Chapter 1

The kinds of principalities and the means by which they are

acquired

Machiavelli identifies two types of states, or dominions that hold power over men:
republics and principalities. Principalities can be either hereditary (rule by family
succession) or new. For the former type, he gives as a recent example, King
Ferdinand II of Spain and for the latter, Francesco Sforza of Milan. These
principalities may be accustomed to previous rule (hereditary) or freedom (new).
They may be acquired by fortune or ability.

Chapter 2

Hereditary principalities

Machiavelli focuses on principalities because he has discussed republics in another

work (Discourses). His basic plan is to convey how principalities can be best
governed and preserved. Given the nature of hereditary principalities, Machiavelli
believes that they are easier to maintain than new principalities because a
hereditary prince does not have rule much differently than before. Even an ordinary
prince can retain power unless unusual forces deprive him of it. But even if a
hereditary prince loses power, he can easily regain it if the new ruler falters even a
bit. The hereditary prince has an easier time gaining the love of his subjects than a
new prince does because the people feel a natural affection for him. Unless the
hereditary prince is unusually cruel, his subjects will prefer a traditional ruler to a
new one.

Chapter 3

Mixed principalities

New principalities and mixed principalities-new territories added to existing ones-

face difficulties because the residents expect the new ruler to be better than the
one before. Experience usually proves otherwise, as the new ruler must be wary of
those he overthrows and at the same time, please those who brought him to power.
These friendships are hard to satisfy because those who helped him come to power
expect a lot in return. It is easier to hold on to power of a rebellious territory the
second time around because the reinstated prince can use the rebellion as an
excuse to implement stricter rule.

Newly conquered states may be from the same region and share the same
language as the old territories or they may not. When they share a common culture
and language, the new prince should establish his rule by extinguishing the line of
former princes and maintaining the status quo, specifically the territories' laws and
taxes. Then these new territories will be more quickly assimilated with the old
territories.

When the customs and language are different, the ruling prince needs fortune and
ability. The best strategy is for the prince to reside in the new territories so that he
can quickly put down rebellions and instill loyalty or fear into his new subjects. A
foreign prince is less likely to attack a territory when a prince is a resident. The next
best strategy is to send out colonies or, in a less efficient case, a portion of the
army into the conquered territories to maintain order and settle the state. The only
drawback to this method is having to displace a few subjects in order to house the
colonists or the army, but this is not a major concern because the displaced are
usually poor and without much influence. Machiavelli coldly adds, "men must be
either pampered or annihilated." (p. 16) If an army is sent, there is more potential
for trouble because troops are more difficult to maintain and their presence causes
resentment among the people.

Chapter 4

Why Alexander's successors were able to keep possession of Darius' kingdom

after Alexander's death

Given that newly acquired states are difficult to control, Machiavelli discusses how
the successors of Alexander the Great in the Asiatic lands were able to retain power
after his death. Machiavelli identifies two ways of governing a principality. One way
is for a single prince to rule over the whole territory with ministers and functionaries
acting as his servants, as is the case in Turkey. The other way is for a prince to rule
along with barons who hold inherited positions and have their own loyal subjects, as
is the case in France. Machiavelli points out that the Kingdom of the Turks would be
difficult to conquer because in order to win, one must mount a battle against a
strong, united force. But once defeated, it would be easy to keep because the new
conqueror needs only to extinguish the ruling family, the source of the kingdom's
unity. The Kingdom of France, on the other hand, would be easy to conquer, but
difficult to keep. To defeat France, one needs only to find a discontented baron,
among many, who is willing to be an ally, but once in power, a conquering prince
will find a host of problems to deal with. In a state like France, a prince is never free
from having to please friends and extinguish enemies.

The Asiatic lands conquered by Alexander was like the Turkish government,
therefore, it was easy to control even after the emperor's death. The Romans, on
the other hand, experienced difficulties controlling territories with governments
similar to the French. Therefore, one can assess the likelihood of a prince's success
in controlling a newly acquired principality by the type of government the territory
has had. This is as much a determining factor of success or failure as the prince's
abilities.

Chapter 5

How to govern cities and principalities that, prior to being occupied, lived under
their own laws

There are three ways of keeping a principality that is accustomed to living under its
own laws: destroy it, reside in it, or allow a form of self-government that is friendly
to the prince and take tribute from it.

