the extremely flexible applications
technology provided by the digital computer.
To appreciate the full significance of these developments, it is neces­
sary to follow the generalization of the concept of "machine" to its ultimate
development in the hands of the British mathematician Alan Turing and
several others. Turing devised an abstract representation that formalized
his intuition of the core meaning of "mechanism," as applied to the theory
of computable functions. Any computation can be regarded as the transfor­
mation of a string of input symbols into a string of output symbols by a se­
quence of rule-governed steps. A procedure that is guaranteed to lead to the
desired output in a finite sequence of steps is called an "algorithm" or "ef­
fective procedure." Turing envisioned a machine consisting of a read/write
head operating on an indefinitely extendable tape ruled off into squares.
The behavior of the machine is completely specified by a set of five-part
rules. Given the machine's current state, and the input symbol written in the
current square, these rules instruct the machine to change state, write a new
symbol on the tape, and either remain where it is or move one square left or
right. By altering the number of states, the size of the vocabulary, and the
behavioral rules, an immense variety of behaviors can be realized by such
devices. In fact, Turing argued persuasively that anything that would natu­
rally qualify as an algorithm can be represented by a suitably constructed
machine of this sort. He also proved rigorously that he could construct a
"universal" Turing machine that would simulate the behavior of any other
Turing machine. The intuitive notion of "effective procedure" was thus ex­
plicated in terms of the formal notion "realizable by a Turing machine."
That this is not an arbitrary result but in a fundamental sense exhausts the
meaning of the concept of mechanism is strongly suggested by the fact that
other workers such as Alonso Church and Emil Post arrived at provably
equivalent results from widely different starting points.

5. Some observers, however, already resisted this interpretation of the behavioral

appearances as truly equivalent to intrinsic purposefulness in the everyday psycho­
logical sense; see, for example, Buckley (1 968, Part V).
8-Chapter 1

Because of their utter simplicity, Turing machines do even very simple

things such as adding two numbers in extremely cumbersome ways. Their
significance is theoretical, not practical. But links to brain-mind theory were
quickly forged. An influential paper by McCulloch and Pitts (1943) showed
that networks constructed from idealized neurons could in principle imple­
ment logical behaviors of arbitrary complexity. Both they themselves and
other workers further showed that equivalent capacities could be realized
using richer elements that more nearly approximated the characteristics of
real neurons. Thus it seemed likely that brains in principle have capacities
equivalent to those of Turing machines. They might conceivably have ad­
ditional capacities as well, but if so-and this is the essential point-these
capacities may lie beyond the reach of understanding based on computa­
tional principles alone.
The final ingredient was provided by mathematician John von Neu­
mann, who in 1947 invented the basic architecture of the modern stored­
program digital computer. Von Neumann was entirely familiar with the
theory of computability, and he was undoubtedly directly inspired as well
by McCulloch, Pitts, and Wiener, all of whom participated with him in
an important series of conferences on cybernetics sponsored by the Macy
Foundation (Dupuy, 2000). It was evident to all that von Neumann's new
architecture provided in effect the logical capabilities of a universal Tur­
ing machine, but now at last in a practically useful form. To the extent that
mind and brain are governed by formalizable rules, their activities could
now in principle be modeled on suitably programmed general-purpose digi­
tal computers. To those sufficiently committed a priori to mechanistic prin­
ciples, the very existence of any given class of behavior essentially entailed
the possibility of such formalization. The relation of mind to brain could be
conceptualized as analogous to the relation of computer software to com­
puter hardware, and the mind-brain problem would simply disappear.
There were other more specific theoretical results that further strength­
ened this emerging point of view. Consider, for example, some of the early
results in theoretical linguistics. Chomsky (1963) and others showed that
the possible classes of formal models of language (generative grammars)
formed a hierarchy, in which the weakest or most highly constrained class
(finite-state grammars) was obtained from the strongest or least constrained
class (unrestricted rewriting systems) by the application of progressively
more severe constraints on the form of the permissible rules of the gram­
mar. The resulting hierarchy of grammars, it turns out, also corresponds to
a hierarchy of classes of automata derived from Turing machines in parallel
fashion. Formal results from automata studies thus transferred to the anal­
ysis of candidate grammatical theories. Chomsky (1957) was able to show
that then-existing psychological and linguistic proposals for theories of lan­
guage, when formalized, corresponded to the weakest or most constrained
members of the hierarchy of grammars, and that these grammars were in
principle too weak to account for systematic structural properties of many
kinds of sentences found in natural languages such as English. He was thus
led to his famous theory of transformational grammar as the weakest class
 A View from the Mainstream-9

of theory which is still strong enough to account for the known grammatical
facts of language. The result that the corresponding automata are weaker
than Turing machines greatly strengthened the presumption that linguistic
behavior might be formalizable for computer modeling.
The central idea that minds, brains, and computers could fruitfully
be regarded as variants of a more general class of information-processing
mechanisms quickly took root, even among neuroscientists (W. J. Freeman,
1998; von Neumann, 1958). The ground was very well prepared. Indeed,
these developments seem to me an inevitable outcome of our Western sci­
entific tradition. This is not meant disparagingly, however. I have stressed
these results about Turing machines and so on precisely to underscore the
impressive depth of the theoretical foundation on which all the ensuing de­
velopments rest, a foundation which I feel has not been adequately appre­
ciated by many critics of this kind of work, such as Edelman and Tononi
(2000), nor even by some of its enthusiastic supporters, such as H. Gardner
(1985).
In practice, the applications came a bit slowly at first. In part this was
due to purely technical factors. The early computers were small, slow, and
highly prone to malfunction. More importantly, in the early days program­
ming a computer was an exasperating business requiring detailed familiar­
ity with low-level details of the hardware organization. Indeed, the basic ele­
ments of the available programming languages referred to data structures
and operations virtually at the hardware level. As the technology advanced,
however, machines grew larger, faster, and more reliable, and so-called
"higher-order" languages were created, such as FORTRAN, whose primi­
tives referred to data structures and operations at a level relatively natural
for human problem-solvers. Special-purpose applications programs written
in a higher-order language congenial to the user could then be translated
by general-purpose "compiler" or "interpreter" programs into the internal
language of the computer for execution by the hardware.
I mention these details because they relate to the other main reason for
the delay, which is more theoretical in nature and involves a basic question
of strategy. The fantastic complexities of the brain can obviously be studied
at many different levels from the cellular or even sub-cellular on up. At what
level shall we seek scientific explanations of human mental activity? Many
scientists, particularly those working at lower levels of the hierarchy of ap­
proaches, assume that events at the higher levels are in principle reducible
to events at lower levels, and that reductive explanations employing the con­
cepts of the lower levels are necessarily superior or more fundamental. Like
many other psychologists, I strongly disagree with this view.
Consider, for example, the problem of understanding the behavior of
a computer playing chess under the control of a stored program. It seems
obvious that we might observe the behavior of the computer's flip-flops for­
ever without gaining the slightest real understanding of the principles that
are embodied in the program and explain its behavior. One of the essential
characteristics of both human and animal behavior is that functional invari­
ance at a higher level may be coupled with extreme diversity at lower levels.
lO-Chapter 1

For example, the rats whose cortex Lashley (1950) progressively destroyed
in efforts to locate the memory trace could wobble, roll, or swim to their
food box, and I can write a given message with either hand, or probably
even with my feet if necessary. Attempted explanations based on activities
of the participating muscle-groups, neurons, and so on would never get to
the essential common feature, which is the approximate invariance of the
final behavioral outcome.
Thus it seems appropriate in general to seek a higher and perhaps dis­
tinctively "psychological" level of explanation for human cognitive pro­
cesses. For the computer simulation approach this involves identifying an
appropriate set of elementary information structures and processes that
seem powerful enough in principle to account for the relevant behaviors.
The hypothesized structures and processes should perhaps also be poten­
tially realizable in the brain, given its known properties-or at least not
demonstrably inconsistent with these properties-but successful use of the
computer as a tool of psychological understanding does not require the ob­
viously false presumption of literal identity between digital computers and
brains.
By the late 1 950s and early 1960s, a number of higher-order program­
ming languages had been created which emphasized the capacities of com­
puters as general-purpose symbol-manipulating or information-transform­
ing devices, rather than their more familiar "number-crunching" capacities.
These languages (such as IPL-V, LISP, and SNOBOL) provided facilities, for
example, for creating and manipulating complex tree-like data structures
consisting of hierarchically ordered and cross-referenced lists of symbols.
Structures of this sort played a central role in theoretical linguistics, and
in this and other ways the new languages seemed to many workers to fall
a t about the right level of abstraction to support realistic efforts to model
important aspects of human cognition.
Previous generations of workers had been obliged either to try to force
human mental processes to conform to artificially simple but relatively rig­
orous behavioristic models, or to lapse into the uncontrolled introspection
and mentalistic speculations of an earlier era. Now suddenly we were pro­
vided with a conceptual and technical apparatus sufficiently rich to express
much of the necessary complexity without loss of rigor. The "black box"
could be stuffed at will with whatever mechanisms seemed necessary to
account for a given behavior. A complicated theory could be empirically
tested by implementing it in the form of a computer program and verifying
its ability to generate the behavior, or to simulate a record of the behavior.
Progress toward machine intelligence could be assessed by means of "Tur­
ing's test"-the capacity of a computer program to mimic human behavior
sufficiently well that a physically remote human interlocutor is unable to
distinguish the program from another human in an "imitation game" (Tur­
ing, 1 950). The seminal modeling ideas of Craik (1943) could at last be put
into practice.
Enthusiasm for the computational approach to human cognition fairly
crackles through the pages of influential early books such as G. A. Miller,
 A View from the Mainstream-l l

Galanter, and Pribram (1960), Lindsay and Norman (1972), and Newell and
Simon (1972). Their enthusiasm seemed justified by the ensuing flood of
theoretical and experimental work based on these ideas. In addition to the
specific efforts at computer modeling of cognitive functions that is my main
concern here, the rise of the computer-based information-processing para­
digm also stimulated a healthy reawakening of broader interests in many
of the old central concerns of psychology, such as mental imagery, think­
ing, and even consciousness. I must also acknowledge here that I myself ini­
tially embraced the computational theory practically without reservation.
It certainly seemed an enormous step forward at the time. Fellow graduate
students likely remember my oft-repeated attempts to assure them that the
CTM would soon solve this or that fundamental problem in psychology. But
all was not well.

Problems in Classic Cognitivism

With the appearance of suitable higher-order languages, numerous re­

search groups set to work to endow computers with capacities for various
kinds of skilled performance, including game-playing (especially complex
games such as chess), problem-solving (for example, proving theorems in
the propositional calculus), pattern recognition (such as recognizing sloppy
hand-written characters), question-answering (in restricted domains such
as baseball), and natural language translation. An important strategic dif­
ference quickly appeared, dividing these efforts roughly into two streams
often called computer simulation (CS) and artificial intelligence (AI), re­
spectively. Workers in CS remained faithful to the aim of increasing psycho­
logical understanding, in that they sought not only to reproduce particular
kinds of human performance, but also to identify testable models of the
means by which humans achieve that performance. AI workers, by contrast,
disavowed any direct interest in psychology and sought rather to achieve
high-level performance by whatever means possible.
I will not attempt to review the substantive accomplishments here.6 Suf­
fice it to say that many of the individual contributions represented consider­
able intellectual and technical achievements. Especially dazzling for me was
"SHRDLU," a virtual robot that could interact with its handler in more or
less ordinary-appearing language while carrying out complex sequences of
requested operations on toy blocks of varied color, size, and shape (Wino­
grad, 1 972).
However, without intending to disparage these attainments I must add
that they still fel l very far short of what anyone could plausibly describe
as general intelligence. I mention this only because of the extremely inflat-

6. Readers interested in following the history of such work can refer to landmark
publications such as Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963), M insky ( 1 968), Schank and
Colby (1 973), Winograd ( 1972), and Winston (1975), or for an overview H. Gardner
(1985).
12-Chapter 1

ed image which many outside observers had at the time of the progress of
this work, an image aggressively promoted by some of the research work­
ers themselves. Many extraordinarily grandiose statements and predictions
were being bandied about on the basis of very modest concrete accomplish­
ments. Of course the predictions could conceivably have been correct; after
all, the theoretical foundation is deep, and the work was still in its infancy.
Perhaps we were simply in the early stages of an evolutionary process in
which machines would inevitably attain at least the equivalent of human
cognitive abilities.
My own confidence in the new paradigm was severely shaken, however,
by extensive and sobering experience associated with my dissertation re­
search in the area of natural language processing. The group with which I
was working was principally concerned with the applied technical problem
of reducing lexical ambiguity in English text, the practical aim being in­
creased precision and power of automated computer-based content analysis
procedures. In approaching this problem, we constructed an alphabetized
concordance of some half-million words of "typical" behavioral science
texts sampled from a variety of sources. This keyword-in-context listing
(KWIC) identified the most frequently occurring words and supplied infor­
mation about their typical patterns of usage. It turned out that about 2,000
types (in this context, dictionary entries) covered around 90% of the tokens
(occurrent words) in an average running text. The striking regularities of
word usage evident in the KWIC enabled us to build for each such diction­
ary entry a small computer routine that could scan the context in which each
new token instance of that entry appeared and attempt to determine which
member of a pre-established set of meanings was actually present. Crude as
it was, the resulting system worked surprisingly well, achieving about 90%
accuracy in a large new sample of text (E. F. Kelly & Stone, 1975). So at a
practical level the project was rather successful.
My own primary interest, however, lay in determining whether the
brute facts of everyday language as we were seeing them could successfully
be captured by existing computationalist theories of semantic representa­
tion. The main such theory at the time was that of 1. J. Katz and Fodor
( 1964). Their theory built upon the central notions of Chomsky's transfor­
mational linguistics and embodied the essential doctrines of the classical
computationalist program as subsequently formalized by J. Fodor (1 975),
Pylyshyn ( 1984), and others. Specifically, it depicted determination of the
meaning of a sentence as resulting from a rule-bound calculation, governed
by the syntactic analysis of that sentence, which operates upon pre-estab­
lished representations of the meanings of its constituent words. The possible
meanings of the words themselves were treated as exhaustively specifiable in
advance, with their essential semantic contents represented in terms of an
underlying universal set of discrete "semantic markers"-in effect, atoms
of meaning-or logical structures built out of such markers. In a nutshell,
syntax was to provide for the generativity of language, our ability to make
"infinite use of finite means," and semantics would go along for the ride.
 A View from the Mainstream-1 3

Although Katz and Fodor had made their account appear at least semi­
plausible for a few carefully contrived examples, it failed totally to account
for obvious and pervasive features of the language in our database, lan­
guage as actually used by ordinary speakers for ordinary purposes. For
one thing, it was clear that resolution of lexical ambiguity routinely relied
upon all sorts of linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge, and not just on
some supposedly "essential" knowledge of pre-established word meanings.
More importantly, sentence interpretation could not plausibly be viewed as
a matter of context-driven selection from large numbers of pre-established
and highly specific word meanings. Rather, it clearly involved generation of
appropriate interpretations based on much smaller numbers of more gen­
eral meanings (see, e.g., the entries provided by different dictionaries for
common workhorse words such as among, jind,jine, and line, and note that
all major parts of speech display these properties). Any scheme based on
atomization of meaning would necessarily fail to capture what to me had
become the most characteristic property of word-meaning, a felt Gestalt
quality or wholeness, at a level of generality that naturally supports exten­
sions of usage into an indefinite variety-indeed whole families-of novel
but appropriate contexts. The existing proposals could only represent the
content of a general term such as "line" by some sample of its possible par­
ticularizations, and in so doing rendered themselves systematically unable
to distinguish between metaphorical truth and l iteral falsehood. It seemed
especially ironic that Katz and Fodor, for all their transformationalist in­
vective about the need to respect the productivity of language, had erected
a semantic theory which in effect elevated the commonplace to a standard
of propriety and denied creativity at the level of words or concepts. Their
theory failed to account even for identification, let alone representation, of
linguistic meaning (E. F. Kelly, 1975).
I also noted with a certain degree of alarm that this crucial property of
generality underlying the normal use of words seemed continuous with de­
velopmentally earlier achievements. Skilled motor acts and perceptual rec­
ognition, for example, require similar on-the-f1.y adaptations of past learning
to present circumstance. It seemed at least vaguely conceivable that these
difficult but undeniably fundamental qualities of embodied action and cog­
nition might somehow be rooted in lower-level properties of the nervous
system as a particular kind of computing machine. Early discussions had
emphasized similarities between brains and digital computers, for example
treating the all-or-nothing neural spike discharge or action potential as the
equivalent of a digital relay. In more recent times, however, we had become
increasingly sensitized to the ubiquitous presence in real nervous systems of
inherently more continuous or "analog" processes, such as the spatial and
temporal summation of neural input that leads to spike formation, and the
rate and pattern of the resulting spike discharges. Workers in CS and AI had
been relying heavily on their doctrine of "multiple realizability," assuming
perhaps too cavalierly that they could safely disregard such low-level "hard­
ware" details and pitch their efforts at a level of abstraction that happened
14-Chapter 1

to be congenial both to them and to the available computers. What seemed

now to be emerging, however, was that these low-level neurophysiological
properties might enter into the overall computational possibilities of the
brain in a much more fundamental way than previously suspected. Perhaps
the "missing" cognitive attributes were dependent upon such low-level char­
acteristics. Most neuroscientists, of course-even while adopting more or
less wholesale the new computationalist or "information-processing" para­
digm-had always presumed this would be so.
The net result of all this was to make me much more skeptical and pes­
simistic regarding the prospects for computational cognitivism as it was
then being practiced. To be sure, others had noted similar problems and
were trying to do something about them. The importance of incorporating
more general knowledge of the world into language-processing models, for
example, had already begun to be recognized, and new formal devices were
being introduced to represent what the computer needed to know (what we
ourselves know) about various sorts of "typical" situations it might encoun­
ter. But it seemed clear to me that all of these knowledge-representation
devices, such as "frames" (Minsky, 1975), "scripts" (Schank & Colby, 1973),
and "schemata" (Neisser, 1976), suffered essentially the same problems I
had identified in the Katz and Fodor account of word meaning. Specifi­
cally, they required the possible scenarios of application to be spelled out
in advance, in great but necessarily incomplete detail, and as a result ended
up being "brittle," intolerant of even minor departures from the pre-pro­
grammed expectations. I also pointed out that Winograd's undeniable suc­
cess with SHRDLU had derived in considerable part precisely from his
careful a priori restriction of the problem domain in a manner that allowed
him essentially to circumvent this whole complex of very difficult issues?
Many of the themes just sounded have been confirmed and amplified in
more recent work. On the positive side, our knowledge of the content, orga­
nization, and development of the human conceptual system has increased
enormously. The old Socratic idea that concepts must be defined in terms of
necessary and sufficient features has given way to a recognition of the role
of perceptual-level examples, prototypes, and family resemblances in the
content of real human concepts (Medin & Heit, 1999; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978;
E. E. Smith & Medin, 1981). The contributions of a fundamental human
capacity for metaphorizing at levels ranging from everyday language to the
highest flights of creativity, are also now more widely appreciated (Gentner,
Holyoak, & Kokinov, 2001; Hofstadter & FARG, 1995; Holyoak & Tha­
gard, 1995; Lakoff, 1987, 1995; see also our Chapter 7). Computer language­
processing systems have tended to move, as I predicted, toward a relatively
simplified and "surfacy" syntax coupled with richer representations of the
lexicon, and they sometimes attempt to resolve residual ambiguities with
the aid of statistical data derived from large databases.
More crucial to the concerns of this chapter, however, are major sub­
sequent events on the negative side. Shortly after I completed my disser-

7. For further details see E . F. Kelly ( 1 975).

 A View from the Mainstream-l S

tation, Hubert Dreyfus (1972) systematically questioned both the progress

and the prospects of CS and AI. He began by reviewing the early work in
game-playing, problem-solving, language translation, and pattern recogni­
tion. Work in each domain was characterized by a common pattern consist­
ing of encouraging early success followed by steadily diminishing returns.
Subsequent work in artificial intelligence, according to Dreyfus, had fared
little better, achieving its limited successes only by operating in artificially
constrained environments that do not exemplify fundamental difficulties
handled with conspicuous ease by everyday human intelligence. Dreyfus
argued that the extreme efficiency of human intelligence-which becomes
progressively more apparent as we move toward problem domains more
typical of its ordinary application-rests on a complex of interrelated abili­
ties which he termed fringe consciousness, ambiguity tolerance based on
efficient use of context, essential-inessential distinctions, and perspicuous
grouping. Most critically of all, human cognitive performance is character­
istically guided by insight, an overall grasp of the problem situation, with
essential aspects at the foreground of attention set against an organizing
but largely implicit background. Phenomenologically, the situation is pri­
mary; specific facts or features of the situation may only become evident
through a deliberate attentive effort of a quite secondary sort. By contrast,
Dreyfus argued, for the computer all facts must be specified in advance as
explicit bits of atomic data; whatever crude representation of the situation
the computer can achieve is necessarily constructed by explicit calculation
upon these situation-independent facts. Ironically, AI seemed to have ad­
opted the conceptual framework of Wittgenstein's Tractatus shortly after
the realities of language use had driven Wittgenstein himself to abandon
it. Building upon these and related observations, Dreyfus attempted to es­
tablish his main thesis, that central human mental skills are in principle not
reproducible on digital computers.
Dreyfus's concerns clearly overlapped with mine, and I therefore had
no doubt that he had identified a cluster of problems which at the very least
constitute extremely difficult problems of practice, although I was not yet
convinced that these problems were insoluble in principle. Hardcore AI
partisans experienced no such unease, attacking Dreyfus immediately and
viciously as merely an ignorant outsider. Shortly afterward, however, Jo­
seph Weizenbaum, a prominent AI insider,S expressed broadly similar kinds
of misgivings, although he was less confident than Dreyfus in theoretical ar­
guments against the possibility of machine intelligence, and relied primar­
ily on a moral argument to the effect that there are many kinds of things,
including psychotherapy, which computers should never be permitted to
perform (Weizenbaum, 1976).

8. Among other things, Weizenbaum was author of the widely known ELIZA
program, which simulates a non-directive psychotherapist by means of various sim­
ple technical devices that involve no "understanding" whatever. Weizenbaum had
been horrified to discover many persons interacting with this program as though it
were an actual human being.
16-Chapter 1

The most significant by far of these rumblings from within, however, oc­
curred a decade later when a consummate insider, Terry Winograd himself,
publicly defected from the program of classical AI. Winograd and Flores
(1 986) explicitly embraced most of the points already raised above, empha­
sizing in particular that large parts of human mental life cannot be reduced
to explicit rules and therefore cannot be formalized for production by a
computer program. Their detailed and fully-informed argument should be
required reading for anyone interested in these issues. 9 The best we can hope
for along classical lines, they concluded, is special-purpose expert systems,
adapted to carefully circumscribed domains that lend themselves to such
formalization. Current examples, of course, include things like chess-play­
ing, integration and differentiation of mathematical formulae, and perhaps
certain areas of medical diagnosis.

The Second Cognitive Revolution: Connectionism and Dynamic

Systems

Since the late 1970s psychology has taken a strongly biological turn,
and cognitive science has evolved into cognitive neuroscience. This came as
somewhat of a surprise to persons like myself who had been reared in the in­
tellectual tradition of classical or "symbolic" cognitivism and had expected
to do all their proper business with little or no reference to biology. When
I was a graduate student, for example, the required course in physiological
psychology consisted essentially of a smattering of neuroanatomy followed
by a lot of boring stuff about appetitive behavior in lower organisms, and
that was pretty much that.
I will single out four main threads of this evolution. The first arose with­
in classical cognitivism itself. As indicated above, there was a lot of ferment
in the early days as researchers sought to identify appropriate forms of rep­
resentation for the sorts of knowledge we humans can bring to bear in our
thinking, speaking, and so on. Largely reflecting its own historical origins
and the available means of representation, cognitive theory initially focused
almost exclusively on linguistic or propositional forms of knowledge repre­
sentation. Mental imagery, however, had recently been readmitted onto the
roster of acceptable research topics (R. R. Holt, 1964), and a number of im­
portant new experimental studies were being carried out, especially by Rog­
er Shepard, Stephen Kosslyn, and various others. On the strength of these
investigations Kosslyn (1973) ventured to advance an information-process­
ing theory of visual imagery in which the underlying knowledge structures
hypothesized to support the generation of imagery were themselves essen­
tially pictorial and spatial in nature. This provoked an intense reaction from

9. Fundamentally similar views have also been advanced by writers such as Po­
lanyi ( 1 966) and Searle (1992, chap. 8). It is ironic, and perhaps symptomatic, that
CTM advocate Robert Harnish (2002, pp. 107-123) reports enthusiastically on
SHRDLU without even mentioning Winograd's defection.
 A View from the Mainstream-17

Zenon Pylyshyn (1973), who reaffirmed the classical cognitivist view that all
knowledge is linguistic or propositional in character (J. Fodor, 1975). The
ensuing imagery debate has raged on more or less ever since, its intricate
experimental details of interest primarily to the participants.1O For present
purposes the critical event was an important theoretical paper by John R.
Anderson (1978). Anderson argued that since both kinds of representations
(and potentially many others as well) could be made internally coherent,
and would lead to identical behavioral predictions, a fundamental theoreti­
cal indeterminacy had emerged. Considerations of parsimony and efficiency
might lead us to prefer one such theory to its competitors, but only physi­
ological observations could potentially determine which was in fact correct.
Thus it became evident, more generally, that neurophysiological data can
sometimes provide important constraints on psychological theory.
The second thread was the emergence and consolidation following
World War II of neuropsychology as a scientific discipline. An outgrowth and
companion of the medical discipline of neurology, neuropsychology seeks
to gain insight into the nature and operations of the mind through careful
observation and analysis of the mental disturbances, sometimes highly spe­
cific and bizarre, that are produced by gunshot or shrapnel wounds, strokes,
degenerative diseases, and other forms of injury to the brain.11 The general
thrust of this work was to suggest that skilled cognitive performances of all
kinds characteristically involve cooperation of a number of localized cor­
tical and subcortical regions of the brain, each presumptively specialized
for some particular role in the overall performance. Classical cognitivism
quickly adapted to this emerging picture of things, assimilating its funda­
mental theme of the mind as a computational or information-processing
mechanism to a "modular" view of its components and internal organiza­
tion (J. Fodor, 1 983; Pinker, 1997).
The third development was the advent and maturation of the functional
neuroimaging technologies mentioned in the Introduction, which enable us
to observe directly, without opening up the skull, the activity of the working
human brain. Two principal classes of such methods are currently available,
although others are under development.12 The first provides measures of
the electric and magnetic fields directly generated by neuroelectric activ­
ity in populations of suitably located and oriented cortical neurons (elec-

10. But see Brann (1991) and N. 1. T. Thomas (1999) for excellent third-party re­
views.
1 1 . Some important early landmarks here are books by H. Gardner (1976), Luria
(1966), Sacks ( 1987), and Shall ice (1988).
12. In addition to the "macro" technologies described in the text, which operate
on scales from the whole brain down to roughly naked-eye-sized parts of it, contem­
porary neuroscience has developed an impressive arsenal of "micro" technologies,
suitable mainly for use in animal studies, that operate down to the cellular or even
subcellular level. Other emerging developments at the macro level that look espe­
cially promising for future work in humans include transcranial optical imaging
and transcranial magnetic stimulation.
1 8-Chapter I

troencephalography [EEG]; magnetoencephalography [MEG]). The second

provides measures of hemodynamic or metabolic consequences of neural
activity such as local changes of blood flow, glucose consumption, or blood
oxygenation (especially positron emission tomography [PET]; and function­
al magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]). All these technologies are complex
and expensive, and they tend within and between classes to have comple­
mentary strengths and weaknesses (see, e.g., Nunez & Silberstein, 2000;
Toga & Mazziotta, 1996; Wikswo, Gevins, & Williamson, 1993). Together,
they undoubtedly constitute a major methodological advance for cognitive
neuroscience. Indeed, scarcely an issue now goes by of any cognitive neuro­
science journal that does not contain one or more papers featuring images
outfitted with colored spots identifying regions of "significant" brain "acti­
vation" produced by some stimulus or task.13
The final thread is the one most directly germane to our primary sub­
ject, the computational theory of the mind (CTM). Specifically, discourage­
ment with the progress of classical or symbolic cognitivism led in the 1980s
to an enormous resurgence of interest in a fundamentally different style
of computation that also seems more directly comparable to what actually
goes on in brains-namely, propagation of activity through large networks
of basically similar elementary units.
I say "resurgence" because this approach actually harks all the way
back to the seminal work of McCulloch and Pitts (1943), Hebb (1949), and
others. There had been some promising early steps in this direction, notably
the work of Rosenblatt (1962) on "perceptrons," but mainstream interest
had largely faded under the impact of a devastating critique by AI parti­
sans Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert ( 1968). These authors, mathe­
maticians by training, proved rigorously that simple one-layer perceptrons
cannot compute even simple things such as the elementary logic function
"exclusive OR" (that is, either A or B but not both). In their conclusion,
summing up the implications of these results, they conjectured that more
complicated networks would fare little better. In effect they urged the field
to stay focused on the CTM in its classic symbol-processing form. One of
the great ironies here, as pointed out by Dupuy (2000), is that whereas John
von Neumann, the great mathematician, had been interested in expanding
the possibilities of computation by reference to the actual behavior of the
brain, Warren McCulloch, a neuroscientist, had in effect abstracted from
the brain a logic machine; and now here was Minsky, who had been von
Neumann's doctoral student at Princeton, promoting McCulloch-style sym­
bolic computation in preference to the neurophysiologically grounded ap­
proach advocated by his own illustrious mentor.

1 3. Most cognitive neuroscientists clearly regard such work as repeatedly and un­
ambiguously confirming the basic mind-brain doctrine of contemporary physical­
ism, but many significant technical uncertainties remain regarding procedures for
acquisition, processing, and interpretation of imaging data, and some of the avail­
able results actually conflict with that doctrine. We will touch upon these issues
later in this chapter, as well as in our Chapters 4 and 9.
 A View from the Mainstream-19

At any rate the net effect was to drive neural-network models temporar­
ily to the margins of the field, although a few dedicated souls such as James
Anderson and Stephen Grossberg soldiered on. The subject burst back into
the mainstream, however, with the publication of a two-volume handbook
on parallel distributed processing (PDP) or "connectionism" as it came to be
called (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).14 Connectionism has subsequently
emerged as a serious rival to classical cognitivism, but I will give here only
the briefest account of these developments.
The fundamental faith of connectionists is that intelligence emerges
from the interactions of large numbers of simple processing units organized
in a network of appropriate structure. By modifying features of network
architecture such as the number of elementary units, the number of lay­
ers, their connectivity patterns (feed forward only vs. recurrent), the rules
for activating units (simple thresholds, sigmoid functions), and the rules for
modifying the connection strengths among units in light of network perfor­
mance or experience (Hebb, delta, generalized delta), an enormous variety
of interesting behaviors can be produced. Networks have proved especially
good at some things at which classical models were conspicuously bad, such
as pattern recognition, perceptual learning and generalization, and filling
in of incomplete input. They also display psychologically interesting and de­
sirable properties such as content-addressable memory and "graceful deg­
radation"-the tendency, as in Lashley's rats, for performance to decline
smoothly and continuously as units are progressively removed. It is perhaps
not surprising, given these properties, that unbridled optimism soon reap­
peared within the field. One leading connectionist, Smolen sky (1988), has
proclaimed that "it is likely that connectionist models will offer the most
significant progress of the past several millennia on the mind/body prob­
lem" (p. 3). Many contemporary psychologists agree, and even some phi­
losophers of mind, including in particular Daniel Dennett and the Church­
lands, are no less enthusiastic.
Significant problems have also come to light, however. Although net­
work models are often said to be "neurally inspired," the current level of
neurophysiological realism is typically very low. Both the "neurons" them­
selves and their connectivity patterns are routinely idealized and distorted,
and the most successful learning rule ("back propagation" or generalized
delta) still has no generally recognized counterpart in the nervous system
(Crick, 1 994). Models often have large numbers of free parameters which
must be adjusted to fit specific situations, raising doubts about their gen­
erality. Similarly, generation of a targeted behavior is sometimes strongly
and unrealistically dependent on the exact content and order of previous
network experience or training. Many observers, including Papert (1988),
also worry that problems of catastrophic interference between previously
learned behaviors will emerge as networks are scaled up to more realis-

14. Excellent general introductions are provided by Bechtel and Abrahamsen

(2002) and Harnish (2002), and many of the most important early papers are re­
printed, with illuminating commentaries, by 1. A. Anderson and Rosenfeld ( 1988).
20-Chapter 1

tic dimensions. Most important of all, networks have particular difficulty

capturing precisely those characteristics of human cognition to which the
classical cognitivist approach seems best suited-features such as its hierar­
chical organization, temporal orderliness, and productivity. Indeed, despite
some new technical wrinkles, connectionism can be viewed as amounting
in large part to a modern revival of 19th-century associationism. To the
extent that this characterization is correct, connectionism therefore inherits
the very same problems that led to the rise of classic cognitivism in the first
place (J. Fodor, 2001 ; Pinker & Mehler, 1988).
The last 20 years or so of computational modeling of the mind have
been dominated by the attempts of these two warring paradigms to refine
themselves and work out their relationship. Classical symbol-manipula­
tion modelers, for example, are trying to find ways to make their models
more adaptable and less brittle, while connectionists are looking for better
ways of generating orderly behavior in the absence of explicit rules. Each
paradigm clearly aspires to absorbing the other, but some workers are also
exploring "hybrid" computational systems in which the connectionist part
takes care of things like perceptual learning and category formation-the
subsymbolic level or "microstructure" of cognition-while a more classical
symbol-manipulation part deals with things like problem-solving and lan­
guage. It is not at all clear how things will sort out, although the connection­
ist faction seems presently ascendant.
I must also mention, however, one further recent development emerg­
ing from within connectionism itself, one that threatens in effect to devour
it from the other side. This movement, dynamic systems theory, has close
ties to modern technical developments in the physics and mathematics of
complex systems. There can be no doubt that the brain, with its vast net­
work of reciprocally interconnected and non-linear elements, is an example
of the kind of systems to which these new developments apply. Dynamic
systems theorists often use typical connectionist technical apparatus to
synthesize network models, but they bring to bear additional mathematical
and graphical tools to characterize and analyze the temporal dynamics of
network behavior. The most distinctive property of this school, however, is
its more radical theoretical position. In contrast with mainstream connec­
tionism, which it regards as a kind of halfway-house or unholy compromise
with classical cognitivism, it advocates abandoning altogether cognitivism's
next deepest commitment after computation itself-namely, the concept of
a representational level. From the dynamicist point of view what goes on
inside our heads is nothing like what the classical formulation presumes,
with computational processes operating on stored symbolic knowledge­
representations of one or more sorts. There is instead only the mechanical
operation of a vast neural network in accordance with deterministic rules.
As Dupuy (2000) observed, this is clearly the direction in which the early
cyberneticians such as von Neumann were headed. It is also the view of
 A View from the Mainstream-21

leading contemporary neuroscientists and modelers such as Edelman and

Tononi (2000) and Walter Freeman (1999, 2000).15
I shall not attempt here to adjudicate among these various schools of
computational ism on their own terms. Readers interested in getting a more
complete picture of this enormous and thriving industry in all its facets can
probably do no better than to sample the contents of the MIT Encyclopedia
of the Cognitive Sciences (MITECS) (R. A. Wilson & Keil, 1999). For the
record, my own overall sense is that the accomplishments, although cer­
tainly substantial, continue to lag the "hype" by a wide margin. This seems
especially true in the area of language processing, which, as Descartes and
Chomsky in particular have insisted, should be viewed as a crucial test case.
Despite my skepticism, however, I believe that persons of all philosophic or
methodological persuasions should strongly support further efforts along
all of these lines. As the computational theories evolve, they are constantly
sharpening our understanding not only of what the various kinds of compu­
tational models can do, but also of what we ourselves do in a broad range of
situations. Even apart from its ultimate success or failure, each new attempt
to extend computer modeling into a novel domain of human cognitive per­
formance forces us in the first instance to try to understand in detail what
capacities are presupposed by that performance. As our understanding of
the capacities of minds deepens and becomes more detailed, it should be­
come increasingly possible to judge precisely which of those capacities may
be explainable, and to what extent, in terms of such models.
There are good reasons, however, to believe that computationalism
alone, in any of its forms, cannot provide a complete account of the mind. I
turn next to these. All readers, but especially newcomers to these issues, are
advised that from this point forward my discussion becomes more tenden­
tious and increasingly at odds with current mainstream opinion.

John Searle's Critique of Computational Theories of the Mind

Many persons both inside and outside of psychology have expressed

reservations of one sort or another about computationalism, but without
doubt the most sweeping, searching, and sustained attack on the CTM has
come from Berkeley philosopher John Searle.
Briefly, Searle has two principal arguments.16 The first, the famous
"Chinese Room" argument, was directed at the central claim of strong ar­
tificial intelligence-specifically, the idea that running a computer program
can of itself be sufficient for, or constitutive of, understanding (Searle, 1980,
1984, 1 990). The essence of this thought experiment is that a person who

I S . For useful general introductions to dynamic systems see Bechtel and Abra­
hamsen (2002, chap. 8), A. Clark (2001), Dupuy (2000), Kelso (1995), Port and van
Gelder (1998), and papers by Beer (2000) and van Gelder (1998).
16. Parenthetically, a neglected paper by Heil (1981) argued on very similar
grounds that the computational ism of J. Fodor (1 975) is fundamentally mistaken.
22-Chapter 1

knows no Chinese, but who appropriately answers questions in Chinese by

virtue of manipulating symbols according to the rules of a (hypothetical)
computer program, would not thereby understand any part of the resulting
"conversation." Computing is by definition purely syntactical, and consists
only of manipulation of uninterpeted formal symbols according to the ex­
plicit rules of a program. The occupant of the Chinese room does all that
but understands nothing. Hence, semantics is something over and above
syntax, and strong AI is falseP Moreover, the Turing test is clearly inade­
quate; simulation is not duplication, and to act as ifone understands Chinese
does not guarantee that one does.
Classical cognitivism in its more general forms, however, might seem to
escape the force of this simple argument, insofar as the computational com­
ponent is no longer regarded as constituting or providing the semantics, but
only as manipulating, in a manner that mirrors and "respects" their content,
semantic representations that are provided elsewhere in the theory (as, e.g.,
in the theory of J. J. Katz & Fodor, 1 964). Against this move Searle mounts
a further and deeper argument. The most basic underlying assumption of
classical cognitivism is that the brain, although certainly different from von
Neumann machines, literally is a computer. However, Searle argues, "com­
putation" and "information-processing" are not observer-independent fea­
tures of the world that we empirically discover, like mass, gravity, photosyn­
thesis, and digestion. Rather, these are observer-relative properties that we
assign to certain systems for our own purposes. In short, the claim that the
brain is a computer is not false, but incoherent. Not only is semantics not in­
trinsic to syntax, as shown by the Chinese Room, but syntax is not intrinsic
to physics, or to the neurophysiology of the brain (Searle, 1992, 1 997).
The details of Searle's arguments, and the fire storms of controversy
they have provoked over the years, are far too numerous and complex to
sort out here, but I wish to make a few summary remarks.
First, like other critics of the CTM such as Dreyfus (1972) and Penrose
(1989, 1994), Searle has been startled by the intensity of the reactions he
provokes:

Oddly enough I have encountered more passion from adherents of the

computational theory of the mind than from adherents of traditional reli­
gious doctrines of the soul. Some computationalists invest an almost reli­
gious intensity into their faith that our deepest problems about the mind
will have a computational solution. Many people apparently believe that
somehow or other, unless we are proven to be computers, something ter­
ribly important will be lost.18 (Searle, 1997, p. 1 89)

17. According to Dupuy (2000, pp. 141-142), Kurt G6del himself specifically stat­
ed that irreducibility of semantics to syntax was the "real point" of his incomplete­
ness theorem. See also Penrose ( 1989, 1 994).
18. See Searle ( 1980) for some choice examples of these reactions. Additional ex­
amples of the quasi-religious fervor of hard-core compuphiliacs can be found in
Brockman (2003). Michael Grosso informs me that this kind of investment of re-
 A View from the Mainstream-23

Second, this "passion" undoubtedly accounts for the apparent inability

of many psychological and philosophical defenders of the CTM even to re­
port Searle's message accurately, let alone to appreciate its force. Without
dwelling upon the details, see for example Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2002,
pp. 303-304), Boden (1990), Chalmers (1996, chap. 9), H. Gardner (1 985, pp.
17 1-177), Harnish (2002, chap. 9 & chap. 1 3), and Pinker (1 997, pp. 93-96).
Many others, such as Minsky (1985), Newell (1990), and Thagard (1998), es­
sentially ignore him altogether. Searle defends himself much better against
his critics than I could do on his behalf, and fortunately he has taken a
number of opportunities to do so. In addition to the original debate over
the Chinese room (Searle, 1980), see in particular his encounters with the
Churchlands (Searle, 1990) and with Dennett (Searle, 1997).
Third, although the initial targets of Searle's arguments were strong
AI and cognitivism in its now classic "symbol-processing" formulation,
there is no doubt that his arguments apply to computationalism in all of its
forms. Searle made this explicit for standard forms of connectionism in his
exchange with Dennett (Searle, 1997), and I think he would certainly do so
for dynamic systems theory as well, and for the same reasons. The funda­
mental commonality of the different sorts of models is underscored by the
fact that they all are typically implemented in the same sort of physical ar­
chitecture, the standard von Neumann architecture used in garden-variety
personal computers. Specifics of the computing architecture can profoundly
influence the speed and efficiency of computation, but this does not alter its
fundamental character and has no bearing on the core theoretical issues.1 9
In sum, I feel sure that Searle's negative judgment regarding the com­
putational theory of the mind will be sustained. Like Nagel (1 993a), I have
come to regard the CTM as one of the dominant i llusions of our age. I hasten
to add that this judgment has little practical import for cognitive science; for
as Searle himself points out, and as I remarked above, use of computers to
model particular cognitive functions is a perfectly legitimate and undoubt­
edly useful scientific activity. But for a fundamental theory of the mind we
must look elsewhere.
To the extent that physicalist accounts of the mind are identifiable with
the CTM, Searle and his allies have already discredited them. However,
physicalism has not yet exhausted its resources. Searle's further and posi­
tive contribution is to advocate a novel philosophic position which he calls
"biological naturalism," a position which in fact closely approximates the
views of many leading neuroscientists. I turn next to this.

ligiosity in materialism as a philosophic doctrine goes back at least as far as Em­

pedocles, who was called "soter" (savior) by his followers.
19. Parenthetically, shifting the effective locus of the computations to a level
above (E. L. Schwartz, 1 999) or below (Penrose, 1989, 1 994) that of single network
elements also has no bearing on these issues.
24-Chapter I

Biological Naturalism: The Final Frontier

To set the stage I will quote the most trenchant statement known to me
regarding the current status of the mind-body problem. It is from philoso­
pher Thomas Nagel (1993b):

The mind-body problem exists because we naturally want to include the

mental life of conscious organisms in a comprehensive scientific under­
standing of the world. On the one hand it seems obvious that everything
that happens in the mind depends on, or is, something that happens in
the brain. On the other hand the defining features of mental states and
events, features like their intentionality, their subjectivity and their con­
scious experiential quality, seem not to be comprehensible simply in terms
of the physical operation of the organism. This is not just because we have
not yet accumulated enough empirical information: the problem is theo­
retical. We cannot at present imagine an explanation of colour percep­
tion, for example, which would do for that phenomenon what chemistry
has done for combustion-an explanation which would tell us in physical
terms, and without residue, what the experience of colour perception is.
Philosophical analyses of the distinguishing features of the mental that are
designed to get us over this hurdle generally involve implausible forms of
reductionism, behaviouristic in inspiration. The question is whether there
is another way of bringing mental phenomena into a unified conception of
objective reality without relying on a narrow standard of objectivity which
excludes everything that makes them interesting. (p. I )

Searle believes he has a good physicalist answer-indeed, in its general

form the only possible answer-to Nagel's question. It goes like this: One
can accept the reality of conscious mental life without lapsing into dual­
ism, which (he thinks) would be tantamount to abandoning 400 years of
cumulative scientific achievement. Consciousness is a biological process as
physical as digestion, caused by low-level neurophysiological events in the
brain such as neuron firings and the like. But consciousness is not a separate
something, over and above the brain action; the causality is not of the boy­
hits-ball-then-ball-breaks-window sort. Rather, consciousness emerges, in
roughly the same way that solidity emerges when water freezes upon reach­
ing a certain critical temperature. It is a system-level property of the brain.
And this is not epiphenomenalism, the idea that consciousness is real but
ineffectual; like the solidity of ice or other emergent physical properties,
consciousness has causal consequences, causal powers.
Although consciousness is thus at least in principle causally reducible,
it is not ontologically reducible; for this would involve showing that what
appears to us as consciousness is in reality something else, but in the case
of consciousness itself, unlike the apparent rising and setting of the sun, the
appearance is the reality. For Searle the CTM was on the right track, insofar
as it was a materialist theory of the mind, but it was not nearly materialistic
enough. To imagine that the mind can be instantiated in computer programs
of any kind is to entertain a kind of residual dualism. The brain generates
 A View from the Mainstream-25

mind and consciousness by physical, causal mechanisms inherent in our

biology, and we need to respect that unique biological reality. This does not
entail that mind and consciousness could not appear in other places, for
example in some sort of suitably constructed artifact; but in order for this
to occur, the physical substrate of the artifact would need to embody causal
powers at least equivalent to those inherent in the brain itself.
That summarizes the central theoretical part of Searle's position. He
also goes on to characterize the phenomenology of consciousness in ways
that are strikingly reminiscent of James (1890b), and considers in general
terms how best to pursue its scientific study. Clearly, given his theoretical
commitments, the main order of business is to study the associated neuro­
physiology. Searle (1997) singled out for special praise neuroscientists such
as Gerald Edelman and Francis Crick who were in effect carrying out this
program. His admiration for real neuroscience is certainly justified, and it
is apparently reciprocated; in a recent paper in the Annual Review ofNeuro­
science he again summarizes his theoretical views regarding consciousness
and offers a variety of additional suggestions, both shrewd and detailed, for
further neuroscientific investigation (Searle, 2000).
To summarize: In my view John Searle deserves enormous credit for
having almost single-handedly altered the terms of the mind-brain con­
troversy. On the negative side, his destructive critique of the CTM should
eliminate from contention a family of views that have dominated the past
half-century, especially in psychology. On the positive side, his effective ad­
vocacy of "biological naturalism" has focused attention clearly and sharply
on the position that I believe represents the ultimate development, the nec­
essary culmination, of a conventional physicalist approach to the mind. The
fundamental question before us now reduces starkly to this: Can everything
we know about the mind be explained in terms of brain processes?

Problems with Biological Naturalism

First, briefly, some conceptual issues. I am not at all persuaded that Searle
has succeeded in making meaningful distinctions between his philosophical
views and those of a host of others who would describe themselves as advo­
cates of token identity or even property dualism. In particular, his abstract
account of the "emergence" of consciousness strikes me as verging upon
intellectual sleight of hand. Can mental properties simply be stipulated into
physicality in this way? The analogies seem faulty. In the water/ice situa­
tion, for example, both ends of the causal relation are indisputably physical
things that we know how to observe and measure in conventional physical
ways. But that is exactly what is at issue in the relation of brain to mind, as
Nagel pointed out.
Related to this, and also captured by Nagel's remarks, we do not in fact
have anything even remotely resembling a full causal account of conscious-
26-Chapter I

ness, let alone an account that we can understand in the way we under­
stand the freezing of water. Intelligibility of causal accounts is surely some­
thing we would like to have, but in this case it seems singularly difficult to
imagine how we could possibly get one. I will leave aside here, however, the
more philosophic issue whether we should require that a satisfactory causal
account be intelligible, and focus instead on the prior empirical question
whether we can get one at all.
For Searle it is virtually axiomatic, a given, that brain processes caus­
ally generate every detail of our conscious mental life. Throughout his writ­
ings he characterizes this as a demonstrated fact, something we know with
complete certainty and beyond any possibility of doubt. In the discussion
of his paper in Bock and Marsh (1993), for example, he candidly exclaims
"frankly, I just can't take it seriously that my point of view, that brain pro­
cesses cause consciousness, is denied!" (p. 77).
The vast majority of contemporary neuroscientists and psychologists
undoubtedly would agree with Searle in accepting without hesitation this
basic premise, although many would perhaps question, as I do, details of his
account of the emergence, and his confidence that we will be able to achieve
a biological theory that is both adequately complete and theoretically sat­
isfying.20 As noted in the Introduction, the assumption that brain generates
mind-that the mind is what the brain does, full stop-seems plausible in
light of much prior scientific experience, and has generally served us well as
a working hypothesis. It will undoubtedly continue for most scientists to do
so. And this is not a bad thing; for as Dupuy (2000) remarked: "The only
way to prove the falsity of materialism is to give it every benefit of doubt,
to allow it to push forward as far as it can, while remaining alert to its mis­
steps, to the obstacles that it encounters, and, ultimately, to the limits it
runs up against. Any other method-fixing its boundaries in advance, for
example-is bound to fail" (p. 25).
I agree strongly with this view. I also appreciate that the human brain is
a fantastically complex biological system which undoubtedly harbors layer
upon layer of neurophysiological mechanism still to be unraveled by our
steadily deepening scientific inquiry. New discoveries are constantly being
made, some of which profoundly enrich our appreciation of the brain's re­
sources. For example, the old idea that neurons communicate exclusively

20. I think this characterization applies to contemporary philosophers as well, al­

though I am not sufficiently well informed to be sure of this. Nagel appears to accept
that there must be such a causal linkage, while doubting that we can make it intelli­
gible. Colin McGinn (1999) has staked out a similar position which accepts the exis­
tence of causal connections but attempts to deny on principled grounds (unsuccess­
fully, I think) that we can ever understand them. Searle's most radical philosophical
opponent, however, is undoubtedly David Chalmers (1996). Chalmers argues that
"zombies," beings exactly like us behaviorally but completely unconscious, are logi­
cally conceivable, and that consciousness must therefore be something above and
beyond the recognized physical order. Searle will have none of this, but his rebuttal
again presumes what is in question, that low-level physical processes in the brain
cause consciousness. See their exchange in Searle ( 1 997).
 A View from the Mainstream-27

by means of direct and specific synaptic connections has been enriched by

discovery of complementary "volume-conduction" effects caused by dif­
fusion of neurotransmitters through the local extracellular space (Agnati,
Bjelke, & Fuxe, 1992). Again, neuroscientists had long believed that the
dendrites which make up the input arbor of a typical cortical neuron are
essentially passive cables; but in recent years we have discovered that they
are enormously more complex and contribute actively to the overall electri­
cal behavior of the cell (see, e.g., the special issue of Science, October 27,
2000). Similarly, it had long been believed that glial cells provide only struc­
tural and metabolic support for the really important elements, the neurons
(which they greatly outnumber), but it has recently been demonstrated that
by scavenging potassium ions from the extracellular space, glia can also
directly modify the electrical behavior of local neural populations (Kohn,
Metz, Quibrera, Tommerdahl, & Whitsel, 2000; Kohn, Metz, Tommerdahl,
& Whitsel, 2002).21
Other examples could readily be provided, but the point should already
be clear: No one can prophesy with certainty how far or even in precisely
what directions our evolving understanding of brain mechanisms may lead.
Nevertheless, and unlike Dupuy (2000), I believe that sufficient information
is already in hand to demonstrate that biological naturalism as currently
conceived is not only incomplete butfalse as a theory of the mind.
At this point we make the empirical turn that is the central and dis­
tinctive contribution of this book. I will begin by outlining the conceptual
framework that underlies our presentation. Imagine if you will two complex
streams of activity flowing through time in parallel, one consisting of your
conscious mental experience, the other of the myriad physiological process­
es going on in your brain. Imagine further, even though it is scarcely feasible
in practice, that we could divide both streams individually into a sequence
of states, and in such a way that the mental states correspond to the brain
states. Suppose still further, and again counterfactually, that perfect 1 : 1 cor­
respondence between the two sequences has been established empirically.
We have discovered the Holy Grail of neuroscience and psychology, the
neural correlates of consciousness.
All the traditional philosophical positions on the mind-body problem
arise from different ways of interpreting this correlation. The current main­
stream consensus is that brain processes generate or constitute mental pro­
cesses, but this is not the only possible interpretation.
Note first that even perfect correlation would not necessarily entail iden­
tity. For example, like all other mammals we have both hearts and lungs, but
hearts and lungs are not identical. It remains at least conceptually possible
that minds and brains are distinct, though functionally closely linked.

21. Perhaps not coincidentally, detailed postmortem anatomical investigation of

Einstein's brain revealed that the most striking respect in which it differed from
ordinary brains was i n having significantly larger numbers of glia (Diamond, Schei­
bel, & Harvey, 1985).
28-Chapter 1

The fundamental scientific strategy for sorting out the causal structure
underlying observed correlations is of course to attempt to determine what
influences what by manipulating the two sides of the correlation. It is evi­
dent, and everyone agrees, that physical events such as sitting on a tack can
influence mental events. But what about the other way around? It seems
equally obvious, naively, that mental events cause physical events, too. For
example, as Searle likes to say, I decide to raise my arm and it goes up. But
there is a hitch here, an asymmetry in the causal structure. Physicalists can
normally reply, and do in their preferred fashion, that the causality in such
cases resides not in the mental per se but in its physical equivalents or ac­
companiments. In sum, we can cleanly, simply, and directly manipulate the
physical side of the correlation, but not so the mental, at least under ordi­
nary conditions.
Nevertheless, we will argue, the correlations we actually observe are not
simply incomplete but demonstrably imperfect. There exist certain kinds
of empirically verifiable mental properties, states, and effects that appear
to outstrip in principle the explanatory potential of physical processes oc­
curring in brains.22 Facts of this sort, moreover, can often be accommo­
dated more naturally within an alternative interpretation of the mind-brain
correlation, one already developed in abstract form by William James
(1 898/1900).
James pointed out that to describe the mind as a function of the brain
does not fully specify the character of the functional dependence. Physiolo­
gists routinely presume that the role of the brain is productive, the brain gen­
erating the mind in something like the way the tea kettle generates steam,
or the electric current flowing in a lamp generates light. But other forms
of functional dependence exist which merit closer consideration. The true
function of the brain might for example be permissive, like the trigger of a
crossbow, or more importantly, transmissive, like an optical lens or a prism,
or like the keys of a pipe organ (or perhaps, in more contemporary terms,
like the receivers in our radios and televisions).
More generally, one can at least dimly imagine some sort of mental
reality, which in James's view might be anything from a finite mind or per­
sonality to a World Soul, that is closely coupled to the brain functionally
but somehow distinct from it. Within this basic framework James himself
spoke variously of the brain as straining, sifting, canalizing, limiting, and
individualizing that larger mental reality existing behind the scenes. He also
quoted approvingly Schiller's (1891/1894, pp. 293, 295) characterization of
matter as "an admirably calculated machinery for regulating, limiting, and
restraining the consciousness which it encases .. . . Matter is not that which
produces Consciousness, but that which limits it, and confines its intensity
within certain limits" (James, 1898/1900, pp. 66-67). James also explicitly
portrayed the brain as exerting these various effects in a manner dependent

22. In Chapter 3 we begin to redress the asymmetry by describing numerous em­

pirical phenomena of just this kind.
 A View from the Mainstream-29

on its own functional status, and linked this idea to Fechner's conception of
a fluctuating psychophysical threshold (pp. 24, 59-66).
Much can immediately be said in favor of such a picture, James then
argued. It is in principle compatible with all of the facts conventionally in­
terpreted under the production model, and however metaphorical and in­
comprehensible it might at first seem, it is in reality no more so than its
materialist rival. It also has certain positive superiorities. In particular, it
appears potentially capable of explaining various additional facts such as
those being unearthed by F. W. H. Myers and his colleagues in psychical
research (pp. 24-27).
In sum, "transmission" or "filter" models are logically viable, and they
should rise or fal l in the usual scientific way in terms of their capacity to ac­
commodate the available empirical evidence.23
The remainder of this book consists primarily of a systematic though
necessarily incomplete marshaling of evidence and argument supporting
filter models in general as an abstract class. Only in Chapter 9, after all this
material has been put on the table, will we attempt to identify in greater
detail the specific forms we think such theories might take. To complete the
present chapter, I will next set forth in brief compass a catalog of types of
mental phenomena that appear especially resistant to explanation in con­
ventional mechanistic, biological terms. Most though not all of these phe­
nomena will be discussed in detail in the chapters that fol low.

Psi Phenomena

Like James (1898/1900) and McDougall (191 1/1961), among many others,
I will immediately appropriate the entire body of evidence for psi phenom­
ena in service of our central thesis. Such phenomena by definition involve
correlations occurring across physical barriers that should be sufficient, on
presently accepted principles, to prevent their formation (Broad, 1962). This
occurs for example when a subject successfully identifies randomly selected
targets concealed in opaque envelopes, or displayed in a remote location. It
is not difficult to set up controlled experiments of this sort and to evaluate
their outcomes using rigorous statistical procedures. As stated in the Intro­
duction, and documented in our Appendix, a considerable amount of work

23. As indicated by an 1 897 letter to Schiller (Perry, 1 935, vol. 2, pp. 1 33-1 34),
James thought initially that the transmission theory was his own invention, but it
certainly has a much longer history. By the time of the Ingersoll lecture James him­
self had identified the following passage from Kant's Critique ofPure Reason: "The
body would thus be, not the cause of our thinking, but merely a condition restrictive
thereof, and, although essential to our sensuous and animal consciousness, it may
be regarded as an impeder of our pure spiritual life" (1898/1900, pp. 28-29). Michael
Grosso informs me that the filter concept can also be detected in a number of the
Platonic dialogues, including Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Ion. Clearly, a definitive his­
tory of the filter model is yet to be written.
3D-Chapter 1

has been carried out along these lines, with results more than sufficient to
convince me and the other authors of this book that the sheer existence of
the basic input/output phenomena-ESP and PK, or in the more theory­
neutral terminology of Thouless and Wiesner (1947), "psi"-is an inescap­
able scientific reality with which we must somehow come to terms.
In this light the anti-psi polemic recently advanced by psychologist/phi­
losopher and long-time skeptic Nick Humphrey (1 996) is particularly star­
tling. Throughout his book Humphrey alludes to a supposed killer argu­
ment that he will later deploy to demonstrate the impossibility of psi. When
we finally get there (Chapter 26), the argument turns out to be that he can­
not imagine any possible scenario under which ostensible psi effects could
be achieved by some combination of known physical mechanisms. There­
fore the reported effects cannot and do not happen, Q. E. D. But whether we
like it or not, such effects do happen, as a matter of empirical fact (see the
Introduction and the Appendix). That is the whole point, and what makes
the phenomena theoretically interesting in the first place! Humphrey's "ar­
gument" amounts in my opinion to little more than an expression of his
deeply felt wish that the phenomena should simply go away. In this he is of
course adopting a strategy that has been widely practiced by contemporary
scientists and philosophers.24
Psi phenomena in general are important because they provide examples
of human behavioral capacities that seem extremely difficult or impossible
to account for in terms of presently recognized computational, biological,
or phys ic a l princ ip l es . Even more important for our purposes, however, is
a further body of evidence suggestive of post-mortem survival, the persis­
tence of elements of mind and personality following bodily death. It is sim­
ply false to declare, as does Paul Church land (1988), that "we possess no
such evidence" (p. 10). We in fact possess a lot of such evidence, much of
it of high quality (see the Appendix). Ironically, the primary threat to the
survivalist interpretation of this evidence arises not from considerations of
evidential quality, but from the difficulty of excluding alternative explana­
tions based upon paranormal interactions involving only living persons.
Quite apart from any personal or theological interests readers may bring
to this subject, it should be evident that post-mortem survival in any form,
if it occurs, demonstrates the presence of a fundamental bifurcation in na­
ture, and hence the falsehood of biological naturalism. We will touch upon
various facets of the survival evidence later in the book and summarize our
collective sense of the empirical status of the problem in Chapter 9.
Evidence for the occurrence of psi phenomena in general and post-mor­
tem survival in particular thus plays an important though largely implicit

24. A curious and relevant historical precedent is provided by Turing (1950), who
explicitly considered the possibility that telepathy could undermine his proposed
Turing-test procedures in favor of the human. Indeed, he evidently took this rather
seriously, since it appears last in a list of objections ordered at least roughly in terms
of increasing difficulty. His "solution" to the problem, however-putting the human
into a "telepathy-proof room"-is patently defective, as he himself probably knew.
 A View from the Mainstream-31

role in our overall argument. Our efforts in this book will be amply reward­
ed if they lead scientifically-minded readers to take these subjects more seri­
ously than they otherwise might. There are many other kinds of evidence,
however, that point in the same general direction.

Extreme Psychophysical Influence

Under this heading comes a variety of phenomena especially suggestive

of direct mental agency in the production of physiological or even physical
effects. Chapter 3 discusses many such phenomena in detail, but I will give
a few examples here to capture their flavor.
Placebo effects and related kinds of psychosomatic phenomena have
long been informally recognized and are now widely accepted, but they were
accepted by modern medical science only grudgingly, as new mechanisms
of brain-body interaction came to light that seemed potentially capable of
accounting for them. There remain many types of kindred phenomena,
however, that pose progressively more severe challenges to explanation in
such terms.
Myers, for example, was interested in hysterical "glove anesthesias," in
which a patient loses sensation from the skin of a hand in the absence of or­
ganic lesion. In such cases the anesthetic skin region typically corresponds
only to a psychological entity, the patient's idea, in complete disregard of
the underlying anatomical organization. At the same time, curiously, some­
thing in the patient remains aware of the afflicted region and protects it
from injury.
Related phenomena have been reported in the context of hypnosis. For
example, highly suggestible persons who can vividly imagine undergoing
an injurious circumstance such as receiving a burn to the skin sometimes
suffer effects closely analogous to those that the physical injury itself would
produce, such as a blister. More rarely, the correspondence between the
hypnotic blister and its imagined source extends even to details of geomet­
ric shape, details which appear especially hard to account for in terms of
known mechanisms of brain-body interaction. A closely related and well­
documented phenomenon is that of "stigmata," in which fervently devout
or pious believers in Christ develop wounds analogous to those inflicted
during his crucifixion. The injuries to the skin are again localized and spe­
cific in form, and they differ in locus and character in accordance with their
subjects' varying conceptions of Christ's own injuries. Similarly dramatic
phenomena have occasionally been documented in psychiatric patients in
connection with their recall of prior physical trauma.
The conventional expectation, of course, is that even the most extreme of
the phenomena just mentioned can ultimately be explained in terms of brain
processes. Continuing allegiance to this expectation, despite the explana­
tory difficulties, is undoubtedly encouraged by the fact that the phenomena
described so far all involve effects of a person's mental states on that person's
32-Chapter 1

own body. Even more drastic explanatory challenges are posed, however,
by additional and related phenomena in which one person's mental state
seems to have directly influenced another person's body. Such phenomena
include "maternal impressions" (birthmarks or birth defects on a newborn
that correspond to an unusual and intense experience of the mother dur­
ing the pregnancy), distant healing, experimental studies of distant mental
influence on living systems, and cases in which a child who claims to have
memories of the life of a deceased person also displays unusual birthmarks
or birth defects corresponding closely with marks (usually fatal wounds) on
the body of that person. In addition, there has been a considerable influx
since Myers's time of other experimental evidence demonstrating the reality
of psychokinesis (PK), which by definition involves direct mental influence
on the physical environment.
Chapter 3 presents selective and focused discussions of phenomena of
these various types, emphasizing their strong association with factors such
as emotion, strong beliefs, and unusually vivid mental imagery, and draw­
ing out their implications for an adequate theoretical picture of conscious­
ness, volition, and the mind-body problem. Within-subject phenomena such
as placebo effects, hypnotically induced blisters, and stigmata are also more
carefully situated in relation to modern developments in "psychoneuroim­
munology" and mind-body medicine. The common threads of the chapter
are, first, to point out the many, varied, and well-documented phenomena
of extreme psychophysical influence for which no conventional physicalist
explanation is presently available, or in some cases even seems possible; and,
second, to point out the theoretical continuity between normal, conscious
volitional acts and these less common phenomena that suggest unconscious
(or subliminal) volitional activity, sometimes of wider scope than conscious
volition itself. The chapter also provides striking examples of the sometimes
pathological interplay between scientific theories and scientific "fact."

Informational Capacity, Precision, and Depth

A number of well-documented psychological phenomena involve levels

of detail, precision, or logical depth that seem hard to reconcile with what
can be achieved by a fundamentally analog mechanism operating in a sta­
tistical way with neural components of low intrinsic precision and reliabil­
ity. I will give three examples of the sort of thing I have in mind.
The first comes from a case of "automatic writing" observed by James
(1889). The subject wrote with his extended right arm on large sheets of pa­
per, his face meanwhile buried in the crook of his left elbow. For him to see
what he was doing was "a physical impossibility." Nevertheless, James con­
tinues: "Two or three times in my presence on one evening, after covering a
sheet with writing (the pencil never being raised, so that the words ran into
each other), he returned to the top of the sheet and proceeded downwards,
 A View from the Mainstream-33

dotting each i and crossing each t with absolute precision and great rapid­
ity" (p. 44).
This extraordinary performance illustrates two features that have often
appeared together in the substantial but neglected scientific literature deal­
ing with automatic writing (Koutstaal, 1 992; Stevenson, 1978): The subject
is in an altered state of consciousness, and the motor performance, itself ex­
traordinary, is apparently guided by an extremely detailed memory record,
an essentially photographic representation of the uncompleted page.
The latter property relates to the phenomenon of eidetic imagery, my
second example, study of which was revived in modern times by the Habers
(see Obler & Fein, 1 988, for an overview). Probably the most dramatic dem­
onstration of its psychological reality has been provided using lulesz ran­
dom-dot stereograms (Stromeyer, 1970; Stromeyer & Psotka, 1 970; see also
lulesz, 1971 , pp. 239-246). These are essentially pairs of computer-gener­
ated pictures, each of which by itself looks like a matrix of randomly placed
dots, but constructed in such a way that when viewed simultaneously (by
presentation to the two eyes separately) a visual form emerges in depth.
Stromeyer and Psotka adapted this technology to their aims by present­
ing pictures of this type to the eyes of their single subject, a gifted female
eidetiker, at different times, ultimately as much as three days apart. Under
these conditions, the subject could only extract the hidden form if she could
fuse current input to one eye with an extremely detailed memory-image of
previous input to the other eye. Remarkably, she was able to succeed under
a wide variety of increasingly severe demands. The original stereograms, for
example, were 100 x 100 arrays, but she ultimately succeeded under double­
blind conditions with arrays as large as 1 000 x 1000, or a million "bits,"
viewed up to four hours apart.
These results were understandably shocking to many psychologists,
who sought to escape their force by pointing to the dependence on a single
gifted subject and the absence of replications (R. Herrnstein, personal com­
munication, October, 1 972). At least one successful replication has subse­
quently occurred, however. Specifically, Crawford, Wallace, Nemura, and
Slater ( 1986) demonstrated that their highly hypnotizable subjects were able
to succeed with the small (100 x 100) stereograms, but only when they were
hypnotized. Moreover, the literature already contains many additional ex­
amples of prodigious memory. Stromeyer and Psotka themselves mention
the mnemonist intensively studied by Luria (1968) and the case of the "Shass
Pollaks," who memorized all 12 volumes of the Babylonian Talmud (Strat­
ton, 1917). Sacks (1 987, chap. 22) has reported a similar case of a person
who among other things knew by heart all nine volumes and 6,000 pages
of Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians. Other examples could easily
be cited. Prodigious memory of this sort appears to be a real psychological
phenomenon.
Third in this group is the whole family of "calculating prodigies." Of
special interest is the "savant syndrome," often associated with infantile au­
tism, in which islands of spectacular ability appear in the midst of general-
34-Chapter 1

ized mental disability (Obler & Fein, 1988; Treffert, 1 989). The abilities are
of many types, but almost invariably involve prodigious memory. The depth
of the problems they pose for brain theory is exemplified by the case of "The
Twins," also described by Sacks (1987). These individuals, unable to per­
form even simple additions and subtractions with any accuracy, nonetheless
proved able to generate and test prime numbers "in their heads." Sacks was
able to verify the primacy up to 10 digits, but only by means of published
tables, while the twins themselves went on happily exchanging ostensibly
prime numbers of even greater length, eventually reaching 20 digits. Sacks
makes the intriguing suggestion that they seem not to be literally calculating
these enormous numbers, but discovering them by navigating through some
vast inner iconic "landscape" in which the relevant numerical relations are
somehow represented pictorially. The twins themselves of course cannot say
how they do it.
Phenomena of the sorts described in this section look hard to explain
in terms of brain processes. The most serious attempt to do so known to me
(Snyder & Mitchell, 1999) is in fact devoid of specific neural mechanisms. Its
central argument is rather that early-stage brain processes like those sub­
serving visual perception, for example, must also be rather savant-like in
terms of their speed, precision, and informational capacity; what is unusual
about savants, therefore, may consist merely in their access to these mecha­
nisms. This "explanation" of course presupposes a positive answer to the
fundamental question at issue, whether the brain alone can accomplish any
of these things, including perceptual synthesis itself (see below).
I will make just one further observation before leaving this fascinating
and challenging subject. The biocomputational approach leads to one fur­
ther expectation that could readily be tested using brain imaging methods
but to my knowledge has not. As proved by von Neumann (1956), the only
practical way to get increased arithmetical depth and precision out of indi­
vidually unreliable computing elements is to use more of them. Although I
do not know how to quantify this in a rigorous way, the biocomputational
perspective clearly implies that calculating prodigies must use very large
portions of their brains in very abnormal ways to achieve the observed ef­
fects. The cognitive losses that often accompany savant skills could perhaps
be a reflection of such substitution, but we must remember that savant-type
skills sometimes also occur in geniuses such as the mathematicians Gauss
and Ampere (see also Obler & Fein, 1988, chap. 23).

Memory

The previous section focused on phenomena such as prodigious memo­

ry that appear potentially incompatible with the physical properties of the
brain considered as a kind of computing device. Problems also arise, how­
ever, in regard to memory in its more familiar and everyday forms. Here I
 A View from the Mainstream-35

provide a brief sketch of the relevant issues, which are discussed in depth in
Chapter 4.
Memory is increasingly recognized as central to all human cognitive
and perceptual functions, yet we remain largely ignorant of where and in
what forms our past experience is stored and by what means it is brought
to bear upon the present. Generations of psychologists and neurobiolo­
gists have taken it as axiomatic that all memories must exist in the form of
"traces," physical changes produced in the brain by experience, but there
has been little progress toward scientific consensus on the details of these
mechanisms despite many decades of intensive research.
Significant progress has recently been made, to be sure, in regard to
"learning" and "memory" in simple creatures such as the sea-slug (Aply­
sia), and more generally in regard to what might be called "habit memory"
(Bergson, 190811991), the automatic adjustments of organisms to their envi­
ronments. But these discoveries fall far short of providing satisfactory ex­
planations of the most central and important characteristics of the human
memory system, including in particular our supplies of general knowledge
(semantic memory) and our ability to recall voluntarily and explicitly our
own past experience (autobiographical or episodic memory). Furthermore,
recent functional neuroimaging studies, although generating vast amounts
of "data," have yielded little if any progress toward a comprehensive and
coherent account of memory based on trace theory.
Meanwhile, deep logical and conceptual problems have been identified
in the root notion of the memory "trace" itself, as well as in allied compo­
nents of current mainstream doctrine such as "information" and "repre­
sentation." Most challenging of all to mainstream views is the substantial
body of evidence that has accumulated-much of it since Myers's original
efforts along these lines-suggesting that autobiograph ical, semantic, and
procedural (skill) memories sometimes survive bodily death. If this is the
case, memory in living persons presumably exists at least in part outside
the brain and body as conventionally understood. At the very least this evi­
dence raises profound and interesting issues of both philosophical and prac­
tical importance in regard to our criteria and procedures for determining
personal identity.
I believe that the evidence and issues discussed in Chapter 4 collectively
suggest the need for a radical reconceptualization of human memory along
lines suggested a century ago by Myers, James, and Bergson. We will return
to this theme in Chapter 9.

Psychological Automatisms and Secondary Centers of Consciousness

Phenomena catalogued under this heading involve what looks like mul­
tiple concurrent engagement, in potentially incompatible ways, of major
cognitive skills (linguistic skills, for example) and the corresponding brain
systems. Let me explain.
36-Chapter 1

The current mainstream view pictures the mind or "cognitive system"

as a hierarchically ordered network of subprocessors or "modules," each
specialized for some particular task and corresponding (it is hoped) to some
particular brain region or regions. Leaving aside major issues regarding the
details of its specification, this picture seems broadly consistent with the
overall manner in which our minds seem normally to operate. Our basic
way of doing things, that is, is essentially one at a time in serial fashion.
Although psychologists recognize that with suitable training people can do
more things simultaneously than they customarily suppose, this generaliza­
tion applies mainly to relatively divergent things, and conspicuously fails
as the simultaneous tasks become more complex and similar (Baars, 1 997;
Neisser, 1976; Pashler, 1 998).
Nevertheless, a large body of credible evidence, some dating back to the
late 19th century, demonstrates that additional "cognitive systems," psycho­
logical entities indistinguishable from full-fledged conscious minds or per­
sonalities as we normally understand these terms, can sometimes occupy
the same organism simultaneously, carrying on their varied existences as it
were in parallel, and largely outside the awareness of the primary, everyday
consciousness. In essence, the structure that cognitive psychology conven­
tionally pictures as unitary, as instantiated within and identified with a par­
ticular organization of brain systems, can be functionally divided-divid­
ed, moreover, not horizontally, leading to isolation of the normal cognitive
capacities from each other, but vertically, leading to the appearance of what
seem to be two or more complete cognitive systems each of which includes
all of the relevant capacities. Even worse, it sometimes happens that one of
these "multiple" or "alter" personalities appears to have direct access to the
conscious mental activity of one or more others, but not vice versa.
Investigation of such phenomena, and more generally of "consciousness
beyond the margin" (E. Taylor, 1996) was central to the early work of Myers
and James among many others. Two brief examples may serve to convey a
more concrete initial sense of the character of these phenomena.
The first comes from Myers (HP, vol. 2, pp. 418-422), who quoted from
a report by Oxford philosopher F. C. S. Schiller on automatic writing pro­
duced by his brother. As is characteristic of this genre of automatisms, the
writer typically had no consciousness of the content of his writing, which
went on continuously while he was fully and consciously engaged in some
other activity such as reading a book or telling a story. Of particular rele­
vance here, however, were occasions on which he wrote simultaneously with
both hands and on completely different subjects, one or the other of these
streams of writing also sometimes being in mirror-image form.
The second example is the case of Anna Winsor, described both by
James (1889) in his report on automatic writing and by Myers (HP, vol. 1 ,
pp. 354-360). The case was protracted and bizarre, but only superficially
resembles the neurological "alien hand" (Dr. Strangelove) syndrome. Its
central feature is that the patient, Anna, at a certain point lost voluntary
control of her right arm, which was taken over by a distinctive secondary
 A View from the Mainstream-37

personality. This personality, whom Anna herself named "Old Stump," was
benign, often protecting Anna from her pronounced tendencies toward self­
injury. As in the case of Schiller's brother, Stump also typically wrote or
drew while Anna herself was occupied with other matters. But Stump also
continued writing and drawing even when Anna was asleep, and sometimes
in total darkness. This secondary personality also remained calm and ra­
tional during periods when Anna herself was feverish and delusional, and it
manifested knowledge and skills which Anna did not possess.
The enormous literature on these subjects is reviewed systematically,
and its implications discussed, in Chapter 5. The chapter specifically ar­
gues for the psychological reality of the phenomenon of co-consciousness
(as distinguished from unconscious cerebration and alternating conscious­
ness), which is fundamental both to Myers's own theoretical framework and
(as discussed in Chapter 8) to James's later application of that framework to
problems in religion and philosophy.

The Unity of Conscious Experience

Under this heading I will briefly address two interrelated problems.

The first and narrower is the so-called "binding" problem. This problem
emerged as a consequence of the success of contemporary neuroscientists
in analyzing sensory mechanisms, particularly in the visual system. It turns
out that different properties of a visual object such as its form, color, and
motion in depth are handled individually by largely separate regions or
mechanisms within the visual system. But once the stimulus has been thus
dismembered, so to speak, how does it get back together again as a unit of
visual experience?
Only one thing is certain: The unification of experience is not achieved
anatomically. There are no privileged places or structures in the brain
where everything comes together, either for the visual system by itself or
for the sensory systems altogether. McDougall (191 1/1961) was already fully
aware of this, and used it as a cornerstone of his argument against materi­
alist accounts of the mind. In his view, the evident disparity between the
multiplicity of physiological processes in the brain and the felt unity of con­
scious experience could only be resolved in physicalist terms by anatomical
convergence, and since there is no such convergence, physicalism must be
false. 25

25. There is an important historical irony here. Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992)
also focus on the absence of anatomical convergence, apparently thinking this
is something new, but use it in a completely different way. Whereas McDougall
(191 1 /1961) took the unity of conscious experience as a fundamental and undeni­
able empirical reality, one which physicalism could not explain, Kinsbourne and
especially Dennett (1991) want to use the physiological diversity to undermine that
appearance of unity itself, along with other supposedly pre-scientific "folk-psychol-
38-Chapter I

McDougall's original argument, although ingenious, relied upon the

faulty premise that the only possible physical means of unification must be
anatomical. All current neurophysiological proposals for solving the bind­
ing problem are instead functional in nature. The essential concept common
to all of them is that oscillatory electrical activity in widely distributed neu­
ral populations can be rapidly and reversibly synchronized in the "gamma"
band of frequencies (roughly 30-70 Hz), thereby providing a possible mech­
anistic solution to the binding problem (von der Malsburg, 1995).26
A great deal of sophisticated experimental and theoretical work over
the past 20 years has demonstrated that such mechanisms do in fact exist
in the nervous system, and that they are active in conjunction with normal
perceptual synthesisY Indeed, Searle's doctrine of biological naturalism
has now crystallized neurophysiologically in the form of a family of "global
workspace" theories, all of which make the central claim that conscious
experience occurs specifically and only in conjunction with large-scale pat­
terns of gamma-band oscillatory activity linking widely separated areas
of the brain (Crick, 1994; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001 ; Edelman & Tononi,
2000; A. K. Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001 ; W. J. Freeman, 2000; Llinas, Rib­
ary, Contreras, & Pedroarena, 1998; Newman & Baars, 1993; Singer, 1998;
Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie, 2001).28

ogy" intuitions about the nature of consciousness. See also Searle ( 1997, chap. 5),
later sections of this chapter, and our Chapter 9.
26. This paragraph summarizes decades of cumulative progress in the neurobiol­
ogy of sensory coding. The early work, inspired by Hubel and Wiesel (1 962), em­
phasized "feature detection" by single sensory neurons, and provided for detection
and representation of higher-order features or conjunctions of features by means
of suitable anatomical connectivity. It was subsequently recognized, however, that
combinations of elementary features could potentially occur in numbers far too
large to manage exclusively in this anatomically-based way. The new functional
proposals overcome the combinatorial explosion by providing for rapid and revers­
ible linkages among groups of cells responding to more elementary properties.
27. Note that this characterization does not imply or require that the oscil­
latory activity itself satisfactorily explains binding. That it does not has already
been argued by neurophysiologists such as Crick and Koch (2003) and Shad len and
Movshon ( 1999). See also the following paragraphs.
28. Although the "global workspace" terminology originated with Baars (1988,
1997), we will use it throughout this book i n the more generic sense supplied in the
text. Baars certainly deserves much credit for emphasizing that we need somehow
to reconcile the unity of conscious experience with the multiplicity of associated
neurophysiological processes in the brain, and for stimulating new imaging studies
that seek to identify more precisely the critical neurophysiological conditions them­
selves (see, e.g., Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). His own specific version of a theory
of this type, however, is less than satisfactory. In particular, his extended allegory
of the "theater of consciousness" (Baars, 1997, pp. 41-47), although providing a
colorful vocabulary with which to describe or interpret a variety of psychological
phenomena, is conceptually incoherent in a multitude of ways.
 A View from the Mainstream-39

The neurophysiological global workspace, however, cannot be the

whole story. A sizeable body of recent evidence demonstrates that orga­
nized, elaborate, and vivid conscious experience sometimes occurs under
physiological conditions, such as deep general anesthesia and cardiac ar­
rest, which preclude workspace operation. Experiences of this sort fall un­
der the more general heading of "near-death experiences" or NDEs, which
are discussed in detail in Chapter 6 together with related phenomena such
as "out-of-body experiences" (OBEs) and lucid dreams. In short, it appears
to us that McDougall was right after all, albeit for the wrong reason. In ef­
fect, we will argue, recent progress in mainstream physicalist brain theory
has provided new means for its own falsification as a complete account of
mind-brain relations.
Availability of this emerging evidence emboldens me to make some fur­
ther and even more contentious remarks regarding the larger problem of
perceptual synthesis, and the direction in which things seem to me to be
movmg.
It is an historical fact that mainstream cognitive psychology has always
tended on the whole to try to solve its problems "on the cheap," with as
little reference as possible to what all of us experience every day as cen­
tral features of our conscious mental life. The early workers in "mechanical
translation," for example, imagined that they could do a decent job simply
by constructing a large dictionary that would enable substitution of words
in one language for words in the other. This approach failed miserably, and
we were slowly driven, failed step by failed step, to the recognition that truly
adequate translation presupposes understanding, or in short a full apprecia­
tion of the capacities underlying the human use of language.
A similar evolution is underway in regard to perceptual theory. Most
of the work to date has taken a strongly "bottom-up" approach, along lines
formulated in the seminal book of Marr (1982). This school views percep­
tual synthesis as a kind of exhaustive calculation from the totality of input
currently present at our sensory surfaces. Machine vision and robotics, for
example, necessarily took this approach, and even in neuroscience it seemed
to make sense to start with the most accessible parts of the perceptual sys­
tems-the end organs and their peripheral connections-and work our way
inward. The great sensory systems themselves-vision, audition, somato­
sensation, and so on-were also presumed to operate more or less indepen­
dently, and were in fact typically studied in isolation.
A separate tradition dating back at least to Kant and the early Gestalt
theorists, and carried forward into the modern era by psychologists such
as Neisser (1 967, 1 976), has been sensitive to the presence of "top-down"
influences, both within and between sensory modalities. Although a few
perceptual subsystems (such as those that engender the Miiller-Lyer and
other incorrigible visual illusions) may be truly autonomous or "cognitively
impenetrable" in the sense of J. Fodor ( 1983), these seem to be isolated and
special cases. A very different overall picture of perceptual synthesis is cur­
rently emerging in which top-down influences predominate. On this view
40�Chapter 1

perceptual synthesis is achieved not from the input, but with its aid. This is
necessarily the case for example in regard to ambiguous figures, where the
stimulus information itself is not sufficient to determine a uniquely "cor­
rect" interpretation. More generally, we routinely ignore information that
is present in the input and supply information that is not, speed-reading
providing a characteristic example.29 Something within us, a sort of cosmo­
genic, world-generating, or virtual-reality system, is continuously updating
and projecting an overall model of the perceptual environment and our po­
sition within it, guided by very limited samplings of the available sensory
information (Simons & Chabris, 1999; Tart, 1993).
As in the case of understanding spoken or written language, an enor­
mous amount of general knowledge is constantly mobilized in service of
this projective activity, which freely utilizes any and all relevant sensory
data available to it. Top-down and cross-modal sensory interactions have
recently been recognized as the rule rather than the exception in perception
(A. K. Engel et ai., 2001; Shimojo & Shams, 2001). Neuroscientist Rodolfo
Llinas and his co-workers have even advanced the view, which I believe is
profoundly correct, that dreaming, far from being an odd and incidental part
of our mental life, represents the fundamental form of this projective activ­
ity. Ordinary perceptual synthesis, on this inverted view of things, amounts
to oneiric (dreamlike) activity constrained by sensory input (Llinas & Pare,
1996; Llinas & Ribary, 1994). Hartmann (1975) had proposed similar ideas
in regard to hallucinatory activity more generally, with dreaming included.
On his view such activity is again a ubiquitous and fundamental feature of
our mental life, and the critical question is not "why do we sometimes hal­
lucinate?" but rather "what keeps us from hallucinating most of the time?"
The answer, he thought, lies in inhibitory influences somehow exerted by
the brain activity that accompanies ongoing perceptual and cognitive func­
tions of the ordinary waking sorts. Similar arguments for the primacy and
importance of this cosmogenic capacity have more recently been advanced
by Brann (1991) and Globus (1987).30

29. Yuo mgiht aslo be srupsired to fnid taht yuo can raed tihs ntoe wtihuot mcuh
truoble.
30. Another relevant phenomenon, and one that deserves more attention, is spon­
taneous hallucinatory experience in normal and awake persons. That such experi­
ences commonly occur was initially demonstrated by the founders of the Society for
Psychical Research (Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886; H. Sidgwick et a!., 1 894) and
has subsequently been confirmed repeatedly by others (Bentall, 2000). The mere
fact of their occurrence demonstrates that the projective activity can sometimes
partially or even wholly override current sensory input. Waking apparitions also
share with dreams a tendency to incorporate massive amounts of information about
physically remote events (Gurney et a!., 1 886). Critical readers should not indulge
any temptation they may experience to dismiss these case reports wholesale as mere
"anecdotes," for they are massively and carefully documented. Penetrating analysis
of the pitfalls of eyewitness testimony did not begin with Loftus ( 1979), as com­
monly supposed: See Gurney et a!. (1 886), its review by James (1 887), and Chapters
2 and 6.
 A View from the Mainstream-41

So far so good, but where exactly is the "top," the ultimate source of
this projective activity? The mainstream neuroscientists who have already
recognized its existence invariably presume that it arises entirely within the
brain itself. Evidence such as that assembled in Chapter 6, however, like
the more direct evidence of post-mortem survival, strongly suggests that it
originates outside the brain as conventionally understood. We will return
to this in Chapter 9.

Genius-Level Creativity

In the Introduction we quoted Edgar Wind's guiding principle, that "the

commonplace may be understood as a reduction of the exceptional, but the
exceptional cannot be understood as an amplification of the commonplace."
That principle applies with particular force and poignancy, I think, to the
topic of this section. Any scientific theory of personality and cognition truly
worthy of the name surely must help us to understand this humanly vital
topic, but by this standard we have so far made distressingly little progress.
The reason, in my opinion, is that for the most part we have violated Wind's
principle by trying to understand the exceptional-real genius, in its fullest
expressions-as an amplification of the commonplace-"creativity," as we
find it in random samples of undergraduates and the like.
Myers and James consciously and deliberately approached the subject
from the other end, and in connection with the enlarged conception of hu­
man personality which they were struggling to articulate. In Chapter 7 we
discuss genius from this point of view, describing Myers's account in some
detail and situating it in relation to the main trends in contemporary cre­
ativity research. Focusing primarily on the creative process and creative
personality structure, we argue that Myers anticipated most of what has
been good in more recent work, while also accommodating in a natural way
a variety of additional phenomena-including psychological automatisms
and secondary centers of consciousness, altered states of consciousness,
unusual forms of symbolic thinking, and psi-that are inescapably bound
up with this topic but scarcely touched upon in contemporary mainstream
accounts. We also show that various expectations flowing from Myers's ac­
count of genius have been strongly confirmed by more recent empirical ob­
servations.

Mystical Experience

Experiences of this type lie at the core of the world's major religious
traditions and have continued to occur throughout history and across cul­
tures. Their existence as a distinctive and important class of psychological
phenomena can scarcely be denied. Yet they have largely been ignored by
mainstream psychology and neuroscience, and generations of reductionist
42-Chapter 1

clinical psychologists and psychiatrists have consistently sought to devalue

and pathologize them. Even when acknowledging that such experiences are
often life-transforming and self-validating for those who have them, the his­
torically standard epistemological approaches in psychology and philoso­
phy-beginning with William James in his Varieties of Religious Experi­
ence-treat them as purely subjective events having authority only for those
who experience them, and thus deny their objective significance and the
testability of the associated truth-claims. However, a large though scattered
literature testifies to the occurrence in such experiences, or in individuals
who have them, of genius-level creativity and many other unusual empiri­
cal phenomena of the sorts discussed in this book. Mystical-type states of
consciousness are also now known to be at least partially reproducible by
pharmacological means (psychedelics), and they can also be induced by
protracted self-discipline involving transformative practices such as the
various forms of meditation. A more objective, informed, and sympathetic
appraisal of mystical experience finds within it much additional support for
a Myers-type theory of human personality, and many new opportunities for
empirical research. Chapter 8 will develop these themes in detail.

The Heart of the Mind

In this final section I wish to comment briefly on a hornet's nest of

theoretical issues lying at the very core of our mental life, issues that have
been the focus of extensive recent debates, especially in the philosophical
literature.31 These issues are deep, individually complex, and densely inter­
connected. What I have to say will necessarily amount to little more than
a summary of my own opinions, but I believe that this statement derives
support both from earlier sections of this chapter and especially from the
chapters that follow.
The crucial point I want to make, especially to my fel low psychologists,
is this: Our a priori commitment to a conventional physicalist account of the
mind has rendered us systematically incapable of dealing adequately with
the mind's most central properties. We need to rethink that commitment.
Consider first the issue of semantic or intentional content, the "mean­
ing" of words and other forms of representation. Throughout our history,
we have tried unsuccessfully to deal with this by "naturalizing" it, reducing
it to something else that seems potentially more tractable. An old favorite
among psychologists, traceable at least back to Locke and Hume, is that
representations work by resembling what they represent, by virtue of some
sort of built-in similarity or structural isomorphism. Any hope along these
lines was long ago exploded in philosophical circles, as shown for example

3 1 . See also Chapter 4, which discusses several of these issues in the specific con­
text of memory theory, and Gauld (1989), which develops views similar to those
expressed here more systematically and generally in regard to the "entrapment" of
cognitive science by its current conceptual framework.
 A View from the Mainstream-43

by Goodman (1972) and by Heil (1981) in his destructive review of J. Fodor

(1975). The central move subsequently made by classical cognitive psychol­
ogy is essentially the semantic counterpart of the prevailing functionalist
doctrine in philosophy of mind: Meanings are not to be conceived as in­
trinsic to words or concepts on this view, but rather as deriving from and
defined by the functional role those words or concepts play in the overall
linguistic system. Currently, there is great interest in "externalist" causal
accounts of this functionalist type. In connectionism, dynamic systems
theory, and neuroscience, for example, the "meaning" of a given response,
such as the settling of a network into one of its "attractors" or the firing off
of a volley of spikes by a neuron in visual cortex, is typically identified with
whatever it is in the organism's environment that produces that response.
But this simply cannot be right. How can such an account deal with abstract
things, for example, or non-existent things? Responses do not qualify ipso
facto as representations, nor signs as symbols. Something essential is being
left out. That something, as Searle (1992) so effectively argues, is precisely
what matters, the semantic or mental content (see also the detailed discus­
sion of "representations" in Chapter 4).
Closely related to this is the more general and abstract problem of inten­
tionality, the ability of any and all representational forms to be about things,
events, and states of affairs in the world. Mainstream psychologists and phi­
losophers have struggled to find ways of making intentionality intrinsic to
the representations themselves, but again it just does not and cannot work,
because something essential is left out. That something is the user of the rep­
resentations. Intentionality is inherently a three-way relation involving us­
ers, symbols, and things symbolized, and the user cannot be eliminated. As
Searle puts it in various places, the intentionality of language is secondary
and derives from the intrinsic intentionality of the mind. Searle thus agrees
in part with Brentano (187411995), for whom intentionality was the primary
distinguishing mark of the mental. At the same time, however, Searle ig­
nores the other and more fundamental part of Brentano's thesis, which is
that intentionality cannot be obtained from any kind of physical system,
presumably including brains (see Puccetti, 1 989, and Dupuy, 2000, for use­
ful discussions of this issue from opposing points of view).
Tal k of "users" and the like raises for many contemporary psycholo­
gists and philosophers the terrifying specter of the homunculus, a little be­
ing within who embodies all the capacities we sought to explain in the first
place. Such a result would clearly be disastrous, because that being would
evidently need a similar though smaller being within itself, and so on with­
out end. Cognitive modelers seeking to provide a strictly physicalist account
of the mind must therefol,"e do so without invoking a homunculus, but they
have not succeeded. Often the homuncular aspect is hidden, slipped into a
model by its designers or builders and covertly enlisting the semantic and
intentional capacities of its users or observers. The semantic theory of J. J.
Katz and Fodor (1 964), mentioned earlier, provides one example of this, in
that the notation they used to designate their "semantic markers" progres-
44--Chapter 1

sively took on characteristics of telegraphic speech as the theory evolved (E.

F. Kelly, 1 975). Much of the contemporary work on computational model­
ing of metaphor has similar problems (Chapter 7).
Sometimes, however, the homunculus is more brazenly evident. One ex­
ample is Marr's account of vision, which applies computations to the two­
dimensional array of retinal input in order to generate a "description" of
the three-dimensional world that provided that visual input, but then needs
someone to interpret that description (Searle, 1992). Another is Kosslyn's
model of visual imagery, which essentially puts up an image on a sort of
internal TV screen, but then needs somebody else to view that image. Draa­
isma (2000) and our Chapter 4 identify similar homunculus problems in the
context of contemporary memory models.
Particularly in its more blatant forms the homunculus problem has at­
tracted the attention of physicalists such as Dennett (1978), who have sought
to remove its philosophic sting. Dennett's solution is to "discharge" the ho­
munculus by a process of "recursive decomposition." The basic idea is that
the "smart" homunculus appearing at the top of a model can be replaced
by progressively larger numbers of less smart homunculi, until we get to a
vast bottom layer corresponding to the "hardware" level of computer flip­
flops or neuron firings. But as Searle (1992) pointed out, this maneuver fails,
because even at the bottom level there has to be something outside the de­
composition, a homunculus in effect, that knows what those lowest-level
operations mean. Cognitive models cannot function without a homunculus,
in short, precisely because they lack what we have-minds, with their ca­
pacities for semantics, intentionality, and all the rest built in.
No homunculus problem, however, is posed by the structure of our
conscious experience itself. The efforts of Dennett (1991) and others to
claim that there is such a problem, and to use that to ridicule any residue
of dualism, rely upon the deeply flawed metaphor of the "Cartesian the­
ater," a place where mental contents get displayed and I pop in separately
to view them. Descartes himself, James, and Searle, among others, all have
this right; conscious experience comes to us whole and undivided, with the
qualitative feels, phenomenological content, unity, and subjective point of
view all built-in, intrinsic features. I and my experience cannot be separated
in this way.
Finally, I wish simply to record, without argument, my own deepest
intuition as to where these issues lead. All of the great unsolved mysteries of
the mind-semantics, intentionality, volition, the self, and consciousness­
seem to me inextricably interconnected, with consciousness somehow at the
root of all.
The consciousness I have in mind is emphatically not that of Chalmers
(1996), irreducible but ineffectual, consisting merely of phenomenological
properties or "qualia" arbitrarily tacked on to a strong artificial intelligence
that does all the cognitive work. Ordinary perception and action are satu­
rated with conceptual understanding, and conceptual understanding is sat­
urated with phenomenological content. Volition too has an intentionality
aspect, for as Nietzsche somewhere remarked, one cannot just will, one must
 A View from the Mainstream---45

will something. Each individual word is in effect "a microcosm of human

consciousness" (Vygotsky, 1986/2000, p. 256), and "all meaning is in some
way ultimately grounded in being" (Cassirer, 1957, p. 94). And as William
James so forcibly argued at the dawn of our science, all of this perceptual,
cognitive, and volitional activity somehow emanates from a mysterious and
elusive "spiritual self," which can often be sensed at or behind the inner­
most subjective pole of our ongoing conscious experience.
Consciousness, in short, far from being a passive epiphenomenon,
seems to me to play an essential role-indeed the essential role-in all of
our most basic cognitive capacities. I can find no better way of ending this
section than simply to stand back and applaud the trenchant conclusion
drawn by philosopher E. J. Lowe (1998), which encapsulates my own views
and the central contention of this book: "Reductive physicalism, far from
being equipped to solve the so-called 'easy' problems of consciousness, has
in fact nothing very useful to say about any aspect of consciousness" (pp.
1 21-1 22).

Conclusion

In regard to the deep theoretical issues broached in the previous section, my

views as a psychologist closely parallel those of a small minority of modern
philosophical writers including E. J. Lowe, Thomas Nagel, and John Searle.
I feel an enormous debt of gratitude to them for so vigorously defending,
like James (1 890b), the reality and importance of our conscious mental life.
I find it altogether astonishing, and predict that it will be found so as well
by our intellectual descendants, that so much of our science and philosophy
from James to the present has sought-consciously!-to slight or ignore
these first-person realities of the mind, and sometimes even to deny that
they exist. There is perhaps no better example of the power of theory to
blind us to facts.
But that has now all changed. We have come full circle and surely will
not turn backward again. The question that now confronts us, as it con­
fronted James, is whether all this richness of our conscious mental life really
can be accounted for in terms of physical operations in the brain. Searle
himself, of course, is sure that it can, at least in principle. But this is just a
pious hope, the latest form of "promissory materialism" (Popper & Eccles,
1977, p. 96). Even philosophers fundamentally sympathetic to Searle's point
of view are not nearly so confident. Consider for example the gloomy con­
clusions of physicalist Jaegwon Kim (1998):

We find ourselves i n a profound dilemma: If we are prepared to embrace

reductionism, we can explain mental causation. However, in the process of
reducing mentality to physical/biological properties, we may well lose the
intrinsic, subjective character of our mentality-arguably, the very thing
that makes the mental mental. I n what sense, then, have we saved "mental"
46-Chapter I

causation? But if we reject reductionism, we are not able to see how mental
causation should be possible. But saving mentality while losing causality
doesn't seem to amount to saving anything worth saving. For what good is
the mind if it has no causal power? Either way, we are in danger of losing
mentality. That is the dilemma. (p. 237)

In this passage Kim, a determined but scrupulously honest physicalist,

has clearly moved within a hair's breadth of the more skeptical and agnostic
Nagel. This surely is a development that ought to worry other physicalists.
But whereas their troubles with physicalism arose primarily via conceptual
analysis, and have led them to no definite conclusion, ours are primarily
empirical in character, and actually falsify biological naturalism. That is
the central contention of this book. We believe strongly that in order to get
an adequate scientific account of the mind we must be prepared to take seri­
ously all relevant data and to modify as necessary even our most fundamen­
tal theoretical ideas. Some of the most relevant kinds of data, however, have
been systematically excluded from contemporary scientific and philosophic
discussions.
Following chapters, as indicated, will discuss a number of these neglect­
ed topics in depth. Let me conclude by briefly recapitulating the argument
as it has developed so far: Despite its many significant accomplishments, a
century of mainstream scientific psychology has not provided a satisfactory
theory of mind, or solved the mind-body problem. Physicalist accounts of
the mind appear to be approaching their limits without fully accounting for
its properties. The computational theory of the mind has been overthrown,
forcing physicalism to retreat into what necessarily constitutes its final fron­
tier, the unique biology of the brain. But this biological naturalism appears
destined to fare little better. Some critical properties of mental life can al­
ready be recognized as irreconcilable in principle with physical operations
of the brain, and others seem likely to prove so as well.
These failures warrant a serious attempt to rethink the entire subject
of mind-brain relations from a different perspective-specifically, from the
perspective provided by James's generic "transmission" theory. There is no
better way to begin such an effort than by reviewing the extraordinary con­
tributions of F. W. H. Myers, James's colleague and friend, who provided
the most fully developed version so far of a theory of this type.
 Chapter 2

F. W. H. Myers and the Empiric al

Study of the Mind-Body Problem

Emily Williams Kelly

Psychology sometimes seems to suffer from a memory loss that borders on

the pathological. Not only is the number of rediscoveries shamefully high,
but valuable empirical and conceptual work carried out i n older traditions
has disturbingly little impact on present-day research. The result is that
certain defects in theory formulation diagnosed as long ago as the nine­
teenth century, are repeatedly reintroduced i n psychology. (Draaisma,
2000, p. 5)

The Historical Context

As the above quotation suggests, psychology as a research discipline has not

been a steadily progressing advance of knowledge, each generation build­
ing on the discoveries and achievements of its predecessors in a systematic
march toward new knowledge. Even in the physical sciences, in which there
has been a somewhat more linear progression of achievement, many sci­
entists take the all too parochial view that the insights and observations
of previous generations have been superseded by the technological, meth­
odological, empirical, and even conceptual developments of the present.
Few modern working scientists consider it likely that an examination of the
history of their field might not only broaden their perspective on contem-

47
48-Chapter 2

porary problems, but even suggest new (or renewed) avenues for attacking
those problems. Over a century ago, however, that quintessential spokes­
man for modern science, Thomas Huxley, lamented the historical ignorance
of scientists in his own day and urged them to study their history because
"there is assuredly no more effectual method of clearing up one's own mind
on any subject than by talking it over, so to speak, with men of real power
and grasp, who have considered it from a totally different point of view" (T.
H. Huxley, 1874, p. 556).
In the second half of the 19th century, psychology was undergoing a
major and rapid transformation from moral philosophy to naturalistic sci­
ence, and central to this transformation were efforts to grapple with ques­
tions as fundamental to psychology as the nature of mind, the nature of the
relationship between mental and physical processes, and the relationship
of psychology to the rest of science. By the early years of the 20th century,
however, such fundamental questions had, for all intents and purposes, been
written off as "metaphysical" problems unsuitable for a scientific psychol­
ogy. Psychology was well on its way to the fragmentation and conceptual
impasses characteristic of contemporary psychology, as described in the
Introduction and Chapter 1. What led to this abandonment of fundamental
questions? Can a return to them aid psychologists in moving the science
of psychology forward, both by bringing psychology conceptually into the
21st century and, perhaps even more importantly, by advancing knowledge
about issues that are of interest and concern to the general public?
It is our contention in this book that such a return to fundamental ques­
tions is not only desirable but essential to psychology, and that a few "men
of real power and grasp" in the late 19th century-including in particular
F. W. H. Myers and William James-had opened up avenues for attacking
these questions empirically, avenues that were quickly closed off by assump­
tions and beliefs that stil l overwhelmingly permeate modern psychology.
In this chapter, I will first describe briefly the intellectual context in which
scientific psychology developed in the 19th century, and then provide an
overview of the work of F. W. H. Myers.

The Roots of Scientific Psychology: Dualism, Mechanistic

Determinism, and the Continuity of Nature

Science, from Copernicus to the present, has undoubtedly been the

single most important influence on the modern world, its reach extend­
ing far beyond technological advances to the fundamental changes it has
brought to the way humans view themselves and the world around them.
The scientific revolution had its roots in ideas that, with every subsequent
accomplishment and advance in science, have become ever more entrenched
in modern thinking. An important impetus to the development of Western
science was the clear articulation of a dualism that split the phenomenal
universe into two radically different domains. With Descartes' distinction
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-49

between extended, mechanical matter and unextended, volitional mind, and

Galileo's distinction between primary, objective properties (such as mass)
and secondary, essentially subjective properties (such as color), the mate­
rial, mechanical, objective side of nature became the domain of science.
The physical universe was conceived as operating according to a uniform
and unvarying mechanical system of causes and effects-a view in distinct
contrast to the old, pre-scientific view of the world as subject to the vary­
ing and unpredictable actions of personal forces, whether human or divine.
By observing and measuring events, scientists could identify and describe
these unvarying sequences, or natural laws, and thus predict future events.
Closely related to this idea of mechanistic determinism was the principle of
atomistic reductionism, or the assumption that physical systems could be
understood in terms of the actions and reactions of their simplest or lowest­
level parts. A major goal of science was therefore to identify and describe
with ever greater precision the basic elements and processes from which a
physical system is built.
This assumption of mechanistic determinism was what made the physi­
cal sciences so immensely successful throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th
centuries, and each new success further entrenched the assumption that the
world is primarily a kind of machine. Scientific determinism culminated
in the views of the astronomer Laplace, who, in an often quoted passage,
insisted that all events without exception "obey the great laws of nature"
and that what we perceive as happening by chance or by free will simply
reflects our ignorance of the causes. Thus, for "an intelligence that, at a
given instant, could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated
and the respective situation of the beings that make it up . . . nothing would be
uncertain, and the future, like the past, would be open to its eyes" (Laplace,
1 82511 995, p. 2). Perhaps inevitably, a corollary of this thorough-going
determinism emerged as epiphenomenalism, the view that mind and free
will-the other half of dualism-are either illusions or, at best, secondary,
ineffectual byproducts of the physical, mechanical world.1
Further advances in science during the 19th century lent increasing sup­
port to another important and spreading assumption about the universe,
one that, ironically, began to undermine the dualism from which modern
science had developed. One major development was the formulation of the
principle of the conservation of energy, introduced to the general scientific
world primarily through Helmholtz's famous 1847 lecture to the Physical
Society of Berlin. This law stated that the total sum of energy in the universe
is constant, energy never being either lost or gained but simply transformed
from one kind to another (including, Einstein later determined, from and

1 . Laplace's determinism and belief that "conscious will is an illusion" are still
very much a part of modern philosophy and science: "If [scientific psychologists]
somehow had access to all the information they could ever want, the assumption
of psychology is that they could uncover the mechanisms that give rise to all
your behavior and so could certainly explain why you picked up this book at this
moment" (Wegner, 2002, p. I).
50-Chapter 2

into mass). The law thus became the specific foundation for belief in the unity
of all nature in a closed, causal system. Another important development
was Darwin's theory that all biological organisms have evolved through the
mechanism of natural selection. With the application of evolutionary ideas
to biology, not only were all forms oflife presumed to be subject to the same
universal mechanisms, but all forms of life could be seen as having devel­
oped from the same elementary organisms.
From these and other descriptions of natural laws emerged the principle
of continuity, or the assumption that the universe is a unitary, not dualistic,
phenomenon. All elements of the universe are not only inextricably related,
but they all function according to the same basic, deterministic principles of
cause and effect and are all, in the final analysis, of the same basic essence
or nature. A corollary of this belief in continuity was the growing convic­
tion that, if the world is ultimately a unity, all phenomena must be subject to
the same tools of knowledge-that is, the methods of classical science that
had already proved so successful. Because scientific method relied so com­
pletely on observation, it followed that only phenomena that are observable,
directly or indirectly, could provide the contents of science.

Psychology as Science: A Fundamental Conflict

Among those increasing numbers of people who understood the power

of scientific inquiry and felt the impact of its accomplishments, there arose
the convictions that the principle of continuity demanded the unity, not dual­
ity, of the psychophysical organism; that mental phenomena, like physical
ones, are natural phenomena; and thus that psychology could be subjected
to the same empirical methods that had so revolutionized other branches
of natural philosophy and transformed them into science. The attempt to
transform psychology into a science, however, raised some unique prob­
lems. The phenomena of psychology are unlike those of any of the physical
sciences in that they are, above all else, mental. At the theoretical heart of
psychology, therefore, are the questions, What are mental phenomena and
what is their relation to physical phenomena? Is mind "an elementary force
in nature," as primary and fundamental a characteristic of nature as matter,
or is it the "resultant of the really elementary forces," an evolved, emergent,
or epiphenomenal characteristic of matter (James, 1902/1958, p. l OS)? Of
particular theoretical importance for psychology is the question of mental
causality, or volition: Can mental phenomena initiate changes in the physi­
cal world? If so, what are the parameters and laws of such mental causality,
and what do they imply about the question of whether mind is a fundamen­
tal or a derivative aspect of nature? Is mind, in short, caused or causal?
Scientists of other fields found no need to ask such questions. The
physical sciences had progressed, in fact, specifically by rejecting mental,
"spiritual," or personal causality as operative in nature in favor of a view
of nature as governed wholly by impersonal, mechanistic laws. The notion
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-51

of mental causality was increasingly dismissed as a vestige of primitive,

"supernatural" ways of thinking. 2 The resulting intellectual turmoil of the
19th century, however, was more than a conflict between an old, dying order
and a new, more advanced one, or even, as it is so often portrayed, between
Religion and Science. It was, in essence, a conflict between experience and
knowledge (Daston, 1978): Individual first-person experience suggests one
kind of world-one of personal agency-but the cumulative third-person
knowledge produced by science was suggesting quite a different world­
one of impersonal agency. Scientific psychology became the point at which
those two world views collided, thus presenting science with the most seri­
ous challenge to the strength and sufficiency of its assumptions, principles,
and methods.
The potential incorporation of psychology into science, in sum, seemed
to present a threat to both. If the "anomaly" of mind, with its apparently
volitional, teleological, and subjective phenomena, was to be reconciled
with the otherwise increasingly uniform picture painted by Western science
of mechanistic, atomistic, physical determinism, then either the concept of
mind or the assumptions of modern science would have to be altered. Psy­
chologists could redefine, or reconceptualize, psychology in such a way that
it excludes whatever does not fit the framework of the physical sciences,
such as consciousness or volitional agency; or they could use the phenom­
ena of psychology to modify the model of science that limits causal agency
to physical determinism. They could, in short, either narrow psychology to
fit science as it was then understood, or expand science to accommodate
psychological phenomena. The nearly unanimous choice of 19th-century
scientists was the former course, to force psychology into the framework of
assumptions derived from the classical physical sciences, rather than enter­
tain the idea that science might have to be enlarged to accommodate mental
phenomena and causality on an equal footing with physical phenomena and
causality (Cook [Kelly], 1992). As Boring (1933) succinctly stated: "Histori­
cally science is physical science. Psychology, if it is to be a science, must be
like physics . . ..The ultimate abandonment of dualism leaves us the physi­
cal world as the only reality. Consciousness will ultimately be measured in
physical dimensions" (pp. 6, 8).

The Naturalization of Mind: Limiting Psychology

The first major task for the mid-19th-century scientists who sought to
transform psychology into science was to reconceptualize mind as a natu­
ral, not supernatural, phenomenon. Several lines of influence contributed
importantly to this process. The 17th- and 18th-century empiricist philoso­
phy of associationism, which held that all mental phenomena derive solely

2. Today concepts such as volition (along with "belief, desire, fear, sensation, pain,
joy, and so on") are similarly dismissed by many as vestiges of "folk psychology"
(Church1and, 1988, p. 44).
52-Chapter 2

from experience (specifically, elementary sensations that bond together to

form complex perceptions and ideas) was of immense importance in pro­
viding a model of mind that seemed consistent with the scientific model of
the physical world as atomistic and deterministic. Advances in physiology,
particularly in the localization of function in the brain and nervous system,
together with a reflex model of sensorimotor processes that also dovetailed
with atomism, associationism, and mechanistic determinism, strongly sup­
ported a view of mind as produced by the brain, and thus of physiology as
the basis for a science of psychology. The doctrine of the conservation of
energy made it increasingly difficult for many scientists to accept the idea of
mental processes that could break into the closed causal chain of energy. It
also provided a new notion, derived particularly from the physicist Gustav
Fechner (considered by many to be the founder of experimental psychology),
of mind as a form of energy, the product of a nervous system whose func­
tion is to translate physical energy into psychophysical activity. Last, but
certainly not least, the biological sciences, in the form of Darwin's theory
of evolution and natural selection, played an immense role in undermining
old ideas about the uniqueness of human minds and weakening whatever
remained of any belief among scientists in teleological or volitional pro­
cesses in nature.
The naturalization of mind, however, was as revolutionary an idea as
Darwinism, and for similar reasons. In the firsthand, subjective experience
of all humans, mind seems an indivisible unity, an "I" that is a free, active,
causal agent in an otherwise deterministic nature. This concept was being
assaulted on many scientific fronts, however, and was rapidly being replaced
by a concept of mind as solely the product of a nervous system shaped over
the course of evolution in response to the demands of the environment. I
use the term "assaulted" deliberately, because this new concept of mind was
so antithetical to longstanding and seemingly commonsense ways in which
people view their mind, or self, that it quickly became a battleground in
which the emerging forces of modern science were arrayed against the old
guard of religion, theology, and metaphysics. This war pitted naturalism
and the principle of continuity against supernaturalism and dualism; and it
was not simply an intellectual matter, but one with enormous implications
for the way humans would view themselves, their society, and the world
around them. Because so much was at stake, positions rapidly became rig­
idly polarized, and many of the most well-known and vocal of the scientists
advocating for a new science of mind took strong anti-dualistic, anti-teleo­
logical views that left no room for compromise.
One of most important results of this militant dichotomization of sci­
entific naturalism and metaphysical dualism was that there was no room in
the former for a concept central to the latter, namely, mental causality or
volition. A major phenomenon of psychology was therefore automatically
excluded because of the assumption that materialistic determinism consti­
tutes the essence of science. For many scientists, causative volition was a
nonsensical concept because (they said) it required the introduction of new
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-53

energy into what was otherwise a closed system. Moreover, allowing for the
concept of volition in psychology was "a back-door attempt to reintroduce
an active ego or soul into the new psychology" (Daston, 1978, p. 202). Voli­
tion became "a taboo concept" because scientists thought "it would pull
psychology back to its prescientific, mystical days" (Decker, 1986, p. 52).
Thomas Huxley (1887/1892), "Darwin's bull-dog" and the personification
of the so-called science-religion debate of the 19th century, asked: "The
ultimate form of the problem is this: Have we any reason to believe that a
feeling, or state of consciousness, is capable of directly affecting the motion
of even the smallest conceivable molecule of matter?" (p. 292). His answer,
and that of many others, was, certainly not: "If anybody says that the will
influences matter, the statement is not untrue, but it is nonsense .. . . Such
an assertion belongs to the crude materialism of the savage. Now the only
thing which influences matter is the position of surrounding matter or the
motion of surrounding matter" (Clifford, 1874, p. 728). Mental as well as
physical events are part of a deterministic chain in which one event is the
direct antecedent of, and gives rise to, the next event; but "volitions do not
enter into the chain of causation . . . at all.. . . [T]he feeling we call volition is
not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain
which is the immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata" (T. H.
Huxley, 1 874, pp. 576-577).3
Huxley's statement expresses another central assumption of the 19th­
century founders of scientific psychology-the assumption that matter is
the primary, independent factor in the universe and that mind is a second­
ary, dependent byproduct of it. Henry Maudsley, a prominent physician
and physiologist whose Physiology and Pathology of Mind (1 868) became "a
turning point in English psychiatry" (Lewis, 195 1 , p. 269), summed up the
views of many of his scientific contemporaries when he defined materialism
as the belief that "mind is an outcome and function of matter in a certain
state of organization" (Maudsley, 1879, p. 667). Huxley (1892) argued that
"so far as observation and experiment go, they teach us that the psychical
phenomena are dependent on the physical. . . called into existence" by physi­
cal processes (p. 43). Alexander Bain (1 87211874), one of the most influential
psychologists during the formative years of scientific psychology, argued
that all feelings, intellectual capacities, and volitional activities are directly
correlated with and dependent on brain states. In France also, prominent
psychologists left no room for doubt that mind and consciousness are wholly
dependent on physiological processes. Theodule Ribot (1 898), Professor of
Experimental and Comparative Psychology at the College of France, stated
unequivocally that "the organism and the brain . . . constitute the real per­
sonality," and the apparently psychological problem of "the unity of the
ego is, in its ultimate form, a biological problem" (pp. 154-156). Early in his
career, Ribot had argued, like Huxley, for an automaton theory in which
"consciousness is only an adjunct of certain nervous processes, as incapable
of reacting upon them as is a shadow upon the steps of the traveler whom

3. For a 21 st-century advocate of such views, see Wegner (2002).

54-Chapter 2

it accompanies" (Ribot, 1882, p. 1 1). He later modified this extreme view

to say that mind, once called into existence by the brain, could have some
efficacy.4 Nonetheless, "the fundamental and active element is the nervous
system, [and] the other [i.e., consciousness] is only a concomitant" (Ribot,
1898, pp. 1 1-12). Psychologists, he said, may treat mental states as causal
phenomena, so long as they do not forget that all mental states "have their
roots in the organism and are pre-determined by it . . . [and] that these [men­
tal] causes are in their turn effects" (p. 51). Even a clinician such as Pierre
Janet (1893/1 901), who described the disturbances he observed as functional
and mental rather than organic, emphasized that psychological phenomena
are of "cortical origin"(p. 27): "You will understand, once for all, that the
word 'mind' represents the highest functions of the brain and probably the
functions of the cortex" (p. 52). In sum, for many in the first generation of
scientific psychology, the thorough-going unilateral dependence of mind on
brain was "a practical certainty . . . .There are numbers of questions relating
to the connection of the mind with the body which have ceased to be open
questions, because Science has had her word to say about them" (Clifford,
1874, pp. 734, 7 1 5).

The Unresolved Dilemmas of Psychology

The principles of 19th-century scientific naturalism took firm hold in

psychology. Mechanistic determinism and reductionistic atomism had been
pitted against the old "commonsense" or "folk-psychology" principles such
as teleology, meaning, and volition, and had apparently emerged victorious.
Nevertheless, humanistic principles were not easily relinquished. Through­
out much of the 1 9th century, the conflict between scientific determinism
and human volition remained a central dilemma of the age (Chadwick,
1 975, pp. 204-205; Daston, 1978, 1982).
In particular, the denial of volition, or mental causality, left some major
problems unresolved. Not only did such a conclusion contradict the daily
experience of all humans; it also presented major social and ethical prob­
lems. If human beings are products of deterministic processes, how can they
be held accountable for their actions under any social or ethical codes? Even
Huxley (1892), who had contemptuously dismissed "the primitive dualism
of a natural world 'fixed in fate' and a supernatural, left to the free play of
volition" (p. 4), felt this dilemma so keenly that he was ultimately forced to
construct his own "primitive dualism" of Nature and Society, the former
characterized by law, the latter by volition or free will (e.g., T. H. Huxley,
1888/1898). The undeniably dual nature of human experience, together with
the social and moral necessity for a belief in volition, presented psycholo­
gists with paradoxes and problems that seemed insoluble without sacrific-

4. More recently, the eminent neuroscientist Roger Sperry (e.g., 1 980) has
expressed a similar view.
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-55

ing either human principles on the one hand or scientific principles on the
other.
Another major problem that the new psychology not only left unre­
solved, but actually exacerbated, was the question of whether to view mind
as fundamentally a unity or a multiplicity. Is mind an indivisible whole that
is the cohesive, organizing factor of mental life, or is it a structure built up
from innumerable elements or experiences? Is mind the sum of the parts,
or the factor drawing the parts together in the first place? In brief, is mind
best understood from the bottom up or the top down? In the 19th century,
this problem was central to the conflict between the old dualistic psychol­
ogy and the new materialist psychology; it was a battle "which pitted the
metaphysical 'unity of self' against the scientific 'multiplicity of selves'"
(Robinson, 1978, p. 349). The first was the traditional notion of self, and
even an associationist such as 1. S. Mill (1 84311 874) found this a compelling
idea: "There is a something I call Myself, or, by another form of expression,
my mind, which I consider as distinct from these sensations, thoughts, etc.;
a something which I conceive to be not the thoughts, but the being that has
the thoughts" (p. 56).
In direct opposition to this view was the "colonial" view of conscious­
ness as a multiplicity built up from innumerable elements of the nervous sys­
tem working in coordination: "Physiology shows that this verdict [of unity
of mind] is an illusion . . . .The apparently simple is, on analysis, found to be
complex" (Ribot, 1 882, pp. 42, 45). Mill (1843/1874), after acknowledging
the compelling sense we all have of a unified self, went on to say that we can
have no knowledge of what this something is ("though it is myself") but only
of "the series of its states of consciousness" (p. 57). For an increasing num­
ber of 19th-century scientists, that knowable "series" was the only concep­
tion of mind that psychology needed, especially since the view of mind as a
multiplicity conformed much better to the analytic method of science and
the atomistic view of matter in 19th-century physics than did the concept of
a unitary, indivisible self.
Nevertheless, most psychologists recognized that the multiplicity view
of mind left fundamental problems unresolved. As McDougal l (191111961)
later said, the basic problem for all theories of mind is: "What holds con­
sciousness together?" How do we get psychical unity out of physical multi­
plicity, "the hanging together of a multiplicity of conscious processes in a
numerically distinct or individual stream" (p. 164)?5
The problem of whether mind is a unity or a multiplicity also raised
the problem of whether the traditional analytic methods of the physical sci­
ences are adequate for a science of psychology. If mind is basically a com­
posite structure built up from numerous psychological elements, then such
methods are appropriate for psychology. If, however, mind is most funda­
mentally a unity, then new methods, going beyond quantitative analysis,
may be required. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a few psycholo-

5. The problem, known today as "the binding problem," remains a fundamental

one in psychology and the neurosciences (see Chapter 1).
56-Chapter 2

gists continued to insist, in opposition to most of their colleagues, that the

analytic method alone is insufficient for psychology. To these psychologists
(who included William James, James Ward, and G. F. Stout), when experi­
ence is "decomposed into elements" in the interests of conforming to the
analytic scientific method, an important datum-the whole-has been lost
(Daston, 1982). G. Murphy (1929), specifically discussing the limitations of
the quantitative method when applied to human experience, suggested: "It
may well be that psychology, precisely because of its concern with problems
refractory to existing methods, will be the means of wresting from nature
new methods and realities" (p. 415). Similarly, the historian Brett (1921), in
the context of discussing the unity-multiplicity problem, said simply: "The
central problem [in psychology] is the question of method" (p. 148).
The unity-multiplicity problem is also important because it raises in
yet another form the question of the relationship of mind and body, that is,
whether mind is caused or causal. Can mind be understood adequately as
the product of simple physiological sensations or processes? Or is it itself
a fundamental, elementary, and causal principle in nature? In essence, the
unity-multiplicity debate is a variant of the primary problem facing scien­
tific psychology: whether-and how-the concept of volition can be accom­
modated within a deterministic scientific understanding of nature.

An Attempted Solution: Methodological Parallelism

In short, psychologists had worked themselves into an impasse: They

had set up an implacable dichotomy of naturalistic (or physicalistic) versus
supernaturalistic (or dualistic) ideas about mind, but most of them were
unable to throw themselves wholeheartedly on the side of naturalism as
they had defined it, which logically required the denial of such "supernatu­
ralistic" ideas as volition and the unity of human personality. Many psy­
chologists sought to escape these discomforts by adopting a methodological
parallelism, based on a doctrine of mind-brain concomitance enunciated by
the neurologist Hughlings Jackson. Like Huxley, Clifford, Wundt, Bain, and
many other 1 9th-century scientists, Jackson had expressed the view that, if
he could be convinced that mind had interacted with and influenced matter,
he would be forced to give up neurology altogether, "the implication being
that dualism means the negation of law"-and, hence, of science (Engel­
hardt, 1 975, p. 145). In other words, because of the law of the conservation
of energy, there can be "no interference of one with the other" (Jackson,
1931-1932, vol. 2, p. 72).6 Jackson therefore adopted the position that states

6. This belief that mental efficacy is a violation of the conservation of energy

l ies behind much of contemporary rejection of any form of dualism in which
consciousness is understood as an active force in nature (see, e.g., Dennett, 1 991).
Similarly, it is also behind much of the rejection of psi phenomena, the assumption
being that the mental efficacy implied by such phenomena "den[ies] the universal
validity of one of the greatest triumphs of nineteenth-century science, the laws of
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-57

of consciousness are different in kind from nervous states; the two occur
together, that is, in correlation; but there is no interaction or interference
between them. Mental phenomena and physiological phenomena, in other
words, constitute two parallel, completely closed, yet somehow correlated
causal chains; but the relationship between the two chains, the nature of the
concomitance, is a metaphysical, and not scientific, problem.
Few psychologists adopted a specific philosophical doctrine of parallel­
ism such as that of Leibniz. Most insisted instead that this parallelism was
not ontological, but methodological or linguistic only. Increasingly, they
began to argue that the impasses to which the naturalization of mind had
led are the result of mixing conceptual categories or realms of discourse
(e.g., Janet, 1 89311901). Adopting a methodological parallelism of psycho­
logical and physical processes allowed psychologists the "luxury of onto­
logical agnosticism while they got on with their work" (R. M. Young, 1970,
p. 233), because it freed them to study psychological processes in their own
right, without needing to relate them back in any specific way to their physi­
ological substratum.
Even more fundamentally, psychologists began to argue that the
impasses in psychology reflected limits beyond which scientific method can­
not go. John Tyndall (1879), one of the most thoughtful exponents of sci­
entific monism, argued that, although the absolute correlation of mental
phenomena with brain phenomena is known, the ultimate nature of that
relationship is not only unknown but unknowable. A neutral statement
of the "invariable" correlation, or parallelism, is as far as science can go;
science can describe the mind-matter relationship but it cannot explain it,
because, with mind or consciousness, "the methods pursued in mechanical
science come to an end . . . [and] logical continuity disappears" (pp. 390-391).
Tyndall (1 874/1879) therefore insisted that he must remain agnostic on the
question of whether mind is a causal factor in physical events, or merely a
by-product of them, because

the production of consciousness by molecular action is to me quite as

inconceivable on mechanical principles as the production of molecular
motion by consciousness . . . .I, however, reject neither, and thus stand in
the presence of two Incomprehensibles, instead of one Incomprehensible.

thermodynamics" (Deese, 1972, p. l l 5). More generally, as the long-time editor of

the Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease put it, "paranormal phenomena . . . are
intrinsically unacceptable-there is no way to make them compatible with the
total accumulated body of scientific knowledge . . . The problem lies . . .in the body
of knowledge and theory which must be abandoned or radically modified in
order to accept it" (E. G. Brody, 1 979, pp. 72 73). Phenomena of mental efficacy
-

(such as those described in Chapter 3 and in works listed in the Appendix) may
indeed require a "radical modification" of certain assumptions in modern science,
particularly about the nature of mind and matter. They in no way, however, require
the "abandonment" of accumulated scientific knowledge-provided we distinguish
assumptions from knowledge.
58-Chapter 2

While accepting fearlessly the facts of materialism dwelt upon in these

pages, I bow my head in the dust before that mystery of mind. (p. 224)

Even William James, who could hardly be accused of wishing to put

psychology into a theoretical or methodological straitjacket, nevertheless
argued in The Principles of Psychology for a methodological parallelism:
"Empirical parallelism . . . [is] the wisest course. . . . [N]ature in her unfathom-
able designs has mixed us . . . of brain and mind, . . . the two things hang indubi-
tably together and determine each other's being, but how or why, no mortal
may ever know" (James, 1890b, vol. I , p. 182).1
In fact, however, the professed ontological neutrality was usually any­
thing but that. Behind the methodological parallelism, and the associated
call to get on with studying and describing psychological processes in and
of themselves, was the often thinly disguised assumption that mental phe­
nomena are a secondary byproduct of the fundamental constituent of the
universe, matter. T. H. Huxley (1 892), summarizing his own position, spoke
for many of his scientific contemporaries: "I have frequently expressed my
incapacity to understand the nature of the relation between consciousness
and a certain anatomical tissue . . . [but] so far as observation and experi­
ment go, they teach us that the psychical phenomena are dependent on the
physical" (p. 43). Thus, in the same breath, he expressed both an inability to
understand the nature of the mind-matter relationship and a fundamental
conclusion about its nature. Huxley was agnostic, therefore, not concern­
ing the nature of the relationship of mind and matter-he was convinced
that mind is ultimately dependent on (because derived from) matter-but
only concerning the specific nature of that dependence. In short, for Huxley
as for many other 19th-century scientists, the exact nature of the depen­
dence of psychical processes on physical ones was an open-though unre­
solvable-question; but the general dependence of mind on matter was a
resolved-and thus closed-question.
The outcome of adopting this methodological parallelism in psychol­
ogy was not difficult to foresee. Psychologists could get on with the business
of simply describing psychological processes, professing a vague working
assumption of mind-brain unity without having to deal with fundamental
theoretical issues such as the nature of mind-brain concomitance and the
associated problem of the efficacy of mind in the physical world. The dis­
missal of such problems as "metaphysical" only, and not "scientific," effec­
tively foreclosed any challenge to the assumption underlying psychology of
a unilateral dependence of mind on brain. Although the nature and extent
of mind-brain correlation should have become the major empirical problem
for a psychology that sought theoretical understanding of its subject matter,
it was instead altogether avoided. Perhaps even more problematically, 19th­
century psychology had been built on a rigid and unyielding dichotomy of
physicalistic naturalism versus dualistic supernaturalism, and the rigidity

7. This view that the mind-body problem is insoluble is essentially the "mysterian"
position of McGinn (1 999).
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-59

of the dichotomy precluded any serious consideration of the possibility that

the solution to its paradoxes and problems might lie in a close and criti­
cal examination of prevailing assumptions about naturalism itself-that is,
about whether the equation of naturalism with physicalism and determin­
ism, and of mental efficacy with supernaturalism and lawlessness, exhausted
the possibilities.
Scientists instrumental in the development of 19th-century psychol­
ogy thus in general had chosen to conceptualize science primarily not as
a method with which to confront basic questions posed by contradictory
aspects of human experience, but as a doctrine to which psychology, if it
is to be a science, must conform. Because so many 19th-century scientists
refused to question or even critically examine the assumptions of the physi­
cal sciences and the world view derived from them, and thus avoided theo­
retical problems that psychological phenomena alone raised, those assump­
tions, that world view, and the pattern of avoiding basic theoretical issues
became the foundation upon which modern psychology was built. During
its subsequent history, psychology, despite its broad expansion in the 20th
century, has for the most part remained within that framework:

Ever since its stipulation into existence as an independent science, psychol­

ogy has been far more concerned with being a science than with courageous
and self-determining confrontations with its historically constituted sub­
ject matter. Its history has been largely a matter of emulating the methods,
forms, symbols of the established sciences, especially physics. In so doing,
there has been an inevitable tendency to retreat from broad and intensely
significant ranges of its subject matter, and to form rationales for so doing
which could only invite further retreat. (Koch, 1961 , pp. 629-630)

F. W. H. Myers: Purposes and Principles

Not all psychologists acquiesced in this retreat from major problems and
theoretical issues in psychology. William James, for one, was acutely aware
that parallelism, or the Jacksonian doctrine of concomitance, avoided, and
did nothing to help resolve, the basic problems of mental causality inherent
in psychology. To the injunction of his colleague Charles Mercier-"Having
firmly and tenaciously grasped these two notions, of the absolute separate­
ness of mind and matter, and of the invariable concomitance of a mental
change with a bodily change, the student will enter on the study of psychol­
ogy with half his difficulties surmounted"-James replied: "Half his diffi­
culties ignored, I should prefer to say. For this 'concomitance' in the midst
of 'absolute separateness' is an utterly irrational notion" (James, 1890b, vol.
I , p. 1 36). Although he himself had urged psychologists to adopt an empir­
ical or methodological parallelism, he also cautioned them that this was
"certainly only a provisional halting-place, and things must some day be
more thoroughly thought out" (p. 182). James's close friend and colleague,
60-Chapter 2

F. W. H. Myers, was one of the few psychologists who attempted to do just

this. In numerous papers published between 1880 and his death in 190 1 ,
culminating in h i s (1903) posthumously published Human Personality and
Its Survival of Bodily Death (HP), Myers dissented from the determination
of his scientific contemporaries to exclude from psychology its most basic
questions.
Myers was born at Keswick, England, in 1843, the son of a liberal cler­
gyman who died when Myers was eight. He went up to Cambridge Univer­
sity in 1860 and lived in Cambridge until his death in 1901. At Cambridge he
earned a First Class in both the Classical Tripos and the Moral Sciences Tri­
pos, and he began reading for the Natural Sciences Tripos. In 1865 he was
appointed to a fellowship and lectureship in classics at Cambridge, which
he held until 1869, when, influenced by J. S. Mill's liberalism, he resigned
his fellowship to work for the movement to broaden higher education, and
particularly women's education, in Britain. After the passage of the Educa­
tion Act of 1 870, he began work in 1872 as a government school inspector,
and in 1875 he was appointed school inspector for the Cambridge District, a
position he held for the next 25 years.
Myers's work in education, however, eventually provided simply the
background and part of the financial support for the real work of his life.
Like many of the intellectual leaders of the mid-19th century, he had rejected
the Christianity in which he had been raised because of its insufficient ratio­
nal basis and "the need of an inward make-believe" (Myers, 1893/1961 , p.
36). Although scientists such as those referred to earlier i n this chapter were
giving widespread currency to the new assumption that mind is a secondary
byproduct of elementary material processes, this too seemed to him a gra­
tuitous assumption that required closer scrutiny. To examine this assump­
tion with novel lines of empirical research, Myers helped found the Society
for Psychical Research (SPR) in 1882, an organization whose stated aim was
"to approach these various problems without prejudice or prepossession of
any kind, and in the same spirit of exact and unimpassioned inquiry which
has enabled Science to solve so many problems, once not less obscure nor
less hotly debated" (Society for Psychical Research, 1882, p. 4).
In the SPR's early years, the phenomena studied included most promi­
nently the study of hypnosis and mesmerism, telepathy, mediumship, and
hallucinations. The larger purpose of psychical research, however, as con­
ceived by its most prominent founders, was to examine such phenomena in
light of their bearing on questions about the nature and place in the uni­
verse of mind or human personality. In addition to Myers, founders and
early members of the SPR included prominent scientists and intellectual
leaders such as Arthur and Gerald Balfour, W. F. Barrett, W. E. Gladstone,
Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Rayleigh, John Ruskin, F. C. S. Schiller, Henry Sidg­
wick, Eleanor Sidgwick, Balfour Stewart, Lord Tennyson, and J. J. Thom­
son, all of whom sought a more satisfactory understanding of human nature
than the intellectual climate of the 19th century was providing. For the first
two decades of the SPR's existence, Myers was one of its most active inves-
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-61

tigators and prolific writers; and his model of human personality, which he
began to formulate in the early 1880s and then presented in detail in the
1890s in a series of nine papers on the Subliminal Self, became the theoreti­
cal framework for psychical research, and remained so for decades.8
It is readily apparent from even a brief glance at Myers's writings that
his ultimate concern was with the question of whether individual personality
survives death: "The question for man most momentous of all is . . .whether
or no his personality involves any element which can survive bodily death.
In this direction have always lain the greatest fears, the farthest-reaching
hopes, which could either oppress or stimulate mortal minds" (HP, vol. 1, p.
1). His interest in psychology therefore was not purely academic. Although
initially a poet and classicist, he turned to science and psychology because
he understood that the question of post-mortem survival was, in essence,
the problem of the relation of mind and body, a problem not to be left to
"inward make-believe" (Myers, 189311904, p. 42) but to be attacked by empir­
ical methods. As William James (1901) said at the time of Myers's death:

Myers had as it were to re-create his personality before he became the wary
critic of evidence, the skillful handler of hypothesis, the learned neurolo­
gist and omnivorous reader of biological and cosmological maUer, with
whom in later years we were acquainted. The transformation came about
because he needed to be all these things in order to work successfully at
the problem that lay near his heart. (p. 214)

Armed with a fervent belief in the power of scientific method, Myers fought
the prevailing tendency in late 19th-century psychology to exclude its most
fundamental problems and argued instead for an expansion of psychology's
empirical base, the development of its own methods, and an examination of
the theoretical assumptions about mind and scientific naturalism that were
contributing to the narrowing of psychology.
Before examining Myers's theory of human personality and the ave­
nues of research that he believed important for approaching the mind-body
problem empirically, it is first essential to understand some of the purposes
and principles that provided the foundation for his thinking. Myers and
the field of psychical research in general, for which he was the primary
spokesman and theoretician in its first decades, have too often been mis­
understood, erroneously portrayed, and contemptuously dismissed as rep­
resenting "pseudo-science" characterized by "magico-religious belief" and
"irrationality" or even "anti-rationality" (see, e.g., Alcock, 1981; Zusne,
1985), or as threatening to return Western society to the superstitious belief
in "the operation of 'hidden,' 'mysterious,' or 'occult' forces in the universe"
(Kurtz, 1 985, p. 505). Nothing could be further from the truth. The central
principles guiding Myers were in fact precisely those of most of his scientific
contemporaries, including "our modern ideas of continuity, conservation,

8. These nine papers are: Myers, 1 892b, 1892c, 1 892d, 1 892e, 1 892f, 1 893a, 1 893b,
1 895d, and 1 895e.
62-Chapter 2

evolution" (HP, vol. 2, p. 251), and a central purpose was to encourage the
expansion of science and scientific method to address the most fundamental
questions about the nature of human personality. For Myers and his col­
leagues, the "very raison d'etre [of psychical research] is the extension of
scientific method, of intellectual virtues . . . .into regions where many a cur­
rent of old tradition, of heated emotion, even of pseudo-scientific prejudice,
deflects the bark" (Myers, 1900a, p. 459).9

Tertium Quid

In the midst of revolutionary new ideas in the 19th century about the
nature and study of mind, not everyone agreed that the rigid dichotomy of
the old, theological, personal world view and the new, scientific, impersonal
world view, or the acquiescent methodological parallelism to which this
dichotomization had led, is the final word. In the introduction to a two-vol­
ume collection of some of his essays, Myers's close friend and fellow psychi­
cal researcher Edmund Gurney ( l 887d) wrote:

Most of the papers deal with matters of contemporary controversy, as

to which two antagonistic opinions have been strongly entertained and
enforced .. . .In most of these questions I am conscious of "a great deal to
be said on both sides", . . . [and] the truer view seems to me . . . not one that
would extenuate differences . . . [but one whose] immediate tendency, on the
contrary, is rather to make each of the duels triangular. In short, it is a
tertium quid. (pp. v-vii)

John Stuart Mill had been the leader and exemplar of mid-19th-century
liberal thinkers who believed that the cause of knowledge is best served,
not by partisans, but by "those who take something from both sides of the
great controversies, and make out that neither extreme is right, nor wholly
wrong" (Mill, 1910, vol. 2, p. 360). The impact of Mill was particularly
strong on intellectual circles at Cambridge in the 1860s; and Myers, Gur­
ney, and other early leaders of psychical research educated at Cambridge
fully absorbed this "tertium quid" approach. Fundamental both to Myers's
thinking and to psychical research in general, therefore, was the belief that
conflicts between ideas or points of view are best settled not by contentious

9. In the same paper, he went on to say that "we have more in common with those
who may criticise or attack our work with competent diligence than with those who
may acclaim and exaggerate it without adding thereto any careful work of their own"
(p. 459). Unfortunately, most critics of parapsychology and psychical research, past
and present, have not "criticise[d] or attack[ed] our work with competent diligence,"
nor have they added any work, careful or otherwise, of their own. With such "critics"
in mind, as well as those who "acclaim and exaggerate," Myers (1894-1895) also
pointed out that "between the scornfully sceptical and the eagerly superstitious we
have virtually had to create a public of our own" (p. 1 90). Unfortunately, that public
still remains small.
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-63

debate but by increased knowledge, and that knowledge advances not by the
interminable clashing of old antagonists but by the application of both new
methods and new perspectives to old problems. Behind Myers's work was
thus a conscious and sustained attempt to move beyond the increasingly
polarized, dichotomous positions of 19th-century thought and to seek dif­
ferent, broader perspectives in which aspects of both (or all) sides may have
a place. As he put it, "something is gained if, having started with the precon­
ception that 'all which is not A is B,' we have come to the conclusion that our
own subject-matter is neither A nor B, but X" (Myers, 1 890a, p. 248).

Continuity

For Myers, as for so many 19th-century scientists, the continuity or uni­

formity of nature had emerged as the one most fundamental principle guid­
ing modern scientific knowledge: "If Nature is to be intelligible to our minds
she must be continuous; her action must be uniformitarian and not cata­
strophic" (Myers, l 895a, p. 22). Myers thus believed that all phenomena­
mental and material, normal and abnormal, commonplace and rare-are in
some sense continuous, coherent, and amenable to the rational, empirical
methods of science. The further implication of this belief in continuity was
the belief that scientific knowledge would advance qualitatively only when
scientists address all phenomena, and particularly those that do not readily
fit into current views:

If any phenomenon . . . seems arbitrary, or incoherent, or unintelligible, she

[science] does not therefore suppose that she has come upon an unravelled
end in the texture of things; but rather takes for granted that a rational
answer to the new problem must somewhere exist,-an answer which will
be all the more instructive because it will involve facts of which that first
question must have failed to take due account. (Myers, 1900b, p. 1 20)

Empiricism

A corollary of this belief in the continuity of the universe was that the
only reliable means of obtaining knowledge, not only about the physical
world but about mind, is scientific method, "those methods of inquiry which
in attacking all other problems [man] has found the most efficacious" (HP,
vol. 1 , p. 1). Myers did not believe that science is the only way of knowing. A
person whose intensely poetic and emotional nature was vividly apparent in
all his writings, he recognized that science and intellect may not provide a
person's "only or his deepest insight into the meaning of the Universe," and
that "contemplation, revelation, ecstasy, may carry deep into certain hearts
64-Chapter 2

an even profounder truth" (Myers, 1900b, p. 1 14).10 Science undoubtedly has

its limitations,

just as we admit the inadequacy, the conventionality, of human speech

itself. Speech cannot match the meaning which looks in an hour of emo­
tion from the eyes of a friend. But what we learn from that gaze is indefin­
able and incommunicable. Our race needed the spoken and written word,
with all its baldness, if they were to understand each other and to grow
to be men. So with Science as opposed to Intuition. Science forms a lan­
guage common to all mankind; she can explain herself when she is mis­
understood and right herself when she goes wrong; nor has humanity yet
found . . . that the methods of Science, intelligently and honestly followed,
have led us in the end astray. (Myers, 1900b, p. 1 l4)

Expanding Psychology

Despite his recognition that science has its limits, Myers objected vehe­
mently to the growing segregation in the 19th century of science and meta­
physics, science and religion, volition and determinism, or mind and matter.
In keeping with his "tertium quid" approach, he believed that the challenge
to science does not end but begins precisely when one comes up against
two contradictory findings, positions, or theories, and that breakthroughs
occur when one continues to work with conflicting data and ideas until a
new picture emerges that can put conflicts and paradoxes in a new light or
a larger perspective.
For Myers, those who banned certain phenomena or topics from sci­
entific inquiry showed "a want rather than an excess of confidence" in "the
immutable regularity" of nature (Myers, 1881, p. 99). The reach of science
is limited only by our ingenuity in translating large, metaphysical problems
into finite, empirical ones (Myers, 1 885d, p. 127). In psychical research in
particular, "such confrontations with metaphysical problems reduced to
concrete form are a specialty of our research" (Myers, 1894, p. 421). Myers's
(1891c) superb review of William lames's Principles ofPsychology was a plea,
in opposition to the deliberate separation of metaphysics and psychology
advocated in that book, to try instead to translate the former into the latter,
and thus to attack large questions by an "attempt to give [them] a precise, an
experimental character" (p. 132). Whereas lames had warned that the data
of psychology cannot provide answers to fundamental, metaphysical ques­
tions, Myers turned the issue around and argued instead that fundamental
questions provide the guidance and direction for producing the data-and
ultimately the knowledge-of psychology. II Whereas lames had empha-

10. For more in-depth discussions of this other kind of "knowing," see Chapters
7 and 8 .
I I . In h i s 1 894 Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association,
James (1895/1978) abandoned his earlier attempt to separate metaphysics and
psychology.
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-65

sized the limitations of psychology, Myers, in contrast, wanted to awaken

scientists to a sense of the potential power and scope of psychology. We may,
he said, so far have insufficiently appreciated "how very far. . . the possibility
of experiment may extend" (p. 1 1 9). Myers thus (like James) warned of the
danger to science of "the instinct of system, of a rounded and completed
doctrine" that prematurely limits what science can and cannot address: A
"determined protest against premature synthesis is as much needed now as
ever" (Myers, 1889h, p. 392).
In particular, Myers protested against limiting science to the existing
subject matter, methods, and concepts of the physical sciences by conced­
ing prematurely that questions about the nature of the relationship between
mental and physical phenomena-going beyond the prevailing but ulti­
mately vague assumption of concomitance-are scientifically unapproach­
able. Instead, "the only line of demarcation which science can draw, . . . is
between things which can, or which cannot, be cognised by our existing
faculties," a line which is by no means "permanent and immovable .. . . On the
contrary, it is the continual work of science to render that which is incogni­
sable cognisable, that which is imperceptible perceptible .. . . Aristotle . . . rel­
egated his unknowable to the fixed stars . . . but we have no more reason than
he had to take our [present] mental horizon for an objective line" (Myers,
1881, p. 103).
In addition to lamenting the premature limitation of psychology's
subject matter and methods, Myers would also have lamented the current
breach in psychology (and indeed in current parapsychology) between its
experimental and humanistic or transpersonal branches, that is, between
empirically oriented persons who emphasize the objective scientific method
and experientially oriented persons who emphasize a more subjective or
intuitive approach. The challenge to psychologists-not an easy one, obvi­
ously-is to bring the objective method to bear on psychological phenom­
ena without losing sight of their inherent subjectivity. This challenge of
bringing scientific method to bear on highly personal experiential phenom­
ena becomes particularly apparent in the study of mystical experience (see
Chapter 8).

Psychophysiological Concomitance

Clearly, the most basic problem in psychology needing to be translated

from metaphysical to empirical form is the question of psychophysiologi­
cal correlation. As I discussed earlier, most scientists (then and now) con­
cluded that the mind-body problem is no longer an open empirical question,
because advances in physical science seemed to render it certain that mind
is a product of the nervous system and wholly dependent on it. For Myers,
however, the mind-matter problem was still very much an open empirical
problem-and the basic theoretical question at the heart of psychology. He
argued that the principle of concomitance, or correlation, which states sim-
66-Chapter 2

ply that "for every mental state there is a correlative nervous state" (Jack­
son, 193 1-1932, vol. 2, p. 72), has not closed off the empirical question of
the causal relationship between mind and brain, because it is essentially a
neutral statement: "Accompanying the mental phenomena-states of con­
sciousness, there are physical phenomena-brain changes; but no knowl­
edge of the one throws any light on the other" (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 3n). Moreover,
merely continuing to observe the parallelism will not advance our knowl­
edge in any qualitative sense:

However exactly the parallelism between psychical and cerebral energies

may be established, the exacter correlation can tell us little more than the
vaguer told us-little more than we had always known . . . . But as to the ori-
gin or essential significance of this close connection . . .we avowedly know
nothing at all. We do not know whether the mental energy precedes or
follows on the cerebral change, nor whether the two are, somehow, but dif­
ferent aspects of the same fact. (Myers, 1891d, p. 635) 12

Psychologists had in fact limited their observations of mind-brain cor­

relation primarily to situations in which brain is essentially the indepen­
dent variable and mind the dependent. The observer creates or looks for a
condition of damage or alteration to the nervous system and then describes
the effects on mental functioning or, at best, looks at a mental state and
attempts to identify an associated physiological state. Such essentially one­
sided observations are, in Myers's view, bound to lead to inadequate conclu­
sions. When, he said, we look at a partially illuminated globe, the result is

a familiar optical illusion. When we see half of some body strongly illumi­
nated, and half of it feebly illuminated, it is hard to believe that the bril­
liant moiety is not the larger of the two. And, similarly, it is the increased
definiteness of our conception of the physical side of our mental opera­
tions which seems to increase its relative importance, -to give it a kind of
priority over the psychical aspect of the same processes. Yet. .. the central
problem of the relation of the objective and subjective sides of the psycho­
neural phenomena can i n no way be altered by any increase of definiteness
in our knowledge of the objective processes which correspond to the sub­
jective side. (Myers, 1886a, p. xl)

The Study of Subliminal Phenomena13

Achieving a more balanced approach to the problem of mind-brain

concomitance requires a thoroughgoing empirical study of mental efficacy,
that is, the study of phenomena which suggest that a change in mental state

1 2 . Those confident that modern neuroimaging techniques confirm the view

that mind is a product of the brain would do well to remember this cautionary
statement.
1 3. As I will explain later in this chapter, Myers proposed that the word
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the M ind-Body Problem-67

has produced some change in a physiological or physical state (I will dis­

cuss such phenomena in depth in Chapter 3). To advance our understand­
ing of the relationship between mind and brain beyond the long-recog­
nized but little-understood parallelism, Myers believed that psychologists
needed to begin to single out for special attention situations in which the
ordinary relationship between mental and physical functioning seems to be
altered or thrown out of gear. In particular, he believed that a newly emerg­
ing field-namely, the study of subliminal phenomena in all their myriad
forms-had enormous potential for increasing scientific knowledge about
the relationship of mental and physical processes. These phenomena are
especially important because in them the normal equilibrium, as Myers put
it, between mental and physical functioning often seems to be upset, and
mental and physical processes operate in unaccustomed and unusual ways.
Such phenomena thus suggest that the correlation of mind and brain might
not be as straightforward as it appears under normal circumstances.
Myers also believed that such phenomena are important because they
sometimes reveal latent mental processes or abilities not apparent in the
context of ordinary psychophysiological functioning. The study of sublimi­
nal phenomena, which was expanding rapidly during the 19th century (see,
e.g., Ellenberger, 1970; Gauld, 1992), increasingly turned up phenomena
difficult to reconcile with the prevailing physiological, mechanistic theory
of mind. For example, psychosomatic phenomena such as those associated
with hypnosis and hysteria suggest that alterations in mental states or pro­
cesses can have dramatic effects on physiological processes. Such phenom­
ena thus reveal the possibility of experimentally manipulating mental states
as the independent or causal variable and observing the effects on physical
processes. Moreover, many subliminal phenomena such as hysterical anes­
thesia or hypnotic hallucinations, occurring in conditions where physical
pathology is unlikely, nonetheless sometimes resemble phenomena that
are clearly associated with neuropathology. These phenomena suggest that
similar effects might not always have similar causes; a blister, for example,
might have either a physical cause (a burn) or a mental cause (an hypnotic
suggestion). Myers urged the importance of studying such phenomena to
determine whether, and under what conditions, mind might be an active
initiating factor. Finally, more extreme phenomena such as telepathy14 even

"subliminal" be used, rather than "subconscious" or "unconscious," to denote

psychological phenomena occurring outside one's normal waking consciousness.
14. The word "telepathy" was introduced by Myers in 1 882 (W. F. Barrett, Massey,
et aI., 1 883, p. 147; Myers, 1 896a, p. 174) to refer to the phenomenon of one person
apparently deriving information directly from another person's mind. Although
telepathy and clairvoyance were, and still are, much more controversial than, for
example, hypnosis or hallucinations, Myers and his colleagues believed that they
had sufficient evidence, both from experiments and from spontaneous experiences,
to try to incorporate such phenomena into a broader understanding of the nature of
mind; and we agree. We again urge readers to consult the Appendix for references
to the serious literature on psychical research.
68-Chapter 2

more clearly suggest that mental and physical processes do not always oper­
ate in the accustomed manner (e.g., Gurney et aI., 1886).
To Myers, therefore, subliminal phenomena are particularly important
because they suggest that mind is something greater, not only in extent but in
capacity, than ordinary psychological phenomena reveal. He argued, how­
ever, that the investigation of subliminal phenomena must be approached
from a larger perspective than that of most previous studies, which were pri­
marily undertaken for medical or clinical purposes. Although subliminal
phenomena were beginning to be widely studied by clinicians (especially in
France by Janet, Charcot, Binet, and many others), Myers believed that they
should also be examined for their bearing upon central theoretical problems
in psychology. The study of hallucinations, for example, "has usually been
undertaken with a therapeutic and not with a purely scientific purpose,"
with the result that pathological aspects of hallucinations have been noted
and emphasized, rather than their "absolute psychological significance"
(Myers, 1892d, p. 342). Similarly, as I will discuss in more detail later, Myers
believed that hypnotism is potentially one of the most effective method­
ological tools for theoretical psychologists. Yet, here too, in the burgeoning
study of hypnosis

we have to regret the lamentable scarcity of purely psychological experi­

ments over the whole hypnotic field. We are habitually forced to base our
psychological inferences on therapeutic practice; and i n directions where
there has been no therapeutic effort there are gaps in our knowledge,
which those hypnotists who have good subjects at their disposal should be
invited to fill up as soon as may be. (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 91)

Even hysteria, clearly a severe clinical problem and understandably

emphasized as such, is also an important potential source of knowledge
about psychophysiological functioning (Myers, 1893a; HP, chap. 2). Hyster­
ics often show subliminal control over physiological functioning, produc­
ing effects, such as hysterical anesthesias or stigmata, that are practically
unknown under normal conditions. A comparison of hysterical and neuro­
logical disorders might therefore reveal much about the nature and extent of
psychological processes as causal processes, especially the degree to which
they are dependent on neurological conditions or, conversely, may them­
selves alter these conditions.

The New Physics

Just as subliminal phenomena were showing mind to be more exten­

sive and of a different nature than previously assumed, so late 19th-century
physics was showing the physical universe to be more extensive-and even
of a different nature-than previously assumed. Perhaps its greatest accom­
plishment was in beginning to reveal just how limited our normal, unaided
sensory perception is, in comparison with the character and extent of the
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-69

surrounding universe. Myers recognized the potential importance to the

mind-matter problem of this dawning realization. To those whose thinking
about the nature of psychophysical processes has been circumscribed by the
assumption that our everyday perception of the physical world is somehow a
benchmark, Myers (1881) cautioned that "Science, while perpetually deny­
ing an unseen world, is perpetually revealing it" (p. 103).
The discovery and study of electromagnetic radiation in particular had
begun to reveal just how narrow and limited our sensory perceptions are.
The expansion of our knowledge "into regions of rays which no senses born
within us have enabled us directly to discern" (Myers, 1894-1895, p. 196)
implies that we have not yet exhausted our potential knowledge of aspects
of the universe co-existing, undetected, with the perceivable world. Science
cannot "conjecture beforehand how many distinct but coexisting environ­
ments may now surround us . . . . Her own history has been one of constantly
widening conceptions" (Myers, 1 894-1895, p. 195). In a prescient remark
anticipating the upheavals in scientists' conception of space, matter, and
time brought on by 20th-century physics, Myers cautioned that we "must
be ready to conceive other invisible environments or co-existences, and in
a sense to sit loose to the conception of Space, regarded as an obstacle to
communication or cognition" (HP, vol. 2, p. 262).
Yet he also emphasized repeatedly that such "unseen" environments
must somehow be "fundamentally continuous" and interrelated with the
one we know directly; "if an unseen world exists . . .we must in some sense be
in it" (Myers, 189ld, p. 634): Like "a tadpole . . .who had learned theoretically
that what he was breathing in his pond was not the water but the oxygen dis­
solved therein,-and who then should . . . raise his head above water. . . [and]
perceive frogs and other animals respiring the translucid air" (HP, vol. 2, p.
526), scientists too would probably continue to discover unsuspected envi­
ronments, co-existing and continuous with the familiar world we perceive
directly, even if also differing from it in certain respects. IS

Mind and Matter

Myers therefore was in a real sense motivated by the expectation that

a combined study of the unsuspected range of mind and the previously
unsuspected properties and extent of matter would begin to suggest new

1 5. An important concept in late 19th-century physics was that of the ether.

The discovery of radiation had led many scientists to postulate a homogeneous,
frictionless, non-material substance filling what we perceive as "empty" space and
serving as the transmitting medium for light and electromagnetic forces. Although
20th-century physics abandoned this particular concept of ether, it nonetheless
added significant support for the larger idea behind the concept of ether-and the
one that was of especial significance to Myers-that the imperceptible range of
the material universe far exceeds the few aspects of it that are perceptible by our
normal, unaided senses.
70-Chapter 2

and unprecedented ways of understanding the relation between the two.

Because 19th-century physics and the study of subliminal phenomena were
showing that our conceptions of both matter and mind are inadequate and
incomplete, so too, Myers concluded, must be the old dichotomy of dualism
and materialism which had derived from them. Myers (1890a) therefore cau­
tioned that "the categories 'material' and 'immaterial'. . . may be quite inad­
equate" (p. 247): "The line between the 'material' and the 'immaterial,' as
these words are commonly used, means little more than the line between the
phenomena which our senses or our instruments can detect or register and
the phenomena which they can not" (Myers, l 886b, p. 290). Anticipating
a question that became of central importance after his death, in the wake
of theoretical advances in 20th-century physics, Myers asked how one can
define the distinction between subjective and objective when matter, which
appears to have certain characteristics from one perspective, has different
characteristics from another: "The impenetrability of matter, which seems
our ultimate sensory fact, may be as relative and contingent a property as
colour itself" (Myers, 1890a, p. 247; HP, vol. 1, p. 277). In short, both the
new psychology of the subliminal and the new physics led him to the con­
viction that "it is no longer safe to assume any sharply-defined distinction
of mind and matter.. . . [O]ur notions of mind and matter must pass through
many a phase as yet un imagined" (Myers, 1886c, pp. 178-179).

An Expanded Naturalism

In keeping with his commitment to the "tertium quid" approach as the

most productive route to advancing science, Myers also rejected the idea
that physicalistic naturalism and supernaturalism exhaust the possible
views on the nature of the world. The choices are not, he thought, limited
either to the assumption that nature consists entirely of what we can now
perceive or otherwise infer from our present understanding of matter, or to
the assumption that the universe is essentially lawless and capricious, liable
to disruption by whim or vagary. Naturalists believe there is only one world,
the "orderly world of Nature" (T. H. Huxley, 1892, p. 3); supernaturalists
believe there are two worlds, nature and a world above or beyond nature, the
latter not subject to the orderly determinism of nature. In one sense, Myers
was a strict naturalist, believing in the continuity of all phenomena in one
world and the invariability and universal application of natural laws. Thus
he rejected the concept of miracles, conceived as "violations of natural law"
or "exceptions" to natural law "permitted by Providence," because, he said,
"we know now that natural laws are never violated" and "that all phenom­
ena alike take place in accordance with the laws of the universe" (Myers,
1881, p. 99; 1889d, p. 14).
Where Myers differed with most scientific naturalists was on the ques­
tion of whether "Nature" should be assumed to be synonymous with "Mat­
ter" as then understood. For him, belief in one continuous, orderly world did
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-7 1

not automatically imply that the known laws of matter provide the sole and
fundamental foundation of that world: "Accepting as perfectly valid every
law which recognised science can establish" does not preclude the supposi­
tion that there may also be "further laws, of a different kind it may be," but
still "susceptible of rigorous investigation" (Gurney & Myers, 1 884a, p. 792).
The modern belief that the universe is "inevitably naturalistic, cosmical,
evolutionary" and never the result of "specially-authorised interference"
does not exclude the belief that there may be "a scheme of laws . . . of which
our sciences of matter are . . . powerless to take account," but which new sci­
ences-particularly psychology-might discover (Myers, 1890b, p. 329).
Myers thus rejected both supernaturalism and the prevalent form of
naturalism in favor of a different, expanded concept of scientific natural­
ism: "This distinction [between natural and supernatural] we altogether
repudiate" (W. F. Barrett, Massey, et aI., 1883, p. 150). In an early essay,
Myers (1881) expressed his belief that it is possible to reconcile "the conflict
between science and orthodoxy [religion] . . .which . . . too often assumes [the
form] of a sheer and barren contradiction"; but to do so, it is first neces­
sary to "reject all question-begging terms-all phrases such as 'violations
of the order of Nature'" (p. 96). He endorsed the general belief behind St.
Augustine's statement that "God does nothing against nature." No phenom­
ena violate the laws of nature; nevertheless, some phenomena may indeed
go "against Nature as we know it-i n its familiar and ordinary way." There­
fore Myers urged antagonists in the controversy between naturalism and
supernaturalism to move beyond the divergent and polarized positions in
which their assumptions have fixed them: "Let us not oppose law and mira­
cle. . . . Let us not oppose the natural and the supernatural." Such "polemical
antitheses" derive from the fact that "on each side of the controversy we find
a reasonable prepossession pushed too often to an unreasonable extreme"
(pp. 96-97). As a first step toward resolving or reconciling the apparent
contradiction between naturalism and supernaturalism, Myers rejected the
word "supernatural" altogether as a meaningless word. Instead, he

ventured to coin the word "supernormal" to be applied to phenomena

which are beyond what usually happens-beyond, that is, in the sense of
suggesting unknown psychical laws. It is thus formed on the analogy of
abnormal. When we speak of an abnormal phenomenon we do not mean
one which contravenes natural laws, but one which exhibits them in an
unusual or inexplicable form. Similarly by a supernormal phenomenon, I
mean, not one which overrides natural laws, for I believe no such phenom­
enon to exist, but one which exhibits the action of laws higher, in a psychi­
cal aspect, than are discerned in action in everyday life. By higher (either
in a psychical or in a physiological sense) I mean "apparently belonging to
a more advanced stage of evolution." (Myers, 1885b, p. 30n)

These, then, were the general purposes and principles on which Myers
based his approach to psychology: first, to maintain a belief in the ultimate
rationality and continuity or interrelatedness of all phenomena, mental as
well as physical; and second, to attempt to forge a new perspective on old
problems concerning the nature of mind by extending psychology's range of
observation and data beyond ordinary, familiar phenomena and by broad­
ening its concepts through continually examining assumptions, hypotheses,
and views contrary to those currently prevailing. On the basis of this "ter­
tium quid" approach, Myers went on to make two major contributions to
psychology. First, he developed a theoretical model of mind that was an
important attempt to move beyond the two predominant, but diametrically
opposed, views of mind and to develop a more comprehensive view. Second,
he identified numerous lines of research by which he thought that the mind­
matter problem could be approached, and potentially resolved, empirically.
In the rest of this chapter, I will first describe Myers's model of mind and
then, by giving a brief overview of his book Human Personality, introduce
some of the kinds of research that he believed essential for developing an
adequate theory of mind.

Myers's Theory of Human Personality

The engine that drove all of Myers's thinking and work was his passionate
desire to learn whether or not individual consciousness survives death. As
a scientific naturalist in the broad sense, however, he fully recognized that
such an enormous question cannot be answered until that problem, and any
empirical phenomena relevant to it, can be situated in a framework that
makes them theoretically continuous and congruent with other psychologi­
cal and biological phenomena. This does not mean reducing the unknown
to the already known, the approach taken in so much of scientific psychol­
ogy, but instead linking the unknown to the already known in a continuous
series. Developing such a series, from normal to abnormal to supernormal
psychological phenomena, formed the methodological and organizational
basis for all of Myers's work.
The immediate challenge for a psychology that might ultimately deal
with the question of post-mortem survival is to determine whether human
personality is of such a nature that it could even conceivably survive the
destruction of the biological organism. In other words, survival research can
be conducted productively only within the broader context of psychologi­
cal research on the nature of mind or consciousness in general: "It became
gradually plain to me that before we could safely mark off any group of
manifestations as definitely implying an influence from beyond the grave,
there was need of a more searching review of the capacities of man's incar­
nate personality than psychologists . . . had thought it worth their while to
undertake" (HP, vol. 1, pp. 8-9). Translating the mind-body problem into
an empirical research problem thus became for Myers the primary chal­
lenge and task for psychology. It is important to emphasize again that the
principle of psychophysiological correlation itself is not what was at issue;
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-73

that there is some fundamental relationship between normal, waking con­

sciousness and the state of the brain was and is evident to scientists and
non-scientists alike. Nevertheless, recognizing this correlation still leaves
open the question of what it signifies.
The first step toward translating the mind-body problem into an empir­
ical problem, therefore, is to recognize that there is more than one way to
interpret mind-brain correlation. A few individuals have suggested that the
brain may not produce consciousness, as the vast majority of 19th- and 20th­
century scientists assumed; the brain may insteadfilter, or shape, conscious­
ness. In that case consciousness may be only partly dependent on the brain,
and it might therefore conceivably survive the death of the body.16
Myers presented what is so far the most thoroughly worked out and
empirically grounded version of this filter interpretation of mind-body cor­
relation. Myers himself did not refer to the brain specifically as the filter,
nor does he refer to the transmission model of consciousness as described
by James (189811900) or Schiller (1891/1894). Nevertheless, his huge body
of published writings is largely an elaboration of the view that certain phe­
nomena of psychology, particularly of abnormal psychology and psychical
research, demonstrate that human personality is far more extensive than we
ordinarily realize; that our normal waking consciousness (called by Myers
the supraliminal consciousness) reflects simply those relatively few psy­
chological elements and processes that have been selected from that more
extensive consciousness (called by Myers the Subliminal Self) in adaptation
to the demands of our present environment; and that the biological organ­
ism, instead of producing consciousness, is the adaptive mechanism that
limits and shapes ordinary waking consciousness out of this larger, mostly
latent, Self. In sum:

There exists a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty,

which for the most part remains potential only . . . but from which the con­
sciousness and faculty of earth-life are mere selections. . . . [N]o Self of
which we can here have cognisance is i n reality more than a fragment of
a larger Self,- revealed in a fashion at once shifting and limited through
an organism not so framed as to afford it full manifestation. (HP, vol. 2,
pp. 12, 1 5)

16. For some persons who have seriously considered this "filter" or (as James
called it) "transmission" interpretation of mind-brain relations, see Bergson (1913),
Broad (1953), Burt (1968, pp. 58-59), A. Huxley (1 954/ 1990, p. 23), James (1898/1900),
and Schiller (189111894, pp. 293-295). See also our Chapters 1 , 8, and 9.
74-Chapter 2

The Unity-Multiplicity Problem: "Unitary" versus "Colonial" Views

of Mind

Myers's view of human personality had grown out of his attempts, begun
in the early 1880s, to bridge the major theoretical gulf between the old, phil­
osophical, mentalistic psychology and the new, scientific, physiological psy­
chology. As in physics-which throughout its history had seen the recurrent
waxing and waning of wave versus particle theories of light-psychological
theorizing vacillated between, in essence, a wave theory of mind, in which
mind is seen as an indivisible unity, and a particle theory, in which mind is
seen as the composite product of individual sensations or other "atomistic"
psychological elements. Myers quoted from the 1 8th-century philosopher
Thomas Reid to describe the view of mind as an indivisible whole:

The conviction which every man has of his identity. . . needs no aid of phi­
losophy to strengthen it; and no philosophy can weaken it.. . . 1 am not
thought, I am not action, I am not feelings; I am something that thinks,
and acts, and suffers. My thoughts and actions and feelings change every
moment. . . ; but that selfor I, to which they belong, is permanent.. . . [A] per­
son is a monad, and is not divisible into parts. (Myers, 1 885c, p. 639; HP,
vol. 1 , p. 10)

In the new physiological psychology, in contrast, mind was seen as an aggre­

gate of elements. Its perceived unity derives entirely from the evolved coor­
dination of the parts and processes of the bodily organism, and it is subject
to disintegration under pathological conditions. Ribot provided Myers with
his description of this "colonial" view of mind:

It is the organism . . .which constitutes the real personality. . . The conscious

personality i s never more than a small fraction of the psychical personal­
ity. The unity of the Ego i s not therefore the unity of a single entity diffus­
ing itself among multiple phenomena; it is the co-ordination of a certain
number of states perpetually renascent, and having for their sole common
basis the vague feeling of our body. This unity does not diffuse itself down­
wards, but is aggregated by ascent from below. . ; the Self is a co-ordina­
.

tion. (HP, vol. 1, p. 10; see Ribot, 1 898, pp. 1 54-155)

These two views seemed completely opposite in nature and apparently

"hopelessly incompatible" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 1); and yet each was supported by
empirical observation-"the one by our inmost consciousness," or personal
experience, and "the other by [the] unanswerable observation and inference"
of advancing scientific analysis (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 1). In keeping with his "ter­
tium quid" approach, however, Myers believed that "the reconcilement of
the two opposing systems in a profounder synthesis" is possible (HP, vol. 1,
p. 1 1). Neither view, he argued, is wrong; both are simply incomplete. Myers
agreed with the colonialists that mind is not the simple unity we generally
take it to be (Myers, 1885c, p. 638; HP, vol. 1, p. 1 1): "The old-fashioned con­
ception of human personality as a unitary consciousness known with prac-
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-75

tical completeness to the waking self need[s] complete revision" (HP, vol.
2, p. 8 1). The rapidly multiplying observations of experimental psychology,
neurology, psychopathology, and hypnotism clearly showed that the human
mind is far more extensive than ordinarily thought, since much psychologi­
cal functioning remains outside the range of our conscious mental life; that
higher mental processes had evolved from lower ones; and that under cer­
tain conditions, the ordinary unity of consciousness can break down.
Nevertheless, Myers also believed that even though these observations
were correct, the theoretical conclusion drawn from them-that human
personality is a mere aggregate of separate elements--is a premature and
superficial conclusion. He believed that, when psychologists probe more
deeply into the problem, the analysis, paradoxically, reveals an underlying
continuity, and a fundamental unity, of human personality.

An Expanded View of Consciousness

An important first step that Myers took in this direction was to try to
clear up the confusion that many people-then and now-have felt about
the notion of an "unconscious mind." Most people naively equate their
mind, and especially the term "consciousness," with their ordinary aware­
ness. To propose that there are unconscious mental states, therefore, seems
an oxymoron. This belief gave rise in the 19th century to interpretations
of unconscious phenomena such as the physiologist William Carpenter's
hypothesis of unconscious cerebration, according to which all unconscious
processes, being by definition devoid of conscious awareness, are reflexes of
the brain (Carpenter, 1874/ 1882).17
This hypothesis was severely challenged, however, by mUltiple kinds of
evidence then emerging for complex mental functioning that occurred out­
side an individual's ordinary waking awareness. Such evidence included in
particular the alterations in consciousness seen in connection with mesmer­
ism and hypnosis, as well as numerous clinical reports of cases involving
alternate, or secondary, personalities, with what appeared to be separate
memory chains, streams of consciousness, and thus self-identity comparable
in kind (if not always in degree) to the original personality.18 In these situ­
ations, processes occurring beyond the margins of ordinary consciousness
displayed all the characteristics that we attribute to conscious beings, such
as memory, intention, volition, and creativity. Myers unequivocally denied
that any variant of the "unconscious cerebration" hypothesis can accom­
modate such observations: "I wish to protest against the undue extension of
such phrases as 'unconscious cerebration,' and to insist that we have as good
ground for attributing consciousness to some at least of these subliminal

17. The same idea lives on today i n the form of "the cognitive unconscious" (see
Chapter 5).
18. See, for example, Binet (1890, 1 891/1 896), M . Prince (1905/1 908), Sidis
(1 898/1906, 1 9 1 2), and Sidis and Goodhart (1 905). See also Chapter 5.
76-Chapter 2

operations in ourselves as we have for attributing consciousness to the intel­

lectual performances of our neighbors" (Myers, 1892c, p. 327).
Myers was thus led to a definition of "conscious" radically different
from our usual equation of it with what goes on in our ordinary, waking,
aware self. For him "conscious means memorable," that is, something that
is "capable of being comprehended within some chain of memory," either
of the primary consciousness or of a secondary one, given the appropriate
conditions (Myers, 1885d, p. 1 29; 189lc, p. 1 17):

When we conceive any act other than our own as a conscious act, we do so
either because we regard it as complex, and therefore purposive, or because
we perceive that it has been remembered. . . .The memorability of an act is,
in fact, a better proof of consciousness than its complexity. . . .I cannot see
how we can phrase our definition more simply than by saying that any act
or condition must be regarded as conscious if it is potentially memorable.
(HP, vol. I , pp. 36-37)

In other words, something is "conscious" if it is capable of entering waking

awareness, given the appropriate condition or the discovery of an "appropri­
ate artifice" or experimental method to elicit it (Myers, 1 891c, p. 1 1 5). Given
this new, expanded conception of what is "conscious," Myers (l 892b) there­
fore considered such terms as "'Unconscious,' or even 'subconscious,' . . . [to
be] directly misleading," and he proposed instead the words "supraliminal"
and "subliminal" to distinguish between streams of consciousness that are
and are not, respectively, identifiable with ordinary awareness (p. 305).
This notion of something within us being conscious, even though it is
not accessible to our ordinary awareness, is an exceedingly difficult one for
most of us to accept, since it is so at variance with our usual assumption that
the self of which we are aware comprises the totality of what we are as con­
scious mental beings. Nevertheless, it is essential to keep in mind Myers's
new and enlarged conception of consciousness if one is to understand his
theory of human personality as something far more extensive than our wak­
ing self.

A Jacksonian Model of Mind

Myers's model of mind was deliberately patterned on Hughlings Jack­

son's hierarchical model of nervous system functioning, which in turn had
derived from the 19th-century philosopher Herbert Spencer's ideas about
the evolution and dissolution of complex systems (Jackson, 1884). Jackson
described the nervous system as a hierarchy of three general levels, ranging
from the oldest and most basic biochemical processes, shared with primi­
tive organisms, to mid-level sensorimotor processes, to the most recently
evolved cerebral centers with which the higher mental processes are associ­
ated. Development occurs as older processes, through repeated function­
ing, become more organized, automatic, unconscious, and stable. Reced-
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-77

ing, as it were, from center stage and into the background of consciousness,
these processes continue to function automatically, providing the basis
upon which higher and more complex processes develop. The higher pro­
cesses, being newer, are less organized, less automatic, and less stable, and
require, because of their relative unfamiliarity, more conscious attention.
When injury or disease strikes the nervous system, the higher processes­
being less stable-are the first to be affected and impaired, and when the
higher processes can no longer function, lower functions re-emerge from
the background. According to Jackson (1884), therefore, dissolution of the
nervous system proceeds in an order inverse to its original development,
and pathological functioning, including the symptoms of insanity, reflect
simply whatever lower-level nervous system processes remain functional
when higher-level ones have become impaired (p. 591). This model of a hier­
archical system that is in a constant state of change-or evolution and dis­
solution-in response to the organism's environment became the model for
Myers's conception of mind, or human personality.
Myers's observations of the numerous forms and varieties of mental
functioning outside ordinary awareness led him to recognize that the dis­
tinction between subliminal and supraliminal aspects of consciousness is not
as simple as a dichotomy between "conscious" and "not conscious" (Myers,
1885a, p. 234). It is also "far more complex than a mere fission into two [or
more] personalities" (Myers, 1889f, p. 21 1), which many psychologists and
clinicians were proposing as an alternative to the unconscious cerebration
hypothesis. Mind is instead a complex, fluctuating, and ever-changing inter­
action of subliminal and supraliminal elements or processes.
Moreover, our ordinary waking, supraliminal consciousness is not a
pinnacle or the tip of an iceberg:

There seems no reason to assume that our active consciousness is neces­

sarily altogether superior to the consciousnesses [or processes] which are
at present secondary, or potential only. We may rather hold that super­
conscious may be quite as legitimate a term as sub-conscious, and instead
of regarding our consciousness (as i s commonly done) as a threshold in our
being, above which ideas and sensations must rise if we wish to cognize
them, we may prefer to regard it as a segment of our being, into which
ideas and sensations may enter either from below or from above. (Myers,
1 885a, p. 234)19

19. "Subliminal" was thus perhaps an unfortunate choice of terminology, since it

means "below the threshold." Myers used the word "subliminal" to refer to "all that
takes place beneath the ordinary threshold [of consciousness], or say, if preferred,
outside the ordinary margin of consciousness" (HP, vol. 1, p. 14). In Myers's model
of mind, waking consciousness is not at the top of a hierarchy, with an "unconscious"
or "subconscious" beneath. Instead, it is a segment taken, as it were, from the
middle of the entire spectrum of consciousness. The words "subliminal" and
"supraliminal" are adequate to convey the idea that certain aspects of experience
enter into our ordinary conscious awareness whereas others do not; but they are
not adequate to convey the more complex model of mind that Myers developed to
78-Chapter 2

To illustrate this view of our ordinary self as a "segment" of a larger

Self, Myers used an analogy with the electromagnetic spectrum. Specifi­
cally, he suggested that the Individuality or larger Self can be thought of as
analogous to a ray of light which, when filtered through a prism, appears as
a continuum, or spectrum, of colors. Our ordinary waking consciousness
corresponds only to that small segment of the electromagnetic spectrum
that is visible to the naked eye (and varies from species to species); but just
as the electromagnetic spectrum extends in either direction far beyond the
small portion normally visible to us, so human consciousness extends in
either direction beyond the small portion of which we are ordinarily aware.
In the "infrared" region of consciousness are older, more primitive pro­
cesses-processes that are unconscious, automatic, and primarily physi­
ological. Thus, "at the red end (so to say) consciousness disappears among
the organic processes" (Myers, 1894-1895, p. 197). Sleep, for example, and
its associated psychophysiological processes are an important manifesta­
tion of an older, more primitive state (Myers, 1892e; HP, chap. 4). In con­
trast, in the "ultraviolet" region of the spectrum are all those mental capaci­
ties that remain latent because they have not yet emerged at a supraliminal
level through adaptive evolutionary processes. In the "ultraviolet" region,
therefore, are those new modes of functioning that appear-rarely, fitfully,
and briefly. They are the "super-conscious operations" that are "not below
the threshold-but rather above the upper horizon of consciousness" (Myers,
l 886b, p. 285), supernormal phenomena that "indicate a higher evolution­
ary level. . . above the norm of man rather than outside his nature" (Myers,
l 896a, p. 174; see also l 885b, p. 30n). Such latent, "ultraviolet" capacities
include telepathy, the inspirations of creative genius, mystical perceptions,
and other such phenomena that occasionally emerge.

An Evolutionary View of Mind

Consciousness, in sum, is not to be equated with that relatively small

fragment of it that we know as our waking awareness, perception, or mem­
ory, because that fragment has been selected from a larger whole. Myers
went on to suggest that the nature and extent of the waking, or supralimi­
nal, portion of consciousness, whether in a species or an individual, has
been determined by the same mechanism that has determined what portion
of the electromagnetic spectrum itself is visible: selection in response to the
demands of the organism's environment. Out of the innumerable potential
sensory or psychological processes, only those most useful for survival have
thus far emerged: "My waking consciousness may embrace only such part
of my whole range of faculties as it has been useful for my ancestors to
keep under immediate control in their struggle for terrene existence.. . . [T]he

differentiate various kinds of subliminal phenomena. It might have been better if he

had used the alternate words he suggested, "intra-marginal" and "extra-marginal"
or "ultramarginal" (HP, vol. I, p. 14n).
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-79

range of perception which rises above the threshold-the spectrum, as I call

it, of my supraliminal consciousness-may merely have been determined by
natural selection" (Myers, 1 894-1895, p. 1 97). The ordinary waking self is
not the only possible self that could have developed out of the entire, mostly
latent Self; nor, as Myers frequently emphasized, is it necessarily psycho­
logically superior to or more important than the rest of the spectrum of
consciousness:

I hold that we each of us contain the potentialities of many different

arrangements of the elements of our personality. . . The arrangement with
which we habitually identify ourselves,-what we call the normal or pri­
mary self,-consists, in my view, of elements selected for us in the struggle
for existence with special reference to the maintenance of ordinary physi­
cal needs, and is not necessarily superior in any other respect to the latent
personalities which lie alongside it. (Myers, l 888a, p. 387)

Myers's model of the evolution of mind echoed certain further ideas of

Spencer, from whom Jackson had derived his model of the evolution and
dissolution of the nervous system. In Spencer's evolutionary theories, the
universe-like an embryo-began as a simple homogeneity, or formless
unity, which began to divide and differentiate into parts, and then inte­
grated to form new units that become increasingly complex in the ongoing
process of adapting to their environment. Jackson had applied these general
ideas about the evolutionary differentiation and increasing complexity of
systems to physiology and the nervous system in particular (R. M. Young,
1968, 1970).
Implicit in these ideas about the evolution of the universe from a form­
less homogeneity to complex forms of life was the idea that all of the lat­
ter were somehow inherent in the former. An important aspect of Myers's
ideas about the evolution of mind or consciousness, therefore, was that, just
as the forms of all living organisms were somehow latent in the original
homogeneity, or "primal germ," from which all life developed, all forms of
consciousness were likewise inherent in the homogeneous primal germ. All
life "starts from an X of some sort; and for my present argument it matters
not whether you call X a carbon-atom or an immortal soul. Whatever it was,
X had certain propensities, which must have dated in any case from some
age anterior to its existence upon our recent planet. . . [and] on which earth's
forces began their play" (Myers, 1892b, p. 3 18).
Thus, Myers suggested, there had been a "primitive simple irritability"
(HP, vol. 1, p. 95), or "undifferentiated sensory capacity of the supposed
primal germ" (Myers, 1 896a, p. 167), which he called panaesthesia. Out of
this homogeneous or undifferentiated sensibility have developed the partic­
ular senses we now have. For example, the evolutionary process eventually
reached "a point. . .where vision differentiate[d] itself from various indefinite
forms of perception . . .with the growing sensibility of the pigment-spot to
light and shadow" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 224). Similarly, other senses evolved out
80-Chapter 2

of some pre-existing latent potential. Just as importantly, other forms of

perception may yet be emerging and evolving:

Whatever be the part which we assign to external influences in its evolu­

tion, the fact remains that the germ possessed the power of responding
in an indefinite number of ways to an indefinite number of stimuli. It was
only the accident of its exposure to certain stimuli and not to others which
has made it what it now is. And having shown itself so far modifiable as to
acquire these highly specialised senses which I possess, it is doubtless still
modifiable in directions as unthinkable to me as my eyesight would have
been unthinkable to the oyster. (Myers, 1 88ge, p. 190)

Myers also pointed out that, on both the individual and evolutionary
levels, the process of evolution has involved not simply the adaptation of an
organism to its environment, but also, with increasingly complex sensory
processes, the widening perception of that environment, the "gradual dis­
covery of an environment, always there, but unknown" (HP, vol. 2, p. 95).
The implication for Myers was that, as physics was also revealing, there
probably are "unseen" environments, imperceptible to our senses as they
have so far evolved, but nonetheless "fundamentally continuous" and inter­
related with what we do perceive.
Human beings have "evoked in greatest multiplicity the unnumbered
faculties latent in the irritability of a speck of slime" (HP, vol. 1, p. 76).
Nevertheless, it does not thereby follow that our present sensory capacities
and our normal waking consciousness mark the final point of the evolution­
ary process: "To anyone . . .who takes a broad view of human development,
it must seem a very improbable thing that that development should at this
particular moment have reached its final term" (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 86). Just as
in the individual spectrum of potential consciousness some contents and
capacities have become supraliminal and some remain subliminal, so in the
evolutionary spectrum of consciousness, some faculties have been evoked
and some remain latent (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 19); but there is "no apparent rea­
son why these latent powers should not from time to time receive sufficient
stimulus" to appear sporadically, and eVen ultimately to develop more fully
(HP, vol., 1, p. 1 86).

The Subliminal Self: A "Tertium Quid" Theory of Consciousness

With this evolutionary model of a larger Self whose latent capacities

gradually emerge and whose emergent manifestation grows increasingly
complex in response to the demands of the environment, Myers thought
that psychology could resolve the apparent conflict between the old concept
of mind as a unity and the new concept of mind as a multiplicity, and affirm
that both views are in fact correct, although incomplete: Consciousness is,
he insisted, "at once profoundly unitary and almost infinitely complex"
(HP, vol. I , p. 34). The Subliminal Self or Individuality-the original whole
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-81

light ray, in the metaphor of the electromagnetic spectrum-registers or

otherwise incorporates within itself everything that comes within its range
of experience. These are "the elements of our personality," and those few
"elements selected for us in the struggle for existence" are bound together
in a more or less stable chain of memory, our ordinary waking self (Myers,
1887b, p. 387). In certain circumstances, however, other chains of memory
or groupings of elements may form: "The letters of our inward alphabet
will shape themselves into many other dialects;-many other personalities,
as distinct as those which we assume to be ourselves, can be made out of
our mental material" (Myers, 188ge, p. 1 95). Moreover, the number of such
groupings or personalities is potentially endless: "The fresh combinations
of our personal elements . . . may be evoked, by accident [e.g., spontaneous
somnambulism or multiple personality] or design [e.g., hypnosis or sugges­
tion], in a variety to which we can at present assign no limit" (Myers, 1 888a,
p. 387). If any of these new chains of memory become sufficiently complex
and stable, they thus develop into one or more secondary personalities, or
subliminal selves.
Nonetheless, behind the "shifting" elements and groupings of elements
of our being, there is a "perdurable Unity" (Myers, 1889g, p. 343; see also
1 885a, 1 885c). It is erroneous, he thought, to conclude that the analysis of
personality into many components means that there is no ultimate unity
behind it ( l887a, p. 260). Myers found it particularly significant that, in
certain hypnotic and psychopathological cases, the various personalities
were not totally isolated; some of them were, in varying degrees, aware of
others. In Janet's case of Leonie (or Madame B.), for example, the second­
ary personality, Leontine, was fully aware of Leonie, although Leonie was
unaware of her; and the third personality, Leonore, possessed the memories
of both the other two, even though they were both unaware (directly) of
her existence (see HP, vol. 1, pp. 322-326). Similarly, in Morton Prince's
case of Christine Beauchamp, there was a hierarchy of selves in which each
one knew about the one(s) lower in the hierarchy, but not the one(s) above
it (Prince, 1900, 1 905/1908). Although this "hierarchy" of memory was not
straightforward or even present in every case of multiple personality, it was
a common enough feature to be noteworthy, and particularly because the
same sort of hierarchy could also be evoked experimentally by hypnosis
(Gurney, 1884, 1887c): "We all know that the hypnotised subject as a rule
remembers waking life, but that the awakened subject as a rule has wholly
forgotten the effects of this hypnotic trance. The full significance of this
fact. . . has hardly yet, I think, been realised in any quarter" (Myers, 1 892b,
p. 303). The significance is that there may in fact be an underlying unity to
human personality.20

20. H ilgard (1977) has more recently called attention to the importance of
the "covert" contents of consciousness that can be uncovered by means such as
hypnosis. Observing that people who profess to be unaware of events occurring
while they were hypnotized can sometimes recover memories of these events when
re-hypnotized, H ilgard proposed his "neo-dissociationist" model of hypnosis,
82-Chapter 2

Many critics of Myers's theory (e.g., Jastrow, 1906; Mallock, 1903;

McDougall, 1 926, p. 523) have mistakenly attributed to him the view that
the subliminal and the supraliminal selves act as two co-existing, discrete
selves. This completely misrepresents his actual view. Myers's theory was
not simply a hypothesis of the multiplicity of personality, but went further
and tried to reconcile the paradoxical multiplicity and unity of human per­
sonality. Myers in fact explicitly said: "I do not . . . assume that there are two
correlative and parallel selves existing always within us" (HP, vol. 1 , p. I S):

My contention is, not, as some of my critics seem to suppose, that a man

(say Socrates) has within him a conscious and an unconscious self, which
lie side by side, but apart, and find expression alternately, but rather that
Socrates' mind is capable of concentrating itself round more than one
focus, either simultaneously or successively. I do not limit the number of
foci to two. (Myers, 1885d, p. 129)

One contemporary historian has even alleged that "the cornerstone of

his [Myers's] conception was the fact that consciousness had no essential
unity" (E. Taylor, 1996, p. 81), an assertion that clearly misses the essence of
Myers's theory of human personality, his oft-stated conclusion that there is
a "perdurable Unity."
To understand that in Myers's theory mind is both a unity and a mul­
tiplicity, it is essential to understand the clear distinction that he drew
between "Individuality" and "personality." By Individuality, or Self, he
meant to refer to "the underlying psychical unity which I postulate as exist­
ing beneath all our phenomenal manifestations"; by personality, or self, he
meant those "more external and transitory" chains of memory, including
the ordinary or supraliminal self of which we are customarily aware, as well
as the potentially infinite number of selves that may be formed from "the
elements of our being" (Myers, 1 892b, p. 305; l 888a, p. 387). Each of us is
one of the former, even though many of the latter may be formed from that
larger Self: "The human individuality [is] a practically infinite reservoir of
personal states;-as a kaleidoscope which may be shaken into a thousand
patterns, yet so that no pattern can employ all pieces contained in the tube"
(Myers, 1892e, p. 363). 21

suggesting that hypnosis creates an amnesic barrier preventing mentation in

the hypnotic state from entering ordinary waking consciousness. I n important
respects, therefore, Hilgard's hypothesis of a "Hidden Observer" who has access to
these covert memories is similar to Myers'S hypothesis of an underlying Subliminal
Self who, as hypnosis sometimes shows, is aware of events that the supraliminal
consciousness is not. H ilgard, however, distances his theory decisively from any
theories of another "self," primarily because, unlike Myers, his theory is built on
the assumption that all forms of consciousness, covert as well as overt, are brain
processes alone. See Chapter 5 for further discussion of H ilgard's views.
21. Oxford philosopher F. C. S. Schiller (1891/1894, pp. 279-282) drew a similar
distinction between the phenomenal "self" and the transcendental "Ego." Like
Myers, he emphasized that the Ego is not a second self, but that the ordinary self
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-83

Understanding the distinction Myers drew between "Individuality"

and "personality"-or between "Self" and "self"-can help clear up the
sorts of confusion that Gauld (1968) apparently experienced with regard to
Myers's theory. Gauld complained about "the abstruseness and complex­
ity of the concepts central to his theory, such as consciousness, mind, soul,
spirit, personality, psychical activity," and he argued that in Myers's theory
the "soul," not the "subliminal self," is the "unifying principle . . .'behind'
all mental phenomena. . . .The concept of the 'subliminal self' is simply not
qualified to act as a unifying theoretical principle" (Gauld, 1968, pp. 278,
295). Further, Gauld complained, "Myers offers little elucidation of these
terms" (p. 278).
Some of this confusion undoubtedly derives in part from Myers's own
somewhat inconsistent use of the terms "subliminal self" or "subliminal
consciousness." On some occasions, he used the term "subliminal" to refer
in general to "all which lies below that threshold [of ordinary conscious­
ness]" (Myers, 1 892b, p. 305). On other occasions he used it to refer more
specifically to secondary personalities or chains of memory such as those
that occur spontaneously, in hysteria or multiple personality, and those that
are artificially induced, as in hypnosis. On still other occasions, he used the
term "subliminal self" (usually, but unfortunately not consistently, spelled
with capital letters as "Subliminal Self" or "subliminal Self") to refer to the
underlying unity or larger Self. These "concepts central to his theory" are
undoubtedly difficult, but despite some inconsistency in his usage or spell­
ing Myers was quite clear in his intent to distinguish between a subliminal
"self" (a personality alternate or in addition to the normal waking one) and
the Subliminal "Self" or "Individuality" (which is his real "unifying theo­
retical principle"). In this book we will try to keep the distinction clear in
readers' minds by using the term "subliminal consciousness" to refer to any
conscious psychological processes occurring outside ordinary awareness;
the term "subliminal self" (lower case) to refer to "any chain of memory suf­
ficiently continuous, and embracing sufficient particulars, to acquire what
is popularly called a 'character' of its own" (pp. 305-306n); and the term
"Individuality" or "Subliminal Self" (upper case) to refer to the underlying
larger Self.

The Permeable Boundary: A Psychological Mechanism

In Myers's model, evolution of consciousness involves the shifting of the

supraliminal segment up the spectrum into the ultraviolet region, as more
and more psychological processes are mastered and then relegated to the

is an extract of the Ego (p. 410). In many respects, in fact, Schiller's and Myers's
theories of mind are parallel; and in a review of Morton Prince's The Unconscious
(Schiller, 1 9 1 5), Schiller specifically advocated Myers's theory of human personality
as providing the best account of the facts described by Prince. Ducasse ( 1 95 1 , p. 495)
later drew a similar distinction between individuality and personality.
84-Chapter 2

infrared region, while, simultaneously, latent psychological capacities or

processes are drawn out of the ultraviolet region and into the supraliminal
range. The supraliminal consciousness has been shaped and is maintained
by a kind of psychological "membrane" that controls the passage of psy­
chological elements and processes between the supraliminal and subliminal
regions of consciousness. Thus, the boundaries between the supraliminal
and the various subliminal portions of the Self are neither fixed nor even
precise, but fluid and continually shifting. In other words, the boundaries
are "permeable," such that there is a constant exchange of material between
regions. An evolutionary model, in fact, demands such lability if there is to
be adaptation in the face of changing circumstances: "Self-adaptation to
wider environments must inevitably be accompanied. . . by something of ner­
vous instability" (HP, vol. 1, p. 92). As a consequence, during the course of
evolution there is "a continual displacement of the threshold of conscious­
ness" (HP, vol. 1, p. 16). Similarly, on the individual level, "the personality
of each of us is in a state of constantly shifting equilibrium" (Myers, 1893a,
p. 9), as the range of our supraliminal awareness expands, contracts, and
shifts, and as the processes over which we have conscious, or supraliminal,
control become increasingly complex. All alterations of consciousness are
the result, in short, of an instability or "permeability" of the psychological
boundaries between supraliminal and subliminal processes. 22

Evolutive and Dissolutive Phenomena

An important corollary of this concept of a permeable boundary

between regions of consciousness is that such lability or "nervous insta­
bility" can bring changes in either direction-retrogressive or progressive.
Hughlings Jackson (1884) had described the ongoing process of both evolu­
tion and dissolution ("the reverse of the process of evolution") in the nervous
system. Myers extended Jackson's hypothesis to insist that an evolutionary
hypothesis of mind implies that there will be both "phenomena of degenera­
tion [dissolution] and phenomena of evolution" in mental functioning (HP,
vol. 2, p. 1 94). Deviations from the usual psychological state are not neces-

22. More recently, Hartmann (1989, 1991) has proposed a similar model in
which what he calls "boundaries" between various "regions, parts, or processes"
in the mind (Hartmann, 1991, p. 4) can be "thick" or "thin" and thus contribute
to individual differences in fantasy-proneness, absorption, hypnotizability, dream
recall, lucid dreaming, and related psychological processes. He also argued, as
Myers did, that thin boundaries can be either adaptive or maladaptive, as seen
especially in the "relationship between boundaries and creativity or madness" (p.
8). In his chapter on "Predecessors of the Boundary Concept," however, he makes
no mention of Myers, and therefore believes, erroneously, that "the concept of thin
and thick boundaries has not. .. been previously used as I am using it-that is, as
a broad dimension of personality and an aspect of the overall organization of the
mind" (p. 49). Thalbourne ( 1 998; Thalbourne & Delin, 1 994) has also proposed a
similar model, based on a factor that he calls "transliminality."
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-85

sarily always pathological or "dissolutive"; they may also be beneficial or

"evolutive."
In contrast, most 19th-century scientists took the view that all "abnor­
mal" phenomena are degenerative or pathological. This was the prevailing
view among French clinicians such as Janet, and scientists such as Maudsley
and Cesare Lombroso had carried it to an extreme, insisting that even such
apparently beneficial phenomena as genius are symptoms of disease, "degen­
eracy," or insanity. Many scientists (and, increasingly, other persons) "know
well that man can fall below himself; but that he can rise above himself they
can believe no more" (Myers, 1886a, p. Ivi). As I mentioned earlier, Myers
introduced the term "supernormal" in 1885 as one cognate to "abnormal"
but implying evolutive rather than pathological abnormal phenomena. He
summed up the distinction as follows:

[I] regard all psychical, as well as all physiological activities as necessar­

ily either developmental or degenerative, tending to evolution or dissolu­
tion. And further, whilst altogether waiving any teleological speculation, I
will ask [the reader] hypothetically to suppose that an evolutionary nisus,
something which we may represent as an effort towards self-development,
self-adaptation, self-renewal, is discernible especially on the psychical
side of at any rate the higher forms of l i fe. Our question, Supernormal or
abnormal?-may then be phrased, Evolutive or dissolutive? And in study­
ing each psychical phenomenon in turn we shall have to inquire whether it
indicates a mere degeneration of powers already acquired, or, on the other
hand, "the promise and potency," if not the actual possession, of powers
as yet unrecognised or unknown. (Myers, l 885b, p. 31)

An understanding of abnormal phenomena as potentially evolutive as

well as dissolutive is particularly important if a purely psychological (or the­
oretical), as opposed to medical, understanding of them is to be achieved.
Clinicians, not surprisingly, see primarily the morbidity and losses associ­
ated with abnormal processes, and their purpose is to restore the patient
to an ordinary level of functioning (Myers, 1898b, p. 103; 1900c, p. 384).
Myers (1892b) thought that the psychologist, in contrast, should be inter­
ested also in what capacities may be gained in abnormal states (p. 315). In a
review (1900c) of Janet's Nevroses et Idees Fixes and Flournoy's Des Indes a
la planete Mars, Myers contrasted their approaches to, and perspectives on,
abnormal subconscious processes, with Janet's being the "therapeutic" or
clinical, and Flournoy's the psychological or theoretical.
Myers was careful to emphasize, however, that in his insistence on
acknowledging evolutive aspects of subliminal function, he did "not mean
to imply that [subliminal] mentation is ipso facto superior to supraliminal. . .
that all our best thought was subliminal, or that all that was subliminal was
potentially 'inspiration'" (HP, vol. 1 , pp. 71-72). Clearly, many abnormal
psychological phenomena are degenerative and harmful: "Hidden in the
deep of our being is a rubbish-heap as well as a treasure-house;-degen­
erations and insanities as well as beginnings of higher development" (HP,
86-Chapter 2

vol. 1 , p. 72).23 Nonetheless, there is "real psychological danger in fixing our

conception of human character too low. Some essential lessons [concerning
the nature and functioning of human personality] are apt to be missed" (HP,
vol. 1 , p. 50).
On the other hand, our waking or supraliminal consciousness is also
not inherently superior, or even necessarily "the most important part of the
psychical operations which are going on within us" (Myers, 1887a, pp. 258-
259). Myers agreed with Jackson (1884), who, when discussing the evolution
and dissolution of the nervous system, had insisted that manifesting states
are the '''fittest,' not 'best' . . . . [T]he evolutionist has nothing to do with good
or bad" (p. 591). The distinction, Myers emphasized repeatedly, between
the subliminal and the supraliminal, as well as between the evolutive and
dissolutive, is "a purely psychological one" (Myers, 1900d, p. 289; HP, vol.
1 , p. 72).
To those, therefore, who asked: "Are we then to believe that the sublimi­
nal self is both wiser and more foolish, truer and more false, more under­
standing and more ignorant, more reliable and more untrustworthy than the
normal self?" (Dallas, 1900, p. 288), Myers's answer was "Yes." Depending
on the conditions under which they emerge, the elements of the Sublimi­
nal Self or Individuality can fall into numerous patterns or even "selves,"
running the gamut from the most primitive, elementary, fragmentary, and
pathological to the most advanced, complex, complete, and beneficial.

23. lastrow was among those who mistakenly thought that Myers's hypothesis
of human personality was based on the notion that subliminal processes are "ipso
facto" superior to supraliminal ones (see, e.g., lastrow, 1 906, p. 537). Jastrow seems,
however, to have completely misunderstood Myers's hypothesis in general. He
criticized it as based "upon a fundamental emphasis on the schism of conflicting
personalities," and went on to argue that his own hypothesis of the "subconscious
as a natural function with the most intimate relations to consciousness, . . . both
parts of a common synthesis, . . .is diametrically opposed to that of the subliminal
self" (1906, pp. 537, 539-540). Elsewhere ( 1903) he criticized Myers's hypothesis as
one of discontinuity and argued that the concept of the subconscious will not be
recognized in psychology as important until the hypothesis of the discontinuity of
consciousness and the subconscious is replaced by one recognizing their underlying
continuity. lastrow's hypothesis, in fact, was in many ways closely similar to Myers's
hypothesis, particularly with regard to the ultimate continuity of conscious and
subliminal processes. Some of the larger implications that Myers drew from the
same premises (such as the potential post-mortem survival of human personality)
were undeniably different from lastrow's conclusions; and this may explain why
lastrow (and others) have been so prone to misread and misrepresent Myers's
hypothesis. It may also help explain why Jastrow (1900) and others have also been
so prone to misread and misrepresent psychical research generally.
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-87

Automatisms and the Expression of Subliminal Functioning

Another important concept in Jackson's model of nervous system func­

tioning that was paralleled in Myers's model of mind was that of automa­
tisms. 24 Jackson (1884) had proposed that the older and more habitual a
process became, the more stable, unconscious, and automatic its execution
became, leaving the organism free to develop more advanced and complex
processes. Similarly, according to Myers, as a species evolves or an individ­
ual develops, older psychological processes become more stable and auto­
matic. There is, he pointed out, an evolutionary advantage to "relegating
voluntary ends to automatic execution," because learned, stable, automatic
processes get "the needed thing done . . .with a verve and a completeness
which conscious effort finds it hard to rival" (Myers, 1 900c, p. 41 5). But
Myers's concept of automatisms went beyond that of Jackson to include not
only the automatic execution of older, more established modes of function­
ing (those in the "infrared" region), but also the emergence of new, more
complex processes originating in the "ultraviolet" region. Myers therefore
defined psychological automatisms generally as any form of communica­
tion or exchange of material from the subliminal regions of the psychologi­
cal spectrum to the supraliminal. They include dreams, secondary person­
alities, hypnosis, automatic writing, trance speaking, and the "uprushes" of
subliminally generated creative inspirations into supraliminal expression.
Automatisms, moreover, may take the form of influence upon primarily
organic processes over which the supraliminal self ordinarily has no control
(as in the phenomena of hysterical or hypnotic anesthesia), as well as of
new and sporadically occurring processes (such as telepathy) over which the
supraliminal similarly has little or no control.
On Myers's model of mind, subliminal processes emerge when con­
sciousness is deflected from its normal, supraliminal functioning: "To some
extent at least the abeyance of the supraliminal life must be the liberation
of the subliminal" (HP, vol. 1, p. 122). More specifically, "it seems as though
this supersensory faculty assumed activity in an inverse ratio to the activi­
ties of everyday life" (Myers, 1886b, p. 287). Supernormal processes such
as telepathy do seem to occur more frequently while either the percipient
or the agent (or both) is asleep, in the states between sleeping and wak­
ing, in a state of ill health, or dying; and subliminal functioning in general
emerges more readily during altered states of consciousness such as hyp­
nosis, hysteria, or even ordinary distraction. Thus, whereas supraliminal
functioning usually reflects "the familiar parallelism between bodily and
mental states," subliminal mental processes might vary "inversely, rather
than directly, with the observable activity of the nervous system or of the
conscious mind" (Myers, 1890b, p. 320; 1891d, p. 638). For Myers, therefore,
the importance of studying psychological automatisms and other aspects of

24. Because the concept of automatisms is so central to Myers's model of

consciousness, and so important to address adequately in any attempt to understand
consciousness, we have devoted an entire chapter to this topic (see Chapter 5).
88-Chapter 2

subliminal functioning derives largely from the light it might shed on mind­
body relations.
Myers also proposed that the emergence of subliminal material in
automatism may be more likely when one's habitual "paths of external is a­
tion"25 are in abeyance. As a possible example, he suggested that because the
left hemisphere, the seat of verbal capacity, has become the predominant
expressive vehicle for cognitive and other intellectual functioning, then sub­
liminal functioning, or automatisms, might more readily emerge when the
left hemisphere is damaged, inhibited, or otherwise prevented from func­
tioning ful ly: "In graphic automatism [automatic writing] the action of the
right hemisphere is predominant, because the secondary self can appropri­
ate its energies more readily than those of the left hemisphere, which is more
immediately at the service of the waking mind" (Myers, 1885b, p. 43).26
This suggestion that the subliminal portions of our spectrum of con­
sciousness might find their "readiest path of externalisation" through the
right hemisphere has received modest support from modern observations
indicating that right-hemisphere functioning (in right-handers, at least) is
for the most part nonverbal (see, e.g., Springer & Deutsch, 1985). Myers had
noted that "our subliminal mentation is less closely bound to the faculty of
speech than is our supraliminal" (HP, vol. 1, p. 98). More specifically, the
"language" of subliminal consciousness seems to be primarily pictorial and
symbolic, rather than verbal and propositional (e.g., Myers, 1892f, p. 460;
1 897, p. 70; HP, vol. 1 , pp. 100, 277), and he suggested that the "study of
visual and motor automatism w i l l afford us sufficient proof that symbolism,
at any rate pictorial symbolism, becomes increasingly important as we get
at the contents of those hidden [subliminal] strata" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 100). Thus,
he said, art, music, and even poetry (whose "material. . .is the very language
which she would fain transcend") are expressions of this subliminal lan­
guage (Myers, 1 897, p. 70; HP, vol. 1, p. 101).

25. This phrase refers to a common belief in the 19th century (and one that
remains with us today; see Chapter 4) that psychological functioning produces
physical changes or "traces" in the brain and that the nerve-currents accompanying
psychological processes take the "paths" ofleast resistance, carving out "established"
paths that subsequent nervous activity will become more likely to fol low (see, e.g.,
Carpenter, 187411882, p. 442; James, 1 890b, vol. I, pp. 108, 563, 659). In contrast,
Myers was concerned to emphasize that here, as elsewhere, psychologists and
physiologists still have no real understanding of mind-brain correlation. Therefore,
to forestall readers who might be tempted to take his terminology of "brain paths"
literally, Myers ( 1 889a) explained that he was using the terminology as a metaphor
and not "a real transcript of the unknown processes which actually occur" (p.
535).
26. In the wake of discoveries of the localization of function in the brain
(beginning especially with Broca's localization of a center for spoken language), the
concept of hemispheric asymmetry and differences became an important one in the
late 19th century (see Harrington, 1987). Myers was one of the earliest to suggest
that subliminal phenomena might find their readiest expression through what was
considered the non-dominant hemisphere.
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the M ind-Body Problem-89

Myers also proposed that variations in the complexity of subliminal

functioning or automatisms might be correlated with the amount of time
a person has spent, say, doing automatic writing or in an hypnotic state or
secondary personality. He noted the observations of Elliotson and Janet
about variations in "the amount of personality which the hypnotised sub­
ject is able to manifest" (Myers, 1888a, p. 390) and suggested that such dif­
ferences depend on the stock of memories accumulated in the secondary
state. Hypnotize a person once or a few times, and the "little scrap of mem­
ory" associated with these states is wholly insufficient "to dignify. . .with
the name of a secondary personality. Repeat the process, however, many
hundred times, and at last the time spent in the hypnotic trance, the experi­
ence gained therein, will become comparable with the time spent in nor­
mal existence, and the experience gained in the common routine of life."
For example, "Mme. B . has been so often hypnotised, and during so many
years, . . . that Leontine has by this time acquired a very considerable stock of
memories which Mme. B. does not share" (p. 391).
Myers also offered a possible explanation for a frequently noted charac­
teristic of automatisms: the puerile, silly, trivial nature of much of the con­
tent, "quite independent of the intellectual level of the automatist" (Myers,
1887a, p. 212). This feature had, perhaps understandably, made automa­
tisms a target for much levity and repugnance, 27 but Myers suggested that
automatisms, such as the "much-derided phenomenon of 'table-tilting',"
might be early, rudimentary attempts at subliminal communication, just as
gestures or sounds of animals are early forms of communication (HP, vol.
2, p. 92). Thus, "the interest [of most automatisms] . . . certainly does not lie
in the wisdom of the oracle received" (Myers, 1885a, p. 239). The interest
lies instead in the possibility of finding means of gaining greater access to
subliminal regions of our consciousness: "If once we can get a spy into the
citadel of our own being, his rudest signalling will tell us more than our
subtlest inferences from outside of what is being planned and done within"
(HP, vol. 2, p. 91).

A Law of Mental Causality

Myers ful ly expected that there are laws of mental causality, or psy­
chological laws in addition to those of the physical world and not derived
from these. Moreover, he believed that some such concept as telepathy-the
hypothesis that individual minds (or Selves) can, at some now-subliminal
level, interact directly with other minds-will be an important element in

27. Huxley ( 1 9 1 3), for example, spoke contemptuously of the "twaddle" produced
by many spiritist mediums (vol. 2, p. 144). Stevenson ( 1978), commenting on the
"vapid writings" that an automatic writer had attributed to the deceased William
James, remarked that survival of death with such "a terrible post-mortem reduction
of personal capacities . . . makes it, at least to me, a rather unattractive prospect" (p.
323).
90-Chapter 2

the major law or principle of psychology that remains to be discovered.

Myers thought that this "law" of psychology would demonstrate in gen­
eral "the Interpenetration of Worlds," that is, the interaction between the
physical world that our senses have evolved to perceive and what he called
the "metetherial" world, the larger universe that is beyond our direct sen­
sory perception but that "co-exist[s] with, and manifest[s] itself through, the
material universe that we know" (Myers, 1892f, p. 534). The belief that there
is a world beyond the known physical one has of course been fundamental
in most religions (although many religions, particularly Western ones, have,
in contrast to Myers, traditionally seen the physical and the spiritual worlds
as discontinuous); but Myers believed that the demonstration of "telepa­
thy. . .would be the first indication of a possible scientific basis" for this belief
(Myers, 1886a, p. Ivii).
Myers found an important hint to what the new law of psychology might
look like in a concept from mesmerism. Many mesmerists believed that the
effects they were able to elicit from their subjects result from a yet unknown
physical radiation or force passing from the mesmerist to the subject, cre­
ating a connection that they called rapport. Myers and Gurney believed
that the mesmerists might have been on the right track, but that instead
of being a physical phenomenon, the influence might be a psychological
one, some kind of "a specialised relation between two minds," a resonant
link, or a "subtle inter-communication" between subliminal minds (Myers,
1886a, p. Ivii; 1 8 86b, p. 287; HP, vol. 1, p. 209). This notion of a psychologi­
cal link between minds became the basis for Myers's concept of telepathy
and, indeed, his concept of all supernormal interaction. The nature of the
relation remained entirely unknown, as it had for the mesmerists. Certain
people made good mesmerists or hypnotists, but no one understood why.
The "rapport" does not seem clearly related "either to kinship or to affec­
tion" (1884-1 885, p. 100), and there are even some telepathic or other such
cases in which the nature of the presumed rapport is particularly puzzling,
since the people involved are strangers (1884-1885, p. 122). Myers suggested,
however, that in some sense this telepathic or mental "rapport" might be the
psychological equivalent of the concepts of molecular attraction (Gurney &
Myers, 1884a, pp. 8 14-815) or of gravitation (HP, vol. 1 , p. 38) in the physical
world; and it remained for psychologists to identify and describe this link
more adequately.

Methods for Psychology

Myers's vision for a new psychology included more than a theoretical model
of mind that could carry psychology beyond the dichotomy of the old
mentalistic psychology and the new materialistic one. He also repeatedly
emphasized the need for psychologists to develop their own unique meth­
ods, suitable to the particular problems and phenomena of psychology and
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-9l

not modeled solely after those of the physical sciences. Unfortunately, psy­
chology still "remains in that early stage . . .when the methods of experiment
are such as other sciences have suggested, not such as this special branch
of inquiry suggests for itself, or can use with unique effect." The methods
successful in the physical sciences, however, are insufficient for psychology:
"They help us rather to define accurately facts already roughly known, than
to get at underlying facts of which common consciousness does not inform
us. To do this we must pass from general mechanical artifices to artifices
special to psychology" (Myers, 1 892f, p. 443).
In other words, if psychology is to move beyond merely describing in
more detail what we already know, more or less clearly, on the basis of our
ordinary experience, then the important work of psychology lies in going
beyond what we commonly observe. Major theoretical advances in psychol­
ogy will come primarily from examining, not normal psychological pro­
cesses and behavior, but the unusual, often rare phenomena associated with
subliminal functioning, and appropriate methods must be found for elicit­
ing them. The primary methodological challenge to psychology, therefore,
lies in developing methods, or "artifices," for extending observations of the
contents and capacities of mind beyond the visible portion of the psycholog­
ical spectrum, just as the physical sciences have developed artificial means
of extending sensory perception beyond its ordinary limits (HP, vol. 1 , pp.
17-18).
Myers also emphasized that all sciences must go through a developmen­
tal process in which their methods, initially crude and imperfect, are gradu­
ally improved and strengthened. The apparent reluctance of psychologists
to develop their own special methods reflected, Myers thought, their reluc­
tance to put themselves back in the primitive methodological state where
all sciences must begin and where they must return every time they attack
new and different problems: "I allude to the ever-growing dislike felt by the
votaries of advanced and established sciences to the rude approximate work
which has been needed in the infancy of every science; and needed in greater
degree as each new science involved a wider scope." There is, he warned,
"danger. . . for Experimental Psychology in the temptation to cling too exclu­
sively to the safe methods of sciences exacter than ours can as yet in reality
be." If psychologists "will make only such experiments as admit of precise
numerical results," the danger is that psychology will become "no more than
a curious appendage to Neurology," rather than its own science, making its
own real discoveries: "Men who insist on electric lamps along their road will
never reach the centre of Africa" (Myers, 1894-1895, p. 191).
The gap between many psychologists and Myers and his colleagues in
psychical research increasingly grew to be one between those who preferred
the established, precise methods of other sciences and who narrowed the
scope of their researches accordingly, and those who preferred to keep their
sights set on fundamental problems, however inadequate the methods might
so far be. In reviews of two issues of L'Annee psychologique, published near
the end of his life, Myers conveyed his deep disappointment with what he
92-Chapter 2

saw as the resulting superficiality and triviality of much of modern psychol­

ogy. In the first review ( l898c), he contrasted the safe "surface-mining" of
most psychological researchers with the riskier "deep-level mining" of the
psychical researchers (p. 147). The second review (Myers, 1900e) was more
blunt:

The subjects of research seem scarcely of sufficient importance to occupy

for long the attention of scientific minds. The elaborate Bibliography. . . rep­
resents a great mass of intellectual effort, from which, perhaps, fewer lead­
ing ideas have in fact emerged than might have been hoped in an age where
really illuminating generalisations in science are wont to be so promptly
pursued. (p. 106)

The reason for this triteness, he thought, lay in the overwhelming ten­
dency of many psychologists "to treat the easy parts of the subject . . . and
to ignore altogether those difficult parts," with the result that the research
does little more than re-affirm "obvious common-sense" and brings no real
advance in knowledge (p. 106). Those involved in psychical research, in
contrast, attempted to push beyond the commonplace and treat the diffi­
cult parts, inevitably with some risk that they "must make many mistakes"
(Myers, 1895c, p. 233). Myers summarized these contrasting approaches to
psychology as follows:

First come the many new Professors and Lecturers in Germany, France,
America, and elsewhere who are making accurate experiments on every­
thing in man which they can manage to get at;-the nervous system in
general, vision, audition, orientation, tactile sensibility, reaction-times,
fatigue, attention, memory, mental imagery,-with a host of cognate
inquiries. Much of this is delicate quantitative work, and is performed with
instruments of precision. The drawback is that such methods and such
apparatus are better adapted to give accuracy to facts already roughly
known than to carry the inquirer much farther into the depths of our
being. It is work preparatory to discovery, rather than discovery itself.
At the other end of the range a group still small. . .is attacking psycho­
logical problems of the highest importance, but which admit as yet of only
approximate and tentative methods of inquiry. This is work of discovery
indeed; but it is rough pioneer's work-preparatory also in its own way to
the ultimate science to which we all aspire. (p. 233)

In keeping with his "tertium quid" approach, Myers believed that that
"ultimate science" requires above all else the examination and inclusion,
not only of data supporting one's own position, but even more importantly,
of data supporting conflicting positions. He therefore repeatedly cautioned
about the too-frequent temptation to draw conclusions based on a limited
range of observations. He advocated instead amassing a broad range of per­
tinent data-broad not just in quantity but especially in kind-in order to
prevent the premature assumption of a hypothesis or view that may be, not
necessarily wrong, but misleadingly narrow and incomplete. For example,
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-93

he said, Carpenter's hypothesis of unconscious cerebration to explain sub­

liminal phenomena in general, and Faraday's hypothesis of unconscious
muscular action to explain table-tilting in particular, "were, so far as they
went, not only legitimate, but the most 10gica1. . .to explain the scanty evi­
dence with which alone Faraday and Carpenter attempted to deal"; they
were not, however, hypotheses applicable to the full range of available and
pertinent data (Myers, 1886a, p. lxii). Similarly, Janet's observations of auto­
matic writing had been confined to hysterical patients, and to relatively few
even of them, and as a result "a good many passages of M. Janet's . . . seem to
me . . .lacking in width of purview," although containing "much which I hold
to be true and important" (Myers, 1 88ge, pp. 1 89, 191).
Myers and his SPR colleagues thought also that the conflict between
"mesmerism" and "hypnotism" was probably the result of limited observa­
tions on both sides (W. F. Barrett, Gurney, Myers, et aI., 1 883). Mesmer­
ists believed that the phenomena produced by Mesmer and his successors
were the result of an actual physical force or "effluence" passing from the
mesmeriser to the subject. The new hypothesis of hypnotism, in contrast,
attributed the phenomena to suggestion, or the subject's belief that a certain
procedure or cause will lead to a certain result. In Myers's view, both theo­
ries were inadequate because advocates on both sides often confined their
observations to too narrow a range. In the case of hypnosis in particular,
there was often a "confinement of attention to some few of the commoner
and more obvious manifestations" (Myers, 1 898b, p. 101).
Likewise, he said, the Nancy view of hypnosis as a psychological phe­
nomenon of suggestion had prevailed over the Salpetriere view of it as pri­
marily a physiological phenomenon, because advocates of the former, such
as Bernheim and Liebeault, had experimented with more, and more varied,
subjects than had Charcot and his colleagues at the Salpetriere.28 Now, how­
ever, the Nancy school was itself in danger of becoming trapped in its own
brand of dogmatism by "insisting that all in hypnotism is suggestion . . . . 1
must adhere to the view which I have often expressed .. . . Has not the history
of hypnotism thus far been a slow but repeated justification of those who,
in each successive controversy, took the wider and less exclusive view?"
(Myers, 188ge, p. 198). In appealing for a wider gathering of data, he thus
urged "a freer communication between opposing schools" in a joint effort
to attack the problems involved (Myers, 1 892b, p. 326).
Myers similarly cautioned against the too rigid dismissal of hypotheses
alternate to one's own. He defended the approach of explicitly maintain­
ing multiple hypotheses as working possibilities, believing that this breadth
of view might enable one ultimately to identify some more comprehensive
or "tertium quid" principle that encompasses aspects of the competing
hypotheses as well as a wider range of data. His attempt to reconcile the
unitary and colonial views of mind exemplified how he thought conflict­
ing views could be reconciled within a larger perspective. Maintaining mul-

28. For a discussion of the Salpetriere and Nancy schools and their differences,
see Gauld ( 1992), especially pp. 306-362.
94-Chapter 2

tiple hypotheses or interpretations as working possibilities is also impor­

tant because this encourages a broader range of observations. With regard
to mesmerism/hypnotism, for example, people who favored the mesmeric
hypothesis usually emphasized quite different kinds of phenomena than did
those who favored the suggestion hypothesis.
Myers believed that the study of phenomena and beliefs found among
ancient cultures and so-called primitive peoples should also play an impor­
tant part in expanding psychology. One of his earliest papers was an attempt
to suggest some parallels between ancient Greek oracles and divination
practices and more recent phenomena such as table-tilting and automatic
writing (Myers, 1880/1888). He contended that primitive beliefs and reports
were not necessarily invalid superstitions simply because of their origin. At
a time when most Westerners regarded non-Westerners as "childish" sav­
ages, Myers (1886a) urged the potential importance of comparative ethnol­
ogy and anthropology to psychology and "hoped that shamans and medi­
cine-men will not vanish before the missionary until they have yielded some
fuller lessons to the psycho-physicist [i.e., psychologist]" (p. xlv).
Thus, instead of judging "the worth of ideas by tracing their origins,"
as scientists following in the footsteps of E. B. Tylor, Sir John Lubbock,
and Herbert Spencer tended to do, Myers urged that we adopt "a some­
what more searching criterion. Instead of asking in what age a doctrine
originated-with the implied assumption that the more recent it is, the bet­
ter-we can now ask how far it is in accord or discord with a great mass of
actual recent evidence" (HP, vol. 2, p. 91). Gurney's comprehensive survey
of witchcraft literature, for example, had shown that firsthand (not second­
ary) accounts of phenomena attributed to witchcraft bore a remarkable
resemblance to modern phenomena of hypnotism and hysteria (Gurney et
aI., 1886, vol. 2, pp. 1 16-120, 172-185). This example suggests that, faced
with unusual or abnormal phenomena, one is not limited to accepting tra­
ditional explanations and beliefs about them in their original form or to
rejecting the observations altogether. Invalid or insufficient interpretations
may have derived from perfectly valid observations. The important ques­
tion to ask is "whether hypotheses, now admitted to be erroneous, had ever
been based in past times on evidence in any way comparable to that which
we have adduced" (Myers, 1 886a, p. lxix).
In addition to considering a breadth of phenomena and of explanatory
hypotheses, Myers believed it was equally important to maintain a breadth
of method. The ultimate goal of any science, he said, is to arrive at an expla­
nation of a phenomenon sufficient to allow one to predict or produce that
phenomenon (Myers, 1880/1888, p. 56). All sciences, however, must pass
through two prior methodological stages before reaching that advanced
stage: "First, [the phenomena] will occur spontaneously. Next, they will be
empirically produced. And lastly they will be produced scientifically; pro­
duced, that is to say, with real knowledge of the conditions on which they
depend." Psychical researchers and others attempting to push psychology
beyond the commonplace and toward "real discovery" were, he thought,
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-95

"just entering" the second stage, that is, the early experimental stage "at
which we can sometimes set the machinery going, but have no notion how
it works." Nevertheless, as long as one remains at this second stage, and has
not yet progressed to the third stage of understanding fully how to produce
the phenomena, then the observational method must continue in conjunc­
tion with the experimental work. It remains "important to take stock, so
to say, of the whole range of spontaneous phenomena corresponding to the
phenomena which we are endeavouring to produce. We shall thus learn how
far we are likely to be able to go, and we may get hints as to the quickest line
of progress" (Myers, 1892c, p. 333).
In short, the methodological approach for psychology that Myers advo­
cated was above all else a comparative one: comparing observations from
widely differing conditions, places, or times; comparing spontaneous phe­
nomena and experimentally produced phenomena; comparing different
hypotheses or perspectives. Furthermore, because of his fervent belief in
the ultimate continuity of all phenomena, he emphasized the necessity of
showing continuity and interrelationship among apparently disparate phe­
nomena. It was particularly important to understand the continuity between
normal psychological phenomena and the refractory and rare abnormal and
supernormal phenomena of psychology and psychical research, not only to
bring the latter out of the realm of superstition and into the realm of science,
but also to strengthen science itself by expanding its framework to include,
not just some, but all phenomena of human experience. As James summa­
rized this, Myers brought "unlike things thus together by forming series of
which the intermediate terms connect the extremes":

Myers's great principle of research was that in order to understand any one
species of fact we ought to have all the species of the same general class
of fact before us. So he took a lot of scattered phenomena, some of them
recognized as reputable, others outlawed from science, or treated as iso­
lated curiosities; he made series of them, filled in the transitions by delicate
hypotheses or analogies, and bound them together in a system by his bold
inclusive conception of the Subliminal Self, so that no one can now touch
one part of the fabric without finding the rest entangled with it.. . .Through
him for the first time, psychologists are in possession of their full material.
(James, 1901, p. 16)

Empirical Phenomena for the Study of Mind:

An Introduction to Human Personality

In addition therefore to outlining a new model of mind and urging the

development of methods uniquely suited to psychology, Myers sought to
call the attention of psychologists to "their full material" by describing an
enormous range of phenomena, both spontaneously occurring and experi­
mentally induced, that he thought not only must be accounted for in any
96-Chapter 2

adequate theory of human personality but also are essential for stimulating
the development of such a theory. The most ful ly developed and complete
form in which the theoretical, methodological, and empirical themes of
Myers's work were presented is the massive two-volume Human Personality
and Its Survival oj Bodily Death (1 903). Although it was published posthu­
mously, two years after Myers's death, most of it had been finished and was
ready for publication at the time of his death, large parts of it having been
drawn from or based upon his numerous publications from the 1 880s and
1890s.29 As Myers had requested when he realized that he was seriously ill
and might die soon, Richard Hodgson and Alice Johnson served as edi­
tors after his death.30 When the book appeared, it was quickly reviewed in
numerous journals and periodicals.31
Human Personality consists of \0 chapters and lengthy Appendices that
present much of the empirical data and case reports supporting the pri­
mary material. In the first chapter Myers introduces his overall purpose and
his theory of the Subliminal Self. In Chapters 2 and 3 he provides a more
detailed account of the theory by discussing two seemingly different kinds
of phenomena that he believed are closely related psychologically, namely,
hysteria and genius. In Chapters 4 and 5 he discusses the emergence of sub-

29. The William James scholar Eugene Taylor (1 984, p. 179; 1996, p. 147) made an
egregious error when he stated that Human Personality was published posthumously
by Myers's widow and son because Myers himselfhad largely abandoned the project.
He further seriously misrepresented the facts when he opined that Myers had not
completed the book because he had "dallied around" during the 1 890s (Taylor, 1 996,
p. 147). I n fact, Myers published nearly 50 papers and reviews in the I I years before
his death, including the important series of nine lengthy papers on the Subliminal
Sel f, published between 1 892 and 1895 (see footnote 8 for the references), on which
much of Human Personality was based. Would that we could all "dally" like this.
30. Although the primary task remaining for the editors was to put the unfinished
Chapter 9 and the Appendices in order, at least two major changes occurred that
probably deviated sharply from Myers's own wishes. First, as I shall discuss further
below, a large body of material that Myers had intended to include in Chapter 9,
concerning the medium Mrs. Thompson, was omitted. Secondly, Myers himself
had apparently intended a di fferent title for his book than the one that appeared.
James (1 902/1958, p. 386n) stated that it had already been announced by Longmans,
Green, and Company as in press under the title Human Personality in the Light
of Recent Research-a title that far more accurately reflected Myers's approach
than did the title that was ultimately used. The change was apparently made at the
last minute by the editors or the publishers and, I suspect, would not have been
approved by Myers himself. As I have already mentioned, although the question of
survival after death was certainly Myers's central concern, he fully understood that
it could be approached adequately only within the much larger context of the nature
of consciousness. Un fortunately, the title that was used has probably turned away
many scientific readers who would have examined the book if Myers's own title had
been used.
3 1 . We have placed the most significant of these contemporary reviews (Flournoy,
James, McDougall , Stout) on our digital version of Human Personality (see our
Introduction, p. xxx). See also Gauld ( 1 968, chap. 1 2).
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-97

liminal functioning in two altered states of consciousness: sleep and hyp­

nosis. In Chapters 6 through 9 he presents a wide variety of evidence, both
spontaneous and experimental, for psychological "automatisms" of sublim­
inal origin. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with sensory automatisms, or "messages
which the subliminal self sends up to the supraliminal in sensory form,"
especially visual or auditory form, "externalised into quasi-percepts" (HP,
vol. 1 , pp. 23, 222). Chapters 8 and 9 deal with motor automatisms, or sub­
liminal impulses or ideas expressed through motor functioning, whether
"by movement of limbs or hand or tongue" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 222). The final
chapter is an Epilogue assembled by the editors from some of Myers's more
speculative writings. It consists largely of a "Provisional Sketch of a Reli­
gious Synthesis" and several appendices in which Myers outlines his hope
and belief that science ("that great wedding between Reason and Experi­
ence" [HP, vol. 2, p. 295]) and religion ("the sane and normal response of
the human spirit. . . to the known phenomena of the universe, regarded as an
intelligible whole" [HP, vol. 2, p. 284]) will come together so that the meth­
ods of science can be directed toward questions that religion alone has thus
far asked (HP, vol. 2, p. 305).
In the remainder of this chapter, I will briefly sketch, using as an outline
the chapter divisions of Human Personality, some of the many types of phe­
nomena and lines of research that Myers believed important for a truly com­
prehensive and instructive science of psychology. This skeletal presentation,
however, can provide only a glimpse of the richness, depth, and orderliness
of the evidence that Myers marshaled in support of his theory. As Gardner
Murphy (1954) cautioned years later,

The reader who would grasp what Myers is doing must simply keep his fin­
gers in the appendices, often the appendices of both volumes, and indeed
sometimes several fingers at once, to trace out the carefully marshalled
evidence which is offered by the author at each point to support the gener­
alization which he offers. This is the only way in which the documentary
strength and philosophical significance of Myers can be understood. (p.
iv)

Chapters 2 and 3: Hysteria and Genius

Myers noted that Breuer and Freud had been puzzled by their seem­
ingly paradoxical observation "that amongst hysterics we find the clear­
est-minded, the strongest-willed, the fullest of character, the most acutely
critical specimens of humanity" (translated and quoted by Myers, 1 893a, p.
14;32 see Breuer & Freud, 1 89311957, p. 1 3). More generally, the apparent rela­
tionship between genius and insanity had long been noted and debated (and
stil l is; see our Chapter 7). In Myers's model of mind, this relationship is to

32. This paper (Myers, 1893a, pp. 1 2-15) provided the first published account of
Freud's work in English (Fuller & Fuller, 1986; E. Jones, 1 961, vol. I , p. 250).
98-Chapter 2

be expected. He considered both to be manifestations of the same general

psychological mechanism-that is, an unusual "perturbation," instability,
or permeability in the boundary between subliminal and supraliminal pro­
cesses. "Normal" individuals, in contrast, have a relatively stable, less per­
meable barrier, and are correspondingly less variable: "The man who is in
but small degree thus permeable, who acts uniformly on supraliminal con­
siderations, . . .is likely to be safe in prudent mediocrity" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 16).
The difference between hysteria and genius is a qualitative, not psychologi­
cal, one. Hysteria (which Myers called a "self-suggestive malady" or "disease
of the hypnotic stratum") is for the most part (although not entirely) a disso­
lutive process, whereas creative genius is primarily evolutive. When there is
"a lack of liminal stability, an excessive permeability, if I may so say, of the
psychical diaphragm which separates the empirical [supraliminal] from the
latent [subliminal] faculties of man," then there may be either an expansion
of consciousness (an "uprush" of latent material from the subliminal into
the supraliminal) or, conversely, a narrowing of consciousness (a "down­
draught" from the supraliminal into the subliminal). The former is genius,
the latter is hysteria (Myers, 1893a, pp. 8, 16; HP, vol. 1, pp. 20, 66).
As I mentioned earlier, Myers had long urged psychologists to study hys­
teria as a psychological, as opposed to a clinical or medical, phenomenon.
The purely descriptive, clinical approach had yielded little true understand­
ing of hysteria. A nosological definition of hysteria had proven "impossi­
ble," since symptoms seem almost infinitely variable. A more adequate defi­
nition, he urged, will come only when we "seek it from some psychological
standpoint" (Myers, 1893a, p. 5).
The study of the dissolution of personality might also reveal much
about its evolution, or integration, and how the "normal" personality main­
tains a relatively stable integration (HP, vol. 1, pp. 19, 35). Unlike Janet and
most French clinicians, Myers ( l893a) believed that the ordinary or "nor­
mal" personality is "no true ideal, no stable synthesis, but rather a transi­
tory and shifting compromise .. . .The personality of each of us is in a state of
constantly shifting equilibrium" (pp. 6, 9). More fundamentally, all mani­
festations of personality involve a narrowing of the field of consciousness so
"that it can take in the minimum of sensations necessary for the support of
life" (p. 17). The narrowing of the hysteric's field of consciousness, therefore,
differs more in degree than in kind from that of the normal person. Thus,
unlike organic losses of function, hysterical symptoms are "the mere subsid­
ence of these powers to a level where the empirical will can no longer reach
them," but from which they can potentially be recalled (p. 16). They are, in
short, not "extinguished" but submerged (HP, vol. 1, pp. 46-47).
Myers thus predicted that experiments on hysterics would show that, at
some level of consciousness, hysterics retain sensations and memories that
they seem to have lost-as in fact experiments of Binet, Pierre Janet, and
Jules Janet were showing (Myers, 1 893b, pp. 201-204; l889c, pp. 217-219;
1893a, pp. 16-22; HP, chap. 2). Pierre Janet, for example, had observed "how
rare a thing it was that any accident or injury followed upon hysterical loss
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-99

of feeling in the limbs" (HP, vol . 1 , p. 47). Some deeper level of personal­
ity, it seems, retains awareness and maintains some subliminal supervision
over the individual's functioning. Similarly, Janet showed that, although an
hysteric might have lost the ability to carry out a motor task when her atten­
tion was directed to it, she actually retained the capacity at a subliminal
level (Myers, 1893a, pp. 21-22). Janet also followed Myers's lead in utilizing
automatic writing as a means of accessing the subliminal content of con­
sciousness, thus revealing that psychological traumas often contribute to
the development of hysterical symptoms, although they remain out of the
patient's conscious awareness (Janet, 1889). Myers encouraged such experi­
ments, not only to determine how deep the hysterical losses of sensation and
memory really go and to what extent subliminal awareness of "lost" areas of
consciousness might still be influencing supraliminal functioning, but also
to demonstrate, as he believed they would, an underlying unity and continu­
ity beneath the hysteric's apparently dissociated personality.
Finally, cases of hysteria provide "one of the most fertile sources of new
knowledge of body and mind" (HP, vol. 1, p. 43). Hysteria is not solely an
excessive narrowing of consciousness, and phenomena such as hysterical
anesthesia, blindness, or paralysis (e.g., Binet, 1 890; Binet & Fere, 1 888;
Janet, 189311901, 1907/1920) are not, according to Myers, simply the losses
of sensory or motor capacity that they appear to be. Moreover, they are
not organically caused: They do not fit any anatomical pattern; they might
periodically change location; and they can often be cured or made to disap­
pear by suggestion. Hysterical symptoms are instead "phantom copies of
real maladies of the nervous system" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 43). As such, they are
evidence for a level of control over physiological processes, latent in the
subliminal consciousness of the individual, that is beyond the capacity of
the supraliminal consciousness. This apparent ability of the hysteric's sub­
liminal consciousness to initiate and control, at some level, physiological
processes that are normally beyond conscious control seemed to Myers to
be a gain rather than a loss of function and to have important implications
for an understanding of the relationship of mind and body. In Chapter 3 I
will discuss in more detail these important phenomena, as well as closely
related phenomena such as stigmata, "faith" healing, and maternal impres­
sions, to which Myers also called attention.
In short, Myers believed that hysteria, when viewed as a psychological
phenomenon, gives "striking" support to "my own principal thesis" (HP,
vol. I , p. 19), namely, that all personality is a filtering or narrowing of the
field of consciousness from a larger Self, the rest of which remains latent and
capable of emerging only under the appropriate conditions. The hysterical
personality, in essence, bears the same relationship to the normal, healthy,
supraliminal personality as the latter bears to the ideal, totally integrated
Self or Individuality of which it is an extract.33

33. Myers ( l893a), perhaps a trifle facetiously, compared the hysteric's frequent
unawareness of and indifference to her limitations to the indifference of most
normal people to learning more about the nature and extent of their own minds: "If
IOO-Chapter 2

Similarly, Myers argued that the study of genius can teach us about the
structure and evolutionary dynamics of mind, since the same psychological
mechanism that produces a narrowing of consciousness in hysterics pro­
duces an expansion of consciousness in geniuses (Myers, l 892d; HP, chap.
3): Both involve an unusual instability or permeability of the barrier or filter
between the subliminal and supraliminal, in one case leading primarily to
a "down-draught," in the other to an "uprush." Believing that the evolu­
tion of mind involves a general process of "gaining a completer control over
innate but latent faculty," Myers defined genius as "an emergence of hidden
faculty" (Myers, l 895b, p. 6). In particular, it involves "a power of utilising a
wider range than other men can utilise of faculties in some degree innate in
all," as well as "a subliminal uprush, an emergence into the current of ideas
which the man is consciously manipulating of other ideas which he has not
consciously originated, but which have shaped themselves beyond his will,
in profounder regions of his being" (HP, vol. 1, p. 71). As an "uprush," an
inspiration of genius is a psychological automatism, a subspecies of sub­
liminal phenomena. What distinguishes the phenomena of genius, however,
is that they involve not so much the emergence of new faculties as the inten­
sification of familiar ones (HP, vol. 1, p. 96). In the analogy of the spectrum,
they "make the bright parts of the habitual spectrum more brilliant," rather
than drawing on subliminal faculty "beyond the limits of the ordinary con­
scious spectrum" (HP, vol. 1, p. 78).
Myers's conception of genius was thus quite different from that of
Maudsley, Lombroso, and others who considered genius to be indica­
tive of pathology (Myers, 188ge, p. 1 92; HP, vol. 1, p. 71). Unlike them, he
believed that geniuses, with their "perceptions of new truths and powers of
new action," represent instead the "highest product of the race" (HP, vol. 1 ,
pp. 96, 7 1). Because genius and madness both involve similar psychological
mechanisms-namely, a permeability of the psychological boundary-it is
to be expected that they might frequently occur in the same person (Myers,
1885d, p. 1 30; 1892d, p. 355); but any nervous disorders that accompany
genius signal, not dissolution, but a "perturbation which masks evolution"
(HP, vol. 1 , p. 93).
Genius is customarily associated with an unusually high level of intel­
lectual functioning or extraordinary artistic achievements of a scientist,
writer, artist, musician, or dancer. Psychologically speaking, however, any
uprush of heightened faculty belongs to the same class: "A man may have a
sudden and accurate inspiration of what o'clock it is, in just the same way as
Virgil might have an inspiration of the second half of a difficult hexameter"
(HP, vol. 1, p. 78). A psychological conception of genius, Myers insisted, is
entirely different from the aesthetic conception. Whereas from the aesthetic
view the important consideration is the perceived quality or value of the
product, from the psychological perspective the important consideration

we had been a populace of hysterics we should have acquiesced in our hysteria. We

should have pushed aside as a fantastic enthusiast the fellow sufferer who strove to
tell us that this was not all that we were meant to be" (p. 25).
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem�lOl

is the psychological mechanism behind the phenomenon, that is, a sudden

uprush from the subliminal that is "incommensurable" with ordinary con­
scious effort (Myers, 1898b, p. 104; HP, vol. 1, pp. 75, 99). Two works of art
or two different kinds of phenomena may thus be "in the same psychological
class" without being "in the same artistic class" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 75).
In Chapter 7 we will return to a discussion of the phenomena of genius,
including one that Myers thought particularly useful for studying the psy­
chological mechanism involved, namely, arithmetical prodigies. Accord­
ing to Myers, the "calculating boy" is of the same psychological genus as
a Shakespeare, although clearly not of "the highest order of art" (Myers,
1898b, p. 104; 1892d, p. 349). Nevertheless, the products of the calculat­
ing prodigy, unlike those of the artist, can be judged on purely objective
grounds; the answer is either right or wrong. Thus, the study of such persons
may provide a relatively objective way to study the otherwise subjective pro­
cesses of inspirational uprush (Myers, 1 892d, pp. 356, 360; HP, vol. 1, pp.
78-85).

