The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence PDF

the oxford handbook of
NAT IONA L
S EC UR I T Y
IN T ELLIG EN C E
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the oxford handbook of
NAT IONA L
S EC UR I T Y
IN T ELLIG EN C E
Edited by
LOCH K. JOHNSON
1 2010
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The Oxford handbook of national security intelligence / edited by

Loch K. Johnson.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-537588-6
1. Intelligence service. 2. National security. 3. Security,
International. I. Johnson, Loch K., 1942–
JF1525.I6O97 2009
327.12—dc22 2009052406
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America

on acid-free paper
Contents
About the Contributors, xi
Part I Introduction
1. National Security Intelligence, 3

Loch K. Johnson
2. National Security and Public Anxiety: Our Changing Perceptions, 33

Sir Richard Dearlove
Part II Theory and Method
3. Theories of Intelligence, 43
Peter Gill
4. The Sources and Methods of Intelligence Studies, 59

James J. Wirtz
5. Getting Intelligence History Right: Reflections and Recommendations

from the Inside, 70
Nicholas Dujmovic
6. Assessing Intelligence Performance, 87

John A. Gentry
Part III The Evolution of Modern Intelligence
7. The Rise of the U.S. Intelligence System, 1917–1977, 107

Michael Warner
8. The Rise and Fall of the CIA, 122

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones
vi contents
9. British Strategic Intelligence and the Cold War, 138

Len Scott
10. Signals Intelligence in War and Power Politics, 1914–2010, 155

John Ferris
11. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 172

Kenneth M. Absher, Michael C. Desch, and Roman Popadiuk
12. Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 189

Frederic F. Manget
13. The Evolution of International Collaboration in the Global

Intelligence Era, 212
A. Denis Clift
Part IV Intelligence Collection and Processing
14. The Dilemma of Open Sources Intelligence: Is OSINT Really

Intelligence?, 229
Arthur S. Hulnick
15. The Troubled Inheritance: The National Security Agency

and the Obama Administration, 242
Matthew M. Aid
16. Human Source Intelligence, 257

Frederick P. Hitz
17. United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence, 275

A. Walter Dorn
18. Privatized Spying: The Emerging Intelligence Industry, 296

Patrick R. Keefe
19. Guarding the Border: Intelligence and Law Enforcement in

Canada’s Immigration System, 310
Arne Kislenko
20. Extraordinary Rendition, 328

William G. Weaver and Robert M. Pallitto
contents vii
Part V Intelligence Analysis and Production
21. Addressing “Complexities” in Homeland Security, 343

Gregory F. Treverton
22. The Intelligence Analysis Crisis, 359

Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott
23. Competitive Analysis: Techniques for Better Gauging Enemy Political

Intentions and Military Capabilities, 375
Richard L. Russell
24. Decision Advantage and the Nature of Intelligence Analysis, 389

Jennifer E. Sims
25. Intelligence Analysis in an Uncertain Environment, 404

William M. Nolte
26. The Dilemma of Defense Intelligence, 422

Richard A. Best, Jr.
Part VI Intelligence Dissemination
27. The Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship, 437

Mark M. Lowenthal
28. On Uncertainty and the Limits of Intelligence, 452

Peter Jackson
29. The Perils of Politicization, 472

Paul R. Pillar
30. Leadership in an Intelligence Organization: The Directors

of Central Intelligence and the CIA, 485
David Robarge
Part VII Counterintelligence
31. The Future of FBI Counterintelligence through the Lens

of the Past Hundred Years, 505
Raymond J. Batvinis
viii contents
32. Treason: “’Tis Worse than Murder”, 518

Stan A. Taylor and Kayle Buchanan
33. The Challenges of Counterintelligence, 537

Paul J. Redmond
34. Catching an Atom Spy: MI5 and the Investigation of Klaus Fuchs, 555
Timothy Gibbs
Part VIII Covert Action
35. Covert Action, Pentagon Style, 569

Jennifer D. Kibbe
36. Covert Action: United States Law in Substance, Process, and Practice, 587
James E. Baker
37. Covert Action: Strengths and Weaknesses, 608

William J. Daugherty
Part IX Intelligence Accountability
38. The Role of Defense in Shaping U.S. Intelligence Reform, 629

James R. Clapper, Jr.
39. Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom, 640

Ian Leigh
40. Rethinking the State Secrets Privilege, 657

Louis Fisher
41. Accounting for the Future or the Past?: Developing Accountability and
Oversight Systems to Meet Future Intelligence Needs, 673
Stuart Farson and Reg Whitaker
42. “A Very British Institution”: The Intelligence and Security Committee

and Intelligence Accountability in the United Kingdom, 699
Mark Phythian
43. The Politics of Intelligence Accountability, 719

Glenn Hastedt
contents ix
44. Ethics and Professional Intelligence, 735

Michael Andregg
Part X Intelligence in Other Lands
45. Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The Quest for

Transparency and Effectiveness, 757
Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei
46. The Intelligence Services of Russia, 774

Robert W. Pringle
47. The German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND): Evolution and Current

Policy Issues, 790
Wolfgang Krieger
48. Israeli Intelligence: Organization, Failures, and Successes, 806

Ephraim Kahana
49. Intelligence and National Security: The Australian Experience, 823

David Martin Jones
Glossary, 843
Index, 851
About the Contributors
Kenneth M. Absher is a fellow with the Scowcroft Institute of International

Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service in College Station,
Texas, and a former senior CIA official.
Matthew M. Aid is a resident of Washington, D.C., and the author of the

documentary history of the National Security Agency, entitled The Secret Sentry
(2009).
Michael Andregg is an intelligence professional who also teaches at the

University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota.
James E. Baker is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,
as well as adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, University
of Iowa College of Law, and University of Pittsburgh Law School, and he has also
served as legal adviser to the National Security Council.
Uri Bar-Joseph is an associate professor of international relations, University of

Haifa.
Raymond J. Batvinis is a former special agent of the FBI, concentrating in

foreign counterintelligence and counterterrorism for twenty-five years, and is the
author of Origins of FBI Counterintelligence.
Richard A. Best, Jr., is a defense analyst with the Congressional Research

Service, Washington, D.C.
Thomas C. Bruneau is a distinguished professor in the Department of National

Security Affairs and program manager for Latin America at the Center for
Civil-Military Relations, both at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California.
Kayle Buchanan is a recent graduate in political science from Brigham Young

University in Provo, Utah.
James R. Clapper, Jr., is currently under secretary of defense for intelligence,

has served as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and is a retired lieutenant general from the U.S.
Air Force.
xii contributors
A. Denis Clift is former president of the National Defense Intelligence College.
William J. Daugherty is a professor of government at Armstrong Atlantic

State University in Savannah, Georgia.
Sir Richard Dearlove is a former career intelligence officer and served as

chief of the Secret Intelligence Service from 1999 to 2004, and is now Master of
Pembroke College, Cambridge University.
Michael C. Desch is a professor of political science and fellow of the Joan B.

Kroc Institute for International Peace at the University of Notre Dame.
A. Walter Dorn is an associate professor of defense studies at the Canadian

Forces College and the Royal Military College of Canada.
Nicholas Dujmovic is a CIA staff historian and a frequent contributor to, and
editorial board member of, the journal Studies in Intelligence.
Stuart Farson is a lecturer in the political science department, Simon Fraser

University, Vancouver/Surrey, Canada, and served as director of research for
the Special Committee of the House Commons (Canada) on the Review of the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act.
John Ferris is a professor of history at the University of Calgary.
Louis Fisher is a specialist in constitutional law with the Law Library of the
Library of Congress and the author of a number of books on national security
law, including The Constitution and 9/11: Recurring Threats to America’s Freedoms.
John A. Gentry is a former intelligence analyst at the CIA, and is now an

assistant professor of irregular warfare, College of International Security Affairs,
National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
Timothy Gibbs is a former post-graduate student of Professor Christopher

Andrew (the official historian for the Security Service), an ex-member of the
intelligence seminar at the History Faculty of Cambridge University, and the
recipient of a doctoral degree in history from Robinson College at Cambridge.
Peter Gill is a research professor in intelligence studies, University of Salford,

and has recently co-authored Intelligence in an Insecure World and co-edited
Intelligence Theory.
Glenn Hastedt is a professor of political science at James Madison University

and director of the Center for Liberal and Applied Social Sciences and the Justice
Studies Major.
contributors xiii
Frederick P. Hitz is a lecturer in the University of Virginia School of Law and

Batten School of Public Policy and Leadership, and the former inspector general
of the CIA from 1990 to 1998.
Arthur S. Hulnick is an associate professor of international affairs at Boston

University and a former intelligence officer, serving in the U.S. Air Force and the
CIA.
Peter Jackson is a senior lecturer in international politics at the Department

of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, co-editor of the
international journal Intelligence and National Security, and author of France and
the Nazi Menace: Intelligence and Policy-Making, 1933–1939.
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones is a professor of history emeritus at the University of

Edinburgh, Scotland.
Loch K. Johnson is the Regents and Meigs Professor of Public and International
Affairs at the University of Georgia and co-editor of the international journal
Intelligence and National Security.
David Martin Jones teaches in the School of Political Science and

International Studies at the University of Queensland and has written a number
of books and articles on Southeast Asian regionalism and Australian foreign
policy.
Ephraim Kahana is chair of the national security program in the department

of political science, Western Galilee College, Israel.
Patrick R. Keefe is a graduate of the School of Law at Yale University and is

presently a fellow with the Century Foundation in New York City.
Jennifer D. Kibbe is an assistant professor of government at Franklin and

Marshall College, where she focuses on U.S. foreign policy and intelligence.
Arne Kislenko is a former senior immigration officer at Pearson International

Airport in Toronto, where he worked on many national security cases, and is now
an associate professor of history at Ryerson University and an adjunct professor
of international relations at Trinity College, University of Toronto.
Wolfgang Krieger is a professor of history at Philipps University in Marburg,

Germany.
Ian Leigh is a professor of law and the co-director of the Human Rights Centre
at the University of Durham in the United Kingdom.
xiv contributors
Mark M. Lowenthal is author of Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th

ed., and has served as deputy assistant secretary for functional analysis in the
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, as staff director of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and assistant director of Central
Intelligence for analysis and production.
Frederic F. Manget is a former deputy general counsel and member of the

Senior Intelligence Service at the CIA.
Rose McDermott is a professor of political science at Brown University.
Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei is a research associate at the Center for

Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
William M. Nolte is a former National Security Agency and National

Intelligence Counsel analyst, and former chief of education and training, both for
NSA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and is now a research
professor at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland.
Robert M. Pallitto is an assistant professor of political science at Seton Hall

University in South Orange, New Jersey, and a former trial attorney.
Mark Phythian is a professor of politics and international relations at the

University of Leicester, United Kingdom, and the author, editor, or coeditor of
nine books, including Intelligence in an Insecure World (with Peter Gill).
Paul R. Pillar is a visiting professor and director of studies in the Security

Studies Program at Georgetown University, and retired from a twenty-eight-year
career in the U.S. intelligence community.
Roman Popadiuk is the executive director of the George Bush Presidential

Library Foundation at Texas A&M University, and a retired member of the career
Senior Foreign Service and the first U.S. ambassador to Ukraine in 1992–1993.
Robert W. Pringle is a former foreign service and intelligence officer who

served in Moscow and southern Africa.
Paul J. Redmond is a thirty-four-year veteran of the CIA’s clandestine service

and at the time of retirement was head of counterintelligence at the Agency.
David Robarge is chief historian of the Central Intelligence Agency and

previously served there as a leadership analyst.
Richard L. Russell is a former CIA political-military analyst who now teaches

grand strategy and military operations for Georgetown University’s Security
contributors xv
Studies Program, and the author of Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA
Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right.
Len Scott is a professor of international politics at the University of Wales,

Aberystwyth, where he is director of the Center for Intelligence and International
Security Studies, and coeditor of Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First
Century: Journeys in Shadows.
Jennifer E. Sims is director of intelligence studies and visiting professor in the

Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service.
Stan A. Taylor is an emeritus professor of political science and a research

fellow at the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies at Brigham
Young University in Provo, Utah, and writes frequently on intelligence matters.
Gregory F. Treverton is director of the RAND Corporation’s Center for

Global Risk and Security and a visiting fellow at the Centre for Asymmetric
Threat Studies (CATS), Swedish National Defense College.
Michael Warner is the historian for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
William G. Weaver is director of academic programs at University College at

the University of Texas, El Paso, and writes on governmental secrecy and abuse.
Reg Whitaker is a distinguished research professor emeritus, York University,

and adjunct professor of Political Science, University of Victoria, Canada.
James J. Wirtz is dean of the School of International Graduate Studies at the

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
part i
INTRODUCTION
chapter 1
NATIONAL SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE
loch k. johnson
The purpose of this Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence is to impart

a broad understanding of an important, and relatively new, discipline that focuses
on the hidden side of government: those secret agencies that provide security-
related information to policymakers and carry out other clandestine operations on
their behalf. The Handbook’s objective is to provide a state-of-the art assessment of
the literature and findings in this field of study, often referred to as “strategic intel-
ligence,” or, in this volume, “national security intelligence”—a more accurate title,
since the topic encompasses tactical as well as strategic intelligence. The envisioned
readership includes both specialists and well-educated nonspecialists who would
like to have a synthesis of the current scholarship on espionage and related activi-
ties. The essays collected here seek to map out the discipline and suggest future
research agendas.1
Since 1975, the literature on national security intelligence has burgeoned in the
United States and other countries. In the United States, this growth has been stimu-
lated by public concern over intelligence scandals and failures: illegal domestic spy-
ing, disclosed in 1975; the controversial covert actions labeled the Iran-contra
1
The editor warmly acknowledges the indispensable assistance of David McBride at Oxford
University Press, who approached him with the idea for this Handbook; Alexandra Dauler, also at
Oxford University Press, who guided the projected along the production pathway; Kristin E. Swati
for her computer guidance and many other helpful hints; Gwen Colvin, production editor at
Oxford University Press; Katherine Ulrich, for outstanding copyediting; and the all-star lineup of
authors who graciously met the deadlines on time.
4 introduction
scandal, in 1987; spectacular cases of treason inside the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), revealed in 1994 and 2001,
respectively; the shock of terrorist attacks against the homeland in 2001; and the
faulty prediction that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in 2002.
In the wake of these unfortunate—indeed tragic—events, voluminous reports writ-
ten by government panels of inquiry poured forth, followed by scholarly (and often
not-so-scholarly) books and articles that commented on the scandals and failures,
offered reform proposals, and marshaled data and theory to achieve a better under-
standing of the dark side of government. (See the References at the end of each
chapter for lists of suggested readings.)
Joining the CIA’s well-regarded journal on intelligence, entitled Studies in
Intelligence and published since the 1950s (at first, only in a classified form), came a
number of new journals devoted to scholarship on national security intelligence,
including Cryptologia, published in the United States and focused on codebreaking;
The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, published in the
United States; and Intelligence and National Security, published in United Kingdom.
By 2007–2009, this field of study had become sufficiently mature to warrant three
major handbooks: one published by Routledge, another by Praeger (in five vol-
umes), and now this less specialized, but more comprehensive, overview from
Oxford University Press.2
Starting in the 1970s, I began clipping articles on intelligence from the New
York Times. Before the 9/11 attacks in 2001, my scrapbooks filled slowly, except for
a few days or weeks during the height of an occasional intelligence scandal or
failure, as with the congressional hearings into the Iran-contra affair in 1987. Often
the newspaper was fallow for months with respect to stories on intelligence. Now,
though, there is an article to clip almost every day and certainly every week, stim-
ulated by the 9/11 attacks; the Iraqi WMD failure; squabbling in Washington, D.C.,
over the proper degree of legislative supervision for intelligence activities; contro-
versy over warrantless electronic surveillance in the United States, disclosed in
2004; the intelligence reform drive from 2001 to 2005; and ongoing concerns about
U.S. security vulnerabilities. Even popular magazines, such as The New Yorker,
have dedicated more space than ever in recent years to reporting on intelligence
subjects. The discipline of national security intelligence has come of age in the
public conscience, as well as among journalists and policymakers and within an
expanding pool of researchers in the nation’s think tanks and universities—
although remaining still something of an orphan in mainstream academic studies
(Zegart 2007a).
As exhibited (for example) by the nationalities of contributors to the journal
Intelligence and National Security, a similar evolution of intelligence studies has
been taking place in other countries, too, with an increasingly robust involvement
in the field by scholars in Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as in France,
2
Johnson (2007a); Johnson (2007b).
national security intelligence 5
Germany, Israel, Italy, Austria, Greece, Scandinavia, and Australia. Additional pock-
ets of intelligence research have cropped up in Brazil, Argentina, Poland, and South
Korea (Born, Johnson, and Leigh 2005).
In this Handbook, a wide range of nationalities, career experiences, and schol-
arly training are reflected, underscoring the spread of interest in this subject across
many boundaries. While most of the authors are from the United States, repre-
sented, too, are experts who reside in Australia, Canada, England, Germany, Israel,
Scotland, and Wales. Twenty-three of the contributors are from academe; twenty-
two from intelligence agencies in the United States and the United Kingdom (retired
or still on active duty); eight from the Congress, the judiciary, and government
institutions of higher learning; two with nonprofit study centers; and one associ-
ated with a think tank. Some of the contributors are senior scholars, well known in
the discipline; others are new to the field. The outcome of this mix is a volume rich
in research disciplines, findings, and agendas, with a multitude of international per-
spectives on the subject of national security intelligence.
1. The Meaning of National

Security Intelligence
Put simply, the main purpose of intelligence is to provide information to policy-
makers that may help illuminate their decision options. A leading intelligence offi-
cial has suggested that the goal is one of “eliminating or reducing uncertainty for
government decision-makers” (Clapper 1995). The assumption is that good—that
is, accurate, comprehensive, and timely—information will lead to more effective
choices made by government officials. Of course, policymakers receive information
from a variety of sources, not just the nation’s secret agencies; intelligence is only
one, albeit sometimes a vital, current in the “river of information” (Gates 1994) that
flows through a nation’s capital.
In the United States, a basic (if incomplete) definition of national security intel-
ligence is the “knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us—the prelude
to Presidential decision and action” (Central Intelligence Agency 1991, 13). This defi-
nition points to intelligence as a matter of “situational awareness,” that is, under-
standing events and conditions throughout the world faced by policymakers, diplo-
mats, and military commanders. In this vein, when people speak of “intelligence”
they are usually referring to information—tangible data about personalities and
events around the globe. This information is communicated by intelligence officers
to policymakers in the form of oral briefings, memoranda, and more formal reports,
either short or long, all focused on bringing a leader up-to-date on current events
or investing the policymaker with a more in-depth comprehension of a topic based
on exhaustive research.
6 introduction
The policymaker may want to know the location of terrorists affiliated with Al
Qaeda, the number and whereabouts of Chinese nuclear submarines, or the iden-
tity of nations buying yellow cake uranium from Niger or other nations that have
rich deposits of this element critical for the production of nuclear weaponry.
Military commanders on a battlefront will want to know the weapons capabilities
of adversaries and the location of their war-fighters. The amount of information
that could be valuable in making a political, economic, diplomatic, or military deci-
sion is potentially vast, and its collection is limited only by a nation’s available
resources to fund espionage rings, surveillance satellites, reconnaissance aircraft,
and listening devices, plus its skill in ferreting out pertinent data (“signals”) from
the vast sea of irrelevant information (“noise”).
National security intelligence can refer to more than an information product,
though. It can mean a process as well. Although it is easy enough to state the core
purpose of intelligence—providing information to policymakers—the challenge of
actually gathering, assessing, and delivering useful insights to those who make deci-
sions is an intricate matter. As many a grand strategist has lamented (for example,
Murray and Gimsley 1994), uncertainty and ambiguity dominate the environment
in which decisions are made in Washington, D.C., and every other world capital.
The process of collecting information, along with its analysis and dissemination to
policymakers, is often known as the “intelligence cycle” and, as discussed below, it is
a process replete with chances for error.
Moreover, intelligence may be thought of as a set of missions carried out by a
nation’s secret agencies. The intelligence cycle captures the first and most impor-
tant mission: gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information to policymakers.
A second mission, though, is also significant: counterintelligence (CI)—the respon-
sibility of secret agencies to thwart hostile operations directed against them and
their nation by foreign intelligence services or terrorist organizations. Significant,
too, is a third mission known as covert action (CA), whereby a nation seeks to inter-
vene secretly into the affairs of other nations or factions in hopes of advancing its
own security interests.
Finally, intelligence may refer to a cluster of people and organizations that carry
out the missions of collection-and-analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action.
“Make sure you check with intelligence before bombing that building,” a com-
mander might tell his fighter pilots, urging them to clarify that the recommended
target is truly an arms depot and not a hospital. In the United States, this cluster of
people and organizations is known as the “intelligence community,” consisting of
sixteen agencies and amounting collectively to the largest and most expensive intel-
ligence apparatus in history.
The four meanings of national security intelligence—information, process,
missions, and organizations—receive a closer look in this introduction, since the
rest of the handbook requires a familiarity with these basics. Using the United States
as an illustration, let’s start with intelligence as a set of organizations; then we can
peer inside these structures to examine the dynamic nature of their secret
operations.
2. Intelligence as Organization:
The American Example
The major American intelligence agencies include eight organizations housed
within the framework of the Department of Defense, seven in civilian policy
departments, and one—the CIA—that stands alone as an independent agency. The
military intelligence agencies include the National Security Agency (NSA), the
nation’s codebreaking and “signals intelligence” agency (engaged primarily in tele-
phone eavesdropping); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), dedi-
cated to the gathering of photographic or “imagery” intelligence from cameras
mounted on spy satellites in space, as well as lower-altitude reconnaissance air-
craft; the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which supervises the construc-
tion, launching, and maintenance of the nation’s spy satellites; the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), which conducts assessments of military-related sub-
jects; and the intelligence units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, each
preoccupied with collecting and analyzing tactical intelligence from theaters over-
seas where U.S. personnel serve in uniform. Together, the NSA, NGA NRO, DIA,
and the four service intelligence units account for some 85 percent of the total
annual U.S. intelligence budget of some $75 billion and employs roughly 85 percent
of the nation’s espionage personnel.3 (See figure 1.1 for a current blueprint of the
U.S. intelligence community.)
On the civilian side, seven of the major intelligence agencies include the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), located in the Justice Department and assigned both
a counterintelligence and a counterterrorism mission; a Treasury Department
Office of Intelligence Support, which concentrates on a variety of global financial
topics, such as tracing the flow of petrodollars and the hidden funds of terrorist
organizations; the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR),
the smallest of the secret agencies but one of the most highly regarded, in part
because of its talented corps of foreign service officers; the Energy Department’s
Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, which tracks the worldwide move-
ment of nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium, heavy water, and nuclear reactor
parts) and maintains counterintelligence security at the nation’s weapons laborato-
ries; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which has an intelligence analy-
sis unit; a Coast Guard intelligence service, affiliated with the Department of
Homeland Security; and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), long a
component of the Justice Department and recently elevated to the status of a full-
fledged member of the intelligence community.4
3
The 85 percent figure for funding is from Aspin-Brown Commission (1996, 49), and for
personnel, from the editor’s interviews with U.S. intelligence experts in 2008.
4
For an insightful account of how the Coast Guard became a member of the intelligence
community, see Wirth (2007).
8 introduction
President
President’s
Intelligence Advisory Department of
Board (PIAB) Homeland Security
(DHS)
National Security
Council (NSC)
Intelligence Oversight
Board (IOB) Coast Guard
National Security Adviser Intelligence
Secretary of Defense Department of Justice

Department of Defense Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)
Director of National
National Geospatial- Intelligence (DNI)
intelligence Agency (NGA) Drug Enforcement
Administration
Deputy Directors National Counter- (DEA)
National Reconnaissance of National terrorism
Office (NRO) Intelligence Center
(DDNIs) National (NCTC)
Department of State
Intelligence
Bureau of Intelligence
National Security Council
and Research (INR)
Agency (NSA) (NIC)
Defense Intelligence Department of

Agency (DIA) Central Intelligence Energy
Agency (CIA)
Army, Navy, Air Force

Department of
& Marine Intelligence
Treasury
Military Independent Departmental

Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Agencies
Agencies Agency (Other than Department
of Defense)
Figure 1.1. The U.S. Intelligence Community in 2010.

From 1947 to 2004, a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) led the Intelligence Community,
rather than a Director of National Intelligence.
One more agency, the CIA, is also civilian in character, but is located outside
the government’s policy cabinet. During the Cold War, the CIA—“the Agency,” as
it is known among its officers—held a special cachet as the only espionage orga-
nization formally established by the National Security Act of 1947. More impor-
tant still, it became the location where the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI)—the titular leader of all the intelligence agencies—hung his hat (no woman
has held that position), in a suite of offices on the seventh floor of the Agency’s
Old Headquarters Building in Langley, Virginia, adjacent to the township of
McLean.5
In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act replaced the Office of the
5
DCI with a new position: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or DNI.
As the names imply, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central
Intelligence were meant to reside at the heart of the intelligence establishment, play-
ing the role of coordinators for the community’s activities and the collators of its
“all-source” (all agency) reports, in an otherwise highly fragmented mélange of spy
organizations.6 R. James Woolsey, who held the position of DCI during the early
years of the Clinton administration (1993–1995), has described the role of America’s
intelligence chief. “You’re kind of Chairman and CEO of the CIA,” he stated, “and
you’re kind of Chairman of the Board of the intelligence community” (Woolsey
1993a). He emphasized, though, that the Director does not have the authority to give
“rudder orders” to the heads of the various intelligence agencies (Woolsey served
for a time as Undersecretary of the Navy). Rather, he went on, “it’s more subtle”—a
matter of personal relationships, conversations, and gentle persuasion—the glue of
trust and rapport that is rarely discussed in the government textbooks but is the
essence of successful government transactions.
The CIA’s organizational framework during the Cold War is presented in figure 1.2.
Admiral Stansfield Turner, who served as DCI during the Carter years (1977–1981),
once referred to the four Directorates within the Agency—at the time, Operations,
Administration (now called Support), Science and Technology, and Intelligence—as
“separate baronies,” underscoring the point that the CIA has several different cultures
within its walls that are not always in harmony with one another, or with the Agency’s
leadership cadre on the seventh floor (Turner 1991).7
As figure 1.3 illustrates, during the Cold War (1947–1991) the Directorate of
Operations (DO), led by a deputy director for operations (DDO), was the arm of
the CIA that extended overseas, housed for the most part in U.S. embassies around
the world. Today the DO is known as the National Clandestine Service (NCS). Its
personnel abroad are known as “case officers,” or, in a recent change of nomencla-
ture, “operations officers,” and are led by a chief of station or COS within each
embassy. The job of the case officer is to recruit foreigners to engage in espionage
against their own countries, as well as to support the CIA’s counterintelligence
operations and covert actions. For this recruitment effort, case officers need to be
gregarious individuals: charming, persuasive, and daring. To fall under their beguil-
ing spell is to be “case officered” or “COed.”8
Back at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, analysts in the Directorate of
Intelligence (DI) interpret the “raw” (unanalyzed) information gathered by opera-
tions officers and their local recruits, as well as by America’s spy satellites and other
machines. The job of the analysts—the Agency’s intellectuals—is to provide insight
6
On the evolution of the American intelligence establishment, see Corson (1977);
Jeffreys-Jones (1989); Lowenthal (2005); Ranelagh (1986); Ransom (1970); Richelson (2008); and
Stuart (2008).
7
For a vivid description of his difficulties in trying to manage the CIA, let alone the larger
intelligence community, see Turner (1985).
8
For a fictional, but realistic, glimpse into the life of a case officer (C/O) and the difficulties
of recruiting spies abroad, see Weissberg (2008).
Director,
Central
Office of National Intelligence Director
Inspector General
Legislative Intelligence Intelligence
General Counsel
Liaison Council Deputy Director, Community
Central Intelligence Staff
Executive Director
Public Affairs
Comptroller
Office
Deputy Director Deputy Director Deputy Director Deputy Director

for for for for
Operations Science & Technology Intelligence Administration
Office of Research Office of Office of Scientific Office of
& Development Soviet Analysis and Weapons Research Medical Services
Office of Development Office of Office of
Office of Security
& Engineering European Analysis Global Issues
Foreign Broadcast Office of Near Eastern Office of Office of Training
Information Service & South Asian Analysis Imagery Analysis & Education
Office of Signal Intelligence Office of Office of Current Produc- Office of Finance
(SIGINT) Operations East Asian Analysis tion and Analytic Support
Office of Office African & Office of Office of Logistics
Technical Service Latin American Analysis Central Reference
National Photographic Office of
Interpretation Center Information Services
Office of
Data Processing
Office of
Communications
Office of Personnel
Figure 1.2. The Organizational Framework of the CIA at the End of the Cold War.
Fact Book on Intelligence, Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (April 1983), p. 9.
Directorate of Operations
Deputy Director for

Operations (DDO)
Covert Special Counter- Other

Counter- Counter-
Action Operations Intelligence Specialized
Terrorism Narcotics
Staff (CAS) (SO) Staff (CIS) Staffs
Regional Divisions
Soviet, Near East Western

Europe Africa
East Europe East Asia Hemisphere
Specific
Countries
Chief
of Station
(COS)
CIA
Officers
Assets
Figure 1.3. The Organizational Framework of the CIA’s Directorate

of Operations during the Cold War.
into what the information means with respect to the global interests and security of
the United States. The Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) is the home
of the CIA’s “Dr. Q” scientists and assorted other “techno-weenies” who develop
equipment to aid the espionage effort, from wigs and other disguises to tiny listen-
ing devices and exotic weapons. The Directorate of Support (DS) is where managers
reside who conduct periodic polygraph tests on employees and otherwise ensure
the maintenance of tight security. Both DS&T and the DS offer support to NCS field
activities abroad and DI analysis at home.
All of the intelligence agencies exist to carry out operations at the request of the
president and other senior policy officials. The most important of these operations—
Mission No. 1—is the gathering and interpretation (analysis) of information about
world events and conditions, guided by the theoretical construct known as the “intel-
ligence cycle”—the process by which information is brought from the field to the
White House.
12 introduction
3. Intelligence as Process
The Intelligence Cycle

Despite its simplification of a complex process, the “intelligence cycle” offers a use-
ful analytic construct for understanding how the secret agencies gather, interpret,
and disseminate information.9 Intelligence professionals refer to the first step in the
cycle as “planning and direction” (see figure 1.4).
Planning and Direction

The initial stage of the intelligence cycle is critical. Unless a potential target is clearly
highlighted during the listing of intelligence priorities (“requirements”) by Washington
Planning
and Direction
New
Requirement
Dissemination
Collection
Analysis and
Production
Processing
Figure 1.4. The Intelligence Cycle in the United States.

