Youngs The Exclusive Society
Youngs The Exclusive Society
Youngs The Exclusive Society
Pre-Refeered Version. Final version published in 2004, Br Jnl Criminology, 44: 533-
549
Introduction
The Exclusive Society (1999) represents Jock Young’s most recent addition to his long
and distinguished corpus of criminological works. Quite apart from Young’s stature
well known, Young’s influential career has charted (and in important ways helped
drive) the various trajectories and disputes in ‘Left’ criminology from the 1960s
onwards. Hence his writings provide the ‘historian’ of recent criminological thought
with insights into the perilous and contested attempts by self-styled ‘left
and socially sensitive field. As such, this latest contribution to Leftist agenda-setting
might warrant careful scrutiny by those looking to discern new paths for critical
progressive treatment of crime and criminal justice. Secondly, the book represents an
one of its own doyen. Perhaps more that any other recent contribution by an
discourse to developments in the cognate fields of social, cultural and political theory.
In the various short reviews received since publication, the book’s theoretical
ambition has garnered both considerable praise (Loader, 2000; Waite 2000; Lippens,
2001) and provoked some incisive critical comments (Smith, 2000; Williams, 2000).
useful insights can be garnered into both the ongoing difficulties faced by a leftist
criminology, and the equally dilemmatic character of the wider and influential
developments in social theory upon which it might seek to draw. At the same time,
argument in The Exclusive Society. The second section examines this argument in
redirection and revision of Young’s work toward social, cultural and political
theorisation, are recognisable Left Realist tenets. The third section turns to the
unacknowledged recuperation of sociological positivism underpinning Young’s
argue that in this regard Young’s position is somewhat at variance with his depiction
depiction of this modernity, arguing that it represents what has been described
(O’Brien and Penna, 1996) as a narrative of modern society that obscures evidence of
some can only be achieved through exclusion for others. In other words, exclusion
and inclusion are part and parcel of highly differentiated and asymmetric historical
processes.
A Theoretical Synopsis
throughout this paper, it is both useful and appropriate to begin with a brief synopsis
of the book’s general argument and approach through a survey of the key themes that
Its basic conceptual coordinates can be discerned, in the first instance, from its
subtitle – ‘Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity’. These four
terms demarcate the confluence of themes that provide both the book’s substantive
concerns, and the theoretical and conceptual frame through which Young seeks to
address them. The yoking of ‘social exclusion’ with ‘crime’ intimates the deep-seated
causal connections that, according to Young, underpin and increasingly exacerbate the
sole recourse to the intensification of ‘crime control’ and/or penal severity. In other
words, the book seeks to reconnect the ‘crime debate’ to that about socio-economic
being its familiar catchwords). Keeping abreast of shifting theoretical and policy
debates, Young casts the problem of marginality in the language of ‘social exclusion’
fashion, Young isn’t content to merely map the dimensions of social exclusion, but
seeks to locate its genesis in both the structural and cultural transformation of
‘modern’ society.
welfarist state strategy that sought to furnish social protection ‘from the cradle to the
that combined work and welfare, buoyed up by a booming economy and (male) ‘full’
employment. In this regime, the socially marginal and ‘difficult’ were approached as
deskilling and devalorisation of manual labour; and the rise of a ‘white-collar’ and
service sector that drew increasing numbers of women into the labour market. Hence,
are the correlate of this structural crisis and subsequent ‘post-Fordist’ resettlement.
precariousness prevalent throughout the social structure, and the persistent presence
widespread ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens, 1991) and fear. This has become
manifest in punitive scapegoating of the poor on the one hand; and on the other, the
incitement of frustration, resentment and reactive violence on the part of the excluded
(an argument which in notable ways parallels that of Young’s erstwhile collaborator,
the late Ian Taylor, whose Crime in Context (2000) draws similar connections
deprivation’ are crucial causal antecedents of both an explosion in crime and anti-
social behaviour, and an increasingly frantic and repressive agenda of crime control
that seeks to manage its own ‘residuum’, the new ‘dangerous classes’.