Chapter 4: Sleep

Myers believed that the study of sleep and dreams should occupy a
prominent position in psychological research. In keeping with his view
that consciousness has evolved out of a primitive "panaesthesia," Myers
described the evolution of consciousness as a process in which, in response
to environmental demands, we become "more and more awake." Sleep is
thus a reversion to an earlier stage of development. Furthermore, just "as
sleep precedes vigilance, so do dreams precede thought" (Myers, 1 892e, p.
363); dreams, he thought, represent "the kind of mentation from which our
clearer and more coherent states may be supposed to develop" (HP, vol. 1 ,
p. 58).
Myers's ( l 898b) psychological definition of sleep, therefore, was that it
is "an alternating phase of our personality" (p. 105) in which the organism
reverts to a more primitive state of consciousness for reparative purposes:
"It is a fully admitted, although an absolutely unexplained fact, that the
regenerative quality of healthy sleep is something sui generis, which no com­
pleteness of waking quiescence can rival or approach" (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 23).
Myers attributed this characteristic feature of sleep to its being a primitive,
now subliminal, state of consciousness. Just as in Jackson's hierarchical
theory of nervous functioning a lower level takes over when a higher level
ceases to function, so in Myers's theory, when waking consciousness ceases,
the infrared portion of the spectrum of consciousness, with its "increased
control over organic functions at the foundation of life" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 23),
takes over and makes sleep the "regenerative phase of our personality" (HP,
vol. 1 , p. 1 52; 1898b, p. 105).
For Myers (1892e), therefore, sleep was "no mere abeyance of waking
activities, but rather a phase of personality with characteristics definitely
I 02-Chapter 2

its own" (p. 365). The most obvious and important of these characteristics
are the reparative organic processes; but there are also others indicating a
kind of psychological functioning different from that in the supraliminal
waking state. Because of the "heightening effect of sleep" in allowing sub­
liminal impressions "to cross the threshold of consciousness," particularly
by appearing in dreams (W. F. Barrett, Massey, et aI., 1 883, p. 140), sleep and
dreams can provide an important source of knowledge about subliminal
functioning.
First, Myers argued, dreams provide a readily available means of study­
ing the "language" of the subliminal, a language that may underlie other,
less common forms of automatism or subliminal processes. Just as sleep is
not simply an absence of waking functioning, dreams are not just "echoes or
fragments of waking experience, fantastically combined" (Myers, 1 892e, p.
365). Dreams are the evolutionary precursor of thought (p. 363), expressed
in a form or language that is often symbolic in content rather than literal. So
that psychologists might begin to learn this symbolic, primarily nonverbal
language, "dreams should be subjected to an analysis far more searching
than they have as yet received from any quarter" (pp. 365-366).
The study of sleep and dreams might also provide information about
enhanced or even novel psychological processes emerging in subliminal
functioning ( l892e; HP, chap. 4). For example, dreams most commonly, but
also hypnagogic and hypnopompic34 illusions, reveal a latent capacity for
internally generated imagery going far beyond the person's ordinary vol­
untary waking capacity. For many people, in fact, dream imagery is "the
highest point" that their visualizing faculty reaches (Myers, 1 892e, p. 370).
Moreover, in most people dreams display a creative and dramatizing capac­
ity far greater than they normally show (p. 371); and in some dreams cogni­
tive or problem-solving processes seem to have been enhanced, as in cases
in which solutions to mathematical or scholarly problems have appeared in
dreams (pp. 392-397; HP, vol. 1, pp. 134-135, 372-379).
Another cognitive function that can be enhanced in dreams is memory.
For example, "we occasionally recover in sleep a memory which has wholly
dropped out of waking consciousness," a phenomenon Myers considered
common enough so that "no one will raise any doubt about it" (Myers,
1 892e, pp. 380-381). More interestingly, however, there are also occasional
dreams involving facts of which the person had never supraliminally been
aware (pp. 381-392). Such extensions of memory suggested to Myers that,
in sleep as well as in other subliminal states of consciousness, memory may
be more wide-ranging than is supraliminal, waking memory-even if it is
also less focused or controlled than supraliminal memory (HP, vol. 1, p.
1 29). In other words, the study of enhanced memory, or hypermnesia, in
dreams-induding the memory of events once known but now forgotten,
as well as events perceived with the normal senses but never consciously

34. Myers ( 1892b, pp. 3 14-315) coined this word to refer to images that may occur
as a person is waking up, comparable to the hypnagogic imagery that precedes
sleep.
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-I03

noted-is of interest in showing that both memory and sensory percep­

tion extend beyond our ordinarily noted supraliminal range. Furthermore,
Myers believed that the study of memory in dreams will reveal an underly­
ing continuity of memory between the dream state and related conditions
such as hypnotic and somnambulistic states, and thus provide further sup­
port for his theory of a fundamental unity of human personality behind its
multiple and often seemingly disparate manifestations (Myers, 1 892e, pp.
378-379; HP, vol. 1, pp. 128-134, 370-372).
Myers's model of mind predicts that if sleep is a state of conscious­
ness in which subliminal processes take over from supraliminal ones, then
sleep should facilitate subliminal functioning, not only in the organic or
"infrared" region, but also in the "ultraviolet" range of the psychological
spectrum, such as the emergence of telepathic impressions in dreams. This
does, in fact, seem to be the case (W. F. Barrett, Massey, et aI., 1883, p. 140;
HP, vol. 1, pp. 1 35-150, 379-436).35 Moreover, Myers ( l 892e) conjectured
that dreams which seem particularly vivid or otherwise impressive to the
dreamer-and especially dreams that lead the dreamer to take some action
once he or she wakes up-might more often be those which later prove
to have been supernormal (pp. 366-367). He thus suggested studying the
qualitative intensity of dreams as part of an effort to identify supernormal
dreams more readily.
Although dreams, by their very nature, are spontaneously occurring
phenomena, Myers nevertheless believed that they can occasionally be
brought under some experimental control:

I have long thought that we are too indolent in regard to our dreams; that
we neglect precious occasions of experiment for want of a little resolute
direction of the will.. . . [W]e ought to accustom ourselves to look on each
dream, not only as a psychological observation, but as an observation which
may be transformed into an experiment. We should constantly represent to
ourselves what points we should like to notice and test in dreams; and then
when going to sleep we should impress upon our minds that we are going
to try an experiment;-that we are going to carry into our dreams enough
of our waking self to tell us that they are dreams, and to prompt us to psy­
chological inquiry. (Myers, 1887a, p. 241)

What he was proposing was the study of what today we call lucid dreams,
a phenomenon now generally acknowledged even though, like many of the
phenomena Myers thought important for psychologists to study, it first had
to go through a prolonged period of resistance on the part of many scien­
tists (Green, 1 968a; LaBerge, 1985; see also our Chapter 6).36

35. Numerous studies of spontaneous supernormal phenomena since Myers's

time have shown dreams to be a frequent vehicle for telepathic impressions (e. g.,
Stevenson, 1 970, p. 2) ; and for more recent experimental evidence of the facilitating
effects of sleep on psi functioning, see Child ( 1985) and Ullman and Krippner, with
Vaughan (1973).
36. Myers put himself to the task that he proposed, even though he knew that he
104-Chapter 2

Chapter 5: Hypnotism

From the spontaneous subliminal phenomena associated with sleep,

Myers moved on to what he called "that great experimental modification of
sleep," hypnotism (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 52). Gurney and Myers had long argued
that hypnosis is far more important than a curious anomaly or stage enter­
tainment (Gurney & Myers, 1 885, p. 422; HP, vol. 1, p. 1 58). The method that
had evolved from Mesmer's original discovery had, in fact, been "the first
really intimate, really penetrating method of psychological experiment"
(Myers, 1892f, p. 444) and could provide a "corner-stone of a valid experi­
mental psychology" (Gurney & Myers, 1 885, p. 422; Myers, I 885c, p. 641 n).
Its psychological importance lay for them in its potential as "an experimen­
tal method of reaching the subliminal self" (Myers, 1 89Ib, p. 83).
As a psychological method, however, hypnosis was in its infancy. It
had been used in clinical therapy, but its theoretical implications remained
largely unexamined (HP, vol. 1 , pp. 22-23). As I mentioned earlier, Myers
repeatedly emphasized that the usefulness of hypnosis as an experimental
method depended on an adequately broad conception of the nature, and
hence the phenomena, of hypnosis. Although the terms "mesmerism" and
"hypnotism" are sometimes used loosely or interchangeably, the former
being considered simply an older term for the latter, there is in fact a dis­
tinct difference between the two concepts, and the two schools of thought
emphasized not only different interpretations of the phenomena, but even
radically different phenomena. One major motivation behind the work of
Myers and Gurney on hypnosis was to keep alive both sets of interpreta­
tions and observations and arrive at a better, more comprehensive view.
They believed that both the mesmeric hypothesis and the hypnosis hypoth­
esis had merit, since both had empirical observations supporting them.
On the other hand, they also believed that both remained inadequate. The
"efftuence"-whatever it is that seemingly emanates from the hypnotist to
cause an effect in the subject-is probably not a new physical force, as the
mesmerists thought, but a psychological one. Likewise the concept of "sug­
gestion," central to the hypnosis view, is inadequate because suggestion
itself is wholly unexplained. They thus cautioned against a too-thorough
abandonment of the old mesmeric hypothesis and a too-eager readiness to
adopt the suggestion hypothesis as the new dogmatism (see, e.g, Gurney &
Myers, 1883).
A point to which Myers returned frequently, however, stemmed from
his fear-justified, in light of what actually happened after the turn of the
century-that the problem of hypnosis as a theoretical issue in psychology
would not be adequately pursued because of the mistaken perception that
it has been "explained" in terms of suggestion. Suggestion, it is said, pro­
duces effects because in a "suggestible" person it leads to the suspension of

was both a poor dreamer (Myers, 1887a, p. 241) and a poor visualizer (Myers, 1 892e,
p. 370). Perhaps predictably, he succeeded on only three nights out of nearly 3,000
on which he tried (Myers, 1 887a, p. 241).
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-105

volition or will, to the person's complete absorption in some idea, and to

the "increased internal responsiveness of the organism" (Gurney & Myers,
1883, p. 699; HP, vol. I , p. xxxv). This "suggestion hypothesis," however, is
simply a description of the subject's condition and "not in any way an expla­
nation" of how the condition is brought about (Gurney & Myers, 1 883, p.
699). There is obviously a "profound nervous change"; but how is it effected?
Many people "use the word suggestion as though this were in itself an expla­
nation of the way in which the phenomena are produced, . . . [but] they. . . seem
hardly to think it needful or possible to inquire how it comes to pass that a
sane man's psychical balance is capable of being thus suddenly disturbed"­
and particularly by a method that would seem to have "little more efficacy
than the mere utterance of a charm" (Myers, 1 892b, pp. 300-301). In short,
the words "suggestion," "self-suggestion," and "suggestibility" are "mere
names which disguise our ignorance" (HP, vol. I , p. 1 53).31
Myers thought that all the phenomena of suggestion or hypnosis are,
in the final analysis, phenomena of self-suggestion, because suggestion is a
process that activates the subliminal consciousness, or at least a portion of
it (Myers, 1891a, p. 170; 1892f, p. 446; HP, vol. I , p. 169). As he clearly rec­
ognized, this definition of suggestion also fails to provide an explanation;
nevertheless, he thought that it could help advance our understanding-and
direct our empirical research-by clearly making hypnosis and suggestion
part of a larger problem of psychology, namely, that of the activation of
subliminal functioning in general (HP, vol. I , p. 169).
Myers believed that psychological research on hypnosis supported his
view of the continuity of consciousness underlying the fragmented manifes­
tations of it. In the spontaneous "fugue" case of Ansel Bourne, for example,
the secondary personality, of which the primary personality was unaware,
re-emerged under hypnosis (R. Hodgson, 1891; James, 1 890b, vol. 1 , pp.
390-393). Gurney, who "practically opened up in England a whole depart­
ment of experimental psychology" (Myers, 1 888b, p. 368), studied the con­
tent and persistence of memories in different hypnotic states, showing not
only that hypnotic states have and maintain distinct memory groupings, but
also that they in some sense persist and continue to operate even when not
overt (Gurney, 1884; Myers, 1 888a, p. 377).
A related problem is the process by which separate memory chains are
formed. Janet, Elliotson, Gurney, and others had noted "how very differ­
ent, in different cases, i s the amount of personality which the hypnotised

37. As Andrew Lang ( 1 9 1 1) put it, "to 'explain the explanation' is the task for
the future" (p. 546). Contemporary psychologists have not advanced much
further. Claims that "we can now understand hypnosis, in part, as a conditioning
phenomenon" (Neher, 1 980, p. 295) are distressingly common and similarly disguise
scientists' ignorance about the essential mechanism underlying hypnosis. Gauld
(1992, chap. 25) has provided an excellent overview of contemporary definitions
of hypnosis, suggestion, and related concepts; and he concludes that none of them
"have any greater explanatory validity than [those of the 19th century]. A truly
viable concept of hypnosis remains to be achieved" (p. 610).
106-Chapter 2

subject is able to manifest" (Myers, l 888a, p. 390), ranging from simple

states of mono-ideism to seemingly full-blown, fully functioning personali­
ties. As I mentioned earlier, Myers ( l 888a) suggested that "the time spent
in the hypnotic trance, the experience gained therein," was the crucial fac­
tor, just as in spontaneous somnambulistic cases: The more the secondary
state functioned, the more memories and experience it would accrue, and
the more it would come to resemble the primary state in scope and capacity
(pp. 391-392).
Like lanet's observations of hysteria, research further suggested that
sensations or memories that disappear because of an hypnotic suggestion
are not in fact destroyed or lost, but are simply submerged in other strata
of consciousness, from which they can potentially be re-evoked (Myers,
l 888a, pp. 385, 393): "The problem thus suggested is one of wide-ranging
importance . . . [because it] ultimately involves the question of the relation of
our assumed underlying individuality [or 'Self'] to the various personalities
through which it finds partial and temporary expression" (Myers, 1 892b, p.
324).
Myers thought that hypnosis, like hysteria, has too often been regarded
from the perspective of functions lost or diminished, rather than of those
gained. In contrast, he argued that the most fundamental characteristic of
hypnosis is not the inhibition, but the enhancement of functions: "No mere
inhibition will produce hallucinations . . . .The real kernel of the phenomenon
is not the inhibition but the dynamogeny;-not the abstraction of attention
or imagination from other topics, but the increased power which imagina­
tion gains under suggestion" (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 89). Even when hypnosis pro­
duces a clear loss of function, as in suggested anesthesia, analgesia, or nega­
tive hallucinations (i.e., an inability to see something that is actually there),
the resulting lack of sensation seems more than a withdrawal of attention
or even inhibition of sensation. More importantly, it suggests an enhanced
ability of subliminal levels of consciousness to control psychophysiological
processes that are not ordinarily under conscious control.
Hypnotic alteration of physiological processes is one of the most impor­
tant of the phenomena that Myers thought could advance our understand­
ing of mental efficacy and the relationship of mind and brain; and we have
therefore devoted an entire chapter in this book to a discussion of this and
related phenomena (Chapter 3). Another potentially important phenomenon
is the effect of hypnotic suggestion on perception, especially the production
of hallucinations (W. F. Barrett, Gurney, Hodgson, et aI., 1883, pp. 22-23;
Myers, 1888a, pp. 383-385; 1 892f, pp. 445-449; HP, vol. 1 , pp. 1 88-191). Hyp­
notic production of hallucinations is not only common, but also "one of the
most striking of all our indications of latent faculty" (Myers, 1 898b, p. 1 05).
Although the phenomenon is routinely attributed to suggestion and to the
subject's motivation to obey the hypnotist, it clearly involves more than the
subject's compliant use of a familiar voluntary faculty: "Under ordinary cir-
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-I07

cumstances my subject simply cannot see a tiger at will; nor can I affect the
visual centres which might enable him to do so" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 233).38
Myers also believed that studying experimentally induced hallucina­
tions is "an important prerequisite" for understanding spontaneous hal­
lucinations (Myers, 1892b, pp. 319-320). For example, he conducted some
experiments (Myers, 1892f, pp. 460-461) in which two hypnotized subjects
were given different suggestions about what they would see on a blank sur­
face or speculum. They were then brought together and asked to describe
what they saw. Each subject described what had been suggested to him, and
neither was able to influence the other to see or report anything else. Such
experiments clearly are pertinent to the question of collective hallucinations
and particularly the hypothesis that the comments or reactions of one per­
son having an hallucination influenced others present to have an hallucina­
tion they otherwise would not have had.
Additionally, some hypnotic phenomena appeared to involve hyperes­
thesia, or the enhancement of the normal five senses. The philosopher Henri
Bergson, for example, reported a case of a boy who could, while hypnotized,
identify objects reflected in the corneas of the experimenter's eyes (Myers,
1887b; HP, vol. I , pp. 477-479). Recognizing and ruling out such sensory
hyperesthesia is, of course, necessary before one invokes an explanation
involving psi phenomena such as telepathy or clairvoyance.39
In addition to enhanced control over perceptual processes, the phe­
nomena of hypnosis sometimes involve enhancements of cognitive pro­
cesses. Experiments in post-hypnotic suggestion by Gurney (1887b; 1888),
Delbreuf (1 892), and Bramwell (1 896) showed that some level of subliminal
consciousness can conduct complicated arithmetical calculations or keep
track of a specific, often lengthy lapse of time (see HP, vol. 1 , pp. 502-510).
Such experiments might contribute, for example, to an understanding of
arithmetical prodigies or the claims of some people that they can awaken
themselves at pre-determined times (Myers, 1898b, p. 104; H. Sidgwick &
Myers, 1892, pp. 605-607).
Finally, from Myers's conception of hypnosis as a means of accessing
subliminal strata of consciousness, it follows that phenomena suggestive of
supernormal modes of perception, such as telepathy or clairvoyance, would

38. Modern social psychological theories of hypnosis, which attribute hypnotic

effects primarily to the compliant behavior of subjects wishing to fulfill the role of
good subjects, still fail to address this fundamental question about how subjects
comply with effects not ordinarily under their conscious control. This failure i n
large part is surely because of what Myers ( 1 898b) had lamented a s "confinement of
attention to some few of the commoner and more obvious manifestations" (p. 101;
see also our Chapter 5). I will discuss this problem more fully in Chapter 3.
39. Nonetheless, Myers also warned against carrying such explanations to
unreasonable extremes. For example, he noted, someone had proposed that subjects
hypnotized at a distance had fallen into trance because they heard "the changed
sound accompanying the hypnotiser's quickened circulation" (Myers, 1 8 87b, p.
535).
108-Chapter 2

also be observed in connection with hypnosis (see, e.g., HP, vol. 1 , pp. 543-
546, 553-559). Indeed, such phenomena had long been reported in the older
mesmeric literature (Gauld, 1992); and SPR members conducted experi­
ments with hypnosis in which the hypothesis of some supernormal mode of
perception had to be considered (see, e.g., Gurney et aI., 1 886, chap. 2). In the
century since these early experiments, many other studies have supported
the prediction from Myers's model that hypnosis can sometimes elicit or
enhance supernormal functioning (for reviews, see Honorton & Krippner,
1 969; Schechter, 1984; Stanford & Stein, 1994; van de Castle, 1969).

Chapters 6 and 7: Hallucinations-Sensory Automatisms and

Phantasms of the Dead

Myers considered research on hallucinations particularly important,

because they provide an instructive means of studying the relationship
between "subjective," mental, internal perception and "objective," physical,
external reality. As Myers noted, even our senses do not provide us with an
entirely obj ective representation of external reality; sensory perception is
itself a mental construct that "is in its own way highly symbolic" (HP, vol.
1 , p. 277). Likewise, hallucinations "further. . . confound our already doubt­
ful contrast between objective and subjective, . . . between 'real' and 'unreal'
things" (Myers, 189lc, p. 1 25).
The study of hallucinations, however, had to be carried out in conjunc­
tion with attempts to understand the relationship of hallucinations to other
modes of perception and imagery (HP, vol. 1, pp. 224-231). Myers and Gur­
ney had first attempted to fit hallucinations into a general scheme of percep­
tion in 1884 (Gurney & Myers, 1 884b, pp. 77-82; see also Gurney, 1 885).
They argued that visual perceptions and hallucinations are produced by the
same neurological sensory apparatus, but in the former the primary stimu­
lus has come from peripheral sensory mechanisms, whereas in the latter the
stimulus has come from mental processes directly activating the relevant
cortical areas. Hallucinations therefore fall on a continuum with other per­
ceptual processes, including not only normal sight, but after-images, illu­
sions, memory images, and dreams (HP, vol. 1, pp. 224-231).
Myers further argued that not all hallucinations are pathological, as
most psychologists then (and now) assumed. Many hallucinations are indeed
generated by pathological, physiological agents such as drugs, alcohol, or
disease, but others represent internal imagery generated spontaneously or by
suggestion. One of the most important accomplishments of Myers, Gurney,
and their colleagues in psychical research was in demonstrating the previ­
ously unsuspected, but as it turns out not infrequent, occurrence of halluc i­
nations in normal, healthy individuals. In contrast to psychologists such as
Janet, who believed that hypnotic phenomena such as post-hypnotic hallu­
cinations could be produced only in hysterical subjects (Janet, 1 89311901 , p.
277), the psychical researchers were showing that normal individuals could
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem-109

in fact be hypnotized and induced to experience vivid hallucinations (e.g.,

Myers, 1 892f, p. 470). In addition, they demonstrated the frequent occur­
rence of spontaneous hallucinations among normal persons, conducting
extensive investigations of hundreds of such cases (e.g., Gurney et aI., 1886;
E. M . Sidgwick, 1 922), as well as two major surveys (Gurney et aI., 1 886,
chap. 8; H. Sidgwick et aI., 1 894). In both the first survey (which yielded
5,705 replies) and the second (17,000), the results showed that approximately
10% of the persons questioned reported having experienced an hallucina­
tion of sight, sound, or touch when awake and in good health. These early
estimates of the prevalence of hallucinations among normal persons have
proved remarkably accurate (see Bentall, 2000, pp. 94-95, for a review).
These studies and surveys also demonstrated that such hallucinations
are not always purely subjective in origin. Some, in fact, are veridical-that
is, they involve seeing, hearing, or otherwise sensing some event happen­
ing at a physically remote location. For example, many of the experiences
reported to Gurney, Myers and their colleagues involved seeing an appari­
tion of someone who was undergoing some kind of crisis (usually death) at
about the same time.40
In these studies, the researchers dealt with two major issues. First they
addressed the all-important question of the reliability of the evidence, and
in the problems that they identified and the standards of evidence that they
set for their material, they were pioneers in the psychology of eyewitness
testimony (Gurney et aI., 1 886, chap. 4). Second, they asked whether the
observed correspondences between hallucinations and crisis events could
have occurred by chance. Using their own figures for the frequency with
which people report having hallucinations in a waking, healthy state,
together with statistics regarding the incidence of death in the United King­
dom, they concluded that hallucinations coinciding with a death happened
too frequently to be attributable to chance (Gurney et aI., 1 886, chap. 8; H.
Sidgwick e t aI., 1894).
Veridical hallucinations are, however, in some sense both subjective
and objective. Even when the stimulus for the hallucination is external and
objective, as seems to be the case with veridical hallucinations correspond­
ing to some real but distant event, the percipient's mind often contributes by
modifying that original stimulus in idiosyncratic ways, such that the hallu­
cination may take symbolic, expected, or familiar forms (Gurney & Myers,
1884b, pp. 8 1-82; see also Tyrrell, 1943/1953). Hallucinations "are not mere
crude externalisations . . . .They are in most cases elaborate products-com­
plex images which must have needed intelligence to fashion them" (HP, vol.

40. Although no subsequent study of veridical hallucinations has approached

those of the early SPR in scope or thoroughness of investigation, such experiences
have continued to be reported (see, e.g., Dale, White, & Murphy, 1 962; Green, 1960;
Stevenson, 1970, 1 995; S. H. Wright, 1 999). An ongoing study at our research unit in
the University of Virginia over the past several years has identified more than 200
cases of dreams, telepathic impressions, or hallucinations occurring at the time of
some crisis (usually death) occurring to a person at a distance.
1 1O-Chapter 2

I , p. 234). To further understand the relative contribution of subjective and

objective elements, Myers believed that it is necessary to examine both sides
of a case-that of the percipient and that of the person undergoing the crisis,
including the state of consciousness of each and the emotional relationship
between them (W. F. Barrett, Massey, et aI., 1 883; Myers, 1 884-1 885). Myers
particularly warned against "the error of attributing too much importance
to the person who sees the phantom, because his account of the matter is the
only one which we can [or do] get" ( l886b, p. 301).4 1
Undoubtedly, the cases that raise in particularly acute form the prob­
lem of the subjectivity versus objectivity of hallucinations, and the ones that
Myers believed to be the most important to study, are collective cases, in
which more than one person perceives an apparition simultaneously (see,
e.g., Myers, 1886b; 1886d; 1 890b; 1 898a). Because collective cases suggest
some kind of objective stimulus for the hallucinations, they raise "this per­
plexing problem of the relation of psychical operations to space" (Myers,
1886b, p. 302). Myers proposed the idea that subliminal elements of Person
A's mind may be drawn to a particular place, perhaps by some form of psy­
chological "rapport" with one or more people there. These subliminal ele­
ments then, in some yet unknown way, modify an actual point in space, not
in a material way perceptible to ordinary senses, but nonetheless in some
manner sufficient to stimulate perception of Person A at subliminal levels
of the percipients' minds. His hypothesis was, in short, a spatial one without
being a sensory one (Myers, 1 886b; 1 898a, pp. 323-325). It resulted from his
attempt to find a more satisfactory view than, on the one hand, the ani­
mistic interpretation of apparitions as some kind of objective "ghost" that
multiple people present will see and, on the other hand, Gurney's hypoth­
esis that apparitions are subjective hallucinations produced by a telepathic
impression, with collective cases involving further telepathic transfer of this
impression from a primary percipient to bystanders. There is still no con­
sensus in sight on this complex and theoretically important phenomenon
(for a review, see Gauld, 1 982, chap. I S).
Like crisis apparitions of persons who may be dying but not yet
deceased, apparitions of people that the percipient already knows to be
dead have been reported in all times and cultures, and numerous such cases
were reported to the SPR. Although most such cases cannot be attributed to
anything other than subjectively generated imagery, some cases do suggest
a more objective origin, including collective hallucinations of a deceased
person; cases in which veridical information unknown to the percipient was
conveyed by the apparition; and cases in which the apparition was later
recognized by the percipient in a photograph of someone he or she had not
known in life (Myers, 1 889d; 1890b; HP, chap. 7).
Myers also called attention to hallucinations perceived by a seriously
ill or dying person, experiences that in recent years have been called near­
death experiences and deathbed visions. We have devoted a whole chapter
to this topic (Chapter 6) because such experiences seem to us particularly

41. Stevenson (1987, pp. 106-107) has since had to repeat this warning.
 F. W. H. Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem- I l l

important, suggesting a s they do "the persistence . . . of consciousness under

pathological conditions which would seem to negative its possibility"(Myers,
189lc, p. 1 16).
I have already referred to the importance Myers placed on the study of
hypnotically induced hallucinations. Another important method for induc­
ing hallucinations-one that leaves the subject more or less in an ordinary
state of consciousness, "undisturbed" by suggestion from another person­
is "scrying" (Myers, 1 892f, p. 449). Throughout history and across cultures,
people have deliberately generated visual and auditory hallucinations with
various forms of speculum (or crystal) gazing and "shell-hearing." Although
such methods have long been associated with occultism and superstition,
Myers believed that they could be usefully adapted and developed as an
experimental method in psychology (pp. 458-459, 465).42
In early attempts at scrying the content will often be nothing more than
"confused reminiscences" or other more or less random imagery (Myers,
1892f, p. 483). In keeping with his idea that the complexity and extent of sub­
liminal functioning correlate with the amount of time spent in the altered
state, Myers suggested that, as the scrying is pursued further and devel­
ops, the material will become more complex. As with dreams, there may be
material once known but now forgotten, or material that had been within
one's sensory range but never consciously perceived. Most importantly, but
most rarely, the hallucinations may contain information not known nor­
mally by the automatist (Myers, 1 892b, pp. 3 18-319; 1892d, p. 348; 1 892f;
1899; HP, vol. I , pp. 575-598). Because he believed that complex material,
and particularly the latter kinds, will emerge only with sustained attempts,
Myers ( l896b, 1899) chastised those whose efforts at inducing automatisms
had been brief and superficial and who had drawn their conclusions from
those limited observations.

Chapters 8, 9, and the Epilogue: Motor Automatisms, Trance,

Possession, and Ecstasy

When subliminal material is expressed through motor functioning,

Myers classified it as an active, or motor, automatism. For example, if atten­
tion is sufficiently diverted from the act of writing, certain persons may pro­
duce automatic writing, something more than the simple doodling common
to many people, and often attaining "a degree of complexity hitherto little
suspected" (Myers, 1885a, p. 248). Because of this complexity, together with
the conviction of most automatists that the writing seems not to have origi­
nated within themselves, many people believe the phenomenon is produced

42. He was right: The Ganzfeld method now widely used in parapsychology can
be viewed as a modern variant of the crystal-gazing and shell-hearing techniques
that Myers advocated for psychological research, in that a uniform visual and
auditory field is used to heighten internal imagery and focus the subject's attention
on it (for some references, see the Appendix).
1 l 2-Chapter 2

by some external agency (usually, the spirits of deceased persons). Against

this popular interpretation, Myers ( 1893b) argued that "the great majority
of such communications represent the subliminal workings of the automa­
tist's mind alone" (p. 41). As such, automatic writing is potentially another
important method available to psychologists for "throwing light upon the
workings of the subconscious strata of the mind" (Myers, 1 890c, p. 671), and
several of Myers's earliest papers ( 1 884, 1 885a, 1 885b, 1887a) were therefore
devoted to this topic.43
Other motor automatisms include dowsing, automatic drawing or
painting, and telekinesis (now called psychokinesis or PK), the movement of
objects involving no tactile or other normal physical contact with the object.
Myers placed particular emphasis, however, on another means (in addition
to automatic writing) of expressing subliminal mentation verbally-namely,
automatic or trance speaking.44 As with automatic writing, much of the
material is gibberish (Myers, 1885b, p. 46), but in certain persons it develops
into far more than this. In Myers's lifetime, Mrs. Piper, a trance automa­
tist studied extensively by William James and Richard Hodgson, and Mrs.
Thompson, an automatist identified and studied extensively by Myers him­
self ( 1902),45 provided the most important examples of supernormal func­
tioning in the trance state-so important that Myers was ultimately con­
vinced by sittings that he had with them that he had obtained evidence of
personal survival after death (Myers, 1 89311961 , pp. 40-41 ; 1902, p. 73).46

43. We will return to the topic of automatic writing in Chapter 5.

44. Although the phenomenon is more widely referred to as "mediumship,"
Myers preferred the term "automatist" to "medium," because the latter is question­
begging, implying that the material spoken has come from a deceased person,
whereas the term "automatist" reflects more generally the means by which the
material is produced, rather than a purported source.
It is worth noting here also that most of the best mediums studied extensively in the
late 1 9th and early 20th centuries were trance automatists. Although mediumship
has in recent years become a topic of interest to the general public, and hence the
media, few of today's mediums seem to go into an altered state, much less a "trance"
or alternate personality state. On Myers's theory, the abeyance of the supraliminal
is conducive, if not absolutely necessary, for the emergence of subliminal mentation,
whether from one's own mind or from that of a deceased person. This notable
difference between mediums of today and the automatists of the past may explain
why, in my view, the material produced by today's mediums is generally of far lower
evidential quality.
45. The research with Mrs. Thompson occupied much of the last two years of
Myers's life. He had originally intended to include a report of his work with her
in Human Personality, but for reasons that are not clear what he had written was
omitted after his death (see Gauld, 1 968, p. 325; Piddington, 1903, pp. 74-76).
Unfortunately, none of the records of his 150 sittings with her survive.
46. For an introduction to and review of the literature on Mrs. Piper, as well as
important mediums studied after Myers's death, see Gauld (1982). We will return to
the topic of mediumship in Chapters 4 and 5.
 F. W. H . Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem�1 l 3

Myers believed that trance can develop i n two directions (HP, vol. 2 , p.
217). On the one hand, trance may involve an apparent "possession," either
by the automatist's own (subliminal) mind or by the mind of another per­
son, living or deceased. Most such cases, however, are neither all one type
of possession nor all the other, but instead involve a more complex "admix­
ture . . . of elements which come from the sensitive's own mind with elements
inspired from without" (HP, vol. 2, p. 249). On the other hand, trance may
lead to a phenomenon "common to all religions" (HP, vol. 2, p. 260), and
that is "ecstasy." In Myers's view, aspects of a person's consciousness can
sometimes make "excursions" beyond its normal bounds and thereby make
contact with aspects of the universe with which it ordinarily does not. Such
excursions can range from clairvoyance, which is an "incipient" type, to
the ful l-blown ecstatic experiences of mystics or other persons.47 He also
pointed out that the two types of trance are "complementary or correla­
tive," one involving some sort of "entry" of an external mind into another
person's body ("possession"), the other involving some sort of "excursion"
out of one's body into a larger environment ("ecstasy") (HP, vol. 2, p. 259).
Although he used words such as "enter" and "go out," "inside" and "out­
side," he emphasized that the unknown processes behind these phenomena,
as well as related phenomena such as clairvoyance, "need not be . . . spatial"
(HP, vol. 2, p. 259).
We will discuss ecstasy and mystical experiences more ful ly in Chapter
8. It is important to note here, however, the spiritual motivation so central
to all of Myers's work and permeating especially Chapter 9 and the Epilogue
of HP. This attitude, and in particular what Gauld (1968, p. 276) called the
"Cosmic chant" of some of Myers's more lyrical writing, has surely contrib­
uted to the misunderstanding and dismissal of Myers by other scientists. He
himself readily acknowledged this motivation: "For my own part, I certainly
cannot claim such impartiality as indifference might bring. From my earli­
est childhood-from my very first recollection-the desire for eternal life
has immeasurably eclipsed for me every other wish or hope." Nevertheless,
he went on to say, "desire is not necessarily bias," and he believed that "my
wishes do not strongly warp my judgment. . . sometimes the very keenness of
personal anxiety may make one afraid to believe, as readily as other men,
that which one most longs for" (HP, vol. 2, p. 294). Believing that all aspects
of the universe and human experience are part of some unified whole, he
insisted that science and religion are not separate, or even separable, and his
goal was, by bringing religion and science to bear on each other, to expand
and strengthen both. On the one hand, therefore, he believed that science
could ''prove the preamble ofall religions" (HP, vol. 2, p. 297)-namely, that
the universe extends far beyond the perceptible material world. On the other
hand, religion could contribute to "the expansion of Science herself until
she can satisfy those questions which the human heart will rightly ask, but
to which Religion alone has thus far attempted an answer" (HP, vol. 2, p.

47. Shortly after Myers's death, James addressed in detail the phenomenon of
ecstasy, or mystical experience, in his 1 902 Gifford lectures ( 1902/1958).
1 14-Chapter 2

305). Whatever one thinks of the personal religious convictions that Myers
drew from his work, his general goal of expanding science and psychology
to include all aspects of human experience, from the most primitive physi­
ological reflexes to the highest manifestations of creativity and mysticism,
was one to which, we contend, scientists must return after more than a cen­
tury of avoiding those "larger questions which the human heart will rightly
ask."

Conclusion

Aldous Huxley ( 1 961), comparing Human Personality to better-known writ­

ings on the "unconscious" by Freud and Jung, said: "How strange and how
unfortunate it is that this amazingly rich, profound, and stimulating book
should have been neglected in favor of descriptions of human nature less
complete and of explanations less adequate to the given facts!" Evaluations
of Myers and his work, however, both by his contemporaries and by later
psychologists or historians of psychology, have been extraordinarily varied,
both in the accuracy with which they have portrayed his ideas and in the
conclusions they have drawn about the value of his work. Myers himself
recognized that his ideas and theories were far-reaching and at many points
possibly premature; but his conjectures and speculations were part of a
deliberate attempt to encourage further empirical research: "My excuse for
the bold and comprehensive way in which I have set forth [my] hypotheses
. . . [is that if] there is to be widespread effort there must be widespread inter­
est; and such interest can only be evoked by an understanding of the vast
importance of the discovery to which these small and scattered inquiries do
manifestly, although remotely, tend" (Myers, 1 892f, p. 534).
One of the most cogent evaluations of Myers was that of his friend and
colleague William James,48 upon whom Myers's ideas had a considerable and
lasting impact.49 Myers, he said, had identified psychology's most important

48. James's discussion of Myers's contributions to psychology (James, 1 901) and

his review of Human Personality (James, 1903) are reproduced in our digital version
of HP.
49. Some James scholars have mistakenly credited James with developing the
idea of the subli m inal consciousness, upon which Myers then drew. Barzun, for
example, claims that James, "with his usual generosity," gave credit to Myers, even
though "two years before Myers, he [James] had written an article on 'The Hidden
Self'" (Barzun, 1 983, p. 230n); and McDermott ( 1 986, p. xviii) echoes Barzun's
claim. These writers are clearly unaware that Myers's ideas about a sublimi nal
consciousness long predated the series of nine papers on the Subliminal Self that
he began publishing in 1 892 (see, e.g., Myers, 1884, 1 885a, 1 8 85b). As we wiIJ discuss
further in Chapter 5, James himself said that the "discovery" of a consciousness
"extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness" was made i n 1 886
(James, 1 90211 958, p. 1 88). Although matters of priority are often difficult to sort
out, especiaIJy since i mportant ideas usually do not spring suddenly out of a void,
 F. W. H . Myers and the Empirical Study of the Mind-Body Problem- l i S

problem: " The precise constitution of the subliminal. . . i s the problem which
deserves to figure in our science hereafter as the problem of Myers" (James,
1901, pp. 17, 18). Moreover, "Myers has not only propounded the problem
definitely, he has also invented definite methods for its solution . . . . He is so
far the only generalizer of the problem and the only user of all the methods"
(p. 17). James similarly appreciated the vast range of psychological phenom­
ena that Myers identified as pertinent to the problem (p. 16).
Additionally, James considered Myers's theory of human personality
to be an important one: "It is a vast synthesis, but a coherent one .. . .No one
of the dots by which his map is plotted out, no one of the 'corners' required
by his triangulation, is purely hypothetical. He offers empirical evidence
for the concrete existence of every element which his scheme postulates
and works with" (James, 1903, p. 30). To those who found Myers's theory
"unsatisfactory," James pointed out that "no regular psychologist has ever
tried his hand at the problem . . . . Myers's map is the only scientifically serious
investigation that has yet been offered" (p. 33).
James ( 1903) did express some reservations, to which we will return in
Chapter 9, but one particularly worth noting here is:

Most readers, even those who admire the scheme as a whole, will doubt­
less shrink from yielding their credence to it unreservedly. . . .The types of
case which he uses as stepping-stones are some of them, at present, either
in quality or quantity, decidedly weak supports for the weight which the
theory would rest upon them, and it remains at least possible that future
records may not remedy this frailty. (p. 31)

In the remaining chapters of this book, we will examine many of the "step­
ping-stones" to which James refers, and we will argue that "future records"
have to an unappreciated extent remedied their frailty. In the century since
Myers's death, many of the observations he made have been powerfully
reinforced by subsequent research. Perhaps more importantly, the interven­
ing century of psychological research has reinforced the need for a theory of
human personality which-like his-encompasses the full range of human
experience.

it seems clear that the basic outlines of Myers's theory of subliminal consciousness
were well in place in the 1 880s.
 Chapter 3

Psychophysiological Influence!

Emily Williams Kelly

Phrases about "the influence of the mind on the body" are so often loosely
adduced as though they were themselves the explanation needed, that it
is as well to keep the real obscurity of the physiological problems in view.
(Gurney, 1 887a, p. 105)

The naturalization of mind begun in earnest in the 1 9th century has con­
tinued unabated, and the assumption that mind is wholly derivative from
brain processes has strengthened and grown more pervasive over the last
century. The consensus of nearly all scientists and philosophers today is
that all aspects of mind and consciousness are byproducts of an evolving
nervous system; and extremists such as the "eliminative materialists" even
hold not only that all mental processes and concepts are in principle reduc­
ible to brain processes but that any reference to them in language other than
that of physiology constitutes mere pre-scientific "folk psychology," to be
abolished through further advances in physiology.
This widespread presumption of equivalence between mind and brain
is based on the observations, both scientific and everyday, that the evolu­
tion of mind is correlated with the evolution of the nervous system and that
changes in or injuries to the brain result in changes in or even abolition of
consciousness. It is easy to forget, however, that correlation is not causation.
As I pointed out in Chapter 2, the assumption that the correlation implies a

1 . This chapter has been inspired largely by two great works, both of a remark­
able breadth and depth of scholarship: Reincarnation and Biology, by Ian Stevenson
( 1 997), and The Future o/ the Body, by Michael Murphy (1992).
1 17
l I8-Chapter 3

unilateral dependence of consciousness on the brain has been exacerbated

and entrenched because observations of the mind-brain relationship have
been limited primarily to situations in which a change on the side of the
brain is the independent variable and changes on the side of behavior or
consciousness the dependent. What happens, however, when we expand our
observations to phenomena in which a change in mental state clearly seems
to be the initiating cause, and a change in a physiological or physical state
the result-phenomena, in brief, relevant to a problem long neglected by
psychologists, namely, the problem of volition?
In Human Personality, Myers laid out a wide variety of phenomena that
had to be addressed by scientific research before the books were closed on
the question of the nature of mind-brain correlation. Some of these-previ­
ously ignored, denied, or derided by scientists because they resisted a ready
physiological explanation and seemed instead to harken back to a pre-sci­
entific, magical way of thinking-are now finding their way back to the
mainstream of scientific and medical thinking. This has happened not only
because the phenomena continue to be observed, but much more impor­
tantly because scientists have begun to identify neurobiological processes
that seem to bring them safely within the framework of the prevailing physi­
ological model. But how complete and adequate are such models, even in
principle if not yet in actuality, to explain the enormous variety of phenom­
ena in which a mental state seems to have triggered a physiological reaction?
As we will see, it is less than fully clear that they succeed even for phenom­
ena that are becoming more widely acceptable. Moreover, many additional
phenomena discussed by Myers continue to remain outside the mainstream
of scientific and medical thinking, still ignored, denied, or derided, even
though observations of these too have continued and, in some instances,
grown substantially in number and quality.
There is, in short, a continuum of phenomena suggesting effects of
mental state on physiological processes, ranging from those now increas­
ingly accepted by the scientific community and seemingly explainable by
physiological mechanisms to phenomena still routinely dismissed by most
scientists as outside the explanatory framework of science. In this chapter I
take the position that many of the latter phenomena rest on just as firm an
empirical basis as the former and that, like the former, they must somehow
be brought within the framework of science-science, that is, as a method
and not as an ideology-before we can arrive at an adequate understand­
ing of consciousness and volition. I will begin with phenomena of mind­
body interaction that have gradually become accepted by scientists, and
the theories that have begun to make them more acceptable, and then move
further along the continuum to address phenomena that become progres­
sively more difficult to account for within present models of mind and brain.
For most of these phenomena there is an extensive amount of biomedical
literature, which I will certainly not attempt to review exhaustively. The pri­
mary purposes of this chapter, rather, are: first, simply to call attention to
the extraordinarily wide range of documented phenomena of psychophysi-
 Psychophysiological Influence-1 l 9

cal influence which seem t o originate i n o r depend upon a person's beliefs

or expectations, however those were generated; and second, to show how
the more extreme and unusual of these phenomena challenge physiological
models of any conventional sort.
I will begin by briefly describing the revolutionary developments of
the last few decades in regard to mind-body medicine and "the faith that
heals." 2 It is no exaggeration to say that there has been an explosion of inter­
est in recent years in the question of whether, and when, psychological states
or traits affect physical health, promoting both health and disease. Medical
journals as well as the popular press have published numerous reports on
studies of the relationship between physical health and spirituality, religion,
personality, stress, depression, humor, imagery, meditation, and-that
quintessential emblem of patient expectation and faith-the placebo. To be
sure, many physicians and other scientists still support a statement made
20 years ago by a former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine:
"The venerable belief that mental state is an important factor in the cause
and cure of disease . . . is largely folklore" (Angell, 1985, pp. 1 571-1572). Such
resistance may be breaking down, however.
What has led to this increasing breakdown in resistance to, and the
explosion of interest in, phenomena suggesting that mental factors contrib­
ute importantly to physical health? In this section I will first review devel­
opments in psychosomatic medicine and especially the burgeoning field of
psychoneuroimmunology (PNI) that have recently made the concept of psy­
chological influence on health more palatable to scientists. I will then briefly
review how the findings of PNI have been applied to various phenomena.
Finally, I will discuss research on the placebo effect, which illustrates the
general shift in scientific opinion about mind and health.

Psychosomatic Medicine

Many physicians and historians of medicine have maintained that Western

medicine is deeply tied to Cartesian-style dualism (see, e.g., G. L. Engel,
1 977; Lipowski, 1984) and that "from Hippocrates on [it] has tended to be
staunchly naturalistic and somatic, or physiologic" (Lipowski, 1984, p. 1 59).
With the growing identification of specific agents of diseases in the 19th cen­
tury, medicine became increasingly wedded to reductionism and a mecha­
nistic model of disease in which the role of medicine was to repair mal­
functioning of the biological machine. It is a mistake, however, to attribute
a reductionistic view of disease and "noninteractionist" dualism to Des-

2. Two articles with this title have appeared in medical journals (Frank, 1975;
Osler, 1 910), and, although separated by 65 years (and even by culture, if the distinct
difference in linguistic style can be taken as a measure of that), they both conveyed
the same message: the importance in medicine of releasing the patient's own powers
of healing.
l 20-Chapter 3

cartes himself. Interaction of the two onto logically distinct "substances,"

mind and body, was in fact a central feature of Cartesian dualism; Des­
cartes famously proposed that this interaction perhaps took place in the
pineal gland. It was, in fact, chiefly this aspect of Cartesian dualism that has
caused philosophical problems for many people ever since Descartes' time,
because they cannot imagine how two substances so unlike can interact.3
As a result, although the rigid separation of the workings of mind and body
cannot be attributed to Descartes himself, it is nonetheless true that it was
the influence of his substance dualism that led to the subsequent separation
of physical and psychological processes and to a mechanistic determinism
in medicine, and indeed in virtually all of modern Western science.
As Lipowski ( 1984, 1986) has described, modern psychosomatic medi­
cine emerged in the early decades of the 20th century as a reaction against
biological reductionism in medicine. It was initially focused around two
concepts, namely, psychogenesis-the notion that psychological factors can
cause and influence physical disease-and holism-the notion that mind
and body are an indivisible unity. Although the initial purpose of psycho­
somatic medicine was "to bridge the gap that exists between the universe of
psychological functioning and the universe of physiological functioning"
(Ruesch, 1947, p. 291), more recently people have begun to argue that mod­
ern psychosomatic medicine has instead perpetuated dualism and deviated
from holism (e.g., Fava & Sonino, 2000; Karlsson, 2000; Lipowski, 1 984,
1986). Lipowski (1 986), for example, has argued that the very concept ofpsy­
chogenesis, with its implication that mental factors ("something 'psychic"')
are a causative agent in disease ("something 'somatic''') (p. 4), is rooted in
"unresolved issues of causality and dualism, and should best be buried"
(Lipowski, 1984, p. 162). More bluntly, "the traditional concept of psycho­
genesis is obsolete" and "undermine[s] a much-needed holistic approach to
the practice of medicine" (Lipowski, 1986, p. 4; 1984, p. 1 55).
Engel ( 1977) argued that not only psychiatry but "all medicine is in
crisis . . . [because of its] adherence to a model of disease no longer adequate"
(p. 1 29)-that is, the reductionistic model deriving from classical dualism.
He proposed a new model that he christened "biopsychosocial." The hall­
mark of this model is the "psychobiological unity of man," which requires
a "general systems" approach to health and disease in which all levels, from
the molecular to the social and environmental, are linked (p. 1 34). Psycho­
somatic medicine therefore is no longer to be defined in traditional psycho­
genic terms as "the role of psychological factors in causing disease," but
instead as "an integrative approach . . . based on a biopsychosocial view of
illness" (Sharpe, Gill, Strain, & Mayou, 1996, p. I OJ).
This holistic or multifactorial view and the related systems approach
have rapidly become widespread and influential, not only in medicine but
also in psychology. This new perspective has contributed importantly to

3. More specifically, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, such interaction has seemed to

many people necessarily to conflict with the law of energy conservation and hence
to invite an abandonment of science.
 Psychophysiological Influence-1 2 1

breaking down the resistance to the idea that psychological factors can
influence the body, because it essentially erases the problem by insisting on
the unity, if not identity, of mind and brain. In essence, however, the change
to the classical psychosomatic models consisted of recasting the "psycho­
logical" part as itself biological, with ideas, beliefs, expectations, and the
like to be understood as patterns of neural activity. In consequence, some
scientists have begun to speak of this unified psychophysiological entity as
"the brain-mind" (e.g., H. Spiegel, 1 997, p. 617).
A few authors have cautioned that there has been a too eager abandon­
ment of the original "psychogenic" idea that psychological factors play "an
important etiologic role in the production of disease" (Nemiah, 2000, p. 299).
Moreover, although the currently prevailing view is that "the mind-body
problem . . . cannot be viewed as the subject matter of psychosomatic medi­
cine" (Lipowski, 1 984, p. 168), a minority still think that "as a discipline,
psychiatry should be deeply interested in the mind-body problem" (Kend­
ler, 2001 , p. 989). It is important to note also that the theoretical assumption
of mind-body unity, or holism, is nevertheless itself frequently accompa­
nied by a methodological dualism: "Mind and body may be regarded as
abstractions derived for methodologic purposes," and the "most appropri­
ate" position for medicine is "a methodologic and linguistic approach to the
mind-body problem rather than a metaphysical one" (Lipowski, 1 984, pp.
1 68, 161). The editor of the American Journal of Psychiatry spoke for many
when she suggested that "the relationship between mind and brain has been
extensively discussed . . .without any decisive resolution .. . . One heuristic solu­
tion, therefore, is to adopt the position that the mind is the expression of the
activity of the brain and that these two are separable for purposes of analy­
sis and discussion but inseparable in actuality" (Andreasen, 1997, p. 1586).
As I discussed in Chapter 2 , however, this methodological parallelism
not only permits but encourages the evasion of important questions about
the "how" of psychophysical interaction. In rejecting dualism and embrac­
ing a holistic systems model, "we have been evading the question of the
'how' of physical symptom formation, and so far extremely limited atten­
tion has been given to the matter of transition from a purely mental concept,
such as consciousness, to very specific somatic alterations" (Sheikh, Kun­
zendorf, & Sheikh, 1 996, p. 1 53). Moreover, most contemporary scientists go
much further and believe that this assumption of mind-body inseparability
is not simply a "heuristic solution" but an established fact: "We know that
mind and brain are inseparable .. . . Mental phenomena arise from the brain"
(Gabbard, 2000, p. 1 17).
i22-Chapter 3

Psychoneuroimmunology

Resistance to the idea that mental factors can influence physical states has
primarily been rooted in the lack of any theory to explain the interaction:
"Physicians and scientists until recently dismissed such ideas as nonsense,
because there did not appear to be a plausible biological mechanism to
explain the link" (E. M. Sternberg, 2001 , p. 16). The expression of an anti­
dualistic, holistic approach to mind and body in the biopsychosocial model
laid the groundwork, but the most important impetus to the readmittance of
the idea that mental factors influence the body has come from a burgeoning
field that seems to many scientists to provide a plausible biological mecha­
nism, namely, psychoneuroimmunology (PNI). This field had its roots in
the work of the physiologist Walter Cannon, the physician Hans Selye, and
others, who showed that the body maintains its proper state of functioning
by a self-regulating internal process (called by Cannon "homeostasis") and
that stress is an important factor in upsetting the normal balance because,
reflecting the body's reaction to environmental changes, it has widespread
biochemical and neurophysiological effects. Solomon and Moos ( 1964)
extended this picture by hypothesizing that stress could be immunosuppres­
sive and in this way could influence health, but there was much resistance
to this idea because it was then widely assumed that the immune system is
autonomous and beyond the reach of influence by the central nervous sys­
tem (see, e.g., Solomon, 1993; E. M. Sternberg, 2001).
Although evidence continued to accumulate, especially in psychoso­
matic medicine, for the influence of psychological factors on disease and
health, and although it seems intuitive that "the two great systems that
relate the organism to the outside world [that is, the nervous system and the
immune system] 'ought' to talk to each other" (Solomon, 1993, p. 357), it
took an experiment by Ader and Cohen (1 975) to demonstrate such interac­
tion conclusively. Using a classical conditioning paradigm, Ader and Cohen
showed that the immune system of rats could be suppressed by exposing
them first to an immunosuppressive drug coupled with saccharine, and then
to the saccharine alone. Once the immune system had been shown to be
responsive to conditioning of the central nervous system, this finding could
be extended to account for the interaction between the immune system and
central nervous system activity in response to stress.
PNI seeks to delineate physiological and functional connections
between the brain and the immune system, and as such has been dubbed
"the field of mind-body communication" (E. M. Sternberg, 2001 , p. xi). The
literature of PNI is now vast, but the key point for purposes of this chapter
is that "even the greatest skeptic must now admit that a wealth of evidence
exists to prove in the most stringent scientific terms that the functions of the
mind do influence the health of the body. . . This level of proof [provided by
PNI] of the myriad connections between the brain and the immune system
was needed" (E. M. Sternberg, 2001 , p. xvi). In particular, "by understand­
ing these [mind-body] connections in modern terms, in the language of mol-
 Psychophysiological Influence-l 23

ecules and nerve pathways, electrical impulses and hormonal responses,

scientists can finally accept that such effects are real" (E. M. Sternberg,
200 1, p. 7). In the next few pages I will describe how scientists have begun
to explain in these terms some specific psychophysical phenomena that had
previously been viewed with suspicion, disbelief, and even disdain. The fun­
damental idea is that anything which produces prolonged stress or other
strong emotions leads to biochemical changes that, by affecting systems
such as the immune or cardiovascular system, can produce disease;4 and,
conversely, anything that relieves the stress can help reverse those effects,
restore homeostatic balance, and, perhaps, improve health.

Mind and Disease

We begin with some phenomena of apparently psychogenic disease. There

have been occasional reports of "mass hysteria" among co-workers, stu­
dents, or other closely associated groups (see Hahn, 1997, pp. 63-64). When
the symptoms are of a general systemic nature, they can perhaps best be
explained by the stress associated with the sudden shared expectation or
fear of becoming ill. Much more commonly reported and widely studied,
however, has been the relationship between chronic negative emotions such
as depression or hopelessness and illness (for a review see Wulsin, 2000;
Wulsin, Vaillant, & Wells, 1 999). For example, a study of over 2,400 patients
in Finland showed that hopelessness, as measured by a simple two-item
scale, was significantly correlated with higher rates of death from cardio­
vascular disease, cancer, and violence or injury, as well as with a higher inci­
dence of nonfatal cancer and myocardial infarction (Everson et ai., 1996).
A feeling of hopelessness may have also been a major contributing factor
in two other studies (D. P. Phillips, Ruth, & Wagner, 1993; D. P. Phillips et
aI., 200l), in which a complex of beliefs in traditional Asian medicine and
astrology seemed to have contributed to mortality among people who held
these beliefs, presumably because these beliefs led them "to feel helpless,
hopeless, or stoic" (D. P. Phillips et aI., 1 993, p. 1 142). Other studies have
homed in more directly on the association between depression or hopeless­
ness and cancer (e.g., M. Watson, Haviland, Greer, Davidson, & Bliss, 1999;
see also Holden, 1 978) or cardiovascular disease (e.g., Schulz et aI., 2000). In
addition to epidemiological studies, there is also evidence from prospective
studies of healthy subjects for an association between depression and coro­
nary heart disease (Haas et aI., 2005).

4. In "modern" terms, "stress leads to increased adrenal cortical activity and

consequent deficiency of T cells, [and] impairment of host defense system," and
"the cost of chronic exposure to fluctuating or heightened neural or neuroendo­
crine response" and of "increased hypothalamic-pituatary-adrenal axis (HPA) acti­
vation" may be disease (Lipowski, 1 977, p. 240; Fava & Sonino, 2000, p. 187; see also
E. M. Sternberg & Gold, 2002).
1 24-Chapter 3

Bereavement and Mortality

One of the most poignant examples of the relationship between negative

emotions and disease comes from the numerous studies showing increased
mortality after bereavement. As Jacobs and Ostfeld ( 1977) pointed out,
the study of conjugal bereavement is particularly useful for examining the
relationship between stress and illness, both because of its specificity and
because of its severity. Jacobs and Ostfeld reviewed eight studies that had
been conducted up to that time, all showing an increased risk of mortality
during the first two years after bereavement, and especially among men dur­
ing the first six months. McAvoy ( 1986) and 1. R. Williams (2005) provide
more recent reviews. In addition, Williams provides a brief review of studies
showing both an increased incidence of depression among the bereaved and
an association between depression and increased mortality from cardiovas­
cular disease. In a large prospective study of nearly 1 00,000 widows and
widowers, Kaprio, Koskenvuo, and Rita (1 987) found a significantly higher
rate of mortality immediately after bereavement, even as early as the first
week.
Although most of the studies of the relationship between bereavement,
depression, and mortality are epidemiological studies, some studies have
attempted to pinpoint physiological mechanisms underlying the increased
mortality. Bartrop, Lazarus, Luckhurst, Kiloh, and Penny ( 1977) measured
lymphocyte function in 26 bereaved spouses, both two weeks and six weeks
after their spouse's death. Their findings of depressed T-cell functioning
showed "for the first time . . . a measurable abnormality in immune func­
tion" resulting from severe psychological stress (p. 834). Schleifer, Keller,
Camerino, Thornton, and Stein ( 1983) replicated and extended this study by
measuring lymphocyte stimulation responses in the spouses of 1 5 women
with advanced breast cancer, measuring the responses several times before
the spouse's death, as well as two months and one year after the death.
The responses were significantly weaker after bereavement than before,
"demonstrat[ing] that suppression of mitogen-induced lymphocyte stimula­
tion in widowers is a direct consequence of the bereavement event" and not
"a preexisting suppressed hormone state" (p. 376).

Sudden and "Voodoo" Death

Another example of the association between depression, bereavement,

cardiovascular disease, and increased risk of death is the phenomenon of
sudden death. Engel (e.g., 1 966, 1968) wrote extensively on the relationship
between stress, hopelessness, and mortality, which he called the "giving up­
given up" complex, a phenomenon that had been demonstrated earlier in
experimental studies of rats exposed to conditions of danger accompanied
by hopelessness (Richter, 1957; see also G. L. Engel, 1 978). In particular,
Engel (1971) discussed numerous examples of people who have died sud-
 Psychophysiological Influence-1 25

denly, usually from cardiac arrest, shortly after receiving a sudden shock,
such as news of a death or other serious loss, a sudden fright, or, occasion­
ally, at a time of unusual joy. Although Engel's cases were ones he learned
about anecdotally, either from media reports or from medical colleagues, a
systematic study of 26 men who died suddenly found that both depression
and an event causing acute anger or other emotion immediately preceded
the death (w. A. Greene, Goldstein, & Moss, 1 972); and a study of 100 men
under the age of 70 who died suddenly found that the vast majority of them
had been under unusual stress, within 30 minutes, 24 hours, or six months
before the death (A. Myers & Dewar, 1975, p. 1 1 37).
I mentioned above that some sudden deaths have occurred at a time of
fear. Among the most well known of these cases of being "scared to death"
are those commonly labeled "voodoo death," but also "hex death," "bone­
pointing," or death by sorcery. In such cases, a person who has been cursed
or otherwise led by another, usually authoritative, person to believe that he
or she is going to die at a particular time does in fact die. The phenomenon
has periodically been discussed in the Western medical and anthropologi­
cal literature ever since physiologist Walter Cannon's 1942 paper describ­
ing some cases reported by anthropologists and physicians and proposing
a physiological mechanism for them. It is often assumed that such cases
are found primarily in preliterate societies. Despite the many difficulties
in penetrating preliterate cultures by Western investigators and in obtain­
ing adequate medical documentation in connection with suspected voodoo
deaths, medical observers have continued to report similar observations.
A. A. Watson ( 1973), for example, reported witnessing 9 or 10 such cases (in
about four years) while he was medical officer at a small mission hospital in
Zaire. One of them involved a native nurse who, now a Christian, had been
"outspoken on the foolishness of accepting the belief in the death curse,"
but who nonetheless died within three days of learning that he himself had
been cursed (p. 1 94). Even in the United States, belief in voodoo death, and
associated cases, persist among particular sociocultural groups such as
African-Americans (Golden, 1 977, 1 982; Tinling, 1967).
Such cases, however, are by no means limited to preliterate or "folk"
societies; they also occur in modern Western cultures. Although superfi­
cially different, the general phenomenology of Western cases parallels that
found in aboriginal or preliterate cultures. The belief that one is going to
die may be generated, not by a witch doctor's curse, but by more culturally
congruent phenomena such as a fortune teller's prediction (Barker, 1968),
a doctor's pronouncement of a hopeless condition (Milton, 1973), or some
other suggestion accepted by the patient. Both Myers (1 895e, pp. 528-529)
and Tuke ( 1884, pp. 1 1 2-1 1 3) described cases in which a prediction of death
seemed to have contributed to the person's sudden death. More recently,
Boitnott, Friesinger, and Slavin ( 1967) reported a case in which a midwife
who had delivered three babies on the same day had predicted that the first
would die before her 16th birthday (she did so, in an automobile accident),
the second would die before her 21st birthday (she died on her 21st birthday),
1 26-Chapter 3

and the third (the subject of the report) would die before her 23rd birthday.
This woman was admitted to the hospital, anxious, "terrified," and con­
vinced that she was "doomed" because of the prediction; and she died there
two weeks later, the day before her 23rd birthday, apparently of pulmonary
hypertension.
Walters ( 1944) described a case of a woman who, because of a com­
plex family situation, believed that she would die at the same age (42) as her
mother. As Walters described the events: "Her last two weeks were marked
by extreme excitement and fearfulness .. . . She lapsed into a coma on the
anniversary of her mother's death and died the day after, in the seventh
month of her forty-second year. . . .It is probable that the cause of death was
renal failure brought about by acute emotionalism" (p. 84).
Another Western case more closely resembles voodoo death. Mathis
(1 964) reported the case of a man who first developed asthma at the age of
53 and died nine months later of an asthmatic attack. A closer examination
of his history revealed that he suffered his first attack two days after his
mother had cursed him for going against her wishes, saying "something dire
will happen to you" as a result. His attacks all seemed to be precipitated
by similar encounters with his mother. On the day of his death, at a 5:00
p.m. interview with a physician, "he was in excellent physical and mental
condition." At 5:30 p.m. he had a telephone conversation with his mother, in
which she repeated her warning. At 6:35 p.m. he was found semicomatose,
and at 6:55 p.m. he was pronounced dead.
A letter to the editor of the British Medical Journal in 1965 (Elkington,
Steele, & Yun, 1 965) described the case of a 43-year-old woman who died
following a minor operation. Years earlier she had been told by a fortune
teller that she would die at 43, and before her operation she told both her
sister and a nurse that she would not survive the operation. This report pre­
cipitated numerous additional letters to the editor, in many of which physi­
cians reported their own observations of similar cases (e.g., Barker, 1965;
Ellis, 1 965; Hunter, 1965; Nelson, 1965; Nixon, 1965; P. J. W. Young, 1965).
Barker (1965, 1966) appealed in two major medical journals for other cases
of "auto-suggestion," particularly those generated by remarks of fortune
tellers, and he subsequently published a short book on this and related phe­
nomena (Barker, 1968).
A corollary of the belief in voodoo death is the belief that the curse can
be overridden by the counter measures of a more powerful figure. Kirkpat­
rick (1981) described the case of a 28-year-old Philippine-American woman
diagnosed with and treated for systemic lupus erythematosus. Although the
treatments were at first successful, when her i llness recurred she refused
further treatment and returned to the Philippines, where her village's witch
doctor "removed the curse placed on her by a previous suitor." She returned
three weeks later, apparently cured, and continued in good health with no
further conventional treatment for at least two years, when she gave birth
to a child. Golden (1982) similarly described the case of an American man,
admitted to a Veterans Administration hospital, whose wife had put a "spell"
 Psychophysiological Influence-127

on him, but who "began to recover upon administration of a placebo liquid,

with considerable emphasis as to its potency by the physician" (p. 40). Even
more dramatic is a case described by Meador (1 992) of an American man
who was considered "doomed" by himself and his family because of a hex
put on the patient by a voodoo priest. His physician likewise considered him
to be "near death"; but he was successful in overriding the hex and setting
in motion an almost instantaneous and rapid recovery by fully entering into
the belief system of the patient and his family and conducting an elaborate
and convincing counter-hex (pp. 244-245). The physicians in Golden's and
Meador's cases, as well as the Filipino witch doctor in Kirkpatrick's case,
had apparently gained the patient's confidence that they were more power­
ful than the original hexer.
Meador's paper is interesting and important in a more general sense,
because the two cases he described blur the lines between deaths associated
with "primitive" folk beliefs and those occurring in modern medical circum­
stances. In the case described above, both the illness and subsequent cure
were strongly associated with the patient's belief in hexing. The other case
involved an elderly man who had been given the diagnosis of widespread,
incurable liver cancer. He and everyone around him believed in the final­
ity of this diagnosis, and he died shortly thereafter. An autopsy, however,
revealed that the diagnosis had been a false positive; only a small cancerous
nodule was found, insufficient to have caused death.
Meador's ( 1992) second case in fact illustrates several aspects of the rela­
tionship between psychological factors and disease. The patient had lost his
wife under particularly tragic and sudden circumstances; as he described
it, "everything I ever loved or wanted in my whole life vanished. Gone for­
ever. . . . My heart and soul were lost in the flood that night" (p. 246). Within
six months of her death, he was diagnosed with cancer. When he was told
in October that he had only a short time to live, he said he would like to live
through Christmas for his family's sake. He was seen at monthly intervals
and "looked quite good on each visit," but in early January he was readmit­
ted to the hospital and died 24 hours later. The case is a vivid example of
the relationship between bereavement and depression in the onset of dis­
ease, the apparently deliberate postponement of death until after a signifi­
cant occasion (to be discussed more fully below), and death associated with
suggestion. Meador considered both cases to be examples of "hex death,"
defining a hex death as "a ritualized pronouncement of death by someone
perceived by the subject to have immense power and authority" (p. 244);
and he asked "are we so different from our ancient and primitive witch doc­
tor colleagues?" The only difference is cultural; and in modern culture "the
idea that words or symbolic actions can cause death . . . challenges our bio­
molecular model of the world. . . and we tend to deny that a phenomenon
exists until it can be explained in molecular terms" (p. 247).
1 28-Chapter 3

Possible Mechanisms Behind Psychological Factors in Mortality

Noting that before the 20th century physicians routinely took into
account the influence of mental state on the health of patients, Engel (1968)
asked: "How is it that such insights could have vanished so completely from
medical writings for so long?" (p. 363). In a later paper he further com­
mented that "consideration of the relationship between emotion and sudden
death has virtually disappeared from the medical literature, or at best the
idea is greeted with scepticism if not incredulity or downright ridicule" (G.
L. Engel, 197 1 , p. 772). Since Engel made those remarks, and perhaps to
a great extent because of him, the relationship between stress and illness
or death has become a major focus of research, the attitude shifting from
incredulity to a search for the underlying physiological mechanisms.5 As
I mentioned earlier, that search has been prompted primarily by the find­
ings of PNI that stress and associated strong emotions produce physiologi­
cal effects which can precipitate disease. Phenomena such as voodoo death
have thus begun to be taken more seriously precisely because of the growing
belief that "such deaths may be explained in physicalistic terms" (Lachman,
1 982-1983, p. 347).
Particularly important to this change in attitude has been research
showing that the activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA)
axis by stress leads to the release of corticosteroids, which have profound
effects on the immune system. Explanations along these lines have been
proposed in particular for the mechanism by which stress and emotion can
lead to sudden death. Cannon (1 942) himself suggested that voodoo death
was the result of "the persistent excessive activity of the sympathico-adrenal
system," precipitated by extreme fear and unrelieved by any action on the
part of the victim, who believes that he can do nothing to prevent his death.6
In an editorial on the 60th anniversary of the publication of Cannon's
paper, E. M. Sternberg (2002) credited his work with "form[ing] the basis of
much of our modern understanding of the physiological response systems

5. See, for example, an extensive review of studies showing a relationship between

psychological factors and cardiovascular disease, as well as a discussion of some
physiological mechanisms that may be behind the relationship (Rozanski, Blumen­
thal, & Kaplan, 1999).
6. Similarly, Fry ( 1 965) and, more recently, Wittstein et aI. (2005) have suggested
that increased activity of the sympathetic nervous system produced by stress can
lead to sudden death. In contrast, Spieker et aI. (2002) thought that "a contribu­
tion of the sympathetic nervous system to the derangement of vascular function
after mental stress could be excluded" (p. 2819); and Richter (1957) suggested that
the deaths of the rats in his study seemed to involve overactivity of the parasympa­
thetic nervous system. Other researchers (G. L. Engel, 1971, 1978; Lex, 1974) have
proposed that both the sympathetic and the parasympathetic systems-or, in more
operational terms, the "flight-or-fight" and "conservation-withdrawal" reactions of
the biological defense system-are involved. Such debates, however, concern only
the detailed mechanisms involved, and not the basic premise that stress has pro­
found effects on the body.
 Psychophysiological Influence-129

involved in linking emotions, such as fear, with i llness" (p. 1 564). More­
over, she concluded that "most of Cannon's proposed explanations" have
been upheld by subsequent research on the role of the massive release of
stress hormones and other neurochemicals in causing disease. The picture
remains complicated, because research on the relationship between depres­
sion and specific immune system measures and diseases (such as HIV) has
often produced inconsistent results (M. Stein, M iller, & Trustman, 1991).
Nonetheless, increased understanding of the mechanisms seems likely to
come from advances in basic PNI research. Meanwhile, perhaps the best
lesson to take away from all these phenomena is that "unless you have some­
thing to live for you die before your time" ("Pertinax," 1965, p. 876).

Mind and Health

The relationship between psychological factors and health is not limited

to the role of mental states in the etiology or prognosis of disease. If nega­
tive emotions can contribute to disease and even death, positive ones ought
conversely to contribute to improvements in health or even healing. Cousins
(1976) was instrumental in bringing widespread attention to this idea. Con­
fronted with a serious illness with little hope of full recovery, he recalled
Selye's ( 1956) demonstration that stress and negative emotions can lead to
illness, and he wondered whether the opposite might not also be true. As a
result, he undertook a regime that consisted, among other things, of improv­
ing his psychological state by daily doses of humor and laughter. He recov­
ered, and concluded that "the will to live is not a theoretical abstraction but
a physiologic reality" (p. 1462). Since then he has supported research on the
relationship between positive emotions and health, including the study of
laughter and its impact on stress hormones and other physiological mea­
sures (Berk et aI., 1989). More generally, numerous studies have shown the
efficacy of interventions such as relaxation training, meditation, imagery,
biofeedback, and hypnosis in alleviating pain and perhaps also in improv­
ing conditions associated with cancer, cardiovascular disease, and surgery
(for a review, see Astin, Shapiro, Eisenberg, & Forys, 2003).

Postponement of Death

One example of the "will to live" described by Cousins is that some

people seem to have postponed their death until after some meaningful
occasion, such as the arrival of a loved one or a significant day (Callanan &
Kelley, 1 993). I mentioned above Meador's ( 1992) patient, who announced
his desire to live through Christmas, and then died shortly afterward. A
more famous example is that of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, both
of whom died on July 4, 1826, exactly 50 years after the Declaration of
l 30-Chapter 3

Independence was signed. Although there is no direct evidence that either

one expressed the wish to live until that date, Jefferson's last words-"Is it
the Fourth?"-suggest that this meaningful occasion was prominent in his
mind (Peterson, 1 970, p. 1 008). More generally, some epidemiological stud­
ies (D. P. Phillips & King, 1988; D. P. Phillips & Smith, 1 990) have shown a
significant dip in mortality rate just prior to an event culturally significant
to the individual and a subsequent rise in mortality immediately afterward,
again suggesting that the "will to live" may keep a person alive, but only
until the event has passed.

Religion and Health

A more general manifestation of the relationship between positive men­

tal factors and health is one that has received an enormous amount of atten­
tion in recent years in both the medical literature and the popular media­
namely, the effect of religious involvement on health. Reviews over the past
decade (e.g., Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001 ; Levin, 1994; Luskin,
2000; Matthews et al., 1 998; Mueller, Plevak, & Rummans, 200 1 ; L. H. Pow­
ell, Shahabi, & Thoresen, 2003) have shown not only that there has been
growing, widespread interest in the relationship, but also that the "quan­
tity as well as methodological quality" of studies conducted since the 1 990s
have increased "markedly" (w. R. Miller & Thoresen, 2003, p. 26). Mat­
thews et al. (1998), for example, looked at the relationship between religious
commitment and prevention of illness, coping with illness, and recovery
from illness, and concluded that a "large proportion of published empirical
data" suggests a positive correlation (p. 1 18). Luskin (2000) looked primar­
ily at the association with cardiovascular and pulmonary disease, and he
too thought that the evidence, although primarily from correlational stud­
ies, is "suggestive." In a much more extensive review, Koenig et al. (2001)
examined over 1 ,300 studies on the relationship between religious factors
and various aspects of mental and physical health. In particular, the studies
looking at physical health suggested that religious involvement correlates
with improved immune system function and a lower risk of cardiovascular
disease, hypertension, stroke, pain, and mortality in general. Levin ( 1994),
reviewing "hundreds of studies," concluded that as a body of evidence they
show "statistically significant, salutory effects of religious indicators on
morbidity and mortality" (p. 1475). Cautioning that correlation does not
imply causation, he broke the problem down further by asking: "Is there an
association?"; "Is it valid?"; and "Is it causal?" On the basis of the studies
reviewed, he answered the first question "yes"; after reviewing a variety of
possibly confounding variables, he answered the second "probably"; and
after emphasizing the multifactorial nature of causality for such a phenom­
enon, he answered the third "maybe."
There have also, however, been strong critics of this literature. Sloan,
Bagiella, and Powell ( 1999) in particular have criticized such studies as
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-1 3 1

inconsistent and often methodologically weak. Moreover, they regard the

introduction of spirituality and religion into medical practice as ethically
suspect. As a result of both problems, they argued that "suggestions that
religious activity will promote health, [and] that illness is the result of insuf­
ficient faith, are unwarranted" (p. 667). Nearly all reviewers on this subject
have acknowledged that most research to date is based on epidemiological
data or on prospective cohort studies, and not on randomized clinical trials
where contributing factors can be more carefully controlled (e.g. Koenig et
"
al., 2001 , p. 382). Most researchers, however, have considered this weakness
as one to be remedied in future research, and not as a reason for dismissing
what has already been done (e.g., McCullough, Larson, Hoyt, Koenig, &
Thoresen, 2000, p. 220; L. H. Powell et al., 2003, p. 50).
Moreover, recent statistical and methodological reviews have shown that
there have in fact been studies methodologically sufficient to warrant further
research. In a series of papers in the American Psychologist (W. R. Miller &
Thoresen, 2003; L. H. Powell et al., 2003; Seeman, Dubin, & Seeman, 2003),
the authors used a levels-of-evidence approach in which they judged and
ranked studies in terms of methodological soundness. The strongest finding
was of "a strong, consistent, prospective, and often graded reduction in risk
of mortality in church/service attendees" (L. H. Powell et al., 2003, p. 36).
Consistent with this finding is a study that used a meta-analytic, rather than
levels-of-evidence, approach (McCullough et al., 2000). In 42 independent
studies based on samples of almost 1 26,000 people, the meta-analysis also
revealed a significant correlation between religious involvement and reduc­
tion of mortality from a variety of causes.

Meditation and Healing

Another strong finding from the analyses in the American Psychologist

series concerns the relationship between meditative practices and better
health (Seeman et al., 2003). I will return to the topic of meditation below in
regard to the apparent ability of yogis and other contemplatives to control
autonomic functions; but here I will mention just briefly a few additional
meditation studies not covered by Seeman et al. G. R. Smith, McKenzie,
Marmer, and Steele (1985) described the case of "an experienced meditator"
with a hypersensitivity to a viral antigen. Apparently by a combination of
her usual daily meditation and a process of visualization, she "could volun­
tarily modulate her immune responses by a psychic mechanism . . . . the sub­
ject, acting with intention, was able to affect not only her skin test response
but also the response of her lymphocytes studied in the laboratory" (p.
2 1 1 1).
Meares (e.g., 1 977, 1 979, 1 980) has described his work with advanced or
terminal cancer patients who undertook, under his training and supervi­
sion, an intensive program of meditation. Of 73 patients thus treated, nearly
all received relief from pain and anxiety. In about 1 0% of the patients the
1 32-Chapter 3

growth of the tumor was slowed, and another 10% also "far outlived" the
original prognosis of their oncologists (Meares, 1980, p. 323). More dramat­
ically, five had a complete regression "in the absence of any organic treat­
ment which could possibly account for it," and five more seemed "well on
their way" to a similar regression. Meares (1981, 1983) proposed a mecha­
nism for the remissions: On the assumption that cancer is related to a fail­
ure of the immune system, he proposed that meditation, by lowering the
patient's anxiety and feelings of stress, also lowers cortisone production,
adrenaline levels, and the activity of the sympathetic nervous system, thus
boosting the functioning of the immune system.7
Meares suggested that a similar process might explain some cases of
spontaneous regression of cancer (Meares, 1977, p. 1 33). There have been
several reviews of this phenomenon (see in particular Challis & Stam, 1990;
O'Regan & H irshberg, 1993). All defined spontaneous regression as the par­
tial or complete disappearance of a malignancy in the absence of any treat­
ment, or with treatment generally considered inadequate to bring about the
observed results (Challis & Stam, 1990, p. 545). Even with this restrictive
definition, it is clear that hundreds of such remissions have been reported
in the medical literature, and furthermore that the usual "explanation" in
terms of mistaken diagnosis is wholly inadequate. Unfortunately, however,
practically none of the reports include a description of the psychological
conditions surrounding the remission (one exception is Ikemi, Nakagawa,
Nakagawa, & Sugita, 1 975, but their report was limited to five cases). Any
at tempt to ev aluat e either Meares's hypothesis or any other more compre­
hensive, "biopsychosocial" view of remissions must await more detailed
reports.

Faith Healing

The phenomenon known as faith healing, spiritual healing, and a vari­

ety of other names has been defined as "any purely mental effort undertaken
by one person with the intention to improve physical or emotional well­
being in another" (Targ, 1 997, p. 74). The medical community has occasion­
ally responded to the continuing reliance among the general public on such
healing by examining the history and claims for alternative forms of healing
(see, e.g., a section of the 1910 British Medical Journal devoted to this topic).
In 1893 Myers and his brother A. T. Myers, a physician, published a paper
in response to the then widespread interest in apparent cures of diseases

7. Another contributing factor may have been Meares himself. In line with my
earlier discussion of the role of authoritative figures in creating or removing a
"curse" of death, Meares's own apparent conviction of the efficacy of meditation
in healing, together with his insistence on a particular practice-even ritual-that
was not to be deviated from, may have profoundly influenced his patients' beliefs
and expectations. A similar factor seems to be involved in placebo/nocebo effects,
which I discuss later in this chapter.
 Psychophysiological Influence-133

with mesmerism, at the shrine at Lourdes, and by "mind-healers." Although

deploring the too frequent lack of firsthand or medical testimony in such
cases, they concluded that the occurrence of some such cures was "cer­
tain .. . . Cures are and always have been effected by other than demonstrably
physiological means" (Myers & Myers, 1 893, p. 164). What was still very
much unresolved was the explanation of the cures. In their view there was at
that time no adequate evidence for any mechanism beyond the activation of
the person's "own inward forces" by self-suggestion (p. 207). Nevertheless,
even if healing is the result of self-suggestion, the mechanism-be it faith
in mesmerism, in Lourdes, in the healer, or in something else-is not to be
dismissed as insignificant. In the first place, the mechanism behind self-sug­
gestion has shown "the power of evoking the imagination to a degree and in
a manner in which nothing else has ever evoked it" (Gurney & Myers, 1 885,
p. 406). Also, it remains unknown how the "imagination" or faith can acti­
vate these self-healing forces-themselves yet another unknown.
Now once again, with the recent burgeoning of alternative and comple­
mentary medicine in this country and in Europe, the scientific and medical
community has turned its attention to evaluating seriously some of these
claims. In the United States, the Office of Alternative Medicine (now the
National Center for Alternative and Complementary Medicine), at the
National Institutes of Health, was founded in 1 992, and its budget grew
from $2 million in 1 992 to $123.1 million in 2005. Among the many topics
of interest, especially among the general public, has been faith or spiritual
healing. Such healing includes not only that occurring under the auspices
of a particular religion, but also healing by practitioners who profess no
faith except in their ability to heal by transferring some power or energy to
the patient, usually to correct some imbalance thought to be causing the
disease and to activate the patient's self-healing capacities (R. D. Hodges &
Scofield, 1 995, p. 205). I will discuss the phenomenon of distant healing and
prayer under double-blind conditions later in the chapter, but here I limit
the discussion primarily to healing in a context in which patients know they
are being treated by a healer and hence in which self-suggestion seems likely
to be a factor. 8
One example of healing apparently through some form of faith on the
part of the patient is that of John Fagan, which received widespread pub­
licity. A physician knowledgeable about this case published a report con­
cerning its medical aspects (Curran, 1 976). Diagnosed with and operated
on for invasive cancer of the stomach in the spring of 1 965, Fagan slowly
deteriorated for the next two years. By 1 967 he had deteriorated to the point
that during the weekend of March 4th-5th his doctor said that his death
was imminent. On March 6th, however, he roused, asked to eat, and from

8. I emphasize here that self-suggestion i s likely to be a factor, perhaps even the

most important one; but it is important to keep in mind that the source of the effect
is not always clear. As I will discuss later in the chapter, there is also strong evidence
supporting the idea that one person can deliberately influence the physiology of
another person.
1 34-Chapter 3

then on "made an uninterrupted recovery" (p. 333). Clinical and radiologi­

cal examinations carried out in 1971 showed no sign of the tumor. The only
intervention apparent at the time his recovery began consisted of "the fam­
ily appeal to the intercession of the Blessed John Ogilvie [a 17th-century
Scottish Reformation martyr]," accompanied by prayers and novenas on
the part of local parishioners (p. 333). The case was offered in support of
Ogilvie's canonization, and in accordance with the formal procedures of
the Catholic Church the testimony of many medical witnesses was gathered.
As Curran noted (p. 335), contrary opinions were expressed by some other
medical specialists, "but invariably without a full knowledge of all the rel­
evant details."
In another case, the role of "faith," and hence of self-suggestion, is some­
what less clear. Dunbar (1954) described a 1931 report in a medical journal
of a case involving a professor with chronic and longstanding eczema who
was cured in one day after going to a woman known for her cures by prayer.
He had originally refused to go to her because he was an atheist, but he
finally went at his family's urging and out of desperation for relief (p. 617).
R . Gardner ( 1983) reported seven cases, most of them observed by Brit­
ish physicians (including himself) between 1951 and 1982, in which healing
of a variety of serious and even life-threatening conditions began shortly
after the patient had been prayed for. In six of these cases the patient was
an adult present during the prayers (although unconscious in at least two
cases). One involved a young physician in Wales with meningitis that devel­
oped into Waterhouse-Friderichsen syndrome, an adrenal gland failure that
is often fatal. Although "no such case had ever survived in that hospital,"
she recovered suddenly and swiftly after several groups prayed for her (p.
1929). Two cases-one involving severe hemorrhaging prior to and after a
caesarean delivery, the other involving abdominal hemorrhage from a rup­
tured spleen-occurred in remote places in which medical facilities and
supplies were minimal. The missionary physicians present attested to the
rapid and complete healing after the patients were prayed for, despite the
almost complete lack of conventional treatment available. A nun in Ger­
many recovered from a broken pelvis unusually rapidly and also without
conventional treatment, her recovery clearly beginning almost instantly
after prayers and "laying on of hands" by other nuns. In the fifth case, a
young girl with a serious and longstanding leg ulcer asked for healing at a
prayer meeting: "By next morning almost the whole ulcer had dried up with
healthy skin covering; but one spot continued to exude pus." A week later
the group conducted more prayers and "laying on of hands," and "heal­
ing became immediately complete" (p. 1 932). In the sixth case involving an
adult, no diagnosis was given, but the patient, a villager in Thailand, was
thought to have died by missionaries and villagers present. The missionar­
ies prayed for her, and "twenty minutes later she sat up" (p. 1932). Although,
as Gardner pointed out, there is "not the slightest proof that . . . [she] actually
 Psychophysiological lnfiuence-135

died," her almost instantaneous recovery after the praying, from whatever
condition she was in, is at least noteworthy.9
In the seventh case reported by Gardner, attributing the recovery to
the patient's " faith" or to self-suggestion again becomes more problematic.
This case involved an infant in England diagnosed with advanced fibros­
ing alveolitis, for which the prognosis "is almost uniformly fatal" in such a
young child (p. 1 928). He failed to respond to conventional treatment and
after three months in the hospital was discharged home with a "hopeless"
prognosis, with "maintenance" medication only. After being taken to a
local prayer service-at the suggestion of his physician-he began a rapid
and ultimately complete recovery.
Gardner compared these contemporary cases, in most of which there is
"no doubt as to the accuracy of the diagnosis or clinical details" (p. 1930),
with similar cases reported by the historian Bede in the 7th century; and he
concluded from the similarities that older cases lacking in adequate medical
documentation are not necessarily to be dismissed on that account alone.
Moreover, one might add, cases with clear medical documentation cannot
be ignored or dismissed as "anecdotes" or on the grounds that the reporters
had, like Bede, a Christian orientation and, presumably, interpretation of
the healings. Another physician has published reports of "miraculous" heal­
ings in a strongly Christian context (Casdorph, 1 976). Casdorph described
10 cases of rapid and complete healing of serious and longstanding illnesses,
including rheumatoid arthritis, mUltiple sclerosis, various kinds of can­
cer (bone, brain, and kidney), and other debilitating and life-threatening
diseases that had not been, or could not be, cured by conventional medi­
cal treatment. All occurred during the 1 970s either during or shortly after
the patient attended a large public service conducted by the well-known
healer Kathryn Kuhlman; and all are extensively documented with medical
records studied by Dr. Casdorph, as well as by testimony obtained from the
patients and the physicians involved.
Although Gardner's report was published in the British Medical Jour­
nal, most medical journals have refused to publish studies on faith healing
(Benor, 1 990, p. 9).10 As a result, almost all of the research studies, as well
as reviews of them, have been published in relatively obscure specialty jour­
nals, such as parapsychology journals (which are, however, peer-reviewed)
or ones devoted to alternative and complementary medicine (e.g., Abbot,
2000; Benor, 1990; Schouten, 1993a, 1 993b; Solfvin, 1984).

9. Interestingly, although this case occurred in rural Thailand in 1963, the woman
also described an experience that seems much like the near-death experiences that
have been widely reported in the West in recent decades (see our Chapter 6): She
said that "she had met Christ, had seen into heaven, but was told she must go back
and report what she had seen" (Gardner, 1 983, p. 1 932).
10. Casdorph has published research papers on other topics in prestigious medi­
cal journals, but his reports of unusual healings were published in a popular book.
One wonders whether he tried, without success, to publish these reports in profes­
sional journals.
136-Chapter 3

Most reviewers have covered a highly heterogeneous group of stud­

ies, including studies conducted on nonhuman targets, on human subjects
aware of the intended intervention, and on human subjects kept blind as to
whether or not they were being treated. Abbot (2000), for example, reviewed
22 studies involving randomized clinical trials, which were almost evenly
split between distant healing studies and studies involving contact between
the healer and the patient. The results of the studies were also almost evenly
split, with 10 showing a significant positive effect (five of them involving
distant-healing and five direct contact). Moreover, there did not seem to be a
relationship between the methodological quality of the study and the results.
Because of these mixed results, and because of the "significant heterogene­
ity" in the studies with regard to healing method used, medical condition
treated, outcome measure, and control intervention, Abbot decided-as
have most other reviewers and researchers-that no firm conclusion can yet
be drawn, but that there has been enough positive evidence from studies of
good quality to warrant further and better research on faith healing.1I

I I . I mentioned earlier that few medical journals would publish results of faith
or spiritual healing studies, regardless of their quality, until recent years. When the
prestigious JA MA (Journal of the American Medical Association) finally broke this
ban in its pages, it did so in an unusual and revealing way. Specifically, in 1 998 the
editors of JA MA published a science-fair project of a 9-year-old 4th-grader who
herself had designed and carried out an experiment to test the practice of Thera­
peutic Touch (TT), and in particular "whether TT practitioners can actually per­
ceive a 'human energy field'" (Rosa, Rosa, Sarner, & Barrett, 1998, p. 1 005). Finding
that the "practitioners were unable to detect the investigator's 'energy fields,'" the
authors concluded that this study provided "unrefuted [sic] evidence that the claims
of TT are groundless and that further professional use is unjustified" (p. 1005).
However, as 12 letters to the editor about this paper unanimously pointed out,
such a sweeping conclusion was premature, biased, and irresponsible. One clinician
summed up the study as "simpleminded, methodologically flawed, and irrelevant"
(Freinkel, 1998, p. 1905). Several others described some of its serious methodologi­
cal flaws. Others recognized that the authors failed to make the important distinc­
tion between the efficacy of the method and the theoretical underpinning proposed
by practitioners: "The definitive test of a healing practice is whether healing takes
place, not whether the practitioners have a flawless grasp of the natural forces at
work" (Lee, 1998, p. 1905). It is remarkable-but unfortunately not uncommon­
that the editors of this major journal would publish a paper that sweepingly dis­
misses a whole complex and controversial phenomenon solely on the basis of one
small and highly flawed study-especially since they have not, to my knowledge,
published a review or research paper with more moderate and reliable conclusions.
One can only conclude that this affair reflects a deep-seated bias on the part of the
editors, where "one would expect medical professionals to be more concerned with
whether real healing takes place" (Lee, 1998, p. 1 906). It is not difficult to guess
what would have been the fate of a paper submitted by similar authors, with simi­
larly flawed methodology and conclusions, if the results had been positive and not
in accord with editorial bias. For more responsible reviews of TT, see Astin, Hark­
ness, and Ernst (2000), Peters (1999), and Wardell and Weymouth (2004).
 Psychophysiological Influence-1 37

I turn now to cases, like that of John Fagan, in which the healing agency
seems not to have been another person deliberately attempting to heal some­
one, and in which the hypothesis of healing by self-suggestion is therefore
particularly strong. One of the most well-known-and controversial-of
the claims involving "faith healing" is the venerable belief that visits to cer­
tain places or shrines, such as the hundreds of healing temples of ancient
Greece, can result in healing. The best known of such places is the shrine at
Lourdes, in France. Since 1 858, when a young girl claimed to see an appari­
tion of the Virgin Mary at a spring, millions of people have visited the place
in the hope of being cured, and there has been an ongoing and still very
much unresolved debate about the nature of the cures that have occurred:
The faithful attribute them to miracles, while the skeptical pronounce them
instances of misdiagnosis, chance spontaneous recovery, or psychosomatic
recovery from functional rather than organic ailments. Lourdes is unique
as a healing shrine, in terms of the level of involvement of physicians in
the evaluation of the cases. One prominent physician-a Nobel laureate in
medicine-himself witnessed the sudden and to him unprecedented recov­
ery of a woman near death from tubercular peritonitis (Carrel, 1 950). More
generally, since the late 19th century there have been investigative bodies of
physicians charged with evaluating claims of cures. Dowling ( 1984) gives a
good brief description of the history, procedures, and standards of medical
evaluation at Lourdes.
Not all observers, however, have found the medical evaluations ade­
quate. D. J. West (1957), a physician, examined 1 1 cases that occurred
between 1 937 and 1952, the only cures during that time period ultimately
pronounced "miraculous" by an Ecclesiastical Commission after first pass­
ing through two levels of medical evaluation (the Lourdes Medical Bureau
and then a Medical Commission in Paris). He arrived at a conclusion simi­
lar to that of Myers and Myers (1893) 64 years earlier-namely, that the
medical documentation in all the cases was too incomplete (and sometimes
even biased and distorted) for a reliable assessment of the patient's condi­
tion before and after the visit to Lourdes. In his review West had two aims.
The first was to determine whether the Lourdes cures were of "a remark­
able kind, such as are not ordinarily encountered in medical experience"
(p. 1 1); and his answer was "No." There was no restoration of lost limbs,
for example, and "in no case is a sudden structural change confirmed by
the evidence of X-rays taken just before and just after the event" (p. 1 22).
Instead, "the great majority of cures concern potentially recoverable condi­
tions and are remarkable only in the speed and manner in which they are
said to have taken place" (p. 1 22). Secondly, West asked whether the cures
were "inexplicable," and again he answered "No," insisting that many of
even the best cases "are in fact readily explainable in ordinary terms" (p.
1 22). He favored the view that most of the cases are the result either of the
psychosomatic healing of a functional disease that had been misdiagnosed
as an organic one, or that they were the result of a spontaneous, naturally
1 38-Chapter 3

occurring recovery in patients "whose recuperative powers seemed sud­

denly to reassert themselves" (p. 1 3).1 2
West was quite right to point out that what occurs at Lourdes is not
unique, in that similar cases can be found in other contexts. Nonetheless,
was he right in saying that there is a "rational physiological basis" (p. 1 19)
for the Lourdes cures and that they are thus "readily explainable"? Even if a
disease is "functional" and not "organic"-a distinction that West himself
emphasized is not one that can be clearly made-do we understand what
these "recuperative powers" are or how and when they work? Do we really
understand the physiological basis of rapid healing by hypnosis or any other
means of suggestion? Such questions are fundamental, not only in connec­
tion with Lourdes cases, but in connection with all the phenomena that I am
discussing in this chapter, including the effects of self-suggestion on physi­
ological conditions.
Since 1954, moreover-and therefore after the occurrence of the cases
examined by West-the medical evaluation at Lourdes has been extended
such that medical dossiers on cases that seem worthy of further follow-up
have been passed on to an international body of physicians. This committee
examines all available medical documentation to determine whether a cor­
rect diagnosis was made; whether the disease was both organic and serious;
whether there was a possibility that the disease disappeared spontaneously
or in response to medical treatment; whether the symptoms disappeared;
how sudden and complete the cure was; and how long the cure persisted.
Out of 38 dossiers sent to this committee between 1954 and 1 984, 19 have
been judged "medically and scientifically inexplicable" (Dowling, 1 984, p.
637).'3
Much of the literature on Lourdes is in French. There are, however,
several good sources in English published after West's book, and also after
the 1954 establishment of the international body of medical evaluators (e.g.,
Dowling, 1 984; Garner, 1 974; M. Murphy, 1992, pp. 267-271). These report
several cases not discussed by West, including one older case (the 1 923 case
of John Traynor) and three more recent ones (those of Vittorio Micheli
[ 1963], Serge Perrin [1 970], and Delizia Cirolli [1976]), in all four of which
there was extensive medical documentation. In the case of Vittorio Micheli,
for example, X-rays showed "an almost complete destruction of the left pel­
vis" as a result of sarcoma (Garner, 1974, p. 1 257). At Lourdes in May 1963,
Micheli felt an immediate disappearance of his long-standing pain and a
subjective sense that he was cured. Within a month, he was walking, and
within three months X-rays "showed that the sarcoma had regressed and
the bone of the pelvis was recuperating" (p. 1259). In a similar case, 1 2-year-

12. As examples of such recuperative powers, he cites (pp. 19-20, 1 19) some of the
kinds of phenomena that I will discuss at greater length later in this chapter, such as
accelerated healing of skin diseases by hypnosis.
1 3 . As Dowling and others have emphasized, however, declaring a cure "medi­
cally inexplicable" is not synonymous with declaring it a "miracle"-the latter being
a theological, not scientific, designation.
 Psychophysiological Influence-139

old Delizia Ciroll i went to Lourdes in August 1976 with a diagnosis (made
by X-rays and a biopsy) of a bony metastasis of a neuroblastoma. There
was no improvement, and she continued to decline, X-rays in September
showing further growth of the cancer. Villagers prayed for her, however,
and her mother regularly gave her Lourdes water. By Christmas, weigh­
ing less than 50 pounds, she began to recover. Subsequent X-rays showed
the bone repairing, and ultimately cured. Although "there was no doubt
she had been cured," the exact nature of the diagnosis was in some doubt.
Doctors ultimately decided that Ewing's tumor was more likely than a neu­
roblastoma; but whether a neuroblastoma or a Ewing's tumor, spontaneous
remissions are either rare or unknown (Dowling, 1 984, p. 636).
Again, what are we to make of such cases? Clearly we cannot dismiss
them as based on unreliable or distorted "anecdotes." But is it then an
adequate explanation simply to say that some self-healing power, perhaps
within the neuroimmunological system, has been activated in some unusu­
ally potent way? What is this self-healing power, how is it activated, and
how does it work, not only in the repair of a bone seriously damaged by can­
cer, but even in less dramatic illnesses? Do "spontaneous" cures and remis­
sions-whether those that are frequently seen or those that are rare-occur
only by "chance"?

Placebo and Nocebo

Closely related to all the phenomena I have discussed so far-some now

accepted as genuine, some still viewed with considerable skepticism-is a
phenomenon that has occupied an odd place in the history of modern medi­
cine, namely, the placebo effect and its obverse, the nocebo effect. Scien­
tists have struggled even with the problem of defining placebo/nocebol4-let
alone explaining it-primarily because most of them wish to avoid charges of
dualism, and thus they reject definitions that involve any "tortuous attempts
to define the placebo as a belief state separable from the purely physical
effect of a drug or of surgery" (Wall, 1996, p. 163). Many insist, as we saw
earlier, that mind and body are a unified entity-"brain-mind"-and on
this basis some have suggested, rather vaguely, that placebo/nocebo effects
are "meaning responses" (Moerman, 2000, p. 56) or "context effects" (Klei­
jnen, 2000). As I will argue throughout this chapter, however, such assump­
tions and terms provide neither definitions nor explanations.
A placebo (or nocebo) is an intervention that has no known direct
physiological consequences but nevertheless improves (or worsens) a per­
son's health. For a more precise definition, however, "dualistic" terms seem
unavoidable to convey the basic idea that a psychological factor seems
to have precipitated a change in a physiological condition. As Kihlstrom

14. Thompson (2005) discusses the problem of defining placebo (pp. 27-28) and
provides a table listing 18 different dictionary definitions from 1785 to 2001 (pp.
1 8-21).
140-Chapter 3

(1 993a) cautiously recognized, the placebo response suggests "the reverse

of the conventional way of thinking about the mind-body problem. We usu­
ally think about mental states as emerging from physiological processes. In
placebo, there is a mental state that seems to alter physiological processes"
(p. 215).
There has thus been widespread resistance to and skepticism about the
notion of a placebo effect-despite the professed belief of many scientists in
a unified "brain-mind"-because "it poses a serious challenge to much of
the ideology of biomedicine . . . [that] disease is a mechanical phenomenon"
(Moerman, 2000, p. 65). The placebo's odd place in the history of mod­
ern medicine derives from the conflict between this relatively new but now
prevailing mechanistic assumption in Western medicine and the old, long­
standing assumption in medicine that "faith heals." The issue came to a
head after the 1940s with the emergence of the double-blind, randomized
clinical trial as the standard for medical research, and also with the pub­
lication of some influential papers, especially that of Beecher ( 1955), that
seemed to show "the oxymoron-like enigma of an effect produced by some­
thing that is inert" (Kaptchuk, 1 998, p. 1723). In clinical research, it became
essential to show that a new procedure or therapy was better than "non­
specific effects" produced by a placebo, and placebo thus became simply
the control condition, a "nuisance" to be eliminated in the search for truly
effective treatments.15
Placebo's "odd" place, therefore, is that, on the one hand, it has been so
thoroughly accepted by the medical community that it is now an obligatory
factor in the experimental design of studies of the efficacy of medical treat­
ments; and yet on the other hand, there has been virtually no effort until
recently to understand the "enigma" of the placebo itself and its apparent
conflict with the biomedical model. As Kaptchuk (2002) cautioned, "dis­
missing a treatment as 'just a placebo' may not be enough" (p. 817).
Benson and Epstein (1975) were among the first to urge scientists to
drop their "disdain" for the placebo and study it as a phenomenon in its own
right, but 24 years later some researchers were still asking "why the bald
facts of the placebo phenomenon . . . have not yet launched a thousand inqui­
ries into the mind's treatment powers" (Dientsfrey, 1999, p. 233). Efforts
to understand the placebo itself, however, have increased in recent years,
largely because a physiological hypothesis emerged that "gave it instant
respectability in 20th century terms" (Wall, 1993, p. 1 97). Specifically, J. D.
Levine, Gordon, and Fields ( 1978) reported a double-blind study in which 40
post-dental-surgery patients were given a placebo as a pain-killer. An hour

IS. This attitude that the placebo is simply a nuisance to be eliminated, rather
than an important phenomenon begging to be explained both for theoretical rea­
sons and so that it might perhaps be used deliberately, remains the dominant one.
For example, two physicians (both of them, incidentally, supported by grants from
drug companies) recently said that "a detailed understanding" will allow scientists
"to decrease placebo response in clinical trials" (D. J. Stein & Mayberg, 2005, p.
442).
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-14l

later 17 were randomly chosen to receive another placebo, and the remain­
ing 23 were given naloxone, a substance that blocks the analgesic effect of
endogenous opiate-like substances such as endorphins. Those given the nal­
oxone reported significantly more pain than those given a second placebo,
leading the authors to hypothesize that because naloxone undid the anal­
gesic effects of the placebo, the original placebo effect had been the result
of opiate release. With this paper, "the neurobiology of placebo was born"
(Amanzio & Benedetti, 1999, p. 484), and subsequent studies have supported
a relationship between placebo analgesia and release of endogenous opiates
(Rowbotham, 2001; ter Riet, de Craen, de Boer, & Kessells, 1998).
Despite the gradual shift from considering the placebo as only a con­
trol condition for research to investigating the placebo effect itself, not all
scientists are convinced that there is any placebo effect to be studied. For
some (Bailar, 2001), the belief that placebos have powerful clinical effects
is a "myth." Others (Kienle & Kiene, 1997) have argued that the "placebo
topic seems to invite sloppy methodological thinking" (p. 1 3 1 1). Most of
this criticism stems from the fact that there are relatively few studies in
which there were three conditions: a treatment condition, a placebo condi­
tion, and a true no-treatment condition. This is perhaps understandable in
that, up until recently, the placebo itself was considered the control condi­
tion. Nevertheless, it is argued, without a true control condition with which
to compare them, effects seen in the placebo condition may simply be the
result of naturally occurring effects, such as spontaneously occurring fluc­
tuations in, or even recovery from, the illness (Ernst & Resch, 1995; Kienle
& Kiene, 1997). In a recent review of studies (Hr6bjartsson & G0tzsche,
2001) in which there was a true control (no-treatment) condition as well as a
placebo condition, the authors claimed to find "little evidence that placebos
in general have powerful clinical effects" (p. 1 599), and they further claimed
that the few effects that do occur are subjective only, especially in pain relief
(see also S. Fisher, 2000; Spiro, 2000).
The responses to such skepticism about the existence of placebo effects
have primarily been two: First, the review ofHr6bjartsson and G0tzsche suf­
fered from methodological problems of its own, in that it "lumped together
studies ranging across 40 different maladies," some susceptible to placebo
effects, some not (Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004, p. 326). The review "is
the classic apples and oranges problem in meta-analysis .. . .What this study
shows is not that placebos do not improve anything, but rather that they do
not improve everything" (D. Spiegel, Kraemer, & Carlson, 2001). The sec­
ond and more robust response has been that placebo has in fact been shown
to have objective, and not simply subjective, consequences. I will now exam­
ine some of these more objective manifestations of the placebo effect that
must be considered in the debate about its existence and nature.
There have perhaps been more studies of the relationship between pla­
cebo and pain than any other studies involving a placebo treatment, prob­
ably because pain seems especially responsive to placebo (Ernst & Resch,
1995, p. 552). This observation has led many to conclude that placebo works
142-Chapter 3

primarily on subjective perceptions-although one might then ask, as one

researcher did, "If it's all in your head, does that mean you only think you
feel better?" (Ader, 2000, p. 7). I have already mentioned studies showing a
relationship between placebo and the release of endogenous opioids. More
recent studies on pain and placebo have added to the evidence that pla­
cebo can produce highly specific and objectively measurable physiological
changes. For example, two brain-imaging studies, one with positron emis­
sion tomography (PET) (Petrovic, Kalso, Peters son, & Ingvar, 2002), and
one with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Wager et aI.,
2004), have shown decreased activity in brain areas associated with pain
(such as the thalamus, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex) in response
to placebo administration as an analgesic. In another study (Zubieta et aI.,
2005) PET imaging specifically showed activation of the endogenous opioid
system in response to a placebo analgesic.
Another condition wh.ose responsiveness to placebo might be thought
purely subjective is depression. Effects of placebo on depression have been
recognized since the introduction of pharmacologic treatments (e.g., Malitz
& Kanzler, 1971), and a meta-analysis of studies in which patients had been
assigned randomly to an antidepressant medication or to a placebo pro­
vocatively suggested that much of the effect of the medications themselves
is attributable to placebo effects (Kirsch & Sapirstein, 1999). Most stud­
ies have indeed used subjective measures of effectiveness, such as scales in
which patients rate the severity of particular symptoms; but at least two
recent studies have focused on more objective outcomes. Both studies found
alterations in brain activity, one using electroencephalography, or EEG
(Leuchter, Cook, Witte, Morgan, & Abrams, 2002), the other using PET
(Mayberg et aI., 2002); and both also found that the physiological response
to placebo was in some way different from that to the antidepressant. Such
findings suggest not only that placebo is an active, and not a "no-treatment,"
condition, but also that "the two treatments [placebo and pharmacological]
are not physiologically equivalent" (Leuchter et aI., 2002, p. 1 25).
Other conditions known to be responsive to psychological factors, such
as asthma and ulcers, have also been responsive to placebo, and several
studies have measured physiological reactions to placebo treatments of
these conditions. For example, asthmatic patients given a nocebo (an inhal­
ant of saline solution that they were told was an allergen) showed a signifi­
cant increase in airway resistance; all the resulting asthmatic attacks then
responded to a placebo (the same saline solution that they were now told
was a medication) (Luparello, Lyons, Bleecker, & McFadden, 1968; McFad­
den, Luparello, Lyons, & Bleecker, 1969; see also Butler & Steptoe, 1 986).
Moerman (1983, 2000) reviewed numerous studies comparing placebo and
the drug cimetadine in the treatment of ulcers, in which the effect was deter­
mined by an objective measure (an endoscopic examination). The studies
showed "broad variation-from 0 to 100 percent-in placebo effectiveness
rates" (Moerman, 2000, p. 51). Related to this, in one of the earliest studies
to obtain objective measures of placebo (and nocebo) response, Sternbach
(1 964) reported a small study in which six subjects were given three pills
 Psychophysiological Influence-143

on separate occasions. They were told that one was a stimulant to stomach
activity, one was a relaxant, and one was a placebo. In fact, all three pills
were placebos, but in four of the six subjects the measured gastric motility
rate reflected what the subject thought was the nature of the pill-that is,
highest for the "stimulant," lowest for the "relaxant," and intermediate for
the "placebo."
Placebo treatment has not been confined to the use of dummy pills or
saline solution. There are some indications that the type of placebo used
may influence the strength of the response, and specifically that a type of
intervention believed by the patient to be more effective might produce a
stronger response.16 Placebo injection, for example, may have more efficacy
than a placebo pill (Kaptchuk, Goldman, Stone, & Stason, 2000). If so, it
would be surprising if surgery, one of the most radical interventions pos­
sible, did not occasionally show a placebo response. There are, of course,
ethical issues that often preclude sham surgery (Hornig & Miller, 2002), and
because of methodological problems, the results of such studies can be con­
sidered only suggestive (for example, there are no studies comparing the sur­
gery and sham surgery with a third, no-treatment condition). Nevertheless,
surgeons themselves have recognized that surgery, like medications, should
be evaluated when possible for a placebo effect (A. G. Johnson, 1994), and
there have been a few studies comparing the effects of certain surgical pro­
cedures with those of a sham surgery.
Among the earliest such studies were several in the 1950s involving a
procedure for the treatment of angina, in which mammary arteries were tied
off in the belief that this would increase blood flow through other channels.
Suspicion about the rationale of this procedure led to the testing of it with
sham surgery. Neither the patients nor the physicians evaluating them after
the surgery knew which group they were in. In one study (Cobb, Thomas,
Dillard, Merendino, & Bruce, 1959), both groups improved with regard to
the number of nitroglycerine tablets taken, with the sham-surgery group
showing a slightly greater reduction than the real-surgery group. The sham­
surgery group also reported slightly greater subjective improvement, the
most dramatic improvement being that of a sham-surgery patient. Neither
group improved significantly with regard to exercise tolerance or electrocar­
diographic changes, but the only three patients who did show improvement
on these measures were all from the sham-surgery group. In another study
(Dimond, Kittle, & Crockett, 1 958), there was significant improvement in
10 of 13 real-surgery patients, as well as in all five sham-surgery patients.
Apparently the success of this procedure had depended more on the enthu­
siasm of the surgeons performing it than on the procedure itself (Beecher,
1961; Benson & McCallie, 1979). More recently, two physicians suggested
that laser treatment for angina may also have "a potentially marked pla­
cebo effect" and that, because it has been evaluated primarily with subjec­
tive measures and by physicians "presumably enthusiastic" about the pro-

16. For some references to studies suggesting that the size and color of a placebo
pill may influence its effectiveness, see Thompson (2005, p. 41).
144-Chapter 3

cedure, more objective studies are needed to determine how much of the
reported success with the procedure may have been the result of a patient's
(and physician's) belief that laser therapy "is synonymous with state-of-the­
art, successful therapy" (R. A. Lange & Hillis, 1999).
Studies have also been carried out recently comparing arthroscopic
knee surgery with placebo sham surgery (Moseley et aI., 2002). Patients
received either the real surgical treatment, or arthroscopic lavage only, or
simulated surgery. Neither the patients nor the physicians who evaluated
them for 24 months after the surgery knew which group they were in. Out­
come was measured both by patient reports of pain and level of function and
by more objective tests of walking and stair climbing. Overall, there were no
differences between the three groups; patients in all three groups reported
less pain and improved function. More significantly, on the measures evalu­
ated by physicians, "objectively measured walking and stair climbing were
poorer in the debridement [surgery] group than in the placebo group" (p.
84). The authors thus cautioned that the study showed "the great potential
for a placebo effect with surgery" and that "health care researchers should
not underestimate the placebo effect, regardless of its mechanism" (p. 87).
Another attempt to evaluate objective responses to placebo surgery
involved ultrasound therapy for patients following dental surgery (Hashish,
Harvey, & Harris, 1986). There were three groups of patients: those receiv­
ing ultrasound therapy, those receiving a mock ultrasound treatment, and
those receiving no treatment. All three groups were given both antibiotic
and analgesic pills. Results were evaluated not only by subjective reports
of postoperative pain, but also by objective measures of inflammation and
facial swelling. There was significant reduction in all three measures in both
the ultrasound and placebo groups, as compared with the control group.
The authors concluded, moreover, that the "majority of the anti-inflamma­
tory activity was attributable to the placebo effect" (p. 77). In a follow-up
study (Ho, Hashish, Salmon, Freeman, & Harvey, 1988) designed to rule
out possible massage effects of contact with the ultrasound equipment, as
well as emotional factors such as anxiety, the researchers again found that
"swelling was reduced by a placebo effect of ultrasound" (p. 197).
A more serious and debilitating condition that has also occasionally
responded to placebo, on both subjective and objective measures, is Parkin­
son's Disease (Shetty et aI., 1999; Stoessl & de la Fuente-Fermindez, 2004).
Some investigators have looked at objective measures of placebo effects
in conjunction with drug treatments for Parkinson's. For example, Goetz,
Leurgans, Raman, and Stebbins (2000) found that some placebo-treated
patients showed improvement in a standardized evaluation of motor func­
tion. (Patients also, interestingly, reported a variety of noxious side effects
of the placebo, including upper respiratory symptoms and nausea.) Other
researchers (de la Fuente-Fernandez et aI., 2001), using PET, have found
a "substantial release of endogenous dopamine" in response to a placebo
injection, an effect "comparable to that of therapeutic doses of levodopa . . .
or apomorphine" (p. 1 164; de la Fuente-Fernandez, Phillips et aI., 2002).
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-145

Another study (Benedetti et ai., 2004) showed changes in neuronal activity

in association with a placebo saline injection (in contrast to a no-treatment
control group), and the authors concluded that "these STN [subthalamic
nucleus] neuronal changes are likely to be induced by the placebo-activated
dopamine" (p. 588).
Placebo effects have also been found in some studies of a surgical pro­
cedure to implant fetal (nigral) tissue in the brains of Parkinson's patients,
again prompting some physicians to emphasize the need to include, when
possible, a placebo (sham surgery) in studies to evaluate the effectiveness
of such surgery (Albin, 2002; T. B. Freeman et ai., 1999). In one such study
(Freed et ai., 2001), among patients reporting improvement there was no
difference between the real and placebo treatment. In a later reanalysis of
the same data (McRae et ai., 2004), expectation seemed to produce a "very
strong" placebo effect, because those who thought they had received the real
treatment had better scores, regardless of which treatment they had in fact
received. Similarly, a study (de la Fuente-Fernandez, 2004) of patients who
had received both real and simulated deep-brain stimulation for Parkinson's
showed that the magnitude of effect was equivalent in both conditions, as
measured objectively by a standardized scale of motor function.
Despite recent studies of placebo showing objective measures of
improvement, many physicians still insist that, regardless of its mechanism,
placebo "helps people to feel better. . . , but it cannot cure diseases"; or more
specifically that "evidence that diseases like cancer yield to placebos are
[sic] limited to anecdotes, few, if any, of which can be believed .. . . no one has
yet convinced me that tuning up the nervous or immune systems repels the
overwhelming forces of disease" (Spiro, 2000, p. 26).
One of the "anecdotes" to which Spiro may have been referring is the
well-known case reported by Klopfer (1957). In this case, a patient who was
clearly near death from lymphosarcoma learned that his hospital was to
participate in studies of a promising new drug, Krebiozen. Although he did
not qualify for the study because he was so close to death, he was so insistent
on receiving the drug that his doctor agreed. Within three days of his first
injection, he was up and walking, and his "tumor masses . . .were half their
original size." In 10 days he was discharged, and he continued in "practically
perfect" health for two months. At this time, he began to see in the media
conflicting reports about the drug; as a result, "he began to lose faith . . . [and]
relapsed to his original state." His doctor decided to tell him not to believe
what he had read because there was an improved, stronger version avail­
able, and "with much fanfare" he gave him an injection-this time, of water.
The patient again recovered, the results "even more dramatic" than before,
and the water injections were continued for another two months. When,
however, the patient learned that further studies had shown the drug to be
worthless, he almost immediately declined again and died within days (pp.
337-339).
Recovery from such serious conditions in response to a placebo treat­
ment is undoubtedly rare, and necessarily such reports must be "anecdotal,"
if what is meant by this is a case report and not an experimental study.
146-Chapter 3

Nevertheless, there is no good or compelling reason to dismiss such reports

in the absence of evidence of fraud or incompetence. Moreover, Klopfer's
report is not unique. Earlier I discussed cases of remission of cancer in con­
nection with Lourdes and with meditation, again reported by presumably
competent physicians, and I suggested that, without more knowledge of the
psychological conditions involved in the numerous reports of spontaneous
remissions of cancer, it is premature to dismiss them as attributable solely
to chance.
In sum, we have convergent evidence, not only from formal studies of
placebo but also from other phenomena such as those I have so far dis­
cussed, that health can be significantly influenced by psychological factors
such as belief or suggestion. It seems more useful at this point, therefore,
to ask not whether, but how, this occurs. As I mentioned earlier, PNI stud­
ies suggest strongly that psychological factors such as stress or anxiety, or
converse conditions such as relaxation or hope, can, through the interac­
tion of the nervous and immune systems, significantly impact a person's
health. In placebo studies in particular, there have been two primary candi­
dates for a more specific mechanism. Some have argued, in the wake of the
Ader and Cohen (1975) study that essentially launched PNI, that placebo is
a conditioned response (e.g., Ader, 1997), but others (e.g., Kienle & Kiene,
1997) have pointed out the weaknesses of evidence for relevant conditioning
in most clinical situations (pp. 1314-1 315). In particular, how can there be
"conditioning" of responses that have not occurred before? The other and
more common proposal, therefore, is that the response to placebo depends
on the patient's expectations (e.g., de la Fuente-Fermindez, Schulzer, &
Stoessl, 2002). G. H. Montgomery and Kirsch (1997), for example, con­
cluded that "conditioning . . .is completely mediated by expectancy" (p. 1 1 1);
the "effect of placebos depends on the strength of the person's expectations,
not on how those expectations were formed" (p. 108). In practice, however,
disentangling a conditioned response from the influence of expectation
in an adult human is not straightforward, and studies comparing the two
hypotheses have found that both are in fact involved, perhaps in different
ways (Amanzio & Benedetti, 1999; Benedetti et al., 2003; Stewart-Williams
& Podd, 2004). For example, Benedetti and his colleagues found that expec­
tation seemed to be the primary factor in the release of endogenous opioids
in response to placebo given for pain relief, whereas conditioning seemed
more involved in the release of hormones such as dopamine in Parkinson's
patients (Amanzio & Benedetti, 1999; Benedetti et al., 2003).
Whether expectation, conditioning, or both are involved, a much more
fundamental problem remains. Placebo has received increased attention in
recent years because of evidence that it activates physiological mechanisms,
such as the release of dopamine or endogenous opioids or a more basic reac­
tion of the immune system in general. Similarly, other phenomena such as
"voodoo death" or faith healing can be taken more seriously as the mutual
interaction of the nervous and immune systems. But how adequate are these
explanations? Even if we assume that expectation is the fundamental fac­
tor, "a remaining question is how these expectancies then generate the cor-
 Psychophysiological Influence-147

responding responses" (Kirsch, 2004, p. 341). More directly, "how does a

social situation, a psychosocial factor, initiate a physiological process in the
body?" (Dienstfrey, 1 999, p. 230). As the neurophysiologist Wall cautioned
(1993), explanations offered so far seem to be no more than "labelling an
unknown process" (p. 214).
Behind these vague descriptions of psychophysiological mechanism,
however, is the presumption that has grown steadily over the past century
or more-discussed throughout this book-that mind and brain are not
separable but are in fact coterminous, different words for the same phe­
nomenon. With regard specifically to the placebo, Byerly (1976) proposed
an "alternative to either a physicalistic or mentalistic interpretation," in
which "physical and psychological factors are not treated as two separate
substances"; with this "softening of the distinction," the problem of "how
mind and body can causally interact seems less of a problem" (p. 433). Simi­
larly, H. Brody (1 980) devoted an entire volume to placebo as seen by the
new "philosophy of medicine," an anti-Cartesian, holistic search for "theo­
ries which avoid the rigid distinction between mental and bodily phenom­
ena" (p. 23). Numerous others writing about the placebo effect have rejected
the "outmoded dualism" (Wall, 1977, p. 365) and "misleading dichotomy"
of mind and brain (Cardefia & Kirsch, 2000, p. 16) that "obfuscates and
stigmatizes" such phenomena as placebo (Hahn & Kleinman, 1983, p. 16).
Instead, the new "conceptualization [is that] . . . mind and beliefs are literally
embodied and, conversely, the bodies of persons literally mindful" (Hahn &
Kleinman, 1983, p. 16), and "without the Cartesian straightjacket, the issue
then becomes not whether mental, 'non-material' processes can bring about
significant changes, but rather whether one type of physical events can have
a substantial effect on others" (Cardefia & Kirsch, 2000, p. 16). Underlying
this "holistic" approach to psychophysiology, however, is a very clear-cut
assumption: Most scientists today take a "neuralist" view that "obviates
the mind-body mechanism problem because it treats subjective phenomena
(the conscious mind) as products of nervous system activity.. . . this neural­
ist approach avoids the problem of how subjective 'mind' could act on the
objective and physical body" (Fields & Price, 1997, p. 94).
The noteworthy word in this last quotation is "avoids." In their determi­
nation not to be saddled with the stigma of dualism-a word synonymous
for most modern scientists with "unscientific"-scientists have opted for a
position that in fact explains nothing and is really only an empty restate­
ment of the obvious, that we are psychophysiological beings. One can read­
ily embrace the "biopsychosocial" view of humans as products of inextri­
cably interwoven factors, and one can also reject the view-mistakenly
called Cartesian dualism-that mind and body are separate entities that
cannot interact. But we cannot-or should not-gloss over the problem that
remains. Despite statements and assumptions about "holism" or "unity,"
we observe that there are mental events and physical events, and few would
argue that they are not somehow related. No one, however, can say how.
How, for example, does "a person's belief in a sham treatment. . . send a mes-
148-Chapter 3

sage to his or her pituitary gland to release its own endogenous pharma­
ceuticals" (Harrington, 1997, p. 5)? It is a difficult enough question when,
as with most of the phenomena discussed so far, the initiating factor seems
to be a general state such as fear, depression, or belief, and the effect seems
to be a general systemic one which then leads to the waxing or waning of
one or another disease. The question becomes still more difficult, however,
when particular ideas somehow translate into more specific physiological
reactions. I will next describe examples of this more problematic kind.

Specific Physiological Changes Appearing Spontaneously

Sudden Whitening of Hair or Skin

Many of the phenomena we have discussed thus far have involved stress
that seems to have resulted in a general breakdown in the immune or car­
diovascular systems, as in cases of sudden or "voodoo" death. A much more
specific physiological response-less catastrophic, but probably related to
these sudden-death cases-involves hair turning white suddenly, even within
a few hours, usually after a severe fright. Such cases have been reported
for centuries, both in the medical literature (for reviews, see Barahal, 1 940;
Ephraim, 1959; Stevenson, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 1726-1731) and in the non-medi­
cal historica1 1iterature (see Jelinek, 1973). A frequently cited example is the
case observed by Parry, a surgeon, in 1 859, of a Bengali prisoner whose hair
turned from glossy black to grey within a half hour, apparently because he
was "stupefied with fear" (Parry, 1 861). This case is by no means unique,
as the above-mentioned reviews demonstrate. Similarly, there have been
reports of a sudden change of pigmentation in patches of skin (for a review
and some photographs of the phenomenon, see Stevenson, 1 997, vol. 2, pp.
1731-1735). Despite the numerous reports, often by apparently qualified
medical observers, there has been, and remains, much skepticism about the
phenomenon. For many scientists, "the structure and physiology of hair
seems incompatible with the sudden spontaneous change in the hair color"
(Helm & Milgrom, 1 970, p. 1 03), and "despite the reports of otherwise trust­
worthy observers," the cases thus are dismissed as "legendary tales" or even
"fiction" (Ephraim, 1 959, p. 233). Some have suggested that many reports
are exaggerations, transforming the "weeks or months in reality" to "over­
night" (Jelinek, 1973, p. 530)
Others have taken the phenomenon seriously and suggested possible
explanations. One of the earliest was that microscopic air bubbles have
developed in the hair and that these reflect light and create an illusion that
the hair changed color. The explanation seemed supported by "the fact that
emotional states such as shock, rage, or fear, produce histamine-like sub­
stances in the skin with a subsequent lowering of the surface tension of the
fluid in the hair shaft, producing a release of gaseous bubbles" (Barahal
 Psychophysiological Inftuence-149

& Freeman, 1 946, pp. 35-36; see also Barahal, 1 940; and R. Jones, 1902).
Some (Ephraim, 1959, p. 233) have thought that this mechanism has been
confirmed in some cases, whereas others (Jelinek, 1973, p. 529) have thought
not, but in any event air bubbles cannot account for cases, by far the most
common type, in which the change was permanent.
Another proposed explanation has been that a sudden loss of hair in
which dark pigmented hairs fall out, but white ones do not, would give the
illusion that the hair had changed color rapidly (Helm & Milgrom, 1970;
Jelinek, 1973; P. R. Montgomery, 1967): "In recent years, most patients with
rapid whitening of scalp hair have been found to have either alopecia aleata
[loss of hair] or vitiligo [whitening of patches of the skin]" (Guin, Kumar,
& Petersen, 1981, p. 577). Although this explanation almost certainly cov­
ers some cases, it cannot cover all, especially those in which the patient had
originally had no (or very few) white hairs and those in which the reporting
physician denied any substantial hair loss (see Stevenson, 1997, vol. 2, p.
1730).
Because sudden stress or other intense emotion affects the immune and
nervous systems, resulting biochemical changes might somehow contrib­
ute to loss of pigment (Ephraim, 1959, p. 233; Ornsteen, 1930); and Guin et
al. (1981) have pointed out that both alopecia aleata and vitiligo have been
associated with immune disorders. Clearly, however, sudden whitening of
hair or skin pigment involves a more precise mechanism than that behind
the general systemic responses in the conditions I have discussed so far,
and it remains "physiologically difficult to understand how the hair, which,
once formed, is a structure without nerves or blood supply, can throughout
its length undergo rapid physicochemical changes directly due to emotional
influences" (Ephraim, 1959, p. 228).

False Pregnancy

In contrast to general stress, a quite specific idea seems to have precipi­

tated a specific physiological response in the condition known as pseudo­
cyesis, in which a woman who falsely believes herself to be pregnant shows
many of the physiological symptoms of pregnancy (for a succinct review,
see Small, 1 986). The condition has been known to physicians at least since
the time of Hippocrates, who described 12 cases that he had observed.
Another well-known case from antiquity was that of Mary Tudor (Aldrich,
1972). Pseudocyesis also is-or was-not an uncommon condition. Bivin
and Klinger (1 937) reviewed 444 cases, most from the English-language lit­
erature of the 19th and 20th centuries, and another review 22 years later
by Murray and Abraham (1978) reported an additional 68. T. X. Barber
(1984) commented that a "surprisingly large number of. . . excellent hyp­
notic subjects (60% of those asked)" in one of his studies had experienced
pseudocyesis on one or more occasions (p. 1 12). There have been reports
of other cases since 1978 (e.g., five in Devane, Vera, Buhi, & Kalra, 1985;
I SO-Chapter 3

six in Whelan & Stewart, 1990; and six in Signer et aI., 1992), but it is clear
that the reported incidence (if not the real incidence) is declining, probably
because of several factors. Improved diagnostic techniques, for example,
do not allow a woman to maintain the illusion of pregnancy for long; and
increased sociocultural options for women besides motherhood may have
lessened the pressure to become pregnant that many women probably felt in
earlier times (L. M. Cohen, 1982).
The symptoms are often objective ones, so much so that the condition
"may tax the diagnostic abilities of the ablest physician" (Fried, Rakoff,
Schopbach, & Kaplan, 1951, p. 1330). In one study of 27 cases occurring
between 1 937 and 1952, in every case at least one doctor had concurred with
the woman's belief that she was pregnant (Schopbach, Fried, & Rakoff,
1 952, p. 1 30). The commonest symptoms are, in order of incidence: abdomi­
nal enlargement, often progressing at approximately the rate of a normal
pregnancy; menstrual disturbances (usually a complete cessation of men­
struation for several months); sensation of fetal movements, felt not only by
the woman but by others (including doctors); nausea and other gastrointes­
tinal symptoms; breast changes, including secretions; labor pains; enlarge­
ment of the uterus; and changes in the cervix (Bivin & Klinger, 1937). Most
authors since 1937 have reported similar symptoms.17
Some physicians have hypothesized that pseudocyesis represents a psy­
chosomatic response to conflicting wishes and fears of pregnancy (e.g., Bivin
& Klinger, 1937; Bressler, Nyhus, & Magnussen, 1958; Fried et ai., 1951).
According to this interpretation, it is a kind of conversion disorder, that is,
a condition in which "a change in physical functioning mimicks a physical
condition as an expression of a psychological conflict or need" (O'Grady &
Rosenthal, 1989, pp. 506-507). Many cases of pseudocyesis do seem to have
occurred at times of psychological distress, although few patients have been
considered hysterical, as are most individuals in whom conversion reactions
are commonly observed. More generally, Pawlowski and Pawlowski (1958)
suggested that the extent to which the pseudo-pregnancy progresses depends
in large part on "the extent to which the idea of pregnancy takes possession
of the patient's entire personality" (p. 439). Clearly, however, such psycho­
logical interpretations constitute at best descriptions of the precipitating
conditions, and not an explanation.
Most observers of pseudocyesis therefore have emphasized a psycho­
physiological approach according to which disturbances in the hypothala­
mus, perhaps brought on by depression or anxiety, have led to alterations in

17. There have even been a few cases reported of pseudocyesis in a male, although
the symptoms are generally much less pronounced than in women. Also, unlike
women, the men almost invariably have severe psychological d isorders contribut­
ing to the delusional belief that they are pregnant (see Silva, Leong, & Weinstock,
1991, for references to reports of such cases). A related and much more common
phenomenon is that of couvade, in which someone (usually the father), witnessing
the expectant mother's symptoms and suffering, experiences similar ones in appar­
ent empathy (Klein , 1 991).
 Psychophysiological Influence-151

neuroendocrine function and hormonal levels. Among the first to propose

this mechanism were Fried et a!. (1951; see also a second paper by the same
group [Schopbach et a!., 1 952]). They proposed that "psychic factors acted
on the endocrine system by utilization of pathways from the cortex through
the hypothalamus to the anterior pituitary gland causing release of the
luteotropin and suppression of the follicle-stimulating hormone" (p. 1 334).
E. Brown and Barglow (1971) attempted to pinpoint the initiating "psychic
factor" more precisely, suggesting that this is depression, which "is associ­
ated with alterations in the neuronal networks connecting the higher brain
centers [cerebral cortex and limbic system] with the median eminence of the
hypothalamus," and more specifically with a decrease in biogenic amines
(p. 227). Signer et a!. (1992) reported six cases of pseudocyesis associated
with depression, but they cautioned that "pseudocyesis does not appear to
be a single, coherent entity" (p. 322).
Starkman, Marshall, la Feria, and Kelch, (1985) tested Brown and
Barglow's theory with psychiatric and neuroendocrine profiles of two of
their patients, and they also looked at the neuroendocrine profiles of four
additional patients previously reported in the medical literature. In these
six patients, Brown and Barglow's hypothesis was not supported. One of
Starkman et al.'s two patients showed no clinical symptoms of depression,
and, more significantly, the neuroendocrine profiles among all six varied
both from each other and from the predictions of Brown and Barglow. In
particular, the prolactin levels varied and could not therefore explain the
cessation of menstruation in the patients (p. 55).
Because endogenous opioid peptides in the hypothalamus had been
shown to have an "inhibitory effect in the neuroendocrine regulation of
gonadotropin secretion," and because women with organic hypothalamic
amenorrhea have responded to injections of naloxone, Devane et a!. (1985)
predicted that women with pseudocyesis would likewise respond to nalox­
one. They did not, leading the authors to the "unexpected" conclusion that
"opioid peptide modulation is not perturbed in patients with pseudocye­
sis." More significantly, the authors commented that "the prompt clinical
recovery after disclosure of the diagnosis [of pseudocyesis] is evidence that
organic hypothalamic dysfunction was not present" (p. 1 87).
Although it seems likely that pseudocyesis is the result of some psycho­
physiological process in which an emotional state has triggered changes in
neuroendocrine and hormonal levels, there has so far been no consistent
pattern observed either in psychological state or in neurophysiological find­
ings. Because of the "lack of consistent endocrinologic findings" some have
argued again, as did Engel, that the biomedical "linear model of psycho­
genic or biological causation" is inadequate and that what is needed instead
is a biopsychosocial model (Whelan & Stewart, 1990, p. 104). Pseudocyesis
is certainly a striking example of the complex interplay of psychological,
biological, and sociocultural factors in disease; but I repeat that this "sys­
tems" approach provides a description, not an explanation, of the phenom­
enon. Statements such as "the usually accepted mechanism is that the symp-
1 52-Chapter 3

toms [of pregnancy] generated by the individual. . . reduce anxiety" (O'Grady

& Rosenthal, 1989, p. 507) or a "depressive mechanism induces neuroen­
docrine changes through cortical or limbic connections at the level of the
hypothalamus" (Whelan & Stewart, 1990, p. 105) tell us nothing about how
such changes are "generated" or "induced."
In sum, there is much evidence for an association between a woman's
belief that she is pregnant and objective physiological changes in her body
consistent with that belief, but so far the mechanisms underlying this asso­
ciation remain unknown. Unfortunately, although "the role of psychogenic
factors in the control of the neuroendocrine system is becoming one of
the most exciting areas of psychosomatic medicine" and pseudocyesis has
been called "a paradigm of psychosomatic research" (Murray & Abraham,
1978, pp. 629, 631), opportunities for understanding the condition may be
diminishing. IS Pawlowski and Pawlowski (1958) predicted that, as diagnos­
tic methods improve and especially "as people become more cultured and
sophisticated, their emotional conflicts will seek a more profound, sophis­
ticated mode of expression than that of spurious pregnancy" (p. 440).19 If
so, this is unfortunate (from a scientific point of view), because not only do
we not have an adequate picture of the psychophysiological mechanisms
involved, we are even less knowledgeable about how the specific idea of
pregnancy can trigger the specific physiological systems necessary to pro­
duce the symptoms.

Stigmata

Among the most well known and hotly debated of the phenomena I dis­
cuss in this chapter are cases of stigmata, in which a person develops marks,
and even bleeding, corresponding to the sites of wounds Christ is thought to
have suffered at his crucifixion. Hundreds of cases have been reported from
the 1 3th century to the present time, although one of the early reviewers of
the phenomenon concluded that up to his time only 50 had been reported
with adequate testimony (Thurston, 1952, p. 121). Most of the cases have

1 8 . The neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998)

likewise thought that "pseudocyesis provides a valuable opportunity for explor­
ing the mysterious no-man's-land between mind and body" (p. 218). He also noted
(p. 216) that the incidence has declined from 1 in 200 pregnancies in the late 1 8th
century to about I in 10,000 today, but unfortunately he gives no source for these
figures.
19. An alternative (or additional) explanation for the decline of reports of
cases of pseudocyesis is one that applies more generally to many types of controver­
sial phenomena: The decline may represent not so much a decline in the incidence as
a decline in the reporting of such cases. Because such cases do not fit with our cur­
rent understanding of the possible mechanisms, observers may fail to report them
or, at another level, journal reviewers and editors may decline to publish reports,
believing that such cases cannot really occur.
 Psychophysiological Influence-153

occurred in young, single females, often Catholic and usually highly reli­
gious. The marks are usually on the palms, the backs of the hands, and the
soles and top of the feet, corresponding to sites where nails were thought
to have pinned Christ to the cross. Another common site is in the side, cor­
responding to the spear wound. Less common but still repeatedly reported
are marks on the head, back, or shoulders (corresponding to the crown of
thorns, the lashings Christ received, and the site where he bore the cross),
and, more rarely, bloody tears. Although usually called "wounds," the
marks vary in nature from relatively simple red marks to blisters to actual
bleeding. Rarely are actual lesions seen; the bleeding instead seems to erupt
from unbroken skin. The emergence of the marks is almost always periodic
and regular, usually occurring on Fridays and repeating weekly for years.
They frequently appear when the stigmatic is in some kind of altered state
of consciousness, such as an ecstatic state or trance. Finally, however severe
the nature of the wounds or bleeding, no sepsis or inflammation occurs,
and the wounds disappear rapidly, leaving little or no mark, until the next
recurrence. 20
Among the most well known cases are those of St. Francis of Assisi in
the 1 3th century, usually considered the first stigmatic, and cases from the
19th and 20th centuries, such as Louise Lateau, Gemma Gelgani, Therese
Neumann, and Padre Pio. Stigmata are, however, still occurring. Early and
Lifschutz (1 974) reported the case of a lO-year-old girl in California who
was "intensely religious" and strongly identified with Christ. She showed
no signs of psychopathology. Unlike most cases, in this one the stigmata
appeared on only one occasion, a period of 19 days just preceding Easter
1 972. A week before the stigmata appeared the girl had read a book about
the crucifixion, and three days later she had seen a movie depicting it. Both
portrayals of the crucifixion apparently affected her deeply, and on the
night she saw the movie she also had a vivid dream about it. Her stigmata
consisted of bleeding from the usual sites, including the hands, feet, and
forehead. As in many cases, there were no lesions; the blood seemed instead
to ooze from the skin. Although the physician (one of the authors) never saw
the actual onset of bleeding, on one occasion she "observed the blood [on
her palm] to increase in volume four fold" (p. 199). Bleeding from all sites
occurred for the last time on Good Friday; up to the time of publication of
the report they had not recurred.
Whitlock and Hynes (1978) reported the case of Mrs. H., a Polish Cath­
olic woman who had wanted to enter a convent as a young girl, but became
pregnant at age 16. After years of unhappiness, in 1958 at age 49 she devel­
oped hysterical anesthesia and began having visions and pains in her limbs.
Shortly afterward a weekly cycle began in which every Friday she would
pass into a trance state and late that afternoon blood would appear "below
her closed eyelids." Because the blood seemed to be oozing from the skin

20. For some reviews and summaries of cases in English, see Klauder (1938), M.
Murphy (1992, pp. 484-502), Ratnoff (1969), Stevenson (1997, vol. I, pp. 34-53),
Thurston ( 1 922, 1 952), and Whitlock and Hynes (1 978).
l 54-Chapter 3

and there were no lesions or broken blood vessels, the authors conjectured
that the bloody secretions came from her tear ducts (p. 191). She remained
under the care of one of the authors of the paper until her death in 1963, and
the authors were "satisfied that the phenomena of trance, muscular rigidity
and the blood on her eyelids were genuine and not fraudulent" (p. 192). Like
many stigmatics, Mrs. H. was "generally regarded as hysterical" (p. 192);
but, unlike most, her stigmata took only one form-bloody tears. More­
over, that form is one of the most rare, having been reported in only a few
other cases, such as those of Therese Neumann, Gemma Galgani, Elisabeth
K., and Delfina (Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1 , p. 39; Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, p.
1 98).21
J. G. Fisher and Kollar (1 980) reported the case of a 23-year-old Mexi­
can-American woman, who was initially raised Catholic but later became
Pentacostal. Her religiosity intensified when she married a man equally
active in the Pentacostal church. In 1971, six months after her marriage,
stigmata began to appear, first on her hands, later on her feet, head, back,
and left side, "usually (but not always) associated with religious ecstasy"
(p. 1461). The authors began psychological and physiological studies (an
MMPI that "revealed a normal profile," with no signs of psychopathology),
but unfortunately they were unable to complete their studies because she
and her husband "disappeared abruptly without notice" (p. 1462).
An even more recent case was phenomenologically quite different from
either Mrs. H. or Early and Lifschutz's patient. Margnelli (1999) reported
the case of Anna Maria T., an Italian Catholic woman whose stigmata first
appeared in 1 990, when she was 64. They continued to appear regularly on
the first Friday of every month and would last two to three days before sud­
denly disappearing, leaving no scars. They were still continuing to appear
regularly up to the time of the publication of the report. The marks occurred
only on her palms and consisted of red rounded blotches, and sometimes
blisters, that most closely resembled a burn but never bled. Anna Maria
was not unusually religious, but she did pray and go to mass once a week,
especially after the death of her husband in 1987, and she was an admirer
of St. Francis and Padre Pio (both of them stigmatics themselves). Unlike
most stigmatics, she apparently did not go into a trance-like state, although
the stigmata had begun when, while praying, she had a vivid vision of Jesus
approaching her and taking her by the hands.
She was closely followed by the author for five months, during which time
color and infrared photographs were taken, various physiological reactions
measured, and psychological tests (MMPI and Rorschach) administered.
Measurements and photographs were made on days when the stigmata were
present as well as on days when they were not. Physiological measurements
showed differences in temperature, blood flow, and electrodermal response

2 1 . Related to this phenomenon may be that of the secretion of bloody sweat

under emotional circumstances, of which there have also been a few reports, usually
among persons who were not religious stigmatics (Dunbar, 1954, p. 608; Tuke, 1884,
p. 295).
 Psychophysiological Influence-ISS

between the stigmatic areas and surrounding skin, as well as differences

between the days when stigmata were present and "control" days when
they were not. The psychological tests showed no signs of psychopathology,
including low scores on the hysteria scale. She did have a high score on the
schizophrenia scale of the MMPI, but her high scores were primarily attrib­
utable to items about experiences that the American Psychiatric Associa­
tion now considers nonpathological, such as religious and mystical visions
(Margnelli, 1999, p. 479).
Myers pointed out that people usually react to reports of stigmata
with one of two polarized views: "au supercherie au miracle"-either fraud
or miracle (HP, vol. 1, p. 492). Although fraudulent cases have certainly
occurred, many others have been studied and reported carefully enough
that it is "beyond doubt that the pertinent lesions were not created artifactu­
ally" (Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, p. 35). With reports of the psychological pro­
files of stigmatics increasingly available, the dichotomy of opinion has been
modified to "pathology or miracle" (Simpson, 1984). It has become clear
that many stigmatics have shown symptoms of hysteria (Thurston, 1952, p.
1 24), often having a prolonged period of ill health and strange symptoms,
sometimes followed by "a 'miraculous' healing" and then by the onset of
the stigmata (Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, p. 187). For years, therefore, hyste­
ria has had "pride of place" as the explanation, usually as a "denigratory
label, which in the minds of some writers is barely to be distinguished from
conscious malingering"-the old assumption, that is, of fraud (Whitlock &
Hynes, 1 978, p. 1 94). As I pointed out earlier, however, in some recent, well­
studied cases (Early & Lifschutz, 1974; Margnelli, 1999) there have been no
signs of hysteria or other psychopathology.
The problem of stigmata, however, lies much deeper than asking whether
they are symptoms of psychopathology or not. Clearly, "calling a phenom­
enon hysterical is no explanation" (Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, p. 194); "we are
just substituting one poorly understood diagnosis (stigmata) with another
(hysterical conversion)" (Simpson, 1984, p. 1748). As I discussed in Chapter
2, with regard to all the phenomena about which he wrote, including stig­
mata, Myers attempted to go beyond the usual polarized positions and find
a more comprehensive explanation. A century later Stevenson (1997) echoed
this approach when he argued that, instead of reducing stigmata to hysteria
or elevating them to miracles, it is "possible to appraise stigmata without
using the vocabulary of hagiology or that of psychopathology" (vol. 1, p.
34). Indeed, it is not only possible, but essential.
Some writers have attempted to interpret stigmata in psychoanalytic
terms, noting not only the hysterical symptoms but the parallel between
stigmata and menstruation (e.g., Lifschutz, 1957). "Interpretations are not
explanations," however, as Whitlock and Hynes (1978, p. 199) succinctly
stated, and more recently scientists have looked to psychophysiology for
explanations, particularly in the wake of our increasing awareness of the
relationship between emotions and the immune system. Some have sug­
gested that the general ill health of many stigmatics, perhaps exacerbated
1 56-Chapter 3

by prolonged fasting, may have led to a general depletion of the immune

system resulting in diseases such as herpes simplex (Simpson, 1984, p. 1747;
Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, pp. 198-1 99). Others have noted that in hemophili­
acs, as in stigmatics, bleeding sometimes occurs in connection with severe
emotional stress (Ratnoff, 1969, p. 157; Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, p. 196).
The most specific suggestion, however, has come from Ratnoff (1 969),
who compared stigmata cases with a phenomenon known as autoerythro­
cyte sensitization (AES), "the lay equivalent of stigmata" (p. 162). AES is
a rare condition in which the patient, usually a woman, has suffered some
severe physical trauma and subsequently develops bruising, inflamma­
tion, pain, swelling, or other internal bleeding at times of emotional stress.
Because the symptoms can be induced by injecting small amounts of their
own blood into patients, it has been suggested that the original trauma
created an unusual sensitivity to their own blood, a sensitivity apparently
somehow activated by subsequent stress. It has further been suggested that
AES is an autoimmune disorder, but tests have not yet demonstrated this
(Ratnoff, 1969, p. 160).
The psychological similarities between AES patients and stigmatics are
notable. Like stigmatics, AES patients are nearly all women, their symp­
toms "sound like the table of contents of a monograph on hysteria," and
most patients were "under severe emotional stress when symptoms first
appeared" (Ratnoff, 1969, pp. 161-162). The physiological parallels, how­
ever, are not so clear-cut. Stigma tics do not develop bruising or inflamma­
tion, the hallmark of AES. J. G. Fisher and Kollar (1980) concluded that
AES was an unlikely diagnosis in the case they investigated, and, moreover,
"our review of the literature failed to identify any stigmatic in whom this
interesting psychosomatic entity would have been a likely mechanism" (p.
1463).

Phenomena Related to Stigmata

Any proposed mechanism of stigmata will also have to take into account
that it is not an isolated phenomenon. There have been many reports of sim­
ilar, but "non-religious" cases in which strong emotion seems to have pro­
duced a specific physiological reaction related to the emotion, in particular,
"somatic repetitions of previous experiences" (R. L. Moody, 1948). Steven­
son (1997, vol . 1 , p. 68-78) has reviewed many such cases. In some cases
the rush to psychoanalytic interpretations unfortunately overshadowed the
re-porting of the phenomenon itself. In one of these, a 3 1-year-old man bled
on the palms of his hands on three occasions, all involving a stressful situa­
tion (Needles, 1 943). In another case a man was reported to have bled from
his armpits, in the absence of any visible wound, for four to five days every
month for at least seven months (Hadley, 1 929-1930).
Other cases that have also been interpreted psychoanalytically may
have been related to AES, since the somatic reactions reflected an earlier
injury. In a case reported by Graff and Wallerstein (1954), a male patient
in a psychiatric ward developed, on two occasions, some unusual swelling
 Psychophysiological Infiuence�157

on one of his several tattoos. The reactions occurred two days apart, both
times after a psychiatric interview in which he talked about various trau­
matic memories. Because the wheals remained for 24 hours after the first
occasion, photographs and plaster casts of them were made (pp. 510, 512). In
another case (Lifschutz, 1957) a patient reported that, when she was 13, her
father had "scratched her down her back with his fingernails, leaving three
long scars." Four years later she left home, but when her father announced
he was coming to visit her, the scars, healed for four years, bled, and they
did so again on several subsequent occasions when her father was coming
to visit (p. 529). Dunbar (1954) described two similar cases. In one of them a
patient, recalling that a physician treating her for typhoid fever would "jok­
ingly. . . grasp her neck with his hand," developed a red spot on the left side of
her neck and three red spots ("of the size of a finger tip") on the right side (p.
614). In the other case, a woman developed a bruise and swelling on an arm
in association with recalling her husband beating her (p. 622).
Two of the most remarkable cases were witnessed and documented by
R. L. Moody (1946, 1 948). In one, a man was hospitalized for several months
in 1935 because of frequent somnambulism. On one occasion, to restrain
him from his wanderings, his hands were tied behind his back while he slept.
Nine years later he was again hospitalized because of somnambulism, as
well as aggressive behavior. One night he was seen writhing on his bed with
his hands clasped behind his back, after which he got up and walked outside
in a somnambulistic state, his hands still behind his back. Because of the
patient's aggressive behavior, Moody had ordered that he not be followed
in his somnambulistic wanderings "for the safety of the staff." He returned
20 minutes later in an apparently normal state. The nurse then saw "deep
weals like rope marks on each arm" (1946, p. 934). They remained and were
observed by Moody and others for two days. On the evening after they dis­
appeared, "the incident was abreacted under narcosis." 22 While he was in
an apparently "completely dissociated state" and being observed by Moody,
"weals appeared on both forearms; gradually these became indented; and
finally some fresh petechial hremorrhages appeared along their course" (p.
934). Although trickery could not be ruled out on the first occasion, since the
patient was unobserved just before the marks were noticed by the nurse, on
the second occasion the marks appeared under Moody's direct observation.
These remained until the next morning, when they were photographed. The
photograph published by Moody shows the many indentations on the arm
and their close resemblance to rope marks (p. 935; reproduced in Stevenson,
1997, vol . 1, p. 72).
In another case, of a woman whose father had beaten her repeatedly
when she was a child, "swelling, bruising, and bleeding were observed by me
on at least thirty occasions" while she was reliving various traumas she had
suffered CR. L. Moody, 1948 , p. 964). Moody described several examples,

22. R. L. Moody (1946) defined "abreaction" as "an uninhibited reliving of the

traumatic incident. . . [that] differs fundamentally from the mere recall of a forgotten
event" (p. 934).
I S8-Chapter 3

including bruises that appeared on her left buttock;23 a red, bleeding mark
on her left shoulder; the flushing, hemorrhaging, and flaking of a scar left
from a childhood accident; red streaks appearing on her leg while she was
recalling another accident; and a "test case" in which Moody, in the pres­
ence of a colleague, produced an abreaction of an event in which her father
had struck her across the palms with a whip, and "transverse red streaks"
appeared on her palms and later bled. The most interesting occurrence,
however, was when she was reliving an incident in which her father had
struck her with an "elaborately carved stick," and a bruise developed with
"a curious sharply defined pattern" that apparently resembled the stick.
In addition to vivid recall of a past event, vivid dreams may also some­
times lead to a physiological response. Tuke (1884) reported a case in which
a man dreamed that he had been hit in the chest with a stone: "The vivid
shock awoke him, and then he found that there was on his chest. . . a round
mark, having the appearance of a bruise" (p. 286). Because it was also swol­
len the next day, he went to a doctor for treatment, and it soon healed. Ste­
venson (1997, vol. 1, pp. 76-78) reported a case in which an Indian man,
while seriously ill with typhoid fever, had a vivid experience in which he
thought that he had died and that, as he was struggling to return to life,
persons in the "other realm" had subdued him by cutting off his legs at the
knees. When he recovered, "he was found to have some unusual horizontal
scars in the skin across the front of both knees," and the "scars" persisted so
that years later Stevenson was able to photograph them (p. 78).
Stevenson (1997, vol. 1 , pp. 54-56) has also reviewed several cases in
which a person's emotional reaction to seeing wounds on another person has
resulted in similar wounds on the observer. Kerner, for example, reported
an 1812 case of a man who observed severe wounds being inflicted on a
soldier, and shortly afterward he developed similar wounds which "bled
and . . . [had to be] treated medically." Pabst described the case of a woman
who, at the time her soldier-brother was being beaten on the back for some
misbehavior, developed bleeding wounds on her own back. Carter reported
a case in which a woman witnessed her child's three middle fingers being cut
off when a window sash fell on them. The surgeon treating the child noted
that the corresponding three fingers on the mother's hand were swollen and
inflamed, so that pus had to be drained from them the next day.
Tuke (1884, pp. 285-287) reported similar cases, such as that of a woman
"whose lips and mouth became suddenly enormously swollen" when she
thought a child was about to cut itself on the lip with a knife (p. 287). In
another case, a woman "well known" to Tuke saw the near-crushing of a
child's ankle by a heavy iron gate. She immediately felt intense pain in her
own corresponding ankle and walked home with difficulty, at which time
she "found a circle around the ankle, as if it had been painted with red-

23. Stevenson (1997, vol. I, p. 75) reported two similar cases, related to him by
colleagues, in which a patient developed wheals on the buttocks when recalling a
beating.
 Psychophysiological Influence-159

currant juice." The next day it was inflamed, and it kept her bedridden for
several days (p. 285).
Such cases "cause initial incredulity" (Stevenson, 1 997, vol. 1, p. 74),
especially when they occur in times and places other than our own. More
recently, however, Rantasalo and Penttinen (1959) reported the case of a
mother who, on six occasions, developed blisters on her arm. The six occa­
sions were, first, during her first pregnancy, then on each of the four occa­
sions when her three children were vaccinated, and finally during a time of
stress again involving the welfare of her children.
Later in this chapter I will discuss the numerous instances in which
bleeding, blistering, or other marks have been induced deliberately, usually
by hypnotic suggestion, but one such case is worth mentioning in this sec­
tion because it is apparently the only one in which wounds closely resem­
bling religious stigmata have been produced by hypnotic suggestion. This
is the case of Elisabeth K., a German girl observed by Lechler beginning in
1 929. Lechler's report has never been translated; the best summary of the
case in English, including five photographs of the stigmata, is by Stevenson
(1997, vol. 1 , pp. 43-49). Similar to the cases reported above of people who
developed reactions in response to seeing another person's injuries, Elisa­
beth had an "extraordinary capacity to translate images" of another person's
suffering into similar symptoms on her own body (p. 44). After attending a
lecture on the crucifixion on Good Friday 1932, she reported to Lechler that
she had felt severe pain in her hands and feet while watching depictions of
Jesus nailed to the cross. Lechler had been hypnotizing her for several years
for treatment of a variety of hysterical symptoms, and he decided to test
her apparent ability to produce symptoms in sympathy with other people's
suffering. He hypnotized her and suggested that she would dream that night
of nails being driven into her hands and feet. The next day she had red,
swollen areas, "with the skin somewhat opened up," at the suggested sites.
Lechler told her about the hypnotic suggestion and, with her consent, gave
her the further suggestion that the wounds would become deeper and that
she would produce bloody tears-suggestions that were also effective. On
subsequent occasions he was able to induce actual bleeding, as well as swol­
len red marks on her forehead and shoulder. The marks on the forehead,
flecked with blood, were especially interesting because some of them were
"distinctly triangular in shape, and therefore corresponding to the wounds
that real thorns might sometimes make" (Stevenson, 1 997, vol. 1 , p. 45; pho­
tographs of these triangular marks are on p. 48). After the first inductions,
she was kept under constant surveillance, and Lechler witnessed the onset
of the bleeding on several occasions.

Specificity of the Wounds

An adequate explanation of stigmata will have to take into account
not only the existence of these other kinds of cases, both spontaneous and
induced, but also several further noteworthy features. First, as we have seen
in the above examples, marks appear at quite specific locations correspond-
160-Chapter 3

ing to the image in the person's mind, whether the image is of Jesus' wounds
or of wounds on someone else. For example, stigmata corresponding to the
spear wound on Jesus' side may be located on either the left or the right
side, apparently reflecting the stigmatic's belief about the location of that
wound (Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1 , pp. 40-41): "There seems to be little doubt
that the representation of this wound in pictures or sculptural crucifixes
had a powerful influence on which side of the body the lesion appeared"
(Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, p. 187). Some stigmatics have had wounds in the
palms of their hands, others wounds in the wrists (Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1 ,
pp. 38, 41). A n additional example o f the specificity o f location i s provided
by a rare phenomenon known as "espousal rings," in which a red line, often
accompanied by thickening of the skin, appears encircling a finger, appar­
ently as a symbolic token of the person's devotion to Jesus (Thurston, 1952,
pp. 130-140). One example was the case of Marie-Julie Jahenny, a 1 9th-cen­
tury Breton girl whose stigmatic ring appeared in 1874 and was still visible
in 1891 (M. Murphy, 1992, pp. 491-492; Thurston, 1922, pp. 206-208).
In addition, wounds often take specific shapes, again corresponding
to the image in the person's mind. The triangular marks on Elisabeth K.'s
forehead provide one example. In the case of Anna Emmerich, Y-shaped
stigmata on her chest resembled a Y-shaped cross at the church of her
childhood (M. Murphy, 1992, pp. 486-488; Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1 , p. 42).
I have already mentioned the detailed shape of rope marks on one of R. L.
Moody's patients; Stevenson (1997, vol. 1 , pp. 38-39) describes three similar
cases among stigmatics (two from the 17th century and, again, Marie-Julie
Jahenny in the 1 9th century), in which rope marks on the wrists appeared,
apparently corresponding to images of Jesus being bound to the cross by
ropes rather than by nails.
Other features of stigmata cases are difficult to reconcile with the
notion that they are the result of some normal disease such as herpes sim­
plex. One is their temporal regularity: Many recur regularly, often for years,
at a specific time, usually Friday. Another is "the almost invariable absence
of sepsis when they were open or healing" (Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, p.
188). Additionally, the wounds disappear and heal rapidly, usually leaving
no scars, inflammation, or other residue. Thurston (1922) summed up the
problem presented by features such as these: "For the symmetrical arrange­
ment and narrowly limited area, the periodicity extending over a long term
of years, and for such deep wounds . . . -wounds that never suppurate but
heal with extraordinary rapidity-there seems to be no adequate analogy"
(pp. 200-201). More recently, Margnelli (1999) asked what "activates the
nerve trunks, the contained area of the lesions, the wounds' topographical
precision and their long duration" (p. 464).

Predisposing Characteristics
Certain psychological characteristics or conditions seem conducive
to psychophysiological phenomena such as stigmata. The "unmistakable
symptoms of hysteria" in many stigmatics is a clue (Thurston, 1952, p. 122),
 Psychophysiological I nfiuence-161

but the essential factor does not seem to be psychopathology per se, but
rather a trait variously manifesting as suggestibility, absorption or intense
concentration, capacity for vivid imagery, hypnotizability, or dissociation.
As M. Murphy (1 992) put it, "images, it seems, often work upon the flesh
most effectively in states of deep mental absorption" (p. 500), and clearly an
important feature in most cases has been the person's heightened, intense
"monoideism" or concentration on the relevant images (Stevenson, 1997,
vol. 1, pp. 50-5 1 , 80-83).
Another characteristic is what has been called "abnormal suggestibil­
ity" (Thurston, 1 952, p. 1 22) or unusual "impressionability" (Stevenson,
1997, vol. 1 , p. 52). Stigmatics seem to be "model hysterics in whom suggest­
ibility/auto-suggestibility would reach the maximum visibility" (Margnelli,
1999, p. 464). Ratnoff (1969) likewise noted the importance of suggestibility
among patients with AES syndrome (p. 162).
Related to both absorption and suggestibility is the observation that
stigmata frequently occur when the person is in some kind of altered state
of consciousness, such as religious "ecstasy" or a trance (Margnelli, 1999,
pp. 466-467; Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, pp. 1 87, 189). Such an altered state
may also be conducive in non-religious cases, as seen in that of R. L. Moody
(1 946) in which the marks appeared during a somnambulistic state. Such
altered states figure so frequently in these cases that Whitlock and Hynes
(1978) called them "essential precursors" of stigmata-like lesions: "One fact
appears to be fairly well established: the existence of a state of trance or
some other altered state of consciousness seems to have a facilitatory effect
on the production of changes that culminate in bleeding from open wounds
in the skin" (p. 500).
Another important factor, and one surely tied to the absorption in rel­
evant imagery, is the intense emotion accompanying stigmata and related
cases. Many people have noted, and many of the phenomena described in
this chapter suggest, "that intense emotional experience can activate spe­
cific psychophysiological mechanisms" (Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, p. 200).
The fundamental question, however, behind stigmata as well as all the other
phenomena described in this chapter, is "How?" Although some may pre­
sume with R. L. Moody (1946) that "neural pathways undoubtedly exist by
which psychic contents may be projected on to the body in a highly specific
manner" (p. 935), we must ask what exactly are the neural pathways under­
lying a physical symptom, such as stigmata, with a highly specific form,
location, and temporal occurrence: "It is difficult to see how underlying sys­
temic disorders on their own could cause painful recurrent bleeding, often
for periods of many years" (Whitlock & Hynes, 1978, p. 199). More spe­
cifically, "we have no understanding of how the brain could instruct local
blood vessels and other tissues to represent the various forms in the skin"
(Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, p. 87); and vague suggestions that "an anomalous
activation of nerve fibers . . .induc[es] the liberation of histamine in points
where the lesions are formed" are-or should be-clearly inadequate (Mar­
gnelli, 1 999, pp. 463-464).
162-Chapter 3

Hysteria

As I mentioned above, the association between stigmata and hysteria

may provide a clue to some more fundamental underlying characteristic,
such as suggestibility or absorption, that can lead to both. It should thus
not be surprising that hysteria involves other psychophysiological effects;
indeed, hysteria is defined as "symptoms of a neurological nature-paraly­
sis, anaesthesia, aphasia, blindness, amnesia, fits, etc.-for which there is
no apparent neurological cause" (Lader, 1973, p. 265). Moreover, the symp­
toms are not only not caused by organic damage, but they also "cannot be
mapped on to conventional neuroanatomical knowledge" (Sierra & Berrios,
1999, p. 267). Discussing hysterical anesthesia, Myers noted that "the ames­
thetic belts or patches do not always, or even generally, correspond with
true anatomical areas, such as would be affected by the actual lesion of any
given nerve. They follow what may be called fancy arrangements;-some­
times corresponding to rough popular notions of divisions of the body,­
sometimes seeming to reflect merely childish caprice" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 45).
Because of the paradox in the biomedical model of a disease with no
apparent pathophysiology, there has been much controversy over the years
about the validity of hysteria as a diagnosis or even a concept. Some physi­
cians have considered it merely "a cloak for ignorance" (Marsden, 1986, p.
285). Nonetheless, "a tough old word like hysteria dies very hard. It tends to
outlive its obituarists" (Lewis, 1975, p. 12), in large part because observation
of the symptoms persists. Thus, despite the waxing and waning of hysteria
as a diagnostic category, "the concept of 'hysteria' is alive and well in the
practice of medicine" (Slavney, 1990, p. 3). Without further understanding
of the mechanisms involved, however, some physicians have suggested that
it be considered, not a diagnosis, but simply a "descriptive neurologic short­
hand" (Marsden, 1 986, p. 286).
The theoretical importance for psychology of hysterical symptoms was
not lost on Myers. He repeatedly emphasized that such phenomena provide
a potential source of important knowledge about psychophysiological func­
tioning in general, precisely because they are "phantom copies of real mala­
dies of the nervous system . . . due . . . not to purely physiological but rather to
intellectual causes" (HP, vol. 1, p. 43). Cases of hysteria provide "one of
the most fertile sources of new knowledge of mind and body" because they
are "in some ways a better dissecting agent than any other" for isolating,
manipulating, and studying the psychological and organic contributions
to the symptoms, especially when hysterical symptoms can be compared
with organically caused neurological cases that they resemble (HP, vol. 1,
pp. 43, 65). Noting also (as many others have) the parallels and similarities
between hysteria and hypnosis, Myers considered both to be manifestations
of an unusual instability or permeability in the boundary normally separat­
ing subliminal and supraliminal processes. He thus considered hysteria to
be a "self-suggestive malady" or "disease of the hypnotic stratum" (Myers,
1893a, p. 5). By studying the two together therefore-hysteria as the spon-
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-163

taneously occurring phenomenon, hypnosis as the experimental production

of the same or similar phenomena-we might begin to unravel the "para­
doxical" notion of a physical symptom induced by an idea.
As with all the phenomena I am discussing in this chapter, most attempts
to explain hysteria have "wavered between the two terms of Cartesian dual­
ism" (Ey, 1982, p. 1 1), considering them either "real" (that is, organic) or
"imaginary" (that is, psychological or malingering). The term "hysteria"
itself derived from the longstanding belief that the disease, far more com­
mon in women, resulted from a disorder of the uterus; but the 18th-century
physician Robert Whytt proposed that it was instead a derangement of the
nervous system, not the uterus, and 19th-century scientists took up this idea
enthusiastically (Slavney, 1990, pp. 22-24). Maudsley, for example, vaguely
attributed hysteria to an underlying "molecular disorder" in the nervous
system. Janet thought it was a deficiency in neural "energy" resulting in an
inability to integrate sensory input and thus a "dissociation" of sensorimo­
tor processes. Some thought it primarily a disorder "in the higher cerebral
centers" (Yazici & Kostakoglu, 1998, p. 166); and others have suggested that
the symptoms are the result of changes in cerebral blood flow (Sierra & Ber­
rios, 1999, p. 272).
In the absence of detailed knowledge of the physiology involved, how­
ever, such explanations amounted to "the delineation of a metaphor, not
the demonstration of a mechanism" (Slavney, 1990, p. 24). Psychodynamic
interpretations thus began to take over. Breuer and Freud, for example, pro­
posed that the primary mechanism is the conversion of a strong idea or emo­
tion into somatic expression-specifically, the observed symptoms of motor
or sensory dysfunction or loss-"in much the same way as kinetic energy
can be converted into various forms of movement and power" (Whitlock,
1967, p. 146).
The conversion hypothesis, however, is itself metaphoric and does not
explain but embodies the problem. It "fails to state how it bridges the gap
between the mental and the physical. How does the psychic energy or libido
actually become transformed into something physical to produce, say, a
paraplegia?" (E. Miller, 1987, p. 166). Psychological explanations such as
conversion have seemed to many to be "very much tied up with dualist
notions of mind/brain relationships" (E. Miller, 1999, p. 188), and, because
of the modern determination to avoid at any cost the "pain of Cartesian
dualism" (Halligan & David, 1999, p. 161), the pendulum has swung away
from psycho-dynamic interpretations of hysteria and back again to seeking
neurophysiological mechanisms-but this time rooted more squarely in the
notion of the "brain-mind," that mysteriously unified entity in which the
terms on either side of the hyphen are, in the final analysis, synonymous.
It has been known since the late 19th century that the sensorimotor
functioning of an hysterical patient remains intact at some level, although
part of it is prevented somehow from reaching the patient's awareness. For
example, a patient suffering from hysterical blindness may, when hypno­
tized or producing automatic writing, give evidence of having perceived a
164-Chapter 3

particular visual stimulus when he or she is unaware of having done so.

Similarly, patients with hysterical anesthesias rarely suffer any injury to the
affected area, as often happens when sensation is blocked by, say, chemical
anesthesia (HP, vol. 1 , pp. 46-47). Since the 19th century, therefore, neuro­
physiological theories have described hysteria not so much as a loss but as
an inhibition of normal sensorimotor processes, with a resulting dissocia­
tion of sensory input and perceptual awareness. Ludwig (1972), for example,
attributed hysteria to "a dysfunction of attention and recent memory due to
increased corticofugal inhibition of afferent stimulation" (p. 771).
Building on such proposals, researchers in recent years have attempted
to identify more specifically the neural correlates of hysteria. There have
not yet been many such studies. Some writers (Athwal, Harrigan, Fink,
Harshall, & Frackowiak, 2001) have expressed surprise at the "dearth of
relevant neuropsychological or anatomicophysiological reports in the lit­
erature" (p. 217); but the development of neuroimaging techniques has
encouraged scientists that we now have the "means of elucidating the neural
correlates of conversion disorder" (Yazici & Kostakoglu, 1998, p. 163). The
earliest neuroimaging studies involved EEG recordings of evoked poten­
tials, using somatosensory, visual, or auditory stimuli corresponding to the
clinical deficits. In general these studies have tended to show that there is
little or no alteration of "early" components (those closely tied to physical
aspects of the stimuli), but significant changes in later components asso­
ciated with attention and other aspects of psychological response (Lader,
1 973; Marsden, 1 986; Sierra & Berrios, 1999). Other evoked potential studies
have similarly supported a "gate control theory" of pain, in which pain is
prevented somehow from reaching consciousness (Sierra & Berrios, 1999,
pp. 276-277; Slavney, 1990, p. 28), even though the painful stimulus appears
to be processed normally up to the cortical entry level. 24
Tiihonen, Kuikka, Viinamiiki, Lehtonen, and Partanen (1995) used
SPECT imaging to measure changes in cerebral blood flow in a patient with
both paralysis and loss of sensation in her left arm. They took measure­
ments during the time she was symptomatic and after she had recovered,
and found differences suggesting that the hysterical symptoms were "asso­
ciated with the simultaneous activation of frontal inhibitory areas and inhi­
bition of the somatosensory cortex" (p. 134).
Two years later Marshall and colleagues reported a study with a woman
suffering from left-sided hysterical paralysis of her arm and leg (Marshall,

24. It remains unresolved at this point whether hysterical sensory deficits do

sometimes reach down to earlier levels of the corresponding pathways, as suggested
by Levy and Mushin ( 1973) and some other early studies. An ideal way of pursuing
this question would be to use natural tactile stimuli (not electrical stimuli, which
bypass the tactile receptors i n the skin) applied to anesthetic versus normal hands
in the same subjects. This would circumvent the problems that arise i n connection
with visual and auditory stimuli stemming from changes of head or gaze orienta­
tion and provide each "hysterical" evoked response with a natural within-subject
control.
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-165

Halligan, Fink, Wade, & Frackowiak, 1997; a more complete report is in

Athwal et aI., 2001). They used PET to measure regional cerebral blood
flow both when she attempted to move her left (paralyzed) leg and when she
attempted to move her good leg. Unlike attempts with the good leg, which
activated contralateral motor cortex in the expected way, those with the
paralyzed left leg "failed to activate right motor cortex"; instead, there was
significant activation of the right orbito-frontal and right anterior cingulate
cortex, two areas that are "implicated in action, emotion, and motor inhibi­
tion" (Marshall et aI., 1 997, pp. B l , B5). Like Tiihonen et aI., they concluded
that hysterical paralysis involves the inhibition of the relevant sensorimotor
areas by activation of frontal inhibitory mechanisms.
Other studies (Yazici & Kostakoglu, 1998; Vuilleumier et aI., 2001) have
also shown alterations in cerebral blood flow suggesting "regional cortical
inhibition associated with conversion symptoms" (Yazici & Kostakoglu,
1 998, p. 167). In two additional studies, researchers used imaging meth­
ods (evoked potential methods in Lorenz, Kunze, & Bromm, 1998; PET in
Spence, Crimlisk, Cope, Ron, & Grasby, 2000) to try to distinguish between
patients with hysterical sensorimotor losses and healthy persons feigning
such losses. Researchers in both studies concluded that hysterical senso­
rimotor loss can be "neurophysiologic ally distinguished from malingering"
(Lorenz et aI., 1 998, p. 191). In the first of these, an hysterical patient failed
to produce an "oddball" evoked response at the cognitive level (P300) to
rare stimuli applied to his anesthetic right hand, even though the sensory
pathways themselves were apparently intact since the potentials evoked by
both electrical and thermal (laser) stimulation of that hand were otherwise
normal. This finding supports the early conjecture of Ludwig (1972) that the
deficit is not at the sensorimotor level, but at some higher, cognitive level. In
the second study, which compared three patients showing hysterical motor
weakness of an arm with two feigners and six control subjects, Spence et al.
(2000) found evidence suggesting that the patients' hysterical motor symp­
toms were associated with reduced blood flow in left dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, an area associated with volition.
Neurophysiological studies such as these are all converging on the idea
that the physiological symptoms of hysteria are produced by some inhibi­
tory mechanism, operating at a "high level of cognitive processing," that
"inhibits processing of information at levels necessary for awareness," and
moreover that prefrontal structures are the "likely substrate" because they
are part of the "network that integrates attentional responses and gener­
ates awareness" (Sierra & Berrios, 1999, pp. 283, 279). Neuropsychiatrists,
in short, may be closing in on physiological expressions of the mechanism
by which "distressing psychological events . . . alter the neurophysiology of
the human brain in a specific way and trigger [specific] symptoms . . .through
activating or inhibiting critical areas of the brain" (Tiihonen et aI., 1 995, pp.
1 35-1 36). But the critical question-with regard not only to hysteria and all
the phenomena discussed in this chapter, but also to "normal" volitional
phenomena such as raising one's arm-is not whether this or that area of
166�Chapter 3

the brain is activated, inhibited, or in some other way altered; obviously,

"hysterical paralysis must express itself through the physiological medium
of brain anatomy" (Athwal et aI., 2001 , p. 216). The critical question is how
the physiological change producing the symptoms is set in motion in the
first place: "How is the meaning of events translated into the pathophysiol­
ogy of neurons?" (Slavney, 1990, p. 29); "how the neurotransmitters were
affected by the psychological state . . . still requires explanation" (E. Miller,
1999, p. 188); "how [do] psychological mechanisms translate (convert) from
an emotional reaction into physical symptoms" (Halligan & David, 1999, p.
161)? The problem, again, is particularly acute when the symptoms "do not
reflect known anatomical functions, do not correspond to known neuro­
logical pathways . . . ,and do not follow known principles of neurophysiologic
response patterns" (Ludwig, 1972, p. 771).
The problem becomes still more acute when we recognize what has
made hysteria so notoriously difficult both to diagnose and to define noso­
logically-namely, its protean nature. Symptoms may change location, may
respond to suggestion, or may reflect some meaningful response to psycho­
logical precipitating conditions. Another important point is one that Myers
called attention to more than a century ago, but has rarely been appreci­
ated: Both hysteria and hypnosis involve not just a functional loss or inhibi­
tion but also a gain, in that the hysteric or the hypnotized person seems to
have attained a level of control-albeit at a subliminal level-over processes
not ordinarily under volitional control. Moreover, physiological studies of
hysteria seem to be showing that there is no underlying organic damage and
that the nervous system is operating normally-"the brain receives normal
sensory input. . . and can issue normal motor commands." What seems to
be affected, instead, is the cortical activity ordinarily associated with con­
sciousness, and "it is here that contemporary neurobiology faces a major
challenge. The cerebral mechanisms of consciousness are not understood"
(Marsden, 1986, p. 287).
In sum, as in the case of stigmata an adequate account of hysterical
conversion will have to account for the specificity of the symptoms, as well
as for the facts that they often do not fit any anatomical pattern (as in "glove
anesthesias"), may change location, and can often be changed, alleviated, or
cured by suggestion. General psychophysiological mechanisms, therefore,
such as that behind "the tears that follow tragedy and the facial flushing
that accompanies shame" (Slavney, 1990, p. 23) or the perspiration, tachy­
cardia, and other symptoms accompanying stress, anxiety, or fear can­
not adequately account for the "more dramatic" symptoms of hysteria (E.
Miller, 1 999, pp. 186-187). Scientists may increasingly be "elucidating the
neural correlates of conversion disorder" (Yazici & Kostakoglu, 1998, p.
163), but, as Myers frequently emphasized, "correlates" is a neutral term
and implies nothing about causation. Describing what is happening at the
physiological level in the modern terminology of the neurosciences brings
us no closer to an adequate theoretical understanding of the phenomena
than we were a century ago. Modern neurophysiological terminology, like
 Psychophysiological Intluence-167

the old psychodynamic terminology, can too easily "distract attention from
careful investigation of how beliefs and related mental images about the
body come to implement physiological changes in the persons affected"
(Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1 , p. 53n).
The search for an adequate theoretical model, however, has been ham­
pered by the fear of being chained to an outmoded dualism. Like most
modern scientists, those addressing the problem of hysteria have called for
a reconceptualization of the phenomenon that avoids the pitfalls of dual­
ism (E. Miller, 1999) and offers instead "a more all-embracing concept"
that integrates rather than separates "the organic and functional, somatic
and psychological " (Ey, 1 982, p. 18). Again, however, I emphasize that such
"holism" also brings us no closer to a real understanding of psychophysi­
ological phenomena and too often leads instead to such vacuous statements
as "an individual's hysterical symptoms correspond to his/her ideas about
what his/her symptoms should look like [because] his/her symptoms are his/
her ideas" (M. Turner, 1 999, p. 200).

Multiple Personality and Dissociative Disorders

Another phenomenon involving profound altered states of conscious­

ness, and closely related to hysteria, is multiple personality disorder (MPD),
now more generally called dissociative identity disorder (DID). The main
feature of MPD is not, as in hysteria, the so-called conversion or somatic
symptoms, but the dissociation. Nonetheless, perhaps not surprisingly,
there are frequent reports of MPD patients manifesting strikingly differ­
ent physiological characteristics or symptoms in association with different
"alter" personalities. In Chapter 5 we will discuss MPD in detail. In this
section, I will concentrate on neurophysiological findings in MPD patients,
especially from the point of view of their relevance for the central message
of this chapter, namely, that "experimental investigations of the processes
by which persons with MPD accomplish such changes may eventually aid
the understanding of normal mind-body processes" (S. D. Miller & Trig­
giano, 1992, p. 57).
There have been several reviews of psychophysiological changes associ­
ated with MPD (Birnbaum & Thomann, 1996; Coons, 1988; S. D. Miller
& Triggiano, 1992; F. W. Putnam, 1984, 1991). Systematic observation and
research in this area was initially motivated by continuing skepticism and
controversy over the clinical validity of MPD and the hope of determin­
ing whether it was "real" or simply an extreme form of role-playing. But
as Putnam (1991) pointed out, hoping to "prove" the reality of MPD with
psychophysiological studies is probably unrealistic, since "there are few
physiological measures that can readily distinguish between separate peo­
ple" (p. 491). Thus, the goal of research on the psychophysiology of MPD
has gradually shifted away from trying to "prove" the reality of MPD and
instead toward trying to identify the neurophysiological processes underly-
168-Chapter 3

ing MPD and thereby aid in our understanding of the mechanisms of con­
sciousness in general (e.g., S. D. Miller & Triggiano, 1992, p. 57; F. W. Put­
nam, 1991 , p. 493; Reinders et a!., 2003)-a goal more in line with Myers's
approach of studying abnormal and unusual phenomena to shed light on
normal psychophysiological processes. All the reviewers have emphasized
that research in this area is in its infancy: There have been few studies yet
with adequate experimental controls, and many of them are unpublished,
presented only in conference reports. Nonetheless, these preliminary stud­
ies, as well as frequent clinical observations, have shown that psychophysi­
ological changes associated with MPD constitute a robust and potentially
important phenomenon.
Psychophysiological changes between alter personalities have been
observed "in virtually every organ of the body" (Coons, 1988, p. 47).
Although such observations are often derisively labeled as mere "anec­
dotes," the persistence and number of them was what suggested the need for
more controlled studies in the first place. Many of the changes, in fact, are
sensorimotor changes similar to those seen in hysterical conversion. There
have been reports, for example, of anesthesia or analgesia in one personality
but not others (e.g., B. G. Braun, 1983a, pp. 87-88; Ludwig, Brandsma, Wil­
bur, Bendfeldt, & Jameson, 1972, pp. 305-306); estimates of the incidence
of these are 25-38% (Coons, 1988, p. 48; F. W. Putnam, Guroff, Silberman,
Barban, & Post, 1 986, p. 287). Related phenomena such as deafness or audi­
tory hallucinations, or muteness or speaking with different accents, have
also been reported (Coons, 1988, p. 48; S. D. Miller & Triggiano, 1992, pp.
54-55).
There have also been reports of changes in handedness or handwrit­
ing across personalities (Coons, 1988, p. 49); in one study, 37% of the 100
patients surveyed showed changes in handedness (F. W. Putnam et a!., 1986,
p. 289). As many as 26% of MPD patients show allergies in some personali­
ties but not in others (F. W. Putnam et a!., 1986, p. 289). In their book about
their famous patient "Eve," for example, Thigpen and Cleckley (1957, p. 132)
reported that the alternate personality Eve Black had an allergic reaction
when she wore nylon stockings, whereas the original personality Eve White
did not. B. G. Braun (1983b) described a case in which one personality could
eat oranges normally, whereas all the other personalities were allergic to
citrus. In another case one personality was allergic to cats, whereas another
was not. In still another a woman had an allergic response to smoke in one
personality but not in another. In a survey of 100 cases, 35% involved alter
personalities which responded differently to foods, and in nearly half the
cases they responded differently to medications (F. W. Putnam et a!., 1986,
p. 289). For example, B. G. Braun (1983a) reported a case in which a woman
who developed adult-onset diabetes "required variable amounts of insulin
depending on which personality had control" (p. 87).
Related to stigmata and the recurrence of traumatic wounds in some
psychiatric patients are phenomena that B. G. Braun (1983b, p. 127) observed
in two patients. One woman, whose mother had repeatedly burned her with
cigarettes, developed several red marks on her skin while recalling the abuse
 Psychophysiological lnfluence-169

in one personality, and they would reappear whenever that particular per­
sonality emerged.25 In another case Braun observed stripe marks develop
across a patient's arms, shoulders, and neck, apparently refle cting the
patient's memory of being whipped by his mother with a bull-whip. Similar
cases appear in unpublished reports. Ewin (1979; see also B. G. Braun, 1983b,
pp. 1 27-128) had a patient who had suffered severe burns in a motel fire. Ten
years later, after he learned about a boy who had similarly been burned in a
hotel fire, "the area from which his skin grafts had been taken became quite
red, painful, and swollen" (p. 271). Densen-Garber (unpublished data cited
in Coons, 1 988, p. 50, and in S. D. Miller & Triggiano, 1992, p. 56) reported
on stigmata-like phenomena in two cases. In one, a woman addicted to her­
oin in one personality (but showing no withdrawal symptoms in the others)
would develop needle track marks when she switched to that personality. In
another, a man beaten as a child would develop welts and marks on his back
and legs when he switched to his child personality.
Sensory changes, especially visual ones, have also been described. An
early case was that reported by Dufay in 1876 (Alvarado, 1989, p. 162; HP,
vol. 1 , pp. 1 33-1 35), in which a woman who had severe myopia requiring
glasses could, when in a somnambulistic state, do needlework and even
thread the needle easily without her glasses and in poorer light. Condon,
Ogston, and Pacoe (1969) studied film recordings made of "Eve" and discov­
ered that the three personalities all showed strabismus (divergent eye move­
ments in which the two eyes move in different directions and/or at different
speeds). The "least stable personality" showed by far the largest number of
such divergent movements, whereas the personality who later became the
dominant personality showed very few. B. G. Braun (1983a, p. 86) reported
color-blindness in a patient ("documented by the isochromatic color blind­
ness test") that disappeared following successful integration of the person­
alities. Birnbaum and Thomann (1996) reported a case remarkably similar
to cases of hysterical blindness, in which the patient briefly showed a severe
loss of peripheral vision in her right eye during a particularly stressful time
in her psychiatric therapy. The same patient required different corrective
lens for her primary and an alter personality, and there were also differences
between them in corneal curvature and astigmatism.
It is in studies of optical changes across personalities that we begin
to find experimental studies assessing these differences. So far there have
been three such studies (S. D. Miller, 1989; S. D. Miller, Blackburn, Scholes,
White, & Mamalis, 1991; the third, a 1985 study by Shepard & Braun, is
unfortunately unpublished, but is described briefly by Miller, whose studies

25. Braun reports that he confirmed this particular abuse with outside sources.
Whether the memories of abuse by patients reflect real events or are false memories
has been a matter of much controversy and debate in psychiatric and legal forums
(see, e.g., Braude, 1995; D. Schacter, 1996), but for purposes of the issues I am dis­
cussing i n this chapter, resolving that debate is u nnecessary. The crucial point here
is that mental changes , whether rooted in reality or fantasy, can lead to unarguably
real physiological changes.
170-Chapter 3

were intended as a replication). In the first study Shepard and Braun, exam­
ining seven MPD patients, found "clinically significant optical differences
between alter personalities" on six measures: visual acuity, manifest refrac­
tion, color vision, pupil size, corneal curvature, and intraocular pressure (S.
D. Miller, 1989). On two additional measures, eye muscle balance and visual
fields, there were no significant changes except in one patient. In his attempt
to replicate this study, Miller added a control group of nine people who
attempted to simulate alter personalties, for comparison with nine MPD
patients.26 An ophthalmologist, blind to which persons were the patients
and which the simulators, administered and evaluated the ophthalmologi­
cal tests. He tested these 18 people on five of the eight measures that Shepard
and Braun had used: visual acuity (both with and without correction), man­
ifest refraction, pupil size, eye muscle balance, and visual fields. There were
4.5 times more changes among different personalities in MPD patients than
in those of the simulating controls. Some of the measures are "subjective,"
requiring the responses of the person being examined, whereas others are
"objective," or measured directly by the ophthalmologist; but Miller ques­
tioned whether even the subjective measures were "transparent" enough so
that a feigning patient would know the appropriate responses to make, and
furthermore whether patients would be knowledgeable enough to produce
the consistent results observed over multiple trials (p. 485).
S. D. Miller et al. (1991) replicated this study, extending it to 20 MPD
patients and 20 simulating controls, and they again found significantly
greater differences, both stat i st i cal l y and clinically, between the alter per­
sonalities of the MPD patients than between the "simulated" personalities
of the controls. In a table summarizing the results of the three studies, how­
ever, they also show that the measures on which significant changes were
found were not the same across all three studies, with changes in visual
acuity and manifest refraction being the most consistent.
In addition to these controlled comparisons, Miller, like clinicians
before him, noted some "highly unusual personality-specific" physiologi­
cal changes that were "not amenable" to statistical study (p. 483). 21 In one

26. Although experimental studies with "control" subjects are usually considered
the ideal to which all psychological research must conform to be acceptable, stud­
ies of MPD involving simulating controls raise the question of how useful such a
research model is when confronting phenomena produced by highly unusual sub­
jects. This question arises again in connection with experimental studies of hypno­
sis that fai l to acknowledge the importance of using highly hypnotizable subjects
(discussed later in this chapter) and in connection with phenomena associated with
creativity, genius, and mystical experience (Chapters 7 and 8).
27. S. D. M iller and his colleagues (1991) caution that there has been no system­
atic research on whether observed differences are consistent over time within per­
sonalities, and that "psychophysiological differences between personalities may
be more labile than previously thought." Nevertheless, they believe that the study
of such differences should move away from demonstrating the phenomena toward
seeking the "underlying processes by which these patients develop such differences"
(p. 1 35).
 Psychophysiological Influence-l71

patient, for example, a condition known as accommodative-type esotropia,

or a rotation of the eyes that sometimes appears in 4- to 5-year-old children
but eventually corrects itself, was observed only in a personality that was
four years old, and not in the adult personalities. In another case, an adult
personality showed presbyopia, or deterioration of the ability of the eye to
adjust thickness and curvature of the lens, whereas two child personalities
did not, consistent with normal aging of eyesight. One personality of a third
patient had 20115 visual acuity in both eyes and no muscle balance prob­
lems; but in another personality, vision "markedly deteriorated to 20/30 in
the right eye, and 20/50 in the left eye," and there was also a muscle balance
disorder (a rotation outward of the left eye). Both conditions "completely
resolved" when the patient switched back to the first personality (p. 484).
As with hysterical conversion, the development of neurological measur­
ing techniques has prompted studies looking at measurable physiological
differences between MPD alter personalities. Unfortunately, most of these
studies date from the 1970s and 1980s, when techniques were less devel­
oped than they are now, but they are worth noting because many of them
did demonstrate quantitative differences between personalities that could,
and should, be followed up using more sophisticated imaging and statistical
techniques.
The first such study, published nearly 1 00 years ago (M. Prince &
Peterson, 1908), looked at galvanic skin response (GSR), or changes in skin
resistence, in three personalities of one patient. Presented with emotion­
ally laden words, the personalities reacted differently to them, as mea­
sured by the GSR. It took more than 60 years for someone to follow up
on these promising results, but in 1972 one study measuring, among many
other things, GSR in four personalities was reported (Ludwig et aI., 1972).
Emotionally laden words were determined for each of the four personalities
and presented to the appropriate personality; again there were differential
responses consistent with the clinical picture. In a second study, however,
with a different patient who also had four personalities, Ludwig and his col­
leagues (Larmore, Ludwig, & Cain, 1 977) found no unusual changes in GSR.
Two additional studies involving measurement of skin conductance (Bahn­
son & Smith, 1 975, p. 86, and Brende, 1984) found changes that "var[ied] by
emerging personality." More recently, F. W. Putnam, Zahn, and Post (1990)
looked at skin conductance in the context of other activity of the autonomic
nervous system (ANS), such as heart and respiration rates. They found
overall differences among the alter personalities of nine MPD patients, but
they also found differences among the alter personalities of five simulating
control subjects. Nevertheless, the patterns in the various changes led the
authors to suggest the "differences in ANS activity between alter personal­
ity states may be arrived at in different ways" by MPD patients and controls
(p. 256).
Several studies have used EEG methods to look for possible differences
among personalities, not only in patterns of spontaneous electrical activity
but also in average evoked responses, usually from visual stimulation. Two
i72-Chapter 3

studies-one of Eve in the 1950s by Thigpen and Cleckley, and another by

Morselli of a patient named Marisa-found EEG differences in background
alpha frequency, as well as in muscle tension (F. W. Putnam, 1984, p. 33;
Thigpen & Cleckley, 1954, p. 145; 1957, pp. 141-142). Similarly, Ludwig et al.
(1972) found "dramatic differences in [EEG] activity," including differences
in alpha blocking (Ludwig, 1 983, p. 95). The personalities in Larmore et al.'s
(1977) patient also showed changes in alpha abundance, but not significant
enough for any "definite conclusions" (p. 39).
As S. D. Miller and Triggiano (1992) remarked, "psychophysiological
research using evoked potentials has provided some of the most consistent
and convincing experimental evidence for the existence of MPD as a clini­
cal entity, as well as for the distinctness of the personality states" (p. 50). In
the pioneering study of Ludwig et al. (1972), there were "definite qualitative
differences in the VER [visual evoked response] records in the [four] differ­
ent states" (p. 305), and these findings, together with the other physiologi­
cal and psychological measures taken, led the authors to suggest that the
personalities represent "different altered states of consciousness" (p. 308).
Ludwig and his colleagues (Larmore et aI., 1977) stated this conclusion even
more forcefully in the report of a second patient, in which the physiological
findings were in general unremarkable, with the notable exception of the
visual evoked response: "The average visual evoked responses (AER) for
each personality [four] were quite different from each other," and in fact,
"each personality had its own individual AER type, as if four different peo­
ple had been tested" (p. 40).
In an attempt to replicate Larmore et aI., F. W. Putnam and his col­
leagues (Putnam, 1 984, pp. 35-36; Putnam, 1986, p. 1 12; Putnam, 1991 , p.
493) conducted a study in which they compared the visual evoked potentials
of MPD patients with simulating controls. The results showed "significant
differences in evoked and spontaneous central nervous system (CNS) activ­
ity across MPD personality states that were not duplicated by the simulating
controls" (Putnam, 1991 , p. 493). Specifically, "the MPD alter personalities
looked significantly less like each other on the measures of amplitude and
latency for the P l OD, N120, and P200 visually evoked potential components
than did the 'alternate personalities' of the simulating control subjects"
(Putnam, 1 986, p. 1 1 2). More generally, because within an individual the
visual evoked response seems to be "relatively reliable and time-stable" and
"fluctuations . . . [are] extremely limited" (Larmore et aI., 1977, p. 40), it seems
unlikely that MPD patients were feigning these differences.
There have been a few other studies of visual evoked responses. In a pre­
liminary study of two patients who had been successfully integrated using
hypnotherapy, B. G. Braun (1983a) found differences in the scalp topog­
raphy of the P l OO component of visual evoked responses between person­
alities and following the integrations. Pitblado and Cohen (1984) reported
"significant and longitudinally stable differences among the five personal­
ity states in amplitudes, latencies, and right-left asymmetries." Two other
 Psychophysiological Influence-173

(unpublished) studies similarly found "a significant personality effect on the

evoked potentials" (S. D. Miller & Triggiano, 1 992, p. 50).
More recent studies have involved contemporary neuroimaging tech­
niques, including mapping of EEG frequencies (Hughes, Kuhlman, Fich­
tner, & Gruenfeld, 1990), SPECT (Saxe, Vasile, Hill, Bloomingdale, &
Van der Kolk, 1 992), and PET (Reinders et al., 2003). Although the results
have again suggested reproducible differences between alter personalities
in individual patients, these studies can at best be considered preliminary
only, given the large number of problems that have yet to be satisfactorily
controlled. Nonetheless, discussion of the possible mechanisms and impli­
cations of physiological differences between alter personalities of MPD
patients has begun. F. W. Putnam (1991) outlined the five primary models
that have been proposed-namely, that alter personalities are the product
of: (1) an autohypnotic or trance-like state; (2) a functional disconnection
between the cerebral hemispheres; (3) epileptic-type seizures in the tempo­
ral lobes; (4) discrete psychophysiological and behavioral states produced by
mechanisms such as conditioning or state-dependent learning and memory;
and (5) feigning or role-playing. Putnam concluded that there is little if any
evidence thus far to support (2) or (3) and considerable evidence to refute (5).
The "most congruent" model to Putnam seems to be (4), although he also
pointed out, in support of (1), the relationship between hypnotizability and
clinical dissociation in adults.
Much of the neurophysiological evidence to date can, in fact, be viewed
as supporting a Myers-like view of alter personalities as the products of an
hypnotic-like state in which some "slackening of the centralising energy"
can start a process leading to "a new mnemonic chain" in which state­
dependent learning and memory can accrue and eventually form a new per­
sonality. Moreover, he believed, these "fresh combinations of our personal
elements . . . may be evoked, by accident or design, in a variety to which we
can at present assign no limit" (Myers, 1888a, pp. 383, 387). 28 Since Myers's
time, much more data has accumulated suggesting the high hypnotizability
of MPD patients (already well recognized in the late 19th century by Myers,
Charcot, Janet, and others), as well as in support of a Myers-like "behav­
ioral state model. . . that alter personalities represent discrete behavioral
states of consciousness with personality state-specific encoding of certain
types of memory, behavior, and psychophysiology" (F. W. Putnam, 1991, p.
499)-in short, that partly distinctive personalities can develop within the
same organism and influence it in somewhat divergent fashions.
The major remaining question, however, is not so much why, but how
these states form and, especially, how the accompanying physiological
changes are produced. The one finding on which probably all observers
of MPD can agree is the central role of emotion, and especially stress, in

28. Some of these conditions of "accident" and "design" which Myers suggests
can produce these new chains of consciousness include dreams, somnambulism,
automatic writing, trance, certain intoxications, hysteria, and hypnotism (Myers,
1 888a, p. 387; see also our Chapters 2 and 5).
174-Chapter 3

engendering and maintaining dissociative states; and certainly the general

importance of emotional states in altering both the autonomic and central
nervous systems is well known. It seems likely, therefore, that EEG, blood
flow, and GSR or other autonomic changes reflect the different emotional
states of the various personalities, because of changes in arousal, anxiety,
muscle tension, and the like that must accompany these emotional changes
(Coons, M ilstein, & Marley, 1982; F. W. Putnam et aI., 1990). Ludwig et al.
(1972), for example, found that psychophysiological changes are prominent
in "emotionally relevant areas" but "tend to disappear for most emotion­
ally neutral or non-affect-laden material" (p. 308). Mathew, Jack, and West
(1985) found marked changes in regional cerebral blood flow in the right
temporal lobe between alter personalities in two patients, and they sug­
gested that, because the right hemisphere plays an important role in general
in emotional states, it follows that it would play a similar role in dissociative
states.
Such explanations may well be correct for generalized physiological
changes, but the picture becomes more complicated when we encounter
more specific and selective changes, such as the vision changes found by
S. D. Miller and his colleagues, different allergic responses, anesthesias,
or state-specific stigmata-like reactions, all of which have been reported
repeatedly and for years. For such effects, researchers have so far suggested
only rather vague models involving some kind of inhibition of function. B.
G. Braun (1983b), for example, speculated that when patients do not show
an allergic reaction in one state that they have in others, this is because
"the final common pathway, the allergic response, can be blocked" (p. l 33).
Reinders et al. (2003) similarly suggested "an inability . . . to integrate visual
and somatosensory information," that is, a "'blocking' of trauma-related
information" (p. 21 22), and Forrest (2001) concluded that the orbitofrontal
cortex produces "a pattern of lateral inhibition between conflicting subsets
of self-representations which are normally integrated into a unified self" (p.
259).
But do such proposals really constitute an explanation of the mecha­
nism leading to specific physiological changes? Or are they merely redescrip­
tions of the original phenomena in more "modern," physiological terms? As
with studies of hysteria, scientists may be starting to close in on some neu­
ral correlates of some dissociative phenomena. But, once again, the larger
underlying problem is: How is the differential and often quite specific and
time-limited release of particular neurotransmitters, or the "blocking" of
somatosensory information, or the "lateral inhibition" between the various
states accomplished? This central problem, already serious enough in the
context of the spontaneously occurring phenomena I have discussed so far,
becomes even more serious when we consider psychophysiological changes
that are induced deliberately. I turn next to these.
 Psychophysiological Influence-175

Specific Physiological Effects Induced Deliberately

Deliberately induced changes in autonomic processes that are not ordinar­

ily under voluntary control have long been reported (Tuke, 1 884), particu­
larly in connection with yogic, Zen, or other meditative practices intended
to alter the ordinary influences of physical, and particularly sensory, pro­
cesses on consciousness.29 In this section, I will describe some of the auto­
nomic changes that have been observed and some proposed explanations,
concentrating especially on phenomena suggesting unusual kinds or levels
of deliberate, volitional control over autonomic processes.
I begin with two cases, reported in a medical journal and later described
by Dunbar (1954), that are reminiscent of cases I described earlier, such as
those of R. L. Moody (1946, 1948), in which a person remembering a trau­
matic experience developed marks or wounds on the skin corresponding to
injuries suffered during that experience. Dunbar described two people who
could apparently deliberately produce urticaria, or wheals on the skin. One
was a physician who had been "able from childhood to produce urticaria on
his arms and trunk 'by the strength of his will'." The other was "able, under
the eyes of the physician, to produce an urticarial wheal at any designated
spot on his forehead just 'by thinking about it,' without any previous touch­
ing of the spot" (p. 612).
Among the earliest studies describing deliberately induced autonomic
changes were several of persons who claimed to be able voluntarily to
increase their heart rate. The physician Tuke (1884, pp. 371-372) confirmed
the claim of an acquaintance that he could voluntarily increase his heart
rate 10 to 20 beats a minute; on the occasion that Tuke observed, his pulse
went from 63 to 82 in two minutes. Tuke was inclined to think "the mere
direction of the Attention to the heart is sufficient," but because few people
can accomplish this feat, it might have been more appropriate to suggest
that a focus of attention on the heart might be necessary, but certainly not
sufficient. Between 1872 and 1968 at least 18 more such cases were reported
in the scientific and medical literature. Favill and White (1917), for example,
reported Favill's own ability to increase his heart rate by 30 to 96 beats a
minute, the increase usually beginning immediately and reaching its peak
after "several beats." Another example is Luria's (1968) remarkable subject
S., who demonstrated for Luria his ability to control his heart rate by first
raising it to 100 from a resting state of 70 to 72 and then lowering it to 64 to
66 beats a minute. He said that he did the first by imagining himself running
to catch a train, and the second by imagining himself in bed trying to fall
asleep (p. 1 39). Most observers of these effects reported no correlation with
respiration rate, and most subjects could shed little light on how they were
able to produce them. Some reported, rather vaguely, exerting considerable

29. For a comprehensive bibliography of about 1 ,700 studies of physical and

psychological effects of meditation from 1931-1996, see M. Murphy and Donovan
(1997).
176-Chapter 3

mental effort. At least one person said specifically that he did not conjure
up appropriate imagery or emotion, but was able to raise his heart rate in
the same way-whatever that is-that one raises an arm: "It is probably no
more-and no less-mysterious than is, for example, the flexing of a biceps
muscle" (Ogden & Shock, 1939, p. 320; italics added).
I have added italics to this important sentence because, despite its
familiarity, volitional control of our muscular activity-how the intention
to raise an arm translates into the appropriate motor response-remains a
mystery, encapsulating the mind-body problem in its essence, and not magi­
cally erased by simply asserting that the intention and the response are both
brain processes. This point is underscored by the work of Basmajian (1977)
on voluntary control of single motor units in skeletal muscles. Specifically,
when provided with suitable auditory feedback derived from a fine-wire elec­
trode inserted into skeletal muscles (such as biceps), most subjects can rap­
idly learn to enhance selectively the activity of any given motor unit within
the area sampled by that electrode, while suppressing that of neighboring
units. Virtuoso subjects can not only raise or lower the overall rates at which
such isolated units generate motor potentials, but control their temporal
spacing as well, some even producing complex rhythmic sequences such as
"drum rolls" on demand. Two further points are especially significant here:
First, successful subjects have no idea whatever how they exercise this con­
trol; they simply learn to do so, much as an infant learns to control its limbs.
Second, the control in this case is certainly direct, as there is in general
no naturalistic situation a person might recreate in imagination that would
produce a corresponding specificity of motor unit behaviors.3D
The increased heart rate in the cases described above was usually
accompanied by other autonomic changes, such as a rise in blood pres­
sure and dilation of the pupils. Although these were normally involuntary
accompaniments, Tuke (1 884, pp. 375-377) also reported on two men each
of whom could "in the same light contract or dilate his pupil at will" and,
at least in one of the cases, "with as much facility as he can open and shut
his hand." One of these men produced the changes by imagining himself
in a bright or a dark place; but the other said specifically that he did not
use any such imagery. Similarly, Luria's subject S. showed a cochlear-pupil
reflex when he imagined a piercing sound and a depression of alpha waves
when he imagined that a strong light was flashing in his eyes (Luria, 1968,
p. 142).

30. There is also an enormous literature on the control of autonomic processes

through biofeedback training, such as the regulation of blood flow to the hand, and
hence hand temperature, in Raynaud's disease. (I will discuss later in the chapter
efforts to influence blood flow in Raynaud's disease by hypnotic suggestion.) Bio­
feedback studies are obviously relevant to understanding the relationship between
volition and physiological processes, but so as not to make this chapter even longer
than it already is, I will simply refer readers to sources such as Kamiya et al. (197 1),
Lehrer and Woolfolk (1 993), and G. E. Schwartz and Beatty (1977).
 Psychophysiological Influence-In

Yogis

I turn now to autonomic changes voluntarily induced by yogis or other

trained meditators. A frequent claim is that some yogis are able to survive
long periods of time in a meditative state without food, water, or even air.
Several studies have examined the hypothesis that they do this by lowering
their metabolism, one indication of which would be a decrease in heart rate
and hence in oxygen consumption. Although a lowered heart rate could be
presumed to be the result of the relaxation, at least one case suggested that
something more may be involved. Hoenig (1968) observed that, while the
yogi was in a meditative state (maintained in the experiments for up to nine
hours), there was an unusual pattern in his heart rate: It gradually decreased
from 100 to 40, and then gradually increased again to 100, in regular cycles
of 20 to 25 minutes. Despite the unusual pattern, Hoenig suggested that it
was probably "a by-product of relaxation of an extreme degree" (p. 88).
Some yogis have claimed that they can survive conditions of depriva­
tion not simply by lowering heart rate, but by stopping the heart altogether.
Again, Tuke (1884, pp. 372-373) provided examples of Westerners who have
made such claims; but when modern devices such as EEG and EKG allowed
better examination, in most cases it was found that the heart did not actu­
ally stop. The heart sounds and the pulse were reduced enough not to be
detectable by ordinary examination, and thus the heart seemed to have
stopped without actually having done so. This reduction was apparently
accomplished by some variation on the Valsalva maneuver, in which con­
traction of chest muscles, while holding the breath, puts pressure on the
heart. Again, however, the picture is not quite so simple because in at least
two cases EKG seemed to show that the heart had in fact stopped. McClure
(1 959) reported the case of a non-yogi in which EKG showed "slowing of
the sinus rate progressively to the point of sinus arrest for a period of a few
seconds" (p. 440). Moreover, no breath-holding or Valsalva maneuver was
observed; "the patient simply abolished all sympathetic tone by complete
mental and physical relaxation" (p. 441).
A much more extreme case, observed and reported by Kothari, Bor­
dia, and Gupta (1973a, 1 973b), involved a yogi who was confined to a small
underground pit for eight days, connected to an EKG with 12 leads "short
enough not to allow any movement" (1 973b, p. 1646). Almost immediately
after the pit was sealed, a significant sinus tachycardia developed and pro­
gressed until it reached 250 beats per minute, but without any sign of isch­
emia. This tachycardia continued for 29 hours when, suddenly and with
no prior slowing of the heart rate, "a straight-line had replaced the [EKG]
tracing" (p. 1647; a reproduction of the tracings is in the report). The inves­
tigators wanted to terminate the experiment, understandably fearing that
the yogi was dead, but his attendants insisted that it continue. The flat-line
state persisted for five more days until, half an hour before the experiment
was scheduled to end, sinus tachycardia again developed. This continued
for two hours after the yogi was removed from the pit, when his heart rate
l78-Chapter 3

finally returned to normal (98 beats per minute). The obvious explanation,
that the EKG leads had been disconnected, was ruled out, first because
the machine was immediately checked for any malfunctioning, but more
importantly because no electrical disturbance ever appeared, such as would
accompany the disconnection of the leads; subsequent attempts by the
investigators to disconnect the leads always produced "gross and irregular
electrical disturbance." Moreover, malfunction of the machine was highly
unlikely, since "the [EKG] re-appeared spontaneously on the last day" (p.
1649), an "extraordinary coincidence" if it had been a malfunction of the
machine (M. Murphy, 1992, p. 535).3 1 Having ruled out such explanations,
the authors candidly admitted that they were "not prepared" to accept that
the yogi had voluntarily stopped his heart for five days and survived; but
they could "offer no satisfactory explanation for the [EKG] record before
us" (p. 1649).
Other studies (Anand, Chhina, & Singh, 1961b; Hoenig, 1968; Karam­
belkar, Vinekar, & Bhole, 1968; Vakil, 1950) have also involved putting yogis
in underground pits, for periods ranging from hours to days, and observing
metabolic changes including oxygen intake and carbon dioxide output. Most
have shown a significant decrease in oxygen consumption, "much more than
what could be produced even by sleep" (Anand et aI., 1961b, p. 89), a finding
replicated in the studies by Wallace and Benson (Wallace, 1970; Wallace
& Benson, 1972) of Transcendental Meditation practitioners. Concurrently,
there is usually a significant decrease in carbon dioxide output.
Most investigators have concluded that yogis can survive these condi­
tions not only because of their reduced metabolism but also because "air­
tight" underground pits are not, in fact, airtight, even when sealed; oxygen
and other gases seep in from the surrounding earth. In one study (Anand et
aI., 1961b), however, the pit actually was airtight, not one dug in the earth
but a specially constructed metal box. In these conditions the yogi showed
that he could voluntarily "reduce his oxygen intake and carbon dioxide out­
put to levels significantly lower than his [ordinary] requirements" (p. 87).
Other physiological changes suggest even more direct control of auto­
nomic functions. Luria (1968, pp. 140-141) reported that S. deliberately
raised the temperature of one hand by 20 C and then immediately low­
ered the temperature on the other hand by I V2° C. He said that he did this
by imagining one hand being placed on a hot stove and the other being
immersed in cold water. Similarly, a yogi was reportedly able to induce an
1 1 0 F difference in the temperature of the left and right sides of the palm of
one hand, with the color of the skin changing to pink on the hot side and
grey on the cold side (M. Murphy, 1992, p. 532). Wenger and Bagchi (1961)
observed a yogi who could produce forehead perspiration within I V2-l 0
minutes o f being asked t o d o so; moreover, the temperature o n his forehead

3 1 . The sudden reappearance of the heart beat half an hour before the scheduled
end of the experiment also suggested an unusually precise internal clock, since the
yogi had been in complete isolation and darkness for eight days (M. Murphy, 1 992,
p. 535).
 Psychophysiological Influence-179

and on his arm was found to have risen. To warm himself while meditating
for long periods in cold mountain caves, he had taught himself to do this
by imagining himself in a warm place. Similarly, Benson et al. (1982) found
that three practitioners of g Tum-mo (or heat) yoga, who also learn to warm
themselves while meditating in cold Himalayan mountain conditions, could
deliberately and significantly raise the temperature of their fingers and toes,
by amounts ranging from 3.15° C up to 8.3° C.
Body temperature can apparently also be lowered. For example, the
yogi studied by Kothari et al. (1973b), who had such extreme and delib­
erately produced fluctuations in heart rate, including a straight-line EKG
for five days, had also induced a marked hypothermia. The investigators
reported that his body temperature was "abnormally cold" (34.8° C / 94.6°
F) when he was removed from the pit, and he shivered severely for two hours
afterward, although the temperature in the pit had been normal and com­
fortable (24-33° C) for the entire eight days (pp. 1648-1649).
Several hypotheses have been suggested for metabolic changes such as
these. Wenger and Bagchi (1961) suggested that the ability of the yogi who
could voluntarily produce perspiration on his forehead was "a conditioned
ANS response pattern to visual imagery based on reaction to the ambient
temperature in the caves" in which he meditated, which the authors estimated
was about 0° C (pp. 3 1 3-314). This argument seems rather circular, however,
since it is difficult to understand what produced the original, unconditioned
rise in local skin temperature that provided the basis for such conditioning.
Benson et al. (1982) said that the "most likely mechanism" was not control­
ling metabolism but controlling vasodilation, or blood flow (p. 235). Simi­
larly, Frederick and Barber (1972) concluded that "the principles involved,"
both in yogis and in hypnotized subjects (as I will discuss later), are "local­
ized vasoconstriction and vasodilation . . .induced by various types of sug­
gestions," whether from oneself or from another person. In other words,
"the process of vividly imagining cold water gives rise to vasoconstriction
and the process of vividly imagining warmth gives rise to vasodilation" (p.
860). However, as with most pronouncements that a response is the result
of "suggestion" or "imagining," such an "explanation" is no more than a
restatement of the phenomena in biological terms, and the deeper problem
still lurks: How are these hypothesized mechanisms activated in the first
place, particularly in instances of specific and localized, rather than general
or systemic, changes?

Specific Physiological Changes Induced by Hypnosis

I turn now to phenomena apparently induced at the "suggestion" of another

person; but it is important to keep in mind here Myers's definition of sugges­
tion as "successful appeal to the subliminal self" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 169) and its
implication that many phenomena ostensibly produced by suggestion from
1 80-Chapter 3

another person may in large part be attributable to auto- or self-sugges­

tion.
Psychophysiological changes have been deliberately induced most fre­
quently through hypnosis. (As we will see in the following pages, however,
many of the same phenomena have been produced by suggestions that did
not involve a formal hypnotic induction.) Like other phenomena discussed
in this chapter, hypnosis (and its predecessor, mesmerism) has a long, com­
plicated, and often contentious history, and there is an enormous literature
about it. The definitive history may be found in Gauld (1992). In this section
I will limit the discussion to an especially important aspect of hypnosis­
the localized and often quite specific physiological changes that have been
induced by hypnotic suggestion.
It is first important to emphasize, as have Myers and others, that hypno­
sis is much more than an entertaining oddity. Myers (1885c) considered hyp­
notism "as above all things a method ofpsychological experiment" (p. 64l n),
"an experimental method of reaching the subliminal self," and particularly
a "means of artificial displacement of the psycho-physiological threshold"
(Myers, l 89lb, p. 83). Others since Myers have echoed its importance. For
example, Bramwell (1903, p. 176) remarked that, although its therapeutic
use in surgery and medicine is necessarily limited because only a small
proportion of patients are sufficiently responsive to it, it is nonetheless of
great theoretical importance for both psychology and physiology. T. X. Bar­
ber (1984) said bluntly that because suggestion can produce physiological
changes, "the royal road to solving the mind-body problem involve[s] unrav­
eling the mystery of hypnosis" (p. 77).
Much of the research on hypnosis over the past century has revolved
around the question of whether hypnosis is a discrete "state" with its own
unique phenomena, or whether it is simply an extension or variation of nor­
mal states of consciousness and psychological processes associated with
suggestion. The variety of positions taken over the years on this question
has prompted a corresponding variety of attempted explanations for the
physiological changes induced by hypnosis, especially hypotheses about
the role of cortical inhibition or alterations in blood flow, and about the
central role of emotion, imagery, and belief. I will return to the question of
the adequacy of these explanations after I have provided some examples of
specific psychophysiological changes induced by hypnotic suggestion.32 In
the meantime, there are two important points to keep in mind. First, those
(like Barber) who have repeatedly argued that many phenomena produced
by hypnotic suggestion can also often be produced by non-hypnotic sugges­
tion or by voluntary efforts are certainly correct. One of the main points of
this chapter is, as Myers emphasized, the continuity and interrelationship
of phenomena such as I have been discussing, both with each other and
with other psychophysiological processes. We will see, therefore, that many

32. For reviews of such phenomena, see T. X. Barber ( 1961 , 1965, 1 978, 1984),
Crasilneck and Hall (1959), Gorton (1949), M. Murphy (1992, chap. 1 5), and Steven­
son ( 1 997, vol. 1 , pp. 56-68).
 Psychophysiological Influence-18 1

unusual phenomena described earlier, including stigmata and other skin

changes, changes in allergic reactions, sensory changes such as anesthesia
and analgesia, changes in heart rate and other autonomic functions, and
the healing effects associated with placebo, occur not only in waking states
involving intense emotion, imagery, or belief, but also with hypnosis. Hyp­
nosis may in some way facilitate these phenomena, but there seem to be no
phenomena absolutely unique to hypnosis.
The other crucial point to keep in mind is that effects seen in connec­
tion with hypnosis often go far beyond general systemic effects of stress or
relaxation, in terms of their specificity of location and other characteris­
tics, and that any adequate explanation must address this specificity. Many
theorists have contended that hypnosis is a simple extension of "normal"
psychological processes, produced by compliance with the experimenter's
instructions, "role-playing," or outright feigning.33 They have been able to
do so, however, only by confining their observations primarily to studies
involving the most elementary, commonplace phenomena, and conducted
with ordinary, even non-hypnotizable, subjects.34 I therefore dissent sharply
from the position taken by McDougall (1908). Contrasting himself with
those such as Myers who "fix their attention on the most strange and per­
plexing of the phenomena of hypnotism," McDougall regarded as "more
sober" and "more consistent with scientific principles" an approach that
"concentrate[s] attention upon the simplest and least astonishing of them"
(p. 242). I instead agree with Myers, who, as I pointed out in Chapter 2,
believed that confining one's observations to a narrow range can lead only
to a position that, lacking "width of purview," may be completely mislead­
ingY In this section, therefore, I will concentrate on the more rare, extreme
phenomena that are too often ignored in theorizing about hypnosis.
Most of the research on physiological effects of hypnosis, as well as
most of the extreme phenomena reported, have occurred in connection with
the effects of hypnosis on pain and on a variety of conditions involving the
skin. Before turning to these two primary areas, I will first mention briefly
some effects that have been induced by hypnosis on autonomic and sensory
processes.

Autonomic Effects

Many studies have examined changes induced by hypnosis in auto­

nomic functions such as glucose level, gastrointestinal effects, skin temper-

33. For a detailed discussion of this "sociocognitive" position, see Chapter 5.

34. This "college sophomore as subject" methodology has been a major factor in
the inadequacy of much psychological research and has led, in our view, to the trivi­
alization not only of hypnotic phenomena, but also of important areas of human
experience such as creativity, meditation, and mysticism (see also Chapters 7 and
8).
35. I remind readers here of "Wind's principle," quoted in the Introduction.
1 82�Chapter 3

ature, salivation, and heart rate, but the conclusion of most reviewers of the
phenomena has been that these changes are secondary results of changes in
emotional arousal (e.g., T. X. Barber, 1961 , 1965; Crasilneck & Hall, 1959;
Gorton, 1949; Reiter, 1965). In one patient, for example, temporary cardiac
arrest was induced by suggesting that the patient recall previous episodes of
fainting (Raginsky, 1959), an effect perhaps related to the emotion generated
by the memories. In another study, however, reminiscent of the deliberately
induced changes in heart rate among yogis and other persons, a dramatic
acceleration of heart rate was induced by hypnosis, an effect apparently
induced directly and not by any suggested or accompanying emotions (van
Pelt, 1 965).
I mentioned earlier some cases of multiple personality disorder in which
the subject, while exhibiting the personality of a young child, showed physi­
ological effects appropriate to that age: In one case, the child personality
had a childhood eye muscle disorder that disappeared in the adult person­
alities, and in another the older personalities had myopia, whereas two child
personalities did not (S. D. Miller, 1989). A similar age-specific alteration in
myopia was induced hypnotically by Erickson (1943). An even more impor­
tant study was reported by Gidro-Frank and Bowersbuch (1948), in which
three subjects, regressed to the age of about five to six months and below,
consistently exhibited the Babinski reflex, a reflex that is produced by strok­
ing the sole of an infant's foot, and that normally disappears and gradu­
ally changes to a different kind of reflex by the age of about one year. The
Babinski reflex appeared spontaneously, with no specific suggestion for it by
the experimenters and in subjects unaware of its existence and properties.
One reviewer (Gorton, 1949) commented shortly after the publication of
this study that it was "the best single piece of evidence available at present
to support the thesis that hypnotic suggestion properly administered to suit­
able subjects can bring about psychobiological changes in the total organ­
ism which are impossible of attainment in the waking state" (p. 478; italics
added).
Another interesting case involving autonomic changes is related to the
phenomenon of false pregnancy, discussed earlier. Its subject, a male under­
going hypnotherapy in an attempt to quit smoking, was on one occasion
given the suggestion to imagine himself as the person he would like to be.
Instead of imagining himself as a non-smoker-presumably the hypnotist's
intention-he imagined himself as a pregnant woman. A homosexual whose
partner had recently died, he had long thought of himself as a woman and
had wished he could bear a child. After the initial suggestion by the hypno­
therapist, the patient continued on a daily basis to produce vivid imagery of
himself as a pregnant woman, and by the time he came to a hospital three
months later, he had an enlarged abdomen, morning nausea, nipple secre­
tion, and "noticeable" enlargement of one breast (D. Barrett, 1988).
A related series of studies similarly suggests that strong imagery in con­
nection with suggestion can contribute to structural changes in the body.
In these studies 70 women who wished to increase the size of their breasts
 Psychophysiological lnfluence-183

were given several relevant suggestions while in a hypnotic trance. They

were instructed, for example, to feel sensations of warmth and tingling in
their breasts and to visualize themselves as they wished to look. Nearly all
the women succeeded to some extent in increasing their breast size, with
an average increase across the studies of 1 Y2-2 inches.36 Moreover, one of
the researchers (Willard, 1 977) found that those women who could "obtain
visual imagery, quickly, easily, and a large percent of the time that they
attempted it" had the greatest success (p. 197). T. X. Barber (1978) proposed
that "this kind of focused, believed-in thinking, imaging, and visualizing
can lead to increased blood flow to the breasts which, in turn, could stimu­
late breast development" (p. 20). As with many explanations this sounds
at least vaguely plausible, but it is in fact only a description of a possible
mediating mechanism. It is in no way an explanation of how imagery sets in
motion the specific and focused blood flow necessary to produce the imag­
ined result.