But the only sure way is to destroy it because there is always a chance that its
residents will rebel in the name of freedom, which once tasted is never forgotten.
Thus, a territory that is used to having a ruler will be easier to control than a more
liberal territory, such as a republic.

Chapter 6

Concerning new principalities acquired by one's own arms and

ability

Machiavelli notes that ambitious men often imitate other great men so that even if
they fall short, they can come close, just like an archer who, judging his target to be
too far, aims for a target farther off. In addressing new princes, Machiavelli assumes
that for a private citizen to become a prince, either ability or fortune must play a
major part. As examples of those who became princes through their ability rather
than fortune, Machiavelli lists Moses, the biblical leader of the Exodus, Cyrus,
founder of the Persian Empire, Romulus, the legendary founder of Rome, and
Theseus, the legendary hero of Athens. What these men have in common is more
than their abilities. They all capitalized on the opportunities that lay before them.

For men who become princes by their abilities, the greatest difficulty is in winning
their dominions. After the hard part is done, their abilities allow them to rule
effortlessly. According to Machiavelli, it is often necessary for a new prince to set up
new, innovative methods of government. But Machiavelli warns that in such a case,
the prince will find many enemies among those who oppose change. On the other
hand, the prince will find the supporters of change to be passive because people
generally do not want to trust something until it is firmly established.

The only effective way to establish a new system is to use force. Machiavelli gives
as an example Savaronola, the Dominican friar who held power over Florence with
his fiery sermons, but lost control because he was unarmed when his message was
no longer welcomed. Machiavelli observes, "From this it follows that all armed
prophets have succeeded and all unarmed ones have failed; for in addition to what
has already been said, people are by nature changeable." He notes that princes
such as Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus could not have succeeded without
taking up arms. Hiero of Syracuse is a modern example of a private citizen who
used his abilities to rise to power. Although he had to work hard to establish power,
once in control, his abilities allowed him to easily maintain it

Chapter 7

Concerning new principalities acquired with the arms and fortunes of

others

Machiavelli turns his attention to private citizens who acquire principalities through
fortune, such as through a bestowed gift or bribery. These so-called princes make
no effort in acquiring power, but they inevitably face many difficulties in preserving
it. Without a loyal army or any traditions to stand on, a prince of a new state that
relies on fortune does not have a good chance of surviving. In reviewing the two
ways of becoming a prince, either through ability or fortune, Machiavelli offers two
illustrations. Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan, is an example of a prince who
rose to power through his abilities. He maintained his power with ease because he
had to overcome many obstacles in establishing his state. Cesare Borgia, or Duke
Valentino, is an example of one who acquired his position and territory through
fortune-by inheriting it from his father, Pope Alexander VI. But he lost it through
fortune as well, although he did everything right. Using Cesare Borgia's life as a
case study, Machiavelli constructs an interesting argument-that ultimate success is
dependent upon both ability and fortune. Cesare Borgia is the model prince that all
other princes who come to power by fortune should imitate. Machiavelli writes:

"Therefore, if you are a prince in possession of a newly acquired state and deem it
necessary to guard against your enemies, to gain allies, to win either by force or
fraud, to be loved and feared by your subjects, to be respected and obeyed by your
troops, to annihilate those who can or must attack you, to reform and modernize
old institutions, to be severe yet cordial, magnanimous and liberal, to abolish a
disloyal militia and create a new one, to preserve the friendship of kings and
princes in such a way that they will either favor you graciously or oppose you
cautiously-then for such purposes you will not find fresher examples to follow than
the actions of this man

Chapter 8

Concerning those who become princes by evil means

A private citizen may become a prince in two ways that cannot be characterized by
ability or fortune. One is through wicked means and the other is through election by
his fellow citizens. Machiavelli gives an ancient and modern example of the former
kind without making morality its core issue. Agathocles of Sicily is an example of a
potter who rises through the military ranks to become its commanding officer. At an
opportune time, he kills off the ruling powers of Syracuse and becomes king. Thus,
his rise to power was not through fortune, though it cannot be attributed to virtue
either because of the extreme cruelty of his acts. "By such methods one may win
dominion but not glory,"

states Machiavelli, although he does acknowledge the fact that some rulers must
resort to evil deeds. The modern example is Oliverotto da Fermo, who killed his
uncle in order to take power. Machiavelli provides these two examples to explore
the use of proper and improper cruelty. Proper cruelty is done early and at one
stroke so that the deed accomplishes the desired goal without making the citizens
feel constantly threatened. Improper cruelty is one that is repetitious, which makes
the citizens always wary of danger. As a general rule, harm should be inflicted all at
once while benefits should be given little by little. Both harm and benefits should
not serve as quick solutions for desperate circumstances.