Adapted from Factbook on Intelligence, Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, October 1993, p. 14.
9
For a critique of the complex reality behind the simplified theoretical abstraction of the
“cycle,” see Hulnick (2007).
officials, it is unlikely to receive much attention by those with responsibilities for col-
lecting information in the field. The world is a large and fractious place, with more
than 200 nations and a plethora of groups, factions, gangs, cartels, and terrorist groups,
some of whom have a sharply adversarial relationship with the United States. As DCI
Woolsey observed soon after the end of the Cold War, the United States had slain the
Soviet dragon, but “we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poison-
ous snakes” (Woolsey 1993a). However much prelapsarians might have longed for the
sunlit uplands of a new and peaceful era after the demise of the Soviet Union, realists
properly anticipated a future still dark and filled with menace. At some point the
degree of danger posed by foreign adversaries (or domestic subversives) becomes self-
evident, as in the case of the Qaeda terrorist organization in the wake of its surprise
attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, though, no one
in the government—or anywhere else—has a crystal ball to predict exactly when and
where danger will strike. Part of the dilemma stems from the fact that we live in a
world filled not just with secrets but with mysteries.
By secrets, intelligence experts (for example: Nye 1994, Treverton 1994) refer to
something that the United States might be able to find out, even though the infor-
mation is concealed by another nation or group, say, the number of tanks and
nuclear submarines in the Chinese military inventory. With the use of satellites and
other surveillance methods, the United States can determine that number. Some
secrets, though, are much harder to acquire, such as the whereabouts of terrorist
leaders, or the precise vault in Tehran that contains Iran’s nuclear weapons plans. At
least, though, there is a chance of gaining access to this information. In contrast,
mysteries are things we are unlikely to know about until they happen, because they
lie beyond the ken of human capacity to foresee. For example, no one can tell who
will be the next chancellor of Germany, or what breakthroughs in the invention of
new strategic weaponry the Chinese may achieve in the next decade. As former
Secretary of State Dean Rusk liked to point out (Rusk 1988), “Providence has not
provided human beings with the capacity to pierce the fog of the future.”
Rwanda provides an illustration of how difficult it can be to anticipate unfold-
ing world events. Les Aspin once told me (Aspin 1994): “When I became Secretary
of Defense [in 1993 at the beginning of the Clinton Administration], I served several
months without ever giving Rwanda a thought. Then, for several weeks, that’s all
I thought about. After that, it fell abruptly off the screen and I never again thought
about Rwanda.” The African nation had become the “flavor of the month” for poli-
cymakers and, in turn, intelligence officers scrambled to meet the information needs
of Secretary Aspin and others about why Rwanda was in turmoil. Similarly, two
decades earlier in 1963, who in Washington anticipated that within a year Vietnam
would become one of the most important intelligence priorities for the United
States, and would remain so for a decade? In 1989, or again in 2002, who placed Iraq
at the zenith of America’s security concerns, as it would become a year later in each
instance?
In the United States, the task of determining intelligence priorities is often known
as “threat assessment.” Experts and policymakers gather periodically to evaluate the
14 introduction
perils that confront the nation. They establish a ladder of priorities from the
most dangerous threats (often designated “Tiers 1A and 1B”) to the least dangerous
(“Tier 4”). A special category (“Tier 0”) is reserved for crisis situations that might
suddenly require immediate U.S. military intervention (Garthoff 2005, 240).
Important, too, are calculations about possible global opportunities for the United
States. Intelligence is expected to provide a “heads up” regarding both threats and
opportunities. Bias and guesswork enter into the picture, along with the limitations
caused by the inherent opaqueness of the future. On which tier should one place
China in the threat assessment? Iran? Syria? What about the Russian Federation,
which is now less hostile toward the United States than during the Cold War, but
still retains the capacity to destroy every American metropolis from Los Angeles to
New York City in the thirty-minute witchfire of a nuclear holocaust? What about
Cuba, benign enough to some in recent years, but for others still a pesky and unpre-
dictable neighbor?
Around the Cabinet Room in the White House the arguments fly regarding the
proper hierarchy of concerns, as senior policy and intelligence officials attempt to
assess the world’s risks and opportunities. This is not an academic exercise. The
outcome determines the priorities for the multibillion-dollar spending that occurs
each year on intelligence collection-and-analysis. It also pinpoints locations on
the world map where spies will be infiltrated; telephones and computers tapped;
surveillance satellites set into orbit; reconnaissance aircraft dispatched on overflight
missions; and potentially lethal covert actions aimed.
Over the years, the United States has undertaken several major inquiries into
the activities of the intelligence agencies. Each has concluded that one of the most
significant flaws in the intelligence cycle is the failure of policymakers to clarify,
during the initial planning-and-direction phase of the intelligence cycle, exactly
what kinds of information they need. All too frequently, intelligence officers are left
in the dark about the “wish list” of top policy officials, who in turn are inclined to
assume that somehow the secret agencies will divine and respond to whatever issues
await action in the policy in-boxes of the White House, the State Department, and
other important places around Washington.
Further, as a rule, policymakers are reluctant to take the time to update their list
of collection priorities for the intelligence agencies (a responsibility called “task-
ing”), even annually. So the right hand of intelligence often remains ignorant about
the left hand of policy deliberations. Some staffers in the nation’s top forum for
security deliberations, the National Security Council (NSC), have been on the job
for a year or more and have never met—or even talked on a secure telephone—with
experienced intelligence analysts working in their same areas of responsibility,
whether arms control or global environmental issues (Inderfurth and Johnson
2004; Johnson 2000).
The ultimate question for planners is: how much intelligence is enough? That,
in turn, depends on the chances a nation is willing to take about the future—how
much “information insurance” they desire. It depends, as well, on the global inter-
ests a nation may have ( Johnson 2003). I once asked former DCI William E. Colby
(1973–1976) if the United States gathered too much intelligence. “Not for a big
nation,” he replied (Colby 1991). “If I were Israel, I’d spend my time on the neigh-
boring Arab armies and I wouldn’t give a damn about what happened in China. We
are a big power and we’ve got to worry about all of the world.”
Intelligence Collection and the Ints

The second stage in the intelligence cycle is collection: going after the information
that planners and policymakers designate. During the Cold War, the highest intel-
ligence priority was to learn about the locations and capabilities of Soviet weap-
onry, especially nuclear devices (Goodman 2007). This was sometimes a dangerous
endeavor, as underscored by the more than forty U.S. spy planes shot down during
the Cold War period.
Intelligence can provide “cat’s eyes in the dark,” in the British phrase, although
without necessarily being able to say precisely when or where something will hap-
pen. Even wealthy superpowers are unable to saturate the globe completely with
expensive surveillance “platforms” designed for “remote sensing”—reconnaissance
aircraft, satellites, and ground-based listening posts. The world is simply too vast.
Nevertheless, satellite photography (“imagery”) helped to tamp down the hair-
trigger anxieties of the superpowers during the Cold War. Through their use of
satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, both ideological encampments could confi-
dently spy on the missilery and armies of their opponents. As a consequence, a Pearl
Harbor–like surprise attack became an unlikely possibility and this transparency
allowed a relaxation of tensions in Moscow and Washington. Moreover, intelligence
guides today’s high-tech, precision weapons systems to their targets, by providing
accurate maps, as well as data on weather and terrain contours.
Each of the U.S. intelligence agencies has a set of methods (“tradecraft”), known
colloquially within the world of intelligence by the abbreviation “ints,” that is, intel-
ligence activities (Lowenthal 2009). Imagery or photographic intelligence becomes
“imint,” short for imagery intelligence (or “geoint,” for geospatial intelligence), and
signals intelligence becomes “sigint.” Human intelligence—the use of agents or
“assets,” as professionals refer to the foreign operatives who comprise their spy
rings—becomes “humint.”10 Within each of the ints, intelligence professionals
attempt to fashion ingenious methods for purloining secrets from America’s adver-
saries, say, the laptop computer of a foreign government scientist in charge of weap-
ons engineering.11 These espionage methods can range from highly sophisticated
devices that watch foreign military maneuvers through telescopic lens on satellites
orbiting hundreds of miles away in deep space, to the planting of miniature micro-
phones in the breasts of pigeons trained to roost on the window ledges of foreign
10
On imint (geoint), see Burrows (1986); on sigint, Bamford (1984); and on humint, Hitz
(2004).
11
As DCI R. James Woolsey once stated in a 1994 speech: “What we really exist for is stealing
secrets” (Wise 1999, M2).
16 introduction
embassies in Washington, or overseas (Gertz 1994). Best of all would be a reliable

human asset close to top decision-makers in another country, perhaps a staff aide
or a mistress.
Another prominent int is “osint” or open-sources intelligence: information
gleaned from nonsecretive origins, such as libraries, the Internet, the media, and—
sometimes difficult to acquire in closed societies—public speeches by foreign offi-
cials. Is there information in the public domain about airplane runways in Rwanda
and whether they can support the weight of a U.S. C-47, or must CIA agents acquire
this data from secret sources? What about the density of the sand in the deserts near
Tehran: is it firm enough for the landing of U.S. helicopters? (This was an important
intelligence question in 1979, when the Carter Administration was planning a rescue
of U.S. diplomats held inside the U.S. embassy in Iran’s capital city.) During World
War II, osint was often all the United States had to guide its armed forces and dip-
lomats. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk recalled from his days as a young officer in
Army intelligence or G-2 in 1941 (Rusk 1963, 390):
I was asked to take charge of a new section that had been organized to cover
everything from Afghanistan right through southern Asia, southeast Asia,
Australia, and the Pacific…. Because we had no intelligence organization that had
been giving attention to that area up to that time, the materials available to me
when I reported for duty consisted of a tourist handbook on India and Ceylon, a
1924 military attaché’s report from London on the Indian Army, and a drawer full
of clippings from the New York Times that had been gathered since World War
One. That was literally the resources of G-2 on that vast part of the world a year
after the war in Europe had started.
“The intelligence agencies are not in business to be the Brookings Institution,”

a senior intelligence official has emphasized (Tenet 1994), referring to the promi-
nent think tank in Washington, D.C. “They’re in business to provide clandestine
information.” Nonetheless, he continues, “there is a certain amount of overt infor-
mation that is necessary to do that job.” Open-sources information can make clear
what data is still missing and will have to be obtained through clandestine methods.
Since the end of the Cold War, roughly 90 percent—some say as much as 95 per-
cent—of all intelligence reports are comprised of osint. A contemporary example of
useful osint are Iranian blogs on the Internet, which offer revealing glimpses into
that secretive society.
The “golden nuggets” of intelligence acquired by way of the secret ints (docu-
ments lifted by a CIA asset from a Beijing government safe, for instance) are folded
into the much larger osint mix. No organizations in Washington are better equipped
and experienced than the intelligence agencies for the melding of this secret and
public information—quickly and in a readable, bound form. Several of the secret
agencies have been refining this skill since the early days of the Cold War and have
become efficient at the compilation, printing, and rapid delivery of intelligence
reports to key offices around Washington—a kind of fresh, direct “pizza delivery
service” of information.
The newest int—measurement and signatures intelligence or “masint”—can be

useful, too. Here the methodology involves testing for the presence of telltale gases,
or other chemical and biological indicators, that might reveal the presence of illicit
materials, say, waste fumes in a factory that point to the production of the nerve gas
sarin. Or electronic emissions from a weapons system that might disclose its speci-
fications, perhaps revealing the presence of nuclear materials inside the metal cas-
ing of a bomb. Between 1994 and 2008, for example, the Energy Department’s Office
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence reportedly spent some $430 million on
nuclear detection equipment at international border crossings, especially along
Russia’s frontiers (Bronner 2008, A27).
Humint versus Techint

Another broad distinction made within the intelligence agencies is between humint
and technical intelligence or “techint”—the latter an abbreviation that lumps
together all of the machine-based intelligence-collection activities (see Richelson
2001, Wallace and Melton, with Schlesinger 2008). The vast majority of monies
spent on collection goes into techint. This category includes: imint (geoint) and
sigint satellites; large NSA listening antennae; and reconnaissance aircraft, like the
U-2 and A-12 spy planes, and their successor the SR-21, as well as the popular
Predator, a pilotless aircraft (a drone or unmanned aerial vehicle—UAV) fielded
over Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nations in the Middle East and South Asia follow-
ing the 9/11 attacks.
Understandably awed by the technological capabilities of spy machines, offi-
cials were inclined during the Cold War to readily approve appropriations for their
construction and deployment; Washington policymakers and their military com-
manders in the field wanted photographs of Soviet tanks and missile silos, and tran-
scripts of telephone conversations between officials in communist capitals. Less
sexy were humint assets, whose identities remained concealed from budget officials,
and whose yield is comparatively meager—no hundreds of photographs a day, as
produced by U.S. surveillance satellites. This fascination for intelligence hardware
has continued into the Age of Terrorism.
The United States devotes just a single-digit percentage of the annual intelli-
gence budget to humint (Millis 1994, A15). Spy machines are costly, while human
agents are inexpensive to hire and sustain on an annual stipend. One of the ironies of
American intelligence is that while the vast percentage of its annual budget goes into
expensive intelligence hardware, especially satellites, the value of these machines is
questionable in helping the United States understand such contemporary global
concerns as terrorism or China’s burgeoning economic might. Cameras on satellites
or airplanes are unable to peer inside the canvas tents, roofed mud huts, or mountain
caves in Afghanistan or Pakistan, where terrorists gather to plan their deadly opera-
tions, or into the deep underground caverns where North Koreans have constructed
atomic weapons. “Space cameras cannot see into factories where missiles are made,
or into the sheds of shipyards,” emphasizes an intelligence expert (Zuckerman
18 introduction
1982, 130). “Photographs cannot tell whether stacks of drums outside an assumed
chemical-warfare plant contain nerve gas or oil, or whether they are empty.”
Further, many of the best contributions from spy machines come not so much
from pricey satellites as from the far less expensive UAVs. On occasion, though,
sigint satellites do capture revealing telephone communications, say, between inter-
national drug lords. Moreover, the photography that imint satellites produce on
such matters as Russian and Chinese missile sites, North Korean troop deployments,
Hamas rocket emplacements in Gaza, or the secretive construction of nuclear reac-
tors in Iran, are of obvious importance. In the case of terrorism, though, one would
prefer to have a human agent well situated inside the Qaeda organization. For
America’s security, such an asset could be worth a dozen billion-dollar satellites.
Yet, humint has its distinct limitations, too. It is worth stressing that inside
closed societies like Iraq in 2002, or North Korea and Iran today, local spies are dif-
ficult to recruit—especially since Americans have focused for decades on the com-
munist world and largely ignored the study of languages, history, and culture
necessary to recruit and operate spies in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. How
many Americans speak Pashto, Arabic, and Farsi well? How many can comprehend
the nuances of slang and various dialects in those regions of the world? The answers
are: very few. And how many are willing to serve as operational officers for govern-
ment pay in perilous locations, trying to recruit local assets? Again, few. Moreover,
even if successfully recruited, indigenous assets can be untrustworthy. They are
neither Boy Scouts nor nuns, but often the dregs of society, driven by greed and
absent any moral compass.
Foreign assets sometimes fabricate reports, sell information to the highest bid-
der, and scheme as false defectors or double-agents. A recent example of the risks
involved in humint is the German agent in Iraq during 2002, Rafid Ahmed Alwan,
prophetically codenamed “Curve Ball.” He managed to convince the German intel-
ligence service that WMDs did exist in Iraq; and the CIA, in turn, took this bait
through its intelligence liaison relationship with the Germans. Only after the war
began in Iraq in 2003 did Curve Ball’s bona fides fall into doubt among German and
CIA intelligence officials; he was, it turned out, a consummate liar (CBS News
2007).
Now and then, however, a humint asset can provide extraordinarily helpful
information, as did the Soviet military intelligence officer Oleg Penkovsky during
the Cold War. Information from him helped the United States identify the presence
of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. With the occasional successes like
Penkosky in mind, the United States and most other countries persevere in their
quest for reliable and productive espionage agents, even though the cost-benefit
ratio will be poor in most years.
Synergy is important, as well, for effective intelligence collection. DCI Woolsey
once offered the example of North Korea. “That nation is so closely guarded that
humint becomes indispensable to know what is going on,” he told me (Woolsey
1993b). “This humint then tips off sigint possibilities, which in turn may suggest
where best to gather imint. These capabilities, ideally, dovetail with one another.”
A controversial form of intelligence collection is the use of harsh interrogation

techniques against captured terrorist suspects. This approach can involve “extraor-
dinary rendition,” whereby the CIA essentially grabs a suspect off a street in another
country and flies him to a foreign capitol (Cairo is reportedly a favorite) for ques-
tioning by local intelligence officers unrestrained by U.S. legal and ethical prohibi-
tions against brutal cross-examination techniques—as if this handoff absolved the
Agency of complicity just because its officers were absent from the room when the
electrodes were attached to a victim. Although the CIA has occasionally resorted to
such collection methods itself (for example, using the technique of waterboarding,
a form of torture that simulates drowning), this kind of tradecraft has been widely
discredited. The editor of Newsweek International, for example, has noted that “the
best sources of intelligence on jihadi cells have tended to come from within locali-
ties and neighborhoods [that is, from local humint]. This information has probably
been more useful than any we have obtained from waterboarding or sleep depriva-
tion” (Zakaria 2006, 9; see, also: Cole and Dempsey 2006; Fisher 2008; Goldsmith
2007; Johnson 2007c).
Processing
In the third stage of the cycle, the intelligence that has been collected—perhaps
intercepted telephone conversations in Farsi or stolen Syrian government docu-
ments—must be converted into usable information, that is, translated into English,
decoded if necessary, and put into a form that the president and other officials can
readily comprehend. This is known as processing: the conversion of “raw” intelli-
gence, whether photographs or telephone intercepts, into a readable format.
Intelligence pours into the U.S. secret agencies “like a firehose held to the
mouth,” to use a metaphor made popular by a former director of the National
Security Agency, Admiral Noel Gayler ( Johnson 1985, 83). He had become exasper-
ated by all the information rushing into his agency from sigint satellites, huge listen-
ing antennae located around the globe, and thousands of small eavesdropping
devices planted by CIA and NSA teams in various countries. Each day, hundreds of
satellite photographs arrive at the NGA; and about four million telephone, fax, and
email intercepts, often in difficult codes that must be deciphered, flood the NSA.
The volume is unlikely to dissipate. For example, every minute a thousand people
around the world sign up for a new cell phone. Moreover, the United States is always
short on translators, photo-interpreters, and codebreaking mathematicians. In
response to a query about the major problems facing U.S. intelligence, no wonder
Admiral Mike McConnell remarked when he was NSA director: “I have three major
problems: processing, processing, and processing” ( Johnson 1994).
As the public now knows, the day before the 9/11 attacks the NSA intercepted a
telephone message in Farsi from a suspected Qaeda operative. Translated on
September 12th—too late to be of any use—the message proclaimed: “Tomorrow is
zero hour” (Woodward 2004, 215). Whether a more rapid translation might have led
to a tightening of U.S. airport security procedures on the morning of 9/11 and
20 introduction
thwarted the attacks is anyone’s guess, but it may well have. The point, though, is
that as things stand today the vast majority of information gathered by America’s
intelligence agencies is never examined; it gathers dust in warehouses—the fate of
an estimated 90 percent of what the intelligence community collects, and as much
as 99 percent of the telephone intercepts swept in by the NSA (Millis 1998; Bamford
1984). Here is a supreme challenge for the government’s information-technology
specialists: improving the nation’s capacity to sift rapidly through collected intelli-
gence data, separating out the signals from the noise.
Analysis
At the heart and soul of the intelligence cycle is the next phase: analysis. At this
stage, the task is to bring meaning and insight to the information that has been col-
lected and processed—what the British refer to as “assessment.” The method is
straightforward: hire the smartest people you can find to pore over all the available
information from open and secret sources, in an attempt to understand better what
is happening in the world. If the intelligence community is unable to provide reli-
able insights into what all the collected information means, each of the preceding
stages in the intelligence cycle is for naught. For example, it is one thing to have
discovered in 2000 that a group of terrorists convened in Kuala Lumpur (as did
members of the 9/11 Qaeda attack team), but what policy officials really needed to
know is why the meeting took place and what schemes were hatched. What were the
specific implications of the secret terrorist rendezvous for America’s security? This
information was never acquired and analyzed.
Here’s the bad news: intelligence analysts will always be taken by surprise from
time to time, because of human limitations on the accurate forecasting of events
(Betts 2007). This brings us back to the dilemma of incomplete information and the
uncertain light of the future. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk once suggested
to me that all intelligence reports ought to start off with the honest caveat, “We
really don’t know what is going to happen, but here is our best guess” (Rusk 1988).
There is good news, too, however. For the roughly $75 billion it spends each year
on intelligence today (over double the figure from 1994, in constant dollars), the
United States is able to deploy the largest and—at least in terms of spy machines—
the most sophisticated espionage apparatus ever devised by humankind. This brings
in a torrent of information, some of which is quite useful. Further, the federal gov-
ernment has been able to attract into the intelligence agencies many good minds to
interpret the findings. The secret agencies are expert, as well, in packaging and deliv-
ering their best judgments to the right people in government in a timely manner.
Yet, despite all this intelligence sophistication, things still go wrong. Perhaps noth-
ing illustrates this reality better than the information failures associated with the 9/11
attacks and the misjudgment about the existence of WMDs in Iraq (Betts 2007; Clarke
2004; Johnson 2006; Risen 2006; Tenet with Harlow 2007; Zegart 2007b). Many of the
essays in this book shed light on why such failures occur before, during, and after the
analytic phase of the intelligence cycle and what might be done to limit them.
Dissemination
Finally, intelligence reports must be distributed to those who make decisions on
behalf of the United States. This may seem easy enough, but even this stage of the
cycle is rife with possibilities for mistakes. Former DCI Robert Gates once observed
(1994) that “we have twenty-first century methods for collecting information and
getting it back to Washington, and eighteenth century methods for getting it to
policymakers.” As the first U.S. intelligence director after the Cold War, he proposed
the use of advanced desktop computer technologies to keep policymakers informed
of the latest intelligence; but members of the policy community, like the Luddite
parents of high-tech teenagers, proved reluctant to embrace these new “virtual”
methods. A closer examination of intelligence dissemination returns us to the ques-
tion of intelligence as an informational product—the “value added” by key data
provided to policymakers in reports like the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).
4. Intelligence as Information
The President’s Daily Brief is the most prestigious report on current world events
and is distributed to only the President and a few other top policymakers in the
government of the United States. The National Intelligence Estimate is a longer,
more in-depth study of a topic—say, the future leadership succession in China. It
has a wider dissemination, but is still limited to top officials.12
Intelligence must have several essential characteristics for it to be helpful to poli-
cymakers. Ideally, it will be relevant, timely, accurate, complete, and unbiased. It must
also be “actionable” (sometimes referred to as “tactical” by intelligence officers)—
that is, specific enough to allow policy officials to act upon the information.
Relevance is essential. If the president wants to know about the activities of
insurgents in Baghdad, but the CIA analyst is concentrating on the subject of his
Ph.D. thesis—leadership succession in the Mongolian People’s Army—the presi-
dent will be poorly served and unhappy about the quality of intelligence support.
The president and other officials are driven by fires in their in-boxes; they want
answers to these immediate problems. If intelligence fails to know about these fires
and address them, it will be ignored.
Timeliness is equally vital. The most disquieting acronym an analyst can see
scrawled across his or her intelligence report by a policymaker is OBE—“overtaken
by events.” Reports on the whereabouts of Qaeda terrorists are especially perishable,
as the Clinton Administration found out in 1999. That year, the President autho-
rized the firing of cruise missiles from American warships in the Red Sea to take out
the Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, who was (according to local intelligence assets)
12
On the PDB and the NIE, see Johnson (2008).
22 introduction
bivouacked in the Zhawar Kili region of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Bin Laden

departed the terrorist enclave of tents just a few hours before the missiles came
streaking low across the Paktia Province headed for the encampment.
Accuracy, too, is indispensable. Just ask the NATO pilot whom the U.S. intelli-
gence agencies provided with targeting coordinates over Belgrade in 1999 to guide
his bombing of a suspected Serbian weapons depot, only to discover after he had
released his payload that the building was actually the Chinese embassy. Several
Chinese diplomats and journalists on the premise were killed.
By complete intelligence, I mean information and analysis based on the combined
data available from each of the intelligence services—a holistic integration of “all-
source” information. In creating the CIA, one of President Harry S. Truman’s objec-
tives was to eliminate the separate piles of intelligence reports from different agencies
that accumulated each morning on his desk in the Oval Office. He wanted them
replaced with a smaller number of coordinated and collated reports—sometimes
referred to as “all-source fusion,” “multi-int,” or, in the military, “jointness.” All-source
reports capitalize on the synergism possible from bringing together each of the ints
from the various agencies to create a more coherent picture of world events and
conditions—a jigsaw puzzle or mosaic replete with as many pieces as possible (though
inevitably, in the real world, with many missing pieces).
Unbiased intelligence is also high on the list of desirable intelligence qualities—
the highest of all, according to most experts. Here the goal is to keep information
free of political spin. Analysts are expected to assess facts and their possible mean-
ings in a neutral, dispassionate manner, just like scholars and journalists. For the
most part, intelligence officers maintain this ethos; occasionally, though, a few suc-
cumb to pressures from the White House or some other high office to deliver “intel-
ligence to please”—information that supports the prevailing political views of an
administration, rather than speaking truth to power about the unpleasant reality
that its policies have failed or are likely to fail. On the flip side, policymakers in high
office ideally will have the courage to hear the truth, rather than brush it aside as
President Lyndon B. Johnson did with intelligence reports that brought him bad
news about the war in Vietnam during the 1960s (Hughes 1974).
As for actionable intelligence, if reports from the CIA are vague—“our warning
indicators are blinking red and terrorists may strike the United States at any time”—
they have limited value. Of course, a vague warning (if reliable) is better than no
warning at all and can alert Americans to hunker down; but infinitely better is to
know when, where, and how terrorists are going to strike. “Qaeda operatives will try
to board commercial airplanes in Boston next Wednesday at 8:30 a.m.”—here is the
level of detail that one hopes for. If this degree of specificity can be achieved, the
intelligence agencies will have scored a home run with bases loaded in the ninth
inning of a tied game. An information coup of this magnitude will be a rarity; but
it remains the goal, and one that is sometimes achieved.
These qualities of intelligence reporting add up to a tall order and indicate
why errors occur throughout the intelligence cycle. In an effort to reduce the num-
ber of mistakes, the lion’s share of the annual intelligence budget has gone toward
supporting each phase of the cycle: from planning, collection (the most expensive),
and processing, to analysis and dissemination. The ultimate irony of intelligence is
that, even when secret reports achieve a high level of perfection, policymakers may
reject or twist them because they fail to fit into their hopes and preconceptions. As
Pushkin put it in his poem, entitled “The Hero,” “Uplifting illusion is dearer to us
than a host of truths.”
5. Intelligence as a Set of Missions