Sensory Effects

For more than two centuries there have been frequent reports of sensory
changes, in all modalities, that occur as a result of hypnotic (or mesmeric)
suggestion. These include, for example, increased acuity of senses (hyper­
aesthesia) and hallucinations (whether positive ones, to perceive something
for which there was no physical stimulus, or conversely negative ones, not
to perceive something). The philosopher Henri Bergson reported in 1876 a
case of hyperaesthesia in which the ability of a hypnotized boy to identify
"clairvoyantly" a playing card being looked at by the experimenter turned
out instead to be an ability to see the card reflected in the experimenter's eye
(HP, vol. 1, pp. 477-479). More recent if less dramatic studies have demon­
strated improvements of visual acuity with hypnosis in highly hypnotizable
subjects (e.g., Davison & Singleton, 1967; Kline, 1952-1953; Weitzenhoffer,
1 95 1). Other people, however, have noted that similar improvements can be
induced by suggestion only, not accompanied by hypnosis (e.g., Sheehan,
Smith, & Forest, 1982). They have thus attributed such feats, not to some
special ability associated with the hypnotic "state," but to processes such
as increased (or decreased) attention to stimuli or to feigning or "role-play­
ing" (whether deliberate or not) in compliance with the hypnotist's instruc­
tions. To address this issue, much emphasis has been placed on examining
more objective changes, especially changes not ordinarily under volitional
control.
For example, changes in normal dilation or contraction of the pupils
during hypnosis have occasionally been reported. One of the earliest to
observe this was the surgeon Esdaile (1 846), who described several occa­
sions in which the pupils of a hypnotized patient remained dilated even

36. For references to these studies see T. X. Barber ( 1978) and M. Murphy (1992,
pp. 336-337).
1 84-Chapter 3

when exposed to ful l Indian sunlight: "The muscles of the eye, and iris, . . .
lose their contractibility, and the eye becomes as motionless and insensible
to light as that of a dead man" (pp. 46, 82-83). Similarly the French physi­
cian Fere reported that the pupils of two hysterical patients contracted and
dilated appropriately in response to a suggestion given in the "cataleptic"
(or deep hypnotic) state, but not to the same suggestions when they were
in a normal state (Tuke, 1 884, p. 377). More recently, Schwarz, Bickford,
and Rasmussen (1955) found that in two of three subjects who responded
to a hypnotic suggestion of total blindness, the pupils became "much more
dilated and sluggish in their reaction to light" (p. 567). More dramatically,
Erickson (1977) reported "subjects who would dilate the pupil of one eye
and contract the pupil of the other in hypnotic trance, when looking at the
same light" (p. 9). Unfortunately, he published no detailed report of these
observations; but he did describe (1965) the case of one girl who could pro­
duce unilateral pupillary responses even when not hypnotized, reminiscent
of the three subjects reported by Tuke and Luria (discussed earlier) who
could voluntarily control pupil contraction or dilation. Significantly, this
girl was "an excellent hypnotic subject"; she had extensive experience with
producing suggested visual hallucinations, and she was also "remarkably
competent in developing autohypnotic trances to obliterate pain."
Whether changes of these sorts have been induced by hypnosis or by non­
hypnotic suggestion, our oft-repeated question remains: How? To say that
it is simply a matter of voluntarily, or even involuntarily, diverted attention
(see, e.g., T. X. Barber, 1961; McPeake, 1968) demonstrates the inadequacy
of explanations that deal only with the more commonplace phenomena. The
hypothesis of diverted attention becomes somewhat strained when one con­
siders a report in which a hypnotized subject did not react "even when a
pistol was discharged close beside him" (Esdaile, 1846, p. 278). Perhaps the
important diverted attention here is not that of the subject from the relevant
stimulus, but that of the theoretician from the relevant phenomena.
Recent imaging studies seem to be moving us in the direction of see­
ing hypnosis more comprehensively, neither as a mere extension of normal
capacities nor as a discrete and homogeneous altered "state" associated
with unique phenomena, but instead as a means of facilitating-in ways
still unknown-physiological changes that go far beyond those producible
by simple imagining or role-playing. For example, two recent PET studies of
hypnotically induced hallucinations (Kosslyn, Thompson, Costantini-Fer­
rando, Alpert, & Spiegel, 2000; Szechtman, Woody, Bowers, & Nahmias,
1 998) both found changes in regional cerebral blood flow consistent with
what is seen during "real" sensory perception, but unlike the changes seen
with nonhypnotic imagery. As the authors of one of these studies concluded,
"hypnosis is a psychological state with distinct neural correlates and is not
just the result of adopting a role" (Kosslyn et al., 2000, p. 1279).
Autonomic and sensory changes such as I have been discussing present
a significant enough challenge for those seeking to develop an adequate the­
oretical understanding of hypnosis and suggestion. When we examine the
 Psychophysiological Influence-IS5

phenomena of hypnotic analgesia and effects involving the skin, we encoun­

ter even more serious challenges.

Hypnotic Analgesia

Hypnosis-or, more properly in this context, mesmerism-developed

primarily as a therapeutic tool in late 18th- and early 19th-century medi­
cine, but observers quickly realized that perhaps its most powerful medical
use, in the days before chemical anesthesia, was as a means of reducing and
even eliminating the severe pain that otherwise accompanied every surgical
procedure. The heyday of mesmeric analgesia occurred between 1829, when
a cancerous breast was removed from a mesmerized patient who showed
no signs of pain and no changes in pulse or breathing during the surgery,
and 1854, when a similar surgery was performed in the presence of several
observing physicians (see Gauld, 1988). By far the most surgeries carried out
in conjunction with mesmerism were performed by James Esdaile in Bengal
between 1845 and 1851. These surgeries included amputations of breasts,
limbs, and penises, as well as less severe operations, but the largest number
(161) were for removal of often enormous (up to 80 pounds) scrotal tumors,
a condition distressingly common in those days in Bengal. Even after the
introduction of chemical anesthesia in the mid-19th century, which quickly
superseded the need for any other kind in most cases, mesmeric or hypnotic
analgesia continued to be used occasionally, especially in situations when
a chemical agent might have been dangerous. Bramwell (1903, chap. 9), for
instance, described numerous cases of his own as well as those of other
physicians, particularly for the removal of teeth (an excruciatingly painful
procedure without anesthesia), but also for eye surgery, removal of tonsils
and uterine and breast tumors, and childbirth. Even in more recent years,
numerous painless surgeries under hypnosis have been reported (for a list of
32 reports of such surgeries between 1 955 and 1974, see Hilgard & Hilgard,
197511983, p. 1 34).
As with hypnosis in general, attempts to explain hypnotic analgesia
have fal len primarily into two camps, which can be roughly described as
(1) physiological theories that seek an explanation in terms of changes in
the brain, especially the inhibition of memory, attention, or perceptual pro­
cesses; and (2) psychological theories that seek an explanation in terms of
normal psychological processes such as expectation, relaxation and anxi­
ety reduction, or "role-playing" enacted in compliance with the social or
interpersonal context. These two groups of theories are by no means mutu­
ally exclusive. Nevertheless, the acceptance of hypnotic analgesia has been
hindered by the frequent contention that hypnosis has not really produced
analgesia, but has only prompted subjects to adopt a variety of strategies
either for coping with the pain or for hiding it from observers. Thus, as with
other phenomena I have been discussing, some investigators have tried to go
1 86-Chapter 3

beyond relying on verbal reports of patients and have sought more objective
physiological indicators of pain, or the lack of it.
Even as early an investigator as Esdaile had gone beyond the almost
invariable verbal reports of his patients that they had felt no pain, and also
beyond the observations by himself and numerous others that patients had
endured the surgeries without showing overt behavioral signs of pain. He
also reported that, in addition to the behavioral signs, physiological signs
of pain-ones not readily amenable to volitional control, such as changes in
pulse rate or pupil reaction-were absent. Decades later, other investigators
began again to look at objectively measurable changes such as galvanic skin
response, facial flinching, respiration and pulse, vasomotor changes, and
pupil changes (for a review, see Gorton, 1949, pp. 468-473).
The recent emergence of brain imaging techniques has led to renewed
interest in identifying physiological markers for, and explanations of, hyp­
notic analgesia (for a review, see Crawford, Knebel, & Vendemia, 1998). One
early study (Goldstein & Hilgard, 1975), confirmed by later ones, weakened
the hypothesis that hypnotic analgesia, like placebo analgesia, might result
from the release of endogenous opioids: The analgesia persisted even after
the injection of naloxone, which blocks opioid release. More recent studies,
however, have begun to suggest other possible neurological mechanisms.
D. Spiegel, Bierre, and Rootenberg (1989), for example, found changes in
somatosensory cortical event-related potentials following hypnotic sugges­
tions-but only among highly hypnotizable subjects-leading them to sug­
gest (rather vaguely) that hypnotic analgesia involves "alterations in per­
ceptual processing" (p. 753). Since then, other researchers have reported
changes in event-related potentials in the anterior frontal cortex (Crawford,
Knebel, Kaplan, et aI., 1998; Kropotov, Crawford, & Polyakov, 1997).
In what one commentator (Gracely, 1995) called "a pivotal study" in
the controversy between social-psychological and physiological schools of
thought, Kiernan, Dane, Phillips, and Price (1995) found that a spinal pain
reflex (the RIll) was reduced when hypnosis was effective in reducing pain,
leading the authors to conclude that "hypnotic sensory analgesia is at least
partly mediated by. . . mechanisms in the spinal cord" (p. 44). The picture
was complicated, however, by a study that measured RIll, somatosensory
evoked potentials, changes in spontaneous background EEG, and auto­
nomic responses (heart rate and respiration). Although all 18 highly hypno­
tizable subjects reported significant reduction of pain and showed changes
in the RIll spinal reflex, for some of the subjects the spinal reflex decreased
in connection with the hypnotic analgesia, whereas in the rest it increased.
The authors could only suggest that there must be individual differences in
mechanisms for modulating pain (N. Danziger et aI., 1998).
Still other neuroimaging studies support the emerging concept that
multiple brain regions contribute differentially to the experience of pain
(and thus to hypnotic analgesia), and that these "are highly interactive"
(Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997, p. 970). Using hypno­
sis as a tool to differentiate these regions, researchers have begun to suggest
 Psychophysiological Influence-I87

that the sensory and discriminative aspects of painful stimuli are handled
primarily by somatosensory cortex, whereas aspects of emotional response,
such as judgments of pain unpleasantness, are handled by anterior cingu­
late cortex and related frontal structures (Faymonville et ai., 2000; Rain­
ville, Carrier, Hofbauer, Bushnell, & Duncan, 1 997, 1999). Hypnotic anal­
gesia may therefore in part involve a functional dissociation between these
normally cooperating parts of the brain, which in turn enables a blunting of
the pain experience.
Although research on the neurophysiology of hypnotic analgesia (and
of hypnosis in general) is becoming a robust activity, two major questions
remain. The first, asked repeatedly throughout this chapter, is-how does
it occur? Over a century ago, neurophysiologists were already suggesting
that hypnosis involves the inhibition of higher cortical centers, and most
neurophysiological theories since then have suggested one or another cor­
tical or subcortical process as being inhibited or otherwise blocked from
functioning normally during hypnosis. But how is this inhibition effected?
What sets in motion the complex and specific processes involved in, say,
complete analgesia of the right forearm or a left lower wisdom tooth? Some
neurophysiologists have recently begun to recognize, as Myers (1886a)
already had, that hypnosis involves more than "inhibitory cerebral action"
(p. xlii). Crawford, Knebel, and Vendemia (1998) have suggested that hyp­
notic analgesia requires the "activation of a supervisory attentional control
system . . .involving the anterior frontal cortex" (pp. 22, 29). But, again, what
activates this "supervisory control system," and how does it know to release
the relevant neurochemicals, or block the relevant neural pathways, or do
whatever else is required to produce the desired result?
The second primary question lurking behind all the numerous and var­
ied studies of hypnotic analgesia over the past century is prompted by the
uneasy feeling that should be felt by anyone who has paid sufficient atten­
tion to what has actually been reported in connection with mesmeric and
hypnotic analgesia-specifically, a feeling that somewhere along the way
we have missed the boat, or, perhaps more precisely, that scientists have
become so focused on the minor leaks in the hold that they have failed to go
on deck and see the typhoon bearing down on the boat. I am referring here
to the question of how adequate all proposed theories-neurological as well
as psychological-are to account for the more extreme phenomena that have
repeatedly been reported by qualified medical observers. For many people,
there is "astonishment" when reading reports of these phenomena, because
they challenge the belief "that hypnotic states are really no more than states
of heightened awareness or attentiveness [or] states of conscious conformity
and obedience" (Robinson, 1977, p. xxvi). The usual response of such people
is simply to dismiss the reports as "anecdotes" that can be ignored in light
of more "rigorous" experimental and clinical studies (Spanos & Chaves,
1989). This is bad enough, but it is even more intellectually irresponsible to
distort and misrepresent what was actually reported, as T. X. Barber (1963)
does to Esdaile's reports. Barber suggests that Esdaile's patients "may not
I88-Chapter 3

have been free of anxiety and pain," because they "moved" or "gave a cry."
He fails to mention, however, that such signs were extremely infrequent, as
Esdaile himself reported, or that such signs of "moving" or "moaning" also
occur occasionally in connection with chemical anesthesias such as ether,
chloroform, or nitrous oxide (Gauld, 1988, p. 21). Moreover, Esdaile recog­
nized that some patients were less responsive to suggestion than others, and
may have felt some pain, and thus he soon introduced measures to ensure
that a patient was adequately analgesic before proceeding with the surgery.
Moreover, as Bramwell (1903) and others have pointed out, there is a
vast difference between (in Bramwell's terms) the "pinprick" involved in
most experimental studies and the "faradic brush" (an extremely painful
DC electrical stimulus) involved in other situations (p. 94). Most contempo­
rary experimental studies use relatively minor and brief pain stimuli (under­
standably, given ethical considerations). The reports of surgical procedures,
however, are quite another matter. There are, as I mentioned earlier, numer­
ous reports of major surgeries, including amputations. Gauld (1988) points
out that one response of some contemporary theorists has been to suggest
that "the pain caused by surgical procedures is not as great as is commonly
supposed"; but he cautions us to recognize that "it is easy, in these comfort­
able days, to forget what pre-anaesthetic surgery was like for the patient"
(pp. 20-21).37
A few examples, selected from numerous similar ones, should illus­
trate the kind of extreme phenomena that need to be accounted for, and not
dismissed cavalierly as "anecdotes," fabrications, or exaggerations. Moll
(1901) cites "a cynical experiment of the American physician, Dr. Little,
who thrust a needle through the cornea of a subject whom he suspected
of simulation" (p. 1 1 3). A dental surgeon reported operating on several of
Bramwell's hypnotized patients, extracting in all about 40 teeth, including a
young girl's "two left lower molars, which were decayed down to a level with
the alveolus, with pulps exposed; also two right lower molar stumps, and
a lower bicuspid: all difficult teeth" (Bramwell, 1903, pp. 162-163). Mason
(1955b) reported the case of a woman who had two impacted wisdom teeth
extracted under hypnosis, involving an incision in the gum and removal of
bone by chisels. Later, also under hypnosis alone, she had a follow-up surgi­
cal bilateral mammoplasty in which scars, skin, breast tissue, and fat were
cut out and the breasts completely reshaped. This procedure took 70 min­
utes, during which time she showed no sign of pain or shock. She later said
that she felt and remembered nothing.

37. Darwin, who ultimately rejected a medical career in part because of his
inability to tolerate the suffering he witnessed, reminds us of this: "[I] attended on
two occasions the operating theatre in the hospital at Edinburgh, and saw two very
bad operations, one on a child, but I rushed away before they were completed. Nor
did I ever attend again, for hardly any inducement would have been strong enough
to make me do so; this being long before the blessed days of chloroform. The two
cases fairly haunted me for many a long year" (Darwin, 1 892/1958, p. 1 2).
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-1 89

One of Esdaile's nearly 300 surgeries illustrates in particularly vivid

detail that we are not here talking about the "pinpricks" of most contem­
porary experimental studies.38 The case was that of a man who for two
years had suffered from "a tumour in the antrum maxillare; the tumour has
pushed up the orbit of the eye, filled up the nose, passed into the throat, and
caused an enlargement of the neck" (Esdaile, 1846, p. 147). Although the
patient proved difficult to mesmerize, Esdaile finally succeeded in doing so.
Then, he reports,

I performed one of the most severe and protracted operations in surgery. . . .

I put a long knife i n at the corner o f his mouth, and brought the point out
over the cheek-bone, dividing the parts between; from this, I pushed it
through the skin at the inner corner of the eye, and dissected the cheek
back to the nose. The pressure of the tumour had caused the absorption of
the anterior wall of the antrum, and on pressing my fingers between it and
the bones, it burst, and a shocking gush of blood, and brain-like matter,
followed. The tumour extended as far my fingers could reach under the
orbit and cheek-bone, and passed into the gullet-having destroyed the
bones and partition of the nose . . . .The man never moved, nor showed any
signs of life, except an occasional indistinct moan.J9 (pp. 148-149)

With this description firmly in mind, consider now this statement by T.

X. Barber (1963), who purports to explain hypnotic analgesia in terms of the
patient's "motivation for denial of pain":

[He] has often formed a close relationship with the physician-hypnotist

and would like to please him or at least not to disappoint him . . . . [He] is
aware that if he states that he suffered, he is implying that the physician's
time and energy were wasted and his efforts futile . . . . this may at times be
sufficient for him to try to inhibit overt signs of pain such as moaning,
wincing, or restlessness . . . . [The patients] "bravely made no signs of suffer­
ing at all." (pp. 306-308)

38. T. X. Barber (1963) contemptuously dismisses those who "almost always rel[y]
heavily on Esdaile's series" in support of their contention that truly painless surger­
ies have been performed under hypnotic analgesia alone (p. 316). Similarly, Spanos
and Chaves ( 1989) "view with alarm the retreat to nineteenth century anecdotes"
(p. 1 3 1). I make no apologies for being another who is profoundly impressed with
Esdaile's reports. I can only wonder at the intransigence of those who simply dis­
miss reports that run counter to their beliefs, and moreover in doing so grossly mis­
represent them. Furthermore, the suggestion that such reports are limited to one
reporter or to the 19th century or any other "pre-modern" or "pre-scientific" period
is simply false (again, see Hilgard & H i lgard, 197511983, p. 1 34).
39. A "moan," no doubt, that was behind Barber's dismissal of this case as not
being truly painless-but as Esdaile commented later, "he declares most positively,
that he knew nothing that had been done to him . . . -and I presume he knows best"
(p. 1 50).
1 90-Chapter 3

It seems hardly necessary to point out the utter insufficiency of such

"explanations" for cases like those of Esdaile.40 Perhaps those who suggest
that the pain is not as severe as we might imagine, or explain hypnotic anal­
gesia in terms such as "role-playing" or "bravely" hiding their pain, would
be willing to test their theories by submitting themselves to removal of a
tooth, amputation of a leg, or probing of an exposed sciatic nerve with­
out chemical anesthesia. The juxtaposition of Esdaile's report and Barber's
explanation should demonstrate unequivocally the danger of relying too
heavily, when theorizing about these or any other phenomena, on labora­
tory experiments divorced from real-life situations.

Skin Conditions: Healing

Many of the most profound analgesic effects of hypnosis have been

obtained in situations involving severe trauma to the skin, such as surgery
or burns (Dahinterova, 1967; Ewin, 1979; Hammond, Keye, & Grant, 1983,
p. 56). Dunbar (1 954) commented on the importance of the skin as a means
of expressing emotion through physical symptoms. She surmised that, as
"the boundary between the self and the outer world, the skin . . . seems to
be peculiarly susceptible to suggestion" (p. 647). Not surprisingly, there­
fore, the other major area in which hypnosis and mesmerism have produced
striking physiological responses has involved various skin conditions. In this
context it has been used both to heal or remove such conditions and to pro­
duce conditions that were not already present. I will begin with the former,
noting particularly what Sulzberger and Wol f (1934) pointed out long ago,
that "dermatology [was] one of the first branches of medicine to recognize
officially the curative powers of suggestion on organic ailments," because
the effects were clear-cut: "lichen planus, psoriasis, warts, and dermatoses
in general are either present, clearly visible, tangible and palpable-or they
are gone" (p. 552). Results, in short, are objective.

Allergies
In a massive review of psychological factors in both the etiology and
the treatment of skin diseases, Dunbar (1 954, chap. 14) discussed the impor­
tance of emotion in connection with allergies, and she cited in particular
a 1 931 experimental study in which reactions to an allergen were signifi­
cantly reduced or increased in response to hypnotic suggestion (pp. 628-

40. Such explanations are also not new. In a book ful l of reports of cases like
Esdaile's, Elliotson (1843) described the amputation of a leg, in words as graphic as
Esdaile's, and the subsequent reaction of a surgeon that "the man had been trained
to it" and "had disciplined himself to bear pain without expressing his feelings" (pp.
7, 8). Like others since then, however, the skeptical surgeon ignored some crucial
details, such as the report that during the surgery the "divided end of his sciatic
nerve was . . . poked with the points of a forceps, and he gave no sign of suffering"
(p. I I).
 Psychophysiological I nfluence-191

629). Decades later T. X. Barber (1984) concluded that "abnormally reactive

(allergic) skin responses to pollen, house dust, tuberculin, and many other
allergens can be reduced and at times totally blocked by suggestions not
to react," particularly among highly hypnotizable persons (p. 75). Mason
(1960), for example, reported that the lesions caused by skin allergies were
improved in eight of nine patients by hypnotic suggestion. Among the most
interesting studies, however, have been those in which allergic reactions to
a skin test have been abolished. Mason and Black (1958) reported a case in
which not only the patient's symptomatic signs of asthma and hay fever,
but also her reactions to a skin test with the allergens that had previously
affected her were abolished. Mason (1 960) also reported a case in which he
injected both of a patient's arms with tuberculin, but told the patient that
one arm was being injected with water only. The skin reaction, as indicated
by the Mantoux test, was inhibited in that arm, but normal in the other arm.
Several weeks later, the test was repeated, with the experimental ("water"­
injected) and control (tuberculin-injected) arms being reversed, and again
the reaction was inhibited only in the arm that the patient believed had been
injected with water (p. 336).
Black, Humphrey, and Niven (1 963) extended this study to four more
Mantoux-positive patients, this time evaluating not only the observed swell­
ing and redness but also skin biopsies. Again, there was significant reduction
in the overt symptoms, but no changes were found in the cellular patterns
in biopsy specimens. They concluded that the reactions to hypnotic sugges­
tion took place, not at the cellular level, but at the level at which fluids are
exuded, suggesting "a vascular constituent. . .in the mechanism of inhibi­
tion" (p. 1652). Similarly, in a review years earlier of hypnosis and allergies,
Gorton (1 949, pp. 337-339) had suggested that the effect was on the "cutane­
ous reaction" and not on the underlying "allergic constitution."
In a more recent study (Laidlaw, Booth, & Large, 1996), 32 of 38 sub­
jects were able to reduce significantly the size of skin wheals produced in
reaction to a histamine solution when exposed to a hypnotic-like procedure
involving relaxation, imagination, and visualization.41

Bleeding
Hypnotic suggestion has also been successful in controlling bleeding,
an especially important use for hemophiliacs. Myers (HP, vol. 1, p. 490)
had called attention to this phenomenon, particularly in connection with a
case in which a young boy was cured of "a most desperate case of hremor­
rhagy." But possibly the best-known case is that involving the Russian
monk Rasputin, who was said to have been able to stop the bleeding of
the hemophiliac son of the Czar by hypnotic suggestion (Stevenson, 1997,
vol. 1, p. 58). Blood flow has also been slowed or stopped in an effort to

41 . The subjects had been chosen randomly, all had comparable reactions
to the histamine solution in a pretest, and all were given a hypnotic susceptibility
scale, but there was no relationship between hypnotizability and the response of the
skin reaction to the hypnotic suggestion (p. 245).
192�Chapter 3

promote healing. McCord (1968) reported that, in a patient whose frequent

and severe nosebleeds had responded only "poorly" to conventional treat­
ments, a single hypnotic suggestion ("given . . .in a definite and purposeful
manner") stopped the bleeding entirely, at least up to a three-month fol­
lowup. Clawson and Swade (1975) reported immediately stopping the bleed­
ing of a severe laceration. Bleeding that does not involve the skin has also
been stopped, for example with severe gastrointestinal bleeding from ulcers
(Bishay, Stevens, & Lee, 1984; L. E. Fredericks, 1967). Perhaps the most
common use, however, has been to control bleeding in dental surgery, par­
ticularly with hemophiliacs (for reviews, see T. X. Barber, 1984, pp. 95-96;
Crasilneck & Hall, 1959, pp. 1 5-16).
Hypnosis has also been used to increase blood flow. I noted earlier in the
chapter reports that yogis could raise or lower the temperature in a hand,
sometimes unilaterally. Similar results have been obtained with hypnosis
(see T. X. Barber, 1 978; Conn & Mott, 1984; McGuirck, Fitzgerald, Fried­
mann, Oakley, & Salmon, 1998; HP, vol. 1, p. 491). Because altered blood
flow produces such temperature changes, a few investigators have asked
whether hypnotic suggestion could help patients suffering from Raynaud's
Disease, a painful condition caused by low peripheral blood flow, usually to
the fingers or toes. Grabowska (1971) and Conn and Mott (1984) reported
significant increases in blood flow in four patients, and Crasilneck and Hall
(1975, pp. 1 27-128) reported that among 48 patients whom they had treated
between 1 950 and 1975, there was remission or marked improvement in
about 60%.

Burns
In light of studies such as these showing that hypnotic suggestion can
affect blood flow to specific sites (T. X. Barber, 1978, 1984), the hypothesis
that healing of wounds might be accelerated by hypnosis seems more than
plausible. In one study (Ginandes, Brooks, Sando, Jones, & Aker, 2003),
for example, surgical incision wounds healed faster in a hypnotic sugges­
tion group than in two control groups. In addition to-or perhaps because
of-its effectiveness as an analgesic, hypnotic suggestion has also been used
successfully to promote healing of severe burns. Most of the reports have
been of clinical cases, such as that of Ewin (1979), who reported that 1 3 of
14 severely burned patients "healed rapidly and without scarring," includ­
ing a man whose right leg had briefly been immersed up to the knee in 9500
C (17500 F) molten aluminum. The 14th patient had "scoffed at the idea" of
hypnosis, perhaps contributing to a self-fulfilling lack of effect.
Few controlled studies have been conducted, but in 1983 some prelimi­
nary findings were reported (Hammond et aI., 1983; Margolis, Domangue,
Ehleben, & Shrier, 1983; Moore & Kaplan, 1983). Two of these provided sug­
gestive results consistent with accelerated healing, but the results in the third
(Moore & Kaplan, 1983) were even more impressive. The patients served as
their own controls in that each had suffered similar burns on both sides of
the body (usually both hands), and the hypnotic suggestion was directed
 Psychophysiological Influence-193

at one side only, randomly chosen. Four of the five patients "demonstrated
clearly accelerated healing on the treated side," as judged by a physician
unaware of which side had been treated. The fifth patient had temperature
increases and rapid healing on both sides, and among the other four patients,
after about the third day of treatment, there was no further acceleration in
the difference between the two sides. However, there was surely motivation
in the patients-understandably-to heal both sides and not conform to the
experimental protocol to heal just one, and the authors pointed out some
evidence suggesting this explanation of the results (p. 17).

Warts
Another situation in which hypnotic healing of a skin condition has
been studied involves the treatment of warts. "Old-wives" remedies have
been numerous, varied, and persistent for centuries. Such methods have
included passing the warts to someone else by means of a knotted ribbon
(Gravitz, 1981, p. 282), rubbing the warts with beef stolen from a butch­
er's shop (Tuke, 1884, pp. 403-404), or making a drawing of the warts and
then burning the paper (Sulzberger & Wolf, 1934). "There are as many such
methods as there are lands and customs" (Sulzberger & Wol f, 1934, p. 553),
and the common element, clearly, is suggestion. As we have seen through­
out this chapter, suggestion and accompanying psychological reactions can
have profound effects in the absence of specific hypnotic induction tech­
niques; and the removal of warts is no exception.
Dunbar (1954, chap. 14) said that the contribution of psychological fac­
tors to the etiology as well as cure of warts is "a subject. ..which illustrates
particularly well certain phases of medical thinking," because folk treat­
ments have "always" been around, but physicians ignored the phenomena
until Bloch "had the moral courage and scientific objectivity to take up
these matters and investigate them systematically" (pp. 623-624). She was
referring here to the German physician Bloch, who in the 1920s developed
an elaborate procedure in which patients were blindfolded and their warts
exposed to the (non-existent) "X-rays" from a noisy and intimidating-look­
ing machine. The warts were then painted with a topical treatment (actually,
only a dye) and the patient warned not to touch the warts or wash off the
"medicine" until it had faded. Bloch became famous for his successful cures
of warts. In a group of 179 patients who were followed up, 31% were cured
after the first treatment, and 78.5% overall were eventually cured. More­
over, the cures occurred usually within weeks, even though many of the
patients had had their warts for months or even years, and previous medical
treatments had been unsuccessful (T. X. Barber, 1984, p. 80; Sulzberger &
Wolf, 1 934, pp. 553-554). After Bloch, "the treatment of warts by suggestion
[became] more or less respectable" (Dunbar, 1954, p. 624), and references
to subsequent instances of successful treatment of warts by non-hypnotic
suggestion can be found in several reviews (e.g., Sulzberger & Wolf, 1934;
Surman, Gottlieb, Hackett, & Silverberg, 1973; Ullman, 1959).
1 94-Chapter 3

A few investigators have compared the efficacy of hypnotic and non­

hypnotic suggestion. The first such study was by R. F. Q. Johnson and Bar­
ber (1 978), who gave the same suggestions to a group exposed to an hypnotic
induction procedure and to another group instructed in "focused contem­
plation." Three of 1 1 patients in the hypnotic group were cured, as opposed
to none of the "focused contemplation" group. Because these numbers were
so small, Spanos and his colleagues attempted to replicate and extend these
findings. In one experiment the hypnosis group did better than either a pla­
cebo or a no-treatment group. In a second experiment both a group given
an hypnotic suggestion and a group given a suggestion without hypnotic
induction did better than a control group (Spanos, Stenstrom, & Johnston,
1988). In a third experiment the hypnosis group did better than a medica­
tion-treated group, a placebo group, and no-treatment group (Spanos, Wil­
liams, & Gwynn, 1 990).
All four studies provide some evidence for the effectiveness of hypnotic
treatment, even though the subjects were not chosen on the basis of their
hypnotizability, but solely because they had warts and volunteered for the
study. Nonetheless, Spanos and his colleagues did find that subjects who
lost their warts, whether in the hypnosis, suggestion, or placebo groups,
reported more vivid imagery than those who did not. Similarly, two studies
(Asher, 1956; Ullman & Dudek, 1960) found that patients capable of deep
trance fared significantly better in being cured of their warts by hypnosis
than did those who were not.
Others have reported the successful treatment of warts with hypnosis
(e.g., Clawson & Swade, 1 975; Ewin, 1974), but many such results have been
criticized because they could not exclude the possibility of spontaneous
remission, which does occur frequently. Recognizing this problem, Clawson
and Swade (1 975, p. 165) had remarked that a better experiment than cur­
ing all warts would be one in which specific warts were targeted. Successful
experiments of this kind would weaken the explanation that the warts had
disappeared spontaneously, as part of their "natural history," such as some
general systemic change in the patient's immune system or vasomotor pro­
cesses. In fact, there have been some studies in which patients had warts on
both sides of the body (usually on their hands), the experimenters suggested
that the warts on only one side would disappear, and only the selected
warts were cured (Dreaper, 1978; Sinclair-Gieben & Chalmers, 1959).42 In

42. Several other studies have not provided evidence for a side-specific effect, in
that in these studies the warts disappeared on both sides and not just on the selected
side (R. F. Q. Johnson & Barber, 1978; Spanos et aI., 1988; Surman, Gottlieb, &
Hackett, 1972; Surman et aI., 1973); but there may be a fairly straightforward expla­
nation. In a study that produced significant healing but not a side-specific effect,
Spanos et ai. (1988, p. 257) noted that the effect of suggestion was greater on the
hand that had the most warts, whether it was the target or control side; and in their
highly successful study, Sinclair-Gieben and Chalmers (1959, p. 481) had always
selected the hand with the most or the largest warts as the target hand. As with burn
cases, therefore, it seems likely that the patient's primary motivation would be to
cure the worst, and preferably all, of the warts, rather than comply with the experi-
 Psychophysiological Influence-195

Dreaper's case, when treatment was begun the intention was to remove all
warts, which were on both sides of both hands. When they began to shrink,
however, he suggested to the patient that she allow one wart to remain, as a
control; and "after ten months' treatment the only wart remaining was the
suggested one" (p. 308). Attention was then directed to the remaining wart,
and it too disappeared after two months.
Sinclair-Gieben and Chalmers thought that, to be successful, subjects
had to reach a depth of hypnosis such that they could carry out a post-hyp­
notic suggestion-a logical hypothesis since the gradual disappearance of
warts after hypnosis is, in essence, the continuing operation of a post-hyp­
notic suggestion. In their study, in nine of the 10 patients who could reach
this level of hypnosis the warts disappeared on the treated but not on the
untreated side.
Nearly all the proposed explanations of curing warts by suggestion have
been variations on the idea that the blood supply to the warts has been
altered, a change produced by some vaguely characterized neurological
mechanism. Sulzberger and Wol f (1 934) were among the earliest to propose
this kind of explanation, saying that the "permeability of the capillaries may
be affected by psychic influences," and more specifically that the hypothala­
mus receives impulses from the cortex, "which are, in turn, transmitted to
the sympathetic and parasympathetic nerve fibres leading to the particular
part. In this way, vasomotor and other changes are brought about which, in
turn, can cause local trophic and physico-chemical changes. These changes
are probably sufficient to make the soil unsuitable for further activity of
the wart virus" (p. 555). In reviewing and summing up similar theories,
Ullman (1959) emphasized the important role of emotion, and particularly
"vasomotor effects emotionally induced": "The mechanism of healing in
the case of cures by suggestion is in all likelihood dependent on local vas­
cular changes brought about by vegetative impulses concomitant with the
affective changes experienced by the patient" (p. 483).
Sulzberger and Wol f (1934), however, also cautioned that such descrip­
tions "may, at first, seem to be a satisfactory explanation-but, on further
analysis, how utterly hypothetical and incomplete!" (p. 556). We would do
well to remember this cautionary remark, even-perhaps especially-now.
I have asked repeatedly throughout this chapter whether more precise iden­
tification of physiological effects accompanying the phenomena discussed,
even if correct, really gets us any closer to understanding what has set those
effects in motion, particularly when they involve not simply a generalized
systemic response to stress, relaxation, fear, or some other emotion, but
instead a specific and localized response. As Dreaper (1978) asked, when
commenting on his own impressive case in which the "mechanism" allowed
one single wart among many to remain, "what can be the mechanism . . .

mental goal of removing only the randomly chosen ones. More clear-cut results
might be obtained, therefore, by assuring patients that after the "target" warts have
been removed, the treatment will later be directed toward the "control" warts.
196-Chapter 3

[that] could cause the geographically selective destruction of warts" (pp.

308-309)?
Whatever the mechanism, most observers of the phenomena agree that,
because warts are a kind of skin tumor produced by a virus, if warts "can be
cured by suggestion, then we are forced to admit that we are concerned with
something which deals with the most fundamental processes in medicine"
(Sulzberger & Wolf, 1934, p. 553). Understanding this phenomenon might,
therefore, lead to an "understanding of the bodily mechanisms involved in
immunity, resistance against disease, malignancy, and other vital problems"
(Gravitz, 198 1 , p. 282). More specifically, Clawson and Swade (1 975) called
warts "a model for metastasizing tumors," and they conjectured that if sug­
gestion can cure warts by stopping the blood flow to the capillaries nourish­
ing them, then "we think likewise tumors can be destroyed" (p. 165).43

Other Skin Diseases

Although the remission of tumors by hypnotic suggestion remains a
hypothetical suggestion for now, hypnosis has nevertheless already been
used successfully to treat skin diseases far more serious than warts. For
example, Osgood (see HP, vol. I, pp. 471-472), Bramwell (1903, p. 264),
Asher (1956, pp. 31 1-312), Mason (1960), and others (see Crasilneck & Hall,
1 959, p. 15) have reported curing or significantly improving cases of eczema
with hypnotic suggestion, and Frankel and Misch (1973) reported signifi­
cant improvement in a case of psoriasis that had resisted 20 years of conven­
tional treatments. Dunbar (1954, pp. 616-623) reviewed numerous reports
of cures, often almost instantaneous, of longstanding eczema, psoriasis,
and other skin disorders. She also described a case of a physician who had
suffered a severe X-ray burn, the effects of which had persisted for 14 years
as painful swelling, eczema, and scars so severe that another physician had
recommended amputation. The symptoms were almost completely cured
after four weeks of hypnotic treatment, and a year later were completely
healed.
Most striking, however, have been reports of the improvement in some
cases of congenital ichthyosiform erythrodermia, or "fish-skin disease," a
congenital disease appearing at birth or shortly thereafter in which a thick,
black, horny layer of skin, inelastic and subject to painful lesions, covers
part or even all of the body. There have been 10 cases in which this disfigur­
ing and painful condition has responded favorably, with varying degrees of
success, to hypnotic suggestion, improvements that were initially "unbeliev­
able" to T. X. Barber (1984, p. 77), given that spontaneous remissions, or

43. Whereas patients can see warts and the effect that suggestion may be having
on them, most tumors are not visible to the patient, and this may hinder the effec­
tiveness of any suggestive techniques. Now, however, tumors can be viewed directly
with imaging techniques, and it is worth considering that patients given appropriate
suggestions together with the feedback of such images might respond to suggestion
as effectively as patients with warts have done.
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-197

even significant improvement in response to conventional treatments, are

practically unknown.
The first and most dramatic case was reported by Mason (1952). The
patient was a teen-age boy in whom the disease affected nearly his entire
body. Mason began the treatment by focusing suggestions on the left arm,
with results both quick and striking: "Five days later the horny layer soft­
ened, became friable, and fell off. The skin underneath became pink and soft
within a few days .. . . At the end of 10 days the arm was completely clear from
the shoulder to the wrist" (p. 422). Mason then treated the other arm, and
10 days later the legs and the trunk. The improvements ranged from 50-95%
for various parts of the body. There was "rapid and dramatic" improvement
in the first few weeks, but little further improvement after that. As Mason
(1955a) reported later, however, four years after the treatment "not only has
there been no relapse, but his skin has continued to improve . . .without fur­
ther treatment of any sort, hypnotic or otherwise" (p. 58).
Inspired by Mason's results, other physicians tried hypnotic suggestion
in similar patients, usually as a last resort when all other treatments had
failed, and they too reported varying degrees of success. Mullins, Murray,
and Shapiro (1 955) reported a case of pachyonychia congenita, a condition
similar to ichthyosis. Like Mason, they focused first on a specific area, in
this case the left hand, and "within three days there was noticeable soften­
ing of the keratotic material on the left hand." The treatment continued, and
the authors published photographs showing the dramatic improvement in
the soles of the patient's feet. When the patient was admitted to the hospital,
the condition was so painful that he could not walk and was confined to a
wheelchair. By the 1 3th day of treatment, "he stood on his feet without pain
for the first time in his life that he could remember," and by the 17th day "he
was able to walk the length of the ward without pain." Five months later he
was walking "with only slight impairment" (p. 267).
Mason (1 955a), commenting on this case, noted that it "shows that the
treatment is repeatable in other hands and that the improvement in the case
I reported is not a freak occurrence." Other repetitions followed, with vary­
ing results that began to indicate the complex nature of such treatment.
Kidd (1 966), for example, called attention to the potential importance of
the depth of trance attained. He had treated two patients suffering from
ichthyosis, a father and his 4-year-old son. The father was able to achieve
a sufficient depth of trance, and within five weeks there was 90% remission
of his symptoms, a near-complete cure. In contrast, the child was "inat­
tentive and easily distracted," able to achieve only a "light" and "superfi­
cial" trance, and he showed only 30% improvement. Similarly, Wink (1961)
reported treating two sisters, and the sister who reached a deeper trance
showed more improvement than the other.
Schneck (1954, 1966) reported two ichthyosis cases in which the response
to the hypnotic treatment was more moderate and also took a more up-and­
down course, apparently in part because the patients had ambivalent feelings
about being cured; and at the end of his second report he commented that
198-Chapter 3

"no total cure has been effected" (1966, p. 234). He was apparently unaware,
however, of two cases in which a total cure was achieved (Bethune & Kidd,
1961). In the first, after seven weeks of treatment, "the patient had reached
a state of complete naked-eye remission," and four years later she remained
cured. The second case was somewhat more complicated. The early results
were "not so striking" as in the first case, and after about six months the
patient had a partial relapse. This relapse prompted "a determined redirec­
tion of drive by the patient himself," which almost immediately produced "a
complete remission, which has remained" (p. 1421).
The difficulty of explaining such effects is complicated by the undeni­
able fact that positive results are more the exception than the rule. Mason
himself ( 1961), whose first case stimulated the rest, failed with eight subse­
quent ichthyosis patients with whom he tried hypnosis, and "why one case
responded and the others did not still remains a mystery." One strong can­
didate for an explanation (not, however, mentioned by Mason) is that the
first patient may have been highly hypnotizable, whereas the others may
have been less so.
Whatever the reason, the cases that have been successful cannot simply
be ignored because other attempts have failed.44 Mason's first case report
prompted numerous letters to the editor of the British Medical Journal, many
of them skeptical and dismissive. One of the correspondents, however, who
had himself actually seen Mason's patient, had this to say: "It is surprising
that it [congenital ichthyosis] should respond to any kind of treatment; that
it should respond to hypnotic suggestion demands a revision of current con­
cepts of the relation between mind and body. If this case does not surprise
Dr. Freeman [one of the skeptics], nothing ever will" (Bettley, 1952).
T. X. Barber (1984) also commented on the importance of such cases
for an adequate understanding of the mind-body problem, concluding that
these reports of cures of ichthyosis alone are "sufficient to topple the dual­
istic dichotomy between mind and body." Insofar as "dualism" is under­
stood-incorrectly-to imply the impossibility of interaction between mind
and body, Barber is correct. As I discussed earlier, however, a mere assertion
of the unity of mind and body gets us no further in understanding how (as
Barber described it) "abnormally functioning skin cells begin to function
normally when the individual is exposed to specific words or communica­
tions (suggestions)," and his explanation-that "suggestions are associated
with dramatic skin changes when they are experienced and accepted at a
deep emotional level"-is clearly no help in that regard (p. 79).
Other attempts to explain the amelioration of ichthyosis by suggestion
are similarly inadequate. Most investigators have simply "presumed that
the effect of suggestion on the patient activates the nervous system and sets
in motion complex physiological adjustments" (Bethune & Kidd, 1961 , p.

44. This point might seem too obvious to have to make, but, in fact, in many
instances involving controversial phenomena, it has apparently been too tempting,
because easier, to ignore positive results rather than to dig deeper into conditions
behind, and hence reasons for, the successes versus the failures.
 Psychophysiological Influence-199

1420). Others have tried to be more specific, noting for example that "the
skin is a sensitive indicator of emotional disorder" such as stress (p. 1419).
Thus, the presumed changes in blood flow occur when "a state of emotional
high drive . . .initiates activity of the central nervous system [and] the subjec­
tive feeling of the physiological response directs efferent nerve impulses to
the organ or part which is now the seat of subjective sensations" (p. 1420).
In short, "efferent nerve impulses act on the vascular bed of the affected
skin areas" (Kidd, 1 966, p. 107). But how does an idea, an image, or an emo­
tion activate nerve impulses that target a specific location on the skin? Kidd
thought it "easy" to understand that psychological methods may be success­
ful "in treating diseases that are of psychogenic as well as organic origin"
(p. 103). Is it, though? As Wink (1961) pointed out, cases in which there is
"a generalized beneficial effect, rather than a local and specific effect" may
be more easily understood, but cases involving "correspondences between
specific suggestions and the changes consequent upon them . . .indicate the
influence of a psychological process acting directly on local tissue metabo­
lism . . . and it is difficult to see by what pathways such an influence could be
mediated" (p. 742). Wink's two cases, like those of Mason (1952) and Mul-
lins et al. (1955),

both showed some definite conformity to the suggestions, though this con­
formity was not exact, for the response included improvement extending
outside the designated areas, and a relative failure in other areas which
were intended to respond. Finally, though there was a mild improvement
in undesignated areas, it was quite overshadowed by the changes in those
intended to benefit. (Wink, 1961, p. 743)

Moreover, as even Kidd (1966) acknowledged, the severity and undeniable

organic etiology of ichthyosis make it "less easy to understand how [it] . . .
can be so spectacularly affected by a psychological process" (p. 103).45

Skin Conditions: Induction of Bleeding, Blisters, and Markings

Hypnosis clearly can have beneficial therapeutic effects, but it is per­

haps even more important theoretically, as Myers so strongly argued. In this
context numerous experimental attempts have been made, not to remove a
pathophysiological condition that already existed, but to induce one that
did not. As a transition into this next section, I will mention one particu­
larly important study that combined the elements both of therapeutic heal­
ing and of experimental induction of a skin condition. I mentioned earlier

45. Kidd ( 1 966) also pointed out, first, that "there is no evidence that any psycho­
logical component influenced either cause or chronicity" of ichthyosis (especially
considering that it is usually present from birth), and, second, that hypnotic sug­
gestions "seem to operate without direct reference to the emotional state of the
patient" (p. 104).
200-Chapter 3

some studies in which asthmatic patients, given a nocebo that they were told
was an allergen and then a placebo that they were told was a medication,
responded appropriately to these suggestions. In a similar study, this one
involving hypnosis, Ikemi and Nakagawa (1962) reported five experiments
involving teenage boys, some of whom were allergic to the leaves of lacquer
and wax trees, developing severe dermatitis when exposed to the leaves, and
some of whom were not. In one experiment involving 13 subjects who were
severely allergic, five were given the suggestion when hypnotized, and eight
were given the same suggestions in a waking state. All were touched on one
arm with a lacquer or wax tree leaf but told that it was that of a chestnut tree
(to which they were not allergic). They were touched on the other arm with
a chestnut tree leaf but told that it was a lacquer or wax tree leaf. Four of
the five hypnotized subjects and seven of the eight non-hypnotized subjects
developed dermatitis in response to the inert substance that they thought
was the allergic agent, and conversely showed no reaction to the real allergic
agent that they thought was inert. The other two subjects showed an allergic
response to both substances, including the inert one.
In another experiment, this one involving 15 (non-hypnotized) subjects
who were moderately allergic, all subjects were touched on both arms with
the actual allergic agent, but they were told that one was the agent whereas
the other was only water. The subjects were observed for five days. At the
end of that time eight of the 15 subjects had developed a normal allergic
reaction on one arm, but not on the arm that they thought had been touched
with water. In three other subjects, the allergic reaction on the "water" arm
took longer to develop than it did on the other arm.
Some subjects had claimed that they did not even have to touch the
leaves, but had only to walk under the trees to develop an allergic reaction.
The conventional explanation was that they had in fact been exposed to
minute particles of the leaf in the air under the tree. To test this, the authors
took one of the boys and had him walk under a lacquer tree that he knew
to be such; he developed the usual reaction. On a second occasion he was
taken under an oak tree in which lacquer tree leaves had been placed with­
out his knowledge. On this occasion, he did not develop an allergic reaction.
Another boy developed an allergic reaction both when he was taken under
a lacquer tree that he knew to be such and when he was taken under a tree
that he was told (falsely) was a lacquer tree.
The authors concluded that there is a psychological component in the
development of allergic reactions, revealed by their success in both sup­
pressing and inducing the physiological response by means of suggestion.
But what known mechanism can selectively turn on the allergic response in
one arm while simultaneously turning it off in the other?
I turn now to cases in which a stigmata-like skin reaction, such as an
area of redness, a burn or blister, or even bleeding, has been induced by
hypnotic suggestion. I discussed earlier the spontaneous cases of redness,
bleeding, and blistering occurring at specific sites, most notably in con­
nection with stigmata and with the recall of previous traumatic or emo-
 Psychophysiological Infiuence�201

tionaI experiences. Similar but deliberately induced phenomena have been

reported since the earliest days of mesmerism (Gauld, 1990), although the
heyday was certainly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There have
been several useful reviews, of varying comprehensiveness (e.g., Dunbar,
1 954, pp. 601-603; Gauld, 1990; Moll, 1901, pp. 130-138; HP, vol. 1, pp.
493-498; Pattie, 1 941; Paul, 1963; Stevenson, 1997, vol. I , pp. 60-67; Weit­
zenhoffer, 1 953, pp. 142-144), and M. Murphy (1992, p. 337) estimated that
several hundred such cases have been reported. Relatively few of these have
been reported in detail, but the above reviews provide summaries of, and
references to, important experiments that were conducted and reported by
scientific observers.
As with cases of spontaneous stigmata, a common criticism has been
that in many cases the subjects were not adequately watched to ensure that
they had not deliberately induced the wounds, whether deceitfully or out of
a compulsion to obey the hypnotist in whatever way. The suspicion of fraud
(conscious or unconscious) was increased by the observation that many sub­
jects who responded to suggestions of blistering were undoubtedly hysteri­
cal. Some extremely interesting reports, therefore, are inconclusive because
the subjects were left unattended. Biggs (1887), for example, reported three
such cases. In the first, he suggested that a cross would appear on the sub­
ject's right arm and remain until he told it to go away. It appeared after three
days, in the form of "a dusky-red cross, four or five inches long and about
three inches wide." Although the subject was not kept under surveillance
for those three days, the fact that the mark persisted for several months,
and disappeared only when she returned to Dr. Biggs in desperation to have
it removed by suggestion, makes deliberate deception seem unlikely. In
another case, Biggs suggested that a red cross would appear on the subject's
chest every Friday, and that eventually the words "Sancta" and "Crucis"
would appear and the cross would bleed. The cross appeared on the first Fri­
day after the suggestion was given, and re-appeared consistently for many
weeks thereafter-not being visible on any other day of the week. On one
occasion only, bleeding occurred and part of a letter "s" appeared in the
suggested spot. In the third case, a cross was also induced, but, unlike the
other two cases, it appeared long after the suggestion (six weeks), by which
time Biggs thought that the experiment had failed. Moreover, it lasted only
two to three days.46
In response to the criticism that unwatched subjects may have delib­
erately injured themselves, some investigators have attempted to prevent
self-injury either by suggesting the mark at a location out of the subject's
reach or by bandaging the relevant area and, usually, securing it with a seal.
For example, in one 1886 experiment, eight postage stamps were applied
to a hypnotized woman's back, out of her reach, and she was told that they

46. One might ask why Biggs (and others) repeatedly used the image of a cross
with his subjects; but this is understandable if one considers that emotional salience
may be an important factor. We do not, however, have information about the religi­
osity of these three subjects.
202-Chapter 3

were a blistering agent. The area was then bandaged. The next day the still
intact bandages and stamps were removed. The area was "thickened, dead­
ened and of a whitish-yellow colour," surrounded by a reddened and swollen
area, and later that day a blister appeared (Gauld, 1990, p. 143; Pattie, 1941,
pp. 63-64; Stevenson, 1 997, vol. 1 , p. 61).
Similarly, Hadfield (1917) reported that he had induced a blister in a
patient by touching him lightly on the arm with his finger, but telling him
that it was a "red-hot iron." A blister formed after half an hour, but because
the patient had been unobserved during that time, Hadfield considered this
inconclusive. Consequently, he attempted another experiment, but this time
covered the area with "a large roller bandage, so that it would be impossible
for [the patient] to interfere with the area touched." The bandage was then
fastened with a safety pin and the pin sealed with sealing wax. Nonetheless,
six hours later, a blister had formed, and it soon increased in size and devel­
oped a large quantity of fluid.
Other experimenters used different means of securing the area. In one
experiment, a sealed cardboard tube was placed around the area (Paul,
1 963, p. 236). In two others a glass covering was applied instead of a soft
bandage, a covering "that would seem to preclude any attempt to scratch
the indicated area" (Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, p. 61).
Even with such coverings, however, doubts can remain, particularly
since in at least one case the subject was apparently still able to scratch
herself through the bandage (Gauld, 1990, p. 144). An alternative or addi­
tional measure is to keep the subjects under close surveillance until the
mark or blister appears. Hadfield himself was not satisfied with the bandag­
ing method, and in a third experiment with his subject, he instituted "still
stricter conditions" in which the patient's arm was bandaged as before, and
he was watched continuously for 24 hours. The bandage was then removed,
and Hadfield and three other surgeons observed "the beginning of a blis­
ter. . . , which gradually developed during the day to form a large bleb with
an area of inflammation around it."
One might argue that 24 hours is a long time to keep someone under
observation without lapses of attention, even with multiple observers. How­
ever, in most cases in which the subject was closely observed, the time until
the mark developed was much shorter, and in numerous cases the mark in
fact developed almost instantly. For example, one subject had spontane­
ously begun crying bloody tears, which we encountered earlier in some of
the stigmata cases. The tears could also be evoked by hypnotic suggestion,
but not halted, and so on one occasion the physician suggested instead that
the bleeding be transferred to her hand. Several minutes after she was awak­
ened, "blood seemed to well up in the lines of the hand much as a pro­
fuse sweat would have done." Moreover, the process "took place before our
eyes" (see Gauld, 1990, pp. 141-142; HP, vol. 1, p. 498). Similarly, Smirnoff
described two instances in which a blister appeared shortly after the sug­
gestion, and he could rule out self-injury because "the whole process ran its
course before our eyes" (Gauld, 1990, p. 147; Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, p. 63).
 Psychophysiological Influence-203

Li6beault suggested to two subjects that when they were awakened, they
would go to a stove and touch it, suggesting further that the stove was red­
hot. They did so, and although the stove was in fact cold, both subjects
developed immediate reactions, one "a lively reddening" and the other "an
actual burn from which the skin subsequently came away" (Gauld, 1990,
p. 142; Madden, 1 903). Bellis (1966) suggested to a patient that she imagine
herself on the beach on a sunny day, not intending to induce anything but
relaxation. Instead, immediately upon awakening her, he saw that her face
had become "beet-red . . . [and the] redness extended over her shoulders and
half-way down her arms." Ullman (1947) gave a soldier the suggestion that a
molten shell fragment had hit his hand. An "immediate pallor" developed,
and 20 minutes later a "narrow red margin appeared." In an hour a blister
began to form, ultimately becoming a second-degree burn. Most impor­
tantly, the "patient had remained under the observation of the author and
another medical officer. . . for the entire period" (p. 829).
Some observers were not satisfied even with such immediate reactions.
Schrenck-Notzing, whose experiences with a subject who was probably
guilty of self-injury had led him to issue a strong plea for adequate control
in these experiments, watched a red mark develop "almost immediately"
on one of Li6beault's hysterical patients. Not convinced, he and a colleague
paid a surprise visit to the patient's house, and while there they commented
that she seemed to have been bitten by an insect because they saw a red
spot under her left ear (nothing, in fact, was there). They reinforced the
suggestion by saying that it seemed to be getting worse and must be pain­
ful . Although concerned, she did not touch the spot, and within three min­
utes they saw that an area of redness had developed in the spot suggested
(Gauld, 1990, p. 144).
Perhaps the most striking case of immediate observation, however,
involved a patient of Schindler (see Pattie, 1941, p. 70; Paul, 1963, p. 237; Ste­
venson, 1997, vol. 1, p. 62), who had suffered from spontaneous and appar­
ent psychogenic bruising (the phenomenon later called autoerythrocyte
sensitization, discussed earlier). Schindler was able to induce bruising in
this patient by hypnotic suggestion, and on one occasion he suggested that a
blister would develop, which it did. Ultimately, according to an entry in his
log, "it is now possible to regulate the occurrence of the blister to the minute.
It shoots up before the eyes of the physician at the regulated time, becoming
fully developed within five minutes" (Dunbar, 1954, p. 603).
Fraud (or unconscious compliance, if one wishes to be more generous
in the interpretation) thus seems to be ruled out as a general explanation.
Other more "normal" explanations have been suggested, however, relying
especially on the idea that the subject's skin is unusually sensitive and there­
fore that the phenomena observed involve either dermographia (a condi­
tion in which even light touch can produce marked reactions) or contact
dermatitis (in which ordinarily harmless materials, usually metal, produce
an allergic reaction). Paul (1 963), for example, attributed most (but not all)
cases to such reactions, and he even extended the hypothesis to suggest that
204-Chapter 3

in cases in which a bandage was applied to control the subject's access to the
site, the bandage itselfcaused the wound: "In their zeal," he said, the investi­
gators "have in fact induced the 'injury' themselves" (p. 239). In many cases
the site of the blister had been lightly touched to reinforce the suggestion.
Sometimes the stimulus was simply the physician's finger, and sometimes it
was a small object such as a coin, a metal file, or a pencil, especially when
the suggestion given was that the hypnotist was burning the patient with a
hot object.
However, in one early study examining the possibility that hysterical
patients showing unusual skin reactions have abnormally reactive skin,
Haxthausen (1936) found that none of the eight hysterical patients examined
did. Gauld (1990, pp. 148-149) and Stevenson (1997, vol. 1, pp. 64-65) have
also pointed out that, although some subjects have had unusually sensitive
skin, not all have. More importantly, in cases in which the stimulus was
an everyday object, such as a button, a matchstick, or a cold stove-or the
physician's finger-it is "absolutely inconceivable" that a contact dermatitis
sufficient to produce blisters would not have been known before to the sub­
jects or their doctors (who were often the hypnotists) (Gauld, 1990, p. 149).
Myers seems to have been the first to recognize the need to provide
appropriate controls for unusual skin reactions. In an 1885 experiment in
which he and Gurney participated, Liebeault "slightly pricked" the back of
the hand of his patient Mlle. A. E., suggesting that a patch of redness would
form there. At the same time, Myers scratched her arm, with no sugges­
tion of any reaction, as a control. On the place touched by Liebeault, a red
patch appeared almost immediately; on Myers's control scratch, no reac­
tion was observed (Myers, 1886c, pp. 167-168n). Forel later made a similar
experiment in which he drew a cross on each forearm with a blunt knife. He
suggested that blisters would appear, but on the right side only, and after
five minutes a reddish swelling and a wheal, "somewhat in the shape of a
cross," appeared on that side only (Moll, 1901, pp. 136-137). In a similar
case, performed by a German physician, Oskar Kohnstamm, before a group
of neurologists, some of whom kept the hypnotized subject under constant
observation, a cross was traced on both arms with a pencil, with the sugges­
tion that a wheal would form on the left side only. A wheal appeared an hour
later, only on the left arm (Dunbar, 1954, p. 613).
Similar cases are those in which a suggestion of analgesia was given to
one arm, but not to the other, to see whether the suggested analgesia would
affect the skin response. Delboeuf, for example, suggested to a hypnotized
subject that her right arm was analgesic, and he then burned both arms
with a red-hot iron rod.47 The left arm showed a normal reaction, with a
large, inflamed, and blistered wound, but the right arm had only a small
bump, with no redness or inflammation (Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 65-66).
In another experiment performed by the physician Kohnstamm before a

47. Delboeuf had obtained her permission to do this before he hypnotized her,
but probably few subjects (or university review boards) would agree to such a pro­
cedure today.
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-205

medical audience, a deeply hypnotized subject was given the suggestion that
one finger would be analgesic. When that finger was punctured with a large
pin, no bleeding occurred, although the corresponding finger on the other
hand bled normally when similarly punctured (Dunbar, 1954, p. 608). Chap­
man, Goodell, and Wolff (1959) reported a more extensive experiment of
this kind, involving 13 hypnotized subjects in 40 experiments. In 39 of these
the subjects were given the suggestion that one arm was either normal or
anesthetized and that the other arm was especially "vulnerable"; and in the
other the suggestion was that one arm was normal and the other was anes­
thetic. A "standard noxious [thermal] stimulus" was then applied to three
spots on each arm. In 30 of the 40 experiments, the arm suggested to be the
more "vulnerable" showed greater inflammatory reaction and damage than
did the anesthetic or normal arm. The reaction clearly depended on the sub­
jects' beliefs or expectations about being burned, and not on an unusually
sensitive skin condition.
An equally important argument against dermographia or contact der­
matitis as general explanations is that there are numerous cases in which the
site that developed the reaction was not touched. In the Myers/Liebeault
case, described above, Liebeault had suggested that a red mark would
appear on both hands, although he touched only one of them. A red mark
developed also on the hand he had not touched, although "a little less red
and distinct" than the other mark (Myers, 1886c, pp. 167-168n). In Bellis's
case of induced sunburn, no tactile contact was made with the patient's face,
arm, or shoulders; and in Schindler's case, also cited above, many of the
instances of bruising and blistering involved suggestion only, with no touch
(Paul, 1963, pp. 237, 241). Charcot suggested to a patient, "without touch­
ing it," that her arm was covered with burning wax. She was continuously
watched, and within a few minutes she developed "a veritable burn" (Gauld,
1 990, p. 146). Ullman (1 947, pp. 829-830) suggested to his patient (the sol­
dier mentioned above) that he was "rundown and debilitated" and that a
fever blister would develop on his lower lip in the right corner. The area was
not touched. The patient was kept under observation, and 24 hours later
one large blister and multiple smaller satellite blisters had developed at the
suggested site.
Other cases that cannot be explained by skin sensitivity are those in
which the mark appeared at a site other than the one either suggested or
touched. Podiapolsky (1909) described a case, again one in which the sub­
ject was closely watched by several people, in which a coin and then the
bottom of a thermometer case were lightly pressed against her skin in two
locations on her back, with the suggestion that she was being burned, as
with a hot coal. Several hours later, blisters had appeared in both spots, but
"not quite in the right place." One was a grouping of three or four blisters
about 3 cm below and to the left of the site touched, and the other a larger,
broken blister about 1 cm above that site. Similarly, Smirnoff placed a but­
ton on his subject's hand, suggesting that it was "glowing hot." Immediately
after she was awakened, a red patch appeared, and 15 minutes later a blister
206-Chapter 3

surrounded by reddening appeared-"not on the spot where the button had

been laid, but somewhat lower." Four days later Smirnoff tried the same
experiment, placing a copper letter C near the previous burn. At first the site
of the previous burn, not the present site, turned red; and then this disap­
peared and a blister developed between the site of the previous burn and the
site where the copper had been placed (Gauld, 1990, p. 147).
A particularly interesting example of marks appearing at a site differ­
ent from the one touched was that of lIma Szandor, who was described as
"almost dangerously susceptible to hypnotic blistering," sometimes devel­
oping reactions "much worse than the experimenters intended" (Gauld,
1 990, p. 143). After an initial incident in which a medical student had laid
a pair of scissors on her chest, suggesting that they were red-hot and thus
producing a serious burn, Drs. von Krafft-Ebing and Jendrassik began to
experiment with her, but making more "humane" suggestions such as red
marks (HP, vol. 1, pp. 495-496). lIma was an hysteric whose right side was
"permanently anesthetic," and, interestingly, when objects were placed on
her left side, with the suggestion that they were hot, the mark appeared, not
where the object had been placed, but instead on the corresponding spot
on her (anesthetic) right side (Gauld, 1990, p. 143; HP, vol. 1, p. 496; Pattie,
1 941, p. 64).
Another case illustrates again that the reaction depends more strongly
on the patient's "idea" (in Myers's term) than on the actual stimulus. The
famous hysterical subject Louis V. had developed the idea that gold would
burn him. An investigator, Voisin, reported that when he touched Louis
with gold, a burn and blistering would indeed occur; but "if the subject was
unaware that the object was gold, there would be no effect and, conversely,
if he thought he was touched by gold or mercury when he was not, a burn
would appear" (Gauld, 1990, p. 146).
The case of lIma, mentioned above, is important for another reason. I
have so far been describing mainly cases in which the reaction was precise
in terms of location. lIma's case is one of many in which the specificity was
not just in location, but also in shape. On one occasion, for example, a letter
K was pressed against her left shoulder, and "in a few hours a K-like blister,
'with quite sharp outlines,' came on the corresponding spot on the right
side." Even more interestingly-given the fact that it had appeared on the
opposite arm rather than the one that received the stimulus-this and other
marks on lIma appeared reversed, as in a mirror-image (HP, vol. 1, p. 496;
Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1 , p. 64). Moreover, in the case of the letter K it was
not "an exact reproduction" of the original K stimulus, but in a different
style, as if in "another person's handwriting" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 496). On another
occasion a ring with a notch in it was placed on her left arm, and again the
mark appeared on the right arm instead, in the "shape of the ring with an
indication of a notch" (Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, p. 64).
Madden (1 903) considered lIma a fraud, in part because he considered
her a "degenerate" and "cunning but evil-minded" hysteric, in part because
he believed that she had not been adequately controlled, and in part because
 Psychophysiological Influence-207

of the supposedly "fatal defect" that it took 24 hours or more for her blis­
ters to develop. It is not clear why this lapse of time should necessarily be
considered a defect; but in any case, like many such "skeptics" he was less
than accurate in his portrayal of the facts. It is not true that "in no case"
with lIma was the interval less than 24 hours; nor is it true that there was
no description of the means by which lIma was controlled. lendrissik, for
example, had reported an instance (the one involving the ring) in which the
blister had developed after five hours, during which period of time she had
been watched continuously (Gauld, 1990, p. 143; Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, p.
64). Another "condemning fact" to Madden was that, according to him, a
"burn just like a K" appeared on the shoulder touched. In reality, the mark
appeared not on the left shoulder, but on the untouched right shoulder, and
was both reversed and more like an H than a K in shape.
Myers took quite a different view of the reversal and distortion of the
K than Madden's "conviction" that such distortions were "the very stron­
gest evidence for deceit." For him, lIma's case was a "striking example"
of "the intellectual character, as I have termed it, of the organic process
which responds to suggestion" (HP, vol. 1, p. 495). The fact that the mark
was not an exact reproduction suggested to Myers that, just as the marks
in Dr. Biggs's three cases had corresponded to "the idea of cruciformity,"
so in this case it "corresponded to an intellectual idea," that is, "the idea of
K-shape," an idea that "underwent some idiosyncratic modification in the
subject's subliminal intelligence" (HP, vol. 1, p. 496)-one of those modi­
fications, common in other automatisms such as automatic writing, being
mirror-image writing (Myers, 1 885b).
Other marks corresponding to a suggested shape have been reported.
Earlier in the chapter I described several cases of this kind. By hypnotic sug­
gestion Lechler was able to induce on the forehead of his patient Elisabeth
K. several marks having the triangular shape of thorns. lima K. developed
on her right arm a blister in the shape of a ring with the additional detail
of a notch in the ring, corresponding to the shape and appearance of a ring
that had been pressed against her left arm. Similarly, several stigmatics have
developed marks, called "espousal rings," encircling a finger (Thurston,
1 952, pp. 1 30-140). Another case, this one not involving hypnosis, was R. L.
Moody's patient, on whose arm appeared marks clearly showing indenta­
tions resembling rope marks. I have also already mentioned Biggs's three
subjects, who developed marks in the shape of a cross. More significantly,
one of them also developed a mark, in a place that had not been touched,
that was the beginning of a letter S, in response to the suggestion that the
word "Sancta" would appear. In Bellis's case of induced sunburn, the red­
ness conformed to the lines of the patient's dress. Louis v., who showed
numerous physiological reactions to suggestions, on one occasion devel­
oped a bleeding V on his arm after that had been suggested to him (Myers,
1886c, pp. 168-169; Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, p. 63). One of Liebeault's patients
developed a mark resembling a cross in response to a post-hypnotic sugges­
tion (Gauld, 1990, p. 144), as did Forel's subject (Moll, 1901, pp. 136-1 37).
208-Chapter 3

Janet reported three cases, the first illustrating again what Myers called
"the intelligence presiding over these organic suggestions" (HP, vol. 1, p.
496). Specifically, Janet suggested to his patient Rose that he was applying
a mustard plaster to her abdomen, although he did not in fact do so. After a
few hours, a swollen and red rectangular area appeared, but it had the odd
characteristic that it looked as though the four corners had been cut on a
diagonal. When Janet commented on this, Rose said that it was the custom
where she came from to cut the corners at an angle; it was thus her own
notion of mustard plasters, and not the suggestion from Janet, that deter­
mined the particular form. On another occasion, Janet suggested to Rose
that he was applying a mustard plaster in the shape of a six-pointed star, and
a red mark appeared with "exactly" (Janet's term) that shape. In the third
instance, this one involving his patient Leonie, Janet suggested a mustard
plaster in the shape of an S, and a mark in that shape appeared on her chest
(HP, vol. 1, pp. 496-497; Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, p. 64).
Another remarkable case involving skin marks corresponding closely
to suggested images was that of Olga Kahl. Among her abilities was that
of producing thin red lines in the skin of her forearms or chest, closely cor­
responding to target images chosen sometimes by her, sometimes by the
investigators.48 This ability was studied in detail by the physician Osty and
the physiologist Richet (Osty, 1929). Their experiments were conducted
with Olga under observation in full daylight. The marks were generally
both clear and large, occupying for example a sizeable part of Olga's ventral
forearm. They usually took some tens of seconds to form and then faded
within a minute. Unfortunately, there are no photographs of these marks
(as there are in R. L. Moody's cases, in the case of Lechler's Elisabeth K.,
or in Hadfield's case), but Osty made drawings of lO of them, which have
been published (Osty, 1929, pp. 129-l31; Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1 , pp. 97, 98,
l O1). Three of the targets were complex line drawings, all reproduced fairly
closely in Olga's skin writing, although somewhat distorted or missing some
lines. When the number 8 was suggested, for example, an X first appeared,
and then a rounded line at the bottom appeared, giving the X the appear­
ance of part of an 8. When a water goblet was suggested, lines appeared
that closely resembled one side of a drawing of a goblet. In the remaining
five instances, names were suggested, and in all cases letters appeared on
her arm, one after the other, partially spelling out the name. Thus, the name
"Rosa" yielded "Ro," the name Fran<;:ois yielded "FrAN," and the name
"Sabine" yielded an odd-looking S, followed by an A, a B, a blank space,
and then an N and a straight vertical line. The name "Yolande" yielded an
odd-looking Y, followed by a blank space, then an L, a distorted a, an n, a
distorted d, and an e. Perhaps the most interesting, however, was "Rene,"
which came out upside down on her arm in the form "REH." Olga was Rus­
sian, and in the Russian alphabet N is written like H. Although there had

48. As I will discuss later in the chapter, an important feature of this case is that,
when the target was chosen by the investigators, Olga herself was usually neither
told nor allowed to see what the target was.
 Psychophysiological Influence-209

been no touching or tracing of the images on Olga, she was tested for der­
mographia, and showed only a "feeble" response (Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1 ,
p. 102).

Attempted Explanations of Hypnotic Skin Marking and Related

Phenomena

It seems clear that there have been cases of skin marking and blistering
that cannot be explained in terms either of fraud or of unusually sensitive
skin. What other "normal" explanations might be available? Several have
been proposed. One of the most common focuses on the fact that in many
instances of hypnotic or non-hypnotic skin reactions, as well as many of
the other phenomena discussed in this chapter, emotion plays an impor­
tant role. Clearly, emotion can engender physiological reactions, such as the
blushing that occurs when one feels embarrassment or the increase in heart
rate when one is frightened. Blushing or changes in heart rate, however, are
a far cry from a clearly outlined letter K at a specific spot on the skin. As
Stevenson (1997, vol . 1 , pp. 102-103) put it, "blushing shows neither the vol­
untariness nor an ability to control the sites of vasodilatation, let alone that
of dilating blood vessels to represent particular forms." Madden (1903) was
more specific: "No one ever saw a blush in the shape of a K of such intensity
that it caused a burn" (p. 289).
Others have suggested that the abnormal reactions are, in essence, a
conditioned response produced when the person recalls suffering a similar
injury in the past (see, e.g., Paul, 1 963, p. 242). Podiapolsky (1909), for exam­
ple, had found that a certain patient did not respond, as Janet's patients had,
to suggestions that a mustard plaster was being applied, but he then learned
that this patient had never experienced a real mustard plaster. He concluded
that subjects must have previously experienced the sensations of a particu­
lar stimulus before the suggestion would "take." Similarly, as we saw earlier,
Ewin (1979, p. 271) reported the case of a man who developed redness and
swelling when he was vividly reminded of a serious burn he had suffered 10
years earlier; R . L. Moody's patient developed rope marks on his arm when
recalling a traumatic experience of being tied down with ropes; and Bellis's
patient developed a sunburn in reaction to her memory of a severe sunburn
she had previously experienced. Weitzenhoffer (1953) believed, much like
Podiapolsky, that "for the suggestion to be effective the subject must have
previously experienced traumatic situations leading to blister formation,"
because the "re-experiencing" elicits a conditioned response that "brings
about reflexedly the somatic changes that were once associated with the pre­
vious reaction" (pp. 298, 296).49

49. To Weitzenhoffer's credit, he acknowledged that the hypothesis of condition­

ing can explain only generalized responses, and not phenomena involving "specific
localization." In what was surely a remarkable understatement, he admitted that
the latter phenomena require " further refinement" of the hypothesis (p. 196).
21O-Chapter 3

It is worth describing here in some detail a modern experiment that sup­

posedly supports this "conditioned-response" theory of skin-markings, in
part because this experiment is a particularly egregious example-provided
by an important contemporary experimenter-of how not to study this psy­
chological phenomenon. To investigate claims of hypnotic skin markings,
R. F. Q. Johnson and Barber (1976) decided to develop a protocol that would
rule out supposed "weaknesses" of previous studies, including the facts that
most such studies involved one subject only and that the subjects had often
been hysterical or "somnambulistic." Their subjects were instead 40 student
nurses who had never before been hypnotized. All were told explicitly that
the purpose of the study was to induce blisters by hypnosis. After a formal
hypnotic induction procedure, for 20 minutes the experimenter suggested to
the subject that she was frying bacon and burned her hand when she acci­
dentally touched the hot pan. After five minutes and 10 minutes, the sugges­
tion was interrupted to ask the subject whether she felt anything yet. Of the
40 subjects, only one produced a reddening (but not a blister) on her hand.
This reaction developed within five minutes after the verbal suggestions
were begun, was clearly visible to both the subject and the experimenter,
and disappeared within three minutes after the completion of the 20-minute
session. That subject, as it turned out, had been burned by hot grease at
that spot some years earlier; and she further reported that the experimental
mark closely resembled in shape the earlier burn. On this basis the authors
concluded that previous trauma and some associated conditioning are nec­
essary in general for a reaction.
It is hard to imagine an experiment less likely to produce the desired
result (even assuming-doubtful in the case of Barber and his colleagues­
that the desired result was in fact the hypnotic production of blisters). A
mere 20 minutes, in subjects who had never before experienced hypnosis,
and with an interruption every few minutes, could hardly be conducive to
the deep state of absorption that has clearly been a factor in most success­
ful suggestions. Additionally and perhaps more importantly, the use of
unselected subjects for whom there is no empirical or theoretical reason
to think they would be able to react in such an extreme way to suggestion
is almost guaranteed to ensure failure. Johnson and Barber argued that
this is an invalid objection because 12 of the 40 subjects scored above the
median on a test of hypnotic susceptibility. "Above the median," however,
is hardly equivalent to being highly hypnotizable, let alone "somnambulis­
tic."50 Finally, given Barber's well-known skepticism about "this purported
relationship between blister formation and hypnotic suggestion" (Johnson
& Barber, 1 976, p. 172), it seems more than likely that there was a negative
"demand characteristic"-that is, an implicit suggestion not to respond-

50. Barber (1984) later apparently acquiesced somewhat on this point when he
described "all of the individuals" who had produced blisters as "superb" or "excel­
lent" hypnotic subjects (p. 92).
 Psychophysiological Influence-2 1 1

operating in this experiment.51 In short, this experiment is a quintessential

example of an all-too-familiar characteristic of experimental studies in psy­
chology, that of allowing "methodolatry" to triumph over a sincere attempt
to learn something important about a controversial but theoretically sig­
nificant phenomenon. The fact that, even under such non-conducive condi­
tions, Johnson and Barber still had one subject respond mildly is perhaps a
surprising testament to the robustness of this phenomenon.
Emotion and a kind of "memory" or "conditioning" associated with
previous injuries may indeed play some role, in some cases, but this clearly
cannot provide an adequate general explanation since neither emotion nor
relevant previous trauma are present in all or even most of the reported
cases. We encounter even more serious limitations, however, when we exam­
ine other attempts to provide purely biological explanations.
As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, most contemporary sci­
entists take the position that understanding the "how" of psychophysiologi­
cal interactions presents no problem because the "psychological" parts of
these interactions are themselves ultimately biological, involving nothing
more than patterns of electrochemical activity in the central nervous system.
"Thoughts" and "emotions" simply represent certain aspects of this bio­
logically unitary mind-brain system, while "warts and allergic responses"
represent others, and there is thus no particular problem in understanding,
at least in principle, how the former might produce or influence the latter
(T. X. Barber, 1 984, p. 84). Indeed, to suggest anything different is auto­
matically viewed with horror as threatening a return to outmoded forms of
dualistic thinking. As a consequence, many scientists will let pass without
comment a statement such as that of Grabowska (1971): "The most probable
explanation [in this case, for elevation of skin temperature in response to
hypnotic suggestion] is that the word 'warmth' becomes . . . a stimulus equally
strong (and perhaps even stronger) than the action of heat in the waking
state" (p. 1050). But surely it is legitimate here to ask, how?
The viability of this basic conceptual scheme of mind-brain identity
has simply been assumed by most modern students of skin-marking and
blistering by suggestion. Most of the resulting accounts, however, proceed
at a very general level, without adequate attention to the details. S. I. Cohen,
Bondurant, and Silverman (1960), for example, speak vaguely of how emo-

5 1 . The "experimenter effect," in which the experimenter's explicit or implicit

expectations can profoundly influence the experimental results, has become increas­
ingly recognized in psychology (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1 978), and perhaps even more
so in parapsychology (e.g., Kennedy & Taddonio, 1976; R. A. White, 1976). A strik­
ing illustration in the specific context of the hypnotic production of blisters was
described by H. Spiegel ( 1 997). Spiegel hypnotized an army corporal and touched
him on the arm with a pencil, telling him that it was a hot iron. Within a few min­
utes a blister appeared. During the next month, the experiment was repeated suc­
cessfully four times; but on a fifth occasion "the experiment was repeated .. .in the
presence of a high-ranking officer who voiced doubts about the genuineness of the
experiment. After being belittled and humiliated by this authority figure, this sub­
ject never again responded to the hypnotic suggestion" (p. 617).
2 l 2-Chapter 3

tionally charged words cause activation of the hypothalamus, which in turn

regulates the autonomic nervous system, thus producing the required effects
on localized blood vessels. Weitzenhoffer (1953, p. 296n) similarly found it
"plausible" that suggested blistering can be produced by the central nervous
system by way of its close connections with the autonomic nervous system,
which is known to regulate peripheral vascular changes. Chapman et al.
(1959), who conducted research on inflammatory responses generally as well
as research specifically on the influence of suggestion on inflammatory skin
reactions, blandly proposed that a person's "perceptions and attitudes are
relevant to neural activities that engender or enhance inflammatory reac­
tions" (p. 104). Paul (1 963) epitomized the lot when he declared that there is
"little doubt that the anatomical structure of the brain contains the neces­
sary circuits and pathways to allow such cortical influence on subcortical
and brain stem structures" (p. 242), and hence to create whatever localized
reactions of blood vessels and other physiological components of the skin
are necessary to produce the phenomena of interest. Paul notwithstanding,
however, there is considerable doubt.
This kind of vapid and generic theorizing reached new depths in an
important paper by T. X. Barber (1984), in which after many years of dogged
resistance he announced that he had finally come to accept the existence of
some psychophysiological phenomena of hypnosis that he had earlier (e.g.,
1 961) dismissed as mere "compliance." The reason, it turns out, is that he
had finally found a satisfactory explanation for them, one that "should, once
for all, topple the dualistic dichotomy." Here is his explanation:

The meanings or ideas imbedded in words which are spoken by one person
and deeply accepted by another can be communicated to the cells of the
body (and to the chemicals within the cells); the cells then can change their
activities in order to conform to the meanings or ideas which have been
transmitted to them. (pp. 1 1 5-1 16)

Similarly, Barber asserts, beliefs "alter microphysiological processes" (p.

1 16), "abnormally functioning skin cells begin to function normally when
the individual is exposed to specific words or communication (suggestions)"
(p. 78), and "feelings . . .instruct the cells to behave the way they would if a
burn was occurring, warts were regressing, or mammary glands were grow­
ing" (p. 1 1 8).
Barber undoubtedly believed in all sincerity that with this kind of talk
he was "posing an explanation" (as he entitled the section beginning on p.
24 in the version of his 1984 paper published in the journal Advances); but
it is surely more accurate to characterize it instead as "posing as an expla­
nation." What Barber and others of this general persuasion typically do is
essentially to focus primarily on the bookends of the process-an idea or
image and the corresponding physiological change-while simply presum­
ing that the passage from the former to the latter can be fully accounted for
in conventional biological terms.
 Psychophysiological Influence-213

Those intermediate connections, however, are all-important. In the first

place, as I have emphasized throughout this chapter, identification of cen­
tral nervous system correlates of an "idea," even if far more precise than
those currently available, would not obviously or necessarily bring us any
closer to understanding how the various mechanisms required to produce
the desired outcome-and only those-are set in motion. As Myers (1891d)
put it, "however exactly the parallelism between psychical and cerebral
energies may be established, the exacter correlation can tell us little more
than the vaguer told us" (p. 635).
Secondly, just how exceedingly complex and specific these subsequent
biological steps themselves must often be has not been adequately appreci­
ated by most contemporary workers. T. X. Barber (1984), for example, echo­
ing a suggestion originally made by Gurney (1887a), proposed that a vivid
hallucination, such as that of heat at a particular skin location, provides
"an important mediating step" in producing a blister at that location; but
he made no serious attempt to explain more precisely how it does so. Barber
merely asserted, in words remarkable only for how they skip over rather
than address the underlying problem: "When individuals experience (hal­
lucinate) a suggested burn in virtually the same way as they experience an
actual burn, the central nervous system can react in virtually the same way
as it reacts to an actual burn" (p. 92).
Others, to their credit, have felt some unease with regard to the pros­
pects for providing an adequate account in such terms. Bowers (1979), for
example, evidently accepted Barber's basic picture, suggesting that the pro­
duction of highly specific or "focused" effects such as blisters is rooted in
"the central nervous system's capacity for imagery and symbolism" and
involves "the transduction of information from a semantic to a somatic
level, possible through the mediation of imagery." Yet Bowers also acknowl­
edged openly, unlike Barber, that "the specifics of this transduction process
are . . . a mystery of the profoundest sort, with all sorts of implications for the
so-called mind-body problem" (pp. 269-270).
A very few others have been more explicit in raising questions about this
"transduction." McDougall (1911/1961), for example, asked how "the neural
impulses initiated in the auditory nerve by the sound of the words, 'Your
left eye is blind,' . . . find their way to the fibres of the left optic nerve . . . [or]
paralyse the conductivity of the nerve" (p. 352).52 Myers (1 892c) remarked,
more poetically, that the hypnotist's "command, 'Feel pain no more!', is no
more a scientific instruction how not to feel pain than the prophet's 'Wash in
Jordan and be clean!' was a pharmacopoeal prescription for leprosy" (pp.
331-332).
The biologist, physician, and author Lewis Thomas (1979) regarded phe­
nomena such as hypnotic healing of warts as "one of the great mystifications
of science," and he was explicit and eloquent in stating his views as to where
an adequate explanation must be sought. As he put it, it is "hardly enough

52. In answer to his own question, McDougall could only say that it was "utterly
impossible to conceive."
214-Chapter 3

for the mind to say, simply, get off, eliminate yourselves, without provid­
ing something in the way of specifications as to how to go about it." Given
that warts are caused by a virus and often gotten rid of by immunological
mechanisms rejecting them, the process of eliminating them by suggestion
probably involves not only selectively shutting down the local blood sup­
ply, but also activating the appropriate lymphocytes while simultaneously
"exclud[ing] the wrong ones." Again, he insisted, "it wouldn't do to fob off
the whole intricate business on lower centers without sending along a quite
detailed set of specifications, away over my head." Thomas concluded that
there must be a "Person in charge," a "kind of superintelligence in all of us"
that knows how to do this, one that is "infinitely smarter and possessed of
technical know-how far beyond our present understanding." Yet

there ought to be a better word than Unconscious, even capitalized, for

what I have, so to speak, in mind. I was brought up to regard this aspect of
thinking as a sort of private sanitarium, walled off somewhere in a suburb
of my brain, capable only of producing such garbled information as to
keep my mind always a little off balance.
But any mental apparatus that can reject a wart is something else
again. This is not the sort of confused, disordered process you would
expect at the hands of the kind of unconscious you read about in books,
at the edge of things making up dreams or getting mixed up on words, or
having hysterics. (p. 59)

The type of "Unconscious" that Thomas seems to have in mind is, in

fact, precisely what Myers meant by his notion of a Subliminal Self-a kind
of hidden, larger intelligence guiding and producing the protean and ever­
shifting symptoms of hysteria, knowing how to turn on and off the inflam­
matory processes behind stigmata or hypnotically produced blisters, or
accomplishing in ways unknown to our ordinary consciousness the goal of
expressing an idea such as that of a "K" or a cross in somatic form. As I dis­
cussed in Chapter 2, one of the central issues Myers was addressing was the
problem of volition, and he specifically suggested that, just as it had been a
mistake to identify mind with that portion of it of which we are aware, so it
might be a mistake to limit volition to the relatively small supraliminal frag­
ment of the total spectrum of consciousness. Volition should instead be con­
sidered the function of an individual's mind as a whole, subliminal as well
as supraliminal, and not be limited to those acts an individual is aware of
initiating consciously and voluntarily (HP, vol. 2, pp. 518�523). An hypnotic
or other suggestion is effective because the larger subliminal intelligence
"carries out the idea as well as it can, unhindered by the mistakes or clum­
siness of the conscious mind" (Myers, 1886e, p. 448). How that "Person in
charge" does so is, of course, no more clear to us than how the brain might
do so; but it seems likely that the process is a volitional and goal-oriented
one, rather than an automatic brain reflex or even, as Thomas described it,
one in which some "mental apparatus" understands and carries out each
individual step along the way. And this brings us once again face to face
 Psychophysiological Influence-2 l S

with a fundamental problem with which few psychologists have been willing
to grapple-namely, the problem of volition and what all volitional phe­
nomena, from deliberately raising one's arm to deliberately raising a blister,
imply about the nature of mind.
Even Thomas, however, may not have fully appreciated the magnitude
of the problems he was pointing out. I have already stated several times that
attempted explanations of phenomena of psychophysiological influence in
conventional biological terms become progressively strained and unsatis­
factory as we move from the level of commonly occurring global or systemic
effects to phenomena of the more localized, dramatic, and uncommon sorts.
In fact, I will now argue, in extreme cases like those of blistering and skin
marking the conventional approach breaks down altogether, because the
brain and body demonstrably lack output mechanisms capable of produc­
ing the observed effects. It is imperative to note also that this argument,
if sustained, casts retrospective doubt on the conventional interpretations
of all seemingly less complex phenomena of psychophysiological influence,
including that everyday phenomenon which we so readily take for granted­
namely, our ability to raise our arm whenever we intend to do so.
Consider first the case of hypnotically induced blisters. Gurney (1887a)
examined these thoughtfully in relation to his own suggestion that vivid
mental imagery might be a causative factor in their production. The more
primitive manifestations, such as a generalized reddening of an area of skin
when attention is focused on it, seemed to him possibly within the reach of
a biological explanation. However, he cautioned, "difficulties increase as we
go on." In particular, he recognized clearly the difficulties of identifying any
mechanism by which a suggested idea-hypnotic or non-hypnotic, emo­
tional or non-emotional, hallucinatory or not-could produce a "minutely
localised erethism . . . [that] corresponds with the idea to the extent of being
cruciform" (p. 105). Gurney was even willing to allow-wrongly, as we now
know-the possibility "that the cerebral area involved in the idea of a cross
should itself be cruciform." That would not help explain the cruciform blis­
ter, however:

No one has ever supposed that a nervous impulse transmitted from ide­
ational tracts to lower centres, and thence to the periphery, was conveyed
by fibres which retained precisely similar spatial relations, so that the
course of the discharge, wherever cut across, would present a similar sec­
tion. Passing inwards from the periphery along the track of nervous distur­
bance, should we find cruciformity of area all the way? And if not, where
does it stop? And if it stops anywhere, what is the connection between the
cruciform effect at the periphery, and the cause (even if we assume that to
be cruciform) in the brain? (Gurney, 1887, p. 1 05)

Others since Gurney have also clearly recognized the severe explanatory
challenge posed by blisters of this type. Madden (1903) outlined arguments
that are in fact quite similar to Gurney's, but unlike Gurney he concluded
on that basis that "vesication by suggestion is a physiological impossibility"
2 l6-Chapter 3

and therefore that all previous investigators had been deceived. Pattie (1941)
was more cautious, acknowledging the strength of the evidence, but main­
taining "an attitude of suspended judgment, an attitude due mostly to [my]
inability to understand by what physiological processes suggestion-or the
central nervous system-could produce localized and circumscribed erythe­
mas or blisters" (p. 71).
The essence of the problem in more modern terms is that although we
have learned a great deal in recent decades about the processes of neuro­
genic inflammation that give rise to blister formation in the case of, say, a
burn, we have no credible idea as to how those processes could be engaged
directly by the central nervous system, in the absence of the tissue injury
and activation of pain receptors that normally precipitate local release of
substance P and related vasoactive agents. Pattie himself thought that this
had to occur "independent of the central nervous system," and in this he
seems almost certainly correct.
But how then might it happen at all, if the central nervous system can­
not itself directly produce the necessary effects in the skin, with the requisite
precision? The only remaining hope for a neurological explanation amounts
essentially to transferring control of blister shape to the corresponding tac­
tile stimulus, such as Janet's mustard plaster in the shape of a six-pointed
star. The basic idea is that an abnormal state of the central nervous system,
such as deep hypnotic trance, might somehow sensitize the skin in such a
way that light touch with the star activates local mechanisms of blistering
in the same way that they would normally have been activated had the star
actually been burning hot. Although skin-based mechanisms capable of
producing such local sensitization are known to exist (Willis, 1999), it is not
known whether they can be mobilized by hypnosis, directly from the central
nervous system, in the necessary form and extent. Furthermore, and more
decisively, these mechanisms could not in any event provide a general expla­
nation of hypnotic blistering because, as we have seen, blisters sometimes
appear, not at the location touched by the hypnotist, but at some other loca­
tion, or even in the absence of any touch stimulus whatever.
Let us go on to a second and even more challenging case, the skin-writ­
ing of Olga Kahl.53 The marks in this case were in or below the skin, and not
on the skin, because they were not altered by attempts to wash them away
(Bester man, 1929, p. 428). Osty (1929), a physician, regarded this skin-writ­
ing phenomenon as an inspiring example of generally unrecognized poten­
tials of the human organism for physiological self-control, and he made
a serious attempt to understand it in terms of the neurophysiology of the
day. The red color, apparent depth, and spatial precision of the lines clearly
required an extraordinary degree of control of the peripheral circulation.
Osty (p. 1 37) assumed that this control had to be exerted at the level of the
capillary bed, through local dilation of capillaries, and by a central nervous

53. I will leave aside here the psi-related aspects of this case, discussed later in the
chapter, and consider only the challenge it poses as a purely psychophysiological
phenomenon.
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-2l 7

mechanism of exquisite precision. There was a problem, however. Physiolo­

gists already knew most of what we know today about autonomic control of
the peripheral vasculature, and had demonstrated its existence only to the
insufficiently precise level of arterioles terminating prior to the capillary
level. Osty, confident that his biological assumptions must be correct, there­
fore postulated that a similar but more delicate control system exists within
the capillary bed itself, and he challenged anatomists to find it.
Osty's hypothesis was bold and reasonable at the time, but we now
know that it is false, and for several reasons. First and already decisive is the
fact that the requisite neuroanatomical structures within the capillary bed
simply do not exist. Second, it has become clearer that the autonomic ner­
vous system-more specifically, the sympathetic outflow from the stellate
ganglion that supplies forearm skin-is designed primarily for relatively
global and spatially imprecise tasks such as thermoregulation, relying on
unmyelinated and highly branched neurons to achieve these effects. Finally,
it does not appear to be the case, as Osty also assumed, that any of these
sympathetic neurons produces active vasodilation in peripheral vascula­
ture. Rather, their primary effect is vasoconstriction, and although a mod­
est and diffuse vasodilatory effect can be achieved by relaxation of this sym­
pathetic vasoconstriction, active vasodilation in the skin now appears to be
dominated instead by non-neural mechanisms involving release within the
skin of various vasoactive chemical agents from structures such as mast
cells, the capillary endothelium, and "varicosities" in the sympathetic fibers
themselves (Berne & Levy, 1993; Brading, 1999; Hamill, 1996; Janig, 1990;
Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991; Roddie, 1 983; Ryan, 1991; Willis, 1999).
In short, Olga's skin-writing, like the formation of cruciform hypnotic
blisters, appears to be mediated by some sort of abnormal and yet spatially
precise operation of these local chemical mechanisms of inflammation and
vascular control. How such control could be exerted remains a mystery, but
it is worth pointing out that both situations offer numerous opportunities
for further physiological investigation, if suitable subjects can be found.
Sympathetic nerve-block, for example, should not abolish the effects. Simi­
larly, more detailed time-course-information could help to identify which
vasoactive agents are potentially involved, with follow-up experiments
using selective agonists/antagonists of these agents helping to pinpoint their
contributions. Substance P and similar peptides activated in dermographia,
for example, appear unlikely candidates for a role in Olga's skin-writing,
because their time courses are on the order of minutes to hours rather than
the tens of seconds in which Olga's skin-writing appeared.
In sum, I have now provided two examples of extreme psychophysio­
logical influence for which no explanation in conventional biological terms
seems even possible, let alone anywhere in sight. Like Gurney (l887a), I do
not wish to insist too strongly on the impossibility; but I do insist that at min­
imum serious explanatory gaps currently exist, and that these gaps cannot
simply be papered over with glib and vague invocations of the principle of
psychophysical equivalence, or mind-body unity, that has been relied upon
2IS-Chapter 3

by nearly all contemporary investigators. Similar gaps exist with regard to

nearly all the other phenomena I have discussed so far in this chapter.

Changes in Another Person's Body

By this point it should be abundantly clear that there are numerous types,
and many well-attested instances, of phenomena demonstrating that an
emotion, a belief, vivid imagery, or some other psychological process can
sometimes produce striking physiological changes which, in terms of their
specificity of location and form, go far beyond the generalized responses of
the body and nervous system to stress or other emotions. The belief that all
phenomena of psychophysiological influence must be explainable in purely
biological terms can perhaps be sustained, in those sufficiently committed
to it, so long as we confine our attention-as we have so far-to phenomena
involving the apparent effects of mental states on a person's own body.
This promissory materialism, however, is further undermined by related
types of phenomena in which one person's mental state seems to have influ­
enced another person's body. Although most scientists, and many others,
are unwilling even to entertain the idea that such phenomena can occur,
they do in fact occur, and pose essentially the same problem as phenomena
of psychophysiological influence involving only one person. Both types are
examples of volition, or the carrying out of some kind of intention or pur­
pose by some kind of intelligence. Even in its simplest and most basic forms,
as I have said before, volition remains a mystery: How does the idea to raise
one's arm translate into the complex motor processes that carry out that
intention? The phenomena that I will discuss in the remainder of this chap­
ter are simply an extension of that basic problem, but they are especially
important because they call even more seriously into question glib asser­
tions of mind-body "unity" as the basis of all psychophysical interactions.
How on such views can a brain process in one person set in motion its physi­
ological expression in the body of another person? The problem of volition,
from the most common everyday acts to the rarest and most extreme of the
phenomena examined in this chapter, will remain a mystery without some
understanding of the relation of mind and brain that goes deeper than either
an absolute separation of non-interactive mind and brain or the currently
popular, but ultimately superfic ial, assertion of mind-brain unity.
Myers suggested that all supernormal phenomena, including those in
which the thoughts of one person seem to have affected the body of another
person, may reflect an ability to act on other bodies "such . . . as the living
energy, whatever it be, in each of us is wont to exercise upon the brain"
(Myers, 1894, p. 417), a process he called "telergy" (HP, vol. 2, p. 52). The
extension of this volitional power from one's own body to another person's
body may seem radical, but, as Myers (1894) summarized the situation, we
are as ignorant about the nature of the former as about the latter:
 Psychophysiological Influence-219

It is the very secret of life which confronts us here; the fundamental antin­
omy between Mind and Matter. . . .I here say only that since this problem
does already exist, . . .we have no right to take for granted that the prob­
lem, when more closely approached, will keep within its ancient limits, or
that Mind, whose far-darting energy we are now realising, must needs be
always powerless upon aught but the grey matter of the brain. (p. 421)

One important point to emphasize, however, is that the distinction I am

making here between effects on one's own body and effects on another per­
son's body is often harder to draw, in practice, than one might expect. In the
first place, it seems likely, as Myers pointed out (e.g., HP, vol. 1, p. 213), that
most if not all psychophysiological effects of direct suggestion-whether
produced by suggestions arising from within oneself or by suggestions com­
ing from another person (such as a healer or a hypnotist)-are ultimately the
result of self-suggestion. For most of the phenomena discussed in this chap­
ter, moreover, any suggestions received from other persons are perceived
in the normal way. In other cases, however, it seems reasonable to extend
this picture by proposing, based on the extensive evidence for psi (see the
Appendix), that a suggestion has been received in some supernormal way.
Whether perceived normally or supernormally, the suggestion takes root in
the person's mind and sets off whatever psychophysiological processes in
his or her own body are necessary to produce the observed phenomena.
In cases of this latter type, however, we must also keep in mind the pos­
sibility that, in addition to a physiological process set in motion by self-sug­
gestion, there may also have been some more direct influence by the other
person; and it is often not clear-cut when, or to what extent, the former
process may leave off and the latter take over. This will become particularly
apparent when we come to cases in which the other person was making a
deliberate attempt to alter the physiology of the subject.
Keeping in mind these cautionary remarks about possible sources of the
influence, I will next briefly survey phenomena of psychophysiological influ­
ence that involve, not just one, but two people-that is, evidence indicat­
ing that one person can somehow induce physiological changes in another
person's body. The section will be relatively brief, because this topic lies so
far beyond ideas that most contemporary scientists are willing to entertain
that research has been severely limited both by the number of people willing
to undertake it and by the serious lack of funding for it. Nonetheless, as I
will try to make evident, there has in fact already been a substantial amount
of serious scientific research on these topics, the results of which cry out for
further research.

Spontaneously Occurring Phenomena

Sympathetic Symptoms
The difficulty of making the distinction between effects on one's own
body and effects on another person's body is illustrated by cases that might
220-Chapter 3

be considered "transitional." In the cases that comprise this category, one

person takes on the pains Or other symptoms of another person's suffer­
ing, apparently in sympathy with that person, a phenomenon that has been
called "compathy," Or "the physical equivalent to empathy" (1. M. Morse &
Mitcham, 1 997). I mentioned earlier the well-known phenomenon of cou­
vade, in which a man suffers some of the symptoms of his pregnant wife,
such as nausea during the pregnancy Or abdominal Or other pains during
the childbirth. I also mentioned earlier cases described by Stevenson (1997,
vol. 1 , pp. 54-56) and Tuke (1884, pp. 285-287), in which a person devel­
oped bleeding, blisters, swelling, Or other adverse reactions after witnessing
a corresponding injury on another person. 54
I also earlier discussed what is in fact another, more extreme example of
this phenomenon, namely, stigmata. Stigmata seem essentially to be symp­
toms of the stigmatic's sympathy for the suffering of Jesus; and so it is per­
haps not surprising that other sympathetic symptoms have also occasionally
been reported in connection with stigmatics. Therese Neumann, for exam­
ple, apparently developed symptoms comparable to those she witnessed in
other people (Klauder, 1938, p. 653), as did Anna Emmerich and Elizabeth
K., the subject in whom Lechler had induced stigmata with hypnosis (Ste­
venson, 1997, vol. 1 , pp. 43-44). Likewise, Olga K., not a stigmatic in the
religious sense but a person capable of producing similar skin symptoms,
is reported to have developed pain in her cheek, and later an abscess on the
inside of her cheek that penetrated through it, as a reaction to having seen
in Turkey some dervishes who thrust skewers through their cheeks (Steven­
son, 1997, vol. 1 , p. 95). People such as stigmatics who develop symptoms
in response to the suffering of others may share certain personality traits
that make them susceptible to this and other kinds of psychophysiological
responses. A hint might be provided by Barber's finding (1984) that a large
number of highly hypnotizable and fantasy-prone individuals experience
not only false pregnancy, as I mentioned earlier, but also "another person's
symptoms when they hear or read about them" (p. 1 1 3).
It seems relatively clear-cut in these cases that the effect is the result
of self-suggestion. The problem becomes more complicated, however, when
we come to the many similar cases in which the person did not actually wit�
ness, Or even know normally about, the condition of the other person. In
one case, for example, a woman suddenly "doubled over, clutching her chest
as if in severe pain and said, 'Something has happened to Nell [her daugh­
ter], she has been hurt.'" Two hours later she learned that Nell had died in
a car accident, from wounds incurred when the steering wheel pierced her
chest (Rhine, 1 962, p. 107). In cases such as these, did the subject of the case
perceive the distant event in some supernormal manner and develop sym-

54. For two additional cases reported by Stevenson-including that of a man who,
shortly after a friend died of lung cancer, developed pains that persisted for more
than four years and seemed to correspond to the pains suffered by his friend-see
Stevenson, 1965, pp. 1 232-1233; 1 970, p. 108.
 Psychophysiological Influence-221

pathetic symptoms by self-suggestion? Or did the distant person exert some

sort of influence on the body of the subject? Or both?
Stevenson (1970, pp. 108-1 14; 1997, vol. 1, pp. 92-93) has provided
reviews of numerous similar cases, and Rhine (1 967) published a paper in
which she analyzed 169 cases reported to her in which someone described
having had a "somatic experience" corresponding to the injury or illness of
a distant person. Of these 169, 58 had occurred at the time of death of the
distant person, 52 involved non-fatal accidents, 33 corresponded to illnesses
or operations, and 26 were related to childbirth (p. 1 1 5). In one case, for
example, the person "suddenly got violent pains in my right eye"; she soon
learned that her son had suffered an injury to his eye at about that time
from the backfiring of an engine (p. 1 1 5). In another, a man "suddenly. . . felt
a severe shock to my temple" and said to his wife that he felt that his brother
had just shot himself; four hours later he received a telegram confirming this
(p. 1 20). In another, similar to hysterical cases of limb paralysis, a person
suffered a temporary paralysis of a leg at about the time the other person
had been fatally wounded in the hip and leg (pp. 121-122). In still another,
reminiscent of stigmata cases, the person developed a mark on one arm,
which lasted for several days and apparently corresponded to an intrave­
nous injection in the arm of a friend then hospitalized.
Because in these cases the condition of one person was not known about
normally by the person who developed a symptom corresponding to it, they
may seem to some readers to be of a qualitatively different kind than those
in which the subject did see or hear about the stimulus. Yet, given the phe­
nomenological similarity of the two, and given also the extensive evidence
that people can learn about events in some way other than through ordinary
sensory functioning (see the Appendix), it is possible that the essential dif­
ference lies only in the manner in which the idea providing the stimulus for
the physiological response reached the subject's mind.

Maternal Impressions
There have been numerous cases, reported throughout history, in which
an idea in the mind of a pregnant woman, usually triggered by her percep­
tion of another person's injury or deformity, seems to have resulted in a sim­
ilar deformity in a third person-her unborn baby. Such phenomena have
been called "maternal impressions," and Myers urged the study of them:

If [some] shock fal l upon the mother during the embryo's life, and if it
chance . . . to reach the mother's subliminal self in effective fashion, it may
then transfer itself to the embryo, and imprint upon the child the organic
memory of the mother's emotion of admiration, disgust, or fear. . . . 1 believe
that there is evidence enough . . . to show that isolated and momentary sug­
gestions-as the sight of a crushed ankle or missing finger-may produce
a definite localised effect on the embryo in much the same way as a hyp­
notic suggestion may produce a localised congestion or secretion. (Myers,
1 895d, p. 349; also HP, vol. 2, p. 267)
222-Chapter 3

Most modern medical scientists deny the reality of maternal impres­

sion cases. E. M. Sternberg (2001), for example, referred to them as "the fif­
teenth century belief in monster births i f a pregnant woman was exposed to
a fright," a belief "carried through to the nineteenth century and, in trans­
muted form, on into the twentieth century, in grandmother's warning that
if mother spilled coffee on her leg, baby would be born with a birthmark on
the thigh." She concluded that such "magical thinking" has now, in the 21st
century, fal len "by the wayside," remaining only in "the realm of popular
culture" (p. 8).
But can reports of maternal impressions be dismissed so quickly as mere
superstition? Contrary to what Sternberg and many others may assume, the
phenomenon is not confined to folklore or legend: Numerous cases have in
fact been observed by physicians and reported in medical journals. Myers
(HP, vol. 1 , pp. 455-458) called attention to two cases reported by physicians
in medical journals in the 1890s. The first involved a "very suggestible"
woman who during her pregnancy encountered a woman with a birthmark
covering one whole side of her face. Thereafter, throughout her pregnancy,
she had the hallucination that the faces of all passers-by in the street were
similarly marked. Interestingly, she did not expect her unborn child to have
the mark; but it did. The second case was slightly different, in that the preg­
nant woman had the misfortune to be present when her husband was shot
in the left side of his chest. He survived, but while trying to help him, she
had gotten blood all over her face; and, as she confided to their doctor that
same day, she was convinced that her child would be born with a "bloody
face." Instead, as the doctor observed nearly eight months later, the baby
was born with "bright red marks" that were "elevated nrevi . . . easily to be
seen at a distance of a hundred feet." Moreover, "they were on the left side
of the chest, and although not in the exact anatomic location of the wound
on the father's chest, still so near the spot that they are easily recognised
as resulting therefrom. The mother had seen the wounds in her husband's
chest, and had told me during his illness that they made her sick every time
she looked at them."55
Stevenson ( l992a, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 104-175) has provided an important
review of this phenomenon, with a detailed survey and analysis of 50 cases
selected from several hundred that he identified in the literature. 56 The 50
cases were chosen by the following criteria: First, in many of them the physi­
cian (usually also the author) had seen not only the baby and its birthmark or
birth defect, but also the person whose similar deformity had impressed the

55. An interesting variation on this may have occurred in connection with a stig­
mata case. I mentioned earlier a case reported by J. G. Fisher and Kollar (1980) of
a young Mexican-American woman who developed stigmata shortly after her mar­
riage. About a year and a hal f later, she gave birth to a child who "also had the stig­
mata (hands, feet, crown of thorns) five times, the first at age 21> weeks" (p. 1462).
This is a "variation" on maternal impression cases because the marks developed,
not in utero, but shortly after the child's birth.
56. For a summary of all 50 cases, see Stevenson (1997, Table 3.2, pp. 1 1 1-134).
 Psychophysiological I nfluence-223

pregnant woman. Second, Stevenson chose cases in which the most detail
had been given (although in many of them still more detail would have been
desirable). Third, he chose cases in which the correspondence between the
two marks or deformities was close. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
he gave preference to cases in which the marks in question were unusual,
thus lessening the likelihood of chance correspondence.
For example, 32 of the 50 cases involved birth defects, usually the con­
genital absence of all or part of a limb. In one (from the 1890s), a child of the
pregnant woman had accidentally been cut severely with a wood chopper
across the middle, ring, and little fingers of the left hand; and the child born
subsequently was also missing the middle, ring, and little fingers of the left
hand. In another (from 1 949) the pregnant woman saw a man whose ear had
been cut off by a sword in a war, and her child was born without an exter­
nal left ear. In a third case (from 1863), a pregnant woman who had seen
her brother's genitalia after his penis had been amputated for treatment of
cancer later gave birth to a male child lacking a penis. The physician in this
case confirmed the condition of both the woman's brother and her baby.
This case particularly calls into question the hypothesis of chance coinci­
dence: Surgical amputation of a penis is not a common occurrence, and the
incidence of congenital absence of the penis is similarly exceedingly rare.
Stevenson (1997, vol. 1, p. 140) cites an 1898 study in which the incidence
of congenital absence of the penis was estimated at 1 in 30,000,000 births
and another study showing that only 15 such cases had been reported in the
medical literature up to 195 1 .
In the remaining 18 cases, involving what would b e more accurately
described as birthmarks rather than birth defects, the two conditions were
also often unusual ones. In one case (from 1877), a pregnant woman's 2-
year-old son cut his upper lip severely, requiring surgical repair and leaving
a scar. The child born subsequently had a linear scar on the upper lip at the
same place. In another case, a woman had seen her husband after he had
been slapped on the face and neck by someone whose four bloody fingers
had left bloody marks on his face. The child was born with marks on the
face and neck resembling the four finger marks.
The cases are not confined to earlier times. Similar cases are still occa­
sionally reported, even in medical journals (e.g., H. C. Williams & Pem­
broke, 1988). Stevenson himself has investigated and reported six such cases
(1 997, vol. 1, pp. 142-173).57 One of these (Stevenson, 1985, 1989, 1997, vol. 1 ,
pp. 160-169) occurred i n the 1980s i n Sri Lanka. I n 1974 the father and uncle
of Sampath, the subject of the case, murdered a man in their village by cut­
ting off his arms and legs. The victim's mother repeatedly cursed the family
and wished them to have a deformed child. Sampath's mother feared that the
curse would be effective, but when her next child was born a few years later,

57. Additionally, some of the more than 200 cases that Stevenson (1 992b,
1 997) has reported of birthmarks or birth defects attributed to the effects of a pre­
vious life (which I will discuss later in the chapter) may possibly be attributable
instead to maternal impression.
224-Chapter 3

it was normal and she believed that the curse had somehow been negated.
The next child, however, born in 1982, was severely deformed, lacking both
of his arms and having seriously deformed legs.
A curse of this kind is an unusual form of maternal impression, but we
encountered similar kinds of cases earlier in the chapter in connection with
hexing or voodoo deaths. Moreover, Sampath's case is not alone. A pediatri­
cian in Australia reported a remarkably similar case (E. K. Turner, 1960), in
which a young girl became pregnant by a man of whom her parents disap­
proved. From the second month of her pregnancy,5s her mother repeatedly
cursed her and declared that the baby would be born "without arms and
legs, and blind." The girl nonetheless persisted in the pregnancy, and when
the child was born he was missing both legs and had severe deformities of
the arms, although he did not seem to be blind. He died six months later.
The author attributed the deformities to severe stress that aborted the devel­
opment of the child's limbs.
E. M. Sternberg (2001) likewise believes that stress or other strong emo­
tion can explain such cases, because of the findings of psychoneuroimmu­
nology, discussed earlier in this chapter, showing a relationship between
emotion and the immune system. Thus, she claims, maternal impression
cases have been "removed from the realm of the magical" (p. 8). But can
anyone really take seriously the "explanation" that "stress" produced the
specific, localized, and often rare marks and deformities encountered in
many of these cases?
Unfortunately, opportunities for scientists to find a more adequate
explanation by studying cases at first hand may be diminishing. In ear­
lier centuries physicians believed that the fetus was directly connected to
the mother's body by nerve or blood vessels and that the cases could be
"explained" as an effect of the mother's mental processes on her own body.
As long they believed in this as a plausible explanation, maternal impression
cases were regularly reported in the medical literature. In the 20th century,
however, scientists learned that there are no such neural or circulatory con­
nections. There is transfer of some substances across the placenta, but this
clearly cannot explain how an idea in one person's mind (the mother's) could
translate into correspondingly specific and localized effects on another per­
son's body (the baby's). Apparently because there was no longer an accept­
able explanation, reports of such cases in the medical literature declined
precipitously. Perhaps even more importantly, however, as Stevenson (1 997,
vol. 1 , p. 174) has pointed out, the real (and not just the reported) incidence
of such cases may also be falling off, since the belief in such an effect among
the general public may be dying away, in the West at least.

58. This case i llustrates an interesting finding by Stevenson (1997, vol. 1, pp. 1 38-
1 39), namely, that the stimulus i n maternal impression cases was significantly more
likely to occur in the first trimester than in the other two. Assuming that a pregnant
woman would be equally likely in any trimester to encounter a stimulus, Stevenson
suggested that this finding is "medically significant," because the 1 st trimester is
also the one in which the developing fetus is most vulnerable.
 Psychophysiological Inftuence-225

Distant Mental Influence on Living Systems

The cases of "sympathetic symptoms," described earlier, occurred

spontaneously, often at a time of crisis for the person whose injury seemed
to provide the stimulus. In this section I will discuss some of the evidence for
closely related phenomena, in which one person has deliberately attempted
to influence physiological processes in another person. Here in particular
we encounter again the problem of deciding whether the effect is really some
direct influence on the subject by the other person or rather the result of self­
suggestion within the subject, engendered by information obtained in some
supernormal fashion. Support for the former possibility derives from the
large experimental literature concerning direct mental influence on inani­
mate or non-human living targets, otherwise known as psychokinesis, or
PK.59

Community ofSensation
Some of the early mesmerists had reported that a mesmerized subject
sometimes seemed to experience a sensation comparable to one that the
mesmerist was feeling, usually a taste or a pain-although, as Gauld (1992,
pp. 234-235) pointed out, rarely was there any indication that auditory or
olfactory cues had been adequately controlled for. Later in the century,
Esdaile, Elliotson, and others also reported experiments along these lines
(for a brief review, see Gurney et aI., 1886, vol. 2, pp. 324-329), and still later
Gurney, Myers, and other members of the SPR undertook similar experi­
ments (for a review, see Gurney et aI., 1886, vol. 1, pp. 51-58; HP, vol. 1, pp.
540-543).
Another series of experiments that might be considered a variation on
the "community of sensation" phenomena were those, described earlier, in
which Olga Kahl was able to reproduce on her skin target pictures or writ­
ing. It was remarkable enough, as described above, that she could somehow
translate an image presented to her normally into corresponding marks
within her skin. Even more remarkable was that the target information
often had not been conveyed to her in any normal sensory way. In a typical
experiment of this sort, an investigator would write a name or other target
on a piece of paper and then concentrate on it, always taking care of course
that Olga did not see it, sometimes by going into a different room. The
investigators also sometimes designated at the time of the experiment the
skin location where they wanted the marks to appear. Within a short time,
corresponding letters or lines would begin to form in Olga's skin (Stevenson,
1 997, vol. 1, pp. 94-lO3). Somehow, it seemed, information in one person's
mind was transferred, within seconds or minutes, into a highly specific
physiological reaction in another person. Olga's case invites the interpreta­
tion that it was the image that arose in her mind, rather than a direct PK
effect from the other person, that somehow controlled the reaction: Recall,

59. I will not attempt here even to summarize this literature, let alone discuss it
adequately, but for pointers into it see the Appendix.
226-Chapter 3

for example, that when the target was the name "Rene," the "N" came out
looking like an "H," as in the alphabet of Olga's native Russian.

Suggestion at a Distance
The possibility of direct, PK-like influence from experimenters or other
persons, however, seems stronger in some other experiments in which a
more generalized physiological response was induced in a distant subject.
For example, Janet, Richet, and others undertook experiments in "sugges­
tion at a distance," in some of which Myers participated (Janet, 188611968a,
l 88611968b; Myers, 1886c, pp. 1 27-137; Richet, 1888, pp. 32-52).60 In 18 of
25 trials Janet and his colleague Gibert were able to induce a trance in their
hysterical subject Leonie at distances varying from V4 to 1 mile. In most of
these, the experimenter made the suggestion while another person was with
Leonie and could observe her. To rule out the possibility that the observer
might have inadvertently conveyed normally to her a suggestion that she fall
into an hypnotic trance, some trials were made when the observer did not
know that an attempt was being made. Moreover, she was rarely found to
have fallen into a trance spontaneously, "not provoked by our order" (Janet,
1886b, p. 263). Recognizing the importance of such experiments, Myers sug­
gested that they be extended with experiments on the distant influence of a
subject's physiological state (such as vasomotor, circulatory, or respiratory
systems) (l886e, p. 450; 1893b, pp. 31-32).61
Myers had thought that Janet and his colleagues "are not likely to
drop the inquiry; and we may hope that the experiments . . . are but the first
instalment of what they may yet achieve" ( l 886e, p. 450). Regrettably, they
did soon drop the inquiry. Even worse, years later Janet downplayed their
significance, apparently retrospectively embarrassed by his own results. In
reporting his experiments in 1886, he had said that "there is a sort of fac­
ulty, I don't know what sort, by which she [Leonie] is able to perceive the
thoughts of others" (Janet, 188611968a) p. 130); but in 1930 he declared that
he had always been "skeptical as to mental suggestion and hypnotism from
a distance" (Janet, 193011961 , p. 1 25). He even rebuked those who had tried
to urge the importance of such research. Apparently, the suggestion that
such studies might imply "unknown faculties of the human mind" (p. 125)
was unacceptable enough to lead him to repudiate this line of research­
even his own-altogether.62

60. For a description of Richet's experiments in English, see A. T. Myers ( 1888)

and Pod more (1894, pp. 1 1 3-1 16).
61. Researchers in recent years have successfully taken up this suggestion to study
distant influence on physiology-but we have here another cautionary example of
the consequences of ignoring one's history. No current parapsychologist conduct­
ing research on distant mental influence seems aware of Myers's suggestion, and it
was decades before research along these lines was begun.
62. Janet's "retrocognitive dissonance"-to use a phrase coined by Brian Inglis
( I 983)-reflects an all too common reaction to supernormal phenomena, even those
produced in careful experiments witnessed or even conducted by oneself.
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-227

Fortunately, not everyone agreed with Janet. Other experiments of this

kind were carried out later by Russian scientists, especially the physiologist
L. L. Vasiliev of the University of Leningrad (for an overview, see Vasiliev,
1976). During the years 1 933-1934, Vasiliev and some colleagues conducted
260 trials with three subjects (two of them hysterical patients, one normal).
In these, an observer stayed in the room with the subject while another
experimenter attempted, at randomly chosen times unknown both to the
subject and to the observer, first to put the subject into a hypnotic trance
and then to awaken him or her, solely by sending a mental command. There
were four conditions, involving varying degrees of screening the subject
from sensory cues: In the least restrictive trials (n = 65), the "sender" was in
the same room as the subject, a few meters away, but out of sight. In the rest
the sender and subject were nearly always in different rooms, separated by
two passages whose doors were shut. In 68 trials the sender was in a "perfect
screening chamber" (p. 1 16), and in 32 of these the subject was in a Faraday
chamber (to screen out electromagnetic radiation). In only about 10% of the
trials did the subject fail to go to sleep or wake up within a few minutes of
the command; and there was no overall statistical difference between the
four conditions (p. 1 26). Vasiliev also conducted another series of 12 trials
with distances ranging from 25 meters to 1700 kilometers, and in most of
these, the subject fell asleep or woke up within one to two minutes of the
distant command (p. 1 53).
Like Janet, Vasiliev also reported that on very few occasions did the
subjects fal l into, or awaken from, a hypnotic trance spontaneously (p. 129).
This, together with the fact that many trials were successful even when the
time of induction was randomly chosen by the "sender" and unknown to
both the subject and the observer, weakens the hypothesis that trances were
induced by the subject's expectations.
In recent years, there have been many other kinds of studies designed
even more tightly to rule out expectation as an explanation. Before turning
to the laboratory studies, I will first comment briefly on one particular vari­
ety of distant-influence studies that has been highly controversial, highly
publicized, and (so far) inconclusive-namely, attempts to heal a distant
person, either by prayer or by a "psychic healer."

Distant Intentionality Studies: Clinical

Studies of alternative healing methods such as Therapeutic Touch (dis­
cussed earlier) are so far "inconclusive because of the required presence
of the practitioner" (Targ, 1997, p. 76) and the resulting strong likelihood
that any effects seen are placebo effects (themselves requiring explanation,
as I have argued). Within the enormous literature on complementary and
alternative forms of healing, there have been relatively few studies that have
attempted to control for such effects by conducting the healing intervention
at a distance and unknown to the patient.63 Some of these have involved

63. Such studies, however, still do not entirely rule out placebo, or self-suggestion,
effects. There remains the possibility that patients detected the attempted influence
228-Chapter 3

self-identified alternative healers; some have involved ordinary people pray­

ing for the sick person. Reviews of these studies (Abbot, 2000; Astin et aI.,
2000; Ernst, 2003; Targ, 1997) have acknowledged the methodological prob­
lems and equivocal results, but most also cautiously conclude that there is
sufficient evidence to warrant further research. For example, among the 13
distant-healing studies reviewed by Abbot and by Astin et aI., six produced
significant results.
Of the three most often cited and apparently well-conducted studies
yielding positive results, two involved prayer (Byrd, 1988; Harris et aI., 1999)
and one involved distant healing (Sicher, Targ, Moore, & Smith, 1998). All
have methodological problems that the authors themselves were the first to
acknowledge.64 Clearly, the results so far are inconclusive, and the only way
to resolve the question is with more thorough and better-designed studies.
But some general comments about these studies are in order here. First,
perhaps more notable than the studies themselves have been the reactions to
them. For a microcosm of these reactions, one has only to look at the 15 let­
ters to the editor of the Archives of Internal Medicine prompted by the Har­
ris et al. study. Harris and his colleagues attempted to replicate the findings
of Byrd with a large-scale study involving 990 patients admitted to a cardiac
care unit (CCU); 466 were randomly assigned to be prayed for by distant
persons who did not know them, and the rest were given standard care only.
The patients not only did not know which group they were assigned to, they
also did not even know that such a study was being conducted. A person
unconnected with the CCU assigned patients randomly to the groups, and
no one who had any contact with or evaluated the patients knew which
group they were in. Because the prayers were simply for a speedy recovery,
the investigators expected a global effect, rather than any specific outcomes;
and they did find that the patients in the "prayer" group had "lower overall
adverse outcomes" in the CCu.
Of the 15 letters to the editor, only one was positive; the rest criticized
the study on various methodological, statistical, or ethical grounds, some
of which are valid concerns. The predominant motivation for the critiques,
however, seems to have been that religion and science cannot and should not
be mixed, some protesting that if prayer is effective we will "need to reassess
500 years of scientific achievement" (Sandweiss, 2000), others arguing that
"God's omnipotence is beyond our ability to add or detract" (Galishoff,
2000).
The first critique is one that has repeatedly been leveled against studies
of all phenomena suggesting a primary role for volitional or mental causa­
tion-particularly psi phenomena, but also nearly all the phenomena dis­
cussed in this chapter. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, Myers and most others

in some supernormal manner.

64. Unlike Galton, apparently the first person to attempt a scientific study of
prayer, most people have recognized that such research is anything but "a simple
statistical question" (Galton, 1 872, p. 1 26) and involves numerous logical and meth­
odological problems (see, e.g., Chibnall, Jeral, & Cerullo, 2001 , pp. 2529-2530).
 Psychophysiological Influence-229

who have taken seriously the evidence for such phenomena have insisted
that the only consequence of accepting them is not the negation but the
expansion of modern science-rightly understood as an epistemological
method and not an ideology. One can fully accept the fundamental scientific
premise of the underlying continuity and lawfulness of nature without also
assuming that we currently know all relevant principles. Accepting evidence
that consciousness can have an influence on distant minds or matter clearly
implies rejection of the modern equation of the natural order with the physi­
cal universe as classically conceived-but not of science itself.
The second critique of prayer studies-the need to keep science and
religion separate because questions about God are beyond the scope of sci­
ence-betrays a limited view of what prayer studies really imply. Much of
the visceral reaction against studies of the efficacy of prayer seems to be
based on this assumption: "The most fundamental problem is that experi­
ments to test the power of prayer. . . require God . . . to work miracles. The
whole enterprise is therefore not really about prayer as a practice, but about
the existence of God" (Thomson, 1996, p. 534). And again: "God is the pur­
ported mechanism in these studies . . . .We maintain that studies of distant
prayer have had this feature not to test the effect of prayer on human illness,
but to test for God's intervention in response to human intercession" (Chib­
nail et al., 2001, p. 2532).
Such statements are simply false. I cannot of course comment on the
personal motivations of individual researchers, but prayer studies broadly
understood are not about the existence of either God or miracles. As Harris
et al. insisted, "it was intercessory prayer, not the existence of God, that was
tested here" (p. 2277). Prayer studies are, in fact, a subset of the much larger
body of research intended to examine the question of whether consciousness
can directly affect, not just the healing of another person, but more gener­
ally material objects (psychokinesis, or PK studies; see the Appendix) and
biological systems (the experimental studies to be discussed in the next sec­
tion). Given this larger context of numerous studies suggesting the existence
of such effects, it would be surprising if intercessory prayer-understood as
the intentional direction of one's thoughts toward another person-were not
effective under appropriate circumstances (those circumstances, of course,
to be determined by further research).
A more valid criticism of prayer studies has been that the use of blinded
intercessors-persons praying for a distant person not known to them­
makes little psychological sense (Chibnall et al., 2001).65 These authors sug­
gest placing the intercessor surreptitiously outside a patient's room where
they can "direct their intention right at the patient" (p. 2532). As an alterna­
tive, remote healers or persons praying could view the patient on a video
monitor. As we will see in the next section, numerous successful experi­
ments in distant influence have been conducted in this way, and I would

65. Three recent large-scale studies of prayer and healing that did not produce
significant results suffered from this same methodological weakness, one I consider
serious (Aviles et aI., 2001 ; Benson et aI., 2006; Krucoff et aI., 2005).
230-Chapter 3

expect the results of prayer studies to improve greatly under more personal
and directed conditions.66

Distant Intentionality Studies: Experimental

I said earlier that prayer studies are, in fact, a subset of a much larger
body of research intended to determine whether a person's conscious inten­
tion can directly affect distant biological systems, without any normal com­
munication of the intention. A body of studies much more robust than the
prayer studies, in terms of both numbers and results, consists of what have
previously been called bio-PK, distant intentionality, or healing analog
studies, and are now generally called DMILS, or "distant mental influence
on living systems."67 These studies include not only those in which a physi­
ological response of another person is the target, but also numerous studies
in which non-human organisms, from bacteria or yeast to small mammals,
have been the targets. Over the past few decades there have been more than
150 such studies (for reviews, see Benor, 1990; Braud, 1993, 2003; Solfvin,
1984). In this section, however, I will concentrate on research involving
humans, of which there have also been several reviews (Braud & Schlitz,
1989, 1991; Delanoy, 2001 ; Schlitz & Braud, 1997; S. Schmidt, Schneider,
Utts, & Walach, 2004).
The basic method for these studies has been for one person (the "agent")
to direct some specified intention at another person (the subject or target
person), such as the intention to calm or conversely to arouse that person. In
nearly all of the studies, the response of the target person to the intentions
of the agent has been measured by reactions of the autonomic nervous sys­
tem (usually skin conductance or other measures of electrodermal activity).
Because this response reflects a level of arousal in the target person that is
not under conscious control, the assumption has been that such a measure
is a better indicator of an effect than are conscious attempts to respond
to the agent's intentions, such as by guessing when he or she is directing
the intention. Experimental methods have been designed specifically to rule
out conventional explanations for any response seen in the target persons,
such as suggestion or expectation, sensory cues, naturally occurring inter­
nal rhythms in the autonomic nervous system, recording errors, arbitrary
selection of data, and chance. For example, the two persons are isolated in
separate rooms with no sensory contact possible, experimental and control
periods are randomly interspersed in an order that is automatically gener­
ated, and responses are recorded automatically.

66. I remind readers of Myers's concept of "rapport" (discussed in Chapter 2)­

that is, some kind of link or interconnectedness between persons at a subliminal
level that may contribute to spontaneous occurrences of supernormal phenomena,
to effective induction of hypnotic trance and associated phenomena of suggestion,
and to successful psi experiments, including distant healing studies.
67. Another translation of DMILS is "direct mental interaction with living sys­
tems."
 Psychophysiological Inftuence-231

Under these general conditions, the results over numerous studies have
been reasonably consistent and robust. In an overview of 19 studies con­
ducted at three labs, Schlitz and Braud (1997) found an overall success rate
of 37%, when 5% would be expected by chance (p = .0000007, effect size
= .25). In a more recent and conservative meta-analysis of 37 studies, S.

Schmidt et al. (2004) found a somewhat smaller, but still significant effect (p
= .00 1 , effect size = . 1 1).

A related group of experiments derived from the experience people

often report of feeling that they are being stared at and finding, when they
turn to look, that they are in fact being stared at. In these experiments the
agent, instead of trying to calm or arouse the person, simply stares at him
or her on a video monitor during randomly selected periods of time. Again,
some autonomic measure such as electrodermal activity is measured. In 1 1
such studies at three labs, Schlitz and Braud (1997) found an overall success
rate of 64%, when 5% would be expected by chance (p = .000054, effect size
= .25). A later meta-analysis of 15 studies by S. Schmidt et al. (2004) also

yielded a significant effect (p = .01, effect size = . l 3).

The staring studies have also revealed some interesting trends. Unlike
the calm/activate studies, in which the prediction clearly is that the target
person's autonomic response will be lowered during the "calm" periods
and heightened during the "activate" periods, in the staring studies there
is no such clear expectation of what the response will be. Some people (or
people in some situations) might find the staring uncomfortable or intru­
sive and thus become anxious and aroused; others might be more comfort­
able and thus react to the connection with another person in a more posi­
tive or relaxed way; and some people might react differently depending on
whether the agent is a stranger or. a friend. Experiments by Braud, Shafer,
and Andrews (1993a, 1993b) in fact suggested such differential responses: In
early experiments the staring produced arousal or activation in the target
persons; in later experiments, however, after the starer or the target per­
son, or both, had been given "connectedness training" (i.e., instruction and
exercises in how to feel comfortable with and open to relating to another
person), the staring produced significant results in the opposite direction,
calming instead of arousing the target person. Whether the two persons
were strangers or acquaintances before the training had no effect on these
results (1 993b, p. 393), but scores on personality scales of introversion and
social avoidance and distress were related to the staring response (pp. 400-
403).
Another series of staring studies derived from the failure of one per­
son- an avowed and vocal skeptic of psi phenomena-to replicate the orig­
inal results. In this new series the skeptic, Richard Wiseman, and another
experimenter who has consistently obtained highly significant results not
only in staring studies but in many other DMILS and remote-viewing stud­
ies, Marilyn Schlitz, carried out experiments jointly, first in Wiseman's lab
and then in Schlitz's (Wiseman & Schlitz, 1997, 1999). In these studies the
experimental conditions were the same for all, except that in half of them
Wiseman served as the experimenter and in half Schlitz did. In both series
232-Chapter 3

Schlitz obtained significant results, whereas Wiseman obtained only chance

results, suggesting that Schlitz's positive attitude and Wiseman's negative
attitude influenced the results, whether directly or indirectly. These studies
are, in fact, further confirmation of the "experimenter effect," long observed
in psi research, which I mentioned earlier, and they raise again the questions
of who the real "subject" is, or whether some kind of "rapport" or intercon­
nection between the "subject" and "experimenter" is the crucial factor.68
As with all psi research, and indeed with psychological research in gen­
eral, DMILS studies are not invariably replicable. Nevertheless, the history
of the research shows effect sizes that are equal to, and sometimes even
greater than, "some recent medical studies that have been heralded as med­
ical breakthroughs" (Schlitz & Braud, 1 997, p. 7 1). Clearly, these studies
should be repeated and extended.

Birthmarks and Birth Defects in Cases of the Reincarnation Type

In this chapter I first examined phenomena in which a person's ideas

or images seem to have generated physiological responses in his or her own
body. I then expanded the scope to look at phenomena in which images or
ideas or intentions in one person's mind seem to have initiated physiological
reactions in another person's body. In this final section, I cross still another
boundary and look at phenomena in which images or ideas that we may
presume to have existed in the mind of a person who has died seem to cor­
respond with characteristics of a living person's body.
I am referring here to a subgroup of the cases generally known as cases
of the reincarnation type (CORT). These are cases in which a young child,
usually about two to three years old, begins to exhibit what seem to be
memories of the life of a now-deceased person. Such children often speak
about other parents, or a spouse and children they believe they have, and
another home; and they also often talk about how they died. In many cases
they give sufficient information, such as names of people or places, so that
their parents (or, more rarely, an investigator) are able to identify and locate
the person about whose life the child seems to be speaking. These children
also often show unusual behavior that seems appropriate for the life they
are talking about. If the deceased person drowned, for example, the child
may have an extreme phobia of water. If the deceased person was of the
opposite sex, the child may show gender confusion or behavior appropriate
for that sex. The child usually stops speaking about the other life between

68. These studies also underscore another point I made earlier: Failure of some
investigators to replicate research does not automatically invalidate positive results
obtained by other qualified researchers. Such failure calls, instead, for closer exami­
nation of the factors contributing to success in one study but not in another. Strong
experimenter effects are hardly unknown elsewhere in psychology; biofeedback
training for control of hand temperature provides another and closely related exam­
ple (Taub, 1977, pp. 276-277).
 Psychophysiological Inf'luence-233

the ages of five and eight, although the associated behavior may persist into
adulthood. Research on these cases, which have been found all over the
world, has been going on for over 40 years, and several thousand cases have
been identified and studied-some in great detail-by a number of investi­
gators, including most notably Dr. Ian Stevenson, who pioneered this line
of research (for an introduction, see Stevenson, 2001; Tucker, 2005; see also
the Appendix for additional literature).
Particularly relevant to this chapter are those cases, now numbering
well over 200, in which the child has a birthmark or birth defect corre­
sponding to a similar mark (usually a fatal wound) on the deceased per­
son. Stevenson has considered these cases so important that he devoted a
two-volume, 2,268-page monograph (1997) to them. A typical case is that
of Hanumant Saxena (Stevenson, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 455-467), an Indian boy
born with a large cluster of hypopigmented birthmarks near the center of
his chest. A few weeks before he was conceived, a man in his village had
been shot in the chest at close range with a shotgun, and almost immedi­
ately died. Hanumant's mother not only saw the body, but had a dream
about the dead man which prepared her to think that she might have a child
who would be the rebirth of this man. Between the ages of three and five,
Hanumant spoke as if he were this man; but the most important feature of
the case is certainly the unusual birthmark, especially since Stevenson was
able to confirm by means of a post-mortem report its close correspondence
with the fatal wound.
Hanumant's family believed that he was the deceased man reborn, and
on this theory birthmarks such as his are somehow linked to the mental and
physical effects produced in the deceased man as he was suddenly shot to
death. There are, however, other possible interpretations that must be kept
in mind when studying these cases. The most obvious, of course, is chance
coincidence. Most people are born with some birthmarks, and certainly one
of these will occasionally correspond just by chance with a mark on another
person's body. Stevenson (1997, vol. 1, pp. 1 1 31-1 140) has discussed this pos­
sibility extensively. The basic argument against the chance hypothesis in
most of the cases is that, unlike the common moles and nevi that many
people are born with, the birthmarks and birth defects in these cases are
often extremely unusual ones. Hanumant's multiple hypopigmented marks
provide one example. Other cases involve extremely unusual birth defects
such as unilateral brachydactyly (the lack of part or whole of the fingers on
one hand), a condition otherwise practically unknown in the medical litera­
ture. Moreover, the close correspondence in shape, size, location, and other
features in most cases makes the chance hypothesis exceedingly unlikely,
especially since the children's families have not scoured the countryside
looking for someone whose fatal wounds correspond to their child's marks.
Instead, either the deceased person lived nearby-making the chance expla­
nation even more unlikely-or the deceased person had been identified by
means of statements that the child made.
234-Chapter 3

Another argument against chance is that there are many cases in which
there are two or more birthmarks, not in the same location as in Hanumant's
case, but in two or more discrete locations. Stevenson (1997, vol. 2, pp. 1 1 32-
1 1 34) has listed 33 examples of this type in a table. In 18 of these there were
birthmarks corresponding to entry and exit gunshot wounds, often with a
small birthmark corresponding to the entry wound and a larger and more
irregularly shaped one corresponding to the exit wound (Stevenson, 1997,
vol. I, pp. 933-934). One such case, for example, involved a birthmark in
the subject's throat. After hearing a description from the deceased man's
sister of how he had shot himself in the throat, Stevenson conjectured that
the subject might also have a birthmark on the top of his head. Returning
to the subject, he found another, slightly larger birthmark there, covered by
hair, about which he had not previously been told (Stevenson, 1997, vol. I ,
pp. 728-745).
The chance interpretation is further weakened by another type of case.
In discussing maternal impression cases, Myers ( l 892c) had urged attempts
to generate them experimentally, using some benign rather than harmful
image or suggestion as the stimulus (p. 335n). In some CORT cases, attempts
of this sort have been made, and successfully. In some Asian countries, par­
ticularly Thailand and Burma, people sometimes mark the body of a dying
or just-deceased person with, say, soot from a cooking pot, in the hope of
generating a birthmark in a later-born child that will allow the family to
identify the deceased person in his or her next life (Stevenson, 1997, vol.
1, pp. 803-879; Tucker, 2005, pp. 77-82; Tucker & Keil, in press). Steven­
son and his colleagues have identified and studied 38 such "experimental
birthmark" cases in which a child's birthmarks or birth defects correspond
closely with a mark made on the deceased person's body (Tucker, 2005, p.
77). Moreover, in some African countries where infant mortality is high,
particularly Nigeria, some people engage in the practice of mutilating a
dead infant's body, such as by cutting off the tip of a finger, believing that
this will prevent the child from dying again in infancy after its next birth.
Stevenson (1997, chap. 20) has reported several cases of this type in which
the correspondence between the mutilation and defects in a child born later,
usually in the same family, is close and chance seems highly unlikely.
One such "experimental birthmark" case illustrates particularly well
the difficulty confronting the chance hypothesis. The case involved a young
Thai woman who died during surgery for a congenital heart problem; 13
months later her sister gave birth to a female child, Ma Choe Hnin Htet,
who was found to have two birthmarks-a long linear hypopigmented
birthmark down the middle of her chest and an irregularly shaped red
birthmark on the back of her neck. Stevenson confirmed with the deceased
woman's surgeon that the first birthmark corresponded closely with the sur­
gical wound. Moreover, three of the deceased woman's friends explained
that, as they were preparing the body for cremation, they had marked the
back of the woman's neck with lipstick, hoping to generate an "experimen­
tal" birthmark of the kind described above. The mother of the child had of
 Psychophysiological Influence-235

course known about the surgery on her sister. She had not, however, known
about the marking of the body until after the child was born (Stevenson,
1 997, vol. 1, pp. 839-852).
Here I can only refer readers to Stevenson's densely documented mono­
graph for more information about the unusual nature of many of the birth­
marks and birth defects and their close correspondence to similarly unusual
marks or wounds on the deceased person; but I think it is an inescapable
conclusion that chance correspondence can explain few if any of these
cases.
Another possible interpretation that in some cases seems more reason­
able to consider is that of maternal impressions. In most of the birthmark/
birth-defect cases reported by Stevenson and others, the mother had either
seen or heard about the wound on the deceased person. In Hanumant's
case, for example, the hypothesis of maternal impression seems strong.
This hypothesis is complicated, however, by the fact that in some cases the
mother did not know anything whatsoever about the wound or mark on the
deceased person, at least not consciously. Ma Choe Hnin Htet's case pro­
vides an example: Although her mother knew about the surgery, she knew
nothing about the lipstick mark made on the back of her deceased sister's
neck. Stevenson has listed 25 such cases in a table (1 997, vol. 1 , p. 1 144). As we
saw in our discussion of "sympathetic symptoms," however, a wound, pain,
or other injury in one person's body was sometimes reflected in a physiologi­
cal response, such as pain, in another person, even though the latter had no
way of knowing normally about the injury. In such cases it was plausible to
suppose that the process leading to the physiological response was guided
by information obtained by the respondent in some supernormal manner. A
similar process is plausible here too, and difficult to rule out decisively.
Another possible interpretation of these cases is that something in
the mind of a dying or perhaps even a deceased person has somehow been
translated into a mark on a developing fetus.69 The process might thus be
comparable to psychokinesis (PK) or, more precisely in this instance, to
DMILS-type cases-the critical difference being that the agent may be a
deceased person, still surviving in some form. Alternatively, CORT cases
involving birthmarks and birth defects may be more akin to cases, such as
those of stigmata, in which powerful or obsessive images in the mind of a
person have produced a physiological response in that person's own body­
the important difference here being that the body influenced is a new body,

69. The "mark" does not always involve just surface features on the skin. Ste­
venson ( 1997, chap. 21) has reported cases in which the subject has a disease cor­
responding to one that the previous person suffered. One such case was that of
Selma Kiliy, a Turkish girl who seemed to be remembering the life of a woman
who had died a year or so before Selma's birth of kidney disease; Selma herself
subsequently developed kidney disease at the age of about seven (Stevenson, vol.
2, pp. 1 679-1695). In a similar case, investigated by Tucker (Pasricha, Keil, Tucker,
& Stevenson, 2005, pp. 379-381; Tucker, 2005, pp. 1-3), an American boy was born
with defects of the pulmonary artery and heart closely similar to injuries suffered
by his grandfather, a policeman, when he was fatally shot.
236-Chapter 3

now being occupied by what is in some sense the same person. With this
interpretation, the cases would be what most people witnessing them believe
them to be-instances of rebirth or reincarnation. On any interpretation
involving survival, however, it seems necessary to postulate, as has Steven­
son (1997, vol. 2, pp. 2083-2092), some kind of "vehicle" or "substance" or
"field" that retains memories and dispositional characteristics of a deceased
person, called by Stevenson a "psychophore."
It is difficult to judge the relative plausibility of these interpreta­
tions in particular cases, and it is by no means self-evident that any one
of them is always or even most frequently the best. Whatever the correct
interpretation(s), however, what should be evident is that these cases are not
sui generis, but instead constitute another large and well-documented fam­
ily of extreme psychophysiological phenomena related to the various other
phenomena we have examined in this chapter.
A further important question, however, remains. Many of the CORT
cases involve a deceased person who was a total stranger, or perhaps only
slightly acquainted with the child's family. What, therefore, is the connec­
tion or impetus, whether for the deceased person to be reborn in that family,
or for the deceased person to influence that particular developing fetus, or
for the mother to generate a maternal impression involving that person? The
problem is not confined to these cases. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Myers
(1884-1885) pointed out that the connection between people in some tele­
pathic or other supernormal experiences also does not seem "clearly refer­
able either to kinship or to affection" (p. 100), since the people involved were
strangers (p. 1 22). We are a long way from answering this question, just as
we are a long way from understanding many other aspects of the phenom­
ena described in this chapter.

Conclusion

One major goal of this chapter has been to provide an overall picture, derived
from a truly enormous biomedical literature, of the remarkable range and
diversity of phenomena of psychophysiological influence. Another major
goal has been to show that there are well-attested phenomena demonstrat­
ing that strong emotions, beliefs, or intentions, unusually vivid imagery,
and altered or dissociative states of consciousness sometimes result in
striking physiological changes that, in terms of factors such as specificity
of form and location, go far beyond generalized or systemic responses of
the body and nervous system to stress or other emotions. Still another goal
has been, following Myers, to present all these diverse phenomena in such
a way as to show that they are not isolated, individual "anomalies," but
instead comprise a continuum, ranging from commonplace and accepted
kinds to extraordinary and dismissed ones, and moreover that they are
deeply related both phenomenologically and conceptually. Recognizing
 Psychophysiological Infiuence-237

this continuum also highlights the primary thesis of this chapter: Volition
in general-whether of the sort that we take for granted (such as raising an
arm) or rarer phenomena that more clearly challenge the currently prevail­
ing view of mind-brain relations (such as raising a blister)-remains a chal­
lenging mystery.
Moreover, the phenomena described in this chapter illustrate that simi­
lar effects can result from quite different psychological and physiological
conditions. Blisters can occur in response to a thermal stimulus, a strong
emotional memory of a previous burn, or the suggestion of a hypnotist, and
it seems unlikely that the physiological mechanism is the same in all three
types. Symptoms of pregnancy occurring as a result of a true pregnancy
seem to involve different physiological mechanisms from those occurring
in association with pseudocyesis. An hallucination can be generated patho­
logically by physical illness, drugs, or alcohol, or by a telepathic impression.
Again, we seem to be encountering volition: In contrast to purely physiolog­
ical responses, many of the phenomena described in this chapter suggest the
realization of an intention by whatever mechanism is available.
I have also tried to call attention to some important methodological
issues inherent in the study of these refractory and puzzling phenomena.
Reports of them often take the form of individual case studies involving
persons who were clearly very unusual. Most of the phenomena described in
this chapter occur primarily among such persons, and not among randomly
selected samples of ordinary persons. For example, inducing phenomena
such as psi, blisters, or vivid hallucinations with hypnotic suggestion does
not occur easily or readily. As Myers stated, "they are not often evoked in
answer to any rapid and, so to say, perfunctory hypnotic suggestion; they
do not spring up in miscellaneous hospital practice; they need an education
and a development which is hardly bestowed on one hypnotized subject in a
hundred" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 209).
Moreover, such studies of unusual persons cannot be belittled and dis­
missed as mere "anecdotes," in contrast with experimental studies involving
larger numbers of less unusual subjects. This is particularly evident when
one recognizes that most if not all of the cited observations and reports have
been made by competent scientists, and that the phenomena they describe
fall into a coherent overall pattern such as I have tried to display in this
chapter.
Another important lesson concerns the remarkable interplay between
theory and data that has generally governed the responses of scientists to
the phenomena described in this chapter. On the one hand, phenomena
previously regarded as suspect became more acceptable when a theory was
discovered that seemed to permit their existence. Thus, for example, tra­
ditional psychosomatic medicine, long regarded with great skepticism by
many physicians, has revived (albeit in modified form) with the advent of
psychoneuroimmunology. On a more personal level, T. X. Barber's resis­
tance to the evidence for extreme hypnotic phenomena collapsed once he
238-Chapter 3

came to believe-mistakenly-that he knew how to explain them in biologi­

cal terms.
This is a two-edged sword, however. Phenomena once regarded as
empirically established or "real," in part because they appeared poten­
tially explainable in terms of an existing theory, may sometimes be unfairly
demoted if that theory proves unsound. Something of this sort seems to
have happened in the case of "maternal impressions," which were widely
reported in the medical literature until physicians could no longer think
of a pregnant woman and her fetus as a single organism-whereupon the
reports sharply declined.
These tensions run throughout the spectrum of psychophysiological
phenomena discussed in this chapter. Phenomena suggesting that mental
activity in one person can produce physiological effects in another person
clearly contradict the prevailing materialist conception of the mind-body
system as a closed biological unit. They are thus unacceptable to, and dis­
missed by, most contemporary scientists, even though the evidence for them
is in many cases as good as or better than the evidence for many other psy­
chophysical phenomena which they do accept.
The latter phenomena are currently more acceptable precisely because
most scientists presume that they are at least potentially explainable within
the prevailing conceptual framework of biological materialism. This pre­
sumption, however, is demonstrably unsound. Certain extreme psychophys­
iological phenomena that occur on a within-person basis, such as Olga K.'s
skin-writing, stigmata, and hypnotically induced blisters of specific geo­
metric shapes, lie beyond the reach of current neurophysiological under­
standing, and seem likely to remain so. Yet these more extreme forms of
psychophysiological influence, however unusual, are continuous with the
many "lesser," or more commonly encountered, forms catalogued in this
chapter. This continuity thus casts doubt back on the conventional "expla­
nations" for these lesser forms themselves, raising the question of how cor­
rect, complete, or adequate they in fact are. Moreover, these conventional
explanations, as we have seen throughout this chapter, are in fact typically
not explanations at all, but at best redescriptions of the phenomena in vague
biological terms, based on equally vague assumptions of mind-brain unity.
We have, in short, not even begun to understand how an idea generates
a physiological response, whether in one's own body or in another person's
body. It is clear that all the phenomena of pyschophysiological influence
discussed in this chapter involve, to some degree or another, an element of
volition, intention, belief, expectation, strong emotion, or some other such
mental state. It is equally clear that recognizing the central role of such
states tells us nothing about how the physiological reaction is generated. I
will not belabor that point further, except to emphasize that an understand­
ing of suggestion is what is required now. An early student of phenomena
such as faith healing defined suggestion as "the law that any idea possessing
 Psychophysiological Influence-239

the mind tends to materialize itself in the body" (Goddard, 1 899, p. 500).70
Hypnosis has come to be accepted in large part because its phenomena can
blithely be attributed to "suggestion" conceived in this way. But as many
people have recognized, explanations that invoke suggestion beg the ques­
tion in that "they presuppose that the nature of suggestion has been fully
clarified, which is hardly true" (Weitzenhoffer, 1953, p. 232). Myers warned
that words such as suggestion are "mere names which disguise our igno­
rance" (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 53); and his contemporary Andrew Lang (191 1), also
referring to suggestion, insisted that "to 'explain the explanation' is the task
for the future" (p. 546).
All the phenomena of this chapter presumably have physiological
correlates of some sort that we may be able to pinpoint more precisely as
research continues. But, I repeat, identifying such correlates will tell us little
if anything about how the physiological processes involved are initiated and
guided by an idea. The currently popular assertion that mind and brain
are mind-brain-a biological, material unity-is as empty an explanation
as suggestion. Recognizing this, however, does not automatically entail a
return to the substance dualism that engenders such fear and loathing in the
hearts and minds of most contemporary scientists. Such persons should con­
sider more seriously Myers's insight that our expanding knowledge, about
both the nature of mind and the nature of matter, suggests that "our notions
of mind and matter"-as well as of the relationship between them-"must
pass through many a phase as yet unimagined" (Myers, 1886c, p. 179).
More specifically, after studying phenomena such as I have covered in
this chapter, Myers (1891d) was confident that "Thought and Conscious­
ness" would emerge as a fundamental aspect of the universe, and "not, as
the materialists hold them, a mere epiphenomenon, an accidental and transi­
tory accompaniment of more permanent energies, a light that flashes out
from the furnace-door, but does none of the work" (p. 642). The unwilling­
ness of most scientists to confront and address the real nature and scale of
the problems posed by the psychophysiological phenomena outlined in this
chapter reflects the general unwillingness in psychology and neuroscience
to confront the problems both of psychophysical interaction and of volition,
problems at the heart of the nature of consciousness.

70. This definition anticipated-and was every bit as uninformative as-the

"psychophysiological principle" that researchers on biofeedback and related effects
sometimes invoke: "Every change in the physiological state is accompanied by an
appropriate change i n the mental-emotional state, conscious or unconscious; and
conversely, every change in the mental-emotional state, conscious or unconscious,
is accompanied by an appropriate change i n the physiological state" (see, e.g., Nor­
ris & Fahrian, 1993, p. 234).
 Chapter 4

Memory

Alan Gauld1

Great is the power of memory, a fearful thing, 0 my God, a deep and

boundless manifoldness; and this thing is the mind, and this am I myself. (St.
Augustine, Confessions, Book X, p. 2 1 3)

Among all the facts capable of throwing light on the psychophysiological

relation, those which concern memory, whether in the normal or in the path­
ological state, hold a privileged position. (Bergson, 1 908/ 1 99 1 , p. 1 3)

Human Personality contains no chapter specifically devoted to memory, and

although the book is replete with examples and discussions of oddities of
memory, about the actual nature of memory Myers says only a little. Nev­
ertheless, the central aim and thrust of his work-to show that certain curi­
ous phenomena are best interpreted as evidence that human personality may
survive bodily death-necessarily involves memory-related issues of which
Myers was certainly aware, and which since his time have been the subjects of
numerous and intensive investigations. I shall discuss these under two princi­
pal headings: ( I ) problems to do with the doctrine of "memory traces" and
the relation between memory and the brain; (2) issues to do with the role of
memory phenomena in discussions of the survival problem. The latter are
deeply and necessarily entangled with the philosophical problem of personal
identity-the problem, that is, of the conditions under which we may prop­
erly claim that a person is the same individual person as one known to have

I . I am most grateful for the help of Ed and Emily Kelly in the preparation of this chap­
ter.

241
242-Chapter 4

existed at some previous time. The literature in all these areas is enormous,
and all I can do is try very briefly to sketch some of the leading questions.
Definitive answers are not to be had-only perhaps further questions.

Memory and the Brain

Trace Theories: General Issues

We appear to ourselves, naively, to exist in a three-dimensional universe

which moves forward continuously in time. Furthermore, at any given moment
we experience only some tiny part of this universe as it presents itself to our
senses. Hence it is altogether natural to suppose that our ability to recall par­
ticular experiences involves some sort of physical changes which those expe­
riences produced in our brains, changes which in some way "represent" the
experiences and can travel with us in time. These changes, of course, are the
putative "memory traces." This fundamental intuition, rooted in everyday
experience, has dominated the history of thought about memory, finding
expression in whatever technical metaphors are conveniently available, from
the wax tablets of Plato to the holograms, digital computers, and connection­
ist networks of today (Draaisma, 2000; Sutton, 1 998).
Two points should immediately be made about this fundamental presup­
position. First, despite its undeniable intuitive appeal it is not logically coer­
cive, and relies covertly on deep presumptions of a metaphysical character
about the mind-brain relation and the possible forms of causal connection
between events (Heil, 1 978; Russell, 1 92 1 a). Although taken by most contem­
porary scientists and philosophers as an unquestioned and indeed unques­
tionable axiom, it is more properly regarded as a working principle, the merit
of which must be assessed in terms of its ability to yield a theory that sat­
isfactorily accounts for the facts of human memory. Second, to the extent
that such a brain-based theory of memory is forthcoming it would appear to
reduce correspondingly the prospects for post-mortem survival of any par­
ticular memories, and thus to challenge Myers's program at its core. Our first
order of business must therefore be to gauge as best we can the actual level of
progress, and the prospects for further progress, along contemporary main­
stream lines.
I will begin with some conceptual issues in traditional "trace" theories
of memory.2 Historically, most such theories have been closely linked with
the view that memories (or most of them) are fainter or less vivid revivals of

2. Many of the conceptual diffic ulties I will be pointing out in this chapter have been dis­
cussed previously by myself and others (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2003, pp. 160-164; Braude,
1979, pp. 188-202, 209-212; Bursen, 1978; Gauld, 1982, pp. 189-203, 1989; Heil, 1978; Mal­
colm, 1977). Most of these critiques, however, have appeared in locations frequented primar­
ily by philosophers.
 Memory-243

past perceptual experiences. Between revivals these "memory-images" are in

some sense "stored" until summoned up by a perceptual experience similar
to or associated with the one of which they are a washed-out copy. A power­
ful impression may create an image that remains pretty much unchanged;
a series of similar images may perhaps blend like a composite photograph
yielding a general idea. A conventional "trace" interpretation of what is going
on would be roughly as follows: Stimulation of our sense organs brings about
a complex series of brain events that culminate in our perceiving the cause of
the stimulation. These brain events leave behind minute but probably wide­
spread changes in the structure and interconnections of brain cells, the effect
of which is to make us liable under certain circumstances to relive the original
perceptual experience, or some blend of it with others, in a partial or dimin­
ished form, often termed a "memory image." The relevant circumstances
include the occurrence of a stimulus which shares some of the properties of
the original one, or of a stimulus which was concurrent with the original one
and caused the formation of "associative" cross-linkages between the two sets
of pathways.
This way of thinking about memory is, in one or other of its slightly
updated disguises, still surprisingly common, and yet it is obviously unten­
able for a diversity of reasons. Take first the case of what are now termed
"episodic" or "autobiographical" memories, memories of oneself witnessing
things or doing or participating in events or activities. Certainly one might
conceivably relive one's original experience, and indeed relive it again and
again, because of the changes it had brought about in one's brain. But, as
William James ( l 890b) put it over a century ago (and he was just one of a
number who made the same point in their various terminologies):3

The first element which [memory] knowledge involves would seem to be the
revival in the mind of an image or copy of the original event. And it is an
assumption made by many writers that the revival of an image is all that
is needed to constitute the memory of the original occurrence. But such a
revival is obviously not a memory, whatever else it may be; it is simply a
duplicate, a second event, having absolutely no connection with the first
event except that it happens to resemble it. . . . The successive editions of a
feeling are so many independent events, each snug in its own skin. (vol. 1 ,
pp. 649-650)

James's contemporary G. T. Ladd ( 1 893) put it even more strongly:

There is no memory-image . . . that does not involve the conscious recogni­

tion of that particular image, as representative of its own past, by the same
mind . . . . All that any physiological process could possibly explain, in case we
knew its nature most completely, would be why I remember one thing rather

3. See, for instance, Carpenter (1874/1882, pp. 454-455).

244-Chapter 4

than another-granted the inexplicable power of the mind to remember. . . at

all. (pp. 429--430)4

Myers ( l 89 I c) had written a detailed review of James's Principles of Psy­

chology and would certainly have been aware of the above problems. James,
however, thought he had an answer to views such as Ladd's that the revival of
a past experience in accordance with trace theory could never per se constitute
an act of remembering. His answer, in outline, is as follows (James, I 890b, vol.
1 , pp. 650-659). To think of an event as past requires that one think of it not
just in its naked and timeless simplicity, but in its relations to other contem­
porary events, dates, names, circumstances, and so forth. In short, one thinks
of it along with "a lot of contiguous associates. " But, he goes on, memory
involves yet more; it involves placing the event in one's own past, experiencing
it with that "warmth and intimacy . . . characterizing all experiences 'appropri­
ated' by the thinker as his own." When this whole bundle is "known in one
integral pulse of consciousness," we have remembering. The cause of remem­
bering is activation of the complex network of brain pathways composed of
the traces of the original experience and the associated traces of its "setting"
as just described.
But this is still not a solution to the problem. For all these "contiguous
associates" might occur as parts or fragments or aspects or shadings of a
global experience the core of which is the image of some object or event that
ought thereby, according to James's theory, to become a memory-image. But
it would not. The whole collection might pop into one's mind unbidden at
regular intervals without conveying that it was or resembled or represented
an experience one had had before. James, I fear, does not sufficiently consider
the difficulties confronting his solution. I have an image--<:all it an appar­
ent memory-of standing on a hillside and watching a pair of golden eagles
circling each other and rising higher and higher above the adjacent valley.
Do the facts that I can confidently picture and name the place, the hill, the
approximate date, and the person who was with me strengthen my tendency
so to regard it? In some sense almost certainly; but only because I take it for
granted that my images of these further matters are also true memory-images,
thereby landing us in a regress.
What of the "warmth and intimacy" which James also regards as a dif­
ferentia of true memories (the cognate notion of a "feeling of familiarity"
has also been quite often invoked)? He thinks that this warmth and intimacy
"characteriz[es] all experiences 'appropriated' by the thinker as his own"
(James, 1 890b, vol. I , p. 650). What this feeling may be is quite obscure, but
insofar as one can interpret it in the light of his chapter on "The Conscious­
ness of Self" it would appear to be a consequence of a perceived similarity
between a present experience or phase of the self and a past one. However,

4. It is of course perfectly possible that one should entertain without recognition an image
that replicates or resembles some object or event that one experienced in the past, and that
this image should be caused by neural traces left in one's brain by the past experience. One
could, if one wished, extend the term "memory" to cover such episodes (see also Ayer, 1968,
pp. 252-256). But this move would not dispose of the problems confronting trace theory.
 Memory-245

this presupposes and hence cannot explain the phenomenon of memory. Per­
haps one might postulate instead that a true memory image is distinguished
from an imagined fiction by some intrinsic characteristic that marks its impec­
cably authentic origins and gives it a metaphorical warmth and intimacy. This
"mark" cannot be sheer vividness, since images of hallucinatory vividness
can be quite erroneous. Let us just pretend that genuine memory experiences
emerge with an ineffable stamp of genuineness that somehow influences us
subliminally. It cannot be that we learn that such images are genuine, for that
would involve memory and be regressive. The only alternative is to suppose
that the stamp of genuineness somehow (perhaps innately) invests the image
with an irresistible authority that makes its acceptance inevitable. Will this
radical approach rescue a trace theory of memory? Of course not. Whatever
the stamp of genuineness may consist in, its presence, nature, and origins lie
outside the actual image and thus introduce into remembering some unknown
factor over and beyond the underlying trace. But the stamp of genuineness,
along with feelings of warmth, intimacy or familiarity, and so forth, are surely
myths, except insofar as they are metaphorical synonyms for recognition, itself
a form of memory and therefore as an explanation yet again regressive.s
Recognizable descendants of this "trace" theory of personal, autobio­
graphical memory have persisted, and at times flourished, more or less down
to the present. And I have talked of them as though what is meant is a kind
of viewing or hearing, fol lowing the reactivation of a memory trace, of an
interior picture or recording (generally attenuated and vague) of the object
or event originally perceived. Such experiences are still widely called "mem­
ory-images." Now if one took these metaphors literally (as many seem to)
the images would emerge as entities, almost as little objects or pictures, hav­
ing a similar status to the "sense-data" or "sensa" widely written about by
early to mid-20th-century philosophers, and by some thought of as known
by a not too clearly defined "inner perception" or "inner sense." Such ideas
lead to various problems that, whether or not insoluble, are at least decidedly
tricky. For instance, the images would need interpretation before they could
qualify as memory-images. Whoever "looked at" them would have in effect
to say to him- or herself "that is so and so or such and such, at this, that, or
the other time and place, and I know because I was there and observed or
experienced it." This implies at least two further kinds of memory that have
to be brought to bear on the images before they can qualify as full-blooded
personal or autobiographical memory-images. The first is the matter of what
makes a memory "mine," a personal memory rather than an exercise of the
imagination. One can, as we saw, certainly talk of such memories possess­
ing a certain "intimacy" ("warmth," which is a sensory property, would be
misleading) and be understood; but that is simply to state the problem. The

5. Using visual pattern recognition tests, in combination with fMRI scans, Slotnick and
Schacter (2004) found that correct recognition, as opposed to false recognition, was accom­
panied by relatively heightened activity in "early" visual processing areas (occipital areas 18
and 19). However the authors conclude that these findings most probably "reflect a non-con­
scious or implicit form of memory retrieval." It is not altogether clear why we should call it
memory "retrieval" at all.
246-Chapter 4

second is the additional requirement for a kind of memory (call it "factual"

memory for the moment) bringing to bear a great deal of background infor­
mation without which a putative memory-image would become impossible to
interpret properly, or would at best be highly ambiguous. Thus I have a fairly
vivid memory of an occasion during my military service on which the far end
of the barrel of my rifle blew away on my sixth or seventh shot. But an image
(such as I have) of a splayed and truncated metal tube seen from behind and
slightly above, and accompanied by vaguer images, visual and tactile, of the
underlying wooden stock, conveys nothing like the full force and content of
the memory. The experience must include, indeed be pervaded by, an implicit
understanding of such facts as what rifles are, what firearms are, what car­
tridges are, what explosives are, what a trigger does, how dangerous the whole
thing was, and so forth. Without this understanding (which involves both a
grasp of relevant concepts and further factual memories) the whole experience
would be attenuated into a thin shadow of full-blooded remembering.6 How
is the requirement for that further understanding to be met without either on
the one hand postulating a memory that is outside the scope of the central
image or on the other hand invoking an indefinite regress of further images?
Can the additional factual knowledge and the concepts required possibly be
accommodated within the trace and image approach to memory? It is hardly
obvious or certain that they can.
There is another way, more favored by certain philosophers than by psy­
chologists, of talking about the images involved in personal, autobiographi­
cal memory. It is to say that you remember not by summoning up or having
a memory-image but by a kind of partial reliving of the original experience
of which one might say "it was rather as if I were back there again," and
so forth. Such a way of talking has certain advantages, apart from avoiding
overt commitment to inner objects and inner sense. It circumvents, or might
be deployed so as to circumvent, some of the problems raised in the previ­
ous paragraph. If there is a kind of reliving of a whole brief episode then
presumably whatever interpretations, whatever background information and
deployment of concepts were involved at the time, should again be available
and involved. But this still leaves substantial problems. As pointed out above,
reliving an episode, whether or not the reliving is identified with neural activi­
ties shaped by that episode, does not per se amount to remembering it. For to
describe the experience one says not "it is rather as if I am looking at" this,
that, and the other, where this, that, and the other just happen to be things
one personally observed, was involved in, and so forth, but "it is rather as
if I were back there again," which implies that I am aware of my present
experience as a kind of reliving of one of my past experiences. But what this
awareness can consist in (which, as pointed out above, is of course one of
the central problems of personal memory) remains unilluminated. It certainly

6. One can of course have a purely factual memory of something one personally experi­
enced-for instance I can remember the fact that I once met a certain rather distinguished
lady, though, regrettably, I cannot recollect the lady or the occasion at all-but that is not
what is here in question.
 Memory-247

cannot consist in one's grasping in the moment of recollection that there is

a causal relationship between the two experiences,7 which cannot be known
independently of the present putative memory-experience.
In sum, what seems to me to be the case is that the whole experience of
recollecting one's past experiences is essentially pervaded by or pregnant with
the feeling that these are things from the past-one's own past. We do not as
yet know how to account for the past-directedness of those personal experi­
ences that we take as our personal ("episodic" or autobiographical) memo­
ries, nor how to account for the fact that our sense of their past-directedness
(which can vary in strength) may sometimes be delusory and lead to false "rec­
ollection" (see also, Cassirer, 1 957, p. 1 79n; Dalla Barba, 1 999, pp. 1 68-1 7 1 ) .
These issues are closely connected with the larger problem of "intentionality,"
which will be touched on later.
Finally some brief comments on what may conveniently be called "fac­
tual memory." In the not very satisfactory but widely accepted modern termi­
nology, "factual" or "propositional" memory would fall into the more general
category of "semantic memory," which also covers, for instance, memory for
words and their meanings, and the possession of "concepts," a particularly
ambiguous term. Factual memories involve recollection not of some person­
ally experienced object or event as such, but of some fact, general or particu­
lar, for example, the fact that Gladstone lacked the forefinger of one hand, or
the fact that granite is composed of quartz, mica, and feldspar. Such memo­
ries are often mediated, accompanied, or illustrated by images, but these do
not have to be "of" particular or generalized past events or objects. Indeed
factual memories routinely transcend any such limited set of images or actions
as the reactivation or revival of brain traces reflecting one's previous experi­
ences might be supposed capable of generating. "Transcend" here marks the
point that for any given factual memory there is typically no one image or
action that fully reflects the totality of what is remembered, but generally a
set (impossible to delimit sharply) of possible images and actions any one of
which could, in some sense hard to define, partially reflect it. For instance I
am aware of the fact that the large, reddish-brown, highly poisonous, and
aggressive Brazilian wandering spider (phoneutria fera) is reputedly the most
dangerous of all spiders. So far as I can tell, my memory-knowledge of this
matter can or could result in any one of a considerable variety of mental
images, none fully embodying all that I remember, and also in "imageless
thoughts," in inner or outer speech, and in actions so precipitate as to preclude

7. This is a central part of modern proposals about "metarepresentation" (see, e.g., Hoed,
2001, pp. 326-328, and Pemer, 2000, pp. 300-301). B. Levine et a!. (1998), discussing a patient
suffering from traumatic brain injury, attributed his combination of severely impaired "epi­
sodic" (personal) memory with retained or reacquired factual ("semantic") memory relating
to some of the lost events, to an impaired awareness of continuity of self over time, due to
right frontal damage. But such an impairment just of the "autonoetic" aspect of memory
would still have left open the possibility of the "revival" (not, however, manifested by the
patient in question) of particular past experiences that he nonetheless did not recognize as
from his past and that could not be regarded as "memory" in the full sense or as a justifiable
basis for memory-claims.
248-Chapter 4

any causation by preceding images. The images, words, and actions concerned
may and often will be adapted to the varied circumstances eliciting them and
may take a range of forms impossible to set limits to. It is difficult indeed to
see how one might accommodate these facts within any approach that tries
to reduce memory to the mere revival, in mental images or any other form,
of the residua of past experiences stored in the brain as neural changes. Once
again, in sum, we would have to say that the underlying "memory" knowledge
(whatever it may consist in) is something over, above, and behind any delimit­
able set of possible expressions in thought and behavior.

Modern Approaches: Cognitive

I pass now straight to the present-day scene in which the study of memory
(and practically everything else in mainstream academic psychology) is car­
ried out largely within the traditions of "cognitive psychology" and the com­
putational theory of the mind (CTM). As described more fully in Chapter 1 ,
the cognitive psychological movement began in the 1 950s, and represented
a displacement of the traditions of stimulus-response behaviorism by ideas
drawn from the interlinked sources of "information theory," linguistics, and
(particularly) computer science and the general theory of computation (the
ensemble, together with some aspects of neuropsychology, is often referred
to as "cognitive science"). Computer science seemed to open up many pos­
sibilities for the understanding of memory, not least because the vocabulary
adopted by pioneering computer engineers gave prominence to "memory" and
related terms. So we still find many psychologists discussing memory (often
rather unreflectingly) within a broad framework according to which the brain
receives "input" "encoded" by successive stages of the sensory pathways, and
this input is passed into one or more forms of short-term or working memory
(a "buffer") and thence (perhaps in recoded form) to an "address" within
a more permanent memory store ("external memory") from which in due
course it can on the receipt of appropriate cues be "retrieved" and further
processed.
Within this general coding/storage/retrieval (CSR) framework, comput­
ers are regarded from a mathematico-logical point of view as discrete-state
devices which manipulate language-like symbols (that is, tokens of different
symbol types) and strings of symbols, in accordance with sets of formal rules
("algorithms"), and which may store (in "memory") and later be made to
resurrect (or "token") such symbols and symbol-strings. This terminology
has also been found appropriate by the somewhat numerous philosophers
who have fallen under the spell of cognitive science, for example Fodor (Cain,
2002) and other proponents of the CTM. According to these philosophers,
the mind is "computational" because its procedures, like those of comput­
ers, involve formal rule-governed operations on "symbols," and "representa­
tional" because these symbols are or may be "representations" -of what or
for whom or how remains largely obscure. Particular "mental states" consist in
 Memory-249

the system standing in one or another of various possible kinds of (generally

unanalyzed) computational relations (to be identified with believing, desiring,
etc.) to internal symbolic tokens or "representations" of particular proposi­
tions (e.g., the proposition that dinner is ready, or the proposition that small
moas still survive in the New Zealand bush), the totality being referred to as
a "propositional attitude. " In such terms remembering consists in the system
"tokening," and adopting a relation of belief or memory-belief towards, a
representation (symbol-string) internal to the system itself. Memory "traces"
per se are rarely mentioned, but "representations" fulfil a similar role so far as
episodic and semantic memory are concerned.
Over the years we have seen assorted variations on, refinements of, or
selections from the original broad framework outlined above. Rather more
than a simple variation has been the emerging framework of "connection­
ist" and "dynamic systems" models, as summarized in Chapter I . In models
of these types the results of learning may be distributed across many cells
and their connections, so that the network continues to function, though
with diminishing success, even as cells and connections are being progres­
sively eliminated (the so-called "graceful degradation"). Such networks are
particularly good at recognizing patterns and spatial relationships. On the
other hand they are less straightforwardly effective than traditional cognitive
models at the sort of symbol manipulations supposedly required to support
activities such as linguistic behavior and the solution of ordinary logical prob­
lems. Nonetheless, network thinking has become dominant among the more
theoretically oriented cognitive psychologists, especially those interested in
building bridges to neuroscience. 8
There has been a certain amount of argument over the question of
whether or not the internal states of connectionist networks can be said to
constitute inner representations of external states of affairs (connectionists
themselves commonly use the representation terminology). A given network
may learn multiple tasks without mutual interference, and many units and
their connections may be involved in more than one of them. But in that case
not merely are the "traces" distributed across the network, but it becomes dif­
ficult to identify which subset of these interconnections, or of the patterns of
activation associated with them, constitutes what representation. However, I
am myself inclined to set aside such arguments and accept that connectionist
networks are on the same footing as conventional digital-computer models
with regard to the question of whether or not their inner states may be classi­
fied as "representations." For if (and it is a big "if"; see below) some object or
state of affairs may be called a "representation" of another in virtue of some
(as yet unspecified) physically determinable relationship that obtains between
the two of them (and certainly both classical and connectionist modelers tend
to think in terms of such relationships), the fact that connectionist represen­
tations may become in some sense blended together does not affect the issue,

8. A particularly thoroughgoing attempt to cover everything from sensory processes to

conscious man in society (and embracing memory) in terms of associationism and connec­
tionism is that by Mesulam (1998, 2000).
250-Chapter 4

provided that (like holograms) they can in the end be completely and success­
fully disentangled by the right procedures, as they have to be to produce the
correct final output. Again certain connectionists (e.g., Smolensky, Legendre,
& Miyata, 1 994) have adapted the mathematics of tensor calculus specifically
in order to abstract from the distributed activity patterns of connectionist
networks an analysis in terms of symbol structures and rules mirroring those
of more conventional symbol-manipulating computational systems.
After these preliminaries we can turn to the cognitive psychology of
memory insofar as it has been conducted in relative independence of brain
physiology. It is characterized by a vast quantity of data, a considerable num­
ber of theories or explanatory speculations of rather limited scope, and a
noticeable scarcity of broader theories (Neath & Surprenant, 2003, pp. 363-
394). Much of the theorizing is conducted within the broad CTM conceptual
framework outlined above, and some of the theories are actually designed
and implemented as computer programs. Thus we find regular use of such
terms as "information," "encoding," "computation," "representation,"
"store," "address," "search," "retrieval," and so forth. In general this frame­
work is taken essentially for granted by psychologists, though with some vari­
ations, the most considerable being of course found among connectionists.
The philosophers mentioned above, who find the computational approach of
cognitive psychologists to "mental phenomena" congenial, have been rather
more critical. They fall into two groups: first, those who, like most cognitive
psychologists, are prepared to accept "mentalistic" or "folk psychological"
terminology, but insist that it must be redeemed in "naturalistic" terms (i.e. ,
roughly, terms consonant with the principles of current physical science)�no
easy task; and second, those (a small group favoring connectionism) who
hold such redemption impossible, and aspire to "eliminate" mentalistic terms
altogether from the scientific vocabulary (e.g., Churchland, 1 988).
The most obvious problem with the cognitive psychologists' framework
of thought is its very unsatisfactory terminology. Several of the key terms
listed above have both well-understood everyday usages and technical usages
assigned to them by the pioneers of computer technology. The novel techni­
cal usages should have been enclosed in scare quotes; but somehow the scare
quotes, if they were ever there, were soon forgotten. This made it easy for
people to slide carelessly from one usage to another and to delude themselves
that they were making progress when they were not. Let us consider in this
light, because of their crucial relevance to problems of memory, the terms
"store," "representation," and "information" (on the pitfalls of the first two
of these, see especially Bennett & Hacker, 2003, pp. 1 58-1 7 1 , 1 92-1 93).
Let us start with "store." The metaphors of a memory "store" and of
memory "storage" have a long history (Draaisma, 2000; Sutton, 1998),
and there has been a good deal of hovering between literal and metaphori­
cal interpretations. Taken literally, a memory "store" would be something
like a cupboard or a filing cabinet in the mind or brain that might contain
equivalents of notes, file cards, or photographs, perhaps labeled and arranged
systematically. But to retrieve, look at, and recognize these would require a
 Memory-2SI

person or second memory system (or "homunculus"; see Chapter 1 ) already

possessing the relevant skills and memories. The materials stored would have
only the status of aides-memoire, and for the analogy to shed significant light
on the nature of memory, a further and fuller and non-regressive account
of this second, retrieving, system, as well as of the storage system, would be
needed. Such accounts are not readily discoverable (see related critiques by
Bennett & Hacker, 2003, pp. 1 58-1 7 1 ; Bursen, 1 978). Latterly various semi­
distinct memory "stores" have been proposed by cognitive psychologists and
neuroscientists-for example, a short-term store or stores, a long-term store
or stores, a stored lexicon possibly subdivided into various types of catego­
rial stores, and so forth. However, without the backing of an adequate and
non-regressive explanation of how these stores could possibly perform the
functions assigned to them, these proposals amount largely to recommending
ways of speaking that highlight relationships between damage to certain brain
systems and various kinds of memory malfunctions, or between performance
of certain memory tasks and metabolic or electrical activity in certain brain
regions. As I shall argue later in the chapter, these relationships themselves are
for the most part far from clear, consistent, and compelling, and their proper
interpretation remains uncertain.
Next consider the term "information," which has become pervasive in
cognitive psychology and neuroscience. It has a good many readily compre­
hensible everyday uses, as when one receives information, shares information,
gleans information from the newspapers or from gossip, relays information,
sells information, and so on. These uses are very different from the technical
mathematical one developed by communications engineers in the late 1 940s
(see Shannon & Weaver, 1 9491 1 963). In the latter, "information" presupposes
a "source" of encoded messages, a finite alphabet of possible messages (which
may vary in probability), and a channel connecting the source to a "receiver"
that decodes the messages. The "information" conveyed by receipt of a given
message is measured in terms of the number of possible alternative messages
that the received message eliminates. For present purposes the point is this:
"Information" thus defined is, or purports to be, a "naturalistic" concept,
that is, one that can be applied objectively in a variety of different contexts
and without any dependence upon scientifically suspect mentalistic concepts.
This concept, however, is at best only very distantly connected with "informa­
tion" in the ordinary sense, which has mainly to do with the dissemination of
knowledge, of true propositions about matters of fact. Weaver (in Shannon &
Weaver, 1 94911 963, p. 8) makes it crystal clear that information in the techni­
cal sense is not to be confused with meaningful information in the everyday
sense. "In fact," he says, "two messages, one of which is heavily loaded with
meaning, and the other of which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent
from the present viewpoint as regards information. "
The concept o f information began t o infiltrate psychology i n the 1 950s
during the first stirrings of what was later to become cognitive psychology.
And there it has remained. But the meaning of the term has not remained
constant. Neath and Surprenant (2003) remark: "Although the original con-
252-Chapter 4

cept of information as put forth in information theory (e.g., Attneave, 1 959)

is no longer widely accepted, the basic idea still forms the foundation for
cognitive psychology" (p. 1 6). Unfortunately, they nowhere pause to define
how they themselves are using the term; and this is characteristic of the field
as a whole. Thus there is considerable scope for easing to and fro between the
more technical and the very different everyday uses of the term "informa­
tion." When we find (as we often do) someone talking of encoded "informa­
tion" being transmitted from short-term to long-term memory or from one
part of the brain to another, or of depressive individuals processing "infor­
mation" differently from non-depressives, it is commonly very hard or even
impossible to work out what exactly is being proposed.9
Closely related to the concept of "information" is that of "representa­
tion," which is central not only to problems of memory but to cognitive psy­
chology generally. In the ordinary sense of "representation" one thing can be
a representation of another, or stand for or "stand in" for another in some
context of discussion or activity, only if some person makes, creates, or adopts
it for that purpose, or decides, decrees, accepts, or agrees with others, and
so on, that it is or shall be so. Pictures, words, diagrams, equations, models,
model soldiers, pebbles picked up on the beach, gestures, whatever is available
or adaptable, can all be turned to account as representations of other objects
or states of affairs-but only by virtue of deliberate action on the part of
human beings who already possess the necessary memories, desires, inten­
tions, skills, and conceptual capacities. Mere accidental pictorial or auditory
similarity does not per se make one thing a representation of another, though
it may facilitate something's being adopted as a representation. Occasionally
a credulous person may indeed take, say, markings inside a sliced pomegran­
ate as a picture of a religious figure, or the shimmering colors of the aurora
borealis as representing warring armies; but an implicit assumption underly­
ing such ascriptions is always that there is a purpose and an intelligence at
work, albeit in such instances a superhuman one. It should be noted, too, that
an effect is not per se a representation of its cause, however closely the latter
may be reflected in, or resemble, the former. The theropod's footprint is not
a representation of the theropod's foot, even though it can tell us a lot about
the foot and indeed about the theropod.
If we look now at questions concerning the "inner representations" pos­
tulated by cognitive psychologists and their philosophical allies as part of
their program for handling not just memory-beliefs but thought processes in
general, certain obvious issues arise. One can of course in an everyday sense

9. The concept of information has been applied in various other areas of science, from
genetics to cosmology. The source of these uses is often the close relationship between the
mathematical concepts of information in information theory and of thermodynamic prob­
ability in statistical thermodynamics. In thermodynamics "entropy" is a measure of chaos or
the disorderliness of a system. In information theory "information" is a measure of orderli­
ness. Hence information has been called negentropy, or the negative of entropy. In this form
it has found its way into cosmology as a measure of system order, organization, or complexity.
But it is not at all clear that all or any two of these concepts can be equated with each other
(see also Davies, 1995, pp. 73-77) or that any can satisfactorily be used for such a purpose.
 Memory�253

create "inner representations" for oneself, and in certain cases seem to come
upon them; one can picture to oneself some absent or imaginary state of
affairs, excogitate a description of it in "inner speech," recognize hypnagogic
images that pass before one's mind. But these capacities are not other than
those one exercises in drawing a sketch or diagram as a sketch or diagram of
some putative state of affairs, or in taking rows of model soldiers as oppos­
ing armies in a battle that is about to begin. Such capacities to create "inner
representations," and "outer" ones also, are not to the cognitive scientist's
way of thinking to be explained in the sort of "mentalistic" terms which we
commonly use to describe them. Cognitive scientists, as noted above, are after
"naturalistic" accounts, ones free of unredeemed "non-naturalistic" terms
such as those of "folk psychology." This ambition has so far proved a will
o'the wisp, alluring and seemingly almost within grasp, but perpetually elu­
sive. Despite this small difficulty, many, perhaps most, psychologists seem
content to drift hopefully on and accept the scientific kudos derived from
using "representation" as if it were a high-flying technical term, while surrep­
titiously and illegitimately reverting to its everyday connotations.
We have already met rather similar situations over "store" and "informa­
tion." Philosophers, even those irrevocably wedded to the idea that only com­
puter or network models can throw light on the nature and workings of the
mind, have generally been more critical. In a moment I shall briefly discuss
some recent attempts by philosophers to give a naturalistic account of the
relation that must obtain between two things if one of them is to be regarded
as a "representation" of the other. A solution to this problem would, in the
context of a representationalist theory of thought, amount to or involve
a solution to the so far unresolved problem of the "intentionality" of the
mental, of the fact that such "propositional attitudes" as thinking, believing,
desiring, intending, and so forth, can be said to be "directed upon" or "about"
states of affairs outside the immediate experience of believing, desiring, and
so forth. IO

10. Thus a desire is always a desire "for" something or "that" something should come about
or be the case; a thought is a thought "of" or "about" some state of affairs; a belief is always
a belief "that" something is, was, or will be the case. A full description of any such mental
state must always include a specification of the state of affairs upon which it is directed.
But of course we can, and often do, desire, hope for, think about, imagine, dream about,
fancy that we recall, and so forth, objects or states of affairs that do not exist or obtain, and
never have existed or obtained and never will. For instance Ponce de Leon (we may sup­
pose) did many of these things in respect to the Fountain of Youth. Intentionality is therefore
not a relation between the cognizing subject and some external state of affairs (it has been
called "relationlike"). Furthermore, beliefs, desires, and what have you can only be about or
directed upon external states of affairs as these are understood or conceived by the believer
or desirer. For example, I may believe that the criminal will be caught, and the criminal may
in fact be Moriarty; but if I do not know that the criminal is Moriarty, my belief will not be
correctly described by the statement that I believe that Moriarty will be caught. These points
have often been put more formally by saying that the sentences describing mental phenomena
exhibit certain logical peculiarities. Such sentences are said, for instance, to exhibit failure of
existential generalization ("he is riding on a horse" implies the existence of a horse, whereas
"he is thinking of a centaur" does not imply the existence of a centaur), and referential opacity
("he recollected that Scott was the author of Waverley," together with "Scott was the owner
254-Chapter 4

Before we turn to the kinds of solutions that have been proposed, I must
say a bit about the types of inner representations commonly invoked by con­
temporary cognitive psychologists. Some have centered their discussions and
practical work mainly around the role of images (and images undoubtedly do
play an important part in the mental lives of many people). We have already
criticized as regressive the role played in traditional trace accounts of memory
by internal images conceived as faded perceptions. There is, however, one fur­
ther point that is worth a brief mention. Some authors have a habit of refer­
ring to images (particularly visual ones) as "analog" representations, meaning
that they can change continuously when representing changes or variations
in their "intentional objects" (as, for instance, the needle on a gauge changes
continuously while representing steam pressure in the boiler of a locomotive).
Analog representations are conventionally contrasted with "digital" ones, for
instance those constituted by the states and state transitions of a discrete state
automaton such as a digital computer. But some cognitive psychologists (e.g.,
Kosslyn, 1 980, 1 98 1 , and see also his later views, 1 994, e.g., pp. 4-9) have
developed "digital" models for mental images, thereby blurring this distinc­
tion. 1 1 Somewhere between concepts of analog and of digital representations
is the notion of an "inner model" (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1 983), according to
which one somehow builds up "inner" or brain "models" of one's environ­
ment or parts of it. Such models do not literally resemble the environment,
but are said to map on to it, systematically, so that facts about the environment
can be read off from the model by an internal scanning device (vaguely identi­
fiable with "the mind"). As explanations of memory and related phenomena,
however, "inner models" seem to me every bit as regressive as simple images
(see also Gauld, 1 989, pp. 1 1 2-1 14, 1 26-1 32).
What may be called the main line of philosophical (perhaps one should
say "cognitive philosophical") theorizing about "inner representations" has
lain squarely within the classic "digital" or "symbol-processing" tradition,
though there have been many branch lines. It also lies squarely within the
"naturalizing" tradition, the tradition that tries to avoid introducing into its
speculations any concepts not demonstrably compatible with those of physi­
cal science, and accordingly looks benignly upon the CTM. How does this
apply to "propositional attitudes," that is, to mental states such as belief or
desire (and particularly belief, because belief includes memory-beliefs), which
are held to involve a distinctive attitude towards some particular proposi­
tion? Theorists of this genre commonly suppose that in believing the believer
stands in a belief relation (conceived computationally, but for our purposes
we need not worry about the details) to an "inner representation" regarded
on the analogy of symbols or symbol-strings in a digital computer or on its
screen. It is this inner representation that purportedly carries the semantic

of Abbotsford," do not together imply "he recollected that the owner of Abbotsford was the
author of Waverley").
1 1 . Fodor (2003) attempts, with his usual panache, to assimilate David Hume's impression­
idea (roughly, sensation-image) epistemology to his own preferred "Representational Theory
of the Mind" (at least a first cousin to the CTM).
 Memory-255

properties of the belief-state; in other words, it carries a semantic content that

may be evaluated as true or false. 1 2
In the main these content-carrying representations have been identified
with words or strings of words in a putative "Language of Thought" ("LOT"
or "Mentalese") encoded in the brain (Cain, 2002, pp. 5 1-73, 1 1 6-1 22; Fodor,
1 975, 1 98 1 b). The referents of its symbols (at any rate its basic ones), the
things the symbols pick out, are not learned but are in some way given to
one. This does not mean that one innately possesses full concepts of those
things; for instance one might be able to pick out horses on the basis of a few
characteristics without grasping that horses are mammals, ungulates, warm­
blooded, and so forth. LOT precedes the acquisition of a "natural" language,
such as English, the words of which acquire their reference by becoming
linked to symbols in LOT. In these terms to think of a horse is first and fore­
most to revive ("token") the LOT symbol HORSE, and to think of a horse
jumping over a gate is to "token" the corresponding string of LOT symbols in
an order and manner determined by "syntactic" rules, which Fodor regards as
operating on the "formal" features of the symbols. Complex LOT representa­
tions thus consist of "tokenings" of rule-governed strings of simple symbols.
The LOT hypothesis has the seeming advantage of potentially accounting for
one's ability to generate an indefinitely large number of inner representations,
using a finite dictionary of simple symbols and a finite set of syntactic rules.
But it also encounters a good many difficulties, most of which I shall have to
pass over (see Cain, 2002, pp. 5 \-6\ , 1 1 6-1 24, 2 1 0-2 1 1).
With this background, we can return to our central problem. What is
it that makes an inner representation "of" or "about" that of which it is a
representation? The problem has often been approached through the concept
of information (e.g., Dretske, 1 988; Jacob, 1 997; Rowlands, 1 999), or rather
through a concept of "information," since the concept concerned is rather
looser than the technical one discussed above. It goes along these lines: Con­
sider two physical systems, one of which we will call s for "source" and the
other r for "receiver. " A lawful relation exists between them such that when­
ever source s is in state F, receiver r passes into state G. Then we might say that
the fact that receiver r is in state G "carries the information" that source s is
in state F because it is nomologically necessary (empirically always the case)
that when receiver r is in state G, source s is in state F. (Of course there might
actually be another state F2 of s such that r goes into G, but I will ignore this
complication).
An often-used example, germane for our purposes because like memory
it relates to past events, would be the width of tree rings. We might say that the
growth ring (receiver r) for such and such a year is broad (is in state G), and

12. I have decided not to go into the issue of externalism versus internalism, which some
would think relevant in the present context and on which there is a large literature. Roughly
speaking, internalism is the view that a mental state, for example, a memory-belief, can be
characterized (e.g., as the belief that so-and-so) solely in terms of factors internal to the
believer, (i.e., its "narrow content"); externalism holds that reference to factors external to
the believer ("broad content") may be required. For brief introductions to the issues see Segal
(2000, chap. 5) and Cain (2002, chap. 6).
256-Chapter 4

this carries the information that the corresponding summer (source s) was
sunny (in state F) since it is nomologically necessary that if the ring is wide
the summer was sunny. A next move, tempting to some, has been to say, let us
call receiver r's being in state G (a state which carries the "information" that
source s is in state F) a "representation" of source s's being in state F. This
purportedly gives us a "naturalistic" concept of representation. It would be a
very different concept from the everyday one touched on above, but that is not
a problem; we have to find a different concept anyway, because the usual one
is only intelligible when applied to human beings who already possess diverse
intellectual capacities including memory, which is precisely what we are aim­
ing to explain naturalistically in terms of "representations."
Nonetheless this approach will not do. As I said above, effects are not
plausibly construed as "representations" of their causes. For the fact that
receiver r is in state G is no more than a sign or clue or indication that source
s is in state F, just as a sprinkling of cigar ash on the ground (receiver r is in
state G) is a clue that the villain stood there smoking for five minutes (source
s is in state F). The ash on the ground is not a symbol or a representation; it
is just a sprinkling of ash. In particular we cannot evaluate the ash as true or
false; but this is fatal, because however much we may change our concept of
representation it must remain the case that the representational aspect of the
propositional attitude of belief, memory-belief, or otherwise, is that aspect of
the whole which makes it possible to evaluate the belief as true or false. In the
case of the ash all that can be evaluated as true or false is the inference which
Holmes draws from studying it.
To solve the problem of inner representations in conventional physicalist
terms, we are thus still left with three tasks. We must devise a theory of inner
representations (whether informational or not) that does not presuppose the
intervention of an intelligent, concept-, and memory-possessing human agent.
We must work out how to smuggle this proposal into our overall account of
brain functioning. And we must so arrange things that a representation is
not merely located in the brain but available to be "tokened" (brought up on
some inner screen?) and put to use (in computations on that screen?). This
last would appear to involve a shift from a third-person or observer's to a
first-person "take" on representations, another interesting requirement. Alas,
neither I nor anyone else, so far as I know or can judge, can find any way
whatever of accomplishing these tasks, or at least any way that amounts to
more than a mere neuroscientific fairy tale.
It is easy to see why the LOT approach, which has so often hidden its magic
wand behind the impressive logical requirements of the inviolable CTM, has
had such appeal. It solves these three problems (if "solves" is the right word)
at a stroke: The symbols of LOT are basically unlearned and carry "informa­
tion" conceived naturalistically. They are presumed to be in the brain. And
they can be "tokened. " Q. E. D. But let us probe the LOT hypothesis a little
further. According to this hypothesis, to think of a horse, to activate an inner
representation of a horse, requires one to "token" the LOT symbol HORSE.
But what does this involve? Does one hear a little inner voice whisper HORSE
 Memory-257

(or let us say 'mno� to give it a slight but appropriate air of strangeness) when­
ever one encounters a horse? Of course not; and in any case this would be
of no help when it came to understanding memory, because one would still
have to learn the association between ' mno� and horses. Or, more plausibly,
does the tokening of the LOT symbol simply result in a wordless intimation
which might be expressed as "Ah! One of those!" Then the child, born with or
very quickly developing the neural embodiments of LOT symbols, might be
supposed as it encountered each new object to have the intimations "One of
those " one of those , one of those} ," and so on.
2
But whatever help this form of the LOT hypothesis might give us in deal­
ing with certain of the propositional attitudes, it will not be easy to apply to
memory, that is, to memory-beliefs. For in the scheme of things we are con­
sidering, the truth or otherwise of a belief is determined by the truth evalua­
tion of the inner representation on which the belief is directed. If (to take the
simplest possible example) my belief is directed on the representation (LOT
symbol) HORSE and a horse is there, the belief is true. But what if my belief
is that I have seen a horse before, that is, it is a memory-belief? Then what is
believed is in effect not "horse" but "horse again." But what is the force of this
"again"? How might it be unpacked into symbols? The content of the belief
would have to be something like: "This is a horse, I have seen one before, and
what's more I can remember seeing one before." All the separate statements
that are here conjoined would appear to be necessary to capture the full impli­
cations of "horse again."
However, this is more complex than would at first sight appear. For the
second and third parts of this conjunction are statements about myself and
my history as a continuous sentient being. It is far from obvious how or
whether the elements in these statements could be supposed to be represented
by special symbols of our built-in LOT. And more than that, a symbol rep­
resenting remembering has to be present or implicit in the overall compound
inner representation. In effect to remember something is, in part, to believe
that one remembers it. But this involves one's having a propositional atti­
tude of belief directed on a LOT sentence that includes a representation of
a propositional attitude of belief directed on a LOT sentence that. . . and so
on. But it is memory that we were hoping to analyze in terms of such inner
representations and propositional attitudes directed upon them. It does not
seem plausible to maintain that under these circumstances an illuminating
and non-regressive account of memory can be derived from a framework of
thought which regards memory as an attitude of belief directed on informa­
tion-carrying inner representations consisting of symbols of a "Language of
Thought."
Here, as throughout, I have had to skim very quickly over the surface of
some very difficult and extensively discussed problems. The approaches to
inner representations I have so far been mainly concerned with are commonly,
though hardly luminously, classed under the heading of "informational
semantics." They have been SUbjected to several additional lines of objection
258-Chapter 4

that I have not attempted to summarize. 13 But there are other approaches
to the naturalization of meaning.14 For example, there are approaches, not
on the whole spelled out in detail, involving what has been variously called
"inferential role," "causal role," or "conceptual role semantics" (Block, 1 986,
1 995; Cain, 2002, pp. 1 24- 1 34; J. Fodor & Lepore, 1992, chap. 6). Their unify­
ing idea is that the semantic properties of inner representations are at least in
part determined by the inferential, causal, or conceptual relationships these
representations bear to each other. And there is a tendency to suppose, or
hope, that inferential and conceptual relationships may be reducible to causal
ones, thus bringing the whole scheme into line with a "functionalist" philoso­
phy of mind (see Chapter 1).
Certainly the question of what makes a representation a representation
"of" that which it represents can hardly be considered independently of ques­
tions about the relations of one representation to other representations and
of the whole complex to the things represented. To take a simple example:
One might have an "inner representation" of a "hammer" as a moderate-sized
T-shaped hard object, and on this basis one would do quite well at calling
hammers "hammers." But this would fall seriously short of capturing the full
meaning of the term. Such a T-shaped object might be a mere decoration or
a religious symbol. It is essential to thinking about, wanting, having beliefs
concerning or memories of, a hammer, that one knows a hammer to be a tool
used in the building and related trades, and one cannot (according to the rep­
resentational theory of thinking) know this except through the mediation of
further representations. The question therefore arises of how these different
representations interact to produce the desired result. But it would be very dif­
ficult to suppose with causal role theorists that the relations between the con­
stitutive representations are at root causal. Part of the meaning of "hammer,"
of what would have to be embraced by an adequate inner representation, is a
tool used in the building trade; and part of the meaning of "building trade" is
the sort of trade in which hammers are used. And so on. Without this mutual
relationship the scope of each representation would become vaguer and for
most purposes less effective. What we possess here and elsewhere seems to be
a whole intrinsically interrelated system of representations which cannot be
picked apart without attenuating the content of each individual representa­
tion. Such relationships appear to be conceptual as opposed to causal. And
yet to label them as "inferential" or "conceptual" carries its own difficulties.
Consider a geological hammer. Someone who had never seen or heard of
such an implement yet knew a little about hammers and about geology could
nonetheless work out some of its likely features, for example, that it would be
likely to have a wedge or chisel aspect for splitting rocks as well as a fiat side
for breaking them, and represent it accordingly. This would not be a matter
of selecting aspects of a hammer-representation and aspects of a geology­
representation and combining them, nor yet of each representation occasion­
ing causal changes in the other, but of his creatively exercising what might be

13. On these standard difficulties, see, for example, Jacob (1997) and Rowlands (1999).
14. For a general account of these, see Fodor and Lepore (1992) and Loewer (1999).
 Memory-259

called practical intelligence, in ways hardly reducible to the formal inferences

of logic, about the likely purposes and requirements of geologists in relation
to hammers.
There are also "teleological" theories (Millikan, 1 984; Papineau, 1 993)
that emphasize the biological and particularly the evolutionary utility of
information-carrying inner representations. Several proponents of the infor­
mational approach (e.g., Jacob, 1 997; Rowlands, 1 999) have attempted to
mend lacunae in their positions by incorporating ideas from the teleological
approaches. So has Dretske ( 1 988), the principal pioneer of the informational
approach. Dretske has further gone on to propose that to create a true inner
representation, the fact of the informational relation between the (human or
at least animate) receiver (call him or her r) being in internal state Gj and
the source s being in state F must be learned by receiver r, leading to neural
changes in r that bring about behavior appropriate to source s's being in state
F whenever receiver r is in state G. In effect G assumes charge of the behav-
I I
.

lOr.
But all proposals of this kind encounter profound difficulties of the fol­
lowing sort: A certain smell reaching my nostrils in the morning air (receiver
r moves into state G) may be a sign that sausages and bacon are being cooked
in the kitchen (source s is in state F). Lo and behold, after a few repetitions I
start turning up in the kitchen soon after the smell reaches me. But this could
have come about in various ways. The rewarding effect of stumbling across
food in the kitchen (source s is in state F) soon after the olfactory stimulation
began (receiver r is in state G) could have strengthened the neural connections
between my olfactory lobes and my leg muscles in such a way that the chemi­
cal stimulation of my nose now brings me downstairs like an automaton. But
in that case I would no more have an inner representation of the connection
between smell and breakfast than a slug drawn irresistibly towards spilt beer
would have an inner representation of the connection between the smell of
beer and beer. Suppose, on the other hand, that what I acquired was not an
automatic response to the smell as a regular precursor (a "sign") of break­
fast, but instead knowledge that the smell is a sign of breakfast. In that case
my new memory-knowledge (my supposedly newly formed inner representa­
tion of the smell-breakfast relationship) could in principle find expression
in all sorts of different ways, some entirely contrary to the automatic stimu­
lus-response sequence described above. There is no sense in which my inner
state Gj would have charge of this behavior: I would be in charge of it. For
example, I might think "sausage and bacon will contravene my diet" and go
for a walk instead. So now all that Dretske needs to complete his theory is to
tell us ( 1 ) what the neural changes are that constitute the representation, (2)
what makes them a "representation" of the smell-breakfast regularity, and
(3) how the representation in question is accessed and utilized, and not only
that but variably and intelligently utilized. In other words the whole problem
remains to be solved.
In sum, exiguous though these accounts have necessarily been, I hope
to have shown that both traditional "trace" theories of memory and their
modern "inner representation" counterparts are faced with very considerable
260-Chapter 4

conceptual difficulties, difficulties which have for the most part gone unrecog­
nized or ignored, particularly by psychologists. I am not going to claim that
these difficulties are in principle insuperable-though I personally cannot see
any way round theml5-but I do claim that they cannot and should not be
ignored.

Modern Approaches: Neuroscientific

The period during which Myers was writing his Human Personality was
one of significant advance in knowledge of brain function (Hecaen & Lan­
teri-Laura, 1 977, pp. 1 27-200), and he was well aware of these advances.
The relevant discoveries came principally from study of the effects of brain
lesions, but also, to a limited extent, from animal experimentation. The major
sensory and motor regions had been located, and it was known that certain
cortical areas were linked to aspects of linguistic and conceptual capacity
(see, e.g., Ladd, 1 893; Ladd & Woodworth, 1 9 1 5; Markowitsch, 1 992). But
of the physical basis of "episodic" and much of "semantic" memory almost
nothing was known. It was widely assumed that memory "traces," though
they were never found, must be located in what before long came to be called
"silent" or "association" areas, that is to say, areas of cortex ("polymodal
areas"), outside the known sensory, motor, and language-related regions, on
which "association fibers" from one or more sensory areas were presumed
to converge and create intra- or inter-modality "associations," and perhaps
also links to output pathways. This assumption could be supported by citing
the loss of memory and intellect accompanying various forms of senile and
other cortical degeneration,16 while the hypothetical "memory traces" could
now be conceived on the newer analogies of photographic plates, grooves in
wax phonograph cylinders, or circuitry in telephone switchboards (Draaisma,
2000; Sutton, 1 998).
For some decades what is now called neuropsychology continued to
revolve mainly around brain lesions and brain anatomy, with a leavening of

1 5. My own view (Gauld & Shotter, 1977, pp. 1 12-1 16) is that there is no way of deriv­
ing the intentional (e.g., the "aboutness" of a memory-belief) from the non-intentional. See
also Smythe (1992): "Cognitive theorists must come to recognize that cognitive states and
processes are already meaningfully constituted prior to their theoretical interpretation" (p.
359).
16. The amnesias forming a prominent part of "Korsakoff's syndrome" were well known by
1900, but only much later was it proposed that they result from atrophy of or damage to one or
more parts of the "limbic" system occasioned by thiamine deficiency consequent on chronic
alcoholism. The limbic system consists of a set of interlinked structures in or surrounding the
upper brain stem, and including the amygdala, the hippocampus, the mammillary bodies,
certain thalamic nuclei, the fornix, and various associated regions of cortex. Most frequently
involved seem to be the mammillary bodies and anterior thalamus, but the variable location
of the damage and its tendency to be accompanied by general cortical degeneration, together
with the somewhat muddy nature of the overall syndrome, have rather hindered speculative
interpretation.
 Memory-261

psychological speculation. But even by the early 1950s only a limited number
of further discoveries had been made that bore directly on questions to do
with the physiological basis of memory. 17 This was to change markedly in the
late 1 950s as the result of a brain operation which, undertaken to alleviate
severe epilepsy, turned out to have had catastrophic side-effects. The patient,
known in the literature as H . M. or Henry M . , underwent bilateral removal of
the hippocampus (a somewhat slug-shaped structure deep inside the medial
temporal lobes) and adjacent parts of temporal cortex. He thereafter exhib­
ited a dense and intractable " anterograde amnesia" (an inability to acquire
new memories), combined with a lesser "retrograde amnesia" (a difficulty
in recalling events from a certain period of time preceding the operation),
despite retaining more or less normal short-term memory. Further study of
H. M . , and of cases analogous to his, brought vividly home the fact that here
at last was a kind of brain lesion of limited scope which had a profound effect
on memory. Early speculation as to the critical locus centered round the hip­
pocampus itself, which has extensive and reciprocal linkages to other brain
regions. It was suggested that the function of the hippocampus was to trans­
fer material circulating in short-term memory to a long-term memory store
in which (following some period of "consolidation") it might be indefinitely
retained. No hippocampus, no further admissions to long-term memory.
In the decades between then and today, there have been many develop­
ments both in neuroscience in general and in the neuropsychology of mem­
ory. IS Theoretical standpoints have shifted appreciably, mainly because of the
infiltration or partial ousting of the older, heavily anatomical approach by
the newer functional concepts, not to say jargon, of cognitive psychology,
which of course has itself progressively transformed into cognitive neurosci­
ence. In its earlier days practitioners of "cognitive neuropsychology" were less
interested in the localization of psychological functions in the brain than in
interpreting the psychological effects of brain damage in terms of cognitive
psychological models, models often set out in the box-and-arrow manner of
flow charts. They were particularly interested in finding so-called "double dis­
sociations" of function, that is, in discovering pairs of functions, conceived
as part of some cognitive psychological model, either of which can be carried
on successfully even when the other is impaired by some sort of brain insult.
Such dissociations were (and still commonly are) thought to shed light on the
validity of functional distinctions embedded in the models-which indeed
they may do when the "dissociated" functions are more exhaustively tested
than is commonly the case (Shallice, 1 988; Uttal, 200 1). Nowadays cognitive
neuropsychologists are usually well versed in brain anatomy and interested

17. It is interesting to note the limited progress on this front between Ladd and Woodworth
( 1 9 1 5) and Morgan and Stellar (1950), each in its day a standard textbook of physiological
psychology.
18. Useful general works here are Bear, Connors, and Paradiso (2000), Carlson (2004),
Eichenbaum (2002), Eichenbaum and Cohen (2001), Heilman (2002), Heilman and Valenstein
(2003), Kolb and Whishaw (2003), and Parker, Wilding, and Bussey (2002).
262�Chapter 4

not only in the cognitive consequences of brain injuries but in the location
and character of the injuries themselves.
More significant and ultimately more important than these shifts in
theoretical standpoint have been the numerous and remarkable technologi­
cal advances in our ability to observe the inner workings of the brain. As
described more fully in Chapter 1 , we can divide these technologies roughly
into two groups: "macro" technologies which operate on scales from the
whole brain down to roughly naked-eye-sized parts of it, and "micro" tech­
niques operating down to the cellular or sub-cellular level. At present the
"macro" technological advances generating the greatest interest and enthusi­
asm are those involving "imaging" or "scanning" of the brain by techniques
which reveal the level of metabolic activity (as measured for example by blood
flow, glucose consumption, or oxygen uptake) in various brain regions. These
techniques-especially positron emission tomography (PET) and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)-give rise to the widely reproduced (and
often seriously misleading) computerized images in which "active" areas are
represented in red, less active ones in orange, and so on. Another "macro"
technique, electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB), has also produced many
interesting results related to memory (see, e.g., Ojemann, 1 983, 1 990; Pen­
field & Rasmussen, 1 952). More recently somewhat similar results have been
obtained by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), which does not require
opening of the skull. Each of the latter techniques has been shown capable
of interfering with the maintenance or expression of certain kinds of what
might be called "memory" (short-term perceptual, short-term verbal, sen­
tence construction or production). The "micro" technological advances have
been deployed mainly in studies of rudimentary learning and conditioning
processes in simpler organisms, in an effort to identify and characterize at the
inter- or intra-cellular levels the fundamental biochemical mechanisms likely
to be at work.
So what have these technological developments, macro and micro, taught
us about memory? They have certainly resulted in a vast accumulation of
data, but have they brought about a revolution in our understanding of mem­
ory? It is, I think, fair to say that advances in understanding have nothing like
kept pace with the accumulation of data, and that the latter has served mainly
to bring out the complexity of the problems that impede the former. To jus­
tify these assertions fully would require several substantial volumes of which
I have no ambition to be the author. However, to illustrate the character of
recent developments it will be useful to consider various to-ings and fro-ings
in the neuropsychological investigation of explicit or "declarative" memory
(i.e. , roughly, the sort of memories-most notably "episodic" and "seman­
tic" memories-that can be brought to conscious awareness and reported
upon). J 9

1 9. I have had to pass by some very curious cases of loss of memory for the qualita­
tive properties of things. In a smal1 number of extreme examples (see for instance Kolb &
Whishaw, 2003, pp. 332-333; Zeki, 1993, pp. 265-266; and cf. Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987,
pp. 1450-1451), brain damage has led not just to inability to see things in color (achromatop-
 Memory-263

I mentioned above that in the case of H. M . and various analogous cases

that came to light in succeeding years the dense anterograde amnesia that
resulted from bilateral damage to or resection of the hippocampal region
was generally taken to show that the hippocampus itself played a vital bridg­
ing role between short-term memory and long-term memory stores. How­
ever, during several decades of experimental work with humans and animals,
this simple proposal underwent significant vagaries of fortune. It was sug­
gested, for example, that so-called hippocampal amnesia was actually due
to severance of fibers of passage (the temporal stem) that pass close by the
hippocampus. This idea was apparently put out of court by the discovery
of severely amnesic patients in whom the hippocampi had been bilaterally
destroyed without any damage to adjacent structures (e.g., Zola-Morgan,
Squire, & Amaral, 1 986), but more recent studies with monkeys and humans
have occasioned further rethinking. In a meta-analysis of visual recognition
experiments (delayed matching to sample) with monkeys, Baxter and Murray
(Baxter, 2002) concluded that lesions limited to the hippocampus have a small
but reliable effect, ones limited to the neighboring perirhinal cortex have a
larger but still modest one, and lesions including perirhinal cortex plus at least
one other component of the hippocampal complex have a larger one still (p.
I l l ). A further, and curious, finding (pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 2) was that the greater the
hippocampal damage, the less the impairment of memory, whereas with rhi­
nal cortex lesions (the rhinal cortex includes the perirhinal cortex) the reverse
held true. 20 Baxter proposes that this may be because the hippocampus oper­
ates by recall of particular events ("episodic memory") whereas the rhinal
cortex operates by detecting relative familiarity. These regions accordingly
make different contributions to the solution of visual recognition problems,
and may compete with each other. A partially functioning but still competing
hippocampus may thus produce more deleterious effects than no hippocam­
pus at all, or a mere remnant.
In the human case too there is evidence that the hippocampus subserves
episodic rather than semantic memory. Vargha-Khadem et al. ( 1 997) report
on three patients who had suffered very early bilateral damage limited to the
hippocampus (their hippocampi were much reduced in volume). In addi­
tion to the problems with spatial and temporal memory commonly associ­
ated with hippocampal lesions, these patients suffered from severe antero-

sia) or to name the colors of things (color anomia) but to inability to recollect what it is like
to experience color.
20. See also Irle and Markowitsch (1990) and criticisms by Zola-Morgan and Squire (1993).
Findings in healthy humans of a negative correlation between hippocampal volume and
memory performance, and also between grey matter volume and memory performance, have
been surprisingly frequent (see, e.g., Van Petten et a!., 2004). How far this has to do with the
need for the thinning out of nerve cells and connections during early development is still a
matter of discussion. The most startling examples of discrepancy between tissue volume and
mental ability are certain cases of hydrocephalus described by Lorber (1983) and Lonton
(1979), and see also R. Lewin (1980). Some of these individuals were able to function at a
normal to high level with both cerebral hemispheres reduced to as little as five percent of the
normal volume.
264-Chapter 4

grade amnesia for episodic memory tasks; but semantic learning and memory
were well preserved. A case of the opposite tendency is described by Kapur
et al. ( 1 994). This patient's hippocampus and surrounding structures were
intact, but other medial temporal lobe structures had gone. Episodic memory
was preserved, but there were moderate impairments of semantic memory.
Steinvarth, Levine, and Corkin (2005) conclude from experiments with two
severely amnesic but contrasting patients (H. M . and W R.), combined with a
review of other cases, that although established semantic memories may after
awhile shake free of dependence on medial temporal lobe structures, episodic
memories (defined, however, as bound to delimitable spatio-temporal con­
texts, so that genuine autobiographical episodes recollected out of context
would not count) in general do not.
Various other cases seem likewise to indicate at least a partial "double
dissociation" between episodic or autobiographical memory and semantic
memory. For instance, Kitchener, Hodges, and McCarthy ( 1 998) report a
patient with severely impaired episodic memory, both anterograde and retro­
grade, but largely preserved semantic memory. A stroke had occasioned dam­
age to the right hippocampus and severe general damage to the left medial
temporal lobe. 1. R. Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, and Funnell ( 1 992) and
Murre, Graham, and Hodges (200 1 ) describe cases of progressive "semantic
dementia" with lateral temporal cortical degeneration in which the patients
suffered from considerable impairment of semantic memory but had some
degree of spared episodic memory. Similarly, De Renzi, Liotti, and Nichelli
( 1 987) describe a patient with impaired semantic memory but preserved auto­
biographical memory in conjunction with damage to the anteromedial por­
tion of the left temporal lobe caused by acute encephalitis. Temple and Rich­
ardson (2004) describe a case of seemingly idiopathic developmental amnesia
in a 9-year-old girl with impaired semantic memory but preserved episodic.
Maguire and Frith (2003) found that in a comparison of older with younger
subjects, neither suffering from morphological changes in the medial tempo­
ral lobes, brain activation during episodic-autobiographical but not semantic
memory tasks had switched substantially with age from the left hippocampus
to the right.
With regard to the prevailing "double dissociation" interpretation of
such cases, however, one can only recommend great caution. It is easy enough
to suppose that semantic memory could persist in the absence of episodic
memory, but vice versa is a different matter. Suppose one remembers, as I
do, blowing away the end of one's army service rifle while firing rapidly. As
I remarked above, one could not remember this episode in its fullness unless
implicit, so to speak, in one's act of remembering were a grasp of various
further remembered facts, as well as of the conceptual background against
which it occurred. Without such "semantic" memory, one's recollection of
the event in question would be so to speak pale and attenuated. One can per­
haps imagine being able to recall something about an exciting episode with an
elongated object of wood and metal, without having any real ("semantic")
memory of what a rifle is and what it can accomplish and how it is used and
 Memory-265

of the circumstances in which it might be used or of what it was that really

happened. But would that constitute a full episodic memory of the event in
question? In other words, as semantic memory weakens, episodic memory
inevitably must lose substance. Furthermore, such a weakening would by no
means always be revealed by conventional "tests" of episodic memory such as
recollection of recent events or of recently presented word lists, or discrimi­
nation of words that were versus words that were not on such lists (see also,
Dalla Barba, 1 999, pp. 1 88-1 89; Horner, 1 990; and Ladd, 1 893, p. 2 1 6, for a
similar point in connection with aphasia). Conversely, it is not at all clear in
cases such as that of De Renzi et al. ( 1 987), mentioned above, that elements
of semantic memory specifically relevant to the supposedly preserved auto­
biographical memories (e.g., of the patient's wedding) were in fact impaired;
indeed, if those memories were fully preserved (and it would be very difficult
to tell, without far more careful and direct probing than is customary), the
clear implication would be that more of semantic memory was preserved than
was accessible to the routine neuropsychological assessment procedures these
investigators employed. The situation is not helped by the loose definitions
of "semantic" and "episodic" that are in practice employed, which leave both
terms liable to net an assortment of heterogeneous fish.
To summarize so far: In the first flush of excitement that followed the
early studies of the case of H. M., the role of the hippocampus itself in
memory (as distinct from the role of the hippocampus together with other
medial temporal lobe and associated structures) was rather exaggerated and
simplified, though clearly it does normally have some important role. Propos­
als that it might be especially involved in episodic as distinct from semantic
memory suffer inter alia from empirical and conceptual difficulties in clearly
separating the two, but are by no means to be entirely rejected. It is becoming
increasingly likely, however, that there are multiple forms of amnesia in which
multiple brain regions can be to a greater or lesser extent involved, and that
the original hope that amnesic syndromes may be neatly classified along two
or three dimensions each associated with particular brain systems is likely to
be at best rather incompletely fulfilled. 2 1
The emergence of the new functional neuroimaging techniques in the
1 980s (PET) and early 1 990s (fMRI) to an extent deflected the focus of mem­
ory studies away from the hippocampus and medial temporal lobes towards
prefrontal areas. For it transpired, to everyone's surprise, that although
marked prefrontal activations turned up regularly in investigations of epi­
sodic and semantic memory, hippocampal and medial temporal lobe activa­
tions, though not unknown, were less consistently observed. By 1 994, Tulving

21 . This was forcefully argued by Markowitsch (1984), and has been confirmed since. For
example, after a lengthy and most interesting review of20 years of work with K. C., a multiply
brain-damaged and severely amnesic patient, Rosenbaum et al. (2005) conclude that implicit
memory may be preserved when explicit memory has vanished, that "it is not necessarily the
case that episodic and semantic memory follow the same trajectory of impairment and pres­
ervation," that there may be different types of spatial memory, and that "different types of
inferences may be made on the basis of cases in which lesions are highly restricted and those
like K. C. with more extensive damage" (pp. 1015, 1016).
266-Chapter 4

felt able to put forward the HERA (hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymme­

try) hypothesis, largely on the basis of imaging data (Tulving, Kapur, Craik,
Moscovitch, & Houle, 1 994). This hypothesis stated that left prefrontal regions
are particularly involved in the "encoding" of episodic memories, and right
ones in their retrieval (the hypothesis is just about encoding and retrieval, not
about storage). It was also found that semantic retrieval activated regions
overlapping with the left prefrontal episodic encoding regions, while work­
ing memory activated regions overlapping with the right prefrontal episodic
retrieval regions. There were also certain recurrent links with more posterior
activations, for example of episodic encoding with medial temporal activa­
tions, particularly of the parahippocampal gyrus, and of episodic retrieval
with activation of the parahippocampal gyrus and of medial parietal cortex.
For some years the HERA hypothesis enjoyed considerable popularity,
with a good bit of evidence apparently supporting it, but it too has largely dis­
solved, perhaps in part because of continuing technical and statistical devel­
opments in the field of brain imaging. For instance, a large-scale survey of
brain imaging studies by Cabeza and Nyberg (2000) showed that although 23
out of 52 studies of episodic retrieval found the predicted peak activations in
right frontal and prefrontal regions, additional peaks were also often found,
scattered across left frontal and prefrontal cortex and also in both left and
right parietal areas. M. R. Miller et al. (2002), with nine subjects carrying
out an episodic retrieval task (verbal recognition), found highly significant
activations of both left and right frontal and prefrontal regions, as well as the
anterior cingulate gyrus and left and right lower parietal areas. There were
also marked individual differences between the subjects. Six of the subjects
returned for a follow-up session six months later using a similar verbal recog­
nition task. The individual subjects exhibited fairly constant patterns of acti­
vation across the two sessions, but variations between the activation patterns
of different subjects remained appreciable.22 The authors attribute this state
of affairs to there being "various conscious strategies underlying the perfor­
mance of this task, rather than a common memory mechanism" (p. 1 2 1 1 ); but
this hypothesis, while not implausible, does not help a lot in the absence of an
inventory of the alternative strategies that might be brought to bear even on
this very simple task.
Others (e.g., Ranganath & Knight, 2002) have similarly proposed that
prefrontal activity during episodic memory tasks is not due to the operations
of specific encoding and retrieval mechanisms but rather to strategic, goal­
directed, and evaluative processes that assist or modulate the functioning of
memory mechanisms operating elsewhere. Somewhat similar explanations
have occasionally been offered for the effects of brain lesions which appar­
ently interfere with memory processes. In fact, one can draw a number of
parallels between difficulties of interpretation that were widely (although
slowly) acknowledged in relation to the behavioral and mental changes fol­
lowing brain lesions (whether experimental, accidental, or pathophysiologi-

22. Vttal (2001) and especially Harpaz (2006) make very strong claims about the pervasive
lack of inter-experiment, inter-subject, or even intra-subject consistency in imaging studies.
 Memory-267

cal) and the difficulties, increasingly recognized by professionals in the field,

of interpreting the significance of brain imaging studies for the understand­
ing of brain function (Vttal, 200 1 ) . For instance, both approaches have dem­
onstrated that very often a given brain area may be involved in more than
one function, both in the same and in different individuals. Sharply local­
ized "dedicated" areas are rather the exception outside the motor and sensory
regions of the cortex, a finding which has enhanced the popularity of con­
nectionist ideas. Both approaches also have to cope with problems raised by
the fact that the loci under investigation may have or have had inhibitory or
modulatory rather than excitatory functions. And both have been accused of
obliterating or minimizing the significance of individual differences by using
restricted subject pools or by crudely averaging data across subjects.
Conceptual and methodological difficulties in imaging studies affiict cog­
nitive neuroscience generally, and are discussed in greater detail in our Chap­
ter 9, but the latter accusation in particular requires some further comment
here. Individual differences in the ostensible localization of memory func­
tions in the brain tend on balance to become more marked as one moves from
the perceptual end of the scale to the verbal and conceptual. We have already
noted the results of M . R. Miller et al. (2002) on verbal recognition memory.
The "localization" of language functions in different left-hemisphere sites not
infrequently departs grossly from standard expectations even in right-handed
adults,23 and language may be right-hemisphere based in perhaps one person
in 20.
Early but persistent methods of assessing the results of PET and fMRI
scans led to some breathtaking oversimplifications, particularly as the find­
ings filtered through to the popular or popular scientific press. Especially per­
nicious in this regard is the so-called "subtraction" technique. In this, levels
of metabolic activity observed in the brain during the performance of some
task are displayed after first subtracting out the levels of brain activity during
a "control" period, usually defined as "rest" or as performance of a task pre­
sumed to be identical to the experimental task except in lacking some hypo­
thetical additional cognitive factor. The results are presented (either for indi­
vidual brains or as an average across a group of brains) by coloring the most
active regions in red, less active ones in orange, and so forth. This procedure
was at first naively thought capable of identifying areas specifically respon­
sible for the targeted cognitive component. However, a good part of the whole
brain will have been active during the performance of both tasks, and the fact
that some areas are zeroed out by the subtraction does not imply that these
make no contribution, or the same contribution, in the situations being com­
pared. Furthermore, the display of "significant" differences depends heav­
ily on the filtering and thresholding employed, often trades on very small
absolute differences in the actual levels of activity, and may even involve only
areas of activation shared across subjects. The net result of such procedures
is sometimes to leave only a tiny illuminated region, which, in extreme cases,

23. See, for example, Caplan (1987, pp. 345-402), Kertesz (1979), Ojemann (1990, pp. 303-
304), Ojemann and Whitaker (1978), and Pulvermiiller (1999).
268-Chapter 4

may be christened by such ridiculous titles as "the God spot" or "the seat of
intelligence" (see the criticisms by Sarter, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 1 996).
These kinds of procedures are now widely regarded with caution, and
more sophisticated ones are being adopted or are under development, but
other substantial difficulties in the interpretation of PET and fMRI findings
remain. For instance these findings reflect degrees of blood flow and oxygen
uptake in different brain regions; but how are the latter in turn related to
"information processing" in those areas? Metabolic activity within any region
is more likely to be determined by the inputs to that region than by its out­
puts, that is, by the results of information processing (Logothetis, 2002), and
in fact inputs are not infrequently inhibitory with respect to outputs. Indeed
there is no obvious reason why degree of metabolic excitement in the brain
should always be in synchrony with the functional importance of the task
being undertaken. Again in work with brain imaging there is always a trade­
off between achieving sharp definition and achieving a rapid response to
changes in mental activity.
No one, I think, would deny that there are problems----conceptual, empiri­
cal, and interpretive-with imaging studies. Where differences of opinion arise
is over how or whether these problems can ultimately be resolved. Some (e.g.,
Uttal, 200 1 ) argue that the problems are irresolvable, that there is a certain
endemic elusiveness about the relations between brain functions and psycho­
logical ones. Others, probably ranking most neuroscientists among their num­
bers, are more optimistic and anticipate steady progress driven by advances
in imaging hardware and image-analysis techniques, perhaps combined with
fractionation of brain functions and the assigning of sub-functions to differ­
ent anatomical loci. One can only await developments; but I personally am
unconvinced that technological developments will not multiply rather than
diminish the opacities with which we are currently confronted.
Meanwhile, what are we to say of the supposed memory stores in regions
of anterior and posterior "association" cortex, to which episodic memory
traces are supposedly consigned, within which they are supposedly con­
solidated, and from which episodic and semantic memories are allegedly
retrieved? There is no doubt that diffuse degeneration or metabolic impov­
erishment of those regions (as for example in Alzheimer's disease) may occa­
sion or be accompanied by severe and generalized memory problems includ­
ing retrograde amnesia, but interpretation of this fact is not straightforward.
Many cognitive functions and personality characteristics may be drastically
disrupted by the disease, which is associated with (and some say caused by)
gross malfunctioning of neurotransmitter systems (especially but not exclu­
sively cholinergic ones) centering on subcortical structures.
Things look at first sight a bit more clear-cut, perhaps, in relation to
semantic memory. Specifically, there are some fairly well-established find­
ings that have been interpreted as demonstrating the existence of semantic
memory "stores" of restricted scope and limited anatomical area. Damage
to certain brain areas, especially ones abutting on posterior speech areas of
the left hemisphere, has long been known to produce "anomia" or "anomic
 Memory-269

aphasia." Patients have difficulty, relatively unaccompanied by other prob­

lems, in finding the right words to express what they wish to say. This disorder
was initially attributed by some to interference with a "lexicon" or "word
store" somewhere in the vicinity of the angular gyrus. It was also found that
the difficulty could be specific to particular categories of words, for instance
the names of animals or of plants or of inanimate objects or of tools, sug­
gesting a subdivided lexicon. And it gradually became apparent that often
the problems were not just in word-finding, but were more of the nature of
category-specific amnesias, in which patients might suffer from difficulty in
recognizing or remembering objects from certain categories, and in exhibit­
ing a conceptual grasp of their natures. Categories particularly liable to be
affected included, for example, animals, plants, artifacts, and tools or other
non-living things (according to some, the biological importance of objects
of these categories has led to the evolution of dedicated neural circuitry).
Latterly, PET and fMRI studies with normal subjects have come up with
moderately confirmatory findings as to the brain regions involved in the func­
tions concerned (see reviews by Perani, 1 999, and by the various contributors
to Forde & Humphreys, 2002, and A. Martin & Caramazza, 2003). These
regions overlapped a good deal but sometimes showed distinguishably dif­
ferent areas of peak activation, particularly in left infero-temporal, lateral
temporal, occipito-temporal, and posterior parietal cortex, and (when tools
are involved) ventral pre-motor cortex.
In a way these findings concerning "category-specific" areas encapsulate
and bring to a head certain of the theoretical and conceptual problems about
memory already raised (I pass by the purely empirical issue that there are,
as always, considerable differences between the findings of different stud­
ies). For example, if we talk (as does Perani, 1 999) of these findings reveal­
ing "anatomically segregated representations of semantic knowledge" (p. 69),
we fall foul of the twin points: (I) that representations require interpreters
who are already knowledgeable enough to comprehend them; and (2) that to
understand membership of a category (say the category of animals) one must
possess, or at least have a toehold in, a whole network of further concepts,
with pervasive links among themselves and to other concepts, for example live
versus inanimate, sensate versus insensate, reproductive versus non-reproduc­
tive, self-repairing versus inert, ingesting nutrition versus not doing so, and so
on. Where are the "anatomically segregated representations" of these further
areas of semantic "knowledge" to be found?
It will also prove instructive at this point to situate these issues in a larger
historical context.24 In a book now widely but undeservedly neglected, Berg­
son ( 1 908/ 1 99 1 ) had argued for a view in which consciousness "overflows the
organism." Much more goes on in the mind, he thought, than can be expressed
in the activity of the brain. The brain Bergson regarded as the "point of inser­
tion of the mind in matter," an "organ of attention to life," which primarily
limits and focuses mental activity in service of appropriate adjustments of the
organism to its environment.