cultural reconfiguration, linked in part to the crisis of Fordism. For Young, the post-
war regime of production and consumption was anchored and reflected in a set of
with its attendant sexual division of labour. Paralleling recent arguments by Richard
Sennett (1998) and Zygmunt Bauman (2001), Young sees these older certainties
pluralisation and fragmentation of identities and lifestyles. These are today met with
market individualism and consumer choice) on the one hand, and persecuting it (in the
form of reactive and ‘essentialist’ yearnings to purify and restore a lost homogeneity)
on the other. Moreover, the dissolution of working class communities has bequeathed
an urban landscape beset by predation and incivility, in which the poor prey upon
modernity’, ‘late modernity’ and ‘risk society’ developed by the likes of Ulrich Beck
and Anthony Giddens. From this viewpoint, the ‘explosion of difference’, and the
fears and responses it engenders, are part of an inexorable inner dynamic of modernity
that is increasingly contingent and malleable. Again, this incites a range of responses
a reactionary moralism that pins its hopes on restoring former certainties. Hence,
through a series of theoretical associations, Young links crime, fear and incivility
(their inexorable rise and the fearful responses they inspire) with both the release of
‘difference’ and the entrenchment of social divisions that are their structural and
cultural determinants.
crime and difference is, in the latter parts of the book, supplemented by a foray into
the current malaise. He rejects backward-harking calls to restore the ‘golden age’ of
Sociologically, the clock cannot be turned back. Economic, technological and global
otherness that cannot be simply effaced, no matter how much conservatives might
hanker after ‘Family Values’ and the like, or nostalgic leftists might dream of a world
of working class collectivism (along with its unarticulated white, male hegemony).
pernicious essentialisms, since the universalism of the old inclusive society always
underwrote an insidious violence, denying Others the right to exist on anything other
than its own terms. As an alternative, Young draws upon the recent political-
between the politics of economic redistribution and the more recent agenda of the
cultural recognition of difference (or ‘identity politics’ as it’s often called). For
Young, the redistributive imperative could be met by a radical ‘meritocracy’, one that
permits the genuine connection of reward with merit, thereby offering sustainable
paths out of economic exclusion and marginality (pp. 185-189). The aspiration for
Having charted the main theoretical coordinates and lines of argument presented by
Young, we can now turn to consider their cogency, significance and wider
criminological implications. Perhaps the first question, to many readers’ minds, will
concern the relationship of Young’s excursus to his previous work. Given our
latest work with the ‘Left Realist’ position that he pioneered in the 1980s (see, for
example, Young 1986, 1987, 1992). This work, of course, was the target of much
opprobrium from those who, insistent upon flying the flag of ‘critical criminology’,
other hand, it was a necessary move to rescue Left criminology from its multiple
criminology’s recent career, trials, and tribulations, see Hall, 2002). Does Young’s
latest work represent a reassertion of ‘Left Realist’ principles? It’s reformulation? It’s
their Others”, discerns that Young “has tried to move beyond them in The Exclusive
Society” (Lippens, 2001: 570)1. This assessment alludes to the concerted criticism of
Left Realism on the grounds that, in its headlong rush to demonstrate its relevance for
mapping of crime levels and distributions (manifest most notably in the centrality
accorded to crime and victimisation surveys). In doing so, its critics argued, Young
and his colleagues had consigned wider critical social, political and cultural reflection
to the margins. The Left Realist drive for relevance had, in effect, taken a retrograde
others) that could situate crime in a wider framework capable of addressing the role of
state power, class politics, and the like, or of offering a cogent sociological account of
its causes and genesis (see Sim et al, 1987; McMahon, 1988; Walklate, 1998). In this
respect, The Exclusive Society does indeed represent something of a volte face. Not
only have wider social, political and cultural theoretical debates been admitted, but
they have also come to take centre stage. Indeed, as Young notes in his
Acknowledgements, the ‘book started off as one on criminology and ended up as one
mobilised are manifold (a smorgasbord, one reviewer opined (Williams, 2000), and
pitch their accounts at the macro (or even ‘meta’) level, as they seek to chart
Hence Young, in attempting to insert ‘crime’ into the interstices of ‘grand theories’
about ‘modernity’, seeks to bring criminological concerns into the broadest contextual
focus possible.
1
Indeed, as Simon Cottee (2002: 388) has recently noted, Young’s discussion of those positions
previously derided as ‘left idealist’ appears much more conciliatory in his latest work.
