6 Bautista V Salonga

2/28/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 172
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bautista vs. Salonga
*
G.R. No. 86439. April 13, 1989.
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs.

SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE,
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Appointing Power

of the President; Commission on Appointments; Administrative
Law; The appointment by the President of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is to be made without the review
and participation of the Commission on Appointments.–––Since
the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is
not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments which are to be
made with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,
it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman
of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of
the Commission on Appointments. To be more precise, the
appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution
itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. The President appoints the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the
second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they
are among the officers of government “whom he (the President)
may be authorized by law to appoint.” And Section 2(c), Executive
Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint
the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.
It provides: “(c) The Chairman and the Members of the
Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years without reappointment.
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000170876b1dc629aefd58003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/44
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term

of the predecessor.”
_________________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 161
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Appointments;

Acceptance of; Petitioner’s appointment on December 17, 1988 as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights was a completed
act on the part of the President.–––The threshold question that has
really come to the fore is whether the President, subsequent to
her act of 17 December 1988, and after petitioner Bautista had
qualified for the office to which she had been appointed, by taking
the oath of office and actually assuming and discharging the
functions and duties thereof, could extend another appointment to
the petitioner on 14 January 1989, an “ad interim appointment”
as termed by the respondent Commission on Appointments or any
other kind of appointment to the same office of Chairman.
Commission on Human Rights that called for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The Court, with all due respect to
both the Executive and Legislative Departments of government,
and after careful deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in
the negative. When Her Excellency, the President converted
petitioner Bautista’s designation as Acting Chairman to a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she advised
Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such
appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the performance of
the duties of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or
accept the appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment
by taking her oath of office before the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming
immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista’s appointment
therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the President.
To paraphrase the great jurist, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in the
celebrated case of Marbury vs. Madison. x x x “The answer to this
question seems an obvious one. The appointment being the sole
act of the president, must be completely evidenced, when it is

shown that he has done everything to be performed by him. x x x
Some point of time must be taken when the power of the executive
over an officer, not removable at his will must cease. That point of
time must be when the constitutional power of appointment has
been exercised. And this power has been exercised when the last
act, required from the person possessing the power, has been
performed. x x x But having once made the appointment, his (the
President’s) power over the office is terminated in all cases, where
by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office
is then in the person
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appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of

accepting or rejecting it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; No new or further appointment can be made to a position
already filled by a previously completed appointment which had
been accepted by the appointee through a valid qualification and
assumption of duty.–––It is respondent Commission’s submission
that the President, after the appointment of 17 December 1988
extended to petitioner Bautista, decided to extend another
appointment (14 January 1989) to petitioner Bautista, this time,
submitting such appointment (more accurately, nomination) to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. And yet, it
seems obvious enough, both in logic and in fact, that no new or
further appointment could be made to a position already filled by
a previously completed appointment which had been accepted by
the appointee, through a valid qualification and assumption of its
duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Same; Same; When the appointment is one that the Constitution
mandates is for the President to make without the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, the Executive’s act of
submitting such appointment to the Commission on Appointments,
and the latter’s act of confirming or rejecting the same, are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction.–––Respondent Commission
vigorously contends that granting that petitioner’s appointment
as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is one that
under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the
Mison case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within
the president’s prerogative to voluntarily submit such

appointment to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation.
The mischief in this contention, as the Court perceives it, lies in
the suggestion that the President (with Congress agreeing) may,
from time to time move power boundaries, in the Constitution
differently from where they are placed by the Constitution. The
Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance.
Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not
political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or even necessity.
Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission on
Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers
none. The evident constitutional intent is to strike a careful and
delicate balance in the matter of appointments to public office,
between the President and Congress (the latter acting through
the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of
the scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of
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power. In other words, to the extent that the Constitution has

blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with
the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also has
the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no
power of participation in the Commission on Appointments over
other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the
Constitution. The exercise of political options that finds no
support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Nor can the
Commission on Appointments by the actual exercise of its
constitutionally delimited power to review presidential
appointments, create power to confirm appointments that the
Constitution has reserved to the President alone. Stated
differently, when the appointment is one that the Constitution
mandates is for the President to make without the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, the executive’s voluntary act of
submitting such appointment to the Commission on
Appointments and the latter’s act of confirming or rejecting the
same are done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Same; Administrative Law; Appointments; Ad Interim
Appointments; Appointments that are for the President solely to
make, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.–––Nor can
respondents impressively contend that the new appointment or
re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was an ad interim
appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad

interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
President to make, i.e., without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their
very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to
appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments
are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but
appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is,
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments,
can not be ad interim appointments.
Same; Same; Same; Tenure in Office as Distinguished from
Term of Office; As the term of office of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is 7 years, without reappointment
as provided by Exec. Order 163, the tenure in office of said
Chairman cannot be later made dependent on the pleasure of the
President, hence, E.O. 163-A providing that the tenure of said
Chairman and the members of the CHR shall be at the pleasure of
the President is unconstitutional.–––Executive Order No. 163-A,
30 June 1987, providing that the tenure of the
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Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights

shall be at the pleasure of the President is unconstitutional. x x x
It is to be noted that, while the earlier executive order (No. 163)
speaks of a term of office of the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights–––which is seven (7) years without
reappointment–––the later executive order (163-A) speaks of the
tenure in office of the Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights, which is “at the pleasure of the President.”
Tenure in office should not be confused with term of office. As Mr.
Justice (later, Chief Justice) Concepcion in his concurring opinion
in Alba vs. Evangelista, stated: “The distinction between ‘term’
and ‘tenure’ is important, for, pursuant to the Constitution, ‘no
officer or employee in the Civil Service may be removed or
suspended except for cause, as provided by law’ (Art. XII, section
4), and this fundamental principle would be defeated if Congress
could legally make the tenure of some officials dependent upon
the pleasure of the President, by clothing the latter with blanket
authority to replace a public officer before the expiration of his
term.” When Executive Order No. 163 was issued, the evident
purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision that “the

term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the
Members of the Commission (on Human Rights) shall be provided
by law” (Sec. 17(2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). As the term of
office of the Chairman (and Members) of the Commission on
Human Rights, is seven (7) years, without re-appointment, as
provided by Executive Order No. 163, and consistent with the
constitutional design to give the Commission the needed
independence to perform and accomplish its functions and duties,
the tenure in office of said Chairman (and Members) cannot be
later made dependent on the pleasure of the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An independent office like
the CHR cannot truly function with independence and
effectiveness, if the tenure in office of its Chairman and its
members is made dependent on the pleasure of the President.–––
Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how
an office conceived and created by the Constitution to be
independent–––as the Commission on Human Rights–––and
vested with the delicate and vital functions of investigating
violations of human rights, pinpointing responsibility and
recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures therefor,
can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when the
tenure in office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent
on the pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A,
being anti-
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VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 165
thetical to the constitutional mandate of independence for the