24. For the ensuing paragraphs on Bergson and Damasio, I am indebted to Ed Kelly.
270-Chapter 4

Now these metaphors, while picturesque, are surely very obscure, and I do
not wish to defend or endorse Bergson's general philosophical position. How­
ever, there is one specific point at which it connects directly with the issues
presently before us. His book advances a variety of theoretical and empirical
arguments in support of the view that "true" memory cannot be accounted for
in terms of "engrams" (traces) inscribed upon the brain.25 Among his empiri­
cal arguments the one he himself clearly thought most decisive concerned
memory for words and their meanings. He was fully aware of the emerging
neuropsychological story about the language system and its relationship to
the clinical phenomena of aphasia. Anomia seemed to him to provide a cru­
cial "test case," one in which he could demonstrate a fatal flaw in trace theo­
ries of memory. For most of his contemporaries the loss of specific letters,
words, or groups of words following a stroke seemed to provide the first really
compelling evidence for localization of specific memories at specific points
in the brain. But closer study of the evidence, Bergson argued, reveals that
this interpretation is incorrect. For example, a patient may recover a seem­
ingly "lost" word if he becomes sufficiently excited, and although he cannot
produce the name of some pictured object on demand, as in a typical testing
context, he may produce it spontaneously in some other context, or even in
the course of his circumlocutions about the pictured object itself. Thus, what
appears to be damaged is not the memory per se but the mechanism of its
retrieval. The engram theory, Bergson concluded, is false.
From our present vantage point we can see that Bergson was basically
correct about the facts; specific types of knowledge or psychological function
may be significantly degraded by localized lesions, but they are rarely com­
pletely abolished. His conclusion that this falsifies trace theory, however, was
certainly premature and unwarranted, because the argument depends upon
the incorrect premise that a materialist account of memory must be framed in
terms of sharply localized traces, analogous to the inscription of snatches of
music in the grooves of a phonographic record. As we have seen, however, vir­
tually all contemporary neuroscientific and connectionist thinking presumes
that traces are anatomically widely distributed.
But the story does not end there. Bergson's account of how "true" remem­
bering actually works, though again basically metaphorical, comes remark­
ably close to the picture sketched above as emerging from the latest neuro­
psychological and functional neuroimaging studies. On Bergson's view the
overall pattern of brain activity associated with some particular act of con­
scious remembering constitutes a sort of "frame," into which the memory­
knowledge somehow "inserts" itself. In retrieving semantic knowledge, say of
a hammer, this "frame" would tend to consist of activation of whatever brain
areas would be involved in my actually perceiving and using hammers. Similar
expectations flow from the general connectionist point of view, according to

25. Bergson sharply distinguishes "true" memory, by which in modern terminology he

means declarative (semantic and episodic) memory, from "habit" memory, conceived as the
totality of sensorimotor skills and adjustments acquired by the organism over the history of
its interactions with the environment.
 Memory-27I

which the "cell assembly" or assemblies that supposedly contain or represent

my knowledge of hammers have been shaped by the environmental regulari­
ties I have encountered in the course of my previous perceptual and motor
dealings with them.
This same basic idea is also central to the influential "convergence zone
framework" put forward in a long series of papers and books by the Dama­
sios, primarily but not exclusively on the basis of neuropsychological evidence
(e.g., Damasio, 1 989; Damasio & Damasio, 1 994, 2000). In brief, the Dama­
sios acknowledge that the older models of language and the brain (which
of course have long been heralded as a major neuropsychological success
story, and are still widely reproduced in textbooks) are in fact mere "car­
toons," caricatures of a much more complex reality. Although there is, espe­
cially in the left hemisphere, certainly some degree of specialization of frontal
areas for speech and of posterior areas near the junction of the temporal,
occipital, and parietal lobes for understanding and recognition, the territories
involved are larger and more variable between persons than previously real­
ized. This fits with the larger picture the Damasios are attempting to capture.
They argue that neither conceptual/semantic knowledge nor autobiographi­
cal memories are stored "whole" at particular locations in the brain. Rather,
elements of that knowledge and experience are stored in regions appropri­
ate to them individually-for example, visual elements in the visual areas,
action-related elements in the motor areas, and so on. Conscious remember­
ing occurs in conjunction with a process of reassembly, in which the needed
elements are bound together at progressively higher levels of integration (the
convergence zones), these being reciprocally linked with both "upstream" and
"downstream" cortical regions. This reciprocal connectivity supports elabo­
ration of shared patterns of electrical activity, widely distributed across the
relevant cortical territories, which effect and indeed constitute the reassembly.
In recent publications they explicitly identify this neuroelectric reassembly
mechanism with proposed solutions of the "binding" problem in percep­
tion-that is, with gamma oscillations and the like (see Chapter 1 ) .
I will not attempt t o criticize these views i n any great detail, but a few gen­
eral comments are certainly in order. The Damasio "framework" is of course
far more detailed than Bergson's, and in that sense capitalizes appropriately
on a century of further advances in our knowledge of the brain. Certainly it
is expressed in more up-to-date neurophysiological jargon. Nevertheless, its
driving idea is essentially the same as Bergson's, and at bottom it is hardly less
metaphorical. Perhaps this is why the Damasios repeatedly characterize their
proposal as a "framework" rather than as a "theory" or "model. " Although
none of these terms is ever really defined, their choice of "framework" seems
intended to license a rather abstract and schematic "manner of speaking" that
is only loosely tied to real neurophysiology. In particular, no real account is
provided of what guides the reassembly process to the correct result, say my
memory of a particular hammer, or of how this result would be distinguished
from my perception of the same object. Nor do they attempt to deal with
the generality of conceptual and factual knowledge, and its "transcendence"
272-Chapter 4

of specific forms of expression as discussed earlier, or with the fundamen­

tal problem of intentionality. Indeed, applied to autobiographical memory
the Damasio "framework" seems to amount to little more than a traditional
image theory made over in impressive-sounding neurophysiological terminol­
ogy, an account that not only inherits all the problems of its image-theory
predecessors but also compounds these with an additional layer of problems
related to the need for a genuine specification of the hypothesized decomposi­
tion and reassembly processes.
In sum, although the Damasio "framework" seems to represent the lead­
ing edge of systems-level thinking about memory and the brain-it is cited
approvingly, for example, by authorities such as Mesulam (2000, p. 6 1 ) and
Schacter ( 1 996, p. 86-87)-it appears to me not only descriptively incom­
plete but conceptually incoherent. Perhaps something more along the lines
of Bergson's view, in which brain activity is only part of the story, needs after
all to be reconsidered. Both views lead to similar expectations in terms of
correlations between forms of remembering and patterns of brain activity,
and so both are more or less in accord with the same facts, as we presently
know them. But the theoretical gulf between them is profound, for the Dama­
sios, unlike Bergson, presume the validity of the conventional mainstream
assumption that the observed patterns of brain activity generate, or perhaps
even constitute, occasions of conscious remembering.
Several kinds of observations, however, in addition to observations
directly suggesting post-mortem survival of memories (which I will discuss
later in this chapter), strike me as potentially telling against the Damasios.
First, like the general perceptual binding model itself, the Damasio "frame­
work" is threatened by observations involving the occurrence of normal or
even enhanced mental activity under physiological conditions in which the
putative mechanisms of binding are certainly disabled (see Chapters I and 6
for further details). Second, there are suggestions within the massive literature
relating to aphasia that mental life is sometimes relatively unimpaired, per­
haps surprisingly so, by strokes or other injuries that affect sizeable portions
of the dominant hemisphere. Many such patients talk, for example, about
knowing exactly what they wanted to say but being unable to find the correct
words. Of course most such patients say or imply that their general grasp
of things was diminished or clouded in some way, at least part of the time,
and in many if not most patients any documented impairments are distress­
ingly persistent. Nevertheless, there are a few scattered case reports suggest­
ing that very significant brain injury and aphasia may sometimes co-occur
with a relative absence of correspondingly severe effects on "the mind." Such
cases can only become known, of course, by virtue of the patient recovering
fully enough to tell the story of his or her experience during the illness. While
such outcomes are certainly rare, and the reliability of retrospective reports
must be examined critically, some of the cases already on record come from
persons of recognized ability and veracity (see, e.g. , the cases of Professor
Lordat and Drs. Saloz and Forel in H. Gardner, 1 976, pp. 397-40 1 ; and see
also G. Humphrey, 1 963, pp. 249-325; Moss, 1 972; Wint, 1 965). Additional
 Memory-273

cases of this type, especially if supported by use of modern imaging methods

to provide careful characterization of the accompanying lesions, would be of
great theoretical interest.
Finally, and this is really a more general comment on the theoretical
import of conventional neuropsychological studies, consider the following
remark by Bertrand Russell ( l 92Ja):

The theory of the engram, or any similar theory, has to maintain that, given
a body and brain in a suitable state, a man will have a certain memory, with­
out the need of any further conditions. What is known, however, is only that
he will not have memories if his body and brain are not in a suitable state.
That is to say, the appropriate state of body and brain is proved to be neces­
sary for memory, but not to be sufficient. So far, therefore, as our definite
knowledge goes, memory may require for its causation a past occurrence as
well as a certain present state of the brain. (p. 9 1 )

To summarize the results o f this section, what I earlier called the "macro"
approach to memory and the brain, as exemplified by neuropsychological and
neuroimaging investigations of "episodic" and "semantic" memory, has deliv­
ered great quantities of empirical data, but offers only rather limited help
with problems of interpretation and localization, and certainly has not yet
provided anything like a coherent and complete theory of memory. It is time
to look briefly at the "micro" approach, and particularly at its biochemical
aspects.26
There are many substances, the most obvious being alcohol, administra­
tion of which can produce biochemical changes that affect memory. Scopol­
amine and benzodiazepines, which enhance the effects of GABA (gamma­
aminobutyric acid, the major inhibitory cortical neurotransmitter), have been
used for pre- and post-operative medication and have the convenient effect of
promoting amnesia for possibly unpleasant experiences attendant on surgery.
Ingestion of glucose and the inhaling of pure oxygen have both been shown
to cause transient memory improvements in the elderly. What we are after,
however, are biochemical processes that are specifically linked to memory,
so that the memory changes cannot be attributed to a general excitement or
depression of function or to motivational or attentional changes. Much (not
all) of the relevant work has been done on invertebrates (notably the sea­
hare and the fruit-fly) and on rats,27 and especially with the rat hippocampus,
which permits of being removed, cut into thin but still functioning slices, and

26. There are useful treatments of this area in Bear et al. (2000) and Carlson (2004). A
semi-popular and very readable book on biochemical and related approaches to memory is
Bourtchouladze (2002); a much more technical one is Holscher (2001).
27. Bennett and Hacker (2003, pp. 1 56-158) argue that research on habituation, sensitiza­
tion, and classical conditioning is "not research on memory in any sense of the word," a view
with which I quite agree. They remark that "an accelerated reflex or a conditioned reaction is
not a form of knowledge. But memory is the retention 0/ knowledge acquired, and remember­
ing to . . . is the use o/knowledge retained" (p. 157). And they enlarge on this theme. One might
remark further that even in the human case, the subject in, say, an eyeblink conditioning
experiment may well have learned that the CS will be followed by an unpleasant experience;
274-Chapter 4

studied in vitro. The main aim of this work has been to explain the phenom­
enon of "long-term potentiation" (LTP), a process thought to be central in
memory formation.
LTP is a relatively long-lasting enhancement in the excitability of a post­
synaptic neuron through induced brief but high-frequency bombardments
from a pre-synaptic neuron. A feature of LTP particularly attractive to main­
stream memory theorists is that if a weaker stimulus arrives at the post-syn­
aptic cell more or less concurrently with the high-frequency bombardment,
the cell's response to the weaker stimulus is strengthened, thus apparently
paralleling what happens in classical conditioning when, say, a warning sound
comes to produce the eyeblink originally called forth by a puff of air. The
attempt to provide a neurochemical account of the basis of memory has
thus devolved mainly to seeking explanations of LTP and certain closely
related matters (including long-term depression). No one would claim that
the account is as yet anywhere near completion; but certain features stand
out and seem to hold across at least some sites outside the hippocampus.
One is the involvement of the excitatory neurotransmitter glutamate, which
in appropriate circumstances opens receptors on the membrane of the post­
synaptic cell allowing the entry of calcium ions from the extracellular fluid.
This in turn activates enzymes that (after very complicated chains of events)
multiply the number of receptors in the cell membrane and cause other struc­
tural changes further increasing the receptivity of the cell. It may also trigger
a backward diffusion of nitric oxide into the pre-synaptic cell, which increases
the production of glutamate there.
All this results, however, only in an LTP lasting for periods most appro­
priately counted in hours. It has become clear that what has been termed
"long-lasting, long-term potentiation" requires the synthesis of new proteins
in or around the receptor-bearing dendrites (branches) of the post-synaptic
cell. Like the other processes we have been considering, this one also seems
to be initiated during the later stages of the cascade of intra-cellular events
initiated by the influx of calcium ions. The end-product of this cascade is the
activation of CREB (c-amp response element binding) proteins which bind to
segments of DNA and by affecting gene expression modulate protein produc­
tion. How exactly this may bring about long-lasting, long-term potentiation
remains a matter of speculation.
I should remark that while a fair bit of the relevant work in this area has
been done directly upon in vitro slices of rat hippocampus, some of the pro­
posals put forward have also been successfully tested by observing the effects
which interference (chemical, psychopharmacological, genetic) with various
stages of the postulated cascades of neurochemical happenings may have
upon the learning capabilities of experimental animals. Certain drug compa­
nies are known to have become interested in the possible memory-enhancing
effects of CREB proteins. But even so it would be pointless to pretend that

but his response to the CS (closing the eyes and screwing up the face) is on a much more primi­
tive level than the application of propositional knowledge.
 Memory-275

all, or anything like all, of the findings in this area are necessarily to be inter­
preted at face value.28
The turn of mind of many of those who have engaged in this kind of
research is clearly to regard the results as evidence for good old-fashioned
memory traces (henceforth, GOFMTs), often conceived in the neurological
fashion introduced by the late D. O. Hebb ( 1 949), and widely accepted in one
or another form today. However, it seems to me certain that no theory in the
GOFMT tradition will ever fully get to grips with the problems of memory,
at least where by memory is meant the human capacity to acquire and deploy
knowledge, rather than, say, the automatic modifications of neuromuscular
reactivity acquired during procedures of classical or operant conditioning
and the like. I have already touched on some of the more obvious theoreti­
cal problems. Memory is not a reliving of some past experience or of some
distillate of past experiences, or the re-enactment of past behavior when like
circumstances recur. Perhaps there is at times such an aspect to remember­
ing; but that aspect would need to be supplemented by a kind of memory
(one might be tempted to describe it as "memory proper") which implicitly
affirms "that is how it was and I was there as witness or participant. "29 It is
often assumed that such a requirement does not hold true for "semantic" as
distinct from "episodic" memory, but even with that there has to be a kind of
implicit affirmation of the form "I learned that somewhere or another from
some reliable source or sources."
The need for such an implicit affirmation (and by "implicit" I do not
mean "not conscious" but only not in general spelled out) also highlights sev­
eral further difficult, interlocked, and almost universally neglected issues. I
am thinking in particular of the inescapable involvement in human memory
of one's "self," or of oneself conceived from a first-person point of view ("/
was there"), and the need to offer some account of the fact that remembering
(an event in the present) is often "of" or "about" a past or future event or fact
(that yesterday one saw an eclipse of the moon or visited one's dentist, or that
tomorrow one will see an eclipse of the moon or visit one's dentist). What is it
to regard some event as in this peculiarly intimate way part of one's own his­
tory or likely future, and how can one derive the concepts of past and future
from experience limited to the fleeting present? How indeed can one handle
the "ofness" or "aboutness" of all propositional acts or judgments, includ­
ing of course memory-judgments? This is again the perennial problem of the
"intentionality" of the mental, which we ran into before as the problem of
"inner representations" and their relation to that which they are held to "rep­
resent." Intentionality-"the heart of the mind" (Puccetti, 1 989)-lies at the

28. Cautionary warnings concerning the alleged evidence for LTP given by the contribu­
tors to Holscher (2001 ) relate to failures to repeat, changes of experimental conditions leading
to failures to obtain the phenomenon, the likelihood that there is more than one kind of LTP
(dependent on location and biochemistry), the likelihood that LTP may be confined or largely
confined to limited areas of the hippocampus, the side-effects of the chemicals used and the
genetic manipulations introduced, and the possibility that LTP may in fact be a product of
widespread theta rhythms and gamma rhythms in the brain.
29. See footnote 7 on "metarepresentation."
276-Chapter 4

core of all acts of occurrent remembering in which one consciously mobilizes

memory knowledge, both episodic and semantic.
To make matters even more complicated, the intentionality of one's mem­
ory judgments (as of any other kind of j udgment) is inescapably tied to one's
possession and exercise of concepts. And here it is vital to appreciate that the
acquisition of a memory can precipitate an almost instantaneous readjust­
ment in a whole network of concepts. Suppose I quite unexpectedly witness
(unobserved, let us trust) Professor Moriarty, the quiet mathematician and
art collector, setting the fuse of a bomb. I shall remember this moment (if
I survive) not as one in which I saw a tall, angular figure holding a pecu­
liar round object, but as one in which I suddenly realized that the seemingly
innocuous academic was in reality a much-hunted international assassin and
Napoleon of crime. This requires me to possess and deploy both a Moriarty­
concept and a large network of highly sophisticated social and criminological
concepts, and requires also that I suddenly and radically change the former
and somewhat adjust the latter in order to capture my new vision of Moriarty.
And many of these concepts will be "stimulus-neutral" ones, that is, concepts
of entire classes of things whose members share no special physical charac­
teristics that they do not also share with an indefinite number of things that
are not members of the class. The attempt to envisage such massive concep­
tual readjustments in terms of GOFMTs would require one to imagine new
and appropriate dendritic spines and synapses popping out, not in minutes
or hours (which has sometimes been observed), but almost instantly like a
speeded-up film of mushrooms burgeoning. And even then we would have no
answer to the problem of how the newly hatched synapses could be regarded
as "about" or "representing" Professor Moriarty in his new context of evil.
Furthermore, what would such widespread and major changes do to the
remainder of the conceptual system, presumed to occupy heavily overlapping
portions of the cortical network?30
Each one of this circle of conceptual issues has been the subject of lengthy
discussion by many philosophers and by certain psychologists, and I certainly
cannot probe them further here. No large measure of agreement has resulted
from these discussions, and I will only remark that I do not see GOFMT
theories in anything like their present form advancing them in the slightest.
GOFMT theories themselves, I must also point out, are confronted with cer­
tain oddities in the empirical findings, explanatory challenges which though
perhaps not insuperable are certainly significant. There are, for instance,
findings that cast doubt, not on the claim that selective synaptic strengthen­
ing (occasionally perhaps synaptic pruning also) is normally involved in the
establishment of memories (this seems incontrovertible, at least at a certain
level), but rather on any suggestion that the self-same synaptic changes must
be retained in full force for the memory to persist undiminished. For example
Raichle et al. ( 1 994, cited by Nyberg & Cabeza, 2000, p. 502) found with a
verb-generation task that, as the task was mastered, the initially widespread

30. Similar issues, it should be noted, arise in regard to the phenomenon of creative insight
(Chapter 7).
 Memory-277

areas of brain activation diminished until their pattern was indistinguishable

from that produced by simple word repetition. Rather similar findings have
been reported by Pascual-Leone, Grafman, and Hallett ( 1 994) with a serial
button-pressing task, and by Haier et al. ( 1 992) for the video game Tetris. Pos­
sibly related observations include the progressive shrinkage of the time-win­
dow of retrograde amnesia following closed-head injuries, and a few reports
of sudden full recovery of autobiographical memory in amnesic patients with
demonstrated brain lesions, where the recovery is somehow triggered by an
encounter with some situation resembling a forgotten but emotionally signifi­
cant event (Luchelli, Muggia, & Spinnler, 1 995).
My own thinking about all this tends toward the view that while the syn­
aptic changes investigated by the biochemical believers in GOFMTs may very
well be necessary for the formation of memories, they may not be necessary,
or necessary in anything like the same quantity or distribution, for their main­
tenance. Furthermore, to the extent that they are necessary we do not really
know why they are necessary, and we have no real understanding of their con­
tributions to whatever conditions might be sufficient for particular instances
or types of remembering. These problems, moreover, become increasingly
conspicuous as we ascend the scale from simple conditioning phenomena and
the like to the phenomena of explicit memory in conscious human beings.
The attempt to extend ideas and findings derived from the former to embrace
the latter is reminiscent of, and conceptually parallel to, the hopeless attempts
by early behaviorists to extend their stimulus-response theories of learning
to cover the sophisticated behavior of human beings.31 I myself think that we
probably shall never be able to give a satisfactory account of the whole lot in
terms of current neurochemistry. This is not to claim that no complete physi­
cal explanation of memory will ever be possible, but I do think that in order
to provide one we shall at minimum have to move away from the accepted con­
cepts of neurochemistry and neuroscience as they now are and into frontier
areas of physics as they then may be.
Some current writers on memory are indeed already distancing them­
selves from the simplifications of GOFMT and adopting what they tend to
refer to as a more "holistic" or "dynamic systems" approach (see Chapter I ).
Among these- and such views as theirs have a distinguished lineage in neuro­
science (see Hecaen & Lanteri-Laura, 1 977, pp. 203-235)-are W. 1. Freeman,
Rose, and McIntosh. Freeman (2000), for instance, says of his work on olfac­
tory learning in rabbits (a valuable short account of this is Freeman, 1 99 1 ),
as investigated by multichannel electrophysiological recordings from different
cortical areas:

First, a sensation from an odorant does not create a pattern in the brain that
is fixed and stored away in a memory bank. Instead, I have observed that
brain activity patterns are constantly dissolving, reforming, and changing,
particularly in relation to one another. When an animal learns to respond to
a new odor, there is a shift in all other patterns, even if they are not directly

31. See also footnote 27 above.

278-Chapter 4

involved with the learning. There are no fixed representations, as there are
in computers; there are only meanings. Second, a sensory stimulus from an
object does indeed induce the formation of a pattern in the brain, but when
it is given repeatedly it does not induce precisely the same pattern in the same
brain, let alone in any other brain. (p. 22)

In somewhat similar vein Rose (2003) says of his experiments with chick-
ens:

The seemingly paradoxical results of the first set of these experiments was
that regions of the brain which were necessary for memories to be made, and
which showed lasting cellular changes as a result of that learning, after an
hour or so ceased to be necessary for recall. The solution to this paradox was
the recognition that memories are dynamic and dispersed, located in differ­
ent ways in different parts of the brain. (p. 373; see also 2005, pp. 1 59-1 63 ,
207-2 1 2)

Similar findings with mammals are reviewed by Shors (2004).

Again, coming to the same problems from a neuropsychological direc­
tion, McIntosh ( 1 999) concludes an account of his own neuroimaging work
on human episodic retrieval by stating:

Right prefrontal cortical activity could be associated with the act of search­
ing (retrieval mode) or successful retrieval depending on its relations to other
[activated or deactivated] brain regions. . . . Common to both examples is the
possibility that learning and memory . . . may emerge from neural interactions
rather than being the responsibility of particular brain areas. . . . Memory per
se is an emergent behavior of the central nervous system-it is something the
brain does. (p. 542)

These ideas are less than fully worked out, but they seem to me headed in
the right direction.32 In the light of current trends in brain science one can cer­
tainly see the appeal, indeed the necessity, of regarding the brain increasingly

32. Another phenomenon that has been taken to support the view of memory "traces" as
dynamic and constantly subject to revision is the recent discovery or rediscovery that estab­
lished "memories" can apparently be erased if they are activated and their activation is fol­
lowed shortly afterwards by the administration of a protein synthesis inhibitor (for reviews,
see Alberini, 2005; Nader, 2003a). The findings have led to a renewed debate between the
currently dominant "structuralist" theories of memory and supporters of a more strongly
biochemical approach, with the biochemists arguing that structural "traces" could not be so
quickly eradicated, and proposing instead a return to the notion (unfashionable for upwards
of 30 years) that the bearers of memories must instead be complex molecules (Arshavsky,
2003; Nader, 2003b). The "memories" studied have often involved rats or chicks coming to
avoid or react to an impending noxious stimulus on receipt of a warning signal, and it is less
than obvious that "memory" is an appropriate term for their reactions. In some experimen­
tal situations (e.g., ones involving noxious tastes) the effect has not been found. It is as yet
far from apparent whether similar findings might also be obtained with human episodic or
semantic memories. What has become increasingly clear with more sharply targeted bio­
chemical intervention is that while in general consolidation of memories and reconsolida­
tion following reactivation share common molecular mechanisms, they are likely to involve
largely different brain loci and systems, as though the memories have so to speak moved on.
 Memory-279

as a dynamic, holistic, and self-organizing system. I hasten to add, however,

that simply pointing to these changing patterns of brain activity does not of
itself magically solve any of the major conceptual issues I have raised. It may
in fact introduce further ones. Freeman, for example, is simply not warranted
in equating his observed patterns of electrical activity with "meanings." The
problems here are analogous to those of token identity theory as described in
Chapter 1 : Most basically, how does electrical activity in the brain translate
into "meanings" at all? Furthermore, if the patterns generated by successive
presentations of a given stimulus to the same or different organisms differ
widely (as they do) and if the pattern of response to that stimulus is radically
altered by learning a response to a different, unrelated stimulus (as it is), what
is it about all these varying patterns of response that enables them to embody
the same "meaning"?
As further illustrations of the "dynamic" and "holistic" nature of the
brain activities relating to learning and memory, one might also note the
sometimes extraordinary reorganizations of function that may follow, and to
a fair extent compensate for, agenesis or early destruction of brain tissue. In
connection with memory the most obvious examples are the quite numerous
cases (especially ones involving very early damage) of apparent takeover of
language functions by the right hemisphere following damage to or removal
of the left (linguistic) hemisphere.33 Very remarkable functional plasticity has
also been demonstrated by motor and sensory regions of the brain. Fawcett,
Rosser, and Dunnett (200 1 , p. 1 83) cite as an example patients who had suf­
fered one-sided paralyses following strokes that damaged (as expected) the
opposite motor cortex. These patients subsequently exhibited some degree of
recovery and were asked to move their hands during a PET scan. Movement
of the affected hands occasioned increased blood flow in sensorimotor cor­
tex and cerebellum on both sides, which had apparently taken over the func­
tion of the damaged left motor area. As another example, the same authors
also cite a PET study of blind persons who had learned to read Braille. This
revealed that the tactile task of reading Braille was being sustained by visual
areas of cortex, although simple touch stimuli did not activate these areas. M.
H . Johnson (2005, pp. 1 34-1 35) cites evidence that congenital deafness may
lead to part-allocation of auditory cortex to vision. He also notes (pp. 40-44)
that rather remarkable sensory and motor plasticity has been demonstrated
following experimental lesion studies in ferrets, up to and including the re­
routing of visual input from visual cortex to auditory cortex deprived of its
normal auditory input. Under such conditions the auditory cortex will react
to visual input and may develop a systematic map of the retina. Behavior­
ally, animals that had learned to distinguish visual stimuli presented to the
normal hemisphere from auditory ones would transfer this learning to visual

Furthermore, there may be a time effect, newly minted memories being affected by protein
synthesis inhibitors, and more established ones less affected or immune.
33. See, for example, V. Anderson, Northam, Hendy, and Wrennall (2001), Basso, Gardelli,
Grassi, and Mariotti ( 1 989), and A. Smith ( 1983).
28D-Chapter 4

stimuli presented to the auditory cortex of the rewired hemisphere.34 In some

experiments a rapid (in young animals tens of minutes, in adult ones a day
to several days) growth and retraction of dendritic spines (a precursor to the
formation of synapses) in response to experience has been directly observed
in the living animal, as for example by Trachtenberg et al. (2002) in "barrel"
cortex subserving the whiskers of young adult mice.35 In the human case it is
sometimes tempting to suggest, as William James seems to hint ( l 890b, vol.
1 , pp. 1 42-1 43), that the idea of the missing or impaired function must play
some part in its restoration.
One can only wait to see what the emerging holistic-dynamic approaches
to brain function may deliver, both for cognitive science generally and for
the study of memory in particular. Meanwhile, let me now summarize this
long and sometimes difficult survey of the accomplishments and limitations
of conventional approaches to memory. With regard to good old-fashioned
memory traces (GOFMTs), my conclusion was that while synaptic changes
may well in many or all instances be essential to enabling conditions for the
formation of memories, no full or adequate account of memory can be given
in terms of the replaying of such stored traces of past events. And the pro­
posed GOFMTs have nothing to say about such key questions as the "inten­
tionality" of memory and the relations between concept possession and mem­
ory. Some recent writers, sensing these problems and aware of the decidedly
fluctuating relations between memory processes and patterns of events in the
brain, have (as I noted above) developed more dynamic and holistic views of
the neural underpinnings of memory. But these views, even though no doubt
an advance on GOFMTs, still offer us little enlightenment on intentionality,
concept possession, and the precise role of synaptic changes, and do not as
yet help us understand how it can be that the same memory can be supported
by activity centering now in one brain region and now in another.
There are two very general points to bring forward with us from this part
of the chapter: First, there is a good deal of evidence to indicate that nor­
mally the formation of memories is closely linked to minute structural and
broader functional changes in the brain, mediated or initiated in some way by
activity of the hippocampus and allied brain structures. Second, beyond this
we know far less than most people imagine. We have very limited theoreti­
cal understanding of how, especially in the human case, the various changes
and activities that take place in the brain during explicit remembering relate
to conscious memory as we routinely experience and express it. The brain­
based coding/storage/retrieval model that most contemporary workers accept
without hesitation as the foundation of their efforts confronts widely ignored

34. Useful short reviews of this material wi ll be found in Fawcett et al. (2001, chap. 1 3) and
M. H. Johnson (2005, pp. 40-44). The re-routing studies are those of Roe, Pallas, Hahm, and
Sur (1990), Sur ( 1 993), and von Melchner, Pallas, and Sur (2000).
35. Grutzendler, Kasthuri, and Gan (2002) failed to obtain confirmatory findings; but they
used mice on average rather older, examined visual rather than barrel cortex (rats and mice
are not highly visual animals), and did not provide the animals with a changing environment
to stimulate experience-related neural activity.
 Memory-281

but very significant difficulties. Although the mainstream view of memory as

purely a matter of brain function has for most persons hardened into a dogma
that cannot be questioned, in my view it does not merit that status. It remains
essentially a neurophysiological myth, appealing and widely shared and woven
around an impressive collection of empirical findings, but unproven. It is still
the case, as I said on an earlier occasion, that the evidence adduced in support
of this view consists for the most part simply of facts that may be harmonized
with it if you already happen to think it true (Gauld, 1 989, p. 1 97).
The conceptual and empirical difficulties in modern memory work,
touched upon above, suggest that a fuller understanding of human memory
may ultimately require some radical change of perspective.36 And it is con­
ceivable that some of the odd facts collected by Myers and his colleagues may
have some bearing on such a change.

The Problem of Survival

I return at last to Myers and his disciplined and long-sustained quest to find
evidence that might permit, and a philosophy that might sustain, a rational
belief in human survival of bodily death. It should be emphasized, perhaps,
that to the extent that such a quest succeeds it will among other things under­
mine all theories of memory based entirely on brain processes. Myers himself
was persuaded of survival by the evidence available to him, and regarded it
as providing "the strongest proof which can be imagined" for the underlying
unity of personality, that it can outlast not just minor disintegrations but "the
crowning disintegration of bodily death" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 1 ).
The principal form of evidence for the post-mortem persistence of an
identifiable individual has to be the survival of his or her distinctive memo­
ries, from which questions about the post-mortem survival of his or her char­
acteristic desires, purposes, and skills can only partially be separated. Myers
himself encapsulates the evidential issues this way (HP, vol. 2, p. 252):

In earth-life the actual body, in itself but a subordinate element in our

thought of our friend, did yet by its physical continuity override as a symbol
of identity all lapses of memory, all changes of the character within. Yet it
was memory and character,-the stored impressions upon which he reacted,
and his specific mode of reaction,-which made our veritable friend. How
much of memory, how much of character, must he preserve for our recogni­
tion?

36. Attempts to find salvation by proposing cosmic memory stores in which the memories
of living persons may be deposited and subsequently be accessed by those persons before
their deaths and by suitably attuned other individuals ("psychics," "mediums") thereafter
would be very likely to stumble over very much the same problems we have been discussing.
Setting aside the "akashic records" of Hinduism, the best-known speculations of this kind are
those of Wi lliam James on "cosmic consciousness" (see James, 1 9091197 1 , 190911986).
282-Chapter 4

As will shortly become evident, it is not at all obvious how to answer

this question. To some the question is not even meaningful. But before we
can get any deeper into these issues, it will be well to have some preliminary
sense of the character and status of the relevant evidence. This evidence con­
sisted in Myers's time principally (but by no means entirely, because cases of
apparitions of certain types, and related phenomena, also figured largely) of
detailed studies of "mediums" or "sensitives" through whose organisms (as in
trance speaking or automatic writing of one form or another; see Chapter 5)
or by means of whose peculiar sensibilities ("seeing" clairvoyantly and "hear­
ing" clairaudiently) the departed can allegedly communicate with the living.
Since Myers's time, one further large and important category of evidence has
been added, namely, the investigations by Stevenson and his collaborators of
numerous cases of young children who, more or less from the time they begin
to speak, ostensibly recall previous lives (see the Appendix). In a number of
carefully investigated cases of both these major categories correct informa­
tion with no obvious normal source has been transmitted as if from or about
some deceased person.
Conventional interpretations of the proposed "evidence for survival"
mostly fall into one of three broad and rough categories:

( 1 ) Interpretations confining themselves to "normal" factors such as wishful

thinking or fraud.

(2) Interpretations that postulate "supernormal" factors not including post­

mortem survival of the pre-mortem personality. The most-discussed of such
interpretations is the "super-ESP" hypothesis which has it that evidence,
however impressive, for the post-mortem survival of someone's memories is
to be attributed to supernormal or psychic abilities, sometimes necessarily of
enormous scope, exercised by or between persons still living.

(3) Interpretations in terms of the post-mortem survival of the memories

and character, or recognizable fragments or aspects thereof, of the formerly
living individual concerned.

I do not propose to discuss these interpretations at any length. Explana­

tions in terms of fairly obvious normal factors-in the case of mediums, fish­
ing for information (often very rapidly and skillfully), clever reading of the
sitters' appearance, expression, voice, manners, and so forth,37 wishful think­
ing (not infrequently by the medium as well as by the sitter), sometimes out­
right fraud such as a network of informants-will carry us a long way, at least
with respect to run-of-the-mill cases, but they will not, in my opinion (based
on a fair amount of practical experience and a considerable acquaintance

37. It is curious how these tactics, well-known and often commented on for well over a
century, have of late been christened "cold reading" and treated as though the fact of their
use was some kind of new discovery. The earliest use of the term, according to Lamont and
Wiseman ( 1 999, p. 134), dates from 1977.
 Memory-283

with the literature), cover all cases.38 It is indeed regrettable that the interest of
the substantial number of really puzzling and carefully investigated cases has
tended to be obscured by the much larger quantity of inferior evidence with
which the popular market has been flo oded, especially in recent years.
Not least among the "puzzle cases" is Mrs. Leonora E. Piper ( 1 859-1 956)
of Boston, William lames's "White Crow"and one of the two "trance" medi­
ums that most impressed Myers. Mrs. Piper was extensively investigated both
in America and England (for fairly extensive accounts of her, see Gauld, 1 982,
and H. Holt, 1 9 1 5) . There is no doubt that on bad days she (or her "con­
trols") would blatantly fish and hazard guesses; but on good days the flow of
accurate, detailed, and appropriate information that sitters (including new sit­
ters, sitters introduced under pseudonyms, etc.) might receive, as though the
veritable memories of deceased persons known to them were being tapped,
could be at once baffling and compelling. Although it has been convincingly
argued, in this and other similar cases, that the communicating "personali­
ties" are simply aspects or phases of the medium herself (E. M . Sidgwick,
1 9 1 5)-like the various personalities of multiple personality cases they are
apt to share limitations of thought and knowledge, or favorite turns of phrase
and quirks of vocabulary with each other and with the medium-the prob­
lems still remain of where the apparently surviving memories come from and
of how they find their way into the medium's mind.
Interpretations of categories 2 and 3 have to be taken together. Each cat­
egory contains proposals other than the clear-cut super-ESP versus survival
ones to which the possibilities are so often reduced. But I shall have to pass
over them here and confine my remarks to the two main proposals. Initially
these sound pretty straightforward, but when one comes to look for ways to
decide between them testable implications prove elusive. The rival interpreta­
tions are little better than dummy emplacements behind which entrenched
opposing theoreticians make a good deal of noise while waiting hopefully
for decisive weaponry to arrive. Proponents of a survivalist view argue that
mediums through whom deceased persons are ostensibly communicating
their memories, or children who ostensibly remember previous lives, have in
some instances come out with copious and correct information far exceeding
anything that the medium or child could have come by normally or could
have obtained supernormally from still living persons or other extant sources.
Their opponents claim that we cannot with assurance set limits on what could
be learned by normal or supernormal means not involving communication
with the departed, and that in any case the process by which such a discar-

38. The distinguished philosopher and psychical researcher C. D. Broad ( 1962) offers the
following summary remarks, with which I wholly agree: "Controls and ostensible communi­
cators often display a knowledge of facts about the past lives of dead persons and about the
present actions and thoughts and emotions of living ones, which is too extensive and detailed
to be reasonably ascribed to chance-coincidence, and it is quite inexplicable by reference to
any normal sources of information open to the medium. I do not think that this would be
seriously questioned by anyone, with a reasonably open mind, who had made a careful study
of the recorded facts and had had a certain amount of experience of his own in these matters;
though it is often dogmatically denied by persons who lack those qualifications" (p. 259).
284-Chapter 4

nate individual must be supposed to communicate information to or through

a medium would itself amount to what could only be reckoned a form of
"super-ESP" (or "super-PK"), albeit of a slightly less "super" variety. Reso­
lution of the arguments does not seem imminent or in their present context
even conceivable.39

Myers's Approach to the Problem of Survival

Myers himself has his own characteristic approach to these problems,

an approach which may have been insufficiently appreciated by subsequent
writers, possibly because the "super-ESP" hypothesis (though implicit in, say,
the ideas of Podmore40) had not in their time been fully spelled out. Myers's
approach may be characterized as a "broad canvas" one, in contrast to the
"narrow focus" adopted by those of his successors who have concentrated
mainly on the issue of whether or not the range and scope of ESP, as dis­
covered empirically through experiment and observation, can justifiably be
stretched to cover the "super-ESP" required by the "super-ESP hypothesis."
In other words Myers hoped that if he placed the evidence for survival against
a wide background of related and well-documented phenomena ranging from
the normal, through the abnormal, to the supernormal, and all seemingly
pointing to or compatible with a certain kind of explanatory framework, the
power of the whole picture would overcome the doubts that some people
might have felt about the interpretation of certain sections of it considered
in isolation.
The background regions of Myers's "broad canvas" are set out in Chap­
ters 2 to 5 of Human Personality, and what might be called the "foreground"­
including direct evidence for survival-in Chapters 6 to 9. He begins in Chap­
ter 2 by describing cases in which a second stream of consciousness with a
separate chain of memories and often a different character has for extended
periods displaced the ordinary or original stream. Mostly the change is dis­
integrative but sometimes it has been an improvement, and in some examples
the second personality has shown signs of possessing enhanced or even super­
normal faculties, especially telepathy. He goes on in Chapters 3-5 to consider
certain phenomena to be found in rather more ordinary, or at any rate non­
pathological, phases of existence, phenomena that, like secondary streams of
consciousness, might likewise be called intrusive (although in a less marked
way). The phenomena are:

( 1 ) The "uprushes of imaginative power" which, often in symbolic form,

"spring full-armed into our ken from the depths of our being" (HP, vol. 1 ,

39. For further discussion o f these issues, see Chapter 9, as well as works listed i n our
Appendix.
40. See, for example, the interesting exchange on apparitions of the dead between Myers
and Pod more ( Myers, 1 889d, 1890b; Podmore, 1890).
 Memory-285

p. 220) without any distinctive conscious antecedents, and which have been
thought characteristic of literary, musical and scientific genius (HP, chap.
3).

(2) The spontaneous and often unexpected material in dreams, including

recollections of long-forgotten scenes and incidents or items of supernormal
information, which are not ordinarily accessible to the waking consciousness
(HP, chap. 4).

(3) In the state of hypnosis also (which Myers regarded as "an experimental
development of the sleeping phase of personality"41 ), we more than ever find
evidence of heightened faculty, including access to ordinarily inaccessible
memories, enhanced control over physiological processes, and supernormal
processes (HP, chap. 5).

Consideration of the phenomena of genius, dreams, and hypnosis led

Myers to the view that secondary streams of consciousness are not just rare
and pathological phenomena but characteristic of human beings in general.
What is relatively rare is the displacement of the normal waking conscious­
ness by a secondary or "subliminal" stream of consciousness. But the second­
ary streams, although hidden, are there, as it were beneath the ordinary con­
sciousness, in all of us. Moreover, because there is evidence that dreams may
develop into secondary or somnambulistic states and that memories associ­
ated with somnambulistic episodes will often be found to be part of the hyp­
notic memory, Myers suggested that dreams, somnambulism, and hypnosis
are all rooted in the same subliminal level of consciousness.
Into this speculative background-supported, however, by a wealth of
facts to which I cannot possibly do justice-Myers endeavored (in Chapters
6-9) to fit and thereby to render more convincing the evidence that he regarded
as pointing towards human survival of bodily death. This evidence hinges
round the notion of automatisms, which he defined as "subliminal emergences
into ordinary life" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 222) and which (as we describe in Chap­
ters 2 and 5 of this volume) he divided into sensory automatisms and motor
automatisms. Many such automatisms can be understood as originating in
the subliminal mind of the automatist alone. The quasi-perceptual visions of
crystal-gazers, many of the visual or auditory images that pop into the minds
of subjects in telepathy experiments, and the vast majority of material emerg­
ing from table-tilting, ouija or planchette board operation, or automatic writ­
ing or speaking, are simply the externalization, in sensory or motor form, of
material from the automatist's own mind, either conscious or subliminal. If
evidence for telepathy appears in any one of these situations, as it does also
in "veridical" apparitions of the living or the dying (in which information
unknown to the percipient is conveyed), then this is because telepathy is a
faculty specially characteristic of subliminal streams of consciousness. Even
when indications of telepathy occur in the context of ostensible messages from

41. A view less widely shared today, and which had indeed begun to be questioned even in
Myers's own time (see also Gauld, 1992, pp. 561-567).
286-Chapter 4

purported spirit communicators, that should not weaken one's caution over
accepting the communicators as genuine-imaginative romancing is another
characteristic of some levels of the subliminal (see our Chapter 5).
Matters become more complex, however, when we come to apparitions
of the dead in which the information conveyed was unknown normally to the
percipient and seemed to have originated in the surviving memories of the
deceased person. In fitting such cases into his "broad" canvas, Myers believed
that it was more intelligible to suppose that the correct and sometimes copi­
ous details arose from the minds of now-deceased persons than to enter (like
Podmore and other advocates of the super-ESP hypothesis) into what Myers
called (HP, vol. 2, p. 68) the " labyrinth of complexity" involved in supposing
that all the veridical details in such cases are assembled by telepathy with liv­
ing sources.
One important group of cases (whose numbers have grown since Myers's
time) influenced his judgment that some cases provide evidence for the active
agency of a surviving deceased person. These are reciprocal or experimental
apparitions, in which the apparition of a living person is seen at a certain
place, and at the same time the person whose apparition it is has a vivid expe­
rience as of being at that spot (H. Hart & Hart, 1 93 3). Such cases sometimes
occur spontaneously, but sometimes they have apparently been induced by an
effort of will or imagination on the part of the "sender. " Myers thought that
such cases provided evidence for a kind of "self-projection" or "psychical
invasion" on the part of the subliminal mind, and thus for the agency or at
least the participation of the person seen as the apparition. Similarly, in cases
of apparitions of the dead, we may need to consider whether elements of the
deceased person's surviving mind and memories may likewise be active. Myers
suggested that "this self-projection is the one definite act which it seems as
though a man might perform equally well before and after bodily death" (HP,
vol. 1 , p. 297). "Psychical invasion," with its implication of post-mortem sur­
vival, might therefore be a more fitting term than "telepathic impact" ; and
"possession" might be a more appropriate term than either.
So much for an exiguous, indeed a skeletal, precis of Myers's "broad can­
vas" approach, centered on the notion of the " Subliminal Self," to the inter­
pretation of the evidence for survival. Through this approach he hoped to
carry his readers over or around the difficulties that obsess those who adopt
what I called above a "narrow focus" approach. I shall touch on the general
notion of a "broad canvas" approach again, but first I need briefly to consider
certain relevant issues that have arisen out of recent philosophical investiga­
tions of the extremely elusive notion of personal identity.

Problems of Personal Identity

It is customary to distinguish (not without some difficulty) between quali­

tative identity, the sort that holds between two or more objects if they are
qualitatively indistinguishable, and numerical identity, the identity of the self-
 Memory-287

same object with itself through the various phases of its career. Numerical
identity is not generally supposed to require qualitative identity (indeed such
a requirement could rarely be met). Thus the proposition that a certain rusty
length of metal found at the bottom of an old lake is numerically identi­
cal with the noted sword Excalibur, formerly the property of a 6th-century
Romano-Celtic war leader, involves no misuse of terms, even though it may
not be true. But if (to take a much discussed type of example) the residual
good metal has been turned into a kilt-pin, and it is claimed that the kilt­
pin is numerically identical with Excalibur, a certain conceptual fog would
quickly set in. Different answers would be possible in different conceptual
contexts. The continued personal identity of human beings (who are ongoing
processes rather than stable objects) is a far more complex question than that
of swords, and conceptual fog can correspondingly set in more quickly and
more thickly.
Let us next distinguish between two sorts of question about personal
identity, which Noonan (2003) in an extended survey of the topic42 charac­
terizes (p. 2) as the "constitutive" (or "metaphysical-cum-semantic") and the
"evidential" questions (Paterson, 1 995, pp. 2 1 -22, calls them the "ontologi­
cal" and the "epistemological" problems). The "constitutive" question is the
question of what personal identity over time consists in, of what makes a per­
son the self-same individual at different phases of his or her existence. Simple
answers to this question-for example, ones in terms of a soul or "Cartesian
ego," of bodily continuity, of continuity of memory, and so forth-have long
ago been largely buried in the debris of protracted conflict, and modern dis­
cussions have more and more consisted of analyses of the concept of personal
identity in terms of tortuous imaginary cases.43 The "evidential" question is
the question of what counts or should count as evidence that a person P2,
encountered at time T2, is the self-same individual as person P I , encountered
at time T l . Obviously, these questions can become deeply intertwined.
Equally obviously, they have a considerable bearing on issues related to
survival. Which answers to the constitutive question do, and which do not,
allow for the possibility of continued personal identity after bodily death?
How far can we justifiably accept the kinds of evidence (or some of them) that
are widely agreed to be appropriate for the reidentification of still embodied
persons as also appropriate for the reidentification of ostensibly disembodied
ones? Which has primacy-empirical evidence or constitutive theory? And so
on. I want to tackle now a recurrent line of argument that attempts to resolve
at a stroke important issues relating to both the constitutive and the evidential
questions.
This originated from the "ordinary language" philosophers who were so
prominent in Oxford philosophy and indeed world philosophy in the 1 950s
and 1 960s. There was a tendency among these philosophers to argue that our

42. Useful edited works are those by Corcoran (2001), Edwards (1997), and R. Martin and
Barresi (2003).
43 . Some philosophers have objected to what they regard as the excessive use of such cases
(see, e.g., Baillie, 1993; Donagan, 1990; and Wilkes, 1 988).
288-Chapter 4

ordinary concept of a human person is so tied up with concepts of a body

and bodily activities that it makes no sense to talk of a person surviving in
the absence of his or her body. The arguments took a variety of forms. One
strand in them44 involved the question of what, in the case of human per­
sons, numerical identity can consist in, and suggested that the only decisive
criterion of numerical identity we can have for individual items in the world
(whether Excalibur or King Arthur) is continuity of spatiotemporal track.
Such continuity is a necessary condition of all reidentification and can only
be exhibited by a physical body. If the continuous bodily track comes to an
end, identity is lost, even if a closely similar item mysteriously appears at
another point in space-time. This holds true of the identity of human persons
as much as of any other item, though in the human case it may for some pur­
poses be necessary to narrow the essential part of these particular items down
to part of the body, namely, the brain.
It was not long before critics began to pick holes in this kind of position,45
but it continues to be adopted, notably by Rosenberg ( 1 998), who states it in a
particularly uncompromising way. Rosenberg (p. 1 07) dismisses the possibility
that "the criterion of personal identity" could be continuity of a non-physical
soul regarded, following Descartes, as devoid of spatial attributes (a rather
unnecessary assertion, since a "Cartesian ego" could in any case only be a
candidate-explanation for, and certainly not a candidate-criterion of, contin­
ued personal identity). We would be quite unable to trace the spatiotemporal
path of such a soul, or to decide whether we had met up with "the same soul
again." Only in respect of physical objects is such tracking and reidentifica­
tion possible. Conversely (pp. 1 05�1 O8, 1 l 9� 1 2 1 ), if we were to imagine the
soul as possessed of spatiotemporal properties, we would simply be turning it
into some sort of highly implausible physical object (if the left barrel doesn't
get you the right one will!). Thus the proper, "logically decisive" or "logically
adequate" criterion (but note that Rosenberg seems here to be using the term
"criterion" in an obscure and non-standard sense46) for continued personal
identity is no different from that for the continued identity across time of any
physical object (pp. 1 04, 1 05). Even if there were some non-physical element
in the human person, that element could not in principle serve as the criterion
for reidentifying the same person again. And even if some of my character-

44. See, for example, Flew ( 1987) and Penelhum (1970).

45. See, for example, Madell (1981), Noonan (2003 , pp. 1 8-21), and Swinburne ( 1 997).
46. The whole line of argument we are here considering has been pervaded and obfuscated
by peculiar and once fashionable uses-which Mundie ( 1970, pp. 1 1 8-1 19, 234-237; see also
Gauld & Shotter, 1 977, pp. 154-161) has called philosophical "jargon uses"-of the term "cri­
terion." Following such uses, continuity of spatiotemporal track, taken as "a" or "the" crite­
rion of continued numerical identity, has been said to be "logically decisive" for or to "logi­
cally guarantee" (phrases of uncertain import having no part in formal logic and functioning
largely as ways of commending one's arguments) such continued identity, induding personal
identity. This makes it sound as though spatiotemporal continuity is an unshakeable part, set
in stone for all time, of the definition of numerical identity. But the ordinary, dictionary usage
of "criterion" does not assign this degree of permanence to criteria.
 Memory-289

istic personal memories were ostensibly to manifest again after my lamented

demise, those memories could not be regarded as my memories.
Of course one can certainly agree that in our ordinary daily dealings with
more or less stable physical objects (for instance, a can of beans on a super­
market shelf), part (and no doubt a large part) of what we mean by saying
"this is the same can again," and thus assigning it a numerical identity across
its various phases, is that the can now before us, given that it is constitutively
similar to a can we have previously encountered, has had a continuous spa­
tiotemporal track from our previous encounter with it to the present one. But
that we can treat all issues of numerical identity in this cavalier and a priori
fashion seems more than a little doubtful, even in the case of physical objects
or entities.
If, for instance, the behavior of cans of beans, or of human organisms,
resembled that of subatomic particles (and there is no totally clear reason why
it should not), philosophers disposed to give an account of numerical identity
in terms of spatiotemporal continuity would have an interesting time. In cer­
tain contexts it seems perfectly acceptable to talk of the same individual par­
ticle, say a photon or an electron, leaving a source and being detected again
a split second later by an appropriate detector. At any rate many physicists
do talk in this way. But all this seems to mean is that a particle has left the
source and a particle has arrived at the targeted destination, and that the most
appropriate way of talking (making allowance for wave-particle duality) is to
say that they are one and the same. Whether the particle pursues a continuous
spatiotemporal pathway from source to detector is a very different issue. For
even a single particle (or atom or molecule or buckyball) may be described
(as in variants of the double-slit experiment and in Feynman's "sum over
histories" approach [see B. Greene, 2004, pp. 1 79-1 84]) as having pursued a
doubled trajectory, or as having putatively explored or pursued every pos­
sible path to its terminus. The situation is further clouded by the Heisenberg
"uncertainty principle" according to which it is impossible simultaneously to
determine exactly both the position and the momentum (that is, mass times
velocity in a direction) of a particle; one can determine only the one or the
other. This blurs the very notion of a spatiotemporal path; and yet one might
still reasonably claim that the particle which departs is the same one which
arnves.
One could play with further examples, for instance the "wormholes"
through space hypothesized by some cosmologists and designers of time
machines. Wormholes are not, as it were, tunnels within our ordinary
neighborhood space-time. When they open up they constitute "new, previ­
ously non-existent tube[s] of space" connecting one region of space-time to
another, and a traveler who steps through the wormhole's mouth (its interface
with his region of space) is not within the space or indeed the time of the
locality he has left, nor yet in those of the locality into which he is about to
emerge through the wormhole's other end. If after his precipitate arrival the
wormhole through which he has passed were to collapse, the space it occupied
290-Chapter 4

would simply have gone.47 In what sense (if any) and from what point of view
(if any) can he be said to have pursued a continuous bodily spatiotemporal
track from his departure point to his almost instantaneous arrival at a desti­
nation remote in space and time?
The upshot of these examples is that criteria for the reidentification of
the same individual items again (be they objects or persons) vary according
to the conceptual framework within which the question of reidentification
arises; and that criteria which are appropriate in one setting may not be mean­
ingfully applicable in another.
There has been an understandable but misguided temptation to regard
the can of beans kind of case, our first example, as canonical for the reiden­
tification of particular things in the world. If we can establish that a can of
beans we observed at a given place and time pursued a continuous spatiotem­
poral path to a different place and time at which we perceived an apparently
identical can, we may for nearly all purposes be sure that the latter was the
same can again as the former. The discovery of its continuous spatiotemporal
track might indeed in some rather loose sense be called "logically decisive"
or "criterial" for questions of its numerical identity. Other cues to continu­
ing identity there may be, but this one is decisive and takes precedence in the
event of a clash. Note, however, that this is so only because within our every­
day framework of thought for talking about everyday items the establishment
of continuity of spatiotemporal track is a question-stopper. Unless the can
has been incinerated and turned to powder, or emptied of its contents, or oth­
erwise metamorphosed, there are no further relevant questions to be asked.
But this framework, it should be observed, is not established by science. It is
a deeply engrained feature of our societal conventions, held because for most
purposes it works more effectively than any other.
This brings us to the essential point: Reidentifying a particular item (per­
son or thing) as the same item again usually presents no problems in the con­
text of the commonplace can of beans model within which spatiotemporal
track predominates. Once we step outside the merely commonplace, however,
we can find ourselves confronted with questions of reidentification which lie
far outside the scope of such a model. We are entitled to talk of the identifi­
cation and reidentification of particular things far beyond the scope of that
model provided that the conceptual context in which we do so licenses and
makes sense of such a way of talking. The everyday conceptual context which
licenses and accords ultimate predominance to talk of continuous spatiotem­
poral tracks through three dimensions of space and one of time is not neces­
sarily the only framework of thought within which we can sensibly talk of
reidentification, whether of particles or of people-indeed L. R . Baker ( 1 997,
2000, 200 1 ) argues at length that even within our present everyday framework
the continuity of the person is not to be identified with the persistence of the
organism.
Let us now turn away from these rather abstract questions of identifica­
tion and reidentification to the more immediate issue of what is in practice

47. For a lucid non-technical account of wormholes, see B. Greene (2004, pp. 461-468).
 Memory-29l

generally regarded as appropriate and potentially satisfactory evidence of

the continued identity of ordinary human beings. Serious problems here are
(discounting momentary failures of recognition and so forth) relatively rare
in everyday life, though they have sometimes arisen more forcefully in the
contexts of certain legal cases (for classic examples, see Rolph, 1 957) or of
various puzzles in historical biography. The sorts of evidence that have been
advanced in such cases are fairly obvious and include a mixture of physical
and psychological components: physical similarity, similarity in behavior and
in psychological characteristics, production of appropriate memories, exhibi­
tion of appropriate skills, possession of relevant mementoes, recognition by
friends and relatives or even (as with Odysseus) by a dog, and continuity of
spatiotemporal track and matters directly related thereto (such as fingerprints,
scars, birthmarks, or DNA tests). These categories of evidence are somewhat
complexly interrelated. They may mutually support, or be necessary comple­
ments of, each other, and from time to time they may conflict. Assessing them
is always a matter of weighing up the tout ensemble.
In the event of conflict between these various kinds of evidence, there is
no doubt that, in Western society at least, good evidence of continuous bodily
track (which can now with modern forensic methods be made almost irrefut­
able) will, if available, usually prevail over all other types. In fact, spatiotem­
poral track is so predominant that it has in effect become a "criterion," indeed
the principal and generally overriding criterion, of the continued existence of
any individual whose identity might be in question. In the ordinary or diction­
ary sense of "criterion" (and I have already pointed out that Rosenberg's use
of the term appears, so far as one can tell, to differ from this ordinary usage),
a criterion is simply a standard by reference to which something is or shall be
deemed to be the case. Criteria are set up by convention, either a gradually
evolving social convention or a deliberately established artificial one. They are
adopted because they work for a given purpose, and once adopted it becomes
self-contradictory, within a restricted context, to affirm the criterion and deny
that something which meets it qualifies as a member of the class of which it
is the criterion. But if a criterion becomes, or is found to be, unsatisfactory
for its destined purpose, it can be changed or dispensed with. Criteria are
absolutely not set in stone. And it is to be noted that if C is a criterion of X,
it does not follow that the term "c" is part of the meaning of the term "X. "
Thus, for somewhat restricted legal purposes a certain breathalyser reading
might be accepted as a criterion of drunkenness. But being "drunk" does not
in more general usage mean or simply mean "giving breathalyser readings
of more than such-and-such." It means "having imbibed too much alcohol
and in consequence behaving in certain unacceptable ways." Likewise person
P2's "being numerically identical with past person P I " may or may not carry
as part of its meaning "having pursued a continuous spatiotemporal track
from T l to T2. " We might, for instance, try (as some have done) to answer the
"constitutive" problem of personal identity in terms of continuity of an indi­
vidual "first-person perspective" and adopt bodily continuity as a criterion of
this simply because it is a generally reliable guide.
292-Chapter 4

Obviously, another kind of evidence of continued personal identity that

might be reckoned to have criterial status is continuity of memory: Does the
soi-disant John Doe remember things which he ought to remember if he is
indeed John Doe? Although continuity of memory is generally outgunned, at
least in Western society, if it comes into conflict with evidence for continuity
of spatiotemporal track, it can come into its own when, say, we are talking
on the telephone via a bad connection to someone with a slightly strange­
sounding voice, and we want to decide whether he really is the old friend
he claims to be; and it has taken on cardinal importance in legal cases and
historical problems antedating DNA testing (and the like) or in which DNA
is not available.
Just occasionally, moreover, one may find cases in which the primacy of
the spatiotemporal track criterion is seriously threatened, and for some over­
whelmed, by rather striking apparent manifestations of continuity of memory
in the absence of accompanying continuity of bodily track. An appreciable
number of the "communicators" through Mrs. Piper (see above) and certain
other intensively studied mediums provide examples. So do the numerous
instances of young children, laboriously investigated by Stevenson and his
collaborators, who ostensibly remember previous lives (for summaries and
references, see Matlock, 1 990; Stevenson, 200 I ; Tucker, 2005), and the rare
and remarkable cases in which a person's ordinary memories and character­
istics have seemingly been replaced, permanently or for extended phases, and
usually upon waking from a coma or serious illness, by a completely differ­
ent set of memories and behavior patterns, ones corresponding to those of a
deceased individual whose existence has subsequently been verified.48
Such cases can be peculiarly baffling or even unsettling to many West­
erners, and not just because they conflict with firmly held religious or philo­
sophical beliefs. The supremacy of the spatiotemporai track criterion is pretty
well entrenched in our society and forms part of an institutionalized web of
concepts, a web which, although compatible with much contemporary sci­
ence, mostly reflects the world we have grown up in and social practices that
work within that world. Too much shaking of such a web is apt to generate a
spreading disturbance.

48. One such case is that of Lurancy Vennum, cited by both Myers (HP, vol. I, pp. 360-368)
and James ( l890b, vol. I, pp. 396-398). Similar but more recent cases are those of Shiva (Ste­
venson, Pasricha, & McClean-Rice, 1989) and Jasbir (Stevenson, 1974, pp. 34-52). Somewhat
different is the case of Sharada (Stevenson & Pasricha, 1979; Stevenson, 1984). In this the
subject was not ill at the time of the "possession," the identity of the intruding personality
(from the early 19th century) was not completely established, though appropriate details were
given, and the intrusions were accompanied by a sudden fluency in a language not (so far as
could be discovered) learned normally by the subject.
 Memory-293

Myers's "Broad Canvas" Revisited

Nonetheless, the spatiotemporal criterion of personal identity, however

useful under ordinary circumstances, is, as I have argued, by no means sacro­
sanct. It is in fact not difficult to conceive a world that is recognizably similar
to, but in some respects considerably different from, our own, in which mem­
ory would be generally accepted as a criterion of personal identity at least
equal to, and sometimes capable of overriding, bodily track, and in which (for
related reasons) certain sorts of supernormal phenomena (not there regarded
as supernormal) might be widely accepted or indeed taken for granted. These
phenomena would of course be especially the ones which Myers regarded as
constituting evidence for survival of bodily death.
Imagine, for instance, a world, occupied by humans like us, in which
instances of telepathy and other forms of ESP and also of PK, or telekine­
sis, are quite common, and in which many persons routinely undergo altered
states of consciousness (ASCs) of various kinds, including vivid dreams and
visions, states of dissociation, trance and secondary personality, and episodes
of automatic writing and speaking. Next let it be the case that the episodes
of telepathy, ESP, and PK occur with particular frequency and effectiveness
when the persons undergoing or initiating them are in an ASC. And let us
assume that the ESP manifesting during the ASCs takes the form not just of
information or warnings about distant happenings, past, present or impend­
ing, but of messages, written or spoken, from living persons, and that on
further inquiry or as the result of experiment, it turns out that these mes­
sages were intended or appropriate and that the ostensible senders were often
themselves in an ASC or even undergoing an OBE in which they believed
themselves to be visiting the spot at which and the person through whom the
message was received. And let it further be the case that quite often messages
containing correct and appropriate information be similarly received ostensi­
bly from deceased persons.
The stage is now set for the final and most dramatic aspects of this imagi­
nary world. Suppose, there are also many cases in which it is found that one
person may be associated with more than one body, or one and the same
body with more than one person. Suppose, for instance, there are cases in
which a living person undergoing an OBE or NDE or in some other abnormal
state manifests as a mediumistic communicator and exhibits the right kind
of memories, cases in which a person has disappeared from a seriously ill or
comatose body and been replaced by a totally different and lately deceased
personality with a completely different but appropriate set of memories, cases
in which a mediumistic communicator manifests with a continuous memory
through different and independent mediums, and cases in which a mediumis­
tic communicator of impressive authenticity announces his or her impending
reincarnation and then turns up as predicted as one of Stevenson's children
who ostensibly remember past lives. Into this interesting assortment of phe­
nomena we might also throw post-mortem apparitions of various nunciative
or message-bearing kinds.
294-Chapter 4

In a world like this, I think it is fair to say, a socially sanctioned concep­

tual framework would be almost universally adopted within which survival
of death would be more or less taken for granted and with it the overrid­
ing importance of memory as a criterion of personal identity. To explain the
phenomena in terms of so-called "super-ESP" would involve weaving a web
so tangled that "super" would be a wholly inadequate prefix to apply to the
"ESP" required. But at the same time the citizens of this imaginary world, at
least the more philosophically oriented ones, would be cautious about saying
they had "proof" of survival. Personal survival cannot be directly demon­
strated by third-person observation, as one might demonstrate (though with
difficulty) that certain terrestrial bacteria can survive on Mars. Nor can it be
demonstrated by theory-based logico-mathematical inference from observ­
able phenomena to the postulated existence of something not itself directly
observable, as the existence of dark matter can be mathematically inferred
from its gravitational effects. In our imagined world, acceptance of survival
would be almost a foundational assumption of life in society, a broad can­
vas picture without which the citizens could not even begin to make sense of
much that they encountered on a daily basis, but within and through which
many matters would be seen to fit together in ways which might in the future
be refined and which would already seem to confirm the larger schema. In
some ways it would be like the "foundational assumption," shared by all of
us save perhaps a few psychopaths, that other people are sentient beings like
ourselves. The power of the whole would derive not from its generating exact
predictions but from the fact that it and it alone would render adequately
comprehensible the nature of and the relations between certain classes of oth­
erwise puzzling phenomena.
It is not hard to find partial analogies to such a situation in other and
more orthodox regions of science.49 The Darwinian theory of evolution,
for instance, is (or was in its earlier days) in many respects a framework of
thought with some of the characteristics of a "broad canvas" schema rather
than of a precise deductive theory. Many findings, even though not precisely
predictable from it, fall into place within it and combine to help us under­
stand certain aspects of the natural world, even though (say) processes of
speciation or convergent evolution in response to environmental conditions
are in most circumstances impossible to observe directly, and the upshots of
such processes are not derivable in detail from the broad framework. 50 Over
the decades, of course, the phenomena comprehended within this framework
have multiplied, and their relations with each other and with more basic data
been greatly tightened.

49. There is no one template that all theories in science must fit, and probably no one con­
tinuum on which they can all be placed. Perhaps several intersecting continua would do the
job! But this raises issues too complex to be gone into here.
50. A similar example might be the theory of continental drift, which brought together a
diversity of findings derivable from and united by the theory largely on what might be called
a commonsense basis. It encountered great hostility from geologists who regarded it as con­
travening established principles. Only when the global positioning system made it possible to
measure the movements of tectonic plates could the theory be directly tested.
 Memory-295

William James ( 1 903) drew a parallel between Darwin and Myers, remark­
ing of the latter that he showed "a genius not unlike that of Charles Darwin
for discovering shadings and transitions, and grading down discontinuities
in his argument" (p. 30). It will have been obvious that, in writing about my
imaginary world of copious evidence for psychical phenomena and for sur­
vival, and about the overarching schema into which that evidence might be
fitted, I have been trying to make clearer, as it were through magnification,
the general aim and tenor of Myers's great project, both on its theoretical
and on its data-collecting side. Of course our world, the "real" world, is not
so generously provided with just the kinds of phenomena you might want for
his purposes. Yet I never cease to be astonished at how far Myers actually got
on both fronts. His Human Personality and his major articles contain between
them one or two and often many first-hand accounts of almost allsl the kinds
of phenomena with which I chose to fill my imaginary world, and of other
phenomena also. And his theory of the Subliminal Self, however one evalu­
ates it, does indeed provide an overarching schema or "broad canvas" into
which this array of phenomena can be systematically slotted with an apparent
strengthening of his general position.

Myers, Memory, and the Evidence for Survival

Any attempt (not least Myers's) to systematize and interpret the osten­
sible evidence for human survival of bodily death has to take on board the
empirical facts, so far as they are known, of the relationship between memory
and the brain. Most modern neuroscientists regard memory as totally a func­
tion of the brain, a view which if justified (and it was widely enough held in
Myers's own time) is fatal to the possibility that memory and related features
of personality might survive death as Myers hoped, believed, and argued. It
is curious how many subsequent persons who have discussed the evidence for
survival and its interpretation have failed to take this crucially relevant ques­
tion fully on board. I discussed the issue of memory and the brain earlier in
the chapter and shall say a few concluding words on it now.
Myers himself was well abreast of the neuroscience of his time, and of
the probable close relations between memory and brain function. Nonethe­
less, he is surprisingly relaxed about the matter and about the inseparably
linked question of the general relation between mind and brain. That mental
functions cannot be wholly reduced to brain functions he regards as indi­
cated by the occurrence of telepathy, of which, he argues (e.g., HP, vol. 1 , pp.
245-246), a physical explanation is not possible, and by the fact that in certain
circumstances (for instance during what would now be called NDEs; see HP,
vol. 2, pp. 3 1 5-323) vivid experiences, including what may have been clairvoy-

5 1 . The major exception is examples of verified cases of ostensible reincarnation, of which

in Myers's time there were very few. He had a curiously ambiguous attitude towards reincar­
nation. His neoplatonist leanings made him interested in the topic, but circumstances in both
his personal life and his psychical research career prejudiced him against it.
296-Chapter 4

ant ones, have occurred to persons who are comatose or greatly enfeebled
(on this, see further our Chapter 6). With regard to memory and brain, he
seems at times almost ready to accept that supraliminal memories are medi­
ated by ordinary memory traces, though he also suggests (HP, vol. 2, p. 1 92)
that, for instance in cases of temporary displacement of one set of memories
by another as in some instances of alternate personalities, the same brain­
cells may be involved in different and discordant memories (a suggestion to
an extent compatible with modern connectionist ideas). These processes, he
remarks, "are completely obscure," but may belong "to the same unknown
series of operations" which ultimately lead to possession by an external spirit.
The Subliminal Self he seems to think of (and this is in line with his other
ideas about its nature) as enjoying a certain, and at "deeper" levels complete,
freedom from the constraints of memory traces and indeed of the brain,52 and
as possibly able to select from and rearrange the restricted and trace-bound
memories characteristic of the supraliminal (for hints about this see HP, vol.
1 , pp. 1 05, 1 28, 226; vol. 2, p. 266). No doubt, also, his firm conviction that
he already possessed compelling evidence for human survival of bodily death
helped to persuade him in accordance with his broad canvas approach that
the physical basis of memory, whatever it might turn out to consist in, could
not be ultimately incompatible with this evidence.
Today memory appears a considerably tougher problem for an approach
like Myers's than it was in his time (and it was tough enough then). The data
demonstrating connections between memory and brain function, which
were already sufficient in Myers's time to fill a library shelf or two, have now
attained a detail and quantity that would fill a library or two. How within a
broad canvas one might reconcile these data with the data ostensibly indicat­
ing that personal memories may survive death and disintegration is not easy
to conceive, and the evidence for post-mortem survival of memory, though it
has grown since Myers's time, has not grown on anything like the same scale
as the evidence for some sort of linkage between memory and the brain.
At the same time, however, it must be recognized that this memory-brain
linkage is nowhere near as straightforward as it is often made out to be. In the
first part of this chapter I said something about modern psychological and
neuroscientific approaches to memory with particular reference to "trace"
theories of memory and their modern descendants. My conclusion about
good old-fashioned memory traces (GOFMTs) was that while they may be

52. If this is indeed the case, and if, as Myers believed, there may be genuine cases of living
persons (often ones who are asleep or comatose) manifesting as mediumistic communica­
tors, it should be possible for the subliminal selves of persons suffering severe memory loss
through brain damage to manifest likewise, relatively unimpeded by their memory problems.
I can call to mind only one apparent case (Schiller, 1 923) of this kind. The medium was Mrs.
Piper and the "communicator" was an elderly lady in an advanced state of senile dementia.
Schiller regarded this case as supporting his "transmission" theory of mind. On this theory
one might suppose that if, as seems not impossible, at some time in the future it becomes pos­
sible to replace cells destroyed by Alzheimer's disease, lost memories might return; that is,
transmission might be resumed; see also Chapter 6 for references to a few cases suggesting
such restoration near death. My own guess is that there would be some degree of restoration,
but not enough to convince those who do not antecedently believe in the theory.
 Memory-297

all very well at the level of conditioned reflexes, avoidance learning, and so
forth, they are totally inadequate to account for human declarative memory
(semantic and episodic). Their modern descendants, the various forms of
"inner representation" imagined by cognitive psychologists, have yet to be put
in any form that coherently handles the relevant facts. In particular neither
GOFMTs nor inner representations have come properly to grips with such
central and inescapable issues as the "intentionality" of memory (what makes
memories "of" or "about" certain events or states of affairs, and, in the case
of cognitive psychology, how "inner representations" become representations
"of" things external to themselves, or become, in short "representations" at
all), and the relations between memory, concept possession, intentionality,
and possession of a "first-person perspective."
Some writers, sensing these problems, have, as outlined earlier, developed
more dynamic and holistic views of the neural underpinnings of memory.
But their views, or so I suggested, do not reach anywhere near the heart of
the matter.
We are left, then, with an awkward conjunction of seemingly discordant
observations. First, it is a hard scientific fact that there are strong and well­
established correlations between normal memory function and activities of
the brain, both macroscopic and microscopic. Any adequate theory of mem­
ory must somehow accommodate and make sense of these correlations. Sec­
ond, currently fashionable hard scientific accounts of memory, which attempt
to build directly on these correlations and are entirely brain-based, have very
marked theoretical and empirical shortcomings, as we have seen.
Finally, into this already complex situation is thrown a further compli­
cation introduced in the second part of the chapter, which here concerns
us particularly; namely, that some peoples' memories-including semantic,
factual, episodic, and procedural memories-have ostensibly to a greater or
lesser extent survived the disintegration of their brains. The evidence for this
ranges from the apparent manifestion of mere snippets of recollection to that
of quite extensive and varied sequences of correct memories presented as
if from an appropriate first-person perspective. Looking at these ostensible
manifestations of post-mortem memory against a broad canvas, even if not
quite Myers's canvas, I find it difficult not to suppose that some of them are
in varying degrees somehow linked to the original person (in ways we do not
understand, but not to be thought of in terms of extant records and memo­
rabilia, the effects of pre-mortem deeds, memories lingering in the minds of
the still-living, or "super-ESP" directed on all or any of these). At any rate,
whatever the best explanation of the best cases may be, I can see no satisfac­
tory means of explaining them away.
Now, if post-mortem survival of memories is a fact-and this assuredly
remains at present a big "if," at least for most scientific observers-the purely
brain-based mainstream approach to memory must necessarily fail. But the
difficulty still remains that, so far as the deliverances of neuroscience go, a
functional memory is normally strongly dependent in some way on a working
brain. What this confluence of discordant observations suggests, in sum, is
298-Chapter 4

that we need to reconceptualize the nature of the linkage between memory

and the brain in some fundamentally novel way.
In this dilemma, the fact that we have rejected the conventional answers
to the problem of memory and brain has certain advantages. It frees us to
pursue less conventional lines of attack on the problem, lines which among
other things may one day conceivably help to clarify how we should best
interpret the ostensible evidence for survival after death.
But what are these lines of attack to be? It seems to me, even on the
basis of the very limited account of human memory and brain function that
I have been able to give here, that any viable account of human declarative
memory in relation to brain function (also of course any viable account of
"intentional" mental phenomena in general) will eventually turn out to have
features such as the following:

( 1 ) It will be a "top down" rather than a "bottom up" theory. That is to say,
it will be a theory which proposes that the elements of a system sometimes
act in conformity with laws characterizing the system as a whole and not
derivable from the interactions of its elements. These principles (unlike the
laws of neurochemistry or the quasi-computational rules of much cognitive
psychological theorizing) might be described as emerging from or super­
vening upon interactions of the elements, not, one should emphasize, on a
moment-by-moment basis, but gradually over time and having something
like the status of psychophysical laws in part tailored to each individual.

(2) It will accommodate the fact that particular declarative memories can­
not be supposed tied or permanently tied to particular anatomical loci in the
brain or to particular brain systems or activity patterns. There is copious evi­
dence that such memories may be underpinned by different brain circuitry at
different stages of their development or may reinstate themselves to a greater
or lesser extent following extensive tissue damage and destruction.

(3) It will recognize that different memories may be intrinsically interrelated

in such a way that one memory (e.g., of handling a firearm) may be as it were
so pervaded by another (that firearms fire bullets propelled by explosives)
that without this relationship it would become, not simply a memory of a
firearm lacking some feature which it had, but not a memory of a firearm at
all. This aspect of our memory-systems still awaits adequate investigation.

(4) It will regard the nerve tracts that transmit nerve impulses from one part
of the brain to another not as conduits for the transmission of "informa­
tion" in the loose sense commonly adopted by psychologists, but as means
by which spatiotemporal patterns of activity in different regions may be fine­
tuned to create overarching patterns.

From what quarter we may derive help in fleshing out the bare bones of
such theoretical requirements remains to be determined. The most obvious
suggestion (and I do not have a better one) is to seek new ideas about the
relations of brain and memory (and also about brain and the ostensible evi­
dence for personal survival) from the bizarre, but fascinating, frontier areas of
 Memory-299

physical science. So far only a small number of workers have even looked at
this road, let alone gone far down it. Lockwood ( 1 989), D. Hodgson ( 1 99 1 ),
and Stapp (2004a) attempt to illuminate cerebral and mental functioning and
their relationships in terms of their own preferred interpretations of quantum
theory. Romijn ( 1 997) proposes, under the influence of Bohm, that a large
part of mental activity, including the storage of declarative memories, takes
place outside the brain at "a deeper, submanifest level." Penrose (2004), com­
ing at the problems from the opposite direction, remarks "that a 'fundamen­
tal' physical theory that lays claim to any kind of completeness at the deepest
levels of physical phenomena must also have the potential to accommodate
conscious mentality" (p. 1 033). He argues strongly that "computational func­
tionalism" is not up to this task. All of these writers lay interesting possible
new directions before their readers-earnests, we may hope, of developments
to come. (These and related issues will be discussed further in Chapter 9.)
Perhaps, then, the best that each of us can do at the moment to subdue
and render provisionally intelligible these complex and complexly interrelated
areas where memory, philosophy, and psychical research meet, mix, and mys­
tify is to work out for him- or herself some tentative sketch for a "broad
canvas" picture of them that, however vague and imperfect, we may hope will
provide appropriate and appropriately related spaces for features we may one
day delineate more effectively. To date no one, perhaps, has had a better trial
shot at this task than did Myers so long ago.

Conclusion

To recapitulate: Myers's approach to the evidence for the survival of memory

and personality is rather different from the approaches taken by many of his
successors. Instead of plunging in medias res, presenting survival evidence and
arguing about the super-ESP hypothesis, he tackles the issues less directly.
Before tackling the survival problem, he sets up what I called a "broad can­
vas" and fills it in area by area. He takes his readers though certain aspects of
normal and abnormal psychology, and also through supernormal phenom­
ena not claiming any other-worldly origin. He tries to demonstrate, from phe­
nomena not presented as evidence for survival, that mental functioning is not
so closely tied to brain functioning as is generally imagined. He is intensely
interested in the frontiers of psychology and also (a less appreciated point)
in the frontiers of physiology (see especially HP, vol. 2, pp. 505-552), from
both of which he sought facts and ideas with which to buttress, enlarge, or
modify his line of thought. He extends his speculations into hidden realms
(the "metetherial," the "subliminal"), which he regarded as constituting a sort
of "implicate order" that underlies and shapes the perceptible world. He did
not expect to "prove" survival by means of one or two wonder cases, but
rather sought to advance the issue by hard and patient graft (at which he was
particularly good). He was, in short, trying to make survival seem a viable or
300-Chapter 4

more than viable option by demonstrating that the world on fuller inquiry
turns out to be more like the "imaginary world" which I described above than
most people would suppose. This may well be the only kind of approach to
the matter that holds out any prospect of ultimate agreement. Whether or not
one believes that Myers himself fully succeeded in his endeavor, one can only
marvel at the dedication, the ability, the range of information, the literary
skill, and the power to inspire others that he brought to it.
 Chapter 5

Automatism and Secondary Centers

of Consciousness

Adam Crabtree

In his classic Varieties of Religious Experience published in 1902, William

James (190211958) made the following striking comment:

I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred
in psychology since I have been a student of that science is the discovery,
first made in 1886,1 that, in certain subjects at least, there is not only the
consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual center and margin, but
an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts, and feel-

I . There is little doubt that the 1 886 date refers to a work of Myers, but there is a question
as to which work. Powell ( 1979, p. 1 56) believes it is Myers's note on "psychical interaction"
in Vol. 2 of Phantasms of the Living (Gurney et aI., 1 886) where he wrote of mental operations
"below the threshold . . . of consciousness" (p. 285). Ignas Skrupskelis, editor of the Harvard
University Press edition of Varieties of Religious Experience, believes that the 1 886 date points
to Myers's paper "Human personality in the light of hypnotic suggestion," which he says was
published in 1 886 in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research; this is also the
opinion of David Leary (Leary, 1 990, p. 1 17). However, Skrupskelis and Leary are mistaken
about the date of publication, which is, in fact, 1885 (Myers, 1 885e). Perry ( 1 935, vol. 2, p.
1 21), Fontinell ( 1986, p. 1 20), Taylor (1996, p. 87), and Barnard ( 1997, p. 173) state that the
reference is to Myers, but do not cite a particular text. To my knowledge, the only author who
believes that James is not referring to Myers in this passage is Ann Taves, who sees his words
as referencing the works of Pierre Janet and indicates that it was actually Janet who made
the "basic discovery" of the subconscious (Taves, 1 999, p. 418). This position is weakened by
the fact that, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Crabtree, 2003), Janet's understanding of the
subconscious was itself largely influenced by the prior work of Myers, and that, in the passage
in question, James nowhere mentions Janet or Janet's term "subconscious," but uses Myers's
term "subliminal" to explicate his meaning.

301
302-Chapter 5

ings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness

altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to
reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I call this the most important
step forward because, unlike the other advances which psychology has
made, this discovery has revealed to us an entirely unsuspected peculiarity
in the constitution of human nature. No other step forward which psychol­
ogy has made can proffer any such claim as this.
I n particular, this discovery of a consciousness existing beyond the
field, or subliminally as M r. Myers terms it, casts light on many phenom­
ena of religious biography. (p. 188)

This remarkable tribute to Frederic Myers may be a surprise to some, but

those who are familiar with James's writings know that he often pointed
to Myers's work as pivotal to scientific psychology and influential in his
own thinking (see, e.g., James, 1 901). Indeed, much of James's later work,
including Varieties of Religious Experience and A Pluralistic Universe, can
be viewed as the systematic application of Myers's central theoretical ideas
to problems in religion, epistemology, and metaphysics. Furthermore, those
who are familiar with psychological writings in the l 880s and l 890s know
that James was only one of a number of prominent figures in psychology
(e.g., Theodore Flournoy2 and Boris Sidis3) who were influenced by Myers's
conception of the "Subliminal Self." It is now becoming clear that Myers
was the first to effectively describe the psychological unconscious (see, e.g.,
Crabtree, 2003; Shamdasani, 1993) and that his influence on the develop­
ment of what Ellenberger (1970) called "dynamic psychiatry" was consider­
able. What may be less known is the role played by the concept of "automa­
tism" in the development of Myers's pivotal ideas and how the concept of
"psychological automatism" provided a framework that would serve well
to explain intelligent human actions not performed by the ordinary con­
sciousness. Myers's views regarding automatism were framed in response to
a contemporary debate on "unconscious cerebration," a debate with roots
in the early history of mesmerism.

Historical Background

The closing decades of the 1 8th century witnessed a startling discovery

which grew out of the practice of "animal magnetism," a healing system

2. Swiss psychologist Theodore Flournoy, author of the widely acclaimed From India to the
Planet Mars ( 1900/1983), mentor to Carl lung, and a personal friend of Myers, wrote: "Fred­
eric Myers was one of the most remarkable personalities of our time in the realm of mental
science" (Flournoy, 1 9 1 1 , p. 48).
3. Boris Sidis, American psychologist and pioneer in laboratory techniques at Harvard,
wrote: "Psychology is especially indebted to the genius of Myers for his wide and comprehen­
sive study of the phenomena of the subconscious, or of what he calls the manifestations of the
subliminal self" (Sidis, 1898/1906, pp. 2-3).
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-303

developed by Franz Anton Mesmer. Mesmer's pupil, the Marquis de Puy­

segur, found that certain people, when being treated for their illnesses,
went into a non-ordinary state of consciousness, something he came to call
"magnetic sleep" or "magnetic somnambulism." This state evinced certain
characteristic qualities that were surprising and dramatic. Puysegur (1784)
wrote that persons in this state showed a notable alteration in personality;
were highly suggestible; demonstrated a special connection with their mag­
netizer which Puysegur called "magnetic rapport" (pp. 28-35); were able to
diagnose and prescribe treatment for their own illnesses and those of others;
could read the thoughts of their magnetizer; and remembered nothing of
what had occurred in the magnetic state when returning to their ordinary
state (Puysegur, 1785, pp. 2-3). Because of the alteration of personality and
post-somnambulistic amnesia, subjects when in their ordinary state did not
feel that they were authors of what was done in the magnetic state. In the last
quarter of the 1 8th century and throughout much of the 1 9th a great deal
of healing work and experimentation was done with people in this state of
magnetic sleep (Crabtree, 1 993; Gauld, 1 992).
Starting in the 1 830s, physiologists who studied human behavior were
concerned to explain the lack of connection between the ordinary waking
state and the somnambulistic state. Specifically, they wanted to find out
how individuals could perform intelligent actions of which they had no
awareness. Some took their cue from experiments, originated by Eduard
Pfluger, which were being carried out with decapitated frogs (see Maudsley,
1 876, pp. 1 38-1 39). These experiments showed that even without its brain,
a frog was able to respond to stimulation with seemingly purposeful move­
ments. This stimuluslresponse combination was called spinal reflex activity,
since the movement originated in the spinal cord. The conclusion was that,
even without its brain, an animal could perform combined movements in
proper sequence for an identifiable purpose. These actions came to be called
"automatisms,"4 actions that require no outside energy or direction.
Physiologists began to speculate about the application of the concept
of the reflex arc to somnambulists. They developed this analogy: Like the
decapitated frog, somnambulists perform purposeful actions which do
not seem to arise from their ordinary consciousness; they act in ways that
seem to imply thought and intention, but without the participation of their
everyday awareness. These physiologists asked: Could this conundrum be
explained as a kind of reflex action? The first to move in this direction was
Thomas Laycock (181 2-1876), professor of medicine at the University of
Edinburgh, who began writing about this view in the Edinburgh Medical
and Surgical Journal in the late 1 830s. Laycock believed that there could be
cerebral reflexes, comparable to spinal reflexes, by which a person's brain
could convert outside stimuli into meaningful actions without the participa­
tion of the individual's consciousness. He was of the opinion that the "old
metaphysics," which held that "mind considered as cause and consciousness

4. As an English word, "automatism" is of relatively recent origin, probably first occurring

in 1838 (Anonymous, 1 838).
304-Chapter 5

were . . . identical" and that "reason was independent from brain function,"
was untenable (Laycock, 1 876, p. 477). He took the position that all energies
involved in human mental functioning originate in the organism and that
psychological research produces no evidence showing that a separate mind
or will causes changes in the brain. He termed the actual process, involving
purely physiological factors, cerebral reflex action, and he declared that this
principle applied even to "the highest work of intellectual faculties" (p. 1).
In this way, he said, every living organism is an automaton, able to adapt
itself to the external world without input from some extrinsic, rational, or
spiritual influence (p. 486).
Similar views5 were developed by William Carpenter (1813-1885), pro­
fessor of medical jurisprudence in University College, London. Writing in
his textbook Principles of Human Physiology ( 1 855), he stated:

But not only is much of our highest Mental Activity thus to be regarded as
the expression of the automatic action of the Cerebrum:-we seem justi­
fied in proceeding further, and in affirming that the Cerebrum may act
upon impressions transmitted to it, and may elaborate results such as we
might have attained by the purposive direction of our minds to the subject,
without any consciousness on our own parts; so that we only become aware
of the operation which has taken place, when we compare the result, as it
presents itself to our minds after it has been attained, with the materials
submitted to the process. (p. 607)

Carpenter called this kind ofcerebral elaboration outside awareness "uncon­

scious cerebration," a term that immediately caught on and was incorpo­
rated into virtually all subsequent discussions of the issue. He believed
unconscious cerebration accounted for everything from recall of forgotten
words to the production of solutions to intellectual problems while one is
sleeping and the emergence of fully formed literary or musical creations that
are constructed without the conscious efforts of the author. He also believed
that it explained the phenomena of somnambulism, both natural and artifi­
cial, as well as the phenomena of spiritualism.
In 1874 Thomas Huxley (1 825-1 895) entered the discussion of the prob­
lem of cerebral automatism through an address at Belfast to the British
Association for the Advancement of Science entitled "On the Hypothesis
that Animals are Automata, and its History" (Huxley, 1874). Using Des­
cartes as his starting point, Huxley declared that it is undeniable that
"reflex action" (occurring without the intervention of consciousness or will)
is a part of ordinary human life. Therefore, he continued, if "actions of a
certain degree of complexity are brought about by mere mechanism, why
may not actions of still greater complexity be the result of a more refined
mechanism?" (p. 564). Although he agreed with Descartes that animals are
automata, Huxley did not accept his notion that they lacked consciousness.
However, he proposed a novel way of seeing consciousness. He assumed

5. Carpenter's views were similar only up to a point, since he still held to the "old" view that
Will, or Volition, was extra-physiological.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-305

that all states of consciousness are caused by molecular changes in the brain
and stated that: "The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to
the mechanism of their body simply as a collateral product of its working,
and to be as completely without any power of modifying that working, as
the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is
without influence upon its machinery" (p. 575). Huxley went on to say that
what is true of brutes is also true of human beings. Nevertheless, he insisted,
this view of things does not rule out free will and does not, as some might
charge, lead to fatalism, materialism, and atheism.6

The Views of F. W. H. Myers

Against this background of debate among physiologists and philosophers/

Myers was led by experimental evidence to a different picture. Experiment­
ing with automatic writing in the early 1 880s, Myers believed he had uncov­
ered compelling evidence that a purely physiological explanation of appar­
ently intelligent automatisms was insufficient. Myers contended that when
physiologists attempted to explain mental automatisms they were operating
under the mistaken assumption that consciousness is unitary. Philosophers
had told them that consciousness and intelligence in human beings are co­
extensive. For the physiologist this would have to mean that if individuals
perform actions of which they are not conscious, those actions have only
the appearance of conscious intelligence and are really mere physiological
reflexes, mere reproductions or recombinations of previous intelligent pro­
cesses now repeated by rote. But, said Myers, if the consciousness of a per­
son is not necessarily unitary, if it can be multiple, then new psychological
vistas appear.
In an important article on automatic writing published in 1 884, Myers
took his initial stand against the position of the physiologists. Describing
what he called the "Clelia" case of automatic writing, which included mate­
rial that he considered to be evidence of telepathy, he made reference to
Carpenter's formulation and stated what he believed was its inadequacy:
"Throughout all these investigations we must keep unconscious cerebra­
tion steadily in view, and we shall, I think, find ourselves confronted with
many of its results, and be induced continually to enlarge its field of action"
(Myers, 1 8 84, pp. 2 1 8-21 9).8 Although here Myers was willing to keep the
old terminology, by the next year he was no longer at ease with it, stating

6. One of those who did so charge was William James (see James, 1879).
7. For a more detailed discussion, see Crabtree (2003).
8. Later Myers would more explicitly spell out his objections: "1 have explained that by
these names [subliminal and supraliminal consciousnesses] 1 wish to protest against the
undue extension of such phrases as 'unconscious cerebration,' and to insist that we have as
good ground for attributing consciousness to some at least of these subliminal operations in
ourselves as we have for attributing consciousness to the intellectual performances of our
306-Chapter 5

that the facts of the Clelia case-particularly the writing of anagrams with
meanings hidden to the automatist9-were "already overpassing very con­
siderably the recognized limits of unconscious cerebration" (Myers, 1885b,
p. 25).
Myers believed instead that the Clelia case and other cases of automatic
writing indicated the presence of a second center of intelligent activity:

It must be repeated, then, that this conclusion is already far enough from
the accredited view as to the extent of the brain's unconscious operation. A
secondary self-i f ! may coin the phrase-is thus gradually postulated,-a
latent capacity, at any rate, in an appreciable fraction of mankind, ofdevel­
oping or manifesting a second focus of cerebral energy which is apparently
neither fugitive nor incidental merely,-a delirium or a dream-but may
possess for a time at least a kind of continuous individuality, a purposive
activity of its own. (p. 27)

Myers repeatedly insisted that an adequate explanation for the phenom­

ena in question had to be psychological, rather than physiological. In the
process of developing his psychological schema, he devised a new psycho­
logical terminology-including such terms as "sub-conscious," "super-con­
scious," and "secondary self"-that had not existed in the literature before.
Myers called for a new kind of psychology, one with a method that would
ensure truly scientific results:

The method to which I refer is that of experimental psychology in its strict­

est sense-the attempt to attack the great problems of our being not by
metaphysical argument, nor by merely introspective analysis, but by a
study, as detailed and exact as in any other natural science, of all such
phenomena of life as have both a psychical and a physical aspect. Pre­
eminently important for such a science is the study of abnormal, and I may
add, of supernormal, mental and physical conditions of all kinds. (Myers,
1 885c, p. 637)

Thus, in discussing how automatisms should be investigated, Myers

made a strong plea for the establishment of a truly scientific psychology.
Although he held that any purely physiological explanation of the kind of
automatisms in question must fail, he insisted that if a psychological expla­
nation of automatisms is to be believable, it must not involve elements that
contradict the findings of physiology. Further, he insisted that as scien­
tists psychological investigators must use methods that involve examining
empirical data, proposing explanatory hypotheses, and devising experi­
ments to test the validity of those hypotheses. He also stressed that to be
truly scientific, psychology must investigate all types of human experience:
the normal, the abnormal, and the supernormal-particularly not shying

neighbors" (Myers, 1 892b, p. 327).

9. See Myers, 1885a, pp. 239-242; HP, vol. I, p. 122.

 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-307

away from the latter on the basis of philosophical bias (see Cook [Kelly],
1992, pp. 32-35, and Chapter 2 of this book).
Myers knew that his conception of multiple centers of consciousness
operating within the psyche was novel and would not be easily accepted by
conventional researchers:

I have elsewhere endeavored to assign a wider range than orthodox science

has yet admitted to the mind's unconscious operation. But the result of
this further analysis has been (as I hold) not to show that ordinary physi­
ological considerations will suffice (as Dr. Carpenter seems to suppose) to
explain all the psychical problems involved, but rather to reveal the fact
that these unconscious operations of the mind do not follow the familiar
channels alone, but are themselves the facilitation or the starting-point of
operations which to science are wholly new. (Myers, 1886a, p. lxii)

Myers stated that this new way of looking at things brought with it a
whole new perspective on automatisms. His automatic writing experiments
(and those of his colleague Edmund Gurney on hypnosis) were conducted
with "normal" subjects, and he believed that the conclusions he arrived at
were applicable to all human beings. He believed that he had adequately
demonstrated that automatisms of a complex, intelligent kind, such as auto­
matic writing, automatic speaking, automatic drawing, artistic creations
that spring into consciousness fully formed, and hallucinations (such as
veridical phantasms) of every kind, resulted from the action of additional
centers of true conscious intelligence operating outside the normal aware­
ness of the individual. He observed that experiences like these provide a
glimpse of intelligent activity which has a brilliance that sometimes exceeds
that of the ordinary self.
In an article on automatic writing published in 1889, Myers attempted
to describe more completely the meaning of the word "automatism" in its
psychological sense (as opposed to what he called "reflex" or "automatic"
phenomena). To begin he stated that automatisms "parallel automatically
whatever our conscious will, our conscious perception can discern or decree"
(Myers, 1 889a, p. 522). He went on to say that automatisms are, first, "inde­
pendent"-that is, not related to some underlying physical pathology-and,
second, "message-bearing" or "nunciative," meaning not that they bring
messages from some source external to the automatist's mind, but that
"they present themselves to us as messages communicated from one stra­
tum to another stratum of the same personality. Originating in some deeper
zone of a man's being, they float up into superficial consciousness as deeds,
visions, words, ready-made and full-blown, without any accompanying per­
ception of the elaborative processes that have made them what they are" (p.
524). Third, in some cases they are "veridical," that is, they correspond with
objective facts not available to the automatist through normal means-an
event, however, that is not to be seen as supernatural but as "supernormal"
(p. 525).
308-Chapter 5

Myers also made it clear that he did not conceive of the hidden second­
ary self as a single principle coordinate with the ordinary self, but rather pic­
tured any number of "secondary manifestations of the self" (Myers, 1 889a,
p. 522). In 1888 he presented a grand formulation of his view of automatism
and raised themes that became familiar in his later writings:

I hold that hypnotism (itself a word covering a vast variety of different

states) may be regarded as constituting one special case which falls under
a far wider category,-the category, namely, of developments of a second­
ary personality. I hold that we each of us contain the potentialities of many
different arrangements of the elements of our personality, each arrange­
ment being distinguishable from the rest by differences in the chain of
memories which pertains to it. The arrangement with which we habitually
identify ourselves,-what we call the normal or primary self,-consists,
in my view, of the elements selected for us in the struggle for existence
with special reference to the maintenance of ordinary physical needs, and
is not necessarily superior in any other respect to the latent personalities
which lie alongside it,-the fresh combinations of our personal elements
which may be evoked, by accident or design, i n a variety to which we can
at present assign no limit. I consider that dreams, with natural somnam­
bulism, automatic writing, with so-called mediumistic trance, as well as
certain intoxications, epilepsies, hysterias, and recurrent insanities, afford
examples of the development of what I have called secondary mnemonic
chains,-fresh personalities, more or less complete, alongside the normal
state. And I would add that hypnotism is only the name given to a group of
empirical methods of inducing these fresh personalities,-of shifting the
centers of maximum energy, and starting a new mnemonic chain. (Myers,
1888a, pp. 387-388)

Myers categorized psychological automatisms under two heads: pas­

sive and active, or as he most commonly put it, sensory and motor. Motor
automatisms included automatic writing, automatic speaking, automatic
drawing, and use of the Chevreul pendulum. Sensory automatisms included
apparitions, hallucinations, dreams, anesthesias, automatically manifested
creative productions (such as literary or musical compositions), most hyp­
notic phenomena, and "idiot savant" phenomena. Also, the mediumistic
phenomena of spiritualism, where not adjudged fraudulent, were treated as
automatisms. What all psychological automatisms had in common was that
they arose from some unknown inner conscious intelligence.
Automatisms include both normal and pathological manifestations.
Myers believed that although the origins of these kinds of automatic phe­
nomena are distinct, their pathways of manifestation may be held in com­
mon:

And here I should wish to give a much wider generality to this principle,
and to argue that i f there be within us a secondary self aiming at manifes­
tation by physiological means, it seems probable that its readiest path of
externalisation-its readiest outlet of visible action,-may often lie along
some track which has already been shown to be a line of low resistance
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-309

by the disintegrating processes of disease. Or, varying the metaphor, we

may anticipate that the partition of the primary and the secondary self
will lie along some plane of cleavage which the morbid dissociations of
our psychical synergies have already shown themselves disposed to follow.
If epilepsy, madness, &c., tend to split up our facuIties in certain ways,
automatism is likely to split them up in ways somewhat resembling these.
(Myers, 1885b, pp. 30-3 1 )

Related Views o f Some Major Contemporaries

Myers's views were noted and commented on by many of his contempo­

raries. Some, such as Pierre Janet, William James, T. W. Mitchell, and
Morton Prince, found them stimulating and developed them in productive
directions. Others, such as Sigmund Freud and William McDougall, were
opposed to them in significant ways.

Pierre Janet

Pierre Janet, widely recognized for his experiments with hysterics,

made use of Myers's revolutionary psychological approach to automatism
to explain the existence of successive states of consciousness that were dis­
tinct from and unknown to the hysteric's ordinary awareness. In his journal
articles of 1884 and 1 885, Myers had already presented his novel ideas, and
when Janet began to formulate his findings in 1886 he built upon Myers's
work in several key areas: Myers's acknowledgment of unconscious and
"sub-conscious" ideas (Myers, 1884, p. 219), his concept of secondary selves
or centers of consciousness "dissociated" from the primary consciousness
(Myers, 1 885b, p. 31), and his recognition that these centers can act concur­
rently with each other (Myers, 1 885a, p. 239). All of these elements show up
in Janet's initial three scientific articles on his work with hysterics (Janet,
1886, 1 887, 1 888).
What we do not see in these initial publications is any significant use
by Janet of the concept of automatism. That changed completely with the
appearance in 1889 of Janet's doctoral thesis L'automatisme psychologique,
where he brought together and expanded the findings of the three articles.
Suddenly in this book, Myers's psychological approach to automatism
becomes the central explanatory principle for the phenomena of hysteria.
Janet did not explain this striking shift in perspective, but there can be little
doubt that he took his lead from Myers, with whose writings he was very
familiar. Janet's colleague, Alfred Binet noted the priority of Myers's work
in his book on alterations of personality:
31O-Chapter 5

We find here [in spiritistic phenomena], therefore, a new and curious

example of mental disaggregation and division of personality. One of the
authors who understands the true nature of spirit phenomena best, Mr.
Myers, summed up the theory of multiple personality very exactly at a
time when M . Janet's studies on somnambulism and my own on hysterical
insensibility-which tend to the same result-were not yet begun. (Binet,
1 896, p. 329)

William James (1901) also identified Myers as the originator of psycho 1-

ogy's new framework:

Myers's work on automatism led to his brilliant conception, in 1891, of hys­

teria. He defined it, with good reasons given, as "a disease of the hypnotic
stratum." Hardly had he done so when the wonderfully ingenious obser­
vations of Binet, and especially of Janet in France, gave to this view the
completest of corroborations. These observations have been extended in
Germany, America, and elsewhere; and although Binet and Janet worked
independently of Myers, and did work far more objective, he nevertheless
will stand as the original announcer of a theory which, in my opinion,
makes an epoch, not only in medical, but in psychological science, because
it brings in an entirely new conception of our mental possibilities. (p. 19)

Despite these acknowledgments by Janet's own peers of Myers's pri­

ority, Janet himself was not as candid, and even today many of Myers's
groundbreaking concepts are incorrectly attributed to Janet.1O It was, how­
ever, Janet who, in L'automatisme psychologique, gave to the phenomenon
Myers had been describing the name that has stayed with us to this day:

We believe that one can accept simultaneously both automatism and con­
sciousness and thereby give satisfaction to those who note in humans an
elementary form of activity as completely determined as an automaton
and to those who want to conserve for humans, in their simplest actions,
consciousness and sensibility. I n other words, it does not seem to us that
in a living being the activity that manifests on the outside through move­
ment can be separated from a certain kind of intelligence and from the
consciousness that accompanies it inside, and our goal is not only to dem­
onstrate that there is a human activity that merits the name of automatic, but
also that it is legitimate to call it a psychological automatism. (Janet, 1889,
pp. 2-3)"

Janet argued that the experience of hysterics indicates the existence of

separate conscious centers (variously called "secondary selves," "second­
ary personalities," "subconscious personalities," and "new psychological
existences") operating outside the field of ordinary consciousness. Further­
more, these centers were present and active in the hysteric co-temporally
with ordinary consciousness; in other words, even while the individual car-

10. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Crabtree (2003).
I I . All translations in this chapter are mine.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-3 l l

ried out ordinary tasks with ordinary mental involvement, these centers
communicated with the researcher in a complex manner that was indistin­
guishable from ordinary intelligent action. Typically this communication
occurred in the form of automatic writing of which the hysterical subject
was unaware. Janet (1889) described the emergence of these centers in his
subjects in this way:

There can be many simultaneous subconscious personalities just as there

can be many successive ones . . . .The conscious life of one of these subjects,
of Lucie, for example, seems to be composed of three parallel streams, one
under the other. When the subject is awake, the three streams exist: the
first is the normal consciousness of the subject who speaks to us; the two
others are groups of sensations and acts more or less associated among
themselves, but absolutely unknown by the person who speaks to us.
When the subject is put to sleep i n the first somnambulism, the first stream
is interrupted and the second surfaces. It shows itself in broad daylight
and lets us see the memories it has acquired in its subterranean life. If we
move on to the second somnambulism, the second stream is interrupted in
its turn and only the third subsists, which then forms the whole conscious
life of the individual. (pp. 333, 335)

As is well known today, Janet developed the concept of "dissociation"

to describe those systems of ideas that exist in connection with a "subcon­
scious" center of consciousness, but not connected with normal conscious­
ness. He identified what he believed to be two laws of dissociation: first, that
ideas can be conscious but not associated with that grouping of sensations
and memories that make up the ordinary "I"; and second, that every phe­
nomenon attached to a hysterical secondary personality is withdrawn from
the awareness of the normal personality.
Janet conducted experiments which showed that secondary personali­
ties can influence the ordinary consciousness of an individual without the
individual having any awareness of that influence. They can, he said, oper­
ate in the background in such a way that in hypnotism, for instance, an indi­
vidual may, through post-hypnotic suggestion, carry out actions that do not
engage the person's ordinary consciousness. According to Janet, the disso­
ciated and segmented life of the hysteric is the result of a pathological con­
dition he named "psychological misery." He posited a "synthesizing force"
that in normal people holds all their psychological experiences together in
a unity, but in hysterics is excessively weak and fails in that task. The result
is what he called a "psychological disaggregation," in which "fairly sizeable
numbers of psychological phenomena are allowed to escape outside personal
perception" (Janet, 1 889, p. 337). Janet believed that where a person experi­
ences traumatic events, a greater amount of synthesizing energy is needed to
preserve psychic unity. In hysterics, with their congenitally low level of that
force, the experiences were dissociated and led to other new subconscious
personalities or were assimilated to already existing secondary personali­
ties. Therapeutic work with hysterics, then, was aimed at uncovering the
hidden secondary centers and dissolving them. In this way Janet was able
3 1 2-Chapter 5

to develop what might be counted as the first comprehensive and effective

therapy for emotional disorders of the hysterical kind (Crabtree, 1 993).
Janet considered the presence of covert centers of consciousness
unknown to the individual to be invariably pathological. As a matter of
fact, he claimed that if there is any subconscious activity at all, it is the
result of pathology. So, said Janet, the state of perfect psychological health
consists in this:

The power to synthesize being very great, all psychological phenomena.

whatever their origin, are united in the same personalpercep tion, and conse­
quently the second personality does not exist. In such a state there would
be no distraction, no anesthesia (systematic or general), no suggestibil­
ity and no possibility of producing a somnambulism, since one could not
develop subconscious phenomena, which would not exist. (Janet, 1 889, p.
336)

Myers believed Janet's work was important but incomplete, largely

because Janet worked exclusively with hysterics. Myers's experiments, on
the other hand, were mostly with ordinary individuals who were able to
develop automatic writing. In contrast to Janet, Myers used the unfolding
data of psychological automatism to develop a wide-ranging and novel con­
ception of the human psyche and human experience, dubbing the rich and
variegated region of hidden psychological activity now emerging the "Sub­
liminal Self." His ideas found support in many contemporary researchers,
notably Binet in France ( 1 890, 1 896), Flournoy in Switzerland ( 190011983),
Dessoir in Germany (1 896), and, of course, James in America.

William James

Very early in his career, William James had struggled with what was
called (based on the paper by Huxley quoted above) the "automaton the­
ory." In a series of lectures titled "The Brain and the Mind" delivered in
1 878 (James, 1 87811988), he argued that because we know the mind better
than the nervous system, we cannot derive psychology from physiology, that
is, explain psychological phenomena in purely physiological terms. Like
Myers, James disagreed with Maudsley, who said that physiology is a full
and sufficient basis for explaining mental experience (Perry, 1 935, vol. 1, p.
28). In these lectures and in his article on Huxley's paper, James vehemently
rejected the notion that automatism, as described by the physiologists, could
provide an adequate basis for understanding human psychology. He insisted
that the "subjective" or introspective method not only provided our most
secure psychological knowledge, but it also provided a basis for interpreting
the facts of brain physiology. Taking aim directly at Huxley, he wrote:

Many persons now-a-days seem to think that any conclusion must be very
scientific if the arguments in favor of it are all derived from twitching of
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-3 1 3

frogs' legs- especially i f t h e frogs are decapitated-& that, on t h e other

hand, any doctrine chiefly vouched for by the feelings of human beings­
with heads on their shoulders, must be benighted & superstitious. They
seem to think too, that any vagary or whim, however unverified, of a sci­
entific man must needs form an integral part of science itself; that when
Huxley, for example, has ruled feeling out of the game of life, and called
it a mere bystander, supernumerary, the matter is settled. I know nothing
more deplorable than this indiscriminating gulping down of everything
materialistic as peculiarly scientific. Nothing is scientific but what is clearly
formulated, reasoned & verified. An opinion signed by the Pope if it have
these merits will be a thoroughly scientific opinion. On the other hand,
an opinion signed by Prof. Huxley, if it violate these requirements, will be
unscientific. To talk of science as many persons do whose mental type is
best represented by P. M . S. [Popular Science Monthly) is ridiculous. With
these persons it is forever Science against Philosophy, Metaphysics, Reli­
gion, Poetry, Sentiment, against all that makes life worth living. (James,
1879, pp. 29-30; see also James, 1 890b, chap. 5)

Although James here promoted an introspective approach as the most

promising available, he had not yet arrived at a framework that comfort­
ably embraced all available data. As indicated in the quotation of James
that opens this chapter, the needed ingredient was eventually supplied by
Myers and his psychologically based notion of automatism. With the advent
of Myers's new perspective, James could embrace a concept of automatism
that provided a psychological rather than physiological framework. In his
review of Janet's L'Automatisme psychologique (James, 1890a), he stated
his appreciation of the importance of this new perspective on automatism.
Writing of the evidence produced by Janet's hysterical patients, James said:
"It is therefore to no 'automatism' in the mechanical sense, that such acts
are due: a self presides over them, a split-off, limited, and buried, but yet a
fully conscious self" (p. 370).
Referring to the therapeutic value of Janet's work, James wrote:

And this leads me to what, after all, is the really important part of these
investigations-I mean their possible application to the relief of human
misery. Let one think and say what one will about the crudity and intellec­
tual barbarism of much of the philosophizing of our contemporary nerve­
doctors; let one dislike as much as one may please the thoroughly mate­
rialistic attitude of mind which many of them show; still, their work, as a
whole, is sanctified by its positive, practical fertility. Theorems about the
unity of the thinking principle will always be, as they always have been, bar­
ren; but observations of fact lead to new issues ad infinitum . Who knows
. . .

how many pathological states (not simply nervous and functional ones,
but organic ones too) may be due to the existence of some perverse buried
fragment of consciousness obstinately nourishing its narrow memory or
delusion, and thereby inhibiting the normal flow of life? (pp. 3 71-372)

James then turned to the work of Myers on automatic writing, Edmund

Gurney on hypnotism, and the findings of others, whose investigations had
3 l4-Chapter 5

shown the coexistence of secondary selves with the primary one. Here, echo­
ing Myers, he brought in his only real criticism of Janet's approach:

My own decided impression is that M. Janet's generalizations are based on

too limited a number of cases to cover the whole ground. He would have it
that the secondary self is always a symptom of hysteria ... .The secondary
and primary consciousnesses added together can, on M. lanet's theory,
never exceed the normally total consciousness of the individual. This the­
ory certainly expresses pretty well the facts which have fallen under the
author's own observations, though even here, if this were a critical article,
I might have something to say. But there are trances that obey another
type . . . . My own impression i s that the trance-condition i s an immensely
complex and fluctuating thing, into the understanding of which we have
hardly begun to penetrate, and concerning which any very sweeping gen­
eralization is sure to be premature. (p. 373)

It should not be surprising, then, that it was Myers 's formulation of

the theory of automatism to which James subscribed. In his second Lowell
Lecture (E. Taylor, 1 984, pp. 49�50), James defined automatism in terms
drawn directly from Myers, calling them sensory and motor messages from
the subliminal. He described them as physical or mental activity performed
without the awareness of the conscious self, expressing a secondary but
hidden dimension of personality. He gave examples of this transmission
of information from the secondary to the primary self, concentrating on
automatic writing, a phenomenon in which James had a particular interest
(James, 1889).
On another occasion, James (l 890�1896/191O) expressed his admiration
for the way Myers was able to provide a framework that could bring all
types of human experiences under one psychological umbrella:

Whatever the judgment of the future may be on M r. Myers' speculations,

the credit will always remain to them of being the first attempt in any lan­
guage to consider the phenomena of hallucination, hypnotism, automa­
tism, double personality, and mediumship as connected parts of one
whole subject. All constructions in this field must be provisional, and it is
as something provisional that Mr. Myers offers us his formulations. But,
thanks to him, we begin to see for the first time what a vast interlocked and
graded system these phenomena, from the rudest motor-automatisms to
the most startling sensory-apparition, form. Quite apart from Mr. Myers'
conclusions, his methodical treatment of them by classes and series is the
first great step toward overcoming the distaste of orthodox science to look
at them at all. (p. 234)

Seeing automatisms as the key to psychopathological symptoms, James

( 1 902/1958) noted that through the investigations of Binet, Janet, Breuer,
Freud, and Prince,

we have revealed to us whole systems of underground life, in the shape of

memories of a painful sort which lead a parasitic existence, buried out-
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-3 1 5

side o f t h e primary fields of consciousness, a n d making irruptions there­

into with hallucinations, pains, convulsions, paralyses of feeling and of
motion, and the whole procession of symptoms of hysteric disease of body
and of mind. Alter or abolish by suggestion these subconscious memories,
and the patient immediately gets well. His symptoms were automatisms, in
M r. Myers's sense of the word. (p. 193)

Before the formulations of either Myers or Janet, cases had been

described in the literature of psychopathology suggesting the presence of
more than one center of consciousness operating in an individual (Crabtree,
1993). The famous case of Felida X, described by Eugene Azam (1887), is
one such example. At age 14 Felida began to experience bouts of profound
sleep, after which she would wake up in a personality different from her
ordinary one, which Azam called her "second state." Another example was
Louie Vive, who exhibited six distinct personalities, each with its own set of
memories. Louie was studied by several well-known psychopathologists of
the day, and his case was eventually described in detail in a book by Bourru
and Burot ( 1 888). Cases such as these were impressive evidence that one
individual could house more than one source of intelligent action. But these,
and most of the other examples in the literature (which begins in the late
1 8th century), had depicted alternating states and provided little evidence
that the centers involved existed co-temporally. Only one case before the
1 8 80s took that next step: the case of "Old Stump." William James (1889)
himself described this case in an article on automatic writing. It concerned
a woman, Anna Winsor, who had been under the care of a Dr. Ira Barrows
of Providence, Rhode Island, from about 1 860. The doctor's record of the
case began when she was 19 and continued for several years. He described
outbreaks of bizarre behavior and fits of self-destructive violence that made
it impossible for the young woman to live a normal life. Shortly after he
had begun treating Anna, Barrows noted a peculiar change. Her right arm
suddenly became painful and then fell limp at her side. At the same time
she looked at the arm in amazement, believing that it belonged to someone
else and that her own right arm was drawn up behind her along her spine.
Her right arm proved to be completely insensitive to pricking and other
tests applied to it. Anna considered it a foreign object and a nuisance. She
believed it was an arm and hand, but not hers. She also considered it intel­
ligent and an intruder and tried to drive it away by biting it, pounding it, and
pricking it. She called it "Stump" and "Old Stump."
The right arm did indeed appear to be governed by a secondary intelli­
gence. When Anna in her delirium tried to pull her hair (with her left hand),
Old Stump stopped her. Old Stump, whose intellectual development seemed
more advanced than that of Anna, also wrote poetry, some of it partially
in Latin (of which she "has no knowledge" [po 553]), produced messages
ostensibly from deceased individuals, made drawings, and communicated
in writing with those around her-all while Anna was asleep or doing other
things and not seeming to notice what Old Stump was up to. Barrows stated
that when Anna was raving, Old Stump was rational, asking and answering
3 16-Chapter 5

questions in writing. Also, Old Stump seemed never to sleep, but watched
over Anna during the night, seeing that she remained covered and rapping
on the headboard to awaken Anna's mother when Anna experienced spasms
or other problems.
This case strikingly illustrates the concurrent operation of two separate
centers of consciousness in one individual. Each manifested as a personal
system with its own ideas, intentions, and memory chains. The later work of
Myers and Janet provided a great deal of additional material that indicated
the co-temporal status of multiple centers. Myers's automatic writing sub­
jects often wrote from a second center while they engaged in ordinary activ­
ities, such as reading or conversing, in their primary consciousness, and
Janet's (1889) hypnotic experiments-with Leonie, for example-demon­
strated the simultaneous activity of several secondary personalities. A case
described by F. C. S. Schiller bears a certain resemblance to that of Anna
Winsor in that a man, using two planchettes, one under each hand, simul­
taneously wrote two messages, dealing with entirely different subjects and
purporting to come from two different personalities (HP, vol. 1 , p. 420).
James, however, was especially interested in a further issue discussed
by Myers, namely the patterns of mutual awareness holding among the con­
currently active centers. Myers held that the consciousness of a sublimi­
nal personality could embrace knowledge of the thoughts and deeds of the
supraliminal self. This might be thought of as a kind of inclusivity-not
necessarily in the way a person's mind is inclusive of its own thoughts-but
in some fashion which allows the thoughts of another personality to be
directly perceived,12 Myers did not speculate on whether this kind of inclu­
sivity could also occur between two or more subliminal consciousnesses.
However, he did indicate that the Subliminal Self (in the sense of the all
embracing and ultimate source of unity beyond the multiplicity of an indi­
vidual) encompasses all that occurs in the supraliminal and multiple sub­
liminal centers (see Chapter 2).
James accepted and carried forward this difficult idea in his later works
on problems in religion and metaphysics (see especially the conclusions of
James, 1 90211 958, and 19091197 1 , Lecture 5). While these later efforts on the
part of James to grapple with the fundamental issues raised by the scientific
investigation of human experience were essentially ignored by most 20th­
century psychologists as mere philosophizing, they were in fact his way of

1 2 . There is no evidence that Myers believed that such a subliminal self necessarily per­
ceives the thoughts (and actions) of the supraliminal self as its own-which would imply that
the subliminal self would perceive itself as responsible for those thoughts (and actions). Such
a position would, in fact, be hard to maintain in the face of a great many accounts in the lit­
erature of mesmerism and hypnotism in which, for example, a hypnotic personality explicitly
distinguished itself from the primary personality and specifically disowned the attitudes and
actions of that personality; these, and many instances of "dual personality" (e.g., Azam, 1 887;
Deleuze, 1 8 1 3, vol. 1, p. 176; Oespine, 1 838, pp. 38-40; Ennemoser, 1 852; Gregory, 1 8 5 1 , pp.
85, 486; James, 1 889; Janet, 1 889; Pigeaire, 1839, p. 44; Prince, 190511908; Richet, 1 883, pp.
228-233) provide evidence that the experience of inclusivity does not necessarily, and perhaps
not typically, involve a sense of common identity. Mitchell ( 1 922, p. 223), on the other hand,
said that one personality of a multiple may sometimes experience another as "part of itself."
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-317

carrying forward the thoroughly empirical spirit of Myers. And he was not
alone in tackling this conceptually difficult subject. American psychologist
and fel low Bostonian Morton Prince was among the foremost of Myers's
contemporaries who grappled with issues relating to automatism and co­
conSCIOusness.

Morton Prince

Prince coined the word "co-consciousness" both to point to the real­

ity of hidden centers of mental life and to convey the co-temporality of the
multiple centers involved . Discussing such phenomena as automatic writ­
ing and speech, post-hypnotic suggestions, and similar phenomena, Prince
(1 907) wrote:

Thus a "doubling" of consciousness results consisting of a personal self

and the subconscious ideas. I prefer myself the term co-conscious to sub­
conscious, partly to express the notion of co-activity of a second co-con­
sciousness, partly to avoid the ambiguity of the conventional term due to
its many meanings, and partly because such ideas are not necessarily sub­
conscious at all; that is, there may be no lack of awareness of them. (pp.
67-68)

Prince also pointed out that the two centers of consciousness need not
be unaware of each other. As in the case of Old Stump, there may be one­
way or even mutual awareness without affecting the fact of separateness.
Like Myers, Prince emphasized that secondary centers show every sign of
intelligence and cannot be explained in purely physiological terms. In fact,
he says, they should be treated as one might treat any separate intelligent
person:

The only grounds which I have for believing that my fellow beings have
thoughts like myself are that their actions are like my own, exhibit intel­
ligence like my own, and when I ask them they tell me they have conscious­
ness, which as described is like my own. Now, when I observe the so-called
automatic actions, I find that they are of similar character, and when I ask
of whatever it is that performs these actions, Whether it is conscious or
not? The written or spoken reply is, that it is and that consciously it feels,
thinks and wills the actions, etc. The evidence being the same in the one
case as i n the other, the presumption is that the automatic intelligence is as
conscious as the personal intelligence. (p. 69)

In his well-known study of the "Miss Beauchamp" case of multiple per­

sonality, Prince (190511908) attempted, among other things, to come to terms
with the "inclusivity" aspect of co-consciousness. This case involved what
Prince ( 1929) called three secondary personalities: BI, named "the Saint,"
who was characterized by piety and scrupulosity, meekness, and endless
3 1 8-Chapter 5

patience; BIV, named "the woman" and "the realist," who was strong, reso­
lute, self-reliant, and easily provoked to anger; and Sally, who was mischie­
vous, fun-loving, free from responsibility-all in all a child in character.
While BI and BIV alternated with each other and became dormant when not
in possession of the body, Sally was a co-conscious personality in a deeper
sense. When she was not interacting in the world, she did not become dor­
mant, but persisted and was active, often producing automatic phenomena
in the other two personalities. Sally knew the thoughts, feelings, and actions
of the other two personalities; also, when co-conscious, "she had percep­
tions of her environment which never entered the awareness of the principal
consciousness. In this state she saw, heard and was generally cognizant of
much that neither BI nor BIV consciously recognized" (p. 149). Prince noted
that "a large mass of evidence goes to show that as a co-consciousness there
were trains of thought and feelings that did not enter the conscious stream
of the principal consciousness" (p. 149).
Sally maintained that she "knows everything Miss Beauchamp . . . does
at the time she does it,-knows what she thinks, hears what she says, reads
what she writes, and sees what she does; that she knows all this as a sepa­
rate co-self, and that her knowledge does not come to her afterwards . . .in
the form of a memory" (Prince, 1 905/1908, p. 145). Sally would torment BI
with practical jokes and called BIV an "idiot." Her whole attitude was that
of a separate person with ideas and purposes of her own, who in no way felt
identified with the others. Here we have another example of inclusiveness in
the sense that the thoughts, feelings, and actions of one personality (or two)
are known by another, without any sense of those thoughts, feelings, and
actions belonging to that other.13
Although probably best known for his work with "Miss Beauchamp,"
Prince derived much of his evidence for co-consciousness from other
sources, not least his work with automatic writing. Like Myers, he believed
that the simultaneous functioning of two or more consciousnesses was the
only possible way to explain much of the data observed. He also noted that
automatic writing exhibits, as it were, grades of co-consciousness, from
automatic writing produced while the writer's ordinary consciousness is
completely alert and active to instances in which ordinary consciousness
is nearly extinguished. He pointed out that in the latter case an argument

1 3 . Later studies of multiple personality (e.g., Allison, 1 980; Beahrs, 1982; Ludwig et ai.,
1 972; F. W. Putnam, 1 989; Ross, 1989) have also described this kind of inclusiveness, where
one personality is aware of the activities of another personality "in real time," as it were,
rather than, say, learning about those activities indirectly through some subsequent inner
communication. Thus one personality was considered to be "co-conscious" with another
when it was directly aware of what that other personality was doing while it was doing it, and
"co-consciousness" referred to the internal state of a multiple in which this kind of awareness
was operating. An alter personality might, for example, speak of "hearing" the thoughts of
another personality or "seeing" the other personality do something. Having such awareness,
however, did not mean experiencing the other personality as having the same identity as the
alter or experiencing that other personality as part of the alter. Each of the two personalities
involved would see the other as distinct in identity from him- or herself, in the same way that
one human being sees another as separate and distinct.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-3 1 9

can b e made for a n explanation based on alternating, rather than coexisting

personalities, but that when ordinary consciousness is alert we encounter
the strongest evidence for the co-temporality of the two centers, because we
then see both the primary and the secondary consciousnesses operating in
the same moment (Prince, 1907, pp. 72-74; for examples, see HP, vol. 1 , pp.
169, 420, 589).
Echoing Myers, Prince insisted that the content of automatic writing
rules out a purely physiological interpretation. The writings do not consist of
words, phrases, and paragraphs that might be mere repetitions or memories
of previous experiences, but rather are made up of original compositions.
Sometimes they convey "fanciful fairy-tale-like fabrication," sometimes
they provide ingenious answers to questions, and sometimes they indicate a
personal character that contrasts to the normal character of the writer. He
concluded: "If such a document were presented as testamentary evidence
in the ordinary course of human affairs, it would seem as if the burden of
proof would lie with him who would insist upon interpreting it as without
psychological meaning and as only the expression of a physiological activity
of the nervous system without thought" (Prince, 1 907, p. 75).
Prince further pointed out that all conscious states, in our experience
of them, "belong to, take part in, or help to make up a self" (p. 76). It is,
in fact, difficult to conceive of a conscious state that is not associated with
a self-conscious self. He stated that it would be "queer" to think of a state
of consciousness or sensation or perception or idea as off by itself, not
attached to anything we call a self. By emphasizing the psychological in this
way, however, Prince insisted that he was not dismissing the physiological.
He held that all thought is correlated with physiological activities, and he
believed that the phenomena would ultimately require both a psychological
and physiological explanation.

T. W. Mitchell

Thomas Walker Mitchell , physician, clinician, and editor of the Brit­

ish Journal of Medical Psychology, took a somewhat Janetian approach to
explaining multiple centers of consciousness in the human psyche. Like
Janet, he developed a theory of dissociation derived from his clinical expe­
riences with hypnotism, hysteria, and multiple personality, and he had little
to say about the possibility of hidden centers of consciousness that might
be operating in the life of the average human being. Nevertheless, his pen­
etrating discussion of central issues in the investigation of multiple centers
renders his writings in this area important.
Mitchell accepted Myers's notion of a threshold of consciousness and
said that he found the term "subliminal" most useful, because, as defined
by Myers (HP, vol. 1, p. 14), it included every possible kind of mental phe­
nomena occurring outside ordinary awareness. He also insisted that there
was an urgent need to clear up the confusion that often showed itself in
320-Chapter 5

discussions of the various types of subliminal phenomena (Mitchell, 1921,

p. 61). Specifically, he argued that there is a difference between what is con­
scious, what is unconscious, and what is dissociated (as described by Janet).
He believed that Prince's terminology was best, stating that "by using Dr.
Prince's term 'co-conscious,' we emphasize the important fact that in these
dissociations we have an actual splitting of consciousness, not merely a split­
ting of the mind" (p. 61). By a splitting of consciousness he meant the rec­
ognition of co-conscious dissociated centers; by a splitting of the mind he
meant the division between what is in some way or other conscious and what
is unconscious; and by "unconscious" M itchell meant those subliminal hap­
penings which occur outside of consciousness and are incapable of entering
into consciousness. He believed that Freud was most accurate in describing
what is unconscious in this sense, but he felt that his explanation too had its
faults (pp. 62-63).
Mitchell stated that dissociation can be said to occur when something
that has been in consciousness becomes split off from it (p. 33). He believed
that this splitting off results in an amnesia, or an inability to recall certain
thoughts, feelings, or actions, and he noted that if a person who is experi­
encing this kind of amnesia is hypnotized, the thoughts, feelings, or actions
can be reclaimed. But, he asked, when split off or dissociated, where do the
thoughts and feelings go?

Thoughts and feelings cannot be left floating about in the void, unclaimed
by any thinker. We have no knowledge of any thoughts or feelings that are
not the thoughts or feelings of some personal self. And we know that i n
becoming dissociated the split-off portions d o not necessarily lose their
quality of consciousness. While the patient is awake and aware of some
things, dissociated sensations or perceptions may provide evidence of a
concurrent discriminative awareness of other things, as effective as that
which characterizes the sensory or perceptive activity of the conscious
waking self. (pp. 33-34)

Mitchell was able to use his schema of dissociated ideas to successfully

treat cases of multiple personality. He explained the formation of dissoci­
ated personalities in this way:

A complex formed in relation to some event accompanied by great emo­

tion may become dissociated from the personal consciousness, so that all
recollection of the event and of the feelings and actions connected with it
becomes impossible. A complex so dissociated does not cease to be capa­
ble of functioning. . . . Many separate experiences may have taken part i n
t h e formation o f a dissociated complex, but they a r e a l l bound together
by some common element of feeling or emotion . . . . [The dissociated mental
complex] must somehow still form part of the structure of the mind. Did
it not do so, it could never take possession of the bodily organism so as
to manifest as a secondary personality. . . . Just as we speak of a man being
possessed by an idea, so we may speak of an idea developing to such an
extent that it arouses a new personality. ( Mitchell, 1 922, pp. 105-1 14)
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-32l

Recognizing that not all instances of multiple personality are the same,
M itchell ( 1 91 2) distinguished two major types: alternating and co-conscious.
In the first type,

the split-off portions of the self seem to remain latent until the attack or
alternation occurs. During their periods of latency they seem to be cut off
from all experience and do not grow or develop i n any way. There is a divi­
sion of the self without any true doubling of consciousness. (p. 272)

This is a situation in which we simply have alternating personalities,

where A is replaced by B, and then B is replaced by A. In this case neither
knows the other directly-their paths never cross. In the second type, how­
ever,

the dissociated portion of consciousness may never have formed a part

of the waking self, and consequently cannot properly be described as a
split-off part of the mind. When it is not in evidence as an alternating per­
sonality, it is not latent. It is co-conscious, and may have experience and
grow and develop in the subconscious. There is a doubling of conscious­
ness without any true division of the normal self. (pp. 272-273)

Here A is replaced by B, and then B by A, but B remains conscious (on a

subliminal level with respect to A) and carries on with its activities while A
is functioning in the world. Mitchell believed that the trance personalities
(i.e., "controls") of mediums belonged in this class and attempted to clarify
how they could have been formed in the first place:

It is true that trance personalities do not, as a rule, alternate with the wak­
ing consciousness to the extent of taking possession of the whole bodily
organism, and in many instances they afford no definite evidence of their
existence as co-conscious activities. Yet i n so far as their origin cannot
be traced to any large splitting off or secession from the waking self, they
seem to conform to the type of secondary personality whose growth and
development take place entirely in the subconscious. I have assumed that
the evolution of these personalities must be dependent on subconscious
experiences in relation to the ordinary environment. But if, as some people
think, man has an environment which transcends sense, it may be that this
environment can affect the subconscious without having any noticeable
influence on the waking self. It would then be legitimate to suppose that
experience related to such an environment might sometimes take part in
the formation of secondary personalities. (p. 274)

In his particular formulation of co-consciousness, Mitchell accepted the

kind of inclusivity described by Myers and Prince. Like Myers, he accepted
that the individual has a fundamental unity. He also believed that alternat­
ing manifestations of secondary selves might in principle be accounted for
in terms of the activation of different neural systems. He argued, however,
that this could not be the explanation for secondary personalities that were
co-conscious with the primary. He stated the dilemma and his solution:
322-Chapter 5

A co-conscious personality's experience in so far as it is experience of the

same things as that of the primary personality, must be obtained through
the same sensory channels and must be subserved by the same neuronic
systems. I n so far as the co-conscious experience is a different experience,
or an experience of different things, it must be due to the inclusion in the
functioning aggregate of a wider system of neural elements . . . . In view of
the occurrence of co-conscious personalities, we seem bound to look for
some other ground of the felt unity of consciousness besides the spatial
continuity of a nervous system through which a unitary soul may mani­
fest. Such a ground may, perhaps, be found in the conception of a psycho­
physical threshold which delimits, though it does not constitute, personal­
ity. . . . A permanently raised threshold will produce a curtailed personality.
On the other hand, if the threshold is lowered, we get an expansion of the
normal consciousness . . . . Any considerable lowering of the threshold will
produce hypnosis, and a permanently lowered threshold will lead to the
formation of a hypnotic personality.. . . Co-conscious personalities would
be due to a doubling of the threshold at which consciousness can appear.
The intensity of neural activity which is necessary for the appearance of a
consciousness is not sufficient for the appearance of the waking conscious­
ness. (pp. 279-281)

In a formulation which echoes that of Myers, Mitchell (1 922) attempted

to account for the unity in multiplicity in terms of a "soul":

I f, as the interactionists maintain, we have to postulate a soul as the

ground of the unity of any consciousness, we must, of course, postulate
a soul as the ground of the unity of each of the consciousnesses met with
i n multiple personalities of the co-conscious or hypnotic type. But there
is no good reason why we should not regard one and the same soul as the
effective ground in each and all of the phases of consciousness occurring
in one individual. (p. 234)

Referring to the view of the philosopher Henri Bergson in regard to the

relationship between body and mind, Mitchell argued that Bergson's con­
ception of memory "helps us to understand how secondary personalities,
even when exhibiting co-consciousness, may be manifestations of the activ­
ity of a single soul" (p. 235). This sounds very much like Myers's overarching
Subliminal Self that contains and coordinates all that occurs in the human
psyche.

William McDougall

In the process of working out his schema, Mitchell examined and

rejected the solution of William McDougall, another major player in the
discussion of automatism and co-consciousness. McDougall was a British
psychologist who had a notable influence on psychological thinking in Eng­
land and the United States in the first half of the 20th century. He was also
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-323

a member of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) and served a term
as its president. McDougall was strongly critical of Myers's vision of sub­
liminal selves, automatism, and multiple centers of consciousness. In his
( 1903) review of Human Personality (on our digital version), McDougall
claimed that Myers subscribed to what William James had called "multiple
monadism," the view that the individual is a system of psychic units each
with its own degree of mental life, but had added to this an unacceptable
additional doctrine that there is a profounder unity, the Subliminal Self,
that coordinates this multiplicity (p. 5 1 5). McDougall developed a different
monadic theory of the psyche, first alluded to in his book Body and Mind
(McDougall, 191 1/1961, p. 368n) and elaborated in his Presidential Address
to the SPR (McDougall, 1 920). Here he repudiated the views of Prince,
Mitchell, and others on co-consciousness and made explicit how very dif­
ferent his understanding of the psyche was from that of Myers.
In this address he stated that, in Body and Mind, "I maintained that,
however we conceive the body, we are compelled to conceive our conscious
mental life as the activity of a unitary being endowed with the faculties of
knowing, feeling and striving, the ego, soul, or self" (McDougall, 1 920, p.
1 1 0). He went on to say that in the years intervening since the publication of
that book, he had himself become involved with cases of nervous disorder
that seemed at first glance to make this notion of a unitary ego untenable.
These cases suggested that the self had been divided into two or more parts,
each endowed with "the fundamental faculties of mind, conscious know­
ing, feeling and striving, a striving that expresses itself in part in the con­
trol of bodily movements" (p. 1 1 0). From such data, said McDougall, many
had concluded that consciousness is a kind of stuff which can be combined,
broken up, and recombined in many ways. However, he insisted that this
conclusion was unjustified and that " the argument for the unity of the ego
seems to me as strong and conclusive as ever" (p. 1 1 1). He did not deny the
facts marshaled by those who accepted the notion of a divided self:

I believe we are compelled to recognise that sometimes, and not infre­

quently, a single human organism or person is the seat of more than one
stream of conscious knowing, feeling and striving, more than one train of
mental activity; and that these trains may be not only distinct, but may
be in acute opposition and conflict one with another, just as really as I
may be in conflict with you, a conflict of purposes, of efforts towards d i f­
ferent ends. I f my former conclusion holds good, it follows that each of
such distinct streams of purposive effort is the activity of a unitary sel f
or ego. Are we then to fly to the ancient theory of possession, whenever
we observe evidence of such multiplicity of distinct mental activities with
a single organism? By no means. The obvious and, I believe, inevitable
inference from the facts is that I who consciously address you am only one
among several selves or egos which my organism, my person, comprises. I
am only the dominant member of a society, an association of similar mem­
bers. There are many purposive activities within my organism of which I
am not aware, which are not my activities but those of my associates . . . . My
subordinates serve me faithfully in the main, provided always that I con-
324-Chapter 5

tinue to be resolute and strong. But, when I relax my control, in states

of sleep, hypnosis, relaxation and abstraction, my subordinates, or some
of them, continue to work and then are apt to manifest their activities i n
the forms w e have learnt t o c a l l sensory a n d motor automatisms. A n d if I
am weak and irresolute, if I do not face the problems of life and take the
necessary decisions for dealing with them, then conflict arises within our
system, one or more of my subordinates gets out of hand, I lose my con­
trol, and division of the personality into conflicting systems replaces the
normal and harmonious co-operation of all members in one system. And
i n extreme cases such a revolted subordinate, escaped from the control of
the dominant member or monad, may continue his career of insubordina­
tion indefinitely, acquiring increased influence over other members of the
society and becoming a serious rival to the normal ruler or dominant. (pp.
1 1 1- 1 1 2)

McDougall illustrated what this conception means in concrete experi­

ence. In dreams, he stated, I, the dominant monad, become passive and
inert, and my subordinates may continue to think. These thoughts are expe­
rienced as dream-images and dream-thoughts and have a quality very dif­
ferent from those of myself, the dominant monad. The reason is that since
they emanate from a subordinate monad, they must be "more primitive,
nearer to the purely organic and instinctive than my own,"-something we
must assume, since they are lower in position in the hierarchy (p. 1 1 5). In
hypnosis too, continued McDougall, subordinate monads are at work, inde­
pendent of my control. The experience of dreams, hypnotism, and other
automatisms shows that each monad retains the memory of its own activi­
ties and can obtain awareness of the actions of other monads only through
hypnosis or other special techniques.
Turning to the issue of survival of death, McDougall stated that "I, if
I survive the dissolution of my bodily organism, shall, by our hypothesis,
retain only those functions which I have not delegated but have developed
by active exercise and those memories which are most truly mine, the mem­
ories of my own activities" (p. 1 20). Thus, for McDougall it is the everyday
"I," the dominant monad, that might survive, and I, as a monad, no lon­
ger function as the commander-in-chief of the hierarchy that characterized
my earthly existence. Just what the new existence may be is not clear, but
McDougall speculated that monads may form new societies after death.14
I have quoted at length from McDougall's talk because it represents, in
clear and uncompromising terms, one very specific view of the relationship
between centers of consciousness within human beings. Although McDou­
gall agreed with Myers in accepting co-conscious centers, he conceived of
their character and relationships in a way that is radically different from
Myers's conception. McDougall conceived of human personality as a hier-

14. We cannot assume from this that McDougall was personally convinced of survival.
I n Body and Mind ( 1 9 1 111961) he wrote: "A considerable mass of evidence pointing in this
direction [survival] has been accumulated . . . . Nevertheless . . . again and again the evidential
character of the observations has fallen just short of perfection" (p. 347).
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-325

archical arrangement of conscious "monads," one which is given order from

the top-the ordinary conscious self-down. IS
This view faces a variety of empirical difficulties, however. First, we
do not have any conscious awareness of planning and commanding in the
sense he describes. Neither does he provide a way to understand asymmetri­
cal consciousness between dissociated personalities, where a "subordinate"
monad would know of the thoughts and activities of the dominant monad,
but not vice versa; this is surprising, because McDougall (191 1 /1961) eventu­
ally accepted the idea that such relations exist (pp. 366-368n; 1 926, pp. 255,
349-350, 490-506). Nor does he make any attempt to account for the super­
normal capacities sometimes exhibited by subordinate monads, although
he clearly accepted that such capacities exist (191 1/1961, chap. 25). Also, in
this schema the monads pre-exist, presumably from birth, but there is no
way to know anything about them or how the various functions of the whole
are divided among them. Speculation about what those functions might be
quickly bogs down. If the dominant monad orders the movement of a hand,
is there a subordinate monad, a "motor movement monad," that carries out
that command? Or is there a hand monad charged with all hand activities?
If the dominant monad orders the writing of an essay, what monads are
involved? It is impossible to come up with anything but the most arbitrary
division of monadic function in attempting to answer such questions.
In struggling with the phenomena of automatism, Myers too came to
the conclusion, as we have seen, that the only possible way of explaining
what occurs is to posit separate centers of consciousness with their own
memory chains, centers that in some cases can be considered full-fledged
personalities in the sense that in their communications they exhibit all
the sorts of qualities that we normally associate with independent selves.
As he investigated the phenomena further, however, Myers realized that
he had opened the door to a rich and dynamic world of hidden activity
in the human psyche, the world of "subliminal" or "ultra-marginal"16 con­
sciousness. Contrary to McDougall's notion that the unity of the individual
human being is produced top-down by the everyday conscious self, a com­
mander-in-chief overseeing lesser but autonomous selves, Myers conceived
of the psyche's unity as deriving from something beyond anything ordinary
consciousness can directly perceive.
Myers referred to that underlying unity as the "Self" with a capital "S"
(although he was not wholly consistent with this), something distinct from
other manifestations of selfhood that he described. Myers used the word
"self" (small "s") as "a descriptive term for any chain of memory sufficiently
continuous, and embracing sufficient particulars, to acquire what is popu-

1 5 . Some years earlier, the philosopher Gerald Balfour, in his Presidential Address to the
SPR, had proposed a similar view (Balfour, 1 906; see also Balfour, 1935, pp. 3 1 1-314, which
further develops these views in the context of an extended critique of Myers's theory of the
Subliminal Self). We will return to this in Chapter 9.
1 6. For a discussion of James's understanding of this expression of Myers, see E. Taylor
( 1996).
326-Chapter 5

larly called a 'character' of its own. There will thus be one distinct supra­
liminal self at a time; but more than one subliminal self may exist, or may be
capable of being called into existence" (Myers, 1 892b, pp. 305-306n).
With regard to "self" (small "s"), Myers held that all psychical action
that occurs in the individual, subliminal and supraliminal, occurs with con­
sciousness and is included in an actual or potential memory. Although he had
himself sometimes done so, Myers thought that to speak of a "secondary"
self could be misleading, because one might give the mistaken impression
that there cannot be more selves than two and because it could cause one to
believe that the supraliminal self, the empirical self of common experience,
was in some way superior to the subliminal self-something that Myers
explicitly denied. He insisted that "the arrangement with which we habitu­
ally identify ourselves,-what we call the normal or primary self. . . is not
necessarily superior in any other respect to the latent personalities which lie
alongside it" (Myers, 1 888a, p. 387). In other words, the ordinary conscious­
ness, the supraliminal self, had no privileged position in respect to those
"arrangements" called subliminal selves or personalities. In fact, a central
part of Myers's doctrine is that these normally hidden strata of the psyche
have access to wider ranges of information and faculty than the everyday
self. This view is in stark contrast to that of McDougall, who insisted on the
superiority of the monad that is the self of everyday life. Said Myers:

Sometimes we seem to see our subliminal perceptions and faculties act­

ing truly in u nity, truly as a Self;-co-ordinated into some harmonious
"inspiration of genius," or some profound and reasonable hypnotic self­
reformation, or some far-reaching supernormal achievement of clairvoy­
ant vision or of self-projection into a spiritual world. Whatever of sublimi­
nal personality is thus acting corresponds with the highest-level centres of
supraliminal life. At such moments the subliminal represents (as I believe)
most nearly what will become the surviving Self. (HP, vol. 1 , p. 73)

The views of Myers and McDougall provide strongly contrasting depic­

tions of the organization of human personality. Elements of these two con­
ceptions may be found in the other formulations that took shape during the
course of the 20th century, but we can think of these two as the canonical
forms, recurring again and again with various nonessential modifications,
as we shall see below in this chapter.
It should be clear, however, that there were important issues on which
McDougall agreed with Myers. Specifically, in relation to the issues of this
chapter, they agreed that multiple centers of consciousness exist, that they
function concurrently, that they can display awareness of each other, and
that they underlie psychological automatisms. None of these views were
shared by another influential contemporary, Sigmund Freud, to whom I
next turn.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-327

Sigmund Freud

The writings of Sigmund Freud present a view of mental activity out­

side ordinary awareness that stands in sharp contrast to those we have so far
discussed. Freud paid little attention to instances of psychological automa­
tism, so plentiful in the psychological literature, and the lack of any system­
atic assessment of this variegated data in his writings is striking. Nonethe­
less, his explanation of the concept of consciousness does have a bearing on
our discussion and must be given serious attention.
Already in his Interpretation of Dreams, Freud took the view that what
is psychical must not be considered equivalent to what is conscious. Here he
wrote: "This enables us to form a quite definite view of the 'essential nature'
of consciousness: we see the process of a thing becoming conscious as a
specific psychical act, distinct from and independent of the process of the
formation of a presentation or idea; and we regard consciousness as a sense
organ which perceives data that arise elsewhere" (Freud, 1 90011964, p. 144).
From this it is clear that Freud saw consciousness as unitary and ruled out
any notion of multiple conscious centers. However, at this point we have
little more than this simple statement on the matter, because Freud had not
yet fully developed his notion of consciousness.
In a paper titled "A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis," con­
sidered one of his most important theoretical papers, Freud went into the
matter of the unicity of consciousness in greater depth. Before discussing
the content of this paper, it is important to say something about factors sur­
rounding its publication.
The paper appeared in 1912 as an article in the SPR Proceedings, writ­
ten by Freud in response to a request from that journal to contribute to
a special medical section. The significance of this publishing venue has
been discussed in an intriguing article by James Keeley (2001) in which the
author presents convincing arguments that Freud acquiesced to the request
because he wanted to make a long delayed answer to comments made by
Myers about Freud's work some 18 years earlier in the same journal. Keeley
claims that there are "surprisingly close textual relations between 'A Note'
and Myers's work, especially Myers's article 'The Mechanism of Hysteria'"
(Myers, 1893a), in which he mentioned Freud's work. Keeley (2001) uses this
and other arguments to make the case that Freud intended his article to
be a strong statement-in Myers's own back yard, so to speak-not only
about the central theoretical concepts of psychoanalysis, but also about how
psychoanalysis had transcended its roots in late 19th-century investigations
of hypnosis and concomitant phenomena-represented particularly by the
work of Myers-and had thus become a ful ly fledged, independent, and (in
his view) correct scientific psychology. Keeley states that, as Freud's first
systematic theorization of the unconscious, this essay is a "crucial text in
the history of psychology: the textual site of Freud's liberating himself from
the influence of nineteenth-century psychology, as represented by the SPR's
psychology of the subliminal self" (p. 772).
328-Chapter 5

Myers, in the article mentioned above, was the first to introduce Freud
and his ideas to the English-speaking world. He referred to the work of
Freud and Breuer with appreciation and cited their findings as welcome
confirmation from medical clinical practice of ideas he had himself devel­
oped about subliminal mental processes. At the same time, Myers implied
that Freud and Breuer were latecomers to the work originally begun by
himself, Edmund Gurney, and Pierre Janet. Although Myers wrote posi­
tively of Freud and Breuer, he also made the point that the investigation of
psychological pathology, such as they had been engaged in, could go only so
far, and that it was only through the study of subliminal phenomena in the
healthy that the ful l story would be told (Myers, l 893a, p. 14). It is Keeley's
(2001) contention that, whatever Freud may have thought about Myers's
comments in 1 893, by 1 9 1 2 he was ready to tell the world that psychoanaly­
sis had become a psychology of unparalleled depth that had left far behind
its beginnings in the 19th-century practice of hypnotism, and embodied
its own distinctive theories and methods. Keeley also believes that Myers's
mention of the name of Janet (with whom Freud had in the intervening years
developed a bitter rivalry) as an investigator who had priority of ideas over
Freud would have provided further motivation for Freud to present his con­
trary views. What is important about Keeley's article for our purposes is its
presentation of the ways in which Freud distinguished the "Unconscious"
of psychoanalysis from Myers's "Subliminal Self" and where that put Freud
in relation to the concepts of automatism, co-consciousness, and secondary
personality.
Freud ( 1 91 2) began "A Note" by making clear what he meant by "con­
scious" and "unconscious." He wrote:

Now let us call "conscious" the conception which is present to our con­
sciousness and of which we are aware, and let this be the only meaning
of the term "conscious." As for latent conceptions, if we have any reason
to suppose that they exist in the mind . . . Iet them be denoted by the term
"unconscious." Thus an unconscious conception is one of which we are
not aware, but the existence of which we are nevertheless ready to admit
on account of other proofs or signs. (pp. 3 1 2-313)

He then tackled the belief that consciousness can be split up in such a way
that some ideas or psychical acts might be said to constitute a "consciousness
apart" which has become estranged from "the bulk of conscious activity"
(p. 3 1 5). Freud acknowledged first that such a view might seem to be sup­
ported by cases of dual personality, such as that described by Azam (1887),
which I mentioned earlier. But we are not justified, said Freud, in extending
the word "conscious" so far that it includes a consciousness of which the
"owner" him- or herself is not aware. He then went on to say that if philoso­
phers find it hard to accept the existence of unconscious ideas, they should
find it even more difficult to accept that there can be such a thing as an
"unconscious consciousness." He suggested that, instead of talking about a
"splitting of consciousness," as in the case of dual consciousness described
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-329

by Azam, it would make most sense to say that we are dealing with a "shift­
ing of consciousness," where that function simply oscillates between two
different psychical complexes "which become conscious and unconscious
in alternation" (p. 3 1 5).
If Myers were reading this explanation, he would object that the exam­
ple Freud chose to illustrate his position, Azam's dual personality case of
Felida X, is one that was widely recognized to be subject to an alternating­
consciousness explanation and therefore could not serve as a test case for
automatism and co-consciousness. Already in the 1 870s, the case of Felida
X had been understood as a shifting of consciousness from one state to
another for which no further explanation was needed. What Freud would
find more difficult to explain with his unitary consciousness theory would
be those numerous cases in which two apparent intelligences communicate
simultaneously. That, after all, was the kind of case that led Myers, James,
Janet, and eventually many others to the notion of psychological automatism
and a conception of the situation that would later be called co-conscious­
ness. If Freud could not explain examples of psychological automatism with
temporal co-consciousness, his theory was incomplete, if not erroneous.
Freud ( 1 91 5/ 1 964) returned to the issue of the unity of consciousness
in The Unconscious, but there did little more than repeat what he had set
forth in his article of 1912. In An A utobiographical Study, however, Freud
(1925/ 1964) took the discussion one step further and launched an explicit,
concerted attack on Pierre Janet and his idea of multiple centers of con­
sciousness. Chafing at Janet's often repeated charge that much of psycho­
analysis derived from his own work, Freud was at pains to show how little
his ideas had in common with Janet's and therefore how absurd the accusa­
tion of intellectual dependence was. He stated his differences in the plainest
terms possible: "Psycho-analysis regarded every thing mental as being in
the first instance unconscious; the further quality of 'consciousness' might
also be present, or again it might be absent" (p. 31). He took pains to chide
those "philosophers" for whom "conscious" and "mental" were identical
and who could not accept the notion of an "unconscious mental." Taking up
Janet's view, Freud pointed out what he considered an unsolvable dilemma:
"Anyone who tried to push the argument further and to conclude from it
that one's own hidden processes belonged actually to a second conscious­
ness would be faced with the concept of a consciousness of which one knew
nothing, of an 'unconscious consciousness'-and this would scarcely be
preferable to the assumption of an 'unconscious mental'" (p. 32).
To anyone who has actually read Janet (and Myers), Freud's stand is,
to say the least, puzzling, and one might wonder if Freud was being delib­
erately obtuse in his interpretation of Janet's "unconscious mental acts."
It was precisely because his hysterical subjects exhibited what he consid­
ered irrefutable evidence for a "consciousness of which one knew nothing"
that Janet felt compelled to posit unconscious mental acts. It was clear even
from Janet's very first writings on the matter that he used the word "uncon­
scious" with a very specific meaning: It meant unconscious in relation to
330-Chapter 5

the subject 's ordinary, everyday consciousness. He certainly never claimed

that he had discovered a consciousness that was unconscious in itself. That
absurdity, which Freud takes to be Janet's meaning, cannot be attributed to
him. Whether Freud was setting up a Janetian straw man for easy destruc­
tion or simply missed the obvious meaning of Janet's statements, we cannot
know. What is clear is that in this crucial theoretical matter Freud clearly
separated himself from Myers, Janet, and the other authors cited above, and
rejected any picture of unconscious mental activity that could be called co­
conscious with ordinary, everyday awareness.
This theoretical stance made it very difficult for psychoanalysis to deal
with dissociative disorders in general and multiple personality disorder in
particular, something that was recognized by Freud's contemporaries. In
his Presidential Address to the Medical Section of the British Psychologi­
cal Society, Bernard Hart (1 926) took Freud and psychoanalysis to task for
failing to account for the phenomena of dissociation in their theoretical
constructions (pp. 253-256).17 In one of his few attempts to account for the
possibility of multiple personalities, Freud ( 1923/1964) wrote:

If [the ego's object-identifications] obtain the upper hand and become too
numerous, unduly powerful, and incompatible with one another, a patho­
logical outcome will not be far off. It may come to a disruption of the ego
in consequence of the different identifications becoming cut off from one
another by resistances; perhaps the secret of the cases of what is described
as "multiple personality" is that the different identifications seize hold of
consciousness in turn [italics added]. Even when things do not go so far as
this, there remains the question of conflicts between the various identifica­
tions into which the ego comes apart, conflicts which cannot after all be
described as entirely pathological. (pp. 30-31)

This rather strained explanation, which left the problem of co-conscious­

ness unexplained, was, it seems, the best that could be done if the unity of
consciousness was to be preserved at all costs.
Freud's idea that there can be mental acts that lack consciousness placed
him in the unenviable position so ably criticized by William James when
asking whether states of mind can be unconscious. James ( l 890b) argued
persuasively that such a view was "the sovereign means for believing what
one likes in psychology and of turning what might become a science into a
tumbling-ground for whimsies" (vol . I, p. 1 63), and James's concerns have
been echoed by more recent critics of psychoanalysis.
Compelling arguments against Freud's conception of conscious and
unconscious mental states have also been advanced by philosopher John
Searle (e.g., Searle, 1992, pp. 1 65-171). He states that, since Freud sees these

17. Despite this criticism of psychoanalysis, Hart contended that when discussing dissocia­
tion, Janet and Freud were operating on two entirely different levels and that what appeared
to be rival theories were in fact two different stages of inquiry (for a description of Hart's
view, see Crabtree, 1 986, pp. 97-100). Unfortunately, Hart did not tackle the crucial issue of
co-consciousness and for that reason failed to see the incompatibility of the two positions.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-331

states as mental (that is, as what Searle would call "occurrent intrinsic
intentional states") even when they are unconscious, Freud is asserting that
the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states is not a
distinction between two kinds of mental states-since, for him, all mental
states are in themselves unconscious. Searle notes that Freud sees bringing
such mental states to consciousness on the analogy of perceiving an object:

What we call "consciousness" is just a mode of perception of states that

are unconscious i n their mode of existence. It is as i f the unconscious men­
tal states really were l ike furniture in the attic of the mind, and to bring
them to consciousness we go up in the attic and shine the flashlight of our
perception on them. Just as the furniture "in itself" is unseen, so mental
states "in themselves" are unconscious. (p. 1 68)

Searle goes on to say that "I cannot find or invent a coherent interpretation
of this theory" (p. 168). Specifically, he states that he cannot find a way to
make this notion of the ontology of the unconscious consistent with cur­
rent knowledge of the brain and that he cannot form a coherent analogy
between perception and consciousness. In regard to the latter problem, he
points out that "the model of perception works on the assumption that there
is a distinction between object perceived and the act of perception" (p. 171).
He argues that this distinction simply cannot apply to conscious thoughts.
Further, he describes why the perception theory of consciousness cannot
stand, because if bringing unconscious states into consciousness consists in
having a perception of previously unconscious mental phenomena, and if
this act of perceiving is itself considered a mental phenomenon (and thus "in
itself" unconscious), then this act of perception requires a further, higher
act of perception to bring it to consciousness, and so forth; in this w ay one
is left with the need for ever-higher acts of perception, involving one in an
"infinite regress."
It seems that the fatal flaw in Freud's view of conscious and unconscious
acts is to consider that mental acts are "in themselves" unconscious. The
view held by Myers might be stated as the contrary: that all mental acts are
"in themselves" conscious. This view escapes the telling criticisms of James
and Searle and provides a ready framework for understanding the data of
automatism that remained so opaque for Freud.
Despite their major differences, Freud did have important areas of
agreement with Myers. Both hoped for ultimate reconciliation between psy­
chology and physiology but repudiated, on the basis of empirical evidence,
the premature and glib reductionism of 1 9th-century neurology. Both also
insisted that mind was not co-extensive with everyday consciousness; and
both held that the "mental" which operates outside ordinary awareness is
governed by laws of its own, laws whose exploration had only just begun.
However, Myers's belief that the Subliminal is the source of both the patho­
logical and the sublime, disturbance and inspired genius, the normal and
the supernormal, contrasted with Freud's description of the Unconscious.
Also, Freud could not agree with Myers's conviction that our everyday "ter-
332-Chapter 5

rene" consciousness cannot be considered superior to that of subliminal

selves, and that there is an ultimate personal unity, referred to as the Sub­
liminal Self (with a capital "S"), that coordinates all human experiences.
Above all, Freud's rejection of the possibility of multiple subliminal centers
of consciousness and his insistence that the only consciousness is the one
we know in everyday life opened a great gulf between his conception of the
psyche and that of Myers.
As Keeley points out, Freud's rejection of his roots in the mesmeric/hyp­
notic traditionl8 were stated and confirmed in "A Note." His opposition to
the conception of the Subliminal Self and its offshoots had dramatic effects
on the subsequent development of psychology and dynamic psychiatry, for
Freud's psychoanalysis came to dominate modern clinical psychological
thinking and in the process squeezed out the older tradition.19

Carl Jung

The psychological system of Freud's one-time protege, Carl Jung, was

more friendly to the ideas initiated by Myers. Jung studied for a time under
Janet, was strongly influenced by Flournoy, with whom he had a friend­
ship, and was acquainted with Myers's writings. Already in his doctoral the­
sis, Jung ( 1 90211983) mentions Myers, citing his "Clelia" case of automatic
writing (pp. 52-53). In his "On the Nature of the Psyche," Jung (194611978)
refers to the work of Myers when citing the passage from James's Varieties
ofReligious Experience (quoted at the start of this chapter) and points to the
recognition of a mental life outside normal consciousness as the discovery
by which the "old psychology was thoroughly unseated and as much revolu­
tionized as classical physics had been by the discovery of radioactivity" (p.
167).
Jung's theory of complexes contains the notion that human beings are
comprised of many fragmentary personalities. He saw complexes as a col­
lection of images and ideas which cluster around a core that embodies one
or more archetypes and are characterized by a common feeling tone (Samu­
els, Shorter, & Plaut, 1 991 , pp. 33-34). He wrote of the fact that the psyche
has a tendency to split:

18. This tradition was what Ellenberger ( 1970) called the "first dynamic psychiatry" (p.
1 1 1).
19. Throughout the decades of the latter half of the 20th century, orthodox Freudian think­
ers for the most part did not stray far from the view expressed by the master. However, some
recent psychoanalytic writings have begun to move away from the strict one-consciousness
view. An example of this new take on psychoanalytic theory can be found in the writings of
James Grotstein, who, in his Who is the Dreamer Who Dreams the Dream? (2000), for exam­
ple, posits an array of subselves who act from their own initiative and display all the charac­
teristics of independently conscious centers.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-333

Although this peculiarity is more clearly observable in psychopathology,

fundamentally it is a normal phenomenon . . . The tendency to split means
that parts of the psyche detach themselves from consciousness to such
an extent that they not only appear foreign, but lead an autonomous life
of their own. It need not be a question of hysterical multiple personal­
ity, or schizophrenic alterations of personality, but merely of so-called
"complexes" that come entirely within the scope of the normal. (Jung,
193711978, p. 121)

Jung (193411978) stated that "there is no difference in principle between a

fragmentary personality and a complex" and that experience had showed
him that complexes are really "splinter psyches" (p. 97). 20
In "A Review of the Complex Theory" Jung explicitly associates his
view of the complex with those of Janet and Morton Prince in regard to
the dissociability of consciousness into "fragmentary personalities" (pp.
96-97). Although Jung says that for all practical purposes fragmentary per­
sonalities are complexes, he does not necessarily hold that all complexes
are fragmentary personalities. So "splinter psyches" and "fragmentary
personalities" are not clearly the same things. For that reason he can say
that personality fragments "undoubtedly have their own consciousness, but
whether such small psychic fragments as complexes are also capable of a
consciousness of their own is a still unanswered question" (p. 97). He points
out that complexes can look very much like separate consciousnesses analo­
gous to our ego consciousness. But they seem to act differently in impor­
tant ways-sometimes behaving like devils playing impish tricks, inducing
embarrassing slips of the tongue or inappropriate physical actions, and
sometimes taking on the role of actors in our dreams (p. 97). His hesitation
to say that these complexes have their own consciousness is based on the
fact that they seem to be "unteachable"-they refuse to do our bidding.
He develops this idea in his "On the Nature of the Psyche," where he writes
that "feeling-toned complexes" when unconscious cannot be altered the way
they can be when conscious:

Although they may be enriched by associations, they are not corrected,

but are conserved in their original form, as can easily be ascertained from
the continuous and uniform effect they have upon the conscious mind.
Similarly, they take on the uninfiuenceable and compulsive character of
an automatism, of which they can be divested only if they are made con­
scious . . . These peculiarities of the unconscious state contrast very strongly
with the way complexes behave in the conscious mind. Here they can be
corrected. (Jung, 1 94611978, pp. 186-1 87)

In ruminations that remind one of the argument between Freud and

Janet referred to above, Jung speculates that perhaps there is "no uncon­
scious psychism which is not at the same time conscious" (p. 1 88). He says

20. In an early description of the formations of "unconscious personalities," lung

( 190211983) states that they are due to the "disaggregation of psychic complexes" (p. 53).
334-Chapter 5

that while it is true that as far as our ego, or ordinary consciousness, is

concerned, they are for all practical purposes unconscious, yet they may,
in themselves, be conscious, "for the ego may know these contents under
one aspect but not know them under another aspect, when they cause dis­
turbances of consciousness .. . . Finally there are cases where an unconscious
ego and hence a second consciousness are present, as we have already seen"
(p. 1 88). It is clear, then, that lung, like Janet and unlike Freud, had room
for a consciousness, a fragmentary personality, that is unknown to (uncon­
scious to) the ordinary ego, and so constitutes a secondary ego with its own
separate consciousness. But whether complexes, or splinter psyches, can be
considered to be conscious in the same way remains, for lung, in doubt.
lung's ideas were in many ways compatible with those of Myers and
were not subject to the objections leveled against Freud's one-conscious­
ness theory. His "fragmentary personalities" have qualities similar to the
secondary personalities of Myers, and his concept of the Self in some ways
resembles Myers's overarching, unifying Subliminal Self. Also, like Myers,
lung connected the activity of fragmentary personalities with creativity on
the one hand and mediumship on the other.

Psychological Automatism: More Recent Work

The lively debates about consciousness and automatism just reviewed

extended into the early 20th century but then subsided, largely due to the
impact of the rise of behaviorism and the fracturing of psychology into clin­
ical and experimental wings (see Introduction). Some interest continued on
the clinical side, but for over a half century most experimental psychologists
as a matter of principle would have little or nothing to do with these sub­
jects. For many decades, William lames himself was more or less drummed
out of the profession by behaviorist historians of psychology such as E.
G. Boring. After this extended hiatus, a new generation of psychologists
began to take interest in the neglected and still unsolved problems relating
to automatisms and the multiplicity of consciousness.

Ernest Hilgard

Ernest Hilgard (1977) has proposed a "neo-dissociation" schema for

dealing with the problem of automatism. Echoing McDougall's "monadic"
conception, Hilgard posits a hierarchical arrangement of subordinate cog­
nitive subsystems which are controlled by an executive monitoring system.
Automatisms occur when executive control is cut off from various subsys­
tems, which then function on their own. In these cases, an amnesic barrier
is formed which causes incoming information to be dissociated from con­
sCIOusness.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-335

Hilgard's (1 994) theory rests on three assumptions: (1) that subordinate

cognitive systems exist, each with some degree of unity, persistence, and
autonomy of function, and that these systems interact, but on occasion can
become somewhat isolated from each other; (2) that some kind of hierarch i­
cal control exists that normally manages the interactions among these sys­
tems, and that without such control the individual would be overwhelmed
by thoughts and actions all of which would be trying to happen at once; and
(3) that there must be an overarching monitoring and controlling structure
which determines the hierarchical arrangement of the overall system (pp.
38-39).
In Hilgard's schema, the action of an executive ego or central control
structure, apparently identified with the ordinary consciousness of everyday
life, is essential to account for planning and choosing which subsystems will
dominate at any particular moment. Hypnosis takes away much of the sub­
ject's normal control and changes the functions and hierarchical arrange­
ment of the subsystems, so that motor controls may be altered, perception
and memory distorted, hallucinations produced, and so on.
Like Myers, Hilgard ( 1977) conceives of dissociated subsystems as bear­
ers of consciousness, analogous to ordinary consciousness, and he explicitly
rej ects the notion that dissociated systems of this kind are a manifestation
of the archaic Unconscious of Freudian psychoanalysis:

By contrast, in automatic writing or hypnosis, when a dissociated part

of consciousness has been uncovered, the amnesic barrier is broken, and
it is possible to converse directly with the dissociated consciousness. The
same direct discourse takes place with a multiple personality, once it
has emerged. This is an important difference between a psychodynamic
unconscious as described previously [referring to the Unconscious of lung
and Freud] and the dissociation interpretation of divided consciousness.
Morton Prince was correct in speaking of the dissociated consciousness as
a coconsciousness, for it is a genuine consciousness corresponding to the
familiar one. (p. 249)

Nevertheless, Hilgard considers the two approaches, the psychoana­

lytic/psychodynamic and the dissociation schemata, to be compatible, each
with something to contribute to understanding the dynamics of the psyche
(p. 250). His description of amnesia in the two explanatory systems demon­
strates this view:

In a dissociation interpretation, the barrier between the separated

activities is essentially an amnesic barrier, preventing the interchange
of memories, whereas, in psychoanalysis, the barrier is based primarily
on repression of unacceptable impulses. I have somewhat oversimplified
the relationship. I have considered the Freudian barrier a horizontal one
(carrying the metaphor of the unconscious being "deeper") and the dis­
sociative barrier a vertical one; thus the split-off parts may have equal sta­
tus in their cognitive aspects . . . . One reason for preserving the distinction
between dissociation and repression is to call attention to an important
336-Chapter 5

finding noted in cases of multiple personality-that the concealed (or dis­

sociated) personality is sometimes more normal or mentally healthy than
the openly displayed one. This accords better with the idea of a split i n the
normal consciousness (a justification for Prince's term coconscious) rather
than with the idea of a primitive unconscious regulated largely by primary
process thinking. (pp. 80, 83)

One thing that Hilgard does not make clear is just how the executive
ego exercises control over the subsystems. That control can hardly be con­
ceived as consciously imposed in many of its aspects. It is one thing to say
that the executive ego, aided by a central monitoring function, consciously
plans and puts certain processes into action. It is quite another to say that
hierarchies of subsystems are consciously arranged and rearranged. There
is no evidence that such conscious interventions occur. If the executive ego
is responsible for those arrangements, it must bring them about uncon­
sciously. Hilgard says: "Central executive functions are responsible for plan­
ning in relation to goals, initiating action commensurate with those plans,
and sustaining action against obstacles and distractions" (p. 220); the steps
of such planning can be laid out and examined. But with many actions that
are obviously intelligently devised we cannot spell out how the various sub­
systems were enabled to interact and successfully bring about the desired
result. For instance, in the heat of an academic debate on a contentious
subject, a mass of information must be sorted, the import of certain words
calculated, the line of the argument charted, and so forth, and debaters will
tell you that only a relatively small number of these factors are consciously
analyzed and that only a limited number of the many decisions involved are
consciously taken. If the executive ego is indeed setting things up so that the
delivery goes well, adjusting and ordering the hierarchy of subsystems, it
must be doing that largely on an unconscious level. Hilgard seems to suggest
that such activity may be taking place through the executive and monitor­
ing functions of the subsystems themselves, and therefore outside the con­
sciousness of the central control. But if in this example we do not need the
central executive and monitoring function to hierarchically arrange sub­
systems, when do we? To say, as Hilgard does (p. 233), that what he calls
the "hidden observer"21 is a fractionated part of the monitoring system that
exists behind an amnesic barrier, is to indicate that there could also be a
significant part of the central executive functioning behind that barrier.
Another problem with Hilgard's approach has to do with the notion of
hierarchy and the tacit assumption that its upper levels are somehow supe­
rior to those below. This difficulty is the same as that faced by McDougall,
who contended that the highest function in the human psyche is the normal
consciousness of everyday life. This view is contradicted by important data
of automatism, such as the fact that cognitive functions unavailable to ordi-

2 1 . The "hidden observer" is a cognitive system that has access to information available
neither to ordinary consciousness nor to hypnotic consciousness. According to Hilgard, it is
discovered by using special techniques within the hypnotic state.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-337

nary consciousness are frequently superior to those of ordinary conscious

thinking and the fact that creative functions, at work on an unconscious
level, consistently show themselves to be superior to processes initiated and
carried out by the normal self (see our Chapter 7). As we have seen above,
Hilgard himself noted that in multiple personality disorder, " the concealed
(or dissociated) personality is sometimes more normal or mentally healthy
than the openly displayed one" (p. 83). For that reason, if the concept of
hierarchy is to have any credibility, it must be purged of any notion that
because the central executive function "controls" and "arranges" subsys­
tems, it is automatically to be considered "higher" or "superior" to those
subsystems.
These difficulties arise from Hilgard's use of metaphors that are fun­
damentally incompatible with each other. His model of human personality
posits a hierarchy of cognitive modules (or monads) specialized for par­
ticular tasks and supporting an emergent conscious self at the top. But if
the normal personality is such a hierarchy of monads, how can it be broken
up to form subsidiary personalities, such as those revealed by the data of
automatism and dissociation? For in that case, each of the newly formed or
discovered secondary conscious centers must have all the cognitive capa­
bilities needed to function as a personality, and not merely those of isolated
specialized modules or monads. Since, in the experimental and clinical
literature, these secondary personalities show themselves as minds which
resemble our own and are relatively complete in their own right, a model of
hierarchically arranged specialized modules must fail. So although Hilgard,
like Myers, accepts the existence of secondary centers of consciousness, his
attempt to contemporize that notion in a form that might be acceptable
to cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists does not really advance our
understanding of how such centers arise or function.22

Stephen Braude

Stephen Braude has undertaken the investigation of automat isms and

secondary personality from a philosophical point of view. In his book First
Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind (Braude,
1995), he examines the human experience of multiplicity and unity, con­
centrating on multiple personality disorder (MPD; today called dissociative
identity disorder, or DID), which he believes provides a unique window into
the human psyche. From his analysis of multiplicity, Braude argues that
although in many ways we function as a conglomerate of distinct psychic
entities, in fact we are at bottom a unity. Using language reminiscent of
Myers (HP, vol. 1 , pp. 9-1 1), Braude (1995) says that at issue is whether we
accept that the psyche is a unity or a "colony of lower order selves" (p. 1 24),

22. Further critical remarks regarding Hilgard's ideas may be found in Gauld (1992, pp.
588-591).
338-Chapter 5

and, like Myers, he argues that there is a unifying "Self" that exists below
and beyond all multiplicity (pp. 166-180).
Braude makes the case that the alter personalities of a multiple are
"distinct centers of self-awareness" (p. 68) or "apperceptive centers" (p. 78).
Defining the latter term, he says that "an apperceptive center is an individ­
ual most of whose autobiographical states [states experienced as one's own]
are indexical [states believed to be one's own]" (p. 78). Further, he contends
that apperceptive centers are distinct if the autobiographical and indexical
states of each are largely non-autobiographical and non-indexical for the
other. The personalities of a multiple, says Braude, fulfill this requirement.
He also points out that these apperceptive centers may exhibit various pat­
terns of asymmetrical awareness "in which personality A is aware of B's
thoughts or actions, but B is not aware of A's existence" (p. 43).
Having described the nature of the distinct centers of a multiple, Braude
is at pains to make a further point:

Probably the most outstanding distinguishing feature of multiplicity is

this: whereas multiples seem to have more than one distinct apperceptive
center at a time, this does not seem to be the case for other strong forms
of dissociation. For example, a hypnotically-induced "hidden observer" is
not an apperceptive center distinct from the original hypnotized individ­
ual, even though hidden observers are similar to alters in some important
respects. Hidden observers report experiences of which the hypnotized
subject is apparently unaware. The hidden observer's experiences are,
therefore, not autobiographical for the subject. But they are indexical, at
least eventually. Once the subject learns of the hidden observer's experi­
ences he accepts those states as his own, despite their having been out­
side conscious awareness. More importantly, however, most (if not all) of
the hypnotic subject's indexical states seem to be indexical for the hidden
observer. . . . Hence, we could say that the disparities of indexicality found
i n hidden observer studies are largely asymmetrical, whereas in cases (such
as MPD) satisfying the conditions for distinct apperceptive centers, they
are mostly symmetrical. (pp. 78-79)

It seems to me that Braude's contention here-that multiple personality

clearly and inherently differs from other strong forms of dissociation in the
way he describes-is mistaken. Specifically, I believe it is incorrect to say
that what happens in hidden observer cases cannot also happen in cases of
multiple personality. There is no reason to believe that one personality-say,
the main functioning personality-of a multiple could not come to believe
that the states of an alter personality are his own. After all, an intelligent
multiple would be quite capable of grasping the nature of multiplicity and
arriving at such a belief. In that case, according to Braude's definition, the
personalities of such a multiple would not be distinct apperceptive centers.
This is a problematic but, it seems to me, inevitable conclusion. For that
reason, I believe that this criterion for distinctness is faulty.
The core problem with Braude's way of determining distinctness has to
do with the word "believe." What would the "belief" that an alter's states
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-339

are or are not one's own be for a multiple? What would it be for a hypnotic
subject who develops hidden observer phenomena? Would they be the same
in each case? I do not think there is any reliable way to determine how these
two instances of belief might differ. For that reason, either distinctness has
to be denied for both, or another criterion needs to be used.
Moreover, I disagree with Braude's statement that most, if not all, of
the hypnotic subject's states seem to be indexical for the hidden observer.
This certainly does not hold true, at least if we go beyond examples taken
from recent "hidden observer" experiments and include in our examina­
tion the massive literature of mesmerism and hypnotism, including cases of
the sort relied upon by Myers and his colleagues. As has been pointed out
in the principal histories of these phenomena (Crabtree, 1 993; Dingwall,
1 967-1968; Ellenberger, 1 970; Gauld, 1 992), credible cases of this type were
reported in large numbers throughout the 1 9th century. In this literature we
encounter many examples of hypnotic personalities who see themselves as
distinct from the hypnotic subject (e.g., Deleuze, 1 8 1 3 , vol. 1 , p. 176; Gurney,
1 884; Janet, 1 886; Strombeck, 1 8 14, pp. 65-70). In these "strong" instances
of dissociation, the hypnotic personalities frequently deny that the states
of the hypnotic subject are indexical for themselves; they explicitly reject
the notion that the thoughts of the subject are their own and affirm their
non-identity with the subject. An examination of the literature of automatic
writing reveals the same attitude on the part of the "communicators."23
The difficulty with Braude's criterion for distinctness is that it falls short
of establishing even the personalities of a multiple as distinct. In my opin­
ion, the best criterion for calling something a "distinct apperceptive center"
or "distinct communicating personality" remains that suggested by Prince
and other early investigators of psychological automatism: If a source of
automatic communication thinks and acts like a personality, for all practi­
cal purposes it is a personality; if the subject of the automatism experiences
that source as distinct from him- or herself, for all practical purposes it is
distinct. 24
Despite this problem in Braude's criterion for distinctness, his overall
grasp of the nature and functioning of multiple centers of consciousness is
impressive, and his book represents an important step forward in establish­
ing a sound philosophical basis for talking about psychological multiplicity.
Although Braude's views were developed independently of those of Myers,

23. Braude agrees that his criterion for distinguishing DID from other strong instances of
dissociation is inadequate as it stands in First Person Plural. His current view is that the dis­
tinction should be established partly in terms of temporal properties. A hidden observer case
might manifest in a very DID-like manner, but be short-lived, whereas DID cases persist for a
considerable period, long enough for at least some alters to get to be personality-like (Braude,
personal communication, May 17, 2004).
24. Braude rightly points out that this criterion does not clearly distinguish DID cases from
deeply-involved role playing and does not cover cases of fragmentary personalities formed for
specific purposes (personal communication, May 17, 2004). Unfortunately, we do not yet have
a good philosophical basis for distinguishing these two forms of automatism and so, I fear,
must make do with rough determinations of this kind.
340-Chapter 5

they are reminiscent of them in several important ways. He insists that

experimental and clinical data have established that multiple apperceptive
centers are real; he recognizes that these selves can be aware of each other in
both symmetrical and asymmetrical ways; and perhaps most importantly,
he presents strong empirically based arguments for an overarching unity
underlying and coordinating these manifestations of multiplicity.
In his discussion of "the unity beneath multiplicity" (Braude, 1 995, pp.
164-190), Braude argues against the "colonialist" view that there is no ulti­
mate psychological unity, but only a multiplicity of independent selves or
subsystems within the individual. He insists that this position cannot be
maintained in the face of certain well-established facts of clinical experi­
ence, such as the commonality of language among alter personalities, their
sharing of basic knowledge and capacities involved in the functions of
everyday living, and the creation and maintenance of coordinated, protec­
tive psychological structures. Braude argues that the process involved in the
production of dissociative centers can only make sense if there is a "pre­
dissociative synthesizing self that orchestrated (and needed to orchestrate)
the initial dissociations" (p. 174) and coordinated the dissociative coping
strategies involved. The management of conflicting needs that occurs in the
dissociative system must be accomplished by a single underlying subject.
Looking at this issue from a philosophical point of view, Braude refers us to
Kant, who contended that in order for us to experience things in sequence
and as connected wholes, there must be an underlying subject, a transcen­
dent ego which is a "synthesizing self [that makes] such phenomenological
and conceptual connections between parts of experience" (p. 1 67). Accord­
ing to Kant, this self or subject cannot be a direct object of experience, but
we are justified in positing its existence. According to Braude, this transcen­
dental ego corresponds to the underlying self that synthesizes the psycho­
logical life of the multiple.
Braude's analysis of the reasons for accepting the notion of a unifying
self beyond multiplicity provides one of the most persuasive arguments to
date for the reality of Myers's ultimate Subliminal Self. Although his sup­
porting data are drawn principally from the experiences of individuals with
DID, the same conclusions could be reached from a similar examination of
the production of hypnotic personalities and other secondary personalities
of automatism.

Unconscious Cerebration Revisited

William Carpenter's doctrine that all automatism results from the "reflex
action of the brain," expressed in the catchphrase "unconscious cerebra­
tion," has always had powerful adherents. This way of thinking, couched
in more modern terminology, remains well represented among psychologi­
cal thinkers today. The main representatives of this point of view are to
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-341

be found among sociocognitive theorists and neurobiologically oriented

psychologists. Despite the overall "unconscious cerebration" orientation of
these schools of thought, there are signs of theoretical expansion as some
have begun to seek an approach that will more comfortably embrace the
complex data of a subliminal mental life and psychological automatism.

Sociocognitive Theorists

Perhaps the most significant contemporary challenge to a Myers-type

interpretation of the phenomena of automatism is that raised by the "socio­
cognitive" approach to hypnosis, dissociation, and related phenomena.
The spokespersons for this way of thinking are principally T. X. Barber,
John Chaves, William Coe, Theodore Sarbin, Nicholas Spanos, and most
recently Daniel Wegner. The most outspoken of this group is without doubt
Spanos, and so it will be useful for our purposes to concentrate on his pre­
sentation of the sociocognitive position.
Spanos, a prolific author of research papers on the subjects of hypno­
sis, memory, imagery, suggestion, and multiple personality, summarized his
key ideas in this area in h is posthumously published book Multiple Identities
and False Memories: A Sociocognitive Perspective (Spanos, 1 996). It is to that
book that I turn for what I presume to be his most developed thinking. This
exposition will focus on sociocognitive assertions that most directly touch
on the phenomenon of automatism, and pass over those that are less directly
relevant. So, for example, there will be no discussion here of the diagnosis
of multiple personality, possible iatrogenic factors in its production, its rela­
tionship to sexual abuse and ritual abuse, or false memories.
The sociocognitive view of automatisms can be quite simply stated.
Automatisms are apparently involuntary actions produced as a result of a
combination of suggestions and demands imposed on the individuals who
manifest them. Those individuals may believe that their actions are not car­
ried out voluntarily, that the experience "happens to them," but analysis
shows that this belief is mistaken. In reality they are playing a role that is
suggested to them, and they adjust their view of their experience to satisfy
the unspoken demands of that role. The role is set up through subtle or
not so subtle cues and is constantly being confirmed and reinforced by the
social context in which the experience occurs. The result is a retrospective
revision of what the experience was, a revision that goes unnoticed by the
person who experiences the automatism.
The issue of multiple centers of consciousness is central to automatism.
Spanos ( 1996) described his attitude towards psychological multiplicity in
this way: "People can learn to think of themselves as possessing more than
one identity or self, and can learn to behave as i f they are first one identity
and then a different identity" (p. 4). For Spanos, as for Freud, consciousness
is always and necessarily unitary. The notion that there can be more than
one center of consciousness, more than one "identity" operating in a person,
342-Chapter 5

is false and the result of social conditioning. Spanos believed that amnesia
on the part of one identity for what might be done by another identity is sim­
ply an example of "selective recall," whereby the individual can only bring
back the memories associated with the present role enactment and cannot
get in touch with any other memories. Referring more specifically to MPD,
Spanos wrote: "Absorption in the enactment of identity A may, to a substan­
tial degree, function to prevent the recall of memories associated with the
enactment of identity B. But what if identity B, when asked to recall identity
A, claims an inability to do so? An 'inability' to recall identity A may be a
requirement of the MPD role" (p. 6). The ability to remember something,
said Spanos, depends on whether the role an individual is now enacting
allows that recall. If it does not, then the person will experience "amnesia."
This view is reflected in Spanos's conception of the nature of hypnosis:

Hypnotic behavior, including so-called hypnotic amnesia, is shown, at its

core, to be strategic behavior enacted to fulfill the subject's beliefs and
expectations about hypnosis. Hypnotic subj ects should not be seen as the
passive automatons of the popular literature, but as voluntary actors striv­
ing to fulfill their role as they define it or as it is defined for them by the
experimental or clinical situation. The notion that hypnosis can be under­
stood as an altered state of consciousness is thus rejected . . . .The amnesia
both of the MPD patient and of the hypnotic subject may be understood
as goal-directed, purposive activity. (pp. 10-1 1 )

As these quotations indicate, Spanos used the language of voluntary

action to describe how individuals go about enacting their roles. They are
"voluntary actors" who carry out "goal-directed, purposive activity." When
describing the "context dependent" nature of hypnotic responding, Spanos
wrote that this responding "is determined by the willingness of the sub­
jects to adopt the hypnotic role" and "their willingness and ability to use
their imaginal and other cognitive skills to create the subjective experiences
called for by suggestions" (pp. 19, 20). These descriptions convey unambigu­
ously Spanos's central message-that people who experience automatisms
are knowingly and willingly playing a role.
Now, Spanos knew that many people who experience automatisms do
not talk about-and often in fact deny-having the conscious intention to
enact a role. He noted that "the sociocognitive perspective recognizes that
hypnotic subjects sometimes experience their responses as feeling involun­
tary" (p. 22). How can responses experienced as involuntary be examples of
voluntary, goal-directed action? Here is Spanos's answer:

Nevertheless, according to this perspective, hypnotic subjects retain con­

trol over their behavior and guide it in terms of their understanding of
what is expected. Subjects report that their behavior feels involuntary, not
because they have lost control over their behavior, but because they inter­
pret their goal-directed behavior as involuntary in line with the expecta­
tions conveyed in suggestions. (p. 22)
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-343

This way of looking at things is, I submit, fatally flawed. In the experi­
mental situation, the subject is asked for a description of his or her experi­
ence of what is happening. This must be done, since it is only the subject who
can say whether something called "voluntariness" subjectively occurs. We
are then told that if the subject describes the experience as involuntary, he
is mistaken. On what basis? That the subject, by describing the experience
as involuntary, is actually obeying ("voluntarily," by the way) some kind of
interiorized social demand. If there ever was a circular proof of a position,
this has to be it! If voluntariness-which can only be determined subjec­
tively-is not to be determined by the experience of the subject, but rather
by the theory of the experimenter, the term has lost all meaning. Here the
explanations of the experimenter rule out results that do not fit the theory,
and for no other reason than that they do not fit the theory.25
In examining Spanos's position, a question should also be asked about
what it can mean that individuals "guide it [their behavior] in terms of their
understanding of what is expected." Is this "guidance" and "understand­
ing" conscious to them? Also, if, as previously stated, amnesia is "selec­
tive recall," is that selection a conscious action? Sociocognitive theorists
certainly speak of these things as if they were conscious. But if so, why do
people have no awareness of this guidance or selection? Do they have some
kind of mechanism that causes them immediately to forget this conscious
guidance or selection as soon as it has happened? On the other hand, if it
is not conscious, are we not then talking about unconscious mental activ­
ity-something that Spanos explicitly rejects?
Voluntariness is, of course, a key issue in automatism. Automatism
involves sensory or motor activity-activity that evinces intelligence-which
the individual does not subjectively experience as deriving from his or her
own conscious thinking or willing. The automatism seems to "happen to"
the individual. How would the sociocognitive theorist explain what is really

25. This kind of rush to prove a theory is also evident in the way sociocognitive research­
ers typically measure "voluntariness." For example, in the protocol used by Spanos (Spanos
& Gorassini, 1984; Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, Starn, & Bertrand, 1983) in connection with
testing hypnotic suggestibility, the individual was asked to rate voluntariness in this way:
"During this [the arm rising] suggestion my arm felt like it rose by itself;" the subject is then
given a choice of four possible answers: a) not at all; b) to a slight degree; c) to a moderate
degree; d) to a great degree. Experiments of this kind rely on what the experimenters might
consider a "commonsense" meaning of the words being used, but that is a naive assumption.
Clinicians know that this framing of the question can be easily misunderstood by the experi­
mental subject. When the subject is asked whether something he or she did was experienced
as happening "by itself," genuine confusion may result. The subject may think: "Well, my
body did it, so I cannot say that it happened 'by itself.'" In this way a conclusion is reached
and the response is given on the basis of that conclusion, which may not reflect the subjective
experience of the subject. If experiments of this kind are to have any validity, there will have
to be greater attention devoted to making sure that the subjects questioned understand the
meaning of the instructions they are being given. One further comment: In a large propor­
tion of sociocognitive studies, the experiments are conducted with un selected undergraduate
volunteers. There is no reason to think that in such samples the more impressive automatic
phenomena, such as those reported in studies involving more selective groups, or in the clini­
cal literature, will occur.
344-Chapter 5

happening? If the automatist knowingly and voluntarily does what the situ­
ation demands, if the actions of the automatist and the interpretation of
those actions are controlled, voluntary, goal-directed,26 as the sociocogni­
tive perspective insists,27 then there seems to be only one possible way that
an automatist could say that the actions are "involuntary." The automatist
must consciously carry out the voluntary, goal-directed behavior, but then
immediately forget that he did so. In that case, an automatism must involve
repeatedly knowing and then forgetting the conscious, voluntary actions
just performed, and doing so again and again in a short space of time. It
must involve at one moment making conscious choices of compliance and
then forgetting those choices, so that it seems to the automatist that no such
choices were ever made, and then at the next moment making another delib­
erate goal-directed choice to comply, and then, once again, immediately
forgetting it, and so on. This might be compared to the multitasking activity
of a computer, which seems to perform many tasks at once, but really is car­
rying out discontinuous operations, constantly leaving one task to carry out
a mini-step in the procedure of another task, and then returning to the first
task to perform a mini-procedure there-and doing all this so quickly that
there seems to be no break in the action. This kind of multitasking of know­
ing and forgetting might be a possible explanation, but to my knowledge the
experiments that sociocognitive experimenters cite contain no evidence of
such a process.28
Given the unproven status of such alternation of knowing and forget­
ting, it must be said that sociocognitive theorists have failed to demonstrate
how what they posit as controlled, voluntary, goal-directed behavior (which
they see as necessary to explain apparent automatisms) could derive from
a unitary consciousness and yet at the same time be hidden from that con­
sciousness. They have failed to show how an action can be both conscious
and unconscious at the same time and in the same respect.

26. As has been pointed out, Janet (and many experimenters since him) showed that
instances of psychological automatism involving negative hallucinations require the inter­
vention of controlled, voluntary, goal-directed behavior to make the automatic movement
intelligible (for instance, through suggestion an individual may be unable to see a table stand­
ing in his path, but nonetheless walk around it and avoid a collision). For Janet, the source of
that behavior was a subconscious center of consciousness.
27. Robert White (1941), often cited by sociocognitive psychologists as a precursor of their
thinking, made the statement: "Goal-directed striving no longer necessarily implies either
awareness or intention" (p. 485). It is precisely this change in meaning of language that haunts
the writing of sociocognitive thinkers and muddies the issues they deal with. How can one say
that "goal-directed" striving does not involve awareness or intention? That can only happen
if one moves the level of discussion from the psychological to the physiological/mechanical.
In that case, a computer, for instance, might be said to carry out "goal-directed" or "purpose­
ful" actions without the benefit of consciousness or intention if those actions are programmed
to accomplish some predetermined end. But if we are going to deal with human beings, and
do so on a psychological level, we do not have the luxury of so glibly excluding awareness and
intention from the scene (see also Chapter I).
28. For a further discussion of the sociocognitive position, see Gauld (1992, pp. 581-608).
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-345

Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner (2002) has recently written a book

that takes an exactly opposite and even more radical stance in regard to the
issue of involuntariness. Among other matters, Wegner discusses the phe­
nomena associated with automatism. Unfortunately, like almost all of his
sociocognitive colleagues, he routinely rules out of consideration all data
involving supernormal experiences, and in his discussion betrays the fact
that he has only the most superficial knowledge of the relevant historical
literature. Wegner rejects entirely the notion of human beings as free agents,
asserting that all behavior is in fact involuntary and that the notion of con­
scious will is simply an illusion that facilitates social life. He points out, cor­
rectly, that there are many examples of misperception and misattribution of
personal agency, but instead of dealing with the complexity that such errors
reveal, he gets rid of agency altogether, at least as something that derives
from conscious intention and will. By a strange twist of perspective, Weg­
ner argues that, since in the case of automatisms we rightly recognize that
we are not really the agents of what we do, automatism presents us with a
truer conception of human action in general-that is, that all human action
is automatism and lacks conscious agency. It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that he repeatedly and approvingly quotes Thomas Huxley. One
of those quotes very well sums up Wegner's position: "The feeling we call
volition is not the cause of the voluntary act, but simply the symbol in con­
sciousness of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of the act"
(Huxley, 1 874, p. 577). The result is that not only will, but consciousness too
is denied any significant contribution to mental life, and Wegner cannot
escape Huxley's famous conclusion that consciousness is purely epiphenom­
enal, just "as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomo­
tive engine is without influence upon its machinery" (p. 575).
What, then, happens to automatism in this schema? An automatism is
simply an action produced by the individual's brain (as all our supposedly
voluntary actions are), but without the illusory feeling that it is produced by
conscious will. We are surprised when we experience an automatism, but,
according to Wegner, we should not be, because here the true state of affairs
is graphically revealed. Here we get to experience first hand that conscious
agency is an illusion. 29

The Cognitive Unconscious

Wegner's epiphenomenal stance is not philosophically new, nor it is out

of step with much current theorizing in cognitive psychology, now widely
thought of as cognitive neuroscience. However, in the past two decades some
cognitive psychologists have begun a "reconsideration" of the unconscious
(Bowers & Meichenbaum, 1 984), as it became increasingly evident that large
parts of our mental life and apparatus are not directly available for intro-

29. For a fuller review of Wegner's book, see E. F. Kelly (2003).

346-Chapter 5

spection. No ful l consensus has yet emerged as to the contents, organiza­

tion, and capabilities of this "cognitive unconscious," but the debate has
certainly revealed the hostility that the scientific mainstream still harbors
toward consciousness in any form. This is perhaps most completely exem­
plified in an article by Max Velmans ( 1991), "Is Human Information Pro­
cessing Conscious?", which denies to consciousness and will any role in the
processing of information and the determination of action. This exchange,
consisting of Velmans's target presentation followed by 36 peer comments
along with Velmans's response to those comments, provides a fairly good
representation of current thinking. This elaborate discussion of conscious
and non-conscious processes demonstrates that cognitive psychology, hav­
ing embraced a one-consciousness view of mental functioning, is essentially
unable to deal with the data of psychological automatism. In fact, the com­
mentary on Velmans's article confirms that many cognitive theorists have
an almost superstitious fear of the notion of ordinary consciousness itself,
and if they are so spooked by this "ghost in the machine" (see "Damn! There
goes that ghost again," Stanovich, 1 991 , pp. 696-697), they respond to the
possibility of secondary centers of consciousness as to a veritable band of
demons. A case in point is the commentary by Graham Wagstaff (1991),
who writes that the idea that "full attentive processing can take place out­
side awareness" (p. 700), an idea discussed by Velmans in connection with
Hilgard's "hidden observer," conjures up the picture of a distinct cognitive
system which "exists separately from the cognitive system represented at any
particular time in awareness or 'open consciousness ' " (Wagstaff's emphasis,
presumably signifying horror) and leads to questionable conceptions like
"multiple personality." Wagstaff finds this possibility so distasteful that he
is confident that Velmans-who must surely feel the same way-will, when
he recognizes where this is going, be driven to embrace the sociocognitive
explanation for such phenomena-that they are artifacts produced by com­
pliance with task demands.
As repugnant as the idea of secondary centers of consciousness may still
be to many cognitive psychologists, there are at least a few who have rec­
ognized that the data of experience demand some multiplicity of this kind.
Some contemporary cognitive theorists, notably those associated with Hil­
gard and the "neo-dissociationist" school, have recently begun tentatively
exploring views reminiscent of those of Myers, James, and their colleagues,
relying heavily on the phenomena of psychological automatism. This trend
is probably best represented in the works of John Kihlstrom.
Writing about "consciousness and me-ness," Kihlstrom (1997) reminds
his colleagues that William James, in his Principles of Psychology, had
insisted that there is an intimate relationship between consciousness and
the self. Kihlstrom writes: "Consciousness comes, in James' view, when we
inject ourselves into our thoughts, feelings, desires, and actions-when we
take possession of them, experience and acknowledge them as our own.
Consciousness is always a personal consciousness, and this was at least as
true for memory as for any other mental faculty" (p. 45 1). Kihlstrom also
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-347

states: "When mental representations are integrated with the self, they
become part of conscious mental life; when this integration is lacking, they
are not accessible to introspection, although they may influence experience,
thought and action outside of phenomenal awareness" (p. 452).
Then Kihlstrom makes a bold move: "Perhaps there is not just one
mental representation of the self.. . . Considerations of the self as a concept
suggest that each individual possesses a number of context-specific selves,
arrayed as a set of exemplars or coexisting with a summary prototype" (p.
463). Again he cites James, who in his Principles wrote:

The buried feelings and thoughts proved now to exist in hysterical anaes­
thetics, in recipients of post-hypnotic suggestion, etc., themselves are parts
of secondary personal selves. These selves . . . are cut off at ordinary times
from communication with the regular and normal self of the individual;
but still they form conscious unities, have continuous memories, speak,
write, invent distinct names for themselves, or adopt names that are sug­
gested; and, in short, are entirely worthy of that title of secondary person­
alities which is now commonly given them. (James, 1 890b, vol. I, p. 227)

Kihlstrom ( 1997) does not see these selves as a part of the "psychologi­
cal unconscious," properly understood. For him, dissociative phenomena
cannot be understood in terms of concepts applied to preconscious and
unconscious processing; they demand reference to a self (p. 464). He spells
out this distinction: "In unconscious processing, procedural knowledge is
executed without ever making contact with a mental representation of self.
In preconscious processing, events have been so degraded that they, too,
never enter working memory at the point of perception . . . .Thus they never
achieve any links with the self in the first place" (p. 464).
In an informal discussion with John Searle, Kihlstrom ( 1993b) further
clarifies the character of mental activity associated with secondary personal
selves:

I do want to insist that these things are mental in a sense that they are
representations of experiences. They are constructed through perception
or reconstructed through memory or whatever, and simply have an impact
on the person's ongoing experience without themselves being conscious. I
don't think this is the same as playing with somebody's neurotransmitter
system, which would not be mental in that sense. These are representa­
tions. I think the best evidence for the representational status is the fact
that you can get conscious access to them under some conditions. The
whole beauty of hypnosis and hysteria, and the reason I'm interested in
hypnosis and hysteria, is that we can cancel the amnesia suggestion and
the person remembers the word list perfectly well. Similarly, when a per­
son recovers from a fugue state, the person remembers his or her past per­
fectly well. You have to give those things the status of mental representa­
tions; they are not merely neurotransmitters hanging around in the brain
matter. (pp. 1 56-1 57)
348-Chapter 5

Statements such as these on the part of some contemporary cognitive

theorists bring psychology back to the core issues raised by Myers, taking
them almost to the point he had already reached in 1 885 when he said that a
purely physiological explanation of the data in question would not do. With
Kihlstrom, we can even say that these theorists have nearly come to the
point of admitting that processes occurring outside primary consciousness
can have a certain internal coherence, being associated with an intelligence
or conscious self and attached to a specific chain of memories. In this way
we might say that Kihlstrom in one fell swoop reclaims for cognitive psy­
chology territory previously denied it, the territory opened up by Myers,
Janet, James, and their colleagues as reviewed above. What is startling and
distressing is that psychology has made so little progress beyond that point
in over a century. We have hardly begun to look at how multiple conscious
centers manifest concretely in ongoing human life, an undertaking that was
already well underway at the beginning of the 20th century. We have yet to
carry out the serious and thorough examination of the whole spectrum of
human experience that Myers and James said was so sorely needed, paying
attention to phenomena that today, as at that time, remain unpopular to
establishment science. The complaint of James (1901) that the exclusion of
these phenomena, such as anomalous, mediumistic, and supernormal expe­
riences, takes place on the basis of a priori philosophical bias, remains as
valid today as it was then.

Neurobiological Research

A small but growing body of neurobiological investigations provides

additional evidence for the psychological reality of secondary centers of
consciousness.3D These have been conducted mainly in the last half of the
20th century and have focused on the phenomenon of M PD (or DID). In
an early survey of psychophysiological phenomena in MPD, B. G. Braun
(1 983b) noted previous clinical reports indicating that striking physiologi­
cal differences were sometimes observed between "alter" personalities in
a multiple personality case, including alterations in handedness, rate and
ability to heal, response to medication, and allergic responses. In this arti­
cle, Braun also described three multiple personality cases of his own which
involved the appearance and disappearance-depending on the personal­
ity in control of the body-of allergies to citrus fruit, cigarette smoke, and
cats. He also described a case in which red dots (resembling cigarette burns
which had been administered to the person as a child) would appear only
when a certain personality was "out." Coons (1 988) published a survey of

30. For additional evidence of this type and related discussions of the evidence cited here,
see Chapter 3. There we address primarily the issue of changes of consciousness that induce
changes in the body. Here we address the issue of the bearing of these phenomena on the
psychological reality of MPD.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-349

physiological aspects of MPD that cited other features noted by clinicians

working with MPD patients. In addition to those already mentioned, he
noted apparent variations in vision and sensitivity to pain, and pointed out
that seizure disorders seemed abnormally common in multiple personal­
ity subj ects. S. D. Miller (1989) subsequently conducted ophthalmological
examinations of alter personalities to test whether MPD subjects would
show greater variability in visual functioning across alter personalities
than would control subjects role-playing MPD. His studies showed that the
MPD subj ects had 4. 5 times the number of changes in optical functioning
observed in simulating control subjects.
Several studies have reported large differences in autonomic function
between alters. For example, Bahnson and Smith ( 1975) describe the results
of measurements of heart rate, respiration, and skin potential taken during
audio-visually recorded psychotherapy sessions with a multiple personality
patient over an eight-month period. Significant differences were observed
in these measurements across the four personalities involved. F. W. Putnam
et al. (1990) assessed autonomic nervous system activity associated with
different alter personality states of MPD subjects using measurements of
skin conductance and heart rate and compared these with parallel measure­
ments of the simulated personalities of controls. They concluded that alter
personality states of MPD are physiologically distinct states of conscious­
ness. They also noted, however, that equivalent differences could be gener­
ated by some control subjects using hypnosis.
Coons ( 1988) pointed out that Morton Prince was the first to measure
galvanic skin responses of alter personalities. He also noted that electro­
encephalographic (EEG) studies of multiple personality have been carried
out since the 1 940s, and stated that a number of reports indicate significant
variations in EEGs, particularly in alpha rhythm, across the personalities,
with most investigators attributing these differences to varying degrees of
arousal and tension. A more recent EEG mapping study, however, showed
topographic differences among alter personalities that could not be repro­
duced by an actress portraying the different personalities (Hughes et aI.,
1 990; see also F. W. Putnam, 1 984). An important study of a multiple with
four personalities by Ludwig et al. (1 972), using EEG in combination with an
autonomic measure, concluded that "all the data obtained fall into a consis­
tent pattern and suggest that traditional skeptical explanations of pretense
or role-playing are insufficient to account for the phenomena observed" (p.
298). Among other things, they demonstrated that the pattern of electroder­
mal response to words that had been paired with electric shocks reflected
the clinically observed relations of awareness between alter personalities;
thus if B claimed to be aware of A but not vice versa, B would respond not
only to his own "loaded" words but also to A's, whereas A would respond
only to his own. A similar study by Larmore et al. (1 977) found a large varia­
tion in visually evoked responses across alter personalities that was com­
parable to differences between unrelated persons and far larger than those
seen in identical twins. Braun (1983a) used visual evoked potential topo-
350-Chapter 5

graphical maps to study the results of integration of the personalities of a

multiple through psychotherapy and concluded that therapeutic procedures
produced neurophysiological changes. In a survey of psychophysiological
investigations of multiple personality, S. D. Miller and Triggiano (1992)
stated that "psycho-physiological research using evoked potentials has pro­
vided some of the most consistent and convincing experimental evidence for
the existence of MPD as a clinical entity, as well as for the distinctness of the
personality states in persons with the disorder" (p. 50).
Only a few studies have so far appeared that use functional neuroim­
aging techniques based on hemodynamic or metabolic correlates of brain
electrical activity. In one study of a multiple, measurements of blood flow in
the brain showed that personality change produced significant differences
in cerebral blood flow in the right temporal lobe (Mathew et al., 1 985). A
study some years later reported that SPECT imaging of a multiple personal­
ity with four alters showed that "visually apparent and statistically signifi­
cant regional cerebral blood flow changes were observed in the left temporal
lobes" (Saxe et al., 1 992, p. 662). Functional magnetic resonance imaging of
a multiple in 1 999 indicated that personality changes were associated with
changes in temporal and hippocampal activity and with nigrostriatal-system
deactivation (Tsai et al., 1 999). No firm conclusions can be drawn from the
few studies presently available, but large between-alter effects do appear to
be present that are accessible to these emerging measurement techniques.
One final topic in the neurobiological study of MPD and DID should
be mentioned: Frank Putnam's investigation of the phenomenology and
physiology of the "switch process" in multiple personality indicated that
the state-changing that occurs as the individual switches from one person­
ality to another has features in common with state-of-consciousness transi­
tions observed in infants, altered states of consciousness, and psychiatric
disorders. Putnam (1 988) wrote: "These include the observation that states
of consciousness are discrete self-organizing patterns of behavior differing
along axes of affect, access to memory, attention and cognition, regulatory
physiology, and a sense of self. State transitions are marked by non-linear
changes in these variables" (p. 24). I might add here that there is an obvious
and intriguing phenomenological similarity between the switch process in
MPD and the changes of state that occur in onset and offset of mediumistic
trance and possession. There seems to be good reason to anticipate that all
these manifestations of secondary personalities have a great deal in com­
mon and can usefully be studied in parallel ways.
Much still remains to be done along the lines indicated here. In 1 991
Putnam summarized the neurophysiological research on MPD up to that
point, noting the difficulties involved in this kind of experimentation and
emphasizing the need for more such work (F. W. Putnam, 1 991). Miller and
Triggiano (1992), while agreeing that the available studies collectively pro­
vide considerable evidence for the distinctness and genuineness of MPD
alters, also stated their belief that many of the studies they reviewed lacked
"appropriate experimental rigor (for example, control subjects, cohort stud-
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-351

ies, experimental blinds, valid survey instruments, etc.)" (p. 56), and sug­
gested directions for future research.
Although the above studies successfully employed physiological mark­
ers to provide evidence for the distinctness and genuineness of alter person­
alities, they themselves do not provide anything like a plausible physiological
theory of the formation of MPD. Indeed, some of the observed phenomena,
such as changes in allergic responses and evoked potential morphologies
would appear, if genuine, to threaten gravely the prospects for finding any
such theory, as Myers himself might have contended. The literature on this
topic is scanty, but a few points should be made.
When evidence of "duplex" personality first emerged in the 1 9th cen­
tury, many neurologically zealous writers immediately sought to map that
evidence onto the obvious anatomical duality of the brain (Harrington,
1 987).31 Myers contributed to these early debates in a particularly interest­
ing and sophisticated way. In a series of papers on automatic writing, Myers
pointed out that quite apart from issues related to its content, such writing
spontaneously displays many other properties that make it extremely chal­
lenging, psychologically. For example it may be produced at extraordinary
speed, or be almost invisibly minute. James (1889) described a case in which
the writer, with his face the whole time buried in his elbow on the side away
from his writing, first writes out an entire page without lifting the pencil
from the paper, and then goes back and dots each i and crosses each t "with
absolute precision and great rapidity" (p. 44). It was noted that writing can
sometimes be produced by both hands simultaneously, and on different top­
ics (HP, vol. 2, p. 420). It may be written with words in reverse order, or with
the order of their letters reversed, or in pure mirror-image form, even start­
ing from the bottom right and continuing to the top left of each page (James,
1 889), or upside down so as to be read in the normal way by an observer fac­
ing the writer (HP, vol. 2, p. 448). Some of these formal peculiarities, Myers
observed, also occurred in the writing of right-handed adults who had suf­
fered damage to the left hemisphere, or in children newly learning how to
write. On the basis of these and related observations Myers tentatively sug­
gested that subliminal processes might often functionally "appropriate the
energies" of the non-dominant hemisphere while the dominant hemisphere
goes about its ordinary business. With characteristic prescience he further
suggested that it might be possible to test this hypothesis by observing pat­
terns of cerebral blood flow (Myers, 1 885b, p. 43)-a suggestion we have
only recently acquired the means to pursue. Unlike some of his contempo­
raries and successors, Myers did not naively imagine the secondary person­
ality as generated by, or residing in, the non-dominant hemisphere, noting
that, among other things, there is the awkward fact that the number of alter
personalities is often greater than twoY

3 1 . The same uncritical enthusiasm persists today in many pop-psychology accounts of

hemispheric specialization.
32. A curious footnote to these discussions is provided by the literature on "split-brain"
patients, in whom the corpus callosum is severed in order to control otherwise intractable
352-Chapter 5

It is now widely recognized that any physiological correlate or substrate

of MPD must be functional rather than anatomical in character. Wegner
(2002) semi-seriously advances the analogy of multiple operating systems
running on the same computer hardware. Passing from personality A to
personality B is thus akin to shutting down Windows and booting up Linux.
But this surely will not do: Apart from the fact that we have no idea what
these operations consist of, physiologically, they could only account in prin­
ciple for the simplest case-that of strictly alternating personalities. A much
more serious proposal has recently been put forward by Edelman and Tononi
(2000), in the context of a neurophysiological theory of consciousness that
Edelman's group has been developing continuously for over two decades,
supported by both large-scale computer simulations and neurophysiologi­
cal experiments. Briefly, they conceive of a state of consciousness as the
expression of a "dynamic core," a massive and distributed thalamocorti­
cal network of reciprocally interconnected neurons brought momentarily
into functional relationship by, for example, the current pattern of stimulus
input. It takes their whole book to explain in detail what this means, and to
present the evidence supporting it, but for our purposes here the essential
points are two: First, these authors have clearly recognized, like Myers, the
striking analogies between psychological and neurological disconnection
syndromes, and that the functional type represents the more fundamen­
tal category. In a neurological syndrome, that is, the disconnection is also
functional but happens to be produced by an anatomical lesion. Second,
they specifically hypothesize that MPD may reflect the operation of mul­
tiple, functionally isolated dynamic cores that form within a single nervous
system. Note however that while such functionally isolated neural systems
might potentially explain both alternating and co-temporal forms of MPD,
it would be very difficult if not impossible to accommodate the additional
property of inclusivity of awareness, as first pointed out long ago by T. W.
Mitchell (1912, pp. 279-28 1). In sum, this is an important and potentially
testable proposal, but the empirical problems here are already deeper than
its authors have yet realized. Moreover, as I shall next explain, still more
difficult problems remain to be faced.

epileptic seizures. Writers such as Gazzaniga ( 1970) and Sperry ( 1974) have argued that this
procedure in effect results in the existence of two conscious persons occupying the same skull.
John Sidtis ( 1986), on the other hand, examining split-brain patients to determine whether
"neurological disconnection produces psychiatric dissociation" (p. 127), concluded: "The
paradoxical absence of striking changes in general behavior after commissurotomy stands as
a counter point to dissociative phenomena ... .The person who remains adapts to disconnec­
tion, in some ways that are behaviorally obvious, such as cross-cuing, and in other ways that
we are just beginning to observe, such as by making use of semantic and spatial information
that is not readily available for conscious processing . . . . Disconnection, then, does not provide
a model for dissociative phenomena" (p. 144).
I agree with this view and would point out that explanations of this type are considerably
less cogent than the evidence assembled by Myers and his colleagues for multiple streams of
consciousness in anatomically intact subjects. See also Nagel (1979, chap. 1 1 , "Brain bisection
and the unity of consciousness").
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-353

Automatism and Supernormal Phenomena

A cornerstone of Myers's theoretical scheme-and a major stumbling-block

for many of his critics-is his contention that the subliminal is the source of
supernormal phenomena, that it functions in ways beyond the competence
of the everyday self and previously unknown to science. Already in his first
paper on the Subliminal Self he remarked that he believed telepathic and
telesthetic impressions "to be habitually received, not by aid of those adits
and operations which the supraliminal self itself directly commands, but by
aid of adits and operations peculiar to the subliminal self" (Myers, 1 892b,
p. 306). Moreover, he argued, these new faculties cannot be explained in
terms of known physiological or physical principles, and this reveals that
the human psyche has roots in a deeper part of reality that somehow tran­
scends ordinary space and time.
Information acquired subliminally thus finds expression, if it does so at
all, via sensory or motor automatism. The evidence that Myers marshals in
support of this unifying generalization is anything but trifling or inconse­
quential. Between the formation of the SPR in 1 882 and his death in 1901,
Myers and his colleagues published in their Proceedings and Journal some­
thing over 10,000 pages of reports on supernormal phenomena, including
not only extended field observations with mediums and heavily documented
studies of spontaneous cases, but early attempts to study telepathy and kin­
dred phenomena experimentally and quantitatively. The industry, thorough­
ness, and care manifest in these publications is unsurpassed in any scientific
literature known to me.33 Further hundreds of articles, monographs, and
books written with similarly high standards were published during the same
time period in continental Europe and the United States. One of the great
contributions of Human Personality is that it distills this enormous mass of
material into an orderly, coherent, and accessible scheme of presentation.
The book itself is thickly documented with case reports and summaries of
observations, and it repeatedly refers the reader to other reports, additional
documentation, and more detailed reports on the same or related subjects.
This vast literature, to which Human Personality itself is only an introduc­
tion, remains an unrivaled archive of information with which anyone who
intends to render judgment on the phenomena must become familiar. Col­
lectively it provides impressive-and in my view, compelling-evidence for
the reality of supernormal phenomena. Any serious examination will dis­
miss this literature at its peril. I will next briefly discuss these connections
between automatisms and supernormal phenomena under three sub-head­
ings: creativity, motor automatisms and mediumship, and experimental psi
research.

33. See James ( 1890-1896/1 9 1 0): "In fact, were I asked to point to a scientific journal where
hard-headed ness and never-sleeping suspicion of sources of error might be seen in their full
bloom, I think I should have to fall back on the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
Research" (pp. 304-305).
354-Chapter 5

Automatism and Creativity

Among the various types of relevant psychological phenomena, none

have been more significant in the development of the concept of automatism
than the inspirations that give rise to creative works. The physiologists who
originally developed the notion of automatism were struggling to explain,
among other things, the subjective descriptions of the creative process given
by some of the greatest literary and musical masters, who spoke of their
productions as sometimes coming to them fully formed, as though they had
been fashioned in some hidden workshop by artists unknown. These his­
torical geniuses described feelings of not being part of the process that pro­
duced their greatest works, acting more like scribes than anything else.
Myers wrote at length about this phenomenon.34 He linked genius with
the classical notion of inspiration, saying that an "inspiration of Genius"
is a "subliminal uprush," an emergence into supraliminal consciousness of
ideas that the person has "not consciously originated, but which have shaped
themselves beyond his will, in profounder regions of his being" (HP, vol. 1 ,
p . 71). Another central element o f creativity for Myers was the integration
of ideas arising from subliminal regions with those of the supraliminal self,
the "utilisation of a greater proportion of man's psychical being in subservi­
ence to ends desired by his supraliminal control" (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 55). The
outcome of the creative process is something intended and desired by the
supraliminal, and the supraliminal thus plays a key role in the completion
of what begins with a subliminal uprush. The heart of the creative process
is an automatism, but its culmination and completion occurs in the realm
of the supraliminal. Thus, creativity is a highly desirable integration of the
two aspects of the psyche and an instance of superior functioning. It is also
an indication of what the human soul is capable of, because there is a hint
of something "beyond," something "incommensurable" with "the results of
conscious logical thought" (vol. 1, p. 98). Perhaps for that very reason the
subliminal source does not usually present itself as a personality, as it often
does in many other types of automatism. Although the result is intelligible,
often brilliantly intelligible, and therefore attributable to an intelligent con­
scious source, that source usually remains unidentified.

Sensory and Motor Automatisms and Mediumship

Myers saw sensory automatisms as "products of inner vision or audi­

tion, externalized into quasi-percepts" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 222), exemplified in
such phenomena as dreams, crystal-visions, and apparitions. Examining
these topics he proceeds in his customary fashion from cases which involve
nothing obviously supernormal, through cases which begin to manifest

34. For more extensive discussion of Myers's ideas about genius, see our Chapter 2 and
especially Chapter 7.
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-355

heightened perception or memory, to cases which involve definite veridi­

cal elements not accessible to ordinary perception or inference. The most
significant type of sensory automatism for Myers was certainly appari­
tions, which form the main focus of Chapters 6 and 7 of Human Personal­
ity (and which we have discussed in Chapter 2). His argument here relied
primarily upon well-documented spontaneous cases, many derived from
the SPR's monumental publications Phantasms of the Living (Gurney et aI.,
1 886) and the "Census of Hallucinations" (H. Sidgwick et aI., 1 894), which
first documented the existence of waking hallucinations in normal persons
and provided an estimate of their incidence/prevalence that agrees quite
closely with current data (BentaH, 2000). The individual cases are some­
times extraordinary both in the amount and character of veridical detail
and in their impact on the persons involved. Myers again leads his read­
ers in stages, from phantasms of living persons, to those of persons in cri­
sis, or dying, to those of the recently or remotely dead, emphasizing cases
that seem to point to continuing personal agency, awareness, and memory
on the part of the dead. For example, an apparition may repeatedly try to
convey some useful piece of information to the percipient, or be witnessed
collectively, or be witnessed by a variety of persons in the same location,
but at different times. The apparition may fulfill a pre-arranged compact
to appear, for example, sometimes appearing not to the intended percipi­
ent but to a companion who did not know the deceased but subsequently
recognized him in a picture.
Myers himself viewed this spontaneous case material as collectively
providing compelling evidence for supernormal faculty in general, and con­
vincing evidence for post-mortem survival in particular, but he was also
acutely aware of the limitations and difficulties of this approach, dependent
as it is upon laborious efforts to verify and corroborate details of u npre d ict­
able and fugitive events. For him, as has been indicated in our previous dis­
cussions, motor automatism ultimately provided a much more abundant and
quasi-experimental source of material related to his central concerns. The
amount of potentially veridical information derived from automatic writ­
ing, for example, was truly staggering, and, as we shall see, some mediums
used this form of expression to convey striking evidence for the operation of
a supernormal faculty, and for the possibility of post-mortem survival.
Myers considered all productions of automatic writing or speaking to
be psychological automatisms, whether they purported to come from spir­
its or were thought of as expressions of some hidden part of the writer or
speaker. He insisted that even if there were cases of actual communication
with spirits through these automatic means, they must first be investigated
as psychological phenomena that use the same mechanisms for emergence
from the subliminal into the supraliminal that all other automatisms use. If
we receive messages from spirits, he insisted, they are communicated first
to some subliminal level of the psyche, and only then do they rise to the
supraliminal. This meant that there was no way to distinguish function­
ally between messages that were produced entirely by inner processes of
the subliminal and those that might originate at least in part outside the
356-Chapter 5

individual. Myers posited a "mythopreic" faculty (HP, vol. 2, p. 5), existing

in the subliminal consciousness of everyone, that constantly produces fan­
tasies, stories, poetic images, and other spontaneous creations which might
on occasion pass through the threshold of consciousness into supralimi­
nal awareness. If spirits communicated, they would do so by means of this
faculty. But the same might be true of manifestations of mental disorders,
such as the hallucinations of "hysterics" or delusions of paranoics. Thus,
the genuineness of mediumistic communications could only be determined
by objective evidence deriving from the contents of the messages. Speaking
of the work of this mythopreic faculty, Myers commented:

One wonders to what extent this strange manufacture of inward romances

can be carried. There is, I may say, a great deal more of it in the world than
is commonly suspected. I have myself received so many cases of these dra­
mati sed utterances-as though a number of different spirits were writing
i n turn through some automatist's hand-that I have come to recognise
the operation of some law of dreams, so to call it, as yet but obscurely
understood. The alleged personalities are for the most part not only
unidentified, but purposely unidentifiable; they give themselves romantic
or ludicrous names, and they are produced and disappear as lightly as
puppets on a mimic stageY (HP, vol. 2, p. 1 30)

Nevertheless, Myers believed that the "ludicrousness" of the form could

not of itself rule out the possibility that veridical supernormal informa­
tion was sometimes being communicated. Communications could be an
odd mixture of the fantastic and the telepathic, for example, as shown in
his exposition of the "Clelia" case of automatic writing already mentioned
(Myers, 1884). Myers recognized the difficulty in providing anything like
proof that messages coming through mediums were actually from spirits.
But he believed that the study of mediumship had value in its own right,
apart from the question of whether or not spirits were involved, since in
the process a great deal could be learned about psychological dynamics at
work in us all. At the same time he clearly recognized that the complexity
of subliminal processes added greatly to the difficulties to be overcome in
dealing with mediumistic material. He also knew that many psychological
investigators of his day, such as Janet, believed that mediumship was invari­
ably a manifestation of mental pathology. In short, he realized that if he
wanted to make the case for seriously studying mediumistic communica­
tions, he would have to do so on the basis of a well-thought-out psychologi­
cal foundation.
Myers did not believe that the phenomena of mediumship were invari­
ably indicators of pathology. Neither did Swiss psychologist Theodore

35. James ( l890b) too commented on the stylistic peculiarities of mediumistic communica­
tions: "If he ventures on higher intellectual flights, he abounds in a curiously vague optimis­
tic philosophy-and-water, in which phrases about spirit, harmony, beauty, law, progression,
development, etc., keep recurring. It seems exactly as if one author composed more than half
of the trance-messages, no matter by whom they are uttered" (vol. I, p. 394).
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-357

Flournoy, whose study of the medium " Helene Smith," From India to the
Planet Mars, is considered a classic to this day.36 Flournoy (1 900/1983) had
this to say about the matter:

It is far from being demonstrated that mediumship is a pathological phe­

nomenon. No doubt it is abnormal, in the sense of being rare, exceptional,
not usual; but morbidity is another matter. It would take quite some time,
several years at least, to carry out a serious and scientific investigation of
the phenomena called mediumistic and be able to pronounce on its true
nature. At the moment there are as many opinions on the matter as there
are investigators. It is interesting to note that in the countries where these
studies have been pushed the furthest-England and America-the domi­
nant view among the savants who have gone deepest into the subject is
not at all unfavourable to mediumship; and that, far from seeing it as a
special case of hysteria, they consider it a faculty superior, advantageous,
healthy-of which hysteria would be a degenerated form, a pathological
parody, a morbid caricature. (p. 59)

Despite the warnings of some clinicians about the possible pathologi­

cal dimensions of mediumship, many, like Myers, considered the quality of
mediumistic messages to be such that they could not be simply dismissed as
defective or pathological mental functioning.37 Myers cited much high-grade
evidence of an association between supernormal faculty and mediumistic
automatisms. Since I can here provide only the scantiest introduction to
this enormous literature (see also the Appendix), I will simply summarize
the principal facts about a medium cited by Myers as providing unusually
powerful evidence for the presence of supernormal capacities, and even for
the continued existence of the departed.
Mrs. Leonora Piper of Boston used both trance speaking and automatic
writing in her sittings. She began her mediumship in the 1 880s and over a
period of 40 years produced information about people, living and dead, that
often astounded her observers. For 1 5 years she was studied, scrutinized,
monitored, and even followed by detectives to rule out any possibility that
she could have obtained information by normal means. For a time William
James played an informal supervisory role in regard to her seances. Then
Richard Hodgson of the SPR was charged with the task of investigating
every aspect of her mediumship and closing any possible loophole in the
precautions taken to insure the genuineness of her phenomena.38 Despite
all th is, she was never discovered in deception or fraud. Details of sittings,

36. Flournoy was a proponent of Myers's "subliminal psychology" (see Flournoy, 191 1 , and
his 1 903 review of Human Personality, on our digital version of HP).
37. C. D. Broad (1962) observed: "Although instructed opinion is almost unanimous in
holding that trance-mediumship supplies data which require a paranormal explanation of
some kind, there is no consensus of experts in favour of any one suggested paranormal expla­
nation" (p. 259).
38. See, for example, R. Hodgson (1 892, 1 898); Hyslop (1901); James (1 909); Lang (1900);
Myers, Lodge, Leaf, and James (1 890); Newbold (1 898); Podmore (1 898); E. M. Sidgwick
( 1 900, 19 15). For biographical material on Mrs. Piper see Gauld (1968), H. Holt ( 1 9 1 5), Hyslop
358-Chapter 5

with the precautions used and information produced, were reported in vari­
ous articles, mostly in the Proceedings of the SPR. Myers himself discussed
the nature and implications of Mrs. Piper's mediumship at some length in
Human Personality (vol . 2, pp. 237-244, 599-624).
Mrs. Piper's mediumistic productions raised many intriguing psycho­
logical questions. The experience of going in and out of the trance state was
characterized by different phenomena at different periods of her medium­
ship. At times it was a pleasant experience, and at others it involved unpleas­
ant happenings such as convulsive movements and grinding of teeth. While
in trance Mrs. Piper could be pricked, cut, or burned and experience no
pain; she could even have ammonia held under her nose without apparent
effect. When she achieved the trance state, she would appear to be taken
over by one or more "spirits" who would conduct the seance and/or provide
the information. She would typically sit slumped over, unresponsive to out­
side stimuli. She might speak to one sitter while writing messages to others.
When Mrs. Piper returned to her normal state, she would often spend some
time in an in-between state in which she would be confused, disoriented,
and exhausted. When fully awake she consistently had no memory for what
had occurred in her trance state.
Mrs. Piper's mediumship went through four distinct stages, with four
different principal "controls" involved-a "control" being the intelligence
who is in direct communication with the medium by voice or writing (E. M.
Sidgwick, 1 91 5). In the first stage her principal control called himself "Phin­
uit." In this stage Phinuit spoke directly to the sitters attending the trance
session. In the second stage, which began in 1 892 and is evidentially the
most significant, Phinuit continued to communicate by voice, but the prin­
cipal control was a recently deceased man named George Pellew, referred
to as "G. P.," who gradually adopted writing as his mode of communica­
tion. During the first part of this period there were frequent occasions on
which Phinuit talked about one subject while at the same time G. P. wrote
about another, but eventually G. P. took over as Mrs. Piper's main controp9
George Pellew, a Washingtonian, had been killed in a riding accident only
a few weeks before his communications started. Hodgson had known him
slightly, but many sitters came to Mrs. Piper who were intimately acquainted
with the man and his peculiarities and who were in a good position to judge
the genuineness of G. P.'s information and style of communication. Of 1 50
sitters who were introduced to him anonymously, G. P. recognized 30 as
his acquaintances in life; those 30, and only those 30, were in fact known
to the living Pellew. G. P. responded to these old friends in ways that were
appropriate to the actual relationships that had existed, sometimes provid-

(1905), Piper (1929), Sage (1903), and Salter (1950). On critics of Mrs. Piper, see Gau1d (1968,
Appendix B).
39. Hodgson ( 1898) was a witness to these instances of dual simultaneous controls operat­
ing concurrently through two different automatisms. He also reported that there were rare
occasions on which right and left hands wrote separate messages while at the same time a
third message was communicated by voice (p. 395).
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-359

ing large amounts of veridical information about their shared experiences

and demonstrating that he knew the views and intimate concerns of each.
The third period of Mrs. Piper's mediumship started in 1 897 and
extended to the death of Richard Hodgson in 1 905. During this phase Mrs.
Piper's chief controls were a group called the "Imperator Band," ostensibly
the same spirits who had previously communicated through a well-known
British medium, the clergyman Stainton Moses, and whose chief communi­
cator was called "Rector." During this period messages delivered by voice
greatly decreased and writing became the main form of communication. In
the fourth period, Rector remained the main control, but Hodgson himself
ostensibly began to communicate (see the report by James [1909] on Mrs.
Piper's "Hodgson control").
In the course of her mediumship, and particularly in the "G. P." period,
Mrs. Piper routinely produced motor automatisms containing abundant
veridical information that could not have been obtained by ordinary means.
But it was not only the information that impressed observers; Mrs. Piper
also reproduced with striking accuracy the mannerisms, verbal expressions,
attitudes, and humor of deceased persons who were ostensibly communicat­
ing through her-especially, but by no means exclusively, in the case of her
"G. P." control. All of her main contemporary investigators were convinced
that some supernormal process gave rise to these manifestations (see Gauld,
1982, pp. 32-44). William James (1896), in his Presidential Address to the
SPR, made this declaration, too little known by modern psychologists:

If you will let me use the language of the professional logic-shop, a univer­
sal proposition can be made untrue by a particular instance. If you wish
to upset the law that all crows are black, you mustn't seek to show that no
crows are; it is enough if you prove one single crow to be white. My own
white crow is Mrs. Piper. In the trances of this medium, I cannot resist
the conviction that knowledge appears which she has never gained by the
ordinary waking use of her eyes and ears and wits. What the source of this
knowledge may be I know not, and have not the glim mer of an explanatory
suggestion to make; but from admitting the fact of such knowledge I can
see no escape. (pp. 5-6)

For many, considering the volume, complexity, and power of the best
available evidence, the only reasonable explanation was that the medium
got her knowledge, as claimed, from spirits of the deceased who commu­
nicated through her. There were, however, already some who thought there
was a cogent alternative explanation. When writing about the medium
"Helene Smith," Flournoy had invoked Myers's notion of the "mythopreic"
to express the tendency that people have to construct characters, stories,
and "romances" in their subliminal minds, and, on occasion, to drama­
tize these romances in the form of automatisms, such as automatic writing.
Flournoy believed that mediums demonstrated this tendency to an extraor­
dinary degree, and that the "spirits" that they claimed to be in touch with
were the products of this faculty. His observations of "Helene Smith" led
360-Chapter 5

him to believe that almost everything that she produced could be explained
in terms of the creative play of her subliminal mind, supplemented by "cryp­
tomnesia" (unconscious recall of forgotten events) and spurred on by the
need to resolve certain personal psychological problems. Although in his
analysis of "Helene Smith's" communications Flournoy allowed for the pos­
sibility that telepathy occasionally had a role, for the most part that element
was played down. Flournoy's estimation of the part played by supernormal
knowledge in mediumistic communications evolved, however, and his final
position on the matter can be found in Spiritism and Psychology (Flournoy,
1 91 1). Here he stated that he now believed that the information presented by
certain mediums was so impressive that telepathy must be involved.
Flournoy's position became the seed for a conception of mediumistic
psychology that slowly evolved over the 20th century and eventually came
to be called the "super-psi" theory of mediumship. This theory of medium­
istic communication has two components:

(I) Super-ESP Component. The medium is believed to have the ability to

exercise psi capacities (telepathy, clairvoyance, retrocognition, precogni­
tion, and psychokinesis) to whatever extent necessary to obtain any infor­
mation needed for successful impersonation of a deceased individual.
Increased powers were gradually ceded to mediums over time as experi­
mental and anecdotal confirmation of these faculties grew, but their exten­
sion far beyond anything that had actually been proven was thus invoked
as part of a speculative hypothesis that could provide an alternative expla­
nation for the impressive veridical information gifted mediums sometimes
produced.