However, this apparent discontinuity with Left Realism must be counter-
balanced by aspects of the book that demonstrate its enduring (if unacknowledged)
commitment to the principles staked-out by the earlier work. Hence another reviewer
felt confident in asserting that The Exclusive Society “has continued to develop the
main themes of realism” (Smith, 2000: 320). These include, firstly, the claim that
‘street crime’ is a ‘real problem’, and one that impacts disproportionately upon the
name ought give it serious address, and attempt to find practical strategies for its
problem by fostering resentment and distrust of its agencies, thereby entrenching the
problem of crime; hence the promotion of a more equitable and sensitive application
by those located in the most disadvantaged social positions, the concept of ‘relative
book, Young reiterates these Left Realist claims: the Left Idealist refusal to treat
crime and its genesis as a serious problem (1); the tendency of labelling theory
real increase in crime (48, 96) of which the disenfranchised working classes are both
redirection toward social, cultural and political theorisation, recognisable Left Realist
tenets are indeed at play. However, continuities with Left Realism notwithstanding,
the turn to more recent trends in social and cultural theory effect a marked revision of
Young’s criminological vision (and a not entirely beneficial one - we will say more on
For the moment, we should like to focus upon another significant feature of the thesis
we suggest, takes two main forms: firstly, the book’s implicit dependence upon
in turn.
The basic rationale of Young’s thesis is that recent decades have witnessed a
profound change vis-à-vis crime, namely that there has been an inexorable rise in
explanatory hypothesis that finds its causes in social exclusion, which in turn is the
criminological explanation. Moreover, and perhaps even more tellingly, the reality of
a quantum rise in crime is derived from empirical regularities manifest in survey data.
In other words, the entire raison d’etre of the book depends upon there in fact having
been a ‘real increase’ in crime, and the evidence for such an increase is derived from
results manifest in crime surveys. The faith placed by Young in such surveys as
providing conclusive evidence for a ‘quantum rise in crime’ (and, indeed, the
considerable attention to exploring, variously, the problem of the ‘dark figure’; the
constructing crime and its apparent levels and social distribution, as revealed
variously by labelling theory, left idealism, moral panic theory, abolitionism and
Young takes the reality of ‘rising crime’ as sufficiently robust as to pin the entire
thesis of the book upon it. Implicitly, Young appears to be suggesting that the
development of crime surveys (so favoured by Left Realism) have effectively ‘filled-
in the blanks’ on the ‘dark figure’, thereby giving us a reliable view of the real
underlying patterns and trends in offending behaviour. This seems to fly in the face of
what we know about the methodological limits of such survey methods, which cannot
‘objective’ than the ‘official statistics’ they sought to supplement or challenge (see,
for example, Michalowski, 1991; Nelken, 1994; Maguire, 1997). Indeed, at various
points, Young slips between talk of ‘rising crime figures’, ‘perceptions of crime’ and
such like on the one hand, and the ‘rise in crime’ on the other (17, 31-2, 35, 69, 122);
having acknowledged that crime figures are socially and politically contingent
constructs that ‘reveal’ crime in different ways, Young then falls back into asserting a
real rise in crime, whose sole evidential basis are those very figures. In other words,
reasons why criminologists have come to look upon such empirical generalisations
“Social Structure and Anomie” (1938). It will be recalled that, in this sociological
classic, Merton located the causes of (working class) crime in the ‘strain’ effected by
distribution of the legitimate means for achieving those goals. Young re-appropriates
Merton, locating the causes of rising crime in the confluence between social exclusion
(deprivation of legitimate means) and the rise of a set of cultural expectations that
place emphasis upon individual gains via the market mechanisms of a consumer
society (culturally-approved goals) (48, 50, 85, 96). The salience of Merton’s
similar cultural values under the aegis of Thatcherism. The ascendance of a market-
Merton’s account. When combined with the systematically entrenched exclusion and
disenfranchisement of those at the ‘bottom’ of the social hierarchy, the conditions are
Young concedes an obvious hostage to fortune. Reviving ‘strain theory’ also means
taking-on some of its more obviously apparent flaws. Most prominent amongst these
explanation for crime that emphasises exclusion from the legitimate opportunity
structure. Merton has been rightly criticised over the decades for having
unproblematically assumed (on the basis of the available statistical evidence) that the
objection. Moreover, as already noted, readers today are much more likely to look
that the problem of offending is a problem of the working (or ‘under’) classes.
key ‘motivation’ for offending) finds itself unable to adequately account for offending
located amongst the ‘powerful’ elsewhere in the social structure. An account that
places its emphasis so squarely on the excluded as the source of a massive rise in
marginalised groups.