While intelligence as information, the end product of the intelligence cycle, is the
most important mission for a nation’s secret agencies, covert action and counterin-
telligence are prominent, too. Neither of these latter two missions were mentioned
specifically in the National Security Act of 1947 that founded the modern U.S. intel-
ligence community; both, however, quickly evolved into core and sometimes con-
troversial responsibilities. Now and then, covert action has attracted more support
than the phases of the intelligence cycle, becoming the tail that wagged the dog.
Covert Action
The covert action mission is nothing less than an attempt by the United States to
change the course of history through the use of secret operations against another
country, terrorist group, or faction—“giving history a push,” suggests a senior CIA
operative (Johnson 1986). These sometimes-controversial activities consist of propa-
ganda operations (say, planting newspaper articles abroad with the help of a “media
asset,” or secretly leafleting against a cause anathema to American interests); political
activities (behind-the-scenes election campaigns against adversaries, providing
money and advertising for friends); attempts to disrupt the economies of adversaries
(counterfeiting foreign currencies, blowing up power plants, mining harbors); and
paramilitary initiatives (supplying weapons to friends overseas, advising surrogates
in secret wars against common adversaries, engaging in assassination plots).13
Although out of favor with some administrations, others have spent enormous
sums of money on covert action. A prominent example is the bold use of this “quiet
option” in Nicaragua and Afghanistan during the Reagan years. For proponents of
this hidden and aggressive approach to American foreign policy, the 1980s were a
Golden Age—the historical high point of spending on, and high-level attention to,
secret intervention abroad ( Johnson 1996).
Covert action is tricky in more than one sense of the word. Its outcome can be
highly unpredictable; history is known to push back. In 1953, this approach—chiefly
13
See Daugherty (2004); Johnson (1989; 1996); Prados (2007); Treverton (1987); Weiner
(2007) Gelb (1975); Church Committee (1975a); Wilford (2008).
24 introduction
the instrument of covert propaganda—permitted the United States and the United
Kingdom to depose the incumbent leader of Iran, Mohammad Mossadeq, and install
the Shah, who was more friendly toward the West’s primary interest in the region:
access to cheap oil. Then, the very next year, the CIA managed—again mainly through
the use of propaganda operations—to frighten the leader of Guatemala, Jacobo
Arbenz, out of office after he threatened to nationalize the United Fruit Company, an
American banana-importing corporation.14 It all seemed so easy. An irritant on the
world stage? Send in the CIA—far less noisy than deploying the Marines and quicker
than diplomacy. Similar efforts to overthrow Fidel Castro of Cuba in 1961 demon-
strated, though, that this philosophy of foreign policy by CIA paramilitary opera-
tions was less simple than it was simpleminded; covert action as a panacea for
America’s foreign policy woes crashed at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 (Wyden 1979).15
The two major Reagan Administration covert actions, in Nicaragua and in
Afghanistan, further underscored the unpredictability of this modus operandi.
Congress closed down CIA paramilitary operations (PM ops) against the Marxist
regime in Nicaragua, believing they were unnecessary. This action by lawmakers
drove the Reagan Administration underground; it decided to pursue paramilitary
methods against the Nicaraguan regime by means other than the CIA, despite the
legal ban. The result was the creation of a secret “self-sustaining, off-the-shelf,
stand-alone” paramilitary organization—“The Enterprise”—outside the official
government. This subterfuge produced the Iran-contra scandal (Hamilton-Inouye
Committee 1987; Cohen and Mitchell 1988). Against the Soviets in Afghanistan,
however, PM ops properly authorized by the President and the Congress proved
remarkably successful, in large part as a result of stinger missiles supplied by the
CIA to the anti-communist mujahideen forces in Afghanistan. These weapons gave
the Afghan fighters (many of whom would later become members of Al Qaeda) the
capacity to shoot down Soviet military aircraft and led Moscow to have second
thoughts about continuing the war (Coll 2004; Crill 2003).
Often there are long-range unanticipated consequences of covert action. In the
Guatemalan coup of 1954, for example, the United Fruit Company was no doubt
pleased at the outcome; but the impoverished citizens of that nation have lived under
repressive regimes ever since this CIA intervention. As journalist Anthony Lewis
writes (1997, A19), “The coup began a long national descent into savagery.” Moreover,
after twenty-six years of repressive rule by the Shah in Iran, the people of that nation
rose up in revolt in 1979 and threw their support behind the nation’s mullahs and a
fundamentalist religious regime—one that is still at odds with the United States.
14
See, respectively: the memoir written by the CIA’s lead operative in the Iranian coup,
Roosevelt (1981), as well as on the Guatemalan coup, Immerman (1982); Wise and Ross (1964); and
Chapman (2008). These covert actions were not blood free, though, by any means. For example, in
Guatemala at least forty-three of the CIA’s local “rebels” were killed in the covert action (Weiner
1977, A11).
15
On intelligence failures more broadly, see Johnson (2007d).
Even the celebrated ousting of the Soviets from Afghanistan during the 1980s
had a down side. The Soviet defeat set the stage for the rise of the fundamentalist
Taliban regime, which in turn provided a haven for Al Qaeda during the time when
its leaders approved the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States. Moreover, the
stinger missiles (shoulder-held rockets that could bring down not just Soviet war-
planes but any nation’s commercial airlines) were never returned to the CIA,
remaining in the hands of Qaeda terrorists, Taliban extremists, and Iranians who
purchased them on the open market from mujahideen warriors after the Soviets
fled Afghanistan. “You get all steamed up backing a rebel group for reasons that are
yours and not theirs,” President John F. Kennedy’s national security adviser,
McGeorge Bundy (1987), once cautioned. “Your reasons run out of steam and theirs
do not.”
Although they never succeeded, the CIA’s assassination plots against foreign
heads of state (Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of Congo, among oth-
ers) eventually became known to the world and portrayed the United States as a
global Godfather (Church Committee 1975a). This was hardly the image most
Americans desired in a Cold War contest with the Communist nations to win the
allegiance of other nations toward the United States and its presumably more
benevolent form of government (Church 1976).
Of course, one person’s perception of long-term negative effects may be coun-
tered by another’s joy over short-term gains. Looking back on the Iranian coup,
DCI William E. Colby observed (King 1987): “. . . the assistance to the Shah to return
in 1953 was an extremely good move which gave Iran twenty-five years of progress
before he was overthrown. Twenty-five years is no small thing.” And, Colby might
have added, neither is a quarter-century of low prices for Americans at their gas
pumps, which this allegiance with the Shah permitted.
Another former DCI, Stansfield Turner, points to the CIA’s covert propaganda
program aimed at communist regimes during the Cold War as an effective use of
covert action. “Certainly one thinks that the book programs [smuggling behind the
Iron Curtain books and other reading materials that were critical of communism in
general and the Soviet regime in particular], the broadcast programs, the informa-
tion programs do good,” he has said (Turner 1991). “When you get facts into a coun-
try where the truth is not a common commodity, you’re doing some good.”16
Counterintelligence
A third mission, counterintelligence, entails the protection of America’s secrets
against theft by foreign intelligence services (Barron 1987; Johnson and Wirtz 2008,
pt. 7; Mangold 1991; Martin 1980; Masterman 1972). These secrets include such items
as the names of CIA assets overseas, the specifications and orbits of NRO sigint and
imint satellites, the capabilities of U-2s and reconnaissance drones, and the timing
16
On the CIA’s use of propaganda during the Cold War, see Wilford (2008).
26 introduction
and location of military operations. Defined more formally (Commission on

Government Security 1957, 48–49), counterintelligence is the
knowledge needed for the protection and preservation of the military, economic,
and productive strength of the United States, including the security of the
government in domestic and foreign affairs against or from espionage, sabotage,
and all other similar clandestine activities designed to weaken or destroy the
United States.
Counterintelligence specialists wage nothing less than a secret war against

antagonistic intelligence services and terrorist organizations (the latter struggle a
subsidiary of counterintelligence known as counterterrorism). As former CIA offi-
cer Paul Pillar has noted (2008): “The principal challenge for the U.S. intelligence
agencies is outsmarting adversaries who work assiduously to keep secret what the
U.S. government hopes to find out. One side’s intelligence success is the other side’s
counterintelligence failures.”
Counterintelligence consists of two matching halves: counterespionage and
security. Counterespionage is the offensive or aggressive side of counterintelligence;
it involves identifying specific adversaries and developing detailed knowledge
about their operations against the United States. Counterespionage officers attempt
to thwart these enemy operations by infiltrating a secret agent or asset (“mole”) into
the hostile intelligence service or terrorist cell—an operation known as a “penetra-
tion.” As a CIA document explains (Church Committee 1975b), counterespionage
“involves knowing all about foreign intelligence services—their people, their instal-
lations, their methods, and their operations,” while security consists of “all that con-
cerns perimeter defenses, ID badges, knowing everything you have to know about
your own people.”
Security is the passive or defensive side of counterintelligence. It entails put-
ting in place static defenses against all hostile and covert operations aimed against
the United States. Security defenses include the screening and clearance of person-
nel, as well as the establishment of programs to safeguard sensitive intelligence
information; in short, the administration of controls to shield against the theft
of information inside America’s government. The goal is to defend the personnel,
installations, and operations of America’s intelligence agencies and other compo-
nents of the government against infiltration by enemy intelligence services and
terrorist organizations.
Among the specific defensive devices used by counterintelligence officers are
security clearances that consist of thorough inquiries into the background of job
candidates; polygraph (lie-detector) tests—“the poly,” as insiders call it, without
affection; special locks; security education; document accountability; censorship;
camouflage; and special access codes. Additional methods of physical security
include the night lighting of sensitive areas, concrete Jersey barriers, and fences with
concertina wire, along with the use of alarms, badges, passes, checkpoints, and
restricted zones. Grim-faced guards, accompanied by German shepherd dogs, patrol
electrified fences that surround the intelligence agencies. Inside their headquarters
buildings, polygraph experts administer tests of loyalty to all new recruits and, peri-
odically, to seasoned intelligence officers, probing to determine if they have had
suspicious contacts with foreigners. Polygraphs have hardly been foolproof. Several
traitors have fooled the machines, among them the Soviet mole inside the CIA,
Aldrich Hazen Ames, finally discovered in 1994 after he had spied for the Kremlin
for a decade. On occasion, though, the polygraph has uncovered treason or other
inappropriate behavior, including a confession from a nervous would-be CIA
employee who had murdered his wife and buried her body in their suburban back-
yard ( Johnson 1995).
The best counterintelligence and counterterrorism officers have the scholarly
attributes of a Talmudic scholar, sifting patiently through dusty field reports and
other records to find out who on the outside might be trying to burrow, mole-like,
into the CIA or one of its companion agencies; or who already on the inside might
be a traitor working for a foreign nation or terrorist group. Over the years, the
counterintelligence mission has sometimes suffered from insufficient attention—
the forgotten stepchild in the intelligence community, overlooked because the job
lacks the immediacy of collection-and-analysis or the glamour of “shoot ‘em up”
covert actions. The discovery of Ames (Wise 1992) and, soon after, another Soviet
spy, Robert Hanssen in the FBI (Wise 2002; Weiner, Johnston, and Lewis 1995),
changed that perception; the importance of counterintelligence suddenly needed
no further explanation, at least for a while.
6. Intelligence Accountability
While this handbook concentrates chiefly on the four meanings of national security
intelligence discussed above, the question of supervising secret agencies is of inter-
est to national security scholars, too. If power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely, as Lord Acton famously warned, secret power can be the ultimate danger
to freedom in a democracy. For this reason, the United States and several other
democracies have experimented since 1975 with measures to hold the intelligence
agencies to a high standard of accountability before the public and their represen-
tatives—what, in the United States, is often referred to as “oversight” (Barrett 2005;
Johnson 2004; Miller 2008; Schwarz and Huq 2007).
In 1975, investigators in the Congress and the White House discovered that the
American intelligence agencies had violated the public trust ( Johnson 2004; Schwarz
2007). The CIA had spied on Vietnam War protesters inside the United States; the
FBI had launched a secret war of espionage and harassment against not only
Vietnam War protesters, but against civil rights activists and (in a warped sense of
balance) members of the Ku Klux Klan as well—anyone who failed to fit into the
28 introduction
image of loyal Americans held by the Bureau Director, J. Edgar Hoover. The NSA
improperly read every international cable sent abroad or received by an American
citizen. Military intelligence units spied within the United States. All the good work
these agencies had carried out during the Cold War was stained by these excesses,
which demanded tighter control by legislative, judicial, and executive intelligence
overseers. The era of new and more serious oversight had begun and continues
today. An ongoing search was underway, in the United States and several other
countries, for the proper balance between the close supervision of intelligence under
the law, on the one hand, and sufficient executive discretion to permit the effective
conduct of the intelligence missions, on the other hand.
7. An Intelligence Studies Agenda

Here, then, are the elements of what is meant by “national security intelligence.” It
is a vast and complicated topic, with both technical and humanistic dimensions—
all made doubly hard to study and understand because of the thick veils of secrecy
that surround a nation’s security apparatus. Fortunately, from the point of view of
democratic openness as well as the canons of scholarly inquiry, many of these veils
have fallen in the past three decades, as a result of government inquiries into intel-
ligence failures and wrongdoing, accompanied by a more determined effort by
researchers to probe the hidden side of government. The essays in this volume are a
testament to the insights about national security that can accrue from a steady
probing of intelligence organizations and their activities.
Much remains to be done and national security imperatives, quite properly, will
never permit full transparency in this sensitive domain. In a democracy, however,
the people must have at least a basic understanding of all their government agen-
cies, even the shadowy world of intelligence. The Cold War was essentially a struggle
between Western and Communist spy organizations, demonstrating the impor-
tance of intelligence (Aldrich 2001, 5). Sometimes these secret agencies have been
the source of great embarrassment to the government, as with the Bay of Pigs fiasco,
the CIA assassination attempts carried out during the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations, the domestic spy scandals of the mid-1970s, and the Iran-contra
scandal a decade later. Intelligence errors can have enormous consequences, too, as
when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 based in part on a faulty intelligence
assessment that Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, was developing WMDs that
could soon strike the United States and the United Kingdom. Further, intelligence
organizations and operations are costly. For all of these reasons, the study of intel-
ligence deserves the public’s attention and closer study by the scholarly community.
The editor and the contributors to this handbook hope the essays that follow will
help the public understand intelligence better, as well as stimulate more research
into this neglected and difficult—but vital—subject.
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32 introduction
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chapter 2
NATIONAL SECURITY
AND PUBLIC ANXIETY:
OUR CHANGING
PERCEPTIONS
sir richard dearlove
There was a time when national security was a straightforward issue—singular in

character and easily defined. The competing or clashing interests of nation states, or
alliances of nation states, encompassed the whole; nothing of significance lay outside
this familiar and well-trodden territory. We knew who our enemies were, we knew
where they were and we knew about the threats they presented. If we did not know
all of our enemies’ or opponents’ secrets, and we seldom did, we could at least be
confident that the secrets were there to be discovered. We created a whole security
régime to protect ourselves and our own secrets—the nature of the Cold War being
that each side was constantly probing the other’s national security defenses for weak-
nesses. Looking back from the globalized twenty-first century it now looks, with the
benefit of hindsight, like a relatively simple regime. What we needed to do was esti-
mable and achievable, what we needed to know had boundaries. Our success in
building and operating an effective national security policy and infrastructure could
be monitored and measured; equally our failures could be analyzed and explained. It
was also very much a government business, and most of it was classified too. In short
we knew where we stood and where our opponents stood and both sides used their
intelligence capability to refine their knowledge of the other’s capability.
This formulaic situation, which was in itself symptomatic of the gridlock
in East/West relations that endured for most of the Cold War, left little room for
34 introduction
innovation or change. I remember how difficult it was to suggest that national secu-
rity would or could ever acquire a more fluid or broad-ranging context. Until the
collapse of the Soviet empire there was an apparent sense of permanence about the
international situation. As the Cold War ended and the Berlin Wall, perhaps its most
iconic symbol, was torn down by Germans from both sides, the initial reaction of
many European national security policymakers, politicians in particular, was to
think only of a world without the Cold War. There was much optimistic talk of a
peace-dividend, shorthand for liberation from the very significant levels of defense
and security expenditure which the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat had driven and which
it had been difficult for any serious politician to question or challenge. Simultaneously
the defense, security, and intelligence sectors were much criticized for seeking to
justify the continuation of their budgets at Cold War levels because they had begun
to articulate their concerns about new and quite different national security threats.
Within the British Treasury a group of “young Turks,” judging the threats to be
negligible, were aggressive in their advocacy of a “Dutch solution” to Britain’s long-
term defense and security needs—that is, minimal expenditure on minimal capa-
bility. In the United States the debate about the future of national security never
went this far; most American politicians seemed to accept that, as the only remain-
ing super-power, America was condemned to continue to play the role of world
policeman. After its embassies in East Africa had been lethally attacked by Al Qaeda,
the United States had started earlier than most to reconfigure and adapt its national
security priorities to its perception of a new series of strategic threats. It was about
this time that in a number of U.S. think-tanks and strategic studies groups the
adjective “global” became commonly attached to “threats.” Also the U.S. intelligence
community’s budget had already been significantly increased to reflect the rising
concern in Washington about the threat from international terrorism, and, though
this was done without any real sense of urgency, a number of structural and organi-
zational changes had been put in hand to augment American counterterrorist
capability.
The events of 9/11 did change this whole area of policy in a very fundamental
way. Looked at through the optic of national security it is difficult to exaggerate the
symbolic importance of those attacks. The developments and shift in priorities that
pre-dated 9/11, significant though they were, were instantly overwhelmed by the
increases in resources and changes of attitude that followed in the immediate wake
of 9/11. It was one of those rare defining moments when what had previously been
suggested only by a few experts was suddenly brought into sharp and dramatic
focus. Overnight U.S. national security priorities were re-ordered, budgets were
changed, resources shifted and national security policy and foreign policy set off
down a new track. In time the security and foreign policy of most other nations
would also be profoundly affected by what had happened in America and the way
in which the U.S. government reacted to it. We continue to live with those
consequences.
Since then there has been a veritable outpouring of theory on and discourse
about national security. In a changing world this would have happened gradually,
national security and public anxiety 35
but 9/11 accelerated and influenced the process, gave it political immediacy and a
high degree of media and academic attention. However, the 9/11 context has also
tainted our changing perceptions of national security, and entangled them in the
controversies which have surrounded, and will continue to surround, the Bush
administration’s policy decisions, in particular its execution of the “global war on
terrorism.” This has made it particularly difficult to detach discussion of national
security at a theoretical level from its practical execution in which so much political
capital and emotion have been invested by advocates and critics alike of the U.S.
administration. As a new administration stands on the threshold of power, it is an
appropriate moment to strive for more clarity in this policy debate. Between the
end of the Cold War and the election of President Barack Obama we have had to
adapt massively the way in which we think about national security—the interna-
tional context has indeed altered fundamentally for a variety of technological, eco-
nomic, social, and political reasons. This debate is still current and highly relevant
to the way in which governments formulate their national security policy and
execute it.
However, events in Georgia and Tibet, China’s spectacular stage-management of
the Olympic Games, Iran’s continued pursuit of a program to produce fissile mate-
rial suitable for nuclear weapons use, remind us forcibly that the assertive and aggres-
sive behavior of nation-states in pursuit of what they perceive as their sovereign
interests is still very much a feature of the international situation. This enduring
aspect has not been superseded. To that extent, an answer to the question “what is
your perception of national security policy?” is likely to be answered very differently
by different governments depending on their regional circumstances, the state of
their domestic politics and how those two factors influence their world view. That
Russia should recently have strengthened its law to prosecute treason and that China’s
human rights record should be so very poor in areas that touch even obliquely on its
national security—witness its treatment of adherents of Falun Gong—point toward
the sensitivity and narrowness of interpretation with which national security can still
be viewed, particularly in countries in which governments are preoccupied with
their assertion, or reassertion, of a new or changing national identity. In our enthu-
siasm to embrace new globally adjusted national security models, it is important not
to overlook this regional and nationalist dimension. The aspirations and ambitions
of emerging twenty-first century nation-states, which certainly bear comparison
with the behavior of the states of nineteenth century Europe, remain the complicat-
ing and unpredictable aspect of national security policy. It is the historic and unavoid-
able given, the element not to be overlooked, the aspect that always has the ability to
catch the international community unprepared and to provoke intense regional
tensions—and which has also been complicated by the impact of nongovernmental
players such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban. However, it was the conflict
between Russia and Georgia that has provided probably the most striking recent
example of a vicious regional clash that was not anticipated.
Nothing in our globalized world can now remain solely regional—the rever-
berations of Russian military action in Georgia, of Israeli intervention in Gaza, the
36 introduction
consequences of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, resonate loudly and rapidly