(2) Superplasticity Component. The medium is also believed to be capable

of unconsciously integrating and dramatizing supernormally acquired
information about an individual in such a way as to convincingly imper­
sonate that individual. This component is based on the belief that human
beings have an unconscious tendency to create stories, fables, character­
izations, and even well-rounded personalities (Myers's "mythopa:ic fac­
ulty") and express those creative fabrications publically. This ability is
characterized by playfulness, inventiveness, and an urge to dramatize that
remains wholly unconscious to the medium.

Ironically, the super-ESP component of the super-psi theory, which

contributed to doubting that mediumistic communications proved survival,
was the result of the extraordinary success of some mediums in demonstrat­
ing telepathy and clairvoyance generally (Gauld, 1982, pp. 1 3 1-138; Steven­
son, 1 977, pp. 1 57-1 58). In any event, there now existed a possible interpreta­
tion of mediumistic messages that did not involve attribution of fraud, but
that also was not based on survival of bodily death.
Myers himself believed that the evidence already available as he was
writing Human Personality was sufficient to establish post-mortem survival
of human personality, but he acknowledged that it might not be convincing
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-361

to everyone.40 A number of other pillars of the SPR also went from early
doubt to acceptance of some concept of survival. After many years of obser­
vation of Mrs. Piper, Hodgson, who was initially skeptical, himself became
convinced of continued personal existence (for a summary of his reasons,
see Gauld, 1 968, pp. 265-267; for the complete account, see R. Hodgson,
1 898). Physicist Oliver Lodge soon ( 1 894), and the rather skeptical Elea­
nor Sidgwick more slowly (1915), came to the same conclusion, although in
somewhat different forms. On the other hand, James remained uncommit­
ted to any notion of survival, and McDougall (191 1 /1 961), although respect­
ful of those who assented, believed that " the evidence is not of such a nature
that it can be stated in a form which should produce conviction in the mind
of any impartial inquirer" (p. 347).
Since Myers's time much more evidence of the types he was familiar
with, plus additional types largely or totally unknown to him, has come
to light (Appendix). Nevertheless, the issue of survival remains essentially
deadlocked, with more or less equally able and informed parties lined up on
both sides. We will revisit the extremely difficult issues related to survival
in Chapter 9, but for present purposes the crucial fact is that the medium­
istic literature fully documents the predicted association between automa­
tism and supernormal phenomena, and to that extent at minimum supports
Myers's overall theoretical outlook.

Automatism and Experimental Psi Research

Large amounts of additional work on sensory and motor automatisms

were carried out following Myers's death, largely along lines originated
by him, and continued to provide high-quality evidence of the postulated
link between automatisms and supernormal phenomena (Appendix). Sig­
nificant later landmarks in the analysis of spontaneous cases include works
by Broad ( 1962), H. Hart (Hart et aI., 1956), Stevenson (1982), and Tyrrell
(1938, 1 943/1953).41 Gauld ( 1982) critically reviewed all contending theories
of apparitions and arrived at a position very close to that of Myers himself.
More recent collections of spontaneous cases, such as those assembled by
Louisa Rhine (1961, 1981), have confirmed not only the general fact that
spontaneous cases of the sorts studied by Myers and his colleagues continue
to occur, and in substantial numbers, but also more specific expectations.
For example, a majority of spontaneous psi experiences occur in connection
with dreams and waking hallucinations; moreover, experiences occurring in

40. "I do not venture to suppose that the evidence set forth in these volumes, even when
considered in connection with other evidence now accessible in our Proceedings, will at once
convince the bulk of my readers that the momentous, the epoch-making discovery has been
already made" (HP, vol. 2, p. 79). In fact, what Myers regarded as his best evidence for sur­
vival (the case of Mrs. Thompson) was never published, and his records of it disappeared
after his death.
41 . H. Hart, Broad, and Stevenson also provide excellent accounts of trance mediumship.
362-Chapter 5

dreams tend to be superior in amount and clarity of veridical detail to those

that occur in the waking state.
By the 1940s, however, work on spontaneous cases and mediumship
had declined drastically in favor of the narrower experimental and statisti­
cal approaches institutionalized at Duke by J. B. Rhine and his colleagues
(Mauskopf & McVaugh, 1 980). In reflection and perhaps imitation of
broader trends in American psychology, psychical research as conceived by
the founders of the SPR thus contracted to its modern expression, "parapsy­
chology." Without denying the importance or value of good experimental
work, I wish to comment parenthetically that this narrowing of perspective
seems to me to have caused considerable damage both to psychical research
itself and to psychology at large. Nonetheless, the modern experimental
tradition of parapsychology has itself produced much additional empirical
evidence in support of Myers's model. In the first instance I should like to
cite that literature in its entirety as demonstrating that supernormal phe­
nomena, which lie at the core of Myers's conception of the Subliminal Self,
do in fact occur (Appendix).
In addition, there are many studies that more specifically support
Myers's concept of sensory and motor automatisms as "mediating vehicles"
(Tyrrell, 1 938) for the expression of psi. For example, an important series of
studies at Maimonides Hospital in Brooklyn confirmed the occurrence of
telepathy in dreams (for a review, see Child, 1 985). Several meta-analyses,
such as Schechter ( 1 984) and Stanford and Stein ( 1994), have also confirmed
that hypnosis can improve performance in experimental psi tasks, although
it interacts in complex ways with a variety of other factors. Additional evi­
dence came to light when laboratory workers began to adapt their experi­
mental and statistical procedures better to the "natural history" of psi. R.
A. White (1964) analyzed the self-descriptions of a number of gifted sub­
jects and found many features in common. In particular, the importance of
deep relaxation, sensory isolation, and mental quietude characteristically
resulted in emergence of the requested information (in the form of invol­
untary visual or auditory imagery), a sensory automatism. Much labora­
tory work on "internal attention states" (Honorton, 1977) was catalyzed by
White's paper, and repeated meta-analyses (e.g., Bem & Honorton, 1 994;
and Radin, 1 997, 2006) have demonstrated that experiments which elicit
"free" verbal or graphic responses to complex target materials under such
conditions consistently produce strong and qualitatively rich psi effects,
rivaling in many instances those observed in spontaneous cases.
The older style of psi experimentation involving massed forced-choice
guessing of ESP cards and the like would seem to provide little scope for
the operation of automatisms, but significant evidence has been found even
there, and especially in connection with gifted subjects. For example E. F.
Kelly, Kanthamani, Child, and Young ( 1975) showed in the case of their
special subject BD that the target-related information was again delivered
primarily in the form of spontaneous, involuntary visual imagery, con­
firming a central feature of that subject's self-description. Similarly, the
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-363

response method of the gifted subject Van Dam in the classic experiment
of Brugmans, Heymans, and Weinberg was essentially a motor automatism
(Schouten & Kelly, 1978). Both of these gifted subjects, and several others
as well, also showed strong tendencies to get hits in "bursts" of unusually
high scoring, often accompanied by mild alterations of state suggestive of
automatism. In some cases, moreover, it could be shown that virtually all of
the excess hits that occurred during very long series of trials occurred dur­
ing scattered episodes of this sort (E. F. Kelly, 1 982).
In sum, the existing literature of experimental parapsychology provides
substantial additional support for Myers's theory, by confirming both the
existence of supernormal phenomena and their linkage with psychological
automatism.

Conclusion

When Myers died in 1901, his masterwork Human Personality was very
nearly complete. There we find Myers's most mature formulation regarding
psychological automatism and the issues surrounding it. His formulation
involves five central features:

(1) He argued that phenomena such as automatic writing, hysteria, medi­

umship, dreams, hypnotism, and creative inspiration force investigators to
look beyond previously available physiological explanations and to posit
centers of consciousness, outside the awareness of the primary conscious­
ness, as the sources of many complex automatic actions and perceptions.

(2) He insisted that these conscious centers must be regarded, at least in

well-developed cases, as personalities or selves-intelligent sources of
thoughts, feelings, and actions that possess their own memory chains and
exhibit a psychological cohesiveness. He indicated that these centers are
not necessarily merely alternating states, but may operate concurrently
with the supraliminal self and with each other.

(3) He noted that secondary or subliminal conscious centers sometimes

display awareness of each other. He also wrote about a kind of "inclusive­
ness" in which subliminal centers may sometimes be aware of the thoughts
and actions of the primary or supraliminal consciousness, as well as the
environment in which the supraliminal consciousness exists. This aware­
ness is ordinarily not reciprocal, however.

(4) He recognized that there is a strong linkage between automatisms and

psi capabilities. Beginning with his study of automatic writing in the 1880s,
Myers demonstrated that information produced by the communicating
consciousness was sometimes veridical and could not be accounted for in
terms of knowledge gained through sense experience and other "normal"
means. Indications of supernormal faculty were discovered throughout
the range of the sensory and motor automat isms he studied.
364-Chapter 5

(5) He further hypothesized an "I" or ultimate Subliminal Self that

embraces both the supraliminal and subliminal consciousness and is aware
of all activity that occurs in each. This Self has roots in a transcendental
environment of some sort, accounting for its supernormal capabilities. It
provides the overarching unity of the psyche, reconciling its "colonial"
versus "unitary" aspects, and it survives the shock of physical death.

Myers's investigation of automatisms focused on complex phenomena

which demonstrated the presence of conscious intelligent activity but did
not arise from the ordinary consciousness of the subject. He rejected the
contemporary physiological explanation then in favor-epitomized by the
term "unconscious cerebration"-as inadequate to explain the data, and he
posited instead a notion of automatism which was essentially psychological.
From a certain point of view, the whole history of subsequent developments
concerning automatism can be looked at as a continued tension between this
newly formulated psychological view of human experience and the attempt,
subtle or not so subtle, to return to the "unconscious cerebration" explana­
tion. I believe that the arguments of Myers and others against this posi­
tion, based as they are on the data of experience, have, if anything, gained
strength over the past century. The first four features of Myers's position, in
particular, I regard as empirically established. The last feature, however, is
more contentious and leads to even larger issues.
Underlying the specific debate about the interpretation of automatism
is a more general controversy about the role of mind, consciousness, and
volition. Myers, like James, Bergson, McDougall, and others, insisted that
a psychology that gives no power to mind and consciousness is an absur­
dity. He was determined to hold a place for the mind and mental activity in
scientific psychology, insisting that automatism was psychological automa­
tism. His position was inclusive, because he believed that mind and organ­
ism stand as irreducible realities that must in the end make peace with each
other.
Finally, among those who preserved a central place for consciousness
and who acknowledged multiple consciousnesses as a real fact of human
experience, Myers espoused a holistic rather than monadic view of the
human psyche. The monadic schema, as described by McDougall, Balfour,
Hilgard, or others, presents us with a hierarchical, top-down picture ofmen­
tal functioning in which our ordinary consciousness stands at the top of the
pyramid and, at least in healthy functioning, directly or indirectly controls
all subordinate elements. In my opinion, this schema collapses in the face
of the complex empirical realities of psychological automatism. Automatic
veridical communication and creative inspiration tell powerfully against
the structure assumed in the monadic schema. Myers, in contrast, insisted
that our ordinary consciousness is not on top in any significant way, and
that, as a matter of fact, what is most sublime in us and what is most original,
derives from the subliminal, from what is out of sight, and from what, in the
last analysis, must be our most essential Self. I believe that only this per­
spective can provide a framework for understanding the whole spectrum of
 Automatism and Secondary Centers of Consciousness-365

human experience as revealed in automatism, and I believe it was the genius

of Myers to so effectively give that perspective expression. We will return to
these themes in a larger setting in Chapter 9.
 Chapter 6

Unusual Experiences Near Death

and Related Phenomena

Emily Williams Kelly, Bruce Greyson,

& Edward F. Kelly

If consciousness be a mere epiphenomenon . . . accompanying, but in no

way guiding, certain molecular changes in the brain , we shall of course
expect. . .that consciousness is exclusively linked with the functional disin­
tegration of central nervous elements, and varies i n its intensity with the
rapidity or energy of that disintegration. And ordinary experience, at least
within physiological limits, will support some view like this. Yet now and
then we find a case where vivid consciousness has existed during a state
of apparent coma . . . tranquilly and intelligently co-existing with an almost
complete abeyance of ordinary vital function . . . . Until this new field has
been more fully worked-until the traces of memory which may survive
from comatose, ecstatic, syncopal conditions have been revived (by hyp­
notic suggestion or otherwise), and carefully compared, we have no right
to make any absolute assertion as to the concomitant cerebral processes
on which consciousness depends. (Myers, 1 891c, pp. 1 16-1 17)

The hypothesis that consciousness i s the product of brain processes, or that

mind is merely the subjective concomitant of neurological events, has been
and remains the almost universal assumption in neuroscience and psychol­
ogy. Investigations of certain extraordinary circumstances, however, reveal
phenomena that call into question this assumption. An analogy can be
drawn with Newtonian dynamics, which appears to explain the physics of
everyday life. It was only the investigation of extraordinary circumstances,

367
368�Chapter 6

involving extremely small or large distances, speeds, or mass, that revealed

the limits of the Newtonian model and the need for additional explanatory
models. So too with the question of the mind-brain relationship: As Myers
understood in urging his colleagues in psychology to study subliminal and
other unusual psychological phenomena, exploration of extraordinary cir­
cumstances may reveal limitations of the current model of mind-brain iden­
tity and the need for a more comprehensive explanatory model.
One such extraordinary circumstance is the continued functioning of
the mind when the brain appears to be inactive or impaired, such as may
occur near death. Myers specifically recognized the importance of such cir­
cumstances: "It is possible that we might learn much were we to question
dying persons, on their awakening from some comatose condition, as to
their memory of any dream or vision during that state" (HP, vol. 2, p. 3 1 5),
and he thus urged "much more of experiment and observation of mental
conditions under anresthetics, during recovery from fainting, and even dur­
ing apparent coma" (Myers, l 89lc, p. 1 1 5). He himself reported three cases
of experiences occurring when a person was close to death but then revived
(Myers, l89lc, l 886b, p. 305; l 892a, pp. 180-200; HP, vol. 2, pp. 3 1 5-323).
The importance of such cases lies in the fact that "the patient, while in a
comatose state, almost pulseless, and at a temperature much below normal,
did, nevertheless, undergo a remarkably vivid series of mental impressions"
(1 892a, p. 1 94).
Such experiences have, in recent years, been labeled "near-death experi­
ences," or NDEs. They are not, however, the isolated and homogeneous phe­
nomenon that such a label suggests. Many experiences called "near-death"
experiences have occurred when the person was not physiologically near
death, and individual features associated with NDEs occur in a wide variety
of conditions in which the person is also clearly not near death. We believe
that the difficulties in explaining, and even in defining, the NDE stem at
least in part from the failure to examine this phenomenon within the con­
text of this larger family of related experiences. In this chapter, after outlin­
ing the general nature of the phenomena known as "NDEs" and the various
explanatory models that have been proposed for them, we will then examine
some of the other types of experiences that are phenomenologically related
to NDEs. These include experiences in which the ordinary perceived rela­
tionship between consciousness and the body has been altered-especially
"out-of-body experiences," in which a person's consciousness seems to be
functioning normally, but from a spatial location outside the body. We will
also discuss a variety of hallucinatoryl experiences in which a person has

I. We wish to emphasize immediately that our use of the word "hallucination," here or else­
where, is in no way meant to imply that the experiences we discuss in this chapter are patho­
logical. We define "hallucination" as a perceptual experience in the absence of corresponding
sensory input. Following Myers's approach, we propose that the word "hallucination" should
be understood more broadly as a psychological process that can take non-pathological as
well as pathological forms, depending on the circumstances in which the experiences occur.
Unfortunately, the association of the word "hallucination" with pathology and delusion is so
ingrained that Stevenson ( l983b) has suggested that we need a new word, "idiophany," to refer
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena�369

seen, heard, or otherwise sensed the presence of a dying or deceased person

not physically present. Finally, we will briefly discuss religious "conversion
experiences" of the sort described by James ( 1902/1958). These provide a
bridge between NDE-type phenomena and the more extreme manifesta­
tions of noetic or life-transforming experiences associated with mysticism,
to which we will devote Chapter 8.
We wish t o emphasize again that all these phenomena are interrelated in
some fundamental but s o far poorly understood way. All involve a marked
alteration in the ordinary relationship of a person's consciousness with the
external world. We believe it is essential to consider the entire spectrum of
experiences when proposing explanations for any one of them. We have cho­
sen to organize this chapter specifically around the experiences known as
NDEs, however, because of their extreme theoretical importance. Despite
the wide variety of physiological and psychological conditions under which
NDEs occur, many such experiences do clearly occur when the brain is
severely impaired. At the end of this chapter we will focus specifically on
this aspect of NDEs, underscoring the important theoretical implications
of experiences of this type for current neurophysiological models of con­
sCIOusness.

Near-Death Experiences: An Introduction

There is no universally agreed on definition of NDEs (Greyson, 1999), but

they are generally understood to be the unusual, often vivid and realistic,
and sometimes profoundly life-changing experiences occurring to people
who have been either physiologically close to death, as in cardiac arrest or
other life-threatening conditions, or psychologically close to death, as in
accidents or illnesses in which they feared they would die.
The following experiences come from our collection at the University
of Virginia and illustrate some of the features commonly reported. The first
was reported by a woman who was in surgery after hemorrhaging severely
and going into shock:

I had floated out of my body and was looking down on all of this [the doc­
tors and nurses working on her]. I was wearing white. I started floating
down a tunnel which had rough looking sides and a blinding, bright light
at the end, and I was headed for the lighted end. As I was going through
the tunnel I saw my Grandfather's face, and he was smiling at me. He said
something like, "It's been a long time. Welcome." He died i n 1 948, and I
was his favorite grandchild; we were very close. I saw several faces on the
wall; some of them I knew and some I did not, but they were all smiling. I

to non-pathological hallucinations. Until this is or some other word becomes widely adopted,
however, we will continue to use the word "hallucination" to include the large number of
experiences that go beyond sensory perception but that seem to have more in common with
ordinary sensory experiences than with illusions or delusions.
370-Chapter 6

was almost to the end, and my Great-Grandmother, who helped raise me

and I was very close to, appeared, and she said "Go back; you have a child
who needs you. You can come here with us later." I tried to argue with her,
but she told me flatly, "You go back."

Another woman, who was in surgery after suffering massive pulmonary

emboli, reported:

Some time after entering the operating room, I found myself above the
scene looking down on myself, and the doctors and nurses around me. I
could, of course, hear everything they were saying, and I wanted to tell
them not to feel so bad, that I couldn't stand the pain any more and I l i ked
it where I was. I was somewhere where it was so beautiful and peaceful that
I wanted to stay there forever. I did not actually see anyone I knew, or any­
thing in particular. There was a bright, but soft light, and I felt the most
comforting sense of peace. Suddenly I thought "Ben [her husband] can't
possibly bring up Molly alone; I had better go back," and that is the last
thing I remember. I am absolutely positive that I decided to come back.
Since that time I have no fear of dying.
I spent ten days in intensive care, and almost a month in the hospi­
tal, but I was never able to mention this to the doctors or nurses. I have
mentioned it to only a very few people in the last couple of years, and then
reluctantly. I feel as though people might think I am making up a story for
attention, but I assure [you] that is not so.
An experience such as this does change your outlook on life and also
some of your religious beliefs. I h ave a lways been an active church-goer,
but only on the surface, I am afraid. Since then, I have given thought to
some of the facts I was taught, and have my own way of dealing with them.
I wish that people who have a loved one die suddenly, perhaps in an early
stage of life, could be made to understand what this felt like, they wouldn't
feel so bad.

Profound experiences near death have been reported throughout his­

tory and in many cultures.2 Among the earliest reports is Plato's description
in Book 10 of the Republic of the experiences of the soldier Er during the
time when he had been thought dead and placed on a funeral pyre. In more
recent times, numerous experiences were reported in the medical literature
of the 1 9th and 20th centuries (for a list of some of these, see Greyson, 1 998).
The 1 9th-century physician Brierre de Boismont (1859) described two such
experiences. In one of them, a woman who had been delirious and seemed
to have died suddenly sighed and was revived by her attendants: "Instead,
however, of thanking the persons who had taken such pains to restore her to
life, she complained to them of their having recalled her soul from a condi­
tion of indescribable repose and happiness .. . . She added that she had heard

2. See, for example, Audette (1982), c. B. Becker (198 1 , 1984), C. Carr ( 1993), Counts ( 1 983),
Feng and Liu (1992), R. Gardner (1983, p. 1932), Holck (1978), Kellehear ( 1993), Lundahl
( 1 982), Osis and Haraldsson (197711997), Pasricha ( 1993), Pasricha and Stevenson (1986),
Schorer (1985), and Zaleski (1987).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-37l

[while seemingly dead] the sighs and lamentations of her father, and all that
had been said with regard to her funeral" (p. 263).
As we mentioned earlier, later in the 1 9th century Myers (1 892a) reported
three cases that included many of the features reported in today's experi­
ences. In one of these, which occurred in 1 889, the patient (a physician him­
self) seemed to have died from typhoid fever; his physician testified that "he
was actually dead as ful ly as I ever supposed anyone dead," with no percep­
tible pulse, heartbeat, or respiration (p. 1 93). Nonetheless, the patient had a
vivid and complex experience of seeming to leave his body and see it, as well
as the actions of the people in the room. He then went to a place of great
beauty where he felt a presence and saw the face of an unidentified person
who radiated great love. He also saw a dark cloud and dark pathway (per­
haps corresponding to the later descriptions by other people of a tunnel).
He seemed to be given the choice of staying or returning, but when he chose
to stay and tried to cross an apparent boundary, he was stopped from pro­
ceeding and then suddenly found himself back in his body. Throughout the
experience, he seemed to be in a nonphysical body that had "perfect health
and strength," and he reported that "memory, judgment, and imagination,
the three great faculties of mind, were intact and active" (pp. 1 83-184).
The first systematic study was that of Heim (1892/1 972), who published a
report on his collection of 30 firsthand accounts (including his own) of expe­
riences of mountain climbers who had fallen in the Alps, soldiers wounded
in war, workers who had fallen from scaffolds, and individuals who had
nearly died in accidents and near-drownings. This study was important
for bringing together for the first time a large number of these experiences,
including experiences that occur, not when the person is physiologically
near death, but when he or she only thinks that death is imminent.
Similar systematic studies were conducted during the early 1 970s, par­
ticularly by psychiatrist Russell Noyes (e.g., Noyes, 1 972, 1 976). In 1975 a
popular book by the psychiatrist and philosopher Raymond Moody brought
widespread attention to such phenomena, and in the past three decades
there has been a surge of interest in and study of them.
As research on these experiences has increased, it has become clear that
NDEs are not infrequent. Our collection at the University of Virginia now
numbers 861 reports, and other researchers, including the many local and
national branches of the International Association for Near-Death Stud­
ies, have also collected large numbers of cases. Early estimates of the inci­
dence of NDEs may have been inflated by ambiguous criteria for NDEs and
by biased sampling (Greyson, 1 998), but studies in the past decade, using
more explicit criteria and better sampling techniques suggest that NDE-like
experiences may occur in about 10-20% of patients close to death (Greyson,
2003; Milne, 1 995; Parnia, Waller, Yeates, & Fenwick, 2001; Schwaninger,
Eisenberg, Schechtman, & Weiss, 2002; van Lommel, van Wees, Meyers, &
Elfferich, 2001).
Although the widespread impression is that NDEs occur among
patients who have been clinically dead and then resuscitated, they in fact
372-Chapter 6

occur in a wide variety of medical circumstances. An examination of medi­

cal records in cases in our collection (all of them experiences reported
to us retrospectively) showed that slightly more than half of the patients,
although ill enough to have been hospitalized, were at no time in danger of
dying (Owens, Cook [Kelly], & Stevenson, 1 990; Stevenson, Cook [Kelly], &
McClean-Rice, 1 989-1 990); NDEs may therefore occur when patients fear
they are dying even if in fact they are not. Moreover, NDEs can also occur
when patients are suddenly confronted with death but escape unharmed, as
in falls or near-accidents (e.g., Heim, 1 89211972).3
Nonetheless, there remain a substantial number of cases in which
patients were clinically near death, such as during cardiac arrest or some
other, usually sudden, loss of vital functions (Finkelmeier, Kenwood,
& Summers, 1 984; Greyson, 2003; Owens et ai., 1 990; Parnia et aI., 200 1 ;
Sabom, 1 982; Schoenbeck & Hocutt, 1 991 ; Schwaninger e t ai., 2002; van
Lommel et aI., 2001). These include some in children who suffered cardiac
arrest (Gabbard & Twemlow, 1 984, pp. 1 54-1 56; M. Morse, 1 983, 1 994a, pp.
67-69, 1 994b; Serdahely, 1 990). In one recent prospective study of 344 car­
diac arrest patients, 62 reported NDEs following resuscitation from cardiac
arrest (van Lommel et ai., 2001). In our own collection of retrospectively
reported NDEs, out of 1 14 cases for which we have obtained and rated med­
ical records, 35 were rated "4" on a 4-point scale of severity of condition,
meaning that there was some documentation of loss of vital signs, often
including cardiac arrest.
Just as NDEs can occur in a wide variety of circumstances, so do they
include a wide variety of features. Frequently recurring features include
feelings of peace and joy; a sense of being out of one's body and watch­
ing events going on around one's body and, occasionally, at some distant
physical location; a cessation of pain; seeing a dark tunnel or void; seeing
an unusually bright light, sometimes experienced as a "Being of Light" that
radiates love and may speak or otherwise communicate with the person;
encountering other beings, often deceased persons whom the experiencer
recognizes; experiencing a revival of memories or even a full life review,
sometimes accompanied by feelings ofjudgment; seeing some "other realm,"
often of great beauty; sensing a barrier or border beyond which the person
cannot go; and returning to the body, often reluctantly.
Although all of these features recur frequently in large groups of cases,
individual experiences are unique. The number of features reported in indi­
vidual cases varies, no experience containing all features has been reported,
no single feature is common to all NDEs, and features do not necessarily

3. In our studies patients are judged to be near death if the medical records indicated a loss
of some vital sign such as blood pressure or pulse or if the condition was serious enough to
have caused death if the patient had received no medical attention. Patients judged not to be
near death were those whose medical records indicated that they had a serious, but not life­
threatening condition and those who were not seriously ill. Many of these medical records
were obtained years after the experience in question, and we cannot vouch for their accuracy
or completeness. Nevertheless, as a group they illustrate the wide variety of physiological
conditions in which these experiences can occur.
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-373

unfold in a particular fixed order. Moreover, in contrast to most NDEs,

which are positive experiences, there are also NDEs that are frightening or
unpleasant (Greyson & Bush, 1992).4
Some investigators have attempted to evaluate NDEs by quantify­
ing their common features. The most widely used systems have been the
Weighted Core Experience Index (WCEI) (Ring, 1 980) and the NDE Scale
(Greyson, 1 983b, 1985), a 32-point rating scale that has been used primarily
to determine the "richness" of, or number of features in, individual cases
and has shown high internal consistency and reliability, and high correla­
tion with Ring's WCEI (r = .90).
All the major features of NDEs have been reported in a wide variety
of circumstances, but certain features correlate somewhat with the circum­
stances in which the experiences occur. For example, alterations in the sense
of time, unusually rapid thinking, and a revival of memories are more com­
mon in near-death events that are sudden and unexpected than in those that
may have been anticipated (Greyson, 1 985). In a study in which medical
records were examined to determine how close to death the person actu­
ally was, certain other features, such as an encounter with a brilliant light,
enhanced cognitive function, and positive emotions, were more common
among individuals who were actually close to death than in those who were
not so seriously ill (Owens et aI., 1 990). People actually close to death were
also more likely to report encounters with deceased persons than those who
were not (E. W. Kelly, 2001). Although children's NDEs are generally simi­
lar to those of adults, none have been reported that include a life review,
perhaps not surprisingly (Bush, 1 983; M. Morse, Castillo, Venecia, Milstein,
& Tyler, 1 986).
One particularly noteworthy feature is that for many experiencers an
NDE permanently and dramatically alters the person's attitudes, beliefs,
and values, often leading to beneficial personal transformations. Afteref­
fects most often reported include increases in spirituality, concern for oth­
ers, and appreciation of life; a heightened sense of purpose; and decreases
in fear of death, in materialistic attitudes, and in competitiveness.5 A large
study of NDEs among survivors of cardiac arrest showed that, after both
a two-year and an eight-year follow up interval, people who had NDEs in
connection with the cardiac arrest had a significant decrease in their fear
of death and a significant increase in their belief in survival after death,
whereas those who had not had an NDE tended not to believe in survival
(van Lommel et aI., 2001). More specifically (and seemingly paradoxically,
given the positive nature of most experiences and the reluctance of many
experiencers to return to the body), those who experience an NDE as the
result of a suicide attempt rarely attempt suicide again, in contrast to most

4. Unpleasant experiences seem to be the exception, however. In our collection, for exam­
ple, among cases for which we have data on this feature, only 1 1% described the NDE as being
either "totally unpleasant" or "mostly unpleasant."
5. See, for example, Bauer (1985), Flynn (1986), Grey ( 1 985), Greyson ( l983a, 1992), Noyes
( 1980), Ring ( 1980, 1984), Sabom ( 1982), and van Lommel et a!. (2001).
374�Chapter 6

suicide attempters. This protective effect may be the result of an increased

sense of purpose and appreciation for life (Greyson, 1981 , 1 992-1993).
Even when the NDE itself has been a positive experience, it can some­
times have negative consequences. NDEs frequently lead to significant
changes in values, attitudes, and interests, and family and friends may have
difficulty understanding and accepting these changes (Bush, 1991; Flynn,
1 986; Greyson, 1997; Insinger, 1 991). Also, some people may doubt their
sanity in the aftermath of such an unexpected and powerful experience,
and they may thus fail to discuss this fear or their experience with others
because of a concern that they will be ridiculed or rejected (see, e.g., van
Lommel et al., 2001, p. 2043).

Explanatory Models of Near-Death Experiences

Apart from the profound psychological effects that NDEs often have on
individual experiencers, the importance ofNDEs for psychology lies in their
implications for an understanding of the relationship of mind and brain. In
particular, it is the continuation and even enhancement of mental function­
ing at a time when the brain is physiologically impaired that presents prob­
lems for the prevailing view of mind-brain relations and thus renders NDEs
of particular importance in this regard. In this section, we will review some
of the explanatory models that have been proposed for NDEs, paying spe­
cial attention to how well they can account for the various features of NDEs
and especially for enhanced mental functioning.

Psychological and Cultural Theories

Expectation
Many observers have considered NDEs to be a defense against the
threat of death. One widespread suggestion is that NDEs are products of
the imagination generated to protect oneself when facing the threat of death
and constructed from one's personal and cultural expectations. NDEs do
seem to be a universal phenomenon-as we mentioned earlier, they have
been reported throughout history and in many cultures-and they may thus
be a common human reaction when confronted with death. On the other
hand, there are cultural differences, suggesting that prior beliefs may have
some influence on the kind of experience a person will have or report. The
life review and tunnel sensation, for example, are common in some cultures
but rare in others (Kellehear, 1 993). Cases in India show some differences in
features as compared with Western cases, primarily in the way in which the
person reports being taken to an "other" realm and being sent back (Pas­
richa & Stevenson, 1 986). Cases in north India also show differences from
cases in south India (Pasricha, 1 993).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-375

Other data, however, do not support an expectation theory. Experiences

often differ sharply from the individual's prior religious or personal beliefs
and expectations about death (Abramovitch, 1988; Ring, 1984). People who
had no prior knowledge about NDEs describe the same kinds of experi­
ences and features as do people more familiar with the phenomenon (Grey­
son, 1 99 1 ; Greyson & Stevenson, 1980; Ring, 1 980; Sabom, 1 982). Young
children, who are less likely to have developed expectations about death,
report NDEs with features similar to those of adults (Bush, 1 983; Gabbard
& Twemlow, 1984; Herzog & Herrin, 1985; M. Morse, 1983, 1 994a, 1994b;
M. Morse, Conner, & Tyler, 1 985; M. Morse et ai., 1986; Serdahely, 1990).
Because many childhood experiences have been recounted only after the
child has grown up, and may therefore have been influenced by the adult
reporter's beliefs, Serdahely ( 1991) compared adult accounts of childhood
NDEs with contemporary accounts by children. The features reported did
not differ significantly between these two groups
If NDEs are significantly shaped by cultural expectations, we might
expect that experiences occurring after 1 975, when Moody's first book made
NDEs such a well-known phenomenon, would conform more closely to
Moody's "model" than those that occurred before that date. This does not
appear to be the case (Long & Long, 2003). Similarly, a study of 24 experi­
ences in our collection that not only occurred but were reported before 1975
found no significant differences in the features reported, when compared to
a matched sample of cases occurring after 1 984, except that fewer "tunnel"
experiences were reported in the pre-I 975 group (Athappilly, Greyson, &
Stevenson, 2006).
There may therefore be a core experience underlying the varying details,
and it is not the core experience that differs so much as the ways in which
people in different cultures describe or interpret what they have experienced.
For example, among both Indian and Western cases many people report
being met by discarnate persons; but in the West these persons are usually
either identified as deceased loved ones or are unrecognized, whereas in
India they are often assumed to be messengers of the god of death. Similarly,
in both cultures people report that they were sent back because it was "not
my time"; but in the West people often feel that they were sent back because
of unfinished business, whereas in I ndia they believe that they were sent
back because the messengers of death inadvertently took the wrong person
(Osis & Haraldsson, 197711997; Pasricha & Stevenson, 1986). Other features
commonly reported cross-culturally include the sense of being out of one's
body, going to another realm, and seeing a light. There seems, in sum, to
be an underlying core experience that is "inevitably cast in the images, con­
cepts and symbols available to the individual" (Roberts & Owen, 1988, p.
6 1 1 ; see also Knoblauch, Schmied, & Schnettler, 2001).6

6. In this respect, NDEs are like mystical experiences. There has long been a dichotomy
of opinion about mystical experiences, some emphasizing the cross-cultural differences in
reports of mystical experience, others (such as James, 190211958, and Stace, 1 96011987) argu-
376-Chapter 6

Related to the "expectation" model is the more recent suggestion that

some NOEs may be the product of "false memories," that is, that "some
patients, on hearing about other survivors' NOEs, would start to imagine
what it would have been like if they had had the same experience" (French,
2001, p. 2010). French derives his argument from the observation that four
of 37 patients in van Lommel et al.'s (2001) study did not initially report an
NOE, but then did report one at a two-year fol lowup interview. Without
denying the possibility that a few reported NOEs may be the result of a
false memory, we believe that for most this hypothesis is highly unlikely.
Even if one discounts the claim of many people reporting NOEs that they
had not previously heard about such experiences-something that we are
not inclined to do-one also has to consider the fact that many people are
reluctant to talk about their experiences with other persons, and may care­
fully choose when and to whom they do so. In our collection of cases, for
example, 57% said that they had been afraid or reluctant to talk about their
experience, and 27% never told anyone until more than a year afterwards.
Given these observations, we are not at all surprised that four of 37 people
in van Lommel et al.'s study might not have reported their experience to the
investigators initially.7

Birth Models
In a variation on the idea that NOEs are a universal psychological reac­
tion to the threat of dying, Sagan ( 1 979, 1 984) interpreted them-with their
features of a dark tunnel, a bright light, and going to another realm-as a
memory of one's birth. C. B. Becker ( 1982) argued, however, that newborns
lack the visual, spatial, or mental capacities to register memories of being
born. Even if the implicit assumption here about the dependence of episodic
memory upon the brain were to prove inadequate (see Chapter 4), a more
important criticism is that many NOEs do not contain the features of a tun-

ing that there is a core of common experience behind those differences. We discuss this issue
more fully in Chapter 8.
7. We have had people tell us that they had never told anyone about their experience, until
they contacted our research unit and told us. While interviewing a woman at her home about
her NDE, one of us (EWK) learned that she had never before told her husband about her
experience. Moreover, when EWK's impending visit prompted the woman to explain to her
husband the reason for the visit, he told her that he too had had an NDE, which he had never
told her about.
This example is not unique. K. Clark (1984) reported a similar situation: At the hospital
and in the presence of his wife, a patient told Clark about his NDE, which occurred dur­
ing mUltiple episodes of cardiac arrest. When he had finished his description, his wife told
them both that she too had had an NDE, during childbirth a few years earlier, but that "she
had never told anyone about this, even her husband, because he had 'always been scientific
minded and I just didn't think he would accept it, and I wasn't prepared to be rejected'"
(p. 249). Another patient, readmitted to Clark's unit several years after an earlier hospital­
ization, told her that, although she had twice asked him during the earlier hospitalization
whether he had any unusual memories associated with his accident, "he had lied and denied
any recollections . . .[because] the experience had been so personal that he needed to come to
terms with it in his own mind before telling anyone about it" (p. 246).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-377

nel or a light, and many other common features of NDEs do not seem ade­
quately accounted for by a "birth" model. Furthermore, Blackmore (1 983)
found that claims of OBEs and of passing through a tunnel to another realm
were equally common among persons born by caesarean section and those
born by normal vaginal delivery. Grof (1975) and Grosso (1981, 1 983) have
generalized the birth model and suggested that NDEs reflect an archetype
of birth (or rebirth), rather than an actual memory, but it is difficult to see
how this theory could be tested empirically.

Depersonalization
Noyes and Kletti ( 1976) suggested that NDEs are a type of depersonal­
ization, in which feelings of detachment, strangeness, and unreality protect
one from the threat of death. There are significant phenomenological differ­
ences, however, between most NDEs and depersonalization (see, e.g., Gab­
bard & Twemlow, 1 984, pp. 45-59).8 For example, in depersonalization, "the
feeling of one's own reality is temporarily lost" (p. 46), a feeling that does
not occur in NDEs. Moreover, many NDEs are described instead as being
vividly real. Most experiences of depersonalization are also unpleasant in
nature, again in distinct contrast to most NDEs. Furthermore, in deper­
sonalization the person may feel a certain detachment from his or her body
without feeling actually out of the body.

Personality Factors
Attempts to identify personality traits or variables that predict either
the occurrence of an NDE or the number and type of features occurring
have generally been inconclusive, although the research has been limited so
far to retrospective studies that may not reliably reflect the person's charac­
teristics before the NDE. Experiencers have collectively been found to be as
psychologically healthy as people who have not had an NDE, and they also
do not differ in age,9 gender, race, religion, religiosity, intelligence, neuroti­
cism, extroversion, anxiety, or Rorschach measures (Gabbard & Twemlow,
1984; Greyson, 1991; I rwin, 1 985; T. P. Locke & Shontz, 1 983; Ring, 1980;
Sabom, 1 982).
Conjecturing that people who experience NDEs may be good hypnotic
subjects, remember their dreams more often, and engage easily in mental
imagery, some researchers have begun to examine personality variables
related to hypnotic susceptibility, dream recall, or imagery. One such char-

8. Gabbard and Twemlow ( 1984) were actually comparing depersonalization with out-of­
body experiences (OBEs), not NOEs in particular, but the features they attributed to OBEs
(p. 1 14) apply equally to NOEs. As we will discuss later in this chapter, OBEs and NOEs are
overlapping phenomena, although neither can be subsumed under the other.
9. There does seem to be a tendency for NOEs to be reported by younger persons, at least
among cardiac patients (see van Lommel et aI., 2001 , p. 2043); but whether this is because
NOEs are more likely to occur in younger people, whether it is because younger people are
more likely to report NOEs, or whether older people are less likely to survive a medical condi­
tion in which an NOE might occur are questions that remain open.
378-Chapter 6

acteristic is dissociation. Ring and Rosing ( 1990) and Greyson (2000) found
that near-death experiencers scored higher than a comparison group on
a dissociation scale, although their scores were much lower than those of
patients with pathological dissociative disorders. Near-death experiencers
may therefore be persons who respond to serious stress with dissociative
behavior that is adaptive, rather than pathological (Greyson, 2001).
Related to dissociative tendencies may be absorption, or the ability to
screen out the external world and focus one's attention either on selected
sensory experiences or on internal imagery (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974),
and fantasy proneness, characterized by frequent and vivid fantasies and
even hallucinations, intensely vivid sensory experiences, and eidetic imag­
ery (S. C. Wilson & Barber, 198 1 , 1 983). Empirical data regarding absorp­
tion and fantasy proneness among near-death experiencers, however, have
been inconclusive. In one study people experiencing an NDE had slightly
higher scores on scales of absorption or fantasy proneness, as compared
with a control group (Council & Greyson, 1985); but the experiencers' scores
on the measure of fantasy proneness were substantially lower than those
of Wilson and Barber's fantasizers. Ring and Rosing ( 1990) found no such
correlation, although this finding may have been partly the result of using
only a brief questionnaire rather than intensive interviews (Lynn & Rhue,
1988). In any case, even a strong relationship between fantasy proneness
and NDEs would not demonstrate that NDEs are nothing but fantasies,
especially since (as we will discuss later) there are NDEs in which the per­
son has perceived some real, verified event occurring outside the ordinary
sensory range. A tendency toward fantasy proneness or absorption might
instead reflect an ability to enter more readily into altered states in which
the ordinary relationship of consciousness to brain activity and to the exter­
nal environment has changed.

Physiological Theories

There have been numerous attempts to explain NDEs in terms of con­

ventional biochemical or neurobiological mechanisms, acting either alone or
in conjunction with other putative mechanisms. Most of these proposals are
variations on the basic idea that changes in the neurochemistry of the brain,
brought on by the physiological or psychological conditions accompanying
a close brush with death (whether real or perceived), lead to abnormal neu­
roelectric activity in certain critical brain areas, usually in the limbic system
or temporal lobes, that produces hallucinations. Most of these theoretical
models are based on claimed similarities between the phenomenology of
NDEs and that of experiences associated with the proposed neurochemical
or neuroanatomical mechanisms. We will briefly review here some of these
models. We should keep in mind, however, that as researchers have learned
more about the variations and complexities of the conditions under which
NDEs can occur, there has been a noticeable move away from attempting
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-379

to find a single common mechanism underlying all NDEs, and toward rec­
ognizing that "a multi-leveled interpretation is . . . the most useful" (Jansen,
1 997a, p. 1 3). Most commentators, therefore, would now acknowledge that
these proposals, biological and psychological, are not mutually exclusive
and that a variety of factors can lead to the occurrence of an NDE.

Blood Gases
One of the earliest and most persistent of the physiological theories
proposed for NDEs is that lowered levels of oxygen (hypoxia or anoxia),
perhaps accompanied by increased levels of carbon dioxide (hypercarbia),
have produced hallucinations (Blackmore, 1 993; Lempert, 1 994; Rodin,
1 980). Although such changes are potentially a factor, particularly among
NDEs occurring in connection with cardiac impairment or arrest, NDEs
also occur in many circumstances in which changes in oxygen or carbon
dioxide levels are unlikely, such as non-life-threatening illnesses, falls, or
other near-accidents. Furthermore, despite claims to the contrary, the expe­
riential phenomena associated with such changes are only superficially
similar to NDEs. One study frequently cited is that of Whinnery ( 1997),
who compared NDEs to what he called the "dreamlets" occurring in brief
periods of unconsciousness induced in fighter pilots by rapid acceleration
in a centrifuge (this reduces blood flow, and therefore delivery of oxygen,
to the brain). He claimed that some features common to NDEs are also
found in these hypoxic episodes, including tunnel vision, bright lights, brief
fragmented visual images, a sense of floating, pleasurable sensations, and,
rarely, a sense of leaving the body. The primary features of acceleration­
induced hypoxia, however, are myoclonic convulsions (rhythmic jerking of
the limbs), impaired memory for events just prior to the onset of uncon­
sciousness, tingling in extremities and around the mouth, confusion and
disorientation upon awakening, and paralysis (Whinnery, 1 997), symptoms
that do not occur in association with NDEs. Moreover, contrary to NDEs,
the visual images Whinnery reported frequently included living people, but
never deceased people; and no life review or accurate out-of-body percep­
tions have been reported in acceleration-induced loss of consciousness.
Other authors have suggested that, in parallel with lowered oxygen lev­
els, increased levels of carbon dioxide may contribute to NDEs (Blackmore,
1996, p. 74; Jansen, 1 997a, p. 1 9). Again, this hypothesis is based on the
purported similarity between NDEs and phenomena reported in connec­
tion with the proposed mechanism. For example, M. Morse, Venecia, and
Milstein ( 1989) state that "all the reported elements of NDEs can be pro­
duced in the offic e setting" with inhaled carbon dioxide (p. 48). Only one
study, however, is cited in support of this claim (Meduna, 1 950). Meduna
does mention some features that occur commonly in NDEs (such as a sense
of being out of the body, a bright light, a dark void or tunnel, revival of
a memory, and a sense of peace, love, or harmony with God); but these
seem comparatively rare, isolated, and fragmented in this context. And
other important features, such as meeting deceased persons or a life review
380-Chapter 6

involving many memories, are not reported. In sum, the overall phenom­
enology of carbon dioxide inhalation does not so far seem at all comparable
to that of NDEs.IO
Another important objection to attributing NDEs to anoxia has been
noted by van Lommel et al. (2001). If anoxia and related mechanisms play
an important role in the generation of NDEs, why do not most cardiac
arrest patients report an NDE? Clearly, anoxia is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition, and some other factor(s) must be involved.

Neurochemical Theories
Another early proposal of a physiological mechanism was that the
release of endorphins or other endogenous opioids at a time of stress plays
a major role in generating NDEs (Blackmore, 1 993; D. Carr, 1981, 1 982;
Saavedra-Aguilar & G6mez-Jeria, 1989). This seemed a reasonable factor
to examine, because endorphins are known quickly to produce cessation
of pain (Oyama, Jin, & Yamaya, 1 980) as well as feelings of peace and well­
being, both of which are common features of NDEs. Problems with mod­
els based on the release of endorphins or similar substances soon became
apparent, however. Most such neurochemicals produce long-lasting effects
once they are released; the injection of endorphins in pain patients, for
example, produces relief from pain lasting for hours (Oyama et aI., 1980).
In contrast, the onset and cessation of the NDE and its associated features
are usually quite abrupt, with the pain relief lasting only as long as the NDE
itself, which may be only seconds.11 Furthermore, although the release of
substances such as endorphins might account for the cessation of pain and
the feelings of joy and peace, it fails to account for many other important
components of NDEs, such as the out-of-body experience, seeing deceased
persons, a life review, and the transformative effects.
Other, related models have thus been proposed that might overcome
these limitations. Perhaps the most important of these has been the sugges­
tion that a ketamine-like endogenous neuroprotective agent may be released
in conditions of stress, acting on NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartate) receptors
located in the upper layers of the cerebral cortex and other central gray­
matter structures to block the neural hyperactivation and consequent cell
death that would otherwise result from the massive release of glutamate
that occurs during stress. Ketamine, an anesthetic agent that selectively
occupies NMDA receptors, can at sub anesthetic doses produce feelings of
being out of the body (Collier, 1 972; Rogo, 1 984). Moreover, ketamine some­
times produces other features common to NDEs, such as travel through a

10. Some authors have reported measurements of arterial blood gases in patients reporting
an NDE that do not support the hypothesis of lowered oxygen levels or heightened carbon
dioxide levels (M. Morse et aI., 1989, p. 50; Parnia et aI., 2001; Sabom, 1982, p. 178). Others,
however, have questioned the reliability of arterial blood measurements as indicators of what
may be going on in the brain (Glicksman & Kellehear, 1 990).
I I . This feature of sudden cessation of pain, and its return when the NDE ends, strikes us
as especially difficult to explain from a conventional neurophysiological point of view.
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-381

dark tunnel into light, believing that one has died, or communing with God
(Jansen, 1 997a, p. 9).
This hypothesis, however, also has problems. First, it is not at all clear
that ketamine experiences do in fact resemble NDEs (M. Morse, 1 997, p.
61; Strassman, 1 997, p. 29).12 Unlike the vast majority of NDEs, ketamine
experiences are often frightening and involve bizarre imagery, and patients
usually express the wish not to repeat the experience (Collier, 1 972; John­
stone, 1 973; Strassman, 1 997). Most ketamine users also recognize the illu­
sory character of their experience (Fenwick, 1 997, p. 45), in contrast to the
many NDE experiencers who are firmly convinced of the reality of what
they experienced and its lack of resemblance to illusions or dreams. Even if
ketamine experiences do resemble NDEs in some respects, many important
features of NDEs, such as seeing deceased people or a revival of memories,
have not been reported with ketamine. Furthermore, ketamine typically
exerts its effects in an otherwise more or less normal brain, while many
NDEs occur under conditions in which brain function is severely compro­
mised. We will return to this point later in the chapter.

Neuroanatomical Models
The need for a more comprehensive and searching comparison between
the phenomenology of NDEs and that associated with various purported
mechanisms for them becomes even more apparent when we examine another
major component of most current physiological theories of NDEs. Behind
most of these theories is an assumption that abnormal activity of the lim­
bic system or the temporal lobes, whether produced by anoxia, endorphins,
ketamine, or some other mechanism, produces NDE-like experiences. M.
Morse et al. (1 989), for example, proposed a model in which imbalances
in serotonin or other monoamines lead to abnormal activity in the tempo­
ral lobes. Saavedra-Aguilar and G6mez-Jeria (1 989) suggested that, under
conditions of hypoxia and psychological stress, there is temporal lobe dys­
function and the release of endogenous neuropeptides or neurotransmitters,
resulting in analgesia, euphoria, and feelings of detachment. They claim
that "the list of mental phenomena seen in temporal lobe epilepsy and ste­
reotoxic stimulation of the temporal lobe includes all the NDE phenomena"
(p. 209), and they thus describe their theory as "a neurophysiological expla­
nation for NDEs that is based on their striking similarity to temporal lobe
epilepsy" (p. 2 17).
Many people cite electrical stimulation studies, particularly those of the
neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, as justifying this belief in the "striking simi­
larity" between NDEs and temporal lobe epilepsy. For example, M. Morse
et al. ( 1989) refer to the "agents that cause OBEs and NDEs," namely, "acti­
vation of areas of the temporal lobe that have been documented to cause
mystical visions, out-of-body sensations, panoramic memories, and vivid
hallucinations," citing Penfield ( 1955) and Penfield and Rasmussen ( 1950) in

12. Jansen ( 1997, p. 8) reports that he has had both types of experience and found them to
be similar, but we know of no other such reports.
382-Chapter 6

support of this statement (p. 47). We will discuss in more detail below the
often-made claim that Penfield and others have produced OBEs by electri­
cal stimulation of the temporal lobes, but two general points merit mention
here.
First, electrical stimulation of cortex is massive and grossly unlike ordi­
nary physiological stimulation. It does not, and cannot, result simply in a
localized "activation" of the stimulated region. Indeed, as Penfield (1 975)
himself clearly recognized, its predominant effects are disruption of elec­
trical activity in the immediate vicinity of the electrode, accompanied by
abnormal patterns of discharge into additional cortical or subcortical areas
to which the stimulated cortex itself is linked by both forward and backward
projections. These remote influences, moreover, may be either excitatory
or inhibitory in character. The net result, in short, is a poorly controlled,
poorly characterized, and spatially widespread pattern of abnormal electri­
cal activity. Similar comments apply to the "electrical storms" associated
with epileptic attacks originating in specific cortical regions.
Second, an examination of the experiences reported by Penfield's sub­
jects, whether during the pre-surgical electrical stimulation studies or dur­
ing actual epileptic seizures, does not support sweeping claims such as those
cited above about the "striking similarity" between NDEs and experiences
produced by temporal lobe seizures or stimulation. Most of the experiences
Penfield reported in fact bore little resemblance to actual NDEs. They con­
sisted of hearing bits of music or singing, seeing isolated and repetitive scenes
that seemed familiar and may have been fragmentary memories, hearing
voices, experiencing fear or other negative emotions, or seeing bizarre imag­
ery that was often described as dream-like (Penfield, 1955; Penfield & Perot,
1 963, pp. 61 1-665). Subsequent studies have found similar experiential phe­
nomena, especially fear or anxiety and fragmented, distorted experiences
quite unlike NDE phenomenology (Gloor, 1 990; Gloor, Olivier, Quesney,
Andermann, & Horowitz, 1 982).13
Persinger ( 1989) has also claimed that "a vast clinical and surgical liter­
ature . . .indicates that floating and rising sensations, OBEs, personally pro­
found mystical and religious encounters, visual and auditory experiences,
and dream-like sequences are evoked, usually as single events, by electri­
cal stimulation of deep, mesiobasal temporal lobe structures" (p. 234). His
sole reference for this strong claim is a paper by Stevens (1982). That paper,
however, is confined entirely to descriptions of certain physiological obser­
vations made in studies of epileptic patients, and it contains no mention
whatever of any subjective experiences or of electrical stimulation studies,
much less of "a vast clinical and surgical literature" supporting Persinger's
claim. Persinger goes on to claim that, using weak transcranial magnetic

1 3 . Moreover, as we will discuss later in this chapter, Gloor and his colleagues called into
question the assumption that it is the stimulation of the temporal lobes that produces the
phenomena reported. Using both surface and depth electrodes, they showed that limbic
structures associated with temporal cortex, rather than temporal cortex itself, constituted
the anatomical substrate for these effects.
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-383

stimulation, he and his colleagues have produced "all of the major compo­
nents of the NDE, including out-of-body experiences, floating, being pulled
towards a light, hearing strange music, and profound meaningful experi­
ences." However, we have been unable to find phenomenological descrip­
tions of the experiences of his subjects adequate to support this claim, and
the brief descriptions that he does provide in fact again bear little resem­
blance to NDEs (e.g., Persinger, 1 994, pp. 284-285).
The discrepancy between Persinger's claim to have stimulated NDEs
and the actual data from his studies is particularly obvious in Persinger
(1999). In one study participants reported their experiences by complet­
ing a "debriefing questionnaire" consisting of 19 items that Persinger calls
"the classic types of experiences associated with these experiments" (p. 96).
Nearly all of these items, however, are completely unlike typical features
of an NDE, and the few that might be said to resemble them ("I felt the
presence of someone"; "I felt as if I left my body"; "I experienced thoughts
from childhood") are too vague to be able to judge their similarity to what
is experienced during an NDE. In two tables, however, Persinger gives ver­
batim descriptions made by two participants during the stimulation experi­
ment (pp. 97-98). Again, neither of these descriptions resembles an NDE.
Isolated elements might seem vaguely similar to those of an NDE ("I see a
light"; "I see trees"; "I feel I'm not here . . . not in my body . . . .I can't feel it");
but without much more detailed description, the claimed similarity between
NDEs and experiences induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation is
clearly premature at best.14
Experiences reported in other brain stimulation studies inspired by Pen­
field's work likewise bear little resemblance to NDEs (Horowitz & Adams,
1 970, p. 1 9). Neurologist Ernst Rodin (1 989) stated bluntly: "In spite of
having seen hundreds of patients with temporal lobe seizures during three
decades of professional life, I have never come across that symptomatology
[of NDEs] as part of a seizure" (p. 256).
Despite the shaky foundations for assertions that NDEs are similar
to experiences produced by abnormal temporal lobe activity, anoxia, ket­
amine, endorphins, or any other proposed physiological mechanism, most
current theories of NDEs are multi factor theories in which these various
hypothetical physiological and psychological mechanisms are combined ad
lib to account for whatever constellation of features is observed in any given
NDE. Blackmore (1 984, 1993) and Palmer ( 1978), for example, have sug­
gested that sensory isolation or increasing malfunction of the body threaten
the patient's body image, leading him or her to feel detached from the body,
after which the person's synesthetic or other imagery abilities produce the

14. It is also important to note that Granqvist et al. (2005; see also Larsson, Larhammar,
Frederikson, & Granqvist, 2005) were unable to replicate Persinger's results. They concluded
that, whereas their studies had involved a strict double-blind protocol, Persinger's partici­
pants had been inadequately blinded and therefore that "suggestibility may account for pre­
viously reported effects" (Granqvist et aI., 2005, p. I). For another skeptical evaluation of
Persinger's claims-by one who has experienced Persinger's "God machine"-see Horgan
(2003, pp. 91-105).
384-Chapter 6

illusion of watching what is going on around the body. The release of endor­
phins leads to analgesia and feelings of joy and peace. With increasing cere­
bral anoxia, the visual system is compromised, producing the illusion of a
tunnel and lights. Temporal-lobe mini-seizures stimulate a revival of memo­
ries. Visions of deceased persons and of another realm are hallucinations
produced by expectations of what will happen at death.
Although physiological, psychological, and sociocultural factors may
indeed interact in complicated ways in conjunction with NDEs, these and
all other psychophysiological theories proposed thus far consist largely of
unsupported speculations about what might be happening during an NDE.
None of the proposed neurophysiological mechanisms have been adequately
tested or even shown actually to occur in connection with NDEs. A natu­
rally occurring ketamine-like substance, for example, has not been iden­
tified in humans (Strassman, 1 997, p. 31). Similarly, the presence of other
relevant neurochemicals or seizure activity during an NDE remains wholly
conjectural, based entirely on the supposed-but questionable-similarity
between experiences they are known to produce and NDEs. Moreover, some
of these proposals, such as the role of expectation or the presence and effects
of anoxia, have been contradicted by what little data we do have. In short,
contrary to confident assertions such as "there is little doubt that the class
of experiences that comprise mystical experiences in general, and NDEs in
particular, is strongly correlated with temporal lobe activity" (Persinger,
1 989, p. 234), there is still very much doubtY
The most important objection to the adequacy of all existing psy­
chophysiological theories, however, is that mental clarity, vivid sensory
imagery, a clear memory of the experience, and a sense that the experi­
ence seemed "more real than real" are the norm for NDEs, even when they
occur under conditions of drastically altered cerebral physiology. As Parnia
and Fenwick (2002) point out, "any acute alteration in cerebral physiology
such as occurring in hypoxia, hypercarbia, metabolic, and drug induced
disturbances and seizures leads to disorganised and compromised cerebral
function . . . [and] impaired attention," whereas "NDEs in cardiac arrest are
clearly not confusional and in fact indicate heightened awareness, attention
and consciousness at a time when consciousness and memory formation
would not be expected to occur" (p. 6). Moreover, experiencers of NDEs in
connection with cardiac arrest almost invariably retain vivid memories of
their experience that change little with the passage of time (van Lomme! et
a!., 2001), despite the fact that memory under such conditions is ordinarily
seriously impaired. For most patients the involvement of the hippocampus
in temporal lobe epilepsy precludes any memory afterward for what hap­
pened during a seizure; "abnormal discharges in the temporal lobe may
produce confusional fragments of phenomena sometimes seen in NDEs .. . .
This i s a very long way from arguing that seizure discharges i n those areas,
resulting from brain catastrophe, can give rise to the clearly remembered,
highly structured NDE" (Fenwick, 1 997, p. 48).

1 5. We will revisit this claim in the context of mystical experiences in Chapter 8.

 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-385

NOEs seem instead to provide direct evidence for a type of mental

functioning that varies "inversely, rather than directly, with the observable
activity of the nervous system" (Myers, 1 891d, p. 638). Such evidence, we
believe, fundamentally conflicts with the conventional doctrine that brain
processes produce consciousness, and supports the alternative view that
brain activity normally serves as a kind of filter, which somehow constrains
the material that emerges into waking consciousness. On this latter view,
the "relaxation" of the filter under certain still poorly understood circum­
stances may lead to drastic alterations of the normal mind-brain relation
and to an associated enhancement or enlargement of consciousness. To this
interpretation of NOEs, which we favor, we now turn.

"Transcendent" Aspects

Most near-death experiencers are convinced that during the NOE they
temporarily separated from their physical bodies, and therefore that they
may also survive the more permanent separation at death. In our collection,
for example, among the people who provided information regarding these
features, 81% reported feeling separated from the body during the NOE,
and 82% said that the NOE had convinced them of survival after death.
We have labeled this interpretation of NOEs a "transcendent" model, at
the risk of alienating readers who associate such a word with unscientific
beliefs, because the idea that there are aspects of the natural world inac­
cessible to our ordinary senses and consciousness, but perhaps reflecting
some level of reality transcending the ordinary physical world, is not inher­
ently unscientific. Although it certainly contradicts the assumptions of most
contemporary psychologists and neuroscientists that the ordinary physical
world is the only reality, the direction that physics has taken in the last cen­
tury amply justifies Myers's cautionary remark that we should "sit loose"
when it comes to making assumptions about the scope and the fundamental
character of the natural world (HP, vol. 2, p. 262; see also our Chapter 9).
The popular interest in NOEs clearly derives from their suggestion that
mind or consciousness may persist and continue to function even after the
death of the brain. In contrast, most NOE researchers have largely ignored
this question, undoubtedly because of the widespread acquiescence among
psychologists and neuroscientists to the dogma that brain produces mind,
or is the mind. Most researchers have concentrated instead on descriptive
studies of the aftereffects of NOEs or on speculating about possible neuro­
physiological and psychological mechanisms, as described above. Several
features of NOEs, however, call into question whether current psychologi­
cal or physiological theories of NOEs will ever provide a full explanation
of them.
386-Chapter 6

Enhanced Mentation
As we mentioned earlier, perhaps the most important of these features,
because it is so commonly reported in NDEs, is the occurrence of full­
fledged mentation, either normal or even enhanced mental activity, at times
when, according to conventional psychophysiological theory, such activity
should be diminishing, or even not possible. Individuals reporting NDEs
often describe the experience as being altogether unlike a dream, in that
their mental processes during the NDE were remarkably clear and lucid and
their sensory experiences unusually vivid, equaling or even surpassing those
of their normal waking state.16 Clearly, these are subjective impressions
that we cannot verify, but the frequency and consistency of such reports
is impressive. Furthermore, an analysis of cases in our collection in which
we were able to examine contemporaneous medical records showed that, in
fact, people reported enhanced mental functioning significantly more often
when they were actually physiologically close to death than when they were
not (Owens et ai., 1990).
Another example of enhanced mental functioning during an NDE
is a rapid revival of memories that sometimes extends over the person's
entire life. Myers ( l 895d) had called attention to this phenomenon when he
described "the occasional revival during drowning-or, in Charles Darwin's
case, during a fal l from a wall-of a series of life memories both swifter and
fuller than conscious effort could have supplied" (p. 354). The philosopher
Henri Bergson likewise recognized not only the occurrence but the theoreti­
cal importance of this phenomenon (e.g., Bergson, 1 90811991, p. 1 55). It is
worth noting here also that such revivals of memory may be frequent (Myers,
1 895d, p. 354). For example, an analysis of computer-coded NDE cases in
our collection showed that in 24% of them there was a report of some degree
of revival of memories during the NDE. We emphasize, moreover, that in
contrast to the isolated and often just single brief memories evoked during
cortical stimulation, those revived during an NDE are frequently described
as being "many" or even as an almost instantaneous "panoramic" review of
the person's entire life.17
Reports of NDEs from widely divergent cultures and times support the
view that enhanced mental functioning can occur under conditions in which
it would not be expected on current models of mind and brain. However one
interprets the crosscultural differences, perhaps the most important finding

16. A recent analysis of our collection showed that 80% of near-death experiencers
described their thinking during the NDE as "clearer than usual" (45%) or "as clear as usual"
(35%). Additionally, 74% described their thinking as "faster than usual" (37%) or at "the usual
speed" (37%); 65% described their thinking as "more logical than usual" (29%) or "as logical
as usual" (36%); and 55% described their control over their thoughts as "more control than
usual" ( 19%) or "as much control as usual" (36%).
17. In our collection, 57% of those reporting memories said that they had experienced many
memories or a review of their entire life; 43'1'0 reported one or a few memories. Additionally,
in an analysis of 68 published life review cases not from our collection, we found that in 7 1%
of these the experience had involved memories of many events or of the person's whole life
(Stevenson & Cook [Kelly], 1 995, p. 455).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-387

from such studies is that people have consistently reported, from different
parts of the world and across different periods of history, having had com­
plicated cognitive and perceptual experiences at times when brain function­
ing was severely impaired.

Veridical Out-oj-Body Perceptions

Another important feature of NDEs that current theoretical models
cannot adequately account for is the experience of being out of the body and
perceiving events that one could not ordinarily have perceived. Near-death
experiencers often report that during the NDE they viewed their bodies as
if from a different point in space. A recent analysis of cases in our collection
showed that 48% of the respondents reported seeing their physical bodies
from a different visual perspective. Many of them also reported witnessing
events going on in the vicinity of their body, such as the attempts of medical
personnel to resuscitate them at the scene of an accident or in an emergency
room.
Like most other features of NDEs, many of these out-of-body percep­
tions are entirely subjective, providing no direct evidence that the person
has in fact either been separated from the body or observed contemporane­
ous circumstances. Some commentators (e.g., Blackmore, 1 993; Saavedra­
Aguilar & G6mez-leria, 1 989; Woerlee, 2004) have argued that the belief
that one has witnessed events going on around one's body is a retrospective
imaginative reconstruction attributable to a persisting ability to hear, even
when unconscious, or to the memory of objects or events that one might have
glimpsed just before losing consciousness or while regaining consciousness,
or to expectations about what was likely to have occurred.
Such explanations are inadequate, however, for several reasons. First,
memory of events occurring just before or after loss of consciousness is usu­
ally confused or completely absent (Aminoff, Scheinman, Griffin, & Herre,
1 988; Parnia & Fenwick, 2002; van Lommel et aI., 2001). Second, claims
that adequately anesthetizedl8 patients retain any significant capacity to be
aware of or respond to their environment in more than rudimentary ways­
let alone to hear and understand-have in general not been substantiated.

1 8 . The expression "adequately anesthetized" is intended here to exclude cases of literal

awakening, or partial awakening, during surgical procedures. Such awakening is known to
occur, even using present-day techniques, in something on the order of 0.1-0.3% of all gen­
eral-surgery procedures (Heier & Steen, 1 996; Sandin, Enlund, Samuelson, & Lennmarken,
2000). Higher rates occur, as might be expected, when muscle relaxants are used in combina­
tion with low levels of anesthetic agents. Other causes of awakening include operator errors,
equipment failures, inability to use sufficient agents because of excessive loss of blood in
trauma cases, and unusual tolerance of particular patients to particular agents. The phenom­
enology of such awakenings, however, is altogether different from that of NOEs, and often
extremely unpleasant, frightening, and even painful (Osterman, Hopper, Heran, Keane, &
van der Kolk, 200 1 ; Spitellie, Holmes, & Domino, 2002). The experiences are typically brief
and fragmentary, and primarily auditory or tactile, and not visual; for example, the patient
may report hearing noises or snippets of speech, or briefly feeling sensations associated with
intubation or with specific surgical procedures. Needless to say, anesthesiologists have strong
motivation, both ethical and legal, to prevent such occurrences.
388-Chapter 6

Since the earliest years of chemical anesthesia, there have been occasional
reports of patients who appeared to display some degree of memory for
events that occurred during surgery (Cheek, 1 964, 1 966). Most of these
could be attributed to insufficient anesthesia, but not all (Levinson, 1 965,
1 990). There were also some intriguing early clinical case reports indicat­
ing that patients sometimes showed agitation following surgery in which
negative comments had been made about them or their prognosis. More
benignly, other patients were reported to recover more quickly when given
positive suggestions during the surgery to the effect that they would do so
(D. Schacter, 1 996, p. 1 72).
Even an early review questioned the claim that people might retain
some auditory perception under general anesthesia, finding numerous
methodological problems with studies purporting to show this (Trustman,
Dubovsky, & Titley, 1 977). Moreover, more recent and better controlled
studies have also not substantiated such claims (Ghoneim & Block, 1 992,
1 997). Studies of memory and awareness in anesthesia have been highly
inconsistent, and there is no convincing evidence for adequately anesthetized
patients having any explicit, or conscious, memory of events during the sur­
gery (apart from patients who have reported such memories in connection
with an NDE). What positive evidence there is for "learning and memory"
during adequate general anesthesia mainly involves implicit memory phe­
nomena such as perceptual and mnemonic "priming" and other low-level
effects, which are known not to require participation of the brain systems
normally involved with explicit declarative memory (Bonke, Fitch, & Mil­
lar, 1 990; D. Schacter, 1 996). Moreover, even these low-level effects occur
inconsistently, and they depend in complex and poorly understood ways on
factors such as the nature and dosage of the specific anesthetic agents used,
their interactions, the specific types of memory tasks used and their con­
ditions of administration, and the many semi-controllable stimulus events
occurring during the surgery itself. Ghoneim and Block (1997) summa­
rize the situation as follows: "We can speculate that unconscious memory
occurs only in few patients, only some of the time, and during light levels
of anesthesia. Learning may be more perceptual than engaging in elaborate
processing of complex information and may be limited to single, relatively
familiar words. Memory may be more evident if tested as soon as possible
after surgery" (p. 406).
In sum, such studies as we have afford little hope for explaining NDE
reports involving complex sensory experiences of events occurring during
general anesthesia in terms of knowledge acquired by the impaired brain
itself during the period of unconsciousness. Note also that any such explan­
atory claims are even less credible when, as commonly happens, the specific
sensory channels involved in the reported experience have been blocked as
part of the surgical routine-for example, when specifically visual experi­
ence is reported by a patient whose eyes were taped shut during the relevant
period of time. We will discuss the theoretical significance of general anes­
thesia in relation to NDEs more fully later in this chapter.
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-389

Another reason for being cautious about attributing claims of out-of­

body perceptions to retrospective reconstruction is a study by Sabom (1 982),
carried out specifically to examine this hypothesis. Sabom had interviewed
32 patients who reported NDEs in which they seemed to be watching what
was going on around their body. Most of these were cardiac patients who
were undergoing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) at the time of their
NDE. Sabom then interviewed 25 "control" patients, "seasoned cardiac
patients" who had not had an NDE during their previous cardiac-related
crises, and asked them to describe a cardiac resuscitation procedure as
if they were watching from a third-person perspective. Among all these
patients, 80% of the "control" patients made at least one major error in their
descriptions, whereas none of the NDE patients made any. Moreover, six of
the 32 NDE patients related accurate details of idiosyncratic or unexpected
(to them) events during their resuscitation (pp. 87-1 1 5). For example, one
man, who developed ventricular fibrillation in the coronary care unit, said
(among many other things) that the nurse picked up "them shocker things"
and "touched them together," and then "everybody moved back away from
it [the defibrillator]" (p. 96). As Sabom explained, rubbing the defibrillator
paddles together to lubricate them and standing back from the defibrillator
to avoid being shocked are common procedures (p. 98).
An even more difficult challenge to ordinary psychological or physi­
ological theories of NDEs comes from cases in which experiencers report
that, while out of the body, they became aware of events occurring at a dis­
tance or that in some other way would have been beyond the reach of their
ordinary senses even if they had been fully and normally conscious. In our
collection, 60 people have described being aware of events occurring outside
the range of their physical senses. K. Clark ( 1 984) and Owens ( 1995) each
published a case of this type, and we have reported on 1 5 cases, including
seven cases previously published by others and eight from our own collection
(Cook [Kelly], Greyson, & Stevenson, 1 998; E. W. Kelly, Greyson, & Steven­
son, 1 999-2000). Some of these accurate perceptions included unexpected
or unlikely details, such as a woman in childbirth who reported being out
of her body and seeing her mother in the waiting room smoking a cigarette;
according to the daughter, the mother (a non-smoker) "admitted much later
that she had 'tried' one or two because she was so nervous!" (Cook [Kelly]
et aI., 1 998, p. 391). Additionally, Ring and Cooper (1 997, 1 999) reported 3 1
cases o f blind individuals, nearly half o f them blind from birth, who experi­
enced during their NDEs quasi-visual and sometimes veridical perceptions
of objects and events. Many of these people, like other NDE experiencers,
also said that they saw a bright light.
A frequent-and valid-criticism of these reports of perceptions of
events at a distance from the body is that they often depend on the expe­
riencer's testimony alone. It is a frustrating fact that in many such cases
people who could possibly provide verification or corroborating testimony
have either moved away or died by the time of the investigation of the case.
The weakness of the testimony for the majority of these claims has encour-
390-Chapter 6

aged commentators such as Blackmore (1993, p. 262) to refuse to accept any

reports of such cases as evidential, on grounds that "many of these claims
are based on purely anecdotal evidence and very few have any indepen­
dent corroboration" (Blackmore, 1 996, p. 75) . However, some cases have
been corroborated by others (K. Clark, 1984; H. Hart, 1 954; Ring & Law­
rence, 1 993). Van Lommel et aI. (2001 , p. 2041), for example, reported a case
in which a cardiac arrest victim was brought into the hospital comatose
and cyanotic, and even after restoration of his circulation, he remained in
a coma and on artificial respiration in the intensive care unit for more than
a week. When he regained consciousness and was transferred back to the
cardiac care unit, he immediately recognized one of the nurses, saying that
this was the person who had removed his dentures during the resuscitation
procedures. He said further that he had watched from above the attempts
of hospital staff to resuscitate him in the emergency room, and he described
"correctly and in detail" the room and the people working on him, includ­
ing the cart in which the nurse had put his dentures. The nurse corrobo­
rated and verified his account. We ourselves (Cook [Kelly] et aI., 1 998, pp.
399-400) have reported a case of this type in which, in addition to numer­
ous other details such as encountering a barrier, seeing a light and tun­
nel, feeling joy and peace, and meeting two deceased relatives, the patient
described leaving his body and watching the cardiac surgeon "flapping his
arms as if trying to fly." The surgeon verified this detail by explaining that,
after scrubbing and to keep his hands from possibly becoming contami­
nated before beginning surgery, he had developed the idiosyncratic habit of
flattening his hands against his chest, while rapidly giving instructions by
pointing with his elbows.

Visions of Deceased Acquaintances

Many people who approach death and recover report that, during
the time they seemed to be dying, they met deceased relatives and friends.
Among the cases in our collection 42% of experiencers reported meeting one
or more recognized deceased acquaintances during the NDE . Such experi­
ences have been widely viewed as being "merely" hallucinations, caused by
drugs or other physiological conditions or by the person's expectations or
wishes to be reunited with deceased loved ones at the time of death. Never­
theless, a closer examination of these experiences indicates that such expla­
nations are not adequate (E. W. Kelly, 2001).
For example, people close to death are more likely to perceive deceased
persons than do healthy people, who, when they have waking hallucinations,
are more likely to perceive living persons (Osis & Haraldsson, 1 977/1 997).
Near-death experiencers whose medical records show that they really were
close to death also were more likely to perceive deceased persons than expe­
riencers who were ill but not close to death, even though many of the latter
thought they were dying (E. W. Kelly, 2001). Moreover, numerous people,
both those near death and those not near death, also perceive figures other
than known deceased persons during the NDE, most of these being unrec-
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-391

ognized. If expectation alone were driving the process, people would pre­
sumably recognize the hallucinatory figures, either as actual deceased or
living people or as known religious figures, more often than was in fact the
case. In our collection, however, few people reported perceiving specific reli­
gious figures such as Jesus.19 Even fewer reported perceiving living persons,
even though many of them commented that it was the thought of living
people whom they were leaving that made them return to their bodies. Only
two people reported perceiving deceased pets, much to the disappointment
of some of those who did not. We have found that people do more often
perceive deceased people with whom they were emotionally close, a find­
ing consistent with the expectation theory-but, we add, equally consistent
with that of survival after death. Nonetheless, in one-third of the cases the
deceased person was either someone with whom the experiencer had a dis­
tant or even poor relationship or someone whom the experiencer had never
met, such as a relative who died long before the experiencer's birth (E. W.
Kelly, 2001). For example, van Lommel (2004, p. 1 22) reported the case of a
man who had an NDE during cardiac arrest in which he saw his deceased
grandmother and an unknown man. He later learned from his dying mother
that he had been born out of an extramarital affair and that his father had
been killed during World War II. Shown a picture of his biological father,
he immediately recognized him as the man he had seen in his NDE, 10 years
previously. We have a similar case in our collection, in which a man reported
seeing five unknown men, one of whom he recognized several months later
in a photograph as the deceased father of a girlfriend (later his wife), whom
he had never met. 20

Converging Lines of Evidence

As we mentioned earlier, the inability of any one conventional physio­
logical or psychological hypothesis to account for all NDEs, or even all fea­
tures of NDEs, has led many researchers to propose multifactorial theories,
combining psychological and physiological mechanisms ad lib. The need,
however, for increasingly complicated and composite explanations, together
with the lack of an adequate empirical foundation for any of them, has led
us to suggest that we should not rule out categorically that NDEs are essen­
tially what many experiencers think they are-namely, evidence that they
have temporarily separated from their body and, moreover, may survive
the permanent separation that occurs at death (Cook [Kelly] et aI., 1998; E.
W. Kelly e t aI., 1 999-2000). When each is examined alone and in isolation,
the features described in this section, as well as other NDE features, may
seem potentially explainable by some psychological or physiological hypo-

19. Many, however, did report seeing a bright or all-encompassing light which seemed to be
a "Being of Light" and was often identified as God.
20. Although in neither of these cases has it been possible to obtain corroborating tes­
timony from someone other than the person who had the experience, they illustrate a par­
ticularly important kind of experience, and we suspect that, as with many of the phenomena
discussed in this chapter, we will identify more such cases if we look specifically for them.
392-Chapter 6

thesis, despite the paucity of supporting evidence. When several features

occur together, however, and when multiple layers of explanation must be
added on ad hoc to account for them, these explanations become increas­
ingly strained.
A case which conspicuously exemplifies numerous features difficult to
account for in conventional psychophysiological terms is that of Pam Rey­
nolds, reported in detail by Sabom (1998, pp. 37-5 1). This case is also partic­
ularly important because Sabom, a cardiologist, was able to obtain verifica­
tion from participating medical personnel concerning some critical details
of the operation that the patient reported observing during her experience.
This patient underwent a procedure called hypothermic cardiac arrest
(Spetzler et aI., 1 988; Weiss et aI., 1 998; M. D. Williams, Rainer, Fieger,
Murray, & Sanchez, 1 991) for removal of an extremely large aneurysm deep
in her brain that would be fatal if it ruptured and that was inaccessible
by ordinary neurosurgical techniques. Her eyes were first lubricated and
taped shut; then, following induction of general anesthesia (Forane, plus
50/50 nitrous oxide/oxygen), she was heavily instrumented to permit accu­
rate monitoring of her vital functions. In addition to standard EEG and
EKG monitors, special catheters provided measures of pulmonary arterial
blood pressure and flow, as well as urinary temperatures in her bladder.
Additional temperature recordings were taken from her esophagus, and
later from the surface of her exposed brain. Molded speakers placed in her
ears, and occluding the ear canals, were used to deliver loud clicks,2! which
permitted monitoring of her brainstem auditory evoked potentials. After
about 90 minutes, the surgery proper began. Her skull was opened, and
she was connected to a cardiopulmonary bypass machine. The circulating
blood was rapidly chilled, her core temperature dropping 25° in about 1 0
minutes. At this point her heart, which had begun to behave erratically,
was deliberately stopped with an intravenous bolus of potassium chloride.
Her EEG went flat. The brainstern evoked responses further weakened as
cooling progressed, and ceased entirely at 60°. She had reached "total brain
shutdown." At this point, the surgical table was tilted up, and the blood was
drained from her brain so that the aneurysm could be safely removed. Fol­
lowing repair of the aneurysm, her blood was warmed and returned to her
body and her vital functions gradually restored. During the resuscitation
procedures, however, her heart went into ventricular fibrillation, and she
had to be shocked twice (50/1001) to restore normal rhythm.
Although the shutdown of her normal physiological functioning was
carefully controlled by the medical team, by all conventional criteria this
patient could be considered clinically dead during the main part of this
procedure: Her electroencephalogram (EEG) was totally flat, her brainstem
auditory evoked potentials had ceased, and blood was completely absent
from her brain. Nevertheless, the patient reported an unusually detailed,
prolonged, and continuous NDE. The experience also included some veri-

2 1 . The clicks were 95 dB, 100 !lS/ click, 1 1 . 3 clicks/sec, in successive blocks of 2,000 clicks
(just under 3 minutes/block).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-393

fiable features: First, despite having speakers in her ears that blocked all
external sounds with 95 dB clicks, the experience began when she heard
the sound of the special saw used to cut into her skull (a sound that she, a
musician, identified as a natural "D"). She then seemed to leave her body
and, from a position near the neurosurgeon's shoulders, was able to see (and
subsequently describe) the saw itself. She also noted the unexpected (to
her) way in which her head had been shaved, and she heard a female voice
commenting that her veins and arteries were small. At some point she felt
herself being pulled along a "tunnel vortex" toward a light. She also heard
her deceased grandmother's voice, and then she saw numerous deceased
relatives, all of them permeated by an "incredibly bright" light. Told by her
relatives that she had to go back, and thinking about the young children she
would be leaving, she reluctantly returned to her body. She also reported
that "when I came back, they were playing 'Hotel California' and the line
was 'You can check out anytime you like, but you can never leave"'-a
choice of music that she later laughingly told one of her doctors had been
"incredibly insensitive."
Although many of the features of her experience were subjective and
unverifiable, some were not. Her description of the unusual saw was verified
by the neurosurgeon and by photographs of it obtained by Sabom. Also, as
the patient had heard, at the time the cardiopulmonary bypass procedure
was being started, the cardiac surgeon (a female) had commented that the
right femoral vessels were too small to support the bypass, so that she had
to prepare the left leg. Although at the time this comment was made the
patient's brainstem auditory evoked potentials had not yet disappeared, the
molded speakers in her ears themselves, let alone the 95 dB clicks, would
have made it impossible for her to hear the comment in the ordinary way,
even had she been fully conscious at that moment.
Equally importantly, the patient reported the kind of mentation that
we described earlier: She said that during her experience she was not only
aware, but "the most aware that I think I have ever been in my life" (Sabom,
1 998, p. 41). She further commented that her vision "was not like normal
vision. It was brighter and more focused and clearer than normal vision" (p.
41) and that her hearing "was a clearer hearing than with my ears" (p. 44).
The case is not perfect. The details were not published for several years
after the experience occurred. More importantly, the verifiable events that
she reported observing in the operating room occurred when she was anes­
thetized and sensorially isolated but before and after the period of time in
which she was clinically "dead." Further, it is impossible to tell exactly when
during the procedure she had the experience of going into a tunnel, seeing
a bright light, and conversing with her deceased relatives. Her description
of the experience suggests (although of course it cannot prove) that it was
continuous from the time she first heard the surgeon's saw (over an hour
after she had been anesthetized) until she returned to her body and heard
the song "Hotel California," near the end of the procedure, some 511z hours
later, when younger assistants had taken over from the surgeons and the
394-Chapter 6

background music was changed to rock music (Sabom, 1 998, p. 47). Some
parts of Pam's experience may therefore have occurred during the time in
the procedure when she was clinically "dead" or near the end of the proce­
dure, when she suddenly went into ventricular fibrillation. We cannot, how­
ever, say with certainty that any part of her NDE actually occurred during
the period when she was clinically "dead." Even so, the extremity of her con­
dition and her heavily anesthetized state throughout the entire procedure
casts serious doubt on any view of mind or consciousness as unilaterally
and totally dependent on intact physiological functioning.
The few shortcomings in this case simply highlight the need for inquir­
ing about the experiences of other patients who have undergone hypother­
mic cardiac arrest or similarly drastic procedures. A major priority for
future research on NDEs is to identify and study experiences that occur in
conjunction with heavily monitored surgical procedures, especially cardiac
procedures involving close monitoring of electrical brain activity, blood
gases, neurochemical levels, or other physiological measures.

The Larger Context

Most of the proposed explanations for NDEs assume that they are the prod­
uct of a "dying brain" (e.g., Blackmore, 1 993; Vaitl et aI., 2005, p. 1 02). As we
have said earlier and will discuss in more detail below, one of the things that
makes NDEs so important is that many of them do occur at a time the per­
son is physiologically near death. Nonetheless, as we also pointed out ear­
lier, many of them do not occur when the person is dying. Moreover, NDEs
are by no means an isolated phenomenon. All features occurring in connec­
tion with NDEs occur in the context of other kinds of experiences in which
the brain is certainly not "dying." Before we can accept any explanation of
NDEs as adequate, we will need far more information than we now have
concerning the actual-as opposed to conjectured-physiological and psy­
chological conditions under which they take place. Clearly, however, they
will never be understood until they are examined together with these other
experiences, occurring under different conditions, that share their features.
We therefore turn now to some of those other experiences.

Out-of-Body Experiences

One phenomenon obviously relevant to NDEs is the out-of-body expe­

rience (OBE). In an OBE a person's consciousness is experienced as hav­
ing separated from the body, but also as continuing to function normally.
The OBE is a frequent feature of NDEs, and there is some evidence that
it represents an early stage that may develop into a more complex NDE
with additional features if the condition is prolonged (R. Lange, Greyson,
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-395

& Houran, 2004, p. 1 67). As a result, many of the early collections of reports
of OBEs included what we would now call NOEs because they occurred in
the context of a medical or life-threatening condition (e.g., Crookall, 1 964,
1 972; Green, 1 968b; Muldoon & Carrington, 1951/1969). On the other hand,
many OBEs occur in non-medical contexts, and many NOEs do not include
OBEs. Thus, it seems likely that neither OBEs nor NOEs are a subset of the
other, but that both instead are manifestations of a larger class of experi­
ences in which there has been an alteration in the ordinary experience of the
self in relation to the body and the external environment.
A typical OBE is one that comes from our own collection, in which a
man competing in a triathalon, after completing the swimming segment and
beginning the bicycling segment, suddenly and briefly seemed to himself to
be above the scene, watching the riders below, including himself, with no
apparent ill effect on his ability to ride the bicycle. A more dramatic but
less typical case is one from the classical literature that is frequently cited,
the Wilmot case (E. M. Sidgwick, 1 891 , pp. 41-46; also cited in HP, vol. 1 ,
pp. 682-685). I n 1 863 Mr. Wilmot and his sister Miss Wilmot were o n a ship
traveling from Liverpool, England, to New York, and for much of the jour­
ney they were in a severe storm. More than a week after the storm began,
Mrs. Wilmot, in Connecticut and worried about the safety of her husband,
had an experience, while she was awake during the middle of the night, in
which she seemed to go to her husband's stateroom on the ship, where she
saw him asleep in the lower berth and another man in the upper berth look­
ing at her. She hesitated, kissed her husband, and left. The next morning Mr.
Wilmot's roommate asked him, apparently somewhat indignantly, about
the woman who had come into their room during the night. Miss Wilmot
added her testimony, saying that the next morning, before she had seen her
brother, the roommate asked her if she had been in to see Mr. Wilmot dur­
ing the night, and when she replied no, he said that he had seen a woman
come into their room in the middle of the night and go to Mr. Wilmot.22

22. Blackmore (1983a, pp. 143-144) thinks that she has successfully discredited the Wilmot
case, and Edwards ( 1997, p. 20) agrees, asserting that "the case totally collapsed when it was
investigated by Susan Blackmore." Blackmore claims that the entire story rests on Mr. Wil­
mot's testimony alone and that this testimony was unreliable because he had been seasick at
the time. She further claims that "Mrs. Wilmot never reported having had an OBE at all."
Although Blackmore claims to have read the original reports (citing Myers's reprinting of the
case), she clearly did not read them carefully enough, and Edwards apparently relied entirely
on Blackmore without reading the original report himself. In the report, both the original
and Myers's reprinting of it, letters are printed not only from Mr. Wilmot but also from Mrs.
Wilmot and Miss Wilmot, corroborating the essential features of his account. Although Mrs.
Wilmot never explicitly said "I had an out-of-body experience," she did say "I had a very vivid
sense all the [next) day of having visited my husband." She also said "I felt much disturbed
at his [the man in the upper berth) presence, as he leaned over, looking at us." She further
reported that "the impression was so strong that I felt unusually happy and refreshed," in
contrast to the anxiety about her husband that had preceded it. We do not unfortunately have
the testimony of the man in the upper berth (who had since died), but, as we mentioned above,
we do have Miss Wilmot's testimony that he told her about his experience the next morning,
before she had seen her brother and heard his account of what had happened. The case is not
396�Chapter 6

The incidence of OBEs among the general population is difficult to

determine, because many of the estimates have been based on question­
naire studies in which there has been no followup or investigation of the
"Yes" responses to learn whether the experience truly qualified as an OBE.
A tentative estimate, however, is that at least 10% of the general population
has experienced one or more OBEs.23
As with NDEs, theories about OBEs have generally become polarized
between conventional psychophysiological theories and a transcendent or
"exteriorization" model in which consciousness really does function outside
the body. Psychophysiological theories typically suggest that seizures or
other abnormal activation of areas of the brain (usually the temporal lobes
and adjacent structures) produce alterations in body perceptions or sche­
mata, leading to depersonalization, OBEs, or "autoscopy" (experiences in
which the person sees an hallucinatory double of him- or herself in external
space; see below). As we mentioned earlier, research frequently cited in sup­
port of a model in which abnormal temporal lobe electrical activity produces
an OBE is that of neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield (e.g., Penfield, 1 955, 1 958a,
1 958b; Penfield & Erickson, 1 941; Penfield & Perot, 1 963). Penfield is widely
reported as having produced OBEs and other NDE-like phenomena in the
course of stimulating various points in the exposed brains of awake epilep­
tic patients being prepared for surgery (e.g., Blackmore, 1 993, pp. 2 1 2-21 3 ;
M . Morse e t aI., 1 989, p . 47; Neppe, 1 989, p. 247; Tong, 2003). Only two out of
his 1 1 32 patients, however, reported anything that might be said to resemble
an OBE: One patient said: "Oh God! I am leaving my body" (Penfield, 1 955,
p. 458). Another patient said only: "I have a queer sensation as if I am not
here . . . . As though I were half and half here" (Penfield & Rasmussen, 1 950, p.
1 74). In later studies at the Montreal Neurological Institute (where Penfield
had conducted his studies), only one of 29 patients with temporal lobe epi­
lepsy reported "a 'floating sensation' which the patient likened at one time
to the excitement felt when watching a football game and at another time to
a startle" (Gloor et aI., 1 982, pp. 1 31-132). Such experiences hardly qualify
as phenomenologically equivalent to OBEs.
Saavedra-Aguilar and G6mez-Jeria (1989) have similarly claimed that
OBEs "appear frequently in TLE [temporal lobe epilepsy]" (p. 214), and they
cite J. A. M. Frederiks (1969) as the reference for this statement. However,
Frederiks made no mention at all of OBEs in connection with temporal
lobe epilepsy (although he did discuss autoscopy-discussed below-which
is related but not identical to OBEs). Perhaps more importantly, Frederiks
specifically denied that any such disorders of the body schema have been
localized: "No well-defined anatomical localization has yet been established
nor is any likely to be established because in most cases a large, bilateral or
diffuse cerebral damage is present or diffuse cerebral dysfunction can be

perfect, but Blackmore's and Edwards's misrepresentation of the reported facts, and offhand
dismissal of testimony that conflicts with their beliefs, is indefensible at best.
23. For a review of studies estimating incidence in various populations, see Alvarado
(2000, pp. 1 84-186).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-397

assumed . . . .The body schema can in my opinion not be strictly localized;

it is one of the many products of the total function of the nervous system"
(pp. 233, 2 1 2).
More compelling evidence for possible physiological factors associ­
ated with the occurrence of OBEs and related phenomena is summarized
in a review by Devinsky, Feldmann, Burrowes, and Bromfield (1 989). They
reported on 10 patients of their own (identified in a prospective study of
1 58 seizure patients) who had experienced OBEs or autoscopic phenomena
in connection with their seizures, and they also reviewed 18 earlier reports
involving an additional 33 seizure patients with similar experiences. Of these
43 patients, 18 reported OBEs and 25 reported autoscopic experiences.24 Of
30 identifiable seizure foci, only 1 8 involved the temporal lobes. These could
occur on either or both sides, and were often accompanied by additional
seizure activity, disease, or injury in frontal, parietal, or occipital cortex.
These complex clinical findings also did not appear to differ in any clear or
consistent way between OBE and autoscopy cases.
More recently, Olaf Blanke and colleagues (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli,
& Seeck, 2004; Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002) have provided
detailed reports, including some neuroimaging results, for six neurological
patients, three of whom had experiences, which Blanke et aI. describe as
OBEs, associated with seizure activity or with direct electrical stimulation
of the exposed cortex. Three additional patients (as well as one of the three
OBE patients) had autoscopic experiences in association with seizures or
(in one case) with a possible ischemic attack during migraine. The imaging
and stimulation results suggested involvement of a common cortical region
encompassing the junction of temporal and parietal cortex (TPJ), a region
which is thought normally to be involved in the integration of vestibular
information with tactile, proprioceptive, and visual information regarding
the body and its location in perceptual space. On this basis, the authors
hypothesized that all such experiences involve failures of this integration,
caused by "paroxysmal cerebral dysfunction of the TPJ in a state of par­
tially and briefly impaired consciousness" (Blanke et aI., 2004, p. 243).

24. Interestingly, four of Devinsky et al.'s own 10 patients described an OBE that sounds
more like an NDE. One patient, for example, was involved in an automobile accident in which
she suffered severe head trauma. Although she was unconscious for two hours and had 24
hours of retrograde amnesia, she remembered that, while unconscious, she had an OBE in
which she saw the scene of the accident, including her own body, and heard a voice send­
ing her back. Her seizures began one month later, as a result of the injuries she suffered in
the accident. Another woman, who had had numerous generalized (or whole-brain) seizures
(about two per month) for 21 years, reported only two OBEs, both of them occurring during
seizures at times when she seemed in danger of dying (for example, by being strangled by the
bedsheets in which she had become entangled). Another woman, who had frequent general­
ized seizures for six years, had her single OBE at a time when she thought she was dying dur­
ing the seizure. The fourth patient, who had frequent absence seizures (about five a week for
17 years), had an NDE-like experience during her only generalized seizure. In this experience,
she had an OBE in which she first saw her unconscious body, and then seemed to travel into
space, where it was "gorgeous . . . [and] warm-not like heat, but security" (Devin sky et aI.,
1989, p . 1082). A voice then told her to go back, which she reluctantly did.
398�Chapter 6

The empirical findings of Blanke and his colleagues are certainly sig­
nificant, but their theoretical conclusions seem to us premature. First, the
purported localization of neurologic abnormalities is less than clear and
compelling. The identified region, the TPJ (encompassing the anterior part
of the angular gyrus and the posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus),
is only a region of "mean overlap" of individual lesions that are distributed
much more widely. Furthermore, the appearance of localization derives in
part from mapping results from the very different brains of all five patients
onto the left hemisphere of only one of them (Blanke et aI., 2004, Figures 2
and 4). In one patient no overt anatomical or functional defect could even
be identified. Similarly, of Devinsky et al.'s ( 1989) 10 patients, three were
specifically said to have fronto-temporal lesions or EEG abnormalities, two
showed "generalized 3/s spike and wave discharges," and one showed no
overt anatomical, neurological, or EEG abnormalities. Among the 29 addi­
tional patients for whom any information was available, the seizures of two
were specifically localized to the anterior temporal lobe (which does not
involve the TPJ), and only about a dozen are characterized in terms even
loosely consistent with the Blanke et al. hypothesis. Furthermore, there is
no clear lateralization. Among Blanke et al.'s patients and those reviewed
by Devinsky et aI., the location of identifiable foci was almost evenly split
between the left and right hemispheres. Moreover, the studies of Gloor and
his colleagues led them to "conclude that experiential phenomena, includ­
ing perceptual ones, are more likely to occur in response to limbic than to
temporal neocortical st i mu l ati on or seizure discharge" (Gloor et ai., 1982,
p. 140; see also Gloor, 1 990).
Second, the generalization from these few patients with identified neuro­
logical problems to all persons experiencing an OBE, most of whom have no
known neurological problem, is purely conjectural. We agree that abnormal
activity in the TPJ region or some other location may sometimes contribute
to the occurrence of an OBE; the fact that the experiences of some of these
patients could be altered or abolished by therapeutic intervention (surgery
or medication) provides evidence for this. Nevertheless, to conclude that
any such activity pattern is necessary, in general, seems to us quite doubt­
ful. All of the patients reported by Devinsky et al. (1989) and five of the
six patients of Blanke et al. (2004) suffered moderate to severe neurological
pathology; but such pathology appears generally to be absent, and certainly
has not been demonstrated to be present, in the vast majority of persons
who spontaneously experience OBEs. A special OBE subject studied by Tart
( 1968), for example, was specifically found to have a normal clinical EEG.
Furthermore, even if we assume that cortex in the vicinity of the TPJ
is involved somehow in the production of at least some OBEs, that cortex
itself is probably not producing them. This is because both seizure activity
and direct electrical stimulation of a particular region of association cortex
typically lead to disruption of whatever patterns of neuroelectric activity
would otherwise be going on there. That is, the failure of the normal inte-
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-399

gration could be explainable by these factors, but not the production of the
abnormal one (the OBE). Something else is doing that.
Moreover, there are many patients with similar neurological problems
or patterns of seizure activity who do not experience OBEs. In Devinsky
et al.'s prospective study (1989), only 10 (or 6. 3%) of 1 58 seizure patients
reported OBEs or autoscopy. Furthermore, although the 43 patients in the
Devinsky et al. review had suffered numerous seizures, often over a period
of many years, 10 had only one experience, and 15 others had five or fewer
(p. 1082). Only two of Penfield's 1 , 1 32 patients reported even vaguely OBE­
like phenomena. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, some of Devinsky et
al.'s patients had an OBE, not during an ordinary seizure, but only at a
time when they were near death, or thought they were dying. These findings
clearly suggest that localized abnormal activity in the brain is not only not
necessary, but also not in general sufficient to produce the change in per­
ceptual locus that is an OBE. At the very least, the sufficient neurological
conditions for OBEs have not yet been fully identified.
Finally, Blanke and his colleagues, and others who have focused on
the role of temporal lobe activity in the production of OBEs, have not even
begun as yet to deal with certain deeper and more difficult aspects of the
OBE. For example, even if we are able to associate OBEs with a certain
region of the brain-something we are far from doing yet-such localiza­
tion cannot account for the occurrence in many cases of veridical percep­
tions during loss of consciousness. More generally, it c annot account for
the occurrence of any complex perception or mentation at a time when the
abnormalities in brain functioning would normally abolish consciousness.
As Devinsky et al. ( 1989) themselves appropriately caution, "an unresolved
problem involves . . . the paradox of apparent consciousness during the sei­
zure" (pp. 1 087-1 088). To equate OBEs with pathological "body illusions,"
as Blanke et al. do, seems to us to beg the question of the nature of these
experiences by ignoring the complexity of their physiological, psychologi­
cal, and phenomenological aspects. In short, studies such as that of Blanke
et al. and Devinsky et al. have not provided anything like a complete and
verified neurophysiological account of the OBE, but rather some prelimi­
nary findings and hypotheses to be pursued in further work.25
The polarization between those who think we must choose between an
exclusively psychophysiological theory on the one hand or, on the other, a
monolithic theory of OBEs as evidence for the separability of consciousness
and the body seems to us too narrow a view. Before suggesting an alterna­
tive way of thinking about the problem, however, we should briefly review
additional aspects of OBE cases that suggest the need for a theory that,

25. In the light of the above considerations, it strikes us as at best highly premature, and
quite revealing, that the editors of Nature saw fit to declare triumphantly, in connection
with their publication of Blanke et al. (2002), that as a result of this one study, which dealt
with only one case, "the part of the brain that can induce out-of-body experiences has been
located" (p. 269).
400-Chapter 6

while not superseding standard psychophysiological models, goes beyond

them.
The cases that present the most serious challenge to explaining OBEs
in conventional terms are those that involve psi,26 including the veridical
perception of some event happening at a distance such as we saw in the
Wilmot case. Blackmore (1 982) correctly acknowledged that "a purely psy­
chological theory of the OBE cannot directly account for paranormal phe­
nomena and if they occur they demand explanation." As we pointed out
earlier, however, she refuses to accept the evidentiality of any such case. She
goes on to conclude that "my guess" is that psychological theories of OBEs
will predominate, that these theories will simply "ignore psi altogether,"
and that "the question of paranormal phenomena will quietly be dropped"
(p. 243). This is certainly one way of handling the problem of reports that
conflict with one's beliefs. But can these reports be dismissed and "ignored"
so cavalierly?
Clearly, not all OBEs-even those with impressive phenomenology­
are veridical in character. A particularly striking reminder of this is an
experience described by Roll (Coly & McMahon, 1 995, pp. 1 18-1 19). In a
vividly realistic OBE, he seemed to leave his body, travel to another part of
the house, and see details of the room, including a shadow cast by the moon
on the rug. Returning to his body and waking up, he went into the room, but
found that there was no moonlight. He concluded that, because the details
of his experience did not correspond to the actual physical environment,
"this was a mental world. I was in the world that I pictured."27 Most OBEs
similarly provide no evidence that they are anything more than unusually
vivid subjective experiences.
Nonetheless, not all OBEs are entirely subjective in nature; the Wilmot
case is hardly unique (see, e.g, Cook [Kelly] et al., 1 998; E. W. Kelly et al.,
1 999-2000, for reports of some NDEs that involved both OBEs and percep­
tion of events at a distance). H. Hart ( 1954) conducted an analysis of 288
published OBE cases in which the person reported perceiving events dur­
ing the experience that he or she could not have perceived in the ordinary
way. The 288 cases were all published with a description sufficient to show
that, in principle, the experience fit the criteria for perception of a real event
occurring at a distance. Most significantly, however, in 99 of these cases
the events in question had been verified as having occurred, and the experi­
ence had been reported to someone else before that verification occurred. In

26. As we discussed in the Introduction, the authors of this book are united in the con­
viction that psi phenomena have been adequately demonstrated, both in spontaneous case
studies and in experimental studies, even if there is as yet no adequate theoretical model to
account for them. It is our hope that this volume will help catalyze the development of such
a model. For readers who do not share our conviction, we refer them to reliable literature on
this topic (see the Appendix).
27. One might ask whether Roll awoke from his OBE, not immediately after the experience
as he thought, but later in the night, when earlier moonlight might have disappeared. The
purpose here, however, is not to debate the details of this particular experience, but simply to
call attention to the undeniable fact that many OBEs, however vivid, are not veridical.
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-40l

many of these cases the testimony of the experiencer remains uncorrobo­

rated, and even in the corroborated cases it is often possible to poke holes
in the testimony, since few of them include a written record of the experi­
ence made before the event was verified. Nevertheless, the large numbers of
claims of veridical OBEs, both corroborated and uncorroborated, suggest
the need for a response more robust than "quietly dropping" them.
An alternate explanation for these veridical cases might be, not that
the person's consciousness in some sense literally left the body and trav­
eled to the distant location, but that the person learned about the event in
question by some psi process such as telepathy or clairvoyance, and then
incorporated that knowledge into the OBE, which was simply an added hal­
lucination. The evidence for psi from both experimental and field studies is
sufficient to make this a plausible theory for many, perhaps even most, of
the veridical cases. Nevertheless, another sub-group of OBEs that strains
even this explanation is a group commonly called "reciprocal apparitions,"
again exemplified by the Wilmot case. In such cases, while one person is
deliberately trying to "project," or is having a spontaneous OBE, or is hav­
ing a dream in which he or she seems to go to a distant location, a person
at that location, unaware of the first person's experience, sees an appari­
tion of that person. H. Hart (1954) summarized 30 such cases that had been
published up to that time (see also H. Hart & Hart, 1933). In a recent study
by one of us (EWK) in which an unselected sample of people was asked
about a variety of unusual experiences they may have had, five cases of
this kind were reported. In one, for example, a nurse became friends with
a quadraplegic man who required several hospitalizations for pneumonia
and other complications. During one of these hospitalizations, the nurse,
feeling guilty that she had not recently visited this patient, had a dream in
which she seemed to go to him in the hospital, stood at the end of his bed,
and told him to keep fighting. Shortly afterward, the patient's sister told this
nurse that he had reported seeing her standing at the foot of his bed, telling
him to keep fighting. None of these five cases are fully investigated or cor­
roborated yet, but the number of them reported clearly suggests that such
experiences have been, and still are being, reported in sufficient quantity to
warrant taking them seriously.
In a few individuals, OBEs sometimes occur repeatedly or even under
some degree of voluntary control, an important property that makes them
potentially amenable to observation under controlled conditions. There
have so far been only a few such studies attempting to examine veridical
perceptions during OBEs. The most well known of these is Tart's ( 1968)
study of "Miss Z," a woman who had frequent sleep-related OBEs. She was
brought into Tart's lab for four nights, where she was connected to an EEG
machine and asked to try, if she had an OBE, to read a five-digit number
that Tart randomly selected and placed as a target on a shelf out of the
range of her normal sight. She succeeded completely on one occasion, but,
as Tart rightly concluded, "this evidence is not conclusive," since there was
a remote possibility that she might subliminally have been able to see the
402-Chapter 6

target reflected in the glass surface of a clock.28 Interestingly, Miss Z's OBE
experiences occurred in conjunction with a fairly well-defined physiological
pattern, developing out of Stage 1 sleep and consisting primarily of low­
voltage "alphoid" EEG dominated by slow alpha frequencies. Moreover, the
rapid eye movements characteristic of dreaming were absent. Miss Z unfor­
tunately moved away shortly after this promising experiment, and Tart was
unable to conduct further work with her.
In another series of experiments, a person who claimed to be able to
induce OBEs at will, while awake, attempted during randomly selected
experimental periods to go to a specified distant location during an OBE
and influence a variety of detectors located there, including other persons,
animals, and physical detectors of various sorts (R. L. Morris, Harary,
Janis, Hartwell, & Roll, 1978). Although the overall psi results of the study
were insignificant, there was one intriguing series of trials in which the sub­
ject's new pet kitten showed significantly less movement and less vocalizing
during the OBE periods than during the control periods. Examination of
physiological data showed that this subject's OBEs were also accompanied
by a fairly distinctive state, consisting of deep relaxation (as evidenced by
significant decline of skin potential) coupled with elements of arousal (as
evidenced by significant increases of heart rate and respiration rate). There
was also a large percentage decline in eye movements, although this was not
statistically significant. There were no significant EEG findings.
Osis and McCormick (1 980), working with another person who claimed
to induce OBEs at will, conducted an experiment in which the task was to
view a target in a specially constructed optical image device in which the
target appears as an illusion and is visible only from a position directly in
front of the viewing window. A random number generator created the target
for each OBE trial by making a random composite of three features (inde­
pendently drawn from four possible background colors, four quadrants, and
five line drawings). In addition, unbeknownst to the subject, a strain gauge
sensor was situated in a shielded chamber directly in front of the viewing
window. Out of 197 such trials, there were 1 14 hits (a hit being defined as
accurate identification of any of the three target features), which was mar­
ginally significant. Perhaps more interestingly, strain gauge activation was
significantly higher during hits than during misses, both before and after
target generation. Although, once again, the results can be interpreted as a
combination of clairvoyance and psychokinesis, they are also in line with an
hypothesis that is consistent with the subject's reported experience, namely,
that he had projected his consciousness into the viewing chamber at the
only point from which the target could be (optically) seen and where the
strain gauge was located.
Clearly, these few existing experiments are inadequate to validate any
interpretation of OBEs as involving either psi or an "exteriorization" of
the mind from the body. Nevertheless, they also collectively demonstrate

28. It is worth noting, however, when considering this suggestion, that she called the five
digits out in their correct left-right order (Tart, 1968, p. 17).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-403

that further experimental work along these lines is feasible and potentially
productive. As with NDEs, the further study of OBEs under appropriate
conditions of experimental control and physiological monitoring is urgently
needed. We repeat, however, our belief that advances in our understanding
of NDEs, OBEs, and related phenomena are likely to come only by moving
beyond the current polarization between exclusively psychophysiological
models on the one hand and transcendent or "exteriorization" models on
the other. OBEs, NDEs, and other such phenomena surely do not occur at
random. It is reasonable to suppose that there are physiological and psycho­
logical conditions specially conducive to such experiences, and some of the
psychological and physiological models proposed, sparse and conjectural
as they presently are, may be converging upon some of those conditions. On
the other hand, there is also a not insignificant body of evidence supporting
the idea that some experiences are more than mere subjective illusions, and
this body of evidence cannot simply be "quietly dropped," as Blackmore
would have us do, simply because it presents problems for current models
of mind and brain.
In attempting to account for reciprocal apparitions, such as those men­
tioned above, and for apparitions perceived simultaneously by more than
one person (discussed later in this chapter), Myers (1886b) had tentatively
proposed the idea that some aspect of consciousness is able in some sense to
"go out" from the body and somehow produce an effect in external physical
space, not in a conventional material way perceptible to ordinary senses,
but nonetheless in a manner sufficient to stimulate an apparition or (as in
the case of the strain gauge in Osis and McCormick's experiment or the kit­
ten in the R. L. Morris et al. study) to affect something physical in the envi­
ronment.29 Such an idea supposes, as Myers ( l 886c) did, that the ordinary
distinction between mind and matter may not be so straightforward as we
often assume, and thus that there may be something intermediate between
matter as we ordinarily perceive it and mind as we ordinarily experience
it (pp. 178-179; see also our Chapter 2). We might further conjecture that
under appropriate psychophysiological conditions, a wide range of experi­
ences may emerge in which the ordinary relationship between conscious­
ness and the body is altered, including some in which consciousness actu­
ally does separate from the body.

Autoscopy
The neurological condition known as autoscopy bears some phenom­
enological resemblance to OBEs. Autoscopy has sometimes been defined
as "the hallucinatory projection of the body image into perceptual space"
(Lukianowicz, 1958, p. 214). This definition, however, is ambiguous as to the
SUbjective point of view from which the experience occurs, leading some
authors inappropriately to equate OBEs and autoscopic experiences (e.g.,
Lunn, 1 970). A more precise definition is "a visual experience where the

29. For an excellent brief discussion of Myers's theory, which he called "phantasmogenetic
efficacy," see Gauld ( 1 982, pp. 250-260).
404-Chapter 6

subject sees an image of him/herself in external space, viewed from within

his/ her own physical body" (Dening & Berrios, 1 994, p. 808). That is, unlike
OBEs, in which one's consciousness itself seems to be located outside the
body, and one views the actual physical body from that external position,
in an autoscopic experience one's consciousness seems to remain inside the
body, as usual, and it is instead the hallucinatory image or "double" that
seems externaPO The autoscopic experience also differs from most sponta­
neously occurring OBEs, and especially from NDEs, in that it is frequently
accompanied by unpleasant feelings of unreality, confusion, or depersonal­
ization (Lukianowicz, 1 958). Moreover, autoscopic experiences, as well as
OBEs reported by seizure patients, usually involve "fear," "horror," "terror,"
or some other negative affect (Blanke et aI., 2004; Dening & Berrios, 1994;
Devinsky et aI., 1989). Finally, people experiencing autoscopic hallucina­
tions usually have some identified concurrent neurological or psychological
pathology (e.g., Blanke et aI., 2004; Damas Mora, Jenner, & Eacott, 1980;
Devinsky et aI., 1 989; Lhermitte, 1951; Lukianowicz, 1 958).3\ Nevertheless,
although OBEs and autoscopic experiences are experientially different in
many ways, both phenomena do involve profound alterations in the ordi­
nary relationship between one's sense of self and sense of the body, and they
may involve similar or overlapping mechanisms.

Lucid Dreams
Another phenomenon suggesting an alteration in the ordinary rela­
tionship of consciousness and the brain is that of lucid dreams. In dreams
of this type the state of consciousness associated with ordinary dreaming
is enhanced, in that dreamers become self-conscious, are aware that they
are dreaming, and are "fully in possession of their cognitive facuIties while
dreaming" such that they can initiate purposive behavior (LaBerge & Gack­
enbach, 2000, p. 1 52). In a real sense, therefore, the dreamer becomes more
"awake" or conscious than is ordinary in sleep and dreams. As we men­
tioned in Chapter 2, Myers ( 1887a) had recognized the importance of this
particular example of enhanced awareness, saying that

we neglect precious occasions of experiment for want of a l ittle resolute

direction of the will.. . . [W]e ought to accustom ourselves to look on each
dream, not only as a psychological observation, but as an observation
which may be transformed into an experiment . . to carry into our dreams
.

enough of our waking self to tell us that they are dreams, and to prompt us
to psychological inquiry. (p. 241)32

30. Blanke et al. (2004) and Brugger, Agosti, Regard, Wieser, and Landis (1994) also call
attention to transitional experiences, called "heautoscopic," in which the subject alternates
between these two perspectives, or even experiences both simultaneously.
3 1 . This apparent association with pathology, however, may simply reflect a reporting bias,
since most studies of autoscopy have been published in medical journals.
32. It was many years before anyone took up this suggestion, but one of the earliest reports
about lucid dreams was published in the SPR Proceedings by Myers's friend and colleague,
Dr. F. van Eeden ( 1 9 1 3).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-405

Like NOEs, lucid dreams were at first widely dismissed as impossi­

ble, and it was not until methods were found for objectively demonstrat­
ing the occurrence of such dreams that psychologists and sleep researchers
accepted the phenomenon (LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000, pp. 1 57-1 58).33
Also, however, as with NOEs, an adequate understanding of lucid dreams
will require situating them within a larger group of phenomena involving
altered or enhanced mental functioning. For example, one interesting find­
ing of recent OBE research is that people who experience OBEs are likely
also to have had lucid dreams, and vice versa (Alvarado, 2000, p. 195). Lucid
dreams may be a kind of precursor to simple OBEs or even to more complex,
veridical ones. Several people who have frequently experienced or delib­
erately induced OBEs have suggested using lucid dreaming as a means of
inducing OBEs (e.g., 1. L. M itchell, 198 1 ; Muldoon & Carrington, 1 92911973,
pp. 125-1 27; Whiteman, 1956). The two phenomena may well depend upon
similar or overlapping physiological mechanisms, and research and theoriz­
ing in both areas will likely progress by joining forces.

Apparitions

We turn now to experiences in which a person has seen, heard, or oth­

erwise sensed the presence of a dying or deceased person not physically
present. Hallucinations are often defined (and often with pejorative intent)
as sensory perceptions in the absence of any corresponding sensory input.
By this general definition, many features of NOEs, such as seeing deceased
people, a brilliant light, or "other realms," are hallucinations. The literature
on hallucinations is vast, and the circumstances under which they occur
are enormously varied (see, e.g., Bentall, 2000; Siegel & West, 1 975). Hal­
lucinations are reported, for example, in connection with a wide variety of
psychotropic drugs or in alcohol- or disease-induced delirium; both positive
and negative hallucinations34 can be produced by hypnosis; they sometimes
occur spontaneously in the drowsy states occurring just before sleep or just
before awakening (hypnagogic or hypnopompic states); they are related to

33. These methods involve subjects signaling with pre-specified voluntary eye movements,
verifiable by outside observers, that they are having a lucid dream (LaBerge & Gackenbach,
2000, p. 1 57-163).
There is another interesting parallel in the history of research on NDEs and lucid dreams:
Blackmore has suggested that NDEs must occur in the moments just before losing conscious­
ness or just before fully regaining it, when brain processes are not so seriously impaired.
Similar explanations were proposed for lucid dreams by sleep researchers whose assumptions
about the nature of sleep did not allow for the "paradoxical" concept of "conscious sleep";
they argued that lucid dreams must occur either in brief awakenings or in non-REM phases of
sleep, until methods were developed demonstrating that lucid dreams do occur during REM
sleep (LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000, pp. 1 57-158).
34. A "positive" hallucination is one in which a person sees a person or object that is not
physically present. A "negative" hallucination is one in which a person does not see a person
or object that is present.
406-Chapter 6

such phenomena as eidetic imagery, synesthesia, and imaginary playmates;

they commonly occur in medical conditions such as migraine (Sacks, 1 999)
and Charles Bonnet syndrome (Schultz, Needham, Taylor, Shindell, & Mel­
zack, 1 996); and they can occur (especially in auditory form) in connection
with psychiatric illnesses such as schizophrenia. Because the literature on
such experiences is so enormous, we can here only call attention to the abso­
lute necessity of situating NDEs, OBEs, and other such phenomena within
this broader context.
One important caveat must be kept in mind here, however, and that
is the converse need for the study of hallucinations in general to include,
and be informed by, study of the kinds of experiences emphasized in this
chapter-that is, NDEs, OBEs, and hallucinations experienced by healthy,
sane people in a waking state. A recent review of research on hallucinatory
experiences is unfortunately not unique in focusing almost exclusively on
psychiatric patients experiencing auditory hallucinations (Bentall, 2000).
We have already discussed in Chapter 2 the central place that the study of
hallucinatory phenomena held in Myers's empirical and theoretical work,
particularly the investigations and surveys by Myers and his colleagues of
spontaneous cases of apparitions of dying or deceased persons (Gurney et
a!., 1 886; H. Sidgwick et a!., 1 894). These studies, and ones reported in more
recent years (e.g., Dale, White, & Murphy, 1 962; Green, 1 960; W. F. Prince,
1 93 1 ; Rhine, 1 98 1 ; Tien, 1991; D. 1. West, 1 948, 1 990), call into serious ques­
tion the long-prevailing assumption, which we mentioned at the beginning
of this chapter, that hallucinations are exclusively pathological in origin,
whether physiologically or psychologically generated. Even hallucinations
among bereaved persons (e.g., Barbato, 1 999; Grimby, 1 993; Marris, 1 958, p.
1 5; Olson, Suddeth, Peterson, & Egelhoff, 1 985; Rees, 1971), although occur­
ring in conditions of obvious psychological distress, are not considered nec­
essarily pathological in the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statisti­
cal Manual of Mental Disorders ( 1994). Clearly, no theory of hallucinations
can be adequate unless it takes into account the wide variety of conditions,
physiological and psychological, under which they occur, including-impor­
tantly-apparitions reported by sane, awake, healthy individuals.

Veridical Apparitions
Additionally, just as an adequate theory of NDEs or OBEs must take
into account the veridical perceptions sometimes occurring outside the
person's ordinary sensory capacities, an adequate theory of hallucinatory
experience must take into account reports of veridical apparitions. Particu­
larly important examples of these are cases in which the hallucination coin­
cided closely in time with the death or some other crisis happening to the
person seen or heard in the hallucination, even though the percipient did
not yet know about that death or crisis. Such cases are far from infrequent.
It is no exaggeration to say that thousands of them have been investigated
and reported, primarily in the pages of the Proceedings and Journals of the
Society for Psychical Research and of the American Society for Psychical
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-407

Research (see, e.g., Gurney et aI., 1 886; E. M. Sidgwick, 1922; H. Sidgwick

et aI., 1 894). Relatively few cases have been reported in more recent decades,
but this is almost certainly the result of the sharp decline of interest among
experimentally oriented parapsychologists in the investigation of spontane­
ous experiences, rather than of any fal ling off in their actual rates of occur­
rence. Stevenson ( 1995) reported three such "crisis" cases, and in a recent
study by one of us (EWK), at least 18 such apparitions were reportedY In
addition to the sheer quantity of such cases, the quality of the evidence is
such that they cannot be dismissed en masse as unsubstantiated "anecdotes."
Hart et al. (1 956), for example, analyzed a collection of 1 65 previously pub­
lished cases in which one of the criteria for inclusion was a written or oral
report made of the experience, or action taken because of the experience,
before the corresponding event was learned about normally.

Collective Apparitions
Another important group of cases suggesting that not all hallucinations
are purely subjective is that of "collective" cases, in which more than one
person has simultaneously seen the apparition. In one case (which provides
an example both of collective perception and of the crisis apparitions men­
tioned above), a man and his 5-year-old son simultaneously saw at the ceil­
ing the face of the man's father, at the time (they subsequently learned) that
this person had died. The man's wife, who was sitting in the same room,
corroborated having witnessed the reactions and comments of her husband
and son, although she did not herself see the apparition (Gurney et aI., 1886,
vol. 2, pp. 248-250). Such cases are again not infrequent: Tyrrell (194311953)
reported that he had found 1 30 collective cases in the literature and had
"no doubt that this list is not exhaustive" (p. 69). Furthermore, although
collective cases are a small fraction of all reported apparitions, most wit­
nesses report being alone at the time they saw the apparition-a condition
perhaps conducive to such an experience. But among cases in which more
than one person was present, a third (H. Sidgwick et aI., 1 894, pp. 320-321 ;
Tyrrell, 1 94311953, p. 23) to half ( H . Hart e t aI., 1 956, pp. 204-205) involved
collective perception, although, as we saw in the case described above, not
everyone present necessarily shares the experience.
Other features of collective cases likewise suggest that they are some­
thing more than subjective experiences. As Tyrrell pointed out (1943/1953),
the testimony in collective cases indicates that "all the percipients see the
same thing, each from his own point of view in space, just as though it were
a material figure" (p. 70). In support of this observation, Tyrrell listed 19
features (of both solitary and collective cases) that suggest some kind of

35. Many cases identified in this study, in which the person reported simply a "sense of
presence" or a "dream" coinciding with a death or other crisis, may also have involved appari­
tions, but even if not, they are clearly related to the apparitional cases. A "sense of presence"
may in fact be an incipient apparition, as suggested by a few cases reported in which an initial
sense of presence then developed into a sensory apparition (Gurney et aI., 1886, vol. 1, p. 483,
527-531).
408-Chapter 6

objectivity to the figure seen (pp. 77-80). For example, in one case a man
reported seeing in his bedroom the figure of his brother on the night the
brother was killed, and he continued to see the figure, in the same spot but
from different perspectives, even when he walked around and away from it
(Gurney et aI., 1886, vol. 1 , pp. 556-559). In another case, a woman saw an
apparition of a dying friend reflected in a mirror, as well as when she turned
to look directly at it (Myers, 1 895e, pp. 444-446; also in HP, vol. I, pp. 421 -
423). In still other cases, the apparition may obscure light and cast a shadow
(e.g., Myers, 1 889d, p. 28; this case, incidentally, was also a collective case).
It was collective cases specifically that led to the two major ways of
interpreting apparitions in general. On the one hand, Gurney had argued
that veridical, or "crisis," apparitions occur when the person learns tele­
pathically36 about, say, the death of the distant person; this information
then emerges into consciousness in the form of an hallucination. Collec­
tive cases occur when one primary percipient receives the information tele­
pathically and then "spreads" the information, also telepathically, to other
persons present who are sufficiently sensitive to detect it. In contrast, Myers
believed that the existence of so many cases in which multiple percipients
had perceived the apparition in consistent fashion, together with certain
details suggesting some kind of objectivity (such as those described in the
previous paragraph), supported the idea that at least some apparitions have
a more objective character than telepathic impression alone can account for.
He thus proposed his idea of "phantasmogenetic efficacy," which we briefly
described earlier in this chapter, in which apparitions are in some sense spa­
tial, or affect space, without being physical in any ordinary sense.37

Deathbed Visions
As we also mentioned earlier, one important feature of NDEs is that
of perceiving identifiable deceased persons during the experience. Closely
related to this feature of NDEs are deathbed visions. Deathbed visions are
experiences in which dying people seem to see or converse with people not
physically present-usually deceased persons-or to perceive some envi­
ronment not physically evident to bystanders. Occasionally, a bystander
will also perceive what a dying person seems to be seeing (see, e.g., Howarth
& Kellehear, 200 1; Stevenson, 1 995, pp. 359-361).
Like NDE experiencers, dying persons who see people not physically
present almost invariably see deceased persons, not living ones. Deathbed
visions rarely seem to involve other features prominently associated with
NDEs, such as OBEs or tunnels, but these differences may be more appar­
ent than real because an even more fundamental difference between NDEs

36. As we pointed out in Chapter 2, Myers coined the word "telepathy" in 1 882 to refer
to the phenomenon of one person apparently deriving information directly from another
person's mind.
37. Gauld ( 1 968, pp. 168-171; 1982, pp. 238-242, 250-260) has presented summaries of
these two views. In 1 968 he was clearly not persuaded by either of them, but by 1982 he took
Myers's theory more seriously.
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-409

and deathbed visions is that in the latter the experiencer usually dies shortly
after the experience. We therefore rarely get direct accounts from dying per­
sons themselves; reports of what they experienced come rather from people
at their bedside who heard what the dying person said about the experience
or who witnessed behavior suggesting what the dying person was experienc­
ing. As a result, we probably know little about the full extent and charac­
ter of the dying person's experience. Nevertheless, the similarities between
NDEs and deathbed visions suggest that, just as NDEs overlap in certain
respects with OBEs, so also do they overlap, in different ways, with death­
bed visions. It seems likely that all are variants of some larger class of phe­
nomena whose nature has yet to be adequately delineated.
There has been little systematic research to date on deathbed visions.
Collections of cases have been published (e.g., W. F. Barrett, 1 926; Bozz­
ano, 1906), but in modern times only Osis (1961) and Osis and Haraldsson
( 1977/1997) have attempted a systematic survey of such experiences. Because
these surveys were based entirely on the retrospective recollections of doc­
tors and nurses, often from many years earlier, the findings must be con­
sidered preliminary only, and they tell us little about the real incidence and
character of such experiences. Nevertheless, they provide reason to believe
that deathbed visions may be far more common than is presently recog­
nized, and potentially accessible to more systematic study. Our own infor­
mal inquiries, particularly with hospice doctors and nurses, have strongly
suggested that such experiences are in fact quite frequent. Moreover, in a
recent study conducted by one of us (EWK), the single most common expe­
rience reported was being with a dying person who seemed to see or hear
deceased loved ones; 218 out of 525 respondents reported such an experi­
ence, including 36 nurses or other hospital workers who reported witnessing
such experiences, some of them on multiple occasions. Clearly, systematic
research is needed to learn more about the incidence, nature, and circum­
stances of these theoretically important and humanly meaningful experi­
ences.
Sufficient evidence is already available, however, to counter any fac­
ile blanket dismissal of deathbed visions as mere hallucinations of a dying
brain. We need to keep in mind, first, that deathbed visions are not isolated
phenomena. As we have seen, people also report seeing deceased persons
in various conditions other than that of actually dying-for example in
NDEs in which they were not physiologically close to death, or in appari­
tions experienced by awake, healthy persons. Second, Osis and Haraldsson
( 1977/1 997) reported that patients were actually less likely, not more likely,
to have deathbed visions if they were on medications or had illnesses affect­
ing consciousness. Also, there are again cases that call into question even
more directly this explanation of deathbed visions as subjective hallucina­
tions. For example, in so-called "Peak in Darien" cases, the dying person
apparently sees, and often expresses surprise at seeing, a person whom he
or she thought was living, but who had in fact recently died. Reports of
41O-Chapter 6

such cases are scattered and often not adequately documented; but there are
enough of them to warrant giving them serious attention.38
An even rarer kind of deathbed experience, but one that like NDEs calls
into question the absolute dependence of mental functioning on the state of
the brain, are cases in which the dying person has demonstrated a sudden
revival in mental functioning just before death. People sometimes appear
to revive somewhat physically just before death. In a case in our collection,
a woman, dying of congestive heart failure, was on oxygen, in a coma, and
unable to communicate. At one point, however, according to her daughter,
who was present, "much to my surprise she not only sat up in bed but leaped
over the bottom rail of the bed, saying 'Jim [her deceased brother], wait for
me, don't go .. . .' She was looking at the wall behind where I sat and obvi­
ously saw something I did not." Her daughter and the nurses present had
trouble restraining her. She did not die on this occasion, but did so a month
later, after being sent home since her condition seemed to have improved.
Even more interesting than these physical revivals, however, are revivals
in mental functioning. Myers ( 1 892b) had referred to the "sudden revivals of
memory or faculty in dying persons" (p. 3 1 6), and there are scattered reports
of people apparently recovering from dementia shortly before death. The
eminent physician Benjamin Rush, author of the first American treatise on
mental illness ( 1 8 1 2), observed that "most of mad people discover a greater
or less degree of reason in the last days or hours of their lives" (p. 257). Simi­
larly, in his classic study of hallucinations, Brierre de Boismont ( 1859) noted
that "at the approach of death we observe that. . . the intellect, which may
have been obscured or extinguished during many years, is again restored in
all its integrity" (p. 236). Flournoy (1903, p. 48) mentioned that French psy­
chiatrists had recently published cases of mentally ill persons who showed
sudden improvement in their condition shortly before death.
In more recent years, Osis (1961) reported two cases, "one of severe
schizophrenia and one of senility, [in which] the patients regained normal
mentality shortly before death" (p. 24). Osis and Haraldsson ( 197711997)
reported a case of a meningitis patient who had been "severely disoriented
almost to the end," but who "cleared up, answered questions, smiled, was
slightly elated and just a few minutes before death, came to herself" (p. 1 33).
Turetskaia and Romanenko (1 975) reported three cases involving remis­
sion of symptoms in dying schizophrenic patients. Grosso (2004, pp. 42-43)
described three dementia cases that had been reported to him, one by a col­
league and two by a nurse. In all three cases, the patient had not recognized
family members for several years, but shortly before death they all were said
to have become more coherent or alert and to have recognized family mem-

38. Reports of such "Peak in Darien" experiences may be found in W. F. Barrett (1926, pp.
10-26), Callanan & Kelley (1993, pp. 89-90, 98-99), Cobbe (1882, p. 297), Crookall ( 196011966,
pp. 21-22), Gallup and Proctor ( 1 982, pp. 1 3-14), Gurney and Myers (1 889, pp. 459-460), Hys­
lop (1908, pp. 88-89), A. Johnson ( 1899, pp. 288-291), Kubler-Ross (1983, pp. 208-210), R. A.
Moody with Perry (1988, p. 1 36), in HP (vol. 2, pp. 339-342), Osis and Haraldsson ( 197711997,
p. 166), Ring ( 1 980, pp. 207-208), E. M. Sidgwick ( 1885, pp. 92-93), Spraggett (1974, p. 95),
and Stevenson (1959, p. 22).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-41 1

bers. Such cases are few i n number and not adequately documented, but
the persistence of such reports suggests that they may represent a real phe­
nomenon that could potentially be substantiated by further investigations.
If so, they would seriously undermine the assumption that in such diseases
as Alzheimer's the mind itself is destroyed in lockstep with the brain (e.g.,
Edwards, 1997, pp. 295-296). Like many of the experiences discussed in this
chapter, such cases would suggest that in some conditions, consciousness
may be enhanced, not destroyed, when constraints normally supplied by the
brain are sufficiently loosened.

Mystical and Conversion Experiences

NDEs also have ties to still another class of phenomena that must be
considered when evaluating proposed explanations. Many features ofNDEs
are similar to those of mystical experiences. The ineffability of the experi­
ence and the sense of being in the presence of something larger than or
transcendent to oneself are features common to both NDEs and mystical
experiences. lust as with NDEs, the onset of a mystical experience is often
accompanied by overwhelming feelings of joy, happiness, and peace (James,
1 90211958, pp. 1 57, 204-205). People sometimes describe a feeling of sud­
den release, and although they usually seem to mean this figuratively, some
reports border on an OBE: As one of Leuba's subjects said, "I cannot tell
you whether I was in the body or out of the body" (Leuba, 1 896, p. 372).39
As with NDEs, many mystical experiences involve enhanced mental
functioning or heightened perception. Sometimes the "senses are much
more acute," such that details of the experience and of one's physical sur­
roundings at the time "are frequently recalled with great minuteness" (Star­
buck, 1906, p. 78). One of lames's ( 1902/1958) experiencers said that "my
memory became exceedingly clear" (p. 1 57). A sensory phenomenon that is
particularly common in mystical experiences, as well as NDEs, is the sense
of seeing a bright light of unusual quality, such as "a strange light which
seemed to light up the whole room (for it was dark)" (p. 202). Some people
seem to be using the phrase "seeing the light" in a figurative sense, but oth­
ers are clearly referring to what was to them a real and vivid sensory phe­
nomenon.
We will discuss mystical experiences in detail in Chapter 8, but here
we focus on one further and extremely significant feature common to both
classes of experience-namely, the transformative aspect, especially of expe­
riences sometimes called conversion experiences. Whatever the explanation
of NDEs may be, there is no doubt that they have a profound and appar­
ently lasting impact on many people who experience them. As we noted
earlier, they often precipitate a significant change in values, attitude toward

39. This person's experience is reminiscent of the experience described by St. Paul in which
he said "whether in the body, or out of the body, r cannot tell" (2 Corinthians 1 2:3).
4 12-Chapter 6

death, and a new sense of purpose or meaning in life. Similarly, conversion

experiences are, by definition, sudden and lasting changes in character and
values such that "religious ideas, previously peripheral in . . . consciousness,
now take central place" (James, 1 90211 958, p. 1 62). Conversion experiences
bring a "changed attitude toward life" (Starbuck, 1 906, p. 360), including
changes in the person's relationship with God, perception and apprecia­
tion of nature, attitude toward self, and, perhaps most significantly, attitude
toward other people ("I was very selfish . . . now I desired the welfare of all
mankind" [James, 1 90211 958, p. 1 57]).
As we seek to evaluate various theories of NDEs, it is important to
emphasize that this transformative aspect is never, so far as we have been
able to discover, reported in connection with the various fragmentary expe­
riences sometimes glibly equated with NDEs, such as the "dreamlets" of
acceleration-induced hypoxia, experiences associated with other abnor­
malities of blood-gas concentrations, or experiences reported by patients
receiving temporal lobe stimulation.40 Moreover, the transformative fea­
tures associated with NDEs differ from those associated with simply com­
ing close to death but without having an NDE (Greyson, 1 983a; Ring, 1984;
van Lommel et aI., 2001). Clearly, the profound transformative aspect of
NDEs suggests that we need some explanation that goes beyond the physi­
ological models we have so far, and even beyond the psychological experi­
ence associated with coming near death.
Many conversion experiences are said to have been preceded by a period
of intense brooding, depression, and questioning, and they seem to be the
result, not so much of conscious striving, but of subliminal "incubation"
of these problems and thoughts, followed by a sudden intrusive experience
of unexpected character that leads to a profound shift in the person's per­
spective and attitude (James, 1 902/1958). Conversion experiences, therefore,
like NDEs, mystical or religious experiences in general, and creativity and
genius, may be best understood with reference to Myers's view of a larger
and active subliminal consciousness from which there is occasionally an
"uprush" of material into ordinary waking consciousness. Moreover, this
"uprush"-and hence these experiences-may all occur more readily in
people in whom the "barrier" between supraliminal and subliminal regions
of the mind is, as Myers put it, more "permeable," whether constitutionally
or because it has been weakened by certain psychological or physiological
conditions.41

40. As we will discuss in Chapter 8, however, such transformations are commonly associ­
ated, not just with religious "conversion" experiences, but with mystical experiences in gen­
eral, including the mystical-type experiences sometimes reported in connection with the use
of certain drugs.
41. James interpreted conversion experiences in just this way, saying that the "discovery
of a consciousness existing beyond the field of consciousness, or subliminally as Mr. Myers
terms it, casts light on many phenomena of religious biography," and that "possession of a
developed subliminal self, and of a leaky or pervious margin, is thus a conditio sine qua non
of the Subject's becoming converted in the instantaneous way" (James, 1 902/ 1 958, pp. 188,
1 94).
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-4l 3

Some o f the literature on religious conversion experiences has followed

the well-worn pathway (discussed in Chapters 7 and 8) found in the literature
on mysticism and on genius by emphasizing pathological manifestations.
Dewhurst and Beard (1 970), for example, reviewed some of the literature
on religiosity, conversion, and religious hallucinations among epileptics,
including a review of evidence suggesting that many Christian mystics were
in fact epileptics, and they then described six of their own epileptic patients
with "mystical delusional experiences." Again, however, a more balanced
picture of all these phenomena may emerge if we keep in mind Myers's
argument, discussed in Chapter 2, that the psychological mechanism of a
"permeable barrier" can lead to evolutive as well as d issolutive phenomena,
from undeniably dysfunctional pathology to the highest levels of creative
and religious experience.

A Psychological Theory?

Thus far in this chapter, we have concentrated on outlining a variety of

interrelated phenomena and some of the theories that have been proposed
to account for them. A major insight that emerges from such a review is the
general recognition that similar experiences can occur under widely vary­
ing psychological and physiological conditions. A major problem remains,
however: Why do most people, when subjected to the same or similar con­
ditions, not have such experiences, whether NDEs, OBEs, apparitions, or
any of the other experiences discussed in this chapter? For example, most
people who suffer cardiac arrest do not report NDEs: Only 1 2% of the car­
diac arrest patients in van Lommel et aJ.'s (2001) study, 1 0% in Greyson's
(2003) study, and 6.3% in Parnia et aJ.'s (2001) study did SO . 42
Part of the answer undoubtedly has to do with the fact, pointed out ear­
lier in this chapter, that many people who have unusual experiences such as
NDEs are reluctant to talk about them, not only with medical personnel but
even with their friends and families, including even spouses. Additionally,
in some cardiac arrest patients, persisting physiological consequences of the
arrest and resuscitation may have blocked memory for any experience. Van
Lommel et al. (2001), for example, noted that generalized memory defects
were significantly more frequent (14%) among those who did not report an
NDE than among those who did (2%). But this still leaves a large reservoir
of patients who apparently had no such experience. What might distinguish
these patients from those who did?
Van Lommel et al. (2001) provide some intriguing clues on the physi­
ological side. There were no significant differences in terms of the resuscita­
tion procedures themselves-that is, factors such as the use of medications,

42. A small percentage of other cardiac arrest patients in these studies reported some mem­
ories during the arrest, but not enough to qualify for an NDE as judged by the Greyson NDE
Scale (Greyson, 1983b, 1985) or the Ring WeEI (Ring, 1 980).
414-Chapter 6

intubation, and defibrillation. The groups also did not differ significantly in
terms of other measures of proximity to death, such as the duration of arrest
and unconsciousness. Both groups included patients who had cardiac arrest
out of the hospital, making a precise evaluation of their actual physiological
condition somewhat more difficult. Nonetheless, patients who reported an
NDE were more than twice as likely to die within 30 days than those who
did not. Clearly, one high priority for further research will be to character­
ize more precisely the relationship between actual physiological proximity
to death, the likelihood of experiencing an NDE, and the phenomenological
character of the experiences that do occur.
More generally, however, the occurrence of not only NDEs but also
other related experiences under such a wide variety of physiological condi­
tions, and to only some people, suggests the need to expand the search for
an adequate theoretical model which includes psychological factors. Gen­
eral support for this idea might come from the additional finding of van
Lommel et al. (2001) that reporters of NDEs were more than three times
as likely as non-reporters to have had a previous NDE, even though the
reporters as a group were significantly younger than the non-reporters. This
suggests again that future research might profit in particular by examining
all the experiences discussed in this chapter in light of Myers's model of a
"permeable barrier" that controls the exchange of material between supra­
liminal and subliminal levels of consciousness. On this model, some people
have more chronically permeable barriers than others, and in all of us the
permeability can vary with changes in physiological or psychological condi­
tions.43 The model predicts, therefore, that people reporting NDEs, as well
as other related experiences, differ from other people on measures of hyp­
notizability, absorption, schizotypy, dissociation, or transliminality. As we
mentioned earlier, a few studies have already found some differences in dis­
sociative tendencies, absorption, and fantasy proneness between those who
have had an NDE and control groups consisting of otherwise unselected
persons who have not. A more meaningful comparison, however, might be
between NDE experiencers and a control group of people who have been in
the same or similar physiological circumstances but did not have an NDE.
This model might also help make sense of what is currently a "loose
end" in the literature on awareness during general anesthesia. We mentioned
earlier that the evidence for memory of events occurring while a patient was
adequately anesthetized is generally poor. Interestingly, however, the most
impressive reports of explicit (or conscious) awareness of events during anes­
thesia have been elicited by hypnosis (Cheek, 1 964, 1 966; Levinson, 1 965).
The historically important Levinson study, for example, involved 10 highly
hypnotizable subjects undergoing very similar surgical procedures carried
out under a deliberately deep and uniform anesthesia regime monitored

43. Hartmann ( 1 989, 1 991) and Thalbourne (1998; Thalbourne & Delin, 1994) have pro­
posed similar ideas about factors influencing the exchange of material between levels of the
mind, and both have developed questionnaire instruments capable to some degree of measur­
ing these factors-"boundaries" and "transliminality," respectively.
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-4l 5

with EEG. A month later-but only under hypnosis-four o f these patients

recalled nearly verbatim, and four others recalled partially, standardized
remarks made by the anesthetist in conjunction with a staged "crisis" in the
procedure. These studies have never, to our knowledge, been adequately
followed up, but they should be, because such results, if replicable, suggest,
like NDEs, that mind is still somehow able to operate when the brain is
disabled by anesthesia. Moreover, they suggest, as Myers argued, that hyp­
nosis is a method particularly conducive to loosening the "barrier" and thus
accessing subliminal levels of consciousness.

The Challenge of Near-Death Experiences

Following Myers, we have argued that explanatory models for the phenom­
ena we have discussed in this chapter must take into account not only the
full range of features and conditions associated with each individual phe­
nomenon in isolation, but also the wide variety of related phenomena that
share some of its principal features. We are not suggesting simplistically
that all these phenomena will one day be brought under the rubric of one
all-encompassing explanation. Nonetheless, we are arguing that if we are to
understand any particular phenomenon, we must situate it in the context of
related phenomena, an exercise that may then ultimately lead to a greatly
expanded view of the nature of all of them. As noted several times in this
chapter, the phenomena that we have discussed all suggest a marked altera­
tion, not only in the person's state of consciousness, but more broadly in the
ordinary relationship of the person's consciousness with the external world.
We emphasize again that some of these alterations-sharing common char­
acteristics despite the apparent diversity of means by which they may be
brought about-suggest that there may be more to the external environ­
ment itself than our ordinary sensorimotor functioning can detect.
The challenge of NDEs in particular, however, goes beyond situating
them properly within a broader framework of cognate phenomena. The
challenge lies also in recognizing and accounting for one central feature that
in our opinion makes this phenomenon uniquely important in any contem­
porary discussion of the mind-brain problem-specifically, the occurrence
of vivid and complex mentation, sensation, and memory under conditions
in which current neuroscientific models of the mind deem conscious experi­
ence of any significant sort impossible. The stark incompatibility of NDEs
with current models of mind-brain relations is particularly evident in con­
nection with experiences that occur under two conditions-general anes­
thesia and cardiac arrest. We wish now to highlight this conflict, because
the theoretical significance of the many experiences occurring under these
conditions has perhaps not been sufficiently appreciated. In both of these
situations, we will argue, much more is at issue than some vague sense of
416-Chapter 6

incompatibility between the characteristics of the mentation that occurs

and the physiological conditions under which it occurs.
In Chapter I we noted that the current mainstream doctrine of bio­
logical naturalism has coalesced neuroscientifically around the family of
"global workspace" theories. Despite differences of detail and interpreta­
tion, all of these theories have in common the view that the essential sub­
strate for conscious experience-the neuroelectric activities that make it
possible and that constitute or directly reflect the necessary and sufficient
conditions for its occurrence-consist of synchronous or at least coherent
high-frequency (gamma-band, roughly 30-70 Hz) EEG oscillations link­
ing widely separated, computationally specialized, regions of the brain.44
An enormous amount of empirical evidence supports the existence of these
mind-brain correlations under normal conditions of mental life, and we do
not dispute this evidence. The conventional theoretical interpretation of this
correlation, however-that the observed neuroelectric activity itself gener­
ates or constitutes the conscious experience-must be incorrect, because in
both general anesthesia and cardiac arrest, the specific neuroelectric condi­
tions that are held to be necessary and sufficient for conscious experience
are abolished-and yet vivid, even heightened, awareness, thinking, and
memory formation can still occur.45

General Anesthesia

Take first the case of NDEs occurring under conditions of general anes­
thesia: In our collection at the University of Virginia, 23% of the computer­
coded cases occurred under anesthesia, and these involved the same fea­
tures that characterize other NDEs, such as having an OBE and watching
medical personnel working on their body, an unusually bright or vivid light,
meeting deceased persons, and-significantly-thoughts, memories, and
sensations that were as clear or clearer than usual. If the incidence of cases
involving anesthesia in our collection is any indication of the general inci­
dence, then conservatively many thousands of NDEs have occurred during
surgical procedures involving general anesthesia.

44. The specific brain regions involved vary somewhat according to the tasks and theorists,
but characteristically include cerebellar and limbic cortex, anterior cingulate and insular cor­
tex, the thalamus with its dense and reciprocal connections with neocortex, and large parts
of the neocortex itself, including in particular frontal and parietal cortex as well as whatever
specific sensory systems may be momentarily engaged (see, e.g., Baars, 1 997; Crick, 1 994;
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Edelman & Tononi, 2000; A. K. Engel et ai., 2001 ; W. J. Freeman,
2000; John, 2001; Liinas, 2001 ; Mesulam, 2000; Varela et ai., 2001).
45. A similar line of argument could be developed, we believe, for related conditions such
as coma and persistent vegetative state, during which NDEs have also occasionally been
reported. We focus here on general anesthesia and cardiac arrest only because the relevant
physiological conditions are relatively well characterized and the cases already numerous.
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-4l 7

John e t a ! . (2001) recently carried out a massive study intended specifi­

cally to identify reliable EEG correlates ofloss and recovery of consciousness
during general anesthesia. They analyzed 19-channel recordings obtained
from 176 surgical patients, using three common types of anesthesia regime
involving diverse mechanisms of action, and they sought to characterize
common properties of the EEG patterns associated with the main stages of
anesthesia. Their results first confirmed and extended what has long been
the main story about anesthesia and EEG, namely, that unconsciousness is
associated with a pronounced shift toward lower frequencies in the delta
and low theta range, with a more frontal distribution and higher power.
More significantly, they showed that gamma-type EEG rhythms lost power
and became decoupled across the brain when patients lost consciousness,
and that these changes were reversed with return of consciousness. The
whole pattern, as Baars points out in a commentary on the paper (Baars,
2001), is consistent with current neurophysiological theories of the global
workspace, and appears to reflect its complete disabling under conditions
of adequate anesthesia.
Additional results supportive of this conclusion derive from other recent
functional imaging studies that have looked at blood flow, glucose metabo­
lism, and other indicators of cerebral activity under conditions of general
anesthesia with agents including propofol, halothane, isoflurane, and deep
sedation with benzodiazapines such as midazolam (Alkire, 1 998; Alkire,
Haier, & Fallon, 2000; Fiset et a!., 1 999; Shulman, Hyder, & Rothman,
2003; Veselis et a!., 1 997; and N. S. White & Alkire, 2003), as well as related
conditions such as persistent vegetative states and coma (see Laureys et a!.,
2004, and the numerous references cited there). In these studies, brain areas
essential to the global workspace are consistently deactivated individually
and decoupled functionally in surgically adequate anesthesia and related
states of unconsciousness. Auditory and other stimuli are still able to acti­
vate their primary receiving areas in the cortex, since the sensory pathways
remain relatively unimpaired, but these stimuli are no longer able to ignite
the large-scale cooperative network interactions that normally accompany
conscious experience.

Cardiac Arrest

The situation is even more dramatic with regard to NDEs occurring

during cardiac arrest, many of which in fact occur also in conjunction with
major surgical procedures involving general anesthesia. As mentioned ear­
lier, there have been numerous reports of NDEs in connection with cardiac
arrest, and, like those that occur with general anesthesia, they include the
typical features associated with NDEs, most notably vivid or even enhanced
sensation and mentation. A typical case is that reported by MacMillan and
Brown (1971) of a cardiac arrest patient who prefaced his description of
an OBE and seeing a light by saying: "I do not have words to express how
418-Chapter 6

vivid the experience was. The main thing that stands out is the clarity of my
thoughts during the episode" (p. 889). Another typical comment was that of
a 6-year-old cardiac arrest victim who insisted that "it was realer than real"
(M. Morse, 1994a, p. 67).
Cardiac arrest, however, is a physiologically brutal event. Cerebral func­
tioning shuts down within a few seconds. Whether the heart actually stops
beating entirely or goes into ventricular fibrillation, the result is essentially
instantaneous circulatory arrest, with blood flow and oxygen uptake in the
brain plunging swiftly to near-zero levels. EEG signs of cerebral ischemia,
typically with global slowing and loss of fast activity, are visually detectable
within 6-10 seconds, and progress to isoelectricity (flat-line EEGs) within
10-20 seconds of the onset of arrest. In sum, full arrest leads rapidly to
establishment of three major clinical signs of death-absence of cardiac
output, absence of respiration, and absence of brainstem reflexes-and pro­
vides the best model we have of the dying process (DeVries, Bakker, Visser,
Diephuis, & van Huffelen, 1 998; Parnia & Fenwick, 2002; van Lommel et
aI., 200 1; Vriens, Bakker, DeVries, Wieneke, & van Huffelen, 1 996). Never­
theless, in five published studies alone, over 100 cases of NDEs occurring
under conditions of cardiac arrest have been reported (Greyson, 2003; Par­
nia et aI., 2001; Sabom, 1 982; Schwaninger et aI., 2002; van Lommel et aI.,
2001), and there are many more in other collections, including our own.
The case of Pam Reynolds, described earlier in this chapter, is a notable
example of an NDE that occurred under conditions involving both deep
general anesthesia and cardiac arrest of a particularly extreme form. As
pointed out in our earlier discussion, we do not know precisely when in
the surgical procedure Pam had her experience, other than to say that the
early parts of the experience, including the OBE, occurred when she was
not yet "brain dead" but already deeply anesthetized. Nonetheless, even if
we assume for the sake of discussion that her entire experience occurred
during these earlier stages of the procedure, brain activity even at that time
was inadequate to support organized mentation, according to current neu­
rophysiological doctrine.
How might scientists intent upon defending the conventional view
respond to the challenge presented by cases occurring under conditions like
these? First, it will undoubtedly be objected that even in the presence of a
flat-lined EEG there still could be undetected brain activity going on. Cur­
rent scalp-EEG technology detects only activity common to large popula­
tions of suitably oriented neurons, mainly in the cerebral cortex; and so
perhaps future improvements in technology will allow us to detect addi­
tional brain activity not visible to us at present. This objection may seem
to have some force, because both experimental and modeling studies show
that certain kinds of electrical events in the brain, such as highly localized
epileptic spikes, do not appear in scalp recordings (Pacia & Ebersole, 1 997).
Moreover, recordings carried out under conditions of general anesthesia
comparable to those used with Pam Reynolds provide direct evidence that
some residual electrical activity can appear subcortically or in the neigh-
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-419

borhood of the ventricles, even in combination with an essentially flat scalp

EEG (Karasawa et aI., 2001).
This first objection, however, completely misses the mark. The issue is
not whether there is brain activity ofany kind whatsoever, but whether there is
brain activity of the specific form regarded by contemporary neuroscience as
the necessary condition of conscious experience.46 Activity of this form is emi­
nently detectable by current EEG technology, and as we have already shown,
it is abolished both by adequate general anesthesia and by cardiac arrest. In
cardiac arrest, even neuronal action-potentials, the ultimate physical basis
for any possible coordination of neural activity between widely separated
brain regions, are rapidly abolished (van Lommel, 2006). Moreover, cells
in the hippocampus, the region thought to be essential for memory forma­
tion (see Chapter 4), are known to be especially vulnerable to the effects
of anoxia (Vriens et aI., 1996). In short, it is not credible to suppose that
N DEs occurring under conditions of adequate general anesthesia, let alone
cardiac arrest, can be accounted for in terms of some hypothetical residual
capacity of the brain to process and store complex information under those
conditions.
A somewhat more credible line of defense, perhaps, is to suggest that
the experiences do not occur when they appear to occur, during the actual
episodes of brain insult, but at a different time, perhaps just before or just
after the insult, when the brain is more or less normally functional. After
all, we do know that large amounts of vivid experience can occur in just a
few seconds, for example in conjunction with the fall of an alpine climber
(Heim, 189211 972). This suggestion too encounters serious problems, how­
ever. First, episodes of ordinary unconsciousness produced by physiologi­
cal events such as ventricular fibrillation or cardiac arrest characteristically
leave their subj ects amnesic and confusional for events immediately preced­
ing and following these episodes, the more so in proportion to their duration
and severity (Aminoff et aI., 1 988; Parnia & Fenwick, 2002; van Lommel et
aI., 2001). In addition, the confusional experiences occurring as a person
is losing or regaining consciousness never, to our knowledge, have the life­
transforming impact so characteristic of NDEs. Second, a substantial num­
ber of NDEs, like Pam Reynolds's, contain apparent time "anchors," in the
form of verifiable reports of events occurring during the period of insult
itself. For example, the cardiac-arrest victim described by van Lommel et
al. (2001) had been discovered lying in a meadow 30 minutes or more prior
to his arrival at the emergency room, comatose and cyanotic, and yet days
later, having recovered, he was able to describe accurately various circum­
stances occurring in conjunction with the ensuing resuscitation procedures
in the hospital.
We have observed two kinds of critical responses, totally divergent, to
verifiable time-anchor events of this sort. The first, favored by mainstream
critics, is essentially to deny that the reported events have occurred or that
they have any force. They are mere "anecdotes," without value as sci en-

46. Representative of people who have completely missed the mark here is Woerlee (2004).
420-Chapter 6

tific evidence. We will make only two comments regarding this attitude, in
relation to the entire body of evidence presently available. First, it is sci­
entifically inappropriate to approach each such "anecdote" in complete
isolation, as though it stands on its own as the only evidence in existence
for phenomena in which people have obtained information about situations
from which they were sensorially isolated. As stated in our Introduction and
documented in the Appendix, phenomena of this type are independently
known to exist; what is unusual here is only the specific circumstances of
their occurrence. Second, as emphasized especially by Bergson (1913) in
his Presidential Address to the SPR, many reports of veridical spontaneous
experiences (including those associated with NDEs) are not simply vague or
general statements but contain very specific details, and the correspondence
of these details with remote events must be recognized as highly unlikely
to have occurred by chance, even if we cannot compute their improbability
with any great exactitude.
The other critical response comes from persons who take the avail­
able veridical reports seriously, like ourselves, but interpret them differ­
ently. Their suggestion, essentially, is that the NDE is simply an imaginative
reconstruction, and one which can sometimes incorporate paranormally
derived information, obtained when the brain is fully functional, about
events occurring during the period of unconsciousness. We will again make
just two brief comments in response: First, this form of counter-explanation
will presumably provide little solace to mainstream critics, since it incorpo­
rates as an essential ingredient psi processes which are themselves equally
inconsistent with current mainstream views. Second, although this time­
displaced psi interpretation, like other "super-psi" hypotheses, cannot be
decisively refuted, it simply ignores, in our opinion, the essential core of
NDE phenomenology-that these intense and vivid experiences are sub­
jectively timed to the moment of the reported and verifiable events and are
remembered that way for years or decades afterwards. It would also need to
explain why the reports always follow, never precede, the events in question,
and why their subjects characteristically show little or no evidence of psi
capacities in any other context before the NDE.
Two further critical responses merit only still briefer mention. One is to
suggest that these supposedly verifiable NDEs are being inadvertently mis­
reported, whether by the subjects of the experiences themselves or by their
investigators. That is certainly always a possibility to be guarded against
in individual cases; but when this suggestion is used repeatedly and with­
out supporting evidence as a blanket defense against the entire body of evi­
dence, it should be recognized for what it is, which is simply an unwilling­
ness to examine that evidence in a truly scientific spirit. The same response
applies, but even more so, to any suggestion that the investigators of NDEs
are just making it all up. As the philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1882) pointed
out in his initial Presidential Address to the SPR in 1882: "We have done all
that we can when the critic has nothing left to allege except that the investi-
 Unusual Experiences Near Death and Related Phenomena-42l

gator is in the trick. But when he has nothing else left to allege he will allege
that" (p. 1 2).

Conclusion

In sum, the central challenge of NDEs lies in asking how these complex
states of consciousness, including vivid mentation, sensory perception, and
memory, can occur under conditions in which current neurophysiological
models of the production of mind by brain deem such states impossible.
This conflict between current neuroscientific orthodoxy and the occurrence
of NDEs under conditions of general anesthesia and/or cardiac arrest is
head-on, profound, and inescapable. In our opinion, no future scientific or
philosophic discussion of the mind-brain problem can be fully responsible,
intellectually, without taking these challenging data into account. We refer
readers back to the quotation from Myers with which we began this chapter,
and to the challenge that he issued over a century ago. Only when research­
ers approach the study of NDEs and their associated physiological condi­
tions with this question firmly in mind will we progress in our understanding
of NDEs beyond the sorts of ill-founded neuroscientific and psychological
speculations that abound in the contemporary literature. Similarly, how­
ever, only when neuroscientists and psychologists examine current models
of mind in light of NDEs and related phenomena such as those discussed in
this chapter will we progress in our understanding of consciousness and its
relation to brain.
 Chapter 7

Genius

Edward F. Kelly and Michael Grosso

In conformity with a rule which seems applicable to every science of obser­

vation . . . it is the exceptional phenomenon which is likely to explain the
usual one; and, consequently, whatever we can observe that has to do with
invention, is capable of throwing light on psychology i n general. (Had­
amard, 1 949, p. 1 36)

I think that a materialist definition of genius is impossible, which is why

the idea of genius is so discredited in an age like our own, where material­
ist ideologies predominate. (Bloom, 2002, p. 12)

In his beautiful memorial tribute to F. W. H. Myers, William James (1901)

endorsed Myers's broad vision of a scientific psychology, contrasting it with
the much narrower vision produced by a different type of scientific imag­
ination, the "classic-academic" type, which he describes in terms almost
equally applicable to present-day mainstream cognitive psychology:

The human mind, as it is figured in this literature, was largely an abstrac­

tion. Its normal adult traits were recognized. A sort of sunlit terrace was
exhibited on which it took its exercise. But where that terrace stopped, the
mind stopped; and there was nothing farther left to tell of in this kind of
philosophy but the brain and the other physical facts of nature. (p. 14)

Thanks to Myers and other "romantic improvers," however, "a mass of

mental phenomena are now seen in the shrubbery beyond the parapet," and

423
424-Chapter 7

"the world of mind is shown as something infinitely more complex than was
suspected" (p. 14). James explicitly characterizes Myers as the leader of this
expansionist movement: "Through him for the first time, psychologists are
in possession of their ful l material, and mental phenomena are set down in
an adequate inventory" (p. l 6). Moreover, Myers was more than just a prodi­
gious collector; he had shown a Darwin-like genius for organizing and coor­
dinating this mass of material in service of what James regarded as the first
serious scientific attempt to delineate the constitution of this transmarginal
or subliminal background of the mind. This problem-henceforward to be
known as "the problem of Myers "-"still awaits us as the problem of far the
deepest moment for our actual psychology, whether his own tentative solu­
tions of certain parts of it be correct or not" (p. 1 8).
Chapter 2 presented a general account of Myers's theory, but here we
will concentrate in much greater detail on just one of the empirical topics
that Myers himself dealt with explicitly-genius. This topic, we will argue,
provides another important arena within which Myers's views, when revis­
ited in light of the much larger body of relevant evidence available today,
can be recognized as preferable in a variety of ways to the alternatives that
mainstream psychological theory and research have so far provided.
Genius is obviously a topic of great human interest and significance,
to all of us as individuals and to civilization as a whole. It also seems self­
evident, as Wind's principle and our first epigraph suggest, that a cogni­
tive science capable of accommodating the fully-developed phenomena of
genius would be capable a fortiori of accommodating cognitive phenomena
in general. However, despite this seemingly crucial importance of genius as
a kind of benchmark and navigational aid for progress in scientific psychol­
ogy, its treatment to date for the most part reflects the general history of
20th-century psychology, as summarized in our Introduction, and has been
anything but satisfactory or illuminating.
In the first four decades following the rise of Watson's radical behavior­
ism, for example, the mainstream American psychological literature was
practically devoid of relevant studies. In his landmark Presidential Address
to the American Psychological Association J. P. Guilford ( 1950) reported
that only 186 of the roughly 1 2 1 ,000 entries in Psychological Abstracts up to
that date had addressed this vital topic. Guilford bemoaned this "appall­
ing" neglect, and his challenge provoked a modest increase in research
output which has continued and even slowly intensified up to the present.
Nevertheless, even now such research represents a relatively tiny and spe­
cialized sub-field of psychology. Moreover, by far the greatest proportion of
research to date has been carried out in the framework of Guilford's own
psychometric tradition, dating back to Galton and Binet, which revolves
mainly around measurement of "divergent thinking," "fluency," "flexibil­
ity," puzzle-solving behaviors, and the like, typically in student volunteers.
We do not wish to disparage unduly the modern research tradition, and
we hasten to add that it includes many other threads, such as the early work
of Gestalt psychologists on "insight," psychoanalytic investigations of "pri-
 Genius-425

mary process" thinking, and detailed studies of life history and personality
characteristics in demonstrably productive individuals, some of which we
will touch upon later.
For purposes of this introduction, however, the important bottom-line
fact is that even to many of its practitioners, not to mention outside observ­
ers such as ourselves, modern "creativity" research appears mired, overall,
in a rather dismal state. A number of the contributors to the recent Hand­
book of Creativity (R. 1. Sternberg, 1 999)-the explicit goal of which was
"to provide the most comprehensive, definitive, and authoritative single vol­
ume review available in the field"-candidly acknowledge this sorry state
of affairs, which also is fully apparent in the most current state-of-the-art
review consulted by us (Runco, 2004). In effect, we suggest, the study of
the real thing-"genius"-has largely degenerated in modern times into the
study of diluted cognates such as "creativity" or even "talent," which hap­
pen to be relatively accessible to the more "objective" means of investigation
currently favored by most investigators.
Myers consciously and deliberately took an approach targeted through­
out to genius in its fullest expressions-what "the highest minds have
bequeathed to us as the heritage of their highest hours" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 120).
We will show that by means of this approach, honoring Wind's principle,
Myers produced an account of genius which anticipates to a remarkable
degree most of what has been best in more recent work, while also accom­
modating various unusual phenomena, such as psychological automatisms
and secondary streams of consciousness, altered states of consciousness,
unusual forms of symbolic thinking, and psi, that are inescapably bound
up with this topic but scarcely touched upon in contemporary mainstream
accounts. His views also have been confirmed at various important points
by more recent empirical and theoretical investigations, and they have
important implications for the further evolution of scientific psychology
more generally.
To substantiate these claims we will present Myers's account of genius
in considerable detail, situating it as we proceed with respect to the main
relevant trends in more recent psychological research. Our presentation is
necessarily telegraphic and selective, for the existing literature on "creativ­
ity," though but a tiny proportion of the psychology literature as a whole,
harbors something upwards of 10,000 papers and books; our purpose is not
to survey this enormous literature comprehensively, but to advance and
defend a particular point of view.

Myers's Theory of Genius: General Features and Scope

Myers's chapter on genius in Human Personality is almost identical to his

earlier paper on this subject (Myers, l 892d). The chapter itself is conspicu­
ously atypical in form, in that it is very short and less densely empirical
426-Chapter 7

than its siblings, and lacks an appendix. Yet there can be no doubt that
it both illustrates and provides support for some of Myers's most central
and deeply-felt convictions regarding the subliminal realm and its role in
human mental life . His chapter on genius is itself a work of genius, so full
of bold and challenging observations and speculations that it will require
the balance of our present chapter and all of the next to do it reasonably
full justice.
Myers begins by setting forth the general character of his conception of
genius. In his previous chapter he had characterized hysteria as a disinte­
grative or "dissolutive" process involving loss of control of normally supra­
liminal elements of the personality. Genius for Myers presents the opposite
situation. Specifically, in genius an increased "strength and concentration of
the inward unifying control" (HP, vol. 1, p. 70) results in enhanced coordi­
nation and integration of the supraliminal and subliminal phases of person­
ality. In effect genius stands in relation to ordinary personality roughly as
ordinary personality itself stands in relation to hysteria. Genius represents
the evolution of personality toward a more ideal form of psychic function­
ing, and therefore toward a truer standard of "normality."
In taking this position Myers directly opposed a sizeable cadre of writ­
ers including Max Nordau, John Nisbet, and Cesare Lombroso, who at that
time were busily engaged in deflating "genius" by characterizing it as noth­
ing more than a form or manifestation of "degeneracy" or "madness" of one
or another supposedly well-understood type.'
Myers's basic response to this deflationary movement, then in full flood,
incisively encapsulates the main features of his own very different view (HP,
vol. 1 , p. 71):

On this point I shall join issue; and I shall suggest, on the other hand, that
Genius-if that vaguely used word is to receive anything like a psychologi­
cal definition-should rather be regarded as a power of utilising a wider
range than other men can utilise of faculties in some degree innate in all;­
a power of appropriating the results of subliminal mentation to subserve
the supraliminal stream of thought;-so that an "inspiration of Genius"
will be in truth a subliminal uprush, an emergence into the current of ideas
which the man is consciously manipulating of other ideas which he has
not consciously originated, but which have shaped themselves beyond his
will, in profounder regions of his being. I shall urge that there is here no
real departure from normality; no abnormality, at least in the sense of
degeneration; but rather a fulfilment of the true norm of man, with sug­
gestions, it may be, of something supernormal;-of something which tran-

I. A striking exception to this widely circulated degeneracy interpretation of genius is the

book by German psychiatrist William Hirsch (1896), translated anonymously into English by
lames's philosophical colleague C. S. Peirce. That lames himself held views similar to and
strongly influenced by those of Myers is apparent from his 1 896 Lowell Lectures, as recon­
structed by E. Taylor ( 1984).
 Genius-427

scends existing normality as an advanced stage of evolutionary progress

transcends an earlier stage.2

Note first Myers's insistence on a psychological definition of genius.

Some later investigators have focused instead primarily on its objective
manifestations, so that "genius" becomes an inference backwards from the
appearance of products that are regarded as useful or valuable or satisfying
by some audience at some point in time. In the work of Lange-Eichbaum
(1 932), representing this tendency of thought at its extreme, the personal­
ity of the genius essentially vanishes, the term "genius" implying only a
relation of approval between products of creative activity and the relevant
community of evaluators. The recently articulated "systems perspective" of
Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1996) and others similarly downplays the psycho­
logical dimensions of the subject in favor of cultural, social, and situational
factors.
Myers, however, deliberately takes the opposite tack. He first clearly
acknowledges that a work of genius conventionally satisfies two distinct
sorts of requirements: "It must involve something original, spontaneous,
unteachable, unexpected, and it must also win for itself in some way the
admiration of mankind" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 75). But he immediately makes clear
that his concern is with the first sort of criterion, which corresponds to a real
psychological class. As he puts it:

What the poet feels while he writes his poem i s a psychological fact in his
history; what his friends feel while they read it may be a psychological
fact in their history, but does not alter the poet's creative effort, which was
what it was, whether any one but himself ever reads his poem or no.

Thus for example Hartley Coleridge seemed to Myers to have manifested

the characteristic psychological marks of genius even though he never pro­
duced anything tangible that commanded wide attention.
Myers's central concern and goal, in sum, is to elucidate the psycho­
logical processes involved in undeniable manifestations of genius, and to
discern their broader implications for the theory of human personality. We
will present and discuss his more detailed arguments under these headings.

The Creative Process: A Descriptive Model

A traditional descriptive model of the creative process, based on the self­

observation and testimony of large numbers of variously eminent persons,
provides a useful organizing framework for this discussion. Credit for

2. E. Taylor (1984, pp. 162-163) uses this very passage-almost verbatim and without iden­
tifying it as Myers's-by way of characterizing Myers's theory of genius as the chief back­
ground for James's final Lowell Lecture.
428-Chapter 7

explicitly formulating this model is usually given to Graham Wallas (1926), a

political scientist and administrator primarily concerned with pedagogical
matters, but it was also formulated in nearly identical terms and in greater
detail by psychologist Eliot Dole Hutchinson ( 1 93 1 , 1 939). The model pos­
its four phases or stages that can often be discerned in high-level creative
effort: (1) preparation; (2) incubation; (3) illumination; and (4) verification.
Briefly, preparation refers primarily to the initial stages of intense volun­
tary effort on a particular work or problem (although it is sometimes gen­
eralized to include the typically lengthy period of time in which high-level
technical skills relevant to the task are laboriously acquired). If this initial
effort fails, the work or problem may temporarily be put aside in frustra­
tion, this being the stage of incubation or renunciation, in which conscious
effort seems to be largely or wholly absent. Something more than simple
rest or dissipation of inhibitions seems to be involved during the incubation
period, for then comes illumination, inspiration, or insight, in which radi­
cally new ideas intrude into consciousness, often suddenly, copiously, and
with strong accompanying affect. This leads to a further stage of voluntary
effort, verification, in which the new material may be evaluated, elaborated,
and worked into the structure of the evolving product.3
Only in rare cases can these "stages" accurately be pictured as unrolling
in a rigid sequence, or at a single level. Normally they go forward concur­
rently at multiple, overlapping, and recursively interacting levels in regard
to different elements of the total problem situation. The incubation and
inspiration stages, which form the psychological heart of the model, are not
invariably or necessarily discernible in individual episodes of creative activ­
ity, and even when recognizably present they can vary widely in duration,
character, and importance (Ghiselin, 1 952; Hutchinson, 1 9 3 1 , 1 939; Koes­
tler, 1 964; Wallas, 1 926).
A descriptive model of this general sort is accepted by nearly everyone
who has studied the subject of genius seriously. There is, however, a modern
"deflationary" tradition, exemplified by Weisberg (1986, 1 999) and Perkins
(198 1 , 2000), that we must comment upon at least briefly before proceeding.
This school wishes to deny that there is anything special or unusual about
the character of the mental processes occurring in genius-level creativity,
and in particular to deny that genius ever depends upon or utilizes any spe­
cial sort of "unconscious" work. Nothing more is involved, on this view,
than unusually tenacious, disciplined, and incremental application of cog­
nitive processes of the ordinary sort. Not surprisingly, this contrarian view
arises mainly in the context of laboratory studies of puzzle-solving behav­
iors and other sorts of on-demand "creativity," mostly in student volunteers.
The fact that the alleged phenomena of incubation and illumination cannot

3. Wallas identified the first three stages in an 1891 lecture by Helmholtz, on the occasion
of his 70th birthday, in which he described how his best scientific ideas had come to him, and
the fourth in the famous account by Poincare of some of his mathematical discoveries (see
Hadamard, 1 949, or Ghiselin, 1952). Hutch inson arrived at his formulation through study of
hundreds of accounts involving not only scientists and mathematicians but artists, musicians,
and Iiterateurs, mostly persons of lesser magnitude than Helmholtz and Poincare.
 Genius�429

readily and reliably be evoked under their preferred laboratory conditions

disposes such workers to conclude that the phenomena do not exist, or are
of only minor importance. Their existence and importance in any event can­
not be established by first-person testimony from any number of witnesses,
no matter how eminent, because such testimony is merely "anecdotal" and
always subject to corruption by well-known hazards such as limitations of
observation, failures of memory, motivated distortions in service of public
personae, and so on.
With all due respect, this "nothing-special" view of genius seems to
us a particularly egregious example of "methodolatry" (see Introduction),
coupled with willful disregard of an enormous and fundamentally coher­
ent mass of evidence deriving from persons especially well positioned and
qualified, generally speaking, to observe and report the phenomena of
greatest psychological interest. As Ghiselin ( 1952) remarks, " the fundamen­
tals . . . are all but inescapable" (p. 1 1). The unwillingness of many modern
literary scholars to confront genius in its full-blown phenomenological real­
ity has recently provoked Harold Bloom (2002) to castigate them as "cul­
tural levelers, quite immune from awe" (p. 7), and in our view that judgment
applies equally here. We also find it especially ironic, and revealing, that in
the end both Weisberg and Perkins are forced to acknowledge that even the
"ordinary" cognitive operations to which they aspire to reduce all mani­
festations of genius-operations such as remembering, recognizing, realiz­
ing, seeing-as, noticing, and reasoning-remain themselves at bottom (and
again in accordance with Wind's principle) unexplained. It is also ironic, of
course, that their repudiation of the possibility of unconscious mental work
in genius comes just as many other mainstream psychologists are re-admit­
ting such things in the form of the "cognitive unconscious." As in Chapter
5, the real issue before us therefore becomes that of the scope and character,
rather than the existence per se, of the mental activity that goes on behind
the scenes, outside the purview of ordinary waking consciousness.

Myers's Psychology of Creative Inspiration

Let us presume, then, that the Wallas/Hutchinson model is broadly cor­

rect, descriptively. Myers directs his analysis straight to the psychological
core of this model, to its most critical, mysterious, and controversial com­
ponent-specifically, to the phase of "illumination," or in his own more
theory-laden terminology, "subliminal uprush." Three main features of his
analysis-continuity, automatism, and incommensurability-will command
the bulk of our attention.
430-Chapter 7

Continuity

Myers emphasizes the fundamental continuity between the mental pro­

cesses at work in genius and those of more everyday character. He is a thor­
oughgoing naturalist, and for him genius is first and foremost an intensifica­
tion of phenomena already observable in germ in the central, supraliminal
part of the mental "spectrum" (Chapter 2), rather than some sort of super­
natural gift of faculty altogether new. Some degree of cooperation between
supraliminal and subliminal elements of personality, he points out,

is constantly occurring on a smaller scale in the inner life of most of us.

We identify ourselves for the most part with a stream of voluntary, fully
conscious ideas,-cerebral movements connected and purposive as the
movements of the hand which records them. Meantime we are aware also
of a substratum of fragmentary, automatic, liminal ideas, of which we take
small account. These are bubbles that break on the surface; but every now
and then there is a stir among them. There is a rush upwards as of a sub­
aqueous spring; an inspiration flashes into the mind for which our con­
scious effort has not prepared us. This so-called inspiration may in itself
be trivial or worthless; but it is the initial stage of a phenomenon to which,
when certain rare attributes are also present, the name of genius will natu­
rally be given. (HP, vol. I, p. 77)

As described in Chapter 2, Myers conceives of the subliminal as being

in all of us restrained or released in accord with dynamic adjustments in the
level of some sort of "threshold"-or in the permeability of a membrane or
"diaphragm"-which regulates its supraliminal expression. In most of us
this dynamic process is evidenced by occurrences such as nocturnal dreams
and the mild dissociative fluctuations, such as daydreams and hypnagogic
states, that mark daily life. In genius, however, these dynamic adjustments
are somehow amplified, providing correspondingly greater supraliminal
access to products or elements of subliminal mentation.
Not all such products are of equal value, however, for "hidden in the
deep of our being is a rubbish-heap as well as a treasure-house" (HP, vol. 1 ,
p. 72). Myers takes pains to guard against any naive o r unchecked romanti­
cism:

I shall be obliged in this chapter to dwell on valuable aid rendered by sub­

liminal mentation; but I do not mean to imply that such mentation is ipso
facto superior to supraliminal, or even that it covers a large proportion
of practically useful human achievement. When I say "The differentia of
genius lies in an increased control over subliminal mentation," I express,
I think, a well-evidenced thesis, and I suggest an important inference,
namely, that the man of genius is for us the best type of the normal man, in
so far as he effects a successful co-operation of an unusually large number
of elements of his personality-reaching a stage of integration slightly in
advance of our own. This much I wish to say: but my thesis is not to be
pushed further:-as though I claimed that all our best thought was sub-
 Genius-431

liminal, or that all that was subliminal was potentially "inspiration." (HP,
vol. 1 , p. 72)

For Myers the subliminal realm has a complex hierarchical organiza­

tion marked by successively higher levels of integration, each with its own
characteristic functional properties or "adits and operations." In deliber­
ate analogy with Hughlings Jackson's evolutionary model of hierarchical
organization in the human nervous system (see our Chapter 2), Myers pic­
tures the subliminal tentatively and broadly as comprising three such levels:
The lowest involves the "minimal psychic concomitant, whatever that may
be" (HP, vol. I, p. 74), of bare vegetative functions of the sort governed by
Jackson's lowest-level physiological centers, as well as mechanical effects
due to habit, adaptation, stimulus inputs that escape conscious detection,
and the like. A middle region, the "hypnotic stratum," is associated with
automatisms such as the dissociative phenomena of hysteria and deep hyp­
nosis, but it also supplies the content of ordinary dreaming, daydreaming,
and imagining and is the source of the "mythopceic" function, an incessant
"strange manufacture of inward romances" (HP, vol. 2, p. 130).4 The deepest
region is the least known and hardest to describe, but is above all the locus
of various forms of supernormal contact with the outside world, including
both psi phenomena and the intuitions and inspirations of genius.
These "strata" are not to be conceived in quasi-geological fashion as if
they are static, immobile, or rigidly separated by impassable barriers: "They
are strata (so to say) not of immovable rock, but of imperfectly miscible flu­
ids of various densities, and subject to currents and ebullitions which often
bring to the surface a stream or bubble from a stratum far below" (Myers,
1 892b, p. 307). Thus, although the metaphor of "depth" used by Myers and
other theoreticians of the subliminal almost inevitably suggests an essen­
tially "geographical" interpretation, for Myers its principal connotations
are meant to be functional rather than spatial. Within this basic functional
scheme, engagement of the "deepest" strata of subliminal activity is specifi­
cally associated for Myers with those profoundest inspirations of genius in
which the Self or Individuality comes closest to full and harmonious mani­
festation of its capabilities, including its supernormal capabilities (HP, vol.
I , p. 73).
Inspirations of genius in general involve successful appeal to the deeper
subliminal levels, with success being due to some combination of intensity
in the appeal itself (via the preparatory labor) and a favorable psychological
constitution (traits) or conditions (states) that provide an unusual "perme­
ability" or openness to the subliminal. Myers's views here are very similar
to those of later observers such as Wallas (1 926), Hutchinson (193 1 , 1939),
Ghiselin (1952), and Kubie ( 1958), among many others. Hutchinson (1939),

4. Ellenberger ( 1 970, pp. 150, 314-318) specifically credits this term and concept to Myers
(although he uses the alternate spelling "mythopretic") and laments its general neglect by sub­
sequent workers in dynamic psychiatry. A major exception is Myers's colleague and admirer
the Swiss psychologist Flournoy, whose studies of the medium Helene Smith we will come to
shortly.
432-Chapter 7

for example, comments that the characteristic phenomenology of illumi­

nation is most pronounced in connection with cases of especially brilliant
insight, "where the degree of difficulty and frustration is great and the drive
toward accomplishment persistently strong" (p. 232). Myers also emphasizes
that the phenomenology intensifies in proportion to "depth." He focuses in
particular on two further psychological characteristics of creative inspira­
tion, both of which flow from, and support, his broader theoretical picture.

Automatism

Myers holds that the subliminal uprushes of genius belong to the more
general category of psychological automatisms (see our Chapter 5) and
therefore are inevitably associated not only with automatism itself but with
related phenomena such as mediumistic trance and kindred altered states of
consciousness. He develops this picture, characteristically, in stages.

Calculating Prodigies
Myers turns first to a discussion of "calculating boys," who for him
illustrate the essential psychological workings of higher forms of genius in a
usefully "diagrammatic," verifiable, and semi-quantitative form. 5 The scant
information then available in regard to some 1 5 such cases either previously
published or known to him personally was sufficient to reveal the affinity
of this "computative gift" to other phenomena of subliminal origin, such
as hallucinations, rather than to products of ordinary voluntary effort. For
example, despite its seemingly necessary connections with more general
mathematical knowledge and insight, it is distributed almost at random,
appearing among persons of ordinary or even extremely low intelligence as
well as in mathematical geniuses such as Gauss and Ampere. It also has a
"critical-period" aspect, tending to appear and disappear suddenly in child­
hood, and if it disappears without being integrated into the general pattern
of voluntary skills, it usually leaves behind no memory whatsoever of the
processes involved. Most significantly, perhaps, among the dull prodigies it
usually operates in the apparent absence of steady conscious effort, or even
while the calculator is consciously occupied with other matters. The answer
simply appears, usually though not always visually, all at once and with no
trace of the steps or processes that led to it. Indeed, the calculator may not
even be able to grasp the elementary arithmetical operations that an ordi-

5. See also our Chapter I. Myers states clearly that he would rather have used illustrations
drawn from higher mathematics, were sufficient data available, and he appeals to mathemati­
cians for accounts of the mental processes accompanying attainment of their highest results
(HP, vol. I, pp. 78-79). This may have precipitated a subsequent survey of mathematicians
carried out by Claparede and Flournoy, which in turn stimulated the famous account by
Poincare in 1904 of his inventive processes (see Hadamard, 1 949, pp. 10-1 1). Hadamard's own
book answers Myers's appeal more definitively, combining Poincare's account with a substan­
tial number of others, and strikingly confirms Myers's general outlook.
 Genius�433

nary person would use to solve, much more laboriously, the same problem.
Myers also noted that there was a possible hint of special involvement of the
right hemisphere in these phenomena, inasmuch as the two cases for which
relevant information was available showed a pronounced tendency toward
ambidexterity.
Myers's observations on prodigious but retarded calculators such as
Dase and Fuller have been sustained and generalized in the subsequent
century, primarily through further study of what is now called the "savant
syndrome," in which islands of considerable or sometimes spectacular abil­
ity appear in the midst of otherwise generalized and profound disability.
A particularly valuable survey is that of Treffert ( 1989), who estimates that
something like 100 such "prodigious" cases of the sort that interested Myers
have so far been reported, of whom roughly one or two dozen, including
"the twins" of Sacks (1987), are currently living. In addition to prodigious
calculators, there have been prodigious mechanical, artistic, and especially
musical savants, all of whom characteristically display narrow but deep
attention coupled with extraordinary memory.6 Treffert speculatively links
the savant syndrome to hypothetical abnormalities in development and func­
tional organization of memory and attentional systems in the savant brain,
and sensibly calls for anatomical and functional imaging studies (which to
our knowledge are just getting underway in earnest) to investigate these.
But in the end, echoing Penfield ( 1975), he acknowledges misgivings as to
whether the brain alone can provide the full answer. Both Treffert and Sacks
are skilled and caring clinicians with long and first-hand experience of the
savant syndrome, and both remain-appropriately, in our opinion-openly
awed by it. They also share with Myers a recognition of its deep connections
with the mystery of genius.

"Organic" Senses
Myers next presses on to consider more briefly some further instances
of apparent subliminal cooperation, instances which share with arithme­
tic calculation the properties of definiteness and verifiability of result, but
which involve sensory phenomena of various sorts. His first examples con­
cern "perceptions of a less specialized kind which underlie our more elabo­
rate modes of cognizing the world around us"-specifically the sense of the
passage of time, and the sense of weight or muscular resistance, which rank

6. Various other kinds of supernormal abilities have also been reported in such individuals.
For example, when Sacks accidentally dropped a large box of matches on the floor, both twins
instantly perceived that there were I I I matches in all, and that this number is the product
of the prime numbers 37 and 3. According to Scripture ( 1 89 1 , pp. 20, 39-40), this unusual
capacity for immediate perceptual grasping of numerosity ("subitizing") is universal among
calculating prodigies. Dase, for example, could instantly determine the number of sheep in
a herd, or of books in a book-case, or of window-panes on the side of a large house. Yet for
most of us such judgments remain accurate only to something at best on the order of the
usual 7 ± 2 items (Mandler & Shebo, 1982; G. A. Miller, 1956). Rimland ( 1978, and personal
communication, November, 1 978) has also reported finding in his survey of savant-type skills
in early infantile autism a few cases in which recurrent spontaneous psi phenomena were
conspicuously present.
434-Chapter 7

"among the profoundest elements in our organic being" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 85).
He cites several cases, drawn mainly from "a sane and waking person" whose
acquaintance he had made, in which correct knowledge of some objective
state of affairs such as the time of day, or the weight of an animal hide,
had appeared spontaneously and in quasi-hallucinatory form, in advance
of verification and accompanied by a strong sense of conviction. Myers sug­
gests that such occurrences are best explained as the result of some sort of
subliminal calculation, analogous to those of arithmetical prodigies, rather
than to any sort of direct or supernormal knowledge.
Hypnotism provides many further analogies to the process of sub­
liminal uprush in genius, as Myers ( l 898b) had himself argued earlier in
an address to the British Medical Association. When a deeply hypnotized
girl produces the suggested hallucination of a black cat, for example, she
reveals a degree of creativity comparable to that of her dreams but normally
unavailable to her waking consciousness. Thus, comments Myers, "as the
Sistine Madonna was to Raphael, so to the hypnotized girl is the delusive
cat." Additional examples are provided by successful posthypnotic sugges­
tions, in which the suggested thoughts or actions emerge into consciousness
or behavior, suddenly and involuntarily, upon the appearance of a prespeci­
fied but consciously forgotten cue. Of special interest among these in the
present connection are cases in which the "cue" consists in the passage of
a specified amount of time. Careful work by Myers's colleagues Gurney,
Delboeuf, and especially Bramwell had shown that in deeply hypnotizable
subjects this sense of the passage of time can sometimes reach astonishing
levels of precision, with errors on the order of one part in 2000 or better
over intervals of many thousands of minutes.7 McDougall (191 111961, pp.
353-354) comments favorably on this work, and mentions in a footnote that
he had himself encountered the same phenomenon-interestingly enough,
in a highly hypnotizable subject who had also proven capable of producing
blisters and extravasation of blood from the skin. McDougall further points
out that this phenomenon poses a severe challenge to any attempted expla­
nation based on unconscious monitoring of physiological rhythms, because
"we know of no bodily rhythm sufficiently constant to serve as the basis of
so accurate an appreciation of duration as would have enabled the subject
to carry out the suggestion with the high degree of accuracy shown" (p.
353). To our limited knowledge of research on biorhythms, this argument
remains valid today, but little further work, unfortunately, appears to have
been carried out along these lines.8

7. Myers gives a condensed account of this work in his chapter on hypnotism (HP, vol. I,
pp. 194-195, plus supporting appendices), but a much fuller account, including descriptions
of the precautions against various potential sources of error, appears in Bramwell (1903, pp.
1 14-139).
8. There may also be an "absolute" time-sense, analogous to the well-known sense of abso­
lute or perfect pitch which is common in the musically gifted (though neither necessary nor
sufficient for high achievement) and apparently universal among musical savants (Treffert,
1 989). One of us (EFK), as a teenager, was briefly acquainted with a younger boy, in other
respects ordinary, who always somehow "knew," with startlingly small error, what time it
 Genius�435

Hallucinatory Syndromes
Myers turns next to Sir John Herschel, the former royal astronomer,
for an example of subliminal products of visual type. Herschel, it turns out,
was subject to vivid and kaleidoscopic visual imagery of a highly regular
and geometric sort. This imagery occurred involuntarily, usually when he
was lying awake in darkness (though twice in broad daylight and twice also
in conjunction with chloroform anesthesia for minor surgeries), and was
not accompanied by illness or discomfort. Herschel himself had interpreted
these hallucinatory phenomena as providing "evidence of a thought, an
intelligence, working within our own organization distinct from that of our
own personality" (HP, vol. 1, p. 88). Myers agreed, viewing them as expres­
sions of an "indwelling general perceptive power" which we all have, and
credited Herschel with having thus originated at least in germ his own more
comprehensive theory of subliminal consciousness.
Contemporary research on hallucinatory syndromes lends support
to Myers's conception, although the situation now looks more complex
and interesting. To begin, Herschel himself can now be recognized as a
migraineur, one of the roughly 1% of the total population who experience
migraine aura without accompanying headache (Sacks, 1 999, chap. 17;
Wilkinson, 2004). Second, "geometrical spectres" like those of his migraine
aura are now known to occur under a wide variety of additional circum­
stances including in particular "hypnagogic" or "twilight" states at sleep
onset and offset, the intoxications produced by various hallucinogenic sub­
stances such as mescaline and LSD, psychotic breakdowns, fever-induced
delirium, stroboscopic visual stimulation at critical frequencies, and sen­
sory deprivation (Kluver, 1 966; Sacks, 1 999; Siegel, 1 977).
The most primitive or elementary forms of such activity typically
involve single or multiple points or spots of light, possibly colored, that may
organize progressively into a variety of characteristic and simple geome­
tries. Drawing mainly upon his own studies with mescaline, Kluver (1 966,
p. 66) identified the principal building blocks, or "hallucinatory form con­
stants," from which more complicated imagery might subsequently evolve.
In his original analysis these were just four in number: (1) gratings, lattices,
fretworks, filigrees, honeycombs, or chessboards; (2) cobwebs; (3) tunnels,
funnels, alleys, cones, or vessels; and (4) spirals.9
The central impulse of mainstream reductionist science, exemplified
with particular clarity in the cases of migraine aura (Sacks, 1 999; Wilkin­
son, 2004) and hypnagogic imagery (Mavromatis, 1 987; D. Schacter, 1976),
has always been to "explain" these recurrent formal characteristics of visual
hallucinatory experience as direct expressions in consciousness of events,

was. Treffert (1 989, pp. 97-98) describes two similar cases, one involving "Ellen," a blind
musical savant who also displayed spontaneous ESP abilities.
9. Kliiver himself was not entirely clear or consistent about this classification, which seems
to us somewhat arbitrary, and Siegel ( 1977) and colleagues, working mainly with psychoac­
tive drugs, subsequently identified additional/arm constants as well as a variety of color and
movement constants. These details need not concern us here, however.
436-Chapter 7

structures, or processes within the visual pathway. Early accounts of hyp­

nagogia, for example, were relentlessly "peripheralist," and sought to trace
most if not all of the reported phenomenology to "entoptic" sources-that
is, to events or structures within the eye itself. Although such sources cer­
tainly do play some role in the formation of hypnagogic imagery, presumably
by triggering or supplying raw materials for some more central constructive
process, few if any now take seriously the notion that hypnagogic imagery,
even in its most elementary forms, is in effect generated within the eye.
This general discussion has recently reached a more interesting stage in
the context of the migraine aura. The core phenomenology of the aura con­
sists of parallel groups of extremely bright, jagged, scintillating lines, some­
times bounding closed regions described as "fortifications" that expand and
move with increasing speed toward the edge of the visual field in a highly
stereotypical manner, usually with a region of "scotoma" or temporary
blindness trailing behind.lO Early thinking emphasized "static" properties
of the aura, viewing it essentially as a kind of phenomenological photo­
graph of the microanatomy of visual cortex, but Lashley (1941), himself a
migraineur, introduced the currently dominant "dynamic" view: Specifi­
cally, careful comparisons between the evolution of his own aura phenom­
enology and the known geometry and organization of primary visual cortex
led him to hypothesize that the aura results from a traveling wave of neu­
ral excitation/depression moving through the cortex at a constant rate of
about 3 mm/minute. More generally, the modern idea is that the dynamics
of migraine aura phenomenology are to be explained entirely in terms of
time-dependent interactions between a spreading-depression process and
the functional architecture of visual cortex. Thus for example the phenom­
enology of jagged boundaries, with short line segments joining at sharp
angles, is thought to reflect the classic HubellWiesel architecture of feature
detectors, orientation columns, and the like in primary visual cortex (Sacks,
1999; Wilkinson, 2004).
In recent years Lashley's converging-operations approach has been
enriched by the advent of functional neuroimaging and computer model­
ing methods, both of which have provided additional support for a spread­
ing-wave model (Bressloff, Cowan, Golubitsky, Thomas, & Wiener, 2001 ;
Dahlem, Engelmann, Lowel, & Miiller, 2000; Hadjikhani et ai., 2001). That
some sort of abnormal pattern of physiological activation is present in visual
cortex during migraine aura is now widely accepted, although details of the
abnormality and its pathophysiological origins remain to be elucidated.
Much less certain, however, is the precise role of this abnormal activ­
ity pattern in production of the conscious experience of aura. There are
undoubtedly some who, like the early "entoptic" theorists of hypnagogia,
imagine visual experience in general to be directly generated by or isomor­
phic with activity in the visual pathway itself, but we now know that the
reality is more complicated. Under normal circumstances, activity in visual
cortical areas is in general necessary but not sufficient for the correspond-

10. For further details see Sacks (1999) and Wilkinson (2004).
 Genius-437

ing elements of conscious visual experience (e.g., Dehaene & Naccache,

200 1; Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). Something further
upstream must interpret or take account of the input-driven activity pat­
tern, which thus initiates, constrains, and guides, but does not fully deter­
mine, the conscious experience.
Several further considerations point in the same direction. It may
be doubted, for example-and indeed Sacks ( 1999, p. 289) himself does
doubt- whether the standard traveling-wave model really can account in
detail for the full-blown phenomenology of the aura. The strain becomes
particularly evident as soon as one goes beyond the abstract notion of form
constants or other carefully selected aura properties such as the size and
speed of motion of "fortifications." Kluver had noted that his form con­
stants are not restricted to the visual modality, and must therefore have a
more central origin. Thus for example one can experience a cobweb on one's
tongue, or feel one's legs turning into a spiral. Kluver pointed out a number
of further properties of hallucinatory experience, moreover, and he himself
acknowledged that these more complex phenomena are invariably of far
greater salience and impressiveness to the subjects of such experience.
The elementary structures identified as visual form constants, for
example, are typically elaborated into ever more complex patterns by an
endless and dynamic geometrization, with the elementary forms repeating
themselves indefinitely at mUltiple spatial scales. The boundaries of forms
are often other forms. There may be microscopic clarity of detail, with lines
almost vanishingly thin, and a kaleidoscopic play of color, brightness, and
movement in the evolving structures. Colors themselves may be unnaturally
bright, rich, and textured. These visions sometimes can be viewed with the
eyes open, in which case they may superimpose upon, alter, or even replace
the visual scene itself, in part or in whole, and they often change dramati­
cally in response to tactile or auditory stimuli. Particularly in cases other
than migraine aura, the hallucinatory process may generate full-blown
dreamlike scenes or stories, sometimes involving additional sensory modal­
ities and incorporating locations, events, or persons long forgotten (Siegel,
1977). As in dreams themselves, this imaginative activity is truly creative
and goes far beyond simple literal reproduction of past experience. For
example one may observe oneself carrying out novel activities of various
sorts, or observe familiar scenes from unfamiliar perspectives.11
In short, in migraine aura as well as the other circumstances in which
hallucinatory activity appears, some process is triggered or released which

I I . Sacks's own worries remain at the level of Kliiver's form-constants, and he seeks to
ameliorate them by appealing to the modern vogue of non-linear dynamic systems, conceived
as operating within the visual system itself to produce more global forms of self-organized
activity that are not so closely tied to the hard-wired cortical architecture and thus might
capture the required properties. This approach barely begins to address the real complexities
of the problem, as indicated in the text, and even on its own narrower terms the simulation
results provided by Sacks are hardly very encouraging. The results of Bressloff et al. (2001)
are far more impressive, and yet these authors explicitly acknowledge various limitations of
their model.
438-Chapter 7

under varying degrees of voluntary control and in service of its ongoing

construction of phenomenological reality can utilize, reinterpret, or even
ignore (as in negative hallucinations) patterns of neural activity appearing
in visual cortex.
Further support for such a view derives from recent investigations of
another hallucinatory syndrome, the Charles Bonnet syndrome (Schultz &
Melzack, 1991). This syndrome (CBS) occurs primarily in otherwise normal
elderly persons, in conjunction with loss of vision due to conditions such
as cataracts, glaucoma, or macular degeneration. Under such conditions,
up to 30% of patients report experiencing complex and involuntary visual
hallucinations while otherwise fully and normally conscious. The real inci­
dence may be substantially higher, since patients are understandably chary
of reporting bizarre experiences to medical personnel. These hallucina­
tions typically appear to their subjects as occupying external space, with
visual quality higher than that of their residual vision. The precipitating
circumstance, in this as in other sensory-deprivation syndromes including
dreaming, is not so much the presence of an abnormal activity pattern (as in
migraine aura) as the absence of normal input-driven ones.
The especially interesting finding from recent EEG and fMRI imaging
studies is that the self-reported phenomenology of hallucinations in CBS
patients correlates with increased activation in the corresponding, func­
tionally specialized subregions of (ventral) visual cortex (ffytche, Howard,
Brammer, David, & Williams 1 998; Santhouse, Howard, & ffytche, 2000).
Thus for example if patients hallucinated in color, increased activation was
found in the color area (V4). This finding is early and tentative, but if cor­
rect it poses problems for a conventional causal account. Clearly, some sort
of subliminal process must be organizing and driving these complex, wide­
spread, and coordinated activation patterns, because they cannot plausibly
be expected to arise by chance from the spontaneous background activity
of the input-deprived visual cortex itself. Analogous though less clear-cut
activation patterns are found in the case of voluntary imagery, when subjects
deliberately attempt to visualize some pre-specified state of affairs (Koss­
Iyn, 1 994), but in CBS, as in dreams and waking apparitions, the imagery is
completely unexpected, surprising, and involuntary. Might this not reflect
the operation of something very like Myers's subliminal consciousness,
establishing appropriate patterns of brain activity in the process of deliver­
ing its products to the supraliminal consciousness? Such a model might also
explain the further result of ffytche et al. (1998), unexpected by them, that
their fMRI signals arose before emergence of the corresponding qualitative
features into subjects' hallucinatory experiences.
A conventional global-workspace theorist might respond by agreeing
that a subliminally formed template or plan of some sort drives the hal­
lucinatory process, while insisting that it be unconscious and inhabit some
other part of the brain. This move, however, would not accommodate at
least two additional lines of evidence that support a more Myers-like view.
First, as already pointed out in Chapter 5, psychological automatisms in
 Genius-439

the form of involuntary visual imagery and hallucinatory states such as

dreaming are known in general to be especially fruitful sources of strong
psi effects, showing that the hallucinatory process has access to informa­
tion beyond the reach of the brain itself. A direct connection to CBS can
be made by way of Gurney et al. (1886, vol . 1 , pp. 389-456), who discussed
the hypnagogic state at length, noting that the number of veridical appa­
ritions occurring under these conditions in their sample of 701 spontane­
ous cases was far higher than would be expected from the sheer proportion
of time we humans pass in such states. The fertility of their analysis has
been abundantly confirmed in subsequent work, including later studies of
spontaneous cases (Sherwood, 2002) and contemporary experimental stud­
ies using the "Ganzfeld" sensory-deprivation technique and other means of
inducing hypnagogic-like states.12 Given this background, in fact, we will
venture two further predictions in relation to CBS itself: First, inasmuch as
CBS amounts to a long-term though partial Ganzfeld condition, we expect
that sympathetic and open-minded investigation will reveal it to be a fertile
source of spontaneous psi effects as well, potentially adaptable for experi­
mental purposes. Second, just as "shell-hearing," like crystal-gazing or
"scrying," can elicit psi-conducive forms of hallucinatory activity in normal
persons (E. F. Kelly & Locke, 198Ia), there ought to be an auditory analog
of CBS with similarly psi-conducive properties.
The second line of evidence is of course that developed in detail in our
previous chapter. To recapitulate, we showed there that full-blown or even
abnormally heightened conscious awareness can occur under conditions of
general anesthesia and/or cardiac arrest, conditions in which the specific
neurophysiological mechanisms believed by current mainstream neurosci­
ence to be necessary for consciousness have been rendered inoperative. This
argument, if correct, shows even more clearly than the argument from psi
phenomena that the roots of the hallucinatory process-Myers's "indwell­
ing general perceptive power"-lie outside the material brain as convention­
ally understood.
In summary of this section on hallucinatory syndromes, Herschel and
Myers now appear to have been rather too hasty in thinking that Herschel's
"geometrical spectres" provided a direct, unmediated window into the
operations of the subliminal mind, but in the end they may have been more
right than wrong. This topic occupies just over a page in Myers's own chap­
ter, and it is not particularly essential to his main argument since he could
certainly have employed other relevant examples such as post-hypnotic
visual hallucinations. We have dwelt upon it at length, however, because
these recent empirical developments have more clearly exposed and sub-

12. The success rate of the Ganzfeld might actually prove much higher, we surmise, ifatten­
tion were confined more narrowly to those subjects and conditions that produce altered states
of consciousness with hypnagogic-like, vivid, and autonomous visual imagery, as contrasted
with more ordinary forms of free-associative thought. Much of what goes on under conven­
tional short-term Ganzfeld conditions is almost certainly of the latter type, as indicated both
by the character of typical mentation reports and by the EEG studies of Wackermann, Piitz,
Biichi, Strauch, and Lehmann (2002). See also Alvarado (1998).
440-Chapter 7

stantiated the deep connections among the various forms of hallucinatory

activity, and their compatibility with Myers's conception of a fundamen­
tal subliminal power or faculty of imagination that enters into the highest
expressions of geniusY

Automatisms in Genius
Myers turns next to his main topic, the natural history of inspiration
itself-"the records, namely, left by eminent men as to the element of sub­
conscious mentation, which was involved in their best work" (HP, vol. I, p.
89). We will recapitulate the main threads of his exposition, departing for
reasons of expository convenience from strictly textual order and emphasiz­
ing points of special theoretical significance to Myers. As we proceed, we
will also attempt to show how his overall picture of genius has been cor­
roborated and extended through various lines of subsequent research and
scholarship.
Myers begins by briefly quoting 10 typical illustrations of the auto­
matic character of inspiration, selecting these from a much larger number
of records obtained by Paul Chabaneix, a French physician, through direct
inquiry with eminent contemporary artists, philosophers, and writers. Two
points are immediately noteworthy here: First, Myers explicitly declined to
make use of similar material that had been collected on a much larger scale,
but in a far less disciplined manner, by von Hartmann in his then-popular
book, Philosophy of the Unconscious, a work which Myers bluntly charac­
terizes as "to me especially distasteful, as containing what seems to me the
loose and extravagant parody of important truth" (HP, vol. 1, p. 89). Sec­
ond, and more importantly, the basic phenomenological picture that Myers
seeks to convey here has been confirmed and amplified in many subsequent
collections.'4
Ghiselin's introductory essay provides a particularly thoughtful,
insightful, and concise descriptive account of the creative process, based
on first-person reports of creative activity in a wide variety of fields. His
account is also highly consistent with Myers's as far as it goes, though lack­
ing Myers's more richly elaborated conception of subliminal operations,
and was arrived at independently, making the confirmation of Myers's gen­
eral outlook even more striking. In regard to automatism, Ghiselin (1952)
could hardly be more definite:

[There is] a sense of self-surrender to an inward necessity i nherent in

something larger than the ego and taking precedence over the established
order. . . . Production by a process of purely conscious calculation seems

13. Our conception of this cosmogonic, world-generating, or virtual-reality system has

much i n common with that of Brann (1991), who provides a systematic exposition and defense
of the thesis that an imaginative capacity of this sort constitutes a fundamental and neglected
dispositional property of the mind.
14. See, in addition to those of Wallas ( 1 926) and Hutchinson (1931, 1939), valuable works
by Abrams (1958), Bowra (1949, 1955), Ghiselin ( 1952), Hadamard ( 1949), Harding (1948),
Koestler (1964), Kubie (1958), and Prescott (1922).
 Genius�441

never to occur. . . . More or less of such automatism is reported by nearly

every worker who has much to say about his processes, and no creative
process has been demonstrated to be wholly free from it. (pp. 1 5-16)

Inspiration is essentially the intrusion into supraliminal consciousness

of some novel form of order that has gestated somewhere beyond its custom­
ary margins. The content of such inspirations can vary widely in character,
scope, and completeness, but psychologically the process is fundamentally
the same throughout its range. The novelty appears

sometimes in the form of a mere glimpse serving as a clue, or like a germ

to be developed; sometimes a fragment of the whole, whether rudimen­
tary and requiring to be worked into shape or already in its final form;
sometimes essentially complete, though needing expansion, verification,
or the like. Spontaneous appearance of inventions very fully formed is not
extremely rare, but it is by no means ordinary. Spontaneity is common, but
what is given is usually far from complete. (p. 1 5)

Thus for Ghiselin as for Myers the essence of genius is unusually effec­
tive cooperation between supraliminal and subliminal elements of the per­
sonality. Neither is sufficient by itself to support the highest forms of creative
achievement. Skilled and persistent voluntary effort is almost invariably
necessary, both to initiate and shape the subliminal work and to evaluate
its products, the materials delivered to waking consciousness in moments of
inspiration. But persons of genius throughout history have testified consis­
tently that such moments were the characteristic and essential accompani­
ment of their best work.
These moments often reach extreme levels of phenomenological impres­
siveness. Material may suddenly appear that is surprising, unfamiliar, even
strange, flowing with extraordinary ease and copiousness, accompanied
by intense affect and excitement, and in the absence of any feeling of per­
sonal responsibility for what comes. Many examples of such events can be
found in the sources cited above, and we need not repeat them in profusion
here, but it is precisely in light of such extreme and unusual manifestations
that Myers seeks to establish the fundamental kinship between subliminal
uprushes of genius and other forms of psychological automatism.
Sleep and dreams provide a first sort of example, relatively close to ordi­
nary experience. Myers pictures the genius as successfully coordinating the
waking and sleeping phases of his existence: "He is carrying into sleep the
knowledge and the purpose of waking hours;-and he is carrying back into
waking hours again the benefit of those profound assimilations which are
the privilege of sleep" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 90). Robert Louis Stevenson provides
the chief example here: In his well-known chapter on dreams in Across the
Plains, Stevenson describes how he progressively harnessed his abundant
dream-life in service of his writing. His "Brownies," the "little people" who
manage his internal theater,
442-Chapter 7

are near connections of the dreamer's, beyond doubt; they share in his
financial worries and have an eye to the bank-book; they share plainly
i n his training; . . . they have plainly learned like him to build the scheme
of a considerate story and to arrange emotion in progressive order; only
I think they have more talent; and one thing is beyond doubt;-they can
tell him a story piece by piece, like a serial, and keep him all the while in
ignorance of where they aim. (HP, vol. 1, p. 91)

The Brownies are thus capable of "really guileful craftsmanship," and

though occasionally guilty of absurdities they generally fashion "better tales
than he could fashion for himself." Stevenson concludes that his unseen col­
laborators do the bulk of his creative work: "That part which is done while I
am sleeping is the Brownies' part beyond contention; but that which is done
when I am up and about is by no means necessarily mine, since all goes to
show the Brownies have a hand in it even then" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 91).
In his following chapter on sleep (section 417 and its appendix), Myers
notes several additional instances of nocturnal problem-solving, which in
that chapter provide him with stepping-stones toward dreams more clearly
involving acquisition of supernormal knowledge. In three of these instances
the solution emerged during a dream, while in the fourth (Professor Lam­
berton) it appeared upon awakening. The last is in some ways the most inter­
esting: Lamberton had tried in vain for over a week to solve algebraically
a certain problem in analytic geometry, but upon awakening that morning
he found the solution standing before his eyes in the form of a complex hal­
lucinatory diagram drawn upon the opposite wall, formerly a blackboard.
This impressed him greatly, as he had made no previous efforts to solve the
problem geometrically, was in general a poor visualizer, and had no other
waking hallucinatory experiences either before or after this one.
Mazzarello (2000) summarizes the well-known cases of scientific dis­
covery involving Kekule, Loewi, and Mendeleyev, and many other cases
of creative solutions obtained during sleep, dreams, and hypnagogic states
have been collected by D. Barrett (2001), Mavromatis ( 1987), and Van de
Castle (1994), among others. We will cite one more, which would have been
especially welcomed by Myers as a demonstration of subliminal contribu­
tions to higher mathematics. The distinguished mathematician Hadamard
(1 949) states that:

One phenomenon is certain and I can vouch for its absolute certainty: the
sudden and immediate appearance of a solution at the very moment of
sudden awakening. On being very abruptly awakened by an external noise,
a solution long searched for appeared to me at once without the slightest
instant of reflection on my part-the fact was remarkable enough to have
struck me unforgettably-and in a quite different direction from any of
those which I had previously tried to follow. (p. 8) 1 5

1 5 . It is of interest, and will be relevant to subsequent discussion, that Hadamard had read
Myers and acknowledges (p. 22) that he himself was capable of automatic writing.
 Genius-443

More generally, drawing not only upon his own experiences of mathemati­
cal discovery but also upon extensive and direct interactions with many
other leading mathematicians and scientists, Hadamard declares that any
doubt as to the existence of unconscious work "can hardly arise" (p. 21).
Indeed, "strictly speaking, there is hardly any completely logical discovery.
Some intervention of intuition issuing from the unconscious is necessary at
least to initiate the logical work" (p. 1 1 2).
We jump now to section 327 of HP, in which Myers begins to develop
more fully the deep and overlapping interconnections among genius,
automatism, and trance. All, of course, involve subliminal influences upon
the supraliminal consciousness, but these can vary greatly in terms of their
intensity, the degree to which they alter the normal functioning of that
consciousness. Just as trance, when habitual, tends to engender automatic
writing or speech, and prolonged automatism tends to induce trance, the
subliminal uprushes of genius can be arranged in a hierarchy of increasing
involvement of these more extreme manifestations.
At the near or shallow end of this progression in depth is the momen­
tary flash of inspiration, a brief automatism. Myers illustrates this with lines
from Wordsworth describing how "Some lovely image in the song rose up
/ Full-formed, like Venus rising from the sea," adding that "such a sudden
poetic creation, like the calculating boy's announcement of the product of
two numbers, resembles the sudden rush of planchette or pencil, in haste to
scrawl some long-wished-for word" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 04).
A transition from ordinary facility to something involving more signifi­
cant contributions from the subliminal can sometimes be recognized in con­
nection with improvisation. Myers first acknowledges the important contri­
butions of memory and conventional rules or habits to ordinary musical or
oratorical improvisation, following lines quite similar to those subsequently
taken by Boden (1991) in regard to computer simulations of jazz improvisa­
tion and the like. But in George Sand ordinary facility evolved into

an unusual vigour and fertility of literary outflow going on in an almost

dreamlike condition; a condition midway between the actual inventive
dreams of R. L. Stevenson and the conscious labour of another man's
composition . . . a continuous and effortless flow of ideas, sometimes with
and sometimes without an apparent externalisation of the characters who
spoke in her romances. (HP, vol. I, p. 106)

Similarly, Charles Dickens was highly prone to hypnagogic-like reveries

(Mavromatis, 1 987) and alluded often to the tendency of his imaginary
characters toward "independence"; for example, "Mrs. Gamp, his greatest
creation, spoke to him, he tells us (generally in church), as with an inward
monitory voice" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 106).
Myers next describes the even more extreme case of M. de Curel, a dis­
tinguished French dramatist, of which a long account had been published
by the psychologist Alfred Binet in 1 894. In de Curel, Myers observes, the
waking experience of creation approaches that of Stevenson in dreams:
444-Chapter 7

He begins in an ordinary way, or with even more than the usual degree of
difficulty and distress in getting into his subject. Then gradually he begins
to feel the creation of a number of quasi-personalities within him;-the
characters of his play, who speak to him;-exactly as Dickens used to
describe Mrs. Gamp as speaking to him in church. These personages are
not clearly visible, but they seem to move round him in a scene-say a
house and garden-which he also dimly perceives, somewhat as we per­
ceive the scene of a dream. He now no longer has the feeling of composi­
tion, of creation, but merely of literary revision; the personages speak and
act for themselves, and even if he is interrupted while writing, or when he
is asleep at night, the play continues to compose itself in his head. Some­
times while out shooting, &c., and not thinking of the play, he hears sen­
tences rising within him which belong to a part of this play which he has
not yet reached. He believes that subliminally the piece has been worked
out to that further point already. M. de Curel calls these minor duplica­
tions of personality a bourgeonnement or budding of his primary personal­
ity;-into which they gradually, though not without some painful struggle,
re-enter after the play is finished. (HP, vol. 1 , p. 107)

Myers goes on at this point to other topics to which we will return

shortly, but we will first point out just a few of the many additional examples
that can be found in collections like those cited earlier, in which works of
genius are mediated at least in part by automatism, sometimes accompa­
nied by trance-like altered states of consciousness.
Parallels to the literary improvisation of George Sand, for example, can
be found in dance, in the work of choreographer George Balanchine:

He started doing this movement and that, showing the dancers what they
had to do. Then at a certain moment it became something much more than
just himself and his ideas. He started to work as a somnambulist, without
knowing what he was doing. And all this was quickly done, with the great­
est assurance. When he finished, he would sit and ask the dancers to show
him what he had done, and he would seem to be very astonished. That is
what I call inspiration. (Teachout, 2004, pp. 1 8-19)

A. E. Housman (1952) described how the inspiration for much of his

best poetry occurred during afternoon walks, following a pint of beer at
lunch. As he strolled along, absent-mindedly looking about,

there would flow into my mind, with sudden and unaccountable emotion,
sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole stanza at once, accom­
panied, not preceded, by a vague notion of the poem which they were des­
tined to form part of. Then there would usually be a lull of an hour or so,
then perhaps the spring would bubble up again . . . .I happen to remember
distinctly the genesis of the piece which stands last in my first volume.
Two of the stanzas, I do not say which, came into my head, just as they
are printed, while I was crossing the corner of Hampstead Heath between
Spaniard's Inn and the footpath to Temple Fortune. A third stanza came
with a little coaxing after tea. One more was needed, but it did not come:
I had to turn to and compose it myself, and that was a laborious business.
 Genius-445

I wrote it thirteen times, and it was more than a twelvemonth before I got
it right. (p. 91)

William Blake, who with Wallace Stevens was "an extremist of the
imagination" (Brann, 1 99 1 , p. 509), wrote his friend Butts that his prophetic
poem Milton was written "from immediate dictation, twelve or sometimes
twenty or thirty lines at a time, without premeditation and even against my
will. The time it has taken in writing was thus rendered non-existent, and
an immense poem exists which seems to be the labour of a long life, all pro­
duced without labour or study. . .1 may praise it, since I dare not pretend to
.

be other than the secretary" (Damon, 1 958, p. 202).16

The hypermnesic, possibly eidetic, and mammothly prolific writer
Thomas Wolfe (1952) describes the onset of the process that generated three
enormous novels in 41'2 years:

An extraordinary image remains to me from that year, the year I spent

abroad when the material of these books first began to take on articulate
form. It seemed that I had inside me, swelling and gathering all the time,
a huge black cloud, and that this cloud was loaded with electricity, preg­
nant, crested, with a kind of hurricane violence that could not be held i n
check much longer; that t h e moment w a s approaching fast when it must
break. Well, all I can say is that the storm did break. It broke that summer
while I was i n Switzerland. It came in torrents, and it is not over yet.
I cannot really say the book was written. It was something that took
hold of me and possessed me, and before I was done with it-that is, before
I finally emerged with the first completed part-it seemed to me that it
had done for me. It was exactly as if this great black storm cloud I have
spoken of had opened up and, mid flashes of lightning, was pouring from
its depth a torrential and ungovernable flood. Upon that flood everything
was swept and borne along as by a great river. And I was borne along with
it. (p. 1 87)

Nietzsche (1952) recounts in similarly extreme terms in Ecce Homo how

he was "invaded" by Thus Spake Zarathustra:

Can any one at the end of this nineteenth century possibly have any dis­
tinct notion of what poets of a more vigourous period meant by inspira­
tion? I f not, I should like to describe it. Provided one has the slightest
remnant of superstition left, one can hardly reject completely the idea that
one is the mere incarnation, or mouthpiece, or medium of some almighty
power. The notion of revelation describes the condition quite simply; by
which I mean that something profoundly convulsive and disturbing sud­
denly becomes visible and audible with indescribable definiteness and
exactness. One hears-one does not seek; one takes-one does not ask
who gives: a thought flashes out like lightning, inevitably without hesita-

16. Myers, like Brann ( 1991), regards Blake as an example of strong imagination insuf­
ficiently controlled by supraliminal discipline: "Throughout all the work of William Blake (I
should say) we see the subliminal self flashing for moments into unity, then smouldering again
in a lurid and scattered glow" (HP, vol. 1, p. 73).
446-Chapter 7

tion-I have never had any choice about it. There is an ecstasy whose ter­
rific tension is sometimes released by a flood of tears, during which one's
progress varies from involuntary impetuosity to involuntary slowness.
There is the feeling that one is utterly out of hand, with the most distinct
consciousness of an infinitude of shuddering thrills that pass through one
from head to foot;-there is a profound happiness in which the most pain­
ful and gloomy feelings are not discordant in effect, but are required as
necessary colors i n this overflow of light. There is an instinct for rhythmic
relations which embraces an entire world of forms (length, the need for a
widely extended rhythm, is almost a measure of the force of inspiration, a
sort of counterpart to its pressure and tension). Everything occurs quite
without volition, as if in an eruption of freedom, independence, power and
divinity. The spontaneity of the images and similes is most remarkable;
one loses all perception of what is imagery and simile; everything offers
itself as the most immediate, exact, and simple means of expression. (pp.
202-203)

Harding (1948, chap. 2) cites a large number of additional cases in which

the sense of being possessed by some external force and compelled to cre­
ate is especially pronounced. One involves Goethe, who described how his
poems sometimes

have come suddenly upon me, and have insisted on being composed imme­
diately, so that I have felt an instinctive and dreamy impulse to write them
down on the spot. In such a somnambulistic condition, it has often hap­
pened that I have had a sheet of paper lying before me all aslant, and I have
not discovered it till all has been written, or I have found no room to write
any more. I have possessed many such sheets written diagonally. (p. 1 2)

Automatism also figures prominently in an especially curious case

involving the great 20th-century poet James Merrill, and in particular his
masterpiece, The Changing Light of Sandover (1980/1 993). On the cover of
this book Harold Bloom expresses particular admiration for one of its chap­
ters: "I don't know that The Book of Ephraim, at least after some dozen
readings, can be over-praised, as nothing since [by] the greatest writers of
our century equals it in demonic force." Yet the book was produced in its
entirety by meanS of a ouija board operated jointly by Merrill and his long­
time friend "R." In its opening pages Merrill describes the instant the ouija
board came to life: "YES a new and urgent power YES I Seized the cup.
It swerved, clung, hesitated, I Darted off, a devil's darning needle I Gyro­
scope our fingers rode bareback I (But stopping dead the instant one lost
touch)." Thus if either Merrill or his partner took his finger off the cup, it
stopped dead. But when it worked, it was astonishing: "Yet even the most
fragmentary message-I Twice as entertaining, twice as wise I As either of
its mediums-enthralled them." It is of course difficult if not impossible to
determine exactly who is contributing what to the creative process in a case
of this sort, but the suggestion that the results outstrip what either could
 Genius-447

accomplish alone is especially intriguing and worthy of further investiga­

tion.17
Bowra ( 1955) summarizes in more general terms the involuntary char­
acter of inspiration as experienced and reported by many poets:

[It] manifests itself in a manner which no one can mistake. The poet unac­
countably finds himself dominated by something which absorbs his being
and excludes other interests from his mind. It is not easy to define exactly
what this is, but we may mark certain elements in it. Central to it is some­
thing which may be called an idea, though in some ways it is too vague to
deserve the name. It has a powerful character and atmosphere of its own,
and though at first it is too indefinite for intellectual analysis, it imposes
itself on the poet with the majesty and authority of vision. Even if he does
not fully understand it, he feels it and almost sees it. (p. 4)

In sum, Myers seems to us certainly correct in pointing out connections

of genius with trance and automatism. Indeed, these same connections can
also be recognized from the opposite d irection-that is, from cases in which
the aspects of trance and automatism predominate, but which also give rise
to high-level creative production. We turn next to these.

Genius in A utomatists
In the first instance it should be noted that considerable amounts of
"creativity" are necessarily involved in the production of characteristic
dissociative phenomena such as glove anesthesias, negative hallucinations
in hypnosis, and "alter" or "multiple" personalities formed in response to
overwhelming trauma. Philosopher Stephen Braude (2002) has shown with
particular clarity that such phenomena cannot be conceived in terms of
atomic mental states or contents that are statically segregated by fixed and
passive boundaries of some sort. Rather, successful maintenance of the dis­
sociation requires continuous, active, adaptive-in short, creative-sub­
liminal improvisation in response to the subject's ongoing and constantly­
changing interactions with his environment. Mediumistic dramatizations
of deceased personalities also sometimes display (at minimum) remarkable
histrionic capacities, reproducing voice, tone, mannerisms, characteristic
turns of phrase, and other traits of the deceased with verisimilitude suffi­
cient to convince even knowledgeable and critical sitters of their continuing
post-mortem existence.
Cases involving emergence of secondary personalities with character­
istics superior to those of the primary personality are also relevant here.
One such case is that of Old Stump, described in Chapter 5. Another is de
Puysegur's patient Victor Race, suffering from an inflamed lung, who mani­
fested when mesmerized a secondary personality remarkably more gifted
than Victor in his normal state: "Though ordinarily a simple and tongue­
tied peasant, he would, in the somnambulic state, converse in a fluent and

17. Similar group dynamics have sometimes been observed, incidentally, in the production
of unusually strong psychokinetic effects (Batcheldor, 1984).
448-Chapter 7

elevated manner. . . Victor assumed management of his own case, diagnosing

and prescribing for his illness, and predicting its course. More than this: on
being brought into contact with other patients, he seemed able to do the
same for them" (Gauld, 1 992, p. 41).
Still more important is the well-studied case of the Swiss medium
"Helene Smith" (Catherine Elise Mii11er). Myers (HP, vol. 2, pp. 1 30-144)
provides a precis based on the initial investigation by Flournoy ( 1 90011963),
using this as his primary example ofthe action of the mid-level "mythopreic"
subliminal centers that engage perpetually in a "strange manufacture of
inward romances" (an interpretation approved by Ellenberger, 1 970, pp.
1 50, 3 17-3 1 8). The initial stages of Helene Smith's trance mediumship were
replete with automatisms of various kinds but consisted mainly of lengthy
descriptions of her supposed adventures in a series of increasingly exotic
settings, including India and the planet Mars. Some of these reports seemed
to contain considerable amounts of plausible historical and geographical
detail, encouraging her admirers to agree with her that she was recounting
her own actual experiences of previous lives. Flournoy and Myers, however,
saw these tales rather as moderately creative productions of her subliminal,
drawing upon a faculty of "cryptomnesia" (Stevenson, 1983a), or subliminal
access to materials long ago encountered but inaccessible to ordinary con­
scious recall. Flournoy's book recounts in detail how he was able by labori­
ous investigation to track down probable sources for much of the content of
her romances, although he did in the end conclude that they also contained
at least a few elements of probable supernormal origin (Flournoy, 1 91 1).
The story does not end there, however. Helene Smith's mediumship
continued to evolve, eventually supplanting her previous waking life as a
department manager in a large shop in Geneva. Flournoy was unfortunately
not privy to these later developments, as she and her followers had become
irritated with his deflationary zeal and punished him by refusing further
cooperation. Of particular interest is a large volume of automatic draw­
ings and paintings, many of which are reproduced in a massive study by
Deonna (1932). Even in reproductions without color her paintings are well
composed, smoothly executed with defined images, exuding a surreal reli­
giosity comparing favorably with the paintings of Frida Khalo. Yet Helene
Smith apparently painted without a brush, using her fingers in a trance-like
condition. N. Fodor ( 1966) quotes her own description of the process:

On the days when I am to paint I am always roused very early-generally

between five and six in the morning-by three loud knocks at my bed. I
open my eyes and see my bedroom brightly illuminated, and immediately
understand that I have to stand up and work. I dress myself in the beauti­
ful iridescent light, and wait a few moments, sitting in my armchair, until
the feeling comes that I have to work. It never delays. All at once I stand
up and walk to the picture. When about two steps before it I feel a strange
sensation, and probably fal l asleep at the same moment. I know, later on,
 Genius-449

that I must have slept because I notice that my fingers are covered with dif­
ferent colours, and I do not remember at all to have used them. (p. 350)18

A related case of perhaps even greater theoretical significance is that of

"Patience Worth," first studied and reported in depth by Walter Franklin
Prince ( 192711964). The medium in this case was Pearl Curran, a midwestern
American housewife of modest education who possessed, so far as Prince
could determine through extensive and careful investigation, no special
interests or aptitude in language, literature, or poetry. In Pearl's 3 1st year,
in the course of some half-hearted experimentation with a ouija board, the
personality identifying itself as Patience Worth, ostensibly a 1 7th-century
Englishwoman, made its first appearance. Her ensuing collaboration with
Pearl lasted almost 25 years, and ultimately produced some 29 volumes or
4,375 single-spaced pages of novels, poems, proverbs, aphorisms, witticisms,
and conversational repartee (Braude, 2003).
Far more important than the sheer volume of this material, however,
are several aspects of its character. First, it was generated automatically,
initially by means of the ouija board, later by automatic vocalization of
single letters, then words, apparently accompanied by panoramas of vivid
visual imagery illustrating or dramatizing the spoken content. Pearl occa­
sionally carried out directly competing tasks such as writing a letter to a
friend while this was going on. Second is the extreme fluency and virtuosity
of the performance. Patience typically produced her material without delay
and faster than a stenographer could write it down, pausing only to let the
stenographer catch up. This was the case even in response to difficult chal­
lenges posed on the spot by Prince-for example, to improvise a poem on a
given theme, or to write alternating lines or passages on different subjects
or in different literary styles. Interrupted by Prince in the middle of a sen­
tence or passage, Patience could resume on demand and without break or
pause, sometimes weeks or months later. Her material was consistently of
high quality even as initially produced, and she almost never revised any­
thing. She also displayed extensive and accurate knowledge of the various
times and places figuring in her novels, and portrayed them with impressive
verisimilitude. Perhaps most remarkable of all, she possessed an extensive
repertoire of archaic Anglo-Saxon words deriving from multiple periods
and localities, many of which were known at the time, if at all, only to a few
professional philologists.
In short, Patience Worth, who had emerged essentially fully-formed in
those first sessions with the ouija board, differed radically from the rela­
tively staid and ordinary Pearl Curran, and not only in matters of person­
ality, style, and attitude but also in knowledge, intelligence, and creative
capacities. Her performances, as Prince ( 1927/1 964) points out, required
"phenomenal memory, phenomenal speed, and phenomenal complexity of
mental operations" (p. 487). Summing up the results of his "arduous and

1 8 . Two additional cases of this type were reported by Osty ( l928a, 1 928b), both involving
pronounced aspects of automatism and trance.
450-Chapter 7

unremitting labor," Prince (1 92711964) advances the following proposition:

"Either our concept of what we call the subconscious must be radically altered,
so as to include potencies of which we hitherto have had no knowledge, or else
some cause operating through but not originating in the subconsciousness of
Mrs. Curran must be acknowledged" (p. 509). We can only second this theo­
retical challenge, as does Schiller ( 1928), as well as Braude (2003) in his valu­
able summary and analysis of the case.
Additional examples of the connection between mediumship and genius
are presented and discussed in Grosso (in press). One we cannot resist men­
tioning here, to conclude this section, concerns the role of Myers and autom­
atism in Surrealism, which was perhaps the most important artistic move­
ment of the 20th century. Cubism, Dada, Futurism, Abstract Expressionism,
and Minimalism were all important but limited innovations, primarily
technical and thematic. Surrealism alone challenged fundamental premises
about art and creativity, shifting the focus from conscious to unconscious
processes, introducing the role of chance in the creative process, and treat­
ing that process as not merely aesthetic but political, social, and metaphysi­
cal. Although it is widely supposed that Surrealism was inspired wholly by
Freud, that is certainly not correct: Its chief theoretician, Andre Breton,
published in 1 933 an article specifically acknowledging its indebtedness to
"the gothic psychiatry of F. W. H. Myers" (Breton, 1 93311997). Myers's work
on automatism in fact provided the key psychological mechanism that Sur­
realism would attempt to exploit in novel ways: "Surrealism has above all
worked to bring inspiration back into favor, and we have for that purpose
promoted the use of automatic forms of expression" (p. 1 5). The goal of Sur­
realism is essentially to unify the personality, which means for Breton what
Myers meant by genius, the successful coordination and interpenetration of
dream and waking life. As Breton (1 92411972) puts it in his Manifestoes of
Surrealism: " I believe in the future resolution of these two states, dream and
reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality,
a surreality, if one may so speak" (p. 14). It would be an interesting study,
but one which would take us too far afield for present purposes, to explore
in greater detail the role actually played by psychological automatisms in
the production of particular works of Surrealist art.
To summarize the discussion so far: Myers argues, and we think he is
correct, that whereas momentary "flashes of inspiration" are essentially
brief automatisms, more or less continuous with much of what goes on in
ordinary mental life, in more extreme cases of real genius the subliminal
uprush becomes more intense and protracted, and arises from deeper sub­
liminal strata that utilize different modes of operation and may have access
to additional sources of information. This leads to the third major feature
of his analysis of inspiration, and-surprisingly-to a cluster of issues lying
at the heart of contemporary cognitive theory.
 Genius-45 l

Incommensurability

Myers introduces this theme in section 322 (HP, vol. 1 , p. 98).

