Conventional Harmonic Wisdom
Conventional Harmonic Wisdom
Conventional Harmonic Wisdom
Volume 2.3:
Eytan Agmon*
ABSTRACT: The essay consists of three parts. (1) A response to John Rothgeb's
objections to the modified version of Riemann's functional harmonic theory proposed in
Eytan Agmon's Music Theory Spectrum article, "Functional Harmony Revisited." (2) A
discussion of the conflict between the type of "conventional harmonic wisdom" that
(modified) functionalism represents and Schenker's view of tonality. (3) A discussion of
what this conflict implies as far as the scope of Schenkerian theory is concerned.
[2] I shall begin the present essay by responding to Rothgeb's objections; neither, I hope
to demonstrate, stands up under scrutiny. However, I believe that Rothgeb is nonetheless
correct in sensing that a serious conflict indeed exists between "conventional [harmonic]
wisdom," of which functionalism is apparently an important ingredient, and certain
tenets of Schenker's theory.{3} In the second part of this essay, therefore, I shall attempt
to isolate the source of this conflict; I shall conclude the essay by considering the
conflict's implications as far as the scope of Schenkerian theory is concerned.{4}
[3] Rothgeb purports to establish the superfluousness of functional theory, vis a vis an
approach that emphasizes context and voice leading, by analyzing the concluding bars
of Schumann's "Am Kamin" from Kinderszenen (see Example 1); he concentrates in
particular on the "vertical event" marked "X." For present purposes, Rothgeb's argument
may be reduced to three essential claims: "strong horizontalism," "weak horizontalism,"
and "contextualism."
[5] For all that Schenker would have us believe that linear motion in tonal music--
apparently by some divine miracle--tends to yield precisely triads and seventh chords as
vertical sonorities, strong horizontalism is a patently absurd position. In Example 2
Schumann's X is replaced by an impostor vertical event *X (Schumann's concluding
tonic is also slightly altered in the example: it now features ^3^ in the soprano rather
than ^1^). In voice-leading terms, X and *X are exactly analogous (the f in *X is also an
escape tone or anticipation of the coming tonic harmony); yet *X is plainly
unacceptable.
[7] Once one concedes that X is a triad (rather than some accidental collection of
pitches), one must also concede that X is an a-minor triad in first inversion, that is, a III6
chord. To be sure, the function of X is not specified by the III6 label; the purpose of
(modified) functionalism is precisely to fill-in this theoretical void. According to
(modified) functionalism, X "has dominant function"; X, in other words, is a member of
a set of triads--a category--whose prototype is V. The relationship between X and V,
moreover, is one of maximal similarity, that is, the two triads have two tones in
common.
[9] Weak horizontalism. Weak horizontalism concedes that X is a triad (thus X is a III6
chord--no "shudder-quotes" required); moreover, weak horizontalism sees an essential
relationship between X and a hypothetical V chord. However, unlike functionalism, that
sees the V/III relationship in terms of common tones, weak horizontalism prefers to see
a 5-6 linear exchange (Example 4).
[11] Once "triad" and "seventh chord" are defined on the basis of voice-leading
considerations, the pernicious harmony/voice-leading dichotomy loses much of its force.
In particular, to say that III is related to V by virtue of two common tones, and to say that
III(6) is related to V by virtue of a 5-6 linear exchange, is to make two logically
equivalent statements.{6} All the same, to base a functional harmonic theory on voice
leading would be a poor choice indeed. In a "deceptive cadence" V-VI, for example, it
makes little sense to say that the VI is related to a hypothetical I by virtue of a 5-6 linear
exchange; yet in terms of common tones, the case is exactly analogous to the V/III
relationship initially discussed. In other words, the common-tone relationship between a
"secondary" triad and a "primary" one is theoretically more general than the (logically
equivalent) voice-leading relationship, which seems to play a more restricted, context-
related role.