through the wider international security system. Many nations feel that their vital
interests are implicitly prejudiced—the significance of such events reaches beyond
the immediate engagement of the protagonists. The post-9/11 literature on national
security is extensive and varied, but it does contain some consistent themes. One is
the interdependence of nations as they face up to the primary globalized threats.
Another is the relative diffusion of power within and among the community of
states which renders even the United States unable to guarantee its own national
security without a far-reaching network of co-operative relationships. When its
ultimate sovereign interests are engaged, the United States has never been an easy
international partner, even for its allies; it has a tendency to act autonomously,
consult afterward, and expect others to fall in line. The post-9/11 world has turned
out to be a humbling place for the United States and forced it to behave with more
consideration and in a manner familiar to smaller, less-powerful nations. Its pri-
mary national security goals can only be achieved effectively by patiently building
genuinely cooperative security alliances with a variety of states, some of which
would not be partners of choice. Perhaps the most vexing and challenging of these
has been with Pakistan, a key player in the “global war on terrorism,” in whose
decisive importance as a counterterrorist player and manifest inadequacies as a
reliable but necessary ally have been assembled all the frustrations of not being
able to achieve even the most straightforward of strategic aims. The United
Kingdom is faced with a similar problem—how to work successfully with Pakistan
in countering the current terrorist threat within the United Kingdom, the majority
of the United Kingdom’s domestic investigations leading back to radical groups or
individuals located in Pakistan. Pakistan typically represents a range of interrelated
terrorist threats and counterterrorist opportunities. However Pakistan’s inability
to staunch the radical terrorist violence it harbors and exports, and the difficulty
of working closely with its security and intelligence services shows to what degree
the national security interests of even the world’s most powerful state have become
compromised.
That governments as sophisticated as those of the United States and United
Kingdom should be so affected by Pakistan’s inability to control its own people,
especially in its remoter tribal areas, is indicative of the wider problem which plays
into our core concerns about national security. The paradox of great power, of the
complex sophistication of the modern state, is that it is highly vulnerable at so many
different points. The perception of the average citizen is that we live uncomfortably
close to breakdown—and the nature of our media leads it to devote a proportion of
its coverage and resources to stoking our anxieties. Most days there will be a head-
line to illustrate this—currently it is the concern over the uncertainty of Europe’s
gas supplies from Russia. Though we are literally bombarded with media stories of
potential and actual anxieties, we have probably never been less threatened by large-
scale international violence, the threat of thermonuclear obliteration having been
virtually removed by the ending of the Cold War. However, our anxieties still seem
pressing, numerous, and immediate and to touch the lives of citizens at a personal
level. Democratic governments have always been obliged to take heed of their
citizens’ fears, but what the citizen may fear and what genuinely may threaten the
security of the state are not the same, though there are, of course, areas of overlap.
These high levels of public anxiety have pushed governments toward the democra-
tization of their national security policy and a complicit media not only fuels the
level of worry but also bangs relentlessly the “something-must-be-done” drum. The
recent tendency for governments to publish statements of national security and
national risk registers is indicative of this trend.
Terrorism, of course, has been the major cause of public anxiety and is cur-
rently amongst the most important drivers of national security policy. Understandably
citizens have been deeply shocked and worried to learn that the young person stand-
ing across from them in the train station, a fellow citizen in much more than name
in our multicultural society, may be considering blowing him or herself and them
to pieces in the name of a set of beliefs whose virulence is in total disharmony with
our liberal democratic and tolerant values. Of course the likelihood of being the
victim of a terrorist attack is extremely remote; but when the threat is so random
and those delivering it so much part of our own society, arguments based on statis-
tics or on a sense of proportion understandably do not carry much weight. In the
United States there is no question that the war on terror has exploited this sense of
vulnerability. In the United Kingdom the response of government and citizens alike
has been more balanced—the probable consequence of having lived with the threat
of Irish terrorism for most of two decades. However, the terrorism of Al Qaeda is
qualitatively different; because it has no tangible political aims, its capacity for vio-
lence seems unrestrained. We fear that Al Qaeda could, if it had the capability, do
something horrendous like explode a device with a nuclear yield. With its complete
disregard for the political consequence of such an attack, it seems that there is noth-
ing that would hold Al Qaeda back. So governments, in their national security poli-
cies, have been obliged to take account of the perception of an extreme risk and
assume that Al Qaeda will continue to attempt to acquire the capability to pull off
at least one of the mass casualty attacks in which we know from intelligence it has
shown interest. For this reason our national security infrastructure must take
account of the possibility of a truly excessive terrorist event—something we have
not previously had to consider. In contrast, the Irish terrorist threat was essentially
only kinetic and the Provisional IRA was in a sense constrained by its wish for its
political wing to be included within the political process. That Al Qaeda aspires to
occupy a nonnegotiable space and that it is apparently nihilistic and purely destruc-
tive of our values, which it does not seek to share in any apparent sense, sets it apart
from most other movements that espouse violence as a part of their political activ-
ity or as a way of reaching their political objectives.
In this age of anxieties, what are the other issues of public concern powerful
enough in their impact to have become a part of the contemporary national secu-
rity agenda? Two natural hazards figure distinctly—climate change and the threat of
a pandemic or SARS outbreak. The disruptive impact of extreme weather events
caused by climate change seems likely to occur more frequently. The longer-term
38 introduction
effects of climate change, such as greater water stress, will also affect food production.
The impact in heavily populated areas with high birth rates may be catastrophic.
Climate change unquestionably has the potential to destabilize whole societies and
the threat of mass migration driven by fundamental economic need could also rap-
idly globalize a regional problem. The tropical storms that ravaged Burma and New
Orleans have given us a disturbing glimpse of the speed at which both rich and poor
societies can unravel. In contrast, the actual threat of a pandemic is difficult to
gauge, easily misrepresented, and the science that relates to the risk easily misunder-
stood. Its potential seriousness, however, and the high levels of mortality together
with their likely impact on health services and the wider economy means that this
is the type of event for which, though it may never strike, we must make
contingencies.
Of manmade anxieties, the list is potentially long. Terrorism apart, the issues
that are now identified most frequently as playing into national security are the pro-
liferation of weapons-related technologies, the potential of modern technologies to
empower individuals or small groups with malign intentions, serious organized
criminality, the vulnerability of energy supplies, the fragility of the state’s critical
infrastructure, and finally we should now probably add the apparent vulnerability of
the banking system. Perhaps the first of these remains the most serious, but what
these issues have in common is that the nation-state acting alone in an intercon-
nected and interdependent world can do very little to protect itself from such prob-
lems, let alone do anything to solve them. This returns us to the theme of
interdependence, which recommends that nations act together to solve their secu-
rity-related crises or take measures together necessary to try to pre-empt crises.
However, in matters that touch on a country’s core sovereign interests it remains very
difficult to secure effective international cooperation or to secure agreements in
which any shared sovereignty is implicit. For example France and the United Kingdom
were insistent that substantive references to national security be dropped from the
European Constitution, though early drafts had included them. One of the great
ironies of the banking crisis has been the rush for a coordinated response that it
eventually produced amongst central bankers, finance ministers, and heads of gov-
ernment. When they were faced with the real threat of imminent international finan-
cial breakdown they acted together successfully—though at early stages of the crisis
they had patently failed to do so. This at the least suggests an eleventh-hour willing-
ness to act for the greater good if the consequences of not doing so are likely to trig-
ger the unthinkable; but in respect of the issues that I have listed, the problem may
be that a coordinated “eleventh-hour” response would simply be too late to avoid an
impending crisis—for example, proliferated nuclear weapons technology in the
wrong hands could have an outcome far worse than the failure of part of the banking
system, though the build-up to such a crisis might lack all the obvious drama and
media attention of our current preoccupation with the health of the banks.
To conclude, the paradox that national security policy faces as it enters the
twenty-first century is that nation-states have lost their exclusive grip on their own
security at the very time when private citizens are assailed by increased fears for
their own security and demand an enhanced guarantee of safety from the state. We
have probably never been safer from large-scale violence (a relative statement of
course from which there must always be a number of striking regional exclusions)
but a striking characteristic of our age is this strong sense of general anxiety about
our lack of security in the face of a multiplicity of threats, natural and manmade,
which we cannot control.
Against this background there can be no question that our understanding of
what constitutes national security is still undergoing significant mutation. The very
phrase “national security” seems inappropriate when the nation has evidently
become dependent on coordinated international action to achieve its more impor-
tant national security objectives. One of the main problems with current national
security theory and policy is its lack of precision. It attempts to sweep up and incor-
porate all the issues that might worry or threaten the citizen. Such an approach has
its strengths in helping to manage the public’s perception of risks but this catch-all
approach is in danger of paying insufficient attention to the more detailed and spe-
cialized concerns of national security professionals, which may be less obvious to
the public and even to politicians. For example, within the countries of the European
Union it is rare now to find any political leaders who worry much about the threat
of hostile espionage (despite the recent experience of one Baltic republic). Perhaps
we need to make a clearer separation between a register of civic anxieties, between
the risks and hazards that press against the complex structures of everyday life, and
what really constitutes our core national security concerns that could really threaten
the viability of the state, as opposed to the quality and safety of life that it delivers to
its citizens. If this collection of essays encourages clarity in thinking through and
acting sensibly on these distinctions, it will be serving a very useful purpose. It is
one thing to have a government and citizenry who are well informed about hazards,
risk and threats, natural and manmade, but it is quite another to construct a fully
effective national security policy and then resource, train, and develop the agencies
and professionals who must implement it.
The internationalization of national security has eroded the distinction we have
traditionally made between home and away, between our domestic and foreign
security. For all national security organizations of every type, whether law enforce-
ment, intelligence gathering or responsible for domestic security, the implications
are far reaching. A hundred years after the foundation of the British Intelligence and
Security Services (amongst the world’s oldest intelligence and security institutions
with unbroken archives) it will be interesting to observe the extent to which this
new global dynamic affects the development of such institutions. The whole sector
is ready for some adaptive organizational and functional change to reflect the way a
multiplicity of issues that we have traditionally treated separately have been joined
up by advancing globally. There will be many vested interests that would prefer to
stick with and make the best of existing arrangements, and it will take strong politi-
cal leadership and clear professional vision to achieve significant reform.
part ii
THEORY
AND
METHOD
chapter 3
THEORIES OF
INTELLIGENCE
peter gill
1. Introduction
The discipline of intelligence studies to date has spent relatively little time on
theorizing. Within the practice of intelligence, considerable use has been made of
theory in order to develop practical applications that contribute to agencies’ core
mandate: the protection of national security. This chapter concentrates, rather, on
theories of intelligence: the issue of how the social sciences have sought to explain
intelligence phenomena—its structures and processes, its successes and failures.
This discussion will identify the key features of the current context for intelligence,
set out some contributions of theory to the analysis of intelligence and its place
within contemporary governance, specifically, what is required if intelligence is to
facilitate rather than damage democracy.
The study of intelligence has increased significantly in the past twenty years
for two main reasons. As long as the Cold War lasted, states sought to keep intel-
ligence secrets very close; consequently much of the literature of intelligence
examined the earlier hot wars of the twentieth century and, mainly in the United
States, contemplated intelligence structures including their impact on domestic
civil liberties. But once the Cold War ended, the western powers became some-
what more relaxed with open discussion of intelligence and the democratization
of regimes in the former Soviet bloc, along with similar developments in Latin
America since the 1980s, was accompanied by the publication of much more offi-
cial material, often in the context of inquiries into the rights abuses of former
regimes. Second, interest in and the literature of intelligence has increased signifi-
cantly since 9/11 not just because of that attack on the United States but also the
44 theory and method
controversial measures taken in response. The intelligence “failures” represented

by 9/11 itself and then the intelligence fiasco around the invasion of Iraq have been
picked over in much detail by various legislative and judicial inquiries. The result-
ing mountain of documentation, and accompanying journalistic and academic
commentary, has provided an enormous opportunity for scholars and researchers
but its excavation has not been matched by conceptual developments in intelli-
gence studies.
2. Why Do We Need Theory?

We need to be explicit about our theoretical assumptions because we cannot
select areas for research or determine the relevance of material, let alone orga-
nize it, without some theoretical framework.1 If we do not consider this explicitly,
our implicit assumptions will color our work, whether we like it or not, and we
shall confuse ourselves and our readers. Then, we want to be able to explain why
intelligence works (or not) as it does, and generalize beyond the particular in
order to have something useful to offer about future policy and practice.2 As we
do so, we must remember the profound ethical implications of what we say—
intelligence is capable of producing both benefits and harms. Given the secrecy,
uncertainty and complexity that characterize the field of intelligence, prediction
is impossible; therefore, recommendations must be advanced modestly in the
full knowledge of the likelihood of unintended outcomes. Intelligence is replete
with paradoxes.
Mark Phythian and I have suggested a “critical realist” approach that examines
causation through the interaction between actors (agency) and structures (Gill and
Phythian 2006, 20–38). Historical accounts are the bedrock for our work but much
of the intelligence process cannot be observed—especially not through the prism of
official documents—and thus we must also develop speculative hypotheses3 that
can be tested against the evidence rather as doctors do as they test out different
diagnoses. In this process of “abduction,” “by applying alternative theories and
models in order to discern connections that were not evident, what intelligence
scholars are doing is what good intelligence analysts do—but in doing so neither
group is merely describing reality as if through clear glass. They are seeking to make
sense of and thus actively ‘create’ the worlds of intelligence and government” (Gill
2009, 212; cf. Fry and Hochstein 1993, 25).
1
Gill (2009) discusses “where we are” with respect to intelligence theory of which this section
is a summary. The book provides a fuller survey of past and current theorizing.
2
This possibility would be rejected by postmodernism, as discussed briefly in Gill and
Phythian (2006, 23–25).
3
Johnson (2009) advances some propositions that might be used in this way.
theories of intelligence 45
3. Defining the Field:

Knowledge and Power
The discipline of intelligence studies has no need to re-invent the wheel: there are
numerous theoretical approaches within social science that can be deployed to
increase our understanding of intelligence. At the most general level, intelligence can
be viewed as a subset of surveillance: a ubiquitous social practice, combining pro-
cesses of knowledge and power and lying at the heart of all risk management.
Specifically, intelligence is “mainly secret activities—targeting, collection, analysis,
dissemination and action—intended to enhance security and/or maintain power
relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities” (Gill 2009, 214).
In order to distinguish intelligence from a myriad of other “knowledge manage-
ment” practices, note that its object is security, some element of it will be conducted
in secrecy and, because it is always relative to others, it will provoke resistance.
Defensive surveillance is most commonly described in terms of “risk” whereas
intelligence contemplates “threats”; this reflects the former’s concern with the unin-
tended harmful consequences of otherwise beneficial human activities rather than
intentionally harmful activities such as terrorism. The growing complexity that has
reduced the possibilities of traditional actuarial calculations of risk has resulted in
the development of the precautionary principle, especially in environment and
health matters. However, the causes and consequences of serious political violence
may display the same attributes of complexity and uncertainty exhibited by prob-
lems to which the precautionary principle is applicable and it has now become “fully
politicized,” as seen in the lead up to the Iraq invasion (Heng 2006, 56).
In determining what is to be done about these risks/threats, four broad types of
knowledge/power relationship can be identified:
In the case of (a decision under) certainty we know the outcomes of different

choices and the only challenge is to be clear about one’s preferences. In the case of
risk we know the outcomes (benefits and adverse effects) and the probability of
various outcomes. In the case of uncertainty we know the possible outcomes but
have no objective ground to estimate their probability. In the case of ignorance
we do not even know what adverse effects to anticipate or we don’t know their
magnitude or relevance and have no clue of their probability. (COMEST 2005, 29)
In the first case there is no need for “intelligence” as such; in the other three intelli-
gence becomes increasingly significant—and difficult.
For example, the shift from “risk” to “uncertainty,” if not actually “ignorance,”
can be illustrated by comparing the official U.K. perception of the threat posed by
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) with that since 9/11. PIRA was a
tightly run, hierarchical organization which, as we now know, was penetrated at a
high level (Gill and Phythian 2006, 68–70) and was estimated to have about 10,000
sympathizers in Northern Ireland in the early 1980s, 1,200 of whom would support
“around 600 active terrorists” (Hennessy 2007, 17). Now, while “(t)errorism is the
politics of uncertainty” (Ericson 2007, 36, emphasis in original), the relative certainty
with which government calculated the numbers and identities of PIRA activists has
been replaced by glorified “guesstimates” of al Qaeda in terms of its nature, form
and strength. For example, Hennessy reports that by late spring 2005 there were
estimated to be two thousand “serious sympathizers” of whom two hundred might
be prepared to carry out a terrorist attack (2007, 37). In December 2007, Jonathan
Evans, Director General of MI5, spoke of two thousand known to be involved in
terrorist activity in the United Kingdom, and, crucially, referred to the probability
of as many again who were unknown (Evans 2007).
Similarly, Michael Warner has drawn on the literature of risk and uncertainty
to illuminate the link between knowledge and power. He characterizes “intelligence
as risk shifting,” showing how “sovereignties” seek to distribute their risk and uncer-
tainty outward, some of it by sharing with allies in increased cooperation (see fur-
ther below) but also by imposing it on adversaries: “To put this in modern
management terms, spies help a sovereign to shift uncertainty into risk, to assess
and manage probabilities, and to mitigate hazards” (Warner 2009a, 22). But when
uncertainty darkens toward ignorance, this process may simply collapse knowledge
into power. Ron Suskind reports the White House meeting in November 2001 that
discussed the possibility of al Qaeda obtaining a nuclear weapon from Pakistan at
which the Vice President proposed: “If there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani
scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat
it as a certainty in terms of our response. . . . It’s not about our analysis, or finding a
preponderance of evidence, it’s about our response” (cited in Suskind 2007, 62). In
other words, what became known as the “Cheney Doctrine” proposed that a condi-
tion of almost perfect ignorance—one percent of “knowledge”—would be the basis
for action. As the basis for security policy, this is highly problematic since it is likely
to compound the problem. As argued by Ulrich Beck, examining the broadest
impact of risks: “The very power and characteristics that are supposed to create a
new quality of security and certainty simultaneously determine the extent of abso-
lute uncontrollability that exists. The more efficiently and comprehensively the
anticipation of consequences is integrated into technical systems, the more evi-
dently and conclusively we lose control. All attempts at minimising or eliminating
risk technologically simply multiply the uncertainty into which we are plunging the
world” (2005, 102 emphasis in original).
Therefore, work is required to evaluate post-9/11 legislation, policies and
practices—proposed on the grounds that they would improve intelligence and the
ability to prevent future attacks—in terms of their actual consequences on the effec-
tiveness or otherwise of intelligence as well as the threat itself. There is a lethal com-
bination of uncertainty and governments’ urge to act that appears to require steady
increments of law—the United Kingdom is a prime example—as any further attack
apparently demonstrates the failure of previous measures. Given the catastrophes
envisaged, and the inevitability of failures of intelligence, there is almost no limit to
the measures envisaged and no real evaluation of the actual outcomes of previous
policies.
4. A Suggested Agenda for Research

In the limited space available, six crucial areas for intelligence research can be iden-
tified: governance, process, structures, cooperation, actors/ethics and oversight.4
4.1. Governance
Even its most passive actions implicate intelligence in governance; therefore it is
never enough to view intelligence as just a form of “staff ” to ministers and govern-
ments (but note Sims’s counterargument 2009, 159–60). Consequently, intelligence
studies must make as much use of theories of power as of theories of knowledge
and risk. There are two broad “streams” of power theories: the mainstream view of
power as zero sum, or “sovereign” and the nonzero-sum view of power as “facilita-
tive” (Scott 2001). Both types of power are inherent in intelligence though the bal-
ance between them will vary with circumstances. Indeed, intelligence has the
potential to be a form of governance: we are familiar with this in “counterintelli-
gence states” (Dziak 1988), but it may come to pass elsewhere whenever security
fears combined with governments’ attempts to provide reassurance (cf. Edelman
1964) dominate politics. We should recall Berki’s “security paradox” (1986): the
more powerful states become in their effort to guarantee security, the more they
become a threat to that security. Important work needs to be done by analysts of
intelligence to describe and explain the impact of the “war on terror” on governance
more generally. Jonathan Simon has charted “how the war on crime transformed
American democracy and created a culture of fear” (the subtitle of Simon 2007) and
argues that the “war on terror” confirms his thesis of the impact metaphoric “wars”
and “nightmares” can have on the construction of new forms and strategies of gov-
ernance (2007, 260–61). Similarly, Laura Donohue’s detailed comparison of coun-
terterrorism law and policy in the United States and United Kingdom provides a
solid basis for this work (2008).
Since security institutions in general and intelligence in particular have such a
“peculiarly intimate relationship with political power” (Cawthra and Luckham
2003, 305), we need to specify how that relationship defines the state in general.
As we have seen, a broad distinction has often been drawn between “counterintel-
ligence states” in authoritarian regimes and those in democracies, but a more
nuanced approach is required. For some time we have sought to distinguish states
broadly in terms of the degree of influence or control in politics enjoyed by those in
security roles. As this increases then we have been more likely to talk about
“(national) security” or “garrison” states (cf. Tapia-Valdes 1982). Seeking to apply
4
There is a good deal of overlap between this discussion and Michael Warner’s proposal that
strategy, regime, and technology are the three key independent variables in explaining the main
similarities and differences between “intelligence systems”—our dependent variable (Warner
2009b).
this more directly to security intelligence agencies and developing Keller’s (1989)
work, this author suggested that by using the two variables of autonomy—the inde-
pendence of agencies from oversight by other political actors—and penetration—
the extent to which agencies are able to gather information and act—we can identify
different “ideal types” of security agencies from the “domestic intelligence bureau”
through “political police” to “independent security state” (Gill 1994, 79–82). Other
authors have made use of and developed this typology (Dombrowski 2007, 241–68;
Williams and Delantant 2001). While some have argued that the impact of 9/11 can
be seen as shifting the balance toward the security or surveillance state (Haggerty
and Ericson 2006; Loader and Walker 2007 provide excellent coverage of these
themes), others have taken a more benign view and characterized the situation, at
least in the United Kingdom, as a “protective state” on the grounds that, while it may
have accumulated more security powers, it has done so with a greater degree of
openness than during the Cold War (Hennessy 2007).
A major development in the last twenty years is the networking between state
agencies and the interpenetration of community, corporate and state intelligence
structures. We need to consider how this affects the governance of intelligence and
how we might deal with any problems it raises. How should we characterize state-
corporate links, as networks (Gill 2006) as nodal governance ( Johnston and Shearing
2003), as symbiosis (O’Reilly, forthcoming) as corporatism (Klein 2007, 18–20;
Thompson 2003, 155–56, 187) or as a return to feudalism (Cerny 2000)? (See further
discussion below.)
4.2. Process
The intelligence process or “cycle” is a commonly deployed device that describes the
various stages in the development of intelligence, though it must be remembered
that it is used for its heuristic value rather than as an accurate model of what actu-
ally happens. As such, it is part of the conceptual language used in developing theo-
retical approaches to intelligence. Part of its utility is that it can be applied to
whatever “level” of intelligence—individual, organizational, national, or transna-
tional—is being studied (Gill and Phythian 2006, 35–38) and it facilitates compara-
tive research (Gill 2007, 82–90).
One area of intelligence where theory is relatively well-developed is in seeking
to explain intelligence “failures” (cf. Betts 1978) though explaining “successes” has
been less discussed (Wirtz 2003). The former are far more likely to be visible than
the latter and may be very costly in terms of human and social damage. It is sug-
gested that explaining failure is a key task for intelligence theory (Phythian 2009,
67–68). Even measuring success is problematic since its manifestation may be that
nothing happens (Betts 2007, 187–90; Gill and Phythian 2006, 16–18). Explaining
failures is an example of the need to examine the interaction of actors and struc-
tures, for example, Amy Zegart criticizes the “finger pointing fallacy” in her analysis
of 9/11 and argues for the superiority of analysis of organizations’ failure to adapt
(2007). Butler’s (2004) examination of the failure of the U.K. agencies to identify the
lack of WMD in Iraq is concerned similarly with the structures and processes by
which the intelligence was developed and promulgated rather than identifying
blameworthy individuals.
4.3. Structures
The basic architecture for intelligence is still set at national level and is established
by states according to some combination of their historical development and per-
ception of need in the face of security threats. This domination of the national level
and state sector of intelligence is clear from even a cursory glance at intelligence
literature. How does theory account for the creation and persistence of state intel-
ligence agencies? Mark Phythian (2009, 57–61) has argued that structural realism
can best explain this for “great powers” based on assumptions of an anarchic world
system within which states have some offensive capacity, are uncertain as to the
intentions of other states and are rational actors. Intelligence is the means by which
states seek to reduce the uncertainty and secrecy characterizes their efforts to main-
tain their survival.
Jennifer Sims provides a critique of this in her advocacy of “adaptive realism”
(2009, 151–65) but a more thoroughgoing theoretical challenge to realism comes
from those who argue that the driving notion of “national security” must be replaced
by a broader concept of “human security” (e.g., Sheptycki 2009). The evidence for
this is the growing interdependence of states and the observation that states may
well enhance their security and stability through cooperation with others that actu-
ally enhances (collective) sovereignty although it diminishes national autonomy
(Beck 2005, 91). Thus Beck argues for a rejection of “methodological nationalism”—
“zombie science”—that fails to recognize or research the extent to which transna-
tional factors “determine” relations within and between states (Beck 2005, 23–24).
For students of intelligence the hard case, of course, is whether the intelligence
hegemon—the United States—is best described in these terms or in those of
realism.
The persistence of intelligence structures may also be accounted for by other
mid-level explanations such as bureaucratic politics; for example Glenn Hastedt
and Douglas B. Skelley (2009) discuss the possibilities and problems of organiza-
tional reform. The United States has shown a particular obsession with “fixing”
(Hulnick 1999; Odom 2003) its intelligence structure. Amy Zegart notes the six clas-
sified and dozen major unclassified studies in the 1990s, the latter making over three
hundred recommendations targeted at CIA, FBI or elsewhere in the intelligence
structure of which only 10 percent had been implemented by 9/11 (2007, 5). Since
9/11 the major innovation has been to establish the Office of Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) to coordinate federal intelligence (what the Director of Central
Intelligence was established to do in 1947 but never quite managed . . . ) but doubts
remain as to whether this will resolve the competing pressures to centralize or
decentralize (e.g., Betts 2007, 142–58). Contemplating the possibility of reforming
the large and fragmented U.S. intelligence “community” reminds one of the hiker
who asked a farmer the way to her destination. After a pause, the local replied
“If I were you, I wouldn’t start from here.”
It follows from 4.1 above that there is an urgent need for comparative research
to examine the mushrooming intelligence activities at sub-state and transnational
levels and the growing significance of nonstate intelligence actors in the corporate
and what we might call the “community” sector. Since security is the bottom line for
any structure of political power (Cerny 2000, 172), can we explain the growth of
intelligence within these sectors in realist terms? Not entirely, because beyond sur-
vival in the marketplace, corporate intelligence aims at profitability—itself usually
analyzed through the prism of rational action—but a key difference is that markets
operate within structures of rules and regulation (however lax they may be some-
times.) Avant (2005), Donald (2008), Dover (2007), O’Reilly and Ellison (2006), and
Shorrock (2008) all provide interesting discussions of private-sector intelligence.
For “community” intelligence actors, family and tribal loyalties, ideological motiva-
tions or messianic beliefs render the resort to assumptions of rational choice prob-
lematic although the context within which they operate (Bozeman 1992)—the
absence of an effective state—means their motivations for intelligence may be more
state-like.
4.4. Cooperation
Cooperation between intelligence agencies is not new, is potentially highly produc-
tive through “sharing” risk but also creates new dangers. The intelligence relation-
ship between the United Kingdom and the United States of America (“UKUSA”) is
the best and most formal example of transnational cooperation that dates from
1947 (Richelson and Ball 1990) but the need for broader cooperation between coun-
tries with divergent laws, cultures and practices has been much emphasized since
9/11, as even the hegemonic United States appreciated its dependence on others in
key intelligence areas. Yet, for the United States, the problem started at home and
the 9/11 Commission exposed the dysfunctionality of the fragmented national intel-
ligence “system.” Though the purported aim of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act has been to rectify this, early signs are that the situation
may actually have been compounded, not just because of the understandable failure
to coordinate the sprawling national system discussed above but also because the
concept of “homeland security” has brought even more state and local agencies into
the intelligence network. Elsewhere, the problem of fragmentation exists but to a
lesser extent because no other country has the wealth to support so many state-
sector intelligence agencies and the corporate sector is less extensive (so far) than in
the United States.
Cooperation beyond the state sector is facilitated from both sides: on the one
hand preventive, risk-based, techniques have long characterized private policing,
while, on the other, states have extended the traditional techniques of “high policing”
into general policing as well as “outsourcing.” There are tensions and conflicts between
corporate and state security actors, for example, private personnel are responsible to
boards of directors and thus to shareholders, not accountable to elected bodies, but no
“immutable contradictions” (Johnston and Shearing 2003, 144–48).
The task of theory is to seek explanation for the conditions under which agen-
cies will and will not cooperate, especially under the conditions of globalization
(Aldrich forthcoming). Where the relations between agencies are not as tightly
bound as envisaged above in corporatism, there are various possibilities. State agen-
cies may contract others with better access to the relevant territory or population but
there is a danger that, feeling restrained by laws and oversight, they will “subcontract”
unlawful operations to corporate or “community” allies. Such seems to have been the
case in Northern Ireland where there is strong evidence that intelligence agencies
“colluded” in the murder of suspected Republicans by Loyalist paramilitaries (Cory
2004; Stevens 2003) and the use by the CIA of “black sites” in Poland and Romania
was based similarly on a desire for deniability (Marty 2007). Where there is greater
independence between agencies, trust and reciprocity are crucial—game theory is a
useful way of theorizing these relations (cf. Thompson 2003, 161–67; Wetzling 2008).
However, the rational assumptions of this approach may be unrealistic when we con-
template the murky depths of intelligence collaboration resting on complex (and
perhaps toxic) mixes of political, financial and ideological motivations.
4.5. Actors and Ethics