Chapter 9

Concerning the civil principality

Another way that a private citizen may become a prince without ability or fortune is
through the support of either the common people or the nobles. From the
conflicting desires of the common people (not wanting to be oppressed) and the
nobles (wanting to oppress), there are three possible scenarios or forms of
government: principality, liberty or license (in political terms: monarchy,
democracy, or anarchy). A civil principality results when the nobles anoint one from
their ranks to rule over the people, or when the people select one of their own to
protect themselves against the nobles. He who comes to power through the nobles
is less secure than one who comes to power through the people because the other
nobles consider themselves equal to the prince, while the people seek only to be
protected from oppression. A prince must group nobles according to whether they
support him or not. In dealing with nobles who are not supportive, the prince should
judge whether it is because of their inherent lack of strong character, or because
they are ambitious and care more about their own interests. Those of the former
character, especially the competent, can be used because they are not a threat. But
the ambitious and cunning nobles should be looked upon as enemies to be carefully
watched.
Whether a prince comes to power through the people or the nobles, he must win
the support of the people, which is easily accomplished by not harming them.
Machiavelli stresses the importance of keeping the good will of the people because
they are crucial in times of trouble. He qualifies this statement by saying that a
prince should not expect the people to bail him out of trouble. If a prince is a man of
courage and ability, the people will inevitably stand behind him even in times of
adversity. A prince must therefore, be closely associated with his people. He must
not rely too heavily on his magistrates to lead them, lest they become too
dependent on his advisors, rather than on him. If the people are dependent upon
the prince in times of peace, they will be loyal to him in times of danger as well.

Chapter 10

How the strength of all principalities should be measured

A way to judge the strength of a prince is to determine whether he can stand on the
power of his own army or must rely on the help of others. A prince who can meet
any enemy on the battlefield is considered self-sufficient; a prince that must rely on
fortifications or on the help of others is not. Machiavelli uses the German cities as
examples of well-prepared fortifications, capable of withstanding a siege for a year.
Such preparations are necessary, and Machiavelli advises the prince that is not self-
sufficient to provide for such measures. A well-fortified city will not be a target of
attack and even if it is, most armies cannot engage in a siege for that long a time.

A wise prince must also know how to keep up the determination of his citizens
during a siege. He can use several tactics, such as giving them hope, warning them
of the cruelty of their attackers, taking strong action against dissenters, and
directing their anger against the enemy. Since the enemy most certainly destroys
the surrounding countryside of a fortified city, a prince can rely on the loyalty of his
subjects whose properties have been damaged. Machiavelli writes, "It is the nature
of men to feel as much bound by the favors they do as by those they receive." As
long as the city is properly defended and has enough food, a wise prince can
withstand any siege.

Chapter 11

Concerning ecclesiastical principalities

In addressing the ecclesiastical principalities, Machiavelli is referring mainly to the

Church and its main position of authority, the papacy. Among the princes, the
ecclesiastical prince is the only one who, once in power, does not have to defend his
power because it is rooted in the ancient traditions of religion. According to
Machiavelli, "[t]hese states alone, therefore, are secure and happy." Machiavelli
attributes the power of the papacy to have originated in the reign of Pope Alexander
VI.

Before he came to office, the ruling powers of Italy did not respect the popes and
the Church. However, when Alexander VI came to power, he used his influence to
strengthen the power of the Church through his son's (Cesare Borgia) military
successes. After Alexander's death, Pope Julius II continued strengthening the
Church's power base through innovative ways to raise money, including the sale of
ecclesiastical offices. He then succeeded in several significant feats: enlarging the
territorial boundaries of the Church through military conquests, weakening the most
powerful barons of Italy, and driving the French out of Italy. Machiavelli suggests to
Pope Leo X, the newly elected pope and uncle to Lorenzo de' Medici, that as his
predecessors have made the position great through the use of arms, he should
make it greater through his goodness and other virtues.