At various points in the book, Young depicts criminological positivism as a
manifest failure; in particular, the causal explanation of crime as emanating from “bad
social conditions” was exploded by the simultaneous rise in levels of prosperity and
crime in the post-War years (35). Young distances himself from this “social
Merton, Young leaves himself free of any positivist ‘taint’. He locates Merton’s
677)) as a crucial factor. Thus, in Young’s view, the essence of a ‘positivist’ account
is its location of the causes for criminal behaviour in the structure of socio-economic
conditions. By introducing ‘culture’ into the equation, positivism has been effectively
set aside. However, such a rendition is, on reflection, not entirely convincing. The
causal explananda, nor does the introduction of ‘culture’ into the explanatory equation
make an account anti-positivist. In fact, the heart of Merton’s “social positivism” (and
individual behaviour. These causes can be located in a cultural system just as well as
a socio-economic one. What Merton’s account does (in good positivist fashion) is
disjunction between levels of poverty and levels of crime across societies), and
emphasising individual success) that, in conjunction with poverty, furnishes the causal
antecedents for crime2. At this juncture, it is worth recalling David Matza’s (1964)
2
On the one hand Merton (1936) sought to curb the more deterministic inclinations of positivist
well-known excursus on the ‘Positive Delinquent’. He points out that a positivism that
given behavioural outcome is not less positivist for that (just more unwieldy,
qualified, and more localised in its explanatory ambit). Young, adopting Merton’s
thesis as his own, rephrases it thus: “Crime occurs where there is cultural inclusion
and structural exclusion” (81: emphasis in the original). Hence it is in the conjunction
of two necessary conditions (one cultural-systemic the other social-structural) that the
causes of crime are to be found – what could be more positivist than this?3
thesis by recourse to methodological ‘name calling’. Despite the many and various
the very fact that this methodological dispute is on-going demonstrates the resilience
and enduring appeal of a social science, however formulated, that could furnish an
sociology by emphasising the purposive character of social action. Yet, on the other, by subsuming
such action under the coordinates provided by a systemic cultural configuration, he largely recuperated
it within the ambit of positivist causation - hence the criticism that his anomic actor is overly ‘socially-
determined’. For more on this see Matza 1964, 1969, and discussion in Sumner, 1994: 76-78.
3
An analogous instance of the use of ‘culture’ and ‘structure’ in a positivist explanation for conduct is
Durkheim’s (1970; orig. 1897) famous account of ‘anomic suicide’. Here, it is the combination of
cultural factors (for example, normlessness, rising expectations) and rapid social-structural change that
is used to furnish a causal explanation. Similarly, empirically evident differences in suicide rates
between social groups (such as Catholics and Protestants) are attributed to differences in their cultural
affiliations. It is in their attachment to different systems of meaning that their differing propensities to
take their own lives are to be found. Here, culture is cause and suicide is effect. Subsequent critiques of
Durkheim’s account have stressed his location of causes for action in structural and cultural variables,
rather than interpretively examining the understandings that the actors themselves might have of their
situation and actions (see, for example, Douglas, 1967 and Atkinson, 1978; also Hughes & Sharrock,
1997: 30-40, on Durkheim’s positivist methodology). The same point can be levelled at Merton’s
subsumation of action to structural and cultural factors that are seen as the causal antecedents of the
action.
methodological programme under the aegis of ‘critical realism’ (see, for example,
Sayer, 2000). It’s worth noting that, in the formulation of Left Realism in the 1980s,
Young had already allied himself with an epistemology and ontology that views
structures as real, mind-independent features of the social world, which act causally to
generate behavioural effects. What is interesting in the present context is that Young’s
account that favours causative explanation over interpretation, and which locates
odds with his depiction of social positivism as an exhausted paradigm, one that is to
well indicate the on-going relevance and centrality of positivist aspirations for
of social formation.