Commission on Human Rights has to be declared
unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Removal; Due Process; Petitioner can
certainly be removed from her office even before the expiration of
the seven-year term, but such removal must be for cause and with
her right to due process properly safeguarded.–––To hold, as the
Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of
the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by
virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17
December 1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she
cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven
(7) year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must
be for cause and with her right to due process properly
safeguarded. In the case of NASECO vs. NLRC, this Court held

that before a rank-and-file employee of the NASECO, a
government-owned corporation, could be dismissed, she was
entitled to a hearing and due process. How much more, in the
case of the Chairman of a constitutionally mandated
INDEPENDENT OFFICE, like the Commission on Human
Rights. If there are charges against Bautista for misfeasance or
malfeasance in office, charges may be filed against her with the
Ombudsman. If he finds a prima facie case against her, the
corresponding information or informations can be filed with the
Sandiganbayan which may in turn order her suspension from
office while the case or cases against her are pending before said
court. This is due process in action. This is the way of a
government of laws and not of men.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Appointment;

Confirmation of Appointments; The Court has no power to add by
implication to the list of presidential appointees whom the
Constitution, in clear and categorical language declares as not
needing confirmation.–––The Constitution specifies clearly the
presidential appointees who do not need confirmation by the
Commission. The reason for non-confirmation is obvious. The
members of the Supreme Court and all lower courts and the
Ombudsman and his deputies are not confirmed because the
Judicial and Bar Council screens nominees before their names are
forwarded to the President. The Vice-President as a cabinet
member needs no confirmation because the Constitution says so.
He or she is chosen by the nation’s entire electorate and is only a
breath away from the Presidency. Those falling under the third
sentence of Section 16, Article VII do not have
166
to be confirmed because the Constitution gives Congress the

authority to free lower ranking officials whose positions are
created by law from that requirement. I believe that we in the
Court have no power to add by implication to the list of
presidential appointees whom the Constitution in clear and
categorical words declares as not needing confirmation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Chairman of the Human
Rights Commission should be included in the first paragraph of
Sec. 16, Art. VII i.e. “other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution,” whose appointments need the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.–––Again, I fail
to see why the captain of a naval boat ordered to fire broadsides
against rebel concentrations should receive greater scrutiny in his
appointment than the Chairman of the Human Rights
Commission who has infinitely more power and opportunity to
bring the rebellion to a just and satisfactory end. But even if I
were to agree with the Sarmiento III v. Mison ruling, I would still
include the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission as one of
the “other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution” under the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII.
Certainly, the chairman cannot be appointed by Congress or the
Supreme Court. Neither should we read Article XIII of the
Constitution as classifying the chairman among the lower ranking
officers who by law may be appointed by the head of an executive
department, agency, commission, or board. The Constitution
created the independent office. The President was intended to
appoint its chairman. I, therefore, regretfully reiterate my dissent
from the Sarmiento III v. Mison ruling and join in the call for a
reexamination of its doctrine.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Appointments; The

submission of the petitioner’s appointment to the Commission on
Appointments is a clear indication that the President no longer
agrees with the Mison ruling.–––As I see it, the submission of the
petitioner’s appointment to the Commission on Appointments is a
clear indication that the President of the Philippines no longer
agrees with the Mison ruling, at least insofar as it applies to the
present case. Significantly, the Commission on Appointments,
which was also aware of Mison, has as clearly rejected it by acting
on the appointment. These meaningful developments must give
us pause. We may
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have committed an error in Mison, which is bad enough, and may

be persisting in it now, which is worse.
Same; Same; Same; Confirmation; Ad Interim Appointments;
What President Aquino extended to the petitioner on Dec. 17, 1988
was an ad interim appointment that although immediately
effective upon acceptance was still subject to confirmation.–––

Coming now to the theory of the majority, I regret I am also
unable to accept it. Consistent with my view in Mison, I submit
that what President Aquino extended to the petitioner on 17
December 1988 was an ad interim appointment that although
immediately effective upon acceptance was still subject to
confirmation. I cannot agree that when the President said the
petitioner could qualify and enter into the performance of her
duties, “all that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or
accept the appointment.” In fact, on the very day it was extended,
the ad interim appointment was submitted by the President of the
Philippines to the Commission on Appointments “for
confirmation.” x x x I repeat my view that the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, for the reasons stated in my
dissent in Mison. Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petition.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Appointments;

Confirmation; The appointments of the Chairman and the
members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be made by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.–––I believe that the appointments of the chairman
and the members of the Commission on Human Rights by the
President require review and confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments in view of the following provision of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: “Sec. 16. The President shall
nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
x x x.” In my view, the “other officers” whose appointments are
vested in the President in the Constitution are the constitutional
officers, meaning those who hold offices created under the
Constitution, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for in the Charter. Those constitutional officers are the chairmen
and members of
168
the Constitutional Commissions, namely: the Civil Service

Commission (Art. IX-B), the Commission on Elections (Art. IX-C),
the Commission on Audit (Art. IX-D), and the Commission on
Human Rights (Sec. 17, Art. XIII). These constitutional
commissions are, without exception, declared to be “independent,”
but while in the case of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, the 1987
Constitution expressly provides that “the Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments” (Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-B;
Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-C and Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-D), no such clause is
found in Section 17, Article VIII creating the Commission on
Human Rights. Its absence, however, does not detract from, or
diminish, the President’s power to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the said Commission. The source of that power
is the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
for: (1) the Commission on Human Rights is an office created by
the Constitution, and (2) the appointment of the Chairman and
Commissioners thereof is vested in the President by the
Constitution. Therefore, the said appointments shall be made by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, as provided in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Checks and Balances; The power of
the Commission on Appointments to review and confirm
appointments made by the President is not a derogation of the
Chief Executive’s appointing power, but is merely a part of the
system of checks and balances in the democratic form of
government provided in our Constitution.–––It is not quite correct
to argue, as the petitioner does, that the power of the Commission
on Appointments to review and confirm appointments made by
the President is a “derogation of the Chief Executive’s appointing
power.” That power is given to the Commission on Appointments
as part of the system of checks and balances in the democratic
form of government provided for in our Constitution. As stated by
a respected constitutional authority, former U.P. Law Dean and
President Vicente G. Sinco: “The function of confirming
appointments is part of the power of appointment itself. It is,
therefore, executive rather than legislative in nature. In giving
this power to an organ of the legislative department, the
Constitution merely provides a detail in the scheme of checks and
balances between the executive and legislative organs of the
government.” (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 11th Ed., p. 266).
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VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 169
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the

Commission on Appointments.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mary Concepcion Bautista for and in her own behalf.
Christine A. Tomas Espinosa for private respondent
Hesiquio R. Mallillin.
PADILLA, J.:
The Court
1
had hoped that its decision in Sarmiento III vs.
Mison, would have settled the question of which
appointments by the President, under the 1987
Constitution, are to be made with and without the review
of the Commission on Appointments. The Mison case was
the first major case under the 1987 Constitution and in
construing Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides:
“The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
“The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.”
this Court, drawing extensively from the proceedings of the

1986 Constitutional Commission and the country’s
experience under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, held
that only those
______________
1 G.R. No. 79974, 17 December 1987, 156 SCRA 549.
170

appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of

Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewed by the Commission on
Appointments, namely, “the heads of the executive
department, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.” All
other appointments by the President are to be made
without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments. Accordingly, in the Mison case, the
appointment of therein respondent Salvador M. Mison as
head of the Bureau of Customs, without the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments, was held valid and in
accordance with the Constitution.
The Mison case doctrine did not foreclose contrary
opinions. So with the very provisions of Sec. 16, Art. VII as
designed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. But the
Constitution, as construed by this Court in appropriate
cases, is the supreme law of the land. And it cannot be
over-stressed that the strength of the Constitution, with all
its imperfections, lies in the respect and obedience accorded
to it by the people, especially the officials of government,
who are the subjects of its commands. Barely a year after
Mison, the Court is again confronted with a similar
question, this time, whether or not the appointment by the
President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), an “independent office” created by the 1987
Constitution, is to be made with or without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (CA, for
brevity). Once more, as in Mison, the Court will resolve the
issue irrespective of the parties involved in the litigation,
mindful that what really matters are the principles that
will guide this Administration and others in the years to
come.
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
appointments to which are to be made with the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it
follows that the appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or
participation of the Commission on
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VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 171

Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not
specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike
the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly
vested by the Constitution in the President 2
with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second
sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because
they are among the officers of government “whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” And
Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987,
authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights. It provides:
“(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on

Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.”
The above conclusions appear to be plainly evident and,

therefore, irresistible. However, the presence in this case of
certain elements–––absent in the Mison case–––makes
necessary a closer scrutiny. The facts are therefore
essential.
On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines
designated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as
“Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights.” The
letter of designation reads:
________________
2 See Section 2 (B), Section 2(C), and Section 2(D), Article IX, 1987
Constitution.
172

“27 August 1987

M a d a m:
You are hereby designated ACTING CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, to succeed the
late Senator Jose W. Diokno and Justice J. B. L. Reyes.
Very truly yours,
CORAZON C. AQUINO
3
HON. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA”
Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and

members of the Commission on Human Rights, befitting 4
an
independent office, as mandated by the Constitution, the
President of the Philippines on 17 December 1988 extended
to petitioner Bautista a permanent appointment as
Chairman of the Commission. The appointment letter is as
follows:
“17 December 1988

The Honorable
The Chairman
Commission on Human Rights
Pasig, Metro Manila
M a d a m:
Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, the
following are hereby appointed to the positions
indicated opposite their respective names in the
Commission on Human Rights:
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA ––– Chairman

ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR. ––– Member
SAMUEL SORIANO ––– Member
HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN ––– Member
NARCISO C. MONTEIRO ––– Member
________________
3 Annex A, Petition, Rollo, p. 8.

4 Sec. 17(1), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution.
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VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 173

By virtue hereof, they may qualify and enter upon

the performance of the duties of the office furnishing
this Office and the Civil Service Commission with

copies of their oath of office.
Very truly yours,5
CORAZON C. AQUINO”
It is to be noted that by virtue of such appointment,

petitioner Bautista was advised by the President that she
could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties
of the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights, requiring her to furnish the office of the President
and the Civil Service Commission with copies of her oath of
office.
On 22 December 1988, before the Chief Justice of this
Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan, petitioner Bautista took
her oath of office by virtue of her appointment as Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights. The full text of the
oath of office is as follows:
“OATH OF OFFICE
I, MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA of 3026 General G.

del Pilar Street, Bangkal, Makati, Metro Manila having
been appointed to the position of CHAIRMAN of the
Commission on Human Rights, do solemnly swear that I
will discharge to the best of my ability all the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which I have been appointed;
uphold the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
and obey all the laws of the land without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 22nd
day of December in the year of Our Lord, 1988 in Manila.
MARCELO B. FERNAN
Chief Justice6
Supreme Court of the Philippines”
_________________
5 Annex B, Petition, Rollo, p. 9.

6 Annex C, Petition, Rollo, p. 10.
174

Immediately, after taking her oath of office as Chairman of

the Commission on Human Rights, petitioner Bautista
discharged the functions and duties of the Office of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights which, as
previously stated, she had originally held merely in an
acting capacity beginning 27 August 1987.
On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter
from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
requesting her to submit to the Commission certain
information and documents as required by its rules in
connection with the confirmation of her appointment7
as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. On 10
January 1989, the Commission on Ap-pointments’
Secretary again wrote petitioner Bautista requesting her
presence at a meeting of the Commission on Appointments
Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and
Human Rights set for 19 January 1989 at 9 A.M. at the
Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower I, Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City that would deliberate on her
appointment
8
as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights.
On 13 January 1989, petitioner Bautista wrote to the
Chairman of the Commission on Appointments stating, for
the reasons therein given, why she considered the
Commission on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to
review her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights. The petitioner’s letter to the Commission
on Appointments’ Chairman reads:
“January 13, 1989
SENATE PRESIDENT JOVITO R. SALONGA

Chairman
Commission on Appointments
Senate, Manila
S i r:
We acknowledge receipt of the communication from the

Commission on Appointments requesting our appearance on
January 19,
_______________
7 Annex D, Petition, Rollo, p. 11-13.

8 Annex D-1, Petition, Rollo, p. 14.
175
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 175

1989 for deliberation on our appointments.

We respectfully submit that the appointments of the
Commissioners of the Human Rights Commission are not subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The Constitution, in Article VII Section 16 which expressly
vested on the President the appointing power, has expressly
mentioned the government officials whose appointments are
subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of
Congress. The Commissioners of the Commission on Human
Rights are not included among those.
Where the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments is
required, as in the case of the Constitutional Commissions such
as the Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission and the
Commission on Elections, it was expressly provided that the
nominations will be subject to confirmation of Commission on
Appointments. The exclusion again of the Commission on Human
Rights, a constitutional office, from this enumeration is a clear
denial of authority to the Commission on Appointments to review
our appointments to the Commission on Human Rights.
Furthermore, the Constitution specifically provides that this
Commission is an independent office which:
a. must investigate all forms of human rights violations

involving civil and political rights;
b. shall monitor the government’s compliance in all our
treaty obligations on human rights. We submit that, the
monitoring of all agencies of government, includes even
Congress itself, in the performance of its functions which
may affect human rights;
c. may call on all agencies of government for the
implementation of its mandate.
The powers of the Commission on Appointments is in fact a

derogation of the Chief Executive’s appointing power and
therefore the grant of that authority to review a valid exercise of
the executive power can never be presumed. It must be expressly
granted.
The Commission on Appointments has no jurisdiction under
the Constitution to review appointments by the President of
Commissioners of the Commission on Human Rights.
In view of the foregoing considerations, as Chairman of an
independent constitutional office. I cannot submit myself to the
Commission on Appointments for the purpose of confirming or
rejecting my appointment.
176

Very truly yours,

MARY CONCEPCION
9
BAUTISTA
Chairman”
In respondent Commission’s comment (in this case),
dated 3 February 1989, there is attached as Annex 1 a
letter of the Commission on Appointments’ Secretary to the
Executive Secretary, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr. making
reference to the “ad interim appointment which Her
Excellency extended to Atty. Mary Concepcion Bautista on
14 January 1989 10
as Chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights” and informing Secretary Macaraig that,
as previously conveyed to him in a letter of 25 January
1989, the Commission on Appointments disapproved
petitioner Bautista’s “ad interim appointment” as
Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in view
of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Appointments. The letter reads:
“1 February 1989
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary
Malacañang, Manila
S i r:
This refers to the ad interim appointment which
Her Excellency extended to Atty. Mary Concepcion
Bautista on 14 January 1989 as Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights.
As we conveyed to you in our letter of 25 January
1989, the Commission on Appointments, assembled in
plenary (session) on the same day, disapproved Atty.
Bautista’s ad interim appointment as Chairperson of
the Commission on Human Rights in view of her
refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission
on Appointments.
This is to inform you that the Commission on
Appointments, likewise assembled in plenary (session)
earlier today, denied Senator
________________
9 Annex E, Petition, Rollo, pp. 15-16.