So far our agenda consists of macro and structural issues; clearly, we need to con-
sider actors also—what is the contribution to intelligence of the people working
within it, individually and in small groups? How are they recruited, what are the
consequences of vetting, how are they trained and managed? How do they deal with
colleagues from other agencies—reluctantly and on the basis of “need-to-know” or
willingly and on the basis of “need-to-share” (Kean and Hamilton 2004, 13.3)?
Theory can contribute here in a number of ways: again, research into failures has
shown the most common forms of cognitive pathologies to which individuals may
be prone—mirror-imaging, group-think, etc. (e.g. Betts 2007, 19–52; Mandel 1987).
In addition to structures, therefore, we must pay attention to the impact of organi-
zational cultures on intelligence agencies (Farson 1991).
One specific aspect of this question is “politicization.” Those working within
intelligence in authoritarian regimes are driven by the domestic political require-
ments of the powers-that-be rather than, say, genuine national requirements for
security intelligence and a key element in the democratization of these agencies is to
establish an ethic of professionalism in which officials may speak “truth unto power.”
However, recent events have cast a shadow over the older democracies implicit claim
of the inherent professionalism of their services. The controversy about the extent
to which analysis of Iraqi WMD was influenced by politicians (as well as being
“cherry-picked”) or subject to self-censorship by analysts who knew which way the
wind blew on Iraq, presented an unflattering portrait of the power of professionals
to resist political pressure, certainly in the United States and to some extent in the
United Kingdom (Gill and Phythian 2006, 131–41).
As we move from analysis to action in conditions of uncertainty or even

ignorance, the dangers of overreaction increase steadily. The application of the pre-
cautionary principle to terrorism by means of prevention and pre-emption must be
carried out carefully and not degenerate into Cheney’s “one percent doctrine,”
kidnapping, and torture. Notwithstanding assertions that “coercive interrogation”
produced information that led to lifesaving actions, these practices have so damaged
the legitimacy of the U.S. cause that it has probably actually exacerbated the risk
(Guillaume 2008, 411). These issues go to the heart of the intelligence enterprise and
have sparked not only great public controversy but much consideration in the lit-
erature of both state (Erskine 2004; Goldman 2006; Herman 2004; Quinlan 2007)
and corporate intelligence (Frost 2008; Runzo 2008).
4.6. Oversight
This takes us, finally, to the crucial question of how oversight—internal and
external—is conducted in order to maximize the probability that intelligence is
both effective and conducted properly. The search for the roots of success and
failure relate directly to what might be described as the “efficacy” of intelligence
but a concomitant concern, at least in countries with pretensions to being demo-
cratic, is that intelligence is also conducted properly or with “propriety.” Since
practitioners, and those inside governments whose policy making requires inter-
action with intelligence, are naturally more concerned with effective intelligence
than whether it is carried out properly, systems of review or oversight are required.
In the context of a democratization of intelligence, not only in former authoritar-
ian regimes in Asia, Europe, and Latin America but also in older democracies
where agencies were created by executive decree, therefore, there is now a sizeable
literature addressing the conditions for effective oversight (cf. Born and Leigh
2005; Johnson 2007b). An important aspect of this issue is the oft-heard concept
of “balance” that implies some trade-off between the demands of effectiveness
and propriety or security and rights. This is a dangerous notion though borne
from the accurate observation that intelligence scandals have given rise to reform
aimed at increasing propriety, while failures have given rise to more concern with
effectiveness. The danger lies in the idea that there is some way of trading off
effective intelligence against human rights; those agencies with the poorest human
rights records are usually also ineffective and inefficient except in their ability to
act repressively.
Since the business of intelligence is gathering information that targets would
prefer to keep private, it would be idle to propose that there can be no limitations of
rights in the interests of security; the point is that infringements must be carried out
proportionately and subject to clear rules and procedures (cf. Betts 2007, 159–77;
McDonald 1981, 407–11). However, in common with regulation theory in general, we
must beware that oversight “theory” can amount to little more than series of plati-
tudes that are often mutually contradictory (Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001,
180–81). Certainly, it is part of the job of oversight committees to make post hoc
criticisms of failures by intelligence agencies but they should also contribute to the
central debate of how agencies are to minimize the dangers of making both Type I
and Type II errors, that is, avoiding excessive surveillance of those who mean no
harm and thus damaging their rights and the inadequate surveillance of those who
do plan to cause harm.
Although in the last quarter of a century congressional, parliamentary, and
other review bodies have been securing a toehold on oversight of state agencies,
events since 9/11 have exposed shortcomings in their arrangements as significant as
they have for intelligence itself. For example, the 9/11 Commission described the
U.S. system as “too complex and secret” (Kean and Hamilton 2004, 13.2) and the
congressional oversight system as “dysfunctional” (Kean and Hamilton 2004, 13.4;
also Johnson 2007a). In the United Kingdom most assessments of the Intelligence
and Security Committee’s first decade concluded that it had performed creditably
in general but poorly over the issue of Iraq (Gill forthcoming). But we have hardly
contemplated how to oversee corporate agencies where “commercial confidential-
ity” rather than state secrecy is a central obstacle. Corporate social responsibility has
some potential for the internal oversight of private security activities (Kinsey 2008)
but external oversight will require action from the state sector. Therefore, theories
of oversight—crucial to ideas of democratic intelligence—must move beyond their
present concern with states to encompass the implications of intelligence gover-
nance that is multi-sectoral and transnational.
It is possible to provide only a few indications here of the work that is needed.
First, there is a need for reviewers to network within the state sector. Justice
O’Connor has provided an excellent start in this respect with the policy proposals
emanating from his enquiry into the rendition of Maher Arar to Syria. Rather than
creating a single overseer for all Canadian agencies with intelligence functions,
O’Connor proposes that agency-specific review bodies deploy “statutory gateways”
so that they can share information and investigative duties where their enquiries
concern the agencies acting as an intelligence network in terms of information shar-
ing or joint operations (Commission of Inquiry 2006). Second, and yet more diffi-
cult, is how oversight might be maintained over state-corporate cooperation. We
can identify a number of general mechanisms with potential in network account-
ability including legal, financial, technological, reputational, and market-based
(Benner et al. 2005) but academics have only just started to consider how these
might work in the case of intelligence (e.g., Forcese 2008; Leigh 2008; Wright 2008).
Third, equally difficult, is to oversee transnational intelligence collaboration.
National reviewers must develop the concept of “dual function” (Slaughter 2005)
and see themselves as responsive to national and international constituencies. For
example, the existing biennial International Review Agencies Conference could be
developed into a more systematic sharing of information, best practice, and, ulti-
mately, joint investigations. National reviewers could seek to insert acknowledge-
ments that information sharing would be subject to review into memoranda of
understanding between agencies (Forcese 2008; Wright 2008; more generally,
Aldrich 2009).
5. Conclusion
There is another crucial reason for deploying theory and this is its contribution to
sorely needed public education. The shocks of the last few years came hard on the
heels of the first stirrings of serious public knowledge of intelligence as the secrecy
of the Cold War period was relaxed. But if the public started to see that James Bond
was not an accurate portrait of the intelligence officer, it has suffered even greater
disillusionment after 9/11 and Iraq. There is a danger that people may come to
believe not just that failures are inevitable but that it is a permanent condition.
Academics will not be invited to give public lectures on theories of intelligence
but, whenever possible, we have an obligation to try to explain and elucidate com-
plex matters in such a way that reason does not submit to security panics. Our
contributions must be informed by more than just an ability to provide historical
parallels and “thick description”; we must develop useful generalizations that assist
understanding.
Michael Warner warns that, for most of history, intelligence has been used to
oppress (2009, 29) and in many parts of the world it still is. Those of us fortunate
to live in liberal democratic regimes with relatively advanced systems of intelligence
oversight must not only ensure that those systems catch up with the rapidly chang-
ing face of intelligence governance but also inform developments in nonliberal sys-
tems so that intelligence provides increased security without sacrificing hard-won
rights.
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chapter 4
THE SOURCES AND

METHODS OF
INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
james j. wirtz
“Sources and methods” is a term often used to describe the practice of intelligence
collection and analysis. Intelligence sources vary, from information gleaned from
espionage, images obtained by earth-orbiting satellites, intercepted communica-
tions, to publicly available media reporting. The nature of the information obtained
also varies; everything from purloined documents to the “signature” of a ship’s
radar can take center-stage in intelligence reports. The term “methods” is synony-
mous with “tradecraft,” the techniques used by operations officers and analysts in
carrying out their duties. For clandestine operatives working under cover in foreign
countries, tradecraft involves such issues as avoiding detection and surveillance,
maintaining secret communications, and the fine art of recruiting and “running”
clandestine agents. For analysts, tradecraft might involve various social-science
methodologies, computer-based analytic tools, or the use of collaborative work-
spaces that exploit emerging information-revolution technologies. Intelligence
agencies also strive to protect their “sources and methods” because a compromise of
the ways they collect and analyze information can give opponents a keen apprecia-
tion of their overall capabilities and interests. Intelligence agencies worldwide sur-
round “sources and methods” with a cloak of secrecy because they are crucial to the
success of ongoing and future operations and analysis.
It is a departure from common practice to talk about the sources and methods
of intelligence studies. Traditionally, the literature on intelligence studies is surveyed
by using a levels-of-analysis approach (Wirtz 1989), by relying on the so-called intel-
ligence cycle to organize topics (Lowenthal 2008), or by highlighting important
operational, theoretical, historical, or public policy issues ( Johnson 2007; Sims and
Gerber 2005). The sources used by those who study intelligence also are obvious;
government documents, secondary sources, media reporting, memoirs, and even
works of fiction are used to gain insights into the history and practice of intelli-
gence. In terms of methods, scholars draw on the social sciences and traditional
methodology to devise theoretically sophisticated and compelling explanations of
extremely complex social interactions (Bar-Joseph 2005). But when applied to the
way scholars approach the study of intelligence, thinking about sources and meth-
ods can help identify the way emerging trends are shaping both the practice and
study of intelligence. Globalization is breaking down the barriers between foreign
and domestic intelligence activities and the way local, state, and national law
enforcement and intelligence agencies operate. Distinctions between public and
private interests and entities also are blurred as activities in the public and private
sphere interact to shape international and domestic threats and opportunities. The
information revolution also is transforming the practice and study of intelligence.
Not only are policymakers, analysts, and scholars confronted with a torrent of data,
information, and analysis, they must cope with emerging virtual realities that now
exist in “cyberspace.” New collective workspaces, empowered by advanced commu-
nication and computer technologies, also are creating new opportunities for col-
laboration that did not exist just a few years ago. The barriers between intelligence
practitioner and scholar are breaking down as both exploit and work to understand
the new setting for domestic and foreign intelligence.
To illustrate the emerging sources and methods of intelligence studies, this
chapter will explore three emerging topics in the study and practice of intelligence:
intelligence for homeland security; the concept of collective intelligence; and the
broad application of intelligence and warning methodologies to mitigate risk. Each
of these topics illustrates how theory and practice are merging as scholars and prac-
titioners respond to the threats and opportunities created by globalization and the
information revolution.
Intelligence for Homeland Security

Well before the September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda attacks against the United States, schol-
ars and officials recognized the general problem posed by the rise of transnational
terrorist networks, one of the externalities created by globalization (Zegart 2007).
Globalization had broken down the barriers between external and domestic threats,
blurring traditional distinctions between foreign enemies and domestic problems
created by criminals, gang activity, local protest movements, or mentally unbalanced
individuals. In December 2000, for instance, the National Intelligence Council
reported that foreign threats would inevitably manifest themselves as local problems.
Movements and individuals that emerged in states with “poor governance” would
sources and methods of intelligence studies 61
spill across national boundaries in the form of “diverse, free-wheeling, transnational

networks.” The Council predicted that as a result, “terrorist tactics will become increas-
ingly sophisticated and designed to achieve mass casualties” (National Intelligence
Council 2000, 50). The U.S. intelligence community recognized the asymmetric
threats posed by nonstate actors.
The fundamental problem posed by these new transnational actors, however, is
that they exploited structural weaknesses within the government of the United
States, a seam that exists between domestic law enforcement agencies and the exter-
nally focused intelligence community. Information and analysis still does not flow
easily across these bureaucratic boundaries, making it difficult to coordinate actions
against even well-understood threats. Additionally, the organizational cultures of
law enforcement and intelligence agencies sometimes work at cross-purposes. While
intelligence agencies were only marginally constrained by legal restrictions while
tracking terrorists operating in foreign lands, domestic law enforcement agencies
had to possess a reasonable criminal predicate before they began to track individu-
als within the United States, especially if they ever wanted to use the evidence gath-
ered as the basis of a criminal prosecution. The focus on prediction, warning, and
interdiction on the part of the intelligence community stood in contrast to the law
enforcement goal of investigating crime and bringing perpetrators to justice.
Linking national intelligence organizations to state, local, and federal law enforce-
ment agencies is not just a matter of overcoming bureaucratic rice bowls or elimi-
nating stove piping. It involves coordinating activities of agencies that face different
constraints and embrace different objectives to achieve a common goal, such as
prevention of the next terrorist attack (Markle Foundation 2002).
Intelligence for homeland security also presents a challenge because it is under-
taken in a multidisciplinary and multi-agency setting. It is difficult to coordinate
activities across a constellation of local, county, and state agencies with different
organizational cultures and traditions, even though a synthesis of their knowledge
would produce a high degree of situational awareness for officials who need to
respond to a crisis. Law enforcement organizations, especially those that practice
community based policing, have a tradition of monitoring the local environment
for abnormal activities and using this information to focus their operations.
Firefighters also maintain a high degree of familiarity with everyday activities in
their operating areas, especially when it comes to gathering information about local
enterprises and structures. Under certain conditions, firefighters also are empow-
ered to search public and private buildings without a warrant, giving them a unique,
if somewhat random, insight into activities in their jurisdictions. But firefighters
lack a tradition of spontaneous intelligence gathering; many fire departments have
no mechanism to gather and communicate information obtained during their
operations. Emergency medical service personnel also gain access to private and
public property and individuals in the course of their normal duties, but they gen-
erally are unwilling to undertake intelligence activities because they are committed
to protecting the privacy of the individuals they contact. By contrast, public health
officials do undertake a variety of real-time surveillance activities related to disease
outbreaks and public safety—syndrome surveillance is a sophisticated and time-

honored practice. Nevertheless, public health authorities often find it difficult fuse
biomedical data with other types of information to develop a compelling picture of
local events. It also is unclear what role other types of workers—building inspec-
tors, meter readers, postal workers, utility workers—can or should play in reporting
information uncovered in the course of their routine duties.
Practitioners and scholars also face a compelling need to create a doctrine for
homeland security intelligence. In other words, they need to devise a guide to roles,
missions, operating procedures, and philosophies to animate the process of gather-
ing, fusing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence across local, state, and federal
agencies. Currently, there are no best practices when it comes to informing first
responders about “what to look for” when it comes to intelligence collection. There
also is little agreement on what types of information—finished intelligence, warn-
ings, spot reports of events, or information about activities in other jurisdictions—
should be moved to individuals in the field. The fact that it is often impossible to
move classified information out of federal agencies to local law-enforcement per-
sonnel and first responders who lack a security clearance simply adds insult to
injury. Infrastructure to provide homeland security intelligence is emerging across
the Untied States in the form of scores of state, metropolitan, and regional intelli-
gence “fusion” and command centers. But in the absence of some sort of doctrine,
each of these entities is devising competing answers to the problems of how best to
provide intelligence to local communities (Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins 2007).
The fundamental question facing those interested in homeland security still
involves the definition of exactly what is meant by homeland security intelligence
(Masse 2006). Although the existing literature on intelligence would suggest that it
is an elusive goal, many believe that homeland security intelligence must produce
“specific event prediction” when it comes to a major terrorist attack. What remains
to be resolved, however, is how to devise an overall bureaucratic architecture, bud-
get, and operating philosophy to achieve this goal into the indefinite future. It might
be best for intelligence officials, first responders, and law-enforcement personnel to
take an “all-hazard” approach when it comes to producing intelligence. This
approach would provide dual benefits: (1) it would help communities deal with
organized crime, gang activity, drug problems, and traditional hazards and (2) it
would allow intelligence organizations to maintain a high degree of situational
awareness in terms of events in their jurisdictions. The ability to distinguish normal
hazards from terrorist incidents can greatly mitigate unnecessary damage to society,
allowing officials to respond appropriately to natural disasters, nefarious activity, or
hoaxes. An all-hazard approach also might be the best way to fulfill the counterter-
rorism mission because it raises the possibility of detecting novel efforts to create
mayhem. Ultimately, an all-hazard approach to intelligence recognizes the political
reality facing politicians. Most problems faced by local communities have little to
do with transnational terror networks. If intelligence is going to succeed, it must
“piggyback” on efforts to address local problems, for example gang activity.
Collective Intelligence
Collective intelligence is a new phenomenon produced by the information revolu-
tion. It reflects the cyber-assisted melding of human consciousness into a collective
awareness of global knowledge, or at least that is the best way to summarize the
myriad of emerging possibilities and threats created as more people and more
information gain access to the Internet (Malone 2008). Collective intelligence will
emerge as more scientists, scholars, officials, and average citizens use the internet to
contact each other to pursue mutual objectives, discover commercial, technical, or
social research opportunities, or debate matters of local and global public policy
(Brown and Isaacs 2008). Some observers believe that collective intelligence will
morph into a form of global consciousness, as political, scientific, or social ques-
tions are debated on the World Wide Web. Identity, knowledge, and reality, or at
least a common conception of reality, will be mediated by search engines combing
through the collective contents of the Web. Others prefer to use the metaphor
“global brain” to describe the “collectively intelligent network that is formed by the
people of this planet together with the computers, knowledge bases and communi-
cation links that connect them together” (Heylighen 2008). The information revo-
lution has already transformed society; collective intelligence is an optimistic way of
thinking about the possibilities created by emerging communication and computer
technologies.
Scholars and practitioners face two issues when confronting the concept of col-
lective intelligence. The first is practical. Theorists and managers need to devise
ways to incorporate new technologies and practices into existing institutions and
bureaucracies. If new technologies make it possible for individuals to access data
bases, conduct analysis, and communicate information and plans for action to col-
leagues and fellow travelers across the world, how can analysts and intelligence offi-
cials be empowered to take the same sorts of actions in a setting hamstrung by
regulations, classification, and bureaucratic constraints? The issue they face is to
find ways to integrate analytical and action networks into what are relatively hierar-
chical organizations.
“Collective intelligence,” however, is probably as much a reality within the U.S.
intelligence community as it is in other institutions around the country. Collaborative
software allows analysts to use collective workspaces to create finished intelligence.
Analysts can post their work, sources, and objectives in a virtual workspace, allow-
ing other analysts to comment or contribute to their evolving analysis (Medina
2008). This collaboration also can occur using “machine intelligence.” The same
way search engines find information and connections among various topics and
projects, software programs look for relationships between analytic endeavors, con-
nections that are not obvious to analysts preoccupied with their own work. Virtual
communities can emerge as analysts with common interests collaborate, despite
differing organizational affiliations or primary responsibilities.
Another opportunity created by collective intelligence is that it provides intel-

ligence managers with a way to monitor the whole enterprise by watching how ana-
lytical judgments are shifting over time. Monitoring the evolution of estimates and
judgments can in turn create important indicators that merit further analysis, iden-
tify intelligence pathologies, or highlight analytical weaknesses that need to be
addressed. In other words, if managers and analysts can watch analyses evolve, they
might be able to address shortcomings that are difficult to detect, especially by those
directly charged with developing specific intelligence products. Analysts and man-
agers’ loss of “situational awareness,” so to speak, has been directly tied to the weak-
nesses in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction. According to one group of senior experts:
Of all the methodological elements that contributed, positively and negatively,
to the intelligence community’s performance, the most important seems to be
an uncritical acceptance of established positions and assumptions. Gaps in
knowledge were left undiscovered or unattended, which to some degree is
explainable by the absence of pervasive, intrusive, and effective collection in Iraq.
Although many products were appropriately caveated, the growing need to caveat
judgments to explain the absence of direct intelligence did not seem to provoke
internal review within the intelligence community. (Kerr, Wolfe, Donegan, and
Pappas 2008, 158)
New decision tools can thus help managers delve into how collective judgments
have evolved to see if underlining assumptions make sense, if the information used
is valid, or if contradictory information has been integrated into the conventional
wisdom.
There is a downside to collective intelligence in that it simply might offer a new
technological pathway to create “intelligence to please.” Intelligence managers would
have to be careful not to abuse their new ability to monitor the thinking that goes
on within the collective by allowing mavericks and devil’s advocates to participate
in the production of finished intelligence. This might be easier said than done, how-
ever, because those intelligence dissenters will be busily documenting how the anal-
ysis embraced by senior officials and intelligence managers turned out to be
dangerously flawed. Depending on how they are employed, these new technologies
and techniques can produce positive or negative results.
The second issue raised by the notion of collective intelligence is the possibility
that the intelligence community’s comparative advantage over other types of state
and nonstate actors could be waning. Proponents of what is known in the literature
as “open-source intelligence,” often describe the information revolution as a boon
to humanity, empowering people to become masters of their own destiny when it
comes to local, regional, or even international issues (Steele 2002). Open-source
advocates note that intelligence agencies were slow to capitalize on the information
revolution because it called into question their raison d’être: maintaining superior
situational awareness through the use of classified data and communication chan-
nels (Steele 2001). Nevertheless, as more groups and individuals are equipped with
state-of-the-art computational and communication systems they can combine local
knowledge with virtually the same resources available to the intelligence commu-
nity to conduct data mining, high-quality analysis, or intelligence preparation of
the battlefield.
The fact that other empowered networks or even individuals are helping to
populate this collective intelligence expands the operating environment for tradi-
tional intelligence agencies. Not only do they have to monitor social, political, or
military events in some distant land, they also have to monitor activities underway
in cyberspace. State agencies ignore developments in cyberspace at their own peril
because they can help define reality on the ground and enable all sorts of nefarious
activities. Some observers of collective intelligence even believe that cyberspace
itself is already defining reality by serving as a source of information for people who
are not eyewitnesses to some unfolding event. The “electronic community,” which is
controlled by no one, already seems to be a place that people turn for information,
opinion, and analysis (Rheingold 2008).
It is thus possible to imagine the emergence of a worldwide consciousness,
which not only defines reality, but actually possess the collective intelligence of mil-
lions of people, a wide array of analytical tools, and access to virtually unlimited
amounts of information. Intelligence agencies would be forced to monitor empow-
ered networks for evidence of nefarious activity or even turn to them for insights
into the latest scientific developments. The intelligence community will have to
monitor cyberspace not just because it is a means of communication, but also
because it is an emerging venue for the advancement of human knowledge and
intelligence activity.
Indications and Warning versus

Specific Event Prediction
When it comes to intelligence analysis, both scholars and practitioners focus their
attention on what is best characterized as “specific event prediction”: the need to
provide policymakers with timely warning of an impending attack, natural disaster,
or some other sort of critical development. Sometimes, analysts “get it right” and
provide senior officers with timely and accurate warning. For example, U.S. Naval
Intelligence provided such an accurate prediction of Japanese plans that it was
largely responsible for the U.S. victory at the Battle of Midway. “Strategic surprise,”
“surprise attack,” or “intelligence failure,” however, are the terms used to describe
when analysts fail to provide specific event prediction, and explaining these sorts of
failure are one of the central issues in the field of intelligence studies.
Specific event prediction is challenging. In fact it is so challenging, that the con-
ventional wisdom suggests that intelligence failures are inevitable for the simple
reason that the exact nature of the next intelligence challenge is unknown, making
it difficult to tailor current reforms to meet future exigencies (Betts 1977). As a result,
practitioners and analysts have turned to indications and warning methodologies as
a new way to respond to emerging threats, especially those posed by nonstate actors.
Drawn from the literature on risk assessment and management and influenced by
the traditional use of indications and warning methodologies to estimate the likeli-
hood of military conflict, an indications-and-warning approach can provide a way
to detect anomalies, to refocus intelligence collection efforts, and to change the alert
status of security forces and procedures.
Indications-and-warning methodology is based on devising a series of indica-
tors that highlight a change of status of an opponent’s forces, especially the move
from normal “peacetime” operations to a wartime or attack posture. Guided by
strategic analysis, which identifies likely risks and productive collection targets,
intelligence-and-warning analysts monitor the external environment for expected
signs of attack, suspicious behavior, or anomalous situations (Davis 2007). During
the Cold War, when attack indicators focused on major military formations, indica-
tions-and-warning analysts relied on national technical means to spot changes in
the operational posture of major military units. Today, indications and warning
often involves subtler targets, individuals or clandestine cells that are undertaking
criminal activities or terrorism. Because these clandestine cells often “hide in plain
sight” while undertaking their nefarious activities, indications and warning meth-
odologies provide a useful way to detect anomalies that suggest that something is
amiss. This might sound impossibly difficult when it comes to tracking the behav-
ior of individuals or small groups, but U.S. law-enforcement personnel did notice
prior to the September 11, 2001, terror attacks that certain pilots were interested in
flying, but not landing, airliners (Wirtz 2008).
Once anomalies are detected, analysts can refocus collection efforts to develop
a better understanding of the target under consideration. In terms of homeland
security, indications-and-warning analysis can be used to focus the efforts of law-
enforcement personnel who can investigate abnormal patterns of activity. Indeed
any method that permits investigators to concentrate their efforts on potentially
important targets would be superior to random surveillance or blanket security
measures. A cursory effort might be all that is necessary to determine that some
anomaly is completely innocent or should be the subject of a sustained surveillance
effort.
An indications-and-warning methodology also can do much to improve secu-
rity because it can provide policymakers with a justification for raising, or reducing,
security precautions in light of suspected threats or changes in potential opponents’
activities. Because people cannot remain at high levels of alert indefinitely, intelli-
gence is critical to all security measures involving human operators. Warning liter-
ally is the message to security personnel that “today” is the day they need to be on
the qui vive. The capture of an Al-Qaeda operative on the way to bomb Los Angeles
International Airport in 1999, for instance, can be attributed to effective action taken
in response to a general alert, not a specific warning about a unique event or the
identification of an individual suspect (Perrow 2005). Changing alert levels and
procedures themselves can create a mission kill when it comes to the activities of
small cells. Because they have to minimize their operational and logistical signa-
tures to reduce the possibility of detection, a change in security could send them
back to the drawing board, forcing them to optimize their operations to meet new
conditions.
Conclusion
What are the sources and methods of intelligence studies? One of the sources is glo-
balization, which is eliminating any meaningful distinction between domestic and
foreign threats. Intelligence analysts were quick to recognize the changing nature of
the intelligence “target,” and the fact that the intelligence and law-enforcement
communities were not well prepared to meet the emerging threat. Nevertheless,
globalization is an ongoing challenge facing scholars and practitioners alike when it
comes to devising effective responses to today’s threats. Another challenge is the
information revolution—it empowers individuals and groups at the expense of the
state and bureaucracy, it creates new analytical tools and techniques at a dizzying
rate, it produces data overload, and it has fashioned entirely new venues for the
practice of intelligence. Scholars have only started to begin to understand the impact
of the information revolution on the functions that make up the intelligence cycle.
Some have even suggested that an emerging global, human-machine interface might
soon trump traditional intelligence organizations as a source of analysis and situa-
tional awareness.
The methods of intelligence studies, the domain of knowledge and practice
relevant to the production of finished intelligence, espionage, and the management
of secret organizations in society, has increased in both scope and complexity in
response to this changing threat environment. Scholars interested in international
terrorism must incorporate an understanding of the restrictions created by law and
organizational culture when it comes to the role played by law enforcement and
various first responders in the collection and production of intelligence. Additionally,
scholars are beginning to address how the information revolution has altered intel-
ligence production, and how new technologies and best practices can be integrated
into existing organizations. Intra-governmental politics, the notion of doctrine, and
the search for superior theory and analytical methodologies are beginning to emerge
as key factors in the study of how best to organize and conduct contemporary intel-
ligence operations.
Compared to the traditional subject matter and methods of intelligence stud-
ies, the sources and methods of intelligence studies point to a future enterprise that
focuses on the politics, technology and coordination of disparate organizations into
a collective endeavor, a way to empower people to better serve national purposes
and the international effort to achieve security. It also adopts a different perspective
on the second oldest profession. Instead of depicting intelligence as a stable and

consistent enterprise, it depicts an endeavor of increasing scope and changing con-
tent. The sources and methods of intelligence studies are helping to define, produce,
and understand the contemporary transformation of intelligence.
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National Intelligence Council. 2000. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with
Nongovernmental Experts. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency.
Perrow, C. 2005. Organizational or Executive Failures? Contemporary Sociology 34:2
(March): 99–107.
Rheingold, H. 2008. “A Slice of Life in My Virtual Community.” In Collective Intelligence:
Creating a Prosperous World at Peace, ed. M. Tovey. Oakton, Virginia: Earth Intelligence
Network.
Sims, J. E., and B. Gerber. 2005. Transforming U.S. Intelligence. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press.
Steele, R. D. 2001. On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World. Washington, D.C.
OSS International Press.
———. 2002. The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public & Political—Citizen’s Action
Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs & Corruption.
Washington, D.C.: OSS Press.
Wirtz, J. J. 1989. The Intelligence Paradigm. Intelligence and National Security 4,
no. 4:829–37.
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chapter 5
GETTING INTELLIGENCE
HISTORY RIGHT:
REFLECTIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM THE INSIDE
nicholas dujmovic
1. Introduction
From its earliest years the Central Intelligence Agency has counted among the vari-
ous specialists it has employed—analysts, scientists and technicians, case officers,
covert action specialists, logisticians—historians who have documented, reflected
on, and interpreted the Agency’s past with a view to understanding its present and
future. Of all the various reasons for an intelligence organization to have a historical
staff—public outreach, substantive contributions to the work of outside scholars,
internal lessons learned—the most important may well be the idea that history can
help us in intelligence1 figure out who we are by shedding light on the value of our
often-misunderstood profession, on the mistakes and achievements of the past and
how they came about, and on the ways we can both improve in our work and even
1
By “intelligence” is meant generally the institutions, people, and processes that are
involved with the four classic functions of intelligence: collection, analysis, covert action, and
counterintelligence.
getting intelligence history right 71
appreciate the reasons for public criticism, distrust, and the occasional call to dis-
band CIA.
The work of the CIA History Staff has an external function, like most govern-
ment-agency historical programs, but its most important function is internal. Even
so, that internal historical function relies on histories and historical treatments of CIA
done by outsiders—even though “inside” historians have greater access to sources
generally denied to “outsiders.” Intelligence historians who work within CIA or other
intelligence agencies have a direct stake in the quality and reliability of these outside
histories, and outside historians benefit from the work of CIA historians as well, mak-
ing for what is effectively an informal but important partnership that is crucial to any
serious scholar of intelligence. This article is an attempt both to describe what “inside”
intelligence historians do and to offer some recommendations for “outside” historians
to make their work more accurate and relevant to all, not least to those citizens who
happen to have clearances and serve their country in intelligence work.
2. History from CIA

To the degree the U.S. public is aware that CIA has a historical program, that awareness
largely is the result of the public outreach mission of the Agency’s History Staff. Any
survey of federal-agency Web sites will show that almost every government department,
agency, or bureau has a staff, unit, or individual “doing” history at that agency. Generally
speaking, the primary mission of any given government historical office is the enhance-
ment of the public’s awareness of what that particular agency has done over the years,
how the taxpayer expenditures for that agency have been justified, and, implicitly, why
that agency should continue to operate. Indeed, many and perhaps most government
historical units are organizationally located in public-affairs offices (and, incongruously,
for a time in the 1950s—when public knowledge of CIA was nil—so was CIA’s).
The Web site of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a model of
this type. It documents in fascinating detail government efforts from the early nine-
teenth century to protect the public from the adulteration of food (and later from
harmful substances in medicines and drugs); the work of the Department of
Agriculture’s chemistry department; the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, which the
FDA considers its origin; and so forth up to the present. One cannot read this his-
tory and take for granted the safety of what we Americans consume. Yet, especially
to intelligence professionals, it seems overkill: the FDA is using its history, well pre-
sented and interesting though it is, to express what most of us would call a “no
brainer”—the idea that the government really ought to be keeping ground glass,
sawdust, and poisons out of our food and medicine. The FDA persuasively makes its
case: keeping our ketchup safe for the past century is indisputably important.
CIA as an institution has a harder task justifying itself, even though arguably
the Agency has helped keep the republic safe for more than sixty years. The idea that
CIA and its work might be important is by no means indisputable. Even though
early American history is replete with examples of the use of intelligence in the
national interest, including by some of the venerated founding fathers (Knott 1986),
by the early twentieth century the American view was that there was something
unusual or unseemly about intelligence, particularly regarding clandestine collec-
tion or covert operations. No less an educated sophisticate than President Woodrow
Wilson—the only U.S. chief executive with a doctorate, and in history and political
science at that!—publicly admitted his befuddlement in 1914 when he learned that
European countries actually spied on one another (Andrew 1995, 30).
This peculiarly American streak of naïveté about intelligence found its most
famous expression in Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s dismissive admonition
that “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail” when in 1929 he ordered his depart-
ment’s codebreaking operation to close.2 Major American newspapers approved;
one editorialized that “this fine gesture will commend itself to all who are trying to
develop the same standards of decency between Governments as exist between indi-
viduals” (Lathrop 2004, 213). The rise of totalitarian dictatorships in the interwar
period convinced many Americans that effective intelligence was tantamount to the
primary totalitarian instrument of control, the secret police. The New York Times in
1938, commenting on proposals to combine U.S. intelligence efforts, even opined
that a concerted intelligence establishment was somehow un-American. “The cre-
ation of any super-espionage military agency is both unnecessary and undesirable.
It is alien to American tradition, and no glorified ‘OGPU’ secret police is needed or
wanted here.”
Even before World War II and the creation of America’s first centralized intel-
ligence organization, the Office of Strategic Services, we see the development of the
view that intelligence serving a democracy is necessarily a threat to that democracy,
that equates intelligence with totalitarian control, and that in the postwar period
would find popular expression in movies and spy fiction (and even some histories)
depicting what can be called the “Evil Geniuses” perspective on intelligence in gen-
eral and CIA in particular.3
A kind of revisionism developed in the 1960s that took the opposite tack:
CIA, far from being omnipotent puppetmasters, the real center of power, the
2
The provenance of Stimson’s saying is often disputed or considered obscure. Stimson
himself, in his memoir co-authored with McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War
(1948), described the incident and what he claimed to have said at the time. It was a remarkable
admission to make. Stimson, who died in 1950, probably in his final years while the Cold War
burgeoned, would have agreed with the 1963 rejoinder of former Director of Central Intelligence
Allen Dulles, “When the fate of a nation and the lives of its soldiers are at stake, gentlemen do read
each other’s mail—if they can get their hands on it.”
3
The film Three Days of the Condor, released in 1975 during the height of congressional
investigations of U.S. intelligence, is an exemplar of the “Evil Geniuses” approach to depicting CIA.
A more recent example is The Good Shepherd (2006), which CIA historians roundly criticized for
its utter lack of historicity (Robarge et al. 2007). For a general critique on how badly Hollywood
depicts CIA, see Johnson (2008).
“government within the government,” is really a bumbling lot of incompetent dolts.