Inclusive Modernity?
difference) and late modern, ‘anthropoemic’ society (that ejects difference). This
desire to either assimilate (and thus eliminate) or exclude (and thus deny) difference
4
On the connections between Young’s Left Realism and earlier positivist criminology, see also Smart
(1990)
appears to be based on an ontological assumption about ‘human nature’: that there is a
persistent will to closure, that the experience of the uncertain and the indeterminate
element. As has been argued elsewhere, this dualism is reductive and empirically
problematic (Yar, 2002). A further problem is that to propose an argument that rests
discussion of both concepts. We argue here that the picture of modernity presented
homogenised portrait of the present, with the differences between them emphasized
from roughly 1948 to the 1960s. Whilst drawing upon a particular understanding of
Penna, et al, 1999). Rather, the immediate post-war years are given ontological status
political regimes by deriving its empirical picture from juridical-political theory and
discourse and assuming that the Marshallian analysis of social citizenship accurately
captures the reality of the socio-economic and political regimes of those years. Such
the inceptions of centralised responses to the ‘social problem’ (in late Georgian
England), continuing throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. It is not clear that there
once was ‘an inclusive society’ (despite political voices on the centre-left advocating
redistributivist welfarism and the expansion of social citizenship), and that this has
given way to its antithesis. In our view, this position can be more usefully understood
inclusion and exclusion that has been fiercely challenged from other perspectives.
Young’s account contains many features of what O’Brien and Penna (1996)
to occur across several areas of social life at more or less the same time. Here,
post-modern society. The ‘late’ or ‘post’ prefix has become a shorthand for an
extensive series of debates about how to understand social change, dealing with
concepts of structure and agency, history, culture, subjectivity, public and private,
identity, ethics and science. There is little consensus over how to interprete historical
processes and, consequently, there are several distinct theoretical ways in which the
question of '
the modern'can be posed. A common approach is to situate the
development of social protection systems (welfare and criminal justice policies and
informs much mainstream work (see for example, Riley, 1992, p188; see also Crook
et al, 1992, pp118-119). This narrative derives from the ‘modernity thesis’, in which
interpretations and social goals, there persists a unity or direction to human history as
rational systems of analysis, philosophy and theory, the enlightenment held out the
promise of an endless era of material progress and prosperity. It saw the emergence
concerned with freedom and justice and the conditions for their realisation. What
- the '
rights of man'
, the proletariat, or rational individualism. They propose a concept
class - which establish the foundations of membership, entitlement and rights within a
The post-war welfare state is usually attributed with a goal of tackling the
statues to the Nation and the White Family.' (Williams, 1989:162). As Williams,
amongst others, pointed out, the gendered and ‘racialised’ political outlines of
Beveridge'
s scheme were sharply criticised when the proposals were published and
have been the source of dispute and struggle ever since. The inequalities upon which
the post-war welfare states and Keynesian political-economies were built were not
peculiar to Britain; Ginsberg (1992) details similar processes in Sweden, and Esping-
Andersen (1990) has detailed the differential stratification effects of different ‘welfare
regimes’. However, it is not only gender and ethnic inequalities that underpinned
unmarried mothers, people with mental health problems, orphans and disturbed
children, for example. The processes of modernisation, from the 1834 Poor Law
Amendment Act in Britain, began with the building of workhouses and gradually
extended to asylums, prisons, and residential facilities, seeing the segregation and
understood not as the ‘halted march of progress’, or the outcome of impersonal forces
number of important developments over the past three decades have contributed to a
disability, ecology, and gay and lesbian movements, forced onto the political agenda
the social and cultural differences through which social and political policy
the exclusionary processes upon which the centralised state social protection system
had been constructed. O’Brien and Penna (1998) discuss how, under the impact of
new social movements and the ‘cultural turn’ in social theory, the debate about
citizenship and inclusion was re-orientated to questions of social, political and cultural
opportunities, rights and needs. Such movements opened up the way to a '
re-
the cultural and political processes through which asymmetrical differences in the
class, race and gender, for example, with economic and social structures of wealth,
process and as a form of society, depended upon a twin movement of both inclusion
capitalism, for example, details the way in which economic dynamics were embedded
progress depended upon both racist and sexist ideologies and practices that comprised
a process of exclusion from many aspects of social life. Modernity, here, comprises a
of less powerful others (O’Brien and Penna, 1996). This process of deconstruction-
human society but a cultural and political vehicle for organising hierarchical and
modern visions of progress, inclusion and identity at face value. Dominant narratives
of modernity tell its story through the voices of particular (powerful) constituents, so
that subtle and persistent divisions in cultural status and power permeate the
definitions and voices that record modern experiences. Much of the literature
social and political analysis so that different voices and definitions can be connected
to their historical contexts and inserted into larger political processes and systems.