10 Emphasis supplied.
177
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 177

Mamintal A. J. Tamano’s motion for reconsideration of

the disapproval of Atty. Bautista’s ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights.
Very truly yours,
RAOUL V. VICTORINO11
Secretary”
On the same date (1 February 1989), the Commission on

Appointments’ Secretary informed petitioner Bautista that
the motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of her “ad
interim appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights” was denied by the Commission on
Appointments. The letter reads as follows:
“1 February 1989
ATTY. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA
Commission on Human Rights
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Bldg.
Pasig, Metro Manila
Dear Atty. Bautista:
Pursuant to Sec. 6 (a), Chapter II of the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments, the denial by the
Commission on Appointments, assembled in plenary
(session) earlier today, of Senator Mamintal A.J.
Tamano’s motion for reconsideration of the disapproval
of your ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights is respectfully
conveyed.
Thank you for your attention.
Very truly yours,
RAOUL V. VICTORINO12
Secretary”
In Annex 3 of respondent Commission’s same comment,

dated 3 February 1989, is a news item appearing in the 3
_______________
11 Annex 1, Commission’s comment, Rollo, p. 53.

178
February 1989 issue of the “Manila Standard” reporting

that the President had designated PCHR Commissioner
Hesiquio R. Mallillin as “Acting Chairman of the
Commission” pending the resolution of Bautista’s case
which had been elevated to the Supreme Court. The news
item is here quoted in full, thus–––
“Aquino names replacement for MaryCon

President Aquino has named replacement for Presidential
Commission on Human Rights Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista whose appointment was rejected anew by the
Congressional commission on appointments.
The President designated PCHR commissioner Hesiquio R.
Mallillin as “acting chairman” of the Commission pending the
resolution of Bautista’s case which had been elevated to the
Supreme Court.
The President’s action followed after Congressional
Commission on Appointments Chairman, Senate President Jovito
Salonga declared Bautista can no longer hold on to her position
after her appointment was not confirmed for the second time.
“For all practical purposes,” Salonga said Bautista can be
accused of usurpation of authority if she insists to stay on her
office.
In effect, the President had asked Bautista
13
to vacate her office
and give way to Mallillin. (Mari Villa)”
On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent

Commission on Appointments had acted on her “ad interim
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights” petitioner Bautista filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare “as
unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force
and effect any action of the Commission on Appointments
as well as of the Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar
Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully extended
appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights, on the ground that they
have no lawful and constitutional
14
authority to confirm and
to review her appointment.”
________________

14 Rollo, p. 5.
179
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 179

The prayer for temporary restraining order was “to enjoin

the respondent Commission on Appointments not to
proceed further with their deliberation and/or proceedings
on the appointment of the petitioner xxx nor to enforce,
implement or act on any order, 15
resolution, etc. issued in the
course of their deliberations.”
Respondents
16
were required to file comment within ten
(10) days. On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an
amended petition, with urgent motion for restraining order,
impleading Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin the
designated acting chairman as party respondent and
praying for the nullification of his appointment. The
succeeding day, a supplemental urgent ex-parte motion
was filed by petitioner seeking to restrain respondent
Mallillin from continuing to exercise the functions of
chairman and to refrain from demanding courtesy
resignations from officers or separating or dismissing
employees of the Commission.
Acting on petitioner’s amended petition and
supplemental urgent ex-parte motion, the Court resolved to
issue a temporary restraining order directing respondent
Mallillin to cease and desist from effecting the dismissal,
courtesy resignation, removal17
and reorganization and other
similar personnel actions. Respondents were likewise
required to comment on said amended petition with
allowance for petitioner to file a reply within two (2) days
from receipt of a copy thereof. Respondents Senator
Salonga, the Commission on Appointments, the Committee
on J & BC and Human Rights filed a 18comment to the
amended 19petition on 21 February 1989. Petitioner filed
her reply. On 24 February
20
1989, respondent Mallillin filed
a separate comment. The Court required 21
petitioner to
reply to respondent Mallillin’s comment. Petitioner
_______________
15 Rollo, pp. 5-6.

16 Resolution of 2 February 1989, Rollo, p. 17.
17 Resolution of 9 February 1989, Rollo, p. 92.
18 Rollo, pp. 145-150.
19 Rollo, pp. 100-144.
20 Rollo, pp. 153-183.
21 Resolution of 28 February 1989, Rollo, p. 183-A.
180

22
filed her reply.
In deference to the Commission on Appointments, an
instrumentality of a co-ordinate and co-equal branch of
government, the Court did not issue a temporary
restraining order directed against it. However, this does
not mean that the issues raised by the petition, as met by
the respondents’ comments, will not be resolved in this
case. The Court will not shirk from its duty as the final
arbiter of constitutional issues, in the same way that it did
not in Mison.
As disclosed by the records, and as previously adverted
to, it is clear that petitioner Bautista was extended by Her
Excellency, the President a permanent appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17
December 1988. Before this date, she was merely the
“Acting Chairman” of the Commission. Bautista’s
appointment on 17 December 1988 is an appointment that
was for the President solely to make, i.e., not an
appointment to be submitted for review and confirmation
(or rejection) by the Commission on Appointments. This is
in accordance with Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine in Mison which is here
reiterated.
The threshold question that has really come to the fore
is whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17
December 1988, and after petitioner Bautista had qualified
for the office to which she had been appointed, by taking
the oath of office and actually assuming and discharging
the functions and duties thereof, could extend another
appointment to the petitioner on 14 January 1989, an “ad
interim appointment” as termed by the respondent
Commission on Appointments or any other kind of
appointment to the same office of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights that called for confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
The Court, with all due respect to both the Executive
and Legislative Departments of government, and after
careful deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in the
negative. When Her Excellency, the President converted
petitioner Bautista’s designation as Acting Chairman to a
permanent
_________________
22 Rollo, pp. 189-201.
181
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 181

appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human

Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she advised
Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of
such appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the
performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights). All that remained for
Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment.
Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her
oath of office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming immediately
thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. Bautista’s appointment
therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the
part of the President. To paraphrase the great jurist, Mr.
Chief Justice23 Marshall, in the celebrated case of Marbury
vs. Madison.
x x x
“The answer to this question seems an obvious one. The
appointment being the sole act of the President, must be
completely evidenced, when it is shown that he has done
everything to be performed by him.
x x x
“Some point of time must be taken when the power of the
executive over an officer, not removable at his will must cease.
That point of time must be when the constitutional power of
appointment has been exercised. And this power has been
exercised when the last act, required from the person possessing
the power, has been performed. x x x
x x x
“But having once made the appointment, his (the President’s)
power over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the
officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in
the person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional
power of accepting or rejecting it. x x x”
__________________
23 1 Cranch 60, 2 Law Ed., U.S. 5-8.
182