This view undoubtedly gets an impetus from the failed Bay of Pigs operation of 1961
(and it is hard to dispute that conclusion) and definitely from the general American
loss of confidence in government throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s.
While the “Evil Geniuses” view tends to be propagated by Hollywood films and
popular fiction, the “Incompetent Dolts” school has supposedly more sophisticated
purveyors, tending to be supported by journalists, columnists, and editorial writers,
for whom the successful end of the Cold War only highlighted CIA’s shortcomings.
Washington columnist Mary McGrory superlatively expressed this view in a series
of diatribes against CIA from 1992 to 1997: “Why does Congress put up with such
ruinously expensive incompetence? . . . The question is why the CIA still exists. . . .
The Agency has to be destroyed in order to save it. . . . Harry Truman’s worst idea. . . .
The CIA is one organization whose record seems to have little to do with its stand-
ing” (Lathrop 2004, 83–85).
As often happens, the best expression of this American dichotomy of perspec-
tive on intelligence and CIA comes from the British, who have a much longer expe-
rience in these matters and in any case have an enviable talent for expressing
themselves so well about them. In 1966, British Security Service (MI5) official John
Bingham noted that “There are currently two schools of thought about our
Intelligence Services. One school is convinced that they are staffed by murderous,
powerful, double-crossing cynics, the other that the taxpayer is supporting a collec-
tion of bumbling, broken-down layabouts” (Lathrop 2004, 81).
Another Briton, intelligence historian Christopher Andrew, echoed this theme
more recently when he spoke in December 2005 at the 50th anniversary celebration
of the founding of Studies in Intelligence, the professional intelligence journal spon-
sored by CIA since 1955. Andrew praised the opening up of Studies to a public audi-
ence since the early 1990s, through the publication of unclassified and declassified
issues and especially through their posting on the Internet, as an important devel-
opment that not only helps the public understand intelligence better but also dimin-
ishes the harmful effects wrought by “conspiracists” who ascribe nothing but evil to
intelligence or by “fantasists” who “describe what they do not know.”
It is the CIA History Staff ’s public mission to offer a balanced and accurate view
of the Agency and its work. This is accomplished in several ways. Like the FDA, CIA
maintains a public Web site, cia.gov, which features historical information and sto-
ries that, it must fairly be said, tend to be supportive of CIA missions and activities
over the Agency’s history. But CIA’s historical outreach goes further than affirming
the Agency’s existence: the Web site includes the unclassified and declassified arti-
cles from Studies in Intelligence that scholars like Christopher Andrew appreciate, as
well as thousands of declassified documents. Visitors to the site also can download
dozens of unclassified products of the History Staff, including historical mono-
graphs on the U-2 and A-12 reconnaissance aircraft, the OSS origins of CIA, docu-
mentary collections on Cold War intelligence issues, and many more. Researchers
can find released national intelligence estimates on the Soviet Union and other crit-
ical analyses and make up their own minds about CIA’s record. The main point here
is that much of the historical material CIA makes publicly available is simply not
favorable to the Agency and cannot be construed as CIA propaganda.4 CIA histori-
ans not only prepare the unclassified histories made available to the public but work
with the declassifiers to identify collections of documents for review and release
based on their historical significance—and not on the basis of whether a particular
release will make CIA’s history look any better.5
In addition to this wealth of material made available on the CIA Web site, which
is unique for any intelligence organization in history in terms of its volume, quan-
tity, and exposure of previously held secrets, CIA historians also speak many times
a year before university classes and seminars, military senior service schools and
war colleges, think tanks, and civic groups. Public disclosure and engagement are
often greeted by skeptics with “Why are they telling us this, and why now?”—imply-
ing that Agency historians are just propagandists putting a spin on CIA history. No
doubt there is a segment of the public that will never be convinced that a CIA his-
torian is anything but a propagandist and for whom any denial of inherent bias will
be seen ipso facto as its confirmation. But for those who profess to keep an open
mind, I would submit two reasons why CIA’s historical analysis can be considered
independent, reliable, and free from official pressure to make the history somehow
better. The first reason is the professional pride CIA historians have as historians,
which is no different from that exhibited by historians in academia, by other gov-
ernment historians, or by independent scholars. Christopher Andrew—one of the
preeminent and most respected intelligence historians in the world—answered this
issue well after he agreed in 2003 to serve as the official historian for the British
Security Service. While no one doubted his qualifications, and praise for his existing
works has been widespread, many scholars have expressed doubts that Andrew
can remain objective. He has “taken the Queen’s shilling” and become the “court
4
In the category of “warts-and-all” treatments of CIA history that Agency historians provide
the public, I would offer my own recent articles in Studies in Intelligence that are critical of past CIA
practices. In “Extraordinary Fidelity: Two CIA Prisoners in China, 1952–73” (Dujmovic 2006), I
criticized the poor decisions of CIA officers in the field that led to the capture and Chinese imprison-
ment of two young CIA men, the stupid mistakes made in their cover story, and the subsequent
organizational legend that unfairly denigrated these men by maintaining they had been on an
unauthorized joyride when their plane was shot down over Manchuria in 1952. In “Amnesia to
Anamnesis: Commemoration of the Dead at CIA,” (Dujmovic 2008), the culture of the operational
directorate came under critical analysis regarding how poorly CIA officers who perished in the line
of duty were remembered for much of the Agency’s history. Additionally, in my critique in Studies of
Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (2007), a book that excoriates the Agency as a
nearly perfect failure since its establishment, I argued for balance by recognizing CIA successes while
acknowledging readily the shortcomings, failures, and outright debacles that are indisputably part of
CIA’s past: “No objective observer of Agency history can fail to note that CIA in its history has
failed—sometimes miserably—in what it set out to do or was ordered to do.” (Dujmovic 2007.)
5
The CIA History Staff, which has formal input into decisions regarding the release of
previously classified information or material undergoing declassification review, tends to favor
release unless damage to national security can be demonstrated as a likely result.
historian” for MI5, as some put it (Glees 2005). Others contend that Andrew is a
professional who knows that his “official” position will, if anything, invite more
scrutiny from the growing ranks of intelligence historians not paid by the govern-
ment who have the expertise and desire to challenge Andrew’s work. As Andrew
himself has acknowledged, “Posterity and postgraduates are breathing down my
neck” (Walker 2003).
Likewise, CIA historians say: Judge us by our work, not by our presumed inten-
tions. Read our material, and if you detect bias, call us on it. Denounce us in profes-
sional journals, on blogs, or in Amazon reviews (the latter has happened at least
once). Shun us at academic conferences. Stop inviting us to speak before your stu-
dents and colleagues. But do not assume from the beginning that what CIA histori-
ans write and conclude is somehow tainted. Conversely, if you like what you see, tell
us, or better yet, pay us an even higher compliment: use our material in your own
work. Not that we keep a rigorous scorecard, but the number of such compliments
we receive from the public and from intelligence scholars greatly exceeds the com-
plaints or even the number of questions raised about our objectivity.
The second argument for the reliability of the public work of CIA historians is
that, as important as that work is, it is no ding an sich but really reflects the History
Staff ’s inner work, for this inner work—the classified research, writing, publication,
and presentation that Agency historians conduct on the inside for cleared readers
and audiences—not only is more important than the external outreach, it abso-
lutely requires us to be critical.
3. History within CIA
If we don’t remember what we did, we won’t know who we are.

—President Ronald Reagan,
address from the Oval Office, 11 January 1989.
When Ronald Reagan addressed the American people for the last time as president,
besides reviewing the achievements of the past eight years he exhorted Americans
to know better who they are as a people by learning more about U.S. history with all
its trials and triumphs, its shortcomings and its successes. The President made a
powerful case for the value of history by linking it to memory and therefore identity
(Reagan 1989). Reagan’s admonition particularly resonates with the CIA History
Staff because most of our activity is directed internally in order to find out what we
did, how that past record shaped and continues to shape the Agency and its officers,
and what we can learn from that experience.
A historical program has existed continuously at CIA for almost sixty years.
Even in 1951, when the Agency was less than four years old, senior CIA officials
recognized the value of history for the purposes of establishing what today we
would call “best practices” or “lessons learned.” Needless to say, outreach to the
American public for its edification regarding U.S. intelligence agencies and their
activities was not considered a mission of the CIA history program in those early
years.
In his definitive study in 1997 of how the Agency’s history program originated
and conducted its business over the years, then CIA Chief Historian Gerald Haines
(1997) noted that, at the beginning “the study of Agency history had the attention of
major CIA officials,” and that this attention was for the right reasons. Agency lead-
ers, including Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith, wanted the CIA
history program to accurately document CIA activities critically and objectively,
including objective analysis of the Agency’s “weaknesses” and “defects” in order to
avoid repeating failures.
Haines’s study shows, however, that over the next forty-five years the CIA his-
torical staff rarely had the resources or high-level attention to fulfill this mandate,
and while it occasionally thrived under CIA directors such as Smith, Richard Helms,
and William Casey, it more often languished with little access to senior officials and
minimal effect on the life and work of the Agency.6 Haines pessimistically concluded
that, while most CIA officers pay lip service to history and are familiar with and use
historical analogies, they “are basically ahistorical. They believe they have no time or
need for history” and are too busy “to appreciate history’s value not only as a pre-
server of the ‘Agency’s memory’ [but also] as an important training mechanism and
as a tool in the [decision] making process.” Haines in 1997 was doubtful the Agency
would learn its “history lesson.”7
Thankfully, today we would have to write a new conclusion to an update of
Haines’s study, for in the past decade the situation has improved notably. Staffing
levels are near historic highs for the program—currently five permanent staff offi-
cers with advanced degrees and relevant experience serving as historians, plus a
researcher and several contract historians. More importantly, the History Staff ’s
involvement in the internal work and culture of the Agency has grown in recent
years to encompass a broad range of activities while remaining professionally objec-
tive in its approach.
6
A relatively new but increasingly frequent exercise on the part of CIA historians is the
attempt to correlate types of director with observed phenomena such as length of tenure, the party
of the president, Agency deaths in the line of duty, and so forth. The fortunes of the History Staff,
however, show no pattern. The program has been championed by directors who were CIA
careerists (Helms, Gates) and by outsiders (Smith), and it has been ignored by insiders (Dulles,
Colby) and outsiders (McCone, Webster) alike.
7
An even more critical assessment of the state of in-house CIA historical studies, albeit from
a far narrower perspective (a personal experience in producing a groundbreaking history of the
origins of CIA) is Troy (1994).
Every newly sworn-in officer of CIA, for example, gets an introduction to the
Agency’s history that many find refreshing and provocative. CIA historians intro-
duce themes that are developed at length in another venue, the twenty-five-hour
“History of CIA” course, a “warts-and-all” SECRET-level survey for midlevel per-
sonnel that is presented annually. Those themes include:
• The state of American intelligence before CIA, why the Agency was created,
and what it was expected to do.
• The difference between the Cold War mission and today’s priorities, and
also the continuities between them, such as the all-source nature of our
work.
• The mix of cooperation, competition, and conflict that has marked CIA’s
relations with other U.S. intelligence agencies, both before and after the
intelligence reform of 2004–2005.
• The interplay between intelligence and CIA on the one hand and
policymaking and the political process and personalities on the other,
typified by the relationship between the CIA director and the President.
• The nature and conduct of covert action, the consequences it often has on
the Agency and on administrations, and the fact that presidents cannot
seem to do without it.
• The development of congressional oversight in response to real and
perceived CIA abuses.
• The record of CIA successes and failures.
With regard to successes and failures, many commentators and historians on
the outside seem to keep an Agency “scorecard” that is particularly heavy on the
failure side. CIA historians point out that public discussion of CIA activities is often
ill-informed or simplistic—what constitutes a success or a failure is often not very
well defined—but in any case, the Agency has had its share of both, and they are
discussed in depth. CIA historians explore analytic failures such as missing the first
Soviet nuclear test, collection and analysis lapses that blinded CIA to the rise and
significance of the Islamist movement in Iran, the mother-of-all operational disas-
ters—the Bay of Pigs—and so on. There are, as it happens, a lot of failures—mostly
because the nature of intelligence work means that the tasks are inherently
difficult.
Against this record of failure, CIA historians also present the important suc-
cesses in collection, analysis, and covert action. Ambiguous cases are also described:
the Berlin Tunnel, for example, arguably belongs in both columns, as does every
counterintelligence case in which an American intelligence officer was found spying
for another country. Almost every counterintelligence case is a security failure of
some sort, but the only thing worse than finding a spy is not finding him.
In addition to presenting general CIA history for the workforce, Agency histo-
rians will cover, on request or as a matter of personal interest, specific topics of con-
cern to a particular CIA component. CIA historians have illuminated for operations
officers and analysts, for example, the difficulties of operating against a particular
“hard target” country with a quite sobering presentation on Cold War activities—
generally unsuccessful ones—in that region. For those who prepare and deliver the
President’s Daily Brief, there is the history of the daily intelligence report to the
Chief Executive. CIA historians provide the Agency’s communications officers with
a sense of their heritage and the enduring attributes of their profession that do not
change even as communications technology grows more sophisticated. Classified
histories and historical presentations are now a staple of many of the Agency’s train-
ing programs, including for case officers, analysts, paramilitary, technical, and
administrative personnel.
Besides educating the workforce and inculcating a sense of identity and heri-
tage, CIA historians increasingly find themselves responding to the needs of CIA
managers and senior staff. Much of the work constitutes quick-turnaround histori-
cal support that includes answering questions such as, who did the PDB go to at the
end of the second Clinton administration (quite a few) or, have Agency aircraft ever
carried weapons (yes). There also are high-level questions about past personalities
and events—often provoked by obituaries—or requests for vetting speeches to
make sure Agency speakers get their facts right. Years ago in a public speech a dep-
uty director of CIA described how the National Security Act of 1947 defined covert
action, which is a problem because the Act studiously avoids mentioning such activ-
ities at all. Today, CIA historians routinely check speeches and testimony for histori-
cal accuracy.
The most gratifying and useful work of the Agency’s History Staff—and the
work that makes absolutely necessary a professional objectivity and willingness to
be critical—concerns the in-depth support for ongoing programs and delibera-
tions. One technical collection program manager, for example, could not create a
narrative of how his unit had developed a particular collection capability because of
the somewhat haphazard and grassroots nature of that development; “we could not
explain how we did it.” This manager wanted the CIA History Staff both to docu-
ment that achievement—including all its false steps and wrong turns—and to serve
as a “lessons learned” model so that other managers could foster an environment
conducive to technological innovation. The resulting study, researched and pro-
duced by a CIA historian, was critical and fair, and it has been well received across
the Intelligence Community.
Another CIA manager contacted the History Staff for help in determining how
the program she inherited had started and what were the challenges and pitfalls
encountered. Another, a manager of analysis, wanted to study how the analytic
directorate was organized in the past, particularly the mix of functional and geo-
graphic offices. Yet another analytic manager was interested in how past presidential
administrations had viewed and used intelligence, and existing studies on this sub-
ject were made available to him. We recently counseled senior management on the
differing types of CIA directors appointed by U.S. presidents of both parties and
historically what impact that has had on the Agency’s activities and influence.
In perhaps the best example of influence, CIA historians were asked to review
the record over several decades of a particular type of intelligence operation;
our conclusions about what practices worked in what situations have been used in
high-level decisions on whether to pursue this type of operation in a particular
place. That is impact, that is relevance, and it does not get any better for historians
than to have one’s work used for current decision making on matters of importance
to the Agency’s mission and therefore to national security.
4. History of CIA
Writing intelligence history is not for the fainthearted, and even from the inside
CIA historians can identify with the challenges outside historians face. Intelligence,
after all, is a profession (or business, or activity, etc.) that not only works in the
shadows but whose practitioners fully intend to keep secret in every way. The record
of precisely what was done, where and how, by whom, and why, is either purpose-
fully not available or often eludes even inside historians who still have to deal with
compartmentalization and “need to know.” Documentary sources are almost always
fragmentary, while oral histories need perhaps more careful handling than usual
(interviewees have been trained to precisely manage information), all of which
results in a situation where discriminating scholarly judgment is required. As a
longtime former CIA historian (Warner 2007) observed, “Intelligence thus, by defi-
nition, resists scholarship. . . . Histories of American intelligence [because the evi-
dentiary base is difficult] tend to resemble in some ways the works of modern
historians writing about ancient times.”
We CIA historians believe that there exists an informal partnership between us
and intelligence historians on the outside. Outsiders have a stake in our publicly
accessible work, for the material made available through the History Staff ’s external
outreach adds value to the corpus of knowledge about CIA and intelligence, at least
judging from the citations and other uses made of it by outside historians. Likewise,
CIA historians have a direct stake in the quality of outside intelligence histories, for
we would find it much more difficult to do our jobs otherwise. Our own expertise
is given a bedrock of knowledge by the fine work published by historians such as
Andrew, John Ranelagh, Loch Johnson, and many others.8 In addition to maintain-
ing a sizeable professional library—the holdings of which are at least 90 percent
from the unclassified world—the CIA History Staff subscribes to and makes use of
in our work professional journals such as Intelligence and National Security, the
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the Journal of Cold War
Studies, the American Historical Review, Diplomatic History, and several others.
The various history presentations offered internally at CIA have reading lists
dominated by books, papers, and articles from the outside. The History Staff is
8
The ability of CIA historians to publish on the outside often relies on our ability to cite
unclassified works.
continually asked what books on CIA history are worth reading—unclassified

books, that is, because CIA officers like to take this reading home or to the beach on
vacation. CIA historians, like other professionals, have to keep up with the literature
and often are asked to comment on the latest book or article on the Agency. Reviews,
of course, are part of the normal output for any historian, and Studies in Intelligence
as well as outside publications often make available the views of CIA historians on
the outside literature.
It should be obvious that, in many ways, CIA historians are greatly in debt to
intelligence historians in the wider world outside of CIA.
By and large, we find that most histories by reputable historians have value, some
of them have great value, and a few are absolutely indispensable. At the same time, it
must be said, some are misleading, inaccurate, portray a CIA with which we are not
familiar, or all of the above, and a few are not worth the paper they are printed on.
For those histories with which we have problems, their shortcomings actually stem
less than might be thought from the lack of access to classified information as they
do from other problems such as bias, laziness, inaccurate terminology, curious lacu-
nae in expertise, or an incomplete appreciation for the subject. Fortunately, the late
Yale historian Robin Winks erred in saying “If the truth [about intelligence history]
were known, hundreds of books now on the shelves would be reclassified from his-
tory to fiction. But the truth is not known.” (Lathrop 2004, 280) The truth, as much
as it can be known, is known by CIA historians, but even so we certainly have not
removed or reclassified hundreds of outside histories from our library shelves.
Given the interest that insiders have in the quality of outside intelligence his-
tory, it seems appropriate to offer some suggestions for making it better. An infor-
mal survey on outside histories recently conducted among CIA historians and many
colleagues in other agencies of the Intelligence Community9 indicates that insiders
often have what may be termed “wince moments” when reading these histories.
These are moments experienced when a staff intelligence historian with clearances
(or a knowledgeable intelligence professional) reads a text and winces because he or
she has come across a statement or assertion that is wrong as a matter of fact or
interpretation and about which the writer should have known better because the
information is public. A wince moment has less to do with criticism of CIA (for we
are all loving critics) or with the disclosure of classified information (that is a differ-
ent kind of wince) than it does with things such as sloppy factual errors, an unfair
portrayal of intelligence activities, an incomplete recounting of the context in which
they occurred, or a distorted conception of the motivations and competencies of
individuals engaged in intelligence. Here, then, are recommendations from insiders
to outsiders concerning the writing of intelligence, and particularly CIA, history.10
9
Besides representing the views of CIA historians, I received written and oral input from the
National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National
Reconnaissance Office. All interpretations are my responsibility, however.
10
Out of respect for outside scholars and historians, I have refrained in the discussion that
follows from identifying problematic outside works by name.
Accurate Terminology Counts for Credibility

My informal poll of intelligence agency historians suggests that this category serves
as the biggest single source of “wince moments” in our outside reading. It is not
pedantic to expect that purported experts on intelligence will get the lingo right. It
may well be pedantic to insist, as some former intelligence officers do, that CIA
officers are never “agents,” because early in CIA history the term “agent” was used
for at least two categories of Agency employees.11 But clarity and consistency demand
limits to the flexibility that ought to be tolerated in writing intelligently about intel-
ligence. There are at least three categories of howlers often encountered:
• Mistaken monikers such as “double agent” to mean just about any person
engaged in espionage except for the spy that has been doubled, i.e.,
recruited by the side that had been his target and secretly turned against
the side that first made him a spy. We are told by no less an authority than
the Encyclopedia Britannica, for example, that Kim Philby was a double
agent, as were Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. If only that were so!
Unfortunately, Philby, like his fellow traitors, was a recruited agent of the
Soviets within British intelligence. If SIS had managed to double him
back, allowing London to feed the Soviets with certain misinformation
while learning about Soviet targets and information gaps, then Philby
would have been a double agent. Intelligence histories that identify spies
like Philby, Oleg Penkovskiy, or Aldrich Ames as double agents have an
uphill battle for credibility among the cognoscenti. Another example: in
describing the world of codes and ciphers, both these terms are incorrectly
used interchangeably; moreover, “codebreaker” is a lazy writer’s synonym
for “cryptanalyst,” but even so it should not be used in the phrase “the
codebreakers said . . .” when what follows is what the decrypted text said.
(Likewise, imagery does not “tell” us anything until the imagery analysts
have made sense of it.)
• Institutional inaccuracies. It might be forgivable to assert that the Office of
Strategic Services was created in July 1941, since OSS—actually established
in June 1942—had a predecessor office (the Coordinator of Information)
that was created the year before, but it is not forgivable to date OSS from
1940, as two different recent historical treatments say. The mistakes about
intelligence institutions—their provenance and evolution, their duties, even
their names—betray a lack of basic research. It is amusing to read of an
analyst in CIA’s Office of Soviet Analysis during the mid-1970s, when that
office was not created until the reorganization of 1981. Too esoteric? Well, it
is astounding to read that the National Security Agency “was directed to take
high-resolution photographs”—presumably from space—of Beirut during
11
For the first few years (into the early 1950s), CIA employed U.S. citizens as “staff agents”
and “contract agents.” These were what we today call “case officers” or “non-official cover officers.”
the 1980s. As a colleague historian from the National Reconnaissance Office

told me, references to NSA’s flying “our birds . . . stems from our being secret
for so long [until 1990]. It was just easier to equate the factory with the truck
drivers.” Other clues that the writer has not done his homework: missing the
transition from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in 2003, or from CIA’s
Directorate of Operations (DO) to the National Clandestine Service (NCS)
in 2005; calling DEA the Drug Enforcement Agency; confusing CIA’s Center
for the Study of Intelligence with its journal, Studies in Intelligence, and so
on. A huge and recurring mistake is referring to National Intelligence
Estimates as CIA products, as if the rest of the Intelligence Community did
not exist (and not keeping up on the IC’s membership over time is another
telling problem).
• Factual flubs betray a lack of expertise that inside experts—and many
outside ones as well—will spot. The “S” in MASINT is for Signature, not
Signals. The world’s highest and fastest reconnaissance aircraft was CIA’s
A-12, not the Air Force’s variant, the SR-71. CIA director John McCone was
never a deputy secretary of defense. The notorious “Family Jewels” com-
prised 693 pages, not 693 potential instances of wrongdoing. Michael
Hayden was not the first CIA director since the early 1950s to be an active
duty military officer. Mistakes like these are eminently checkable, so why
make them and undermine one’s credibility?
Appreciating Inherent Difficulties of All Intelligence