Chapter 12

Concerning various kinds of troops, and especially mercenaries

In having discussed the various types of principalities, Machiavelli turns to the ways
a state can attack other territories or defend itself. Machiavelli writes:

"The two most essential foundations for any state, whether it be old or new, or both
old and new, are sound laws and sound military forces. Now, since the absence of
sound laws assures the absence of sound military forces, while the presence of
sound military forces indicates the presence of sound laws as well, I shall forego a
consideration of laws and discuss military forces instead."

A prince can either have his own forces or rely on mercenary or auxiliary forces.
Mercenary forces are useless because they have no devotion to the prince. Because
their only motivation is their wage, they are not reliable in the face of battle.
Machiavelli attributes much of Italy's demise to its use of mercenary armies.
Moreover, mercenary captains, if they are capable, should be feared because they
usually seek glory for themselves. If the captain is not ambitious, then he is
unreliable and should not be used in the first place. History has shown that princes
with their own armies have accomplished great things. Machiavelli chronicles the
demise of the Italian states and links it with their increased reliance upon
mercenary armies. These armies, with their invented military code of avoiding
hardships, have left Italy vulnerable to the attack of the French, Spanish, and Swiss
troops.

Chapter 13

Concerning auxiliary, mixed, and native forces

Auxiliary forces, or armies borrowed from an ally, are just as useless as mercenary
forces because they fight with their own interests in mind. If they lose, the prince
who utilizes them loses; if they win, the prince is under their favor. In victory,
auxiliary armies are more dangerous than mercenary armies because they are
united and capable of acting against their employers. Machiavelli provides
numerous examples of princes who failed because they used auxiliary forces. As a
reference, Machiavelli considers the example of Cesare Borgia. In his military
campaigns, Borgia used all types of armies: auxiliary, mercenary, and his own. His
accomplishments and reputation were guaranteed only when he relied on his own
troops. Machiavelli reiterates this point through the example of Hiero of Syracuse
and King David from the bible.

Hiero always used his own troops. And as David refused King Saul's armor, before
going to battle against Goliath, Machiavelli warns, "In the end, the arms of another
will fall from your hand, will weigh you down, or restrain you."

Machiavelli uses France as an example of a nation with an army of mixed

composition-part Swiss mercenaries and part native. Because the French have
come to rely upon the Swiss, they cannot do without them. If the French had its own
army, they would be invincible. It is the folly of princes to consider the immediate
benefits and forego the consequences. The decline of the Roman Empire is well
known to have started with their reliance upon mercenary forces. It is no secret that
great princes have always used their own armies.

Chapter 14

A prince's concern in military matters

For Machiavelli, the main concern of a prince should be warfare: "A prince must
have no other objective, no other thought, nor take up any profession but that of
war, its methods and its discipline, for that is the only art expected of a ruler." It is
through war that a hereditary prince retains power and a private citizen rises to
power. Francesco Sforza became the Duke of Milan through military prowess, but
his sons lost their power by avoiding military affairs. A proper prince must never
rest from military concerns. He must be even more diligent in times of peace,
honing his skills through action and study. Considering action, Machiavelli advises
hunting because it keeps the body fit and allows the prince to learn the character
and nature of landscapes. Through this, he can learn how to best defend his
territory and how to advance upon territories similar to it.

Philopoemen, the ancient leader of the Achaeans, is the embodiment of a prince

who is constantly engaged in military affairs. Wherever he went, he would think up
scenarios and situations of warfare and ask his friends for their opinions and offer
up his. Therefore, in battle, he was never in a position where he did not know how
to maneuver. A prince should be given to the study of great military men so that he
can imitate their successes and avoid their mistakes. A prince that is diligent in
times of peace will be ready in times of adversity. Machiavelli writes, "thus, when
fortune turns against him, he will be prepared to resist it."

Chapter 15

Concerning things for which men, and princes especially, are praised or
censured

Machiavelli considers how a prince should behave toward his subjects and his
friends. Although many books have been written on this topic, Machiavelli sees no
practical value in them because they address what ought to be and not what is. He
writes:

"Many men have imagined republics and principalities that never really existed at
all. Yet the way men live is so far removed from the way they ought to live that
anyone who abandons what is for what should be pursues his downfall rather than
his preservation; for a man who strives after goodness in all his acts is sure to come
to ruin, since there are so many men who are not good."