THE “APPOINTMENT” OF PETITIONER BAUTISTA ON

14 JANUARY 1989
It is respondent Commission’s submission that the

President, after the appointment of 17 December 1988
extended to petitioner Bautista, decided to extend another
appointment (14 January 1989) to petitioner Bautista, this
time, submitting such appointment (more accurately,
nomination) to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. And yet, it seems obvious enough, both in
logic and in fact, that no new or further appointment could
be made to a position already filled by a previously
completed appointment which had been accepted by the
appointee, through a valid qualification and assumption of
its duties.
Respondent Commission vigorously contends that,
granting that petitioner’s appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is one that, under Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison
case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within
the president’s prerogative to voluntarily submit such
appointment to the Commission on Appointment for
confirmation. The mischief in this contention, as the Court
perceives it, lies in the suggestion that the President (with
Congress agreeing) may, from time to time move power
boundaries, in the Constitution differently from where they
are placed by the Constitution.
The Court really finds the above contention difficult of
acceptance. Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned
with power not political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or
even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative
(Commission on Appointments) can create power where the
Constitution confers none. The evident constitutional
intent is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the
matter of appointments to public office, between the
President and Congress (the latter acting through the
Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other
of the scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In
other words, to the extent that the Constitution has
blocked off certain appointments for the President to make
with the participation of the Commission on Appointments,
so also has the Constitution mandated that the President
can
183
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 183

confer no power of participation in the Commission on

Appointments over other appointments exclusively
reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of
political options that finds no support in the Constitution
cannot be sustained.
Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual
exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidential appointments, create power to confirm
appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the
President alone. Stated differently, when the appointment
is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President
to make without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, the executive’s voluntary act of submitting
such appointment to the Commission on Appointments and
the latter’s act of confirming or rejecting the same, are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction.
EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY

SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL,
THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN
APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY
1989
Under this heading, we will assume, ex gratia argumenti,

that the Executive may voluntarily allow the Commission
on Appointments to exercise the power of review over an
appoin-ment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution in
the President. Yet, as already noted, when the President
appointed petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to the
position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
with the advice to her that by virtue of such appointment
(not, until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments),
she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her
duties after taking her oath of office, the presidential act of
appointment to the subject position which, under the
Constitution, is to be made, in the first place, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, was
then and there a complete and finished act, which, upon
the acceptance by Bautista, as shown by her taking of the
oath of office and actual assumption of the
184

duties of said office, installed her, indubitably and

unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years. There was
thus no vacancy in the subject office on 14 January 1989 to
which an appointment could be validly made. In fact, there
is no vacancy in said office to this day.
Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new
appointment or re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was an
ad interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional
design, ad interim appointments do not apply to
appointments solely for the President to make, i.e., without
the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad
interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the
review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That
is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that
are for the President solely to make, that is, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, can not
be ad interim appointments.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 163-A, 30 JUNE 1987,

PROVIDING THAT THE TENURE OF THE CHAIRMAN
AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS SHALL BE AT THE PLEASURE OF THE
PRESIDENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Respondent Mallillin contends that with or without

confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
petitioner Bautista, as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, can be removed from said office at anytime,
at the pleasure of the President; and that with the
disapproval of Bautista’s appointment (nomination) by the
Commission on Appointments, there was greater reason for
her removal by the President and her replacement with
respondent Mallillin. Thus, according to respondent
Mallillin, the petition at bar has become moot and
academic.
We do not agree that the petition has become moot and
academic. To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding
oneself
185
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 185

that day is night just because the drapes are drawn and the
lights are on. For, aside from the substantive questions of
constitutional law raised by petitioner, the records clearly
show that petitioner came to this Court in timely manner
and has not shown any indication of abandoning her
petition.
Reliance is placed by respondent Mallillin on Executive
Order No. 163-A, 30 June 1987, full text of which is as
follows:
“WHEREAS, the Constitution does not prescribe the term of office

of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights unlike those of other Constitutional Commissions;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of
the Philippines, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Section 2, sub-paragraph (c) of Executive Order
No. 163 is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights shall be appointed by the President. Their tenure in office
shall be at the pleasure of the President.
SEC. 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 30th day of June, in the year
of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.) JOKER P. ARROYO

24
Executive Secretary”
Previous to Executive Order

25
No. 163-A, or on 5 May 1987,
Executive Order No. 163 was issued by the President, Sec.
2(c) of which provides:
“Sec. 2(c). The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on

Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.”
________________
24 Official Gazette, Vol. 83, July 29, 1987, p. 3307.

25 Official Gazette, Vol. 83, May 11, 1987, p. 2270.
186

It is to be noted that, while the earlier executive order (No.

163) speaks of a term of office of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights–––which is
seven (7) years without reappointment–––the later
executive order (163-A) speaks of the tenure in office of the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights, which is “at the pleasure of the President.”
Tenure in office should not be confused with term of
office. As Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Concepcion
26
in
his concurring opinion in Alba vs. Evangelista, stated:
“The distinction between ‘term’ and ‘tenure’ is important, for,

pursuant to the Constitution, ‘no officer or employee in the Civil
Service may be removed or suspended except for cause, as
provided by law’ (Art. XII, section 4), and this fundamental
principle would be defeated if Congress could legally make the
tenure of some officials dependent upon the pleasure of the
President, by clothing the latter with blanket authority
27
to replace
a public officer before the expiration of his term.”
When Executive Order No. 163 was issued, the evident

purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision
that “the term of office and other qualifications and
disabilities of the Members of the Commission (on Human
Rights) shall be provided by law” (Sec. 17(2), Art. XIII,
1987 Constitution).
As the term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of
the Commission on Human Rights, is seven (7) years,
without reappointment, as provided by Executive Order
No. 163, and consistent with the constitutional design to
give the Commission the needed independence to perform
and accomplish its functions and duties, the tenure in office
of said Chairman (and Members) cannot be later made
dependent on the pleasure of the President.
Nor can respondent Mallillin find support in the
majority opinion in the Alba case, supra, because the power
of the President, sustained therein, to replace a previously
appointed
________________
26 100 Phil. at 683.

27 100 Phil. at 694.
187
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 187

vice-mayor of Roxas City–––given the express provision in

Sec. 8, Rep. Act No. 603 (creating the City of Roxas) stating
that the vice-mayor shall serve at the pleasure of the
President, can find no application to the Chairman of an
INDEPENDENT OFFICE, created not by statute but by
the Constitution itself. Besides, unlike in the Alba case,
here the Constitution has decreed that the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall have a
“term of office.”
Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to
conceptualize how an office conceived and created by the
Constitution to be independent–––as the Commission on
Human Rights–––and vested with the delicate and vital
functions of investigating violations of human rights,
pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions as
well as remedial measures therefor, can truly function with
independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in office of
its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the
pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A,
being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of
independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to
be declared unconstitutional.
The Court is not alone in viewing Executive Order No.
163-A as containing the seeds of its constitutional
destruction. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission clearly point to its being plainly at war with
the constitutional intent of independence for the
Commission. Thus–––
“MR. GARCIA (sponsor). Precisely, one of the reasons why

it is important for this body to be constitutionalized is
the fact that regardless of who is the President or who
holds the executive power, the human rights issue is of
such importance that it should be safeguarded and it
should be independent of political parties or powers that
are actually holding the reins of government. Our
experience during the martial law period made us
realize how precious those rights are and, therefore,
these must be safeguarded at all times.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. GARCIA. I would like to state this fact: Precisely we
do not want the term or the power of the Commission on
Human Rights to be coterminous with the president,
because the President’s power is such that if he appoints
a certain commissioner and that commis-
188

