DIGEST FORMAT:

Arca v. Javier
July 31, 1954
G.R. No. L-6768/50 O.G. 3538
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J

Short Summary
Alfredo Javier married Salud Arca, both Filipino citizens in 1937. Apparently In 1927, Alfredo enlisted in
the US Navy so he had to sail to the US in 1938, leaving his wife and child. Salud lived with Alfredo’s
parents but due to incompatibility of characters she moved back to her hometown. Alfredo filed an
action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, using abandonment as his ground for
the divorce. Salud filed an answer alleging, among other things, that Alfredo was not a resident of
Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, and that it was not true that the cause of their separation was
abandonment on her part but that it was physically impossible for them to be together since Alfredo
was in the US because he was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. The court, however, decreed the dissolution of
their marriage. ISSUE: W/N the divorce decree obtained has a valid effect in Philippine jurisdiction—NO
because at the time Alfredo obtained the divorce decree, he was not a legal resident of Mobile County.
RULING: One of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter. In order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled
in good faith in the State in which the divorce is granted. Jurisprudence has held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status;
and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. Furthermore, any
voluntary appearance made by the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with
jurisdiction. In this case, the divorce decree by the Circuit Court of Mobile County cannot be recognized
in the Philippines because at the time such decree was issued, Alfredo was not a resident of Mobile
County, Alabama. Rather, he was a resident of the Philippines. It may therefore be said that Alfredo
went to Mobile County, not with the intention of permanently residing there, or of considering that
place as his permanent abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such
residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Lastly, Salud’s voluntary appearance before
the Circuit Court of Mobile County cannot be construed to have conferred jurisdiction upon the court.
This is because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of Alfredo that his domicile or legal residence
at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless
and false. Such answer should be considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn
the jurisdiction of the court over the case.

Facts:
 On November 1937, Salud Arca and Alfredo Javier had their marriage solemnized by Judge
Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila. At the time of their marriage, they had already
begotten a son, Alfredo Jr., who was born on December 2, 1931.
 Sometime in 1938, Alfredo left for the US on board a ship of the US Navy. Apparently, Javier
joined the US Navy since 1927.
 Because Alfredo departed to the US, Salud, who was from Maragondon, Cavite, chose to live
with Alfredo’s parents in Naic, Cavite. However, due to the incompatibility of character
between Salud and Alfredo’s parents so she decided to transfer her residence to Maragondon
her native place.
  Since then, Alfredo and Salud’s relationship became strained and on August 1940, Alfredo
brought an action for divorce before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA.
 In her Answer, Salud averred, among others, that Alfredo was not a resident of the State of
Alabama 12 months prior to the institution of the complaint. She argued, rather, that he was a
resident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Salud further argued that it was not true that the cause of
their separation was her desertion/abandonment. She explained that it was physically
impossible for them to be together since Alfredo was in the US since he enlisted in the US Navy.
At this juncture, under the old Civil Code the wife is not bound to live with her husband if the
latter has gone to ultramarine colonies. She thus prayed that the divorce be dismissed. The
court, however, decreed the dissolution of their marriage on April 9, 1941.
 On July 1941, Alfredo married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and he bought a house at
New York. In 1949, Thelma obtained a divorce for reasons not disclosed by the evidence, and
later on, having retired from the US Navy, Alfredo returned to the Philippines on February 13,
1950.
 Armed with 2 divorce decrees, Alfredo then married Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad
Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal Court of Manila on April 1950.
 Salud then filed an information for bigamy against Alfredo. However, the CFI of Manila through
Judge Alejandro J. Panlilio, acquitted Alfredo on August 10, 1951 on the ground that Alfredo’s
marriage with Maria was made in good faith and in the honest belief that this marriage with
Salud had been legally dissolved by the divorce decree obtained from the US.

   Issue/s: 
(COL RELATED) W/N the divorce decree has a valid effect in this jurisdiction? NO.