[12] Contextualism. One may agree that X is a III6 chord with a strong "aura" of V, yet
nonetheless disagree with functionalism concerning a necessary, a-priori relationship
between the two chords. The V/III relationship, one may argue, is purely contextual, and
can be replaced by any "X/Y" relationship whatsoever.
[13] The doctrine of contextualism is with us at least since 1934, when Oswald Jonas
has stated that functionalism "had to fail, because it neglected the fact that two
occurrences of the same chord could be worlds apart in meaning, and that everything
depended on context."{7} Rothgeb echoes the idea in paragraph 9 of his commentary:
When I say that in this case [i.e., Schumann's "Am Kamin"] "III" means V,
the word means may be explicated as "constitutes, or is included within, a
harmonic expression of." "III" may equally mean I; "II" may mean IV;
indeed, instances of "X" meaning Y are legion in the repertoire of tonal
music, and virtually no a-priori limits can be set on the ranges of "X" and
"Y".{8}
[14] Although Rothgeb concedes in a footnote that "certain limits would probably stand
up under scrutiny," his statement is surely a gross misrepresentation of musical reality.
Can "III" mean IV? Can "II" mean I? Can "IV" mean V? In fact, the examples of "X
meaning Y" that Rothgeb cites are exactly those which functional theory allows.
[15] Since Rothgeb proceeds in the next paragraph to consider Schenker's notion of
"scale-step," I suspect that when he speaks of no a-priori constraints on "X meaning Y"
he has in mind hierarchical subordination rather than functional significance. In
Schenker's theory, III (for example) may participate in prolonging IV, as IV may
participate in prolonging V. And indeed, when it comes to hierarchy, functionalism
seems to suffer badly in comparison to Schenker's theory, which introduced the
profound idea of structural levels (recursive embedding) to tonal theory. However, in
FHR I have claimed that (modified) functionalism "is compatible with a hierarchical
approach" (p. 203); I should now like to make good this claim.
II
[19] In the preceding section I have presented arguments which I believe set to rest
Rothgeb's objections to (modified) functionalism. In particular, strong horizontalism,
weak horizontalism, and contextualism have been shown to be either plainly
unacceptable or irrelevant doctrines, which leaves Rothgeb's claims concerning the
superfluousness of (modified) functionalism without support. Moreover, the idea of
functional Auskomponierung renders Rothgeb's complaint concerning the intellectual
poverty of functionalism (relative to Schenker's theory) no longer valid. Indeed,
(modified) functionalism agrees with the Schenkerian approach on two important points:
(1) tonal pitch structure is hierarchical in nature; (2) voice leading plays a crucial role in
rendering the assumed hierarchy cognitively accessible. Nonetheless, it would be wrong
to pretend that a serious conflict between the two theories does not exist. In the present
section I should like to isolate the source of this conflict.
[20] For Schenker, all tonal structure is ultimately referable to the Ursatz a theoretic
construct whose rationale is essentially linear-contrapuntal: a dissonant passing-tone in
the top voice is rendered consonant by means of a bass-arpeggiation. How does the
Ursatz conflict with conventional harmonic wisdom? One conflict is immediately
apparent. As far as the Ursatz is concerned, there are only two basic harmonic states,
"tonic" and "dominant"; a third harmonic state (say, "subdominant") does not exist, or if
it does, its status within the tonal hierarchy is, by definition, inferior.
[21] Even in terms of Schenker's own theory, the idea that IV or II6 represent some sort
of "leaping passing-tone" configuration in the bass surely leaves much to be desired.
Moreover, Schenker's account forces an uncomfortable analogy between the functions of
IV and II6, on the one hand, and III (and even I6), on the other. However, I believe that
Schenker's cavalier attitude towards the subdominant is problematic at a more basic,
intuitive level. For while the subdominant may be the only component of a T-S-D-T
progression whose removal does not violate a certain sense of progressional syntax, by
conventional harmonic wisdom the difference between T-D-T and T-S-D-T is
nonetheless crucial. Perhaps a linguistic analogy could help clarify this point. Consider
the phrase "He ate his heart out." Although the deletion of "his heart out" yields a
syntactically acceptable expression, something essential is surely lost in "reducing" "He
ate his heart out" to "He ate." I have often heard the complaint that a musical phrase is
robbed of its essence once the "structural subdominant" is removed; I believe such a
complaint--even when it comes from an undergraduate student--deserves to be treated
with respect.