Missions and Maintaining Realistic
Expectations about Them
A lack of sobriety about the nature of intelligence work is often the original sin of
CIA histories, from which much other mischief flows. There is nothing easy about
the four classic missions of intelligence—collection, analysis, counterintelligence,
and covert action—and much that suggests that in the real world intelligence will
never work as well as laymen often seem to expect it should work (Betts 2007), so an
approach that implicitly uses a Platonic ideal is simply unrealistic. Keep in mind
that soon after its establishment CIA was expected to maintain a worldwide cover-
age of events and a global capability to respond, unlike every other intelligence ser-
vice with the exception of the KGB.
• The limitations of analysis and warning are particularly important to
understand; it is a cartoonish view that analysts can and therefore should
predict the future. If it were true that these individuals had crystal balls, they
would be in more lucrative lines of work.
• Just the logistics of intelligence support are daunting. Setting up and
operating the first McDonalds or Pizza Hut in Moscow during the Cold War
was a trying task; setting up clandestine support structures and mechanisms

in hostile environments is infinitely harder.
Avoid Stretching Facts or Tailoring Conclusions

to Fit a Theory
Assertions that the development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft reflected CIA’s
failure to develop human sources, or that Polish Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski was not
really a CIA agent, are somewhat more understandable when one realizes they have
been concocted to fit an overarching theory—in this case, that the Agency has never
really succeeded at anything—but the writer gets no points for consistency simply
because a flawed theory has required such outrageous statements.
In another case, a history of CIA’s origins published a few years ago made sev-
eral unsubstantiated assertions that fit into the writer’s theory about organiza-
tions, but unfortunately, as the Intelligence Community historian who reviewed
the book observed, statements that CIA had no authority in the beginning to col-
lect intelligence or engage in covert action are “simply wrong,” exposing the writ-
er’s “shaky grasp of the historical facts.” No CIA or Intelligence Community
historian, I am quite sure, enjoys making such criticisms. We would simply prefer
to praise good history.
Some Themes Are Not Worth Pursuing

Usually related to one of the extreme caricatures of intelligence, there are some lines
of analysis that are pointless, misguided, indefensible, and often, from an insider’s
perspective, simply silly. Historical treatments, for example, that try to portray CIA
as the pinnacle of control of the entire U.S. government by Yale University’s Skull
and Bones secret society suffer from a lack both of evidence and of seriousness.
• The fascination with UFOs on the part of some pseudo-scholars and the
Agency’s alleged role in the assassination of President Kennedy also belong
in this category. Surely someone involved would have talked by now?
Be Familiar with the Scholarly Literature

At one time, historical treatments of CIA had to be somewhat individualist and
journalistic in nature because there was no body of academic work to consult
and to provide a check against shoddy work. Today, thankfully, in addition to the
plethora of books by reputable historians there are also the many professional
scholarly journals devoted to intelligence. Unless he has new sources that under-
lie new interpretations, the historian asserting that President Truman, for exam-
ple, never intended CIA to conduct covert operations, or that the Agency missed
(pick one: the first Chinese atomic test, the 1967 Mideast war, the breakup of
Yugoslavia, the decline of the USSR), will be surprised when he discovers after
publication that his assertions were discredited long before he picked up his pen
(or mouse).
Use a Variety of Sources, but Be Familiar with Their Biases

Relying on a favorite source because he provides good copy can turn into a mine-
field if that source turns out to have some bias. One history book inherently dis-
counted anything a CIA officer said, while accepting as face value every utterance by
a State officer. If a writer of a CIA history uses oral history interviews from 30 per-
cent more State Department officials than from CIA officers, expect someone to
notice and to raise questions. It is not that State officials cannot comment intelli-
gently about CIA and intelligence, but there are differences in perspective. If I wrote
a history of, say, the New York Times, what would it say about my own bias if I inter-
viewed that many more members of the staff of National Review?
Beware of Politically Charged Factoids

When a well-known and respected intelligence historian states as a fact that the
President’s Daily Brief prepared for George W. Bush comprises only one or two
pages, most readers will accept what seems to be an authoritative (and sourced)
statement as true—and for many, it may well confirm their opinions about the First
Customer’s intellectual capabilities. But such a factoid is suspect on the face of it:
how could such a PDB do its job for any president? Moreover, the potentially politi-
cal nature of the assertion requires the objective historian to check and recheck his
sources. In this case, the source—George Tenet’s memoir—actually said that Bush’s
PDB is a series of articles each one or two pages long. Outside historians do not need
charges of bias any more than we inside historians do.
Never Make up Scenes, Words and Phrases, Chronologies,

or Context to Support a Narrative
The revelation last year that one journalist-turned-historian put words in the CIA
director’s mouth and then had the president “respond” to them when no such
exchange actually happened turned into a scandal that may have prevented that
writer from winning a Pulitzer Prize for that work. In another case, a writer openly
invented dialog, thoughts, and motivations concerning a CIA officer more than
half a century ago, saying in a footnote that he did so in service of “the narrative”—
and credited the example of film director Oliver Stone, most famous for the noto-
rious JFK.
Other maxims come to mind. An understanding of the culture and subcultures
within CIA, for example, will show that analysts actually defy politicization.
Considering the ramifications of sweeping assertions—for example, that CIA rou-

tinely deceives presidents or acts as an uncontrolled “rogue elephant”—might avoid
the attendant but unfounded conclusions about broad and perfectly kept conspira-
cies that defy evidence and common sense.
All this is not to say that outside historians should refrain from criticizing
CIA—far from it. Just as we in CIA must never forget that we serve a democracy—
and would not have it any other way—outside scholars have an obligation to use the
liberties that are the blessings of a free society to fairly document, describe, and
interpret the activities of government, including intelligence services. CIA histori-
ans are pleased to be partners in that effort, which benefits all citizens and ulti-
mately helps preserve our liberty.
At the same time, and as part of that effort, CIA historians will not remain silent
if the external commentary is blatantly unfair or unwarranted. In 2007 CIA issued
two press releases, both with History Staff input, regarding highly critical books
that had crossed the line from scholarship into vitriol, suggesting the time is past
when the Agency will simply say “no comment” in the face of uninformed and inac-
curate attacks. In the give and take between inside CIA historians and outside schol-
ars and writers of history, the public’s understanding of the mysterious world of
intelligence stands the best chance of reflecting reality.
REFERENCES
Andrew, C. 1995. For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American
Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York: HarperCollins.
Betts, R. 2007. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security.
Dujmovic, N. 2006. Extraordinary Fidelity: Two CIA Prisoners in China, 1952–73. Studies in
Intelligence 50, no. 4 (December): 21–36.
———. 2007. Elegy of Slashes: Review of Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. Studies in
Intelligence 51, no. 3 (September): 33–43.
———. 2008. Amnesia to Anamnesis: Commemoration of the Dead at CIA. Studies in
Intelligence 52, no. 3 (September): 3–16.
Glees, A. 2005. Can the Spooks Be Spooked? The Times (June 17).
Haines, G. 1997. The CIA’s Own Effort to Understand and Document its Past: A Brief
History of the CIA History Program. Intelligence and National Security 12: 201–222.
Johnson, L. 2008. Spies in the American Movies. Intelligence and National Security 23
(February): 5–24.
Knott, S. F. 1986. Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Lathrop, C. E., ed. 2004. The Literary Spy: The Ultimate Source for Quotations on Espionage
& Intelligence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Reagan, R. 1989. Speaking My Mind: Selected Speeches with Personal Reflections. New York:
Simon and Schuster Audio.
Robarge, D., G. McCollim, N. Dujmovic, and T. G. Coffey. 2007. Review of The Good
Shepherd. Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 1 (March): 1–9.
Stimson, H. L., and G. McBundy. 1948. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York:
Harpers.
Troy, T. F. 1994. Writing History in CIA: A Memoir of Frustration. International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 4 (Winter): 397–411.
Walker, D. 2003. Just How Intelligent? The Guardian (February 18).
Warner, M. 2007. Searching where the Light Shines? An American View of Methods for the
Study of Intelligence. Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of
Government, ed. L. Johnson. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International.
chapter 6
ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE
PERFORMANCE
john a. gentry
1. Introduction
The literature on intelligence focuses extensively on intelligence failures, often
explicitly claiming that failures mean that intelligence services perform poorly as
entire institutions. Yet politicians, citizens, and scholars of intelligence little discuss:
what intelligence services do in aggregate; whether their performance in general is
good, poor, or mediocre; how infrequent but prominent failures compare to ongo-
ing performance that is invisible to outsiders because it is at least adequate; and,
how ignorance of the performance of different types of intelligence activities affects
assessments of whole intelligence services. As a result, as several scholars note, there
is no general theory of intelligence performance (Betts 2007; Dahl 2008, 11; Johnson
2003; Johnson 2003–2004; Pillar 2008a; Treverton et al. 2006, 26–29).
To better judge intelligence performance, it is essential to understand what
intelligence services actually do. The challenges to such understanding are formi-
dable, but some can be overcome and sound if rough judgments about intelligence
performance can be made. The purpose of this chapter is to use existing theory and
available data to move toward a theory of the whole performance of intelligence
agencies, provide an initial scorecard of the recent performance of U.S. intelligence,
and suggest avenues for future research.
The views reflected herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Department of Defense or its components.
2. Toward a Theory of
Intelligence Performance
The largest obstacle to developing a theory of intelligence performance is incom-
plete information about the breadth of intelligence activities and how intelligence
services help the states they serve to generate policy successes. By definition, intel-
ligence operations involve a considerable degree of secrecy. Operations typically are
compartmented, meaning few intelligence officers know even most of what their
organizations do. Intelligence consumers for reasons of security and personal pref-
erence often see little but what immediately concerns them. Senior American poli-
cymakers who could have access to most intelligence material typically want only
the short, pithy conclusions the President’s Daily Brief normally offers, precluding
understanding of information sources and the sometimes laborious analytical pro-
cesses that produce the intelligence they receive. Therefore, essentially no one knows
in detail what even a single major intelligence agency does—let alone what all intel-
ligence services do. The histories of intelligence services, at their best, report impor-
tant organizational policies and priorities and provide anecdotes that accurately
reflect major agency activities.
How then can we derive descriptions of the full range of tasks performed
against which to judge aggregate institutional performance? Organizational mis-
sion statements vary considerably across agencies and within agencies over time.
They are often very broad and vague. For example, in response to television host
Charlie Rose’s 22 October 2007 request to “[t]ell me what you think the CIA’s
[Central Intelligence Agency’s] mission is,” CIA Director Michael Hayden
responded: “In general, it’s to defend the Republic, and you need to understand
the Republic in the broadest sense. It‘s to defend the security, the safety, the physi-
cal safety of the American people. It’s to defend the interests of the United States
of America, and it’s to defend a value system that this nation represents.” While
accurate, this definition does not describe or analyze actual CIA activities. Little
more helpful are narrow focuses on warning of physical attack and vague state-
ments that the job of intelligence is to support policymakers (Grabo 2002; Sims
1995, 5–6).
While war and the intelligence business are very different in important respects,
military analysts’ debates about the nature of military victory offer a starting point
for generating a theory of intelligence performance. Strikingly, despite the massive
descriptive history and analysis of warfare, concepts of military success defined
as strategic victory continue to be debated, and there is no single definition of vic-
tory as a strategic outcome of war (Batholomees 2008; Martel 2007). Military ana-
lysts distinguish between tactical, operational, and strategic influences on military
operations and outcomes, although they often fudge the boundaries between them.
In general, battles are tactical operations that soldiers fight. Military actions and the
senior civilian policy decisions that influence the outcomes of whole wars and shape
assessing intelligence performance 89
states’ long-term welfare are strategic in nature. Operational-level activities fall in

between. No soldier expects wars to be bloodless, meaning casualties and tactical
reverses in the form of battle defeats at the hands of competent enemies are widely
considered to be inevitable, acceptable costs of the strategic victories that usually
define military success. Analyses of the performance of intelligence services also,
I submit, should focus primarily on their influence on long-term, strategic-level
political/economic/military situations of the states they serve, while recognizing
that strategic outcomes often depend on series of tactical actions that, like combat,
feature mixed successes (Pillar 2008a, 26).
The literature on U.S. intelligence failures (and successes) focuses mainly on
tactical-level performance. It, like much of the military literature, often mixes the
three levels of analysis, however. For example, even the two major threat warning
failures of American history were not strategic in nature from the U.S. perspective.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, posed no danger to core U.S. strategic interests,
including national survival, even though al-Qaeda evidently aimed to influence
some strategic-level U.S. policies concerning the Middle East. Japan’s attack on Pearl
Harbor was designed to deter the United States from thwarting Japanese strategic
ambitions in the Western Pacific, but the military effects on the United States were
tactical or, at most, operational-level in influence. Despite losing many ships and
men at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military mobilized quickly and turned the tide of the
Pacific war by mid-1942. In contrast, the U.S.S.R. experienced a strategic failure
when Soviet intelligence did not convince Josef Stalin of the severity of the German
threat in 1941—and Stalin compounded the error by failing to prepare Soviet
defenses. Israel’s failure to anticipate the Arab attacks of 1973 also was strategic given
Israel’s geopolitical situation (Ben-Zvi 1990).
Because strategic intelligence success is relative and partial, and consistent tacti-
cal success is even harder to achieve, I accept Richard Betts’s (1978; 2007) view that
intelligence is inherently prone to failure (Hedley 2005). I also adopt Betts’s (2007)
baseball analogy to describe intelligence service performance. While Betts focuses
on batting average as an indicator of performance, I note that students of baseball
use several other measures of player success, including: runs batted in and slugging
percentage for hitters; stolen bases for base runners; earned run average, wins, holds,
and saves for pitchers; and, qualitative elements like players’ clubhouse leadership
roles. Baseball also keeps negative statistics, like fielding errors and blown saves.
While individually incompatible, assemblies of discrete statistics and fairly well-
accepted qualitative factors together enable baseball aficionados to reach fair degrees
of consensus about where most players’ performances rank in the history of the
game. Analysts of intelligence performance can reasonably aspire to reach similar
degrees of consensus.
While successful intelligence depends on the activities of intelligence organi-
zations, it also depends upon effective policy making and leaders’ supervision of
policy implementation by non-intelligence agencies of government like foreign
and defense ministries and troops in the field—decisions and actions beyond the
control of intelligence services. The latter often determine whether “intelligence”

succeeds or fails by helping states consistently, or not, to win their intelligence-
related international relations “games” (Betts 1978; Johnson 2003, 20; Betts 2007;
Gentry 2008).
Commonly held baseball performance measures cover major offensive and
defensive aspects of the game, and intelligence performance indicators should do
the same. The strategic consequences of states’ use of intelligence depend consis-
tently on the collection and analysis functions of intelligence services. I therefore in
this discussion largely leave aside other, more intermittently important roles like
counterintelligence and covert action and focus on four core missions of intelli-
gence services: (1) monitoring; (2) warning of threats; (3) warning of opportunities
to exploit; and, (4) estimates. Successful performance of each of the four involves
subordinate tasks, only some of which are the primary responsibility of intelligence
services. To properly assess the performance of intelligence services, analysts must
keep the different organizational responsibilities clear and identify the significance
of actions of each major actor on mission performance as a whole. I first discuss
monitoring because it directly affects intelligence services’ conduct of the other
three missions.
Monitoring world affairs is the basic intelligence mission. It enables intelli-
gence services to look “over the horizon” to identify emerging trends of policy
interest and to accurately issue timely warning messages and produce insightful
estimates. Monitoring requires intelligence services to develop information
sources and analytical expertise on topics that may never present senior policy-
makers with critical decisions. Surprises, which by definition are unexpected,
regularly develop in areas that appear to be backwaters—like Afghanistan before
1979 and Grenada before 1983. Many intelligence services therefore, if able to
allocate their own resources, devote substantial resources to the monitoring mis-
sion, understanding that much of the work will never reach senior policymakers.
Successful such work generates organizational expertise but few thanks from
consumers. Poor or mediocre monitoring prompts some complaints but more
often consumers express unhappiness passively by simply ignoring intelligence
products.
Warning of threats is a core, and more prominent, intelligence mission. Successful
warning depends upon intelligence agencies’ (1) timely, accurate collection that is
adequate in breadth and volume, (2) timely and prescient analysis, and (3) clear and
persuasive warning messages. The extent to which the messages are persuasive
depends in part on the communications skills of intelligence officers, but it also
depends upon the (4) relationship, including mutual trust, between senior intelli-
gence officers and their primary consumers (Keiswetter 2008, 5, 10; Johnson 2008,
13–15). Responsibility for this relationship depends only partly on intelligence offi-
cers. Decision-makers then (5) formulate timely policy responses and (6) supervise
the implementation of policy by non-intelligence bureaus like foreign and defense
ministries. The latter may significantly affect the success of the warning message by
the (7) speed and effectiveness of their actions, and by (8) creating and/or amelio-
rating (primarily) tactical vulnerabilities to threats (Gentry 2008; Pillar 2008a, 33).
For example, the U.S. military’s relaxed posture on weekends produced a vulnera-
bility that Japan effectively exploited on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941. Weak
airport security procedures enabled the September 11 attacks, and there would have
been a tactical “intelligence failure” even if U.S. intelligence produced detailed warn-
ings so long as the Federal Aviation Administration continued to permit lax airport
security (Pillar 2008a, 30). In sum, intelligence agencies are primarily responsible
only for items 1–3 above; they are partly responsible for item 4.
Threat warning messages occur in a variety of formats, including normal ana-
lytical products and ad hoc written and oral warnings by senior officers like the U.S.
National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Successful warnings often lead to govern-
ment actions that produce deterrent responses or defenses. Warning failures are
most obviously evidenced by explosions, but they also include erroneous warnings
about events that are not threatening, leading to unnecessary or misguided policies
or actions.
Warning of opportunities to exploit involves roughly the same processes as threat
warnings, although vulnerability amelioration (item 8 above) is normally not a per-
formance variable. Performance indicators differ from those of threat warnings in
that there typically are no overt indicators of failure like burning buildings. Failures
may not be recognized. Effective policy measures triggered by insightful warnings
often appear to be the result of inspired political leadership, not intelligence brief-
ings. Opportunity success depends heavily on mutual trust between policymakers
and intelligence officers. If they are confident that they will not become scapegoats
for policy failures, intelligence officers are more likely to provide the long-lead
warnings most useful to policymakers (Woodward 2008, 237). Similarly, policymak-
ers’ confidence in the competence, loyalty, and integrity of intelligence agencies
enhances odds that they will accept the political risks that opportunity exploitation
often entails.
Estimates, in the U.S. case in the form of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)
and related products of the intelligence community as a whole produced by the
National Intelligence Council (NIC), are hybrid forms of regular “monitoring” as
reported in analytical products and warning messages. Because they build on
knowledge generated by monitoring activities, they consume few additional intel-
ligence resources. Estimates are regularly scheduled for issues of chronic interest
and also are ad hoc, crisis-support products. As high-profile products, estimates
often generate political rancor if the policies they implicitly justify or threats they
identify turn out poorly, especially if the estimates themselves are flawed—like the
2002 NIE on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that the George W. Bush adminis-
tration used to help justify its war against Iraq (Tenet 2007; Keiswetter 2008).
Estimates may be effective if they help ensure that nothing happens; for example,
the NIE 11–3/8 annual series on Soviet strategic programs helped American policy-
makers keep the U.S./Soviet rivalry stable and nonviolent.
3. Detailing Performance Categories

Given the lack of transparency about intelligence activities, successes, and failures,
how can we determine the size, scope, and effectiveness of agencies’ performance of
the four missions? Two related but distinct sources of information provide fairly
comprehensive accounts of what U.S. intelligence services do: their aggregate col-
lection requirements and their analytical research programs. Collection require-
ments are statements of information needs that guide collectors’ targeting priorities
and resource allocations. For years, for example, the Collection Requirements and
Evaluation Staff (CRES), a unit of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), the
agency’s analytical arm, annually compiled statements of collection priorities.1
These requirements, sent to all U.S. intelligence-collection organizations, reflected
needs analysts anticipated over the coming year in light of their expectations about
the evolving international environment and discussions with their consumers.
Before September 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA), primarily a collection
agency, worked about 1,500 formal requirements from agencies like the CIA
(Betts 2007, 109). While NSA’s signals intelligence-focused requirements comprised
a fraction of those levied on all U.S. collectors, many requirements, in my experi-
ence, amount to aspects of the same intelligence problem.
The DI also annually published research programs reflecting major projects
planned for publication in the coming year. These plans did not include ad hoc
projects, articles in serial publications, and current intelligence production. Several
consecutive such annual plans would, therefore, give a fairly good but still incom-
plete view of the DI’s major production activities.
Similarly, in the 1990s, President Bill Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive
35 mandated intelligence topics and assigned priority rankings to them. This effort
was much less comprehensive than the CRES documents of the 1980s. It ignored
major issues and even whole regions of the world but it was designed to do the same
thing as the CRES documents—focus the U.S. intelligence community on priorities
identified by consumers. The older CRES documents and DI research plans, and
eventually Clinton’s now abandoned PDD 35, should become available for scholarly
analysis as time passes.
What do these documents contain? Consistent with Hayden’s comment, they
show a U.S. government interested in a wide range of issues. It thus should not be
surprising that even when the Bush administration was focusing on what it called a
“Global War on Terrorism,” British and American intelligence services reportedly
used technical and human collection assets to track down former Bosnian Serb
leader Radovan Karadzic, an accused war criminal, and then provided the informa-
tion to Serbian police, who arrested him in July 2008 (MacDonald 2008). This epi-
sode is a rare occurrence of a public success that supported the values that drive
many Western foreign policies.
1
At other times, this function has been performed by organizations with other names.
4. Measuring Intelligence Success

To assess an intelligence service, like a baseball player, one must use several per-
formance criteria in a subjectively weighted fashion. A perfect baseball player
would hit 1.000, never commit a fielding error, and never make a base-running mis-
take. An ideal intelligence service would fully know even distant futures, accurately
assess their meanings, accurately communicate to policymakers the significance
of the futures in ways compelling and timely enough to persuade policymakers
to take political risks in order to thwart all threats and exploit all foreign-policy
opportunities.
But like a 1.000 batting average over the course of a whole season, no such ideal
is possible for several reasons (Betts 2007; Pillar 2008a). Most important, the future
is never wholly knowable because it depends on actions that states and other actors
have not yet decided to take, meaning the futures are mysteries, not just secrets to be
discovered. Intelligence targets regularly conceal capabilities and intentions and
competently disseminate disinformation. As futures move from the distant to the
immediate, they are more knowable, meaning that time horizons significantly affect
the specificity and accuracy of reporting and analytical judgments. At the same
time, the timeliness of intelligence directly affects its usefulness to policymakers and
policy-implementing organizations. Therefore, rather than know all, an intelligence
service is successful if it fairly consistently provides generally accurate information,
persuasively, to policymakers and implementers in sufficient time to enable insight-
ful policy decisions and effective policy-implementing action. Adding a time ele-
ment to the analysis of intelligence performance means that the common notion
that success is defined by forecasting accuracy is both too demanding a criterion
and incomplete because it does not account for intelligence messages’ timeliness
and persuasiveness ( Jervis 2006, 10).
A major focus of the intelligence literature’s attention has been on failure evi-
denced by surprise military attack. But such major failures occur infrequently. In
the U.S. case, the only two significant surprise violent attacks on U.S. territory since
1815 were the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and al-Qaeda’s attacks of
September 11, 2001.2 The large literature on intelligence analysis focuses on data
errors, cognitive problems, institutional learning deficiencies, and, put too simply,
failures to “connect the dots”—which only partly contribute to such failures
(Heuer 1999; National Commission 2004; Zegart 2007). But as sophisticated analy-
ses of failures note, even in the cases where there is little dispute about the presence
of surprise, the causes of failures typically are complex and difficult to avoid
(Wohlstetter 1962; Betts 1978; Hedley 2005). But if some surprises, or warning fail-
ures, are inevitable, what constitutes an acceptable level of inevitability? The litera-
ture contains vague standards of acceptable performance.
2
Other analysts include surprises like North Korea’s invasion of the Republic of Korea in
1950 and the Tet offensive 1968, but these events did not lead directly to American military defeats.
It is reasonable to expect that intelligence services competently perform specific

tasks of collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence ( Jervis 2006, 10).
But because intelligence agencies’ activities form part of the complex of activities
that determine whether states produce accurate and timely intelligence and use it
effectively to make and implement national policies, it is essential to also evaluate
policymakers’ roles in making their personal relationships with their intelligence
services, their policies, and their administration of policy-implementing agencies
(Gentry 2008). And, the willingness and ability of implementing agencies to execute
intelligence-driven executive orders and to ameliorate vulnerabilities to adversary
actions (like surprise military attack) vary considerably.
For example, the large-scale Warsaw Pact effort to acquire Western technology
during the Cold War did not help the U.S.S.R. close a wide East-West technology gap;
even in the late 1980s, U.S. intelligence judged the Soviets to substantially lag behind
the West technologically in many strategically important industrial sectors (DCI
1988, 2). Did Soviet intelligence fail? Or were the main culprits inherent aspects of
the Soviet socialist model and inept execution by industrial ministries? If the latter,
as seems likely, policy making and policy-implementing organizations, and not
intelligence services, were responsible for political-economic deficiencies that gen-
erated “intelligence failure.”
Moreover, intelligence agencies may be nearly helpless if foreign actors, appear-
ing as “friends,” manipulate political leaders’ policy decision-making. Much evi-
dence indicates that in the U.S. case, for example, Israel for decades and Bosnian
Muslims in the 1990s successfully manipulated the United States repeatedly
(Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Slater 2002; Gentry 2006). It is unlikely that intelli-
gence services generally are able, and may not want to try, to warn senior policy-
makers of foreign activity directed against them personally.
Given such analytical challenges, what might measures of acceptable perfor-
mance—or batting average—be? One obvious standard is the extent to which intel-
ligence consumers like what they get. The evidence here is mixed. American
intelligence consumers chronically complain about what they get, but they also
often provide kudos to intelligence officers and administrations regularly ask for
large sums for the constellation of U.S. intelligence agencies that Congress as regu-
larly provides, suggesting a considerable degree of satisfaction.3 But by many
accounts, intelligence consumers little understand intelligence services’ processes
and the strengths and limitations of the intelligence products they receive, prompt-
ing former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates (1987–88, 226), who
also worked in the White House for several presidents, to argue that policymakers
typically enter government ignorant of intelligence capabilities and rotate through
government so rapidly that policymakers as a whole continually are ignorant of,
and surprised and disillusioned by, the performance of intelligence. Former DCI
Stansfield Turner (2005, 255) similarly says much criticism of U.S. intelligence is
3
An alternative view is that an unhappy but clueless Congress could only figure out how to
fix intelligence by throwing more money at the problem.
“uninformed.” Policymakers ignorant of the complexities of the intelligence busi-