sioner is subject to the President, therefore, any human

rights violations committed under the person’s
administration will be subject to presidential pressure.
That is what we would like to avoid–––to make the
protection of human rights go beyond the fortunes 28
of
different political parties or administrations in power.”
x x x x x x x x x
“MR. SARMIENTO (sponsor). Yes, Madam President. I
conferred with the honorable Chief Justice Concepcion
and retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes and they believe that
there should be an independent Commission on Human
Rights free from executive influence because many of
the irregularities on human rights violations are
committed by members of the armed forces and
members of the executive branch of the government. So
as to insulate this body from political
29
interference, there
is a need to constitutionalize it.”
x x x x x x x x x
“MR. SARMIENTO: On the inquiry on whether there is a
need for this to be constitutionalized, I would refer to a
previous inquiry that there is still a need for making
this a constitutional body free or insulated from
interference. I conferred with former Chief Justice
Concepcion and the acting chairman of the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights, retired Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, and they are one in saying that this body should
be constitutionalized so that it will be free from
executive control or interferences, since many of the
abuses are committed 30
by the members of the military or
the armed forces.”
x x x x x x x x x
“MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Congress can create this body,
but as I have said, if we leave it to Congress, this
commission will be within the reach of politicians and of
public officers and that to me is dangerous. We should
insulate this body from political control and political
interference because of the nature of its functions–––to
investigate all forms of human rights violations which
are principally committed by members 31of the military,
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
x x x x x x x x x
“MR. GARCIA. The critical factor here is political control,

and normally, when a body is appointed by Presidents
who may change,
_________________
28 Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, August 26,

1986, p. 718.
29 Ibid., p. 728.
30 Ibid., p. 730.
31 Ibid., p. 734.
189
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 189

the commission must remain above these changes in

political control. Secondly, the other important factor to
consider are the armed forces, the police forces which have
tremendous power at their command and, therefore, we
would need a commission composed of men who also are
beyond the reach of these 32
forces and the changes in
political administration.”
x x x x x x x x x
“MR MONSOD. Yes, It is the committee’s position that this
proposed special body, in order to function effectively,
must be invested with an independence that is
necessary not only for its credibility but also for the
effectiveness of its work. However, we want to make a
distinction in this Constitution. May be what happened
was that it was referred to the wrong committee. In the
opinion of the committee, this need not be a commission
that is similar to the three constitutional commissions
like the COA, the COMELEC, 33
and the Civil Service. It
need not be in that article.”
x x x x x x x x x
“MR. COLAYCO. The Commissioner’s earlier objection was
that the Office of the President is not involved in the
project. How sure are we that the next President of the
Philippines will be somebody we can trust? Remember,
even now there is a growing concern about some of the
bodies, agencies
34
and commission created by President
Aquino.”
x x x x x x x x x
“x x x. Leaving to Congress the creation of the
Commission on Human Rights is giving less importance to
a truly fundamental need to set up a body that will
effectively
35
enforce the rules designed to uphold human
rights.”
PETITIONER BAUTISTA MAY OF COURSE BE

REMOVED BUT ONLY FOR CAUSE
To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the

lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her
appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December
1988, and her acceptance thereof, is
________________
32 Ibid., p. 737.
33 Ibid., p. 743.
34 Ibid., p. 747.
35 Ibid., p. 748.
190

not to say that she cannot be removed from office before the
expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be
removed but her removal must be for cause and with her
right to due process36properly safeguarded. In the case of
NASECO vs. NLRC, this Court held that before a rank-
and-file employee of the NASECO, a government-owned
corporation, could be dismissed, she was entitled to a
hearing and due process. How much more, in the case of
the Chairman of a constitutionally mandated
INDEPENDENT OFFICE, like the Commission on Human
Rights.
If there are charges against Bautista for misfeasance or
malfeasance in office, charges may be filed against her with
the Ombudsman. If he finds a prima facie case against her,
the corresponding information or informations can be filed
with the Sandiganbayan which may in turn order her
suspension from office while the37 case or cases against her
are pending before said court. This is due process in
action. This is the way of a government of laws and not of
men.
A FINAL WORD
It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the

rule of law, after petitioner Bautista had elevated her case
to this Tribunal, Her Excellency merely designated an
Acting Chairman for the Commission on Human Rights
(pending decision in this case) instead of appointing
another permanent Chairman. The latter course would
have added only more legal difficulties to an already
difficult situation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner
Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the
lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits,
privileges and emoluments of said office. The temporary
restraining order hereto-
__________________
36 G.R. No. 69870, Naseco vs. NLRC: G.R. No. 70295, Eugenia C. Credo
vs. NLRC, 29 November 1988.
37 Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 3019; People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Rodolfo
B. Albano , G.R. No. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988; Luciano vs. Provincial
Governor, 20 SCRA 516.
191
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 191

fore issued by the Court against respondent Mallillin

enjoining him from dismissing or terminating personnel of
the Commission on Human Rights is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Bidin, Cortés and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., no part, having administered
petitioner’s oath of office.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., please see dissent.
Cruz, J., see dissent.
Sarmiento, J., no part, respondent Mallillin is my
godson.
Griño-Aquino, J., see attached dissenting opinion.
Medialdea, J., I dissent in conformity with the
dissenting opinion of Justice Aquino.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Dissenting Opinion
With all due respect for the contrary view of the majority in
the Court, I maintain that it is asking too much to expect a
constitutional ruling which results in absurd or irrational
consequences to ever become settled.
The President and Congress, the appointees concerned,
and the general public may in time accept the Sarmiento
III v. Mison ruling because this Court has the final word on
what constitutional provisions are supposed to mean but
the incongruity will remain sticking out like a sore thumb.
Serious students of the Constitution will continue to be
disturbed until the meaning of the consent power of the
Commission on Appointments is straightened out either
through a re-examination of this Court’s decision or an
amendment to the Constitution.
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution consists of
only three sentences. The officers specified in the first
sentence clearly require confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. The officers mentioned in the third
sentence just as clearly do not require confirmation. The
problem area lies with those in the second sentence.
I submit that we should re-examine the three groups of
presidential appointees under the three sentences of
Section
192

16.
The first group are the heads of executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by
the Constitution. The first sentence of Section 16 state they
must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The third group are officers lower in rank whose
appointments Congress has by law vested in the President
alone. They need no confirmation.
The second group of presidential appointees are “all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint.” To which group do they
belong?–––Group I requiring confirmation or Group 3
where confirmation is not needed?
No matter how often and how long I read the second
sentence of Section 16, I simply cannot associate the
officers mentioned therein as forming part of those referred

to in the third sentence.
Why am I constrained to hold this view?
(1) If the officers in the first group are the only
appointees who need confirmation, there would be no need
for the second and third sentences of Section 16. They
become superfluous. Any one not falling under an express
listing would need no confirmation. I think the Court is
wrong in treating two carefully crafted and significant
provisions of the fundamental law as superfluities. Except
for the most compelling reasons, which do not exist here, no
constitutional provision should be considered a useless
surplusage.
(2) As strongly stressed by Justice Isagani Cruz here
and in our earlier dissent, the majority view results in the
absurd consequence where one of several hundred colonels
and naval captains must be confirmed but such important
officers as the Governor of the Central Bank with broad
powers over the nation’s economy and future stability or
the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights whose
office calls for no less than a constitutional mandate do not
have to be scrutinized by the Commission on
Appointments. Why should a minor consul
193
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 193

to Timbuktu, Mali need the thorough scrutiny during the

confirmation process while the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs who sends him there and who exercises control over
his acts can be appointed by the President alone? Why
should we interpret Section 16 in such a strange and
irrational manner when no strained construction is needed
to give it a logical and more traditional and understandable
meaning?
(3) The second sentence of Section 16 starts with, “He
shall also appoint x x x.” Whenever we see the word “also”
in a sentence, we associate it with preceding sentences,
never with the different sentence that follows. On the other
hand, the third sentence specifies “other officers lower in
rank” who are appointed pursuant to law by the President
“alone.” This can only mean that the higher ranking
officers in the second sentence must also be appointed with
the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments. When
the Constitution requires Congress to specify who may be
appointed by the President alone, we should not add other
and higher ranking officers as also appointed by her alone.