[22] Schenker's Ursatz is at odds with conventional harmonic wisdom not only
concerning the status of the subdominant; an even more severe conflict, I believe,
concerns the dominant. By conventional harmonic wisdom, I- V(7)-I is one of the least
contextually constrained progressions; the progression retains its functional sense as T-
D-T in countless possible realizations, which may vary considerably in terms of voice
leading, bass progression, or registration. In Schenker's Ursatz, on the other hand, I-V-I
is conceived in terms of severe a- priori contextual constraints. Note, for example, that
even such a simple deviation from the Ursatz-model where the bass, rather than leaping
up a fifth from I to V, leaps down a fourth, is something to be accounted for. This
hopeless "contextualization of the dominant" (together with the "a-priorization of voice
leading") ultimately leads to the utterly absurd position where I- V6-I (say) is seen as
more closely related to (say) I- IV6/4-I than to I-V-I.
III
[23] Lest I should be once again accused of inciting intellectual regress, let me hasten to
point out that my critique of Schenker's Ursatz applies only in so far as the construct is
claimed to constitute a theory of tonality, a theory by which conventional harmonic
wisdom is condescendingly dismissed. I have no objection whatsoever to a more limited
interpretation of what the Ursatz stands for, for example, that the Ursatz (or some
Ursatz-like configuration) is an analytic construct, hypothesized to describe the
structure of some specific piece of music (or possibly a group of pieces); as such, the
Ursatz may be seen as a contextualized harmonic progression, situated at some
(possibly deep) level of compositional structure. Indeed, as a contextualized I-V-I
progression Schenker's Ursatz makes much compositional sense, for it lends the
progression, from the linear point of view, a clear sense of purpose and direction.
[24] I am well aware that for some readers, giving up Schenker's grand vision of tonality
as an unfolding in time of the Chord of Nature may seem an exceedingly dear price to
pay. But I also believe that for many others, who--like myself--deeply cherish the
analytic insights that Schenker's approach has to offer, and yet are unable to turn their
backs on conventional harmonic wisdom, there is simply no other choice. As someone
whose involvement with the Schenkerian approach over the years has been more than
casual, I know how difficult it can be to admit that Schenker delivers less than he
promises. Nonetheless, I believe it is essential that the scope of Schenkerian theory be
seriously reassessed. For if, as Rothgeb would have us believe, there is simply no way in
which the ideas of Heinrich Schenker and Hugo Riemann may be reconciled, tonal
theory is a very small town indeed.
EYTAN AGMON
Bar-Ilan University
Department of Musicology
52900 Ramat-Gan
Israel
agmone@ashur.cc.biu.ac.il
References
1. Music Theory Spectrum 17:2 (1995), 196-214.
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2. John Rothgeb, "Re: Eytan Agmon on Functional Theory," Music Theory Online 2.1
(1996).
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7. Oswald Jonas, Introduction to the Theory of Heinrich Schenker, trans. and ed. John
Rothgeb (New York: Longman, 1982), 127 (emphasis added).
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9. Only the bare outlines of the theory are sketched here; I hope to flesh-out the details
in a separate study.
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10. Carl Schachter, "Analysis by Key: Another Look at Modulation," Music Analysis 6:3
(1987), 292. In light of the present discussion, Auskomponierung may seem to apply
only to functionally interpreted progressions that begin and end on the same chord (e.g.,
II-I-II). However, any functionally interpreted progression referable to a given scale
degree may be said to prolong or compose- out that degree. For example, I-V-VI, as a I-
Stufe progression, may be said to prolong I.
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3/15/96