Since there are many possible qualities that a prince can be said to possess, he
must not be overly concerned about having all the good ones. Although a bad
reputation should be avoided, this is not crucial in maintaining power. The only ethic
that matters is one that is beneficial to the prince in dealing with the concerns of his
state.

Chapter 16

Concerning liberality and parsimony

Machiavelli uses the quality of liberality to illustrate the point he made in the
previous chapter about a prince's reputation. In the case of liberality, it is obvious
that a prince who is generous is considered virtuous. But in practice, it is impossible
for a prince to have a reputation for generosity and also be prudent. The only way
for a prince to sustain generosity is to burden his people with taxes, which causes
resentment. As soon as he ceases to be generous, he will be labeled a miser.

Therefore, it is better for a prince to be parsimonious. Only men with reputations for
parsimony have been able to rule effectively. Machiavelli answers the charge that
some rulers were reputed to be generous by stating that they were generous only
on their way to power, such as Julius Caesar. Others who were reputed to be
generous did so by plundering the resources of their conquests. A prince's liberality
breeds contempt from his subjects either through burdensome taxation or the
malicious reputation of plundering. Guarding against the people's hatred is more
important than building up a reputation for generosity. A wise prince should be
willing to be reputed a miser than be hated for trying to be too generous.

Chapter 17

Concerning cruelty: whether it is better to be loved than to be

feared, or the reverse

Like liberality, it is good for a prince to be considered kind rather than cruel, but it is
more often the case that cruelty serves as a better weapon. For Machiavelli, a
prince who brings peace and stability through his cruelty should be considered
kinder than a leader who brings destruction upon his state because of his misplaced
kindness. A prince must be willing to take cruel measures if it benefits the state.
Executions harm only a few individuals, but it can be healthy for the wellbeing of
the entire state. In answering the question of whether it is better to be loved than
feared, Machiavelli writes,

"The answer is, of course, that it would be best to be both loved and feared. But
since the two rarely come together, anyone compelled to choose will find greater
security in being feared than in being loved."

In general, men are unreliable when hardships arise. Thus, fear is a stronger bond of
loyalty than friendship because men are fickle in relationships, but fear is constant.
It is good for a prince to be feared; but he must avoid being hated. This is possible
as long as the prince refrains from the citizens' properties and women. For a prince
who leads his own army, it is imperative for him to practice cruelty because that is
the only way he can command his soldiers' absolute respect. Machiavelli compares
two great military leaders: Hannibal and Scipio. Although Hannibal's army consisted
of men of various races, they were never rebellious because they feared their
leader. Scipio's men, on the other hand, were known for their mutiny and
dissension. Machiavelli states, "I conclude that since men love as they themselves
determine but fear as their ruler determines, a wise prince must rely upon what he
and not others can control."

Chapter 18

In what way princes should keep their word

Although candor is praised over craftiness, history shows that leaders who practiced
deceit overcame those that lived by their pledges. Machiavelli identifies two ways of
fighting: by law, which is proper for men and by force, which is proper for animals. A
prince must know how to fight both ways in order to be successful. To support his
point, Machiavelli turns to the writers of ancient Greece and to the story of how
Achilles, the Greek mythological hero, was trained by Chiron, the centaur (half man
and half beast). According to Machiavelli, this is to show that a warrior needs to be
trained in the fighting ways of both men and animals.

A prince must have the qualities of both the fox and the lion; one is useless without
the other. A fox can recognize snares but cannot drive away wolves; a lion can drive
off wolves but cannot recognize snares. Like a cunning fox, a wise prince should be
willing to break his pledge if it serves his interests. Machiavelli acknowledges that
this would be bad advice if men were honest, but since they are not, it is
advantageous for a prince to practice the art of deception. Pope Alexander VI is a
leader who is said to have been a master at this craft. For Machiavelli, a prince
should strive to be only as good as circumstances allow him to be. He must also be
willing to resort to evil to accomplish his agenda as fortune dictates. He writes,

"Therefore a prince will not actually need to have all the qualities previously
mentioned, but he must surely seem to have them. Indeed, I would go so far as to
say that having them all and always conforming to them would be harmful, while
appearing to have them would be useful."