The strained interpretation by the Court’s majority makes
the word “alone” meaningless if the officers to whom
“alone” is not appended are also included in the third
group.
(4) The third sentence of Section 16 requires a positive
act of Congress which vests an appointment in the
President alone before such an appointment is freed from
the scrutiny of the Commission on Appointments. By
express constitutional mandate, it is Congress which
determines who do not need confirmation. Under the
majority ruling of the Court, if Congress creates an
important office and requires the consent of the
Commission before a presidential appointment to that
office is perfected, such a requirement would be
unconstitutional. I believe that the Constitution was never
intended to so restrict the lawmaking power. The Court has
no jurisdiction to limit the plenary lawmaking power of the
people’s elected representatives through an implied and, I
must again add, a strained reading of the plain text of
Section 16. Any restriction of legislative power must be
categorical, express, and specific–––never implied or forced.
(5) The Constitution specifies clearly the presidential ap-
194

pointees who do not need confirmation by the Commission.

The reason for non-confirmation is obvious. The members
of the Supreme Court and all lower courts and the
Ombudsman and his deputies are not confirmed because
the Judicial and Bar Council screens nominees before their
names are forwarded to the President. The Vice-President
as a cabinet member needs no confirmation because the
Constitution says so. He or she is chosen by the nation’s
entire electorate and is only a breath away from the
Presidency. Those falling under the third sentence of
Section 16, Article VII do not have to be confirmed because
the Constitution gives Congress the authority to free lower
ranking officials whose positions are created by law from
that requirement. I believe that we in the Court have no
power to add by implication to the list of presidential
appointees whom the Constitution in clear and categorical
words declares as not needing confirmation.
(6) As stated in my dissent in Sarmiento III v. Mison,
the Commission on Appointments is an important
constitutional body which helps give fuller expression to

the democratic principles inherent in our presidential form
of government.
There are those who would render innocuous the
Commission’s power or perhaps even move for its abolition
as a protest against what they believe is too much
horsetrading or sectarian politics in the exercise of its
functions. Since the President is a genuinely liked and
popular leader, personally untouched by scandal, who
appears to be motivated only by the sincerest of intentions,
these people would want the Commission to routinely
rubberstamp those whom she appoints to high office.
Unfortunately, we cannot have one reading of Section 16
for popular Presidents and another interpretation for more
mediocre, disliked, and even abusive or dictatorial ones.
Precisely, Section 16 was intended to check abuse or ill-
considered appointments by a President who belongs to the
latter class.
It is not the judiciary and certainly not the appointed
bureaucracy but Congress which truly represents the
people. We should not expect Congress to act only as the
selfless idealists, the well-meaning technocrats, the
philosophers, and the coffee-shop pundits would have it
move. The masses of our people are poor and
underprivileged, without the resources or the
195
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 195

time to get publicly involved in the intricate workings of

Government, and often ill-informed or functionally
illiterate. These masses together with the propertied
gentry and the elite class can express their divergent views
only through their Senators and Congressmen. Even the
buffoons and retardates deserve to have their interests
considered and aired by the people’s representatives. In the
democracy we have and which we try to improve upon, the
Commission on Appointments cannot be expected to
function like a mindless machine without any debates or
even imperfections. The discussions and wranglings, the
delays and posturing are part of the democratic process.
They should never be used as arguments to restrict
legislative power where the Constitution does not expressly
provide for such a limitation.
The Commission on Human Rights is a very important
office. Our country is beset by widespread insurgency,
marked inequity in the ownership and enjoyment of wealth

and political power, and dangerous conflicts arising from
ideological, ethnic and religious differences. The tendency
to use force and violent means against those who hold
opposite views appears irresistible to the holders of both
governmental and rebel firepower.
The President is doubly careful in the choice of the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights. Fully aware of the ruling in Sarmiento III v. Mison,
she wants the appointments to be a joint responsibility of
the Presidency and Congress, through the Commission on
Appointments. She wants a more thorough screening
process for these sensitive positions. She wants only the
best to survive the process.
Why should we tell both the President and Congress
that they are wrong?
Again, I fail to see why the captain of a naval boat
ordered to fire broadsides against rebel concentrations
should receive greater scrutiny in his appointment than the
Chairman of the Human Rights Commission who has
infinitely more power and opportunity to bring the
rebellion to a just and satisfactory end.
But even if I were to agree with the Sarmiento III v.
Mison ruling, I would still include the Chairman of the
Human
196

Rights Commission as one of the “other officers whose

appointments are vested in him in this Constitution” under
the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII. Certainly, the
chairman cannot be appointed by Congress or the Supreme
Court. Neither should we read Article XIII of the
Constitution as classifying the chairman among the lower
ranking officers who by law may be appointed by the head
of an executive department, agency, commission, or board.
The Constitution created the independent office. The
President was intended to appoint its chairman.
I, therefore, regretfully reiterate my dissent from the
Sarmiento III v. Mison ruling and join in the call for a re-
examina-tion of its doctrine.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
This is as good a time as any to re-examine our ruling in

Sarmiento v. Mison, which was adopted by the Court more
than a year ago over two dissents. The President of the
Philippines has taken a second look at it, and so too has the
Commission on Appointments representing both Houses of
the Congress of the Philippines. It appears that they are
not exactly certain now that the decision in that case was
correct after all. I believe it will not be amiss for us too, in a
spirit of humility, to read the Constitution again on the
possibility that we may have misread it before.
The ponencia assumes that we were right the first time
and that the Mison case is settled–––there is no need to re-
examine it. It therefore approaches the problem at hand
from another perspective and would sustain the petitioner
on an additional ground.
The theory is that the petitioner’s first appointment on
17 December 1988 was valid even if not confirmed,
conformably to Mison, and could not be replaced with the
second appointment on 14 January 1989 because there was
no vacancy to fill. By this reasoning, the opinion would
deftly avoid the question squarely presented to the Court,
viz., whether or not the Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights is subject to confirmation as required now
by both the President of the
197
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 197