And thus there may really be something at times incommensurable between

the inspirations of genius and the results of conscious logical thought.
Just as the calculating boy solves his problems by methods which differ
from the methods of the trained mathematician, so in artistic matters also
that "something of strangeness" which is in "all excellent beauty", may be
the expression of a real difference between subliminal and supraliminal
modes of perception.

Non-Linguistic Symbolisms
In the next six pages, one of the most condensed and difficult but impor­
tant parts of the chapter, Myers develops his central ideas: Subliminal men­
tation is less closely bound than supraliminal mentation to language, either
ordinary spoken and written language or the specialized languages of sci­
ence and mathematics; but it is not for that reason to be presumed inferior,
that it "in some way falls short of the standard implied in articulate speech"
(HP, vol . I, p. 98).
Myers clearly acknowledges the primacy of language as the privileged
means of ordinary communication. It is an absolute necessity of intellectual
life and the foundation of all civilization. But it is not the whole story: "There
is, however, no a priori ground for supposing that language will have the
power to express all the thoughts and emotions of man" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 99).
Indeed, the study of automatisms in general and the inspirations of genius
in particular reveal that other forms of symbolism become increasingly
important as we access deeper strata of the subliminal. There is a "hidden
habit of wider symbolism, of self-communion beyond the limits of speech"
that is better adapted to expression of "that pre-existent but hidden con­
cordance between visible and invisible things, between matter and thought,
between thought and emotion, which the plastic arts, and music, and poetry
do each in their own special field discover and manifest for human wisdom
and joy" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 101).
Myers goes on in section 326 to make some extremely condensed and
penetrating remarks elaborating this basic conception with respect to
poetry, music, and the plastic arts in turn. We encourage interested readers
to savor thoughtfully these remarks, which anticipate in a remarkable way
attempts by later philosophers such as Brann (1991), Cassirer (1 955-1996),
Langer ( 1956), and Whitehead (1 938/1 968) to temper the linguistic obses­
sions of modern analytic philosophy with an appreciation of non-discursive
or "presentational" modes of symbolism. Langer (1 956) says of music, for
example, that "there are certain aspects of the so-called 'inner life'-physi­
cal or mental-which have formal properties similar to those of music-pat­
terns of motion and rest, of tension and release, or agreement and disagree­
ment, proportion, fulfillment, excitation, sudden change, etc." (p. 1 85). By
452-Chapter 7

virtue of such isomorphisms a musical configuration can become expressive

of an emotional state, so that "music sounds the way emotions feel."
But let us return now to mainstream cognitive psychology, where a
similar imbalance in favor of discursive and propositional forms of thought
has long dominated the scene, and especially since the rise of the computa­
tional theory of the mind (CTM; Chapter 1). We wish first simply to reiter­
ate Myers's central empirical claim, that subliminal contributions to cre­
ative activity generally, and to the more extreme "inspirations of genius"
in particular, tend strongly to take the form of unusually intense and often
involuntary imagery, predominantly though not exclusively visual, accom­
panied by strong affect and a profound sense of surprise and wonder at
its beauty, harmony, elegance, and proportion or fitness to the consciously
intended purpose. That this claim is broadly correct, descriptively, seems to
us beyond reasonable doubt, as we have already indicated. What we want
next to discuss in greater depth concerns rather the manner in which scien­
tific psychology subsequent to Myers has dealt with such matters.
The CTM itself in its classical symbol-processing form scarcely touches
these subjects at all, with one important exception-analogy-that we will
discuss in more detail below. Most of the remaining work, surveyed by
Boden (1991; updated in Boden, 1 999), involves attempted computer simula­
tions of processes of scientific discovery, musical improvisation, or the cre­
ation of simple stories, poems, and the like. The authors of these various sci­
entific-discovery programs have been widely faulted for setting things up in
advance in such a way as to make their "discoveries" inevitable, a criticism
with which we generally agree, and in that light the overall assessment of
this work by Boden herself, generally an uncritical enthusiast of the CTM, is
telling: "The success of programs for scientific discovery, limited though it
is, is not matched by programs for producing poems or (especially) stories"
(Boden, 1 999, p. 359).
We will leave this part of the subject there, adding only that the reasons
for these failures, in our view, are essentially the central defects of the CTM
as identified by critics such as Searle and Dreyfus and summarized in Chap­
ter 1 . It is also worth noting, however, that Hofstadter and FARG (1995)
arrive at an equally negative overall assessment from the opposite, CTM­
friendly, point of view. It should also be pointed out, we think, that all such
attempts to explain genius as a completely rule-bound process conflict with
a deep intuition, shared by many, that genius by definition breaks old rules
and makes new ones: As Kant (179011951) put the point so clearly, "genius is
a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given; it is not
a mere aptitude for what can be learned by a rule" (p. 1 50). Indeed, he says,
"Genius is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to art."

Associationism and Its Limits

By far the largest proportion of attempts to explain the creative pro­
cess have invoked the core doctrines of "associationism," in forms ranging
from the 1 7th-century mechanical theory of association of ideas to its mod-
 Genius-453

ern descendant, connectionism, which speaks in terms of waves of excita­

tion reverberating through neural networks (Chapter I). (As J. Fodor [2001]
remarks, perhaps a bit too caustically: "That's what's so nice about empiri­
cist cognitive science: You can drop out for a couple of centuries and not
miss a thing" [po 49] .) Wallas ( 1926), for example, thought of unconscious
or preconscious ideas as existing ready-made in a Jamesian-style "fringe"
of consciousness, in effect a remote part of the "upper cortex," which he
and others of that period naively conceived as a kind of vast telephone
switchboard. The creative person is one in whom trains of association set
in motion by the preparatory labor somehow penetrate that remote region
during the incubation phase and deliver useful ideas back to consciousness
in the form of inspiration. Ghiselin (1952) expresses very similar views in a
slightly updated neurophysiological terminology.
Later accounts by psychologists followed similar lines but sought to
impose a more mechanistic flavor consistent with the observations of Guil­
ford ( 1950) and others regarding the importance of "divergent thinking"
and the like. So, for example, Mednick ( 1962) advanced an associationist
theory according to which creativity is found in persons and conditions in
which the associative hierarchies linking concepts are relatively equipoten­
tial or "flat," permitting large numbers of remote and surprising associa­
tions, in contrast with "steep" hierarchies that permit only relatively small
numbers of obvious or stereotypical ones. Mendelsohn ( 1976) related these
characteristics to attentional processes, emphasizing that "defocusing" of
attention increases the range of possible associations and combinations of
ideas and hence, it is presumed, creativity.
Martindale (1995, 1 999) has recently updated these ideas within the
framework of contemporary neural-network and connectionist theoriz­
ing, seeking in effect a neurobiology of the creative process. He reviews,
for example, a variety of evidence suggesting that the flat associative hier­
archies and defocused attention that supposedly account for creativity cor­
relate to some degree with brain conditions such as reduced cortical arousal
and reduced frontal-lobe control, (possibly) accompanied by relatively
greater right-hemisphere involvement.19 The relentless psychometrician
Hans Eysenck (1 995) welcomes these "state" formulations, treating them as
complementary to his own "trait" concept of "psychoticism" as a biologi­
cally grounded propensity toward remote but relevant associations (p. 267).
For both Martindale and Eysenck, however, as for many other leading cre­
ativity theorists, the central notion that "remote associations" comprise the
essence of the creative process goes essentially unchallenged.
The fundamental idea of associationist theories of creativity is that the
incubationlinspiration cycle can satisfactorily be conceptualized in terms of

19. We comment parenthetically that the conditions identified by Martindale are also asso­
ciated with the hypnagogic state and its vivid, involuntary imagery, which commonly plays a
role in creative activity as noted above. More generally, his neurobiological observations are
also consistent with a Myers-like view in which global impairment of the normal supraliminal
mode of mind-brain operation can lead to proportional disinhibition or release of normally
inaccessible subliminal modes.
454-Chapter 7

retrieval and combination of ideas already in the network, by means of some

process of spreading activation. This conception seems plausible enough,
we would agree, in connection with certain rudimentary forms of the phe­
nomena to be explained. It might well account, for example, for what goes
on when we finally retrieve a temporarily forgotten word following unsuc­
cessful attempts to do so in the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state (A. S. Brown,
1991; R. Brown & McNeill, 1 966; James, 1 890b, vol. 1, p. 251). As many
observers have noted, such occasions seem to involve-at least in germ-all
four stages of the Wallas model, so why not regard TOT as a suitable proto­
type for the whole domain?

Coleridge and the Theory of Imagination

Forceful answers can be found, we submit, in a source rarely consulted
by contemporary psychologists, namely the investigations by 19th-century
English romantic poets, Coleridge in particular, into the nature of human
imagination.20 The gist of the story goes as follows: Coleridge had felt a
strange power in certain early poems by his friend Wordsworth, poems that
he recognized as markedly superior to his own. Seeking to understand this
puzzling but important effect, and thus to harness it in service of his own
poetry, he turned first to the mainstream psychological theory of his day,
the theory of association of ideas as developed by figures such as Hobbes,
Locke, Hume, and Hartley. This theory represented a deliberate and self­
conscious attempt to extend the triumphs of classical mechanistic physics
into the domain of the mind. The "atoms" of the new science were "ideas,"
typically conceived as fainter replicas of former perceptions, or as the sim­
pler qualities or parts into which such perceptions could be analyzed. Their
commerce was to be governed by "laws of association" analogous to New­
ton's laws of motion, based in particular on factors such as contiguity in
time or place, resemblances of one or another sort, and connections of cause
and effect. Imagination, in this framework, was to be conceived in terms of
novel combinations or recombinations of these independent, self-existent
atomic parts. Thus the prototypical example of the imagination at work
became the Chimera of Greek mythology, a fire-breathing monster which
conjoined the head of a lion with a goat's body and serpent tail. Corre­
spondingly, imagination was regarded as fundamentally delusive, and figu-

20. See especially Coleridge ( 1 817/1967); good secondary sources here are Abrams (1958),
Brann (1991), Hill (1978), and I. A. Richards (1960). It seems certain that Myers would have
been intimately familiar with the original literature of this movement, and fully aware of its
deep affinities with the theory of genius he articulates in HP. Most fundamentally, perhaps,
for Coleridge as for Myers, the role of imagination in genius is secondary to its role as "the liv­
ing Power and prime Agent of all human Perception" (Coleridge, 1 81711967, p. 167). For both,
that is, perception becomes imagination constrained by sensory input. It is also somewhat
ironic, even sad, that Coleridge is mainly cited by contemporary psychologists in connection
with his much-maligned stories regarding the composition of Kubla Khan in an opium dream.
He is of far greater importance to psychology, we think, as a theorist and exemplar of the
imagination (see also Lowes, 1927).
 Genius-455

rative and metaphorical language were viewed as serving purely ornamental

functions.
Coleridge struggled to reconcile this mechanistic theory with what he
could directly observe in the workings of real human imagination as mani­
fested in creative geniuses such as Wordsworth, Shakespeare, Milton, and
himself, among sundry others. Imagination, he concluded, cannot be fully
understood in these terms; moreover, the unexplained residue lies at the
very heart of creative imagination, and encompasses its most significant
properties. Coleridge sought to explicate these properties in terms of his
famous distinction between mere fancy and imagination proper: Fancy
seems within reach of associationist theories; mechanical and passive, it
associates, aggregates, collates, collocates, juxtaposes, transposes, rear­
ranges, and mirrors, giving rise in such ways to low-grade products like the
infamous Chimera. Imagination, by contrast, "that synthetic and magical
power," is for Coleridge something radically di fferent and altogether supe­
rior: Imagination is organic and active; it assimilates, dissolves and recre­
ates, fuses, synthesizes, and unifies. It transmutes the chaos of raw materials
provided by everyday experience, forging and shaping them by means of
its inherent "coadunating," "alembic," and "esemplastic" powers into truly
novel creations that balance or reconcile seemingly opposite or discordant
qualities in harmonious unity. It is above all a unique form of thought, and
one of the principal powers of the human mind.
A fuller appreciation of Coleridge's concept of imagination can best be
obtained by studying the numerous examples adduced in the sources cited
above. We ourselves have no doubt that it poses severe challenges, not only
to classical association theories but to cognitive science more generally,
and we think that cognitive science can only be enriched by paying greater
attention to these long-neglected but very high-level discussions. Two fur­
ther observations may serve to reinforce this contention.
The first has to do with the subsequent history of Coleridge's attempted
distinction between fancy and imagination, which has so far been pursued
mainly in the context of literary theory and criticism. Most such observers
have found Coleridge's distinction ultimately untenable, but in an interest­
ing and important way: Specifically, what they deny is not that imagina­
tion has the sorts of properties that Coleridge ascribes to it, but rather that
these difficult properties can be prevented from invading the supposedly
lesser realm of fancy. That is (and again in accord with Wind's principle),
even relatively ordinary forms of cognition, when more closely examined,
are inescapably saturated with properties of the sort that Coleridge viewed
as beyond the reach of any mechanistic association theory (Abrams, 1 958;
I. A. Richards, 1960).
Second, we wish to comment briefly on the few other recent psychologi­
cal publications known to us to have made contact with th is older literature.
The first (Sutton, 1 998) attempts to deny that there is any problem. Spe­
cifically, Sutton claims that certain secondary strains within classical asso­
ciationism, epitomized in particular by Hartley, are the true ancestors of
456-Chapter 7

contemporary connectionism, and that these are immune to critiques such

as Coleridge's which supposedly apply only to its less sophisticated forms.
In fact, however, Coleridge knew Hartley's work intimately and used his
version of associationism as the principal vehicle for his critical analyses.
In our view, Sutton simply avoids coming to grips with the real cognitive
issues, appealing to abstract connectionist principles such as "distributed
representations" and "superimposition" that in fact do little even to help
solve problems of ordinary memory function (Chapter 4), let alone those of
creative imagination.
Similar comments apply to Boden's ( 1 991) chapter on "creative connec­
tions," the setting for which is the remarkable investigation by Lowes (1927)
of the workings of Coleridge's own poetic imagination in the production of
Kubla Khan and The Ancient Mariner. Having dutifully acknowledged the
properties of strong imagination that both Coleridge and Lowes themselves
regarded as truly fundamental, Boden proceeds to treat the subject as if it
really were mostly a matter of associative connections, and explainable at
least in general terms by the elementary properties (which she describes) of
connectionist networks. She forthrightly acknowledges the limitations of
current models, and that " the intuitive understanding offered by Livings­
ton Lowes is incalculably richer, and more subtle, than any connectionist
explanation" (p. 1 3 0), but glibly reassures her readers that these gaps will
be closed in due course by the "more powerful" computer systems of the
future.
No warrants have as yet been provided for these computationalist
promissory notes, and as explained in Chapter 1 we strongly doubt that
they can ever be fulfilled. The situation is to us strongly reminiscent of the
one that provoked the destructive review by Chomsky (1959) of Skinner's
book on verbal behavior, in that connectionist notions which so far explain
rather little when deployed in a careful and technically rigorous manner are
being brandished about metaphorically by less scrupulous enthusiasts as
the answer to everything. A telling commentary on the real state of things
in regard to connectionist modeling of creative imagination is that neither
"creativity" nor "imagination," let alone cognate terms such as "inspira­
tion" or "genius," even appear in the indexes of connectionist handbooks
such as Bechtel and Abrahamson (2002) and Harnish (2002).
Our third example is an important paper by N. 1. T. Thomas (1 999),
who approaches the subject of imagination in the context of a review of the
"imagery debates" mentioned in Chapter 1 . Thomas recognizes that current
imagery theories fall far short of providing an adequate theory of imagina­
tion, and that the Romantic-era theorists of the imagination had important
things to say-sentiments with which we wholly agree. He goes on, how­
ever, to a summary dismissal of Coleridge and his allies on grounds that,
although descriptively on target, they left us only "a mixture of warmed­
over associationist notions, clearly inadequate to the demands being placed
upon them, and fragments of grandiose idealist metaphysics, ripe for mys­
tificatory appropriation" (p. 232). Thomas himself turns instead to "percep-
 Genius-457

tual activity" theory, which takes "seeing-as" as the fundamental capacity

of imagination, and seeks to derive imagination from an account of percep­
tion inspired mainly by recent work in robotics. To this we would respond
first that his investment of such high hopes in robotics seems forlorn; but
more importantly, (1) that the Coleridge/Myers view is much more like his
own than he appreciates (the entire first half in particular of the statement
quoted above is simply inaccurate), and (2) that its empirical and philosoph­
ical foundations are far stronger than he realizes, as demonstrated both by
HP itself and by the present volume.
Despite these caveats, we welcome Thomas's paper as one of several
recent developments within mainstream psychology itself that indicate
growing recognition of the need to deal with creative imagination as it actu­
ally is, rather than as most contemporary workers have pictured it to be.
Even the hard-core experimentalist George Mandler (1994) was moved to
remark that " there may well be conditions in which such spreading or fan­
ning out [of network activation] reaches recesses of the unconscious that
dynamic psychology has considered, but experimental psychology has not"
(p. 25). Another recent example is the "creative cognition" approach (S. M.
Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1 995; Ward, Finke, & Smith, 1 995; Ward, Smith, &
Finke, 1999; Ward, Smith, & Vaid, 1997), which in its emphasis on continu­
ity and the role in creative thinking of "pre-inventive structures" such as
imagery, analogy, and symbolism, has also begun moving beyond the cur­
rent frontiers of mainline cognitive theory in a Myers-like direction, albeit
in what seems to us so far an excessively timid and limited way.
In sum, what seems to be in the offing is a revival of psychologi­
cal interest in creative imagination as a distinctive and powerful mode of
thought. Just as "genius" has degenerated in recent times into "creativity,"
the original Greek phantasia with its connotations of world-fashioning or
cosmogonic power has degenerated over the centuries into mere "fantasy,"
escapist day-dreaming of little or no cognitive import. Like Brann (1991),
we believe psychology must now reverse this pernicious trend; the "sober
romanticism" which she champions in her monumental interdisciplinary
compilation of thinking about the imagination is in fact highly consistent
with Myers's views, and would have been greatly enriched by those views
had only she known them.

Psychoanalytic Theory: Primary and Secondary Process

We said "revival" in the previous paragraph because imagination has
not always been so neglected by psychology as in recent decades. In par­
ticular, and as hinted in the statement above by George Mandler, psycho­
dynamic theories associated with the clinical wing of the field have always
paid far more attention to this subject. In their terms, the "incommensura­
bility" that Myers pointed out between subliminal and supraliminal modes
of functioning maps rather nicely onto a famous distinction between "pri­
mary" and "secondary" process, first introduced by Freud in his Interpreta­
tion ofDreams (1900/1 964, chap. 6). In Freud's original formulation, second-
458-Chapter 7

ary process is more or less clearly understood as ordinary wakeful thinking,

which is voluntary, discursive, more or less logical, and reality-oriented-a
product, in short, of the conscious ego. Primary process, by contrast, Freud
regarded as instinct-dominated, oriented only toward gratification of infan­
tile wishes, and rooted in the unconscious id. In Freud's theory of dream
formation, as expounded by Fliess ( 1 959), primary process expresses itself
in the various properties of dreams which allow them to serve as accept­
able forms of manifest expression for clearly formulated but unacceptable
wishes latent in the unconscious. The properties in question include, for
example, picturization, symbolization, condensation, concretization, allu­
sion, displacement, and representation through opposites.
The psychoanalytic conception of primary process is approximately
convergent, descriptively, with creative imagination as conceived by Myers,
Coleridge, Brann, and others. Where it originally differed, of course, was
in its profound devaluation of imagination, its relentlessly "archeological"
approach to non-verbal symbolism, and more generally its close ties to the
sometimes bizarre formulations of orthodox Freudian metapsychology.
These differences have been substantially eroded, however, by subsequent
revisionary trends within psychoanalysis itself, driven at least in part by tren­
chant empirical critiques of Freud's dream theory by Hall ( 1953) and others.
Primary process is no longer conceived as rigidly distinct from and opposed
to secondary process, or as a mere slave of the Freudian unconscious-that
boiling cesspool of primitive sexual and aggressive urges. Rather, it repre­
sents a distinctive mode of cognition existing alongside secondary process,
complementary to and interactive with it, and potentially available in ser­
vice of creative activity. Kubie ( 1958) in particular has emphasized the ver­
satility, brilliance, and speed of this "preconscious" system, and its role as
the wellspring of creativity:

In the adult who is not hamstrung by conscious or unconscious fear and

guilt, preconscious processes make free use of analogy and allegory,
superimposing dissimilar ingredients into new perceptual and conceptual
patterns, thus reshuffling experience to achieve that fantastic degree of
condensation without which creativity in any field of activity would be
impossible. I n the preconscious use of imagery and allegory many expe­
riences are condensed into a single hieroglyph, which expresses i n one
symbol far more than one can say slowly and precisely, word by word,
on the fully conscious level. This is why preconscious mentation is the
Seven-League Boot of intuitive creative functions. This is how and why
preconscious condensations are used in poetry, humor, the dream, and the
symptom. (pp. 34-35)

Even a few mainstream psychologists from Hilgard (1962), Neisser

( 1963), and Shepard (1978) to Eysenck (\ 995) and Sloman (\996) have recog­
nized that this psychoanalytic concept of primary process, liberated from
its Freudian origins, corresponds to something which is vital in human cog­
nitive makeup generally, and especially significant in relation to creative
 Genius-459

thinking.21 The same recognition lies at the core of the account by Koestler
(1 964) of creative inspiration as "bisociation," or association of ideas across
normally separate domains. Indeed, Koestler states flatly that "we find all
the bisociative patterns that I have discussed prominently displayed in the
dream" (p. 179).
These trends within neo-Freudian psychoanalytic thinking in regard
to primary process and creativity have been documented in many places,
including Erdelyi (1 985), Fromm ( 1978-1979), Kris (1 952), Kubie (1958),
Rapaport (1951), and Suler ( 1980). They coalesce around the concept of
"regression in service of the ego," introduced by Ernst Kris ( 1952). Stripped
of its heavy encrustation in the technical vocabulary of psychoanalysis, this
amounts essentially to voluntary, controlled exposure to the free play of
imagination (primary process) in service of adaptive purposes such as cre­
ativity, wit, and humor (Schafer, 1 958). Clearly, this notion is substantially
congruent with Myers's general conception of genius as effecting greater
than normal cooperation between supraliminal and subliminal forms of
mentation. Kris's (1 952) conception of inspiration likewise is closely similar
to Myers's, except that his clinical perspective and experience compel him
to point out the associated psychological hazards as well: "Inspiration-the
'divine release from the ordinary ways of man,' a state of 'creative mad­
ness' (Plato), in which the ego controls the primary process and puts it into
its service-need be contrasted with the opposite, the psychotic condition,
in which the ego is overwhelmed by the primary process" (p. 60). Koestler
(1 964, p. 659) speaks in very similar terms of genius as reaching deep under­
ground sources of inspiration through a reculer pour mieux sauter, as con­
trasted with pathological conditions representing a reculer sans sauter.

The Crucial Role ofA nalogy and Metaphor

The psychoanalytic concepts of primary process and regression in ser­
vice of the ego provide useful ways of talking about subliminal contribu­
tions to creative activity, but they remain primarily descriptive and rely
upon a psychological theory which derives mainly from clinical practice and
observation. E. F. Kelly (1962) attempted to account for the same descrip­
tive properties in more mechanistic fashion, utilizing Heinz Werner's ( 1957)
broader-based comparative psychology of mental development. Creative
inspiration was again portrayed in much the same terms, emphasizing the
emergence into consciousness of pregnant figurative constructs-images,
symbols, metaphors, analogies, and the like-organized at an unconscious
level; the main novelty, only partly successful, consisted in an attempt to
show how such constructs might form spontaneously in accordance with

21. Not all mainstream psychologists agree, however. R. J. Sternberg and Lubart (1999), for
example, provide just a two-paragraph summary of psychoanalytic contributions, and then
dismiss the entire subject from further consideration, saying only that "although the psycho­
dynamic approach may have offered some insights into creativity, psychodynamic theory was
not at the center of the emerging scientific psychology" (p. 6).
460-Chapter 7

Werner's account of the mechanisms involved in "primitive" perceptual and

conceptual processes.
Common to all these pre-CTM 20th-century accounts was a recogni­
tion of the fundamental role of analogizing in creative activity, and more
generally of metaphor, broadly construed, as the language of the imagina­
tion. Such recognition was hardly original with them, of course: According
to Aristotle, for example, the "greatest thing by far is to have a command of
metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius,
for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances" (Butcher,
1 95 1 , p. 87). For Emerson as for Myers, analogy represented the fundamen­
tal movement of thought, its capacity to penetrate to hidden affinities link­
ing things behind the diversity of their surface appearances. Emerson's god­
son William James ( I890b) accorded analogy a similarly prominent position
within his psychology, declaring the grasping of sameness to be "the very
keel and backbone of our thinking" (vol. 1 , p. 459). Indeed, for him it lies at
the very heart of genius: "Some people are far more sensitive to resemblances,
andfar more ready to point out wherein they consist, than others are. They are
the wits, the poets, the inventors, the scientific men, the practical geniuses.
A native talentfor perceiving analogies is reckoned by Prof. Bain, and by oth­
ers before and after him, as the leading fact in genius of every order" (vol. 1 ,
pp. 529-530). Large-scale analogies have unquestionably played an impor­
tant historical role in shaping scientific thought, two prominent examples
being Laplace's clockwork universe and contemporary efforts to construe
the mind as some sort of computational system. At a lower level Draaisma
(2000) has documented the role of technological metaphors in the evolu­
tion of memory theory, and ironically enough even Perkins (2000), who has
explicitly argued against the importance of analogy in creative thinking,
develops his "nothing-special" theory in the context of an elaborate and sus­
tained analogy between creative effort and prospecting for gold in Alaska
(his "Klondike space" metaphor). The capacity for metaphor, in sum, plays
an important role even in scientific thinking, and it represents an important
element of our overall cognitive organization.

The Failure o/ Computational Theories 0/ Analogy

As noted in Chapter 1 , mainstream cognitive science of the last few
decades has rediscovered these truths. In addition to the important descrip­
tive studies of metaphor by linguist George Lakoff and his colleagues
(Lakoff, 1993, 1 995; Lakoff & Turner, 1 989), a large amount of computer
modeling of analogy processes has been carried out under the auspices of
the CTM, work collectively characterized by practitioners Holyoak and
Thagard (1995) as having produced "great progress" and constituting what
is "undoubtedly one of the success stories of cognitive science" (p. 25 1).
We respectfully demur, and must now attempt at least briefly to explain
why. Our goal here will be to cut through a large and complex literature to
what we perceive as its core problem, which is essentially the inability of all
existing computational models to address the fundamental issues of seman-
 Genius-461

tics or meaning and the intentional activity of knowing human subjects­

the heart of the mind (Chapter I). Non-specialist readers are forewarned
that this section may prove hard going on a first reading.
A comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of recent analogy work is pro­
vided by Gentner, Holyoak, and Kokinov (2001), but we will begin with
two leading exemplars, the structure-mapping theory of Gentner ( 1983),
implemented primarily in the form of their "structure-mapping engine"
(SME; Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1 989; Forbus, Gentner, & Law,
1 994), and the "multiconstraint" theory of Holyoak and Thagard (1 995),
implemented primarily in the form of their "analogical constraint mapping
engine"(ACME; Holyoak & Thagard, 1 989) and programs for "analogical
retrieval by constraint satisfaction" (ARCS; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997;
Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson, & Gochfeld, 1 990). There are many significant
differences among these models, but for our purposes what matters more is
their similarities. We will now sketch these common properties, acknowl­
edging that our description is necessarily terse and that interested readers
may need to consult the original sources to gain a fuller appreciation of
what we are talking about.
Like all cognitive models inspired by the CTM, these models of analogy
processing incorporate two principal components: (1) representations of the
model's knowledge in some cognitive domain or domains, and (2) computa­
tional processes that operate on these representations to produce the desired
behavior. In almost all of the analogy work, as in classical cognitive science
generally, "knowledge" is represented in some sort of predicate-calculus­
like logical format which identifies the objects talked about, their properties
(the predicates that apply to them), and the relations (possibly multiplace)
in which they can participate. Expressions incorporating these elements can
serve as arguments in higher-order expressions, permitting very complex
propositional structures to be built up. Two important things to note here
are: first, that English words are routinely used to identify the various prop­
erties, functions, and relations that make up the knowledge representation
language; and second, that the representations used by the analogy-map­
ping programs are typically hand-crafted by their human designers.
SME and ACM E are concerned only with interpretation of analogies,
and not with their production, which is a far harder problem. "Interpre­
tation" amounts here to identifying the best-possible mapping between
knowledge in a source domain and knowledge in a target domain, each char­
acterized by a representation of the above-indicated sort. ACME does this
(in what seems to us a somewhat more realistic manner, psychologically
speaking) by using a connectionist network to settle on the most coherent
way of picking out the cross-domain correspondences between elements of
the same type-that is, correspondences of objects with objects, predicates
with predicates, and relations with relations-given the available knowledge
representations. In this way, for example, Socrates' description of himself as
"a midwife of ideas" is said to be correctly interpreted when this constraint­
satisfaction mechanism discovers that the expression:
462-Chapter 7

( I ) cause ((helps (obj-midwife obj-mother)) (give_birth_to (obj-mother

obj-child)))

which expresses the system's knowledge in the midwifery (source) domain,

maps onto:

(2) cause ((helps (Socrates obj - student)) ( knows_truth_or_falsity (obj-stu­

dent obj-idea)))

in the Socrates (target) domain in such a way that Socrates bears the same
relationship to ideas as midwives do to babies (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989,
pp. 344-347). Boden (1991, p. 1 74) gushes over this result, characterizing it
as a step toward understanding what takes place in the mind of a human
reader of Shakespeare's famous passage in Macbeth about "sleep that knits
up the ravelled sleave of care," and Holyoak and Thagard (1995, p. 258)
thank her for her "fine overview" of their work on analogy.
We feel obliged to register our astonishment that anyone could take this
example, representative of many similar examples in the broader analogy
literature, so seriously. To us it seems utter caricature of real human under­
standing, "explaining" nothing. We feel certain, too, that John Searle would
agree with this judgment, finding clear parallels to the hyperbole about
computer "story understanding" that originally provoked his critique of the
CTM, all of which applies here (Chapter I).
In this case, however, we can also call upon one further witness who is
even more important, because he differs from both Searle and ourselves in
sharing the basic philosophical commitments of the CTM, and has himself
worked extensively on the subject of analogy. We refer to computer scien­
tist Douglas Hofstadter, who with his "Fluid Analogies Research Group"
(FARG) has tenaciously pursued a radically different and highly innovative
approach to analogy that is rooted in the study of "microdomains" such
as letter-string problems rather than "macro domain" or high-level analo­
gies of the Socrates/midwife sort. Hofstadter and FARG ( 1995) provide not
only an illuminating history of their own efforts, packed with important
psychological and computational insights, but trenchant critiques of their
"real-world" competitors, including in particular SME and ACME, as well
as many other leading projects in cognitive psychology and artificial intel­
ligence including scientific-discovery and story-writing programs.
We will mention here just a few of Hofstadter's most telling criticisms
of SME and ACME, which are also the ones most important for our own
purposes. First, these "real-world" approaches essentially bypass the cru­
cial issue as to how concepts or representations are acquired or constructed
in the first place, leaving it to the designers to provide all the necessary
"knowledge" in precisely the right form. Both systems lack the dynamic
flexibility of human cognition and depend too strongly on the detailed struc­
ture of the representations provided them in advance. Hofstadter wonders,
appropriately, what would happen if these "source" and "target" knowl­
edge representations were coded independently by different persons. Most
 Genius-463

importantly, and like many other AI projects, SME and ACME engender
a strong "Eliza" effect (Weizenbaum, 1 976)-that is, an atmosphere of
meaningfulness which depends strongly upon the use of English-like words
and expressions in their representational notations. Such notations, even if
intended simply as mnemonic aids, covertly engage the semantic capabili­
ties of designers or observers of the system and encourage them to project
these capabilities into the system itself (the homunculus problem; Chapter
1). But, Hofstadter argues, SME and ACME are in reality "hollow," seman­
tically empty; they know nothing about Socrates, midwifery, or anything
else, and operate entirely syntactically, in terms of the forms employed in
the notation. To underscore this last point Hofstadter suggests replacing the
English-like words and expressions of the original notation with letters or
numbers. In that case everything would work exactly as before, except that
the specious atmosphere of meaningfulness would be dispelled.22
Hofstadter's critique of these high-level analogy programs, in our opin­
ion, is fair, thorough, and devastating. We wish only to add one further point
related specifically to ARCS, the program for retrieving suitable analogs of
a given word from long-term memory. Both Boden (1991, p. 174) and Holy­
oak and Thagard ( 1995, p. 252) make much of the fact that ARCS utilizes
information from WordNet, an electronic thesaurus of English developed
independently at Princeton by George Miller and colleagues (Miller, Beck­
with, Fellbaum, Gross, & Miller, 1990). Boden in particular suggests that
ARCS thereby gains access to a significant part of the conceptual system
underlying English, but this suggestion needs to be carefully qualified. As
Miller and Fellbaum (1991, pp. 200-201) made clear, WordNet is not "con­
structive" but merely "differential": It explicitly labels a variety of semantic
properties of entries and semantic relations that hold between entries, but it
does not attempt to represent the meanings of entries directly; rather, it sim­
ply provides brief definitions ("glosses") sufficient to allow fluent speakers
of English to identify meanings which they are presumed already to possess .
Although WordNet helps ARCS retrieve words semantically related to a
target word, it does so syntactically, by virtue of the labels provided, and has
no understanding of word meanings themselves.
If meaning cannot successfully be captured by standard forms of high­
level symbolic cognitive architecture, how then are we to deal with it? Hof­
stadter believes that he has the answer, and that his approach, radically dif­
ferent, ratifies the fundamental connectionist faith that "human cognitive
phenomena are emergent statistical effects of a large number of small, local,
and distributed sub cognitive effects with no global executive" (Hofstadter
& FARG, 1 995, p. 291). Abandoning the forlorn hopes of those who attempt
to get at high-level semantics directly, Hofstadter turns instead to a variety
of microdomains in which, he believes, all the essential features of human
cognition are present, but in more tractable form. His goal, as the book's

22. This same exercise, incidentally, was suggested by E. F. Kelly ( 1 975, p. 72) as a way to
strip the "semantic markers" of 1. 1. Katz and Fodor ( 1964) of their atmosphere of telegraphic
speech.
464-Chapter 7

subtitle indicates, is to develop "computer models of the fundamental mech­

anisms of thought."
The centerpiece of this work is Copycat, a computer program which
generates solutions to analogy problems of the following sort: Suppose the
letter-string aabc were changed to aabd; how would you change the letter­
string ijkk in the "same way"? No brief description can possibly do justice
to the marvelous ingenuity of this program, but we must attempt to convey
enough of its flavor to get to our central point (full details can be found in
Hofstadter & FARG, 1 995; and M. Mitchell, 1 993). The program's archi­
tecture includes three main components: First is the "slipnet," which rep­
resents Copycat's pre-supplied or "Platonic" knowledge and plays a cru­
cial role in its dynamic behavior. This knowledge includes the letters of
the alphabet and the numbers 1 -5, with each successive pair of each group
linked by labeled connections indicating their successor/predecessor rela­
tionships, and a variety of other things including pairs such as first and
last, leftmost and rightmost, and predecessor and successor, all of which are
again explicitly labeled as "opposites" (M. Mitchell, 1 993, p. 47). Second is
the "workspace," essentially a short-term or working memory in which can­
didate solution structures are dynamically assembled in parallel fashion.
Finally, the "coderack" contains a large repertoire of "codelets," essentially
micro-level programs or "agents" that launch themselves opportunistically,
when their conditions of execution are satisfied by structures appearing in
the workspace, or occasionally if they are selected by a random process.23
Each of Copycat's problem runs is dominated at first by bottom-up or
"open-minded" influences consisting of competitive interactions among a
host of codelets operating in parallel, but as processing continues and larger
candidate solution structures begin to form, top-down or "closed-minded"
influences come increasingly into play, reflecting "pressures" created both
by the emerging structures themselves and by the changing configuration
of the slipnet, which is "rubbery" and dynamically adjusts the "distances"
among its concepts in response to the situation at hand. These dynamic
properties represent Hofstadter's way of modeling the context-dependent
conceptual halos and "slippages" that he regards as crucial properties of
human thinking. A measure of "temperature" falls as the level of "good­
ness" or order in the workspace increases, but that order itself emerges spon­
taneously from the collective activity of these low-level processes. There is
no central executive.
That will have to do by way of description of Copycat. No one who
studies this program can fail to admire its ingenuity, but what is its real sig-

23. On pp. 291-295 Hofstadter makes some especially interesting remarks concerning
the position of Copycat's computational architecture with respect to that of conventional
symbolic and connectionist models. It is not a hybrid or mixture of these, but intermedi­
ate between the two. Most importantly, it embodies a fundamental operational distinction
between types (the Platonic constituents of the slipnet) and tokens (their instances in the work­
space), a distinction which Hofstadter believes is essential to all cognitive activity but cannot
be captured by conventional connectionist models. His arguments here are in fact strikingly
parallel to those of 1. Fodor (2001), who has abandoned the CTM altogether.
 Genius�465

nificance? Commentators from the "real-world" faction have been inclined

to dismiss Hofstadter's microdomain approach simply on grounds that it
seems too tiny, too remote from the high-level problems of interest to them,
but Hofstadter defends himself repeatedly and ably against such facile
responses. The real core issue, he argues, has nothing to do with the size
or subject matter per se of problem domains, but rather with their ability
to engender real progress on fundamental issues of cognitive theory, and
especially progress on the core problem of meaning.
We agree with this view, and here we come to the crux of the matter:
Hofstadter believes there is a fundamental difference between Copycat and
the semantically empty "real-world" analogy programs, in that symbols in
Copycat, such as "successor," "acquire at least some degree of genuine mean­
ing, thanks to their correlation with actual phenomena, even if those phe­
nomena take place in a tiny and artificial world" (Hofstadter & FARG, 1995,
p. 290). Unlike SME and ACME, he argues, Copycat can survive the label­
substitution test-for example, replacing "successor" with "SIGMA" -for
the following reason: "An astute human watching the performance of Copy­
cat and seeing the term 'SIGMA' evoked over and over again by the pres­
ence of successor relationships and successorship groups in many diverse
problems would be likely to make the connection after a while, and then
might say, 'Oh, I get it-it appears that the Lisp atom 'SIGMA' stands for
the idea of successorship'" (p. 290).
But this core argument, we submit, is specious: In his zeal to sustain the
CTM, Hofstadter has simply confused what a conscious, intelligent human
observer can learn about Copycat by observing its behavior with what
Copycat itself "knows." He has failed to recognize that the really essential
feature of this micro domain consists in the fact that he is able to limit all
relevant "meanings" to those which can be transformed into formal or syn­
tactic properties of letters and letter-strings, as defined by the slipnet. Like
SME and ACME, Copycat itself "knows" nothing about successorship or
anything else. The claimed contrast with real-world analogy programs is
therefore not fundamental, and the problems of meaning and intentionality
in knowing subjects remain unsolved.24
In sum, neither the "real-world" analogy programs nor Hofstadter's
micro domain approach have as yet done much to illuminate even analogi­
cal thinking of quite pedestrian forms, let alone the more dramatic forms of
metaphor and symbolism accompanying inspirations of genius.

24. It is a bit ironic, in this light, that despite his own earlier warnings about the Eliza
effect in high-level analogy programs, Hofstadter himself begins talking ever more loosely
about Copycat as "seeing," "knowing," "judging," "understanding," "focusing its attention,"
"believing," and so on. On the other hand, it is no surprise that he loathes the "biochauvin­
ism" of philosophers such as John Searle (p. 290) and that he applauds the linguistic achieve­
ments of Terry Winograd's SHRDLU without mentioning Winograd's subsequent defection
from AI (p. 3 1 1 ; see also our Chapter 1).
466-Chapter 7

Implications for Cognitive Theory

But the problems go even deeper, in fact, than we have so far indicated:
Analogical thinking cannot properly be thought of as some sort of special
case, to be handled by mechanisms isolated from the main parts of our cog­
nitive system. Rather, it is simply a relatively conspicuous expression of a
cognitive capacity which pervades even the most mundane uses of every­
day language, but which has not yet received the attention it deserves. We
refer here to the ubiquitous phenomenon of generality in word meaning,
discussed in detail in E. F. Kelly ( 1975). This is something very different
from "slippage," the primary implementation in Copycat of Hofstadter's
important and general ideas about the role of "fluidity" in human think­
ing. "Slippage" for him means a discrete shift from one sharply-defined
concept to a different but related concept-for example, from "successor"
to "predecessor"-whether triggered by "pressures" or by a random deci­
sion. Generality, by contrast, involves the deployment of a single concept in
semantically appropriate ways to a diversity of novel circumstances. This
is distinct on the one hand from polysemy, the possession by a general term
of multiple distinct senses, and on the other from vagueness, under which
we include not only human-type uncertainty about the applicability of a
general term to particular cases, but also failures of discrimination, as in a
connectionist network.
The main thrust of the lengthy discussion in E. F. Kelly ( 1 975), which
we will not repeat here, is to show that generality of word meaning is far
more pervasive than most psychologists and linguists realize. Its pervasive­
ness and importance only become apparent when one is forced to confront
large numbers of everyday usages of common words side-by-side, an expe­
rience that few contemporary cognitive scientists have had. Note also that
this fundamental property of word meaning is closely related to the manner
in which memory-knowledge "transcends" or "overflows" its expressions in
specific episodes of remembering, as discussed in Chapter 4. Neither phe­
nomenon is adequately accounted for by current cognitive theories of "rep­
resentation," and both have been largely ignored in the vast psychological
literature on "concepts" (Komatsu, 1 992; Medin & Heit, 1 999; E. E. Smith
& Medin, 1 98 1). We can only concur with Hofstadter and FARG ( 1995) that
"the question 'what is a concept?' could be said to lie at the crux of cognitive
science, and yet concepts still lack a firm scientific basis" (p. 294).
Meanwhile, what must be fully appreciated is that the domain of met­
aphor, which scholars have tended to identify with lofty flights of poetic
and artistic imagination and to think of as something special, extends in
reality downward to the most pedestrian fig ures of speech of everyday par­
lance, where it shades over into ordinary generality. As Emerson (1837/1983)
remarked, "language is fossil poetry" (p. 457). But there is an evident inner
unity linking highest to lowest, and all are expressions in varying degrees
 Genius-467

of a fundamental and still-unexplained activity of our cognitive organiza­

tion.25
This already has serious implications for cognitive science, but there
is still more to be said. Let us continue for a moment with metaphor and
related modes of symbolism. Above all else, these represent attempts to
understand, construe, or express something in terms of something else. Phi­
losopher Max Black (1 962, 1 990) has done a particularly good job, we think,
of characterizing this process in a psychologically realistic way. Metaphor
breaks rules, but in service of a deeper fidelity. It is inherently creative, for
"there can be no rules for 'creatively' violating rules" (Black, 1 990, p. 55).
Good metaphors illuminate; they express and promote insight, through a
sort of tension or "interanimation" between individual concepts or large
conceptual domains which are kept simultaneously in view. As emphasized
particularly by Black, this interanimation often goes far beyond the sort
of abstract or literal point-by-point comparison between pre specified and
static attributes and relations contemplated by structure-matching theorists
such as Gentner (1 983). Indeed, and as Myers also suggested, in the most
important cases the subject being construed or expressed may itself only
become known, or at least better known, as a result of this symbolic process.
Bowra ( 1955) nicely captures this in his continuing description of creative
inspiration: "What begins by being almost unconscious becomes conscious;
what is at the start an outburst of energy infused with a vague idea or an
undifferentiated vision becomes concrete and definite; what is outside the
poet's control is gradually made to submit to his will and judgment" (pp.
5-6).
The critical point here is once again that these more extreme forms of
"interanimation" have pedestrian analogs at the core of everyday cognition.
This is in fact implied by the phenomenon of generality of word meaning
discussed above: Examination of the entries given by desk dictionaries for
common words such as "make," "take," "turn," "hand," or "go" reveals that
the number of psychologically real meanings is far lower than the number
of usages listed, and indeed those numbers vary enormously among com­
mercial dictionaries for every such word. But if this is the case, compre­
hension of words in context becomes not a matter of selecting among large
numbers of pre-existing, highly specific, and static meanings, but of mutual
adjustment or interanimation involving smaller numbers of more general
and elastic ones. E. F. Kelly (1 975) argued that an appropriate model or pro-

25. To describe this activity, of course, is not to explain it. Common to all recent attempts by
cognitive psychologists to explain it, from Tversky ( 1 977) to the real-world analogy theorists,
is the idea that we can structure the representations of the relevant concepts and things in
such a way that their "similarity" is intrinsic and can be directly computed from properties of
those representations themselves. Formidable difficulties stand in the way of any such proj­
ect, however, as shown in particular by philosophers such as McClendon ( 1 955) and Good­
man ( 1972). As Goodman summarizes his results, "similarity tends under analysis either to
vanish entirely or to require for its explanation just what it purports to explain" (p. 446). For
a notable recent attempt to find a way through these difficulties, see Goldstone (1994); but see
also our Chapter I and below.
468-Chapter 7

totype for contextual understanding is therefore not enforcement of "selec­

tion restrictions" (1. 1. Katz & Fodor, 1 964), but the philosophical notion of
"syncategorematicity," originally developed in relation to evaluative con­
cepts such as "good." The basic idea is that the meaning of "good" changes
systematically when predicated of violinists, horses, ideas, and so on, but
in a manner that is intelligible in terms of the varying natures of the things
so labeled. Similarly, the phrases "eat bread" and "eat soup" do not involve
different meanings of "eat" (Weinreich, 1 966, p. 41 1) but an adjustment of
one more general sense to the different things eaten; a "tiny" elephant is far
larger than a "gigantic" mouse, and so on, without end.
Here again we connect with frontline issues in cognitive theory. Whereas
most of the work to date on concepts deals only with categorization, the
principles by which diverse things are grouped together or recognized as
instances of a single concept, we wish instead to emphasize the closely
related and even more fundamental problem of conceptual combination. A
similar basic impulse clearly underlies other recent developments such as
the work of Lakoff and his colleagues on metaphor, the "generative lexi­
con" of Pustejovsky (1995), the "cognitive grammar" of Langacker ( 1990,
1 999), the "construction-integration" model of discourse comprehension by
Kintsch (1998), and the mutual-constraint "coherence" model of Holyoak
and Thagard (1995), subsequently generalized by Thagard (1997, 2000) and
applied not only to creativity but to a host of related topics in psychology
and philosophy. We welcome all these developments as headed in the right
direction, but find all of them fatally flawed by their dependence on the
grossly inadequate notational devices presently available for representation
and combination of "knowledge." One good example here is that of the real­
world analogy programs, discussed above. More generally, most of the work
carried out so far on "conceptual combination" hardly gets beyond hack­
neyed specimens of the "colorful ball" or "pet fish" type. Sooner or later we
are going to have to come to grips with the full-blown phenomenology of
creative imagination-its coadunative, alembic, and esemplastic powers as
conceived by persons such as Coleridge and Myers.
There is one last and even more basic point we wish to highlight here,
without much argument, before concluding this section. Cognitive science
is also going to have to give up its reliance on the fundamentally flawed idea
that semantics can be treated as intrinsic to the sorts of representational
structures it employs. In the first instance it is seldom if ever the case that a
concept can plausibly be regarded as having a single, fixed structure inde­
pendent of the circumstances in which it is used. Even more importantly, no
such structure, however complex, can fully determine the conditions of its
own application. That gap can only be bridged by the intentional activity
of a conscious mind with the capacity to use representational forms of all
sorts-be they words, phrases, sentences, analogies, metaphors, parables,
allegories, images, symbols, charts, maps, equations, diagrams, blueprints,
models, sketches in sand, or whatever-to achieve and express insight about
states of affairs in the world. These problems are immensely difficult, and
 Genius-469

despite the efforts of the early Gestalt psychologists (Mayer, 1 995, 1999)
present-day cognitive science remains very far from solving them. We can
again only concur with Hofstadter when he says candidly that "though few
seem to recognize or admit it, ours is a field still searching for its founda­
tions" (Hofstadter & FARG, 1 995, p. 376). For related discussion see Chap­
ters 1 , 4, and 9.

Summary
Let us now try to summarize this long discussion of "incommensura­
bility," all of it precipitated by Myers's trenchant comments on differences
between supraliminal and subliminal forms of mentation. Recent decades
have witnessed a welcome renewal of interest among mainstream psycholo­
gists in topics such as imagery, analogy, and metaphor that are deeply inter­
twined with the psychology of genius. In regard to analogy in particular,
serious attempts have been made to account for routine "real-world" forms
of the phenomenon using conventional cognitive formalisms, but despite
claims to the contrary these attempts have produced little if any real prog­
ress. The unconventional "micro domain" approach of Hofstadter and
FARG (1995) has fared little better, although it is in many ways more inter­
esting. Meanwhile, it has also become evident that the aspects or properties
of cognition that make these mid-level problems so intractable in computa­
tionalist terms reach not only upward, to the even more difficult phenomena
associated with genius, but downward, to the most mundane forms of every­
day cognition. In consonance with Wind's principle, an adequate cognitive
psychology of genius will surely accommodate the psychology of everyday
cognition, but a truly adequate psychology of everyday cognition is prob­
ably not attainable without it.
In this light, more intensive investigation of the cognitive character
of subliminal contributions to genius-level creativity is certainly needed.
Older psychological theories of creative inspiration, such as those of the
various psychoanalysts, as well as E. F. Kelly (1962) and Koestler ( 1964),
have grappled more directly with these core phenomena, descriptively, but
fall short of explaining them in a satisfying way. All, significantly, share
one central theoretical commitment, which is to seek explanations of cre­
ative inspiration entirely in terms of regression to developmentally prior or
more "primitive" forms of symbolic activity that persist alongside the more
advanced, adult, reality-oriented forms associated with ordinary language.
Myers has a different and more radical idea: For him, that "something of
strangeness" and the sheer complexity as well as the prodigious memory and
speed of mental operations displayed by calculating boys, by automatists
such as Helene Smith and Patience Worth, and by major inspirations of
genius, all point to something which transcends ordinary forms of cognition
rather than simply preceding them developmentally. We will return to this
theme shortly.
470-Chapter 7

The Creative Personality

Any theory of the creative process entails consequences for a theory of cre­
ative personality, and Myers's unusually rich conception of inspiration as
subliminal uprush entails a correspondingly rich variety of implications
regarding personality structure, both in geniuses themselves and in human­
ity at large. His views in this area again not only correctly anticipate the
main trends in subsequent research, but in some cases point significantly
beyond them.

Genius and Mental Illness

We can conveniently begin to delineate these implications by revert­

ing briefly to Myers's discussion of the 19th-century "degeneracy" theorists
such as Lombroso, Nisbet, and Nordau. A tradition associating genius with
"madness" had of course existed since classical or even pre-classical times,
receiving its most influential early expression in Plato's Phaedrus. The 17th­
century poet John Dryden articulated a widely held view with his famous
epigram that "Great wits are sure to madness near allied / And thin par­
titions do their bounds divide." The degeneracy theorists, however, took
this much further. Self-consciously wrapping themselves in the mantle of
science, authors of this stripe issued numerous and widely circulated polem­
ics which in effect identified genius with "madness," "insanity," or "degen­
eracy," claiming that such an identification was fully justified by advances
in 1 9th-century biological psychology.
Myers was one of the few who disputed this facile reductionism, and his
reasons were cogent. Beginning in section 3 1 5 of HP, he comments directly
on Lombroso as representative of the degeneracy movement. There is first
a sampling problem, in that Lombroso included along with real geniuses
many persons whose eminence derived from sheer hard work or histori­
cal accidents rather than the characteristic psychological qualities of genius
itself. Second, his piling up of "anecdotes of the follies and frailties" (HP,
vol. 1 , p. 91) of the eminent is certainly insufficient to establish his central
thesis: For one thing, the availability of such stories may reflect little more
than the relatively intense scrutiny such persons receive. Subjected to simi­
lar scrutiny, Myers points out, "hardly a good easy man among us but might
be analysed into half neuropath and half Philistine if it would serve a the­
ory" (HP, vol. I, p. 91).26

26. This is particularly true, we should point out, given the excessive latitude of Lombro­
so's criteria for "eccentricity." These are sometimes bizarre by modern diagnostic standards,
including things such as short stature, odd physiognomy or skull shape, left-handedness,
leanness, rickets, and excessive yawning. His procedures also share with those of modern
investigators such as Jamison ( 1993) a problem of circularity due to direct overlap between
features of creativity itself and features supposedly diagnostic of the form of psychopathol-
 Genius-471

Despite these defects in Lombroso's procedures, however, Myers rec­

ognizes that "there are underlying facts of great importance which give to
his view such plausibility as it possesses" (HP, vol. 1, p. 92). What Myers
denies is not the existence of a relationship between genius and madness,
but its interpretation by the degeneracy theorists. Abnormality in a statis­
tical sense is not necessarily pathological, Myers contends. What matters
is the causal structure underlying the observed correlation. For him that
correlation reflects the fact that genius and madness share, as an essential
common feature, an unusual openness to the subliminal. The degeneracy
theorists, however, had missed a crucial difference-namely, that genius
masters its subliminal uprushes, whereas the insane are overwhelmed by
theirsY Genius is not degenerate but "progenerate," reflecting increased
strength and concentration of inward unifying control (HP, vol. I , p. 70) and
increased utilization of subliminal forms of mentation in service of supra­
liminal purpose. Indeed, in its highest developments genius represents the
truest standard of excellence, and a more appropriate criterion of "normal­
ity" than conformity to a statistical average.
William James was largely in agreement with these views and expanded
on them in the culminating lecture of his Lowell series on "exceptional men­
tal states" (E. Taylor, 1 984). Subject to depressive episodes himself, James
took special pains to examine in a more detailed way the arguments of the
degeneracy theorists, and he identified at least two additional problems of a
general sort. First was the issue of overdiagnosis, based on inadequate diag­
nostic criteria: Against any presumption that hallucinations are invariably
diagnostic for psychopathology, for example, James pointed to the demon­
strations by Myers and his colleagues that waking hallucinations are not
uncommon in the lives of otherwise normal persons (Bentall, 2000; Gurney
et aI., 1 886). Secondly, there are many examples of geniuses, even poetic
geniuses, who were paragons of balance and stability. Here James cites
Schiller, Browning, and George Sand, along with various members of his
own community such as Emerson, Longfellow, Lowell, Whittier, and Oliver
Wendell Holmes. Madness therefore is certainly not necessary for genius,
although it may sometimes combine with intellect and will to produce it.
What madness provides in such cases-what really is necessary, and can
also occur in its absence-is uprushes from the "seething cauldron" of the
subliminal, as described by Myers.
This basic Myers/James interpretation of relations between genius and
mental illness has been confirmed and refined by subsequent research,
including not only clinical and biographical investigations but also experi-

ogy with which it is being compared. For Lombroso, for example, "eccentricity" is also indi­
cated by characteristics such as word-coining, originality, and flights of imagination.
27. Compare this statement by Charles Lamb from his remarkable three-page essay "San­
ity of True Genius": "The ground of the mistake is, that men, finding in the raptures of the
higher poetry a condition of exaltation, to which they have no parallel in their own experi­
ence, besides the spurious resemblance of it in dreams and fevers, impute a state of dreami­
ness and fever to the poet. But the true poet dreams being awake. He is not possessed by his
subject but has dominion over it" (E. V. Lucas, 1 903, pp. 1 8 7-1 89).
472-Chapter 7

mental and quantitative studies of various types. We will next briefly survey
some highlights of this large literature.
The clinical side of things was of course at first mainly in the custody
of the Freudian school of psychodynamic theorists, which to a consider­
able extent followed the degeneracy theorists in emphasizing regressive,
unconsciously determined, and seemingly pathological aspects of genius
to the exclusion of those aspects of rational, conscious control that Myers
and James recognized as equally fundamental to success of the creative
enterprise. Freud himself was profoundly ambivalent toward genius and the
imagination, greatly admiring them but deeply suspicious of their origins
(Storr, 1972). Creative imagination, like the dream, was viewed by Freud
as substitute gratification, the disguised expression of unacceptable wishes
and impulses. Behind it all there is nothing but a deep inability to confront
"reality." Leonardo da Vinci, for example, was characterized by Freud as a
repressed homosexual who sublimated his unacceptable urges into scientific
curiosity and the production of great works of art. Of course there is little
if any historical evidence that Leonardo himself was a closet homosexual,
and there have certainly been a great many repressed homosexuals, but few
Leonardos. Freud was apparently undeterred by such considerations, how­
ever, and legions of his disciples followed his example, producing specula­
tive accounts of wildly varying plausibility of the neurotic origins of various
great works of art and literature (see, e.g., W. Phillips, 1 957). These psycho­
analytic accounts mainly addressed supposed neurotic conflicts of creative
geniuses in relation to the thematic content of their works, for as Freud
himself had acknowledged in his study of Leonardo, the creative act itself
remained unexplained.
We have already described in relation to the creative process how ortho­
dox Freudian theory gradually gave way to reformists such as Kris (1952)
and Kubie ( 1958), who adopted views much closer to those of Myers and
James. Kubie's conception of the "preconscious" in particular has a great
deal in common with Myers's conception of the subliminal; it is the home
of imagination, and the vital source of creativity and dreams, rich in affec­
tively loaded symbolism, analogy, and imagery. While retaining Freud's
conception of a truly inaccessible dynamic unconscious which harbors
actively repressed and unacceptable wishes and urges, Kubie ( 1958) treats
this as the source not of creativity itself, as in Freud's view, but of limitations
and distortions in an otherwise healthy psychological process: In a nutshell,
"neurosis corrupts, mars, distorts, and blocks creativeness in every field"
(p. 142). Correspondingly, the creative person is one who enj oys an unusual
degree of conflict-free intimacy with preconscious processes, and who thus
for Kubie as for Myers is a model of psychological health. Closely similar
views in regard to art and neurosis were expressed from the point of view of
literary theory in an excellent essay by Lionel Trilling (1 953).
The psychoanalytic concept of "neurosis" of course corresponds to
relatively mild forms of "insanity" or "madness" as understood by the
1 9th-century degeneracy theorists. As psychiatry advanced and its diagnos-
 Genius-473

tic categories and procedures evolved, attention also focused on relations

between genius and more severe forms of mental illness, including in partic­
ular schizophrenia and the affective spectrum disorders (manic-depressive
or bipolar disorder, major depression, etc.). A sizeable literature developed
in which increasingly refined diagnostic procedures were applied either ret­
rospectively, to the biographies or autobiographies of outstandingly cre­
ative historical personages, or in clinical-type research with living persons
of varying degrees of eminence.
We can quickly summarize the main results of this research, which are
clear and consistent (Eysenck, 1 995; Jamison, 1 993; Juda, 1 949; Ludwig,
1 995; Nettle, 2001; Post, 1 994; R. L. Richards, 1 98 1): There is definitely an
elevated incidence of significant mental illness among highly creative per­
sons, and in particular an elevated incidence of affective spectrum disorders
among poets, writers, and artists. However, this statistical linkage provides
no warrant for any direct or thoroughgoing identification between such ill­
nesses and the psychological conditions of creative activity. Even among
poets and writers, for example, where the incidence of affective disorders
is highest, it falls far short of universality. Conversely, the vast majority of
victims of bipolar disorder and severe depression are certainly not creative
geniuses. There may also be some overestimation of incidences, since even
modern diagnostic manuals have included aspects of creativity as criteria
for the relevant diagnostic entities. The DSM-III used by Jamison (1 993), for
example, included among its criteria for hypomania "sharpened and unusu­
ally creative thinking" and "increased productivity, often with unusual and
self-imposed working hours" (p. 265). Furthermore, even when overt psy­
chopathology is incontrovertibly present-as it clearly sometimes is-its
causal relation to the creativity is not always clear. The higher incidence of
depression among artists and writers, for example, may partly be a conse­
quence rather than a cause of the creative life, owing to the relatively greater
risks and uncertainties of such life for them as compared, say, with scien­
tists. Conversely, the suffering occasioned by mental illness may translate
more directly for them than for scientists into experiences potentially useful
for their creative purposes. There is also the important issue of temporal
relations between creative production and outbursts of disorder. Severe and
chronic disorders such as schizophrenia, for example, typically put an end
to whatever of creativity was present beforehand, and severe depression
commonly does so as well, at least temporarily.
Most importantly, a central recurring theme amidst all the reported
psychopathology is its coexistence with unusual levels of ego strength, man­
ifested in characteristics such as industry, drive, perseverance, organization,
discipline, independence of judgment, tolerance of ambiguity and frustra­
tion, and determination to master the subject at hand using any available
means of expression (Barron, 1 958, 1 963, 1 968, 1 969; Dellas & Gaier, 1 970,
p. 63; Eysenck, 1 995, p. 1 14). Even Jamison (1993, pp. 97-99), despite her
somewhat Lombroso-like tendency to emphasize the pathological, clearly
acknowledges this characteristic: "There is a great deal of evidence to sug-
474-Chapter 7

gest that, compared to 'normal' individuals, artists, writers, and creative

people in general, are both psychologically 'sicker'-that is, they score
higher on a wide variety of measures of psychopathology-and psychologi­
cally healthier (for example, they show quite elevated scores on measures of
self-confidence and ego strength" (p. 97) .28
This paradoxical combination of characteristics is evident even in the
extreme case of manic-depressive illness, which has been especially com­
mon in poets and is Jamison's special interest. She cites as emblematic Sea­
mus Heaney's extraordinary description, which Myers would certainly have
relished, of the poet Robert Lowell:

[Lowell] had in awesome abundance the poet's first gift for surrender
to those energies of language that heave to the fore matter that will not
be otherwise summoned, or that might be otherwise suppressed. Under
the ray of his concentrati:m, the molten stuff of the psyche ran hot and
unstanched. But its final form was as much beaten as poured, the cool­
ing ingot was assiduously hammered. A fully human and relentless intel­
ligence was at work upon the pleasuring quick of the creative act. He was
and will remain a pattern for poets in this amphibiousness, this ability to
plunge into the downward reptilian welter of the individual self and yet
raise himself with whatever knowledge he gained there out on the hard
ledges of the historical present. (Jamison, 1 993, p. 99)

Genius occurring in conjunction with manic-depressive illness, in sum,

is not a model of genius in general but a special case of the more general
model set forth by Myers. It has one key characteristic, however, that makes
it especially inviting as a subject for further research. Specifically, the stages
of the creative process are in this case temporally segregated to a consid­
erable degree, with the "uprush" of imaginative material-the "touch of
fire"-strongly linked to the hypomanic phase of the illness cycle.29 This
circumstance cries out for within-subject neurophysiological and imaging
studies of brain conditions accompanying the cyclic emergence of imagina­
tive activity, as Jamison herself observes (pp. 1 1 2-1 1 3). Not much has yet
been accomplished, unfortunately, along these lines.
Together with the other affective-spectrum disorders, manic-depres­
sive illness also forms part of an even larger picture of biological conditions

28. Compare Barron (1958, p. 164). Much of the extensive research that Jamison cites in
this connection derives from Frank Barron and the Institute for Personality Assessment and
Research (IPAR). Interestingly enough, Barron ( 1969, preface) has revealed that his transi­
tion from philosophy to psychology was spurred by reading Myers's Human Personality in
combination with James's Principles, and that this experience profoundly influenced all of his
subsequent work.
29. Jamison (1993, pp. 105-1 1 3) identifies two principal characteristics which connect the
thinking that occurs during this period with imagination as conceived by Myers, James, and
Coleridge, among others: First, its extreme fluency, speed, and flexibility; second, its formal
properties, including unusual forms of categorization and combination, merging of percepts,
ideas, and images, highly original associations and analogies, and elevated mood. For her
prime illustration of these characteristics, interestingly, she turns to Coleridge.
 Genius-475

conducive to creativity. Specifically, Eysenck ( 1995), Jamison ( 1993), Nettle

(2001), and R. L. Richards, Kinney, Lunde, Benet, and Merzel ( 1988) have
assembled data showing that a capacity for "strong imagination," which
may express itself either in psychosis or in creativity, is at least partly herita­
ble. Thus for example healthy relatives of mental patients show much higher
levels of creative accomplishment than members of the general population
(J. L. Karlsson, 1 984), first-degree relatives of creative persons show higher
incidence of mental illness (Andreasen, 1987), and genius, like manic-depres­
sive illness, tends to distribute along family lines even when the descendants
are adopted by other families (Jamison, 1 993; McNeill, 1971). Exactly what
the relevant genetic conditions are, and how they translate into brain condi­
tions conducive to strong imaginative activity, again remains to be eluci­
dated, although Eysenck in particular thinks of imagination primarily in
terms of "remote associations" and gravitates toward Martindale's account
of biological conditions conducive to these. Nettle in effect turns degen­
eracy theory on its head: Not only does psychosis not explain genius, he sug­
gests, but the social value of strong imagination in the form of genius may
itself explain the persistence of psychosis, which partially shares its genetic
underpinnings.
To summarize the discussion so far, extensive modern research on rela­
tions between genius and mental illness has strongly confirmed Myers's cen­
tral conception of genius as successful cooperation between supraliminal
and subliminal modes of cognition. Further confirmation derives from the
neglected subject of "art in the insane," which we can discuss only briefly
here (see also Grosso, in press). Whereas most of us rely excessively on
supraliminal modes of cognition, and fail to reach our full creative potential
due to insufficient access to the subliminal, these individuals represent the
opposite problem-superabundance of subliminal uprush unchecked by
the necessary supraliminal control. As Kris reported ( 1952), "every mental
institution in western civilization has its inmates who cover every scrap of
paper, every free place on wall or window sill, with words or shapes; there
are some who carve with any instrument at hand in any material to which
they can gain access or who model in bread if there is no clay" (p. 1 53).
These phenomena, which have largely been suppressed by the advent
of antipsychotic medications, formerly occurred in something like 1-2%
of hospitalized patients, usually schizophrenics (Kris, 1952). The creative
activity typically began spontaneously, often in persons with no relevant
prior training or experience, and went on at great intensity for periods rang­
ing from weeks to decades. The sheer volume of the material, as well as its
symbolic richness and complexity, is sometimes staggering: Adolf W6lfli,
for example, a paranoid schizophrenic, worked from 1908 to 1 930 on a mas­
sive narrative that amounts to a personal mythology, a mixture of authentic
personal history and cosmic fantasy, interwoven with prose, poetry, pic­
torial illustrations, and musical compositions. His corpus ultimately com­
prised some 25,000 packed pages, along with hundreds of drawings, many
of which now hang next to the work of Paul Klee in Switzerland (Spoerri,
476-Chapter 7

1 997). Morganthaler (1921/1992) was fascinated by WolfE's relentless cre­

ative output and observed the inmate at his worktable as he wrote and drew.
Wolfli would talk about the content of the work but had no idea how he
did what he did. Morganthaler observed that he worked from no previous
sketch and without conscious plan, yet the entire ongoing oeuvre seemed
guided by a single, compulsive, unifying intelligence (MacGregor, 1 989).
These phenomena clearly have more to do with automatism than
with conscious craft, and belong with the family of mediumistic creativ­
ity discussed above. Wolfli shares with Helene Smith in particular a profile
of extraordinary multi-modal creativity powerfully shaped by persistent
automatisms. All this of course is consistent with Myers's notion of sub­
liminal intelligence. Prinzhorn ( 1972/1995) viewed the phenomena in very
Myers-like terms as outpourings of a distinct and fundamental image-mak­
ing or world-generating capacity of the human mind, whereas Kris (1952)
interpreted them from his orthodox Freudian perspective as unusually
clear expressions of the primary-process mechanisms at work in ordinary
dream-formation. From either point of view, the art of the insane provides a
potentially important window on the workings of creative imagination and
deserves greater attention in that light.

Genius as Personality in Transformation

The brunt of our effort so far has been devoted to showing that Myers's
central conception of genius as successful cooperation between supraliminal
and subliminal forms of mentation has been strongly confirmed by subse­
quent research, and that this has significant ramifications even for contem­
porary mainstream cognitive science. This is by no means the whole story,
however, for his theory of genius as described so far is embedded within a
more comprehensive theoretical framework that pushes the envelope of cur­
rent mainstream thinking about both genius itself and human personality
in general even further (Chapter 2). We will conclude by sketching these
even more challenging features of his theory of genius.
For Myers, as we have said, genius is "evolutive," in contrast to the "dis­
solutive" phenomena associated with hysteria and other mental disorders.
He was profoundly influenced by Darwin, and strove to remain broadly
consistent with Darwin's evolutionary outlook while accommodating the
special facts being brought to light by psychical research. Myers portrays
genius as the norm of the future, representing a condition of improved psy­
chic integration. The genius thus stands for him among the vanguard on an
evolutionary track which humanity as a whole is pursuing, a track that leads
"in the direction of greater complexity in the perceptions which he forms of
things without, and of greater concentration in his own will and thought,­
in that response to perceptions which he makes from within" (HP, vol. 1 , pp.
77-78). This evolution, moreover, consists "not only of gradual self-adapta­
tion to a known environment, but of discovery of an environment, always
 Genius-477

there, but unknown" (HP, vol. I, p. 95). In Myers's "cosmical" theory of

evolution, this process of progressive discovery itself reflects progressive
mobilization of faculties initially latent in the subliminal, including facul­
ties (such as telepathy) which he believed cannot be regarded as products of
ordinary Darwinian ("planetary" or "terrene") evolution.
Although the main lines of Myers's argument for this more comprehen­
sive and obviously controversial view of evolution are initially deployed in
his chapter on genius, we need not attempt to evaluate them here. Myers
himself recognized that the phenomena of genius, while consistent with his
enlarged conception of the subliminal, cannot in themselves suffice to estab­
lish it: "The 'inspirations of genius' which seem to spring full-armed into
our ken from the depths of our being must count as a form of subliminal
faculty, although no theory of such faculty could be based solely upon men­
tal products so closely interwoven with supraliminal or voluntary thinking"
(HP, vol. I , p. 220). Following Myers's own lead, therefore, we will defer
discussion of his larger evolutionary theory to Chapter 9, when we will have
a larger supply of relevant facts at hand, and focus instead more narrowly
here on its expressions in the realm of genius.

The Creative Nisus: A Drive Toward Wholeness

For Myers, the essential link between genius and madness is that they
both reflect, in their differing ways, a "perturbation which masks evolu­
tion," an instability caused by the evolving dynamic interplay between
supraliminal and subliminal modes of mentation. Genius, however, effects
fuller "co-operation of the submerged with the emergent self" (HP, vol. I ,
p. 96), and in this way i t expresses a nisus (striving or drive) toward greater
psychic integration or wholeness that Myers sees as a fundamental property
of human nature. Thus, he says, the waking personality "will endeavor to
attain an ever completer control over the resources of the personality, and
it will culminate in what we term genius when it has unified the subliminal
as far as possible with the supraliminal in its pursuit of deliberate waking
ends" (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 52). Genius, in short, draws upon hidden resources of
the Self or Individuality in service of a more flourishing conscious life.
Expressions of such a nisus can be discerned in all the various forms
and levels of creative activity described above. It can be mobilized, for
example, in the treatment of cases of secondary personality (MPD/DID; see
our Chapter 5). Thus, Victor Race eventually began to take on the superior
qualities of his secondary personality, and early investigators such as Janet
and Binet came to understand more generally that their patients' multiple
selves represented opportunities for re-integration, healing, and enlarge­
ment of the waking personality. Similar positions have been reached by
two thoughtful contemporary students of MPD, Stephen Braude (1995) and
Adam Crabtree ( 1985), from their distinctive vantage points in philosophy
of mind and clinical practice, respectively. Crabtree ( 1985) specifically rec-
478-Chapter 7

ommends that the goal of therapy in such cases should be "to assist the
creation of a full-blown personality that embodies mixed elements already
existing within the individual in a disorganized way" (p. 225).
Similar integrative tendencies can often be seen at work in the related
but more benign domain of mediumistic creativity. The highly functional
Helene Smith, for example, said of herself that "I have never been so clear­
sighted, so lucid, so capable of judging rapidly on all points, as since I have
been developed as a medium" (HP, vol. 2 , p. 1 31). No one disputed these
observations, according to Myers, and his colleague Flournoy, who studied
her extensively, went even further, declaring that those who have looked into
mediumship most deeply "see in it a faculty superior, advantageous, healthy,
of which hysteria is a form of degenerescence, a pathological parody, a mor­
bid caricature" (HP, vol. 2, p. 1 32). Prince (1927/1964) responded in similar
fashion to Professor Cory's characterization of Pearl Curran as "disinte­
grated," noting that "to all appearances, and judging by her ability to meet
the crises and tests of life, she is splendidly integrated" (p. 462). Indeed,
Prince continues, "since somehow remarkable literature has resulted, and
according to all testimony her own mentality has been improved and her
life made happier and more effective since the arrival of 'Patience Worth',
it seems a pity that we cannot start an epidemic of disintegration." We gen­
erally agree with these sentiments, and we deplore the fact that the scien­
tific study of trance mediumship, so ably begun by persons of the stature of
Myers, James, Flournoy, Prince, and others has been so neglected in more
recent times. The psychology and neurophysiology of trance mediumship,
and its impact on the development of personality, cries out for further inves­
tigation using modern research tools.30
A drive toward integration is also observable among creative persons
suffering from various forms of overt psychopathology. Even WolfE, for
example, appeared through his writing and art to gain some degree of mas­
tery over the sexual and aggressive impulses that had led to his hospital­
ization. Writers such as Kubie ( 1958) and Trilling (1953) discuss in depth
how highly creative persons in effect utilize creative work to overcome the
fragmentation of their own personalities by neurotic conflicts, and in so
doing may help us to overcome ours. Jamison (1993) and especially Storr
( 1972) articulate similar views regarding the healing power of art, extending
them to more extreme forms of mental illness including in particular manic­
depressive illness.
Relatively healthy geniuses display a similar nisus, however. Ghiselin
( 1952) states that in general "the inventor, whether artist or thinker, creates
the structure of his psychic life by means of his words" (p. 1 3). This theme
also pervades the discussion by critic Harold Bloom (2002) of 100 geniuses
of literature. Genius in Bloom's view reflects an "aboriginal" compulsion

30. We do not mean to deny, however, that careless or superficial engagement with medi­
umship and associated practices such as the use of ouija boards and the like can sometimes
result from or lead to psychological problems. We also wish to dissociate ourselves from most
current commercial, stage, or TV "mediumship."
 Genius-479

toward the expansion of human consciousness, and thus at the top of his list
stands Shakespeare-"a consciousness shaped by all the consciousnesses
that he imagined. He remains, presumably forever, our largest instance of
the uses of literature for life, which is the work of augmenting conscious­
ness" (p. 1 2). Storr (1972) takes as paradigmatic a statement by composer
Aaron Copland, who, having first explained that the compulsion to create is
at bottom a need for self-expression, continues as follows:

But why is the job never done? Why must one always begin again? The
reason for the compulsion to renewed creativity, it seems to me, i s that
each added work brings with it an element of self-discovery. I must cre­
ate in order to know myself, and since self-knowledge is a never-ending
search, each new work is only a part-answer to the question "Who am I?"
and brings with it the need to go on to other and different part-answers.
(p. 223)

The polymath Johann Wolfgang von Goethe beautifully exemplifies

Myers's view: "What he wanted was totality; he fought the mutual extra­
neousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will. . . he disciplined himself to
wholeness, he created himself," says Nietzsche of Goethe in the Twilight of
the Gods. This "resplendent instance ofjovial genius" himself confirmed, in
a letter to von Humboldt, that he strove incessantly toward a synthesis of
the practical and imaginative elements of his nature, a condition in which
"consciousness and unconsciousness will interact like warp and weft, an
image I am so fond of, uniting the human faculties" (Beddow, 1 989, p. 1 1 1).
It is significant here that Goethe also epitomized for the Swiss analytical
depth-psychologist Carl Jung the process of individuation, "the central con­
cept of my psychology" (lung, 196111965, p. 209). We mentioned in Chapter
5 the influence which Myers apparently exerted on Jung, and this concept
of a drive to individuation, essentially equivalent to Myers's nisus, provides
one striking expression of that influence. More generally, it would not be
too much of a caricature to say that whereas Freud and his school became
preoccupied with the "rubbish heap" side of Myers's broad conception of
the subliminal, Jung tended like Myers himself in the opposite direction,
toward a preoccupation with the subliminal as "treasure house." Jung was
much more in the grip of von Hartmann and the extremist wing of the Ger­
man romantic tradition, however, and his writing has a tendency to dissolve
into depths of obscurity which we like many others sometimes find impen­
etrable. Nevertheless, we feel there is much of value in his work, especially
in regard to creativity. Jungians in general adopt a far more positive stance
than Freud toward imagination, symbolism, and creativity, emphasizing
their role in self-discovery and self-integration (Storr, 1 972, chap. 1 6 & chap.
1 8). In contrast to Freud, for example, Neumann (1959) treats Leonardo's
genius, and genius in general, as a fundamentally transformative and inte­
grative process of personal growth. The Jungian practice of "active imagi­
nation" combines creativity with psychotherapy in a manner also consistent
with Myers's view of genius. Described by Barbara Hannah (1981) as the
480-Chapter 7

"most powerful tool in Jungian psychology for achieving wholeness" (p. 2),
this is essentially a technique for actively engaging the subliminal; one waits,
for example, for emotionally charged imagery to well up from below, and
then actively attempts to express its meanings concretely in paint, words,
gesture, or vocalization.
Similar views regarding the contributions of imagination to psychother­
apy, and more generally of creativity to personal growth or "self-actualiza­
tion," have been advanced by persons such as Achterberg ( 1985), Assagioli
( 196511971), Maslow (1968), Sheikh ( 1984), and Storr ( 1972), among many oth­
ers. This leads inexorably to the potentially important but currently vexed
practical topic of creativity "training," around which a large and lucrative
commercial industry has in recent decades sprung up. We agree for the most
part with critics such as Beyerstein (1 999), R. 1. Sternberg and Lubart ( 1999),
and Weisberg ( 1986) that existing training procedures are not grounded in
an adequate psychological theory of creativity, and that empirical evidence
of their validity and effectiveness is in extremely short supply. Nevertheless,
we also feel with Nickerson ( 1999) cautious optimism that real progress in
this direction may be possible-particularly, we suggest, in the context of
Myers's theoretical and practical investigations of subliminal processes.
Myers himself distinctly foresaw this possibility: "Man is in course of
evolution," he says, and "it may be in his power to hasten his own evolu­
tion in ways previously unknown" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 23). "What advance can
we make in inward mastery?" he wonders; "how far extend our grasp over
the whole range of faculty with which we are obscurely endowed?" (HP, vol.
1 , p. 70). Although Myers himself does not explicitly address these ques­
tions, it follows from his general theory that any procedures which encour­
age increased but controlled interaction with the subliminal can potentially
move us in the desired direction. In addition to "active imagination" and
creative work themselves, one thinks naturally in terms of cultivating phe­
nomena such as ordinary dreams, lucid dreaming, and hypnagogia, which
most persons can probably do, and perhaps-in those with the requisite
susceptibilities-activities such as automatic writing or drawing, crystal­
gazing or scrying, trance mediumship, and deep hypnosis.
We should also mention in this connection that there is a very large
cross-cultural literature dealing with procedures for controlled production
of altered states of consciousness and associated phenomena. The sha­
man, as a specialist in these "archaic techniques of ecstasy," represents in
effect the creative genius of preliterate society (Eliade, 1 964; Nettle, 2001).
M. Murphy ( 1992) has situated this form of genius within an even larger
context, drawing upon a vast array of anthropological, psychological, and
biomedical data to provide a comprehensive natural history of psychophysi­
cal transformative practices. From this larger point of view the shamanistic
vocation can be seen as one species of a broader genus of personality-devel­
opment technologies (Grosso, in press). In addition to utilizing particular
techniques of the sorts identified above, such personality-development
processes might wisely begin by identifying and building upon whatever
 Genius-48l

creative inclinations each person antecedently displays. The range of such

inclinations, Myers suggests, could be wide, for "genius may be recognized
in every region of thought and emotion. In each direction a man's everyday
self may be more or less permeable to subliminal impulses" (HP, vol. 1 , p.
1 16). Comic genius or wit, for example, has been recognized by authori­
ties as divergent in outlook as Freud, Kris, Bergson, and Koestler as being
closely related to the higher forms of genius in its manner of drawing upon
subliminal operations.

Art as Transformative

Creativity in a given domain might also be enhanced more directly,

through exposure to outstanding examples of genius in that domain. We
have in mind here the obscure but important topic of the response of recep­
tive human observers to great works of art. That something more is involved
than purely intellectual appreciation seems certain. Freud in his character­
istic way pathologizes this "something extra." Art provides substitute grati­
fication, a means of escape from reality, and the artist enables us to derive
aesthetic pleasure from his fantasies by formally disguising their forbidden
origins in the unconscious (Freud, 1 92011968, pp. 384-385). For Jung, in
typical contrast, art provides more than aesthetic pleasure; indeed, to the
extent that we can imaginatively involve ourselves in a great work of art we
vicariously participate in the transformative, integrative process effected by
its creator, and are in some measure transformed and integrated ourselves.
Some such "resonance" effect may account, for example, for John Stuart
Mill's famous declaration that he was healed by reading Wordsworth's
poetry, and for the fact that Shakespeare "augments" not just his own con­
sciousness, but ours as well. Thus a major goal of creative education in gen­
eral, as for Harold Bloom (2002), should be "to activate the genius of appre­
ciation" in students, potentiating the transfer of this transformative power
(p. 3). It is surely also relevant here that persons who rate high on objective
scales of aesthetic judgment also tend to rate high on measures of creativity
(Child, 1 973, pp. 65-67).
But there is more to be said, for not all works of art have such transfor­
mative effects, or have them to the same degree. As theoreticians of aesthet­
ics from Longinas forward have almost unanimously contended, there seems
to be a deep inner connection between the psychological phenomenon of
inspiration and the transformative power of art. At the level of persons, for
example, it is simply an empirical fact that virtually every major contributor
to the western cultural canon who has commented on the creative process
has spoken appreciatively of the role of inspiration (Ghiselin, 1 952). And the
relationship goes even deeper, apparently, for it is typically not their creative
work in general but their best work that is described as so benefitting.
That this is not simply the opinion of the creator but also involves quali­
ties inherent in the creative product itself is argued explicitly in the case
482-Chapter 7

of poetry by Bowra (1955, pp. 1 9-25). "Poems which are known to have
been conceived by their authors in inspired moments are often those which
move us most powerfully," he says, stating a potentially testable hypothesis.
Furthermore, "if we look into the question, we see that inspired poetry has
certain qualities which are responsible for its hold on us and for our con­
tinued delight in it." The qualities that Bowra goes on to identify need not
occupy us in detail, for they overlap strongly, and unsurprisingly, with the
qualities of creative imagination as delineated by persons such as Coleridge
and Myers.

Transpersonal Roots of Genius

And here we return at last to the main thread of Myers's own explicit
argument-the thread we temporarily put aside at the end of our discus­
sion of "incommensurability" between supraliminal and subliminal modes
of expression. As we indicated there, Myers does not believe that creative
imagination can be fully explained in terms of facts of personal biography,
developmentally earlier or more "primitive" forms of symbolic activity, and
the like. In the last 14 pages of the genius chapter he develops his alterna­
tive view, according to which the roots of imagination, of expression, and
indeed of genius itself, lie much deeper.
The essence of Myers's conception is that both human personality and
nature as a whole have complex, multilevel organizations, that these orga­
nizations are in some meaningful sense "parallel," and that "inner" and
"outer" somehow mingle at the deepest level. Like Coleridge, who warred
incessantly against "the despotism of the eye," Myers believes that ordinary
supraliminal perceptual and cognitive processes reveal only relatively super­
ficial aspects of the far wider and deeper environment, mostly unknown, in
which we are continuously immersed. The subliminal reaches further into
this complex reality, however, and can report what it finds using its own
characteristic modes of symbolic expression. Thus genius, the distinctive
characteristic of which is "the large infusion of the subliminal in its mental
output" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 97), provides means for discovery of this hidden envi­
ronment.
Views of this sort were of course especially characteristic of the 1 9th­
century English romantic poets (Abrams, 1953; Bowra, 1 955; Prescott, 1 922),
although contemporary American writers of the "transcendentalist" school
held similar views. Emerson (1837/1983), for example, says of the genius that
"in going down into the secrets of his own mind, he has descended into the
secrets of all minds" (p. 64); and not just of minds, but of nature as well, for
"nature is the opposite of the soul, answering to it part for part. One is seal,
and one is print. Its beauty is the beauty of his own mind. Its laws are the
laws of his own mind" (p. 56).
Among later psychologists, the figure who comes closest to Myers is
again Carl Jung ( 1952), who speaks like Myers of true symbolic expression
 Genius-483

as "the expression of something existent in its own right, but imperfectly

known" (p. 2 1 5). lung specifically argues that in the highest or "visionary"
mode of poetic creation, epitomized for him by Part 2 of Goethe's Faust, what
is expressed derives from the deepest stratum of the psyche, a transpersonal
region which he calls the "collective unconscious," where inner and outer
come together (see also Neumann, 1959). We ourselves think that the sorts
of comparative and cross-cultural investigations of "archetypal" symbolism
carried out both by lung himself and by others such as loseph Campbell are
broadly consistent with, and potentially enrich, Myers's conception of the
subliminal and its operation, but it cannot be denied that lung's own writ­
ings about archetypes and the collective unconscious are especially obscure,
and certainly they have had little if any impact on mainstream psychology.

Creativity and Psi

Why then should the mainstream pay more attention to Myers than to
lung in regard to transpersonal aspects of genius? In a nutshell, because here
as elsewhere Myers's system is far better grounded empirically, as demon­
strated both by the present book and by HP itself. In his characteristic way,
Myers begins in section 331 of HP to marshal arguments for his enlarged
conception of the roots of genius. Other parts of HP serve to demonstrate
that subliminal products are prone in general to be carriers of supernormal
knowledge, and the question therefore naturally arises whether this is also
true of the subliminal uprushes associated with genius.
Myers asks first whether such uprushes, like those of a medium or sen­
sitive, tend to display supernormal knowledge of "definite facts." There
is of course a tradition going back to classical times that links these two
domains: The Muses, for example, were the daughters of Memory and pos­
sessed the gift of prophecy. Although Myers recognizes that these gifts may
be somewhat separable in the subliminal region, he clearly expects them
to overlap to some degree, and he declares unequivocally that remarkable
instances of supernormal knowledge in persons of genius "undoubtedly do
exist" (HP, vol. I, p. 108). He declines to discuss "the most conspicuous and
most important" of such instances, by which he means events in the lives of
the great personages of various religions, and he refers briefly instead to two
other historical geniuses-Socrates and loan of Arc-whom he himself had
investigated extensively. Both cases, details of which are provided elsewhere
(Myers, 1889a; HP, vol. 2, pp. 95-\03), involved conspicuous episodes of
trance and automatism, accompanied (more clearly in the case of loan) by
infusions of definite supernormal knowledge.
Myers drops the subject at this point and moves on, but in light of subse­
quent developments more can now be said. First, many additional instances
have come to light of spontaneous psi experiences in the lives of eminent
persons, a particularly good collection being that of Prince (1928/1963).
These demonstrate clearly that psi occurs in highly creative persons, but not
necessarily that it occurs more frequently or dramatically in them than in
484-Chapter 7

the less creative. Two lines of modern experimental evidence, however, more
clearly confirm Myers's expectation of linkages between creativity and psi.
Both trace back to a seminal paper by R. A. White (1964), who sought
to identify psychological conditions associated with the unusual levels of
success in some older "free-response" ESP experiments (these had used
materials such as objects and drawings, rather than ESP cards or the like,
as the targets). Her resulting "recipe" for psi success strikingly parallels the
Wal las/Hutchinson model of the creative process: Specifically, following an
initial period of sensory isolation and relaxation, it prescribes a deliber­
ate demand for the needed information (preparation) followed by waiting
and release of effort (incubation), spontaneous emergence of information
into consciousness (inspiration, usually in the form of involuntary visual
or auditory imagery), and evaluation or elaboration of the information so
retrieved (verification). White's analysis was one of the main influences
leading to Honorton's ( 1977) model of psi and internal attention states, and
to the large body of successful psi research using "Ganzfeld" procedures
(Alvarado, 1 998; Braud, 1 978; see also the Appendix).
A number of additional experimental studies have sought more directly
to measure relationships between creativity and psi performance. Both cre­
ativity and psi have generally been in short supply in these studies, unfortu­
nately, and most have relied excessively, in our opinion, on psychometrically
suspect "creativity" measures of the conventional sorts ("divergent think­
ing" and the like; see, e.g., Barron & Harrington, 1981; Dellas & Gaier,
1 970; Hocevar, 1 981). Nevertheless, some order has begun to emerge, par­
ticularly since the advent of the Ganzfeld procedures. Free-response Gan­
zfeld studies carried out by a variety of investigators and laboratories have
now also clearly indicated that "creative" groups such as musicians, artists,
and writers perform conspicuously better than unselected subjects, averag­
ing something over 40% direct hits where only 25% would be expected by
chance (Dalton, 1997; N. 1. Holt, Delanoy, & Roe, 2004; Schlitz & Honor­
ton, 1 992).
In sum, although much remains to be done to sort out details of the
relationship between creativity and psi, that such a relationship exists now
seems beyond reasonable doubt. We emphasize again that this confirms a
specific expectation flowing directly from Myers's theory of genius.3!

Genius and Mysticism

Beyond occasionally providing supernormal access to definite facts of
the ordinary kind, the subliminal uprushes of genius reveal, Myers thinks,
that we are "capable of a deeper than sensorial perception, of a direct
knowledge of facts of the universe outside the range of any specialised
organ" (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 1 1). In support of this thesis he appeals first to the

31. Another aspect of this relationship, which we will not attempt to develop further here,
concerns possible psi contributions to the creative process itself, and perhaps to some cases
of "simultaneous discovery." Mark Twain (1900), who was a firm believer in "mental telegra­
phy," took special interest in this subject.
 Genius-485

poet Wordsworth, and especially to his unique autobiographical poem The

Prelude, published posthumously and dedicated to his friend Coleridge (see
Wordsworth, Abrams, & Gill, 1 979). "Most poets have been Platonists,"
Myers observes, and "their influence tends to swell that ancient stream of
idealistic thought which lies at the root of all civilised religions" (HP, vol. I,
p. 1 09). Wordsworth, a member of Bloom's top 100, is typical in experienc­
ing his moments of inspiration as moments of entrance or insight into a nor­
mally hidden spiritual environment that somehow undergirds or interpen­
etrates the everyday, observable world. By means of the "auxiliar light" of
his poetic imagination, Myers suggests, Wordsworth obtained "a vague but
genuine consciousness" of this invisible world. His poetry, which had earlier
provoked Coleridge's extensive investigations of the creative imagination,
epitomizes for Myers the symbolic process essential to all great art, "which
abandons logical defin iteness of statement for the sake of a nearer approach
to truth hidden in the ideal world" (HP, vol. 1, p. xxx). Wordsworth's tes­
timony on these matters was especially convincing to Myers, not merely
because of its unmatched volume and evident candor, but because "he, if
any man, has kept his mind, as Bacon advised, concentric to the universe"
(HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 1 1).32
The outreach of the subliminal, moreover, is not purely intellectual or
"telaesthetic" in character, for it is motivated and guided by affective fac­
tors, and in particular by a sense of beauty. Here Myers appeals to Plato
himself, drawing upon his conception of love as expressed by the prophetess
Diotima in the Symposium ( 192-21 2). Love for Myers is the foundation of
both genius and religion, religion being conceived in its essence as genius
of the spiritual realm. Love draws the genius ever forward, ascending stage
by stage in Plato's characteristic fashion from beautiful objects to beautiful
ideas and ultimately to the archetype of absolute beauty itself, whereupon
"beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring
forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but
of a reality)" (Jowett, 1 892/1937, p. 335). For Myers as for Plato, love, beauty,
and truth ultimately merge in a state of exalted consciousness.
Having expressed in such soaring terms his deepest personal intuitions,
Myers concludes by contrasting his view of genius with the conventional
one, reverting for this purpose to his "diagrammatic" example of genius,
the calculating boy. What is the ultimate source of this strange ability, he
wonders. He acknowledges that some sort of spontaneous genetic variation
may be involved; indeed, this hypothesis, "being hardly more than a mere
restatement of the facts, . . . cannot help being true, so far as it goes" (HP, vol.
1 , p. 1 17). But Myers doubts that the biological variation itself can explain
those facts. His own answer is that the ultimate source of Dase's computa­
tional faculty lies in some sort of ideal world in which "the multiplication

32. It is also of some importance here that Myers was socially connected to Wordsworth's
family, had met him as a child, and had previously written a monograph about him informed
by intimate acquaintance with the poet's family history and private correspondence (Myers,
1 880/1929).
486-Chapter 7

table is, so to speak, in the air" (HP, vol. I , p. 1 19). Thus, as in the case of
other supernormal phenomena of subliminal origin, biological variation
did not create but only revealed Dase's ability: "By some chance of evolu­
tion-some sport-a vent-hole was opened at this one point between the
different strata of his being, and a subliminal uprush carried his computa­
tive faculty into the open day" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 1 9).33 The progress of evolu­
tion, epitomized in genius, consists largely in the progressive revelation and
integration of such latent subliminal faculty and, in this way, fuller discov­
ery of this ideal world.
Myers ends here, acknowledging that his grand theoretical vision of
genius as personality in evolution goes beyond what the science of his day
can guarantee, and returns to the sober exposition of matter-of-fact issues
that characterizes the great bulk of his book. How does all this relate, we
must now ask, to a contemporary psychology of genius?
It probably could go without saying that few if any mainstream psychol­
ogists of the past century would have taken these more challenging elements
of Myers's theory of genius at all seriously, had they ever been exposed to
them. Nor have the various humanistic and transpersonal psychologists
who have advocated Myers-like views from the margins of the field shown
much awareness of the additional strength their positions could derive from
Myers's relentlessly empirical approach to an enlarged scientific psychol­
ogy. Both groups, we suggest, would do well to revisit Myers's theoretical
challenge in light of more recent developments.
To begin, the Neoplatonic elements in Myers's account of genius no
longer appear as radical as they might have even a few decades ago. The
sense of beauty, for example, has increasingly been recognized as playing
a vital role in creative activity in all fields from mathematics and science to
the arts. Koestler (1964) in particular had urged this view upon the early
cognitive psychologists, without much success, declaring for example that
"beauty is a function of truth, truth a function of beauty. They can be sepa­
rated by analysis, but in the lived experience of the creative act-and of
its re-creative echo in the beholder-they are as inseparable as thought is
inseparable from emotion" (p. 331). A. I. Miller (2001) documents in detail
the role played by a sense of beauty in both Picasso and Einstein. Even Poin­
care, in what surely is one of the most mechanistic accounts ever provided
of the creative process, invoked the notion of a subliminal aesthetic "sieve"
that would only pass through to waking consciousness, among the innumer­
able "combinations of mental atoms" mechanically formed by unconscious
processes, those whose "elegance" would make them of real mathematical
interest. The contemporary computationalist Hofstadter makes the point
even more directly, saying "I feel that responsiveness to beauty, and its close

33. Treffert ( 1989) comes fairly close to Myers here, concluding that we must conceive the
skills of prodigious savants as emerging out of some sort of "collective unconscious." In such
persons, Treffert says, "access to the rules of music or rules of mathematics, for example, is
so extensive that some ancestral (inherited) memory must exist to account for that access"
(p. 220). Unlike Myers, of course, Treffert hopes to locate this "ancestral memory" in the
biology.
 Genius-487

cousin, simplicity, plays a central role in high-level cognition, and I expect

that this will gradually come to be more clearly recognized as cognitive sci­
ence progresses" (Hofstadter & FARG, 1 995, p. 318). That it is in fact being
so recognized is evident, for example, from R. J. Sternberg and Davidson's
(1995) book on the nature of insight, in the foreword to which Janet Met­
calfe welcomes this as something novel; many of the contributors, she says,
"remark on the joy that is felt with creative insights and also on the appre­
ciation for beauty that characterizes creative people. This aspect of the phe­
nomenology of insight, until very recently, has been neglected as being too
warm and soft for cool, hard Cognitive Science" (p. xi).
Most mainstream psychologists will of course hold out hope that the
sense of beauty itself will ultimately prove within reach of conventional bio­
logically-based thinking. We doubt it, but will not argue that point here.
Much more serious problems, however, are posed by the "telaesthetic"
aspect of creative intuition, its capacity to penetrate beyond the current
horizon of knowledge to real "facts of the universe."
Myers in fact considerably underestimated the strength of his case in
this area, for poets are not the only Platonists, and the products of cre­
ative intuition are often anything but vague. We refer here especially to pure
mathematicians and mathematical physicists, nearly all of whom are Pla­
tonists of some description. For Einstein, for example, music and physics
were closely linked :

He imagined Mozart plucking melodies out of the air as if they were ever
present in the universe, and he thought of himself as working like Mozart,
not merely spinning theories but responding to Nature, in tune with the
cosmos . . . . He thought of both musical and physical truths as Platonic
forms that the mind must intuit. Great music cannot be "created" any
more than great physics can be deduced strictly from experimental data.
Some aesthetic sense of the universe is necessary for both. (A. 1 . M iller,
2001 , p. 1 86)34

Another Nobel laureate in physics, Eugene Wigner ( 1960), has spoken

of "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics," its ability to describe
fundamental processes in the physical world to astonishing levels of accu­
racy. This Platonic theme has been developed most vigorously and explicitly
in recent years by mathematician Roger Penrose ( 1 989, 1 994, 1 997), chiefly
in relation to mathematical concepts although he clearly presupposes that
such a Platonic world may contain "other absolutes, such as the Good and
the Beautiful" as well (Penrose, 1 997, p. 1).

34. Myers held similar views in regard to music, which for him was a quintessential expres­
sion of subliminal faculty. "We know the difficulty of explaining its rise on any current theory
of the evolution of human faculty. We know that it is like something discovered, not like
something manufactured;-Iike wine found in a walled-up cellar, rather than like furniture
made in the workshop above" (HP, vol. 1, p. 103). Mozart, for Myers as for Einstein, is the
prime example. Although we will not pursue this subject further here, music remains even
now resistant to conventional forms of explanation.
488-Chapter 7

Further examples can readily be found in the realm of pure mathemat­

ics. Hadamard (1 949, chap. 8) briefly discusses some cases of "paradoxi­
cal" intuition, including in particular discoveries by Fermat, Riemann, and
Galois of correct mathematical results that were not obvious and that went
far beyond any possibility of proof by means of the mathematics available
at the time. Indeed, some of the proofs were only accomplished following
development of whole new areas of mathematics over periods ranging from
decades to centuries. Hadamard himself specifically suggests, like Myers,
that such intuitions arise from unusually deep strata of the psyche, and that
they sometimes emerge in the form of automatisms.
These properties are also found in the extraordinary and well-docu­
mented life of the modern mathematical genius Srinivas Ramanujan
(Eysenck, 1 995, pp. 1 95-201 ; Kanigel, 1991; Newman, 1 948). There were no
recognizable mathematicians in Ramanujan's family, and he received only
a patchy formal training in the course of a generally unhappy educational
experience in the schools of his native south India. Nevertheless, between
the ages of 16 and 26, ignited by what amounted to little more than a dry
compendium of some 5000 known mathematical equations, this largely self­
taught prodigy managed not only to recapitulate single-handedly a sizeable
fraction of the history of Western mathematics but to generate an astonish­
ing volume and variety of novel results in number theory as well. Discovered
in 1 91 3 by the distinguished British mathematician G. H. Hardy, Ramanujan
continued this prodigious outpouring until his untimely death in 1 920 at the
age of 33. Some of his most important theorems have already taken decades
to prove, and his crammed notebooks will continue to occupy mathema­
ticians for generations to come. His work has found application in areas
as diverse as blast-furnace design, manufacture of plastics and telephone
cables, cancer research, statistical mechanics, and computer science. On
Hardy's informal scale of natural mathematical ability, on which most of us
would rate close to 0 and Hardy placed himself only at 25, the magnificent
David Hilbert ranks an 80, and Ramanujan stands all by himself at 100.
All the main ingredients of Myers's conception of genius are conspicu­
ously present in this case. First there is extraordinary memory; Hardy
recounts, for example, that upon his informing Ramanujan of the number
of a taxi in which he had just arrived for a visit, Ramanujan exclaimed at
once that this number, 1 729, is the smallest integer expressible as the sum of
two cubes in two different ways.
Second and more important, his biography is replete with signs of
automatism. Some examples: "It was the goddess Namagiri, he would tell
his friends, to whom he owed his mathematical gifts. Namagiri would write
the equations on his tongue. Namagiri would bestow mathematical insight
in his dreams" (Kanigel, 1991, p. 36). "Another time, in a dream, he saw a
hand write across a screen made red by flowing blood, tracing out elliptic
integrals" (p. 66). This appearance of drops of blood in his dreams signi­
fied the presence of the god Narahimsa; then "scrolls containing the most
complicated mathematics used to unfold before his eyes" (p. 281). Unfortu-
 Genius-489

nately, neither Hardy nor apparently Ramanujan himself took much inter­
est in observing or reporting these psychological phenomena.
Ramanujan's theorems were "elegant, unexpected, and deep" (p. 206).
Mathematicians of great ability, including Hardy among many others,
were "enraptured" by his work, and specifically by "its richness, beauty,
and mystery-its sheer mathematical loveliness" (pp. 349-350). He was not
often wrong, and even when he was wrong (as in some early work on the dis­
tribution of prime numbers), the incorrect results still exuded this peculiar
atmosphere of mathematical beauty. Yet, as Hardy himself observed, "all
his results, new or old, right or wrong, had been arrived at by a process of
mingled argument, intuition, and induction, of which he was entirely unable
to give any coherent account" (p. 2 16).
Ramanujan was also an overt Platonist, Indian style. "He pictured
equations as products of the mind of God" (p. 282). Mathematical real­
ity exists independently of us, and is discovered, not made; "for him, num­
bers and their mathematical relationships fairly threw off clues to how the
universe fit together. Each new theorem was one more piece of the Infinite
un fathomed" (p. 66). In this matter at least, Ramanujan, the apotheosis of
intuition, was in complete accord with his colleague and mentor Hardy, the
master of proof.
Creative imagination on this scale, we submit, fairly beggars the theo­
retical apparatus available to contemporary cognitive science, its "associa­
tions," predicate-calculus "representations," and all the rest. We make no
exception here of the recent attempt by Lakoff and Nunez (2000) to account
for the origins of mathematics in terms of Lakoff's more general theory
of "embodied cognition." In brief, these authors argue that a fundamental
cognitive process of "conceptual metaphor" can fully explain the progres­
sive elaboration of systems of increasingly abstract mathematical ideas,
both historically and ontogenetically. From this point of view, moreover,
they summarily dismiss the Platonic "romance of mathematics" as mere
pre-scientific mythology, a folk-theory, immune to empirical evidence and
acceptable only as a matter of a priori faith.
Apart from its pedagogical implications, which appear substantial, we
find this theoretical position deeply flawed, and if writing a full review we
would develop the following as our main points of rebuttal: (1) Lakoff and
Nunez insufficiently appreciate the fact that inventions of pure mathematics
have often been discovered only long after the fact to have profound physi­
cal parallels. (2) The realization of a concept such as "number" in alterna­
tive and seemingly inconsistent mathematical forms does not invalidate a
Platonist view, since even on their own terms this is compatible with the
possible existence of the "idea" of number at some deeper psychological
or ontological level. (3) More generally, they persistently confound issues
related to the ontological status of mathematical ideas with issues as to the
means by which we acquire them. (4) They also persistently caricature the
Platonist position, claiming for example that it implies that mathematical
ideas are literally in or part of the observable world, and that classical sym­
bolic computational ism is the correct theory of the mind; yet the Platonist
490�Chapter 7

mathematician Roger Penrose, who explicitly rejects both of these views,

is nowhere discussed. (5) On their own side, meanwhile, they consistently
overstate the progress of cognitive science generally, and of George Lakoff
in particular; simply to label the phenomenon of "conceptual metaphor,"
for example, does nothing whatever to explain it. (6) Finally, a plethora of
ex cathedra pronouncements scattered through their book demonstrates
that Lakoff and Nunez themselves are guilty of precisely the same sort of
faith-based a priori theoretical commitment they attribute to their Platonist
adversaries: Specifically, they themselves accept, without question, the cur­
rent mainstream dogma that everything in the mind must be generated by
brain processes, period. But this quasi-religious doctrine, which they incor­
rectly claim "has been scientifically established by means of convergent evi­
dence within cognitive science" (p. 363), is itself falsified by a wider range of
empirical evidence of the sorts originally marshaled by Myers and updated
in the present volume. Within that larger framework, we conclude, some
sort of "Platonic" construal of mathematics remains an empirically viable
possibility. 35
With this as background, then, let us return briefly to Ramanujan.
Even the normally ebullient Hans Eysenck ( 1995) sheepishly acknowledges
that this case "shows just how much distance there is between that which
we have to explain, and our puny achievements in explaining it" (p. 201).
Kanigel himself, struggling to come to terms with the extreme character
of Ramanujan's genius, begins to wonder whether it is entangled somehow
with his pronounced mystical streak, and his general immersion in south
Indian mystical culture. He notes the consistency of such a view with long­
standing majority tradition in both East and West, and cites approvingly a
passage from Hadamard which explicitly links that tradition to both Myers
and James:

35. See also A. Baker (2005), for a philosophic defense based on the prime-numbered life­
cycle lengths of cicadas. We specifically decline here to embrace any specific philosophical
conception of the "ideal" realm, whether that of Plato himself or any of its historical vari­
ants. Like Myers and James, we tend to think that issues as to its ultimate character and
composition will only be resolved, if ever, by expanded forms of empirical inquiry involving
systematic exploration of altered states of consciousness. There is one point of Platonic doc­
trine, however, that is especially relevant to the subject of genius and deserves at least brief
mention here. Myers was in general very ambivalent about the possibility of pre-existence,
and he specifically rejected Plato's conception of learning as "reminiscence"-the idea that
Dase, for example, might have acquired his knowledge of the multiplication tables through
"individual training" in some previous state of existence (HP, vol. I , p. 1 19). We tend to agree
with Myers in regard to Dase himself, but in light of the large body of evidence that has sub­
sequently accumulated in support of reincarnation (see the Appendix), we would not rule out
its possible contributions to some otherwise puzzling cases of extreme precocity. There are
many such cases, possible examples including Mozart with his pronounced tendencies toward
automatism, and Picasso, who drew skillfully before he could talk and whose first words were
"piz, piz," Spanish baby-talk for "pencil" (A. 1. Miller, 2001 , p. 1 0). Stevenson (2000, p. 654)
has identified several instances of unusual precocity that occurred without familial counter­
parts, but we currently lack any such case that is accompanied by verifiable memories of an
appropriate previous life.
 Genius-491

That unconsciousness may be something not exclusively originating in

ourselves and even participating in Divinity seems already to have been
admitted by Aristotle. I n Leibniz's opinion, it sets the man in commu­
nication with the whole universe, in which nothing could occur without
its repercussion in each of us; and something analogous is to be found in
Schelling; again, Divinity is invoked by Fichte; etc.
Even more recently, a whole philosophical doctrine has been built on
that principle in the first place by Myers, then by William James himself.. . .
According t o that doctrine, the unconscious would set man i n connection
with a world other than the one which is accessible to our senses and with
some kinds of spiritual beings. (Hadamard, 1 949, pp. 40-41)

What Myers and James really said, of course, is not that the subliminal
connects us to another world, but that it connects us to the one existing
world in novel ways. The more extreme phenomena of genius, and especially
phenomena of the sorts adduced by Myers and amplified here, show that the
roots of genius reach into or through a part of our being which somehow
transcends ordinary biological functioning in space and time. The deepest
affinity of genius lies with this transcendent or trans personal aspect of our
psychological constitution, and hence with the world-wide phenomenon of
mysticism.
It is no accident, therefore, that Myers selects as his culminant example
of genius, the completest type of humanity, "the eagle soaring over the tomb
of Plato"-the Alexandrian mystical philosopher Plotinus (HP, vol. I, p.
1 20). But before proceeding further with this theme we must take special
pains to correct a misapprehension which is already rampant in the psycho­
logical literature. Notwithstanding assertions to the contrary by R. 1. Stern­
berg and Lubart (1 999), Boden (1991), Weisberg (1 986), and many others,
mysticism does not imply supernatural intervention. It is true that in pointing
out these psychological connections with mysticism Myers hews close to
the classical origins of the terms genius and creation, with their well-known
supernatural connotations. But the essence of what he is doing is to respect
the impressive phenomenology of genius-reflected in the concept of "inspi­
ration" as being literally "breathed into" by the Muses, a god or daemon, or
whatever-while reinterpreting it in entirely naturalistic, functional terms.
As we will show in the following chapter, the term "mystical" properly refers
to a very large and important class of real human experience which is not
necessarily or even primarily "religious." It does not deserve to be used
pejoratively, and it is not synonymous with "unscientific." To attempt, as
many do, to dichotomize accounts of genius into those that are mystical, as
opposed to those that are supposedly scientific, is altogether specious.
492-Chapter 7

Conclusion

From a purely historical point of view, Myers correctly anticipated most

of what we think has been best in the first century of psychological work
on "creativity." His basic conception of the creative process as successful
cooperation between supraliminal and subliminal modes of cognition, for
example, anticipated the most mature developments in 20th-century psy­
chodynamic theorizing, and led him to an interpretation of relationships
between creativity and mental illness that has been strongly confirmed in
subsequent research. In a qualified sense his emphasis on "continuity" also
anticipates the nascent efforts by present-day cognitive theorists to charac­
terize creativity in terms of extraordinary use of ordinary cognitive abili­
ties.
Still to be taken up, however, are a variety of further challenges which
Myers's theory of genius poses both for the psychology of genius itself and
for psychology more generally. All derive from the fact that Myers, unlike
most contemporary mainstream psychologists, deliberately focused on
genius in its most extreme manifestations rather than on "creativity" of the
more readily available forms. The account of genius which he developed in
this way has implications in at least four key areas:
The first concerns the need for cognitive psychology to expand its scope
to deal more effectively with non-verbal forms of expression in general
and with full-fledged creative imagination in particular. Interest in these
matters appears to be increasing, but the "imagery debates" and so on of
recent decades constitute in our view only the barest beginnings of such an
enlargement. Important but neglected resources here include studies of the
creative imagination by Coleridge and the romantic poets, investigations of
"primary process" thinking by psychodynamic theorists, and investigations
of the hallucinatory syndromes induced by psychedelics and various other
means.
The second concerns the homunculus problem, and our persisting
inability even to recognize, let alone explain, the ubiquitous phenomena
of intentionality, seeing-as, and insightful grasping of meanings as central
aspects of human mental life. These phenomena occur in conjunction with
all forms of symbolic activity, both discursive and non-discursive, from the
highest flights of poetic metaphor and symbolism to the altogether mundane
phenomenon of generality of word meaning in ordinary discourse. Cogni­
tive science has a serious "inattentional blindness" problem, we believe, and
meaning is the unseen gorilla in the room (Simons & Chabris, 1 999).
A third challenge involves Myers's conception of nisus and the transfor­
mative power of creation both for genius itself and for those who interact
with its products. Although this theme too is already present in the litera­
ture to some extent, we think much more research could be carried out along
these lines. Myers's work leads both directly and indirectly, for example, to
a variety of novel possibilities for creativity enhancement that merit further
 Genius-493

investigation. We see this as one aspect of the larger subject of "transforma­

tive practices," which we will address more fully in the following chapter.
Finally, Myers led the way in exposing an inescapable connection be­
tween genius and mysticism at the foundations of human personality. Mys­
ticism, even more than genius itself, has been a topic actively avoided and
even despised by most mainstream psychologists, but like Myers and James
we believe that it will ultimately prove not only significant but central to an
empirically adequate scientific psychology. We turn next to this.
 Chapter 8

Mystical Experience

Edward F. Kelly and Michael Grosso

No philosophy of human personality is worth very much unless it takes

full account of the data of mystical experience. (Price, 1 954, pp. 52-53)

I think it more likely than not that in religious and mystical experience
men come into contact with some Reality or some aspect of Reality which
they do not come into contact with in any other way. (Broad, 1 953, p. 173)

That which lies at the root of each of us lies at the root of the Cosmos too.
(Myers, HP, vol. 2 , p. 277)

Modern mainstream psychology has so far had comparatively little to say

about what is arguably the most extraordinary of all human experiences.
The present chapter attempts to address this deficiency. Like H. H. Price,
we believe that psychology must take account of the full range of human
experience or be reduced to a caricature, a defacing, of what it means to
be human. Unfortunately, there was a long interlude in the development of
modern psychology in which mystical experiences, together with all other
phenomena of consciousness, virtually disappeared from the scientific lit­
erature. In large part because of its undeniable connections with the scien­
tifically unpopular subject of religion, mysticism in particular, even more
than its near-relative genius, has yet to recover from this systematic and
undeserved neglect.
The central aim of this chapter is to abet further the return of the
repressed, by helping to restore the long-avoided and often-despised topic of
mystical experience to what we believe is its proper place in the foreground

495
496-Chapter 8

of a worthy scientific psychology. We approach this task with consider­

able trepidation, however. The literature of mysticism is vast, ramified, and
deeply intertwined with longstanding and emotionally charged controver­
sies in disciplines such as theology and comparative religion. We certainly
claim no special expertise in these areas, and like most scientists would gen­
erally prefer to avoid becoming entangled with them to the extent possible.
Our intention therefore is to focus primarily on the psychological character
and biological accompaniments of these powerful experiences.
Nevertheless, questions related to the objective significance of mystical
experience (or lack thereof) are intellectually inescapable. Indeed, at the
heart of the many controversies surrounding mysticism, particularly in the
West, lies a profound and implacable historical opposition between tradi­
tional religious supernaturalism and the reductive-materialist attitudes that
have dominated modern mainstream scientific literature on the subject. We
will not shrink from addressing these difficult issues. Our plan is to pursue a
middle course, close in empirical spirit to the approaches of F. W. H. Myers
and William James, which takes the phenomena of mysticism seriously but
soberly and attempts to draw out their significant implications for contempo­
rary theories of personality and cognition. Traversing the enormous world­
wide literature pertaining to mysticism in a selective and focused manner,
we will marshal evidence and argument demonstrating the deep consistency
of mystical experience and its concomitants with the expanded scientific
naturalism pioneered by Myers and James and advocated throughout this
book. Interpretation of mystical experience from this larger point of view,
we believe, potentially overcomes the great traditional oppositions and can
heal the analogous divisions that have appeared within scientific psychol­
ogy itself through the rise of its humanistic and transpersonal subcurrents.
The position we are advocating, to put the matter as succinctly if crudely as
we can, strongly endorses the fundamental "expansionist" impulse of these
recent splinter movements, but also insists, equally strongly, on unreserved
commitment to the empirical and theoretical discipline characteristic of
mainstream science (see also Child, 1973).
It could perhaps go without saying that any attempt to steer such a
middle course through these turbulent regions is certain to encounter sig­
nificant opposition from both flanks. As James himself evidently feared in
regard to his classic Varieties of Religious Experience (henceforth, VRE),
we fear that our treatment of mysticism may prove "too biological for the
religious, too religious for the biologists" (Perry, 1 935, vol. 2, p. 326). Nev­
ertheless, we hope to convince many if not all readers that the position we
develop in regard to mysticism is scientifically the most comprehensive and
responsible position available and that it lends itself to further empirical
elaboration in a large number of interesting and feasible directions.
 Mystical Experience-497

Phenomenology of Mystical Experience: An Introduction

The psychological literature on mysticism is conveniently bracketed by two

"bookend" publications-the VRE of James (1 902/1958) and a recent survey
by Wulff (2000). The former, almost everyone would agree, shows how well
begun the subject already was, over a century ago. The latter provides a
useful overview, somewhat weighted toward clinical considerations, of the
modest scientific progress achieved since that time.
James's treatment of mysticism in VRE remains the locus classicus and
natural starting point for serious psychological discussions, even after a
hundred years, and we will rely heavily upon it here. He begins by under­
scoring the central importance of mystical states of consciousness to the
subject matter of his entire book-"the vital chapter from which the other
chapters get their light" (p. 292).1 How shall such states be identified and
characterized? Rejecting out of hand all pejorative uses of the terms "mys­
ticism" and "mystical," James provisionally selects four principal marks,
two major and two minor, which suffice to delimit the family of states most
relevant to his expository purposes.2
The first major characteristic, ineffability, is negative. The subject of
such an experience typically declares

that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be

given in words. It follows from this that its quality must be directly expe­
rienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others. In this peculiarity
mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect.
No one can make clear to another who has never had a certain feeling, in
what the quality or worth of it consists. (pp. 292-293)

The beauty of a spectacular sunset or the passions of love would be dif­

ficult if not impossible to communicate to anyone unacquainted with such
experiences, and mystical experience is for some inherent reason still more
difficult to convey adequately in words, even for geniuses of language such
as Dante or Rumi.
Ineffability, though a useful mark, tells us little that is positive about the
mystical experience itself. But the second major characteristic of mystical
states, emphasized throughout by James, is their noetic quality:

Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who

experience them to be also states of k nowledge. They are states of insight
into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illu-

1 . James goes on immediately to acknowledge as a possible limitation of his treatment that

"my own constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment almost entirely, and I can speak of
them only at second hand" (p. 292). We must acknowledge suffering for the most part from
similar limitations, but we have also followed James in striving throughout to overcome these
by being as "objective and receptive" as we can.
2. All four, we note immediately, are also relevant to full-blown NOEs, which (as we men­
tioned in Chapter 6) commonly include a mystical or transcendent aspect (Greyson, 1985).
498- Chapter 8

minations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate

though they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of
authority for after-time. (p. 293)

Subjects of profound mystical experience thus typically feel sure that they
have gained fundamental insight into the nature of "reality," and yet find
themselves unable to express their discoveries adequately in a form intel­
ligible to the rest of us. It is chiefly this strange combination of cognitive
properties, so characteristic of mystical experience, that has given rise to the
heated controversies regarding its objective significance.
Two further characteristics-transiency and passivity-James regards
as less sharply marked and not to the same degree definitive, but still com­
monly present, particularly in association with experiences that occur
spontaneously. Mystical experiences are typically very intense and usually
though not always can be sustained only for short periods ranging from a
few seconds to perhaps a few hours, although sometimes also recurring over
time with an appearance of progressive development. Even when cultivated
by voluntary practices such as meditation, moreover, they tend to break in
upon and engulf the subject as though originating from a region outside
normal consciousness.
Having described in the abstract these characteristics of strong mystical
experiences, James turns to providing concrete examples. It is important
to note here that in doing so he deliberately employs Myers's taxonomic
method (p. 294; see also Chapter 2), situating his examples of true mystical
experience as extreme cases on a continuum stretching upward through var­
ious phenomena of more rudimentary but related type. He begins with the
sense of heightened significance that can suddenly attach itself to a word, a
phrase, a passage of poetry or music, or the play of light and sound, when
the mind is suitably attuned, remarking that "we are alive or dead to the
eternal inner message of the arts according as we have kept or lost this mys­
tical susceptibility" (p. 295). Next in line come deja vu and related experi­
ences; "dreamy" states of various kinds; states induced by intoxicants and
anesthetics such as alcohol, nitrous oxide, and chloroform; borderline mys­
tical states awakened in various persons by scenes of great natural beauty;
and finally, as his culminant example of a spontaneous mystical experience,
the case of Canadian psychiatrist R. M. Bucke, whose single and brief but
impressive experience at age 36 of what he later termed "cosmic conscious­
ness" led him to devote the remainder of his life to investigating and report­
ing its occurrence in others (Bucke, 1901/1969). We reproduce in full Bucke's
own description of this experience, as quoted by James from a privately
printed pamphlet that preceded the main work.3 All four of James's marks
are clearly present:

3. The corresponding passage in the latter (Bucke, 1 90111969, pp. 9-10), although very simi­
lar in content to the version quoted by James, shows signs of theoretical elaboration in light
of Bucke's subsequent research.
 Mystical Experience-499

I had spent the evening in a great city, with two friends, reading and dis­
cussing poetry and philosophy. We parted at midnight. I had a long drive
in a hansom to my lodging. My mind, deeply under the influence of the
ideas, images, and emotions called up by the reading and talk, was calm
and peaceful. I was in a state of quiet, almost passive enjoyment, not actu­
ally thinking, but letting ideas, images, and emotions flow of themselves,
as it were, through my mind. All at once, without warning of any kind, I
found myself wrapped in a flame-colored cloud. For an instant I thought
of fire, an immense conflagration somewhere close by in that great city;
the next, I knew that the fire was within myself. Directly afterward there
came upon me a sense of exultation, of immense joyousness accompanied
or immediately followed by an intellectual illumination impossible to
describe. Among other things, I did not merely come to believe, but I saw
that the universe is not composed of dead matter, but is, on the contrary,
a living Presence; I became conscious in myself of eternal life. It was not
a conviction that I would have eternal life, but a consciousness that I pos­
sessed eternal life then; I saw that all men are immortal; that the cosmic
order is such that without any peradventure all things work together for
the good of each and all; that the foundation principle of the world, of all
the worlds, i s what we call love, and that happiness of each and all i s in
the long run absolutely certain. The vision lasted a few seconds and was
gone; but the memory of it and the sense of the reality of what it taught
has remained during the quarter of a century which has since elapsed. I
knew that what the vision showed was true. I had attained to a point of
view from which I saw that it must be true. That view, that conviction, I
may say that consciousness, has never, even during periods of the deepest
depression, been lost. (pp. 306-307)

James next goes on, using the relatively scanty comparative materials
available at that time, to provide a sampling of reports concerning states of
consciousness methodically cultivated in accord with the Hindu, Buddhist,
Islamic (Sufi), and Christian mystical traditions. By far the largest amount
of space is devoted to the Christian mystics, with whom James undoubtedly
felt himself more thoroughly and reliably familiar. His emphasis through­
out is on the key properties of ineffability and noetic quality, which emerge
together in conjunction with states of consciousness that somehow pass
beyond all ordinary forms of sensation and cognition and yet seemingly
into contact or even unity with some sort of higher reality. An elegant illus­
tration is provided by St. John of the Cross in his Dark Night of the Soul
(Book 2, chap. 17[3]), in a passage in which he attempts to explain why the
infusion of spiritual knowledge or wisdom in mystical states is ineffable or
"secret":4

[The soul] can find no suitable way or manner or similitude by which it

may be able to describe such lofty understanding and such delicate spiri-

4. We quote from an authoritative English translation of the original Spanish by Allison

Peers ( 1959, pp. 1 59-1 60), whereas James apparently provided his own English translation of
an earlier translation into French. The central message of both English versions is the same,
despite some differences in detail.
SOO-Chapter 8

tual feeling. And thus, even though the soul might have a great desire to
express it and might find many ways in which to describe it, it would still
be secret and remain undescribed. For, as that inward wisdom is so simple,
so general and so spiritual that it has not entered into the understanding
enwrapped or cloaked in any form or image subject to sense, it follows that
sense and imagination (as it has not entered through them nor has taken
their form and color) cannot account for it or imagine it, so as to say any­
thing concerning it, although the soul be clearly aware that it is experienc­
ing and partaking of that rare and delectable wisdom.

We hope that the material presented so far will suffice to convey, even
to readers having no prior acquaintance with the subject, some initial feel­
ing for the impressive phenomenology of mystical experience. Additional
examples will be provided below, and many more can be found in important
collections such as those of Bucke (190111969), Rappold ( 196311 970), Stace
(1 960/ 1987), Underhill (191 1 11 974), and Woods (1 980).
But now what is the real significance of these powerful experiences? Are
they revelations of hidden realities, as the mystics themselves believe, or
are they instead purely subjective phenomena, mere delusions fabricated
by disordered brains? As pointed out above, contemporary Western cul­
ture remains deeply divided on these issues, with the positive and negative
attitudes tending to parcel out along religious versus scientific lines, respec­
tively.
Even more poignantly, both attitudes can sometimes be found coexist­
ing uneasily in the same person, as in the case of the rationalist philosopher
Bertrand Russell. Russell was deeply appreciative of mystical philosophers
such as Plato and Spinoza, and even said of Heraclitus that "in such a nature
we see the true union of the mystic and the man of science-the highest emi­
nence, as I think, that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought" (Rus­
sell, 1 921b, p. 4). Yet Russell also remained deeply and generally distrustful
of mystical experience, declaring with characteristic sarcasm, for example,
that "from a scientific point of view, we can make no distinction between
the man who eats little and sees heaven and the man who drinks much and
sees snakes. Each is in an abnormal physical condition, and therefore has
abnormal perceptions" (Russell, 1 935/1 974, p. 1 88).
On the other hand, many eminent scientists have been more or less
openly religious, and receptive to mysticism in particular. Einstein (1949),
for example, remarked that "the religious geniuses of all ages have been
distinguished by this kind of [cosmic] religious feeling . . . .In my view it is the
most important function of art and science to awaken this feeling and keep
it alive in those who are capable of it .. . .1 maintain that cosmic religious
feeling is the strongest and noblest incitement to scientific research" (pp.
26-28).
Such remarkable diversity of attitudes underscores once again our
need, both culturally and individually, to resolve the fundamental question
as to the "truth" (James) or objective significance of mystical experience. In
order to begin framing the relevant issues more narrowly, we will conclude
 Mystical Experience-50 1

this introduction by briefly contrasting the contemporary opinions of Bucke

and James.
Bucke displays in abundance the characteristic certitude of persons
who have themselves experienced "cosmic consciousness." Nevertheless,
and to his credit, he recognizes that certitude does not entail certainty, and
he therefore also provides several arguments for its objective significance
(Bucke, 190111 969, pp. 70-71). First, mystical consciousness, in contrast with
all forms of "insanity," tends to produce moral elevation, enhanced self­
control, and the like, as demonstrated by the roughly 50 cases catalogued in
his book. In addition, civilization as a whole clearly rests upon foundational
religious careers profoundly shaped by it. Most importantly, the question of
mystical "truth" seems to Bucke entirely on a par, epistemologically, with
that of the truth of ordinary perceptual judgments. Everyone can agree that
the tree is really there across the field because all adequately sighted observ­
ers see and report it in essentially the same way. Similarly, Bucke thinks, the
objective reality of what mystics experience is straightforwardly established
by an argument from unanimity:

Just i n the same way do the reports of those who have had cosmic con­
sciousness correspond in all essentials, though in detail they doubtless
more or less diverge (but these divergences are fully as much in our mis­
understanding of the reports as in the reports themselves). So there is no
instance of a person who has been illumined denying or disputing the
teaching of another who has passed through the same experience. (p. 7 1 )

It seems evident that Bucke's critical faculties were overwhelmed here

by the impressiveness of his own first-person experience. The unanimity he
perceives seems at least partly an artifact of his procedures, for most of the
1 1 features he uses to characterize the supposedly common experience are
directly transcribed from his own, and clearly influenced his identification
of it in others. Thus, for example, he thinks the experience occurs primarily
in well-developed males between the ages of 30 and 40, and acknowledges
his immediate suspicion of cases purportedly occurring under different cir­
cumstances (p. 75). Most importantly, he overlooks the obvious and prob­
lematic fact that unanimous judgments are sometimes uniformly wrong, as
in the case of mirages or incorrigible visual illusions of various kinds.
James, the third-person observer, adopts a more nuanced, subtle, and
cautious stance, despite the fact that he clearly has great personal sympathy
for the driving impulse behind Bucke's argument. In regard to near-una­
nimity at the core of religious mysticism, for example, he says :

This overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the
Absolute is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we both become
one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is the
everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by differ­
ences of clime or creed. In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in
Christian mysticism, i n Whitmanism, we find the same recurring note, so
S02-Chapter 8

that there is about mystical utterances an eternal unanimity which ought

to make a critic stop and think. ( VRE, p. 321)5

Nonetheless, where Bucke sees only unanimity James recognizes and

respects diversity as well, and in his provisional assessment of the "truth" of
mysticism he carefully hedges ( VRE, pp. 323-328). It is true and appropri­
ate, as a matter of psychological fact, that mystical experiences are typically
authoritative for those who have them. Nevertheless, "no authority ema­
nates from them which should make it a duty for those who stand outside of
them to accept their revelations uncritically" (p. 324).
In particular, they do not by anything intrinsic to their character war­
rant any of the specific theological or ecclesiastical doctrines with which
they have commonly been associated. Any naive argument from unanimity
is unsound, in part because that is at bottom only an appeal to numbers,
which has no logical force, but more importantly because the supposed una­
nimity itself appears to James to break down to some degree upon closer
inspection: Not only do mystical states ally themselves freely with a great
diversity of mutually incompatible theological and metaphysical doctrines,
but they have pathological counterparts, such as acute psychotic states,
which seem to emanate from the same or similar subliminal regions of the
psyche. This leads James to his crucial practical conclusion:

That region contains every kind of matter: "seraph and snake" abide there
side by side. To corne from thence is no infallible credential. What comes
must be sifted and tested, and run the gauntlet of confrontation with the
total context of experience, just like what comes from the outer world of
sense. Its value must be ascertained by empirical methods, so long as we
are not mystics ourselves. (p. 326)6

For James, therefore, it remains an open question, to be resolved by

empirical means, whether higher mystical states do or do not in fact provide
more enveloping points of view, windows through which we glimpse nor­
mally hidden aspects of a larger, more comprehensive reality. James himself
clearly is sympathetic to this possibility, and he insists-repeatedly-that

5. lames's personal attitudes are brought out even more clearly in a letter he wrote in 1904
(Perry, 1935, vol. 2, pp. 350-351) to his colleague lames Leuba, an arch-reductionist: "I fi nd
it preposterous to suppose that if there be a feeling of unseen reality shared by large numbers
of best men in their best moments, responded to by other men in their 'deep' moments, good
to live by, strength-giving,-1 find it preposterous, I say, to suppose that the goodness of that
feeling for living purposes should be held to carry no objective significance . . . .Now, although
I am so devoid of Gottesbewusstsein in the directer and stronger sense, yet there is something
in me which makes response when I hear utterances from that quarter made by others. I rec­
ognize the deeper voice. Something tells me:- 'thither lies truth'- and I am sure it is not old
theistic prejudices of infancy. . . . Call this, if you like, my mystical germ."
6. As discussed in Chapter 2, the diversity of the content of the subliminal, ranging from
"dissolutive" to "evolutive" manifestations, was an important aspect of Myers's theory: "Hid­
den in the deep of our being is a rubbish-heap as well as a treasure-house;-degenerations and
insanities as well as beginnings of higher development" (HP, vol. I, p. 72).
 Mystical Experience-503

at minimum "the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the pre­

tension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what
we may believe" (p. 327).
In sum, the problem of evaluating the objective significance of mysti­
cal experience resolves itself into two closely related sub-problems: First, to
what degree are mystical experiences in their full world-wide distribution
truly similar in their most important characteristics? Is there in fact a high­
est type, or universal core? Second, if such a core experience exists, what
if anything about that experience or its concomitants might be brought to
bear on the question of objective significance?
One of the most searching, thoughtful, and provocative examinations
of these questions carried out to date, in our opinion, remains that of ana­
lytic philosopher W. T. Stace (1 960/1987). We will anchor our presentation
to his.

The Problem of the Universal Core

Stace shares with many earlier writers including Bucke and James the gen­
eral sense that deep mystical experiences have something important in com­
mon that sets them off sharply from ordinary states of consciousness. He is
dissatisfied, however, with previous attempts to say what that something is,
and he takes as his first and logically primary task to establish and charac­
terize this universal core in a more rigorous and empirically well-grounded
way.
This requires in the first place sampling from a wider than normal cul­
tural and temporal variety of reported experiences. In addition to numerous
examples drawn from the Judeo-Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and
Taoist religious traditions, therefore, Stace also examines reports provided
by historically prominent but "unattached" mystics such as Plotinus, and
less well-known reports from recent times such as that of Arthur Koestler
(1954).
Of course we have direct access only to mystics' reports (or perhaps
even translations or descriptions of their reports) and not to their experi­
ences themselves. These records, moreover, are sometimes saturated with
highly figurative language, or with language that clearly goes beyond simple
description of an experience to its interpretation, where by "interpretation"
Stace means "anything which the conceptual intellect adds to the experience
for the purpose of understanding it, whether what is added is only classifica­
tory concepts, or a logical inference, or an explanatory hypothesis" (p. 37).
In most cases the relevant conceptual apparatus is of course that provided
by the theological or institutional context in which the experience occurs.
Although this distinction seems clear enough in principle, it is often
hard to apply in practice, and to varying degrees in different cases. Stace is
not at all naive about these diffic ulties, however, and requires only that he
504-Chapter 8

be able to separate the descriptive or phenomenological aspects of reports

from their interpretive or theological parts in sufficient degree, and in a suf­
ficient number of cases, to delineate with reasonable confidence the main
features of the underlying states of consciousness.
Proceeding in this fashion, Stace identifies two principal classes of deep
mystical states, strongly overlapping, which he calls the "extrovertive" and
"introvertive" types. Each of these types is characterized by a family-resem­
blance relation involving seven specific features that empirically co-occur
with high regularity, although not all seven need be present in any given
case. Each type is also accompanied by borderline or transitional cases
showing lesser degrees of conformity to the central, defining pattern.
Five of the features that Stace identifies are common to both of these
main classes and echo properties of mystical experience previously identi­
fied or emphasized by writers such as Bucke, James, Underhill, and others.
The first of these five is a sense of the "objectivity" or "reality" of the expe­
rience, which corresponds to James's "noetic quality" and Bucke's "intel­
lectual illumination." Second is strong positive affect, with feelings of calm,
peace, blessedness, joy, bliss, and the like. Third is a feeling, closely related
to the previous, that what is apprehended or contacted in the experience is
somehow holy, or sacred, or divine. That is, there is an aspect of emotion­
ally charged or numinous contact with something powerful or awesome, a
mysterium tremendum (Otto, 1 923/1 970). Fourth is paradoxicality, a sense
that the experience somehow inherently defies or overpasses ordinary rules
of logic, permitting or demanding simultaneous application of normally
incompatible predicates such as active/inactive, full/empty, light/dark, and
so on. We will give a few examples below, and Stace himself devotes an entire
chapter to this puzzling aspect. Closely connected with this paradoxicality,
of course, is the last of the five features shared by all mystical experience, its
alleged ineffability, as discussed previously.7
Although all strong mystical experiences thus have much in common,
the extrovertive and introvertive types are distinguished by two remain­
ing characteristics which also reveal them to be two species of a common
genus. The extrovertive form is perhaps more common in spontaneous
cases and at earlier stages of the mystic way, although it can also occur fol­
lowing "enlightenment" experiences of the introvertive type. Its primary

7. Stace adds the qualification "alleged" to underscore the peculiarity that virtually all
mystics, having declared that their experience cannot be described in words, immediately
go on to describe it, often at prodigious length. In a separate chapter devoted to this subject
he argues that mystics are in fact providing literal descriptions of remembered experiences
which were themselves inherently paradoxical. Price (1962) resists this interpretation, how­
ever, suggesting that the diffic ulty is more akin to that of one who, not having acquired the
concept of "Scotch mist," must describe the meteorologic condition to which that concept
applies as both "raining" and "not raining." Although we cannot pursue these interesting
issues in greater detail here, we suspect that Price may be correct in suggesting that more
widespread first-person familiarity with mystical experience could lead to reduction of the
apparent paradoxicality through a similar process of "ostensive definition," and more gener­
ally that we need to extend and refine our currently impoverished methods ofphenomenologi­
cal description and analysis.
 Mystical Experience-50S

distinguishing feature is that the ordinary perceptual world remains, but

in transfigured form. A multiplicity of objects and events may continue to
be perceived through the physical senses, but now they are apprehended
as both distinct and yet at the same time mysteriously identical, pervaded
by some sort of shared inner subjectivity or consciousness, or light, or life
which binds all elements of the perceptual field both to each other and to the
perceiving subject. It is as if the multiplicity itself somehow discloses a nor­
mally hidden unity. As Meister Eckhart concisely remarks, "here all blades
of grass, wood, and stone, all things are One" (Stace, 19601 1987, p. 63). One
example is the experience of Bucke, quoted above. Another is a well-known
experience of Jacob Boehme, a German shoemaker and family man of mod­
est education: "Sitting one day in his room his eyes fell upon a burnished
pewter disk, which reflected the sunshine with such marvelous splendor that
he fell into an inward ecstasy, and it seemed to him as if he could now look
into the principles and deepest foundations of things" (Bucke, 190111969,
p. 1 80). Fearing that this might be just a trick of his imagination, Boehme
went outside to test it: "Here he remarked that he gazed into the very heart
of things, the very herbs and grass, and that actual Nature harmonized with
what he had inwardly seen," says one biographer; and "viewing the herbs
and grass of the field in his inward light, he saw into their essences, use and
properties," says another (Underhill, 1 91 1 /1 974, p. 256).
Both Stace and Underhill remark that a number of mystical poets such
as Blake, Tennyson, Whitman, and Wordsworth often seem to verge upon
this sort of experience. Blake, for example, much influenced by Boehme,
sees "a world in a grain of sand, and heaven in a wildflower," and Myers
( 1 880/ 1929) in his biography of Wordsworth characterizes the poet explic­
itly as operating in a realm "midway between mystic intuition and delicate
observation" (p. 1 37). The same sort of apprehension of hidden unity and
expansion of self in and through nature is approached but not quite realized
in the case of Richard Jefferies, which Bucke (190111969, pp. 319-322) treats
as a borderline case of cosmic consciousness. Bucke quotes from Jefferies's
autobiography his description of an experience at age 18 in which a sense
of hidden inward unity underlying the perceptible world first began to flood
into him as he lay alone in the grass:

Having drunk deeply of the heaven above and felt the most glorious beauty
of the day, and remembering the old, old sea, . .I now became lost, and
.

absorbed into the being or existence of the universe. I felt down deep into
the earth, under, and high above into the sky, and farther still to the sun
and stars. Still farther beyond the stars into the hollow of space, and losing
thus my separateness of being came to seem like part of the whole.

We turn now to mystical experiences of the introvertive type, which seem

to us both psychologically and philosophically to form the real heart of the
subj ect. As Stace points out, these are far more prominent in the world­
wide literature of mysticism in that they occur predominantly in advanced
stages of the mystic vocation and are clearly regarded as the higher type by
506 - Chapter 8

persons such as Meister Eckhart who have experienced both. They are also
easily recognized, even by third-person observers such as ourselves, as a
more radical and complete expression of the central impulse of the extro­
vertive mystical states described above. The core experience is again one of
unity, but in this case the unity is even more profound, and it is achieved in
a startlingly different manner. In these experiences one's perceptual world
is not merely transfigured but abolished, along with all other contents of
ordinary consciousness such as specific thoughts, images, memories, and
the like. But what results-confuting the expectations of empiricists such as
David Hume-is not some sort of blank or dim or unconscious condition,
but an extraordinary inward experience of pure, contentless, undifferenti­
ated, unitary consciousness. "This undifferentiated unity is the essence of the
introvertive mystical experience" (Stace, 1 96011 987, p. 87).
A few examples here may help to flesh out this description. We cite
first a passage from the Mandukya Upanishad which distills the essence of
India's psychological teachings. Beyond ordinary consciousness, dreaming
consciousness, and dreamless sleep, say their ancient sages, lies a higher
form of consciousness-Turiya , the Fourth:

The Fourth, say the wise, is not subjective experience, nor objective experi­
ence, nor experience intermediate between these two, nor is it a negative
condition which is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness. It is not
the knowledge of the senses, nor is it relative knowledge, nor yet inferen­
tial knowledge. Beyond the senses, beyond the understanding, beyond all
expression, is The Fourth. It is pure unitary consciousness, wherein aware­
ness of the world and multiplicity is completely obliterated. It is ineffable
peace. It is the supreme good. It is One without a second. It is the Self.
Know it alone! (Prabhavananda & Manchester, 1957, p. 5 1 )

Many passages from the Christian mystical tradition further attest to

the existence of such non-ordinary conscious states devoid of multiplicity.
Stace characteristically emphasizes examples from highly cerebral Chris­
tian mystics such as Ruysbroeck and especially Meister Eckhart, but he also
goes to some pains (pp. 100-104) to argue that St. Teresa's highest unitive
experiences, although described in relatively unsophisticated and theology­
laden language superficially dissimilar from Meister Eckhart's, must have
been in essence the same.8

8. Stace's argument here turns on the fact that St. John of the Cross, whose descriptions
of unitive experience are often extremely similar to Meister Eckhart's, was also St. Teresa's
principal spiritual advisor and confessor and apparently largely agreed with her as to the
principal psychological characteristics of unitive states. An important translator, student,
and admirer of the great Spanish mystics, Peers (1951) confirms this latter point, adding that
"the complementary nature of the works of the two saints is very noticeable: they seldom
disagree, though each relies largely on personal experience, and a synthesis of their writings
would form an account of the mystical life, we may safely say, approached by very few other
syntheses, and surpassed by none" (p. 232). St. John, for example, is known to have deliber­
ately avoided writing on "lower" mystical phenomena such as voices and visions, which he felt
St. Teresa had already described in adequate detail. A j oint and in-depth psychological study
of these two individuals clearly would be of great interest and value.
 Mystical Experience-507

This "vacuum" or negative aspect of introvertive mystical experience is

highlighted by descriptors such as "emptiness," "void," "obscurity," "dark­
ness," "nothingness," "silence," which recur throughout the mystical litera­
ture. Inasmuch as our ordinary sense of space and time is strongly bound
up with (and perhaps even a condition of) the normal multiplicity of per­
ceptual and cognitive experience, the obliteration of this multiplicity may
also account for the further property that the experience typically seems to
its subjects as somehow outside or beyond space and time. Yet this vacuum,
paradoxically, is at the same time a "plenum," with the obscurity "dazzling,"
the desert "teeming," and so on. It is especially these further, positive, but
"ineffable" aspects of unitive mystical experience that seem to us to consti­
tute its central mystery and challenge.
Based on her comprehensive survey of Christian mysticism, Underhill
(191 1/1974) captures both the vacuum and plenum aspects of unitive experi­
ence and draws our attention to still another crucial characteristic:

In this experience the departmental activities of thought and feeling, the

consciousness of I-hood, of space and time-all that belongs to the World
of Becoming and our own place therein-are suspended. The vitality
which we are accustomed to split amongst these various things, is gath­
ered up to form a state of "pure apprehension": a vivid intuition of-or
if you like conjunction with-the Transcendent. . . [the mystic's] conscious­
ness escapes the limitations of the senses, rises to freedom, and is united
for an instant with the "great life of the All." (p. 367)

The feature we wish to emphasize here is the alteration of "I-hood"­

the sense of self. What happens seems again in part explainable as a conse­
quence of the obliteration of multiplicity. Everyday consciousness is typi­
cally felt, with varying degrees of clarity, as structured in terms of a polarity
between ourselves as conscious egos or subjects and whatever it is that we
are currently doing or experiencing. To the degree that this distinction along
with all others is obliterated during unitive experience, it seems inevitable
that the mystic's habitual sense of self must undergo some sort of radical
transformation.
There can be no doubt that this is in fact the case. Stace devotes an entire
section to this subject, which he titles "the dissolution of individuality" (pp.
1 1 1-1 23). This label is accurate insofar as reports of introvertive mystical
experience do often describe the fading, dimming, melting, dissolving, loss,
or death of the ordinary finite self. The Sufis even have a special term for
this , fana , which literally mean "passing away." But this is only one aspect
of the transformation, its negative side. If this were the entirety of what
occurs, genuine mystical experience might be difficult to distinguish from
pathological forms of "depersonalization." The ordinary self is not liter­
ally obliterated, of course, since after all it normally returns, although often
uplifted and transformed in ways we will discuss SUbsequently. The Sufis, for
example, also speak of baqa, revival, the return to an enhanced self. During
the experience, however, the ordinary, everyday self is transcended, in a dra-
508- Chapter 8

matic and remarkably consistent way. Specifically, in its place there char­
acteristically emerges a vastly amplified sense of self-a Self-that almost
inevitably experiences itself as being in a state of direct contact, or union,
or identity with some reality variably conceived as a Universal Self, the One,
the Absolute, the Ground of Being, or God (Stace, 1 960/1987, p. 93).
This fundamental characteristic of introvertive mystical experience
appears with particular clarity and force in another of its classic descrip­
tions, this one by the Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus, who appears in
history at or near the original confluence of the Greek and Oriental mysti­
cal traditions and is arguably a principal fountainhead of modern Western
mystical traditions as well. The passages we quote from are widely known,
and in varying translations have been cited as representative and authorita­
tive by both Stace and Underhill, among many others.9 The testimony of
Plotinus (1969) seems to us especially significant, as it constitutes a seri­
ous effort by a philosopher of the first rank to characterize as clearly as
he can an extraordinary experience of union which he is known to have
entered into himself, on at least four occasions (p. 17). Based largely on this
description, moreover, Underhill (191 1 /1 974, p. 372) specifically endorses the
fundamental identity between the unitive experiences of Plotinus and those
of the great Christian mystics. Its affinities with the description from the
Mandukya Upanishad, quoted above, will be equally apparent.
The key passage appears in the 6th Ennead, tractate 9, section 10, of
which we quote only a small part.1O Plotinus is attempting to describe the
supreme good, the "flight of the one to the One," which can only be realized
in ful l through a mode of direct apprehension which he finds greatly supe­
rior to ordinary reason:

I n our self-seeing There, the self is seen as belonging to that order, or rather
we are merged into that self i n us which has the quality of that order. It is
a knowing of the self restored to its purity. No doubt we should not speak
of seeing; but we cannot help talking in dualities, seen and seer, instead of
boldly, the achievement of unity. In this seeing, we neither hold an object
nor trace distinction; there is no two. The man is changed, no longer him­
self nor self-belonging; he is merged with the Supreme, sunken into it, one
with it: centre coincides with centre, for centres of circles, even here below,
are one when they unite, and two when they separate; and it is in this sense
that we now (after the vision) speak of the Supreme as separate. This is why
the vision baffles telling; we cannot detach the Supreme to state it; if we
have seen something thus detached we have failed of the Supreme which is
to be known only as one with ourselves.

9. Myers, who was intimately familiar with the Enneads, uses the same passages (in his own
slightly different translation, naturally) in an interesting essay on "Tennyson as Prophet"
(Myers, 1 8 89h).
10. Like Stace we have relied on the famous translation by Stephen McKenna, but ours is a
later (4th) edition, revised by B. S. Page, and differs slightly from the version quoted by Stace
(p. 104).
 Mystical Experience-509

The same sort of radical transformation in the sense of self is evident in

two modern "borderline" introvertive cases involving distinguished persons
not attached to any specific mystical tradition. The first, originally pub­
licized by James, involves Tennyson, who describes an experience he fre­
quently had in solitude:

This has come upon me through repeating my own name to myself silently,
till all at once, as it were out of the intensity of the consciousness of indi­
viduality, individuality itself seemed to dissolve away into boundless
being, and this not a confused state but the clearest, the surest of the sur­
est, utterly beyond words-here death was an almost laughable impossi­
bility-the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction, but the
only true l i fe. I am ashamed of my feeble description. H ave I not said the
state is utterly beyond words? ( VRE, p. 295) 1 1

The second and perhaps even more interesting case involves Arthur
Koestler (1 954, pp. 345-363), who reports a series of mystical experiences
precipitated under the harrowing conditions of his imprisonment during
the Spanish Civil War in 1937. Koestler, a scientifically well-educated per­
son, was at that time strongly committed to Socialist/Communist politics
and decidedly materialist and anti-religious. Placed in solitary confine­
ment by his Fascist captors, he had undergone a prolonged hunger strike
and found himself in a state of chronic exhaustion, expecting constantly
to be taken from his cell and beaten or executed like many other prisoners.
The first experience supervened upon his profoundly gratifying success in
reconstructing Euclid's proof that there is an infinity of prime numbers.
Suddenly, he reports,

I was floating on my back in a river of peace, under bridges of silence. It

came from nowhere and flowed nowhere. Then there was no river and no
I. The I had ceased to exist.
It is extremely embarrassing to write down a phrase like that when
one has read The Meaning of Mean ing and nibbled at logical positivism
and aims at verbal precision and dislikes nebulous gushings. Yet, "mysti­
cal" experiences, as we dubiously call them, are not nebulous, vague or
maudlin-they only become so when we debase them by verbalisation.
However, to communicate what is incommunicable by its nature, one must
somehow put it into words, and so one moves in a vicious circle. When I say
"the I had ceased to exist," I refer to a concrete experience that is verbally
as incommunicable as the feeling aroused by a piano concerto, yet just as
real-only much more real. In fact, its primary mark is the sensation that
this state is more real than any other one has experienced before-that for
the first time the veil has fallen and one is in touch with "real reality," the
hidden order of things, the X-ray texture of the world, normally obscured
by layers of irrelevancy.

1 1 . James adds this further statement by Tennyson, as reported by Tyndall: "By God
Almighty! there is no delusion in the matter! It is no nebulous ecstasy, but a state of transcen­
dent wonder, associated with absolute clearness of mind."
5 10-Chapter 8

What distinguishes this type of experience from the emotional

entrancements of music, landscapes or love is that the former has a defi­
nitely intellectual, or rather noumenal, content. It is meaningful, though
not in verbal terms. Verbal transcriptions that come nearest to it are: the
unity and interlocking of everything that exists, an inter-dependence like
that of gravitational fields or communicating vessels. The "I" ceases to
exist because it has, by a kind of mental osmosis, established communica­
tion with, and been dissolved in, the universal pool. It is this process of dis­
solution and limitless expansion which is sensed as the "oceanic feeling",
as the draining of all tension, the absolute catharsis, the peace that passeth
all understanding. (p. 352)

This experience could not be voluntarily induced, but it recurred spontane­

ously, initially as often as two or three times a week and at slowly lengthen­
ing intervals thereafter. Koestler credits it with catalyzing a fundamental
transformation in his attitudes and personality, and with directly inspiring
the four books he produced in the following five years in an effort to digest
its meaning. Later, in response to direct questioning by Stace, Koestler him­
self also interpreted his experience as an incipient or incomplete form of
the full-fledged introvertive experience described in the Mandukya Upani­
shad.
We have now done about as much as we can by way of describing the
principal psychological characteristics of introvertive mystical experience.
Its extreme developments are perhaps most concisely encapsulated by the
famous Vedic formula "Sat-Chit-Ananda"-pure being or existence, pure
awareness or consciousness, and pure bliss, amplified without limit. Many
further descriptions and examples can be found in the sources cited above,
and readers may find it useful to consult these, but mystics themselves
declare unanimously that full appreciation of such extraordinary states of
consciousness comes only to those fortunate enough or determined enough
to experience them directly.
Stace ( 1960/1 987) concludes his descriptive survey of mystical experi­
ences by explicitly identifying the central, crucial property, common to both
the introvertive and extrovertive forms, which constitutes its true universal
core: "In this general experience of a unity which the mystic believes to be in
some sense ultimate and basic to the world, we have the very inner essence
of all mystical experience . . . the nucleus round which the other and more
peripheral characteristics revolve" (pp. 1 32-133).
Stace himself next turns immediately to the task of evaluating this cen­
tral claim of mystics to have made contact with something in nature that is
real, though normally inaccessible-the problem of "objective reference,"
as he calls it. We will shortly follow him there, but we must first deal with a
controversy that his characterization of the universal core has provoked.
 Mystical Experience-5 1 !

Steven Katz and the Contructivist Backlash

Stace was a philosophically sophisticated member of what has come to be

known as the "perennialist" school (A. Huxley, 1 944/1970), which seeks
out and emphasizes commonalities in religion generally and in the mystical
or primordial wisdom tradition in particular (H. Smith, 1 976). There have
always been opposing voices, however, who for one or another reason have
preferred to emphasize the existence of significant and possibly irreducible
differences. William James characteristically found merit in both points
of view, although clearly tending philosophically toward the perennialist
camp, but these contrasting tendencies have recently come into sharp con­
flict over Stace's taxonomy of mystical experience.
The success of Stace's enterprise depends crucially, of course, on the
feasibility of applying successfully in practice his theoretical distinction
between experience and interpretation-in effect, to peer through the diver­
sity of concrete surface forms in which mystical experience has found writ­
ten expression in different times, places, and religious traditions, and to
discern the essential psychological characteristics of the underlying experi­
ences. Is it really possible to perform this psychological extraction? With
certain qualifications to be introduced below, we think so; we count our­
selves among those persuaded that Stace demonstrated, by actually doing
it, that this is possible, at least to a degree sufficient to sustain his character­
ization of the universal core.12
Not everyone agrees, however. An opposing position, "constructivism,"
was formulated with particular force and clarity in an influential essay by
Steven Katz ( 1978) and rapidly became dominant among contemporary
scholars in comparative religion. Its essence is contained in a characteristi­
cally vehement passage from that essay:

There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences. Neither mystical experi­

ence nor more ordinary forms of experience give any indication, or any
grounds for believing, that they are unmediated. That is to say, all expe­
rience is processed through, organized by, and makes itself available to
us i n extremely complex epistemological ways. The notion of unmediated
experience seems, if not self-contradictory, at best empty. . . . the experience
itself as well as the form i n which it is reported is shaped by concepts which
the mystic brings to, and which shape, his experience. (p. 26)

Thus, on the view of Katz and his constructivist allies, if one is a Chris­
tian one necessarily has a distinctively Christian experience, a Taoist's expe­
rience will be structured by Taoist assumptions, a Jew can never escape from
the shaping power of his Jewish upbringing, and so on. There can therefore
be no ultimate type or universal core of mystical experience, independent

12. We especially recommend here a thoughtful and appreciative contemporary review by

the eminent philosopher of perception H. H. Price ( 1 962).
5 1 2-Chapter 8

of factors such as time, context, gender, race, and culture. There is only a
multiplicity of distinctive, culturally conditioned states of consciousness.
We believe this doctrine is seriously flawed, both psychologically and
philosophically. Although we cannot go deeply into details of the contro­
versy, we must attempt at least briefly to indicate our principal reasons for
thinking so.
Katz evidently believes that his primary epistemological axiom-his
italicized statement in the passage above-represents the fundamental nov­
elty in his position and the source of his differences with Stace and other
perennialists. If so, however, he is certainly mistaken. In the first place
the axiom itself is not a novelty, because Stace himself accepts it; he states
clearly, for example, that "there is no such thing as an absolutely pure expe­
rience without any interpretation at all" (p. 203).
Second and more importantly, the axiom by itself does not suffice to
undermine Stace's project, because it leaves uncertain the degree to which
particular experiences are in fact shaped by cultural conditioning. This is
the real source of their differences. Stace nowhere claims that all reported
mystical experiences are completely unmediated, but only that enough of
them are sufficiently so to permit us to grasp their common psychologi­
cal characteristics. Katz, by contrast, clearly presumes that experiences in
general, and mystical experiences in particular, are completely determined
by cultural conditionings. In this crucial respect Katz and other radical
constructivists seem to us driven, at bottom, by an unexamined a priori
commitment to the sort of relentless "postmodernism"-characteristic of
so much contemporary scholarship in the humanities and social sciences­
that abhors absolutes and universal narratives of any kind.
This sort of radical constructivism, however, is known to require heavy
qualification even in the case of ordinary perceptual and cognitive expe­
rience, as shown for example by the old controversies over the "linguistic
relativity" hypothesis of Sapir and Whorf. The fact that Eskimos have many
more words than we do for specific types of snow, for example, does not
entail that we are incapable of having the corresponding perceptual experi­
ences, or of making the same distinctions (recall here too the "Scotch mist"
example). Conversely, many perceptual illusions are "cognitively impene­
trable" in the sense of J. Fodor (1983), and not alterable by any sort of vol­
untary efforts, or by knowledge of their underlying mechanisms.
It cannot be denied, of course, that most of us operate most of the time in
the grip of linguistic habits, beliefs, and expectations that powerfully shape
and color what we experience and report. It is equally certain that many
kinds of phenomena reported by mystics, particularly in the early stages
of their vocation, are shaped in similar ways. Thus, for example, whereas a
Catholic mystic might report a visionary experience of Jesus or the Virgin
Mary, his Hindu counterpart would naturally report a vision of Krishna,
Kali, or some other personality drawn from his own religious tradition.
The radical constructivist position, however, becomes increasingly
strained as we progress toward the deeper regions of mystical experience,
 Mystical Experience-5 1 3

which are precisely the ones of greatest interest both to Stace and to us. In
the first place it ignores the fundamental relationship between the character
of such experience and the practical teachings of mystics as to how it can be
achieved. The central objective of mystical teachings and practices every­
where is essentially the same-specifically, to overcome conditionings and
attachments of everyday life that get in the way of a mystical receptivity
which is presumed to exist in all of us. To what degree we can in fact pal­
liate or transcend these cultural and psychological conditionings is exactly
the question at hand, and this is an empirical question. We all know from
experience that it is to some degree possible to reflect upon one's beliefs,
attitudes, and habits of perception and thought; to take a position for or
against them; to choose to intensify and prolong or reject and eradicate
them; and so on. Mysticism is a domain of human experience in which this
capacity, not highly developed in most of us, is seized upon and exploited in
the highest degree.
The great systematizer of Yogic practices Patanjali, for example, defines
the technique of Yoga succinctly as "inhibition of the modifications of the
mind" (Taimni, 1 972, p. 6). Eliade (1958) characterizes these practices col­
lectively as a process of systematic deconditioning which results in "rebirth
to a nonconditioned mode of being" (p. 4). This "rebirth," moreover, consti­
tutes "one of India's greatest discoveries: that of consciousness as witness,
of consciousness freed from its psychophysiological structures and their
temporal conditioning" (p. xx). To achieve this state, "the yogin undertakes
to 'reverse' normal behavior completely. He subjects himself to a petri­
fied immobility of body (asana), rhythmical breathing and arrest of breath
(pranayama), fixation of the psychomental flux (ekagrata), [and] immobility
of thought" (p. 362). The ultimate goal of Yogic training, in short, is specifi­
cally to overcome the conditionings that keep us culturally and psychologi­
cally bound, and that prevent us from experiencing what we can become in
a deconditioned state.
The same principle is also evident in the various forms of Buddhism.
For example, the Madyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism, founded by
Nagarjuna in the 1 st century B. C. E., is explicit about the practice of pro­
gressively and systematically de conditioning the beliefs and assumptions of
one's working epistemology, leading to a state of pure consciousness called
the Middle Way or Emptiness. Goleman (1977) and D. P. Brown ( 1 977) have
shown respectively, and in detail, that Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga (the
"path to purification") and a collection of Tibetan Buddhist meditation
texts, the Mahamudra, can also be interpreted in these terms. Similarly, a
contemporary Tibetan monk and associate of the Dalai Lama describes
as the fundamental method for achieving states of emptiness or nirvana a
relentless analysis of the contingent conceptualizations that permeate ordi­
nary experience. The fundamental insight sought is that all such experience
is "conceptually designated." Thus he writes: "As you look around at differ­
ent objects and events, mentally comment, 'This is simply a conceptual des­
ignation.' As you do so, try to identify the basis of designation of these vari-
5 14-Chapter 8

ous objects that you identify, and see how you label things that have no label
in themselves" (Lamrimpa, 1 999, p. 37). One trains oneself to observe how
from moment to moment one "conceptually designates" one's experience,
and constructs one's contingent notions of the real, one's values, interpre­
tations, and beliefs, or in sum the entire busy apparatus of one's everyday
mental life. The central Buddhist practice is again to identify, deconstruct,
and root out of consciousness these mental fabrications, and thus to realize
nirvana, release, transcendence-in short, deconditioned consciousness.
The same sort of disciplined effort to overcome ordinary conditionings
is also central to the practices of Plotinus and many Christian mystics. For
example, Dionysius the Areopagite, one of the founders of Christian mysti­
cism, emphasized the idea of the via negativa (Happold, 1 96311970, pp. 21 1-
2 17). It is a way of not doing, forgetting, letting go. For Dionysius the mysti­
cal project is to "leave behind the senses and the operations of the intellect"
and enter the "dazzling obscurity." In the way of negation, we deliberately
go beyond all conditioned attributes "in order that, without veil, we may
know that Unknowing" (p. 2 15).
St. John of the Cross, whose description of "secret" or ineffable wisdom
we quoted earlier, also explains in complementary fashion how that infu­
sion of wisdom is to be attained :

A soul is greatly impeded from reaching this high estate of union with God
when it clings to any understanding or feeling or imagination or appear­
ance or will or manner of its own, and cannot detach and strip itself of all
these. For, as we say, the goal which it seeks lies beyond all this, yea, beyond
even the highest thing that can be known or experienced; and thus a soul
must pass beyond everything to unknowing. (Peers, 1 958, pp. 88-89)

Meister Eckhart's short treatise On Detachment (1981, pp. 285-294) is

also exemplary: "I find no other virtue better than a pure detachment from
all things; because all other virtues have some regard for created things, but
detachment is free from all created things." Perfect detachment leads to the
"annihilation of self." This language of "annihilation" and "nothingness" is
of course parallel to the Sufi/ana or fading and the early Buddhist sunyata
or void, emptiness. By emptying the ordinary self of all sensations, images,
thoughts, and volitions one arrives at the experience of pure consciousness,
the Self, and as Eckhart observes, "the less there is of self, the more there is
of Self" (H. Smith, 2000, p. 73).
A non-theistic Chinese text from the 8th-century T'ang Dynasty sets
forth a psychological dynamic of mystical experience closely similar to that
described by Meister Eckhart. The text, by Hui Hai, On Sudden Illumina­
tion, is a manual consisting of questions and answers regarding the attempt
to achieve nirvana, the experience that offers "deliverance while still in this
life" (Blofeld, 1962, p. 77). Hui Hai uses plain language, without theologi­
cal metaphors and assumptions, to describe the necessary discipline: "Just
let things happen without making any response," he says, "and keep your
minds from dwelling on anything whatsoever; for he who can do this thereby
 Mystical Experience-S IS

enters Nirvana." The expression "anything whatsoever" is equivalent to

Meister Eckhart's "all created things," except that the latter has an obvious
theological connotation that "anything whatsoever" does not. To not dwell
on anything whatsoever is an expression that Rui Rai keeps using, and its
meaning is clear. To not dwell on something is to detach oneself from it. The
quotation continues: "Attained, then, is the condition of no rebirth, other­
wise called the gate of non-duality, the end of strife (peace and calm) . . . .Why
so? Because it is ultimate purity" (Blofeld, 1962, p. 77). Thus, comparing
the Christian Meister Eckhart with the Chinese Buddhist, whose accounts
are relatively uncluttered by mythic and theological baggage, we find that
both the experience itself and the procedures for inducing it are described
in practically identical terms.
Many further examples of this sort could readily be provided, but this
would serve little purpose here. Our essential point is that crucial features
of the introvertive mystical experience as characterized by Stace-in par­
ticular its aspects of undifferentiated unity, devoid of all multiplicity-are
precisely what would be expected to follow from successful practice of these
central mystical disciplines. These "vacuum" properties, moreover, are
the ones most critical to Stace's subsequent philosophical arguments, and
they are also the ones most amenable to direct confirmation by first-person
testimony of the sort that he marshals. It seems clear to us, in sum, that
when mystics talk about inhibiting the modifications of the mind and going
beyond or becoming detached from all "created" (read, constructed) things,
they understand their challenge precisely as that of systematically overcom­
ing the sorts of conditioning that Katz and his allies assume without ques­
tion cannot be overcome. Deikman's (1 966) well-known characterization of
meditation as "de-automatization" embodies the same basic idea. Perovich
(1 990) takes it to the philosophical limit by characterizing constructivism
as a misapplication of Kant's epistemology to experiences which inherently
transcend the shaping or filtering effects even of our most fundamental per­
ceptual categories such as space, time, causality, and selfhood. Important
commonalities in the resulting experiences, moreover, can be seen as direct
expressions of corresponding commonalities in the means that mystics have
discovered for accomplishing this deconditioning and thus reducing or even
escaping altogether, at least temporarily, the normal influence of this Kan­
tian "filter."
Several related observations further undermine the alleged causal
potency of cultural conditionings in shaping all details of mystical experi­
ence. There is first an abundant historical record, particularly in the West­
ern theistic traditions, of tensions resulting from the tendency of mystical
experiences as actually lived to break through the crust of local ecclesiasti­
cal culture. Rappold ( 196311970, p. 249), for example, points to Sufism as a
prime example of this tendency; indeed, several Sufi mystics are known to
have been put to death for heresy after reporting their unitive experiences
with unguarded candor and enthusiasm. Meister Eckhart got into trouble
with the Catholic Church for similar reasons, and in his emphasis on the
5 16-Chapter 8

potential for each individual to discover a Godhead hidden within, he can

perhaps even be viewed as a precursor to the Reformation. At a lower level
one can find many instances of the phenomenon of "redogmatization" (Neu­
mann, 1 968/1970) in which a mystic's initial report is subsequently altered,
whether by himself or by someone else such as a secretary or ecclesiasti­
cal authority, in order to bring it into better alignment with local doctri­
nal requirements. Stace ( 1960/1987, pp. 1 54-161) treats the changing inter­
pretations by Martin Buber of his own introvertive mystical experience as
an example of this phenomenon. Among other things, this points up the
hazards of relying exclusively on mystical texts, particularly when original
authorship or the adequacy of translations is uncertain. As Stace points out,
direct investigation of contemporary cases affords the enormous method­
ological advantage that ambiguities and uncertainties about the details of
experiences as initially reported can potentially be resolved through inter­
action with their SUbjects.
One further argument against the position of Katz and other radical
constructivists seems to us even more decisive. Powerful mystical experi­
ences of the types identified by Stace have often occurred spontaneously
in "naive" persons who previously had no commitment to, or involvement
in, any particular religious or mystical tradition. The first or foundational
experiences within such traditions presumably must have been of this type,
and in cases such as that of Arthur Koestler they have occurred in per­
sons antecedently hostile to the entire subject. We emphasize that in cases
of these sorts the constructivist picture of causal dependence is not sim­
ply unsupported but inverted, in that it is often the experiences themselves
that impel such persons to develop or seek out an interpretive conceptual
framework capable of rendering them intelligible. Grinspoon and Bakalar
(1 979/1 997) have argued that it is in fact precisely in this way that the psy­
chedelic movement of the 1 960s quickly affiliated itself with the Oriental
wisdom traditions.
Folklorist David Hufford (1985, 2005) has also pointed out that in these
respects mystical experiences (and NDEs) appear strikingly analogous to
the "supernatural assault" or sleep-paralysis experiences that have been the
primary focus of his own research (Hufford, 1 982). By being more care­
ful than previous investigators about the phenomenological details, Huf­
ford was able to show that these sleep-paralysis experiences have their own
"universal core," a consistent underlying phenomenology that gets inter­
preted in varying terms in different historical and cross-cultural contexts:
"The actual details of the experience do not vary according to the victim's
background, prior beliefs, or knowledge of a cultural model for the experi­
ence" (Hufford, 1 982, p. 1 20). In this case the experiential uniformity clearly
reflects a corresponding uniformity in the biological conditions under which
sleep-paralysis experiences occur, and Hufford surmises that this will prove
the case in regard to mystical experiences as wellY

13. Similar comments apply, of course, to NDEs, which overlap phenomenologically with
both mystical and psychedelic experiences (see Chapter 6, and Ring, 1988).
 Mystical Experience-5 17

We conclude, then, that the constructivist critique falls short, and that
Stace's characterization of a most-extreme form or universal core in mysti­
cal experiences remains valid. This is not to claim, however, that all mystical
experiences are the same. The domain is large and heterogeneous, and the
constructivists are certainly correct in maintaining that cultural condition­
ing plays an important role in shaping large parts of it. But the domain also
appears to be stratified more or less in the way Stace describes, with its
psychologically and philosophically most significant region lying beyond
the reach of purely constructivist principles. One can certainly honor and
investigate the real differences among mystical traditions, as constructivists
advocate, without denying the reality of these vital commonalities. Consid­
erable further support for this position, especially in regard to the existence
and importance of states of pure, undifferentiated consciousness, can be
found in an important series of books by philosopher Robert Forman (1990,
1998, 1999), himself apparently a subject of such states.
Although we are indebted to Stace for his taxonomic labors, some criti­
cal points also need to be made. We agree first with Price (1962) that he puts
rather too much emphasis on cool intellectual mystics such as Meister Eck­
hart at the expense of more devotional or emotional ones such as St. Teresa
of Avila. Stace constantly reminds his readers that Teresa is naive, uncriti­
cal, not quite up to par philosophically, and-no doubt worst of all-drunk
with love. Yet the available evidence clearly suggests that both reason and
emotion, each in their own way, can serve-when rightly deployed-as tools
of mystical self-development. The Hindu tradition, for example, recognizes
the Bhakti or devotional path as equally valid, and Plato, the Sufis, and
other great Christian mystics such as St. John of the Cross would certainly
agree. James clearly admires St. Teresa's psychological self-descriptions, and
Peers ( 1 95 1 , p. xvii) even characterizes her as the central unifying personal­
ity among the great Spanish mystics. In short, Stace's personal predilections
as an analytic philosopher seem to have led him to underrate the potential
contributions of religious emotion to the genesis of mystical states.14
Second, we must insist that Stace was misguided in excluding voices,
visions, and allied subjects from the class of "genuine" mystical phenomena
(pp. 47-55). These are indeed very different from the more extreme phenom­
ena that are especially germane to his own philosophical agenda, and they
are widely recognized by mystics and scholars alike as belonging primarily
to earlier, lower, or less advanced stages of mystical development. Never­
theless, they comprise a variety of unusual and interesting psychological
phenomena which form an important part of the total worldwide litera­
ture of mysticism. Moreover, as we will soon show, they occupy a natural
place within the sort of psychological model advanced by Myers and James.

14. Ironically, philosopher John E. Smith (1 983) takes William James to task in exactly
the opposite direction-that is, for not adequately appreciating the potential contribution of
abstract metaphysical reasoning to the genesis of mystical states, as illustrated by the case of
St. Bonaventure.
S I 8-Chapter 8

To banish them summarily as Stace does is to overlook and obscure these

important psychological continuities.

The Problem of Objective Significance

The consistency with which mystics describe their deepest experiences dem­
onstrates that they are testifying more or less correctly about unusual states
of consciousness that really do occur, and that are profoundly impressive to
their subjects. As we have already seen, however, this unanimity of the great
mystics about their experience, although necessary, is not by itself sufficient
to establish any thesis regarding its objective significance. It could still be
entirely subj ective, a shared illusion, a mirage, as the great majority of con­
temporary scientists undoubtedly suppose.
On the other hand, it should be equally clear that identification of some
biological condition or conditions under which mystical experience occurs
would not by itself disprove its objective significance. Reductionist scien­
tists have always been inclined to overlook this rather elementary logical
point, and the recent spate of facile and triumphant neurologizing about
"God Spots" and the like is only the latest installment in a long and dismal
history. William James went to considerable pains to disarm this unthink­
ingly skeptical attitude in the very first chapter of VRE: Medical materi­
alism "has no physiological theory of the production of these its favorite
states [i.e., ordinary states], by which it may accredit them; and its attempt
to discredit the states which it dislikes, by vaguely associating them with
nerves and l iver, and connecting them with names connoting bodily afflic­
tion, is altogether illogical and inconsistent" (p. 30). All ordinary percep­
tual and cognitive experience goes forward in conjunction with biological
processes in our bodies and brains, but nobody denies for that reason that
such experience can teach us important things about the reality in which we
find ourselves situated. It could also be the case, as the mystics themselves
believe, that their experience contains lessons of at least equal importance
in regard to that reality. As James himself concluded, mystical experience
like all other experience "must be sifted and tested, and run the gauntlet of
confrontation with the total context of experience" ( VRE, p. 326).
James, as we saw earlier, was led by his own survey to a carefully
guarded epistemological position: Mystics do gravitate in certain definite
philosophical directions, but they are less than fully unanimous about this,
and however impressive their experiences may be individually, collectively
they warrant no specific propositions about the nature of reality to which
those of us who are non-mystics need assent. This remained more or less
the received opinion among philosophers for many decades, as illustrated
by the quotations above from Bertrand Russell and by old standard texts
in epistemology such as Montague (1925). Stace, however, builds upon his
characterization of the universal core in a serious effort to carry the subject
 Mystical Experience-5 19

further. Specifically, he offers a novel-indeed, startling-philosophical

argument in support of the view that mystical experience literaIIy is, as the
mystics themselves claim, in an important way transsubjective.

Stace's Philosophical Argument for Objective Significance

A sense of self-transcendence is inherent in the introvertive mystical

experience, and closely tied to its noetic quality. In this state of pure, uni­
tary consciousness,

the boundary walls of the separate self fade away, and the individual finds
himself passing beyond himself and becoming merged in a boundless and
universal consciousness . . . .The conclusion which the mystic draws-not
however by way of a reasoned conclusion, but as something immediately
experienced-is that what he has reached is not merely his individual
pure ego but the pure ego of the universe; or, otherwise put, that his indi­
vidual self and the universal self are somehow one and the same. (Stace,
1960/1987, pp. 147-148)

Now comes the startling part: Speculative philosophical reasoning,

Stace argues, leads necessarily to the same conclusion. For if any two per­
sons A and B have each attained a state of pure, unitary, undifferentiated
consciousness, there is no longer any property that could individuate or dis­
tinguish these states. They are therefore identical, both to each other and
to any other such states. For the same reason, moreover, there can be only
one pure ego in the universe. "Hence," Stace concludes, "the mystic who
has reached what seems at first to be his own private pure ego has in fact
reached the pure ego of the universe, the pure cosmic ego" (p. 1 5 1). The
same sort of argument, he adds, shows that the extrovertive "One" and the
introvertive "One" are one and the same.
This argument is assuredly breathtaking, but is it sound? Like Price
(1 962), we think not, although for slightly different reasons. At its base lies
a logical principle sometimes attributed to Leibniz called "the identity of
indiscernibles." The crucial point about this principle is that any identity
claim based upon it is falsified by discovery of any property whatsoever
that differentiates the things identified.ls Price points out that two minds are
always differentiated by more than their occurrent contents, their conscious
states alone. Dispositional properties such as memories, skills, habits, and
the like also count, and these clearly survive the mystic's conscious experi­
ence of undifferentiated unity.
Price's argument here is undoubtedly correct, and Stace certainly left
himself open to it by speaking explicitly and repeatedly in terms of identity
of minds. Stace might have responded, we surmise, by restricting his identity

15. Discovery of such properties, for example, is what forced abandonment of early mind­
brain identity theories; see Kim (1998, chap. 3) and our Chapter I .
520-Chapter 8

claim more carefully to the conscious states themselves; but even this can­
not save the argument, for it relies too heavily upon his own very abstract
characterization of the vacuum aspect of introvertive mystical experiences.
In reality, things are more complicated. Even Meister Eckhart, for example,
who provides Stace with many classic descriptions of unitary conscious­
ness, points out repeatedly that some tiny spark or thread of individuality
always remains, even in his "deepest" states, which enables his return to the
ordinary state.
More generally, our reading of the mystical literature suggests that
there is ample room for differentiation of introvertive mystical states on
the plenum side, in terms of their positive characteristics. Affectively, for
example, they seem to range from relatively bland or neutral (or perhaps
even somewhat negative, as in the very atypical case of J. A. Symonds; see
VRE, pp. 296-297) to blissful beyond comparison; as James remarks, "the
deliciousness of some of these states seems to be beyond anything known to
ordinary consciousness" (p. 316).
What this points to again, in our opinion, is the need for a more detailed,
precise, and empirically well-grounded phenomenological cartography
of mystical states. Many such cartographies have already been advanced
within the world's mystical traditions, of course, often in mind-numbing
detail. The difficulties of this profoundly interesting subject are unfortu­
nately greatly magnified by the increasing inability of ordinary language
to convey adequately the properties of the relevant states and experiences
as one ascends the mystical scale. Although these schemes certainly bear
generic resemblances to one another (as indeed they must, if Stace and
other perennialists are right about a common core), we cannot agree with
those such as H. Smith ( 1976) who apparently think this mapping of mysti­
cal states has already been successfully completed, and that the wisdom
traditions themselves provide alternative but equivalent descriptions of the
same, well-established empirical realities. We will not attempt to argue this
point here, but the actual level of resemblance among the traditional taxon­
omies seems to us rather more like that of a group of garden shrubs, similar
in global shape but differing markedly in internal detail. Nor do we find any
compelling reason to suppose that any one of these traditions is empirically
complete and has correctly worked out the whole story, or even is signifi­
cantly ahead of all the others in attempting to do so. We do not doubt that
much can be learned through comparative study of the wisdom traditions,
but we also think a complementary approach to the problem using modern
scientific methods is urgently needed, and long overdue.
In sum, Stace's abstract philosophical argument for the objective sig­
nificance of mystical experience does not quite succeed. Stace himself
acknowledges that it cannot be regarded as conclusive, although he person­
ally finds it strong (p. 202). But at the very least it deserves admiration as
a unique attempt to theorize about mystical experiences in a manner com­
mensurate in boldness with the extraordinary character of the experiences
themselves. It may yet prove true, that is, that the mystic arrives at what
 Mystical Experience-521

Plotinus calls the center of the sphere, the single point at which all of its
great circles intersect-"the still point of the turning world," in T. S. Eliot's
memorable phrase.

Empirical Arguments for Objective Significance

Stace himself turns next to various ontological matters outside the scope
of this chapter. There is much more still to be said, however, in regard to the
objective significance of mystical experience. Specifically, we will now pres­
ent some additional, empirical, arguments supporting the view that mystics
do in fact make contact with reality in novel ways.

Mysticism and Genius

As already suggested near the end of the previous chapter, there are pro­
found and inescapable interconnections, both historical and psychological,
between mysticism and genius. Historically, for example, it is brute fact that
the two co-occur to a conspicuous degree. Bucke's roster of 50 actual and
borderline subjects of cosmic consciousness includes not only outstanding
religious personalities such as Jesus, Paul, Mohammed, Ramakrishna, and
the Buddha, but literary and philosophic luminaries including Socrates,
Plotinus, Dante, Pascal, Spinoza, Blake, Balzac, Emerson, Whitman, Word­
sworth, Tennyson, Pushkin, and Thoreau. Most of the latter also appear on
Bloom's (2002) roster of the 100 all-time greatest writers, along with several
others such as Plato, Virgil, and St. Augustine who could have appeared on
Bucke's list as well. Other writers on Bucke's list such as Edward Carpenter
and Richard Jefferies were highly regarded in their own time, and a number
of significant contemporary writers including not only Koestler but Gerard
Manley Hopkins, John Masefield, Romain Rolland, Rabindranath Tagore,
and Simone Weil are also known to have had mystical or near-mystical expe­
riences. There are undoubtedly many additional literary cases not known to
us, and similar patterns are known to exist among artists, musicians, and
possibly even scientists. The tradition linking music with mysticism goes
back at least as far as Pythagoras, and a list of Western composers subject
to mystical-type experience would almost certainly include not only Bach,
Mozart, and Beethoven, but numerous others such as Cage, Elgar, Holst,
Liszt, Messiaen, Satie, Scriabin, and the jazz artist John Coltrane.1 6
In sum, whether one looks from the genius side or from the mysticism
side, one observes what appears to be a highly significant historical linkage
between these rare and highly valued human attributes.17 Indeed, it is no

16. We are indebted to concert pianist Lorin Hollander for this information (personal com­
munication, April 9, 2006).
17. Many difficulties stand in the way of evaluating this association in a rigorous way using
only historical documents, but for us it satisfies what statisticians jokingly refer to as the
"lOT" ("lnterOcular Trauma") test-it socks you right between the eyes.
522-Chapter 8

exaggeration to say with Bucke that mystical consciousness pervades the

foundations of all civilization. The correlation is less than perfect, to be
sure, for there have been geniuses who are not recognizably mystics and
vice versa. Nevertheless, we predict with confidence (as would Myers) that
if one administered standardized instruments for measurement of creativ­
ity and mysticism to a sufficiently large sample of subjects, one would find
a significant overrepresentation of persons scoring extremely high on both
dimensions simultaneously. Some preliminary evidence of such a relation­
ship has in fact already been found by Thalbourne and Delin (1994, 1 999).
These authors go on, moreover, to suggest that this association results from
a shared personality factor that they call "transliminality," tentatively
defined as "a largely involuntary susceptibility to, and awareness of, large
volumes of inwardly generated psychological phenomena of an ideational
and affective kind" (Thalbourne & Delin, 1 994, p. 25). Although they appar­
ently developed this concept on their own, its affinity with Myers's spectrum
psychology is evident. Indeed, they even epitomize their conception using
the remark by Underhill (191 1 11974), essentially paraphrasing Myers, that "a
'mobile threshold' may make a man a genius, a lunatic, or a saint" (p. 62).18
Mystical experiences also drive within person creative production in
-

various ways. It is hardly surprising, for example, that persons who have
been the subjects of such powerful experiences will often seek to publicize
them using whatever powers of expression they antecedently possess. Thus,
Dante produces the Paradiso, Tennyson's recurrent experience of self-tran­
scendence finds it way into The A ncient Sage, Koestler grinds out his four
books in five years, and-for good or ill-Jacob Boehme generates thick
tomes crammed with impenetrable Hermetic symbolism.
There is one further connection, however, which to our knowledge
remains poorly documented but which if real is of potentially consider­
able significance to cognitive science. Specifically, mystical experience may
sometimes transform an individual's perceptual, cognitive, and expressive
capacities themselves. Bucke (190111969), for example, regards such sudden
increases in mental powers as one aspect of an objective "transfiguration"
produced by genuine experiences of cosmic consciousness. His primary
example is Walt Whitman, whose published works he studied diligently
and whom he knew personally as well. Bucke asserts that "in the case of
Whitman (as in that of Balzac) writings of absolutely no value were imme­
diately followed (and, at least in Whitman's case without practice or study)
by pages . . . covered not only by a masterpiece but by such vital sentences as
have not been written ten times in the history of the race" (p. 226). We our-

1 8 . There is some irony here, for Underhill herself certainly was familiar with Myers's
depth psychology. She cites him explicitly only once, but shows considerable general acquain­
tance with the subject matter of HP, and liberally invokes key Myers concepts such as those
of automatisms, uprushes, and subliminal mentation. She in fact uses Myers in much the
same way as does James in VRE, while apparently distancing herself rather deliberately, for
reasons we can only surmise, from both. One wonders how subsequent mysticism scholarship
might have been altered had she been less reticent about these scientific connections, and less
of an apologist for Christianity.
 M yst ic a l Ex per ie n ce
- 523

selves have encountered several individuals who informally reported noting

sudden and dramatic increases in their perceptual acuity, reading speed,
problem-solving ability, memory capacities, and the like following moder­
ately intense mystical experiences. These changes were further described as
either permanent or slowly fading over periods of weeks to months. Effects
of these types, although relatively mundane, could much more readily be
measured and documented using conventional cognitive instruments.
In sum, the within-subject impact of mystical experience on cognitive
capacities in general and on creative activity in particular seems to us a
topic ripe for more careful investigation. But let us now attempt to draw out
more fully the deep psychological parallels between mysticism and genius.
In the previous chapter, it will be recalled, we showed how Myers character­
ized inspirations of genius in terms of three primary features-continuity,
automatism, and incommensurability. The same three features are also con­
spicuously present in relation to mystical experience and the mystic voca­
tion.
Continuity, for example, was already apparent on a global scale in the
sequence of proto-mystical phenomena assembled by James in VRE. Myers
(HP, chap. 9) examines the upper portion of this range in greater psycho­
logical detail, tracing out a continuum that leads from trance mediumship
and its parallels in the lower forms of shamanism "straight into the inmost
sanctuary of mysticism" (HP, vol. 2, p. 259)-the ecstatic flights of Plotinus
and the other great mystics. Thus:

From the medicine-man of the lowest savages up to St. John, St. Peter,
St. Paul, with Buddha and Mahomet on the way, we find records which,
though morally and intellectually much differing, are in psychological
essence the same . . . .We thus show continuity and reality among phenom­
ena which have seldom been either correlated with each other or even
intelligibly conceived in separation. With our new insight we may correlate
the highest and the lowest ecstatic phenomena with no injury whatever to
the highest. (p. 260)19

In deliberate pursuit of the mystic vocation, moreover, each individual

describes a unique trajectory along this dimension of depth, determined in
part by his own characteristics and in part by the tradition in which he oper­
ates. This is brought out most clearly in relation to the role of automatism,
the second feature shared with genius.

1 9. Although we agree in general terms with their conception of an underlying continuity

between the highest mystical phenomena and phenomena of lower types, we must comment
here that both Myers and James seem to us to share the characteristic cultural chauvinism of
their time in being rather too ready to exalt Christianity at the expense of other religions, and
to presume that pre-literate peoples are incapable of the higher forms of religious experience.
We dare not elaborate on the former, but in regard to the latter see for example the Plains
Indian specialist Joseph Epes Brown (1991), who defends core elements of Native American
traditions as legitimate and independent expressions of the perennial philosophy, and Eliade
(1964), who finds examples of genuine mystical states among Siberian shamans.
524--Chapter 8

William James was fully aware of the connections between automatism

and passivity, his fourth marker of mystical states. When a genuine mysti­
cal state breaks in, he observes, "the mystic feels as if his own will were in
abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a supe­
rior power. This latter peculiarity connects mystical states with certain defi­
nite phenomena of secondary or alternative personality, such as prophetic
speech, automatic writing, or the mediumistic trance" ( VRE, p. 293). Unlike
phenomena of the latter types, however, which tend to be merely interrup­
tive and produce no lasting effects, advanced mystical states of conscious­
ness always leave behind some degree of memory for their content, accom­
panied by conviction of their importance, and they often exert profound
transformative effects on the inner lives of their subjects. Thus they fall into
place in a natural way as higher or more developed forms of the sorts of
psychological automatisms discussed in Chapter 5.
There can be little doubt, moreover, that the trajectory of individual
mystics often consists in considerable part of progression from the lower
to the higher forms. This is particularly evident in the relatively well-docu­
mented lives of the Christian mystics as presented for example by Underhill
( 1 9 1 1 1 1974) and Man�chal (1927/2004). Lower stages of the mystic path are
replete with voices, visions, automatic writing and speaking, and kindred
phenomena. Underhill points to Madam Guyon, for example, as being
almost as much medium as mystic:

When she was composing her works she would experience a sudden and
irresistable inclination to take up her pen; though feeling wholly incapable
of literary composition, and not even knowing the subject on which she
would be impelled to write. If she resisted this impulse it was at the cost of
the most intense discomfort. She would then begin to write with extraor­
dinary swiftness; words, elaborate arguments, and appropriate quotations
coming to her without reflection, and so quickly that one of her longest
books was written in one and a half days. (p. 66)

The psychological resemblance here between Mme. Guyon and cre­

ative mediums such as Helene Smith (Chapter 7) is unmistakable. Underhill
cites a number of additional cases including those of Jacob Boehme and
St. Teresa in which automatisms were pronounced, and she also points out
their general psychological kinship with the phenomenon of creative inspi­
ration.
In both domains, moreover, the value of what is produced can be seen to
increase as the process reaches progressively deeper into the psyche. Low­
grade forms of mystical vision mainly reflect ordinary forms of personal
experience and conventional religious symbolisms, but the contribution of
automatisms to deliberate mystical development is systematic and progres­
sive, ultimately breaking through the shell of the ordinary individuality.
Underhill quotes an elegant synopsis by Delacroix, based on intensive case
studies, which Myers would certainly have applauded:
 Mystical Experience-525

[These automatisms] are governed by an interior aim; they have, above

all, a teleological character. They indicate the continuous intervention of
a being at once wiser and more powerful than the ordinary character and
reason; they are the realization, in visual and auditory images, of a secret
and permanent personality of a superior type to the conscious personal­
ity. They are its voice, the exterior projection of its life. They translate to
the conscious personality the suggestions of the subconscious: and they
permit the continuous penetration of the conscious personality by these
deeper activities. They establish a communication between these two
planes of existence, and, by their imperative nature, they tend to make the
inferior subordinate to the superior. (p. 273)

At the higher stages of the mystic path, moreover, automatisms pro­

gressively shed their quasi-sensory character, while becoming ever more
illuminating and transformative to their subjects. Thus, for example, as St.
Teresa advances from her Life to The Interior Castle, her "visions" become
increasingly abstract, or "intellectual," and decoupled from conventional
symbolisms.20 And this is as it must be, for as her own mentor St. John of the
Cross also advises, an aspirant to the highest unitive states "must be careful
not to lean upon imaginary visions, forms, figures, and particular intelli­
gible objects, for these things can never serve as proportionate or proximate
means to so great an end; yea, rather they are an obstacle in the way, and
therefore to be guarded against and rejected" (Peers, 1958, p. 1 56).
In the limit, as Stace demonstrates, the great mystics succeed in empty­
ing themselves altogether of cognitive particulars, whereupon they expe­
rience that extraordinary inflowing of boundless, pure, undifferentiated
consciousness-an introvertive mystical experience. At this point the third
shared characteristic, incommensurability, becomes even more pronounced
than in the case of genius, for all observers from Bucke and James forward
agree that such states are startlingly different from everyday conscious­
ness-discrete altered states of consciousness as described by Tart (1 975a).
Indeed, it is precisely from this appearance of uncovering something nor­
mally hidden but radically distinct from and superior to ordinary conscious­
ness that mystical states derive their psychological impact and interest, for
subjects and observers alike.

Mysticism and Supernormal Phenomena

One further property shared by mysticism with genius, and potentially
decisive in regard to the question of its objective significance, is its associa­
tion with supernormal phenomena of various sorts. Indeed, explicit claims

20. The modern mystical experience of Jungian psychologist Genevieve Foster ( 1 985) was
closely similar to some of Teresa's "intellectual visions," as Foster herself eventually discov­
ered upon reading Underhill. Its core feature was an overwhelming sense of numinous con­
tact with a loving but invisible being whose presence was keenly felt and sharply localized in
space. This "vision" lasted for some five days, and it transformed her life. See also Hufford's
( 1985) interesting commentary on this case, and Man:chal ( 1927/2004), who makes the "feel­
ing of presence," in a hierarchy of progressively intense forms, central to his account of mysti­
cal development.
526-Chapter 8

regarding such an association are far more widespread and conspicuous

in regard to mysticism, suggesting once again that mysticism at its core
involves an even more extreme development of the psychological processes
and results so skillfully delineated by Myers in relation to genius.21
Biographies of the founding personalities of the great religions are of
course replete with reports of "miraculous" doings of various sorts. These
reports are of little or no scientific value, however, and like Myers we shall
decline to discuss or invoke them. We will begin instead by returning to the
subject of Yoga, which for our purposes provides a more promising starting
point.22
Within the Hindu tradition, an enormous body of theoretical and prac­
tical information pertaining to Yoga was collected, systematized, and crys­
tallized in the form of 1 96 aphorisms or "Sutras" by Patanjali somewhere
near the beginning of the Christian era. This remarkable work, still widely
regarded as an authoritative source of practical information on Yoga, out­
lines within its four brief chapters a sophisticated doctrine regarding human
psychophysical organization, which supplies in turn the theoretical basis
for a comprehensive program of self-development. The claimed results of
this program, catalogued at considerable length, explicitly include the sys­
tematic appearance of both higher states of consciousness and a variety of
supernormal capacities.
There have been many translations and expositions of the Yoga Sutras
and associated commentaries, but the most helpful ones known to us are
those of Oasgupta (1 92411970), Eliade ( 1958, 1 969), and Taimni ( 1972). These
systematically expand the extremely compressed and often difficult language
of the Sutras, presenting thorough expositions of Patanjali's doctrines and
locating them in the larger matrix of orthodox Hindu philosophy.23
Central to Patanjali's practical psychology is a process of progres­
sive intensification of attention, culminating in unwavering absorption in
its obj ects. Three progressively deeper stages are distinguished-concen­
tration (dharana), meditation (dhyana), and the highest state or states of
absorption (samadhi). This threefold process, Samyama, represents much

21. William James himself verges upon this argument at various points in VRE (see, e.g.,
pp. 3 1 3, 314, 378), but always holds back, confining the relevant remarks to brief asides, allu­
sions, and footnotes. His conservatism may have been "politically" wise in the academic envi­
ronment of the Gifford lectures, and indeed his very first words were: "It is with no small
amount of trepidation that I take my place behind this desk, and face this learned audience."
Nevertheless, that James did not more systematically and openly bring the findings of psychi­
cal research to bear on the problem of mystical "truth" seems to us an unfortunate instance,
rare for him, of missed opportunity. It certainly does not reflect any ambivalence or uncer­
tainty on his part regarding the value of these findings (see, e.g., James, 1890-1896/1910).
22. In this section we have adapted some material previously published in E. F. Kelly and
Locke (198Ib). We thank the Parapsychology Foundation for permission to use this mate­
rial.
23. Readers should be forewarned, however, that Taimni occasionally injects superfluous
elements of Theosophical doctrine into his interpretations of Patanjali's meaning. See also
Jain and Jain ( 1 973) for a useful summary of Patanjali's system by contemporary biomedical
scientists.
 Mystical Experience-527

more than a movement within the range of ordinary states of consciousness.

I ndeed the central thrust of Patanjali's exposition is to describe how the
practice of Samyama, systematically intensified, will lead through a hier­
archy of increasingly exalted discrete states to the ultimate mystical objec­
tive of pure, undifferentiated, limitless consciousness. The emergence of
supernormal capacities or siddhis is reported in matter-of-fact fashion as a
by-product of this central movement, their value consisting mainly in pro­
viding markers on the developmental path.24
The Yoga Sutras thus contain an explicit and elaborate theoretical state­
ment of relationships between mystical states and supernormal phenomena,
one which in principle lends itself to empirical verification. In spirit, Patan­
jali's treatise is really a scientific work more than a religious or philosophical
one, although it predates this kind of academic dismemberment of its sub­
ject matter. Its central doctrines are presented not as authoritarian dogma
simply to be believed, but as empirical realities that can be experientially
verified through assiduous practice of specified disciplines.
From a modern experimentally oriented point of view, unfortunately,
the state of evidence directly pertinent to these claims is still unsatisfactory.
Although there are innumerable supportive anecdotes and field observations
of varying impressiveness, there is still little hard evidence documenting the
occurrence of high-grade psi in meditative adepts. This may be due at least
in part to systematic reluctance on the part of such persons to demonstrate
psi abilities; Patanjali himself remarks, and the traditions for the most part
agree, that preoccupation with the siddhis is to be avoided, for it draws the
mind outward and thus creates obstacles to achievement of unitive con­
sciousness, the mystic's proper goal. Skeptics will naturally suspect that this
is merely an excuse, and we ourselves do not doubt that this may sometimes
be the case. In our experience with serious meditators, however, it seems
far more commonly a genuinely held attitude. One can readily appreciate
the dangers of paying too much and the wrong kind of attention to these
phenomena, as emphasized especially by Underhill, but to ignore and deni­
grate them in a wholesale manner seems equally a mistake in view of their
important bearing on the issue of mystical "truth."25 Good psi experiments
with truly accomplished meditators would represent landmark scientific
events in both fields. We ourselves would welcome such opportunities, and
perhaps other groups such as the Dalai Lama's Mind and Life Institute will
ultimately venture in this direction as well.
Meanwhile, a modest amount of progress has already been made in
linking lower-grade forms of meditation experimentally with psi. Honor-

24. An interesting detail arises here: Although the Yogic discipline of meditation is empha­
sized as providing the main pathway to the siddhis, Patanjali also acknowledges that they may
arise "abnormally" in certain other contexts. The relevant sutra (vol. 1, sutra 19) is particu­
larly obscure, but Taimni argues plausibly that it can be construed as referring specifically to
capacities for trance mediumship.
25. For similar reasons we deplore the curious tendency of transpersonal psychology to
distance itself from parapsychology, at least in part out of what looks to us like unthinking
compliance with the prevailing negative attitude of the wisdom traditions.
528-Chapter 8

ton ( 1977) pointed out that the eight limbs of Yogic practice as outlined by
Patanjali can be understood at minimum as a system of progressive psy­
chophysical noise reduction leading to a state characterized by physical
relaxation, isolation from the normal sensory environment, and intensely
focused inwardly directed attention. This is strikingly consistent with the
self-descriptions of gifted ESP subjects (R. A. White, 1964), and it would
therefore not be surprising if even modest practice of Yoga and its cen­
tral techniques of meditation should produce conditions favorable for the
occurrence of psi. And indeed this appears to be the case, as indicated by an
increasing variety and number of experimental studies of psi performance
in relation to meditation and similar low-noise conditions (Braud, 1 978;
Honorton, 1 977, 1 997; Rao & Palmer, 1 987).
Although the linkage identified by Patanjali between the achievement
of deep meditative and mystical states and the emergence of strong psi
phenomena has barely begun to be verified and explored experimentally,
significant further support for such a linkage derives indirectly from com­
parative study of the wisdom traditions themselves. It is noteworthy first
that Patanjali's catalog of siddhis is anything but unique. Other mystical tra­
ditions, including relatively remote ones such as Sufism, Catholicism, and
the many expressions of Shamanism in preliterate societies, have discovered
and catalogued many of the same phenomena in strikingly parallel ways.
These parallels are drawn out in considerable detail by M. Murphy (1992),
who provides what is by far the most systematic attempt to date to construct
a "natural history" of the entire domain.
More importantly, this domain is not populated solely by unverifiable
oral reports of ancient anecdotal lore, as many skeptical observers might
casually suppose. Significant empirical anchorage can be found, for exam­
ple, in an important but neglected work by Herbert Thurston (1952). Thur­
ston, a Jesuit scholar, performed the heroic service of digesting innumerable
volumes of Catholic hagiography in search of serious evidence of supernor­
mal phenomena in the lives of the saints. Most of what he found falls within
the ambiguous domain of extreme psychophysiological influence-what
Myers referred to generically as "hyperboulia," or "increased power over
the organism" (HP, vol. 1 , p. xiii). Relevant phenomena here include stig­
mata (appearance of the wounds of Christ), tokens of espousal (deforma­
tion of the skin to produce structures with the appearance of wedding rings
or other symbols of the mystical marriage), "incendium amoris" (produc­
tion of intense bodily heat), inedia (not eating for weeks, months, or years),
capacity to sustain prolonged contact with fire, boiling water, and so forth,
without pain or injury, several peculiarities manifested by saintly corpses
(prolonged incorruption, continued bleeding, or absence of rigidity), and
luminous phenomena.26 Other phenomena investigated by Thurston, how-

26. Luminous phenomena form a complex and fascinating subject deserving of detailed
treatment on its own. The introvertive mystical state of consciousness is often described as
"self-effulgent," and Bucke takes this sense of unusual subjective light as one of the defining
marks of cosmic consciousness. Something of this sort is in fact commonly reported in con-
 Mystical Experience-529

ever, fal l well within the traditional domain of psi research, including both
ESP phenomena of various kinds and macroscopic PK phenomena includ­
ing in the most extreme cases outright bodily levitation.
Thurston's method is to adduce evidence systematically for each of the
targeted phenomena in turn, based on the lives of saints (mainly post-16th­
century) who reportedly manifested them. The evidence cited comes primar­
ily from the written records of formal proceedings instituted by the Church
for the purposes of determining whether these particular individuals mer­
ited beatification or canonization. However, Thurston also goes to consid­
erable pains to point out instances of analogous phenomena documented
outside the Church. In particular, he seems to have been quite familiar with
the early work of the SPR and with its standards of evidence.
How seriously should scientifically minded persons take this rather
mind-boggling assortment of material? Although this must always remain
to some degree a matter of personal judgment, conditioned by individual
knowledge and sensibilities, we ourselves believe, for reasons we will next
briefly explain, that it deserves to be taken very seriously indeed.
Four main features of Thurston's evidence seem to us significant. First
is its sheer volume. Many individual events of very unsubtle type were
observed and reported consistently by large numbers of people and/or on
repeated occasions, with some of this testimony coming from initially hos­
tile or skeptical witnesses. Some of the reports also appear to be independent
in the sense that persons manifesting or reporting a particular phenomenon
appear unlikely to have known of other contemporaneous or previous mani­
festations of that same phenomenon. Furthermore, most of the categories of
phenomena, in particular those that do not depend on specifically Christian
doctrine, have been reported to recur independently in a variety of settings,
and some, such as the phenomena of extreme psychophysical influence, have
been independently confirmed and amplified by a variety of modern scien­
tific evidence (Chapter 3).
Second is the general quality of the evidence. Beatification and canon­
ization proceedings are serious business, not unlike secular trials. Although
bona fide "miracles" might make good advertisements for the faith, the
Church is a conservative institution with considerable investment in avoid­
ing potentially embarrassing and damaging error. Evidence presented in
favor of a candidate is systematically attacked by a "devil's advocate" or
promotor fidei whose specific task is to find weaknesses sufficient to throw
out the case. The records distinguish among types and grades of evidence­
for example, first-hand versus second-hand testimony, skeptical versus doc­
ile witnesses, and so forth-and important witnesses are whenever possible

junction not only with religious mystical states but also with OBEs, NDEs, shamanic jour­
neys, and apparitional experiences of many sorts (see Chapter 6). The unusual luminosities,
moreover, are sometimes "objective" in the sense that they may be visible to some though not
necessarily all potential observers, or on rare occasions even photographed or detected by
optical instruments such as photomultiplier tubes (Alvarado, 1987; Joines, Baumann, Kim,
Zile, & Simmonds, 2004). Intellectual or spiritual "illumination" and "enlightenment," in
short, may sometimes involve more than mere metaphors.
5 30-Chapter 8

formally deposed. On the whole, the quality of evidence seems to be fairly

comparable to that appearing in the spontaneous case material assembled
by Gurney et al. ( 1 886) and their SPR colleagues.
Third is the attitude of these individuals toward their phenomena. There
is usually scarcely a trace of any sense of pride or ownership. Indeed, many
of the cases reveal not only humility but acute embarrassment often coupled
with active efforts to conceal the supernormal events, lest they should draw
too much attention and disrupt the individual's central spiritual practices.
Any superficial attempt to simulate these attitudes in hopes of promoting
chances of eventual sainthood would likely have been detected by the pro­
motor fidei.
Finally and most germane to the central concerns of this chapter, a
strong association is evident in this material between the occurrence of the
various supernormal phenomena and the achievement of exalted states of
consciousness through intense spiritual practice. In many cases, in fact, the
supernormal events are specifically stated to have occurred during episodes
of spiritual ecstasy.
We will briefly describe here just a single case which exemplifies in
extreme form the challenges posed by this material. Levitation, a phenom­
enon reported by mystics of many traditions, was a principal feature in the
case of Fr. Joseph of Copertino, a 1 7th-century Franciscan monk, for whom
"ecstatic flight" appeared to become a literal reality. Joseph was observed in
flight on over a hundred occasions, and by a large number and variety of wit­
nesses, including hostile ones, whose sworn testimony was obtained within
a few years of the events. His flights occurred both indoors and outdoors,
covered distances ranging from a few feet to 30 yards or more, and some­
times caused him to remain for substantial periods of time in the branches
of nearby trees. Of special interest is the fact that during his canonization
proceedings, the promotor fidei was none other than the great humanist
Prosper Lambertini, later Pope Benedict XIV, also principal codifier of the
Church's standardized rules of procedure and evidence for canonization.
Lambertini was initially hostile to Joseph's cause, but upon thorough and
searching review of all details of the case, including the sworn depositions,
he concluded that the ecstatic flights had indeed occurred essentially as
reported. Subsequently, as Pope, he himself published the decree of Joseph's
Beatification.
We hasten to acknowledge here that so brief a description of this
extraordinary case is sure-and rightly so-to leave many readers incredu­
lous at best. Anyone tempted to dismiss the case offhand, however, should
first study the more detailed accounts of it by Braude ( 1986/1991), Eisenbud
( 1979), and M. Murphy (1992), as well as Thurston ( 1952) himself. Nor is
this case unique: Thurston cites several other well-attested Catholic cases
including that of St. Teresa, and M. Murphy (1992, p. 633) lists 21 more.
Braude also reviews at length the cases of well-investigated mediums includ­
ing Eusapia Palladino and D. D. Home who produced not only levitations
 Mystical Experience-53l

of large objects including themselves but other phenomena from Thurston's

catalog such as immunity to fire, luminosities, and bodily distortions.
In summary, through its deep connections both with genius and with
supernormal phenomena of various kinds, mysticism poses essentially the
same sorts of problems posed for contemporary mainstream psychological
science by genius itself, but in still more extreme form. In both, the individ­
ual reaches deep within his own personality, yet somehow, paradoxically,
makes novel forms of contact with some reality or aspect of reality with­
out, if indeed these spatial metaphors continue to have any meaning.27 But
whereas genius per se presses only to the deepest levels of recognizable sym­
bolic activity, already uncomfortably beyond the horizon of current cogni­
tive theory, mysticism in its most extreme developments transcends those
limits altogether, moving beyond tangible products of all sorts to radically
different forms of consciousness. What could any "computational theory of
the mind," for example, possibly have to say about the introvertive mystical
experience of pure undifferentiated consciousness?
Taking it as established, then, that mystical experiences are both real
and important, our next task is to survey what has so far been learned­
very little, regrettably-about their conditions of occurrence.

Neurobiological Approaches to Mysticism

In this section we will first briefly canvas the principal attempts known to us
to say something meaningful about aspects or patterns of brain-body activ­
ity associated with mystical experience. None of these is very successful,
in our opinion, and all exemplify in varying degrees several characteristic
faults of the existing literature, in particular: (I) failure to come to grips
with the full-blown phenomenology of mystical experiences; (2) paucity of
directly supporting empirical data; and (3) excessive willingness to spin out
elaborate neurophysiological just-so stories that purport to "explain" mysti­
cal experience in terms of currently understood neuroscience.

Mysticism and Temporal Lobe Epilepsy

We begin with the widely circulated hypothesis of a special linkage

between mystical experiences and epileptic seizures, especially seizures
associated with temporal-lobe or temporo-limbic epilepsy (TLE). Claims
of this sort have long been invoked by reductive materialists in efforts to

27. Stace (1960/ 1987, pp. 1 96-197) explicitly likens the ontological status of the "cosmic
ego" encountered by mystics to that of other "universals" as conceived by Plato, Aristotle,
and many philosophers of mathematics. See Chapter 7 regarding the modified Platonism
underlying Myers's account of genius.
532-Chapter 8

"debunk" religious personalities such as St. Paul and Joan of Arc, and are
foundational to the work of contemporary God-in-the-Brain theorists such
as Mandell (1 980) and Persinger ( 1 987). They seem even to have become
widely accepted as an element of medical folklore; according to Ramach­
andran and Blakeslee ( 1 998), for example, "every medical student is taught
that patients with epileptic seizures originating in this part of the brain
can have intense, spiritual experiences during the seizures" (p. 175; see also
Mesulam, 2000, chap. 8).
The actual evidence for such a linkage, however, is in fact very sparse,
as is apparent even in a recent attempt by Saver and Rabin (1997) to summa­
rize the observations supporting it. We focus here on their discussion of ictal
(during-seizure) experiences in TLE, in particular the intellectual "auras"
or altered states of consciousness that sometimes accompany the abnormal
neuroelectric activity. Most such experiences are in the first place only "reli­
gious" in a very broad sense having little to do with mystical states per se.
They include, for example, dreamy states, feelings of depersonalization or
unreality, and feelings of being detached, far away, or "not in this world."
The one point of seemingly genuine contact concerns so-called "ecstatic sei­
zures," for which the historical prototype is Dostoevsky's famous descrip­
tion of Prince Myshkin in The Idiot. This indeed sounds like a real mysti­
cal experience, and Saver and Rabin therefore include Dostoevsky, along
with St. Paul, St. Teresa, and Joan of Arc, in a long table summarizing 1 5
cases of "historical-religious" personalities known or surmised to have been
epileptic. These diagnoses are in most cases transparently circumstantial,
however, and they often depend on behaviors that are associated primar­
ily with early stages of the mystic vocation and are equally well or better
interpreted as psychological automatisms (Chapter 5). In only two of their
15 cases, in fact, is a medical diagnosis of epilepsy certain: In the first, that
of Dostoevsky, it is not certain either that he was a temporal-lobe case or
even that he himself had the experiences he describes (see below); the other,
oddly enough, involves Myers's own brother, the physician Arthur Myers,
who was a patient of Hughlings Jackson (1888, 1 898; see also D. C. Taylor &
Marsh, 1 980) and who was found on autopsy to have a small left temporal
lesion, but who was by no stretch of the imagination subject to mystical
states of any kind.
Saver and Rabin ( 1997) next go on to identify 10 "well-studied modern
clinical cases of ecstatic seizure all [of which] appear to have had a tempo­
rolimbic substrate" (p. 503). In seven of these, however, all appearing in a
single article (D. Williams, 1 956), the "ecstasy" is more aptly described as
"pleasure," and the main point of the article is that even this is extremely
rare. Two of the other three arguably enter the genuinely mystical range, but
fall considerably short even of Dostoevsky's description, let alone the full­
blown introvertive mystical experience.28

28. In the best of these (Cirignotta, Todesco, & Lugaresi, 1 980), a brief ecstatic episode
fortuitously occurred during a polygraphic recording including eight channels of EEG, in a
patient in whom the diagnosis of TLE had been confirmed by the presence of spike-and-wave
 Mystical Experience-533

And what about Dostoevsky himself? Saver and Rabin conspicuously

neglect to cite an important paper by Gastaut (1 978) which deals in depth
with this subject. Temporal-lobe or "psychomotor" epilepsy, it turns out,
came into focus as a well-defined clinical entity only in the late 1 940s, and
Gastaut, a distinguished French epileptologist, had himself been the person
chiefly responsible for entry into that literature-with Dostoevsky as the
canonical example-of the concept of ecstatic auras. In the 1 978 paper, how­
ever, Gastaut totally repudiated his own earlier position. First, close study of
much newly discovered biographical material had led him to conclude that
Dostoevsky mainly suffered not from TLE with organic pathology of the
temporal region but from primary or common generalized functional epi­
lepsy. Second, it now seemed probable that his vivid descriptions of ecstatic
auras were not autobiographical reports but imaginative creations, largely
reflecting his more general religious preoccupations and knowledge. Most
importantly for our purposes here, Gastaut's detailed review of the rele­
vant medical literature revealed that even garden-variety levels of euphoria
or joy, let alone true mystical ecstasy, had extremely rarely if ever been a
component of epileptic auras. In virtually every case in which any affective
tone whatever had been reported, it was typically negative-fear, terror,
anxiety, apprehension, or anger. Among literally thousands of cases stud­
ied directly by himself and several other prominent clinical epileptologists,
Gastaut could not find even one unambiguous example of an ecstatic aura.
Dostoevsky's real contribution to epileptology, he concludes, lies not in the
unsupported concept of mystical auras in TLE, but rather in a recognition
that his genius flourished despite his epilepsy, not because of it, and could
not be diminished or impaired by decades of severe and frequent grand mal
seizures. He was a living disproof, in short, of the "degeneracy" theories of
genius advanced by 1 9th-century writers such as Lombroso and Lelut (p.
1 98; see also Chapter 7).29
Several studies involving direct electrical stimulation of temporal and
limbic cortex in TLE patients have similarly failed to disclose any clear-cut
connection with genuine mystical experience. Only about 10% of the 520
TLE patients studied by Penfield and Perot (1 963), for example, reported any
experiential phenomena at all, either in response to electrical stimulation
or as part of their normal seizure pattern, and none of the reported experi­
ences bears any significant resemblance to mystical states of consciousness.
Subsequent reports by Halgren, Waiter, Cheriow, and Crandall ( 1978), Hal­
gren (1982), Gloor et al. (1 982), and Gloor (1990) confirm these patterns,

activity in right temporal cortex during slow-wave sleep. Although abnormal electrical activ­
ity localized to the right temporal region may therefore have preceded the ecstatic experience,
its causal role is unclear because the experience itself occupied just "a few instants," of uncer­
tain temporal location, in a record that lasts for over a minute and displays rapidly changing
large-scale patterns of unusual brain activity. Future studies of this type, using more EEG
channels, common-reference (versus bipolar) recordings, and markers for onset/offset of the
targeted conscious states, could help to pinpoint their actual electrophysiological correlates.
29. In a subsequent paper Gastaut ( 1 984) slightly qualifies his diagnosis of Dostoevsky's
epilepsy but not his attack on the concept of ecstatic auras in TLE.
534-Chapter 8

and all of them emphasize like Gastaut both that affective responses of
any kind are relatively rare and that they consist almost exclusively of fear
and anxiety. Gloor et al. ( 1982), using implanted multichannel electrodes
which permitted stimulation and recording at both temporal neocortical
and limbic sites in the same subject, showed in addition that experiential
phenomena occur only when limbic structures are activated, whether or
not an afterdischarge propagates to temporal cortex, whereas stimulation
of temporal neocortex produces experiential responses only if it is strong
enough to propagate afterdischarges into limbic structures. Experiential
responses, moreover, can change dramatically with repeated stimulation of
the same limbic site, have no fixed relationship to the precise locus of that
site, and can reoccur after the tissue surrounding the site has been surgically
removed, all suggesting that the conscious experiences actually originate
somewhere else altogether (Halgren, 1982).30
In sum, we find no credible evidence of any generalized associa­
tion between epileptic seizure activity and genuine mystical experience.
Extremely few if any well-documented epileptics have reported true mysti­
cal experiences, and there is little or no cogent evidence of epilepsy in the
great majority of historically prominent mystics about whose lives we have
sufficient information to judge. It may still be true that epilepsy sometimes
produces neurobiological conditions conducive to mystical experience, but
as yet we have no clear picture as to what, precisely, those conditions are.
Meanwhile, TLE per se, as a gross clinical entity, is certainly neither neces­
sary nor sufficient.

Gellhorn and Ergotropicffrophotropic Systems

A second group of neurobiological approaches, now a little outdated,

revolves around the work of neurophysiologist Ernst Gellhorn on auto­
nomic/somatic integration. In a long series of publications, Gellhorn had
identified and characterized two large-scale anatomically distinct physio­
logical systems-broadly, "ergotropic" or activating and "trophotropic" or
quieting-whose interactions support a wide range of ordinary behavioral
and psychological states. Each system is elaborately organized, with visceral

30. Note the structural analogy here with migraine auras and related hallucinatory phenom­
ena discussed in Chapter 7. Among other things, these stimulation results render it exceed­
ingly unlikely, in our opinion, that "God experiences" can be induced by weak impressed
magnetic fields of the sort applied by Persinger ( 1999, 2001). The experiences Persinger reports
are at best distantly related to the genuinely mystical, and they appear highly vulnerable to
distortion by subject expectancies and demand characteristics created by his experimental
conditions. Our long-standing suspicions in this regard have recently been confirmed by the
failure of an attempt to replicate his findings using his own apparatus under strictly double­
blind conditions (Granqvist et aI., 2005). More generally, the numerous papers and books
in which Persinger has claimed to explain all sorts of supernormal phenomena in terms of
largely hypothetical patterns of abnormal temporal lobe activity seem to us of little scientific
value (see also Chapter 6; and Horgan, 2003, pp. 91-\05).
 Mystical Experience-535

or autonomic, skeletal-muscular, and cerebral components integrated in

hierarchical fashion. These hierarchies, moreover, are parallel in structure
in such a way that at each level they generally interact in a competitive or
reciprocally inhibitory manner. Thus, for example, the sympathetic branch
of the autonomic nervous system, a major component of the ergotropic sys­
tem, interacts with the (trophotropic) parasympathetic branch in regulating
functions such as total cardiac output and the distribution of blood to its
target organs. Over a wide range of normal conditions, these systems func­
tion in internally consistent ways and work together smoothly to achieve
a "tuning" of their reciprocal interactions appropriate to the behavioral
situation at hand.31 Gellhorn also explored, however, various circumstances
such as anoxia and sensory deprivation in which the normal congruence
and reciprocity break down, leading to pathological or paradoxical out­
comes of various kinds.
With this large body of prior research providing the scientific back­
ground, Gellhorn and Kiely (1 972) ventured some quite modest and tenta­
tive suggestions about possible neurophysiological underpinnings of mys­
tical states. Most of their article is actually about meditation, and more
specifically about sitting, concentrative forms of meditation, which they
interpreted as producing a generalized shift toward trophotropic domi­
nance. The mere act of sitting in a fixed and relaxed position, for example,
drastically reduces one major source of ergotropic activation, propriocep­
tive feedback from the skeletal musculature. Most of the scanty experi­
mental findings then available regarding meditation-such as slowing of
dominant EEG frequencies and increases in skin resistance-were consis­
tent with this view. Gellhorn and Kiely also pointed out that meditation is
similar in these respects to other psychosomatic quieting disciplines such as
autogenic training and progressive relaxation, and thus can be expected to
have a variety of potentially significant psychological and medical benefits.
As described so far, Gellhorn and Kiely correctly anticipated the con­
fluence with behavioral medicine that has been overwhelmingly the cen­
tral preoccupation of subsequent meditation research (Andresen, 2000; M.
Murphy & Donovan, 1997). More relevant to our purposes here, however,
are their relatively sparse remarks in regard to states of actual mystical
ecstasy. Their primary example is the EEG study of Das and Gastaut ( 1957),
in which reported Yogic ecstasy occurred in conjunction with a physiologi­
cal state that paradoxically combined extreme cortical arousal with pro­
found inhibition of skeletal musculature.32 The general picture they seem to
have in mind is that as Yogic meditation deepens, progressively shifting the

3 1 . Although this classical conception remains substantially correct, it has recently been
expanded and refined in ways summarized by Hugdahl ( 1996).
32. Gellhorn and Kiely also make a somewhat overdrawn comparison here between Yogic
ecstasy and REM (dreaming) sleep, which displays partly similar physiological properties,
and they make the prescient suggestion that the transitions to these states, and to somewhat
similar psychedelic and psychotic states, might be mediated by overlapping or similar mecha­
nisms (see below).
536-Chapter 8

"tuning" toward trophotropic dominance, it will at some point pass beyond

the region within which the total physiological system is dynamically sta­
ble, and thus will lead to paradoxical "rebound" or state-transition effects
which decouple cerebral/experiential states from their normal lower-level
physiological moorings. They make no attempt to provide further details
as to either the locations of these switching points, the specific mechanisms
that drive and guide the switching, or the character of the resulting states.
They clearly regard this "model" as merely provisional and descriptive,
an abstract conceptual framework that might prove heuristically useful in
guiding collection and interpretation of further empirical data.
Julian Davidson ( 1976) provides an excellent and appreciative assess­
ment of Gel lhorn's contribution and suggests several extensions that help
bring it in line with an expanded range of empirical observations. First and
foremost among these is the recognition that mystical states can also be
approached from the ergotropic side. Here Davidson draws upon earlier and
somewhat eccentric publications by Sargant ( 1 975) and Fischer (1971). Sar­
gant, in particular, catalogs a variety of circumstances, drawn from many
cultures, in which intense and prolonged "excitement" induced by dancing,
drumming, singing, hyperventilation, self-mutilation, ritual sex, psychoac­
tive drugs, and the like result in "collapse" and the sudden emergence of
extreme changes in physiological and mental state. Sargant's physiology is
antiquated, and his psychology of altered states empirically inadequate and
impoverished, but the induction of profound altered states of consciousness
by ergotropic maneuvers is unquestionably a real phenomenon (see also E.
F. Kelly & Locke, 1 98 1 b; R. G. Locke & Kelly, 1 985).33
How does it come to pass that driving the system beyond its custom­
ary limits in these seemingly divergent (trophotropic versus ergotropic)
directions can eventuate in mystical states of consciousness having so much
in common? Davidson recognizes this as a problem (p. 365), but has little
to offer by way of solution. Instead, he trails off into a highly speculative
discussion as to how the conscious experience of an altered state might be
determined jointly by physiological conditions and cognitive variables such
as beliefs and attitudes; in this way, he suggests, states which are actually
physiologically diverse might be experienced as similar by virtue of common
beliefs or expectations. His model here, however, is the classic experiment
of S. Schacter and Singer (1 962), in which the experience of physiologically
similar states was made to diverge through manipulations of expectancies
and social settings. The other new element he brings in-inevitably, in
that period-is the possibility that shifts in ergotropicltrophotropic tuning
might also alter the balance of contributions from the differentially spe­
cialized cerebral hemispheres. Ineffability, for example, might result from a
shift of dominance from the more linguistically sophisticated and analyti­
cal left hemisphere toward the more non-verbal, "intuitive," and "holistic"

33. Sargant himself has no use for any of these states and seeks merely to discredit them as
variant forms of "brain-washing," explainable in full in terms of mechanisms of generalized
inhibition identified by Pavlov in his studies of experimental neurosis in dogs.
 Mystical Experience-537

right. Much like the physiologically oriented creativity theorists discussed

in our previous chapter, Davidson also suggests that the psychoanalytic
distinction between primary and secondary process maps at least roughly
onto right versus left hemisphere dominance, with mystical experience, like
inspirations of genius, representing a kind of regression in service of the
ego.
We do not wish to argue that these speculations are entirely without
merit, and indeed they may in particular have some bearing on the lower
stages of mystical development. Two crucial limitations, however, require
special emphasis here: First, it is certain that proposals of these sorts can­
not possibly accommodate the ful l-blown phenomenology of introvertive
mystical experience, because that phenomenology passes beyond the reach
of ordinary cognitive "mechanisms" of all types. Second, they are virtu­
ally devoid of any serious factual basis. The simple truth of the matter is
that we know next to nothing about the relevant physiological conditions.
It seems more likely to us, as to Hufford (2005) and many other observers,
that neurobiological conditions associated with mystical experiences of the
universal-core type will prove to be correspondingly homogeneous in some
crucial way, whether they arise in the contemplative Meister Eckhart or in a
whirling Sufi dervish. But what are those conditions, and how do we arrive
at them from such disparate directions?
The only way to get adequate answers, we believe, is through direct
investigation of genuine mystical states. Very little further progress has been
made in this regard, unfortunately, in the last several decades. The current
state of things is well exemplified, at least for purposes of this chapter, by
two recent and widely circulated attempts to explain mystical experience in
neurobiological terms.