A prince must put on the appearance of such qualities as clemency, faithfulness,

frankness, humanity, and religion-the last being the most important. Men judge by
appearances and as long as the prince is able to produce results, the methods he
utilizes will be deemed necessary and even praiseworthy. Machiavelli mentions an
unnamed ruler, presumably King Ferdinand of Spain, as an example of one who
swears by peace and faith and does the opposite of both. Yet, that is the way he has
kept his power and reputation.

Chapter 19

How to avoid contempt and hatred

Most men are content as long as they are not deprived of their property and
women. A prince should command respect through his conduct because a prince
that is highly esteemed by his people is unlikely to face internal opposition. A prince
who does not provoke the contempt of nobles and keeps the people satisfied does
not have to fear conspirators.

Machiavelli praises the structure of the French government in implementing a

governing body, the parliament, to intercede for the king in matters pertaining to
the relationships between the nobles and the common people. This arrangement
allows the king to govern the people without ever directly opposing the nobles.
Machiavelli writes,
"From it a noteworthy lesson may be drawn: princes should delegate unpopular
duties to others while dispensing all favors directly themselves. I say again that a
prince must respect the nobility, but avoid the hatred of the common people."

Machiavelli addresses those who refer to the lives of Roman emperors as evidence
disproving his previous arguments-mainly that those who rule with force keep
power while those who rule with kindness lose it. He gives a comparatively detailed
account of why the Roman emperors lost their power, although some ruled with
justice and some with cruelty. One main reason is that at the time, there was a third
party-the soldiers, whom the emperors feared more than they did the people. Many
emperors fell because they sided with their soldiers instead of the people. On the
other hand, the emperors who did not side with the army, with the exception of
Marcus Aurelius, fell from power because of it. Among cruel emperors, only
Septimus Severus, who was extraordinarily gifted, was able to rule successfully.
Septimus is an embodiment of a ruler who is like both the fox and the lion.

Machiavelli notes that current leaders do not have to worry about the army because
the people are now more influential. The only exceptions are Turkey and Egypt
where the standing army is still closely interwoven with the sultan's rule. The wise
ruler should borrow the actions of Septimus in coming to power. Once power is
established, he should borrow the actions of Marcus Aurelius in ruling with justice
and moderation.

Chapter 20

Whether fortresses and many other expedients that princes commonly

employ are useful or not

A prince has many options in terms of preserving his state. Some are useful while
others are not. Machiavelli concedes that each case should be evaluated within its
own context, nevertheless, he attempts to offer some general advice. First, it is
always necessary for a new prince to arm his subjects. But when a prince adds a
new domain to his original possession, he must disarm his new subjects because he
should rely only on the soldiers from his native domain. Second, it is not wise for a
prince to encourage factions within his own state.

It serves him better to rid himself of one side than to allow disunity. Third, for a new
prince, it is often wise to rely on subjects he is suspicious of in the beginning of his
reign than others. The suspicious subjects, knowing that they are under scrutiny,
are more inclined to please him in order to gain the prince's favor. Also, a prince
who acquires a new state with the aid of its inhabitants must judge their motives-
whether they helped because of their natural affection for the prince or because of
their hatred for the former ruler. A prince cannot trust those of the latter because it
is impossible to satisfy them. It is better for him to reconcile with his former
enemies. Last, Machiavelli considers fortresses useful in certain cases and harmful
in others. Ultimately, a prince should not rely too heavily on fortresses because they
are useless if the people hate him.

Chapter 21

What a prince must do to be esteemed

A prince earns esteem by undertaking great enterprises. King Ferdinand of Spain is

cited again as an example of a lowly monarch who gained esteem by showing his
ability through great feats. In the name of religion, he conquered many territories
and kept his subjects awed and occupied so that they had no chance to rebel.

When confronted with a decision to take sides among two conflicting parties, it is
always better to be fully devoted to one side than to be neutral. If your allies win,
you benefit whether or not you have more power than they have. If you are more
powerful, then your allies are under your command; if your allies are stronger, they
will always feel a certain obligation to you for your help. If your side loses, you still
have an ally in the loser. It is wise for a prince not to align with a stronger force
unless compelled to do so. The most important virtue is having the wisdom to know
what is the least risky venture and then pursuing it courageously.

Chapter 22

Concerning the prince's ministers

A prince's wisdom will be judged by the quality of his ministers and civil servants.
There are three types of minds: capable of thinking for itself, capable of
understanding the thinking of others, and capable of neither the first nor the
second. The first type is the most excellent, but a prince who has the second kind is
able to succeed as well.