‘Difference’ here does not simply refer to diversity - it refers to socially produced
cultural '
difference'
, represents a position in a complex matrix of political relations
experience of rights, duties, identities, and social and cultural boundaries are
fact organise (O’Brien and Penna, 1996). For example, the supposedly inclusive
period of high modernity saw the relentless segregation of people with learning
declaring ‘no blacks’ and ‘no Irish’, stringent immigration controls on people from
welfare states and their politically interlocking constituencies of gender, race, class
social inclusion (see O’Brien and Penna, 1996; 1998, and Hay, et al, 1999). Europe’s
exclusion, since both the formal public world of rights and entitlements and the
informal everyday world of experience draw on the legacy and persisting effects of
structures of modern, liberal, states. Modern societies are shot through by numerous
public spheres making claims and counter-claims for different inclusions and
exclusions - in the form of rights, entitlements and services (c.f., Fraser, 1994). It is
not possible to achieve a final resolution to these issues of inclusion because the
modern polity is not a static, purely structural, forum in which inequalities and
question for Young’s analysis. Whilst incarceration rates have increased in relation to
prisons, paradoxically they have decreased for other social groups. High modernity,
occurring for, in particular, people with learning disabilities, mental health problems,
prisons. Oliver and Barnes (1998), examining exclusion and inclusion in relation to
children with problems (Triseliotis, 1997), and people with mental illnesses
inequality and prison incarceration rates in recent British history can be attributed to
shifting political rationales and decisions and it seems unnecessary to attribute these
made and sustained, some specification of the mechanisms of forces at work that are
decarceration in other areas of social life? Which process is more significant in terms
Charles Lemert (1999:191, italics in original) put it when discussing another account
of modernity: ‘If it turns out that there are real, incommensurable social differences
Conclusion
theories and methods, and recent developments in the wider fields of social and
cultural theory. However, we claim that it is precisely in this negotiation that the
tensions and difficulties in Young’s account emerge most clearly. Firstly, we have
noted a tension between the Left Realist orientation to localised and empirically
focused mappings of crime, and the attempt to situate crime causation within macro-
level accounts of social, political and cultural transformation. These latter accounts
may be radically counter-intuitive vis-à-vis the ‘common sense’ perceptions of ‘real
crime’ forwarded by the subjects of Realist research, and may be at odds with
results in a stand off between micro and macro scales, between realist and reflexive
the recent anti-positivist orientation of the ‘cultural turn’. The attempt to adopt a
how Young’s mobilisation of recent social-cultural theory has tended toward a rather
social formation that has supposedly supplanted it; this tendency is a flaw of many
about ‘modernity’, ‘post-modernity’, ‘late modernity’ and the like. The result is an
between ‘crime’, ‘social exclusion’ and ‘late modernity’) tends to attribute the social,
accidental (and thereby easily overcome), but are bound-up with the very attempt to
move criminology onto the ground of recent social and cultural theory, and to do so
many of the challenges facing critical criminology (and critical and reflexive social
science more broadly) – viz. the choices between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ (Archer,
2000), between ‘culture’ and ‘economy’ as explanatory foci (Ray and Sayer, 1999),
the discipline itself (Nelken et al, 1994; Cohen, 1998). Insofar as Young’s book falls
short of fulfilling its ambitions, this is due as much to the difficulty of the challenge as
to any particular flaws in reasoning and research. As such, The Exclusive Society
commends attention for the ways in which it dramatises these choices, and the
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