Ratio: 
      On whether the divorce decree has a valid effect in this jurisdiction? NO.
 In essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of
divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this
may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted.
 In the current case, it is true that Salud filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the
Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action
cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only
purpose was to impugn the claim of Alfredo that his domicile or legal residence at that time
was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless
and false. Such answer should be considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is
to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
 Most recent of such cases is Sikat vs. Canson, which involves a case of divorce also based on
the ground of desertion. In that case, John Canson claimed not only that he had legal
residence in the State of Nevada, where the action was brought, but he was an American
citizen, although it was proven that his wife never accompanied him there but has always
remained in the Philippines, and so it has been held that: "it is not . . . the citizenship of the
plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence within the
State." The court further said: "And assuming that John Canson acquired legal residence in the
State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers, this would not confer
jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction, nor
jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was still domiciled
in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person."
  Jurisprudence has held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining
a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by
such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of the
defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction.
 It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State
or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family
domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no
intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts
of the State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the
laws of the State of his own domicile.
 In this case, therefore, it cannot be said that the Mobile County Court of Alabama had
acquired jurisdiction over the case. This is because at the time the divorce was filed by Alfredo,
his legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could not have therefore acquired legal
residence or domicile at Mobile County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that
time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and he merely rented a room where he used to
stay during his occasional shore leave for shift duty.
 That he never intended to live there permanently is shown by the fact that after his marriage
to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house and a lot, and
after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned to
the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It may
therefore be said that Alfredo went to Mobile County, not with the intention of permanently
residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole purpose
of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
court.
 There was also an issue as to whether the ruling in Canson would be applicable in this case. To
this, the Court said that the applicability of the ruling in the Canson case may be justified on
the ground that the Philippine courts can grant divorce only on the ground of adultery on the
part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, and if the decree is predicated on
another ground, that decree cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction. In other words, the courts
in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of 'adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband' as provided for under section 1 of Act No. 2710.
 In this case, the divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of desertion, which is
clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws.
 This ruling is, according to the SC, sound because it is in keeping with the well-known principle
of Private International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the law
affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the State of the forum.
It is also in keeping with our concept of moral values which has always looked upon
marriage as an institution. And such concept has actually crystalized in a more tangible
manner when in the new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to eliminate
altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such concept, we cannot but react adversely
to any attempt to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our
customs, morals, and traditions.

DISPOSITION:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
-------

Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa

Short Summary
Santiago Gatchalian was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen,
following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian. He testified before the Citizen
Evaluation Board that he had 5 kids with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely Jose, Gloria, Francisco (dad of
William and Johnson), Elena, and Benjamin. William is the son of Francisco and the grandson of
Santiago. When William was 12, he arrived in Manila from Hong Kong with his siblings. They carried
with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in HK based on a
cablegram bearing the signature of the incumbent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. They all sought
admission as Filipino citizens.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision, admitting William Gatchalian
and his siblings as Filipino citizens. However, the SOJ issued a Memorandum setting aside all decisions
rendered by the Board of Commissioners (BoC) on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the
Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the BoC to review all cases where entry was
allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including William’s case. The new BoC
reversed the decision declaring William a citizen and ordered his and his companions’ exclusion (due to
forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, which was dispatched to the Philippine
Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens.). A warrant of exclusion
was issued and the decision became final and executory. Petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of
respondent William Gatchalian. William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
injunction before the RTC of Manila presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. BOC filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction, alleging that respondent judge has no
jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Judge dela Rosa issued
the assailed order dated denying the motion to dismiss. Meanwhile, William Gatchalian's wife and minor
children filed before the RTC of Valenzuela, presided by respondent Judge Capulong a case for injunction
with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that the BoC acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. Capulong issued
the questioned TRO restraining BoC from continuing with the deportation proceedings against William
Gatchalian. The SolGen now files this petition for certiorari before the SC. William Gatchalian also files a
counter petition.
Issue: WN William is a Filipino following the citizenship of his father—YES.

In Miciano vs. Brimo this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being
no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of
Philippine law. The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian
much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as
records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of
China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage
Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special
Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the
Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each
other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family
reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree.