A minister must be someone who has the prince's interests in mind over his own. If
a minister is given to thinking about himself, he is not to be trusted. But for a
minister that holds the affairs of the state in the highest regard, a prince must
honor and entrust duties to him generously so that he will become dependent upon
the success of the state, and consequently, the prince.

Chapter 23

How to avoid flatterers

A prudent prince should have a select group of wise counselors to advise him
truthfully only on matters he asks about. All other opinions from others he should
ignore. But ultimately, the decisions should be made by the prince and carried out
resolutely.

He gives an example of Emperor Maximilian II, who never consulted with others
what he planned to do, and when confronted by his counselors of his plans, would
change his mind so that no one knew one day what he would do the next. If a prince
is given to changing his mind, his reputation will suffer. A prince must have the
wisdom to recognize good advice from bad.

Chapter 24

Why the princes of Italy have lost their states

The exploits of a new prince are more closely watched than that of a hereditary
prince. Therefore, if a new prince succeeds in his endeavors through sound laws,
arms, and examples, he will win double glory for himself. Just as a hereditary prince
who loses his kingdom through folly garners double disgrace.

The princes of Italy have lost their kingdoms due to their reliance upon mercenary
or auxiliary armies. They have kept neither the favor of the people nor containment
of the nobles. They cannot blame fortune but only their own defects. They have
resorted to the hope that if deprived of power, they will be brought back by those
unsatisfied with the new rulers. Machiavelli states that such thinking is cowardly
and that only those methods that come from one's own resourcefulness are good,
certain, and enduring.

Chapter 25

Concerning the influence of fortune in human affairs, and the manner in which it
is to be resisted

Some believe that it is needless to control what is determined by God or by fortune.

Having thought the matter through, Machiavelli states, "Nevertheless, since our free
will must not be denied, I estimate that even if fortune is the arbiter of half our
actions, she still allows us to control the other half, or thereabouts." He compares
fortune to a torrential river that cannot be easily controlled during flooding season.
In periods of calm, however, people can erect dams and levees in order to minimize
its impact. Fortune seems to strike at the places where no resistance is offered, as
is the case in Italy.

For a prince to succeed, his character and methods of rule must be suited to the
times. That is why two princes who use the same methods get different results and
another two who use different methods achieve similar results. Pope Julius II is an
example of one whose methods corresponded with the times. Therefore, he was
able to succeed in all the impetuous endeavors he attempted. All things considered,
it is usually better to be impetuous than cautious. Machiavelli writes, "for fortune is
a woman and in order to be mastered she must be jogged and beaten."

Chapter 26

An exhortation to free Italy from the hands of the barbarians

Machiavelli believes that the time is ripe for a determined prince to restore former
glory to Italy and free her from the bondage of barbarian cruelty. Just as great
leaders of the past won glory by taking it upon themselves to meet their nation's
desperate needs, Machiavelli urges the prince, Lorenzo de' Medici, to take up the
endeavor because all the signs point to his success. (The Medici family held great
political clout, including control of the papacy). Before, a certain prince seemed to
have all the necessary qualities to become Italy's savior, but in the end, fortune
undid his labors. Machiavelli is referring to Cesare Borgia, who almost succeeded in
uniting Italy, but failed to do so because of ill health. Machiavelli writes that the
prince, on the other hand, is destined for glory just as long as he follows the model
of former great princes. Italians are not lacking in courage or skill in battle. What
they need is a capable leader who is worthy of the people's respect and admiration.
Italian troops are capable in individual combat, but have done poorly in wars
because of the lack of qualified leaders. Machiavelli emphasizes again that the
prince should command and keep his own army. He is convinced that with new
military weapons and strategy, an Italian army can defeat any of the other
formidable armies-the Spanish, Swiss, German, and French. They all have their
exploitable weakness. Machiavelli writes with much emotion:

"I cannot describe with how much love, with what thirst for revenge, with what
resolute loyalty, with what tenderness, with what tears he would be received in all
those provinces which have endured these foreign hordes. What gates would be
closed to him? What people would deny him obedience? Whose envy would oppose
him? What Italian would withhold his allegiance?"

Machiavelli challenges the prince to save Italy from the control of the barbarians. He
concludes by quoting a line from a poem by Petrarch that takes glory in Italian
might.