The Model of d'Aquili and Newberg

The first comes from (now-deceased) anthropologist/physician Eugene

d'Aquili, a long-time student of neurobiological aspects of religion, and
Andrew Newberg, a specialist in SPECT/PET neuroimaging. In a series of
semi-scientific and popular papers and books, these authors have attempted
to formulate and test an expanded model of mystical states grounded in con­
temporary cognitive neuroscience (d'Aquili & Newberg, 1 993, 1999; New­
berg & d'Aquili, 2000, 2002). Their model, originally presented in the 1993
Zygon paper, has persisted more or less unchanged in subsequent books
and papers, but we will focus on d'Aquili and Newberg (1 999), which con­
tains its most elaborate presentation and illustrates the main defects of their
approach. In this book, we first get an introduction to brain science, clearly
intended for non-scientists, which can only be described as largely outdated,
superficial, and simplistic. It also greatly overstates what we actually know
about many mysterious aspects of ordinary mental activity, as for example
when they assert (p. 34) that the distinction between self and world arises
538-Chapter 8

within left superior posterior parietal cortex. This is followed by an even

more idiosyncratic and controversial analysis of what they call "cognitive
operators" and their associations with specific brain regions. For example,
whereas most contemporary cognitive neuroscientists think of perceptual
integration or "binding" as a large-scale process involving numerous and
widely distributed areas of the brain, d'Aquili and Newberg (p. 52) speak
glibly of a "holistic operator" which itself grasps the entire present situation
as a unified Gestalt, and which resides in the right superior posterior pari­
etal lobe and adjacent cortical areas.
Finally, drawing mainly upon their own inadequate characterizations
of both brain and mind, they present their model of what might be happen­
ing during unitive mystical experience. The model builds upon Gellhorn's
conception of ergotropic/trophotropic systems, but extends it by postulating
a considerable number of specific dynamic interactions among various neo­
cortical and limbic areas. An elaborate narrative is provided, complete with
box-and-arrow diagrams, that amounts to little more than a re-description
of mystical phenomenology in quasi-neurophysiological language. The uni­
tive mystical state occurs, they declare, when simultaneous maximal activa­
tion of both ergotropic and trophotropic systems coincides with complete
functional deafferentation, initiated by conscious intentions issuing from
prefrontal cortex, of both left and right superior posterior parietal orienta­
tion association areas (p. 1 16). Deafferentation on the left supposedly oblit­
erates the self-world dichotomy, while deafferentation on the right results in
an experience of pure space devoid of specific contents, and so on.
There is little point in belaboring these descriptions further here. The
d'Aquili/Newberg "model" of mystical states, in our view, is little more than
a neurophysiological fairy tale, concocted by means of radical extrapola­
tion beyond the primitive basis afforded by contemporary cognitive neuro­
science, and spelled out in far greater detail than is warranted by anything
we really know about mystical states themselves. Certainly there is little
or no independent empirical justification for key elements of their model,
and some, such as their identification of spatial awareness with right poste­
rior parietal cortex, have been seriously undermined by more recent work
(Karnath, Ferber, & Himmelbach, 2001). D'Aquili and Newberg themselves
have presented only a few shreds of crude neuroimaging data suggesting
the expected decreases of parietal activation correlative with increases in
frontal areas, but others such as Kj aer et al. (2002), Lou et al. ( 1999), and
Vollenweider (1998) have identified very different patterns. Furthermore, in
no case is there much reason to feel confident that any true mystical experi­
ences occurred. In short, although we applaud their long-term goals, and
their relatively positive attitude toward mysticism, we cannot say the same
in regard to their science, at least so far. More effort directed to publication
of improved experimental studies in refereed neuroscience journals would
be very much in order.
 Mystical Experience-539

James Austin's Zen and the Brain (1999)

This book is far more substantial scientifically, but also ultimately

unsatisfying, and for partly similar reasons. Austin is a very experienced
clinical neurologist and research neuropharmacologist. What is especially
unusual, however, is that he has also been a practitioner of Zen for over
30 years, in the course of which he has himself experienced a number of
unusual states, including in particular what sounds like a brief but genuine
extrovertive mystical experience-"Kensho," in the terminology of Zen (p.
536)-in 1 982. These experiences clearly impressed him enormously, and
his book appears to be the product of decades of serious effort to under­
stand them in terms of available brain science-a kind of avocation or labor
of love evolving in parallel with his conventional scientific preoccupations.
The result is a quite extraordinary and massive volume that interweaves
large amounts of serious brain science with liberal interludes of personal
narrative and Zen lore. It is perhaps somewhat ironic that anyone could
produce an 844-page book devoted to the importance of getting beyond
words, but for anyone willing to make the necessary effort it is worth the
trip. Austin's basic strategy is to provide grounding in both Zen practice
and brain science, and then to explore their unfolding relationships as prac­
tice deepens. Disproportionate space is devoted to the more dramatic expe­
riences, and especially to his Kensho experience, again testifying to their
impact on him.
A great deal of good results from this approach. Although we cannot
possibly do justice here to the details, Austin provides a comprehensive and
informative survey of existing meditation research, packed with interesting
insights and suggestions for further research. Not surprisingly, given his
scientific background, he is especially strong in regard to neglected basic­
neuroscience aspects such as the role of neurochemistry and dynamically
interacting slow biological rhythms, subjects conspicuously absent from the
model of d'Aquili and Newberg ( 1999) among others. He also constantly
underscores the need for more research, and especially for neuroimaging
studies with advanced meditators, with which we heartily agree.34 Finally,
he is uncommonly alert to the fundamental role that neuroplasticity might
play in reshaping the brains even of adult meditators. Indeed, for him the
ultimate goal of Zen practice is to strip away the neural underpinnings of

34. With one significant technical caveat, however: Austin is not as aware as he should be
of the emerging neurophysiological story in regard to global workspace theory and the puta­
tive role of large-scale shared cortical neuroelectric activity in solving the "binding" prob­
lem (although this seems to be changing-see Austin, 2000). Perhaps for this reason, he also
shares with many other neuroimaging enthusiasts a failure to appreciate the potential con­
tributions of high-density EEG (and MEG) imaging. These electrophysiological methods are
complementary, not alternative, to currently more popular PET and fMRI methods, and have
enjoyed major technical advances in recent years. Briefly, under conditions substantially more
comfortable for subjects, they provide relatively direct measures of shared neural activity, on
a frequency-specific basis and on a time scale more relevant to experience and behavior. See
also Nunez and Silberstein (2000) and E. F. Kelly, Lenz, Franaszczuk, & Truong (1997).
540-Chapter 8

the egocentric space-time framework in which ordinary conditioned experi­

ence takes place. He even proposes at one point that his hypothesized cyto­
toxic "pruning" of the ordinary self might be detectable in post-mortem
microscopic autopsies of what he thinks is its essential neural substrate, a
subcortical triad comprised of the amygdala, hypothalamus, and central
grey matter.35
Despite these considerable strengths, what matters more for purposes
of this chapter are the systematic limitations of Austin's approach. It is
unfortunate first that he takes so much the role of an apologist for Zen.
This was hardly necessary, and it undoubtedly makes his book less attrac­
tive than it might otherwise have been-and deservedly so-to a scientific
audience. More importantly perhaps, this deliberate narrowness of perspec­
tive deprived him of access to a much larger inventory of phenomenological
observations potentially germane to his neurologizing perspective.
One significant example here is his "absorption" experience (p. 469),
in which a luminous and exquisitely detailed image of a small red maple
leaf suddenly appears in the far upper left corner of an otherwise empty,
vast, and jet-black visual field. As a clinical neurologist, Austin immediately
recognizes that something like this could not happen under normal circum­
stances. This is one of a number of examples, including in particular his far
more potent Kensho experience, in which cognitive phenomena emerging
in meditation dramatically surpass ordinary cognitive operations in speed,
precision, complexity, and integrative power. It is certainly to Austin's credit
that he recognizes these, and this in fact illustrates the value and importance
of collecting detailed introspective reports from advanced meditators, and
studying them from an informed neurological perspective. In his protracted
ruminations about the neurophysiological underpinnings of this surprising
event, however, Austin places unwarranted emphasis on the fact that the
image appeared on his left, implying for him an origin in right temporo­
parietal cortex. Yet even a casual acquaintance with the broader literature
of mysticism would have made him aware that such events, as for example
the various visions of St. Teresa, can crop up anywhere around the subject
in spherical space.36 Even when relevant and potentially helpful, in short, his
neurologizing is too dependent both on idiosyncracies of the Zen tradition
and on his own quite limited personal experience of unusual states.

35. Note that Austin differs here both from d'Aquili and Newberg, who think the self is
specially associated with left posterior parietal cortex, and from most other cognitive neu­
roscientists, who presume that it is part of a neural "executive" system which resides within
the frontal lobes.
36. The precise spatial distribution of such events within and between subjects remains to
be determined in detail, however. We leave aside here the related matter of Austin's premature
endorsement of a "copy" or "image" theory of memory, encouraged in part by his subsequent
discovery of a photograph that he himself had earlier made of the same maple leaf (see also
our Chapter 4).
 Mystical Experience-54l

The final limitation, however, is far more fundamental.37 The neurol­

ogizing itself becomes increasingly unsatisfactory and speculative as we
approach the most interesting and important phenomena, and increasingly
saturated with terms such as "might," "maybe," "perhaps," "suppose," and
so on. What this reflects is Austin's clearly acknowledged determination to
construct "explanations" of mystical experience, no matter how far-fetched
and hypothetical, that are wholly based on standard contemporary neuro­
science.
At its core this book represents an extraordinary collision of relent­
lessly conventional and rigid mainstream scientific sensibilities with con­
scious experiences so powerful that they threaten the very foundations of
Austin's orthodox outlook. Like psychology as a whole, Austin defends
himself-perhaps unconsciously-by carefully circumscribing his encoun­
ter with mysticism in such a way as to avoid contact with dimensions of
the subj ect that would still more seriously threaten his preconceived views.
Austin accepts without hesitation that Zen masters have developed ways of
cultivating extraordinary states of consciousness that are characterized by
many unusual and interesting properties, but anything further they might
say is mere Oriental nonsense unworthy of attention; thus we must "strip
off the heavy baggage of centuries of mystical, philosophical, and doctrinal
speculations" (p. 53). Austin's own brief taste of Kensho had such impact
upon him that even he, setting aside these scruples, cannot refrain from
characterizing it with metaphysically loaded terms such as "absolute real­
ity," "ultimate perfection," "eternity," and so on. Nevertheless, he goes to
some pains to assert at numerous points in his book, and apparently with
complete self-assurance, that there is nothing whatever of scientific signifi­
cance in talk of ESP, NOEs, or supernormal phenomena of any kind-this
despite the fact that the wisdom traditions in general, including the Zen
masters he quotes in profusion, take such things seriously. Unfortunately
for him, it is also quite obvious from what he does say about these subjects
that he knows practically nothing about the real scientific literature con­
cerning them. This, we submit, is bad scientific practice-not only for Aus­
tin personally, but for psychology as a whole.

37. Here our views largely coincide with those expressed in a thoughtful review by cognitive
scientist Eleanor Rosch (1999). although we are not comfortable with some of the examples
she invokes in support of her challenge to neuroscientists.
542-Chapter 8

Mysticism and Psychedelics

There is one further topic that is inescapably linked to the neurobiol­

ogy of mystical experience, but that so far falls mainly under the heading of
opportunities sadly lost, or at least postponed. We refer, of course, to the
psychedelic dimension.38
That there are potentially important connections between psychoactive
substances and mysticism was al ready apparent to William James, and in his
taxonomy of protomystical phenomena in VRE he comments in this regard
upon alcohol, nitrous oxide, and other anesthetics such as ether and chlo­
roform. The sway of alcohol over mankind, for example, seems to James to
reside in its capacity to stir, however transiently, the mystic sense: "Sobriety
diminishes, discriminates, and says no; drunkenness expands, unites, and
says yes. It is in fact the great exciter of the Yes function in man. It brings its
votary from the chill periphery of things to the radiant core. It makes him
for the moment one with truth" ( VRE, p. 297). These "whiffs and gleams" of
the mystical, however, belong chiefly to the fleeting early stages of drunken­
ness, which "in its totality is so degrading a poisoning."
Nitrous oxide is an even more powerful stimulant of mystical states.
James was familiar with the contemporary writings of Benjamin Blood, and
had been deeply impressed by the effects on himself of this anesthetic gas. It
was in fact in this specific context that James wrote what is surely one of the
most widely quoted passages in all of psychology:

One conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time, and my impression
of its truth has ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal wak­
ing consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special
type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of
screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We
may go through l i fe without suspecting their existence; but apply the req­
uisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness,
definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field
of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality
can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disre­
garded . . . They forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality. (p.
298)39

38. We prefer the term psychedelic, which means "mind-manifesting," to more theoreti­
cally loaded cognate terms whether negative (such as psychotomimetic, hallucinogenic, and so
on) or positive (such as entheogenic). For an interesting account by Humphry Osmond of his
invention of this term in friendly competition with Aldous Huxley, see Cavanna and Ullman
(1968, pp. 1 24-125).
39. Myers also self-experimented with nitrous oxide. In his review of the Principles (Myers,
189lc) he strongly endorses James's call for further experiments with anesthetics, and adds
this personal note: "Having myself, by mere good fortune, once attained under nitrous oxide
to the state of 'impersonal consciousness' . . . 1 have endeavoured in vain to repeat the experi­
ence. Yet the psychological instructiveness of this unique sensation is so great that it should, I
think, be a matter of course for the experimental psychologist to test fully his own capacity of
getting down into that diffusive sense of scarce-conditioned existence from whence the notion
 Mystical Experience-543

James (p. 301) cites two further instances in which quasi-mystical expe­
rience occurred in conjunction with surgical anesthesia, under chloroform
in one case and ether in the other.40 Indeed, the emergence of both of these
agents as drugs of abuse in the late 19th century may well have resulted in
part from their capacity to engender such experiences (L. Lewin, 192711998).
We are not aware of any modern attempt to collect and systematize observa­
tions of this sort, but the effort to do so would undoubtedly be worthwhile,
since similar experiences are almost certainly occurring in connection with
modern anesthetic regimes, and they bear strongly on the central themes of
this chapter (see also H. Smith, 2000, pp. 70-71). It will also be recalled from
Chapter 6 that NDEs, which often have a mystical dimension, sometimes
occur in conjunction with general surgical anesthesia.
We now reach the heart of the subject, the major psychedelics, includ­
ing both plant-derived substances such as mescaline and psilocybin and the
later synthetic agents, above all LSD-25. Their turbulent cultural and legal
history has been told in detail many times, perhaps most notably in the
sober and balanced treatment by Grinspoon and Bakalar (1 97911997). Had
Myers and James lived long enough, they would certainly have participated
actively in these developments, and indeed James himself is known to have
consumed peyote, though only once because it made him violently ill with­
out any compensatory psychedelic effects (Grinspoon & Bakalar, 197911997,
p. 59).
Although the extraordinary psychedelic properties of LSD had already
been discovered by Albert Hofman in 1943, an overt linkage in Western
popular culture between psychedelics and mysticism was initially forged
by the perennialist Aldous Huxley ( 195411990), based mainly on his own
early encounters with mescaline.41 This was of course followed by the mostly
infamous doings at Harvard under the inauspicious leadership of Timothy
Leary, the hysterical culture wars of the 1960s, and the near-total govern­
ment shutdown by 1970 of psychedelic research with humans (Grob, 1998).
Because of this decades-long ban on new research, much of the following
discussion is based on very old work, some of it certainly falling short in
various ways of today's research standards. Nevertheless, the main points
we want to make appear to us fully justified by the evidence already avail­
able.
First and foremost among these points is that the major psychedelics
can and sometimes do produce genuine mystical experiences. In fact, they
appear capable of producing or at least helping to produce the entire range

of personality itself, and the specialized senses severally, seem slowly to define themselves,
not only as an advance and a development, but as a loss and a limitation" (pp. 1 1 5-1 16).
40. The latter, interestingly, also included an aspect of "panoramic life review" (see Chap­
ter 6).
4l . An interesting historical footnote is provided here by neuroscientist 1. R. Smythies
(1983), who reveals that he provided mescaline not only to Huxley but also to other intellectu­
als interested in its philosophical implications, including C. D. Broad, H. H. Price, and R. C.
Zaehner.
544---Chapter 8

of mystical phenomena, from the lowest forms of trance and automatism to

unitive experiences which seem virtually indistinguishable, phenomenologi­
cally, from those reported by religious mystics. This conclusion is supported
in the first place by a large volume of cross-cultural and historical evidence,
much of which has come to light only in the last few decades, documenting
the contributions of psychoactive agents to religious traditions worldwide.
Psychedelics figure heavily in shamanistic practices, for example, particu­
larly among pre-literate societies of Siberia, Central America, and the Ama­
zon Basin (de Rios, 1984; de Rios & Janiger, 2003; Furst, 1 972; Grinspoon &
Bakalar, 197911997; Schultes & Hofmann, 197911 992). They have also been
implicated in the formation of some major religious traditions. The sacred
Soma plant glorified in the ancient Hindu Rig Veda was tentatively identi­
fied by Wasson (1968) as the red bulbous mushroom amanita muscaria or
fly-agaric, rich in the psychedelic agent psilocybin, and thus some of the
foundational mystical scriptures of India may at least in part reflect experi­
ences engendered by this psychedelic mushroom (see also H. Smith, 2000).
Similarly, the principal rite of popular Greek mystery religion, celebrated
annually for two thousand years, culminated in drinking a potion which
appears to have consisted in part of a derivative of ergot having properties
like those of LSD (Wasson, Ruck, & Hofman, 1978). Many other examples
can be found in and through the sources cited (see also Lukoff, Zanger, &
LU, 1990).
Similar conclusions follow from the initial modern attempts to study
psychedelic effects directly in human volunteers. One major landmark here
is the dissertation research of Walter Pahnke ( 1966; see also Pahnke & Rich­
ards, 1966), who in an attempted double-blind study randomly assigned
either 30 mg of psilocybin or nicotinic acid (an active control which produces
mild skin tingling and flushing) to 10 matched pairs of divinity students and
10 (mostly faculty) "guides," all of whom then spent the next several hours
together, listening in a dedicated room to a live Good Friday service piped
in from a nearby chapel.
Subjects' experiences were assessed through a combination of self­
report, interview, and questionnaire methods within one week and again
after six months, and scaled on both occasions by "blind" judges for the
degree to which they satisfied Stace's criteria for mystical experience. Briefly,
the experimental subjects scored high on average on measures of all seven
of Stace's criteria, and far higher than their matched controls. These large
differences, moreover, had become even more pronounced by the time of a
25-year follow up carried out by Doblin (1991), who somehow managed to
identify 1 9 of the original 20 participants and was able to readminister the
original six-month measurement procedures to 1 6 of these including seven
from the psilocybin group. Despite some issues having to do especially with
the rapid and total collapse of the attempted double-blind, the results of
these studies collectively show that psilocybin is definitely capable under
favorable conditions of producing intense mystical-type experiences that
have profound and persistent life-shaping effects. Additional support for
 Mystical Experience-545

this conclusion derives from the testimony of Huston Smith (2000, pp. 1 00-
101), who as it turns out was one of Pahnke's "guides," received the psilocy­
bin, and acknowledges that the Good Friday experiment provided him with
"the most powerful cosmic homecoming I have ever experienced."
Further evidence comes from Masters and Houston ( 1966), who admin­
istered psychedelics (mainly LSD or peyote) in varying dosages to 206 sub­
jects of their own and interviewed some 214 others who under a variety of
circumstances had taken the same or similar drugs. Although the great pre­
ponderance of the effects they report are perceptual and imaginative, par­
ticularly at low dosages or early in the sessions, they also devote an entire
chapter to experiences of more religious or mystical character, and state
specifically that six of their own 206 subjects appeared to have reached a
"deepest phenomenological stratum" corresponding to the full-fledged
introvertive mystical experience as described by Stace (1 960/1987, p. 307).
All six, interestingly, were over 40 years of age, of superior intelligence, well
adjusted, and creative.
More recently, Strassman (2001) has reported experiences induced by
DMT (dimethyltryptamine), a fast-acting and powerful psychedelic that
may be produced endogenously by the pineal gland.42 Among these, once
again, are experiences that clearly reach well into the mystical range. One
subject, for example, says:

I immediately saw a bright yellow-white light directly in front of me. I chose

to open to it. I was consumed by it and became part of it. There were no
distinctions-no figures or lines, shadows or outlines. There was no body
or anything inside or outside. I was devoid of self, of thought, of time, of
space, of a sense of separateness or ego, or of anything but the white light.
There are no symbols in my language that can begin to describe that sense
of pure being, oneness, and ecstasy. (p. 244)

Many further examples of this sort can be found in the reports of other
researchers who have worked extensively with LSD and related psychedelics,
such as Grof ( 1975, 1985) and de Rios and Janiger (2003), and in the popular
psychedelic literature. Although deep mystical experiences certainly do not
occur automatically or routinely, especially among unprepared recreational
users exposed to drugs of unknown composition and quality, that such
experiences can and do occur fairly often among well-prepared, mature,
and stable persons in suitably structured and comfortable settings seems
to us a certainty. Indeed, like Pahnke and Richards (1966, p. 1 93), we think
that the reproducibility of mystical-type experiences under such conditions
is in principle sufficient to support their investigation using modern experi­
mental methods, if only the current legal barriers can be relaxed.43

42. Strassman also paints a grim picture of the regulatory hurdles he had to overcome in
conducting this research.
43. Groups working in support of such changes include the Heffter Research Institute, the
Albert Hofmann Foundation, the Council on Spiritual Practices (CSP), and the Multidisci-
546-Chapter 8

Some religious scholars such as Zaehner (1 957/1978) and Katz (see Hor­
gan, 2003, pp. 44-45) have strongly resisted such conclusions, but their resis­
tance seems to us transparently motivated by factors such as pre-existing
commitment to one or another theological position and perhaps a certain
horror at the thought that genuine religious experience might sometimes be
obtained by popping a pill, without the protracted austerities characteristic
of traditional mystic self-disciplines.44 Any such horror ought to be miti­
gated at least somewhat, however, by the realization that psychedelics can
be regarded, much like other widely recognized and accepted "triggers" of
genuine mystical experience, as somehow establishing or permitting condi­
tions in the brain that are conducive to its occurrence. The key question, of
course, is precisely what those conditions are.
Although psychedelics clearly afford unique opportunities to produce
and study the relevant conditions experimentally, little has so far been
accomplished along these lines, mainly because of the legal restrictions cur­
rently in place. Nevertheless, some sense of the possibilities in this direction
can already be gleaned from recent PET imaging studies carried out with
humans by psychiatrist F. X. Vollenweider and colleagues in Switzerland,
where these restrictions are less severe (Gamma et aI., 2004; Vollenweider,
1 994, 1998; Vollenweider & Geyer, 2001 ; Vollenweider, Leenders, 0ye, Hell,
& Angst, 1997; Vollenweider, Leenders, Scharfetter, Antonini, et aI., 1 997;
Vollenweider, Leenders, Scharfetter, Maguire, et aI., 1997). The most rel­
evant of these studies examined patterns of brain activity (glucose utiliza­
tion) and associated states of consciousness produced in healthy normal
volunteers by moderate doses of psilocybin and ketamine. Briefly, these
agents were found to produce strikingly similar global effects, despite alto­
gether divergent primary actions on cortical neurotransmission. Metabolic
activity increased over much of the brain, and especially in areas gener­
ally associated with the "global workspace," including in particular frontal,
temporal, and parietal cortex, the insula, and the thalamus. Vollenweider
intreprets these results, which conflict both with the model of d'Aquili and
Newberg ( 1999) and with the "transient hypofrontality" hypothesis of Diet­
rich (2003), as revealing previously hidden interactions among the major
neurotransmitter systems. The common final outcome, he suggests, results
from the fact that both psilocybin (a partial agonist of [5-HT J serotonin
receptors) and ketamine (an antagonist of glutamate at NMDA2 receptors)
lead, by different pathways, to top-down inhibition of a gating or filtering
of incoming information normally exerted at the level of the thalamus. The

plinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS), all easily accessible on the worldwide
web.
44. Austin (1999) acknowledges the overlap between mystical and psychedelic experience,
but discourages the use of drugs on the grounds that they effect rapidly and violently the same
kinds of changes in brain function that he thinks are produced more gradually, voluntarily,
and controllably by practice of meditation. We have considerable sympathy for this point of
view, but genuinely adverse effects even of the major psychedelics are not common (Strass­
man, 1984), and we wonder also whether "gentler" psychedelics yet to be discovered might not
some day prove more trustworthy adjuncts to meditative practice.
 Mystical Experience-547

opening of this thalamic gate, he argues, leads in turn to cortical "overload"

or "flooding," cogn itive "fragmentation," and acutely psychotic states of
consciousness.
This work is interesting and important, in particular because it leads on
its own strictly neurobiological premises to the central idea that psychedelic
and mystical states result from breakdowns of a filtering action normally
exerted somewhere in or by the brain. It is just a beginning, however, and
has a number of serious limitations as well. Many details of the postulated
neurophysiological mechanisms, for example, are sketchy and hypothetical.
The PET imaging results have inherently low spatial and temporal resolu­
tion, are obtained by averaging across subjects, cannot distinguish between
excitation and inhibition (in particular at the level of the thalamus), and
cannot be correlated in a fine-grained manner with dynamic variations
and individual differences in the associated states of consciousness. It is
not clear, moreover, how the theory could be extended to cover mystical­
type states induced by sensory deprivation and other known triggering con­
ditions. Nor, finally, does it do adequate justice, within its fundamentally
pathologizing intellectual framework, to the positive, integrative, and trans­
formative potentials of psychedelic experience.45
We must next say something in regard to contemporary psychological
accounts or models of psychedelic experience. The main such efforts known
to us that are based on large amounts of direct experience with the effects of
LSD and related agents on human subjects are those of de Rios and Janiger
(2003), Grof (1 975, 1980, 1985), and Masters and Houston (1 966), all deriv­
ing from the mid-20th-century. These authors are broadly in agreement on
a number of important points: First, psychedelic experiences are strongly
dependent on set and setting, and enormously variable both within and
between subjects and sessions. Second, what happens at any given point
seems less the product of some highly specific neuropharmacological action
than an amplification or release of more general psychological functions
and materials that would normally be latent but inaccessible. Third, the
resulting experiences are conspicuously stratified in depth: The "aesthetic"
forms (altered perceptions, hallucinatory sensory phenomena, and the like)
are by far the most common but also the least significant. With higher or
repeated doses these tend to give way to more highly imaginative, creative,
symbolic, or even mythic forms of cognitive activity, and finally, in rela­
tively few instances, we may pass altogether beyond the realm of ordinary
cognition and personal biography, with dissolution of the everyday ego and
emergence of unitive mystical experience.

45. We also mention in passing that even on its own purely neurobiological terms Vollen­
weider's current model neglects at least one other important source of "filtering" action in the
brain, namely, the NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartate) receptor system of the upper cortical lay­
ers. As summarized for example by Kohn and Whitsel (2002) and Flohr (2000), this activity­
dependent system plays a critical role in habituation to repeated stimuli and other short-term
dynamic adjustments of cortical function, and also is specifically and selectively disabled by
agents such as ketamine and PCP.
548-Chapter 8

The deepest parts of this continuum are of course our primary concern
here.46 Arguably the most systematic attempt to date to map this "transper­
sonal" region of psychedelic experience is that of psychiatrist Stanislav
Grof, based on literally thousands of sessions spanning 17 years of clini­
cal research and personal experimentation with LSD. The conclusions Grof
wishes to draw from this mass of material were already largely in place by
the time of his first book (Grof, 1975), in which he describes how the expe­
riences he encountered in himself and his patients forced him beyond the
orthodox Freudianism of his psychoanalytic training in Czechoslovakia to
a greatly expanded conception of the human unconscious. Briefly, he identi­
fies four large classes or stages of LSD experience which he terms "abstract
and aesthetic," "psychodynamic," "perinatal," and "transpersonal." The
last two of these represent the principal novelties of his expanded con­
ceptual scheme: Perinatal experiences revolve around ostensible memo­
ries of psychologically formative events occurring near the time of birth,
and transpersonal experiences include, in addition to mystical experiences
proper, the emergence of "archetypes" and other products of the Jungian
collective unconscious, encounters with superhuman spiritual entities,
ostensible memories of past lives, and a score of other experiences that to
say the least are extremely odd.
Grof himself quickly recognized strong affinities between his expanded
conception of the psychodynamic unconscious and the trans personal psy­
chologies associated with the primordial tradition (Tart, 1975b), and he has
spent much of his subsequent career working out these parallels in greater
detail. Huston Smith (1 976, 2000) also recognized these similarities, and
has even gone so far as to characterize Grof's work as in effect scientifically
corroborating that tradition. It is hardly surprising in this light that Grof
is widely regarded as one of the pillars of contemporary transpersonal psy­
chology (Walsh & Vaughan, 1980, 1993).
Grof surely deserves credit for helping to open up this potentially
important area of research, but in our opinion his actual scientific accom­
plishments, as represented in his published works, cannot carry this much
theoretical weight. Perhaps reflecting his clinical background and training,
his reports seem to us to consist mainly of Grof himself presenting, at one
remove from the actual experiences of his subjects, what amount to sum­
mary narratives sketching his overall impressions and interpretations of
their character and meaning. This procedure is certainly insufficient to jus­
tify strong and radical empirical claims of the sorts that he makes through­
out his books. Readers are apparently expected simply to trust his judgment,
primarily on the strength of oft-repeated general reassurances as to the sup­
posedly thorough, cautious, and conservative nature of his procedures for

46. Note, however, that the existence of a "middle" region in which strikingly different and
in some ways superior modes of symbolism and cognition emerge is in line with the account of
genius developed in Chapter 7. Psychedelics could thus in principle facilitate further experi­
mental investigation of these processes, and indeed of creativity itself (de Rios & Janiger,
2003).
 Mystical Ex perie nce- 549

collecting and analyzing data, when what we really need are details of the
actual evidence supporting specific factual claims. In regard to ostensible
memories of past lives, to take one especially significant example, detailed
presentation of verified supporting evidence after the manner of Steven­
son (1997, 2001) is surely crucial; yet Grof presents practically no such evi­
dence, and most of what little he does present was apparently discovered by
the subjects themselves. Unlike Masters and Houston ( 1 966), who suggest
that many aspects of LSD experience "may constitute subliminal triumphs
of Time, Life, Newsweek" (p. 306), Grof also shows little or no awareness
of the potential for cryptomnesia to explain much of his data (Stevenson,
1983a). More generally, he seems to us altogether too prone to regard the
intense phenomenology of LSD experiences as itself somehow warranting
their empirical truth. In sum, although we find Grof's work in many ways
interesting and suggestive, in its current form it falls far short of empirically
establishing his central transpersonal claims.47
One point all psychological students of psychedelics agree upon is that
these agents somehow activate or provide access to important psychological
materials and processes normally latent somewhere beyond the margins of
waking consciousness. In this, psychedelic states are again closely akin to
mystical states. In both, as James puts it, "we pass from out of ordinary con­
sciousness as from a less into a more, as from a smallness into a vastness"
( VRE, p. 319). What could be more natural, under these circumstances, than
to conceive of ordinary consciousness as a contracted or reduced form of
some sort of larger and more potent consciousness latent within-to think,
that is, in terms of a "filter" or " transmission" theory of the sort advocated
by Myers, James, and Bergson, and discussed throughout this book, in
which the normal functions of the brain with its sensory and motor systems
are in substantial part eliminative rather than productive?
Even the physiologist Vollenweider, as we saw, moves partway in this
direction, and many psychologically oriented students of psychedelics in
addition to Grof have explicitly adopted a full-fledged transpersonal filter
model of some sort. A. Huxley (1 954/1990, pp. 22�27) does so, for example,
relying upon the following passage from C. D. Broad ( 1953), which was orig­
inally written in relation to the problems posed for conventional mind-brain
theory by psi phenomena:

Each person is at each moment potentially capable of remembering all

that has ever happened to him and of perceiving everything that is hap­
pening anywhere in the universe. The function of the brain and nervous
system is to protect us from being overwhelmed and confused by this mass
of largely useless and irrelevant knowledge, by shutting out most of what

47. Despite these scientific limitations of his published work, Grof certainly does not
deserve the sneering Voltaire-style abuse heaped upon him by Edwards ( 1996). It remains
possible in our view that more information may yet be mined from Grof's original records,
and that future research by others will substantiate at least some of his transpersonal claims.
Similarly non-dismissive attitudes are expressed by scientific commentators as diverse as
Austin (1999), Wulff (2000), and especially Grinspoon and Bakalar ( 1 979/1997).
5 50-Chapter 8

we should otherwise perceive or remember at any moment, and leaving

only that very small and special selection which is likely to be practically
useful. An extension or modification of this type of theory seems to offer
better hopes of a coherent synthesis of normal and paranormal cognition
than is offered by attempts to tinker with the orthodox notion of events in
the brain and nervous system generating sense-data. (pp. 22-23)

On such a view, Huxley suggests, we are all potentially "Mind at Large."

However, "to make biological survival possible, Mind at Large has to be
funneled through the reducing valve of the brain and nervous system. What
comes out at the other end is a measly trickle of the kind of consciousness
which will help us to stay alive" (p. 23). Huxley sees psychedelic agents as
impairing or suspending this filtering action and thus permitting the inflow­
ing or uprush of Mind at Large with its intrinsically greater capacities:

As M ind at Large seeps past the no longer watertight valve, all kinds of
biologically useless things start to happen. In some cases there may be
extra-sensory perception. Other persons discover a world of visionary
beauty. To others again is revealed the glory, the infinite value and mean­
ingfulness of naked existence, of the given, unconceptualized event. In the
final stage of egolessness there is an "obscure knowledge" that All is in
all-that All is actually each. (p. 26)

A full-fledged transpersonal filter model of this sort has also com­

mended itself to various scientists approaching psychedelics from a d i ve r­
sity of perspectives. One of the first was Stevenson ( 1957), who explicitly
invoked a filter model and remarked that "these drugs may bring us, at least
partially, into contact with a world of which we know little and should know
a great deal more" (p. 439). Similarly, Pahnke, in his 1968 Ingersoll lecture,
specifically endorsed James's (189811900) formulation of the transmission
theory on the same formal occasion 70 years earlier: "Our LSD patients
who have had the psychedelic mystical experience and who previously knew
nothing of this transmission theory are supplying data which precisely fit
this hypothesis. Their threshold seems to be lowered so that they directly
experience this Vaster Consciousness in an Eternal Now, beyond time and
space" (Pahnke, 1969, p. 1 6).
Strassman (2001) playfully analogizes the brain to a television receiver,
with DMT as an agent which at high enough doses enables us to "switch
channels" and thus connect with novel dimensions of reality that are always
present, but normally remain hidden. Similarly, in a postscript to the pre­
sentation and defense of his ketamine model of NDEs, Jansen (1997b)
reports that he has moved away from his former reductive materialism and
toward a transpersonal perspective, aligning himself with those "who see
drugs as just another door to a space, and not as actually producing that
space . . . . Ketamine is a door to a place we cannot normally get to; it is defi­
nitely not evidence that such a place does not exist" (pp. 94-95). We should
point out here that in one particular respect ketamine is an especially inter­
esting psychedelic agent. Its psychedelic and anesthetic effects are known
 Mystical Experience-551

to derive from its capacity to bind non-competitively and selectively to the

NMDA receptor complex found in the upper layers of all central gray-mat­
ter structures (alcohol and nitrous oxide, interestingly, have somewhat simi­
lar although weaker selectivities), and Flohr (2000) in particular has argued
that this receptor system provides the essential neurophysiological substrate
for ordinary consciousness by supporting rapid formation of large-scale cell
assemblies ("binding"; see Chapter 1). At sufficiently high doses this bind­
ing process is completely blocked, in his view, leading to unconsciousness,
whereas at lower doses it is merely impaired, giving rise to what he regards
as purely pathological "disturbances" of consciousness. This model, in our
opinion, again fails to do justice to the phenomenological richness and
complexity of ketamine-induced experiences, which are more in line with
the trans personal filter model advocated here by Jansen, and also by our­
selves . As indicated in Chapter 6 we do not accept Jansen's thoroughgo­
ing identification of NDEs with ketamine experiences, but rather see all
these experiences-psychedelic experiences in general, NDEs, and mystical
experiences proper-as being related and overlapping but not individually
homogeneous or identifiable with each other. Nevertheless, Jansen's revised,
transpersonal interpretation of ketamine experience seems to us basically
correct as far as it goes.48
Other thoughtful students, however, such as Vollenweider (1 998) and
especially Grinspoon and Bakalar ( 1 979/1997), have declined to embrace
such trans personal interpretations of psychedelic effects even though they
do explicitly embrace filter models of more conventional sort. Vollenweider's
exclusive focus on a thalamic gate is certainly too narrow, even in purely
biological terms, but how far do the data actually drive us in the transper­
sonal direction? Grinspoon and Bakalar appear intellectually open to the
transpersonal perspective (see especially their Chapter 7), but they consis­
tently fail to appreciate the degree to which it is in principle empirically test­
able and has in fact already to some degree been successfully tested. This
amounts once again to Stace's problem of objective reference, in a slightly
different guise. What we wish to suggest here is that what psychedelics have
in common with all other means of producing mystical states may consist
not in the engagement of any highly specific final common neurophysiolog­
ical pathways, mechanisms, or modules, but rather in some sort of more
global disruption or "loosening" of the normal mind-brain connection,
which in turn enables ful ler expression of an objectively real transpersonal
component of human personality.
Several further considerations lend support to such a view, in regard
both to psychedelic experience and to mystical experience generally. First
is the sheer diversity of the circumstances known to trigger mystical experi­
ences (Grinspoon & Bakalar, 1979/1997, p. 36; Wulff, 2000, p. 410). These
include not only chemical agents both simple and complex, inorganic and

48. We also suspect that it could be particularly fruitful to explore possible ways of recover­
ing conscious experiences that may occur at a deeper stratum of personality during ketamine
anesthesia (see also Grace, 2003; H. Smith, 2000, pp. 70-71).
552-Chapter 8

organic, but all the various induction procedures both trophotropic and
ergotropic devised by literally thousands of human societies, over thou­
sands of years, in service of their production (R. G. Locke & Kelly, 1985). It
seems to us unlikely that all of these heterogeneous means of engendering
mystical experience can have anything more in common than a capacity to
disrupt or destabilize the normal mode of operation of the mind-brain sys­
tem. Why some kinds of "disruption" produce this "loosening" while others
do not remains to be elucidated.49
Second is the curious phenomenon of synesthesia, or fusion of the
senses, which is a common accompaniment of both psychedelic and mysti­
cal experiences. Although we do not wish to press the point too hard, this
seems just the sort of thing one might expect if the normal sharp differentia­
tion of the special senses is effected by coupling of a more general imagina­
tive power with the specific environment of the brain and its sensory organs,
and is partially undone by a decoupling effect of psychedelic agents. 50 Sug­
gestions by Cytowic ( 1995) and others that synesthesia is more common in
writers, artists, and musicians and also associated with increased incidence
of psi phenomena could, if upheld in further research, support such an
interpretation.
Third, the full-fledged transpersonal filter model receives direct sup­
port from the body of evidence reviewed in Chapter 6 showing that NDEs­
which, as we have said before, often have a mystical or transcendent
aspect-sometimes occur under conditions in which the specific physiologi­
cal mechanisms thought by mainstream neuroscientists to be necessary for
the production of conscious states have been largely or totally disabled.
Finally, states of consciousness produced by psychedelic agents, like
mystical states in general, appear likely to be strongly psi-conducive,
although the evidence for this too is currently less than satisfactory. The
existence of such connections is presumed by the worldwide shamanic tra­
dition and also deeply ingrained in contemporary psychedelic folklore,
including the publicallY expressed expectations of neuroscientist John
Smythies and various eminent persons to whom he provided mescaline (see
footnote 41). However, there has so far been little meaningful experimental
work on this important topic. During the brief period when psychedelics
were widely available for use with humans, formal ESP testing of all sorts
was unfortunately carried out almost without exception using forced-choice
card-guessing methods that are singularly ill-suited for use with persons
undergoing intense psychedelic experiences. Nevertheless, even the scanty
data currently available suggest that the association is real and accessible
to more imaginative forms of experimentation. Grof ( 1975) in typical fash­
ion makes many strong claims but provides little if any credible evidence.

49. Similar issues arise in relation to NDEs, as discussed in Chapter 6.

50. See Myers (1892f), where he suggested that synesthesia was "a kind of vestige of that
undifferentiated continuous sensitivity from which we suppose our existing senses to have
been specialised in the struggle for life" (p. 529). See also his comments on nitrous oxide in
footnote 39.
 Mystical Experience-553

Masters and Houston (1 966, pp. 1 1 3-1 22), in contrast, report some quite
striking albeit informal results using both forced-choice and free-response
procedures, with the latter clearly emerging as the preferred testing strategy
for any future work. Tart (1977) summarizes most of the existing studies
and suggests additional methodological refinements for future work. There
seems ample reason to expect that such work will be successful, provided
that it heeds the lessons of the past (Grob, 1998).
In summary of this section, it seems to us beyond reasonable doubt
that in principle psychedelics afford vital opportunities for wide-ranging
and illuminating experimental studies of mystical-type experiences, their
neurobiological accompaniments, and associated cognitive phenomena
of many kinds including psi phenomena. Whether our culture can muster
the courage and wisdom to permit such explorations remains to be seen,
however. At present the major psychedelics are treated simply as drugs of
abuse, under a legal system which in fact does little to prevent abuse but has
been highly successful in suppressing research that could contribute sig­
nificantly to reshaping scientific understanding of human personality and
mind-body relations. We refer readers here especially to Grinspoon and
Bakalar ( 1979/1997, chap. 8), who sharply highlight the manner in which the
existing medical-legal control system has itself in effect become a means of
defending the entrenched mainstream reductionist-materialist conception
of human mind and personality. As they trenchantly observe, "we have a
mysticism problem as well as a drug problem" (p. 302).

Psychodynamic Approaches to Mysticism:

Toward a Working Model

Much of the scanty theoretical effort so far directed to mysticism by scien­

tific psychology has arisen within its clinical wing and relies chiefly upon
the psychodynamic models of human personality advanced by Freud, Jung,
and their followers. These developments have followed a trajectory gener­
ally parallel to that of psychodynamic theorizing about genius, as reviewed
in Chapter 7, which is to be expected in view of the evident psychological
overlap, discussed above, between these domains. Nevertheless, the result­
ing positions in regard to mysticism are more sharply differentiated in terms
of their overall attitude toward its meaning and significance. We next briefly
canvas these developments (for more detail see Wulff, 2000, and especially
Parsons, 1999).
554-Chapter 8

Freud and Jung

The "classical" phase, dominated by orthodox Freudian psychoanaly­

sis, was almost unremittingly hostile to all expressions of religiosity, mys­
ticism included. Freud regarded religion in general as merely a defense,
much like the protection afforded by a strong father, against infantile feel­
ings of helplessness. To be religious is for him merely to regress to a more
primitive developmental level, to abandon the reality principle in response
to unmanageable stress. His attitudes toward mystical experience per se,
however, developed mainly through his interactions with the French scholar
and novelist Romain Rolland, and are slightly more nuanced. Rolland was
apparently subject to mystical experiences and regarded them as the real
foundation of religious life, something altogether different from religions
themselves as social institutions. This positive attitude on the part of a highly
valued friend evidently discomfited Freud, and in Chapter 1 of Civilization
and Its Discontents he formulated his initial and best-known response. He
acknowledges the occurrence in Rolland and many others of a "peculiar
feeling," which he characterizes as "a sensation of 'eternity', a feeling as of
something limitless, unbounded-as it were 'oceanic'. . . a feeling of an indis­
soluble bond, of being one with the external world as whole" (Freud, 1961,
pp. 1 1-12). Freud can discover no trace of such feelings in himself, however,
and despite the disturbing testimony of Rolland he cannot accept that they
might play a role in religion comparable in importance to the feelings of
infantile helplessness and longing for the father (p. 1 9). He tentatively con­
cludes that mystical states represent the restoration of a "boundless narcis­
sism," much like that of an infant at the breast in a primitive phase of ego­
development antedating the discrimination between self and world.
Freud ends this brief discussion of mysticism on a curious note of
ambivalence which persisted through his continuing interactions with Rol­
land (Parsons, 1 999). His orthodox followers, however, generally devalued
and pathologized the subject without any such reservations (Wulff, 2000, p.
419),51 and theirs was undoubtedly the majority psychodynamic viewpoint
even as recently as the so-called "GAP report" (Group for the Advance­
ment of Psychiatry, 1976). This stunningly arrogant yet i ll-informed posi­
tion paper is in our opinion a low point in the modern psychiatric literature.
Echoing the crudest early psychoanalytic characterizations of genius as
merely an expression of mental illness, it defends a thoroughgoing patholog­
ical-regression interpretation of mysticism by focusing almost exclusively
on marginal or secondary phenomena that lend themselves to such inter­
pretations, while utterly failing to come to grips with the central empirical
realities of the subject.

51. We include in this group the work of Leuba ( 1 925), who sought to analyze the highest
experiences of Christian mystics in terms of a reductive psychodynamics of sexual repression
and sublimation having much in common with Freudian psychoanalysis while not embracing
it overtly. For a destructive critique of Leuba's efforts along these lines, informed by a much
deeper acquaintance with Christian mysticism, see Marechal ( 1927/2004).
 Mystical Experience-555

To be sure, unusual and distinctly odd forms of thought and behavior

can often be identified in the literature of mysticism, sometimes reaching the
level of true psychopathology. Pushkin, for example, appears on the rosters
not only of Bucke (190111969) and Bloom (2002), but also that of lamison
( 1993) as an instance of bipolar disorder. Nevertheless, and again as in the
case of genius, any presumption of a universally pathological origin for
mystical phenomena is belied by a broader acquaintance with the subject.
Anyone who widely samples the lives of the great mystics, for example, with
their intense and difficult psychological disciplines and their extraordinary
practical, creative, and ethical achievements, must surely find it difficult to
take seriously the claim that their psychology is fundamentally and univer­
sally rooted in some sort of infantile narcissism. 52 We are reminded here of
the cautionary remark by Myers ( l886a), just as apt today as it was then, that
modern "thinkers know well that man can fall below himself; but that he can
rise above himself they can believe no more" (vol. 1, p. lvi).
The GAP committee's clinically based pathologizing also directly con­
flicts with a wide variety of empirical evidence (much of which was already
available, starting with lames's VRE, had they chosen to look at it) showing
that religious, supernormal, and mystical-type experiences tend to occur, in
modern Western industrial societies at least, in persons who on average are
at least as well-adjusted, physically healthy, affluent, educated, and creative
as their peers (Greeley, 1974, 1975, 1987; Hay, 1994; Hay & Morisy, 1 978;
Koenig et aI., 200 1; Laski, 1961; Maslow, 1964, 1973; Privette, 1 983; Spilka,
Hood, & Gorsuch, 1985; Wulff, 2000).
As in the case of genius, therefore, the radical pathologizing associated
with classical Freudian psychoanalysis has gradually given way to adap­
tive ("regression in service of the ego") and transformativeltranspersonal
schools of thought (Parsons, 1999; Wulff, 2000) which regard religious and
mystical experience far more positively. One significant and desirable result
of these trends is that the occurrence of mystical experiences, NDEs, and
the like is no longer automatically taken by clinicians, as it once was, to be
diagnostic of mental disorder (Lukoff, Lu, & Turner, 1992). It seems now
to be more widely appreciated, in sum, that such experiences often exert
profoundly positive and even transformative effects on human personality,
including (as exemplified by the reports of Bucke and Tennyson) reduction
or even elimination of the fear of death.
Among the major psychoanalytic theorists, the one most attuned
to these positive, transformative, and transpersonal aspects of religious
and mystical experience was undoubtedly Carl lung. Indeed, lung's more
accepting attitude toward these matters was one of the main causes of his
break with Freud. In brief, whereas for Freud the unconscious was entirely a
function of personal biography and biology, lung conceived it as containing
in addition a deeper functional stratum, the collective unconscious, which
is a repository of universal templates, themes, or "archetypes" of experience
and the principal source of supernormal and transpersonal phenomena.

52. See especially Underhill ( 1 9 1 111974).

556---Chapter 8

lung saw the central process of individuation, the growth and integration of
personality, as driven and shaped by numinous encounters between the con­
scious ego and this deeper unconscious or "dark" region of the psyche. For
him and his followers, as for Myers, genius and mysticism are profoundly
related, with both reflecting an inherent drive or nisus toward more com­
prehensive consciousness and more complete psychic integration. Accord­
ing to Neumann (196811970), we are in fact at bottom homo mysticus: The
mystical is "a fundamental category of human experience" (p. 383) and "the
profoundest source of creative life" (p. 385). Indeed, "man's very center is an
unknown creative force which lives within him and molds him in ever-new
forms and transformations" (p. 41 5). Mystical experiences involve mutually
transformative contacts between the ordinary ego and this hidden center,
which lungians term the self, and thus they can energize and guide that
overall shift in the center of gravity of the personality from ego toward self
which constitutes the essence of individuation. lung's views here approach
those of Underhill ( 1 911 1 1974), for whom "the essence of the mystic life con­
sists in the remaking of personality," leading when successful to the "Mysti­
cal Marriage" or "Unitive Life," a more or less permanent or recurrent state
of "conscious relation with the absolute" (p. 375).
For further detail we must refer readers to the elaborate and sometimes
difficult expositions provided by the lungians themselves. 53 Although it is
true in a general way that lung's theory is more comprehensive than Freud's
and more consistent with the full range of available data, it can hardly be
claimed that it provides an empirically satisfactory or complete psychody­
namic account of mystical experience. lung's arguments for archetypes and
the collective unconscious, for example, rest primarily on his own clinically
based investigations of art and literature, comparative mythology, dreams,
and psychosis, and like most other developments in transpersonal psychol­
ogy have so far generally been viewed by more mainstream psychologists
as undisciplined, uncritical, and largely irrelevant to scientific psychology.
Nevertheless, some additional support for his ideas can be found in fur­
ther studies of comparative mythology by l. Campbell (1949/2004) and per­
haps also in observations from psychedelic investigations. Grof ( 1985), for
example, asserts that the latter "have repeatedly confirmed most of lung's
brilliant insights" and that lung's system, although not yet encompassing
the full spectrum of psychedelic phenomena, "requires the least revisions
or modifications of all the systems of depth psychology" in order to do so
(p. 190).
Such "confirmations" are of course hardly independent of lung's origi­
nal formulations, and it remains to be seen whether or to what degree they
will be supported in further investigations along similar lines. Moreover,

53. A. Huxley ( 1 961) explicitly contrasts the rich documentation with concrete facts that is
so characteristic of Myers with "those psycho-anthropologico-pseudo-genetic speculations
which becloud the writings of the sage of Zurich." Nevertheless, there are also important
similarities and hidden links between the views of Myers and lung that certainly merit further
exploration.
 Mystical Expe rienc e -557

quite apart from serious and still unresolved issues as to the character, num­
ber, and thematic content of "archetypes," there are at least two significant
ways in which Jungian accounts of mystical experience seem to us inad­
equate, empirically. In the first place, such experiences certainly cannot all
be regarded as "archetypal," for archetypes only reach overt expression in
the form of images, broadly construed, and as shown by Stace and others
the innermost core of mystical experience unfolds in a region beyond images
and all other distinctive mental particulars. This is closely connected with
the second and more serious limitation. What Jung clearly found most con­
genial in his encounters with religious mysticism generally and Eastern mys­
ticism in particular was the wealth of myth, symbolism, and imagery that
he could readily assimilate to his core doctrine of individuation and the
collective unconscious, as described above. A central feature of that doc­
trine, however, is Jung's conviction that the ego is the primary bearer of
consciousness. Thus for example, he says:

Consciousness is inconceivable without an ego; it is equated with the rela­

tion of contents to an ego. If there is no ego there is nobody to be conscious
of anything. The ego is therefore indispensable to the conscious process . . . .
I cannot imagine a conscious mental state that does not relate to a subject,
that is, to an ego. (Jung, 1 969b, p. 484)54

This theoretical commitment seems to have rendered Jung systemati­

cally unable to come fully to grips with introvertive mystical experiences of
the sort described by Stace and others. For him, disappearance of the ordi­
nary conscious ego during a numinous encounter with the collective uncon­
scious can only mean that the conscious ego has been flooded, or contami­
nated, or engulfed by the inherently dark contents of that unknown part of
psyche. As a result, consciousness itself supposedly dims or contracts, ulti­
mately to some sort of void, nothingness, or state of egoless unconscious­
ness (e.g., Jung, 1 969a, pp. 287-288; Jung, 1969b, pp. 484-485, 491 , 496, 498,
504-505, 560; see also Neumann, 1 96811970, pp. 379, 381, 383, 392, 397, 399,
403).55
This kind of description of mystical states, however, which follows from
Jung's strong identification of consciousness with the ordinary ego, is flatly
contradicted by the unanimous testimony of great mystics of all times and
places that their highest states are not dim or unconscious, but if anything
"superconscious." The ingredient crucially absent from the Jungian model,
in short, is precisely Myers's central theoretical move, his repudiation of
that identification in favor of his own core conception of the Subliminal
Self-"a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty, which
for the most part remains potential only," but which expresses itself in

54 lung ( 1 969a, p. 283) also makes explicit that the same characterization applies to what­
ever consciousness accompanies any "complexes" or secondary personalities that may form
under pathological conditions (see Chapter 5).
55. A similar picture of the limitations of lung's understanding of mystical experience is
presented in scholarly detail by Coward ( 1 985).
SS8-Chapter 8

greater or lesser degree as a function of fiuctuating conditions in the organ­

ism (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 2) .

Myers and James

And here we arrive at a central message of this chapter, directed not only
to students of comparative religion but also to humanistic and transpersonal
psychologists generally and to any mainstream scientists who might develop
an increased interest in mysticism as a result of our labors here. It is this: The
best way forward, we believe, is not through any sort of minor adjustment of
traditional clinically based psychodynamic models of the sorts advanced by
Freud and lung, as advocated for example by Parsons (1999), nor by uncriti­
cally embracing the "perennialist" psychologies of persons such as H. Smith
( 1976) and Grof (1 975, 1985), but by building upon the conceptually more
adequate and empirically more secure foundation already created by Myers
and carried forward by lames.56
The importance of lames's connections with Myers, we believe, has not
yet been adequately appreciated by most students of mysticism and religion.
lames's biographers, including his "official" biographer Perry ( 1936), have
generally downplayed or ignored altogether his deep involvement with psy­
chical research, and even E. Taylor (1 996, p. 96), who knows better, cites as
a summary of lames's "own position" a passage from VRE (p. 366) in which
lames in essence is paraphrasing Myers (and anticipating Maslow). It can
be argued that a large proportion of lames's late work revolves specifically
around his attempts to draw out in detail consequences for the psychology
of religion, and for epistemology and metaphysics, of Myers's theory of the
Subliminal Self.
These connections are perhaps especially apparent in regard to VRE.
There, lames not only uses Myers's "taxonomic" expository methods
throughout, organizing his case material serially and placing special empha­
sis on the most extreme and challenging phenomena, but clearly acknowl­
edges in various ways and places that the theoretical apparatus he brings to
bear on their explanation is that provided by Myers (e.g., see VRE, pp. 366,
386). His treatments in VRE of the psychology of religion generally, and of
mysticism in particular, can be regarded, not unfairly we believe, as consist­
ing in the main of an attempt to make more fully explicit views that in Myers
are already clearly present but remain for the most part implicit.

56. Recall here that Huxley, who as we saw had himself advanced a filter theory of psyche­
delic and mystical experience, apparently came to the same conclusion when he discovered
Human Personality. In an introduction written for a one-volume edition ( 1 961), he explains
why he finds Myers's conceptual framework far more congenial than those of Freud and Jung,
and declares: "How strange and how unfortunate it is that this amazingly rich, profound, and
stimulating book should have been neglected in favor of descriptions of human nature less
complete and of explanations less adequate to the given facts!" We could hardly agree more.
 Mystical Experience-SS9

But James also went further and extended Myers's thinking in novel and
important ways. In particular, as shown with particular clarity by Leary
(1 990), he continued throughout his final decade to pursue tenaciously the
problem that was always closest to his heart, the problem of the self. Most
psychologists are aware of James's elaborate discussions in the Principles of
the self and the stream of consciousness, and of his famous doctrine of the
thought itself as the only thinker. Relatively few, however, are aware of his
own dissatisfaction with these views, of his continuing struggles after 1 890
to get beyond them, and of the more radical position at which he eventually
arrived.
The linchpin of these late developments is VRE, because in religious
and especially mystical experiences James found himself able to begin trac­
ing that "something more" that he had always obscurely sensed to be hidden
behind the subjective pole of everyday states of consciousness (James, l 890b,
vol. 1, p. 305). In mystical experiences we come into contact with something
in ourselves that is wiser than the ordinary self yet somehow of the same
type or quality. James states as one of his principal conclusions in VRE
that "we have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider
self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious
experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it
goes" (p. 388). This "wider self" James explicitly identifies (p. 386) with the
Subliminal Consciousness as characterized by Myers (1 892b): "Each of us is
in reality an abiding psychical entity far more extensive than he knows-an
individuality which can never express itself completely through any corpo­
real manifestation" (p. 305). On its "near side" this wider self abuts every­
day consciousness and provides "exactly the mediating term" required to
describe accurately, and at least partly explain, not only dissolutive phe­
nomena of various sorts but automatisms, inspirations of genius, and all the
central phenomena of religious life-the divided self, the struggle, prayer,
conversion, the sense of influx of helping power, joy and security, saintli­
ness, and mystical experience itself.
But what about the "far side," the remoter margin of this vast sublimi­
nal region? Here James begins to diverge from Myers in an important way.
Myers was deeply acquainted with mystical philosophers and poets such as
Plato, Plotinus, Wordsworth, and Tennyson, and he himself was evidently
at least somewhat susceptible to mystical experiences, both natural and
drug-induced. Although a strong undercurrent of sympathy for the mysti­
cal therefore pervades his thinking, it rarely finds overt expression in his
scientific writings, including HP, and in fact he himself never discusses the
subject of mysticism explicitly in a continuous and connected fashion. From
various scattered evidence it appears certain that he imagined the sublimi­
nal region revealed by mystical experience as reaching all the way to a sort
of "World Soul" or "God" (see, e.g., Gauld, 1 968, chap. 1 3; Myers, 1 895e, pp.
585-593; HP, chap. 10), but he refrains from any systematic attempt to spell
out his cosmological views in greater detail. Indeed, he explicitly declines to
address such larger issues, saying that his aim is not "to shape the clauses
5 60-Chapter 8

of the great Act of Faith, but merely. . . to prove the preamble ofall religions . . .

that a spiritual world exists-a world [that is] not a mere 'epiphenomenon'
or transitory effect of the material world" ( l900b, pp. 1 16-1 1 7).
James, however, was less preoccupied with personal survival and less
convinced of its existence, and it is he who picks up and develops further
this largely implicit cosmological thread in Myers's thinking. Mystical expe­
rience shows that there is something in us or connected with us which is
both other and larger than our ordinary conscious selves, something which
produces real effects, and which in its highest expressions is "godlike"
though not necessarily corresponding precisely to any extant conception of
God. How shall we conceive the nature and organization of this something
within?
In A Pluralistic Universe ( 1909/1971) James delivers on the promise first
made in his postscript to VRE, setting forth in general terms his sense of the
right sort of answer-specifically, a "pluralistic panpsychism" along lines
originally suggested by Gustav Fechner.57 The facts of ordinary psychol­
ogy, together with those of psychopathology, psychical research, and reli­
gious experience, establish for James a "decidedly formidable probability"
in favor of such a view: "The drift of all the evidence we have seems to me
to sweep us very strongly toward the belief in some form of superhuman life
with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be coconscious" (p. 268). James
pictures this coconscious life as having a complex structure of its own, tak­
ing the form of a hierarchy of progressively comprehensive integrations of
the consciousnesses appearing at lower levels. Int eg r at io n" here involves
"

more than mere summation; following Fechner, James likens it to what we

find in our own experience. Just as the meaning of a sentence is something
above and beyond a summation of the meanings of its constituent words,

our mind is not the bare sum of our sights plus our sounds plus our pains,
but in adding these terms together also finds relations among them and
weaves them into schemes and forms and objects of which no one sense in
its separate estate knows anything.. . .It is as if the total universe of inner
life had a sort of grain or direction, a sort of valvular structure [normally]
permitting knowledge to flow in one way only, so that the wider might
always have the narrower under observation, but never the narrow the
wider. (p. 202)58

57. This is the same Gustav Fechner, the physicist, known to most psychologists only as the
founder of psychophysics.
58. This Fechner/lames concept of integration or compounding is explicitly rejected by
Balfour (1935) and McDougall ( 1 9 1 1 1 1 96 1 ), both of whom also reject Myers's closely related
conception of the Subliminal Self. Both, however, seriously misrepresent it. Balfour, for
example, states that "the unity resulting from the compounding of consciousness is nothing
but the components themselves, although nevertheless each component retains its separate
individuality inside the unity" (p. 270). With typical sarcasm, McDougall characterizes com­
pounding instead as a kind of blending or averaging process: "Suppose my consciousness is
filled with the glory of colour of a sunset sky, while yours, as you lie near by under your motor­
car, is filled with a problem in mechanics. What sort of consciousness would these two make
 Mystical Experience-56 l

James conceives of this integration as an ongoing, evolving process,

the current highest stage of which is a conscious reality of some sort cor­
responding to the common person's notion of God. But his is a finite and
imperfect God which falls short of total integration; the one thing James is
sure about is that the monistic Absolute Idealism of philosophic colleagues
such as Royce and Bradley is false. Its abstract God is to him a foreign and
monstrous fiction, the pernicious result of intellectualizing unconstrained
by empirical data. For James the issues raised by religious experience are
empirical issues, and the proper way forward is clear: "Let empiricism once
become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misun­
derstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new
era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin" ( 19091197 1 ,
p. 270).59
James's own final appraisal of the topography of the subliminal or
transmarginal region is sketched in one of his last published essays, "Confi­
dences of a Psychical Researcher" (1 90911986). There he first goes on record
for the commonness of psychological phenomena originating from that
region, including automatisms such as trance mediumship and automatic
writing, and for the occurrence among them-in the midst of much hum­
bug-of "really supernormal knowledge" (p. 372). Then comes the follow­
ing extraordinary passage:

Out of my experience, such as it is (and it is limited enough) one fixed

conclusion dogmatically emerges, and that is this, that we with our lives
are like islands in the sea, or l i ke trees in the forest. The maple and the
pine may whisper to each other with their leaves, and Conanicut and
Newport hear each other's fog-horns. But the trees also commingle their
roots in the darkness underground, and the islands also hang together
through the ocean's bottom. Just so there is a continuum of cosmic con­
sciousness, against which our individuality builds but accidental fences,
and into which our several minds plunge as into a mother-sea or reservoir.
Our "normal" consciousness is circumscribed for adaptation to our exter­
nal earthly environment, but the fence is weak in spots, and fitful influ­
ences from beyond leak in, showing the otherwise unverifiable common
connexion. Not only psychical research, but metaphysical philosophy and
speculative biology are led in their own ways to look with favor on some
such "panpsychic" view of the universe as this. Assuming this common
reservoir of consciousness to exist, this bank upon which we all draw,
and in which so many of earth's memories must in some way be stored,
or mediums would not get at them as they do, the question is, What is its
own structure? What i s its inner topography? This question, first squarely
formulated by Myers, deserves to be called "Myers's problem" by scientific

if compounded? Presumably a gorgeously coloured problem in mechanics" (p. 169). We will

return to this subject in Chapter 9.
59. Myers expresses the same view: "Bacon foresaw the gradual victory of observation and
experiment-the triumph of actual analyzed fact-in every department of human study;-in
every department save one. The realm of 'Divine things' he left to authority and faith. I here
urge that that great exemption need be no longer made" (HP, vol. 2, p. 279).
562-Chapter 8

men hereafter.6o What are the conditions of individuation or i nsulation in

this mother-sea? To what tracts, to what active systems functioning sepa­
rately in it, do personalities correspond? Are individual "spirits" consti­
tuted there? How numerous, and of how many hierarchic orders may these
then be? How permanent? How transient? And how confluent with one
another may they become?
What again, are the relations between the cosmic consciousness and
matter? Are there subtler forms of matter which upon occasion may enter
into functional connexion with the individuations in the psychic sea, and
then , and then only, show themselves?-So that our ordinary human expe­
rience, on its material as well as on its mental side, would appear to be only
an extract from the larger psycho-physical world? (pp. 374-375)

In VR E James portrays the "axis of reality" as running through the

subjective poles of all conscious experiences, which themselves are "strung
upon it like so many beads" (p. 377). Introvertive mystical experience can be
viewed as essentially revealing the origin of that axis and thus, as our Myers
epigraph to this chapter suggests, the innermost subjective core of James's
hierarchical scheme. For these deep mystical states of pure, undifferenti­
ated, unitary consciousness, in which consciousness takes itself as its own
intentional obj ect and self gives way to Self, appear to expose the normally
hidden roots of everyday forms of intentionality and selfhood.
Here the profound theoretical gulf between conventional mainstream
conceptions of human personality and the radically different conception
advanced by Myers and James expands to its fullest extent. On the conven­
tional view we are essentially closed, encapsulated within our skulls, in the
sense that everything in mind and consciousness is generated by the electro­
chemical activity of our brains. For Myers and James, however, we are open,
in some way profoundly interconnected with each other and with the entire
universe, and what we consciously experience is somehow selected by our
brains from a much larger field of conscious activities originating at least
in part beyond the margins of everyday consciousness, and perhaps even
beyond the brain itself.
We will return to these theoretical matters in Chapter 9. Meanwhile, we
end t h i s section by noting that among the various k inds of evidence mar­
shaled in this book which load the scales in favor of "open," " transmission,"
or "filter" models, that provided by mystical experience and its associated
phenomena was for Myers and James both especially pivotal, personally.
We resonate strongly with their sense of its importance. Furthermore, and
contrary to anti-scientific critics such as H. Smith (1 976), we believe both
that a great deal remains to be learned about mysticism and that much can
be learned through further development and application of conventional

60. James ( 1 9 0 1 , pp. 17-18) first delineated this as "Myers's problem" in his obituary of
Myers, which is included on our digital version of HP.
 Mystical Experience-563

scientific methods and practices.61 We will conclude this chapter, therefore,

by briefly outlining some particularly attractive possibilities of this sort.

Opportunities for Further Research

Most of the useful work to date on mysticism, from James onward, has been
based upon close study of biographical documents and other writings pro­
duced by identified historical mystics and their interpreters. In addition to
illuminating individual cases, these studies have provided raw materials for
the valuable "natural histories" of James, Stace, Thurston, and M. Mur­
phy, among others. Although such work has therefore been valuable and
should surely continue, our purpose here is to emphasize possibilities for
additional, complementary forms of empirical research that can potentially
shed new light on all of the issues discussed above.

General Considerations

To speak first in the most general terms, a foundational principle of all

such research, and a condition for its success, will be to utilize what is best
in both of the relevant intellectual traditions-specifically, the third-per­
son observational tradition currently dominant in Western science and the
first-person introspective disciplines associated primarily with the Oriental
wisdom traditions. This is entirely in the spirit of Myers's "tertium quid" or
"breadth" approach, as described in Chapter 2.
Imaging studies with persons undergoing mystical-type experiences, for
example, would clearly be of enormous value, the more so to the extent that
they combine state-of-the-art neuroimaging methods having appropriate
technical properties (targeting of relevant physiological parameters, high
spatial/temporal resolution, subject-friendliness, and so on) with improved
means of tracking and reporting the characteristics of unusual states of
consciousness. Neuroimaging technology has made spectacular progress in
recent decades and will undoubtedly continue to do so, given its fundamen­
tal role in most if not all areas of cognitive neuroscience. The more challeng­
ing problems lie rather on the first-person side of our science, which is in far
less satisfactory shape. We have yet to recover fully from the decades-long
hegemony of behaviorism, with its strictures against introspection and the
study of conscious states, but significant progress is now being made on this

61. We find especially repugnant the often-expressed view that only persons who them­
selves have had full-blown mystical experiences can contribute anything of value to the study
of mysticism. Anyone tempted by this doctrine should consider the examples of Myers, James,
and Stace, among many others, which belie it. This is not to deny, however, that personal
experience of mystical (and psychedelic) states could be helpful in many ways in shaping their
scientific investigation (see also Tart, 1972).
564-Chapter 8

front as well. It seems now widely appreciated, for example, that "objec­
tive" and "subjective" methods differ more in degree than in kind, and that
the collapse of classical introspectionism had less to do with any inherent
problems than with the ascendency of the behaviorist juggernaut itself (K.
Danziger, 1 980; Varela, 1 996).
There are problems to be sure, as with any other method of scientific
observation, but also an increasing variety and sophistication of means for
coping with these. For excellent general introductions to methodological
issues in altered-states research, see Tart ( l 975a) and Pekala and Cardeiia
(2000). What is especially needed, we think, is further refinement and adap­
tation of these methodologies to the specific environment of research on
meditative, psychedelic, and mystical states. We already have some ques­
tionnaire-type instruments with respectable psychometric properties (reli­
ability and validity) that sample these overlapping domains. These include
Hood's mysticism scale (Hood, 1 975; Hood, Morris, & Watson, 1 993), which
is based directly on Stace's analysis; Dittrich's (1994, 1 998) APZ, which has
become standard for psychedelic studies in Europe; and Pekala's PCI and
DAQ (Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory, Dimensions of Atten­
tion Questionnaire; see Pekala & Cardeiia, 2000, p. 65), which are more
general-purpose tools for quantitative characterization of altered states
of consciousness. In addition, MacDonald, LeClair, Holland, Alter, and
Friedman (1 995) present a comprehensive survey of existing measures of
transpersonal constructs and a good general discussion of the strengths
and limitations of the psychometric approach. Further effort to identify
the major dimensions of variation in altered states of consciousness and to
standardize their measurement should be a high priority, for by mapping
a diversity of experiences into common coordinates the use of such instru­
ments can undoubtedly help bring some order into studies of mysticism, as
has the use of Greyson's (1985) scale in studies of NDEs.
These psychometric efforts must be closely coordinated, however, with
attempts to refine and enrich our currently impoverished resources for phe­
nomenological description of the relevant states (Gifford-May & Thompson,
1994; Lukoff & Lu, 1988; Varela, 1996; Walsh, 1 995). Further comparative
study of the traditional "cartographies" of meditative and mystical states,
as noted earlier, can surely be of help here, but these cartographies can and
must also be cross-checked wherever possible through independent inves­
tigations using contemporary subjects and methods. In-depth interviews
will be crucial to such efforts, and pose problems for the most part analo­
gous to those successfully confronted on a daily basis by skilled workers in
areas such as cultural anthropology, neuropsychology, psychotherapy, and
developmental psychology-namely, the task of fathoming "foreign" states
of mind and consciousness by means of searching yet sensitive questioning
and observation.
Good subjects will also be uncommonly vital to future research on
altered states of consciousness-co-investigators, really, or sometimes even
the investigators themselves in an alternate role-and will often be selected
 Mystical Experience-565

or trained to help ensure its success. Above all, they must strive to describe
their conscious experiences as accurately and in as much detail as possible,
and with a minimum of interpretation as emphasized especially by Stace.
In order to optimize the possibility of correlating physiological and psy­
chological events, moreover, subjects should be enabled to report unusual
experiences (or at least to register them for subsequent reporting). Similarly,
experimenters should be enabled to collect reports of experiences occurring
in conjunction with any unusual physiological events or states they detect
in their subjects, preferably at or near the time of detection. It can be antici­
pated with confidence that our understandings of what we most need to
measure on both the physiological and experiential sides, and how to do
so, are likely to undergo considerable evolution as research of this sort pro­
ceeds.
All of these general considerations would clearly apply, for example,
to further research with psychedelic agents, which would provide means
for producing strong mystical-type states under reasonably well-controlled
experimental conditions. On this front, unfortunately, we can do little at
present except to encourage our European colleagues to expand their intel­
lectual horizons beyond the current preoccupation with "psychotomimetic"
properties of psychedelic experience, while reiterating our hope that suit­
able relaxation of existing regulations will soon facilitate the resumption of
such research here in the U.S. as well.

Sources of Relevant Phenomena

Where else, meanwhile, might we find sources of the sorts of experi­

ences we wish to study? In the first place it seems certain that spontaneous
mystical experiences of various kinds are continuing to occur, at least spo­
radically, and that persons who have such experiences, if not the experi­
ences themselves, are in principle available for more detailed study. Bucke
(1901/1969) readily discovered a number of contemporaneous cases, as did
both Laski (1961) and Maslow (1964, 1973) more recently. Similarly, Hap­
poid's (1963/1 970) interest in mysticism was prompted by experiences of his
own, Stace had direct and productive interactions with both Arthur Koes­
tler and the philosophically astute mescaline subject "N. M.," and Hufford
(1985) was able to interview Genevieve Foster repeatedly regarding aspects
of her visionary experience.
From a different direction Greeley (1975) has reported similarly encour­
aging results based upon a large national multistage probability sample
acquired using the resources of the National Opinion Research Center. Of
some 1 ,460 respondents, Greeley reports that 35% answered affirmatively
his main question, "Have you ever felt as though you were very close to a
powerful, spiritual force that seemed to lift you out of yourself," with almost
half of these describing themselves as having had such experiences "several
times" (1 2%) or "often" (5%). Closely similar results were reported shortly
566-Chapter 8

afterward by Hay and Morisy ( 1 978) for a large sample of adults in Great
Britain.
Greeley's question is rather vague, however, and it seems certain that a
sizeable proportion of the affirmative answers reflect experiences falling well
short of the full-blown mystical type. This is already evident from Greeley's
own data, for among those who answered the main question affirmatively,
the proportions who also accepted key items on an accompanying checklist
of "descriptors" of mystical experience were often quite low, on the order
of 25% or less (p. 65). Moreover, follow up studies by Hufford (1 985) and by
L. Thomas and Cooper ( 1980) demonstrated directly, by investigating in
greater detail the experiences that gave rise to "Yes" answers, that relatively
few could be regarded as genuinely mystical. In the latter study, in fact, only
about 1% of the total sample appeared to have had such experiences.
Although the prevalence of deep mystical experiences is therefore un­
doubtedly much lower than Greeley's numbers suggest, the more important
fact is that they do occur. Even if their incidence were far lower still, say even
on the order of one per million adults per year, there would potentially be
hundreds or even thousands of new cases annually, world-wide, if we could
just find them. We could then not only systematically collect detailed reports
of contemporary mystical experiences but also investigate their conditions
of occurrence (triggers), their short-term and long-term effects, and the cog­
nitive and personality characteristics of those predisposed to have them.
Some sort ofiarger-scale, better-funded, and better-publicized international
registry, structured along lines pioneered in the U.K. by Alister Hardy's
Religious Experience Research Unit (Hardy, 1 979; http://www.religiousex­
perience.co.uk) and in the U. S. by Rhea White's Exceptional Human Expe­
rience network (S. Brown, 2000; http://www.ehe.org), would ideally serve
these purposes and could perhaps even facilitate collaborative connections
between especially promising subjects and appropriate research groups.
Leading educational and membership organizations involved in the pro­
motion and study of meditation and other transformative practices, such
as Esalen, the Institute for Noetic Sciences, the Institute for Tramspersonal
Psychology, and the California Institute for Integral Studies, might also
participate.
Much more also remains to be learned through cross-cultural inves­
tigation of procedures for controlled production of altered states of con­
sciousness. The very large anthropological literature dealing with this sub­
ject shows that over 90% of the world's roughly 4,000 recognized societies
harbor one or more institutionalized procedures for induction of altered
states of consciousness, typically combining elements such as fasting, sleep
deprivation, and other ascetic practices with the use of psychoactive sub­
stances and "driving" procedures such as drumming, dancing, clapping,
and chanting, often carried on at great intensity and for protracted peri­
ods of time. Indeed, the great social value attached to the resulting altered
states of consciousness-which are universally believed to confer supernor­
mal abilities such as divination, healing, and control of pain-is directly
 Mystical Experience-567

reflected in the extremity of the measures that participants willingly endure

in service of their production. As argued in detail elsewhere, more system­
atic analysis of this large but uneven literature, supplemented in the future
by better-informed and better-equipped field studies and by parallel studies
in the laboratory, can be expected with high confidence to elucidate the psy­
chophysiological basis of these powerful effects, and thus potentially lead
to more efficient means of inducing them (E. F. Kelly & Locke, 198 1b; R. G.
Locke & Kelly, 1 985).
At present, however, the most promising and available pathway toward
experimental study of mystical states clearly lies in their methodical cultiva­
tion using the central meditative disciplines developed by the wisdom tradi­
tions. As indicated earlier, these traditions are fundamentally coherent in
their overall psychological contours, though differing in many details, and
their deep convergence on matters of both method and results gives to the
whole, in our minds, the appearance of nascent psychological fact.
There has been a steady growth of interest in meditation since the
1 960s, but the amount of research progress has so far remained rather dis­
appointing, especially from the perspective of this chapter. To be sure, it
has been shown repeatedly that even elementary practice of meditation
techniques can lead to a variety of clinically significant psychophysiologi­
cal consequences, and the resulting marriage of meditation research with
behavioral medicine and psychotherapy undoubtedly represents a public­
health development of considerable practical importance (Andresen, 2000;
Lehrer & Woolfolk, 1 993; M. Murphy & Donovan, 1 997; Shapiro & Walsh,
1984). We have barely scratched the surface, however, in terms of using
meditation to gain experimental access to the higher forms of transforma­
tive ecstatic and mystical experience that comprise its principal long-term
objective. Although this subject is much too large to review in detail here,
we wish to record a few basic observations on the status and prospects of
such research.
As in the case of contemporary experimental work on hypnotism, a
large proportion of existing research on meditation fails even to make sig­
nificant contact with the intended subject matter. Many published studies
reflect an appalling ignorance of the traditional literatures, assuming that
the word "meditation" refers both to some single universal technique and to
a correspondingly unitary state of consciousness, and that practice of the
technique, however elementary, is operationally equivalent to induction of
that state. A large proportion of existing studies are superficial and perfunc­
tory, relying for their subj ects upon convenience samples of undergraduates
and other meditation beginners whose attainments surely fall far short of
the point at which most traditional meditation manuals even begin their
instruction. It should hardly be surprising that such studies have generally
produced correspondingly banal results (Davidson, 1976; M. Murphy &
Donovan, 1 997; Schuman, 1 980; Shapiro & Walsh, 1 984; M. A. West, 1987).
The relatively small amount of work so far carried out with advanced
practitioners, however, has already produced a variety of more intriguing
568-Chapter 8

findings suggestive of what potentially lies ahead. As Michael Murphy,

himself a very experienced meditator, puts it in his overview of meditation
research (M. Murphy & Donovan, 1997): "Contemporary research does not
illumine the full range of experience described in the contemplative scrip­
tures and the oral traditions from which they come. Modern studies give
us only a first picture of the foothills, with a few glimpses of the peaks.
Still, what they give us corresponds in several ways with the traditional
accounts" (p. 44). We will next briefly review just a few of these more prom­
ising "glimpses." The crucial feature these examples have in common is that
they involve an apparent conjunction between unusual conscious states or
events and physiological conditions or events that also lie well outside the
normal range.
First is the conjunction of mystical experience with "deathlike" states
in the body. As James observes in VRE, "in the condition called raptus or
ravishment by theologians, breathing and circulation are so depressed that
it is a question among the doctors whether the soul be or be not temporar­
ily dissevered from the body" (p. 31 6). Underhill (191 111974) similarly states
that in prolonged instances of rapture "the body is c old and rigid, remain­
ing in the exact position which it occupied at the oncoming of the ecstasy,
however diffic ult and unnatural this pose may be. Sometimes entrancement
is so deep that there is complete anesthesia" (p. 359). Myers reports Socrates
as having remained standing in one place under such conditions, immobile,
for periods ranging from several hours to more than a day (HP, vol. 2, p.
99). Several modern cases of this sort, involving meditating Yogis buried in
airtight chambers, were reviewed in Chapter 3, and see Arbman (1968) for
more.
Several more recent experimental studies have also indicated the exis­
tence of a lower-level version of the same or similar phenomena in advanced
practitioners of Transcendental Meditation (TM)-specifically, the occur­
rence of spontaneous respiratory suspensions, more frequent and of longer
duration than those occurring in control subjects, which tend strongly to
be associated with episodes of pure or "transcendental" consciousness and
a fairly consistent pattern of correlated changes in measures of autonomic
and cortical activity (Baddawi, Wallace, Orme-Johnson, & Royzere, 1984;
Farrow & Hebert, 1982; Travis & Wallace, 1 997). Whether these physiologi­
cal occurrences are causes or consequences of the transient alterations in
conscious state is not clear, but they provide at minimum simple and effec­
tive markers for use in further studies. The association with breathing pat­
terns is also especially interesting inasmuch as the respiratory system is a
transitional system having both involuntary and voluntary levels of control,
and deliberate manipulation of breathing patterns (pranayama, in Patan­
jali's system) has always been a major component of meditative disciplines.
It is certain that such practices can strongly influence the concentrations of
blood gases, among other things, and hence directly or indirectly affect many
autonomic and central nervous system functions. For example, recent stud­
ies indicate that meditation techniques involving deliberately slow breath-
 Mystical Experience-569

ing produce pronounced oscillations and high variability of heart rate, a

sensitive indicator of autonomic tuning (Peng et aL, 1999), and that forced
unilateral breathing through individual nostrils, a common component of
pranayama and related techniques, produces both systematic shifts in cere­
bral dominance and correlated changes in performance on hemispherically
specialized cognitive tasks (Jella & Shannahoff-Khalsa, 1993; K. Morris,
1998). Clearly, this area will provide a rich field for further investigation (see
also Austin, 1 999, chap. 22).62
We next give two further examples involving apparent correlations
between unusual conscious states and unusual states of the central nervous
system, as reflected in the behavi9r of EEG measures. Our primary his­
torical source for both sorts of effects is the remarkable paper by Das and
Gastaut (1957), which we regard-despite its imperfections -as a landmark
in the field and a model of how to proceed. Crucial to their success was the
circumstance that Das, a native Indian, had been closely associated since
infancy with a Yogic community, and consequently was able to recruit from
among its members seven very advanced practitioners of a local form of
concentrative meditation. The experiments themselves, some 20 in all, were
carried out in Calcutta, in a plain but air-conditioned room, using portable
physiological instrumentation supplied by Gastaut.63 Following prepara­
tions for recording (four channels of EEG recorded in a variety of deriva­
tions from 10 scalp electrodes, two channels EKG or heart activity, and two
channels EMG or muscle activity recorded from the quadriceps via con­
centric needles), subjects assumed the cross-legged lotus position on a large
couch, performed some preliminary breathing exercises, and began their
meditations. Physiological data were recorded continuously on paper strip­
charts, and subsequently transported to Marseille for analysis by Gastaut.
The results, in a word, are stunning. First, these highly trained sub­
jects were able to remain for hours in a state of perfect physical immobility
and relaxation, with no visible trace of muscle activity in quadriceps EMG
or frontal EEG leads. During this time, moreover, progressive and system­
atic changes of a dramatic sort occurred in their EEGs. Most significantly,
the deepest stages of meditation, including at least one reported episode of
Yogic ecstasy, were accompanied by the emergence of fast rhythmic activity
all over the scalp at progressively increasing frequencies of 20, 30, and ulti­
mately even 40 Hz. During the ecstasy itself, this fast (gamma-range) EEG
activity also reached extraordinary amplitudes, on the order of 150 micro­
volts peak-to-peak (Figure 3, F). Das and Gastaut interpret these EEG
results as revealing a state of extreme cortical excitation accompanying the

62. Following the imposition of governmental restrictions on use of LSD in research with
humans, Grof developed a technique he calls "holotropic breathwork," a kind of music­
assisted hyperventilation which he claims produces similar, if less dramatic effects. Although
we have not specifically investigated it, this claim seems to us rather dubious and reinforces
our more general concerns about the possible role of expectancies and demand characteristics
throughout Grof's research, including his psychedelic research (see also Wulff, 2000).
63. This is the same Henri Gastaut, distinguished French epileptologist, who figured in our
earlier discussion of Dostoevsky's "ecstatic seizures."
570-Chapter 8

unusual concentration of inwardly focused attention that these subjects

were evidently able to achieve. In support of the latter they also remark in
passing that the high-frequency, high -amplitude EEG rhythms, once estab­
lished, were completely unaffected by any form of auditory, visual, tactile,
or nociceptive (painful) stimulation.
This paper is brief, lacks important information regarding details of
the stimulation and recording procedures, contains no statistical analyses,
and in various other ways falls short of what we might now routinely expect
from state-of-the-art psychophysiology research reports. Nevertheless, we
believe it deserves to be taken very seriously.64 The physiological findings are
startling, to be sure, but in a way that makes considerable sense. Further­
more, and more importantly, they have been corroborated at least in part
in a number of subsequent studies, and in particular by those relatively few
studies which exhibit a similar degree of selectivity in regard to the qualifi­
cations of subjects and the choice of data epochs subjected to analysis.
The reported absence of responsiveness to external stimulation, for
example, would naturally be expected in anyone who has achieved what
Patanjali terms pratyahara, withdrawal of the senses, or isolation from the
sensory environment. Additional and very striking examples of this phe­
nomenon were soon provided by Anand et al. (196Ia), again working in
India with Yogis purportedly capable of entering states of samadhi. In two
of these, strong auditory, visual, tactile, and thermal stimuli which invari­
ably produced blocking of ongoing EEG in the normal state failed to do so
during meditation. Two other Yogis showed no changes in parietal EEG
during protracted (45-55 minute) immersion of their hands in near-freezing
water (4°C). A later EEG study of advanced TM practitioners by Banquet
(1 973) similarly showed that the EEG patterns accompanying brief episodes
of "deep meditation" or "transcendence" were not altered by flash and click
stimuli.
Unresponsiveness to external stimuli during deep states of concentra­
tive meditation seems to us surely a real phenomenon. Indeed, it seems an
exaggerated and voluntary form of a phenomenon of selective attention that
all of us encounter spontaneously from time to time in the course of every­
day life, a stock example here being the football player so intent upon the
game that he fails to realize until afterward that he has suffered a painful
injury.65 A natural extension of the existing studies would be to compare the
psychophysiological responses of advanced meditators to identical stimuli
delivered inside versus outside episodes of increased absorption, as indexed
for example by momentary breath suspension. On the psychophysical side

64. Recall here too that this study provided Gellhorn and Kiely (1972) with the principal
stimulus for their theoretical ruminations about neurophysiological correlates of mystical
states.
65. We mention in passing that a widely cited debunking study by D. E. Becker and Shapiro
(1981) has no impact here, because it deals only with habituation of the EEG blocking nor­
mally produced by sensory stimulation, and not with the abnormal absence of blocking, even
by very strong stimuli, observed by others under conditions of deep meditative absorption.
Indeed, we see little sign in their data that any such states occurred.
 Mystical Experience-5 7 l

we would expect stimuli delivered during such episodes to be both less

detectable and of lower subjective magnitude when successfully detected.
Furthermore, analysis of the associated evoked potentials could reveal pre­
cisely where this blockage occurs, whether at the level of the thalamus, as
hypothesized by Austin (1999), or somewhere else in the eNS .
The gamma-frequency EEG activity reported by Das and Gastaut is
of even greater interest, and we believe this too is a real phenomenon. It
certainly cannot be casually dismissed, as it was for example by Fenwick
(1987, p. l O6), as EMG artifact arising from the scalp musculature. Das and
Gastaut themselves were fully aware of this possibility and provide no less
than seven arguments against it. Most fundamentally, the activity is not
"diffuse" or wideband but "fusiform" or spindle-shaped, nearly monochro­
matic at a dominant frequency, and equally visible in regions such as the top
of the head (vertex) that are relatively remote from scalp muscles. Moreover,
this dominant rhythm itself shifts progressively toward the higher frequen­
cies characteristic of deep meditative states and then remains there, stable,
for hours. The original paper gives only a few small-scale illustrations of
the relevant phenomena, but in subsequent correspondence with one of us
(EFK), Gastaut himself, who had of course examined all of the original
recordings in detail, stood firmly behind these published descriptions.
Supportive findings have again also appeared in relevant parts of the
subsequent EEG literature.66 In the Banquet (1973) study, for example, the
EEG patterns that accompanied the deepest meditative states, and only
these, specifically included spatially generalized moderate-amplitude fast
activity in the vicinity of 40 Hz. Even stronger confirmatory evidence has
recently been found in a study of eight highly experienced Tibetan Buddhist
meditators by Lutz, Grieschar, Rawlings, Ricard, and Davidson (2004),
who also point out the theoretical connection between coherent large-scale
gamma oscillations of this sort and perceptual "binding" as conceived by
contemporary global-workspace theorists. Also potentially relevant here is
the curious fact that nitrous oxide, a known psychedelic agent, has been
shown to produce high-amplitude gamma-band EEG activity, mainly in
frontal areas (Yamamura, Fukuda, Takeya, Goto, & Furukawa, 1 98 1).
The central point of this highly selective review is not to claim that any­
thing has yet been definitively established in regard to physiological corre­
lates of deep meditative and mystical states, but only that we already have
substantial, empirically grounded indications that such correlates exist and
are accessible to well-conceived imaging studies of the sorts outlined above.
We will conclude with three further observations concerning the future of
such research.

66. One possible exception here is the study of Anand et al. ( 1 96 I a), who specifically state
that they did not observe the high-frequency, high-amplitude EEG activity reported by Das
and Gastaut. It is not clear, however, whether their experimental conditions, physiological
instrumentation, and EEG recording procedures were fully comparable.
572-Chapter 8

Further Guidelines for Future Research and Theory

First and foremost, we emphasize again, and again as in the case of

genius, the vital importance of focusing more future research on the real
thing-here, genuinely deep meditative and mystical states and persons who
experience these-rather than on conveniently available but inadequate
surrogates. Furthermore, although it would now be technically possible
and certainly worthwhile to carry out more comprehensive and penetrating
field studies of the Das and Gastaut sort, it should not really be necessary
to travel to places such as India or Japan to find suitable subj ects. One long­
term consequence of the culture wars of the 1 960s is the creation throughout
the Western world of sizeable cadres of individuals seriously engaged with
meditation and other transformative practices, at least some of whom would
surely be willing to participate in meaningful scientific research conducted
by sympathetic investigators.
Second, collection of new data should be far the highest priority until we
really know something about what is going on in these unusual individuals
and states. Most of the theorizing that we have seen so far is very premature,
and implicitly presupposes that information derived from neurophysiologi­
cal and neuropsychological investigations of "ordinary" cognitive functions
can be extrapolated freely and without limit to "extraordinary" ones. This
approach fails to take into consideration recent neuroscientific research
revealing a previously unrecognized degree of plasticity even in the adult
nervous system. The human brain is heavily weighted toward top-down
anatomical connectivity and shows remarkable functional adaptability
at all time scales, from milliseconds upward, with numerous mechanisms
available to make some of these functional changes-for good or ill-per­
sistent or even permanent (Gilbert, 1998; Kohn & Whitsel, 2002; Merzenich,
Recanzone, Jenkins, Allard, & Rudo, 1988; Taub, Uswatte, & Elbert, 2002;
see also Chapter I). Such effects seem a priori likely to be reflected in the
anatomical structure and functional organization of the brains of long­
term practitioners of meditation and other transformative disciplines (as
well as in persons who have undergone powerful mystical-type experiences),
and indeed some evidence of topographically specific anatomical changes
in meditators has recently appeared (Lazar et aI., 2005). We should study
these anatomical and functional arrangements directly, and with minimal
presuppositions regarding their possible form.
This need for better empirical grounding also bears strongly upon our
final suggestion, which is this: The more we can learn about the nature of
essential physiological changes associated with deep meditative and mys­
tical states, the better will be our chances of learning how to encourage
or reproduce these states under controlled experimental conditions, which
in turn will permit us to study both the states themselves and associated
supernormal phenomena in greater detail. What is to be avoided here is
the premature closing of scientific accounts that gave rise in the 1 970s to
the first generation of EEG biofeedback devices. During that period, some
 Mystical Experience-573

promising early demonstrations of a possible association between EEG

alpha abundance and pleasurable mental states spawned a cottage industry
of electronics entrepreneurs manufacturing low-cost alpha trainers, which
were then purchased by other experimenters, who used them to conduct
further studies of the same sort, and so on. We need to break out of this
kind of vicious circularity by first gaining a much fuller and clearer picture
of what the relevant physiological conditions are, and only then trying to
find improved ways of creating or supporting them. We think the long-term
prospects for providing improved access to mystical experiences in this way
are actually rather good, and that society as a whole could only benefit in
consequence. Myers and James would surely agree.

Conclusion

Mysticism has largely been ignored by mainstream psychology and philoso­

phy for most of the past century. The encyclopedic Oxford Companion to the
Mind, for example, barely mentions the subj ect, and in a recent and massive
scholarly anthology on philosophy and consciousness (Block, Flanagan, &
Guzeldere, 1997) the word "mysticism" and its cognates appear nowhere in
the index. The central aim of the present chapter has been to help restore this
neglected topic to what earlier thinkers such as Myers and James believed to
be its proper place in the foreground of a worthy scientific psychology.
At first it seemed as if 20th-century psychology was well on the way to
reducing consciousness to a scientific nullity. This perverse trend has been
reversed, however, and consciousness has reappeared on the map of science,
although it is stil l viewed by many as if it were some sort of alien intruder,
or "nomological dangler," something best excised, whenever possible, like a
hanging nail. But a serious study of mysticism forces us to go beyond merely
acknowledging that consciousness is "real" and needs to be explained, to a
recognition that it plays a uniquely significant role in cognition generally,
and that its reality is of a different order than anything else encountered in
the empirical world.
In the first place it is an incontrovertible and empirically grounded fact
that the mystical domain comprises large numbers of real human experi­
ences-experiences, moreover, which are often uniquely powerful and
transformative-and that experiences of this sort lie at or near the founda­
tions of religions generally and thus even of civilization itself.
Furthermore, careful survey and analysis of the reported experiences
reveals that at the core of this domain lies a robust, deeply significant, and
still mysterious psychological phenomenon-the introvertive mystical expe­
rience of pure, unitary, undifferentiated, self-reflexive consciousness-the
singular properties of which pose profound challenges to all mechanist,
physicalist, and computationalist theories of human mind and personality.
574-Chapter 8

Mysticism assigns to consciousness a central and even supreme reality.

Its fundamental lesson is that there are experiences, forms of consciousness,
and modes of being with characteristics not mechanical, physical, or com­
putable. The introvertive mystical experience appears to transcend time and
space, the sensory, the imaginal, and the rational; yet it also involves more
than mere subjective i l lusion, for the associations of mysticism with genius
and with supernormal phenomena show that it makes contact with some
reality or aspect of reality beyond the normal limits of the mind-body sys­
tem as conventionally understood. Indeed, it appears to reveal the underly­
ing source of our ordinary, everyday experience of intentionality and self­
hood. Mysticism, in short, is a topic of vital importance to psychology.
This has consequences, however. In concluding his own review, Wulff
(2000) states that "the valorizing of mystical experience is risky for the
field of psychology, for to take mysticism seriously-to view it as in some
sense a healthy and veridical response to the world-is to open onself to
a world view that fundamentally chal lenges the assumptions, theories and
procedures of modern psychology" (p. 430). This is for the most part a
fair assessment. The facts of mysticism do pose fundamental challenges to
mainstream reductionistic physicalism. Wulff nevertheless thinks, and so
do we, that scientific psychology must open itself more ful ly to these genu­
inely transpersonal aspects of the human psyche.
Transpersonal psychology thus has a real subject matter. But to put the
matter bluntly, it must put its scientific house in better order, and notwith­
standing the unfortunate proclivity of some of i ts adherents toward inflam­
matory rhetoric about supposedly insurmountable "clashes" or "collisions"
between the primordial tradition and mainstream science, we can discover
no essential obstacle to doing so. As we have shown, mystical experiences
and associated phenomena are avai lable for study from a variety of perspec­
tives, and there exist numerous important opportunities for further scien­
tific research.
But mainstream psychology itself will also benefit from such efforts, for
what we are advocating here is not its rejection or overthrow but an expan­
sion, to dimensions at last fu lly commensurate with those inherent in its
subject matter. Mystical and transpersonal experience is a real and vitally
important facet of human psychology, and we must somehow come to terms
with it. Restoring the mystical to its proper place will go far toward restor­
ing the humanity of our science. The mystical roots of conscious experience
also reveal a deep human identity, transcending all national, rational, per­
sonal, and theological differences. What better reason to investigate these
remarkable, transformative experiences?
Finally, we have suggested that the development of an expanded psy­
chology of mysticism can best be guided by a working model grounded in
leading ideas and data provided by Myers, James, and Bergson. The main
elements of this model include : Myers's empirical ly rich hypothesis of the
Subliminal Self; the James-Bergson conception of the mind-brain rela­
tion-their "transmission" hypothesis, the idea of the brain as an organ
 Mystical Experience-575

which somehow limits, shapes, or "filters," not creates, consciousness; and

James's late thinking in regard to pluralistic panpsychism. Such a model,
we believe, makes use of the most important insights provided by previous
work in dynamic psychiatry and philosophy, is potentially consistent with
all relevant facts of present-day neuroscience and neuropsychology, and can
accommodate additional facts-including psi phenomena and mystically
tinged NDEs occurring in conjunction with general anesthesia and cardiac
arrest-that are beyond the reach of conventional mainstream views. Its
further development can also capitalize on important resources not avail­
able to Myers and James themselves, including a more highly developed and
comparative scholarship of mysticism, the world-wide growth and consoli­
dation of transformative practices, and the development of more powerful
research technologies including the new functional neuroimaging methods.
We will now attempt, in our final chapter, to develop and justify this model
in a more systematic and comprehensive way.
 Chapter 9

Toward a Psychology for

the 21st Century

Edward F. Kelly

The problem of Myers still awaits us as the problem of far the deepest
moment for our actual psychology, whether his own tentative solutions of
certain parts of it be correct or not. (James, 1901, p. 1 8)

The rejection of any source of evidence is always treason to that ultimate

rationalism which urges forward science and philosophy alike. (White­
head, 1 92911958, p. 61)

The truest success of this book will lie in its rapid supersession by a better.
(Myers, HP, vol. 1 , p. 9)

We come now to the hardest task of all, that of weaving together the various
threads of this book into an overall reassessment of Myers's work and its
implications for the future of scientific psychology. I will begin with what
some major contemporaries had to say.

Contemporary Reviews of Human Personality

There were many early reviews of HP, ranging in tone from scornful deri­
sion to unalloyed praise (see Gauld, 1 968, chap. 1 2), but the most useful for
our purposes are those of Stout (1 903), McDougall (1 903), and James (1903),

577
578-Chapter 9

each of which offers serious criticism in combination with actual knowledge

of the contents of the book. All are included on our digital version of HP.
The assessment by Stout, a distinguished British psychologist of that
period, is wholly negative and proceeds along lines that many present-day
mainstream reviewers would undoubtedly be inclined to follow. Precisely
for these reasons, it is worth examining here in some detail. It will become
evident that the fundamental issue at stake is that of unconscious cerebra­
tion (Stout) versus subliminal or transmarginal consciousness (Myers), as
discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. Unconscious cerebration, in today's termi­
nology, comprises all the sorts of things a "cognitive unconscious" might
accomplish by means of automatic brain activity.
Stout (1903) begins by describing what he regards as the principal nov­
elty of HP:

The theory represented by M r. Myers diverges in a startling way from all

the various forms of the doctrine of subconscious or unconscious mental
states and processes which have ever been current among psychologists.
The theory has at least as much affinity with such conceptions as that of a
tutelary genius or a guardian angel. The Subliminal Self is not to be identi­
fied with any organized system of mental traces or dispositions formed i n
the course of the conscious experience of the ordinary self.. . .The Sublimi­
nal Self i s rather to be conceived as a primary and independent stream of
personal consciousness having its own separate system of mental traces
and dispositions formed in the course of its own separate experience. (pp.
45-46)

Despite Stout's attempts to justify this description using quotes from HP,
it is a caricature of Myers's actual views. Myers does hold that some con­
tents of the subli minal region do not derive from the conscious experience
of the ordinary sel f, but he certainly does not hold that all of its contents
are of this sort. Indeed, as shown in Chapters 2 and 5, Myers admits all the
conventionally recognized for ms of trans marginal content, including every­
thing from momentarily forgotten or incompletely processed material to
Janet's well-characterized clinical cases of dissociated consciousness, and
seeks only to extend these existing conceptions in order to embrace a still
wider range of documented empirical phenomena. One of the strengths of
his theory, in fact, is that it identifies previously unrecognized relationships
and continuities underlying an enormous range and variety of phenomena,
both normal and supernormal.
Stout next deploys his own caricature of Myers's conception in an
attempt to turn the generality itself into an argument against him. Specifi­
cally, the central strategy of Stout's critique is to argue that the Subliminal
Self as he has described it must provide at least part of the explanation of
all "normal" phenomena, as well as any supernormal ones, and hence that
if any normal phenomenon can be explained without recourse to it, Myers's
general theory is false. He then proceeds to describe how unconscious cer­
ebration alone might explain recollection of momentarily forgotten names,
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-579

problem-solving, alternate personalities, sleep and dreams, hypnosis, and

other generally accepted phenomena discussed by Myers.
Two principal features of Stout's "explanations," however, merit special
emphasis-first, his heavy reliance on promissory materialism in regard to
accepted or "normal" phenomena, and second, his systematic unwillingness
to take seriously Myers's heavy documentation of supernormal phenomena.
Both tendencies are fully evident in regard to hypnosis, for example:

Setting aside alleged cases of telepathy, clairvoyance, etc., hypnosis pres­

ents no phenomena so extraordinary as to justify our regarding them as
beyond the reach of explanation in accordance with the ordinary methods
and principles of physiology and psychology. The way is dark, but it is not
blocked by unsurmountable barriers. We need not have recourse to a fly­
ing-machine. (p. 57)

I cannot resist noting here the irony that Stout's dismissive final sentence
was penned in the same year in which the Wright brothers made their first
successful flight at Kitty Hawk. More to the point scientifically, however,
are the many parts of our Chapter 3 that undermine his unquestioning faith
in the reach o f conventional forms of explanation, even in regard to the
psychophysiological aspects o f hypnotism. Similar comments apply to the
other "normal" phenomena he discusses.
Finally, having resorted repeatedly to his "setting aside" approach
to Myers's documentation of psi-type phenomena occurring in conjunc­
tion with hypnosis, dreams, and so on, and mistakenly believing himsel f
already to have successfully disproven Myers's general theory of the Sub­
liminal Self, Stout turns to a brief statement (pp. 62-64) of his own "per­
sonal attitude" toward psi phenomena generally. He acknowledges "that
after all criticisms are allowed for, the evidence is still decidedly impressive,
and that it is sufficient to constitute a good case for further investigation,"
but he is not persuaded by it. Most of the "reasons" he offers in defense of
this attitude, however, amount to generic suspicions, devoid of re ference to
specific experiments or cases, about possible failures of memory, conscious
or unconscious cheating, and the like, issues that had long since been iden­
tified and controlled in ongoing investigations by Myers and his SPR col­
leagues. The one specific opinion he advances is that a proposed skeptical
explanation of ostensible evidence for telepathy in terms of "unconscious
whispering" is "peculiarly probable." What Stout neglects to mention here,
however, is that this hypothesis-also eagerly embraced by the even more
skeptical American psychologist Titchener in the pages of Science-had
been thoroughly discredited in papers already published by William James
and Henry Sidgwick (see Burkhardt, 1986, chap. 22; E. Taylor, 1996, pp.
108-1 1 1). In short, like many present-day scientists Stout is simply unable to
come fully to grips with the relevant evidence and chooses instead to ignore
it.
McDougall and James, unlike Stout, accept the reality of psi phenom­
ena and find much to admire in the character and content of Myers's book,
5 80-Ch apter 9

but they too have problems with his general theory. McDougall's complaints
run partly parallel to Stout's and rest on the same primary misapprehen­
sions, in particular that Myers fails to recognize routine contributions of
unconscious cerebration to everyday mental life, and that he holds a rigidly
duplex theory in regard to the supraliminal and subliminal streams of con­
sciousness.! Two additional factors also seem to drive his somewhat con­
voluted and turgid critique: First, he is already beginning to develop his
own very different "monadic" theory (discussed in Chapter 5), according to
which the everyday consciousness or self is the real self, and the apex of per­
sonality. This leads him to be hostile to Myers's conception of psychological
automatisms as expressions of a larger and in some ways superior transmar­
ginal consciousness. Secondly, he thinks that Myers has failed to appreciate
his true "main difficulty" (p. 526), the fact that post-mortem survival seems
to be precluded by the normal dependence of mind and consciousness on an
intact brain. Although McDougall's language here is carefully guarded, he
appears at this time to hold something close to a standard production model
of mind-brain relations.
Two crucial points should be noted, however. First, McDougall himself
soon moved beyond the production model, driven in part by the findings of
psychical research and also by his own ruminations on other topics, such as
memory, meaning, and the unity of consciousness, discussed in the present
volume. His book Body and Mind (191 111974) is in fact subtitled "A History
and a Defense of Animism," where by animism he means the following:

The essential notion, which forms the common foundation of all varieties
of Animism, is that all, or some, of those manifestations of life and mind
which distinguish the living man from the corpse and from inorganic bod­
ies are due to the operation within him of something which is of a nature
different from that of the body, an animating principle generally, but not
necessarily or always, conceived as an immaterial and individual being or
soul. (p. xx)

McDougall ultimately arrived at a variety of animism, his "psychophysi­

cal dualism," which embraces the notion of a psyche or soul without pre­
suming it to be ontologically distinct from the body or capable of surviving
bodily death. Indeed, McDougall himself was not convinced of survival.
The principal obstacle remained for him the same "main difficulty" he had
identified in his review of HP, a difficulty which he found the survival evi­
dence then available insufficient-though just barely-to overcome: "Again
and again the evidential character of the observations has fallen just short
of perfection; the objections that stand between us and the acceptance of
the conclusion seem to tremble and sway, but still they are not cast down"
(McDougall, 191 111974, p. 347).

I. See Chapter 2. McDougall continued throughout his career to misrepresent Myers in

these ways, as can be seen for example in his Outline of Abnormal Psychology (McDougall,
1 926, p. 523).
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-58 1

Here, however, the second point comes into play. McDougall seems
never to have taken fully on board the significance of James's ( 1 898/1 900) dis­
cussion of transmission theory (see our Chapter 1). It is not even mentioned
in his review of HP as a possible way around the difficulty, and one, more­
over, that is compatible with Myers's theory. In addition, when McDougall
later does come to discuss it, in the last chapter of Body and Mind, he grossly
misrepresents James's actual views, as I will demonstrate later.
Meanwhile, let us turn even more briefly to the appraisal of Myers's
work by William James. The two main sources for this are his 1901 memo­
rial address and his 1 903 review of HP (both on our digital version of HP).
Both pieces are vintage James, marvels of incisiveness, clarity, warmth, and
felicity of expression, and I beg all readers-especially my fellow psycholo­
gists-to study them with care in conjunction with this chapter. James was
more intimately acquainted with Myers and his work than either Stout or
McDougall, understood the theory better, and appreciated it far more:

It is a vast synthesis, but a coherent one, notwithstanding the vagueness of

some of the terms that figure in it. No one of the dots by which his map i s
plotted out, no one of t h e "corners" required b y his triangulation, i s purely
hypothetical. He offers empirical evidence for the concrete existence of
every element which his scheme postulates and works with. In logical form
the theory is thus a scientific construction of a very high order. (James,
1903, p. 30)

As to the truth of Myers's theory, however, as distinct from its formal

merits, James withholds final judgment, for three primary reasons: First, he
thinks some of the "corners" or "stepping-stones" may themselves be too
frail, or insufficiently well documented. Second, he wonders whether Myers
perhaps generalized too hastily from conditions that in fact have been
adequately documented only in a few special situations, such as deep hyp­
nosis and multiple personality disorder, involving small numbers of high ly
unusual persons. Third, and for James the most troubling, is Myers's inabil­
ity to explain to his satisfaction how the subliminal region can serve e qually
as "rubbish-heap" and "treasure-house" (HP, vol. I, p. 72), "so impartially
the home of both evolutive and of dissolutive phenomena" (James, 1 903, p.
32). All of these concerns are legitimate and remain relevant today, and I
shall attempt to deal with them in the course of what now follows.

A Re-assessment of Myers's Theory of Personality

Principles which I have tried to follow in constructing this assessment, and

which I must ask readers to follow as well, include in particular the fol­
lowing four: First, many contemporary readers, and especially scientific
readers, are likely to find certain aspects of Myers's writing at times jar­
ring or even distasteful. His sentences are often long and complex, his prose
5 82-Chapter 9

sometimes startlingly ornate and lyrical, and the text loaded with quota­
tions from multiple foreign languages including in particular Greek and
Latin.2 All of this can make for hard going, but it involves only superficial
styli stic matters characteri stic of Myers and his time. The effort necessary
to penetrate his meanings is almost always worthwhile, in my opinion, and
it must be made in order to appreciate in full the richness and beauty of his
theory. Related to this, what we must attempt now to appraise i s the theory
that Myers actually held, and not the sorts of caricatures of it served up by
critics such as Stout and McDougall, and by Freud's biographer and disciple
Ernest Jones (1918, p. 1 22) in service of their own very different theoreti­
cal outlooks. Third, we must respond to the whole theory and take all the
associated data into account, not artificially restricting our attention, as did
Stout, to those elements of Myers's vision with which we happen to be com­
fortable at the moment. Finally, and most importantly, we must try to take
into account all of the additional relevant evidence that has come forward
in the intervening century, most of which has been summarized, or at least
pointed to, in the present volume.
Our assessment will proceed at three general levels: (I) Myers's meth­
odological principles and commitments; (2) his natural history of the mind;
and (3) the theoretical structure which he elaborated in order to account for
his data. The first two of these sections can be relatively short and should, I
think, be uncontroversial.

Myers's Methodological Principles

Myers was reared chiefly on literature and history, with primary inter­
ests in poetry and religion, but that he successfully transformed himself
into a seriou s scientist can scarcely be doubted by anyone who take s the
trouble to study his contributions to psychology. As de scribed in Chapter
2, he was deeply committed to the ultimate lawfulness of nature, and to the
use of empirical methods in ferreting out its secrets. Where he differs from
most contemporary scientists i s in refusing to rest content with scientific
theories, facts, or methods in their existing state of development. No topic
is to be banned a priori as beyond the reach of science. Indeed, Myers's
central impulse and long-term goal is to overcome the historical opposi­
tion between science and religion by means of an expanded and enlightened
science capable of penetrating into the p sychological territory previously
occupied by the historical religions alone, with their mutually inconsistent
teachings and decidedly mixed impacts on human welfare. He aspire s ulti­
mately to re-ground thi s entire domain of vital human experience in real
scientific knowledge rather than faith and dogma; see, for example, his
"Provisional Sketch of a Religious Synthesis" in HP (vol. 2 , pp. 284-292).

2. To assist modern readers, we have provided on our digital version of HP translations of

all non-English passages.
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-583

In pursuit of this and all the related goals of psychical research, what seems
to him most needed is not unthinking mechanical application of any exist­
ing method to every new problem, but constant effort to adapt our research
methods creatively to all new situations as they arise, and as we find them.
Myers would therefore certainly have lamented-correctly, I beJieve­
the subsequent withering of psychical research , and of psychology more
generally, into disciplines preoccupied to the extent they presently are with
laboratory-based experimental investigations as the only road to knowl­
edge.3 This is not because he doubted the value of experimentation, when
appropriate, but because he also appreciated the value of other kinds of
empirical research such as detailed individual case studies and field inves­
tigations. Both HP itself and the present volume illustrate, I believe, the
power of the broader concept of empiricism advocated by Myers and James
for psychology as a whole.
It also merits emphasis here that there are many scientific options in the
region between one-shot case studies and full-fledged factorial experimen­
tal designs. Methodologists D. T. Campbell and Stanley ( 1966), for example,
identified numerous useful though less rigorous experimental designs that
are still capable of producing reliable and valid scientific knowledge, and
they explicitly stated that the goal of their efforts was to "encourage an
open-minded and exploratory orientation to novel data-collection arrange­
ments and a new scrutiny of some of the weaknesses that accompany rou­
tine utilizations of the traditional ones" (p. 61). From the opposite direction,
cases initially studied and reported in detail individually, such as appari­
tion cases , NDEs, and cases of the reincarnation type, can also be encoded
according to appropriate descriptive schemes and entered into cumulative
databases which, when they become sufficiently large, afford important new
opportunities for quantitative study of internal patterns, predictive relation­
ships, and so on, governing the relevant domains.4
A broadened empiricism has similarly been advocated for psychology
as a whole by Toulmin and Leary (1985):

It is not only thinking that suffered because of American psychology's cult

of empiricism. . . . Empiricism itself suffered because of the rigid, experi­
mental fetters that were placed upon it. Surely there should be room too
for a retreat, at least by some, from experimental empiricism. All science,
and probably all speculation, originates at a more basic level of empiri­
cism: the level of experience. In a discipline that is often confused about its
subject matter, it is not a bad idea to return to basic experience from time
to time. The natural taxonomy that arises therefrom is much more likely

3. In fact, in reviews of two annual volumes of L'annee psych% gique published shortly
before his death Myers had already begun to lament the direction that scientific psychology
was taking toward limited and ultimately trivial experimental studies (see our Chapter 2).
4. At the University of Virginia, for example, 836 cases of NDEs and 1 ,200 cases of young
children who claim to remember a previous life have been entered into such computerized
databases.
5 84- Chapter 9

to provide a useful framework for experimental work than the artificial

taxonomies that structure so much of the field today. (p. 612) 5

Myers's Natural History of the Mind

This leads immediately, of course, to Myers's own "taxonomy," and on

this subject all serious students agree. His natural history of the mind, quite
apart from the theoretical constructions he based upon it, has been hailed
by many as a scientific achievement of great value in itself. Let James again
speak here for all : In his 1 901 memorial address he describes Myers as "the
pioneer who staked out a vast tract of mental wilderness and planted the
flag of genuine science upon it" (p. 23), largely through exercise of the kind
of taxonomic genius described in our Chapter 2. In his later review of HP,
James (1903) was if anything even more explicit:

Reading him afresh in these two volumes, I find myself filled with an admi­
ration which almost surprises me. The work, whatever weaknesses it may
have, strikes me as at least a masterpiece of co-ordination and unifica­
tion. The voluminous arsenal of "cases" of which the author's memory
disposes might make the most erudite naturalist or historian envy him,
and his delicate power of serially assorting his facts, so as to find always
just the case he needs to fit into a gap in the scheme, is wholly admirable.
He shows indeed a genius not unlike that of Charles Darwin for discov­
ering shadings and transitions, and grading down discontinuities in his
argument. (p. 30)

One of the "weaknesses" James had in mind, as indicated above, was

the possible frailty of some individual elements of Myers's taxonomy. James
unfortunately does not identify which particular elements he had in mind,
but in any event it seems to me undeniable that this "natural history" aspect
of Myers's work has only been further strengthened by the large amounts
of additional evidence generated during the subsequent century and sum­
marized in the present volume. We now have far more detailed evidence,
for example, regarding the existence of psi phenomena in general and their
association with altered states of consciousness such as dreams and hyp­
nosis (see Appendix), supernormal control of bodily processes (Chapter 3),

5. Parenthetically, the 20th-century contraction of "psychical research" to its desiccated

modern descendant, "parapsychology," was if anything even more extreme than that experi­
enced by psychology generally. At the hands of 1. B. Rhine, the field suffered a kind of "iden­
tification with the aggressor"-that is, with the experimental behaviorism of the early-to-mid
20th century-and confined itself in large part not merely to experimental and statistical
methods but to methods of an unnecessarily primitive and limited sort (Burdick & Kelly,
1977). Although this has begun to change in recent decades, parapsychology still falls far
short of what the founders of psychical research envisioned, as reflected in particular by the
tendency of many modern parapsychologists to treat psi phenomena as free-floating "anoma­
lies" rather than trying, like Myers, to incorporate them within a larger framework of inter­
related psychological phenomena.
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-585

problems in regard to conventional trace theories of memory (Chapter 4),

psychological automatisms including the full-blown dissociative phenom­
ena of automatic writing, hypnosis, and MPD/DID (Chapter 5), NDEs and
OBEs occurring under extreme physiological conditions (Chapter 6), genius
(Chapter 7), and mystical and psychedelic experiences (Chapter 8), all of
which maps smoothly onto-and hence reinforces-Myers's basic descrip­
tive framework. I should also reiterate here that Myers not only provided
a useful taxonomy of subliminal contents and processes but also strove to
develop or improve various means of putting these "on tap" for more effi­
cient experimental investigation (Chapter 2). It seems to me a virtual cer­
tainty that we have barely scratched the surface in terms of exploiting these
techniques-such as hypnosis, automatic writing, and crystal-gazing or
"scrying"-in the manner Myers envisaged (E. F. Kelly & Locke, 198Ia).
I turn now to the third level of our reassessment, a far more difficult
subject.

Myers's G eneral Theory of the Psyche: The Subliminal Self

Chapter 2 has set forth what we believe to be the correct understand­

ing of what Myers ( l885c) really meant by his "Subliminal Self" (upper­
case)-briefly, the totality of the psyche, soul, or Individuality, comprising
both supraliminal and subliminal elements, regions, or functional systems.
The supraliminal or everyday self constitutes only a small portion of the
psyche, formed out of some few of its "elements" (p. 387) in response to the
demands of the environment. One or more "subliminal selves" (lower-case)
may also occasionally emerge in a similar way under certain unusual con­
ditions. But the Subliminal Self-the underlying, comprehensive Self-is
the centerpiece of Myers's theoretical construct, for it is at this level that he
seeks to reconcile the "colonial" (Ribot) versus "unitary" (Reid) accounts
of human personality in favor of a more profound unity.6
As noted in Chapter 2, there has been much confusion about this con­
ception in the literature, and it cannot be denied that Myers himself was to

6. It has been overlooked that Myers's colleague Edmund Gurney had apparently arrived
at closely similar views, and for reasons at least partly independent of Myers, prior to his
untimely death in 1888. In Gurney et al. ( 1886) he first points out that phenomena of hypnosis
and secondary personality render it difficult "to measure human existence by the limits of the
phenomenal self." Moreover, he goes on, "the very nature of this difficulty cannot but sug­
gest a deeper solution than the mere connection of various streams of psychic life in a single
organism. It suggests that a single individuality may have its psychical being, so to speak, on
different planes; that the strong fragments of 'unconscious intelligence,' and the alternating
selves of 'double consciousness,' belong really to a more fundamental unity, which finds in
what we call life very imperfect conditions of manifestation; and that the self which ordinary
men habitually regard as their proper individuality may after all be only a partial emergence"
(vol. I, p. 231).
For philosophic elaboration and justification of such a conception Gurney also appeals to
Du PreI (1889/1976). Recall here too that Braude (1995) independently reached a similar posi­
tion based on his philosophical analysis of mUltiple personality disorder (see our Chapter 5).
5 86-Chapter 9

a considerable extent responsible for it. His terminology is unfortunate and

confusing, and even Myers himself did not use it altogether consistently. It
seems likely, though we cannot be sure, that he was still ironing out details
of the exposition at the time of his death. This might have helped clarify
things, but it is certain in any event that the conception is not only inherently
difficult, but also highly counter-intuitive for many commentators-myself
included. Nevertheless, I have come to think that it is more or less correct,
for reasons I will next try to explain.
The starting point for Myers's scheme, his "measured base," consists of
various forms of evidence for the existence of dissociated streams of con­
sciousness existing outside the awareness of the ordinary self, rising in com­
plexity and coherence in some cases to the level of true secondary personali­
ties or "subliminal selves." As shown in Chapters 2 and 5, James and many
others found the evidence Myers marshaled for this purpose already cogent,
and much additional evidence of related types has subsequently come to light
that is further supportive of his interpretations. Chapter 5, for example, pro­
vides what to me is a convincing demonstration that there have been cases
of multiple personality which cannot be satisfactori ly interpreted in terms
of "periodic sharp alterations in a single stream of consciousness" (Gauld,
1 968, p. 279). In this light it is rather sad to find unconscious cerebration
once again being trumpeted as the proper explanation of all psychological
automatisms, as though these old and vigorous debates had never occurred
(see, e.g., Wegner, 2002, and its review by E. F. Kelly, 2003), and despite the
fact that other modern workers such as Hilgard ( 1 977), Kihlstrom (l 993b),
and Oakley ( 1999) have moved toward positions much closer to that adopted
by Myers and James over a century ago.
Chapter 5 in effect provides what might be cal led an "existence proof"
for the possibility that multiple, concurrent, and overlapping streams of
consciousness can sometimes coexist in conjunction with a single human
organism. Much of that evidence, however, derives from very unusual per­
sons and circumstances. Myers argued that subliminal consciousness of this
sort is at work in all of us, al l the time, but this raises James's second issue:
Is such far-reaching generali zation justifiable? This is a fair and realistic
concern, but Myers himself addresses it fairly effectively, I think, and we
can certainly do substantially better today. To document this adequately
would take much more space than can be devoted to it here, but let me at
least briefly indicate the main lines along which the argument would run.
For one thing the database of individuals displaying major automa­
tisms of the sort relied upon by Myers has greatly expanded in the subse­
quent century. Many additional and sometimes even better cases of multiple
personality, automatic writing and drawing, and trance mediumship, for
example, have come to light more recently here in the West. Furthermore,
the enormous 20th-century expansion of cultural anthropology has made
evident that the core phenomena of psychological automatism have a truly
world-wide distribution and reflect in al l likelihood fundamental capacities
which we a ll to some degree share. Like the trance medium Mrs. Piper, for
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-587

example, shamans sometimes report ecstatic journeys undertaken during

periods when to external observers they appeared to be ritually possessed
by identifiable spirits, displaying behaviors appropriate to that state. Also
relevant here is the fact that ritualized procedures for induction of trance
and possession trance in preliterate societies often exert powerful effects on
Western bystanders or observers, sometimes including quite skeptical ones
intent upon defeating any such effects (Deren, 1 972; Sargant, 1 975). Myers
certainly knew about this in general terms, but he could scarcely have imag­
ined the wealth of relevant evidence that has since become available (Bour­
gignon, 1973; E. F. Kelly & Locke, 1981b; R. G. Locke & Kelly, 1985).
Myers also underestimated, if anything, the relevance of dreaming and
allied phenomena to his central argument. Subsequent research has amply
confirmed his original contention that dreams have a strong propensity
to serve as carriers of supernormal information, both spontaneously (e.g.,
Stevenson, 1970, p. 2) and in experimental studies (Child, 1985). But what
modern research has also shown, and Myers did not know, is that this inten­
sified power of involuntary inward visualization, a sensory automatism, is
essentially universal among humans, as revealed in particular by the subse­
quent discovery of physiological correlates of dreaming itself (REM sleep)
as well as by investigations of psychedelic agents, sensory deprivation,
and other "hallucinogenic" conditions (Siegel & West, 1 975). Although we
humans differ widely in terms of access to this "cosmogonic" capacity, we
all apparently have it, and as argued especially by Schiller (1905, 1915) the
maker of these phantasms must be recognized as some sort of highly cre­
ative agency that resides within the personality but is distinct from everyday
consciousness in the way postulated by Myers (see also Globus, 1987). That
this agency is constantly at work behind the scenes is further suggested by
the phenomenology of hypnagogia, in which involuntary dream-like menta­
tion unstably commingles with drowsy ordinary consciousness (Mavroma­
tis, 1 987), by intrusive apparitional experiences occurring under conditions
of full waking consciousness (Chapter 6), and by the "subliminal uprushes"
of genius, which can occur at any time of day or night (Chapter 7).
I will return to the generality issue shortly in a different context, but let
me first say a word about James's third concern, the mingling of rubbish­
heap and treasure-house in the subliminal region, the fact that "the parasitic
ideas of psycho-neurosis, and the fictitious personations of planchette-writ­
ing and mediumship reside there side by side with the inspirations of genius,
with the faculties of telepathy and telresthesia, and with the susceptibility
of genuine spirit control" (James, 1903, p. 32). The key words here are "side
by side," which are more James's than Myers's. James immediately goes on
to acknowledge the manner in which Myers himself actually sought to deal
with this problem-that is, through his conception of the subliminal region
as stratified-but finds this conception "deficient in clearness."
I will make just three comments in response to this complaint. First,
Myers himself would certainly have agreed that his conception is "deficient
in clearness" in the sense that much still needs to be done to identify more
S 88-Chapter 9

fully the number and character of these strata, or more generally to map
out in greater detail the structural and functional organization of the sub­
liminal region. Nevertheless, James seems to me to overstate somewhat the
difficulties here. He may have been thinking of strata as e ssentially geo­
logical in character, rigid and static, whereas Myers was more inclined to
think of them in terms of his image of imperfectly miscible fluids of vary­
ing density, " subject to currents and ebullitions which often bring to the
surface a stream or a bubble from a stratum far below" (Myers, 1 892b, p.
307). On this latter view the p syche i s a dynamic system constantly in flux,
with currents initiated in the deeper layers boiling toward the surface and,
depending on their inherent energies, emerging there in forms varyingly
intermingled with material derived from intermediate layers. Such a pic­
ture, metaphoric though it i s, seems naturally to accommodate the fre quent
but by no means invariable "smothering" of supernormal phenomena in
degenerative accompaniments that so troubled James. Myers also empha­
sized repeatedly that the character of final outcomes-evolutive or dissolu­
tive-is determined in large part by what the supraliminal consciousness
itself is able to do with the subliminal products it receives (see our Chapter
7). Finally, another issue lurking here for James, and barely touched upon
by Myers, concerns the "depth" to which operations of the subliminal parts
of the mind might map directly onto operations of the brain. This general
issue-how Myers's psychological theory can be reconciled with contempo­
rary brain science-will be discussed in detail in a later section.
We move on now to the conceptual heart of Myers's theory of the Sub­
liminal Self, its postulation in all of us of a more comprehensive conscious­
ness, indeed an all-inclusive consciousness embracing the entirety of our
conscious mental activity both supraliminal and subliminal, evolutive and
dissolutive. The primary alternative to such a view (at least among those
prepared to recognize the reality of subliminal streams of awareness) is
the family of "monadic" views exemplified in particular by McDougall
(191 111961, 1920) and Balfour (1935).7
McDougall's monadic theory of personality has already been discussed
in Chapter 5. The e ssence of such theories i s that they picture everyday con­
sciousness as emerging at the apex of a hierarchy of lesser integrations of
lower-level individuals. Under normal conditions, on this view, the ordinary
self or "dominant monad" thus represents the true and only self. Balfour
(1935, p. 175) candidly states, speaking for many, that "my own instinctive
conviction is that my own true self is 'the me as I know myself'." This intu­
ition certainly corresponds both with everyday experience and with all con­
ventional mainstream theories of personality, but it cannot be presumed to

7. The analysis of Myers's theory by Balfour, a philosopher, is the most serious and sus­
tained attempt known to me to grapple directly with its central conceptual difficulties. Balfour
undertook this effort in conjunction with his intensive study of communications delivered by
the trance medium "Mrs. Willett" from the ostensibly surviving personalities of Myers and
Gurney. If nothing else this material illustrates, on Balfour's view, the automatic production
of intellectual activity outstripping the known capacities of the medium in her ordinary state,
as in the case of Patience Worth (Balfour, 1935, p. 300).
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-589

be self-evidently reliable or self-validating. As Myers puts it (HP, vol. 1, p.

1 3):

This is, no doubt, the apparent dictum of consciousness, but it is nothing

more. And the apparent dicta of consciousness have already been shown
to need correction in so many ways which the ordinary observer could
never have anticipated that we surely have no right to trust conscious­
ness, so to say, a step further than we can feel it,-to hold that anything
whatever-even a separate consciousness i n our own organisms-can be
proved not to exist by the mere fact that we-as we know ourselves-are
not aware of it.

In Chapter 5 we described how James (1902/1958, p. 1 88) celebrated the

discovery in 1 886 of "an entirely unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution
of human nature," the transmarginal consciousness identified and explored
by Myers. Balfour, by contrast, wishes to reject Myers's conception for pre­
cisely that reason, complaining that "we are asked to believe that our true
self is a self the very existence of which the vast majority of mankind have
never even suspected" (p. 273). But this argument too is clearly unsound.
For one thing, many peculiarities of the physical world had remained undis­
covered for thousands of years, including rather momentous ones such as
radioactivity (Schiller, 1 905). Certain ly no one now believes that we rou­
tinely have full access to the structure and content of our minds. Moreover,
Myers-like conceptions of a larger consciousness latent within us have in
fact emerged, and repeatedly, within the world 's mystical traditions (Chap­
ter 8).
Human personalities, like biological organisms and even society itself,
have a homeostatic aspect and must constantly strive for balance between
growth and preservation. But the discomfort that many of us undoubted ly
experience in seriously entertaining Myers's conception is undermined by
the widespread occurrence of experiences of psychological "expansion" or
"opening" that appear to support it-whether these be spontaneous or pro­
duced by psychedelic agents, meditation, or other transformative practices.
It is relevant and worth repeating here that Myers and James themselves
displayed a strong affinity for the mystical that was in part intellectual but
a lso derived in part from their own mystical-type experiences, including
powerful experiences induced by nitrous oxide (Chapter 8).
Myers of course also adduced a great deal of empirical evidence directly
contradicting commonsense intuitions as to the supremacy of the supra­
liminal in our mental life, including for example extreme manifestations of
bodily control, secondary personalities whose capabilities exceed those of
the everyday self, genius-level creativity, hypermnesia and calculating prod­
igies, OBEs/NDEs and mystical experiences, psi capacities linked to dreams
and other automatisms, and all the rest. Both his taxonomy of relevant phe­
nomena and his unifying generalizations-in particular that these "super­
normal" phenomena take the form of psychological automatisms arising
from deeper levels of the psyche, and manifest themselves in proportion to
590-Chapter 9

the abeyance of the supraliminal consciousness-have been strengthened at

many points by subse quent research, as demonstrated in this book.
But now we come to what I think is the logical crux of the matter. Myers
conceives the supraliminal consciousness as somehow functioning simulta­
neously both as itself and (possibly together with one or more subliminal
streams of consciousness) as part of a larger, more comprehensive conscious­
ness, the Subliminal Self, which provides for the overarching unity of the
psyche or Individuality. Both McDougall and Balfour explicitly reject this
core conception. In his review of HP, McDougall (1903, p. 518) simply jibes
in passing that he finds it comparable in obscurity to that of the Christian
Trinity. Balfour (pp. 270-271) explicitly recognizes its formal resemblance
to Fechner's conception of the integration or "compounding" of conscious­
ness across individuals, and he acknowledges the appeal of that conception
to James (190911971). Yet he too summarily dismisses it, on grounds that the
theory of compounding itself "presents formidable logical difficulties" and
that Fechner's solution seems to him "frankly mystical."
Although this difficult topic really deserves a much more thorough
scholarly treatment in itself, I wish to argue at least briefly here against Bal­
four and McDougall and on behalf of Myers and James. Both Balfour and
McDougall seem to me excessively committed, a priori, to everyday con­
sciousness as the supreme psychological achievement. Neither has much use
for anything "mystical," and certainly McDougall devotes no chapter to
that subj ect in his otherwise comprehensive Body and Mind. Neither seems
fully to have grasped Myers's conception, for neither distinguishes system­
atically between subliminal selves and the Subliminal Self. As we saw, both
also seriously misrepresent, in different ways, the character of higher-order
compounds or integrations of conscious experience as conceived by Fech­
ner and James (Chapter 8, footnote 58).
The issues come to a head in a particularly relevant way in a brief dis­
cussion by McDougall (191 111961, pp. 358-363), in which he attempts to
repudiate the transmission theory as formulated by James (189811900) in
favor of his own preferred form of animism, his psychophysical dualism
or soul theory. Although this disagreement appears at first sight to involve
a head-on collision between intellectual freight-trains, what actually hap­
pens proves more akin to a passing of great ships in the night. McDougall
begins by asserting that the formulations of transmission theory by James
and Bergson agree on the following "essential points":

Both reject the claims of mechanism to rule in the organic world; both
regard all psychical existence as of the form of consciousness only; both
assume that consciousness exists independently of the physical world in
some vast ocean or oceans of consciousness; both maintain that the con­
sciousness or psychical life of each organism is a ray from this source; that
the bodily organisation of each creature is that which determines indi­
viduality; that the brain is a mechanism which lets through, or brings into
operation in the physical world, a stream of consciousness which is copi­
ous in proportion to the complexity of organisation of the brain. (p. 358n)
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-59 !

Two features o f McDougall's portrayal of transmission theory are especially

relevant here: First, he treats it as depending essentially upon the doctrine
of "mind- stuff," the notion that consciousness exists u ltimately in the form
of "atoms" that can be combined into larger aggregates whi le retaining
their individual identities. Second, he portrays the brain as the organ which
assembles and disassemble s such compounds, and hence takes it as a neces­
sary corollary that " the brain i s the ground of our p sychic individuality"
(p. 358).
This latter feature, however, had already been explicitly denied by
James in a crucial clarification of his own original statement of the trans­
mission theory. This clarification, added to the second edition in the form of
a preface, i s so important that I will quote from it at length.s James begins
by stating that he intends to remove an objection raised by many critics of
his original formulation :

If our finite personality here below, the objectors say, be due to the trans­
mission through the brain of portions of a preexisting larger conscious­
ness, all that can remain after the brain expires is the larger consciousness
itself as such, with which we should thenceforth be perforce reconfounded,
the only means of our existence in finite personal form having ceased.
But this, the critics continue, is the pantheistic idea of immortality,
survival, namely, in the soul of the world; not the Christian idea of immor­
tality, which means survival in strictly personal form.
In showing the possibility of a mental life after the brain's death, they
conclude, the lecture has thus at the same time shown the impossibility of
its identity with the personal life, which is the brain's function . . . .
The plain truth i s that one may conceive the mental world behind the
veil in as individual/orm as one pleases, without any detriment to the general
scheme by which the brain is represented as a transmissive organ .
I f the extreme individualistic view were taken, one's finite mundane
consciousness would be an extract from one's larger, truer personality,
the latter having even now some sort of reality behind the scenes. And
in transmitting it-to keep to our extremely mechanical metaphor, which
confessedly throws no light on the actual modus operandi-one's brain
would also leave effects on the part remaining behind the veil; for when a
thing is torn, both fragments feel the operation.
And just as (to use a very coarse figure) the stubs remain in a check­
book whenever a check is used, to register the transaction, so these
impressions on the transcendent self might constitute so many vouchers of
the finite experiences of which the brain had been the mediator; and ulti­
mately they might form that collection within the larger self of memories
of our earthly passage, which is all that, since Locke's day, the continu-

8. Parenthetically, it seems very unlikely that McDougall would not have been aware of this
clarification. It had long been in the literature when McDougall was writing Body and Mind,
and in his memorial address McDougall (191 1) describes James as having been "for many
years the largest influence affecting my intellectual life" (p. 1 2). We can be sure in any case
that this clarification would have been one of the first points James brought to McDougall's
attention, had they ever discussed the subject.
592-Chapter 9

ance of our personal identity beyond the grave has by psychology been
recognized to mean.
It is true that all this would seem to have affinities rather with preexis­
tence and with possible re-incarnations than with the Christian notion of
immortality. But my concern in the lecture was not to discuss immortality
in general. It was confined to showing it to be not incompatible with the
brain-function theory of our present mundane consciousness. I hold that
it is so compatible, and compatible moreover in fully individualized form.
(James, 1 89811900, pp. v-viii)

The overall resemblance between the picture sketched here by James and
Myers's model of human personality is unmistakable.
The bulk of McDougall 's attack upon transmission theory is directed
at the "mind-stuff" doctrine, and more specifically at James's attempt in A
Pluralistic Universe to defend the very sort of self-compounding of mental
states that he himself had destructively criticized in the Principles. McDou­
gall clearly thinks that in doing this he is attacking the transmission theory
itself, but in this he is again off the mark, for what is primarily at stake in
their disagreement is not the existence of complex mental states but alter­
native accounts of how they come into being. We can therefore bypass the
tortuous details of these arguments (although I must comment in passing
that like McDougall I find James's revised treatment of "compounding"
ultimately unconvincing) and proceed instead to what for our purposes is
a more critical question. Does everyday consciousness represent the high­
est level of consciousness within us, as McDougall and Balfour and virtu­
ally all contemporary mainstream psychologists presume, or could there
really be within many or all of us a more comprehensive consciousness of
the sort postulated by Myers and James? McDougall correctly identifies the
two main sources of evidence relied upon by James and Myers-psychologi­
cal automatisms and related dissociative phenomena, and mystical expe­
rience-but he does not discuss this evidence at all, apparently thinking
(mistakenly) that his theoretical arguments against the transmission theory
have already discredited their view. I must now say a little more about this
evidence.
James (1909/1971) clearly thought that phenomena of divided personal­
ity, hypnosis, automatic writing and speech, and trance mediumship collec­
tively demonstrate the existence of inclusive or higher-order consciousness
as a real psychological phenomenon:

For my own part I find in some of these abnormal or supernormal facts the
strongest suggestions in favor of a superior coconsciousness being possible.
I doubt whether we shall ever understand some of them without using the
very letter of Fechner's conception of a great reservoir in which the memo­
ries of earth's inhabitants are pooled and preserved, and from which, when
the threshold lowers or the valve opens, information ordinarily shut out
leaks into the mind of exceptional individuals among us. (p. 264)
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-593

The main evidence from these sources for inclusive forms of co-conscious­
ness has been summarized in Chapters 2 and 5 and need not be repeated
here; I will only say again that I too find it convincing in that regard (but
see Balfour, 1935, pp. 272-276, and Gauld, 1968, pp. 296-299 for different
views).9
In the Conclusions chapter of A Pluralistic Universe, James turns to reli­
gious and mystical experience for additional evidence:

The sort of belief that religious experience of this type naturally engen­
ders in those who have it is fully in accord with Fechner's theories. To
quote words which I have used elsewhere [i.e., in the Conclusions chapter
of VRE], the believer finds that the tenderer parts of his personal life are
continuous with a more of the same quality which is operative in the uni­
verse outside of him and which he can keep in working touch with, and
in a fashion get on board of and save himself, when all his lower being
has gone to pieces in the wreck. In a word, the believer is continuous, to
his own consciousness, at any rate, with a wider self from which saving
experiences flow in. Those who have such experiences distinctly enough
and often enough to live in the light of them remain quite unmoved by
criticism, from whatever quarter it may come, be it academic or scientific,
or be it merely the voice of logical common sense. They have had their
vision and they know-that is enough-that we inhabit an invisible spiri­
tual environment from which help comes, our soul being mysteriously one
with a larger soul whose instruments we are. (p. 267)

Mystical experience in its higher forms seems to me to strengthen

Myers's position in several important ways. First, it cannot be denied that
the most relevant cases of multiple personality are not only rare but dis­
tinctly pathological in character, in that a more inclusive secondary per­
sonality often, though not always, experiences itself as distinct from, and
even alien and hostile to, the primary personality. Balfour (1935) correctly
points out that this is not what we should expect on Myers's theory of the
normal personality, for (ignoring Balfour's incorrect terminology) "if the
subliminal 'phase' of a man's consciousness represented his true self, we
might actually expect that, on ceasing to be subliminal, it would absorb into
itself the supraliminal phase, and the two phases would be as one self" (pp.
273-274). But as James above suggests, and as we showed in greater detail
in Chapter 8, something of just this expected sort does regularly happen in
conjunction with profound mystical experiences, in which the everyday self
opens up, widens or expands, and becomes at least temporarily identified
with some sort of larger, wiser, and benign self hidden within. The supra-

9. Even McDougall (191111961) himself seems at times to verge on acceptance of the Myers!
James view. For example, he accepts the existence of inclusive memory in multiple personality
cases such as that of Miss Beauchamp (p. 369), and at one point he even suggests that "by con­
ceiving the animating principle of each organism as but relatively individual, as a bud from
the tree of life, it seems possible dimly to foreshadow a synthesis of the Animism of James
and Bergson with the hypothesis [his soul-theory] discussed in these concluding paragraphs"
(p. 377).
594-Chapter 9

liminal self is not condemned , obstructed, or obliterated but transcended,

in a highly positive direction and with powerful transformative aftereffects
that appear in many instances to be objectively measurable.
Evidence from the mystical domain also bears strongly on the general­
ity issues discussed earlier. In the first place, there have certainly been thou­
sands if not millions of deep mystical experiences in the course of human
history, many involving quite ordinary and unprepared persons, and the
mystical traditions are unanimous in believing that all of us are capable
of achieving such experiences through appropriate sorts of transformative
practice. Furthermore, although the occurrence of such an experience does
not itself necessarily imply that the larger consciousness had been there all .
along, as Myers and James suppose, that is certainly the way most mystics
have experienced and reported it-that is, as something already present
within, which they had uncovered or found. Indeed, the course of the mys­
tic vocation often involves a kind of oscillation between these concentric
surface and depth poles of the psyche, as its center of gravity shifts toward
the latter, and in more permanent states of deep mystical realization these
dual foci may sometimes even be maintained simultaneously (Forman,
1 999, chap. 9).
It also seems highly relevant, and psychologically plausible, that the
deeper focus is typically characterized as a passive knower or witness ,
rather than as an actor in its own right; thus for example the Upanishads
repeatedly invoke the metaphor of "two birds on the self-same tree, always
companions, one of which looks on while the other eats the sweet fruit."
The same picture underlies Patanjali's practical system of yoga and its theo­
retical companion, the Samkhya system of orthodox Hindu philosophy. In
the normal situation, that is, the surface and depth foci are more or less
concentric or in alignment, and only when the deeper consciousness with
its more potent faculties and more comprehensive point of view finds the
supraliminal getting out of alignment, so to speak, would it exert its influ­
ence through psychological automatisms of the sorts described by Myers
and James-saving religious experiences , uprushes of genius, veridical
apparitions, phenomena of extreme psychophysical influence, and so on.
The net status of Myers's conception of the Subliminal Self seems to
me presently as follows. The conception itself is admittedly counterintuitive
and logically difficult. I find especially challenging, for example, its aspect
of inclusiveness, and wonder whether the Subliminal Self might better be
conceived as "more comprehensive" in some weaker sense.1O The evidence
presently supporting Myers's conception is also less than compelling, and

10. The central and very obscure difficulty here, also recognized by McDougall, is that
the activity of a mind involves more than its occurrent aspect, the stream of consciousness,
with specific isolable contents such as particular images, thoughts, and the like. Knowing, for
example, that someone has in mind the image of an elderly bearded man would tell you very
little of what is actually going on in that person's mind. For the Subliminal Self to be fully
inclusive of the supraliminal self, it would have to be somehow inclusive of its hidden disposi­
tional properties and point of view as welL Much more is involved in "inclusiveness," that is,
than merely treating the Subliminal Self or Individuality as a large set of discrete "elements
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-595

certainly it falls far short of the form proposed by Gauld ( 1968) as necessary
for a "conclusive" demonstration-specifically, "the bringing to light in a
large number of people of a hidden stream of consciousness which could
give a coherent and testable account of its own past history and actions" (p.
299). Nevertheless, it seems to me definitely possible and perhaps even prob­
able, especially in light of the evidence flowing from mystical experiences,
that Myers and James really have identified a more or less correct account
of the overall structure and dynamics of the human psyche-one, further­
more, that is capable of accommodating in a natural way a far wider array
of empirical observations than any of its rivals. In sum, although Myers's
theory of the Subliminal Self is by no means proven, it constitutes at mini­
mum, in my estimation, a viable and useful working model capable of guid­
ing further research.

Post-Mortem Survival

And now what about Myers's most central concern-whether there is

or is not personal survival of bodily death? Survival is not ruled out a priori
and in general by filter or transmission models of mind and personality,
as it is by all conventional production models. On the other hand, animis­
tic or filter models themselves do not as a class necessarily entail survival,
although they do render it in varying degrees less improbable.
Myers clearly regarded survival as an almost inevitable corollary of the
specific type of personality theory that he elaborates in HP, and indeed to
demonstrate this forms the central strategy and goal of his exposition (his
"broad-canvas" approach; see our Chapters 2 and 4). At the same time, it
should be recognized that the empirical case for survival does not depend
on the correctness of this particular theory. I wish next to summarize the
collective sense of our group as to the empirical status of this problem.
The basic issues have already been framed in Chapters 4 and 5. Briefly,
detailed and specific information has sometimes come forward-under
conditions which rule out "normal" explanations involving conscious or
unconscious cheating, cryptomnesia, defects of memory or reporting, cold
reading, and the l ike-which suggests the possible continued existence in
some form of previously living persons. In the best such cases the poten­
tially viable explanations appear reduced to two principal candidates, either
survival itself or some sort of extreme supernormal (psi) process involving
only living persons.
Myers was convinced by the evidence available to him-while acknowl­
edging that it might not be as convincing to others (HP, vol. 2, p. 79)-that
survival is a fact of nature: "It seems to me now that the evidence for commu­
nication with the spirits of identified deceased persons through the trance-

of personality," some subset of which can be told off into the supraliminal self or personality
and shared by both (see also Braude, 1979).
5 96-Chapter 9

utterances and writings of sensitives apparently controlled by those spirits

is established beyond serious attack" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 29). Myers's acceptance
of personal survival seemed to many of his colleagues at the time, and still
seems to us, premature. This impression, however, may in part reflect the
fact that much of what Myers himself regarded as his best evidence was
either never published at all or could not be published in a manner that
adequately conveys the impact of evidential details and their verisimilitude
available privately to him. His well-known emotional interest in survival, in
any event, seems unlikely to have biased his judgment, as he himself pointed
out (HP, vol. 2, p. 294; see also our Chapter 2).
A considerable amount of additional evidence suggestive of survival
has accumulated in the subsequent century, some of it of very high qual­
ity. Most of this evidence is of types already known to Myers, although
acquired in larger amounts and with various methodological refinements,
while some-such as cases of the reincarnation type, including those involv­
ing birthmarks and birth defects (Chapter 3)-is almost entirely new. The
net result of this accumulation of evidence has been to bring the conflict
between survival and "super-psi" interpretations into ever-sharper relief,
as pro-survival researchers have sought to identify phenomena and test­
ing procedures that increasingly strain the relative credibility of super-psi
interpretations.
For example, it might initially seem plausible that a medium could
acquire information sufficient to impersonate some deceased individual
through telepathic interactions with sitters, especially if a single sitter is
present who has exactly the relevant information. That plausibility may
seem to diminish, however, when no such person is present, as in a "proxy"
sitting; or in sittings when a "drop-in" communicator appears, unknown
to anyone present but subsequently identified as a formerly living person;
or when the necessary information is distributed across multiple individu­
als, some of whom are not present; or when some of that information is
also contained in obscure documents not even known at that moment to
exist. Conversely, survival seems to become more plausible to the degree
that many sources of relevant information are potentially available, with
some conflicting, yet the ostensible communicator delivers information cir­
cumscribed precisely to that which the deceased person himself would have
known, in a manner demonstrably in accord with his intentions, and with
his characteristic mannerisms, diction, humor, and the like. I I

I I . See the Appendix. Another interesting kind of survival evidence involves the display not
only of appropriate information but of high-level skills such as the linguistic skills involved
in "responsive xenoglossy," the capacity to speak fluently a foreign language not learned by
normal means. Stevenson, for example, has documented extensively the case of Sharada, in
which a secondary personality in a young Hindu woman spoke and wrote an archaic form of
Bengali appropriate to the life she claimed to have led some 1 50 years earlier. She also pro­
vided factual details about that life that Stevenson was able to verify, but only by means of an
extremely laborious investigation of obscure historical records (Stevenson, 1984; Stevenson &
Pasricha, 1979; see also Braude, 2003, chap. 4).
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-597

This brief and abstract description will serve, I hope, to illustrate the
general flavor of these debates, which seem to many well-informed observ­
ers to have arrived at a logical impasse. The core problem hinges on the
fact that information provided by an ostensibly surviving communicator
can only be verified by reference to information which is known to some
living person or persons, or objectively documented in some other fashion,
and hence which is also in principle potentially accessible to some sort of
psi process. It is therefore always possible to invent scenarios according to
which apparent evidence of survival can be "explained" alternatively in
terms of psi processes involving only living persons. Such scenarios may
need to be fantastically complex, but psi has been shown in various experi­
mental contexts to operate in a "goal-oriented" manner unaffected by the
apparent "complexity" of its tasks (H. Schmidt, 1 987), and consequently
they cannot be decisively refuted. But note the real logical peculiarity here:
It is not that we have positive knowledge that psi processes can accomplish
the extraordinary things required by such explanations, but rather that we
are presently unable to prove they cannot. 1 2
Let me conclude this section with a few general observations on the
net status of this debate. First, it involves a large body of relevant empiri­
cal evidence which at present is virtually unknown to the great majority of
laypersons and scientists alike. Our Appendix provides many pointers into
this literature, emphasizing sources which illustrate in cogent form proper­
ties of the sorts characterized above as particularly suggestive of survival.
We insist that anyone who wishes to participate meaningfully in discussions
of the survival question must study this literature, thoughtfully and with an
open mind.
Second, the core issue of super-psi versus survival cannot be decisively
resolved at the present time. Persons sufficiently determined to deny sur­
vival while accepting the reality of psi can continue to do so rationally, but
provisional acceptance of the survival hypothesis is also rationally war­
ranted by the evidence available. One might also choose, of course, to defer
commitment either way, pending further information.
As a matter of historical fact, able and informed students such as
Braude (2003), Broad (1962), Dodds (1 934), Ducasse (1961 , 1969), Gauld
(1982), G. Murphy ( 1 945), Price (1966), and Stevenson (e.g., 1 977; 1997, chap.
26), among numerous others, have divided more or less equally, and for the
most part narrowly, along the two sides of this divide. Some have remained
undecided, and Stephen Braude, for many years a particularly determined
defender of super-psi interpretations, has recently moved tentatively to a
mildly pro-survival position much like our own.
Our general attitude toward super-psi explanations, in the first place, is
essentially that of Ducasse (1969):

12. The survival hypothesis itself, of course, must also invoke psi processes of some sort to
account for information flows between mediums and communicators.
598-Chapter 9

When Occam's razor is alleged to shave off survival as a superfluous

hypothesis, and to leave ESP as sufficient to account for all the facts in evi­
dence, it turns out that ESP cannot do it without being arbitrarily endowed
with an ad hoc "beard" consisting not of capacity for more far-reaching
perception, but of capacity for reasoning, inventing, constructing, under­
standing, judging; i.e. for active thinking; and more specifically for the
particular modes of such thinking which only the particular mind whose
survival is in question is known to have been equipped with. (p. 41)

Secondly, the totality of the evidence now available seems to us to have

tilted the balance somewhat further in favor of the survival hypothesis. Of
particular significance in this regard, in our opinion, are mediumistic cases
involving proxy sitters (E. W. Kelly, in press) and drop-in communicators
(for references to this research, see Braude, 2003, chap. 2; and Gauld, 1 982,
chap. 5), cases of the reincarnation type (e.g., Stevenson, 1 997, 2001), and
NDEs occurring under extreme physiological conditions (our Chapter 6).
The last may in the long run prove especially critical, for they arise from the
very heart of mainstream biomedical science, and seem likely to become
more numerous and compelling as our capacity to rescue physiologically
monitored human beings from the borderland of death increases.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the broader theoretical setting
that frames this debate is itself shifting, and in a manner that makes survival
appear to us more likely. In Chapter 3 we highlighted the dynamic interplay
between fact and theory in the specific context of phenomena of extreme
psychophysical influence, showing how previously suspect empirical phe­
nomena suddenly become acceptable once scientists find a theory that
appears to permit them. We think a process of this sort is already underway
in regard to the entire range of interrelated empirical phenomena discussed
in this book and that this will ultimately vindicate Myers's "broad-canvas"
approach to the survival question itself.
More specifically, we think that if other things were anywhere near
equal, most rational persons would conclude, on the basis of the available
evidence, that survival in some form is at least possible, and perhaps even
a demonstrated empirical reality. The problem, of course, is that "other
things" seem to most scientists nowhere near equal, because of the seem­
ingly overwhelming antecedent improbability of survival in the context of
present-day mainstream science and philosophy. As G. Murphy and Dale
(1961) had already remarked, "it is the biological and the philosophical dif­
ficulty with survival that holds us back, not really the unacceptability of
the evidence as such" (p. 213). We believe, however, that these theoretical
difficulties can be greatly attenuated or even removed, and in a way that
potentially accommodates most or all of the rogue phenomena we have dis­
cussed, survival included.
We will attempt shortly to demonstrate this in some detail. Meanwhile,
although we ourselves are collectively disposed to regard survival in some
form as at minimum an empirical possibility, and perhaps even a probabil­
ity, I hasten to add that we expressly disavow any more specific claims, at
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-599

present, as to its incidence and nature. A wide range of possible forms can
be discriminated (Broad, 1 962, Epilogue), and there exists at least some evi­
dence consistent with each of them. These range from mere transient per­
sistence of at least a few memories, to persistence of something much like
the earthly personality with evidence of thought, planning, conscious will,
and so on (Ducasse, 1961, 1969), to merging into some sort of transpersonal
field (G. Murphy, 1 945). It may seem plausible to suppose like Myers that if
anyone survives in personal form we all do, but in making this particular
leap Myers was certainly too hasty, for survival could perfectly well occur
in widely differing forms and durations for different persons, or not at all,
depending on a host of factors we currently know nothing about.13
I will leave the matter there for present purposes. Whether or not read­
ers are swayed by our assessment of the survival issue, we will be satisfied
if we have convinced them of the difficulty and importance of the problem,
and of the fact that it is amenable to empirical investigation. We also wish to
emphasize in concluding this section that a choice must ultimately be made
between super-psi and survival interpretations of the survival evidence.
Both horns of this dilemma are in our view fatal to the current mainstream
materialist synthesis, but the occurrence of survival in particular-of any
form-would decisively resolve the conflict between production and trans­
mission models of mind-brain relations in favor of some sort of transmis-
sion model.

Myers's Generalized Concept of Evolution

As Chapters 2 and 7 have already indicated, the concept of evolution

is central to Myers's theory of personality (HP, vol. I, p. 19). He accepted
Darwin's doctrine of natural selection as the basis of organic evolution,
but sought to integrate it with his own conception of human personality as
rooted in a hidden, wider environment that underlies and interpenetrates
the world of ordinary experience, at bottom a spiritual or "metetherial"
realm lying beyond the material as classically conceived.
The main novelty of this broadened conception of evolution is set forth
in his chapter on genius (HP, vol. 1, pp. 93-98, 1 1 1-120). Like conventional
evolutionary theorists, Myers recognizes that new capacities emerge in con­
junction with the sorts of "protoplasmic" changes played upon by natural
selection. Unlike such theorists, however, he thinks of these capacities as
being not so much generated by the organic changes as released by them
from the subliminal or metetherial realm, in which in some sense they
already existed, latent but unrealized. Thus,

I hold, of course, that sports or variations occur, which are at present

unpredictable, and which reveal in occasional offspring faculties which

\3. The same comment applies, of course, in relation to the evidence for reincarnation.
60O-Chapter 9

their parents showed no signs of possessing. But I differ from those who
hold that the faculty itself thus manifested is now for the first time initiated
in that stock by some chance combination of hereditary elements. I hold
that it is not initiated, but only revealed; that the "sport" has not called a
new faculty into being, but has merely raised an existing faculty above the
threshold of supraliminal consciousness. (HP, vol. 1, p. 1 1 8)

Myers acknowledges that at most points his view is essentially indistin­

guishable from the conventional view:

No fresh mystery is in fact introduced. All human powers, to put the thing
broadly, have somehow or other to be got into protoplasm and then got out
again. You have to explain first how they became implicit in the earliest
and lowest living thing, and then how they have become thus far explicit
in the latest and highest. All the faculties of that highest being, I repeat,
existed virtually in the lowest, and in so far as the admitted faculties are
concerned the difference between my view and the ordinary view may be
said to be little more than a difference as to the sense which that word vir­
tually is here to assume. (HP, vol. 1 , p. 1 18)

The real difference between the two conceptions becomes apparent,

however, in regard to certain additional capacities-such as telepathy and
telcesthesia-which Myers regards as inherently and necessarily beyond
the reach of any explanation based on material factors alone. Inasmuch as
capacities of this sort definitely do exist, less unusual ones can perhaps also
be re-conceptualized in analogous fashion. On such a view, for example,
one might even suppose with Myers that "the specialised forms of terrene
perception were not real novelties in the universe, but imperfect adapta­
tions of protoplasm to the manifestation of the indwelling general percep­
tive power" (HP, vol. I, p. 1 1 8). To illustrate the hypothesized "release" of
subliminal capacities by novelties of biological constitution, Myers appeals
to the example of the calculating prodigy Dase, as described in our Chap­
ter 7. But the central thrust of his argument is that our highest human
attributes-including our capacities for music, art, poetry, beauty, pure
mathematics, truth, and love-are of this sort, and not merely "sports" or
"spandrels," by-products of organic evolution itself. Myers thus conceives
of evolution as having a "cosmical" as well as a "planetary" aspect, tend­
ing globally toward progressive release of these higher attributes and hence
toward "constantly widening and deepening perception of an environment
infinite in infinite ways" (HP, vol. 1 , p. 96). On his view this does not happen
according to any preset or inevitable plan, however; our evolutionary fate
remains uncertain, and it is very much in our own hands.
Myers freely acknowledges that this generalized conception of evolu­
tion is a speculative hypothesis founded upon his more fundamental and
empirically grounded conception of the subliminal realm. Yet this view, he
insists,
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-60 1

is not one whit remoter or more speculative than the view which, Jaute de
mieux, is often tacitly assumed by scientific writers. My supposed oppo­
nent and I are like two children who have looked through a keyhole at the
first few moves in a game of chess,-of whose rules we are entirely igno­
rant. My companion urges that since we have only seen the pawns moved,
it is probable that the game is played with the pawns alone; and that the
major pieces seen confusedly behind the pawns are only a kind of fringe
or ornament of the board. I reply that those pieces stand on the board like
pawns; and that since they are larger and more varied than the pawns, it
is probable that they are meant to play some even more important role in
the game a s it develops. We agree that we must wait and see whether the
pieces are moved; and I now maintain that I have seen a piece moved [i.e.,
telepathy], although my companion has not noticed it.
The chessboard in this parable is the Cosmos; the pawns are those
human faculties which make for the preservation and development on this
planet of the individual and the race; the pieces are faculties which may
either be the mere by-products of terrene evolution, or on the other hand
may form an essential part of the faculty with which the human germ or
the human spirit is originally equipped, for the purpose of self-develop­
ment in a cosmical, as opposed to a merely planetary, environment. (HP,
vol. I , pp. 93-94)

Having briefly described Myers's general conception of evolution, I must

now attempt to evaluate it. To this end I shall begin with James ( 1901), who
clearly acknowledges the significance of that conception, while not attempt­
ing to adjudicate as to its truth:

I feel sure that [it] is a hypothesis of first-rate philosophic importance. It is

based, of course, on his conviction of the extent of the Subliminal, and will
stand or fall as that is verified or not; but whether it stand or fall, it looks
to me like one of those sweeping ideas by which the scientific researches of
an entire generation are often molded. (p. 21)

I think we can go slightly further now, but I must preface the following brief
remarks by saying that I intend to tread very lightly here, in part because
of my own very limited acquaintance with evolutionary biology, and in part
because of the super-heated cultural conflicts currently swirling around this
topic.
I do think there has been a small net movement in the direction of
Myers's view. First, as the present book seeks to demonstrate, his general
picture of mind and personality has in fact continued to accumulate various
kinds of empirical support, even as theoretical and empirical difficulties and
limitations have come to light in competing accounts of conventional mate­
rialistlreductionist sort, such as the CTM (Chapter 1). As James pointed
out, this in itself tends to work in favor of Myers's larger view.
Second, there has recently been some motion in this direction from
within evolutionary biology itself. Let me speak very carefully here. Myers
was certainly no creationist, nor even an "intelligent design" theorist unless
in the most attenuated sense. All he requires is that there be some global
602-Chapter 9

creative tendency in the universe, however slight, that results over time in
increasing richness and complexity of biological forms.14 But even some
mainstream evolutionary biologists seem prepared to accept pictures of
this sort. Commentator Robert Wright (1999), for example, while explicitly
denying that evolution is directed specifically toward us-Homo sapiens­
points out that the average complexity of species has in fact risen in general,
driven by competitive pressures ("arms races") within and between species,
and that mammalian lineages in particular have tended toward increased
"braininess." Certain useful properties such as vision and flight have also
been reinvented repeatedly during the course of evolution, and Wright
explicitly proposes that similar built-in tendencies may exist with respect
to higher-order properties, such as intelligence, altruism, and love, that are
of course central to Myers's vision. Similarly, both Wright himself and the
evolutionary biologist Lumsden (1999) point to an increasing recognition
among neo-Darwinian theorists that in humans the evolution of the genome
has become strongly intertwined with the evolution of civilization itself, so
that they cannot be thought of as proceeding independently on separate
tracks. Lumsden even goes so far as to state flatly that "human creativity is
the fire that drives gene-culture coevolution" (p. 160).'5
Views of these latter sorts seem within range of rapprochement with
Myers's generalized concept of evolution. Modern neo-Darwinists certainly
have achieved a greatly expanded mechanistic understanding of the mate­
rial side of evolution, but I think Myers would unhesitatingly endorse that
aspect of their science. The main residual difference lies rather in the pre­
sumption, shared by most evolutionary biologists with virtually all other
contemporary mainstream scientists, that genius along with all other human
mental functions can be fully and satisfactorily explained in terms of clas­
sical physicalist principles. This presumption was firmly rej ected by both
Myers and James, and the central theme of the present volume has been to
substantiate that they were correct in doing so. Myers's generalized picture
of evolution, in sum, may yet prove closer to the truth.

14. Parenthetically, major 20th-century philosophers such as Alexander, Bergson, and

Whitehead, in addition to James, maintained generically similar views.
15. I find it especially ironic that sophisticated evolutionary biologists like Lumsden find
fault with "Darwinian" creativity models of the sorts proposed by psychologists such as D.
T. Campbell (1960), Perkins (1995), and Simonton (1995) on grounds that biological evolution
itself is not as simplistically mechanistic as they appear to think. I agree, together with diverse
critics from Hadamard (1949) to Koestler (1964), Boden (1991), and Eysenck (1995), that any
conception which takes random variation as the basis of real human creativity is fundamen­
tally flawed-a bad metaphor and little else.
 Toward a Psychology for the 21 st Century-603

Myers/James Filter Theory and Contemporary Science:

Toward Reconciliation

Up to this point I have been arguing on behalf of the Myers/James picture

as a purely psychological theory, urging its provisional acceptance as a use­
ful working model of the overall structure and organization of the human
psyche. I have also tentatively endorsed the reality of post-mortem survival
as an empirical phenomenon, while reserving judgment on Myers's general­
ized evolutionary doctrine pending further information.16
The appeal of Myers's theory derives for me from two principal factors:
First, it encompasses an enormous range of empirical phenomena, includ­
ing a variety of phenomena which lie beyond the reach of mainstream mate­
rialist views. One aim of this book has been to show that many such "rogue"
phenomena exist, as Myers and James both firmly believed, and that the
evidence for them has in general become far stronger during the subsequent
century. Furthermore, these empirical phenomena-both "normal" and
"supernormal"-are interconnected in such a way that one cannot provide
an empirically satisfactory treatment of any one of them without necessarily
becoming entangled with others as well. One cannot deal adequately with
psi phenomena, for example, without recognizing and somehow accommo­
dating their deep associations with topics such as dreaming, genius, and
mysticism. The power of Myers's theory derives not so much from an incon­
trovertible superiority in explaining any of these phenomena individually
as in providing a coherent and plausible scheme of interpretation for all of
them at once. And this is a great virtue of Myers's theory, as pointed out by
Schiller ( 1905): "A synthesis which embraces such a multitude of facts does
not rest solely on any one set of them, and in a sense grows independent of
them all. That is, the mere coherence of the interpretation becomes a great
point in its favour as against a variety of unconnected alternatives" (p. 70).
Myers's theory also has predictive value, at least in the sense of directing
our attention toward additional types of phenomena that might be expected
both to exist and to be accessible to empirical investigation. Myers him­
self, for example, seems to have anticipated both NDEs in general (see our
Chapter 6) and the "mindsight" phenomenon reported tentatively by Ring
and Cooper (1 997, 1999), in which congenitally blind persons undergoing
NDEs report a kind of quasi-visual awareness of their physical surround­
ings (Myers, 1 891c, pp. 126-127). The demonstrated association of psi with
altered states such as dreaming, hypnagogia, and twilight states emerging
under Ganzfeld conditions also is broadly consistent with his general prin­
ciple that subliminal functions emerge in proportion to the abeyance of
normal supraliminal functioning. Similarly, his concept of a "permeable"
boundary between the supraliminal and subliminal regions implies that

16. This applies especially to a part of his doctrine I did not discuss-namely, his convic­
tion that individual human personalities may continue to develop or "evolve" in the post­
mortem state. To my knowledge, there is presently little or no credible evidence for such a
vIew.
604---Chapter 9

persons whose boundaries are demonstrably more permeable, as measured

for example by the scales of Thalbourne ( 1998; Thalbourne & Delin, 1994)
and Hartmann ( 1991), should show more evidence of subliminal function­
ing, such as creativity, psi, involuntary imagery and other automatisms, and
recall of dreams and early childhood events, all of which have been at least
tentatively confirmed. Another such implication, which is rumored to be
true but to my knowledge has not yet been seriously investigated, is that
psi phenomena should be prominently associated with dissociative disor­
ders such as MPD/DID, and perhaps especially with those "alters" that are
deepest or most comprehensive. Many other examples have been provided
in earlier chapters, and more will be supplied below.
But are these considerations sufficient to justify Myers's theory? The
"correct" answer here ultimately depends on one's answer to the prior phil­
osophical question as to precisely what criteria are appropriate for justi­
fication of a psychological theory of this sort. This general and very dif­
ficult problem is the subj ect of ongoing discussion within our Esalen theory
group, and I will certainly not attempt to resolve it here. However, the basic
issues come into sharper focus in the context of a less favorable appraisal of
Myers's theory by Gauld (1992):

The broad framework is not one that can be used to derive the details of
the phenomena that are used to support it. It may "make sense" of the phe­
nomena, but it does not enable us unequivocally to predict any particular
phenomenon. This situation obtains commonly enough in psychology, but
it would generally be thought undesirable in the "hard" sciences and by
philosophers. A partial parallel, however, i s provided by the Darwinian
theory of evolution. Here too we have a broad and abstract hypothesis
which "makes sense" of a great mass of observations; yet it would be hard
to maintain that the details of the data can be directly derived from the
theory. Of course since Darwin's time certain paths have been established
which fi l l some of the space between the theory and particular features
of the phenomena. Nothing similar has been accomplished in respect of
Myers's theory of the subliminal self [sic]. If it had been, Myers would per­
haps now be as famous as Darwin. (pp. 399-400)

I will make just two main comments on this relatively negative assess­
ment. First, I think the demand for derivation of phenomena in all details is
too strong a requirement for justification of large-scale psychological theo­
ries, although I will not attempt to argue this point here. I also think, as
indicated above, that Myers's theory does in fact have significant predictive
value, albeit of a weaker sort than that characteristic of the "hard" sciences.
Second, although Gauld certainly is correct in pointing to the subsequent
"filling in" of Darwin's theory as having contributed in major ways to its
justification, I think he overstates the contrast between Darwin and Myers
in this respect. In the first place, as indicated above, a good deal of descrip­
tive filling-in has already occurred, in the sense of more and better docu­
mentation for phenomena already utilized by Myers himself in developing
his scheme, and the discovery of additional phenomena consistent with it.
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 l st Century-60S

One major gap remains, however. It was specifically the rise of new sci­
entific disciplines such as population genetics and molecular biology that
did more than anything else to fill in and buttress the original Darwinian
theory. Similarly, a psychological theory of the sort advanced by Myers
and James cannot be sustained unless it can somehow be reconciled with
the enormous advances of the ensuing century in what we know about the
brain. The central task of this section, therefore, is to demonstrate that such
reconciliation may in fact be possible.
We believe that the empirical evidence marshaled in this book is suf­
ficient to falsify all forms of biological naturalism, the current physicalist
consensus on mind-brain relationsP The mind is "irreducible" in a stron­
ger sense than that intended by epiphenomenalists, including Chalmers,18
or even by those like Searle who are at least committed to salvaging mind
and consciousness as causal factors in behavior, but cannot explain how
to do so in conventional physicalist terms. There is apparently at least one
fundamental bifurcation in nature that cannot be accounted for in these
terms, and we therefore seem driven toward some sort of animist or plural­
ist alternative.
Although the primary purpose and merit of our book consist in the
marshaling of the evidence itself, we also think it is now possible to see
at least dimly how a psychological "filter" theory of the Myers/James sort
can be adapted to the framework of contemporary science, and we wish
to provide at least in outline some more positive characterization of these
possibilities. We emphasize at the outset that this account is necessarily
provisional and very incomplete; our goal is simply to suggest a variety of
potentially fruitful directions for further investigation. We also urge readers
to bear in mind as they work through this section, as we have in developing
it, the wise counsel of H. H. Price (1939): "We may safely predict that it will
be the timidity of our hypotheses, and not their extravagance, which will
provoke the derision of posterity" (p. 341).
We must begin by making clearer what we mean by "a psychological
filter theory of the Myers/James sort." In the first place, in lumping Myers
and James together in this way we do not mean to imply that they hold

17. From here on I will speak more consistently in the first person plural, reflecting the fact
that what follows is to a much greater extent the product of very extensive discussions involv­
ing all authors of the present book and many additional parties as well. The opinions stated
are in all cases strong majority positions, but I am primarily responsible for details of their
formulation, and not all of us are in full accord on all points. We are, however, unanimous
in regard to certain more general attitudes, including in particular an admiration for Myers
and his synoptic naturalism, skepticism about the current received wisdom in psychology
and neuroscience, openness to unorthodox findings where properly evidenced, and a convic­
tion that the world is at bottom a much more puzzling place than contemporary mainstream
science admits. Individual authors are of course responsible for opinions expressed in their
own chapters.
18. That Chalmers is an epiphenomenalist follows from his arguments for the conceiv­
ability of "zombies," creatures that lack consciousness but nonetheless are equivalent to us
cognitively. We reject both the epiphenomenalism and his endorsement of strong artificial
intelligence.
606-Chapter 9

identical views on all subjects, but only that their overall conceptions of the
psyche are far more similar to each other than to any materialistlreduction­
ist theory past or present.
We also need to specify more carefully our interpretation of James's
"transmission" or "filter" theory, originally introduced in Chapter 1 and
recurring intermittently thereafter throughout this book.19 As invoked
informally and loosely so far, this amounts only to a family of related but
somewhat cloudy metaphors bearing a variety of unexamined connota­
tions and implications regarding the role of the brain in our mental life.
"Transmission," for example, suggests faithful conveyance from one place
to another, but this is certainly not what Myers had in mind with his the­
ory of the Subliminal Self and its relations with the supraliminal self. The
related term "filter," which like Aldous Huxley's "reducing valve" suggests
selection, narrowing, and loss, is much more appropriate to that relation­
ship, and for that reason we greatly prefer it as a shorthand description of
Myers's theory.
But how does this relate to the brain? Myers's theory as he himself
developed it is entirely psychological, not philosophical, and he also says
extremely little about the brain. It is rather James, the psychologist and
philosopher, who explicitly links these notions of transmission and filter­
ing with the brain. James in fact suggests a variety of metaphors, but the
one that has most commonly been seized upon by others is that of opti­
cal devices such as colored glass, lenses, and prisms. The common feature
is that a beam of integral white light presented to such devices comes out
the other side filtered, reduced, focused, redirected, or otherwise altered in
some systematic fashion.
Subsequent advocates of transmission or filter models have tended nat­
urally to update this basic picture with reference to emerging technologies
such as radio and television. Thus for example we find Strassman (2001)
comparing the brain to a TV receiver, and likening entry into the altered
states produced by psychedelics to changing the channel. There are two
generic problems with accounts of this sort, however, that we must attempt
to avoid. First, all metaphors of the radio and TV variety clearly engender
homunculus problems of the sorts described in Chapter 1 ; after all, who is
it that is watching Strassman's TV and changing the channels? More gener-

19. There is a strangely incomplete or asymmetric pattern of connections among James,

Myers, Schiller, and Bergson-all early advocates of filter-type theories-which invites fur­
ther historical investigation. James (1898/1900) is usually given primary credit for formulating
the transmission theory, yet he himself acknowledged that Schiller (1891/1 894) had already
worked it out in greater detail. James's formulation relies heavily on Fechner's concept of the
psychophysical threshold or limen, but he does not point out the close parallel with Myers's
ideas, invoking Myers only as an investigator of supernormal phenomena. Myers, meanwhile,
makes no explicit reference to transmission theory as formulated by either James, Schiller, or
Bergson, and references Schiller and Bergson only in regard to a single case study each. None­
theless Schiller (1905, p. 66) explicitly identifies Myers's general theory as a splendid example
of transmission theory and laments that Myers himself did not describe it in those terms. Yet
James corresponded extensively with both Myers and Schiller around the time of the Ingersoll
lecture, and with Bergson later on (Perry, 1935), and all four were members of the SPR.
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-607

ally, we must not endow the "filter" with all the properties we are trying
to account for in the mind itself-properties such as high-level thinking,
memory, imagination, conceptual grasp, and so on.
The common feature of these metaphors, and the root of their concep­
tual problems, is the idea of passage through the filter. There is a way around
this, however. Recall that the central goal of James's original analysis was to
show that even perfect correlation between brain events and mental events
entails neither the impossibility of post-mortem survival nor the truth of the
conventional materialist production theory of brain-mind relations. Those
views derive from interpreting the admitted facts of functional depen­
dence-mind-brain correlations-in one particular way. Other possibili­
ties exist, however: "When we think of the law that thought is a function
of the brain, we are not required to think of productive function only; we
are entitled also to consider permissive or transmissive function. And this the
ordinary psychophysiologist leaves out of his account" (James, 1 89811900,
p . 1 5).
Most subsequent advocates of James's analysis, as we have seen, have
invoked its "transmission" thread, so much so that the whole picture is now
widely known by that name alone. We think this unfortunate, because it is
actually the other thread-permission-that is theoretically the more prom­
ising. More generally, we wish now to argue that by thinking of the brain as
an organ which somehow constrains, regulates, restricts, limits, and enables
or permits expression of the mind in its full generality, we can obtain an
account of mind-brain relations which potentially reconciles Myers's theory
of the Subliminal Self with the observed correlations between mind and
brain, while circumventing the conceptual difficulties identified above in
transmission models. We in fact see a spectrum of potentially viable theo­
retical possibilities of this sort. We will next canvas these under two broad
headings-non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist models and neutral-monist
models-that seem to us to bracket the range.

Non-Cartesian Dualist-Interactionist Models

When theories need to be changed in order to accommodate discor­

dant observations, it usually makes sense, as a matter of scientific policy,
to change them in ways that seem to do the least possible violence to the
existing theories, while enabling us to explain those additional observa­
tions. This attitude leads in the present case to the family of what we are
calling "non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist models," and more specifically
to a subset of such models corresponding to the psychological filter theory
elaborated by Myers (Chapter 2) and carried forward by James (Chapter 8),
which can be viewed as the most highly developed example so far among
608-Chapter 9

models of this sort.20 The driving idea is that associated with each human
organism, a physical thing in the ordinary sense, is a second thing, a mind
or psyche, which interacts in some way with that organism. Based upon the
evidence summarized in this book, we will also presume for the sake of dis­
cussion that the psyche has the kind of internal organization and dynamics
assigned to it by Myers and James, and that it may under various circum­
stances, including circumstances involving serious bodily injury or death,
be able to function in some manner on its own. What we want to focus on
here is how we can conceive of its normal interactions with the associated
organism.
We will begin by briefly noting that there have been previous efforts
along dualist lines by modern scientists, including some very distinguished
20th-century neuroscientists.21 One group includes Charles Sherrington and
two of his students, John Eccles and Wilder Penfield. All three expressed the
conviction that the properties of minds cannot be reduced to or identified
with those of brains, and all attempted to support that conviction by refer­
ence to empirical data of various kinds. In all cases, however, the evidence
marshaled, although readily interpretable within a dualist-interactionist
framework, was insufficient to establish it, since alternative explanations
based on the conventional viewpoint were nowhere decisively excluded.
Popper and Eccles (1 977) suffered the additional liability that their attacks
were directed mainly at associationist-type theories that had already largely
disappeared from cognitive psychology.22 In Eccles's case it was also clear,
as shown for example by his last ( 1 994) book, that he had embraced dualism
early in life and for largely non-scientific reasons (his Catholicism, possibly
supplemented by an OBE), and had sought throughout his career simply to
tell this unchanging dualist story in the most up-to-date neurophysiologi­
cal language. The net result, in any case, was that the dualistic views of all
three have largely been ignored by mainstream psychologists and neurosci­
entists.
Next comes another major neuroscientist, Roger Sperry (e.g., 1980,
1 993), who also sought to salvage the mind but in a slightly different way,
essentially by splitting the difference between mainstream physicalist views

20. In an unpublished essay on Myers that he was still developing at the time of his death,
C. D. Broad concluded that this was Myers's own philosophic position. This unfinished essay,
"The Life and Work of F. W. H. Myers," can be found among Broad's papers in the archives
of Trinity College, Cambridge.
2 1 . There has recently been a modest revival of interest in dualism among philosophers
as well; see for example J. Foster (1991), E. J. Lowe (1996), Madell (1988), and Smythies and
Beloff (1989). Unfortunately, these philosophic discussions often fail to make contact with
relevant empirical literature; in Corcoran (2001), for example, the possibility of post-mortem
survival is assessed almost exclusively in light of the apparent a priori viability of philosophi­
cal theories that seem to permit it, and without reference to the available empirical evidence.
22. See Mandler ( 1978). Of course associationist theories have subsequently revived in the
form of "connectionism," as described in Chapter I. Note the irony here that the anti-asso­
ciationist arguments of Popper and Eccles, as well as those of William James and numerous
other early critics including in particular the Gestalt psychologists, have once again become
relevant. See also 1. Fodor (200 I).
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-609

and an outright dualism. He undoubtedly took note of the hostile reception

accorded his fellow Nobel prize winner Eccles, and hoped to avoid a similar
fate. His compromise position, "monistic dualism," holds that mind and
consciousness "emerge" from brain processes when these processes reach
a certain threshold of complexity. The emergent properties are said then to
seize control of lower-level aspects of brain function, much as, for example,
an eddy generated by the turbulent flow of a stream "enslaves" the leaves
that circulate within it. The problem is that Sperry essentially stipulates the
emergence without really accounting for it in physicalist terms; both the
emergent and the enslaved phenomena are unambiguously physical in all
his analogies.23 His emergent consciousness appears miraculously and then
takes on a life of its own, so to speak; but this radical kind of emergence has
been specifically rejected as incoherent by more consistent physicalists such
as Searle (1992) and Kim (1998). McDougall (191 1 11 961) had also rejected
such views, which already existed at the end of the 19th century, as "ani­
mism of the lowest or most meagre degree" (p. 357); they seemed to him
to sacrifice the advantages of the mainstream materialist doctrine, and to
introduce all the problems of dualism without any of its potentially com­
pensating advantages . In sum, Sperry's attempted compromise also failed
to take hold.
Preceding chapters of this book have already shown that a much stron­
ger empirical case for some sort of interactive dualism can now be made.
But before attempting to move any further in this theoretical direction we
must next deal with several conceptual issues that have seemed to many
observers to constitute serious or even fatal a priori obstacles to doing so. To
begin, we reject categorically the apparent presumption of most contempo­
rary scientists and philosophers that any departure from the currently fash­
ionable materialist monism is necessarily anti scientific, and that to move
toward pluralism in any form is in and of itself inescapably tantamount to
abandoning several centuries of scientific achievement, releasing the black
flood of occultism, and reverting to primitive supernaturalist beliefs char­
acteristic of bygone times. As John Searle (1992) correctly observes, only
this prevailing terror of dualism can explain the mainstream's willingness
to put forward, and to tolerate, the various kinds of patently unsatisfactory
materialist accounts of mind-brain relations that we have seen over the past
hundred years. We agree with Searle's diagnosis, of course, but not with his
solution. We think, and will attempt to show, that Myers-like theories can
be framed in ways that not only can potentially accommodate most or all
of the relevant psychological and neurophysiological data, but also are fully
compatible with front-line physical science itself.
We certainly do not advocate return to an unmodified Cartesian ism.
We can immediately abandon the most controversial parts of the Cartesian
conceptual apparatus, including in particular the notion of mind and body
as onto logically distinct "substances" with essential or criterial attributes of

23. Note that similar analogies are regularly invoked by dynamic systems theorists such as
W. J. Freeman ( 1 999, 2000).
6 1O-Chapter 9

thinking and extension, respectively. A conceptual distinction can be made

between mind and brain without presupposing this kind of ontological divi­
sion, as recognized clearly by McDougall (191 111961). The absolute dichot­
omy set up by Descartes between mind and body has been substantially
undermined, historically. For one thing, the phenomenological solidity of
matter has proved evanescent in the face of advances on the physical side.
Furthermore, at least some forms of mental activity such as perception and
visual imagery inherently have quasi-spatial phenomenological properties,
as emphasized particularly by writers such as Brann ( 1 991), Price ( 1953),
Smythies (1994), and Velmans (1996). As Myers himself clearly recognized
(Chapter 2), the Cartesian gulf has already narrowed and may be bridged,
or bridgeable, by further advances from either or both sides; thus, "It is
no longer safe to assume any sharply-defined distinction of mind and mat­
ter.. . . Our notions of mind and matter must pass through many a phase as
yet unimagined" (Myers, 1886c, pp. 178-179). Myers himself anticipated the
possible eventual discovery of a single common something, a Tertium Quid,
that would bring the two poles together, while others have imagined a whole
series of intermediate levels, still in some sense "physical," that could serve
as "vehicles of consciousness" (Poortman, 1954/1978).
These developments have immediate impact on the argument that has
most commonly been made against interactive dualism, the causal argu­
ment. Once Descartes had made mind and body so utterly different, it is
alleged, there is no longer any way for them to interact causally, and there­
fore dualism must be false. Searle ( 1992) takes this line. However, whatever
force this argument ever had certainly has been diminished by the subse­
quent blurring of the supposed ontological divide between mind and body.
Moreover, it is not apparent to us that the argument had any real force to
begin with. Descartes himself took psychophysical interaction as a given,
an explanatory primitive, and resisted attempts to construe it on the con­
tact-interaction model of classical physical causation (Richardson, 1982).
Causal relations are not necessarily transparent, and ever since Hume we
have tended to interpret them in terms of consistent covariation. Hume's
argument has in fact recently been embraced by arch-skeptic Paul Edwards
(1 996, chap. 17) in support of his "brain-dependence" thesis-the claim
that brain processes unilaterally generate conscious mental experience. But
surely if causality can work in that direction, it might in principle work in
the other as well (Broad, 1925/1960).
The other common argument against dualism appeals to energy con­
servation laws and their supposed violation by mental causation. As noted
in Chapter 2 this was especially popular in the 1 9th century, the heyday
of classical physics, but it is also implicit in many modern discussions and
resurfaces explicitly in Dennett (1991). However, Broad (192511960, pp. 103-
1 09) had already shown that even in the context of classical physics, which
Dennett mistakenly describes as "standard" physics, such arguments are
inconclusive.
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-6 1 I

Even when the issues are framed in conventional physicalist terms,

therefore, the main traditional arguments against interactive dualism
appear to us less than compelling. Furthermore, and more fundamentally,
it is no longer scientifically appropriate even to frame the issues in this way.
Although a principle of causal closure of the physical world as classically
conceived is assumed as the starting point of practically all contemporary
scientific and philosophic discussions of mind-brain issues, it is hardly self­
evident that this principle applies without restriction to a world that also
contains minds. It assumes precisely what we are challenging, that classical
physicalism is correct and complete, and can fully explain both brains and
minds. But that classical conception of the physical world has long since
been shattered by developments within physics itself, particularly by the
advent of quantum theory in the early years of the 20th century.24
Among the small but growing number of systematic attempts to under­
stand the implications of these developments for mind-brain theory, we
regard as especially promising, and will summarize here, the work of quan­
tum physicist Henry Stapp. There are several reasons for this choice. First,
unlike many more popular writers Stapp knows the physics inside out. Sec­
ond, he is consistently conservative and orthodox in his use of quantum
theory, staying as close as possible to its empirically proven foundations
and postulating no exotic quantum states or processes. Third, he is serious
about establishing connections with mainline psychology and neuroscience.
Finally, he has provided useful comments on a variety of related quantum­
theoretic proposals (including those of Bohm, Eccles, and Penrose and
Hameroff), which tend in broadly similar directions but are less satisfactory
on various technical grounds (Stapp, 2005a, 2005b, in press a, in press b).
Few working psychologists and neuroscientists, let alone the public
at large, have any conception of the fundamental significance of quantum
theory. Classical concepts and approximations are often sufficient to sup­
port the concerns of the special physical sciences, and quantum mechanics
is scarcely mentioned in the context of general education even at the college
level. Yet it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the classical physics
consensus that underwrites practically everything now going on in psy­
chology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind has in fact been completely
undermined by this tectonic shift in the foundations of physics.
This is one of Stapp's main points. He describes vividly how the found­
ers of quantum mechanics discovered, to their extreme discomfiture, that
the fundamental ideas of classical physics were not just limited but wrong,
leading repeatedly to clear predictions that were falsified by experiment.
The theory they were driven to in response, quantum theory, is a more fun­
damental and better physical theory that explains everything explainable
in classical terms, and a vast number of additional things as well, often to
extraordinary levels of accuracy. No experimental outcome predicted by it
has ever been falsified.

24. For authoritative but readable surveys see for example Capek (\961), Whitehead
(1925/1953, 1938/1968), and Stapp (2004a, 2005a).
6 12-Chapter 9

Furthermore, it is crucial to appreciate that human consciousness,

which had deliberately been excluded from the classical physics of the three
preceding centuries, plays an essential role in this improved physical theory.
Orthodox quantum theory is intrinsically a psychophysical theory, "a weav­
ing of psychologically described realities into the framework of mathemati­
cal physics" (Stapp, 2005a). "The founders of quantum mechanics made the
revolutionary move of bringing conscious human experiences into the basic
physical theory in a fundamental way. In the words of Niels Bohr the key
innovation was to recognize that 'in the great drama of existence we our­
selves are both actors and spectators'" (Stapp, 2005a).25
Quantum theory also is necessarily relevant to brain science, for accord­
ing to the principles of contemporary physics it must be used to explain the
behaviors of all macroscopic systems that depend sensitively on the behavior
of their atomic constituents, and brains are certainly systems of this kind.26
Stapp himself has identified and carefully analyzed one particular element
of brain dynamics to which quantum theory certainly applies. This is the
process of exocytosis, in which neurotransmitter molecules are released into
the synaptic cleft. The release is triggered by arrival of calcium ions at criti­
cal sites in the transmitter storage areas, the vesicles. But as these small ions
pass through their membrane channels (diameter circa 1 nanometer) their
positions become nearly fixed; hence, by Heisenberg's uncertainty relation,
what happens next must be represented as a cloud of possible trajectories in
the vicinity of the vesicle. This injection of a true quantum uncertainty­
that is, an uncertainty involving more than incomplete knowledge of clas­
sically conceived details-goes on constantly at every one of the trillions of
active synapses in the waking human brain, and this by itself is sufficient
to establish that the brain is subject to quantum principles. This neces­
sary entry of quantum uncertainties is also consistent with the findings of
dynamic system theorists, who emphasize that in the waking state the brain
operates continually on the edge of instability, with small changes in input
potentially leading to large changes in overall behavior.27

25. Eugene Wigner (1962, p. 285) similarly remarked that the laws of quantum mechan­
ics cannot be formulated consistently without recourse to the concept of consciousness.
Although Wigner himself subsequently retreated from this position, Stapp (2004a) shows that
his reasons for doing so are not compelling.
26. Physicist and brain theorist Paul Nunez (1995) remarks that "an appreciation of the
grand conceptual leap required in the transition from classical to quantum systems may give
us some vague feeling for how far from current views neuroscience may eventually lead. Such
humbling recognition will perhaps make us especially skeptical of attempts to 'explain away'
(that is with tautology) data that do not merge with common notions about consciousness,
such as multiple conscious entities in a single brain, hypnosis, and so on" (p. 1 58).
27. Eccles had originally proposed that this dynamic instability might be exploited by
"triggering" certain "critically poised" neurons, using the quantum indeterminacy associ­
ated with neurotransmitter molecules in the synaptic cleft itself to effect the triggering with­
out violation of conservation laws. It soon became evident, however, that these molecules are
too large, and the distances too long. Eccles himself subsequently settled on the exocytosis
mechanism as a critical site (Beck & Eccles, 1992; Eccles, 1994).
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-61 3

Unfortunately, most brain researchers have not yet recognized the

relevance of quantum-theoretic considerations to their science. A few oth­
ers have considered the possibility but dismissed it out of hand for wholly
inadequate reasons. For example, E. Roy John (2001) asserts that: "There
is no evidence that quantum mechanical processes can apply to the slow
processes which transpire in the brain in times on the order of milliseconds
and involve many cubic centimeters of cells at body temperature" (p. 200).
These statements are simply incorrect, as Stapp (2005a) explains. Body tem­
perature has a negative bearing only on proposals which, unlike his own,
postulate creation and maintenance of large-scale quantum coherence or
other exotic physical states under the normal conditions of brain operation.
Stapp's proposal, moreover, is entirely consistent with the observed spatial
and temporal scales of brain activity in relation to experience and behavior.
Most fundamentally, in light of the demonstration that the behavior of low­
level brain constituents is necessarily saturated with quantum effects, com­
bined with the revolution that has occurred at the foundations of physics,
the burden of proof here falls upon those who deny, not those who affirm,
the relevance of quantum theory to brain science.
Stapp further argues that of the various formulations of quantum the­
ory the one that most naturally applies to neuroscience, and indeed must
be applied in that setting, is that of mathematician John von Neumann
(1932/1 955). The basic reason for this is straightforward: In the course of
developing his rigorous formalization of quantum mechanics, von Neumann
(193211955, chap. 6) proved that the separation originally introduced by the
founders of quantum theory between a very small observed physical system
described in mathematical language and an observing system described in
empirical/phenomenal terms can be progressively shifted in such a way that
the physical, mathematically described part ultimately includes the entire
body and brain of an observing human agent, while the empirical/phe­
nomenal part becomes that agent's stream of conscious experience. In this
restructured framework, identified by Wigner as the "orthodox" interpre­
tation of quantum mechanics, the operations of the complete mind-brain
system necessarily involve more than the deterministic, locally-acting, bot­
tom-up mechanical processes described by classical physics. There continue
to be bottom-up and locally-acting mechanical processes (which von Neu­
mann calls Process 2), but these now take the form prescribed by quantum­
mechanical generalizations of the laws of classical mechanics and incorpo­
rate all of the uncertainties entailed by the quantum principles. Operating
alone, Process 2 would rapidly generate a vast proliferation of possible
brain states, simultaneously existing in a state of "potentiality." What actu­
ally happens, according to the quantum principles, is determined at least in
part by a second process (Process 1) of fundamentally different character,
which von Neumann (193211955) himself specifically characterized as aris­
ing from, or leading into, the human mind, "the intellectual inner life of the
individual" (p. 418). These influences are entirely free, in the sense of not
being determined by anything in the physics itself. Consciousness itself, in
short, is needed to complete the quantum dynamics.
6 14-Chapter 9

In Stapp's minimal and physically justified elaboration of this basic

scheme, the conscious mental activity of the observer is portrayed as oper­
ating top-down, and in an inherently non-local manner, to select or enforce
large-scale, quasi-stable patterns of oscillatory brain activity from the mul­
titude of possible patterns generated by Process 2. Note that these sorts of
global activity patterns, expected in light of Stapp's physics-based theory,
correspond in a natural way to neural correlates of mental activity, as con­
ventionally conceived.
For fuller explanations of all aspects of the theory, interested readers
should consult the original sources. The net effect of these quantum-theo­
retic developments, we emphasize, is to bring consciousness back into both
physical science and brain theory at the foundational level. As Stapp (2004a)
remarks, his model "makes consciousness causally effective, yet it is com­
patible with all known laws of physics, including the law of conservation of
energy" (p. 23). This totally deflates the main arguments, summarized above,
that have routinely been advanced against interactive dualism. Indeed, far
from ruling out dualism, as alleged by Dennett (1991) and numerous others,
"Contemporary physical theory allows, and in its orthodox von Neumann/orm
entails, an interactive dualism" (Stapp, 2005a, italics added).
Stapp's theory as described so far remains abstract and mathematical,
grounded most securely at the physics end. Certainly a great deal remains
to be done to flesh it out in psychological and neuroscientific detail, particu­
larly on the perceptual/cognitive (versus motor) side. Nevertheless, Stapp
himself has already identified a variety of important psychological phe­
nomena that he thinks his model can successfully explain, and in a manner
uniquely consistent with these basic-physics considerations. The key fac­
tor here is the ability of Process 1 to hold a conscious mental intention in
place despite the strong disruptive tendencies inherent in the mechanical
Process 2. This is accomplished, in accordance with a well-studied physi­
cal phenomenon known as the quantum Zeno effect, by allowing the rel­
evant Process I "intentions" or "permissions" to be issued repeatedly, as
needed, but only up to some maximum possible rate. Stapp correctly points
out the striking consistency between this picture and William James's vivid
phenomenological descriptions of attention as the essential phenomenon
of will. The model also potentially explains in a natural way certain other
characteristic features of conscious experience, such as the attentional "bot­
tleneck" of Pashler (1998) and the properties of the "global workspace" as
conceived by many contemporary brain theorists-broadly, the fact that
a serial, integrated, and very limited stream of consciousness somehow
emerges in association with a nervous system that is distributed, massively
parallel, and of huge capacity (Baars, 1993). Top-down effects of the sort
emphasized in Chapter 1 also fall directly and naturally out of such a model:
"Quantum theory, unlike classical physics, can yield mathematically speci­
fied top-down effects of mind on brain that are not determined by the bot-
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-6 1 5

tom-up local-deterministic process" (Stapp, 2005a).28 For examples o f such

top-down effects Stapp mainly relies upon recent clinical research on "self­
directed neuroplasticity," in which psychiatric patients are taught to mod­
ify, voluntarily, their maladaptive psychological (and neurophysiological)
responses to emotionally challenging stimuli (J. Schwartz, Stapp, & Beau­
regard, 2003, 2005). Additional relevant studies would presumably include
those showing that by voluntarily altering their perceptual interpretation
of an ambiguous visual stimulus, subjects can systematically alter patterns
of brain activity even as "early" as primary visual cortex (e.g., Kamitani &
Tong, 2005).
We are sympathetic to these empirical arguments, but we doubt whether
many psychologists and neuroscientists will find them compelling in them­
selves. Up to this point Stapp's empirical case for his interactive-dualist
model appears to us to suffer essentially the same liabilities as the evidence
marshaled by Popper and Eccles (1 977) in support of theirs. That is, his
interpretations may well be correct, but none of the empirical phenomena
he has adduced so far are clearly or decisively beyond the reach of more con­
ventional types of explanation. In particular, the neurophysiological global
workspace models of people such as Damasio, Dehaene, Edelman, Llinas,
and others are as relentlessly conventional and classical as anything else in
mainstream cognitive neuroscience; adherents of such models would cer­
tainly take the view that at least in principle they can explain all top-down
effects, including the results on self-directed neuroplasticity, in terms of the
dense reciprocal connections that are known to link cortical elements of the
global workspace directly or indirectly to all other parts of the brain.
The situation changes, however, when Stapp's theoretical model is com­
bined with the kinds of "rogue" phenomena catalogued in the present book.
We must first acknowledge that in making this move we are going beyond
anything Stapp himself has yet suggested or embraced in his published
work. He does not explicitly characterize the relationship he conceives as
holding between the source of Process I events, the conscious mind of the
individual, and the bodily processes with which it interacts, and it is not
clear to what degree he himself regards them as actually or potentially sepa­
rable. Nevertheless, we see no objection in principle to extending his basic
model in this way, provided that the extension is empirically justified.
A natural starting point is provided by the phenomena of extreme psy­
chophysical influence, such as geometric blisters and skin-writing, that we
have shown cannot be produced directly by mechanisms under the control of
the brain and nervous system (Chapter 3). Process 1 is inherently non-local,
and therefore it can plausibly be imagined as enabling control of events in
the skin that lie beyond the reach of mechanisms known to conventional

28. We note in passing that the received causal doctrine of conventional neuroscience,
that system-level properties of the brain are produced by bottom-up local interactions of its
constituent microentities, is the one-dimensional historical residue of a much richer causal
doctrine dating back to the Greeks, one that specifically incorporates downward mental
or "ontic" causation. For a sustained philosophic argument in support of ontic causation,
informed by modern developments in cognitive neuroscience, see Pols (1998).
6 1 6-Chapter 9

present-day neuroscience. In this case the relevant events would also be

quantum-level events of the same type as those Stapp has already shown are
subject to quantum effects and fundamental to CNS dynamics-namely,
that is, passage of calcium and other small ions through their membrane
channels, resulting in a spatially patterned local release of inflammatory
or vasoactive substances from structures in the skin and its vasculature.
Learning to do this could be viewed as analogous, perhaps, to the situation
in early development, which Stapp portrays as consisting in substantial part
of the child's gradually learning how to bring mental events or intentions
into proper correspondence with environmental events by selecting the
appropriate large-scale patterns of brain activity. Analogous special situa­
tions can perhaps also be identified in adult life, as for example in the con­
scious use of feedback signals to develop exquisitely detailed voluntary con­
trol of single motor units (Basmajian, 1977). It is interesting in this regard,
and consistent with Stapp's general outlook, that rare phenomena such as
the formation of hypnotic blisters of specific geometric shape seem to occur
mainly under conditions of extreme attention to, or preoccupation with,
the relevant psychological material. The same sort of explanation might
extend naturally to other phenomena of extreme psychophysical influence
discussed in Chapters 3 and 8, including stigmata and allied phenomena,
transitional phenomena such as the "maternal impression" cases, and per­
haps even PK-type events occurring further outside one's own body.29 We
will give additional examples as we proceed.
To summarize the argument so far: Although many important issues
clearly remain to be resolved, Stapp and his quantum-theoretic allies have
already successfully undermined the basic-science foundations of present­
day materialist-monist psychology and neuroscience. In so doing they also
have opened a path toward alternative mind-brain theories of dualist-inter­
actionist character that are more consistent both with fundamental science
and with everyday experience, and that have the potential to explain at least
some of the critical empirical phenomena catalogued in this book. Surely
these are enormous theoretical virtues. There seems to be no insuperable
obstacle to moving further in this direction, and we will now attempt to do
so.
The basic pathway for reconciling the Myers/James filter theory with
neuroscience seems clear enough in principle: Brain processes somehow
shape the manner in which the associated psychic entity variably manifests
its intrinsic properties and capabilities in the form of our ordinary or "supra-

29. Clearly on this view the occurrence of such phenomena depends partly on conditions
within the mind or consciousness of the agent, partly on conditions having to do with the
character of the targeted physical system itself, and partly, perhaps, on the availability of
appropriate feedback. This invites further work, both theoretical and experimental, to delin­
eate more precisely what the relevant conditions are, and how they can be instantiated or
exploited experimentally. We also note in passing that this sort of view seems to us prefer­
able to the view apparently held by Myers (HP, vol. 2, pp. 505-554), according to which the
Subliminal Self consciously manipulates all necessary low-level details of the neural and bio­
chemical machinery in order to produce the targeted effects.
 Toward a Psychology for the 21 st Century-61 7

liminal" conscious mental life. The "permeability" o f the "membrane" that

Myers conceptualized in psychological terms as modulating supraliminal
expression of the Subliminal Self would thus have its neurophysiological
counterpart in some aspect or aspects of brain activity. Effects of evolu­
tion, development, fatigue, fasting, psychedelics, meditation, thumps on the
head, electrical brain stimulation, and the like all seem potentially inter­
pretable in such terms.30 But the broad and abstract justification deriving
from James's ( 1898/1900) original argument (that such correlations can be
interpreted in terms of permission or transmission rather than production
theories) is not sufficient for our present purposes. We want now to get
at least in outline a more detailed positive characterization of how such a
mind-brain system might normally operate, and try to reconcile that with a
broad range of existing neuroscientific data. The ultimate goal would be to
explain in a quite specific way, for example, why it is that conscious experi­
ence of such-and-such types should be correlated with the patterns of brain
activation revealed by functional neuroimaging studies, and why specific
types of brain injury produce the kinds of alterations of mental function­
ing that they do. The following pages suggest possible elements of such a
reconciliation.
We will start by rejecting the extreme localizationism characteristic of
much recent research and theory in cognitive neuroscience. Functional neu­
roimaging and neuropsychological studies are commonly regarded, espe­
cially by cognitive psychologists, as providing conclusive and unqualified
support for the view that the mind is entirely "modular" in its constitution
and generated by corresponding structures and processes in the nervous
system. The brain itself is typically conceived by such persons as a function­
ally complete system of "organs of computation" developed over the course
of biological evolution for performance of particular, highly specialized,
computational tasks. The postulated organs or modules thus represent the
neurophysiological implementation of some cognitive model or models of
the box-and-arrow variety, where the boxes represent supposed cognitive
components and the arrows represent relations among them, directions of
"information flow," and the like (J. Fodor, 1 983; Pinker, 1 997; see Chapter 1).
It is further presumed that brain activities portrayed in the model give rise
to, or in some sense are, the associated mental activities and experiences.
The confidence that many scientists apparently have in such a picture,
however, is quite unwarranted: In the first place, James's ( 1898/1900) origi­
nal argument does show that even if the correlations between brain activity
and mental activity were as detailed, clear, and compelling as many people
imagine them to be, that would not of itself be sufficient to establish the
production model as against a permission or transmission model. Further­
more, things are in fact anything but that clear, and they become less so as
we move toward the more central attributes of the mind.

30. Following Myers, we presume that the intelligence which determines precisely what
products of subliminal activity achieve supraliminal expression under particular brain condi­
tions is itself subliminal.
6 1 8-Chapter 9

The widely cited views of 1. Fodor (1983) concerning "modularity" are

much more subtle than most of those who casually cite him realize. Fodor
himself attributed modularity (as defined by most or all of nine specific
criteria) only to the hierarchically organized and relatively hardwired per­
ceptual (and presumably motor) systems, and he in fact specifically denied
that the central domains of the mental have these characteristics. For these
more crucial general-purpose or "horizontal" capacities, such as memory,
thinking, and imagination, the association with brain activity seemed to
Fodor himself relatively global and nonspecific. Furthermore, in his judg­
ment the failure of cognitive science to deal adequately with these capacities
over decades of work had been "pretty nearly absolute" (p. 1 26)-indeed,
so much so that he gloomily concluded: "The ghost has been pushed fur­
ther back into the machine, but it has not been exorcised" (p. 1 27). Hard­
core adherents of the CTM have of course berated Fodor for not attributing
modularity to the mind itself (see, e.g., Cain, 2002, pp. 194-208), but his
own more recent statements have become if anything even stronger. For
example, in Fodor (2001) he explicitly repudiates the CTM in both its clas­
sical/symbolic and connectionist forms, and declares in conclusion: "So far,
what our cognitive science has found out about the mind is mostly that we
don't know how it works" (p. 100).
Fodor's original characterization remains largely applicable today,
despite two further decades of work supported by the advent of the new
functional neuroimaging technologies. In cognitive neuroscience generally
and in functional neuroimaging studies in particular, the modularity doc­
trine has held up best with regard to early-stage sensory functions and the
like, and relatively poorly with regard to the mind proper. This pessimis­
tic view of the situation is argued forcefully in an important critical book
by psychologist William Uttal (2001), which should be required reading
for anyone interested in these issues.31 Most of the mind-imaging industry,
Uttal argues, consists of attempts to correlate poorly defined psychological
constructs with poorly defined and indirect measures of neural activity. On
the psychological side, for example, there is theoretical chaos. Many work­
ers have sought to identify "components" of the mind, supposedly distinct
cognitive functions potentially identifiable with particular brain regions or
structures. However, there is little or no evidence of progress toward agree­
ment as to how many such components exist or what they do. The numbers
of components proposed by different investigators mainly reflect their per­
sonal interests, industriousness, methodological commitments, and so on,
and have ranged from a few to literally hundreds. Both Uttal (2001) and Pols
(1998) argue for the contrasting view, which we share, that mind proper has a
fundamentally unitary character underlying the diversity of its appearances
as mind-in-action. That is, existing taxonomies of supposed mental "com-

3 1 . We refer here especially to Uttal's discussion of experimental and logical issues in neu­
roimaging research; better introductions to the imaging techniques themselves can be found
elsewhere. Related diatribes regarding problems in neuroimaging research can be found at
http://www.human-brain.org.
 Toward a P sycholog y for the 2 1 st Century-6 1 9

ponents" mainly reify aspects o r properties of the mind that are brought
into action under particular task conditions or circumstances. 32
Things are hardly better on the neurophysiological side, despite the
sophistication and elegance of the new functional neuroimaging technolo­
gies. The dramatic and modular-looking "brain activation" pictures now
routinely displayed in fMRIIPET imaging articles in our journals and news
media are often seriously misleading. The brain does not neatly decom­
pose either anatomically or functionally, especially at the cortical level,
into well-delineated structures or regions that are identifiable with specific
components of mind and whose contributions to cognitive performances
can be inserted or removed without influence on the rest of the system. The
appearances of modularity in these images in fact result to a considerable
and insufficiently appreciated degree from the complex processes involved
in image acquisition and analysis itself.
Measuring brain "activation" is not a simple or standardized process
l ike reading a meter on a physical instrument or performing routine assays
of blood chemistry. The intrinsic resolution of the imaging hardware is
compromised by preliminary data-conditioning operations such as spatial
and temporal smoothing or filtering, and there are deep statistical issues,
with no fully satisfactory solutions, related to control of Type I and Type 2
errors (false positives and false negatives) in final images that may still con­
tain hundreds or even thousands of correlated elements. Small variations
in a long sequence of analytical decisions can result in strikingly different­
looking final maps, each portraying well-demarcated regions that ostensi­
bly contain all the physiologically "significant" activation, from the same
raw image data. Attempts to overcome the high variability of anatomical
and functional organization across subjects by mapping their individual
data onto standardized brains or coordinate systems can result in spurious
"localizations" existing in none of them. The mechanisms of neurovascular
coupling that underlie the measured responses are extremely complex and
only partly understood, involve multiple layers of interdependent mechanism
operating on different spatial and temporal scales, and may differ in detail
from region to region and even across layers of the cortex. The measured
responses themselves are spatially and temporally imprecise, relate only
indirectly to the neural activity of primary interest, and correlate well only
in limiting cases with more direct measures of neuroelectrical activity such
as EEG and MEG (Huettell et aI., 2004; Nunez & Silberstein, 2000; Wikswo
et aI., 1993). PET and fMRI also have little capacity at present to distinguish
between excitatory and inhibitory neural activity within a given brain area

32. Analogous comments certainly apply to our presently impoverished means for describ­
ing and differentiating states of consciousness in general. Similar positions as to the uni­
tary character of mind were staked out much earlier by commentators such as James ( l890b),
McDougall (191 1/1961), and Broad (1925/1960). Uttal himself concludes that we should fall
back to a more sophisticated form of behaviorism (p. 206); however, his working list of the
great questions of scientific psychology (his Appendix A) suggests that he may also be open to
more radical theoretical options of the sort we are advocating here, at least if they are forced
upon us by data (as we believe they are).
62O---h
-C apter 9

or to track the rapidly changing patterns of functional interaction between

areas. As pointed out in Chapter 4, the widely-used "subtraction" method­
ology (Kosslyn, 1 994; Posner & Raichle, 1994) is both logically unsound
and neurophysiologic ally implausible, and "double-dissociation" imaging
studies suffer from logical problems similar to those previously identified
in the context of neuropsychological investigations of the effects of brain
injury (Shallice, 1 988). Replicability of imaging results is also far lower than
commonly assumed, and not only between but also within subjects. Many of
these concerns, we must add, apply even in the realm of early-stage sensory
processes, where the localizationist picture is most nearly correct.
Despite the great promise of the new functional neuroimaging tech­
niques, we are still on a steep learning curve and a long way from having
them under full control. Meanwhile, the overall state of evidence supporting
localizationist views of the mind is far less clear and compelling than typi­
cal journal articles and textbook accounts suggest. Chapter 4, for example,
demonstrated in some detail that this generalization holds even in relation
to the representation of linguistic functions, historically the primary inspi­
ration for such views. Furthermore, what evidence remains for modularity
often can be accounted for equally well by distributed network models that
are potentially consistent with our more "global" view of mind-brain inter­
action (Farah, 1 994; Plaut & Farah, 1 990; Van Orden, Jansen op de Haar, &
Bosman, 1 997). Some additional imaging findings also seem conspicuously
more consistent with such a view-for example, recent findings on binocu­
lar rivalry, switching of response patterns to ambiguous figures such as the
Necker cube, and the work on self-directed neuroplasticity. The key feature
common to these is that massive changes occur in the overall patterns of
brain response to an unchanging stimulus, changes that reflect the subject's
altered perception or judgment.
Neurophysiological studies of the consequences of brain injury point,
we think, in similar directions. It is certainly true that deficits resulting from
similar injuries tend to be more alike, and in characteristic ways, than defi­
cits resulting from very dissimilar ones, but this generalization again holds
best for injuries to relatively peripheral parts of the sensory and motor sys­
tems. Although the whole subj ect is clouded by difficulties related to precise
specification of the brain injuries that have actually occurred, together with
their local and distant sequelae in space and time, the higher mental func­
tions seem rarely if ever to be totally destroyed (short, that is, of death or
permanent vegetative states), and there is enormous and largely unexplained
variability both between and within individuals who have suffered serious
injuries of any particular type. Indeed, as indicated in Chapter 4, in the
relatively few cases in which the overall condition of such persons has been
investigated or reported in adequate depth, it is hard not to be impressed by
the degree to which the core of self and mind can sometimes be preserved,
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-62 1

even in combination with catastrophic brain injuries including separation

of the hemispheres (H. Gardner, 1976).33
In sum, far from supporting the idea that cognition is entirely and
extremely modular in its organization, with patterns ofbrain activity directly
reflecting that modularity, modern neuroimaging and neuropsychological
studies have instead provided evidence that the association between con­
scious, effortful mental activity and brain activity is more global in char­
acter. The broad consensus that has recently emerged around the family of
neurophysiological "global workspace" theories in part reflects an increas­
ing recognition that this is the case.
The anatomical makeup of the global workspace varies to some extent
dynamically, in accord with the demands imposed by ongoing activity, but
it is noteworthy that by all accounts it invariably includes areas such as
frontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex whose total volume has greatly
increased in the course of mammalian evolution-that is, areas of "uncom­
mitted," "association," or "intrinsic" cortex above and beyond those specif­
ically dedicated to the more modular and hard-wired pathways and mech­
anisms associated with more peripheral parts of the sensory and motor
systems. The functional architecture of this tissue is substantially uniform,
with the same cell types, patterns of microconnectivity, neurotransmit­
ter/receptor mechanisms, and columnar organization repeated everywhere
(Edelman & Mountcastle, 1 982). It seems clear that the normal supraliminal
expression of mind proper depends strongly, in a manner like that suggested
by global workspace theories, on the total amount and functional status
of this more general-purpose tissue. General intelligence, for example, has
long been known to correlate modestly (around .4) with overall brain size,
and recent work has shown this relationship to be driven primarily by the
volume of areas belonging to the global workspace, especially frontal cortex
(Haier et aI., 2004). In this respect, global workspace theories in fact match
up rather well with the views of Myers and Bergson, who viewed the brain
as predominantly a sensorimotor device, the "organ of attention to life," an
instrument adapted by evolution to enable the mind to gain information
about, and to act upon, the everyday physical environment. Mainstream
global-workspace theorists themselves of course invariably accept the more
fundamental orthodox conception that the underlying brain activity itself,
whatever its form, produces or in some sense is the corresponding mental
activity. Rej ection of that deeper view, however, we regard as necessitated
by the other lines of evidence marshaled earlier in this book.

33. James ( l890b, vol. I , pp. 141-142) went so far as to suggest that the preserved concept
of a lost or diminished mental function may somehow participate directly in the recovery of
that function through appropriate repairs or modifications of the associated brain activity.
We think this idea has merit, as did Myers (189Ic, p. 1 16), but Myers was also certainly correct
in cautioning as to the practical difficulties in evaluating it (see also Finger, LeVere, Almli,
& Stein, 1988).
622-Chapter 9

We think this modified-holist view of mind-brain relations is substan­

tially correct.34 Before taking it further in a dualist-interactionist direction,
however, we must first deal with another possible conceptual obstacle. At
the time of the Principles William James (1 890b) was very sympathetic to
pictures of this general sort. In describing the generic dualist-interactionist
or "soul" theory, the sort of view unhesitatingly endorsed both by virtually
all ordinary persons and by the scholastic philosophers, he said:

If there be such entities . . .they may possibly be affected by the manifold

occurrences that go on in the nervous centers. To the state of the entire
brain at a given moment they may respond by inward modifications of
their own. These changes of state may be pulses of consciousness, cogni­
tive of objects few or many, simple or complex.. . .I confess, therefore, that
to posit a soul influenced in some mysterious way by the brain-states and
responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line
of least logical resistance, so far as we have yet attained. (vol. I, p. 181)

Despite the appeal that such a theory clearly held for him, James declined
to accept it, offering instead his famous doctrine of the stream of conscious­
ness, according to which the only thinker that psychology needed to recog­
nize became the thought itself. Only much later did James give full expres­
sion to the logical scruple that had prevented him from endorsing dualism, a
difficulty whose seriousness is underscored by the fact that George Mandler
(1 978) made it the centerpiece of his hostile commentary on the dualism of
Popper and Eccles (1 977). Here is James's (190911971) statement:

It is not for idle or fantastical reasons that the notion of the substantial
soul, so freely used by common men and the more popular philosophies,
has fallen upon such evil days, and has no prestige in the eyes of critical
thinkers. It only shares the fate of other unrepresentable substances and
principles. They are without exception all so barren that to sincere inquir­
ers they appear as little more than names masquerading- Wo die Begri/fe
fehlen da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein. You see no deeper into
the fact that a hundred sensations get compounded or known together by
thinking that a "soul" does the compounding than you see into a man's
living eighty years by thinking of him as an octogenarian, or into our hav­
ing five fingers by calling us pentadactyls. Souls have worn out both them­
selves and their welcome, that is the plain truth. Philosophy ought to get
the manifolds of experience unified on principles less empty. Like the word

34. "Holism," according to which the brain acts as an undifferentiated whole, goes back
to antiquity and has waned and waxed and waned again in popularity across the history of
modern neuroscience. The 19th century witnessed an upsurge of localization driven by the
early discoveries of people like Fritsch and Hitzig, Broca, and Wernicke, but this produced
an extreme holistic backlash in the 20th at the hands of Pierre Marie, Kurt Goldstein, Henry
Head, and Karl Lashley. Lashley's famously unsuccessful effort to locate "engrams" (mem­
ory traces) in animal brains was particularly influential in American psychology during the
behaviorist period, but localizationists regained the ascendancy during the cognitive revolu­
tion. Current global workspace theories thus represent a compromise position, with partial
reversion toward holism.
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-623

"cause," the word "soul" is but a theoretic stopgap-it marks a place and
claims it for a future explanation to occupy. (p. 221)

The problem is essentially that in taking a dualistic-interactionist posi­

tion on the mind we may seem simply to be giving up, in effect moving things
that we might have hoped to explain in terms of brain processes and the
like into an inaccessible inner realm. We do not accept this objection, how­
ever: In the first place, it seems to us clear that the conventional physicalist
approaches themselves are not adequate to the task, and that the richness of
the conscious human mind simply cannot be explained by homunculus-free
computational models or by classical mechanical brain-processes operating
alone. Like McDougall ( 1 91 111961, p. 362), who specifically rebuked James
for giving up the idea of a psychic being or soul, we think that psychology
must postulate minds or psyches to explain some of its most significant men­
tal and behavioral phenomena (including "rogue" phenomena of the sorts
catalogued in this book), just as physics postulates unobservable entities
and processes to help explain its observable phenomena. The work of Henry
Stapp and allied quantum theorists provides strong additional warrant for
this attitude (and see also Braude, 2003, chap. 9).
The picture we are moving to is thus that the main dispositional prop­
erties or capabilities of the mind (1. Fodor, 1 983) reside in the associated
psychic entity, which is at least in part outside the brain as conventionally
conceived. We normally experience these capabilities as they express them­
selves in conjunction with our organism, in a manner determined at least in
part by its ongoing states and processes, as suggested above and discussed in
greater detail below. The capabilities in question specifically include mem­
ory, thinking, and the cosmogonic imagination or "virtual-reality" system.
More elaborate inventories of the attributes of mind have been presented by
McDougall ( 1 9 1 1 /196\), Broad ( 1 92511960, 1 962), Stevenson (198 1), and Pols
( 1 998), along with a half-dozen or so of the psychologists and neuroscientists
canvassed by Uttal (200\). Pols (1 998), for example, building upon the inven­
tory given by Descartes in book I I of the Meditations, says:

Here, then, is a list of the mind's functions, not perhaps as comprehensive

as it could be, but more comprehensive than most such lists; mind knows,
makes (that is, forms, produces, creates), understands, thinks, conceives,
perceives, remembers, anticipates, believes, doubts, attends, intends,
affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines, values, judges, and feels. (p. 98)

Pols emphasizes that these attributes, though distinguishable, are overlap­

ping and interconnected rather than discrete or separable, and can be viewed
for the most part as modes of operation of a more pervasive conscious unity.
He is close to McDougall (191 111961) in this, though much more detailed.
The normal mind-brain relationship is certainly one of peculiar mutual
dependence and intimacy. That was very clear to Descartes himself:
"Nature . . . teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc. , that
I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very
624-Chapter 9

closely united to it, and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to

compose with it one whole" (Haldane & Ross, 1 93 1 , vol. 1 , p. 1 92). This inti­
macy unfortunately disappeared from many later dualistic accounts includ­
ing in particular that of Eccles, who often speaks in terms of a completely
disembodied "self-conscious mind" that stands apart from and inspects or
influences the activity of cortical columns, rather like an immaterial piano­
player playing the keys of the bodily piano. That sort of picture is clearly
no good, because except by way of very indirect technical arrangements we
normally have no conscious contact whatsoever with low-level physiologi­
cal events occurring in our brains. Eccles's picture also seems inconsistent
with many neuropsychological phenomena such as the confusion that typi­
cally accompanies hemineglect due to parietal-lobe injuries (Stapp, 2004a,
p. 167).
Problems of this sort can probably be circumvented, however. Gauld
(1968) points out that a person can be conceived as relating to his brain in
more intimate fashion, perhaps in a manner somewhat analogous to that
of a parasite to its host, and that such a picture could potentially accom­
modate many relevant facts of neuropsychology: "Malfunctioning of a
host may cause malfunctioning of a parasite, and vice-versa; none the less,
malfunctioning host and malfunctioning parasite might regain their health
if they were separated. Similarly, could a person disengage himself from
his damaged brain, he might once more function properly" (at least tem­
porarily, we might add) (p. 348). Something very much like the latter in
fact appears to happen in the case of NDEs occurring under conditions of
cardiac arrest or general anesthesia (Chapter 6). Philosopher C. D. Broad
(1925/1960, 1 962) repeatedly invoked the somewhat similar metaphor of a
chemical compound, which in some respects seems slightly better: In the
formation of table salt from sodium and chlorine, for example, a unique
entity, something distinctly new, emerges. The components may also give up
something in forming the compound, but they retain their separate identi­
ties and the potential to revert to their previous dissociated state. That is,
there is also a dynamic aspect, with the components able to exist either con­
joined or apart, and a sort of "energy hump" in between so that they tend to
do one or the other depending on whatever conditions are relevant.
The very biological-looking critical-period aspect of cases of the rein­
carnation type (Stevenson, 1 997, 2001), in which pre-existing memories of a
previous life seem to get progressively overlaid by the subsequent learning of
the new personality, appears consistent with such a metaphor. Here it looks
as though what otherwise might normally be a fast and automatic forgetting
process is somehow getting interrupted or delayed. The high incidence in
such cases of violent death in the previous personality is especially intrigu­
ing in this regard.35 More generally, the notion that we begin neonatal life

35. See especially Stevenson (1997). There may also be a parallel here with trance medium­
ship, in that a number of the really successful communicators such as "G.P." (see Gauld, 1968,
1982) have also suffered violent or sudden death. Perhaps "unfinished business" is somehow
conducive to remembering, as in the well-known "Zeigarnik" effect.
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-625

with a great deal of our personality already in place is broadly consistent

with recent trends in developmental psychology, and Stevenson (2000) has
pointed out a variety of ways in which the reincarnation hypothesis could
potentially explain residual variability not otherwise explainable in terms of
"normal" genetic or environmental factors.
Taking the "entry" metaphor seriously requires us to predict that corre­
sponding phenomena of "withdrawal" may sometimes occur. For example,
in persons suffering from progressive senile dementias it may sometimes
happen that the mind of the dying person becomes disengaged sufficiently
from the diseased brain, near the point of death, that relatively normal func­
tioning briefly reappears (provided that suitable expressive capacities are
still available). Phenomena of this type were already being reported by early
observers such as de Boismont (1 859), Flournoy ( 1903), and Rush (1812),
as mentioned in Chapter 6, and recent interactions between several of the
authors of the present book and medical personnel at several hospices and
clinics strongly suggest that such phenomena are still occurring and poten­
tially accessible to systematic study. Severe Alzheimer-type neuropathology
has also sometimes been found in autopsies of persons exhibiting normal or
even above-normal pre-mortem mental function (Davis, Schmitt, Wekstein,
& Markesberg, 1 999). Mental revivals in the context of severe neurodegen­
erative disease clearly merit further research, not least because materialist
critics such as Edwards (1996, chap. 17) have emphatically denied that they
can occur.
The everyday or supraliminal self as we normally experience it comes
into conscious action in conjunction with the associated brain, whenever
that brain achieves some threshold level of overall activation or "arousal"
characterized by the predominance of intrinsic electrical rhythms of
roughly 8-12 Hz and higher. All the major proposals regarding neurophysi­
ological correlates of normal conscious experience point to the importance
of synchronous (or at least coherent) neural oscillations in the gamma fre­
quency range, oscillations that link and perhaps somehow "bind" the elec­
trical activity of widely distributed regions of the brain. In the context of the
non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist model this suggests that there is nor­
mally some sort of mutually constraining or resonant linkage between this
large-scale brain activity and the associated psyche which limits, focuses,
funnels, unifies, and stabilizes the supraliminal mental life, while what­
ever additional strata of mental or psychic organization may be present,
per Myers and James, remain active behind the scenes. The stabilization or
mutual-constraint aspect is revealed, perhaps, by the fact that in NDE cases
involving life-threatening injury, the subject often initially remains at least
briefly in a more or less normal state of consciousness before beginning to
experience the more drastic alterations associated with a full-blown NDE
(Chapter 6). One can also readily imagine, as explicitly suggested by James
(1898/1900), that the normal ongoing interactions between mind and brain
might result in modifications on both sides, although the details of how this
could work again remain obscure.
626-Chapter 9

The patterns of brain activity accompanying normal conscious experi­

ence also seem to have an overall functional architecture that in a mean­
ingful sense is parallel to, or isomorphic with, the characteristic perceiver/
perceived or knower/known phenomenological structure of that experience.
At least two proposals from recent mainstream literature in neurophysiol­
ogy are consistent with this basic idea. Crick and Koch (2003) explicitly
acknowledge this universal phenomenological property, which they call the
"homuncular" structure of experience, and suggest that it probably reflects
some large-scale feature of brain organization. They themselves think it may
reflect the fact that the front of the brain, more involved in executive func­
tions and the like, is "looking at" activity in the back of the brain, which
contains the main sensory systems. This rough and metaphorical way of
formulating the basic idea seems broadly consistent with most current con­
sciousness theories of the global workspace type. A more elaborate and neu­
rophysiologically justified model, however, flows from the specific variant of
workspace theory deriving from Penfield (1 975), Newman and Baars (1993),
and especially Llimis et al. (1998), which emphasizes the role of the extended
reticular activating system and the massive reciprocal connections linking
the thalamus with the cerebral cortex. Llimis's group has discovered a thala­
mocortical "scanning" rhythm, in the neighborhood of 40 Hz, which sweeps
repeatedly across the cortex in a front-to-back direction (Joliot, Ribary, &
Llimls, 1 994). They interpret this as a process by which a thalamus-driven
readout mechanism periodically interrogates the cortex and synthesizes or
binds the various processes going on there into the momentary global state.
Apart from the physiological evidence directly supporting it, this proposal,
unlike that of Crick and Koch (2003), is also consistent with a large body
of clinical evidence showing that small lesions in the upper brainstem and
thalamus completely abolish ordinary consciousness itself, whereas cortical
lesions, even large ones, typically abolish or alter only relatively specific ele­
ments of its phenomenological content.
The Llinas model also maps fairly well onto a sizeable body of data
regarding "the psychological moment" (Stroud, 1955). In simple reaction­
time experiments, for example, the within-subject distribution across trials
of the time it takes to press a button in response to a flash or tone turns out
not to be continuous, as initially expected, but to consist instead of multiple
discrete peaks separated by intervals of a few tens of milliseconds (Dehaene,
1993). Another example is provided by the "wagon-wheel" illusion often
seen in movies, in which the wheels of the stagecoach seem to turn errati­
cally, or even in the wrong direction. This previously had been thought due
entirely to "aliasing" effects associated with the varying relations between
the rate of rotation of the wheel and the fixed presentation rate of the movie
frames, but it turns out to occur even with wheel-like visual objects that
rotate continuously under continuous illumination (Purves, Paydartar, &
Andrews, 1996). The conclusion appears inescapable that there is an inher­
ent discreteness in sensorimotor activity, corresponding in a striking way to
James's notion of "pulses of consciousness." Note also that effects of this
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-627

sort, variable between individuals and tasks, are inherent in Stapp's model,
inasmuch as Process I in itself imposes a task-dependent framing on the
otherwise continuous evolution of Process 2.36
Even when the normal, ongoing adult engagement of mind and brain is
in force (whatever that relationship amounts to in detail), the mind appears
to retain at least a limited ability to operate more independently, and poten­
tially in very different ways, when that engagement is altered or ruptured
in various ways by changes in the functional status of the brain. The dra­
matic and rapid within-subject fluctuations in mental status often observed
in brain-damaged patients (H. Gardner, 1976), for example, might reflect
corresponding fluctuations in patients' capacities to interact normally with
their malfunctioning brains. Sleep and dreams also can clearly be thought
about in this way-a kind of regulated quasi-periodic "stretching" or other
modification of the normal linkage-and certainly the lack of satisfactory
progress on these subjects despite a century or so of serious scientific effort
provides motivation to try thinking about them in a new and different way.
Slow-wave sleep, for example, involves significant modifications in the over­
all level and pattern of brain activity, modifications that partially mimic
those produced by general anesthesia, and these non-REM sleep states are
already known to be accompanied by fragmentary mental activity very
different in character from that of ordinary dreams (Foulkes, 1 962). Vivid
REM-sleep dreaming itself, interestingly, has recently been shown in both
imaging (A. R. Braun et ai., 1 998) and neuropsychological (Solms, 1997)
studies to be associated with reduced activity in prefrontal and occipital cor­
tex, consistent with Myers's principle that the subliminal is liberated by the
abeyance of the supraliminal and its associated forms of outwardly directed
activity. Recently identified phenomena of "paradoxical function facilita­
tion," in which previously unrecognized skills or abilities emerge following
brain injury (Kapur, 1 996; B. L. Miller et ai., 1 998), may in some cases merit
a similar interpretation.
The "dreams" that are sometimes reported as occurring in connection
with general anesthesia itself also deserve more careful study than they have
received to date, to characterize more precisely their phenomenological
properties and physiological conditions of occurrence. For these to occur
at all under conditions of deep general anesthesia would conflict-like the
occurrence of NDEs (Chapter 6)-with current neuroscientific opinion
regarding conditions necessary for conscious experience. They would be
expected, however, from the Myers/James point of view, and especially in
persons open to subliminal influence, such as persons of high "translimi­
nality," with thin or permeable "boundaries." An observation consistent

36. Another possible manifestation of this "framing" process is the EEG "microstates" dis­
covered by Dietrich Lehmann and colleagues (Lehmann, Ozaki, & Pal, 1987; Pascual-Mar­
qui, Michel, & Lehmann, 1 995). These are brief episodes of relatively stable topography in
the scalp-recorded potential field, lasting on the order of 50-ISO milliseconds and separated
by sharp transitions. The manner and degree to which such segmentation of scalp potential
fields corresponds to the rapidly changing structure of conscious experience remains to be
determined, however.
628-Chapter 9

with this expectation is provided by Hejja and Galloon (1975), who showed
that "dreaming" in conjunction with ketamine anesthesia occurred over­
whelmingly among patients who also recalled dreaming at home. A ful l 50
of their reported ketamine dreams occurred among the 68 patients who
also reported dreaming at home, while only two others were reported by an
additional 82 patients who did not.
The NDE literature (Chapter 6) further indicates that the normal link­
age can sometimes be so severely stretched or otherwise modified that the
mental system spontaneously begins to operate in radically different ways.
It seems especially significant in this regard that NDEs involving subjec­
tively enhanced cognitive functioning tend to occur more commonly in per­
sons who in fact are closer to death physiologically (Owens et a!., 1 990). But
NDEs can also occur in persons who are continuously and fully conscious,
as for example in mountain climbers during serious falls, and similar experi­
ences also can arise following ingestion of various psychedelic agents, and
in connection with transformative practices such as meditation, where their
physiological accompaniments are surely very different and can more read­
ily be studied in detail and across time (Chapter 8). The sheer diversity of
circumstances under which similar kinds of experience can occur itself sug­
gests that their common cause may involve some overall alteration of the
normal mind-brain relationship, rather than engagement of specific neuro­
physiological final common pathways or mechanisms.
The strength of mind-brain coupling may also vary systematically
between persons in ways that could be measured, and that might again shed
light on the nature of the coupling itself. Successful trance mediums like
Mrs. Piper, for example, might be viewed (and were viewed by Myers) as
persons in whom the coupling is unusually "loose," permitting the psyche to
disengage partially or wholly from its customary entanglements and thus to
provide temporary access for potential "communicators."37 Unfortunately,
practically nothing of significance is presently known about the great trance
mediums (or for that matter about exceptional psi subjects of any other kind)
in terms of relevant characteristics of physiological function, personality, or
cognitive style.
Our basic functional picture of the normal waking situation, like that
of most neuroscientists including Crick and Koch (2003) in their discussion
of "zombie modes," is that mind and consciousness get involved in ongoing
activity only to the extent they need to, while things that are simple, or fully
learned or overlearned, can run on more or less automatically via brain
processes. Such a division of labor can readily be accommodated within
the basic framework of Stapp's model, because to the degree that the pro­
liferation of possible brain states by Process 2 is directly constrained by
interactions between the organism and its environment, the need for Pro-

37. Conversely, aphasia-like phenomena which often accompany the emergence of a new
communicator (such as difficulties in speaking or writing the right words) might be viewed
as expressions of the difficulties that psyche encounters in "operating" a partly unfamiliar
organism. See Myers (HP, vol. 2, p. 254) for some interesting remarks on this subject.
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-629

cess 1 contributions would be correspondingly reduced. Such a picture is

consistent not only with everyday experiences such as driving a car while
carrying on a conversation, but also with neuroimaging results showing that
the numerous and widely distributed brain territories initially engaged by a
complex task massively deactivate and contract as the task is progressively
mastered (e.g., Haier et aI., 1 992; John, 1976). Consistent with our modi­
fied-holist view, this looks more like changing degrees of engagement of one
large, common structure than all-or-none selective engagement/disengage­
ment of highly localized and specific computational "modules." Similarly,
human cortical neurons involved in working-memory tasks have recently
been shown to produce gamma-band EEG activity under all the task condi­
tions, but in amounts proportional to the overall memory "load" associated
with each task (Howard et aI., 2003). Another relevant observation involves
electrical stimulation of the small thalamic regions that produce petit mal
epileptic "absences"; Penfield (1 975, pp. 37-43) interpreted this as reversibly
disrupting the connection of mind to brain and releasing the brain as a kind
of sensorimotor automaton to operate temporarily on its own, for example
in playing the piano or driving a car (both poorly, in the absence of the nor­
mal conscious fine-tuning).
We have now said about as much as we need to, or at this point usefully
can, in terms of justifying the non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist model
and fleshing it out in neurophysiological terms. Although we have perhaps
made some progress in this regard, it is only candid to acknowledge that we
ourselves remain less than fully satisfied with this approach. The traditional
dualist problems regarding mental causation and energy conservation seem
to be overcome, but there remain further deep problems with no good solu­
tions in sight. We still have no real understanding of the ultimate nature of
the relationship between brain processes and mental activity, and certainly
no solution of Chalmers's "hard problem"-why conscious experiences with
their specific qualitative characteristics should arise at all in connection
with the associated patterns of brain activity. It is not clear which aspects
of the "cognitive unconscious" go with the brain, which with the associated
psyche, and how their respective contributions get coordinated. We have
talked about mind-brain relations primarily in relation to the functioning of
an adult human, presuming the existence of an associated psyche, but where
do these psyches come from in the course of individual human development,
or in the evolution of species? Where and how, exactly, does consciousness
enter the picture? These are difficult problems, to say the least (and see Grif­
fin, 1 997, chap. 3, for related discussion). Finally, we have said practically
nothing about further difficult problems having to do with the properties of
that adult psyche itself. We conceive that the psyche or at least some part of
it may be capable of operating in some fashion on its own, independent of
the brain, but what could be the character or mode of subsistence of such
an entity? Broad (1962, Epilogue), who discusses this problem in consider­
able depth, ultimately adopts the conventional scientific view (disputed by
Braude, 2003, pp. 294-301) that any dispositional properties of a mind must
63O-Chapter 9

be grounded in or explained by minute structure and processes in some sort

of material substrate. From this viewpoint, post-mortem survival of human
personality or consciousness would necessarily occur in conjunction with
some sort of "subtle" physical body or bodies, perhaps of the types con­
ceived by the wisdom traditions and summarized by Poortman (195411978).
Although such a picture does not seem to be ruled out by our present knowl­
edge of physics, and deserves further investigation, we suspect that a more
fundamentally novel way of approaching the problems may in the end yield
a better solution. We turn next to this.