Philippines and the Commission on Appointments. In

effect, we are asked to reconsider the Mison ruling in the
light of this supervening significant albeit decidedly not
controlling circumstance.
The majority makes its ratiocination sound so simple,
but I find I am unable to agree. I think we must address
the legal question frontally instead of falling back on a
legal sleight-of-hand of now-you-see-it-now-you-don’t.
As one who never agreed with the Mison ruling in the
first place, I suspect that the seeming diffidence in
applying it categorically to the case at bar is due to a
degree of uneasiness over its correctness. I think this is the
reason another justification had to be offered to bolster
Mison.
In my dissent in Mison, I specifically mentioned the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights as among
the important officers who would not have to be confirmed
if the majority view were to be followed. By contrast, and
inexplicably, the colonel in the armed forces would need

confirmation although he is not a constitutional officer with
the serious responsibilities of the former. Also not to be
confirmed are the Governor of the Central Bank unlike the
relatively minor multisectoral representative of the
regional consultative commission, and the Undersecretary
of Foreign Affairs although the consul, who is his
subordinate, would need confirmation. When I pointed to
these incongruous situations, I was told it was not our
place to question the wisdom of the Constitution. What I
was questioning was not the wisdom of the Constitution
but the wisdom of our interpretation which I said would
lead to absurd consequences. But only Justice Gutierrez
agreed with me.
Now the chickens have come home to roost. The
petitioner asks us to unequivocally apply our own ruling in
Mison, but we are equivocating. The ponencia would
sustain the petitioner by a circumlocution, such as it is, as
if it does not think Mison will suffice for its conclusion.
As I see it, the submission of the petitioner’s
appointment to the Commission on Appointments is a clear
indication that the President of the Philippines no longer
agrees with the Mison ruling, at least insofar as it applies
to the present case. Signifi-
198

cantly, the Commission on Appointments, which was also

aware of Mison, has as clearly rejected it by acting on the
appointment. These meaningful developments must give us
pause. We may have committed an error in Mison, which is
bad enough, and may be persisting in it now, which is
worse.
Coming now to the theory of the majority, I regret I am
also unable to accept it. Consistent with my view in Mison,
I submit that what President Aquino extended to the
petitioner on 17 December 1988 was an ad interim
appointment that although immediately effective upon
acceptance was still subject to confirmation. I cannot agree
that when the President said the petitioner could qualify
and enter into the performance of her duties, “all that
remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the
appointment.” In fact, on the very day it was extended, the
ad interim appointment was submitted by the President of
the Philippines to the Commission on Appointments “for

confirmation.”
The ponencia says that the appointment did not need
any confirmation, being the sole act of the President under
the Mison ruling. That would have settled the question
quite conclusively, but the opinion goes on to argue another
justification that I for one find unnecessary, not to say
untenable. I sense here a palpable effort to bolster Mison
because of the apprehension that it is falling apart.
Of course, there was no vacancy when the nomination
was made on 14 January 1989. There is no question that
the petitioner was still validly holding the office by virtue
of her ad interim appointment thereto on 17 December
1988. The nomination made later was unnecessary because
the ad interim appointment was still effective. When the
Commission on Appointments sent the petitioner the
letters dated 9 January 1989 and 10 January 1989
requiring her to submit certain data and inviting her to
appear before it, it was acting not on the nomination but on
the ad interim appointment. What was disapproved was
the ad interim appointment, not the nomination. The
nomination of 14 January 1989 is not in issue in this case.
It is entirely immaterial. At best, it is important only as an
affirmation of the President’s acknowledgment that the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights must be
con-
199
VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 199

firmed under Article VII, Section 16 of the Constitution.

It does not follow, of course, that simply because the
President of the Philippines has changed her mind, and
with the expressed support of the Commission on
Appointments, we should docilely submit and reverse
Mison. That is not how democracy works. The Court is
independent. I do suggest, however, that the majority could
have erred in that case and that the least we can do now is
to take a more careful look at the decision. Let us check our
bearings to make sure we have not gone astray. That is all
I ask.
I repeat my view that the Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, for the reasons stated in my
dissent in Mison. Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petition.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: Dissenting:
I believe that the appointments of the chairman and the

members of the Commission on Human Rights by the
President require review and confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments in view of the following
provision of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution:
“SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. x x x.”
In my view, the “other officers” whose appointments are

vested in the President in the Constitution are the
constitutional officers, meaning those who hold offices
created under the Constitution, and whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for in the Charter. Those
constitutional officers are the chairmen and members of
the Constitutional Commissions, namely: the Civil Service
Commission (Art. IX-B), the Commission on Elections (Art.
IX-C), the Commission on Audit (Art. IX-D), and the
Commission on Human Rights (Sec. 17, Art. XIII). These
constitutional commissions are, without ex-
200

ception, declared to be “independent,” but while in the case

of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, the 1987
Constitution expressly provides that “the Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments” (Sec. 1[2],
Art. IX-B; Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-C and Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-D), no
such clause is found in Section 17, Article VIII creating the
Commission on Human Rights. Its absence, however, does
not detract from, or diminish, the President’s power to
appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the said
Commission. The source of that power is the first sentence
of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution for:
(1) the Commission on Human Rights is an office

created by the Constitution, and
(2) the appointment of the Chairman and

Commissioners thereof is vested in the President by
the Constitution.
Therefore, the said appointments shall be made by the

President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, as provided in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution.
It is not quite correct to argue, as the petitioner does,
that the power of the Commission on Appointments to
review and confirm appointments made by the President is
a “derogation of the Chief Executive’s appointing power.”
That power is given to the Commission on Appointments as
part of the system of checks and balances in the democratic
form of government provided for in our Constitution. As
stated by a respected constitutional authority, former U.P.
Law Dean and President Vicente G. Sinco:
“The function of confirming appointments is part of the power of

appointment itself. It is, therefore, executive rather than
legislative in nature. In giving this power to an organ of the
legislative department, the Constitution merely provides a detail
in the scheme of checks and balances between the executive and
legislative organs of the government.” (Phil. Political Law by
Sinco, 11th ed., p. 266).
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition. Petition

granted.
201
VOL. 172, APRIL 17, 1989 201

Garcia vs. Calaliman
Note.–––The appointment of respondent Mison as head

of the Bureau of Customs without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments is valid and in accordance
with the Constitution. (Sarmiento III vs. Mison, 156 SCRA
549.)
–––––o0o–––––
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2/28/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 172

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs.

Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Appointing Power

Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term

VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 161

Bautista vs. Salonga

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Appointments;

act of the president, must be completely evidenced, when it is

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bautista vs. Salonga

appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of

the president’s prerogative to voluntarily submit such

VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 163

Bautista vs. Salonga

power. In other words, to the extent that the Constitution has

appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bautista vs. Salonga

Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights

purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision that “the

VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 165

Bautista vs. Salonga

thetical to the constitutional mandate of independence for the

safeguarded. In the case of NASECO vs. NLRC, this Court held

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Appointment;

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bautista vs. Salonga

to be confirmed because the Constitution gives Congress the

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Appointments; The

VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 167

Bautista vs. Salonga

have committed an error in Mison, which is bad enough, and may

effective upon acceptance was still subject to confirmation.–––

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Appointments;

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bautista vs. Salonga

the Constitutional Commissions, namely: the Civil Service

VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 169

Bautista vs. Salonga

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

“The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the

this Court, drawing extensively from the proceedings of the

1 G.R. No. 79974, 17 December 1987, 156 SCRA 549.

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of

VOL. 172, APRIL 13, 1989 171

“(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on

The above conclusions appear to be plainly evident and,

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“27 August 1987

Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and

“17 December 1988

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA ––– Chairman

3 Annex A, Petition, Rollo, p. 8.