Facts:
 Santiago Gatchalian was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino
citizen, following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian. He testified before
the Citizen Evaluation Board that he had 5 kids with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely Jose, Gloria,
Francisco (dad of William and Johnson), Elena, and Benjamin. William is the son of Francisco
and the grandson of Santiago.
 In 1961, when William was 12, he arrived in Manila from Hong Kong with Gloria, Francisco, and
Johnson (his brother). They carried with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by
the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the
incumbent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. They all sought admission as Filipino citizens. After
investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961,
admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens.
 However, the Secretary of Justice issued a Memorandum setting aside all decisions rendered by
the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of
Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all
cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen,
including William’s case.
 On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners reversed the decision declaring William a
citizen, and ordered his and his companions’ exclusion. A warrant of exclusion was issued and
the decision became final and executory. This was due to the alleged forged cablegram by the
then Secretary of Foreign Affairs which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong
Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens.
 In Arocha v. Vivo, it was settled that William Gatchalian is a Chinese Citizen and the SC
sustained the validity of the July 6, 1962 decree.
 Sometime in 1973, the Gatchalians filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the deportation case against them was assigned. In 1973, the Board of Special
Inquiry recommended to acting Commissioner Nituda the reversal of the decision ordering their
exclusion and deportation. Nituda issued an order reaffirming the decision declaring the
Gatchalians Filipino Citizens.
 In 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of
Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants be charged
with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940. The
Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action.
 On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.
He appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same
day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
  William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa.
 In September 1990, Board of Commissioners filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari
and prohibition wit injunction, alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board
of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela
Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
 Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, William Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge
Capulong a case for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged,
among others, that the Board of Commissioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the
institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the same day, respondent Capulong
issued the questioned temporary restraining order restraining Board of Commissioners from
continuing with the deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.
 The Solicitor General now files this petition for certiorari BEFORE THE SC seeking 1) to set aside
the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent
Judge de la Rosa which denied Board of Commissioner’s motion to dismiss and restrained them
from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the
deportation of respondent William Gatchalian, as well as the Order of respondent Judge
Capulong dated September 6, 1990 which likewise enjoined Board of Commissioners from
proceeding with the deportation charges against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit
respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.
 In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the
evidence on record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no
jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the
question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the
question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias, pre-
judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported
has already prescribed.

   Issue/s: 
(COL RELATED) W/N William is a Filipino following the citizenship of his father - YES

Ratio: 
      On whether William is a Filipino following the citizenship of his father – YES
 In the facts, it was shown that there was a motion for re-hearing, and acting Secretary Nituda
declared William Gatchalian a citizen by affirming the first order issued.That order is the last
official act of the government on the basis of which William Gatchalian continually exercised the
rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in
favor of William.
 The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G.
Davide, Jr., proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage
of the case, where it is not even put in issue, is quite much too late. As stated above, the records
of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been
declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30
years later.
 Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that
 respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose.
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation
arises." BUT Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) CHANGED THE 5R YEAR PERIOD TO 8 YEARS PLEASE
NOTE!!! In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein
respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by
Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be
validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of
respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting
Commissioner Nituda.
 The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a
warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law
itself provides for a period of prescription. "Although a deportation proceeding does not partake
of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right
of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings."
 Board of Commissioners (still) claim that William is an alien. In support of their position,
petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as
the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China,
were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there
any showing what the laws of China were. For the said marriages to be valid in this country, it
should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were
contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be
considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of
their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the
Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
 In Miciano vs. Brimo this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws
on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at
bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that
it is the same as that of Philippine law.
 The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much
more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as
records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the
laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the
Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
 Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of
Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian
before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and
relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130).
Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of
the Civil Code provides: Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
 judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
 Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian
aforementioned are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family
Code).
 Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally
valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.
 Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family
Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent
as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the
coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all
presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.
 Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression."
 Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who
asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the
foreign law.
 Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the
citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn
is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is
admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is
hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby
permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for
lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and
3431- V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement, as to
costs.