Neutral-Monist Models

The key to moving in this more radical direction is to recognize that

our entire discussion of non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist models has
implicitly, and perhaps mistakenly, taken the classical "matter" side of the
Cartesian bifurcation for granted. To recapitulate: The body conceived con­
ventionally as a physiological machine has proven unable to account for
all the properties of minds, and so we must try to find a different theory
that can better account for the empirical data. In a first attempt to do so
we proceeded in what probably seems the most natural and conservative
direction, at least to most persons reared like ourselves in the intellectual
tradition of Western reductionist science. Specifically, following the main
lead suggested by James (189811900), we left the Cartesian body in place but
re-introduced the psyche, conceived as a second and distinct type of existent
(itself possibly at least in part physical in some extended sense) with which
that body is somehow associated. This approach, however, gave rise to dif­
ficulties analogous to those of the traditional Cartesian causal dilemma.
In particular, we have struggled with only limited success to understand
how and why these two species of existents normally interact in the produc­
tion of conscious mental life. We want now to take a different approach, by
examining more closely the body side of the mind-body relation.
We have all grown accustomed to the idea that the phenomenological
table that we see and touch is not the "real" table, as described by phys­
ics. In this case we have no difficulty accepting that ordinary perceptual
experience is not a reliable guide to the ultimate nature of things. Yet it is
extremely difficult if not impossible for most of us to adopt that same atti­
tude with respect to the phenomenological solidity, the felt presence, of our
own bodies. They seem just inescapably there, brute facts, existing on their
own as classical Cartesian objects. It is this intuition, however, that we will
now challenge.38
To begin, consider the character of what we experience in dreams. Those
of us who dream vividly encounter a phenomenological world similar in

38. For additional help in this regard, see the all-out assault on this everyday intuition by
Harrison (1989).
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-63 1

many salient respects to the world we all experience in the waking state. We
experience ourselves as embodied, and we move purposefully among other
solid, three-dimensional objects, including at times other persons, that
seem to exist independently of ourselves and that also behave for the most
part in more or less customary ways. Both we and the persons we encounter
seem to have both an "outside" and an "inside." If we smash violently into
something, we may appear to bleed, and it usually hurts. Those other per­
sons act as though they have their own thoughts and motivations, and they
sometimes tell us things that we ourselves do not consciously know. Yet all
this vivid dream-world experience, so like what we experience in ordinary
waking life, occurs in the near-total absence of corresponding sensory input
(Globus, 1987).
The seeming reality of the dream of course evaporates, for most of us
anyway, when we awaken in the ordinary way to the phenomenologically
similar world presented in everyday experience. This world seems to most of
us unquestionably real, existing "out there" and independently of ourselves.
Yet as we saw in Chapter 8, great mystics of all traditions have reported
entering states of consciousness relative to which that everyday reality itself
proves evanescent in the same way as a dream. The material world given
in everyday experience, they declare, is not what it seems. Matter as we
customarily experience it does not exist, at least not in the way we naively
believe it to exist.
In our attempt to develop the non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist
model we relied heavily on a first major consequence of quantum theory,
that it brings consciousness back into physics at the foundational level and
in a causally effective manner. There is a second major consequence, how­
ever, no less profound but even less widely appreciated. It is this: There is no
such thing as matter as classically conceived. Physics is not ultimately about
an independently existing objective world of classically conceived material
entities, but rather about our knowledge, and about relationships among
experiences. Thus our ontology, our conception of the basic "stuff" of which
the universe is composed, also must undergo fundamental revision. Stapp
(2004a) summarizes the situation this way:

The physical world thus becomes an evolving structure of information,

and of propensities for experiences to occur, rather than a mechanically
evolving mindless material structure. The new conception essentially ful­
fills the age-old philosophical idea that nature should be made out of a
kind of stuff that combines in an integrated and natural way certain mind­
like and matter-like qualities, without being reduced to either classically
conceived mind or classically conceived matter. (p. 268)

Before proceeding further in this direction we will briefly digress, for

reasons that are both historically and conceptually significant. We are
acutely aware that many scientifically minded readers, even among those
who have stayed with us to this point, may have gagged at our emphasis on
the word "ontology." Ontology is a branch of metaphysics, and scientists
632-Chapter 9

tend to pride themselves on having nothing to do with such arcane matters.

William James himself clearly shared that attitude at the time he was writing
the Principles; in his preface and elsewhere he declares that the proper busi­
ness of psychology as a natural science consists simply in ascertaining the
correlations that ordinarily hold between states of mind and brain-states,
and that to attempt to explain these correlations in terms of anything more
fundamental would be to trespass into metaphysics. But Myers (l89lc), in
his remarkable review of the Principles, chided James for taking this nar­
row view, and for failing to recognize the degree to which more penetrating
empirical investigations of the mind-brain connection might be able to shed
light on its ultimate character. Undoubtedly influenced in considerable part
by Myers, James (1892) by the time of his Briefer Course had already aban­
doned the position adopted in the Principles and concluded that there can in
fact be no such thing as a metaphysics-free science of psychology:

When, then, we talk of "psychology as a natural science" we must not

assume that we mean a sort of psychology that stands at last on solid
ground. It means just the reverse: it means a psychology particularly
fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every
joint, a psychology all of whose elementary assumptions and data must be
reconsidered in wider connections and translated into other terms. (pp.
467-468)

So far we have "only the hope of a science," and its actual state of devel­
opment requires us "to understand how great is the darkness in which we
grope, and never to forget that the natural-science assumptions with which
we started are provisional and revisable things" (James, 1 892, p. 468). In his
Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association in Decem­
ber 1 894 James again stated flatly: "I have become convinced . . .that no con­
ventional restrictions can keep metaphysical and so-called epistemological
inquiries out of the psychology-books" (James, 1 895/1978, p. 88; see also E.
Taylor, 1996, chap. 7). The real issue, in short, is not whether we will have
metaphysics, but whether we will have good metaphysics or bad.
This of course marks the point at which behavioristically oriented his­
torians of psychology characteristically portray James as ceasing to be a
psychologist and becoming instead a "mere" philosopher. But there can be
no doubt that James himself did not see things this way. We have already
shown (Chapter 8) that much of James's later work, especially The Varieties
of Religious Experience (1902/1958) and A Pluralistic Universe (1909/197 1),
can be understood in considerable part as direct applications of Myers's
model of the psyche to problems in religion and philosophy. What we have
not yet emphasized, however, is that there is a further dimension of James's
later work that connects directly with the matters now before us.
Our account of the non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist model rested
directly upon the formulation of "transmission" theory by James (1 898/1900).
Yet even at that early date James was already searching for a way to get
beyond dualism. In a crucial footnote he remarks:
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-633

The philosophically instructed reader will notice that I have all along been
placing myself at the ordinary dualistic point of view of natural science
and of common sense. From this point of view mental facts like feelings
are made of one kind of stuff or substance, physical facts of another. An
absolute phenomenalism, not believing such a dualism to be ultimate, may
possibly end by solving some of the problems that are insoluble when pro­
pounded in dualist terms. (pp. 50-51)

This brief statement encapsulates and foreshadows the doctrine of "radi­

cal empiricism" that James was systematically developing during the last
years of his life. This involved far more than the methodological principle
(which he also endorsed) that we must be willing to look at all relevant data
in approaching any scientific problem. Rather, James was driving toward a
comprehensive metaphysical system grounded wholly and directly in actual
human experience, experience of all forms up to and including mystical
experience (see Perry, 1935, vol. 2, Part 6).
James's ambitious program remained unfinished at his death in 1 910,
but it was subsequently taken up and integrated with emerging develop­
ments in physics by the Anglo-American mathematician, philosopher of
science, and metaphysician Alfred North Whitehead. It is no accident, in
this light, that in his last book Whitehead (193811968, p. 2) identified James
as one of the four greatest thinkers of the Western tradition, along with
Plato, Aristotle, and Leibniz. But Whitehead also had a profound under­
standing of emerging developments in physics and clearly recognized their
ontological implications. His work in fact represents the most systematic
effort to date to elaborate a comprehensive metaphysical system specifically
intended to be compatible both with the new basic science and with all avail­
able facts of human experience.39
Whitehead's system is provisional, unfinished, open-ended, and vast in
scope, but altogether naturalistic in spirit and character. It is far too complex
and difficult to present here in any detail, but we can quickly summarize its
central, driving ideas. The root cause of our present mind-brain difficul­
ties, Whitehead argues, is the ontological bifurcation originally imposed
on nature by Descartes and his 17th-century supernaturalist allies. Classi­
cal physics, as it evolved over subsequent centuries in the work of Galileo,
Newton, Laplace, and their successors, dealt only with the "matter" side of
this Cartesian ontology. But its core concept of lifeless mechanical matter
has now proven to be a vicious abstraction, vitiated by what was left out at
the very beginning. Modern physical theory invites us instead to conceive
of nature as in some sense alive throughout, with even its lowest-level con-

39. Just as we have not taken Henry Stapp to be any sort of final or ultimate authority but
rather as the primary representative of a group of quantum theorists whom we see as moving
in broadly similar directions in regard to mind-brain relations, we are here taking Whitehead
as representative of a larger group of "process" theorists working in what we are calling the
neutral-monist tradition. Among these we include (in addition to Leibniz, the later James,
and Whitehead himself in his Harvard period) major figures such as Charles Sanders Peirce,
Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell, Charles Hartshorne, and David Ray Griffin. We thank Eric
Weiss for particularly helpful comments on this section.
634-Chapter 9

stituents having both exterior/objective and interior/subjective aspects. The

fundamental stuff of the universe, on this view, is not lifeless bits of clas­
sically conceived matter moving in fields of force, but "occasions of expe­
rience." These occasions, from the point of view of other such occasions,
appear as "events." But Whitehead's analysis of events suggests that every
event to some degree "feels" causes from the past, "imagines" possibilities
for the future, and "makes decisions" as to what it will become.4o Thus the
definiteness and particularity that distinguish each event from all others are
precisely a result of its "mental pole," however rudimentary.
Whitehead's fundamental move is thus to re-situate mind in matter as
the fundamental factor by which determinate events emerge out of a back­
ground of possibilities. The behavior of the lowest or most matter-like occa­
sions is determined almost completely by efficient causes from the past; such
an event is influenced by or "feels" its past but engages in an absolute mini­
mum of "imagination" or "decision." There is, however, a creative evolu­
tionary drive inherent in nature which leads to the progressive elaboration,
across time, of more complex events associated with correspondingly more
complex, sophisticated, and self-determining experiential interiors. Events
are interdependent, moreover, in ways more subtle and complex than those
contemplated by Descartes and his modern successors. The classical con­
ception of matter arose predominantly in association with the most recently
evolved forms of perceptual experience, especially vision and hearing, but
these are secondary or derivative acquisitions that do not fully disclose the
nature of the ways in which events can potentially affect each other. They
in fact conceal a profound continuity between ourselves and lower forms
of organization in terms of more primitive forms of interrelatedness and
experience which reflect a global interconnectedness that is fundamental to
nature: "Any local agitation shakes the whole universe. The distant effects
are minute, but they are there" (Whitehead, 1 938/1968, p. 1 3 8).41 The funda­
mental concepts in this "organismic" view of nature are process, activity,
transition, and change, all orchestrated in service of "creative advance."42

40. The scare quotes in this sentence are meant to emphasize that the mentalistic terms
employed here are being used broadly and metaphorically, and not as they would normally
apply to the mental activity of a conscious human being. Row far down nature can plausi­
bly be viewed as manifesting such "mentalistic" properties remains an open question, but
the threshold, if one exists, is undoubtedly much further down than most of us commonly
assume. McDougall (191 111969, pp. 258-260) found signs of unified and purposive behavior
even in one-celled organisms such as the Amoeba and the Paramecium, and Seager (1998)
has advanced somewhat similar arguments in regard to elemental units of inanimate nature
itself.
4 1 . Recall that very similar ideas in regard to "panaesthesia" as a more fundamental or
primitive capacity for experience were expressed by Myers (Chapter 2).
42. Whitehead's magnum opus, Process and Reality (1929/1978), is an extremely difficult
book, but an excellent and readable introduction to his main ideas can be found in his last
book (Whitehead, 1938/1968), especially Chapters 7 and 8. Griffin (1997, 1998, 2000) and
Rosinski (1993) provide accurate and readable secondary sources, and G. R. Lucas (1989) and
Griffin, Cobb, Ford, Gunter, and Ochs (1993) situate his work within the larger philosophic
tradition.
 Toward a Psychology for the 21 st Century-635

It would carry us far beyond the purposes and scope of the present book
to present or discuss Whitehead's views here in greater depth. We certainly
do not mean to endorse his views wholesale, but we do wish to record here
our collective sense that he was moving in a direction that is both theoreti­
cally promising and fundamentally consistent with the ontological impli­
cations of quantum theory. The latter is perhaps especially surprising and
impressive in that Whitehead apparently arrived at his ontological ideas
mainly by generalizing from his own earlier work on relativity theory and
foundational concepts of physics such as space, time, motion, and causal­
ity, rather than by way of quantum theory itself. He was certainly famil­
iar with emerging developments in quantum theory, but he apparently saw
these primarily as illustrating or confirming ideas that he had arrived at on
his own and from a different direction (Y. Lowe, 195 1 , p. 90). Many quan­
tum physicists including Henry Stapp (2004b) apparently agree with this
judgment, finding Whitehead's general outlook intuitively appealing and at
least potentially compatible with their understanding of the physics. There
also appears to be growing interest among such physicists in exploring and
deepening these connections, through a process of cross-fertilization and
mutual adjustment in which Whitehead's original philosophical system is
being progressively "modernized" in light of continuing developments in
physics, while serving as a fruitful source of suggestions toward rounding
out the ontological side of quantum theory itself (Shimony, 1 993; Eastman
& Keeton, 2004).43
In addition to being deeply compatible with basic science, a Whitehead­
like neutral-monist outlook seems to afford new possibilities for progress
on substantive issues relevant to mind-brain relations. First, as argued in
particular by Griffin (1997, chap. 3; 1998) one can readily appreciate at least
in principle how a neutral-monist solution might overcome the unresolved
problems-common to both materialism and dualism as traditionally con­
ceived, and probably unresolvable in those terms-of accounting for the
emergence of mind and consciousness in the course of biological evolution
and individual human development. Griffin (1993, 1994, 1 997, 1998, 2000)
has also made serious and generally well-received efforts to accommodate
the data of psychical research, including survival data, within his basically
Whitehead ian framework.44 We ourselves can also glimpse at least in general

43. See Eastman and Keeton's on-line resource guide to physics and Whitehead, which is
available at http://www.ctr4process.org/publications/PSS. It is also worth noting here that
a similar neutral-monist position has tentatively been reached, from still another direction,
by Chalmers ( 1 996); see also his and other contributions to Shear (1998). Chalmers hardly
mentions Whitehead at all, anchoring his neutral-monist sympathies instead in the work of
Russell (1927). For critical comparative analysis of the neutral monisms of Russell and White­
head, see Lovejoy (1930/1960) and G. R. Lucas (1989, chap. 7).
44. Parenthetically, physicist Oliver Lodge ( 1929) was probably the first to recognize the
relevance of Whitehead's metaphysics to the survival problem. Affinities between psi phe­
nomena and the picture of "entangled" reality revealed by quantum theory have been care­
fully drawn out by Radin (2006), and Stapp (in press a), in his discussion of the Libet experi­
ments, provides a potential solution for Griffin's problems concerning precognition.
63�hapter 9

terms how such a framework might ultimately provide viable explanations

of allied phenomena such as NDEs occurring under conditions of general
anesthesia and cardiac arrest (Chapter 6) and the various still-unexplained
properties of human memory (Chapter 4).45
Whitehead's original theory has problems of its own, however. Some
of his most central technical notions and terms, such as "prehension" and
"concrescence," remain for us extremely difficult and obscure. The precise
manner in which lower-grade "actual entities" combine to form higher-grade
entities with new, emergent properties seems particularly in need of further
explication, and the importance of this can readily be appreciated from
a testy exchange between Searle and Chalmers recorded in Searle (1997).
Chalmers (1996) had unwisely mused at length regarding the possible men­
tal life of thermostats, but Searle ridiculed these "panpsychist" speculations
on grounds that thermostats lack the kind of biological organization that
he thinks we know to be necessary for any form of conscious experience.
This kind of attempted reductio ad absurdum has been a common response
to the views of Whitehead and the other neutral monists, but as emphasized
especially by Griffin (1998, chap. 9) it ignores a long tradition, extending
from Leibniz to Whitehead, Hartshorne, and Griffin himself, that attempts
to distinguish systematically between mere "aggregates" (such as rocks and
thermostats) and "compounds" (such as earthworms and ourselves) in terms
of their respective levels and types of organization. Clearly, to the degree
that these distinctions can be grounded in an adequate understanding of the
process of composition, the Searle-type reductio can be circumvented. Pre­
vious philosophic attempts to accomplish this, however, including Griffin's,
seem to us mainly descriptive rather than explanatory.46
Even if the composition problem can be successfully resolved, further
difficulties are already in sight. For example, it is not clear to us at present
whether neutral monism is truly distinguishable from an interactive dualism

45. Related suggestions regarding NDEs and memory have recently been offered by Romijn
(1997), who draws upon the generically similar quantum-mechanical theory of consciousness
developed by David Bohm in his later years. Bohm himself attempted to use that same theory
to explain psi phenomena, which he evidently took seriously (Bohm, 1986), and his neutral­
monist conception of the "implicate order" has also been enlisted by Karl Pribram (1979,
1986, 1991) in support of "holonomic" explanations of brain function, perception, and (recep­
tive) psi, though with only limited success (Braude, 1979; Draaisma, 2000; see also Stapp, in
press a, in press b, regarding technical problems in Bohm's quantum mechanics).
46. A possible way forward is suggested by physicist and philosopher of science Abner Shi­
mony in his critical response to Roger Penrose (1997) from the point of view of a "modernized
Whiteheadianism" which "applies the framework of quantum theory to an ontology that is
ab initio mentalistic" (Shimony, 1997, p. 154). Shimony portrays the emergence of conscious
states from an ensemble of neurons, for example, as due to large-scale quantum entangle­
ment, analogous to the demonstrated emergence in relatively small quantum systems of novel
properties transcending those of their constituents. Quantum theory, that is, already encom­
passes a mode of composition that has no analogue in classical physics. Penrose himself sub­
sequently endorsed these suggestions, stating that "although I had not explicitly asserted, in
either Emperor or Shadows, the need for mentality to be 'onto logically fundamental in the
universe', I think that something of this nature is indeed necessary" (1997, pp. 175-176). See
also Seager (1998).
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-637

of the sort sketched earlier. This is the central theme of Lovejoy's (193011960)
examination of the doctrines advanced by Russell and Whitehead, and
Griffin's descriptive term for his own position, "nondualist interaction ism,"
seems perilously close to an oxymoron. In addition, Whitehead's theory as
described so far is a purely bottom-up theory in which our normal, supra­
liminal consciousness emerges at the apex of a hierarchy of lesser integra­
tions. This picture is similar to the monadic theories of McDougall and
Balfour, and we have already argued that such theories deal poorly with
the fully-developed phenomena of psychological automatism and second­
ary personality, as well as genius and mysticism (Chapters 5, 7, 8). More
generally, they cannot easily accommodate any of the evidence assembled
by Myers, James, and their colleagues for the existence in all or at least
some of us of normally hidden levels of psychic organization characterized
by increasing scope, precision, speed, and complexity of mental function. It
appears possible in principle, however, to accommodate such phenomena,
while remaining within the basic neutral-monist framework, by incorporat­
ing elements of a complementary top-down tradition (represented in the
West by historical figures such as Plato, Plotinus, and the German idealists,
and in the East by the higher schools of Hindu philosophy and the wis­
dom traditions) that sees consciousness itself as the fundamental reality in
nature, flowing outward or downward to its most matter-like aspects, and
then back up again in the course of cosmic evolution (Poortman, 1954/1978).
Whitehead's own system in its full development incorporates such ideas in a
form having much in common with James's vision of an unfinished plural­
istic universe (see our Chapter 8). It is also worth mentioning, perhaps, that
considerable sympathy for views of this general type has been expressed
by theoretical physicists such as Schrodinger (1959, Epilogue), d'Espagnat
(1976), and Haag (1996).
Within such a top-down neutral-monist framework, human personality
would be pictured as a complex system made up of the same kind of "stuff"
throughout. The system consists of a hierarchy of levels or strata of the types
recognized in particular by Myers, James, and the wisdom traditions. Each
level is characterized by its own form of psychophysical organization and
has both interior and exterior aspects that allow it to participate in some
form of experienced world appropriate to itself. The activities of these differ­
ent strata are somehow interconnected, and coordinated in greater or lesser
degree, by something like Myers's Subliminal Self, or by a consciousness
that somehow underlies or pervades the whole structure. The fundamental
cleavage in nature suggested in particular by the survival evidence would on
such a view be interpreted not ontologically, as the separation of an entire
"psyche" from its associated "body," but functionally, as a shift within that
complex system, following dissolution of its outermost psychophysical shell,
to a different mode of operation based on whatever levels remain. Such a
picture would be theoretically attractive in that it incorporates both of the
fundamental insights of quantum theory and overcomes the residual dual­
ism of the non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist model, while also potentially
638-Chapter 9

accommodating all of the relevant empirical data. To what degree it is actu­

ally correct, and can be fleshed out in both empirical and theoretical detail,
remains to be seen.
To recapitulate: Both Myers and James believed that the only way we
can get consciousness out of a theory is to build it into the theory somewhere
at the beginning.47 The neutral-monist options identified here-strictly bot­
tom-up, strictly top-down, or possibly some higher-level integration of the
two-seem to bracket the possible ways of doing so. Our own collective sym­
pathies tend currently, but less than unanimously, toward the last of these
somewhat dizzying abstractions, which clearly has a great deal in common
with the views held by Myers and James. We will not attempt to develop
them further or adjudicate among them at the present time, however, for to
do so is the central goal of our ongoing Esalen discussions and the expected
subj ect of our next book.
Meanwhile, what we think will ultimately prove most helpful in cata­
lyzing further theoretical progress will be thoroughgoing application­
determined and disciplined, but also sympathetic and flexible-of West­
ern-style scientific imagination to the phenomenological realities revealed
by the great contemplative traditions, both East and West. We need to
chart more fully and accurately the natural history of these "higher" or
"deeper" subliminal realms. How many meaningfully distinguishable states
or levels of consciousness actually or potentially exist within us, with what
properties and what relationships to each other? Under what sorts of con­
ditions do they occur, and what sorts of consequences do they have? Can
we harness the benefits of potentially useful states by developing improved
means of facilitating their occurrence? Partial or preliminary answers to
some of these questions may be obtainable through careful and scientifi­
cally informed comparative study of the existing literature of the wisdom
traditions themselves, but what will contribute most in the long run, in our
opinion, is intensified experimental and phenomenological investigation of
altered states of consciousness of all types, whether spontaneously occur­
ring or induced by meditation, psychedelics, hypnosis, or other means. Only
in this way, if ever, will we finally get to the bottom of what James called
"Myers's problem." There are many lifetimes' worth of exciting and impor­
tant science to be done here, work unlikely to be undertaken by persons
immured in the current mainstream consensus.

47. James (1890b) remarks that "ifevolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape
must have been present at the very origin of things" (vol. I, p. 149). See also the critique by
Griffin ( 1 998) of conventional accounts by Dennett, Humphrey, and others of the supposed
incremental "emergence" of consciousness in the course of evolution.
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-639

Summary and Prospectus

For an enlarged scientific picture of human mind and personality to emerge,

two things need to happen: First, it must be demonstrated that the cur­
rently dominant physicalist theories of mind-brain relations are inadequate
in principle; and second, an alternative theory must be found that remedies
these defects.
The present volume has sought mainly to address the first of these
tasks, by assembling in one place large amounts of credible evidence for
a wide variety of empirical phenomena that appear difficult or impossible
to explain in conventional physicalist terms. We find this evidence cumu­
latively overwhelming, and expect to have persuaded many open-minded
readers that this is the case. At the same time, we are also acutely aware that
the continuing scientific resistance to many of these phenomena derives in
large part from their apparent conflict with current physicalist orthodoxy.
Nothing would do more to hasten their wider recognition and acceptance,
we believe, than identification of an alternative theoretical outlook that is
scientifically defensible and that would permit and perhaps ultimately even
explain them. In this concluding chapter, therefore, we have attempted to
show at least in a provisional way that such theoretical expansion appears
possible.
Our theoretical reconnaissance proceeded at two primary levels. In the
first half of the chapter we argued that the psychological theory advanced
by Myers and developed further by James in his late period has been con­
siderably strengthened by many related scientific findings of the subsequent
century. We ourselves strongly suspect that they were already approaching
a more or less correct overall picture of the structure of the human psyche,
but at the very least they provided a useful working model which brings the
entire range of relevant empirical phenomena into intelligible relationship
within a coherent descriptive framework, and which suggests a variety of
potentially fruitful directions for further research.
This theory was not disproven but simply displaced, forgotten-a
casualty of the changes wrought in scientific psychology by the advent of
behaviorism. Its near-total absence from contemporary discussions of con­
sciousness seems to us the worst yet among many unfortunate examples of
scientific amnesia (Draaisma, 2000; Harrington, 1987; Koch & Leary, 1 985),
and to help overcome this amnesia has been one of the central objectives of
our book.
In the second half of the chapter we attempted to go further by show­
ing in a provisional way that more comprehensive psychological theories
of the Myers/James type are also potentially reconcilable with the relevant
aspects of present-day science. In this first stage of an ongoing theoretical
effort we have attempted only to sketch out the main directions in which
further progress seems possible, and is urgently needed. Theories of the
types indicated share several major advantages relative to those that cur­
rently dominate mainstream science and philosophy: In particular, they
64O-Chapter 9

are more deeply compatible with leading-edge physical science itself; they
appear potentially capable of explaining most and perhaps all of the "rogue"
empirical phenomena catalogued in this book; and they ratify, rather than
reject, our everyday experience of ourselves as purposeful, causally effec­
tive, conscious agents. We wish here to underscore this last point, because
it brings out in perhaps the most dramatic and humanly relevant way the
stark contrast between the sorts of theory we are advocating and those that
dominate the current scene.
The self was absolutely central to the psychology of William James
(Leary, 1 990). In the Principles (1 890b) he says: "The universal conscious
fact is not 'feelings and thoughts exist' but 'I think ' and 'I feel'. No psychol­
ogy. . . can question the existence of personal selves. The worst a psychology
can do is so to interpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their
worth" (vol. 1, p. 226). The self is something the presence of which we can
feel almost constantly at the innermost subjective pole of our experience.
Its ultimate origins remain mysterious, and as we saw in Chapter 8 James
himself traced them into the recesses of the subliminal consciousness, and
even to the hypothesis of a World-Soul as the ultimate foundation and root
of our individualized conscious selves. But however it arises, the self is the
active element in the stream of consciousness, expressing the dispositional
basis of our conscious mental life:

It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of sensations,

and by giving or withholding its assent it influences the movements they
tend to arouse. It is the home of interest,-not the pleasant or the painful,
nor even pleasure or pain as such, but that within us to which pleasure
and pain, the pleasant and the painful, speak. It is the source of effort and
attention, and the place from which appear to emanate the fiats of the will.
(vol. 1, pp. 297-298)

This is essentially James's answer to Hume, who had famously declared

that upon looking within he could only find particular sensations, images,
feelings, and thoughts, and never his "self." But the dominant position in
contemporary psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy derives from
Hume, not from James. Particularly with the recent rise of connectionism
and dynamic systems theory (Chapter 1), our experience of ourselves as
causally effective agents has come increasingly to be portrayed as mere illu­
sion, with consciousness itself at best a causally ineffectual by-product of
the grinding of our neural machinery. There is in reality nobody in charge,
no executive. We are nothing but self-organizing packs of neurons. "Sub­
jectless processes" do all the work. Pronouncements of this general type
abound, for example, in recent books and papers by prominent figures such
as the Church lands, Francis Crick, Daniel Dennett, Jean-Pierre Dupuy,
Gerald Edelman, Walter Freeman, Douglas Hofstadter, Steven Pinker, and
numerous others.
Possibly the most extreme specimen to date of this genre is the book
by Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner (2002). Having identified Dennett
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-64 I

in his preface as a primary intellectual influence, and having then quoted

on page I Laplace's 1814 description of the mechanical clockwork universe
as an epitome of the scientifically proper view of things, Wegner proceeds
with no apparent sense of irony or paradox to generate some 400 pages of
argument in support of Thomas Huxley's original claim that our experi­
ence of conscious will as causally efficacious is entirely illusory. Nothing
could more aptly summarize our own estimation of such views than the
caustic remark by Whitehead (1929/1958) that "scientists animated by the
purpose of proving themselves purposeless constitute an interesting subject
for study" (p. 16). Could anything possibly be more remote from the views
of William James, for whom conscious will was a living and undeniable
reality, and the active regulation of our conscious mental life its essential
manifestation?48
We believe that these extraordinary mainstream conclusions, so deeply
at odds with the most fundamental deliverances of everyday experience,
result from correctly perceiving what are in fact necessary consequences
of the classical materialist-monist premises from which practically all of
contemporary psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy derive. We further
contend that disastrous consequences of this magnitude ought to be recog­
nized by everybody for what they really are, a reductio ad absurdum of those
materialist-monist premises themselves. The only possible justification for
clinging to results so monstrous must be the belief that there is no alterna­
tive, no scientifically legitimate way of avoiding them. But we have clearly
shown, we submit, that this belief is mistaken.
In sum, then, to move in the theoretical directions outlined here seems
to us both necessitated by a wide range of empirical data and scientifically
justified at the foundational level of physics itself. Which of the main types
of theory we have distinguished will ultimately prove most satisfactory, and
indeed whether they are in the end meaningfully different types of theory,
remains to be seen. But something along these lines seems to us sure to
emerge, however long this may take, and we predict with high confidence
that psychology will not end up, as many have feared, being cannibalized
either by neurophysiology or by sociology.
Our theoretical suggestions are responsive to Chomsky's repeated pleas
for "unification" between an empirically adequate psychology and a deep­
ened conception of its physical basis (Introduction), and they restore the most
mature concerns of our most luminous predecessor, William James-which
have been systematically ignored by mainstream psychology for over a cen­
tury-to the place which he himself believed they should rightfully occupy
at the center of our science. In effect we seem to have come ful l circle, to a
view of human nature much like that advanced by Myers, James, and their

48. This is not to say, of course, that all of our actions are fully under conscious supra­
liminal control. Both Myers and lames recognized that aspects of experience and behavior
are sometimes controlled in part or in whole by transmarginal influences of various kinds,
whether automatic or "infrared" processes originating in the organism or "ultraviolet" influ­
ences exerted by a wider subliminal consciousness.
642-Chapter 9

colleagues. But we emphatically do not see this as a matter of going back­

ward to something already fully formed, already completed and perfected
at their hands and ready to be adopted as is. It would be more accurate to
say that we have reached the corresponding point on the next higher turn of
a spiral. For their basic picture of the human psyche can now be anchored to
physical science at a much deeper level, and the further development of that
picture can surely capitalize on the tremendous methodological and techni­
cal advances that have been achieved in the intervening century.
The expanded scientific psychology that would result from such efforts
can potentially overcome the great historical divisions within psychology,
while also strengthening its principal domains individually. In general terms
we can readily foresee, for example, a deepened cognitive mainstream in
which the present elevation of the physical or physiological at the expense of
consciousness and the mental has been essentially inverted. Computational
modeling in all its forms would be downgraded from a general theory of the
mind to a useful but limited applications technology (Searle, 1992). Con­
sciousness would be more widely recognized as the constitutive problem of
the field (G. A. Miller, 1985), and far greater resources and effort would be
allocated than at present to research focused upon relationships between
unusual states of consciousness and brain processes, as for example in psy­
chophysiological and neuroimaging studies of OBEs and NDEs, psychedel­
ics, meditation and related transformative practices, mystical experience,
and other altered states. More penetrating investigations of psychophysical
influence and psychological automatisms along lines suggested in Chapters
3 and 5 are surely in order, and there would also be greatly increased empha­
sis on currently unsolved problems in cognitive and personality theory-in
particular, unsolved problems in regard to intentionality, meaning, sym­
bolism, memory, personal identity, selfhood, and volition-that are deeply
intertwined and central to our concerns as human beings.
We can also imagine a revitalization of dynamic psychiatry, comple­
mentary to the current vogue in biological psychiatry, that would result in
development of new and potentially more effective forms of dynamic ther­
apy, fuller exploration of the "mythopretic" dimensions of human person­
ality (Ellenberger, 1 970), and more satisfactory approaches to socially and
personally vital issues such as end-of-life care. Transpersonal psychology,
similarly, can certainly be brought into better relationship with the main­
stream, with its central impulses and concerns grounded primarily in real
empirical knowledge rather than faith in the wisdom traditions. We also
anticipate the development of a new generation of improved transformative
practices, tools for refashioning ourselves in accordance with the enlarged
psychology, that will enable many more of us to draw more efficiently and
systematically upon normally inaccessible interior resources of imagina­
tion, creativity, and spirituality.
The key to this fundamentally optimistic vision, we repeat, is to build
upon the foundation prepared by Myers and James. No other system of
psychology has seriously rivaled its unique combination of unremitting
 Toward a Psychology for the 2 1 st Century-643

commitment to empirical rigor with courage to embrace the supernormal

and transpersonal phenomena that are essential to a fuller understanding
of human mind and personality. Not that it should be regarded as a fin­
ished product, of course-surely the last thing either of them would have
imagined or wished. It is rather a working guide, a provisional map of the
territory, to be fleshed out and further improved by the labors of coming
generations. Indeed, we can do no better here, in concluding both this chap­
ter and our book as a whole, than to appropriate one last statement from
Myers himself, as relevant today as when he first wrote it:

The research on which my friends and I are engaged is not the mere hobby
of a few enthusiasts. Our opinions, of course, are individual and disput­
able; but the facts presented here and in the S.P. R . Proceedings are a very
different matter. Neither the religious nor the scientific reader can longer
afford to ignore them, to pass them by. They must be met, they must be
understood, unless Science and Religion alike are to sink into mere obscu­
rantism. And the one and only way to understand them is to learn more of
them; to collect more evidence, to try more experiments , to bring to bear
on this study a far more potent effort of the human mind than the small
group who have thus far been at work can possibly furnish. Judged by this
standard, the needed help has still to come. Never was there a harvest so
plenteous with labourers so few. (HP, vol. 2, p. 80)
 Appendix

Introductory Bibliography
of Psychical Research

This annotated list is intended only to provide an entry into the vast lit­
erature of serious psychical research. It is by no means complete or even
comprehensive, and it reflects to some degree our personal preferences,
although many if not most of our selections would probably also appear on
similar lists compiled by other knowledgeable professionals. Many of the
entries cited contain extensive bibliographies of their own. For additional
references to some of the basic literature of the field, see http://www.pfly­
ceum.org/106.html.

Introductory and General Scientific Literature

Broughton, Richard S. (1992). Parapsychology: The Controversial Science. New

York: Ballantine. A good general introduction to the problems, findings, and
implications of the science of parapsychology.

Edge, Hoyt L., Morris, Robert L., Rush, Joseph H., & Palmer, John (1986). Founda­
tions of Parapsychology: Exploring the Boundaries of Human Capability. Lon­
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul. An advanced, textbook-style survey of methods
and findings in modern parapsychology, emphasizing experimental studies.

Krippner, Stanley (Ed.) ( 1977-1997). Advances in Parapsychological Research (8

vols.). An ongoing series reviewing recent research on a wide variety of top­
ics of current interest to parapsychologists, including occasional bibliographic
updates of the literature.

Murphy, Michael (1992). The Future of the Body: Explorations into the Further
Evolution of Human Nature. New York: Tarcher/Putnam. An extensive survey

645
646-Appendix

and classification of phenomena bearing on the question of the evolution of

human nature, as suggested in particular by latent, or as yet not fully real­
ized, attributes and capacities for transcendence and transformation. In this
context the author describes a variety of effects of mental states on the body,
as well as numerous transformative practices. Several appendices and a large
bibliography guide the reader to an enormous wealth ofliterature on the topics
surveyed.

Pratt, 1. G., Rhine, J. B., Smith, B. M., Stuart, C. E., & Greenwood, 1. A. (1 940).
Extra-Sensory Perception After Sixty Years: A Critical Appraisal ofthe Research
in Extra-Sensory Perception. New York: Henry Holt. One of the classics of
experimental parapsychology which, despite its age, is still a valuable overview
of the early research at Duke. Includes responses to all meaningful experimen­
tal and statistical criticisms advanced up to that date.

Radin, Dean R. (1 997). The Conscious Universe: The Scientific Truth of Psychic
Phenomena. New York: Harper Edge. An excellent recent survey, particularly
good in terms of its overall assessments of several large areas of contemporary
experimental psi research.

Radin, Dean R. (2006). Entangled Minds: Extrasensory Experiences in a Quantum

Reality. New York: Simon & Schuster. The author presents updated meta-anal­
yses for several large areas of psi research (including Ganzfeld research) and
argues that the "entangled" reality revealed by quantum mechanics is more
congenial to psi than that postulated by classical physics.

Rao, K. Ramakrishna (Ed.) (2001). Basic Research in Parapsychology (2nd ed.). Jef­
ferson, NC: McFarland. A collection of previously published journal reports of
important experimental studies.

Tyrrell, G. N. M. (1961). Science and Psychical Phenomena and Apparitions. New

Hyde Park, N Y: University Books. The first title in this volume contains an
overview of spontaneous cases of psi, experimental evidence, and trance medi­
umship. The second title i s a classic discussion of studies of apparitions and the
several interpretations of them, including Tyrrell's own.

Ullman, Montague, & Krippner, Stanley (with Alan Vaughan) ( 1 989). Dream Telep­
athy (2nd ed.). Jefferson, NC: McFarland. A report of the experiments on tele­
pathic dreams conducted at Maimonides Medical Center in New York, plus a
limited survey of spontaneous dream telepathy cases.

Wolman, B . B . (Ed.) ( 1 985). Handbook of Parapsychology. Jefferson, NC: McFar­

land (first published in 1 977 by Van Nostrand Reinhold). A large book with
technical papers on a wide variety of topics, written by specialists mainly for
scientists, but containing abundant details and references to other publications
for readers wishing to study the subject more deeply.
 Introductory Bibliography of Psychical Research-647

Spontaneous Case Studies

Gurney, Edmund, Myers, Frederic, & Podmore, Frank ( 1 8 86). Phantasms of the
Living (2 vols.). London: Triibner. A classic and the first major publication of
the Society for Psychical Research, primarily reporting hundreds of sponta­
neous cases investigated and documented by the authors, with emphasis on
apparitions coinciding with the death of a distantly located person. Indispens­
able reading for anyone seriously interested in psychical research. Contains
sophisticated discussions of problems of evidence and methods for investigat­
ing spontaneous cases.

Prince, Walter Franklin (1963). Noted Witnessesfor Psychic Occurrences. New Hyde
Park, NY: University Books. Prince collected in this volume numerous first­
hand accounts from well-known scientists, artists, statesmen, and profession­
als from a wide variety of fields, describing apparently paranormal experiences
that they themselves had. Prince believed that such reports from people who
were otherwise known to be responsible, intelligent observers and who had rep­
utations that could be damaged by a fraudulent or fictional account would help
raise the credibility of all reports of spontaneous paranormal experiences.

Rhine, Louisa E. (1981). The Invisible Picture: A Study of Psychic Experiences. Jef­
ferson, NC: McFarland. Summary of the author's research, spanning several
decades, on reports of spontaneous psychic experiences.

Sidgwick, Eleanor Mildred (1962). Phantasms of the Living. New Hyde Park, NY:
University Books. A volume consisting of two classic studies of spontaneous
cases: A survey, first published by Mrs. Sidgwick in 1922, of spontaneous cases
of telepathy and apparitions reported to the Society for Psychical Research
between 1 886 and 1920; and an abridged version of the 1 886 volume Phantasms
of the Living by Gurney, Myers, and Pod more (see above).

Sidgwick, H . , Johnson, A., Myers, A. T., Myers, F. W. H., Podmore, F., & Sidgwick,
E. ( 1894). Report of the Census of Hallucinations. Proceedings of the Society
for Psychical Research, 10, 25-422. Report of a survey of 17,000 persons which
demonstrated the frequent occurrence of hallucinatory experiences in normal,
healthy persons in a waking state. Many of the experiences reported coincided
closely in time with a crisis, such as the death of a distant person, and the
authors made quantitative evaluations suggesting that such experiences occur
more often than can be expected by chance.

Stevenson, Ian ( 1 970). Telepathic Impressions: A Review and Report of35 New Cases.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. A review and analysis of 160
previously published cases in which a person has a strong impression about
something happening to another person who is physically distant, followed by
reports of Stevenson's investigations of 35 new cases.
648-Appendix

Philosophical Literature

Braude, Stephen E. ( 1979). ESP and Psychokinesis: A Philosophical Examination.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press. A discussion of some of the experimen­
tal evidence for psi phenomena, as well as conceptual and philosophical issues
associated with them.

Braude, Stephen E. ( 1986). The Limits ofInfluence: Psychokinesis and the Philosophy
of Science. New York, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Braude examines
evidence for large-scale phenomena of psychokinesis, arguing that much of the
evidence is of high quality and that it can and must be incorporated into the
framework of science.

Broad, C. D. (1962). Lectures on Psychical Research. New York: Humanities Press.

Primarily a series of lectures given in 1959-1960 at Cambridge University by
Broad, a philosopher at Cambridge, presenting and discussing some of the
experimental evidence, trance mediumship, and studies of what Broad called
"hallucinatory quasi-perceptions" (including apparitions, dreams, and out-of­
body experiences).

Griffin, David Ray (1997). Parapsychology, Philosophy, and Spirituality: A Post­

modern Exploration. Albany: SUNY Press. A review of the evidence from psi
research, with an emphasis on the empirical evidence for post-mortem survival,
in the context of Griffin's contention that psi research has been largely rejected
or ignored because it challenges both the supernaturalism of religion and the
materialism of modern science. He argues that it provides the framework for a
much-needed postmodern world view that can go beyond this dichotomy and
reconcile the two within a larger perspective.

Price, H. H. (1995). Philosophical Interactions with Parapsychology: The Major Writ­

ings of H. H. Price on Parapsychology and Survival (Frank B. Dilley, Ed.). New
York: St. Martin's Press. In this volume Dilley brings together many of the
extensive and important writings of H. H . Price (1899-1984), an Oxford philos­
opher, about the theoretical implications of psi research in general and about
theoretical issues underlying the notion of post-mortem survival.

Wheatley, J. M. 0., & Edge, H. ( 1976). Philosophical Dimensions of Parapsychology.

Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. A collection of articles by 21 philosophers
and scientists, published between 1937 and 1973, on the implications of various
kinds of psi phenomena for philosophy and science.

Survival and Mediumship

Braude, Stephen E. (2003). Immortal Remains: The Evidence for Life after Death.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Braude examines various kinds of evi­
dence for survival, including mental mediumship, reincarnation and posses­
sion cases, hauntings, and out-of-body experiences, especially in the context of
 Introductory Bibliography of Psychical Research-649

the survival/super-psi interpretations of them. He concludes that the cumula­

tive weight of the evidence may be tipping the scales slightly toward survival.

Dodds, E. R. (1934). Why I do not believe in survival. Proceedings of the Society for
Psychical Research, 42, 147-172. A classic statement advocating the super-psi
interpretation of survival evidence, written by a keen student of the literature.

Ducasse, C. 1. (1961). A Critical Examination of the Belief in Life After Death.

Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. A philosophical examination of the idea of
life after death, encompassing religious, scientific, philosophical, and empiri­
cal views. Contains an extensive discussion of the concept of reincarnation.

Gauld, Alan ( 1982). Mediumship and Survival: A Century of Investigations. London:

Heinemann. A review of different types of evidence for survival, especially
mental mediumship, but also reincarnation, possession, out-of-body experi­
ences, and apparitions. Gauld also discusses theoretical positions, as well as
methodological and philosophical problems. See also his earlier and briefer
discussion of the same material: Gauld, A. ( 1977). Discarnate survival. In B .
B. Wolman (Ed.), Handbook of Parapsychology (pp. 577-630). New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhold.

Hart, Hornell (1959). The Enigma of Survival. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. A
review of some of the evidence for post-mortem survival from mediumship and
from apparitions, followed by a comprehensive review of the arguments both
for and against the competing interpretations of this evidence.

Murphy, Gardner (1945). (a) An outline of survival evidence; (b) Difficulties con­
fronting the survival hypothesis; (c) Field theory and survival. Journal of the
A merican Society for Psychical Research, 39, 2-34, 67-94, 1 81-209. These
papers by a distinguished American psychologist bring the difficulties of the
survival debate into sharp focus.

Myers, Frederic W. H. (1903). Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death (2
vols.). London: Longmans, Green. A major classic of early psychical research,
and indeed of psychology, in which Myers describes a wide range of subliminal
psychological phenomena, including dissociation, sleep, genius, hypnotism,
automatisms, and trance, within the context of his theory of human personal­
ity as extending beyond the confines of normal psychophysiological function­
ing.

Salter, W. H. ( 1950). Trance Mediumship: An Introductory Study of Mrs. Piper and

Mrs. Leonard. London: Society for Psychical Research. Contains introductory
discussions of two of the most important trance mediums, as well as a valuable
bibliography of the research literature on mediumship.

Saltmarsh, H. F. ( 1930). Evidence of Survivalfrom Cross- Correspondences. London:

G. Bell. A readable introduction to one of the most interesting but d ifficult
bodies of evidence suggestive of post-mortem survival.
650-Appendix

Stevenson, Ian (1 984). Unlearned Language: New Studies in Xenoglossy. Charlot­

tesville: University Press of Virginia. Certainly the best account to date of this
rare but important phenomenon, in which a person demonstrates the ability to
speak responsively a language not learned normally. Includes detailed reports
of two cases that Stevenson investigated.

Stevenson, Ian (1977). Research into the evidence of man's survival after death: A
historical and critical survey with a summary of recent developments. Journal
of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1 65, 1 52-170. A brief but scholarly and well­
documented summary of the main lines of research on post-mortem survival.

Reincarnation

Shroder, Tom (1999). Old Souls: The Scientific Evidence for Past Lives. New York:
Simon & Schuster. In 1 997 Tom Shroder, an editor at the Washington Post,
accompanied Dr. Ian Stevenson through India, Lebanon, and the United
States as Dr. Stevenson investigated cases of children who seem to remember
previous lives. This is Shroder's book about those experiences. Now also out
in paperback as Old Souls: Compelling Evidencefrom Children Who Remember
Past Lives from Fireside Books.

Stevenson, Ian (1 974). Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation (2nd ed., revised
and enlarged). Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. Dr. Stevenson's
first book on what has become an extensive body of research. Includes detailed
reports of 20 cases of children (from five different countries) who claimed to
remember previous lives.

Stevenson, Ian (1 975-1983). Cases of the Reincarnation Type (vols. 1-4). Charlot­
tesville: University Press of Virginia. Reports of 44 cases of the reincarnation
type in India, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Turkey, Burma, and Thailand, investigated
extensively by the author.

Stevenson, Ian (1997). Reincarnation and Biology: A Contribution to the Etiology of

Birthmarks and Birth Defects (2 vols.). Westport, CT: Praeger. These volumes
deal with an important subset of cases of the reincarnation type, cases in which
living subjects manifest birthmarks or birth defects, often of extremely unusual
character, usually corresponding to injuries that killed the ostensible previous
person. Contains reports of over 200 cases, as well as important discussions
of the relationship between this phenomenon and other kinds of phenomena
demonstrating the effects of mental states on the body. (A 200-page synopsis of
this work is available in Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect. Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1 997.)

Stevenson, Ian (2003). European Cases of the Reincarnation Type. Jefferson, NC:
McFarland. With this volume Dr. Stevenson shows that cases of the reincarna­
tion type occur in modern Western cultures, many of them similar to those
from Asian countries in which a belief in reincarnation is widespread. He
 Introductory Bibliography of Psychical Research-651

describes some cases from early in the 20th century, and then reports 32 cases
that he himself investigated.

Stevenson, Ian (2001). Children Who Remember Previous Lives: A Question of Rein­
carnation (Rev. ed.). Jefferson, NC: McFarland. Dr. Stevenson describes, for
the general reader, research conducted over the past 40 years on the phenome­
non of young children who seem to remember a previous life. He also addresses
some of the questions frequently asked about these cases.

Tucker, Jim B. (2005). Life Before Life: A Scientific Investigation of Children 's Memo­
ries of Previous Lives. New York: St. Martin's. An excellent introduction for
the general reader to investigations, conducted by Dr. Tucker, Dr. Ian Steven­
son, and other colleagues, of cases suggestive of reincarnation among young
children. Included are discussions of the memories reported by the children,
unusual behavior in the children, and birthmarks and birth defects apparently
related to the previous life.

History of Psychical Research

Beloff, John (1997). Parapsychology: A Concise History. New York: St. Martin's. A
brief historical survey of the field from its origins in renaissance magic, mes­
merism, and spiritualism, through 19th-century psychical research, early 20th­
century psychical research and experimental parapsychology, to more recent
developments.

Gauld, Alan (1 968). Founders of Psychical Research. New York: Schocken Books.
The best available treatment of the persons and events involved in the forma­
tion and early work of the Society for Psychical Research.

James, William ( 1986). The Works of William James: Essays in Psychical Research.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. A comprehensive collection of all of
James's known writings on the subject of psychical research, from 1 869-1909,
including papers, reviews, and correspondence. Includes all the works pub­
lished in an earlier volume (Murphy, Gardner, & Ballou, Robert O. [1961]. Wil­
liam James on Psychical Research. London: Chatto & Windus).

Mauskopf, Seymour H . , & McVaugh, Michael R. ( 1980). The Elusive Science: Ori­
gins of Experimental Psychical Research. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins
University Press. A comprehensive, well-documented, and scholarly history of
the development of experimental psi research, concentrating primarily on the
period from 1 920-1940.
652-Appendix

Meta-Analyses, Reviews, and

Selected Journal Articles on Experimental Studies

DMILS (Distant Mental Influence on Living Systems)

Braud, W. (2003). Distant Mental Influence. Charlottesville, VA: Hampton Roads.

A collection of papers previously published by Braud and colleagues of experi­
mental studies showing that the intentions of one person can influence physio­
logical processes of other organisms, including other persons. See also Chapter
3 in the present volume for additional references.

Ganzfeld

Bern, D. J., & Honorton, C. (1994). Does psi exist? Replicable evidence for an anom­
alous process of information transfer. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 4-1 8. Report
and meta-analysis of a series of psi Ganzfeld experiments, in which subjects
in a condition of sensory deprivation attempt to identify a randomly chosen
target image. A critical response to this paper was Milton, 1. & Wiseman, R.
( 1999). Does psi exist? Lack of replication of an anomalous process of informa­
tion transfer. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 378-391. A reply to these criticisms
appeared in Bern, D. 1., Palmer, 1., & Broughton, R. S. (2001). Updating the
Ganzfeld database: A victim of its own success? Journal of Parapsychology, 65,
207-218.

Honorton, C. (1985). Meta-analysis of the psi ganzfeld research: A response to

Hyman. Journal of Parapsychology, 49, 51-91 .

Honorton, C., Berger, R., Varvoglis, M., Quant, M., Derr, P., Schechter, E., & Fer­
rari, D. (1990). Psi communication in the ganzfe1d: Experiments with an auto­
mated testing system and a comparison with a meta-analysis of earlier studies.
Journal of Parapsychology, 54, 99-139.

Hyman, R. & Honorton, C . ( 1986). A joint communique: The psi Ganzfeld contro­
versy. Journal of Parapsychology, 50, 351-364. In response to their continuing
debate about the status of the Ganzfeld research, Honorton, a parapsycholo­
gist, and Hyman, a skeptic, issued here a set of guidelines for conducting and
reporting future research that they both agreed would constitute adequately
stringent standards. The papers by Honorton et al. ( 1990) and Bern and Honor­
ton ( 1994) (see above) report research conducted using these guidelines.

Rosenthal, R. (1986). Meta-analytic procedures and the nature of replication: The

ganzfeld debate. Journal of Parapsychology, 50, 3 15-336.
 Introductory Bibliography of Psychical Research-653

Hypnosis and Psi

Honorton, c., & Krippner, S. (1969). Hypnosis and ESP performance: A review
of the experimental literature. Journal of the A merican Society for Psychical
Research, 63, 214-252.

Schechter, E. (1984). Hypnotic induction vs. control conditions: Illustrating an

approach to the evaluation of replicability in parapsychological data. Journal
of the American Societyfor Psychical Research, 78, 1-27.

Stanford, R. G., & Stein, A. G. (1994). A meta-analysis of ESP studies contrasting

hypnosis and a comparison condition. Journal of Parapsychology, 58, 235-269.

Van De Castle, R. L. (1969). The facilitation of ESP through hypnosis. American

Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 12, 37-56.

Statistics and Meta-Analyses

Honorton, C., & Ferrari, D. ( 1 990). "Future telling": A meta-analysis of forced­

choice precognition experiments, 1935-1987. Journal of Parapsychology, 53,
281-308.

Honorton, c., Ferrari, D., & Bern, D. ( 1 998). Extraversion and ESP performance:
A meta-analysis and a new confirmation. Journal of Parapsychology, 62, 255-
276.

Radin, D., & Ferrari, D. (1991). Effects of consciousness on the fall of dice: A meta­
analysis. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 5, 61-83.

Radin, D., & Nelson, R. D. (1989). Consciousness-related effects in random physical

systems. Foundations of Physics, 19, 1499- 1 5 14.

Utts, J. (1991). Replication and meta-analysis in parapsychology. Statistical Science,

6, 363-403.

The Psi Controversy

This is a small but representative selection from a very large literature,

intended to i llustrate the character of the debates. Some of the books and
articles listed above also include substantial discussions of the critical lit­
erature, including Broad (1962), Broughton (1991), Griffin (1997), and Radin
(1997).

Alcock, J. ( 1990). Science and Supernature: A Critical Appraisal of Parapsychology.

Buffalo, NY: Prometheus . Alcock, a social psychologist and committed skep-
654-Appendix

tic, argues that there is no persuasive evidence for any paranormal phenomena
and that it is a belief system rather than science.

Child, I. L. (1985). Psychology and anomalous observations: The question of ESP

in dreams. American Psychologist, 40, 1 219-1230. Reviews the Maimonides
dream telepathy studies (see Ullman & Krippner volume, above) and criticisms
of them by skeptical psychologists.

Druckman, D., & Swets, J. A. (Eds.). (1988). Enhancing Human Performance: Issues,
Theories, and Techniques, pp. 169-231. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press; Palmer, J. A., Honorton, c., & Utts, J. (1988). Reply to the National
Research Council Study on Parapsychology. Research Triangle Park, NC: Para­
psychological Association. A report from the National Research Council which
concluded that research in parapsychology has provided "no scientific justifi­
cation . . . for the existence of parapsychological phenomena." In the reply, the
authors show that the scope of this review was severely restricted to conform
to the authors' pre-existing beliefs, even to the extent of asking a prominent
psychologist to withdraw his favorable conclusions.

Hansel, C. E. M. (1966). ESP: A Scientific Evaluation. New York: Charles Scribner's

Sons; and ( 1980). ESP and Parapsychology: A Critical Re-evaluation. Buffalo,
NY: Prometheus. One of the best-known of the critical books, but one which
demonstrates the lengths to which critics must go to uphold their conclusions.
The second volume took no account of the serious criticisms of the first vol­
ume, such as Honorton, C. (1967). ESP: A Scientific Evaluation. C. E . M. Han­
sel, Review. Journal of Parapsychology, 31, 76-82; Pratt, J. G., & Woodruff,
J. L. (1961). Refutation of Hansel's allegation concerning the Pratt-Woodruff
series. Journal ofParapsychology, 25, 1 14-129; Rhine, J. B., & Pratt, J. G. (1961).
A reply to the Hansel critique of the Pearce-Pratt series. Journal of Parapsy­
chology, 25, 92-98; or Stevenson, !' ( 1967). An antagonist's view of parapsycho1-
ogy. A review of Professor Hansel's ESP: A Scientific Evaluation. Journal ofthe
A merican Society for Psychical Research, 61, 254-267.

Kurtz, Paul (Ed.) (1985). A Skeptic's Handbook of Parapsychology. Buffalo, NY:

Prometheus. A large volume of papers primarily by critics of the field, pub­
lished under the auspices of the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of
Claims of the Paranormal.

Price, George R. (1 955). Science and the supernatural. Science, 122, 359-367. A
paper often cited by skeptics, who nonetheless rarely if ever mention Price's
later apology to Rhine for the accusations of fraud that he made against him in
this paper (Price, George R. [ 1972]. Letter to the editor. Science, 1 75, 359).

Rao, K. R. & Palmer, J. (1987). The anomaly called psi: Recent research and criti­
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 Index
Abbot, N.C: 1 35, 1 36, 228 Alternative medicine, mainstream medicine
Abraham, G. E.: 149, 1 52 and, 1 36, 136n l l
Abrahamsen, A.: 19n 14, 2 1 n 1 5, 23, 456 See Faith healing, Distant healing, Mind­
Abramovitch, H . : 375 body medicine
Abrams, M.: 142 Alvarado, C. S.: 169, 396n23, 405, 439n 12,
Abrams, M. H.: 440n14, 454n20, 455, 482, 484, 528-529n26
485 Amanzio, M.: 141, 146
Absorption: 84n22 Aminoff, M. l.: 387, 419
Hysteria and, 162 Amnesias. See Memory
Multiple personality and, 342 Ampere, A. M.: 34, 432
Mystical experiences and, 570-571 Analgesias. See Hypnotic analgesias,
Near-death experiences and, 378 Placebo analgesias
Physiological effects in hypnosis and, 210 Analogical constraint mapping engine
Stigmata and, 161 (ACME) and, 461
Suggestion and, 105 Criticism of, 462-463, 465
Yoga and, 526-527, 570-571 See also Computational Theory of Mind
See also Psychology (CTM)
Achterberg, J.: 480 Analogical retrieval by constraint
Action at a distance: xxin2 satisfaction (ARCS) and, 471
Adams, 1.: 129-1 30 Criticism of, 462-463
Adams, 1. E.: 383 WordNet and, 463
Ader, R.: 1 22, 142, 146 See also Computational Theory of Mind
Agnati, L. F.: 27 (CTM), Connectionism
Agosti, R.: 404n30 Analogy: 459-465, 469
Aker, l.: 192 Cognition and, 467n25
Alberini, C. M.: 278-279n32 Computational Theory of Mind (CTM)
Albin, R. L.: 145 and, 452, 460-465
Alcock, 1. E.: 61 Creativity and, 459, 460
Aldrich, C. K.: 149 Imagination and, 457, 459
Alexander, S.: 602nl4 See also Metaphor
Alkire, M. T: 417 Anand, B. K.: 178, 571 n66
Allard, T T: 572 Andermann, F.: 382
Allison, R.: 31 8 -n 1 3 Anderson, 1. A.: 19n14
A llport, G.: xviii Anderson, 1. R.: 17, 19
Almli, R.: 621n33 Anderson, Y. : 279n33
Alpert, N. M.: 184 Andreasen, N. c.: 1 2 1 , 475, 535, 567
Alter, A.: 564 Andrews, S.: 231
Altered states of consciousness: xxii, 41, 87, Andrews, T 1.: 626
96-97, 167, 172, 293, 350, 425, 504, 525, 536, Anesthesias, 308, 312
558-559, 564, 566-567, 584, 603 Chemical, 185, 188, 190
See also Automatisms, Dreaming, General, 416-421, 416n45, 628
Meditation, Mediumship, Multiple Global workspace and, 39, 416
Personality, Mystical experience, Hypnotic, 67, 87, 181, 185, 188
Psychedelics, Sleep, Stigmata, Telepathy Hysterical, 3 1 , 67, 68, 87, 99, 106, 1 62, 164,
166

759
760-Index

Memory and, 388 Athwal, B. S.: 164, 166

Multiple personality and, 168, 174 Atkinson, G.: 378
Near-death experiences and, 368, 387, Atomistic reductionism: 49, 54
387n l 8 Attention: xvii.
Stigmata and, 68, 153 Awareness and, 346
Surgery and, 378-388, 414-415, 542-542n39, James and, xvii, 614
543 Progressive intensification of, in yoga,
Angell, M.: 1 1 9 526-527
Angst, J.: 546 Psi research and, 362
Animal magnetism. See Mesmerism See also Concentration, Perception
Animism, 580. See Dualism Attneave, F.: 252
Anoxia and related mechanisms, near-death Audette, 1.: 370n2
experiences and: 379-380, 384, 419 Augustine, St.: 7 1 , 241, 521
Antonini, A.: 546 Austin, J.: 539-541, 539n34, 540n35, 540n36,
Aphasias. See Brain, Memory 546n44, 549n47, 571
Apparitions: 40n30 Autism, infantile, savant syndrome and:
As sensory automatisms, 1 1 0, 285, 308, 314, 33-34, 433n6
354-355 Autobiographical memory. See Episodic
Collective, 1 10, 407-408 memory, Memory
Crisis-related, 109, 408 Automatic drawing. See Automatisms,
Deathbed, 405-411 Helene Smith
Marian, 1 37 Automatic painting. See Automatisms
Nunciative, 293 Automatic writing. See Automatisms
Of the dead, 1 10, 284n40, 409-41 1 Automatisms: 32-33, 36, 41, 87-89, 87n24, 93,
O f the living, 286 94, 97, 1 1 1-1 l 2 , 285, 585, 586-587, 615-616
Post-mortem survival and, 282 Altered states of consciousness and, 87
Reciprocal, 286, 403 Anesthesias and, 87, 88
Self-projection theory of, 286 Calculating prodigies and, 432-433, 433n6,
Telepathic transmission of, 1 1 0 600
Theories of, 360 Cryptomnesia and, 448
Veridical, 406-407, 408, 439 Freud and, 327, 328
Vision and, 438 Genius and, 354, 425, 440-450, 442n1 5, 443,
See also Deathbed visions, Hallucinations, 446-447, 475, 480
Near-death experiences Hallucinations and, 438-439
Aristotle, 65, 460, 491 , 531n27, 633 Hidden observer and, 336
Arshavsky, Y. I.: 278-279n32 Hilgard and, 334-337
Art, transformative aspects of, 481-482, Involuntariness and, 345, 439
492-493 Janet and, 344n26
Artificial intelligence: I I, 13, 15-16 McDougall and, 322-323, 324, 592, 637
Chalmers' theory of, 44-45 Mediumship and, 356-357, 448-449, 480
Hofstadter's critique of, 462-463, 465 Myers and, 302, 307, 363-365, 432, 592
Searle's critique of, 21-22, 461, 465n24 Mystical experience and, 523-525
Asher, R.: 194, 196 Mythopretic faculty and, 356, 359-360,
Assaglioli, R.: 480 431-432
Associationism: Normal versus pathological, 308-309
17th- and 18th-century philosophy and, Origin of term, 303n4
50-5 1 , 452-453 Passive versus active, 308-309
19th-century psychology and, 20, 55-56 Philosophy and, 337-340
Behaviorism and, 3, 6 Prince and, 319, 336
Dualism and, 608n22 Psi research and, 361-363
Fantasy versus imagination in, 455 Reflex action and, 304-305, 307, 340-341
Imagination and, 454-457 Role-playing and, 342, 345
Limitations of, 452-454, 455-456 Secondary centers of consciousness and,
Memory and, 249n8, 260 301-365
See also Connectionism Sensory and motor varieties of, 308, 328,
Astin, J. A.: 1 29, 1 36n1 1 , 228 354-355, 359, 362, 438-439
Athappilly, G. K.: 375 Sociocognitive theory of, 341-342, 346
 Index-761

Supernormal phenomena and, 353-362 Barrett, W. F.: 60, 67-68nI4, 7 1 , 93, 102, 103,
Voluntariness and, 343-344, 345 106, 1 10, 409, 41On38
See also Mediumship, Trance speaking Barron, F.: 474, 474n28, 484
Autonomic processes: Barrows, I.: 3 1 5
Biofeedback and, 176n30 Bartrop, R. w.: 1 24
Hypnosis and, 1 81-183 Barzun, J.: 1 l4 - 1 1 5n49
Voluntary control of, 176, 178 Basmajian, J. Y.: 176, 616
Yogis and, 177-179 Basso, A.: 279n33
Autoscopy: 396, 397, 403-404, 404n31 Batcheldor, K. 1.: 447nl7
See also Depersonalization, Near-death Bauer, w. : 373
experiences, Out-of-body experiences Baumann, S. B.: 528-529n26
Autosuggestion: Baxter, M. 1.: 263
Death and, 126. See Mortality Beahrs, J.: 3 1 8 n l 3
Healing and, 1 3 3 - 1 34, 1 33n8, 1 37, 138 Bear, M. F.: 261n 1 8 , 273n26
Psychophysiological changes and, 180, 218 Beard, A. w.: 413
Therapeutic touch and, 227-228n63 Beatty, 1.: 176n30
See also Faith healing, Distant healing Beauchamp, S.: 81, 3 17-319, 593n8.
Aviles, J. M.: 229n65 See also Multiple personality, M. Prince
Ayer, A. J.: 3, 244n4 Beauregard, M.: 615
Azam, E.: 3 1 5, 316n12, 328-329 Bechtel, w. : 19n14, 21n15, 23, 456
Becker, C. B.: 370n2, 376
Baars, B. 1.: 36, 38, 416n44, 614-615, 626 Becker, D. E.: 570n65
Bach, 1. S. 521 Beckwith, R.: 463
Bacon, F.: xxiii, 561n59 Beddow, M.: 479
Baddawi, K.: 568 Bede, 1 35
Bagchi, B. K.: 178-179 Beecher, H. K.: 140, 143
Bagiella, E.: 1 30 - 1 3 1 Beer, R. D.: 2 1 n l
Bahnson, C. B.: 171, 349 Beethoven, L . : 521
Baillie, 1.: 287n43 Behaviorism. See Psychology
Bain, A.: 53, 56, 460 Bellis, J. M.: 203, 205
Bakalar, J. B.: 516, 543, 544, 549n47, 551 Beloff, J.: 608n21
Bakan, D.: xviii Bern, D. J.: 362
Baker, A.: 490n35 Bendfeldt, F.: 168
Baker, L. R.: 290 Benedetti, F.: 141, 145, 146
Bakker, P. F. A.: 418 Benet, M.: 475
Balanchine, G.: 444 Bennett, M. R . : 242n2, 250, 251, 273-274n27
Balfour, A.: 60 Benor, D.: 1 35, 230
Balfour, G.: 60, 326n1 5, 364, 560n58, 588, Benson, H.: 140, 143, 178, 179, 229n65
588n7, 589, 590, 593 Bentall, R.: 40n30, 109, 405, 406, 471
Ballou, R . 0.: xxvii Bereavement. See Disease,
Balzac, H.: 521, 522 Immunosuppression, Mind­
Banquet, J. P.: 571 body medicine, Mortality,
Barahal, H. S.: 148, 148-149 Psychoneuroimmunology
Barban, L.: 168 Bergson, H.: 35, 73n16, 107, 183, 241, 269,
Barbato, M.: 406 269n24, 270n25, 270-271, 272, 322, 364,
Barber, T. X.: 149, 179, 180, 180n32, 182, 183, 384, 420, 481, 549, 574, 590-591 , 593n9,
183n36, 184, 1 87-188, 189, 189n38, 189n39, 602n14, 606n19, 621 , 633n39
191, 192, 193, 194, 194-195n42, 196-197, Berk, L. S.: 1 29
198, 21On50, 210-21 1 , 212, 213, 220, 237- Berne, R. M.: 217
238, 341, 378 Bernheim, H.: 93
Barglow, P.: 1 5 1 Berntson, G. G.: 268
Barker, J. c . : 125, 1 26 Berrios, G. E.: 162, 164, 165, 404
Barnard, G. w.: 30lnl Bertrand, L.: 343
Barresi, J.: 287n42 Bethune, H. c.: 198, 198-199
Barrett, D.: 182, 442 Beyerstein, B. L.: 480
Barrett, S.: 1 36n1 1 Bhole, M. Y.: 178
Bickford, R. G.: 184
762-l ndex

Bierre, P.: 186 Bondurant, S.: 21 1 -2 1 2

Bigelow, J.: 7 Bonke, B.: 3 8 8
Biggs, M. H . : 201 , 201n46, 207 Booth, R . 1.: 191
Binding problem: 55n5 Bordia, A.: 1 77-178
Anatomical concept of, 38 Boring, E.: 50, 334
Functional concept of, 3 8 Bosman, A. M. T.: 620
Neurophysiology and, 38-39, 539n34, 551 Boundaries:
Perception and, 271-272 Dreaming under general anesthesia and,
See also Consciousness, Global workspace 627-628
theory Genius and, 1 00
Binet, A.: 68, 75, 98, 99, 309-310, 312, 314- Hartmann's conception of, 84n22, 414n43
315, 424, 443-444, 477 Psychological, between supraliminal and
Biological Natural ism: 24-25, 38, 238 , 416 subliminal consciousnesses, 83-84
Critiques of, 25-29, 46, 605, 605n 17 Psychological lability, impact on, 84-85, 97
Post-mortem survival and, 30 Sleep and, 102
See also Searle See also Transliminality
Bio-PK. See Distant mental influence on Bourgignon, E.: 587
living systems (DM I Ls), Psychokinesis Bourne, A.: 105
Bipolar disorder. See Manic-depressive Bourru, H . : 3 1 5
disorder Bourtchouladze, R . : 273n26
Birnbaum, M. H . : 1 67, 169 Bowers, K. S.: 1 84, 213, 345
Birthmarks I Birth defects in cases of the Bowersbuch, M. K . : 182
reincarnation type: 32, 232-236 Bowra, C. M.: 440n14, 447, 482
"Experimental" variety of, 234-235 Bozzano, E . : 409
Independent corroboration of, 234 Brading, A.: 217
See also Maternal impressions Bradley, F. H .: 561
Bishay, E. G.: 1 92 Brain:
Biven, G. D.: 149, 1 50 Body and, 2 1 , 1 2 1 , 1 39
Bjelke, B.: 27 Dynamic theory of, 279, 280
Black, S.: 191 Functional organization of, xx, 28, 52,
Blackburn, T.: 1 69 88n26, 272-273
Blackmore, S.: 377, 379, 380, 383-384, 387, Hemisphericity, 279, 351n31
390, 394, 395-396n22, 396, 400, 403, Holistic theory and, 279, 280
405n33 Injury of, neuroimaging and, 620-621 , 624
Blake, w.: 445, 445n 16, 505, 521 Impairment of, survival and, 296, 296n52,
Blakeslee, S.: 152n 18 368
Blanke, 0.: 397, 398 , 399, 399n25, 404, Memory and, 241 , 242-28 1 , 295-299, 628n37
404n30 Memory enhancement and, 274-275
Bleecker, E. R . : 142 Migraine aura and, 436
Bliss, J. M.: 1 23 Modularity and, 6 1 8
Block, N.: 258, 573 Near-death experiences and, 394, 398-399
Block, R. I.: 388 Ncuroimaging and, 262, 265-266, 268, 397,
Blofeld, 1.: 514-5 1 5 619-620
Blood, B.: 542 Neurotransmitters and, 612
Bloom, H . : 423, 429, 446-447, 478-479, 481 , Out-of-body experiences and, 397, 398-399
555 Plasticity and, 279-280, 280n34, 539-540,
Bloomingdale, K.: 173 572
Blumenthal, 1. A.: 128n5 "Psychological moment", scanning of, and,
Bock, G. R . : 2, 26 626
Boden, M. A.: 23, 443, 452, 456, 462, 463, Quantum mechanics and, 5 1 2 , 6 1 5-616
491 , 602n 1 5 Representation and, 254, 256
Boehme, 1 . : 505, 522, 524 Self-organizational theory and, 279
Bohm, D.: 299, 61 1 , 636n45 Skilled cognitive performances and, 17
Bohr, N.: 612 Split-brain research and, 351-352n32, 621
Boismont, A. B. de: 370, 410, 625 Stimulation of, near-death experiences
Boitnott, J. K.: 125 and, 383, 398-399
Bonaventure, St.: 517-n14 Structural organization of, xx, 278-279
 Index-763

Understanding of, 260 Bush, N . E . : 373, 374, 375

"Wagon wheel" illusion and, 626-627 Bushnell, M. c.: 186-187
See also Consciousness, Mind Bussey, T. J.: 261 n l 8
Brammer, M. J.: 438 Butcher, S. H . : 460
Bramwell, J. M . : 107, 180, 185, 188, 196, Butler, c.: 142
434n7 Byerly, H. c.: 147
Brandsma, J. M.: 168 Byrd, R. C.: 228
Brann, E. T. H.: 17nlO, 40, 440n13, 445,
445nI6, 45 1 , 454n20, 457, 458, 610 Cabeza, R.: 266, 276
Braud, W, G.: 230, 231, 232, 484, 528 Cacioppo, 1. T.: 268
Braude, S. E.: 169n25, 242nl , 337-340, Cage, 1.: 521
339n23, 339n24, 447, 449-450, 477-478, Cain, R. L.: 1 7 1 , 248, 255, 618
530, 585n6, 594-595nI0, 596nl l, 597, 598, Calculating prodigies. See Automatisms,
623, 629, 636n45 Savant syndrome
Braun, A. R.: 627 Callanan, M.: 1 29, 41On38
Braun, B. G.: 168, 168-169, 169n25, 172-173, Camerino, M.: 124
174, 348 Campbell, D. T.: 583, 602n l 5
Brende, 1. 0.: 1 7 1 Campbell, J . ; 556
Brentano, F. : 43 Cannon, w' : 122, 125, 128-129
Bressler, B.: 150 Capek, M.: 6 1 1 n24
Bressloff, P. c.: 436 Caplan, D.: 267n23
Breton, A.: 450 Caramazza, A.: 269
Brett, G. S.: 56 Cardeiia, E.: 147, 564
Breuer, 1.: 97, 163, 314-315, 328 Cardiovascular disease. See Disease.
Broad, C. D.: xxviii, 29, 283n38, 357n37, 361, Carlson, N. R.: 261n 1 8 , 273n26
36In41, 495, 543n41, 549-550, 597, 598, 599, Carlson, R. w': 141
608n20, 610, 619n32, 623, 625, 629 Carpenter, E.: 521
Broca, P: 88n26, 622n34 Carpenter, w' : 88n25, 243n3, 304
Brockman, J.: 22nl 8 Unconscious cerebration, theory of, 75-76,
Brody, E. G . : 56-57n6 93, 304, 307, 340-341
Brody, H.: 147 Carr, C.: 370n2
Bromfield, E.: 397 Carr, D.: 380
Bromm, B.: 165 Carrel, A.: 1 37
Brooks, P.: 192 Carrier, B.: 186-187
Brown, A. S.: 454 Carrington, H.: 395, 405
Brown, D. P.: 5 1 3 Casdorph, H. R.: 1 35, 1 35nlO
Brown, E.: 1 5 1 Cases of the reincarnation type (CORT): 39,
Brown, J. E.: 523nl 9 232-236, 293, 295n51 , 599n13, 624-625
Brown, K . W, G.: 417-418 Post-mortem survival and, 596
Browning, R.: 471 See also Birthmarks / Birth defects in cases
Bruce, R. A.: 143 of the reincarnation type
Brugger, P.: 404n30 Cassirer, E.: 45, 247, 451
Brugmans, H. J. F. W.: 363 Castillo, P.: 373
Bruner, 1.: xxii Category formation: 20
Brunswick, E.: 3 Cavanna, R.: 542n38
Buber, M . : 516 Cerullo, M. A.: 228n64
Biichi, S.: 439nl2 Chabaneix, P.: 440
Bucke, R. 1.: 498-499, 498n3, 500, 501-502, Chabris, C. F.: 40, 492
503-504, 505, 521 , 522-523, 525, 528- Chadwick, 0.: 54
529n26, 555, 565 Chalmers, D: 23, 26n20, 44, 194, 194-195n42,
Buckley, W.: 7n5 195, 605, 605nI8, 629, 635n43, 636
Buhi, W, c.: 149 Chapman, L. F.: 205, 212
Burdick, D. S.: 584n5 Charcot, 1. -M.: 68, 93, 173, 205
Burot, P.: 3 1 5 Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS). See
Burrowes, K.: 397 Hallucinations
Bursen, H. A.: 242nl , 251 Chaves, J. F.: 187, 189n38, 341
Burt, C.: 73nl 6 Cheek, D. B.: 388, 414-41 5
764-Index

Cherlow, D. G.: 533 Brain and, 617-618

Chhina, G. S.: 178 Classical cognitivism, critique of, 23. See
Chibnall, J. T.: 228n64, 229 also Dreyfus, Hofstadter, Searle
Child, I. L.: 103n35, 362, 362-363, 496, 587 Classical cognitivism, problems in,
Chomsky, N.: xxii, 2, 6, 8-10, 21, 456, 641 1 1 ,16,17, 18, 19, 20, 22
See also Language Computer simulation (CS) and, I I , 15-16,
Church, A.: 7 463-464
Churchland, P. M.: 3n3, 19, 30, 50, 250, 640 Criticism of, 343-344, 343n25, 344n28, 345
Cirignotta, F: 532-533n28 External causal models and, 43
Cirolli, D.: 138-139 Genius and, 424, 487, 489-490
Clairvoyance: xxvin6, 67-68nI4, 107, 1 1 3 History of, I-I I , 16-29, 248, 251-252, 260-
Cognitive impairment and, 295-296 262
Hypnosis and, 107-108 Information, concept of, and, 251-252,
See also Psi 252n9, 259
Claparede, E.: 433n5 Informational semantics and, 257-258
Clark, A.: 2 1 n l 5 Meaning and, 492-493
Clark, K.: 376n7, 389, 390 Memory and, 248-260, 342
Classical conditioning of immunoresponses, Neuroimaging and, 618-619
122 Neuroscience and, 249
See also Psychology Secondary selves and, 348
Clawson, T. A.: 192, 194, 196 Supernormal phenomena and, 345
Cleckley, H. M.: 168, 172 Unconscious and, 75n17, 341-345, 629
Clifford, W K.: 53, 54, 56 See also Brain, Computational Theory
Cobb, 1. B.: 634n42 of Mind (CTM), Consciousness, Mind,
Cobb, L. A.: 143 Psychology
Cobbe, F. P.: 41On38 Cohen, 1.: 172
Co-consciousness. See Consciousness, Cohen, L. M.: 150
Multiple personality, M. Prince Cohen, N.: 1 22, 146
Coding / Storage I Retrieval (CSR) Cohen, N. J.: 261 n l 8
framework. See Cognitive psychology, Cohen, S. I.: 2 1 1 -212
Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), Colby, K. M.: I In6,14
Memory, Perception, Sensory Coding Coleridge, S. T.: 427, 454-457, 454n20, 458,
Coe, W: 341 468, 474n29, 482, 485, 492
Cognition: 14 Collective apparitions. See Apparitions
Behaviorism and, 6 Collective unconscious. See Jung
Categorization and, 468 Collier, B. B.: 380-381
Conceptual combination and, 468 Coltrane, J.: 521
Fluidity of thought and, 466 Coly, L.: I n l , 400
Genius-level creativity and, 41, 42, 469 Community of sensation: 225-226
Hypnosis and, 107, 342, 343 Computational Theory of Mind (CTM): xix,
Imagination and, 457 6-1 1 , 13-14, 18, 20, 24-25, 248-249, 601-602,
Knowledge representation and, 467n25, 642
369 Analogical constraint mapping engine
Meaning and, 463-464, 492-493 (ACME) and, 461
Memory and, 35, 36 Analogical retrieval by constraint
Near-death experiences and, 415-421 satisfaction (ARCS) and, 471
Problem-solving and, I I , 15, 20 Categorization and, 468
Question-answering and, I I Conceptual combination and, 468
Subordinate systems of, 335, 348 Critique of, 21-23, 46, 250, 452, 460-465,
Unconscious and, 75n17, 345-348 623
See also Computational Theory of Mind Copycat and, 463-465
(CTM), Intentionality, Knowledge Fodor's theory of modularity and, 618
representation Genius and, 452
Cognitive psychology: xxi, xxv Homunculus problem and, 43-44, 251 , 492
Analogy and, 463-464, 469 Interpretational mapping and, 461-462
Artificial intelligence (AI) and, I I, 1 5 -16, Memory and, 248-260
463-464, 466 Mystical experience and, 531
 Index-765

Structure-mapping engine (SME) and, 361 Quantum dynamics and, 613, 614, 616,
Computer simulation: I I, 13, 1 5 616n29, 636n45
Concentration: Secondary centers of, 41, 305-365
Stigmata and, 161 Sociocognitive theories of, 345, 346-348
Yoga and, 526-527 States of, methods for differentiating,
Conceptual understanding, 619n32
phenomenological content of: 44-45 Survival research and, 72-73
Condon, W. S.: 169 "Theater of", 38
Conn, L.: 192 Transmission model of, 73, 550
Connectionism: 16, 19-21, 43, 249-250, Vehicles of, 610
249n8, 260, 453, 456, 463-464, 464n23, Unity of, 37-44, 321-322, 323, 325-326, 329,
608n22, 640 330, 331-332, 337-338, 341-342, 580, 634
Conner, D.: 375 See also Binding problem, Dualism,
Connors, B. W.: 261 n l 8 Epiphenomenalism, Global workspace
Consciousness: xxi, xxii, xxv, 1 1 , 27, 44, 45, theory, Mind, Reductive physicalism,
76-78, 1 18, 634 Self, Stream of consciousness,
As the fundamental reality in nature, 637 Subliminal consciousness, Supraliminal
Automatism and, 309-310, 345 consciousness
Automaton theory of, 53-54, 312 Conservation of energy, principle of: 49-50
Brain activity and, 626, 627, 642 Impact of, on psychology, 52, 56, 56-57n6
Central control of, Hilgard and, 335, 336- Constantini-Ferrando, M. F.: 184
337 Contreras, D.: 38
Covert centers of, 312, 316, 317, 319, 339 Conversion disorder. See Hysteria, Stigmata
Deep general anesthesia and, 39 Cook, I. A.: 142
Dissociated forms of, 36-37 Coombe-Tennant, W. [Mrs. Willet): 588n7.
Emergent nature of, 24-26, 83-86, 636n46 See Mediumship
Extra-marginal versus Intra-marginal, Coons, P. M.: 1 67, 168, 169, 174, 348, 349
77-79n I9, 578 Cooper, P.: 566
Filter theory of, 546-549, 550, 558, 558- Cooper, S.: 389
559n56, 562-563 Cope, H.: 165
Folk-psychology conceptions of, 37-38n25 Copeland, A.: 479
Freud and, 327, 329, 330-331 , 330nl7 Copernicus: 48
Fringe, 15, 22 Copertino, 1.: 530
Genius and, 100 Copycat: 466
Hidden observer and, 336n21 Description of, 464-465, 464n23
Holistic view of, 364 See also Fluid analogies research group
Homunculus problem and, 43-44, 251, 492 (FARG)
Hysteria and, 98, 99, 166 Corcoran, K.: 287n42
James and, 412n41, 558-559, 561-562, 558- Corkin, S.: 264
589, 591-592, 594 Cosmic consciousness. See Mystical
Jastrow and, 86n23 experience, Post-mortem survival
Jung and, 332-333, 556-557 Council, J. R.: 378
McDougall and, 322-323, 325-326, 336, Counts, D. A.: 370n2
580-581 Cousins, N.: 129
Multiple personality disorders and, 168 Couvade, 150n17
Myers and, 75-76, 80-83, 99, 309-310, 325- Cowan, J. D.: 436
326, 329, 412n41, 561n59, 562, 586, 588- Coward, H.: 557n55
589 Crabtree, A.: 301n l , 302, 303, 304n7, 305n7,
Mystical experiences and, 513, 522 310n10, 315, 339, 477-478
Near-death experiences and, 39, 385 Craik, K. J.: 10, 266
Perception as an analogy for, 331 Crandall, P. H.: 533
Persistence of, in pathological conditions, Crasilneck, H. B.: 180n32, 182, 192, 196
III Crawford, H. J.: 33, 186, 187
Physical measurement and, 50 Creativity: xx, xxx, 14, 41, 42, 75, 87, 1 14,
Physics and, 634 276n30, 353, 356, 359-360, 427-429, 430-
Post-mortem survival and, 591-592 434, 443-444, 450, 453-460, 458n21, 471-
Psi phenomena and, 32
766-Index

473, 478, 481-482, 482-483, 483-484, 487, Delanoy, D.: 484

589 Delbreuf, J.: 107, 204, 204n47
See also Genius Deleuze, J.: 316n 1 2 , 339
Crick, F: 19, 25, 38, 416n44, 626, 628, 640 Delfina: 154
Crimlisk, H. L.: 165 Delin, P.: 84n22, 414n43, 521 , 604
Crisis apparitions. See Apparitions Del1as, M.: 473, 484
Crockett, 1. E.: 143 Dening, T. R.; 404
Crookall, R.: 395, 410n38 Dennett, D. C.: 4, 19, 23, 37-38n25, 56-57n6,
Cryptomnesia: 360, 448 610, 614, 638n47, 640, 640-641
Crystal-gazing. See Scrying Recursive decomposition and, 44
Csikszentmihalyi, M.: 427 Deonna, W.: 448-449
Curel, M. de: 443-444 Depersonalization. See Multiple
Curran, A. P.:l33-134 personality, Near-Death Experience, Out-
Curran, P.: 449-450, 469, 478, 588n7 of-Body Experiences, Psychology
See also Automatic writing Depression. See Disease,
Cybernetics: 7 Immunosuppression, Mind-body
Cytowik, R. E.: 552 medicine, Placebo effect, Psychology,
Psychoneuroimmunology
Dahinterova, J.: 190 Depth psychology: xviii
Dahlem, M. A.: 436 Deren, M.: 587
Dale, L. A.: 109n40, 406, 598 De Renzi, E.: 264, 265
Dalla Barba, G.: 247, 265 De Rios, M. D.: 544, 545, 547, 548n46
Dallas, H. A.: 86 Descartes, R.: 3, 21, 44, 48-49, 1 1 9-120, 304,
Dalton, K.: 484 610, 623, 633
Damas Mora, J. M. R.: 404 See also Dualism
Damasio, A.: xx, 269n24, 271 -272, 615 Despine, C.: 316n12
Damon, S. F : 445 Dessoir, M.: 3 1 2
Dane, J. R.: 186 Devane, G . w.: 149, 1 5 1
Dante, : 497, 521, 522 Devinsky, 0.: 397, 397n24, 398, 399, 404
Danziger, N.: 1 86, 564 DeVries, J. w.: 418
D'Aquili, E.: 537-538, 539, 540n35, 546 Dewar, H. A.: 125
Darwin, C.: xxix, 50, 52, 188n37, 294, 384, Dewhurst, K.: 413
476-477, 602n15, 604 Diamond, M.: 27n21
Das, H. H.: 535, 569, 571, 571n66, 572 Dickens, c.: 443-444
Dase: 433, 433n6, 485-486, 490n35, 600 Dientsfrey, H.: 140, 147
Dasgupta, S.: 526 Diephuis, 1. c.: 418
Daston, L. J.: 50, 53, 54, 56 Dietrich, A.: 546-547
David, A.: 438 Dil1er, D. H.: 143
David, A. S.: 163, 166 Dimensions of Attention Questionnaire
Davidson, J.: 123, 536, 537, 567 (DAQ): 564
Davidson, J. E.: 487 Dimond, E. G.: 143
Davidson, R. J.: 571 Dingwall, E.: 339
Davies, P.: 252 Dionysius the Areopagite: 514
Davis, D. G.: 625 Direct mental influence on living systems.
Da Vinci, L.: 472, 479-480 See Distant mental influence on living
Davison, G. c.: 183 systems (DMILs), Psychokinesis
Death-bed visions: 1 10-1 1 1, 408-4 1 1 , 410n38 Disease:
See also Apparitions, Hallucinations Bereavement and, 124
De Boer, A.: 141 Faith healing and, 1 32-139, 146
Decision-making: xx Fear and, 1 25
Decker, H. S.: 53 Hypnotic suggestion and, 176n30
De Craen, A. J. M.: 141 Mind and, 1 23-124
Deese, 1.: 56-57n6 Placebo and, 1 39-149
Dehaene, S.: 38, 416n44, 437, 615, 626 Psychiatry and, 1 23, 124, 1 29
Deikman, A. 1.: 5 1 5 Psychology and, 1 24, 128n5, 1 29
Deja vu experiences: 498 Stress and, 123, 128-129
Delacroix, H.: 524 Dissociation, 592, 604
 Index-767

Braude and, 338-339, 340 Dryden, 1.: 470

Janet and, 31 1-312, 3 1 9, 329-330, 330n17, 578 Dualism: 24, 25, 44, 48, 54, 56-57n6, 70, 212,
Freud and, 330, 330n l 7 239, 633n39
H ilgard and, 335 Constitutive identity and, 287-288
Mitchell and, 319-320 Energy conservation and, 510
Near-death experiences and, 377-378 Hysteria and, 163, 167
Self and, 347 Interactive form of, 609, 611, 622, 623, 624,
Sociocognitive theories of, 341-348 636-637
Dissociative identity disorder. See Multiple James and, 632-633
personality McDougall and, 580, 590-591
Distant healing: 32, 1 36, 136n l l , 227-230, Monistic form of, 609
228n64, 230n66 Neuroscience and, 608-609
Distant mental influence on living systems Rejection of, in the history of psychology,
(DMILs): 32, 32, 225-232, 226n6l 50, 52, 56
Definition of, 230, 230n66 Western medicine and, 1 1 9-120, 147, 2 1 1 -212
Experimental studies of, 230-232 See a/so Epiphenomenalism, Identity
Methodology and, 230 theory, Mind-body problem, Neutral­
Staring studies, 231-232, 232n68 monist model, Non-Cartesian Dualist­
See a/so Community of sensation, Distant Interactionist Models
healing, Faith healing, Psi, Staring Dubin, L. F: 1 3 1 , l 54n21
studies D ubovsky, S.: 388
Dittrich, A.: 564 Ducasse, C. J.: xxvii, 82-83n21, 597, 598, 599
Divination: 94. See Psi Dudek, S.: 194
Doblin, R.: 544 Dunbar, H. F : 1 34, 157, 175, 190, 193, 196,
Dodds, E. R.: 597 201, 203, 204, 205
Domangue, B. B.: 192 Duncan, G. H.: 186-187
Domino, K. B.: 387n18 Dunnett, S. B.: 279
Donagan, A.: 287n43 Duplex personality. See Multiple
Donovan, S.: xxix, 175, 535, 567, 568 personality
Dostoevsky, : 532, 533, 533n29, 569n63 Du Prel, C.: 585n6
Dowling, J.: 1 37, 1 38, 138n13, 1 39 Dupuy, J. -P.: 8, 18, 20, 21n15, 22n17, 26, 27,
Dowsing: See Automatisms 43, 640
Draaisma, D.: 44, 47, 242, 250, 260, 460, Dynamic psychiatry: 332nl 8
636n45, 639 Genius and, 472
Dreaming: 109n40, 587 Myers's influence on: 302, 43ln4
Brain states and, 627, 631 Dynamic psychology. See Psychology
Freud and, 458 Dynamic systems theory: 16, 20, 23, 43, 249,
General anesthesia and, 627-628 277, 609n23, 640
Genius and, 442-443, 480 See also Cognition, Cognitive psychology,
Imaging and, 627 Connectionism
Lucid, 84n22
McDougall's views on, 324-325 Eacott, S. E.: 404
Memory and, 102 Early, L. F: 1 53, 154, 1 55
Myers's views on, 101- 103, 587 Eastman, T. E.: 635, 635n43
Mystical experience and, 535-536, 535n32 Ebersole, J. S.: 418
Neuropsychology and, 627 Eccles, J. C.: 45, 608, 609, 611, 612n27, 615,
Perceptual synthesis and, 40 622, 624
Phenomenology of, 631 Eckhart, M . : 505, 506, 514-515, 5 15-516, 517,
Recall and, 84n22 520, 537
Stigmata and, 158 Ecstasy:
Subliminal processes and, 87, 102, 285 Epileptic seizures and, 532-533n28, 533n29
Supernormal processes and, 361-362, 603 Neurophysiology of, 535-536
Waking apparitions and, 40n30 Trance and, 1 1 3
See a/so Hallucinations, Sleep See a/so Mystical experience
Dreaper, R.: 194-195, 195-196 Edelman, G. M . : 9, 2 1 , 25, 38, 416n44, 615,
Dretske, F: 255, 259 621 , 640
Dreyfus, H.: 1 5, 22, 452
768-Index

Edwards, P.: 287n42, 395n22, 549n47, 6\0, Engelhardt, H. T., Jr.: 56

625 Engelmann, R.: 436
Egelhoff, C.: 406 Enlund, G.: 387
Ehleben, C.: 192 Ennemoser, J.: 316n12
Eichenbaum, H.: 261n18 Ephraim, A. 1.: 148, 149
Eidetic imagery Epiphenomenalism: 49, 52, 1 15m 345, 345-
Lucid dreaming and, 406 346, 367, 605, 605n18
Memory and, 33 See also Dualism, Identity theory, Mind­
See also Dreaming, Memory, Mental body problem
imagery Episodic memory: 35, 243, 245, 260, 270n25,
Einstein, A.: xxin2, 27n21, 49-50, 486, 273, 275-276
487n34, 500 Brain injury and, 247n7, 261, 263-264,
Eisenberg, D. M.: 129, 371 265n2 1 , 268, 277
Eisenbud, J.: 530 Experimental tests of, 265
Elbert, 1.: 572 Original experience and, 246-247
Electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB). Post-mortem survival and, 295-296
See Brain, Memory See also Memory
Electroencephalography (EEG): xix, 17, Epstein, M. D.: 140
627n36 Ergotropic/trophotropic systems. See
Ganzfeld technique and, 439nl 2 Gelhorn, Meditation, Neuroscience
General anesthesia and, 417, 419 Erickson, M. H.: 182
Hallucinations and, 438 Erickson, T. c.: 396
Hypnotic analgesia and, 186 Ernst, E.: 136n l 1 , 141 , 141-142, 228
Hysteria and, 164, 165 Esdaile, J.: 183-184, 185, 186, 187-188, 189,
Limitations of, 619-620 189n39, 190, 1 90n40, 225
Meditation and, 569-571 Espagnat, B. d': 637
Multiple personality disorder and, 171-173, Everson, S. A.: 123
349 Evolution, theory of: 50, 602nl 5
Mystical experiences and, 569, 570n65, 571, Impact of, on psychology, 52
571n66 Ewin, D. M.: 169, 190, 192, 194
Near-death experiences and, 418-419 Experimenter effect: 21 1n51
Placebo effect on depression and, 142 Staring studies and, 232n68
Temporal lobe epilepsy and, 532-533n28 Extrasensory perception (ESP): xxvin5, 30,
See also Neuroimaging 283, 293, 294, 296, 360, 541 , 598
Elgar, E.: 521 See also Psi
Eliade, M.: 480, 5 1 3, 526 Ey, H.: 167
ELIZA program: 15n8, 463, 465, 465n24 Eye-witness testimony: 40n30, \09
See also Weizenbaum Eysenck, H.: 453, 458, 473, 475, 488, 490,
Elkington, A. R.: 126 602n1 5
Ellenberger, H.: xviii, xxii, 6, 67, 302,
332nI8, 339, 43In4, 448, 642 Fagan, J . : 133-1 34, 1 37
On Human Personality (Myers, 1903), xxix Faith healing: 99, 132-139, 1 36nl 1, 140, 146-
Ellferich, I.: 371 147, 238-239
Elliotson, J.: 89, \05-\06, 190n40, 225 Claims of, at Lourdes, 137-139, 146
Ellis, F. R.: 126 See also Distant healing
Emerson, R. w. : 460, 466-467, 471 , 482, 521 Falkenhainer, B.: 461
Emmerich, A.: 160, 220 Fallon, 1. H.: 417
Emotion: xx False memory syndrome, 169n25, 341
Hypnosis and, 182 False pregnancy: 149-152, 1 52n18, 237
Hysteria and, 163 Biopsychosocial model of, 1 51-152
Multiple personality and, 173, 174 Decline in reports of, 1 52, 1 52nl9
Skin conditions and, 2 1 1 Hypnosis and, 182
Stigmata and, 161 Males and, 150nl 7
Empedocles: 23nl 8 Physiological basis of, 1 5 1
Engel, A . K.: 38, 40, 414n44 Psychological basis of, 150-151
Engel, G. L.: 1 19, 120, 124-125, 128, 1 28n6, Fantasy-proneness: 84n22, 378
151 Faraday, M.: 93
 Index-769

Farah, M. J.: 620 Forel, A.: 207, 272

Farrow, J. T.: 568 Forest, D. W.: 183
Fava, G. A.: 1 20, 123n4 Forgione, F (Padre Pio): 153, 1 54
Favill, J.: 175 Forman, R.: 517
Fawcett, J. w.: 279, 280n34 Forrest, K. A.: 174
Fechner, G.: 28, 52, 560, 560n57, 560n58, Forys, K. L.: 1 29
590, 592, 593, 606n19 Foster, G.: 525n20
Feigenbaum, E. A.: 1 1 n6 Foster, J.: 608n21
Feigl, H.: 4 Foulkes, D.: 627
Fein, F: 33, 34 Frackowiak, R. S. 1.: 164, 165
Feldman, J.: l ln6 Fragmented personalities. See Multiple
Feldmann, E.: 397 personality, Personality
Fellbaum, c.: 463 Franaszczuk, P.: 539n34
Feng, Z.: 370n2 Francis, St., of Assisi, 153, 154
Fenwick, P.: 371, 3 8 1 , 384, 418, 419, 571 Frank, J. D.: 1 19n2
Ferber, S.: 538 Frankel, F H.: 196
Fere, C.: 99, 184 Frederick, A. N.: 179
Feynman, R.: 289 Fredericks, L. E.: 192
ffytche, D. H.: 438 Frederiks, J. A. M.: 396-397
Fichtner, C. G.: 173 Frederikson, M.: 383, 383n14
Fieger, H. G.: 392 Freeman, N.: 148, 148-149
Fields, H. L.: 140-141, 147 Freeman, R.: 144
Filter theory: xxx, 28n23, 73, 603-639 Freeman, T. B.: 145
Finger, S.: 621n33 Freeman, W. 1.: 9, 2 1 , 38, 277-278, 416n44,
Fink, G. R.: 164, 165 609n23, 640
Finke, R. A.: 457 Freinkel, A.: 136n l l
Finkelmeier, B. A.: 372 French, c.: 376
Fischer, S.: 141 Freud, S.: xviii, 97, 1 14, 163, 309, 314-315,
Fischer, R.: 536 327-332, 332n19, 334, 341, 457-458, 472,
Fiset, P.: 417 475, 481 , 481-482, 553, 554n51
Fisher, J. G.: 154, 156, 222n55 Fried, P. H.: 1 50, 1 5 1
Fitch, w.: 388 Friedman, H . L.: 564
Fitzgerald, D.: 192 Friedmann, P. S.: 1 92
Flanagan, 0.: 2, 572 Fries, P.: 38, 40
Flew, A. G. N.: 288n44 Friesinger, G. c.: 1 25
Fliess, R.: 458 Frith, C. D.: 264
Flohr, H.: 551 Fritsch, G.: 622n34
Flores, F : 16 Fry, A.: 1 28n6
Flournoy, T.: 85, 96n31, 302, 302n2, 312, Fuente-Fernandez, R. de la: 144, 144-145,
356-357, 357n36, 359-360, 410, 431n4, 146
432n5, 448-440, 478, 625 Fukuda, M.: 571
Fluid analogies research group (FARG): Fuller: 433
469, 487 Fuller, A. E.: 97
Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), Fuller, A. K.: 97
and, 462-463 Functional magnetic resonance imaging
Copycat and, 463-465 (fMRI): xix, 17
Knowledge representation and, 466 Limitations of, 267-268, 619-620
See also Hofstadter Multiple personality and, 350
Flynn, C. P.: 373n5, 374 Pattern recognition and, 256n5
Fodor, N.: 448-449 Placebo effect on pain and, 142
Fodor, J. A.: 6, 12, 1 3 , 14, 17, 20, 21n16, See also Neuroscience
22, 39, 43-44, 248, 254, 255, 258nI4, 453, Functional neuroimaging: xix, 17-18, 17n12,
463n24, 468, 512, 608n22, 617, 618, 623 66n1 2
Fontinelli, E.: 30lnl Brain and, 262, 265-266
Forbus, K. D.: 461 Fodor's theory of modularity and, 618-619
Ford, M. P.: 634n42 General anesthesia and, 417
Forde, E. M. E.: 269 Genius and, 436
770-Index

Hallucinations and, 438 Creativity and, 100, 354, 425, 430-433, 434,
Interpretational problems in, 1 8n 13, 267- 457, 589
268, 518, 532, 534n30, 619-620 Definition of, 427
Memory and, 35 Degeneracy theory of, 426, 426nl, 470, 478,
Visual cortext and, 438 533
See a/so Neuroscience Depression and, 473
Functionalism: Divergent thinking and, 424
Philosophy and, xix, 5-6 Dreaming and, 441-442, 443-444
Funnell, E.: 264 Ego strength and, 473-474
Furst, P. T.: 544 Flexibility and, 424
Furukawa, K.: 571 Fluency and, 424
Fuxe, K.: 27 Freud and, 471 -472, 475
Gestalt psychology and, 424
Gabbard, G. 0.: 1 2 1 , 372, 375, 377, 377n8 Hallucinatory syndromes and, 435-447
Gackenbach, 1.: 404, 405, 405n33 Hypomania and, 473, 474
Gaier, E. L.: 473, 484 Hysteria and, 97
Galanter, E.: 1 1 Illumination and, 428, 428-429
Galileo: xxv, 49, 633 Imagination and, 454-457, 474n29, 475,
Galishoff, M. L.: 228 482-483, 492-493
Galloon, S.: 628 Incommensurability and, 429, 469
Gallup, G.: 41On38 Incubation and, 428-429
Galton, F. : 228n64, 424 Individuation and, 479-480
Game-playing: 1 1 , 1 5 Insanity and, 97-98, 426, 426nl , 471
Gamma, A . : 546 Insight and, 424
Gan, W. -B.: 280n35 Inspiration and, 440, 441, 450, 477
Ganzfeld technique: 484 Integration of subliminal with
Artistic personality and, 484 supraliminal in, 354, 476-477, 477-481 ,
Hypnagogic imagery and, 439, 439n12 561
Scrying and, 1 1 1n42, 439 Life histories and, 425
States of awareness and, 439n1 2 , 484 Manic-depressive disorder and, 474
Gardelli, M.: 279n33 Materialism and, 423
Gardner, H.: 2, 9, 1 1 , l 7n 1 1 , 23, 272, 621 , 627 Mathematics and, 487-490
Gardner, R.: 134-135, 1 35n9, 370n2 Mediumship and, 450
Garner, 1.: 1 3 8 Multiple personality and, 477-478
Gastaut, H . : 533-534, 533n29, 535, 569, Myers's views on, 96, 97-101, 354, 425-434,
569n63, 571, 571n66, 572 471 , 486-488, 531n27, 589, 599-600
Gauld, A.: I n l , 42n31 , 67, 83, 93n28, 105n37, Mystical experiences and, 480-481 , 589
108, 1 10, 1 12n45, 1 12n46, 1 13, 1 80, 184, Mythopreic faculty and, 356, 359-360
1 88, 201 , 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 225, Neurobiology and, 453-454
242n2, 260n15, 281, 283, 288n46, 303, Organic senses and, 433-434
337n22, 339, 344n28, 357-358n38, 360, 361, Personality deVelopment and, 480-481
403n29, 408n36, 408n37, 448, 559, 577, 586, Physiology and, 470-471 n
588n7, 595, 598, 604-605, 624, 624n35 Pre-inventive structures and, 457
Biography of, Preparation and, 428
Gauss, 1. C. F.: 34, 432 Primary process thinking and, 424-425, 475
Gazzaniga, M.: 351-352n32 Primary process versus secondary process
Gelgani, G.: 153, 154 and, 458
Gelhorn, E.: 534-535, 536, 538, 570n64 Process model of, 428-429
Generalization: 19, 466-467 Psi and, 425
Generative lexicon: 468 Psychoanalysis and, 457-459, 458n21, 471-
See also Analogy, Metaphor 473
Genius: 423-493 Psychopathology and: 85, 470-473
Altered states of consciousness and, 425 Puzzle-solving behavior and, 424, 428-429
Analogy and, 459-460 Secondary selves and, 425, 477-478
Automatism and, 425, 429, 440-450 Self-actualization and, 480-481
Boundaries and, 98 Sleep and, 441-442
Continuity and, 429, 430-432 Supernormal phenomena and, 353
 Index-771

Surrealism and, 450 Graff, N . 1.: 1 56-157

Symbolic thinking and, 425 Grafman, l: 277
Systems perspective and, 427 Graham, K. S.: 264
Trance and, 447 Granqvist, P.: 383, 383n14, 534n30
Transpersonal psychology and, 482-483 Grant, C. W, Jr.: 190
Unconscious and, 75, 87, 428-429 Grasby, P. M.: 1 65
Verification and, 428 Gravitz, M. A.: 193, 196
Gentner, D.: 14, 461 Greeley, A. M.: 555, 565-566
Gestalt psychology: xviii, 39, 424, 369, Green, c.: 103, 109n40, 395, 406
608n22 Greene, B.: 289, 290n47
Gevins, A.: 1 8 Greene, VV. A.: 1 25
Geyer, M. A . : 546 Greer, S.: 1 23
Ghiselin, B.: 428, 428n3, 429, 431 , 440, Gregory, W: 316n l 2
440n 14, 441 , 453, 478-479, 481 Greischar, L . L.: 571
Ghoneim, M. M.: 388 Grey, M.: 373n5
Gidro-Frank, L.: 182 Greyson, B.: 369, 370, 371 , 372, 373, 373n5,
Gifford-May, D.: 564 374, 375, 377, 378, 389, 394, 412, 413,
Gilbert, C. D.: 572 413n42, 418, 497n2, 564
Gill, D.: 120 Greyson Near-Death Experience Scale,
Gill, S.: 485 413n42, 564
Ginandes, c.: 192 Griffin, D. R . : 629, 633n39, 634n42, 635n43,
Gladstone, W E.: 60, 247 635-636, 637, 638n47
Glicksman, M. D.: 380nlO Griffin, 1. c.: 387
Global workspace theory: 38-39, 416, 438- Grimby, A.: 406
439, 539n34, 546-547, 571, 614, 615, 621, Grinspoon, L.: 516, 543, 544, 549n47, 551
622n34, 626 Grob, C. S.: 543, 553
See also Binding problem, Consciousness, Grof, S.: 377, 545, 547, 548-549, 549n47, 552-
Mind 553, 558, 569n62
Globus, G.: 40, 587, 631 Gross, G.: 463
Gloor, P.: 382, 383n13, 398, 533-534 Grossberg, S. 1 9
Glove anesthesia: 31 Grosso, M . : 22-23n I 8 , 28n23, 377, 4 1 1 -412,
Goddard, H.: 239 450, 475, 480-481
Godel, K.: 22n17 Biography of,
Goethe, J. VV. von: 446, 479, 483 Grotstein, J.: 332n 19
Goetz, C. G.: 144 Gruenfeld, M. J.: 173
Gold, P. W: 1 23n4 Grutzendler, 1.: 280n35
Golden, K. M.: 1 25, 126-127 Guilford, J. P.: 424, 453
Goldman, P.: 143 Guin, 1. D.: 149
Goldstein, A.: 186 Gunter, P. A. y.: 634n42
Goldstein, K.: 622n34 Gupta, O. P.: 177-178
Goldstein, S.: 125 Gurney, E.: 40n30, 62, 67-68nI4, 68, 7 1 ,
Goldstone, R . L.: 467n25 8 1 , 90, 93, 94, 104, 105-106, 1 07, 108-109,
Goleman, D.: 5 1 3 1 10, 1 17, 1 33, 204, 213, 21 5-216, 2 1 7, 225,
Golubitsky, M . : 436 301 n 1 , 307, 3 13-314, 328, 339, 355, 406, 407,
G6mez-leria, J. S.: 380, 381, 387 407n35, 408, 410n38, 439, 47 1 , 530, 585,
Goodell, H.: 205 585n6, 588n7
Goodman, N.: 43, 467n25 Guroff, 1. J.: 168
Gorassini, D.: 343 Guyon, Madam: 524
Gordon, N. C.: 140-141 See also Mysticism
Gorsuch, R . : 555 Giizeldere, G.: 573
Gorton, B. E.: 180n32, 182, 186, 191 Gwynn, M. I.: 1 94
Goto, Y.: 57 1
Gottlieb, S. K.: 1 93, 194- 195n42 Haag, R . : 637
Gatzsche, P. c.: 141 Haas, D. c.: 123
Grabowska, M. J.: 192, 2 1 1 Haber, R . N. & L. R . : 33
Grace, R . F.: 551 Hacker, P. M. S.: 242n2, 250, 251, 273-
Graceley, R. H.: 186 274n27
772-Index

Hackett, T. P.: 193, 194-195n42 Harding, R. E. M . : 440n14, 446

Hadamard, J.: 423, 428n3, 432n5, 440n14, Hardy, A.: 566
442, 442nI5, 443, 488, 490, 491 , 602nI 5 Hardy, G. H.: 488, 489
Hadfield, J . A . : 202 Harkness, E.: 1 36n l l
Hadjikhani, N.: 436 Harnish, R.: 2 , 16n9, 19n14, 456
Hadley, E. E.: 1 56 Harrington, A.: 88n26, 147-148, 351 , 639
Hahm, J. -0.: 280n34 Harrington, D.: 484
Hahn, R. A.: 1 23, 147 Harris, M.: 144
Haier, R. J.: 277, 417, 621, 629 Harris, W. S.: 228, 229
Hair, sudden whitening of, 148-149 Harrison, S.: 630
Haldane, E.: 624 Hart, B.: 330, 330n17
Halgren, E.: 533, 534 Hart, E. B.: 286
Hall, C.: 458 Hart, H.: 286, 361, 361n41, 390, 400-40 1 , 407
Hall, J. A.: 180n32, 1 82, 192, 196 Hartley, D.: 454, 455-456
Hallett, M.: 277 Hartmann, E.: 40, 84n22, 414n43, 604
Halligan, P. w. : 163, 164, 165, 166 Hartshorne, c.: 633n39, 636
Hallucinations: 67-68 n 14 Hartwell, J.: 402
Automatism and, 344 Harvey, T.: 27n21
Autoscopic, 396 Harvey, W.: xxv, 144
Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS) and, 438, Hashish, I: 144
439 Haviland, J. S.: 1 23
Ganzfeld experiments and, 439 Haxthausen, H.: 204
Genius and, 435-447 Hay, D.: 555, 566
Global workspace theory and, 438-439 Haynes, J. -D.: 437
Hypnagogic I Hypnopompic, 405-406, 435, Head, H.: 622n34
436, 439 Heaney, S.: 474
Hypnosis and, 106-107, l l l, 183 Hebb, D. O.: 1 8 , 275
Hysteria and, 67 Hebert, J. R.: 568
Kluver and, 437, 437nJ l Hecaen, H.: 260, 277
Migraine headaches and, 436-437 Heier, T.: 387nl 8
Myers's research on, 1 08-1 1 1 Heil, J.: 3 , 2 1 n 16, 43, 242, 242n2
Near-death experiences and, 406 Heilman, K. M . : 261 n 1 8
Out-of-body experiences and, 406 Heim, A . von St. G.: 3 7 1 , 372, 419
Perceptual synthesis and, 40 Heisenberg, w.: 289, 612
Positive versus Negative, 405n34 Heit, E.: 14, 466
Psychedelics and, 435 Hejja, P.: 628
Psychologically healthy people and, 108- Hell, D.: 546
109, 368-369n1 Helm, F.: 148
Psychosis and, 435 Helmholtz, H.: 49, 428n3
Spontaneous waking experiences of, 40n30 Hemispheric Encoding I Retrieval
Subjectivity versus objectivity of, 1 10 Asymmetry (HERA) hypothesis. See
Supernormal processes and, 361-362 Memory
Theoretical problems in psychology and, Hendy, J.: 279n33
68 Hernan, W. J.: 387
Veridical, 109-1 10, 1 09n40, 361-362 Herre, J. M.: 387
Visual characteristics of, 437-438 Herrin, J. T.: 375
See also Apparitions, Mental imagery Herrnstein, R.: 33
Hallucinogens. See Psychedelics Herschel, J.: 435, 439-440
Hameroff, : 6 1 1 Herzog, D. B.: 375
Hamill, R. w.: 217 "Hex death": See Mortality
Hammond, D. C.: 190, 192 Heymans, G.: 363
Hannah, B.: 479-480 Hidden observer, in hypnotic state: 81-82n20
Hansel, C. M.: xxvii Hilgard, E. R.: 81-82n20, 185, 1 86, 189n38,
Happold, F. c.: 500, 514, 5 1 5, 565 334-337, 337n22, 364, 458, 586
Haraldsson, E.: 370n2, 375, 390-391 , 409, Hilgard, J. R.: 185, 189n38
41O, 41On38 Hill, J. S.: 454n20
Harary, S. B.: 402 Hill, T. c.: 173
 Index-773

Hillis, L. D.: 143-144 Horowitz, S.: 382

Himmelbach, M.: 538 Hosinski, T. E . : 634n42
Hippocrates: 1 19, 149 Houle, S.: 266
Hirsch, w.: 426nl Houran, J.: 394
Hitzig, E.: 622n34 Housman, A. E.: 444-445
Ho, K. L.: 144 Houston, J.: 545, 547, 549, 552-553
Hobbes, T.: 454 Howard, R. J.: 438, 629
Hocevar, D.: 484 Howarth, G.: 408
Hocutt, G. D.: 372 Hoyt, W. T.: l 3 l
Hodges, J. R.: 264 Hr6bjartsson, A . : 141
Hodges, R. D.: 1 33 Htet, M. C. H.: 234-235. See Birthmarks I
Hodgins, D.: 343 Birth defects in cases of the reincarnation
Hodgson, D.: 299 type
Hodgson, R.: 96, 105, 106, 1 12, 357, 357- Hubel, D. H.: 38n26
358n38, 358n39, 359, 361 Huettel, S. A.: 619
Hoenig, J.: 177, 178 Hufford, D.: 516, 525n20, 537, 565, 566
Hoerl, C.: 247n7 Hugdahl, K. Y. : 535n31
Hofbauer, R. K.: 187 Hughes, J. R.: 173, 349
Hofman, A.: 543, 544 Hui, H.: 514-5 1 5
Hofstadter, D: 14, 452, 462, 463-465, 464n23, Humanistic psychology, emergence of: xviii
466, 469, 486-487, 640 Human Personality (Myers, 1903)
Holck, F. H.: 370n2 Aldous Huxley on, 1 14
Holden, c.: 123 Contemporary reviews of, 577-582
Holism: 120, 122 Contents of, 95-1 14, 425-427
Memory and, 277 Ellenberger on, xxix, 302
Methodological dualism and, 121, 167 McDougall on, 580-581 , 582
Mind-brain relationship and, 622 James on, xxix, 1 14-115, 581
Neuroscience and, 629 Stout on, 578-580, 582
Placebo effect and, 147 Hume, D.: 42, 454, 505, 610, 640
See also Psychosomatic medicine Representational theory of mind, 254-255
Holland, C. J.: 564 See also Associationism, Self
Hollander, L.: 521 n l 6 Humphrey, G. w. : 262-263nI9, 269, 272
Holmes, M. A . : 387n l8 Humphrey, J. H.: 1 9 1
Holmes, O. W.:471 Humphrey, N . : 3 0 , 638n47
Holscher, C.: 273n26, 275n28 Hunter, J. D.: 126
Holst: 521 Hutchinson, E. D.: 428, 428n3, 429, 431-432,
Holt, H.: 283, 357-358n38 440n14, 484
Holt, N. J.: 484 Huxley, A.: 73n16, 5 1 1 , 542n38, 543, 543n41 ,
Holt, R. R.: 16 549, 550, 556n53, 558-559n56, 606
Holyoak, K. 1.: 14, 460, 461, 462, 463, 468 Huxley, T. H.: 48, 53-54, 56, 58, 70, 89n27,
Home, D. D.: 530. See Mediumship 304-305, 312-3 1 3, 345, 641
Homeostasis: 1 22, 123 Hyder, F.: 417
Homunculus problem. See Computational Hydrocephalus: 4-5, 263n20
Theory of Mind (CTM) Hynes, J. Y.: 153n20, 153-154, 1 55, 1 56, 160,
Honorton, c.: 108, 362, 484, 528 161
Hood, R. W. Jr.: 555 Hyperesthesia: 107, 183
Hood's Mysticism Scale: 564 Hypermnesia: 102-103
Hopelessness and health. See See also Cryptomnesia, Memory
Cardiovascular disease, Disease, Hypnagogic imagery: 102, 435-436, 453n19,
Immunosuppression, Mind-body 480, 603
medicine, Psychoneuroimmunology Hypnopompic imagery: 102, 435-436
Hopper, J.: 387 Hypnosis: 31, 32, 33, 60, 67, 67-68nI4, 75, 8 1 ,
Hopkins, G. M . : 521 81-82n20, 83, 87, 93, 94, 96-97, 585
Horgan, J.: 383, 534n30, 546 Allergies and, 1 90-191, 191n41, 1 99-200
Horner, M. D.: 265 Analgesia and, 185-190
Hornig, S.: 143 Anesthesias and, 67, 87, 1 8 1 , 185, 188, 190
Horowitz, M. J.: 383 Bleeding and, 191-192
774-Index

Blisters and, 237, 615 Multiple personality and, 174

Burns and, 192-193, 200-201, 202, 237 Myers's views on, 97-101, 309
Dissociation and, 31 1-312, 335 Neurophysiology and, 163, 164, 165-166
Experimental study of, 104, lOS, 1 8 1n34, Neuropsychology and, 67, 165-166
307 Psychoanalysis and, 327
Freud and, 332 Psychodynamic model of, 163
Genius and, 434, 480 Secondary selves and, 310-3 1 1
Hallucinations and, 106-107, II 1 , 237 Stigmata and, 160, 162
Healing and, 1 38, 190-99 Subliminal processes and, 285
Hilgard and, 335 Witchcraft and, 94
McDougall and, 323-325
Memory and, 105, 342 Iatrogenesis. See Multiple personality
Myers and, 104-108, 434n7 Identity. See Personal identity
Near-death experiences and, 377 Identity theory:
Pain and, 186, 188, 190n40 Philosophy and, 4-5
Physiological processes and, 106, 181-183 Token identity, S
Psychoanalysis and, 327, 328 Type identity, 4-5
Role-playing and, 342 See a/so Materialism
Schools of, 93, 93n28 Idiophany. See Hallucinations
Secondary selves and, 313-314, 316nlO, 339 Ikemi, y. : 200
Sensory processes and, 183-185 Imagery. See Mental imagery.
Skin conditions and, 199-209, 21 1 n51 Imagination: xvii, 454-457
Skin diseases and, 196-199 Dynamic psychology and, 457
Skin marking and, 210-2 1 1 , 2 1 1 n 5 1 , 212, 615 Genius and, 474n29, 475
Social psychological explanations of, Fantasy versus, in Coleridge's theory, 455
107n38, 107n39, 181 n33 Phenomenology of, 468
Stigmata and, 1 59, 181 See a/so Dreaming, Hallucinations,
Subliminal Self and, 179, 585n6 Perceptual synthesis, Psychedelics
Theory of, autonomic changes and, 184-185 Immunosuppression:
Vision and, 1 8 1 , 183, 183-184 Bereavement and, 124
Warts and, 193-196, 196n43, 21 3-214 Classical conditioning and, 122
Hypnotic analgesia: 1 85-190s Stigmata and, 155-156
Neuroimaging and, 186 Stress and, 122
Neurophysiology of, 1 86-188 Imperator Band: 359. See Mediumship,
Physiological theories of, 185-186 Piper
Psychological theories of, 1 85-186 Implicate order: 636n45
Skepticism of, 187, 1 88, 189n38, 190 See also Bohm
Skin conditions and, 190-199, 198n44 Information processing. See Cognitive
Surgery and, 184, 186 psychology, Computational Theory of
Hypnotic skin marking and related Mind (CTM), Perception, Sensory coding
phenomena: 2 1 1 n51 Information theory. See Cognitive
Experimental tests of, 210-21 I psychology, Computational Theory of
Skepticism of, 210-21 1 , 212 Mind (CTM), Perception, Sensory coding
Theories of, 209-2 18 Inglis, 8.: 266n62
Hypnotizability: 84n22 Ingvar, M.: 142
Hyslop, 1. H.: 357-358n38, 41On38 Insight: 1 5
Hysteria: 83, 96, 106, 162-167 Insinger, M.: 374
Absorption and, 162 Intentionality: 43, 44
Anesthesias and, 31, 67, 87, 99, 106, 162, As the "heart of the mind", 43, 253-260,
164, 166 460-461
Automatic writing and, 93 Memory and, 247, 253, 253nlO, 260n1 5, 275-
Automatism and, 309, 310 276, 280, 296
Biomedical model of, 162, 165 Introspection: xvii, xviii, 10, 346, 564
Definitions of, 163 Involuntariness. See Automatism
Genius and, 98 Irle, E.: 263n20
Hallucinations and, 67 Irwin, H. I.: 377
Inhibitory mechanisms and, 165-166
 Index-775

Jack, R. A.: 1 74 517, 517n14, 518, 520, 523n19, 523-524,

Jackson, W H.: 56-57, 66, 84-85, 86, 87, 101, 525, 526n21 , 542-544, 549, 555, 558-563,
532 594
Automatisms and, 87 Physiology and psychology and, 312-31 3
Mind and, 76-78, 79, 431 Psychical research and, xxvii
Jacob, P.: 255, 258n13, 259 Religion and, 316-317, 412, 497-503, 561-562
Jacobs, S.: 124 Science and, xxiv, xxv, 632
Jahenny, M. -J.: 160 Self and, xxii, 45, 56, 348, 559-562, 640
Jain, K. M.: 526n23 Separating metaphysics from psychology
Jain, M.: 526n23 and, 64n l l , 631-632
James, William: xvii, xviii, xxii, xxiv, Subliminal consciousness and, 1 14-1 1 5n49,
xxviii, xxx-xxxi, 5, 32-33, 35, 36, 40n30, 312, 316n12, 591-592, 617, 640
48, 50, 64-65, 88n25, 89n27, 96n30, 96n31 , Tennyson and, 509
\05, 1 14n48, 280, 292n48, 302, 3 1 2-317, Tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon and, 454
316n12, 346, 357-358n38, 423, 474n28, Transmission theory of mind and, 550, 590-
498n3, 563n61 , 574, 578, 59In8, 593, 593n9, 591 , 605-606, 606n19, 607-608, 616-617,
619n32, 630, 633n39, 637, 638n47, 639, 641 , 632. See also Filter theory
641n48 Unity of consciousness and, 44, 56, 329,
Analogy and, 460 330, 520
Atomism and, 5 Volition and, 614-61 5
Attention and, xvii Winsor and, 3 15-316
Automatic writing and, 36-37, \ 12, 314, 351 Jameson, D. H.: 168
Behaviorism and, 335 Jamison, K. R.: 470-47I n26, 473-474,
Brain injury and, 621n33 474n28, 474n29, 475, 478
Consciousness and, 25, 281 n36, 329, 330, Janet, J.: 98
346-347, 591-592, 614, 625, 626, 638 Janet, P.: xviii, xxix, 54, 57, 68, 8 1 , 85, 89, 93,
Conversion experiences and, 368, 412 105-106, 173, 205, 209, 216, 226, 226n62,
Deja vu experiences and, 498 30In l , 3 16, 316nI2, 328, 334
Discovery of the subconscious and, 301- Anesthesias and, 332
302, 301n1 Consciousness and, 329
Freud and, 330 Dissociation and, 3 1 1 , 339, 578
Genius, creativity and, 41, 426n1, 417n 1 , Freud and, 329-330
47 1 , 472, 474n29, 490, 491 Genius and, 477
Human Personality (Myers, 1903) and, Hallucinations and, \08-\09
xxix, 1 14-1 1 5 Hypnosis at a distance and, 226
Hume and, 640 Hysteria and, 98-99, 31 1-312
Introspection and, 3 12-3 1 3 James and, 313
Jackson and, 59, 431 Mediumship and, 356, 478
Janet and, 3 13-314 Mitchell and, 319
Jung and, 332 Myers on automatism and, 309, 3 \ 0, 313,
Materialism and, 305n6, 632 314-315
Mediumship and, 283, 356n35, 357-358, 359 Secondary centers of consciousness and,
Memory and, 243, 244-245 3 1 1 , 329, 339, 348
Metaphysics and, 3 16-317, 632 Suggestion and, 208
Methodological parallelism and, 58, 59 Janig, W: 217
Mind-brain problem and, 28-29, 46, 73n 16, Janiger, 0.: 544, 545, 547, 548n46e
622-623 Janis, J.: 402
Mind, complexity of, 423-424 Jansen, K. L. R.: 379, 381, 381n12, 550-551
Modern physics and, 639-640 Jansen op de Haar, M. A.: 620
Myers and, 61, 95, 295, 301-302, 325n1 5, Jastrow, 1.: 82, 86n23
423-424, 558-559, 562n60, 577, 581, 586, Jefferies, R.: 505, 521
587-588, 592-593, 601 , 602, 603-639 Jefferson, T.: 129-130
Myers on automatism and, 309, 3 \0, 313, Jelinek, 1. E.: 148, 149
314-3 1 5, 364 Jella, S. A.: 569
Mystical experience and, 42, 1 1 3, 375- Jendrassik, E.: 206
376n6, 4 1 1 , 412, 496, 497n 1 , 499-500, 500- Jenkins, W: 572
501, 501-503, 502n5, 503-504, 509n \ 1 , 5 1 1 , Jenner, F. A.: 404
776-Index

Jeral, J. M.: 228 Kekule, A.: 442

Jessell, T. M.: 217 Kelch, R. P.: 1 5 1
Jewett, D.: xxvi Kellehear, A.: 370n2, 374, 380n10, 408
Jin, T.: 380 Keller, S. E.: 1 24
Joan of Arc: 532 Kelley, P.: 1 29, 327, 328, 332, 410n38
John, E. R.: 416n44, 417, 613, 629 Kelly, E. F.: I n l , 1 2, 13, 14n7, 44, 241 n l ,
John of the Cross, St.: 499-500, 506n8, 514, 269n24, 345n29, 362-363, 439, 459, 463n22,
517 465, 467-468, 469, 526n22, 536, 539n34,
Johnson, A.: 96, 41On38 552, 567, 584n5, 585, 586, 587
Johnson, A. J.: 143 Biography of,
Johnson, M. H.: 279, 280n34 Kelly, E. W. [Cook]: 50, 241 n l , 307, 372, 373,
Johnson, R. F. Q.: 194, 194-195n42, 210-2 1 1 389, 390, 391 , 400, 598
Johnson-Laird, P. M . : 254 Biography of,
Johnstone, R. E . : 381 Kelso, J. A. S.: 2 1 n 1 5
Joines, W. T.: 528-529n26 Kelvin, W. T. [Lord]: xxvi
Joliot, M.: 626 Kendler, K. S.: 1 2 1
Jones, c.: 192 Kennedy, J.: 21 1 n5 1
Jones, E.: 97, 582 Kenwood, N. J . : 372
Jones, R. 149 Kertesz, A.: 267n23
Juda, A.: 473 Kessels, A. G. H.: 141
Julesz, B.: 33 Ketamine, near-death experiences and: 380-
Julesz random-dot stereograms: 33 381, 384
Jung, c.: xviii, 1 14, 302n2, 332-334, 479, 481 , See also Psychedelics
482-483, 553, 555-558, 557n54 Keye, W. R.: 190
Khalo, F. : 448-449
K., Elizabeth: 1 54, 1 59, 160, 207, 208, 220. Kidd, C. B.: 1 98, 198-199, 199, 199n45
See also Hysteria, Stigmata Kiely, W. F.: 535, 570n64
Kahl, 0.: 208, 208n48, 216n53, 216-217, 225- Kienle, G. S.: 141, 146
226 Kienle, H.: 141, 146
Kalra, P. S.: 149 Kiernan, B. D.: 1 86
Kalso, E.: 142 Kihlstrom, J. F.: 1 39-140, 346-348, 586
Kamitani, Y.: 437, 615 Kili�, S.: 235n69
Kamiya, J.: 175n30 Kiloh, L. G.: 124
Kandel, E. R.: 217 Kim, J.: 3, 45-46, 519n15, 528-529n26, 609
Kanigel, R.: 488, 488-489, 490 Kimble, G.: 2
Kant, I.: 28n23, 39, 340, 452, 5 1 5 King, E. w.: 130
Kanthamani, H . : 362-363 Kinney, D. K.: 475
Kanzler, M.: 142 Kinsbourne, M.: 37-38n25
Kaplan, A. J.: 1 50 Kintsch, w.: 468
Kaplan, J.: 128n5 Kirkpatrick, R. A.: 126, 1 27
Kaplan, J. Z.: 1 92-193 Kirsch, I . : 146, 147
Kaplan, L.: 186 Kirsch, L . : 142
Kaprio, J.: 1 24 Kitchener, E. G.: 264
Kaptchuk, T. J.: 140, 143 Kittle, C. F.: 143
Kapur, N.: 264, 266, 627 Kjaer, T. w.: 538
Karasawa, H.: 419 Klauder, J. V.: 153n20, 220
Karlsson, H . E.: 120 Klee, P.: 475
Karlsson, J. L.: 475 Klein, H.: 150nl 7
Karnath, H. 0.: 538 Kleinjen, J . : 139
Kasthuri, N.: 280n35 Kleinman, A.: 147
Katz, J. J.: 12, 1 3, 14, 22, 43-44, 463n22, 468 Kletti, R.: 377
Katz, S. T.: 5 1 1-518, 546 Kline, M. Y.: 183
Keane, T. M.: 387 Klinger, M. P.: 149, 1 50
Keeley, J.: 327, 328 Klopfer, B.: 145, 146
Keeton, H.: 635, 635n43 Kluver, H.: 435, 435n9, 437, 437nl l
Keil, F. c.: 21 Knebel, T.: 186, 1 87
Keil, J.: 234, 235n69 Knight, R. T.: 266
 Index-777

Knoblauch, H.: 375 Laidlaw, T. M.: 1 9 1

Knowledge representation: 16-17, 20, 42, Lakoff, G . : 14, 460, 468, 489-490
248-249, 252-253, 254-255 Lamb, c.: 471
Analogy and, 464, 466 Lambertini, P.: 530
Brain functions and, 269 Lamberton, W.: 442
Cognitive psychology and, 466-467, 467n25 Lamont, P.: 282n37
Computational theory of mind (CTM) and, Lamrimpa, G.: 5 13-514
461 , 462, 464 Landis, T.: 397, 404n30
Copycat and, 464 Lang, A.: 105n37, 239, 357-358n38
Frames theory of, 14. See also Minsky Langacker, R. W.: 468
"Language of thought" and, 255, 256-257 Lange, R.: 394
Semantic content of, 43, 468-469 Lange, R. A.: 143-144
Schemata theory of, 14. See also Colby, Lange-Eichbaum, W: 427
Schank Langer, S. K.: 451-452
Scripts theory of, 14. See also Neisser Language: xx, 3, 20
Teleological theories of, 259 Analogy and, 466
See also Artificial intelligence, Cognition, Behaviorism and, 6
Imagery, Language, Language of Brain and, 255
Thought (LOT), Memory, Perception, See also Linguistics, theoretical; Natural
Symbolism language translation
Koch, c.: 38, 626, 628, 639 Language of Thought (LOT): 255-257
Koch, S.: xviii, xxii, 2, 6, 59 Lanteri-Laura, G.: 260, 277
Koenig, H. G.: 1 30, 1 3 1 , 555 Laplace, P. -S.: 49, 460, 633, 641
Koestler, A.: 428, 440n14, 469, 481, 486, 503, Large, R. G.: 191
509-510, 516, 521 , 522, 565, 602nI 5 Larhammar, D.: 383, 383nl4
Kohn, A.: 27, 547n45, 572 Larmore, K.: 1 7 1 , 172, 349
Kohnstamm, 0.: 204, 204-205 Larson, D. B.: 1 30, 1 3 1
Kokinov, B. K.: 14, 461 Larsson, M . : 383, 383nl4
Kolb, B.: 261n 1 8 , 262-263n 19 Lashley, K. S.: 6, 10, 1 9, 436, 622n34
Kollar, E. 1.: 154, 1 56, 222n55 Laski, M.: 555, 565
Komatsu, L. K.: 466 Lateau, L.: 1 53
Kootstaal, W.: 33 Laureys, S.: 417
Koskenvuo, M.: 124 Law, K.: 461
Kosslyn, S. M.: 16, 44, 184, 254, 438, 620 Lawrence, M.: 390
Kostakoglu, L.: 163, 164, 165, 166 Laycock, T.: 303-304
Kothari, L. K.: 177-178, 179 Lazar, S.: 572
Kraemer, H.: 141 Lazarus, L.: 1 24
Krippner, S.: 103n35, 108 Leaf, W: 357-358n38
Kris, E.: 472, 476, 481 Learning: xx, 35
Kropotov, 1. D.: 186 Leary, D. E.: xvii, xviii, xxii, 2, 30I n l , 583-
Krucoff, M. W: 229n65 584, 639, 640
Kubie, L.: 431, 440n14, 458, 472, 478 Leary, T.: 543, 559
Kubler-Ross, E.: 41On38 Lechler, A.: 1 59, 207
Kuhlman, D. T.: 173 Leclair, L.: 564
Kuhlman, K.: 1 35 Lee, c.: 192
Kuhn, T.: xxv Lee, J.: 1 36n l l
Kuikka, J.: 1 64 Leenders, K. L.: 546
Kumar, v.: 149 Legendre, G.: 250
Kunze, K.: 165 Lehmann, D.: 439n12, 627n36
Kunzendorf, R. G.: 121 Lehrer, P. M.: 176n30, 567
Lehtonen, 1.: 164
LaBerge, S.: 103, 404, 405, 405n33 Leibniz, G.: 57, 491 , 5 19, 633, 633n39, 636
Lachaux, 1. -P.: 38 Lelut, L.: 533
Lachman, S. 1.: 1 28 Lempert, T.: 379
Ladd, G. T.: 243-244, 260, 261n 1 7, 265 Lennmarken, c.: 387
Lader, M.: 162, 163 Lenz, 1. E. Jr.: 539n34
La Feria, J.: l S I Leong, G. B.: 150nl7
778-Index

Leonie: 8 1 , 89, 208, 226, 316 Lubart, T. 1.: 459n21, 491

Lepore, E.: 258nl4 Lubbock, 1.: 94
Leuba, J.: 402n5, 554n51 Lucas, E. V.: 471n27
Leuchter, A. F.: 142 Lucas, G. R.: 634n42, 635n43
Leurgans, S.: 144 Luchelli, F.: 277
LeVere, T. E.: 621n33 Lucid dreaming: 39, 103, 404-405, 405n33
Levin, J. S.: 1 3 0 See also Dreaming
Levine, B.: 247n7, 264 Luckhurst, E.: 124
Levine, 1. D.: 140-141 Ludwig, A. M.: 164, 165, 166, 168, 171, 172,
Levinson, B.: 388 3 1 8n I 3 , 349, 473
Levinson, B. W: 414-415 Lugaresi, E.: 532-533n28
Levy, R.: 164n24 Lukianowicz, N.: 403, 404
Levy, R. M.: 217 Lukoff, D.: 544, 555, 564
Lewin, L.: 543 Lumsden, C. J.:602nI 5
Lewin, R.: 4, 263n20 Lundahl, C. R . : 370n2
Lewis, A.: 53, 162 Lunde, I.: 475
Lex, B. W: 128n6 Lunn, Y.: 403
Lhermitte, 1.: 404 Luparello, T.: 142
Liebault, A. -A.: 93, 203, 204, 205, 207 Luria, A. R.: xxviii, 17nl l , 33, 175-176, 178,
Lifschutz, 1. E.: 1 53, 1 54, 1 55, 1 57 184
Lindsay, P. H.: 1 1 Luskin, F. : 1 30
Linguistics, theoretical: 8 , 10, 1 3 Lutz, A.: 571
Liotti, M.: 264 Lyons, H. A.: 142
Lipowski, Z. J.: 1 19, 120, 1 2 1 , 123n4
Lister, J.: xxv MacDonald, D. H.: 564
Liszt, F.: 521 MacGregor, J. M.: 476
Liu, J.: 370n2 Machine intelligence: 10
L1inas, R.: 38, 40, 416n44, 615, 626 MacMillan, R. L.: 417-418
Lloyd, B. B.: 14 Madden, J.: 203, 206-207, 209, 2 1 5-216
Locke, J.: 42, 454 Madell, G.: 288n45, 608n21
Locke, R. G.: 439, 536, 552, 566, 585, 587 Magnetoencephalography (MEG): 17,
Locke, T. P.: 377 539n34, 619-620
Lockwood, M.: 299 See also Electroencephalography,
Lodge, 0.: 60, 357-358n38, 361, 635n44 Functional Neuroimaging,
Loewi, 0.: 442 Neuroimaging
Loftus, E.: 40n30 Magnussen, F.: 1 50
Logical positivism, Vienna school of: 3 Maguire, E. A.: 264
Lombroso, c.: 85, 100, 426, 470, 470-47I n26, Maguire, P.: 546
473-474, 533 Malcolm, N.: 242n2
Long, J. A.: 375 Malitz, S.: 142
Long, J. P.: 375 Mallock, W H.: 82
Longfellow, : 471 Mamalis, N.: 169
Longinas: 481 Manchester, F.: 506
Long-term memory. See Memory Mandell, A.: 532, 622n34
Lonton, A. P.: 263n20 Mandler, G.: 433n4, 457, 608n22
Lorber, 1.: 263n20 Manic-depressive disorder, genius and:
Lorenz, 1.: 165 474-475
Lou, H. C.: 538 Marechal, 1.: 524, 525n20, 554n51
Lourdes, Shrine at. See Faith healing Marganelli, M.: 154, 155, 160, 161
Lovejoy, A. 0.: 635n43, 637 Margolis, C. G.: 192
Lowe, E. J.: 45, 608n21 Marie, P.: 622n34
Lowe, Y.: 635 Markesberg, W R.: 625
Lowel, S.: 436 Markowitsch, H. 1.: 260, 263n20, 265n21
Lowell, 1. R.: 471 , 474 Marley, C.: 174
Lowes, 1. L.: 454n20, 456 Marmer, D. J.: 1 3 1
LSD-25. See Hofman, Psychedelics Marr, D.: 39, 44
Lu, F.: 544, 555, 564 Marrioti, M.: 279n33
 Index-779

Marris, P.: 406 McGuirck, J.: 1 92

Marsden, C. D.: 162, 164, 166 Mclntosh, A. R.: 277-278
Marsh, D. C.: 532 McKenna, S.: 508nl O
Marsh, J.: 2, 26 McKenzie, J. M . : 1 3 1
Marshall, J. C.: 1 5 1 , 164, 164-165 McMahon, J . D . S . : 400
Martin, A.: 269 McNeil, D.: 354
Martin, R.: 287n42 McNeill, T. F.: 475
Martindale, C.: 453, 453n19, 475 McPeake, J. D.: 184
Martinerie, J.: 38 McRae, c.: 145
Masefield, 1.: 521 McVaugh, M.: 363
Maslow, A.: 480, 555, 558, 565 Meador, C. K.: 127, 129
Mason, A. A.: 188, 1 9 1 , 196, 197, 1 98 Meares, A.: 1 31 - 1 32, 1 32n7
Massey, C. c.: 67-68nI4, 102, 103, 109-1 10 Mechanism:
Masters, R. E . L.: 545, 547, 549, 552-553 Concept of, 6-7
Materialism: 22-23nI 8 , 24-25, 26, 70, 238, Determinism and: 48, 49, 50, 52, 54
304 Medicine:
Eliminative, 1 17 Biopsychosocial model of, 120, 122
Promissory, 45, 579 See also Mind-body medicine,
Psychology and, xx-xxii, xxix, 37 Psychosomatic medicine
See also Mind-brain relationship Medin, D. L.: 14, 466
Maternal impressions: 32, 99, 221-224, 234 Meditation: 42
Mathew, R. 1.: 174, 350 Breath suspension in Transcendental form
Mathis, J. L.: 126 of, 568
Matlock, J. G.: 292 Healing and, 1 3 1 - 1 32
Matter: Mystical experiences and, 5 13-514
Conception of, in classical physics, xxii Neurophysiology of, 535-536, 539-541
Consciousness and, 28 Physiology and, 175n29, 177-179
Matthews, D. A.: 1 30 Psychology and, 175n29
Maudsley, H.: 53, 85, 100, 163, 303, 3 1 2 Research into, 567, 568, 571
Mauskopf, S . : 363 Yoga and, 526-527, 527n24
Mavromatis, A.: 435, 442, 443, 587 Zen and, 538-539
Maxwell, J. c.: xxiv, xxvi Mediumship: 60, 89n27, 282, 293, 353,
Mayberg, H. S.: 140, 142 478n30, 628
Mayer, R.: 469 Cryptomnesia and, 360
Mayou, R.: 120 Drop-in communicators and, 596
Mazzarello, P.: 442 Genius and, 447-448, 450, 478
Mazziotta, J. c.: 1 8 Mythopreic faculty and, 356, 359-360
McAvoy, B. R.: 1 24 Post-mortem survival and, 281-284, 355,
McCallie, D. P. 143 596
McCarthy, R.: 264 Proxy sitters and, 596
McClean-Rice, N.: 292n48, 372 Psychology and, 360
McClelland, J.: 19 Psychopathology and, 356, 357
McClendon, H. J.: 467n25 Research into, 478
McClure, C. M.: 199 Skepticism of, 282n37, 282-283
McCord, H.: 1 92 Super-ESP and, 360
McCormick, D.: 402, 403 Telepathy and, 284-285
McCullough, M. E . : 1 30, 1 3 l Trance personalities and, 321-322, 357-359,
McCullough, W. S.: 8, 1 8 361n41
McDermott, R. A . : 1 14-1 15n49 See also Automatism, Pellew, Phinuit,
McDougall, w.: 29, 37-38, 37-38n25, 39, 55, Piper, R. Thompson
82, 96n31, 1 8 1 , 213, 2 1 3n52, 309, 322-326, Mednick, S. A.: 453
324nI4, 334, 361, 364, 434, 560, 577, 579- Meduna, L. J.: 379-380
581, 580nl , 582, 588-589, 590-591 , 59In8, Mehler, J.: 20
593, 593n8, 609, 610, 619n32, 623, 634n40, Meichenbaum, D.: 345
637 Melchner, L. von: 280n34
McFadden, E. R.: 142 Melzack, R.: 406, 438
McGinn, C.: 26n20, 58 Memory: xx, 34-35, 42n31 , 44, 241-300
780-Index

Amnesias and, 260n16, 261, 262-263nI9, Scientific method and, 57-58, 228-229
263-264. 268-269, 277, 303, 320, 342 Scientific naturalism and, 52-53
Anesthesias during surgery and, 388, 414- See also Volition
415, 543, 543n40 Mental imagery, I I, 16-17, 469
Association areas and, 260 Analog versus digital models of, 254
Associationism and, 249n8, 456 Genius and, 435-447, 440n 13, 492-49
Autobiographical form of. See Episodic Hallucinations and, \08, 1 1 1 , 440
form of Memory and, 244-245, 246
Brain and, 242-281, 298-299 Migraine aura and, 436
Category-specific areas in the brain and, Psi phenomena and, 32
269 Representation and, 16-17, 252-253, 254-
Cognitive psychology and, 34-35, 248-260 256, 257-259
Consciousness and, 76, 322 Stigmata and, 161
Convergence zone framework and, 271 Subliminal processes and, 285, 440
Double dissociation and, 264-265 Suggestion and, 182-183
Emotion and, 244 Mercier, c.: 59
Enhancement of, 274-275 Merendino, K. A.: 143
Episodic form of, 35, 243, 245, 246-247, Merrill, J.: 446-447
247n7, 260, 261, 263-264, 265, 265n21, Merzel, A. P. C.: 475
268, 270n25, 273, 275-276, 277, 295-296 Merzenich, M. M.: 572
Factual variety of, 246n6, 247-248 Mescaline. See Psychedelics
Habit and, 35 Mesmer, F. A.: 93, 104, 303
HERA hypothesis and, 266, 280-281 Mesmerism: 60, 75, 90, 93, 94, 104, 3 16nlO
Hippocampus and, 263-265 Healing and, 1 33, 1 90
Hypnosis and, \05 History of, 302-303
Imagination and, 456 Magnetic rapport and, 303
Knowledge retention and, 273-274n27 Psi phenomena and, \08
Long-term potentiation and, 274-275, See also Amnesias, Community of
275n28 sensation, Hypnosis, Psi
Metaphors of, 250-251 , 254 Messiaen, 0.: 521
Multiple identities and, sociocognitive Mesulam, M. -M.: 272, 416n44, 532
theories of, 341-342 Metaphor:
Near-death experiences and, 386h17 Analogy and, 468, 469
Neuroimaging and, 262, 265-273 Creativity and, 460-465, 466-467
Neurotransmitters and, 273-274 Dissociation and, 335-336, 337
Post-mortem survival and, 272, 281, 292, Imagination and, 454-455, 469
296, 298-299 Memory and, 250-251, 269-270
Previous lives and. See Cases of the Metarepresentation. See Memory
reincarnation type (CORT) Metcalf, J.: 487
Recall of surgery under anesthesia, 414-415 Methodological parallelism: 56-59, 62
Recent research and, 262 Metz, C.: 27
Representation and, 252-253, 255-256, 257, Meyers, Y. : 371
258-259 Micheli, Y. : 1 38
Self and, 275, 322 Michelson, A. A.: xxiv
Semantic variety of, 247, 260, 264 Migraine aura: 435-437, 534n30
Sleep and dreams and, 102-\03 Genius and, 435-436
"Trace" theory of, xxx, 35, 241, 242-248, Lucid dreaming and, 406.
249, 259-260, 275-279, 278-279n32, 296, See also Hallucinations, Mental imagery
585 Milgrom, H.: 148
Unconscious and, 75 Mill, J. S.: 55, 60, 62, 481
See also Eidetic memory, Episodic Millar, K.: 388
memory, Intentionality, Semantic M iller, A. H.: 129
memory Miller, A. 1.: 486, 490n35
Mendeleyev, D.: 442 M iller, B. L.: 627
Mendelsohn, G. A.: 453 Miller, E.: 163, 166, 167
Mental causality: xxi, 49-50, 54, 56, 67, 89- Miller, G. A.: xxii, 10- 1 1 , 463, 642
90, 6\0-6 1 1 , 615n28, 629 Miller, K.: 463
 Index-78 1

Miller, M. R.: 266-267 Human mental development and, xix

Miller, S. D.: 167, 168, 169-170, 170n27, 170- Holism and, 622
171, \72, 173, 174, 182, 349, 350, 433n6 Hypnotic phenomena and, 106
Miller, S. G.: 143 In animals, xix
Miller, W. R.: 1 3 1 Placebo effect and, 147
Millikan, R.: 259 Psi phenomena and, 549-550
Milne, C. T.: 371 See also Dualism, Epiphenomenalism,
Milstein, J.: 373, 379 Identity theory, Materialism
Milstein, y.: 174 Mind-matter problem: 69, 70, 7 1 , 72, 269
Milton, G. w.: 125 Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Milton, J.: 455 Inventory (MMPI): 154, 1 55
Mind: 50 Minsky, M.: 1 1n6, 14, 18, 23
Body and, xvii, xxi, 24-26, 1 20, 1 39-140, 610 Misch, R. c.: 196
Brain and, xvii, xix, xxi, 54, 1 17-1 18, 147, Mitcham, c.: 220
367-368, 608 Mitchell, D. J.: 34
Classical physics and, 454 Mitchell, 1. L.: 405
Concept of, impact on, of 19th-century Mitchell, M.: 464
physical science, 52 Mitchell, T. w.: 309, 316n12, 3 19-322
Concept of, information-processing Miyata, Y.: 250
mechanisms and, 9, 14 Moerman, D. E.: 139, 140, 142
Concept of, psi phenomena and, xxviii Moll, A.: 188, 201 , 204, 207
Deathbed mental revivals and, 410-4 1 1 , 625 Montague, W. P.: 5 1 8
Evolutionary model of: 79, 84-85 Montgomery, G. H.: 146
Filter theory of, xxx, 28n23, 73, 603-639 Montgomery, P. R.: 149
Health and, 129-148 Moody, R. L.: 156, 157n22, 157-158, 160, 161,
Myers's theory of, 72, 78-79 175, 207, 208, 370, 375, 410n38
"Naturalization of", 1 17 Moore, D.: 228
Near-death experiences and, 385, 415-421 Moore, L. E.: 192-193
Unity of, as an illusion, 55 Moos, R. H.: 1 22
Unity-Multiplicity problem of, 74-75, 139, Morgan, C. T.: 261n17
147, 218, 618-619 Morgan, M.: 142
Mind-body medicine: xxi, 32, 1 1 9, 1 23, 1 35- Morganthaler, W.: 476
1 36, 1 36n l l Morisy, A.: 555, 566
See also Placebo, Psychosomatic medicine Morris, K . : 569
Mind-body problem: xvii, xx, 8, 24-25, 27, Morris, R. 1.: 564
46, 49, 610, 639 Morris, R. L.: 402, 403
As an empirical problem, 73 Morse, 1. M.: 220
Connectionism and, 1 9 Morse, M.: 372, 373, 375, 379, 380nlO, 381,
False pregnancy and, 152nl 8 396, 418
I mportance o f deathbed mental revivals Mortality:
for, 410-41 1 Belief and, 126-127
Multiple personality and, 167 Bereavement and, 1 24, 127
Myers's conception of, 61, 65, 2 1 3, 214-215, Fear and, 125, 126
239 Mechanisms for, 128-129
Personal identity and, 286-288 Will to live and, 1 29-130
Post-mortem survival and, 580 See also Disease, Immunosuppression,
Psychiatry and, 1 2 1 Mind-body medicine, Psychosomatic
Mind-brain relationship: xxiv, xxx-xxxi, medicine, Psychoneuroimmunology
18n13, 28n23, 39, 53-54, 1 20, 147, 608, 610, Moscovitch, M.: 266
616, 623-624 Moseley, 1. B.: 144
As identical, in identity theory, 4, 26, 27, Moses, W. S.: 67-68nI4, 359
1 2 1 , 2 1 1 -212, 239, 519, 5 19n15, 633 Moss, A. 1.: 1 25
As unexplainable and unknowable, 57-58, Moss, C. S.: 272
58n7, 59 Mott, T.: 192
Concomitance, theory of, 56, 58, 65, 67, Mountcastle, Y. B.: 621
1 17-118. See also Psychophysiological Movshon, 1. A.: 38
concomitance Mozart, W. A.: 487, 487n34, 490n35, 521
782-Index

Mueller, P. S.: 1 30 Murray, 1. L.: 149, 1 52

Muggia, S.: 277 Murre, J. M. J.: 264
Muldoon, S.: 395, 405 Muscle movement, voluntary control of:
Miiller, C. E. See Multiple personality 93, 176
Miiller, S. C.: 436 See also Volition
Miiller-Lyer visual illusion: 39 Mushin, 1.: 1 64n24
Multiple monadism. See McDougall Myers, A.: 125
Multiple personality: 36-37, 75, 8 1 , 83, 87, Myers, A. T.: 1 32-133, 1 37, 226n60, 532
105, 167-174, 3 1 5-317, 317-319, 3 18n13, 585 Myers, F. W. H.: xxix, xxx-xxxi, 6, 28, 3 1 , 32,
19th-century cases of, 3 1 5 -317 35, 36-37, 40n30, 46, 48, 60, 61n8, 62n9, 67-
Abuse and, 169, 169n25, 341 68n14, 82-83n21, 84n22, 86n23, 87n24, 94,
Altered states of consciousness and, 167, 103n35, 107n38, 1 12n46, 1 14-1 15n49, 125,
\72, 350 1 37, 204, 205, 207, 212, 226n61 , 239, 242,
Alternating versus co-consciousness in, 260, 292n48, 325n1 5, 337, 348, 351-352n32,
3 18-319, 321-322, 328 357-358n38, 404n32, 404n37, 41On38, 423,
Alternative personalities in, 3 18-n13, 338, 474n28, 485n32, 487n34, 495, 563n6 1 , 568,
349, 351, 524 574, 584n5, 593n9, 616n29, 628, 628n37,
Anesthesias and, 168, 174 634n41 , 637, 639, 641n48
Apperceptive centers, concept of, 338-339 Analogy, use of, 78, 100, 460
Centers of consciousness and, 341-342, 347, Anesthesia and, 415, 542-543n39
348-352 Apparitions of the dead and, 284n40, 408
Control group definition, in studies of, Apparitions of the living and, 286
170n26 Automatisms and, 36-37, 87-89, 97, 1 1 1-1 12,
Duplex personality, concept of, 351 302, 305, 307, 308-309, 316, 3 17, 325, 346,
False memory syndrome and, 341 351, 353, 361, 362, 363-365, 432-433
Freud and, 328-329, 330-331 Automatisms, Clelia case and, 305-306,
Genius and, 477-478 306n9, 332, 356
Hidden observers and, 338, 339 Automaton theory and, 3 1 3
Hilgard and, 337 Biography of, 59-62
Jung and, 332-332, 334 Brain injury and, 621n33
Mental representation and, 347 Braude and, 340
Multiple operating systems as an analogy Breuer and, 328
for, 352 Calculating prodigies and, 432-433, 432n5,
Myers and, 173, 306, 308 433n6, 486n33
Neuroimaging studies of, 173, 350 Chains of consciousness and, 173, 173n28,
Neurophysiology and, 167, 168, 170-17 1 , 325
172-173, 173-174, 348-352 Communitiy of sensation experiments and,
Physiology and, 167, 168, 170n27, 170-1 7 1 , 225
\72, 173-174, 321-322, 349 Consciousness and, 76, 77-78, 77-78nI9,
Role-playing and, 342 79-86, 307, 316, 3 17, 3 1 9, 330-332, 348,
Skepticism of, 167-168, 168n25, 169 364-365, 367, 638
Somnambulism and, 169 Controversy in science and, 64-65
State transitions in, 350 Creativity and, 41, 42, 85, 96, 97-101, 307,
Stigmata and, 168-169 355-356, 429-440, 450, 468
Theories of, 173, 337-340, 345-348 Deathbed revivals and, 410
Vision and, 169-170, 1 7 1 , 1 74, 182, 349-350 Dreaming and, 103, 103-104n, 443-444, 480
Mundie, C. W. K.: 288n46 Experimentation and, 583n3
Murphy, G.: xviii, xxvii, 27n21, 109n40, 406, Evolution and, 599-602
597, 598, 599 Filter theory and, 602-639, 606n19, 607-
Quantification and human experience and, 608, 616-617, 616n29
56 Freud and, 328-329, 331, 458-459
Myers and, xxix, 97 Genius and, 41, 42, 85, 96, 97-101, 285,
Murphy, M.: xxix, 1 17nl , 1 38, 1 53n20, 160, 354, 425, 426n1 , 427n2, 440, 441 , 442n15,
175n29, 178, 178n 3 1 , 1 80n32, 183n36, 201 , 445n16, 450, 454n20, 472, 474n29, 475,
480-48 1 , 528, 530, 535, 563, 567, 568 476, 477, 480, 481, 483, 484, 485-486,
Murray, H.: xviii 490n35, 491 , 492-493, 53 1n27
Murray, I. P.: 392
 Index-783

Hallucinations and, 108-1 1 1 , 307, 368- Scientific method and, 63, 94

369nl , 406, 439-440 Scientific naturalism and, 70-7 1 , 631
Healing and, 1 32-133 Scrying and, 1 1 1
Hemisphericity and automatism and, 87 Self, emergent properties of, and, 80-83
Human Personality, contents of, 95-1 14, Sleep and, 101-103, 105-106, 441-442
425-427 Somambulism and, 285
Hypnosis and, 68, 104-108, 179- 1 8 1 , 187, Stigmata and, 1 55
1 9 1 , 1 99, 213, 308 Subliminal, concept of, 67-68, 67n1, 77-78,
Hysteria and, 96, 97-101 , 162, 162-163, 164, 87-89, 301-302, 301 n 1 , 306, 316, 319-320,
166 323, 356, 357n36, 414, 451
Imagination and, 454-457, 468 Subliminal Self, theory of, 61, 1 14-1 1 5n49,
Incommensurability and, 451-469 1 14-1 1 5, 214, 286, 296, 308, 312, 3 16,
Inspiration and, 450, 477 316n1 5, 325-326, 331-332, 585-595, 637-638
Jackson and, 76-77, 85-86, 87-89, 431 Suggestion-at-a-distance experiments and,
James and, 64, 244, 295, 312, 542-543n39 226-227
Janet and, 3 1 2 Super-ESP and, 284
lung and, 332, 334, 479 Supernaturalism and, 71-72
Love and, 485 Supraliminal elements and, 77-78, 482-483,
Lucid dreaming and, 404-405 588
Maternal impressions and, 221, 222, 234 Symbolism and, 451-452
McDougall and, 232-234, 325-326, 588-589 Synesthesia and, 552n50
Mediumship and, 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 , 1 12n44, 360-361, Telepathy and, 408n36
447-448, 478 Tennyson and, 508
Memory and, 241 , 295-299 "Tertium quid" style of argument of, 62-63,
Mental causality and, 89-90 64, 65, 70-7 1 , 72, 74, 92-93, 93-94, 104, 563
Mesmeric rapport and, 90 Unconscious and, 75-76, 329-332
Metetherial world, concept of, 90 Unity I multiplicity problem and, 74-75,
Methodology and, 582-584 80-8 1 , 305, 323, 330-331 , 340
Mill and, 60 Mystical experience: xxx, 41-42, 65, 1 13, 1 14,
Mind, evolution and, 78-80 375-376n6, 495-574
Mind-matter problem and, 70, 239, 608, Alcohol and, 542
608n20, 621 Anesthesia and, 542
Modern physics and, 639-640 Automatism and, 523-525
Multiple personality and, 173, 3 1 8 , 351 Brain plasticity and, 572
Mystical experiences and, 412, 496, 502n6, Constructivism and, 5 1 1 -5 1 8
508n9, 522nI8, 523, 523n19, 524, 525-526, Continuity and, 523, 523n19
555, 556, 556n53, 558-563, 594 Conversion experiences and, 41 1-413,
Nitrous oxide and, 542n39 41 1 n39
Organic senses and, 433-434 Death-like states and, 568
Near-death experiences and, 368, 371, 384, Deja vu experiences and, 498
385-386 Dissolution of individuality and, 507-508,
Panaesthesia, concept of, 79-80 524-525
Personal identity and, 293, 294 Emptiness, experience of, and, 5 1 3 -514, 525
Personality and, 581-585, 637-638 Epilepsy and, 413, 507-510, 5 1 9, 531-534,
Phantasmogenetic efficacy and, 403n29 532-533n28
Possession and, 292n48 Extrovertive versus introvertive types of,
Post-mortem survival and, 61, 72, 241, 281 , 504-507, 519
284-286, 295-299, 360-361 , 361n40, 595- Freud and, 554-558
599 Genius and, 480-48 1 , 521-525
Psychoanalysis and, 457-459 Incommensurability and, 523, 525
Psychology and, 64-65, 90-95, 97, 306-307, I neffability and, 497, 499, 504, 536
522 James and, 558-563, 568, 589, 592-593
Psychophysiological influence and, 2 18-219, Jung and, 554-558
236-237, 238-239 Meaning of, to experiencer, 503-504
Rapport, concept of, 230n66, 232, 236 Myers and, 558-563, 589, 592
Reciprocal apparitions and, 403 Near-death experiences and, 516, 528-
Religion and spirituality and, 1 1 3 - 1 14 529n26
784-Index

Neurobiology of, 531-553 Children and, 375, 377n9

Neuroimaging and, 518, 563-564, 569-570 Cortical stimulation and, 381-382, 383-384,
Neurophysiology and, 534-541, 546-547, 396
570n64 Cross-cultural differences in, 375-376n6
Nitrous oxide and, 542-543 Cross-cultural reports of, 370-371, 374, 375,
Noetic quality of, 497-498, 499, 504 386-387
Objective significance of, 518-531 Deathbed visions and, 408-41 1
Out-of-body experiences and, 528-529n26 Definition of, 369-370
Passivity and, 498, 524 Depersonalization and, 377
Personal identity and, 519-520 Dissociation and, 377-378
Phenomenology of, 497-503, 503, 504n7, Encounters during, 373
506, 506n8, 516n13, 517, 518, 531, 546-549, Enhanced mentation and, 386-387, 387n l6
564 Evidence and, 391n20, 391-392
Psychedelics and, 542-553 Expectation and, 374-376
Psychoactive substances and mysticism, Explanatory models of, 374-394
history of, 542-544 False memory syndrome and, 376
Psychodynamics and, 553-563 Fantasy-proneness and, 378
Psychometric instruments and, 564 Fear of death and, 374
Psychopathology and, 555 Features of, 372-373
Religion and, 559-560, 561-562 General anesthesia and, 368, 387, 387n 18,
Research into, 563-574 388
Russell and, 500 Historical reports of, 370-371
Sleep paralysis and, 516 Imaginative reconstruction and, 387-388,
Supernormal phenomena and, 525-531 389
Symbolism and, 525 James and, 497n2
Synesthesia and, 552 Luminous phenomena and, 528-529n26
Transcendance of the self and, 507-510, 519 Ketamine and, 380-381, 384, 550-551,
Transformative aspects of, 522 551n48
Transpersonal psychology and, 574 Medical conditions and, 371 -372
Transiency and, 498 Methodology and, 583-584
Universal core and, 503-510, 517, 518-531, Mindsight phenomena of, 603
53In27, 572 Myers and, 385, 589
Mystical experiences and, 375-376n6, 411-
Naccache, L.: 38, 416n44, 437 413
Nader, K.: 278-279n32 Neuroanatomical models of, 381-385
Nagel, T.: 23, 24, 25, 26n20, 45, 46, 351- Neurochemistry and, 380-381
352n32 Out-of-body experiences and, 387-390,
Nahmias, C.: 184 394-403
Nakagawa, S.: 200 Panoramic memories and, 386, 386nl 7
Natural language translation: 1 1 , 12, 1 3, Personality factors and, 377-378
15, 39 Physiological nearness to death and, 368,
Natural selection. See Darwin; Evolution 372n3, 390-391
Nature, as a closed causal system: 50 Physiological theories of, 378-385
Impact of, on scientific psychology: 50-51 Post-mortem survival and, 596
Near-death experiences: xxx, 39, 1 10-1 1 1 , Psi phenomena and, 400, 420
135n9, 293, 295, 367-421, 541, 552n49, Psychopathology and, 555
636n45 Reporting biases and, 376, 376n7
Absorption and, 378 Resuscitation procedures and, 413-414
Affect and, 373n4 Temporal lobe abnormalities and, 381-383,
Anesthesia and, 543, 550-551 , 551n48 384, 397n24, 398
Anoxia and, 380-381, 384, 419, 535 Transcendant aspects of, 385-394
Birth memories and, 376-377 Transformative aspects of, 368, 369, 373-
Blood gases and, 379-380, 380nl O 374, 412
Brain impairment and, 368, 394, 624, 625 Veridical elements of, 387-390, 400, 406-
Cardiac arrest and, 372, 384, 389, 390, 417- 407
-418 Visions and, 390-391
Cessation of pain during, 380n I I
 Index-785

Weighted Core Experience Index and, 373, Niven, J. S. F.: 1 9 1

41 3n42 Nixon, W . C . w. : 126
See a/so Out-of-body experiences Nocebo effect: See Placebo effect
Neath, I.: 250, 250-251 Nomura, K.: 33
Needham, w.: 406 Non-Cartesian Dualist-Interactionist
Needles, w.: 156 Models: 607-630
Neher, A.: 105n37 James' transmission model and, 607-608
Neisser, u.: xxii, 14, 36, 39, 458 Myers's filter theory and, 607-608, 608n20
Nelson, S. R. c.: 1 26 Neuroscientists and, 608-609, 608n21,
Nemiah, J. c.: 121 608n22
Neppe, V. M.: 396 Noonan, H. w.: 287, 288n45
Nettle, D.: 473, 475, 480-481 Nordau, M: 426, 470
Neumann, T.: 153, 153, 220, 479-480, 483, Norman, D. A.: I I
556. 557 Norris, P. A.: 239n70
Neural-network models: 1 9-21 , 253, 453 Northam, E.: 279n33
See a/so Connectionism, Dynamic systems Noyes, R.: 371, 373n5, 377
theory Nudo, R. 1.: 572
Neuroimaging. See Nunez, E.: 489-490
Electroencephalography, Functional Nunez, P. L.: 1 8 , 539n34, 612n26, 619
neuroimaging, Functional magnetic Nyberg, L.: 266, 276
resonance imaging (fMRI), Positron Nyhus, P.: 150
emission tomography (PET), Single­
photon emission computed tomography Oakley, D.: 192, 586
(SPECT) Obler, L. K.: 33, 34
Neuroscience: 39, 43 Ochs, P.: 634n42
"Association areas," memory and, 260 Ogden, E.: 176
Brain injury and, 620-621, 624 Ogilvie, J.: 1 34
Consciousness and, 25, 37, 348-352, 552 O'Grady, J. P.: 150, 152
Creativity and, 453-454 Ogston, W. D.: 169
Exocytosis and, 612, 612n27 Ojemann, G. A.: 262, 267n23
Fodor's theory of modularity and, 618-619 Olivier, A.: 382
Hemispheric specificity, naIve view of, Olson, P. R.: 406
351n31 Ontology: 632-633
Hysteria and, 67, 163, 164 Opiates : See Analgesias, Near-death
Information, concept of, in, 251-252, 253 expenences
Limitations of, xxi-xxii, 267 Oritgue, S.: 397
Memory research and, 261-262, 267-270, Orme-Johnson, D.: 568
416 Ornsteen, A. M.: 149
MUltiple personality disorder and, 248-252 Osis, K.: 370n2, 375, 390-391, 402, 403, 409,
Mystical experiences and, 531-553 41O, 410n38
Near-death experiences and, 378-386 Osler, W.:1 l 9n2
Psychology and, 16, 17, 174, 248, 249, 269- Osmond, H.: 542n38
272, 273 Osterman, J. E.: 387
Secondary centers of consciousness and, Ostfeld, A.: 124
348-352 Osty, E.: 208, 216-217, 449nl 8
Task mastery and, 629 Otto, R.: 504
Zen meditation and, 538-539 Out-of-body experience: xxx, 39, 293, 589
Neutral-Monist models: 630-638, 635n43, Autoscopy and, 396, 403-404
636n45, 637 Cortical stimulation and, 396, 397
Newberg, A.: 537-538, 539, 540n35, 546 Depersonalization and, 377n8, 396
Newbold, W. R.: 357-358n38 Experimental investigation of, 401-403,
Newell, A.: 1 1, 23 402n28
Newman, J.: 38, 488, 626 Lucid dreaming and, 405
Newton, I.: xxin2, xxii, 367-368, 633 Luminous phenomena and, 528-529n26
Nichelli, P.: 264 Neuroimaging and, 397
Nietzsche, F.: 44-45, 445-446, 479 Psi phenomena and, 400
Nisbett, 1.: 426, 470
786-Index

Temporal lobe abnormalities and, 397n24, Pattie, F. A.: 201 , 202, 203
398 Paul, G. L.: 203, 203-204, 209, 212
Veridical elements of, 387-390, 400, 400- Paul, St.: 532
401 , 406-407 Pavlov, I. P.: 535n33
See also Near-death experiences Pawlowski, E. J.: 150, 152
Owens, J. E.: 372, 373, 375, 386, 389, 628 Pawlowski, M. M. F.: 150, 152
Oxbury, S.: 264 "Peak in Darien" cases. See Deathbed
Oyama, T.: 380 VISIOns
0ye, I.: 546 Paydartar, J. A.: 626
Ozaki, H.: 627n36 Pedroarena, C.: 38
Peers, A.: 499n4, 506n8, 517, 525
Pacia, S. Y.: 418 Peirce, C. S.: 426, 633n39
Pacoe, L . Y.: 169 Pekala, R. 1.: 564
Pahnke, W: 544, 545, 550 Pellew, G.: 358-359, 624n35. See Piper
Pahrian, S. L.: 239n70 Pembroke, A. c.: 223
Pal, I.: 627n36 Penelhum, T.: 287n44
Palladino, E.: 530. See Mediumship Penfield, W: 381, 382, 396, 399, 433, 533,
Pallas, S. L.: 280n34 608, 626, 629
Palmer, 1.: 383-384, 528 Peng, C. -K.: 569
Panpsychism. See Neutral-monist models Penny, R.: 124
Papert, S.: 18, 19 Penrose, R.: 22, 22n17, 23n19, 299, 487, 490,
Papineau, D.: 259 6 1 1 , 646n46
Paradiso, M. A.: 261n l 8 Penttinen, K.: 159
Paradoxical function facilitation, brain Perani, D.: 269
injury and, 627 Perception: xx, 34, 39, 40
Parallel distributed processing (PDP): 19 19th-century physics and, 69
See also Connectionism, Dynamic systems Binding problem and, 538, 539, 571
theory, Neural-network models Conceptual understanding and, 44-45
Paranormal phenomena: xxviii Imagination and, 456-457
Belief in, 32 Learning and, 19, 20
Evidence for, 645-655 Memory and, 35, 243, 271-272
See also Supernormal phenomena Neurophysiology of, 538
Parapsychology: xxvi Supernormal mode of, 108. See Psi
Criticism of, xxvii-xxviii, 62n9 Symbolic nature of, 108
Experimental methods and, 29-30, 1 1 1 , 362, See also Binding problem, Global
483-484, 552, 582-584, 584n5 workspace theory, Pattern recognition
Experimenter effect and, 2 1 1 n51 Perceptrons: 1 8
Transpersonal psychology and, 527n25 Perceptual synthesis: 34, 3 8 , 39-40, 41
See also Ganzfeld technique, Psi See also Binding problem, Global
Pare, D.: 40 workspace theory
Parker, A.: 261 n l 8 Perkins, D. N.: 428-429, 460, 602nl5
Parnia, S . : 371, 372, 380nlO, 384, 387, 413, Perner, 1.: 247n7
418, 419 Perot, P.: 382, 396, 533
Parry, D. P.: 148 Perovich, A. N., Jr.: 5 1 5
Parsons, W B.: 553, 554, 556, 558 Perrin, S . : 138
Partanen, J.: 164 Perry, P.: 41On38
Pascal, B.: 521 Perry, R. B.: 28n23, 301 n l , 496, 558, 606n19,
Pascual-Leone, A.: 277 633
Pashler, H.: 36, 614 Persinger, M.: 382-383, 383n14, 384, 532,
Pasricha, S.: 235, 292n48, 370n2, 374, 375, 534n30
596nl l Personal identity:
Pasteur, L.: xxv Constitutive questions of, 287
Patanjali: 513, 526, 526n23, 526-527, 528, Evidential questions of, 287
568, 594 Mystical experiences and, 5 19-520
Paterson, R. W. K.: 287 Numerical identity and, 286-287, 288n46,
Pattern recognition: I, 15, 19, 245n5 289
Patterson, K.: 264 Post-mortem survival and, 286-292
 Index-787

Qualitative identity and, 286-287 See also James, Mediumship

See also Memory, Post-mortem survival, Pitblado, C.: 172
Psyche, Psychology, Self Pitts, w.: 8, 18
Personality: xxx, 60, 75, 79, 82 Place, U. T.: 4
Clinical versus theoretical views of, 85 Placebo effect: 31, 32, 1 19, 1 32n7, 1 39-149
Filter theory of, 99 Cardiovascular conditions and, 142-144
Genius-level creativity and, 41-42, 85, 426, Conditioning and, 141, 146-147
476-477 Definitions of, 139n 14, 1 39-140, 140
Hypnosis and, 89 Depression and, 142
Jung's theory of complexes and, 332-333 Expectation and, 146
Myers's theory of, 72-95, 1 1 5, 328, 637-638 Hypnosis and, 181
Neutral-monism and, 637-638 Mind-body medicine and, 1 39-149
Stable integration of, 97 Neurobiology of, 140-141
"Pertinax": 129 Neurological disorders and, 144-145
Peters, R. M.: 136n l l Orthopedic surgery and, 144
Petersen, B . H.: 149 Pain and, 141 -142, 146- 147
Peterson, F.: 171 Skepticism of, 140, 141, 145, 147
Peterson, M. D.: 130 Therapeutic touch and, 227-228n63
Peterson, P. J.: 406 Planck, M.: xxvi
Petersson, K. M.: 142 Plato: 28n23, 242, 370, 470, 485, 487, 491,
Petrovic, P.: 142 500, 517, 521, 531n27, 559, 633, 637
Pfluger, E.: 303 Plaut, F.: 332, 620
Phenomenology of Consciousness I nventory Plevak, D. J.: 130
(PCI): 564 Plotinus, 491, 503, 508-509, 508n9, 514, 549,
Phillips, A. G.: 144-145 637
Phillips, D. P.: 123, 1 30 Podd, J.: 141, 146
Phillips, L. H.: 186 Podiapolsky, P. P.: 205, 209
Phillips, w.: 472 Podmore, F.: 40n30, 67-69nI4, 284, 284n40,
Philosophy of science, verification ism and: 3 286, 357-358n38
Phinuit: 358. See Piper Poincare, H.: 428n3, 432n5, 486
Physicalism. See Materialism Polanyi, M.: 16n9
Physics: 631, 635 Pols, E.: 618-619, 623
19th century concepts in, 69-70nI5, 610-612 Polyakov, Y. I . : 186
Development of, in relation to the Poortman, J. J.: 610, 630, 637
evolution of senses, 80 Popper, K. R.: 45, 615, 622
Newtonian, 367-368 Port, R. F.: 2 1 n l 5
Personal identity and, 289-290 Positron Emission Tomography (PET): xix,
See also Quantum mechanics 17
Physiology: Brain and, 262, 265-266, 279-280
Control of, by yogis, 177-179 Hallucinations and, 194
Hypnosis and, 179-218 Hysteria and, 165
Induced changes in one's own body, 175- Limitations of, 267-268, 619-620
218 Meditation and, 539n34
Induced changes in another's body, 225-236 Mystical experiences and, 537-538, 547
Multiple personality disorder and, 168, Multiple personality disorder and, 173
169-171, 172-174 Placebo effect, depression and, 142
Placebo effects and, 142 Placebo effect, pain and, 142
Spontaneous changes in one's own body, Placebo effect, Parkinson's Disease and,
148-174, 201 144-145
Spontaneous changes in another's body, Psychedelics and, 546-547
218-224 See also Neuroimaging
Picasso, P.: 486, 490n35 Posner, M. 1 . : 620
Piddington, A.: 1 12n45 Possession. See Sharada, Shiva, Vennum
Pigeaire, J.: 316n12 See also Post-mortem survival, Trance
Pinker, S.: xxi, 17,: 20, 23, 617, 640 Post, E . : 7
Piper, L.: 1 12, 1 1 2n46, 283, 292, 296n52, 357- Post, F.: 473
358, 357-358n38, 358n39, 361, 586-587, 628 Post, R. M.: 168, 171
788-Index

Post-mortem survival: 30-31, 35, 61, 72, 281- Task complexity and, 597
292, 595-599, 630 Yoga practices and, 527-528
Apparitions and, 355-356 See also Clairvoyance, Precognition,
As a functional rather than ontological Psychokinesis, Telepathy
shift, 637-638 Psilocybin. See Psychedelics
Cosmic consciousness theory of, 281n36 Psotka, J.: 33
Evidence for, 282, 283n38, 284-286, 295- Psyche. See Subliminal Self
299, 36In40, 596n 1 1 , 648-651 Psychedelics: 42, 435, 516n13, 542n38,
McDougall and, 324-325, 324n 14 543n41
Mediumship and, 282, 360-361 Experimental research with, 542-547,
Memory and, 272, 281, 292, 295-299 545n42, 552
Myers and, 241-242, 281, 292-299, 355-356 Filter theory of conciousness and, 546-549,
Personal identity and, 286-292 550
See also Survival research Global workspace theory and, 546-547
Postponement of death: 129 Mysticism and, 542-553
See also Mind-body medicine Neuroimaging and, 546, 547, 565, 571
Powell, L. H.: 1 30, 1 3 1 Shamanism and, 543-544
Powell, R.: 3 0 l n l Synesthesia and, 552
Powell, T.: 130-131 Psychical research: xxvi, xxvii, 60, 67-68n14
Prabhavananda, S.: 506 Consciousness and, 561-562
Prayer, efficacy of: Neutral-monist models and, 635
Skepticism about, 228-230 Psychology and, 91-92, 93, 94-95, 105, 299,
Study of, 1 34-135, 1 35n9 561
Precognition: xxvin6. Research methods, development in, 109 ,
See also Psi 362-363, 582-584, 584n5
Prescott, F. c.: 440n14, 482 Skeptical conceptions of, 61, 62n9
Pribram, K. H.: I I , 636n45 Skeptical misreadings of, 86n23
Price, D. D.: 147, 186, 186-187 See also Psi
Price, H. H.: 495, 504n7, 51 1n12, 517, 519, Psychoanalysis:
543n41 , 597, 605, 610 Genius and, 457-459, 458n21, 471-473, 555
Prince, M.: xviii, 75, 8 1 , 82-83n21, 170, 309, Hypnosis and, 327, 328
3 14-315, 316n12, 3 17-319, 320, 336, 337, 339, Hysteria and, 327
349 Individuation and, 556
Prince, W. F.: 406, 449-450, 478, 483-484 Myers and, 457-459
Prinzhorn, H.: 476 Mystical experience and, 554-563
Privette, G.: 555 Subliminal and, 327
Problem-solving. See Cognition Psychogenesis: 1 20, 1 2 1
Proctor, w.: 410n38 See also Psychosomatic medicine
Property dualism. See Dualism Psychokinesis (PK): xxvin5, 30, 32, 229, 236,
Pseudocyesis. See False pregnancy 293, 616
Pseudoscience, psychical research and: 61 Automatisms and, 1 1 2.
Psi: See also Distant mental influences on
Concept of, xxvin6 living systems (DMILs)
Definition of, 41 Psychology: 65
Experimental procedures, creativity and Analytical / logical behaviorism, 3-4
484 Anthropology and, 94
Evidence for, 400n26, 420, 529-530, 597- As the science of behavior, xvii-xviii
602, 645-655 As the study of mental life, xvii
Genius and, 425, 483-484, 484n31 Behaviorism, history of, xvii-xvii, xix,
Goal-orientation and, 597 xxix, 2-7, 334, 424, 563-564
Luminous phenomena and, 528-529n26 Behaviorism, identity theory and, 4-5
Mediating vehicles for, 362 Classical conditioning and, 3
Mystical experiences and, 528-531 Clinical and experimental factions in,
Near-death experiences and, 400 xviii-xix, xxii-xxiii, 104
Out-of-body experiences and, 400, 401 Comparative ethnology and, 94
Phenomena of, xxvii, xxviii, 29-31, 107 Creativity and, 429-430, 469, 480
Research into, 353, 361-363 Deathbed mental revivals and, 410-411
 Index-789

Depression and, 473 Psychophore: 236

Dynamic, xviii See also Cases of the reincarnation type
Ego strength and, 473-474 (CORT)
European, xviii Psychophysiological concomitance: 65-66,
Fragmented nature of, in the modern era, 73, 312-3 1 3
xviii, xxxi Psychophysiological influence: xxx, 1 2 1 , 215,
Future of, 641-643 217-218, 218-219, 236-239, 239n70, 348n30,
Genius and, 424, 427, 469, 473-474, 475, 616
479, 480-48 1 , 492-493, 495 Direct versus indirect, 219
Functionalism and, 5-6, 9-10 See also Cases of the reincarnation type
History of, 1 -29, 46, 47-54, 59, 6 1 , 105, 251- (CORT), Distant mental influence on
252, 260-262, 270-271 , 302-305, 309-361 living systems (DMILs), Maternal
Holism in, 1 20-121 impressions, Sympathetic symptoms,
Hypnosis and, 105n37, 181 Volition
Identity theory in: 4-5, 25 Psychosomatic medicine: 119-121, 152
Individuation, genius and, 479 Biological reductionism and, 1 20
Immunosuppression and, 122 Puccetti, R.: 43, 275-276
James / Myers theory and, 639 Pulvermiiller, F.: 267n23
Knowledge versus experience and, 50 Purves, D.: 626
Limitations of, xxix, 64-65, 90-95 Pushkin, : 521 , 555
Mind, theory of, in, 74-75 Pustejovsky, J.: 468
Mind-brain problem in, xix, xx, xxii, xxiv, Putnam, F. w.: 167, 168, 1 7 1 , 172, 173, 174,
xxix, 66 318n13, 349, 350-351
Multiple personality and, 3 1 1 Putnam, H.: 5, 5n4, 6
Myers and, 90-95, 492-493, 639 Piitz, P.: 439nl2
Mystical experiences and, 495-496, 522, Puysegur, M. de: 303, 447-448
573-575 Pylyshyn, Z.: 1 2, 17
Neo-dissociation and, 334-335 Pythagoras: 521
Neuroimaging and, 618-619
Neuroscience and, xix, xxi, xxii Quantum mechanics: xxii, 61 1-615, 612n26,
Personal identity and post-mortem survival 634
and, 286-292 As a psychophysical theory, 612
Philosophy of mind and, xix Brain dynamics and, 612, 623, 633n39
Physics, late 19th century, impact on, 69 "Entanglement" and, 635n44, 635n46
Reductionism and, xxii Interactive dualism and, 61 3-614
Repression and, 335-336 Neuroscience and, 6 1 1 , 612n26, 613
Self-actualization and, 480 Ontological implications of, 635, 636n45,
Supernormal phenomena and, 348 636n46, 637-638
Transformative experiences and, 368, 373- See also Stapp
374, 41 1 -412, 481-482, 492-493 Quesney, L. F.: 382
See also Absorption, Cognition, Cognitive Quibrera, M.: 27
psychology, Emotion, Dissociative
disorders, Imagination, Intentionality, Rabin, 1.: 532, 533
Memory, Mind, Perception Race, y.: 447-448, 477-478
Psychoneuroimmunology (PNI): 32, 1 19, Radin, D. I.: xxviii, 635n44
1 22-123, 1 28, 129, 146 Radtke, L.: 342
See also Disease, Immunosuppression, Raginsky, B. B.: 182
Mind-body medicine, Psychosomatic Raichle, M. E.: 620
medicine Rainer, W. G.: 392
Psychopathology: 75 Rainville, P.: 186-187
19th-century view of: 85 Rakoff, A. E.: 1 50
Genius and, 97-98, 473-474, 475, 555 Ramachandran, Y. S.: 1 52n18, 532
Hysteria and, 163 Raman, R.: 144
Mysticism and, 555 Ramanujan, S.: 488-491
Mythopreic faculty and, 356, 359-360, 431 Ranganath, c.: 266
Near-death experience and, 555 Rantasalo, I.: 159
Stigmata and, 154-156, 160-161 Rao, K. R.: 528
790-Index

Rasmussen, T.: 381, 396 Riddoch, M. J.: 262-263n 1 9

Rasmussen, W. c.: 1 84 Rimland, 8 . : 433n6
Rasputin: 1 9 1 Ring, K.: 373, 373n5, 375, 377, 378, 389, 390,
Ratnoff, O.: 153n20, 1 56, 161 410n38, 412, 413n42, 603
Rawlings, N. B.: 571 Rita, H.: 1 24
Rayleigh, [Lord]. See Strutt, J. Roberts, G.: 375
Recanzone, G.: 572 Robinson, D. N.: 55, 1 87
Rees, W. D.: 406, 437 Roddie, I. C.: 217
Regard, M.: 404n30 Rodin, E.: 379, 383
Reid, T.: 74., 585 Rodriguez, E.: 38
Reincarnation. See Cases of the Roe, A. w.: 280n34
reincarnation type (CORT) Roe, C.: 484
Reinders, A. A. T.: 173, 174 Rogo, D. S.: 380-381
Reiter, P. J.: 182 Roll, w. : 400, 400n27, 402
Relativity, Theory of: xxin2, xxii Rolland, R.: 521 , 554
Relaxation: Rolph, C. H.: 291
Healing under hypnosis and, 191 Romanenko, A. A.: 410
See also Meditation Romijn, H.: 299
Religion: Ron, M. A.: 165
Conversion experiences and, 369, 41 1-412 Rootenberg, J.: 186
Creativity and, 483-484 Rosa, E.: 1 36n l l
Freud and, 554 Rosa, L.: 1 36nl l
Health and, 1 30-131, 1 37-139 Rosch, E.: 14, 540n37
Mystical experiences and, 499, 501-502, Rose, S.: 277-78
506, 507, 5 12-513, 5 14, 5 15, 5 17, 523, Rosenbaum, R. S.: 265n21
523nI9, 524, 528-530, 554n51 Rosenberg, J. F.: 288, 291
Near-death experiences, visions and, 391, Rosenblatt, F.: 1 8
391 n 1 9 Rosenblueth, A.: 7
"Redogmatization" o f mystical texts and, Rosenfeld, E.: 19n14
516 Rosenthal, M.: 150, 152
Science and, 229, 496 Rosenthal, R.: 2 1 l n5 1
Stigmata and, 1 52-169 Rosing, C . J.: 378
Yoga and, 526-527 Ross, C.: 318n 1 3
Universal core, mystical experiences and, Ross, G . R. T.: 624
503-5\0 Rosser, A. E.: 279
Remembering. See Memory Rothman, D. L.: 417
Resch, K. L.: 141-142 Rowbotham, D. J.: 141
Respiratory conditions, Placebo effect on, Rowlands, M.: 255, 258n1 3 , 259
142 Royce, 1.: 561
Retrocognition: xxvin6. Royzere, A. M.: 568
See also Psi Rozanski, A.: 1 28n5
Retrocognitive dissonance: 226n62 Rubin, D. R.: 21 1 n 5 1
Reusch, J.: 1 20 Ruck, c . : 544
Reynolds, P.: 392-394, 418-419. See Near- Rumelhart, D. E.: 19
death experiences Rumi: 497
Rhine, 1. B.: 362, 584n5 Rummins, T. A.: 130
Rhine, L. E.: 220, 221, 361-362, 406 Runco, M. A.: 425
Ribary, U.: 38, 40, 626 Rush, 8.: 4\0, 625
Ribot, T.: 53-54, 55, 74, 585 Ruskin, J.: 60
Ricard, M.: 571 Russell, B.: 242, 273, 500, 518, 633n39,
Richards, I. A.: 454n20, 455 635n43, 637
Richards, R. L.: 473, 475 Ruth, T. E.: 123
Richards, w.: 544, 545 Ryan, T. J.: 217
Richardson, P.: 264 Ryle, G.: 3, 4
Richardson, R. 1.: 6\0
Richet, c.: 208, 226, 226n60, 316nl2 Saavedra-Aguilar, 1. C.: 380, 38 1, 387
Richter, C. P.: 1 24, 1 28n6
 I ndex-791

Sabom, M.: 372, 373n5, 375, 377, 380n 10, Schr6dinger, E.: 637
389, 392, 394, 418 Schultes, R. E . : 544
Sacks, 0.: xxviii, 17, 33, 34, 406, 433, 435, Schultz, G.: 406, 438
436, 436nlO, 437, 437nl l Schulz, R.: 1 23
Sagan, C.: 376 Schulzer, M.: 146
Sage, M.: 357-358n38 Schuman, M.: 567
Salmon, P.: 144, 192 Schwaninger, J.: 371, 372, 418
Salter, W: 357-358n38 Schwartz, E . L.: 23nl9
Sampath: 223-224. See Cases of the Schwartz, G. E.: 176n30
reincarnation type (CORT) Schwartz, 1. H.: 217, 615
Samuels, A.: 332 Schwarz, B. E.: 184
Samuelsson, P.: 387 Science:
Sanchez, M . 1 . : 392 As method, xxii, xxiii, xxiv
Sand, G.: 443, 444, 471 Evolving nature of, xxii, xxxiii-xxiv, xxv-
Sandin, R. H.: 387 xxvi, 64, 69, 91
Sando, W : 192 Experimentation and, 583-584
Sandweiss, D. A.: 228 Experimenter effects in, 2 1 1n51
Santhouse, A. M.: 438 "Facts" in, xxiii-xxiv, xxv
Saperstein, G.: 142 Limitations of, 64
Sapir, E.: 512 Logical positivism and, 3
Sarbin, T.: 341 Parapsychology, and, xxvi
Sargant, W: 536, 536n33, 587 Psychology and, 582
Sarner, L.: 1 36n l l Religion and, 1 1 3-1 14, 582
Sarter, M . : 268 Theories of, 294n49
Satie, E.: 521 Theory in, 294n50
Savant syndrome: 33-34, 101, 107 Scientific method:
See also Calculating prodigies Limitations of, in psychology: 57, 90-95
Saver, 1. L.: 532, 533 Myers's conception of, 63-64, 91, 94
Saxe, G. N.: 173, 350 Psychical research and, 61-62
Saxena, H.: 233-234 Scientism and, xxiii-xxiv, xxviii, 59, 3 1 3
Schachter, D. L.: 169n25, 245n5, 272, 388, Scofield, A. M.: 1 3 3
435, 536 Scriabin, A.: 521
Schank, R. c.: l In6, 14 Scripture, E. W.: 433
Scharfetter, c.: 546 Scrying: 1 1 1 , 285, 585
Schechter, E . : 108, 362 See also Automatisms
Schechtman, K. B.: 371 Searle, 1.: 3, 16n9, 22n18, 24-25, 26, 26n20,
Scheibel, A.: 27n21 28, 37-38n25, 44, 45
Scheinman, M. M.: 387 Biological naturalism and, 38, 605
Schiller, F. C. S.: xxiii, xxx, 28, 28n23, 36-37, Artificial intelligence and, 21 -22
60, 73nI6, 3 1 6, 450, 471 , 587, 589, 606nl 9 Computational Theory of Mind and, 21-23,
Phenomenal self versus transcendental ego 462, 465n24, 642
and, 82-83n21 Freud and, 330-331
Schleifer, S. 1.: 124 Interactional dualism and, 610
Schlitz, M . : 230, 231, 232, 484 Secondary selves and, 347
Schmidt, H.: 597 Semantic content and, 43
Schmidt, S.: 230, 231 Sperry's emergent consciousness and, 609
Schmied, I.: 375 Whitehead and, 636
Schmitt, F. A.: 625 Secondary personalities. See Multiple
Schneck, 1. M.: 197-198 personality
Schneider, R.: 230 Seeck, M.: 397
Schnettler, B.: 375 Seeman, M.: 1 31
Schoenbeck, S. B.: 372 Seeman, T. E.: 1 3 1
Scholes, G.: 169 Segal, G. M . A.: 255n l2
Schopbach, R. R.: 1 50, 1 5 1 Self, the: xvii, xxi, xxii, 44, 75
Schorer, C . E . : 370n2 As an illusion, xxi, 640
Schouten, S.: 1 35, 363 As a unity or a multiplicity, 55, 56, 74-75,
Schrenck-Notzing, A.: 203 321-322, 328-332, 338, 340
792-Index

Context-dependent selves, 347 Shontz, F. C.: 377

Genius and, 477 Shors, T. 1.: 278
Myers's theory of, 73, 78-79, 80-83, 99, 306, Shorter, B.: 332
308, 325-326 Short-term memory. See Memory
Mystical experiences and, 505, 507-508 Shotter, 1. D.: 260n15, 288n46
Neurophysiological "location" of, 540n35 SHRDLU: 1 1, 14, 16n9, 465n24
Transcendance of, in mystical experiences See also VVinograd
and, 519 Shrier, L . : 192
See also Psyche, Subliminal Self Shulman, R. G.: 417
Self-directed neuroplasticity: 615, 620 Sicher, F.: 228
Self-suggestion. See Auto-suggestion, Sidgwick, E. M.: 60, 109, 283, 357-358n38,
Suggestion 358, 361, 395, 407, 410n38
Selye, H.: 1 22, 129 Sidgwick, H.: 40n30, 60, 107, 109, 355, 406,
Semantic memory: 35, 44 , 270n25, 273, 407, 420
275-276 Sidis, B.: 75, 302n3, 302
Brain injury and, 264, 265, 265n21, 268-269 Sidtis, J.: 351-352n32
Post-mortem survival and, 295-296 Siegel, R. K.: 405, 435, 435n9, 587
See also Memory Sierra, M.: 162, 164, 165
Semmel weiss, I. P.: xxv Signer, S. F.: 1 50, l S i
Sensation: Silberman, E . K.: 168
Coding of: 39 Silberstein, R. B.: 18, 539n34, 619
Evolution of, 80 Silva, J. A.: 150n17
Memory images and, 245-246, 249n8 Silverberg, E . L.: 193
Neurobiology and, 38n26 Silverman, A. 1.: 21 1-212
Sense of presence: 407n35, 525n20 Simmonds, C.: 528-529n26
Serdahely, W. 1.: 372, 375 Simon, H. A.: I I
Shadlen, M. N.: 38 Simonton, D . K.: 602n1 5
Shafer, D.: 231 Simons, D. 1.: 40, 492
Shahabi, L.: 1 30 Simpson, C. 1.: ISS, 1 5 6
Shakespeare, VV.: 455, 462, 479, 481 Sinclair-Gieben, A. H . c . : 194, 194-195n42,
Shall ice, T.: 17n 1 1 , 261, 620 195
Shamdasani, S.: 302 Singer, J. E.: 536
Shams, L.: 40 Singer, w.: 38, 40
Shannahoff-Khalsa, D. S.: 569 Singh, B.: 178
Shannon, C. E . : 251 Single-Photon Emission Computed
Shapiro, D. H.: 567, 570n65 Tomography (SPECT):
Shapiro, S. L.: 129 Hysteria and, 164
Sharada: 292n48. See Cases of the Mysticism and, 537-538
reincarnation type (CORT), Xenoglossy Multiple personality disorder and, 173, 350
Sharpe, M.: 120 See also Neuroimaging
Shear, J.: 635n43s Singleton, L.: 183
Shebo, B. J.: 433n5 Skinner, B . F. : 6, 456
Sheehan, E. P.: 183 Skrupskelis, I . : 30l n l
Sheikh, A. A.: 1 2 1 , 480 Slater, H . : 33
Sheikh, K. S.: 1 2 1 Slavin, R. E . : 125-126
Shell-hearing. See Automatisms, Scrying Slavney, P. R.: 162, 163, 164, 166
Shepard, R. N.: 16, 458 Sleep: 96-97, 101-103, 441
Shermer, M.: xxiv Sloan, R. P.: 1 30-1 31
Sherrington, C.: 608 Sloman, S. A.: 458
Sherwood, S. J.: 439 Slotnick, S. 1.: 235n5
Shetty, N.: 144 Small, G. w.: 149
Shimojo, S.: 40 Smart, 1. J. c.: 4
Shimony, A.: 635, 636n46 Smith, A.: 4
Shindell, S.: 406 Smith, D. G.: 1 30
Shiva: 282n48. See Cases of the Smith, E. E . : 14, 466
reincarnation type (CORT) Smith, G. R.: 1 3 \
Shock, N. w.: 176
 Index-793

Smith, Huston: 514, 520, 543, 545, 548, Stanley, J. c.: 583
551n48, 558, 562 Stanovich, K.: 346
Smith, Helene: 357, 359-360, 431n4, 448-449, Stapp, H. P.: 299, 6 1 1 n24, 612n25, 613, 614,
469, 476, 478, 5 1 1 , 524. See Automatism, 615, 616, 623, 624, 626, 628, 628-629, 631 ,
Flournoy, Mediumship 633n39, 635, 635n44
Smith, H. S.: 228 Starbuck, E. D.: 41 1 , 412
Smith, H. y.: 183 Staring studies. See Distant mental
Smith, J. E.: 517n14 influence on living systems (DMILs)
Smith, K . : 171, 349 Starkman, M. N.: 1 5 1
Smith, S. M.: 457 Stason, W. B.: 143
Smolen sky, P.: 19, 250 Stebbins, G. T.: 144
Smythe, W. E.: 160n1 5 Steele, P. R.: 126
Smythies, J . R . : 543n41 , 552, 608n21, 610 Steele, R. w.: 1 3 1
Snyder, A. w.: 34 Steen, P. A . : 387
Socrates: 462, 483, 521, 568 Stein, A. G.: 108, 362
Solfvin, 1.: 135, 230 Stein, D. G.: 621n33
Solms, M.: 627 Stein, D. J.: 140
Solomon, G. F.: 122 Stein, M.: 1 24, 1 29
Solso, R. D.: xxii Steinvarth, S.: 264
Somnambulism: 102, 105-106, 285, 303-304 Stellar, E.: 261 n 17
Automatism and, 3 1 0, 3 1 1 Steptoe, A.: 142
Janet and, 3 1 1 Sternbach, R. A.: 142-143
Reflex action and, 304 Sternberg, E. M.: 1 22-123, 1 23n4, 1 28-129,
Stigmata and, 1 57 222, 224
Unconscious cerebration and, 304 Sternberg, R. 1.: 425, 459n21, 480, 487, 491
Sonino, F.: 1 20, 1 23n4 Stevens, G.: 192
Soul. See Psyche, Self, Subliminal Self Stevens, 1. R.: 382
Spanos, N. P.: 1 87, 189n38, 194, 194-195n42, Stevens, W.: 445
341-348 Stevenson, I.: 33, 89n27, 109n40, 1 10n41,
Spence, S. A.: 165 1 17nl , 148, 149, 153n20, 154, 155, 1 56,
Spencer, H.: 76-77, 79, 94 158n23, 159, 160, 161, 167, 180n32, 1 9 1 , 201 ,
Sperry, R. w. : 54n4, 351-352n32, 608-609 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 220, 220n54,
Spetzler, R. F.: 392 221, 222, 222n56, 223, 223n57, 224,
Spiegel, D.: 141, 1 84, 186 224n58, 225, 233, 234, 235, 235n69, 235-
Spiegel, H.: 121, 21 1 n 5 1 236, 292, 292n48, 360, 361, 361n41, 368-
Spieker, L . E.: 1 28n6 369nl , 370n2, 372, 374, 375, 389, 407, 408,
Spilka, B.: 555 41On38, 448, 490n35, 549, 550, 587, 596n 1 1 ,
Spinelli, L.: 397 597, 598, 623, 624-625, 624n35
Spinnler, H.: 277 Stevenson, R. L.: 441-442, 443-444
Spinoza, : 500, 521 Stewart, B: 60
Spiritualism, unconscious cerebration and: Stewart, D. E.: 150, 1 5 1 , 1 52
304 Stewart-Williams, S.: 141, 146
Spiro, H. M.: 141, 145 Stigmata: 3 1 , 32, 99, 152-161, 201
Spitellie, P. H.: 387n18 Absorption and, 161
Splinter psyches. See Jung, Multiple Anesthesias and, 68, 1 53
personality, Personality Cases of the reincarnation type (CORT)
Split-brain patients. See Brain and, 235-236
Spraggett, A.: 41On38 Fraud and, 155
Squire, L. R.: 263, 263n20 Hypnosis and, 1 8 1
Stace, W. T.: 375-376n6, 500, 503, 503-504, Hysteria and, 166
504n7, 505-508, 506n8, 507-508, 508nl0, Immune disorders and, 156, 1 56-157
5 10-51 1 , 512, 513, 5 1 5, 516, 517-518, 5 1 9, Luminous phenomena and, 528-529, 528-
520-521 , 531n27, 544, 545, 551, 563, 563n61, 529n26
564, 565 Myers's view of, 155
See also Quantum mechanics Physiology and, 166
Starn, H.: 343 Psychological predispositions towards,
Stanford, R. G.: 108, 362 160-161
794-Index

Psychopathology and, 154-1 55, 156, 1 57, 320, 323, 340, 362, 412n41, 414, 557, 558,
1 57n22, 161 560n58, 574-575, 594-595, 594-595n10
Religion and, 152-153, 154-1 55, 1 59, 160, Mythop<l!ic faculty of, 356, 359-360
528-529 Neutral-monism and, 637-638
Skepticism of, 201 -202 Subliminal uprush: 98, 101, 284-285, 354,
Timing of, 160 412, 429, 430, 434, 474, 475, 550, 587
Wound characteristics and, 159-160 See also Genius
Stoessl, A. J.: 144, 146 Sudden death. See Disease,
Stone, D. A.: 143 Immunosuppression, Mind-body
Stone, P. J.: 1 2 medicine, Psychoneuroimmunology
Storr, A . : 472, 478, 479-480 Suddeth, J. A.: 406
Stout, G. E: 56, 96n31, 577, 578-579, 582 Sugar, 0: 4
Strain, 1.: 120 Suggestion: 104-105, 1 34, 238-239
Strassman, R.: 381, 384, 545, 545n42, At a distance, 226-227, 226n61
546n44, 550, 606-607 Healing and, 1 38, 209
Stratton, G. M . : 33 Hypnosis and, 184-185
Strauch, I.: 439n1 2 Physiological changes and, 179-180, 219
Stream of consciousness: xvii, 75, 284, 425, Post-hypnotic, 3 1 1-312
590-591, 595 Skin conditions and, 209, 21 1 n 5 1
Strombeck, E K. von: 339 Stigmata and, 1 6 1
Stromeyer, C. E, III: 33 See also Auto-suggestion, Hypnosis,
Stroud, J. M.: 626 Hypnotizability
Structure-mapping engine (SME): 361 Sulzberger, M. B.: 190, 193, 195, 196
Criticism of, 462-463, 465 Summers, c.: 372
See also Computational theory of mind Super-ESP. See Extrasensory perception,
(CTM) Psi, Survival research
Strutt, 1. (Lord Rayleigh): 60 Supernormal phenomena: xxviii, 541 , 584
Subconscious. Automatism and, 353-363
lastrow's view of: 86n23 Exclusion of, from mainstream psychology,
See also Subliminal Self, Unconscious 348
Subliminal phenomena: 67-68, 69, 70, 76, Evidence for, 361-362, 363, 420, 530, 645-
77-78, 87-89, 96-97, 586 655
Altered states and, I I I Hypnosis and, 107-108
Anesthesias and, 87, 88 Myers's definition of, 7 1 -72, 85, 218-219,
Creativity and, 430-433 306, 353, 589-590, 606nI 9
Definition of, 77-78nI9 Stout's criticism of, 579
Dreams as a type of, 101 Veridica1ity and, 356, 358-359, 360
Genius and, 98, 100, 440-441, 472, 475 Supraliminal consciousness: 73, 76, 77-78,
Hysteria and, 99 86, 97, 637
Neurobiology and, 341, 627 Genius and, 98, 100, 475
Pictorial symbolism and, 88 Global workspace theory and, 621
Psychoanalysis and, 327 Myers's conception of, 77-78nI9, 589-590
Psychopathology and, 587-588 Subliminal consciousness and, 99, 453,
Sleep as a type of, 101-102 453n19
Suggestion and, 105 Suprenant, A. M.: 250, 251-252
Supernormal phenomena and, 353, 603-604 Sur, M.: 280n34
Subliminal Self: 1 14-1 1 5n49, 214, 578-579, Surman, O. w. : 193, 194-195n42
585-595, 616n29, 617, 617n30, 641n48 Surrealism, 450
Freud and, 328 Survival. See Post-mortem survival
Genius and, 426, 475 Survival research:
James's use of, 201 n l , 301-302, 561-562, Psychology and, 72
574-575 Super-ESP and, 283-284, 360, 597n12, 597-
McDougall's criticism of, 323-325, 590-593, 598
594-595nlO Varieties of, 282-284
Myers's conception of, 61, 73, 80-83, 8 1 - See also Cases of the reincarnation type,
82n20, 83, 96, 96n29, 286, 296, 306, 319- Mediumship, Near-death experiences,
Post-mortem survival
 Index-795

Sutton, 1.: 242, 250, 260, 455-456 Depersonalization and, 532n29

Swade, R. H.: 192, 1 94, 196 Ecstatic seizures and, 532, 532-533n28,
Swinburne, R.: 288n45 Mystical experiences and, 531-534
Symbolism: Near-death experiences and, 381-383, 384
As the language of the subliminal, 451-452 Out-of-body experiences and, 396, 397
Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) Tennyson, A. [Lord]: 60, 505, 508, 509,
and, 452, 465 509n 1 1, 521 , 522, 555, 559
Imagination and, 457 Teresa of Avila, St.: 506, 506n8, 517, 524,
Metaphor and, 254 525, 525n20, 530, 532, 540
Non-linguistic, 45 1-454 Ter Reit, G.: 141
Primary versus secondary process and, Thagard, P.: 14, 23, 460, 461 , 462, 463, 468
457-459 Thalbourne, M.A.: 84n22, 414n43, 522, 604
Psychotic art and, 475-476 Therapeutic touch: 1 36n 1 1 , 227-228
Thinking and, 41, 425 See also Faith healing
See also Dreaming, Genius, Thigpen, C. H.: 168, 172
Hallucinations, Mystical experience, Thomann, K.: 167, 169
Psychedelics Thomas, G. I.: 143
Symonds, J. A.: 520 Thomas, L.: 2 1 3 -215, 566
Sympathetic symptoms: 219-221 Thomas, N. J. T.: 17n lO, 456-457
See also Stigmata Thomas, P. J.: 436
Synesthesia: 552, 552n50 Thompson, 1. 1.: 60
Lucid dreaming and, 406 Thompson, N. L.: 564
See also Mystical experience, Psychedelics Thompson, R.: 96n30
Szandor, L: 206-207 See also Mediumship
Szechtman, H.: 184 Thompson, W G.: 1 39n14, 143nl 6
Thompson, W L . : 1 84
Taddonio, J.: 21 1 n 5 1 Thomson, K.S.: 229
Tagore, R . : 521 Thoreau, H.: 521
Taimni, I. K.: 526, 526n23, 527n24 Thorensen, C. E.: 1 30, 1 3 1
Takeya, H.: 571 Thornton, J . C . : 124
Targ, E.: 227, 228 Thouless, R. H.: xxvin6, 30
Tart, C. T.: 40, 1 32, 398, 401-402, 525, 548, Threshold:
553, 564 Fechner's concept of, 28
Taub, E.: 232n68, 572 See also Boundaries, Subliminal
Taves, A.: 301 n l phenomena, Supraliminal consciousness
Taylor, D . C . : 532 Thurston, H.: 152-1 53, 1 53n20, 1 55, 160, 161 ,
Taylor, E.: xxvii, 36, 82, 96n29, 301 n l , 207, 528, 530, 563
3 1 5n16, 426n1, 427n2, 471 , 558, 579 Tien, A. Y.: 406
Taylor, R.: 406 Tiihonen, J.: 164, 165
Teachout, T.: 444 Tinling, D. c.: 1 25
Telekinesis. See Psychokinesis Titchener, E. B.: 578
Telepathy: xxvin6, 30n24, 60, 67, 67-68nI4, Tit1ey, R.: 388
87, 89, 90, 107, 109n40, 408n36 Todesco, C. Y.: 532-533n28
Automatisms and, 305-306 Toga, A. W: 1 8
Dreams and, 102, 102n35 Token identity. See Identity theory
Hypnosis and, 107-108 Tolman, E.: 3
Mediumship and, 360 Tommerdahl, M.: 27
Myers and, 599-600 Tong, F.: 396, 437, 615
Subliminal processes and, 285 Tononi, G.: 10, 2 1 , 38, 416n44
Unconscious whispering and, 579 Toulmin, S.: 583-584
See also Psi Trachtenberg, J. T.: 280
Telergy. See Psi, Psychophysiological Trance:
influence, Volition Genius and, 443, 447
Tellegen, A.: 378 Mediumship and, 357n37, 361n41
Temple, C. M.: 264 Personality and, 321-322
Temporal lobe abnormalities: 398 Possession and, in Myers's view, 1 1 3
Aura and, 533, 533n29 Speaking: 87, 1 1 2 , 357
796-Index

See also Altered states of consciousness, Sociocognitive theories of, 341-345

Automatisms, Mediumship, Possession Underhill, E.: 500, 504, 505, 507, 521,
Transcendentalism, genius and: 482-483. 522n18, 524-525, 525n20, 527, 556, 568
See also Emerson, Thoreau Uswatte, G.: 572
Transformational grammar: 8-9 Uttal, W. R.: 261, 266n22, 267, 268, 618,
See also Chomsky, Language 618n31 , 623
Transliminality: 84n22, 414n43, 522 Utts, J.: 230
Transmission theory. See Filter theory,
James Vaid, J.: 457
Transpersonal psychology: Vaitl, D.: 394
Emergence of, xviii Vakil, R. J.: 178
Filter theory and, 552-553 Valenstein, E.: 261 n 1 8
Future of, 642-643 Valliant, G. E . : 123
Genius and, 482-483 Van de Castle, R.: 108, 442
Mainstream psychology and, 574 Van der Kolk, B. A.: 173, 387n 1 8
Mystical experience and, 555-563 Van Eeden, F.: 404n32
Psychedelics and, 548-553 Van Gelder, T.: 2 1 n l 5
Travis, F.: 568 Van Huffelen, A. c . : 4 1 8
Traynor, 1.: 138 Van Lommel, P.: 371, 372, 373n5, 374, 376,
Treffert, D. A.: 34, 433, 434-435n8, 486n33 377n9, 380, 384, 387, 390, 391, 412, 413-414,
Triggiano, P. 1.: 167, 168, 169, 172, 173, 350 414, 418, 419
Trilling, L.: 472, 478 Van Orden, G. C.: 620
Truong, Y. K.: 539n34 Van Petten, C.: 263n20
Trustman, R.: 388 Van Wees, R.: 371
Trustman, R. L.: 1 29 Varela, F. J.: 38, 416n44, 564
Tsai, G.: 350 Vargha-Khadem, F.: 263-264
Tucker, J.: 233, 234, 235n69, 292 Vasile, R. G.: 173
Tudor, M.: 149 Vasiliev, L. L.: 227
Tuke, D. H.: 1 25, 154, 158, 158-159, 175, 176, Vaughan, F.: 548
184, 193, 220 Velmans, M.: 346, 610
Tulving, E.: 265-265 Vendemia, 1. M. c.: 186, 187
Turetskaia, B. E.: 410 Venecia, D.: 373, 379
Turing, A.: 7, 10, 22, 30n24 Vennum, L.: 292n48. See Possession
Turing machines: xix, 7-8, 9 Vera, M. I.: 149
Turner, E. K.: 224 Veridical hallucinations. See
Turner, M.: 167, 460 Hallucinations.
Turner, R.: 555 Veselis, R. A.: 417
Tversky, A.: 467n25 Viinamiiki, H.: 164
Twain, M.: 484 Vinekar, S. L.: 178
Twemlow, S. w.: 372, 375, 377, 377n8 Virgil: 521
Tyler, D.: 373, 375 Vision: 44
Tylor, E. G.: 94 Hypnosis and, 183
Tyndall, 1.: 57, 509n 1 1 Migraine headaches and, 435-437
Type identity. See Identity theory Multiple personality and, 169-170, 174, 1 82,
Tyrrell, G. N. M.: 109, 361, 362, 407, 407-408 349-350
Near-death experiences and, 390-391
Ullman, M.: 103n35, 193, 194, 203, 205, Visser, G. H.: 418
542n38 Visual imagery: 44
Unconscious: xxii-xxiii, xxix, 37, 75, 75n17, See also Dreaming, Hallucinations,
77, 93. 320, 327, 328, 330-333, 333n20, 335- Imagination, Meditation
336, 345-348, 440, 458, 472, 555-556 Vive, L.: 3 1 5. See Multiple personality
See also Subconscious Voison, A.: 206
Unconscious cerebration: 75-76, 93, 305-306, Volition: xvii, xxi, 44, 49, 54, 56, 1 18, 214
340-352, 578, 580 As "folk psychology", 50
Cognition and, 345-348 As illusory: 49, 640-641
Myers's objections to, 305-306n8, 364 Consciousness and, 641
Neurobiology and, 348-352
 Index-797

Goal-directed strivings and, 343-345, Weinreich, U.: 468

344n27 Weinstock, R.: 1 50n17
Hypnosis and, in the sociocognitive view, Weisberg, R. W.: 428-429, 480, 491
342-343 Weiss, A. N.: 371
Hysteria and, 165-166 Weiss, E.: 633n39
I ntentionality aspect of, 44-45 Weiss, L.: 392
Physiology and, 176n30, 218 Wekstein, D. R.: 625
Psi phenomena and, 32 Weitzenhoffer, A. M.: 1 83 , 209, 209n49, 212,
Scientific naturalism and, 52 239
Suspension of, in hypnosis, 104-105 Weizenbaum, J.: 15, 15n8
Unconscious and, 75 Wells, V. W : 123
Vol lenweider, F. X.: 538, 546, 547n45, 549, Wenger, M. A.: 178-179
551 Werner, H.: 459
Voluntariness. See Automatism, Volition Wernicke, c.: 622n34
Von der Malsburg, C.: 38 West, D. J.: 1 37-1 38, 1 38n 1 2, 406
Von Hartmann: 440, 479 West, L. 1.: 405, 587
Von K rafft-Ebing, R.: 206 West, M. A.: xxix, 567
Von Neumann, J.: 8, 9, 18, 20, 22, 23, 34, West, W S.: 1 74
613, 614 Weymouth, K . E.: 1 36n l l
"Voodoo death": See Mortality Whelan, C. I .: 1 50, 1 5 1 , 1 52
Vriens, E. M.: 418 Whinnery, J. E .: 379
Vuilleumier, P.: 165 W hishaw, I . Q.: 261 n18, 261 -262n 19
Vygotsky, L.: 45 Whitaker, H. A.: 262, 267n23
White, G. L.: 169
Wackermann, J.: 439n 1 2 White, N. S.: 417
Wade, G . R.: 165 White, P. D.: 1 75
Wager, T. D.: 142 White, R.: 344n27
Wagner, L. M.: 123 White, R. A.: 109n40, 21 1 n51, 362, 406, 484,
Wagstaff, G.: 346 528, 566
Walach, H . : 230 Whitehead, A. N.: 451 , 577, 602n14, 61 1 n24,
Wall, P. D.: 1 39, 140, 147 633, 633n39, 634, 634n42, 635, 635n43,
Wallace, 8.: 33 635n44, 635-636, 636n46, 637, 641
Wallace, R. K . : 178, 568 Whiteman, 1. H. M.: 405
Wallas, G.: 428, 428n3, 429, 43 1 , 440n 14, Whitlock, F. A.: 1 53n20, 1 53-154, 1 55, 156,
453, 484 160, 161
Waller, D. G.: 371 Whitman, W.: 505, 521 , 522
Wallerstein, R. S.: 1 56-157 Whitsel, B: 27, 547n45, 572
Walsh, R. N.: 548, 564, 567 Whittier, 1.: 471
Walter, R. D.: 533 Whorf, B.: 5 1 2
Walters, M. J.: 1 26 Whytt, R.: 163
Ward, J.: 56 Wieneke, G. H.: 418
Ward, T. B.: 457 Wiener, N.: 7
Wardell, D. W: 1 36n I I Wiesel, T. N.: 38n26
Wasson, G.: 544 Wieser, H. -G.: 404
Watson, A. A.: 1 25 Wiesner, 8. P.: xxvin6, 30
Watson, J. B.: xvii-xviii, 2-3, 424 Wigner, E . : 487, 612n25, 6 1 3
Watson, M.: 123 Wikswo, 1. P., lr.: 18, 619
Watson, P. J.: 564 Wilbur, C. B.: 168
Weaver, W.: 251 Wilding, E . L.: 261 n l 8
Wegener, A.: xxvi, 49 Wilkinson, F . : 435, 436, 436nlO
Wegner, D. M.: 53n3, 341, 345, 345n29, 586, Will. See Volition
640, 641 Willard, R. D.: 183
Weighted Core Experience Index (WCEI). Willet, Mrs. See Coombe-Tennant
See Greyson Near-Death Experience See also Mediumship
Scale, Near-death experiences Williams, D.: 532
Weil, S.: 521 Williams, H. c.: 223
Weiner, M. C.: 436 Williams, 1. R.: 1 24
798-Index

Williams, M. D.: 392 Young, F.: 362-363

Williams, S.: 438 Young, P. 1. w.: 1 26
Williams, y.: 194 Young, R. M.: 57, 79
Williamson, S. 1.: 1 8 Yun, D. D.: 1 26
Willis, W. D . , lr.: 216, 2 1 7
Wilson, R. A.: 21 Zaehner, R. C.: 543n41, 546
Wilson, S. c.: 378 Zahn, T. P.: 171
Wind, E.: xxiv-xxv, xviii, 41, 1 8 1n35, 424, Zaleski, c.: 370n2
425, 429, 455, 469 Zanger, R.: 544
Wink, C. A. S.: 199 Zeki, S.: 262-263n 1 9
Winograd, T.: II n6, 14, 16, 16 n9, 465n24 Zola-Morgan, S.: 263, 263n20
Winsor, A.: 36-37, 315, 3 1 6, 317 Zubieta, 1. -K.: 142
See a/so Automatisms, Consciousness, Zusne, L.: 61
Multiple personality, Possession
Winston, P. H.: 1 1n6
Wint, G.: 272
Wiseman, R.: 231-232, 282n37
Witchcraft: 94. See Hysteria
Witt, E. A.: 142
Wittgenstein, : 1 5
Wittstein, I . S . : 1 28n6
Woerle, G. M.: 387, 419n46
Wolf, 1.: 190, 193, 195, 196
Wolfe, T.: 445
Wolff, H. G.: 205
WolfE, A.: 475-476, 478
Woods, R.: 500
Woodworth, R. S.: 260, 261 n17, 505
Woody, E.: 1 84
Woolfolk, R. L.: 176n30, 567
Wordsworth, 1.: 485
Wordsworth, w.: 443, 454, 455, 481 , 485,
485n32, 521 , 559
Worth, P.: See Curran, P.
See also Automatic writing, Mediumship,
W. F. Prince
Wrennall, 1.: 279n33
Wright, R. L.: 602
Wright, S. H.: 109n40
Wulff, D. M.: 549n47, 551, 553, 554, 555,
569n62, 574
Wulsin, L. R.: 123
Wundt, w.: 56

X., Hlida: 3 15, 329. See Automatisms,

Azam, Multiple personality
Xenoglossy: 292n48
Responsive form of, 596n1 1

Yamamura, T.: 571

Yamaya, R.: 380
Yazici, K. M.: 163, 164, 165, 166
Yeates, R.: 371
Yoga: 5 1 3, 526, 526-527
Psi phenomena and, 527-528
Yogis, study of: 177-179, 535, 569-571
See a/so Meditation
 About the Authors

Edward F. Kelly is currently Research Professor in the Department of Psychi­

atric Medicine at the University of Virginia. He received his undergraduate degree
in psychology from Yale and a Ph.D. from Harvard with primary interests in psy­
cholinguistics and cognitive science. His most recent research, carried out at the
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill as part of a large neuroscience research
program, involved non-invasive study of normal and abnormal plasticity in human
somatosensory cortex using high-resolution EEG and fMRI techniques. He had
previously spent over 10 years working full time in experimental parapsychology,
initially at 1. B. Rhine's Institute for Parapsychology in Durham, NC, and subse­
quently through the Department of Electrical Engineering at Duke University. He
is author of Computer Recognition ofEnglish Word Senses (with Philip 1. Stone); and
Altered States of Consciousness and Psi: A n Historical Survey and Research Prospec­
tus (with Ralph G. Locke). His central long-term interests revolve around mind­
brain relations and functional neuroimaging studies of unusual states of conscious­
ness and associated cognitive phenomena.

Emily Williams Kelly is currently Research Assistant Professor in the Depart­

ment of Psychiatric Medicine at the University of Virginia. She received her under­
graduate degree in English literature from Duke University, an M.A. in religious
studies from the University of Virginia, and a Ph.D. in psychology from the Uni­
versity of Edinburgh. Her dissertation focused on the development of scientific psy­
chology in the late 19th century, with an emphasis on F. W. H. Myers and his contri­
butions to psychology. She has been associated with the Department of Psychiatric
Medicine since 1 978, working primarily with Dr. Ian Stevenson in research on cases
of the reincarnation type and near-death experiences. In recent years her research
has focused on other kinds of phenomena suggestive of survival after death, includ­
ing apparitions, deathbed visions, and mediumship.

Adam Crabtree is currently on the faculty of the Centre for Training in Psy­
chotherapy, Toronto. He received an M.A. in philosophy from the University of
Toronto and a Ph.D. in therapeutic counseling from the Open International Uni­
versity for Complementary Medicines. He is particularly interested in the history of
hypnotism, psychotherapy, and dissociative disorders. His books include Multiple
Man: Explorations in Possession and Multiple Personality; Animal Magnetism, Early

799
800-About the Contributors

Hypnotism, and Psychical Research: An Annotated Bibliography; and From Mesmer

to Freud: Magnetic Sleep and the Roots of Psychological Healing.

Alan Gauld, M.A., Ph.D., and D.Litt, is a retired Reader in Psychology, School
of Psychology, University of Nottingham. As an undergraduate he read History
and Natural Sciences (Psychology) at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. He spent a
post-graduate year at Harvard, returned to Emmanuel as a Research Fellow, and
then moved to Nottingham, where he principally taught biological psychology and
neuropsychology. He has written or co-authored five books: The Founders of Psy­
chical Research; Human Action and its Psychological Investigation (with John Shot­
ter); Poltergeists (with Tony Cornell); Mediumship and Survival; and A History of
Hypnotism. He is a past president of the Society for Psychical Research, received
from the Parapsychological Association the Award for Outstanding Contributions
to Parapsychological Research, and was awarded the Myers Memorial Medal of the
Society for Psychical Research.

Bruce Greyson is the Chester F. Carlson Professor of Psychiatry and Director

of the Division of Perceptual Studies at the University of Virginia. He was one of
the founders of the International Association for Near-Death Studies, and for the
past 25 years has edited the Journal of Near-Death Studies. Dr. Greyson majored
in psychology at Cornell University, received his medical degree from the SUNY
Upstate Medical College, and completed his psychiatric residency at the University
of Virginia. He practiced and taught psychiatry at the University of Michigan and
the University of Connecticut, where he was Clinical Chief of Psychiatry, before
returning to the University of Virginia 1 1 years ago. Dr. Greyson's research for the
past three decades has focused on the aftereffects and implications of the near­
death experience. He is co-editor (with Charles P. Flynn) of The Near-Death Experi­
ence: Problems, Prospects, Perspectives.

Michael Grosso, though nominally retired, is currently teaching at the Uni­

versity of Virginia's School of Continuing Education. He received his Ph.D. from
Columbia University in philosophy with an M.A. in classical Greek, and has taught
philosophy at Marymount College, John F. Kennedy University, City University
of New York, and New Jersey City University. His main current interests focus on
developing a theory of mind adequate to the available empirical data and develop­
ing methods of 2 1st-century philosophical practice. These interests come together
in his ongoing attempt to develop a new philosophical therapy that is based on
a radically expanded understanding of human mental capacities. He is currently
a director of the American Philosophical Practitioner's Association and Review
Editor of the Journal of Philosophical Practice. His recent books include The Mil­
lennium Myth; Experiencing the Next World Now; and The Misunderstood Savior:
Epicurus and Philosophical Practice (forthcoming).