ness are unlikely to be able to credibly judge the performance of whole intelligence
services. What policymakers want and like may not be what they or their broader
government need to make sound decisions.
Policymakers sometimes have vested interests in inaccurately presenting the
performance of their own intelligence services. Perhaps most importantly, they and
the intelligence investigative commissions they appoint often use intelligence agen-
cies as scapegoats for failed policies ( Jervis 2006; Pillar 2006; Tenet 2007; Gentry 2008,
258–59; Pillar 2008a, 25). Members of Congress chronically use intelligence to attack
administrations of the opposing party. By using intelligence in such ways, policy-
makers also create de facto incentive systems that indirectly shape the cultures,
bureaucratic incentives, operations, and performance of intelligence services
(Gentry 2008). And, citizens lamenting surprise attacks that claim lives of loved-
ones often look for scapegoats and simple answers to complex issues—traits that
investigating commissions encourage (Pillar 2006; Hedley 2005; Tenet 2007, 119, 121,
129–30, 153–54, 173).
Assessments of intelligence performance are inherently difficult for several
other reasons. Systemic factors and dyad-specific relative strengths and vulnerabili-
ties affect intelligence-agency performance. For example, U.S. intelligence tradi-
tionally uses technical collection means extensively. This made much sense when
targeting denied areas like the Soviet Union, but it is not nearly as helpful against
nonstate actors that do not have significant, easily identified territorial bases.
Al-Qaeda operatives who understand American collection techniques are much
more likely to evade U.S. technical collection capabilities than did large Iraqi mili-
tary units and their heavy equipment in the desert in 2003, for example. Like U.S.
military forces that focus on producing technological “solutions” to challenges best
addressed in other ways, U.S. intelligence both reflects American technophile cul-
tural tendencies and is a victim of a Congress that regularly buys expensive techni-
cal collection systems but is reluctant to fund much less costly human collection
assets (Gentry 2002–3). This means that intelligence services’ standard “capabilities”
may generate very different performance against different targets based on the tar-
gets’ vulnerability to the various collection means—meaning, in other words, that
dyadic combinations of mutual strengths and vulnerabilities of intelligence agen-
cies and their targets affect the performance of intelligence agencies independent of
other institutional characteristics.
By the very nature of intelligence processes, it is virtually impossible to deter-
mine the level of effort focused against any target or issue, hampering assessment of
the efficiency of intelligence services’ individual tasks even if their ultimate effec-
tiveness is fairly clear. For example, American efforts against major targets—like the
U.S.S.R. for decades and since 2001 the “Global War on Terrorism”—are global in
nature, meaning many intelligence personnel have such targets as secondary or ter-
tiary responsibilities that generate effort and produce collection reporting or anal-
ysis only intermittently. Similarly, it is inappropriate to assign the cost of collection
systems to the most prominent intelligence topics they address when the assets
typically are used for many purposes; for example, expensive technical collection
systems justified to Congress as necessary for monitoring the Soviet Union also
were used against many other targets, creating an impression that the U.S. intelli-
gence community during the Cold War devoted far more resources to the Warsaw
Pact than in fact it did. Moreover, multiple agencies and intelligence-collection
methods and analytical disciplines together, symbiotically, contribute to accom-
plishing tasks; “minor” contributions may sometimes provide the critical piece that
“solves the puzzle.” Therefore, it is difficult to apportion shares of intelligence per-
formance to individual intelligence activities.
Actions that aid the performance of one function may markedly hinder the
performance of others. For example, an agency that especially values counterintel-
ligence (CI) may countenance hiring policies that hinder collection and analysis—
and the four missions I discuss here—by rejecting job applicants with foreign
experience and family ties who may be well qualified to penetrate security-conscious
targets and have the language skills and cultural sensitivity that foster insightful
analysis. Some argue that the aggressive CI operations of the CIA’s James Angleton
in the 1960s, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) aggressive pursuit of
another Soviet mole in the CIA after the arrest of Aldrich Ames in 1994, significantly
damaged the CIA’s operations directorate, especially, by demoralizing officers,
shunting some experienced officers to nonproductive duties, and encouraging oth-
ers to quit or retire early (Riebling 2002).
The long-lived nature of intelligence operations means judgments about oper-
ational performance are always contingent on time horizons. To contemporary
appearances, CIA’s counterintelligence was far better just before Ames was discov-
ered to have been a long-time Soviet agent than it really was; the FBI looked far
better pursuing a second CIA mole than it did after discovering that the mole actu-
ally was a senior FBI counterintelligence officer—Robert Hanssen—who had been
a Soviet/Russian agent for twenty-one years before being arrested in 2001 (Riebling
2002). The absence of violent attack at any moment does not mean that attacks are
not in planning. And, on the other side, a timely warning that leads to effective
executive action to thwart a threat or exploit an opportunity may lead to the errone-
ous appearance that what was in fact a significant success was a failure; only coun-
terfactual analysis can determine the likely alternative course of events and thence
the nature and extent of the success.
Perceptions of success and failure reflect office-holders’ time horizons. The
short tenures of American officials, tightly constrained by narrow bureaucratic
interests, provide snapshot perceptions, not well-rounded assessments of long-
term intelligence performance. Amateur policymakers on short tours in Washington
often care more about immediately gratifying intelligence support for them alone
than the long-term effectiveness of intelligence agencies’ service to government as
a whole ( Johnson 2008, 21–22). They may be willing to sacrifice longer-term collec-
tive interests if negative consequences are apparent only during the tenures of their
successors. An especially clear case of this phenomenon is the U.S. allocation since
the 1990s of strategic technical collection assets to support small tactical military
operations in the name of force protection (Gentry 2008, 261–264). Generals and
politicians avoid career-damaging, politically embarrassing U.S. casualties in the
short term at unknowable long-term opportunity costs in foregone strategic
collection.
And, states fundamentally affect the rates of success and failure of their intelli-
gence activities by their definitions of success and failure. They can reduce (enhance)
the chances of intelligence agency failure in two major ways: by adopting (rejecting)
a state- versus agency-centric focus for assessments of intelligence performance that
attributes to non-intelligence actors some responsibilities for intelligence-related
problems, and by focusing on strategic (not tactical) performance.4 The United
States made the 9/11 attacks a major intelligence failure even though the U.S. intel-
ligence community had warned repeatedly in mid-2001 in general terms that al-
Qaeda intended to attack the United States. By ignoring the strategic/tactical
distinction and by adopting a zero-tolerance attitude toward any attack, American
political leaders hold U.S. intelligence to a far higher standard than they hold gener-
als fighting competent enemies. This concept of intelligence performance lowers
the threshold of failure and makes future failures more likely by making attacks on
U.S. interests even more attractive to U.S. enemies.
5. A Preliminary U.S. Score Sheet

With the many caveats discussed above in mind, I offer in this section a preliminary
scoring of U.S. intelligence over an extended period of time. First, the massive level of
effort on monitoring activities and low levels of public complaints suggests that the
nonfailure rate is very high. Given an assumption of one thousand major monitoring
issues and the rarity of major public complaints, the fact that U.S. intelligence ser-
vices’ investment in data gathering and human capital yield both immediate and
delayed results, acceptable (even if mediocre) performances constitute the vast major-
ity of results of individual tasks—yielding a nonfailure “batting average” of perhaps
0.990. This performance is primarily attributable to intelligence services alone.
Separating the subcategories of nonfailure into success and shades of medioc-
rity is harder, however. Indicators of successes include periodic kudos from con-
sumers, generally out of public view, and the practice of some Executive Branch
departments and Congress of commissioning analyses from the CIA, especially,
and publishing them as their own work. Because monitoring is designed to gener-
ate advance understanding of the flow of uncertain events, expenditures on
research on activities that develop relevant data and develop human capital have
4
For example, after the U.S. Air Force mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
in 1999, the CIA took essentially the entire blame for the error, even though military organizations
were clearly responsible for assuring the accuracy of their own target data (Tenet 2007, 48–49).
an insurance-like quality. Given the substantial presence of both risk and uncer-
tainty in the intelligence business, states effectively regard spending on monitoring
activities as an insurance “premium.” Insurance performs adequately even if there
is no need for a “claim” in the form of threat warnings (MacEachen 1995, 67–68).
The development of expertise this process generates, when used for crisis support
of decision-makers, including warnings and estimates, leads much more obviously
to intelligence successes. As noted, temporal aspects of such a rating exercise may
mean that even apparently useless monitoring can suddenly become valuable in
later crises. Warning and estimative failures may at root spring from monitoring
weaknesses that fail to generate adequate data reserves and analytical expertise. In
addition, provision of even mediocre monitoring intelligence may improve the
understanding of issues by the staffs of decision-makers; these people typically
directly influence their principals’ policy decisions ( Johnson 2008, 23). Influence
thus may be positive but one step removed from the policymaker and therefore
invisible to leaders who assess the value of intelligence to them. On the other hand,
monitoring in the form of current intelligence—a form U.S. consumers have
increasingly desired in recent years—comes at the cost of precluding the research
and therefore development of analytical expertise that is critical in crises for good
warning messages and estimates.
Strategic threat warnings generally are successful, and the tactical record since
9/11 also is good—evidently producing perhaps a 0.900 “batting average” ( Tenet
2007). The strike outs, fly balls, and ground outs occurred mainly in what
Americans consider to be big games, however. Here it is important to keep tactical
and strategic warnings analytically distinct; for example, the CIA provided exten-
sive strategic warning that al-Qaeda planned large-scale attacks in the United
States but could not provide details that would have constituted tactical warning.
Because such warnings occur in many formats, including oral communications
between senior officials, it is very difficult to identify the number of warning mes-
sages passed.
Warnings of opportunities similarly are hard to identify and are more difficult
to track, but seem to be successful at more modest levels of strategic significance.
For some cases, like the CIA’s alleged failure to predict the fall of the Soviet empire
or India’s 1998 nuclear test, it is debatable whether the event amounted to opportu-
nity warning failures or monitoring surprises. The Indian case is likely a monitoring
surprise, as the Indians worked hard to obscure detection of test preparations (Pillar
2008a, 31–32). A monitoring failure is the right categorization if there was nothing
the U.S. government could do to prevent or otherwise usefully prepare for the con-
sequences of surprise events. Given low levels of mutual trust among policymakers
and intelligence officers and resultant missed opportunities in recent years, I hypoth-
esize that the opportunity warning failure rate is relatively high—perhaps on the
order of 50 percent. Responsibility for such failures in recent years probably lies
roughly evenly with intelligence officers and policymakers.
Given an average of twenty-three NIEs per year in 1946–2005 and a total of
fewer than seventy-five NIEs and other major NIC products produced annually in
Table 6.1 A Preliminary Estimate of Nonfailure Rates

Mission Annual Annual Number Nonfailure Major Source of Problems
Number of Nonfailures Rate
of Tasks
Monitoring ~1000 ~990 ~.99 Intelligence agency collection

and analysis
Threat N/A ~.95 Intelligence agency collection
Warning and analysis, policymaker
responses
Opportunity N/A ~.50 Intelligence agency collection
Warning and analysis, policymaker
responses, mutual confi-
dence of intelligence and
policymakers
Estimates ~75 ~70 ~.90 Monitoring flaws, institu-

tional nature of process,
excessive demands from
policymakers, politicization
of intelligence messages,
scape-goating
2000–2007, rancor that makes the newspapers indicates major failure in only a few
cases per year ( Johnson 2008, 24, 34; Keiswetter 2008).5 Historian Ernest May, after
reviewing some NIEs, similarly concluded that most of them were fairly accurate
(Nye 1995, 87). Some spats over NIEs reflect partisan political battles among intel-
ligence consumers and others amount to administration efforts to blame intelli-
gence officers for policies gone awry—not intelligence-agency inadequacies (Pillar
2006; Betts 2007; Tenet 2007; Gentry 2008; Keiswetter 2008).
A common consumer complaint is that estimates often fail as communication
devices; that is, intelligence fails to persuade its audience ( Johnson 2008, 21–23).
Despite agencies’ ability to note dissent from the majority view through use of
“footnotes,” there is a widely noted tendency for coordination processes to make
NIEs “lowest common denominator” documents that are “mush” or “pabulum.”
While individual agencies may be responsible if they fail to produce expertise or
assign a weak principal drafter to a project, a more consistent problem is the insti-
tutional nature of the estimative process, which reflects bureaucratic politics and
the structure of U.S. intelligence community—sixteen independent agencies with
diverse cultures and competing institutional perspectives and interests—which
stems directly from policy decisions of the Executive Branch and Congress. Mush
5
The count for 2000–2007 includes NIEs, Intelligence Community Assessments, and
Intelligence Community Briefs. The source is the National Intelligence Council.
also is a defensive response to the tendency of policymakers to use intelligence offi-

cers as scapegoats; as bureaucrats, intelligence officers know it is better to be ignored
than criticized. Thus, estimative failures also are caused prominently by both intel-
ligence producers and consumers.
These very preliminary conclusions, and many caveats, suggest a score sheet
that looks something like table 6. Note that the lower success rates are in the oppor-
tunity warning and estimates missions that have especially heavy policymaker
inputs.
6. Lessons for Reformers

This view of intelligence performance has implications for intelligence reformers in
three major respects. First, much of U.S. intelligence works well; major change
within agencies is not needed because much of U.S. intelligence is not broken.
Second, ignorance of the whole of intelligence agencies’ activities is likely to lead to
reform proposals that have unintended, negative consequences for overall perfor-
mance. And third, because responsibility for intelligence failures lies with intelli-
gence consumers and policy-implementing agencies as well as intelligence producers,
meaningful reform must address all relevant actors.
Misguided reform proposals are damaging in several ways—prominently by
altering organizational responsibilities and incentives in dysfunctional ways (Pillar
2008b). The FBI’s harassment of some three hundred CIA officers, employees of a
bitter bureaucratic rival, over a period of several years in the late 1990s is a stark
example of the costs of an organizational “reform” designed to redress the CIA’s
perceived CI ineptitude as allegedly demonstrated by the Ames case (Riebling 2002).
Former DCI Tenet (2007, 332) argues that CIA analysts, stung in the 1990s by a
review commission’s critique that they did not “lean forward” enough in assessing
missile developments in North Korea and Iran, responded in 2002 by too aggres-
sively asserting knowledge of Iraq’s WMD programs (Keiswetter 2008). And, the
admonition to improve intelligence sharing that is a regular feature of reform pro-
posals would have helped Soviet moles Ames and Hanssen by easing gathering
information outside of their normal areas of responsibility—and hurt CI work gen-
erally ( Jervis 2006, 32; Zegart 2007).
Some of the errors that clearly occur are the result of internal-intelligence-process
problems that are widely recognized. But they also spring from institutional incen-
tives produced by presidential management, congressional oversight, and the
bureaucratic nature of a fragmented intelligence community whose dysfunctional
structure is the direct responsibility of policymakers. Reformers therefore should
concentrate on government-wide problems and reform proposals, including institu-
tional incentives.
Emphasis on tactical failures that dominate the literature on intelligence failures

is a formula for overemphasizing relatively minor deficiencies and recommending
reforms without regard to overall institutional performance. Because tactical failures
are inevitable, zero-tolerance standards of acceptable performance virtually ensure
chronic American unhappiness with the performance of U.S. intelligence services
and produce incentives for others to attack U.S. interests.
6. Conclusions
In sum, the literature on the performance of intelligence services is skewed heavily
toward tactical-level activities and process failures, but it contains the seeds of a
theory of intelligence agency performance. I offer here a modest step forward. In
assessing overall performance, it is essential to focus on strategic-level consequences
of whole services because the long-term consequences of intelligence agencies’
interactions with policymakers, policy-implementing agencies, and adversaries
(and sometimes friends) appear only over extended periods of time. It is likely not
possible, and more importantly may be misleading, to simply additively evaluate
small samples of tactical successes and more heavily weighted and obvious
failures.
The construction of meaningful theory requires much greater scholarly aware-
ness of all intelligence-service activities—meaning both better knowledge about,
and less misunderstanding of, the nature of the intelligence business. And, theory
needs better to account for the interactions of intelligence services and their
four main categories of interlocutors: (1) other national intelligence services; (2)
policymakers; (3) policy-implementing agencies; and, (4) foreign actors, both
hostile and “friendly.”
Despite considerable uncertainty, this preliminary assessment indicates that
U.S. nonfailure, if not success, rates are fairly high. Nevertheless, no matter what the
levels of success, and accepting that some failures are inevitable, micro-level analy-
ses of many sorts indicate clearly that U.S. intelligence agencies’ internal perfor-
mance can be improved, independent of the structural dysfunctions created by
policymakers. As baseball fans know, even a long current winning streak and high
batting averages are not excuses for clubhouse complacence.
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part iii
THE EVOLUTION
OF MODERN
INTELLIGENCE
chapter 7
THE RISE OF THE U.S.

INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM,
1917–1977
michael warner
Between 1917 and 1977 the United States created a massive and sophisticated intelligence
establishment to inform the decisions of its leaders and facilitate the success of their
policies. At the beginning of this span of decades, the nation’s armed forces held crude
notions of military intelligence, the best internal security work was performed by the
New York (City) Police Department, and few if any statutory, regulatory, or oversight
mechanisms governed intelligence activities. Roughly three generations later, by con-
trast, the American military spent comparatively lavishly on intelligence based in part
on the most advanced collection technologies available, a potent federal investigative
arm protected the homeland, intelligence officers traveled the globe, and a robust set of
laws, regulations, and oversight processes was under construction.
This course of development was by no means inevitable, smooth, or painless.
Leaders in Washington and their intelligence chiefs made several changes of direc-
tion and not a few mistakes, but the overall movement of American intelligence
system was toward greater size, expense, diversity, and capability. Although any
choice of dates for monitoring institutional change has to be somewhat arbitrary, it
seems fair to say that the “Intelligence Community” in the United States had by 1977
developed beyond its infancy and troubled adolescence into a configuration in
many ways quite similar to its current (2009) form.
The views presented in this essay are the author’s alone and in no way reflect official
positions of the ODNI or any other U.S. Government entity.
108 the evolution of modern intelligence
The rise of intelligence in the United States constituted one aspect of the nation’s
larger response to three challenges: the growing willingness of states to hold non-
combatants at risk for political (and especially ideological) ends; the startling
increases in the ability of states to wreak mass destruction; and the spiraling expenses
involved with deterring enemies who possessed such powerful new weapons. These
three factors were cited to justify the expansion and professionalization of intelli-
gence, some brief but serious intrusions of civil liberties and privacy, and the
Intelligence Community’s increasingly centralized governance.
Influences on the Development of the

American Intelligence System
The development of the intelligence system in the United States has traditionally
been understood as a congeries of organizational histories. Such a heuristic has
proven its merit, but also its limitations. Specifically, it explains too little about the
ways in which the agencies—and the capabilities they create, foster, or neglect—do
and do not serve the larger ends of national policy. This traditional approach thus
needs to be supplemented by an understanding of the larger missions that the intel-
ligence system served during the period in question, and of the controlling influ-
ences upon the evolution of that system.
The U.S. intelligence system developed as it did as a result of three main influ-
ences. The first of these remained fairly constant, the other two changed dramati-
cally between World War I and the 1970s:
Governmental Structures—The United States throughout the period lived
under a federal system of government divided into three branches, two of
them divided in turn into Houses (of Congress) and departments (of the
Executive Branch). This divided structure has traditionally made it difficult
for intelligence leaders in different agencies to concert joint action and
estimates. It has also indirectly resulted in a comparatively tight set of
political and legal restrictions on the range of intelligence activities
permitted with regard to U.S. citizens and resident aliens.
Grand Strategy—The strategic posture of the United States turned more
outward looking in the years before World War I, and was then transformed
early in World War II. Accordingly, the intelligence system was constructed
to defend the nation against foreign intervention, and then re-built and
dramatically expanded to work against totalitarian powers and to support
the projection of American power abroad.
Disruptive Technologies—Over the course of the twentieth century, Western
militaries and intelligence agencies mastered radio communications, air
travel, and atomic energy. All these emerging technologies forced major
the rise of the u.s. intelligence system 109
changes in intelligence organizations around the world. The United States’

intelligence system adapted to these changes somewhat more slowly than
other nations before the great shift in strategy in World War II. Thereafter,
however, the United States on occasion led the world in adapting
intelligence to exploit these technological developments, and in shifting
intelligence to guard against their exploitation by other nations.
All of these influences interacted with one another and lesser factors in a dynamic
and complex process that revolutionized the cast and conduct of U.S. intelligence.
Early Steps
American intelligence had a long but discontinuous pre-history before 1917. General
George Washington occasionally served as his own spymaster in the Revolution,
and Civil War spy legends sometimes had bases in fact. Still, it is difficult in retro-
spect to fathom the simplicity of what passed for intelligence work in United States
as World War I opened in 1914. The U.S. Army knew more about Indian fighting
than trench warfare, and its combat cipher system was outclassed by European
devices constructed three centuries earlier (Kahn 1966, 324). Espionage and sabo-
tage in peacetime were not federal crimes, and thus no federal agency had perma-
nent jurisdiction to investigate them. By an unspoken consensus, intelligence was a
wartime thing in the United States, which could safely be allowed to atrophy between
conflicts. Only a handful of Americans had thought seriously about intelligence
before 1914, and fewer still had accomplished much to provide or preserve it.
As a result of World War I, three big changes came to the practice and organiza-
tion of intelligence in the United States. First, Congress empowered a federal law-
enforcement service to investigate espionage and sabotage and thus to provide for
internal security. The Espionage Act, passed in 1917 just after America set aside its
long neutrality and entered the war on the side of Britain and France, ordered the
Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation to track spies and saboteurs, and thus
effectively ended German hopes that their noisy but amateurish sabotage campaign
in the United States would hobble the allied war effort.1 Second, the U.S. Army
began developing doctrine for producing and providing intelligence to combat
commanders. The American Expeditionary Force had little or no organic intelli-
gence capability when it arrived in France, but its commanders turned this to their
advantage by adopting piecemeal what seemed to them the best organizational and
doctrinal lessons from both their British and French allies on the Western Front
(Bidwell 1986, 250–56). Finally, the Army and Navy both began learning the impor-
tance of modern signals and imagery intelligence methods, which (when managed
1
In 1935 the Bureau of Investigation became the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
properly) provided startling quantities of accurate information on German deploy-

ments and allowed invaluable inferences into enemy intentions (Finnegan 2006,
223–31). All three of these intelligence developments would live on past the war’s
end, and be of great value to the United States in the next world war.
The years after World War I saw something new in the American experience of
intelligence. For the first time, some of the new organizations and capabilities that
had emerged in wartime were preserved in the vast demobilization that followed
the conflict. If anything, the inter-war years saw improvements in all three of the
areas cited above. This sea change resulted from the realization that Americans liter-
ally were no longer safe in their own cities. Modern weaponry and willingness to
target civilian populations (as demonstrated in World War I) had made the United
States increasingly likely to suffer the consequences of conflicts in the Old World—or
even to be pulled into them on one side or another. Intelligence had to be ready, it
followed, to defend the United States against foreign espionage and subversion, and
to produce actionable information for commanders who would lead troops and
fleets in foreign climes. The federal government’s division of powers and offices,
however, ensured that intelligence capabilities would be constructed in departmen-
tal fiefdoms, with minimal interaction and coordination between them.
The impetus behind the next phase of intelligence innovation came in May
1940. Hitler’s lightning conquest of France and threat to invade Britain shocked the
U.S. government and led to far-reaching changes in American policies and institu-
tions. In response to the likelihood of war with Nazi Germany—a war that could
well involve the use of poison gas (or worse) on American cities—President Franklin
Roosevelt did his utmost to prepare the nation for the impending conflict with fas-
cism, most significantly by forging close but initially secret military and intelligence
ties with the United Kingdom. A political alliance with the British Empire was still
unpalatable to many Americans, however, and thus Roosevelt couched his opposi-
tion to Hitler and militarism less as a defense of the pre-war status quo than as an
opportunity to build a more just and thus more secure international order. The
tenets of this vision, as laid down by Roosevelt over the course of the war, have
formed the core of America’s grand strategy for decades thereafter. Its principles
proved readily adaptable in the Cold War, and thus from 1940 on, the American
intelligence system was constructed, tasked, and guided by Washington to facilitate
the implementation and workings of this “Rooseveltian” grand strategy (Reynolds
2001, 178–89).
The Lessons of Total War

World War II drove the United States to validate and hone the techniques and doc-
trines sketched out during the inter-war years. The nation’s intelligence system also
gained two significant new capabilities. The first of these was a capacity to conduct
clandestine operations on foreign soil, usually in conjunction with friendly liaison

services but occasionally on a unilateral basis. The second was a fledgling ability to
produce military intelligence of a strategic nature to guide the higher-level conduct
of war within and across operational “theaters.”
The most dramatic changes to existing capabilities came through the wholesale
application of signals intelligence to the fields of counterintelligence and battlefield
support. The major powers had largely transitioned their most sensitive communi-
cations systems to machine encipherment since the last conflict, gaining increased
speed and security—but in certain cases creating exploitable vulnerabilities as well.
By 1942, British and American cryptologists had independently “solved” enough
Axis message systems to gain invaluable tactical advantages and strategic insights.
Sharing their findings and workloads in unprecedented ways increased the capabili-
ties and confidence of both Allies, giving them crucial advantages over the Germans
and Japanese and certainly shortening the war. The naval victory at Midway (1942)
and the successful landings at Normandy (1944) owed much to the prowess of the
codebreakers and the willingness of Allied commanders to heed them.
An American capability to sustain clandestine activities on foreign soil sprang
from the genius and drive of one man: William J. Donovan. Though his Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) was not the first organization to operate overseas (Army
and Navy attaches had been posted abroad for decades, and the FBI began sending
agents to Latin America in 1940), its contribution to the nation’s intelligence estab-
lishment was different not only in degree but also in kind. OSS ran guerrillas and
commandos, fostered systematic analyses of enemy warmaking potential, used sig-
nals intercepts to catch spies, and worked in concert (if not always in harmony)
with local Allied and neutral intelligence services. By war’s end, OSS had willy-nilly
built up a functioning if still-crude network of stations, liaison contacts, clandestine
assets, and support links in Europe and Asia. OSS would have trouble converting its
capabilities for postwar use, but the job would ultimately get done well enough to
give the United States a functioning, national-level human intelligence arm (Warner
2002, 73–76).
Intelligence also helped military commanders at the “operational” level of war,
assisting theater commanders to understand what was happening in their cam-
paigns. The trick was to integrate intelligence sources and methods across the capa-
bilities and services of both the United States and the Commonwealth. Its two
greatest successes came supporting the campaigns against German U-boats in the
Atlantic and the Combined Bombing Offensive over Germany. The latter case is
particularly instructive. Britain had built a massive bomber fleet and was pounding
German cities through inaccurate but destructive nighttime raids, but the U.S.
Army Air Forces (AAF) had constructed its own bombers and doctrine with a dif-
ferent aim in mind—the systematic strangulation of an enemy’s war effort through
“precision” daylight raids. The AAF’s leaders, however, had not anticipated or pro-
vided for the all-source intelligence to guide air targeting. Such a capability had to
be confected from scratch in England with British tutelage and OSS analytical sup-
port, but it worked well enough for the bombers to limit German fighter aircraft
production in time for the June 1944 invasion of the Continent, and afterward to
choke Nazi Germany’s fuel supplies. The conversion of this capability to support air
campaigns to a postwar basis, however, would prove even more difficult than the
demobilization travails suffered by OSS (Warner 2005).
With the war won in 1945, the early Cold War saw further refinements to the
American intelligence system. Upon taking office after the death of Franklin
Roosevelt that April, President Harry Truman was appalled by the lack of com-
munication and common purpose among the Armed Services and government
departments. Calling their disorganization “antiquated,” he resolved upon “unifi-
cation” of the nation’s military effort and better coordination of national security
policymaking ( Truman 1956, 46). It took Truman two years to persuade Congress,
but the result was the National Security Act of 1947, which among other things
created a Secretary of Defense to command the nation’s military, codified the duty
of the Service heads to advise him and the President (as the Joint Chiefs of Staff),
and called for a National Security Council composed of the department secretar-
ies assembled to coordinate foreign and military policies. Intelligence reform
came by stages in conjunction with this larger program. Truman had already
appointed an officer to coordinate foreign intelligence information and activi-
ties—the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)—and the new Act codified the
DCI’s authorities and responsibilities. It also gave him a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) to exercise them. In taking this step, however, Congress also took
care to limit the impulse toward intelligence centralization. The new DCI would
have direct control only over the CIA, which itself would have no police, sub-
poena, or internal security powers. The Armed Services, moreover, would each
have the right to provide for their own intelligence needs, free of any interference
from the DCI.
The intelligence system thus created (it would not bear the “Intelligence
Community” moniker until the early 1950s) had in effect divided its main duties
among four missions. The first was the defense of American citizens at home from
foreign attacks or undue influence; this would remain the nearly exclusive province
of J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, which had apparently proved its prowess by stifling Axis
espionage and sabotage efforts during the War. The second mission was the coordi-
nation of clandestine activities and liaison overseas; this fell to the DCI, although
the Armed Services also performed human intelligence work abroad. Thirdly, the
Services needed intelligence support to their own planning and operations, which
they would continue to provide for themselves. Finally, President Truman’s January
1946 request that the DCI provide him a daily summary of intelligence develop-
ments quickly merged with a nascent “estimative” function to become a fourth
major mission—that of providing national-level (or “non-departmental”) strategic
analysis to the President and his advisers. In time, this assignment would develop
into a worldwide warning and situational awareness capacity for two generations of
national leaders who, like President Truman, held vivid memories of the surprise at
Pearl Harbor. These four main missions for the American intelligence system would
endure over the duration of the Cold War and beyond.
What this division of labors also did was to paper over certain weaknesses in the
intelligence system that would take years to resolve. Some were circumstantial;
others were structural. The National Security Act had made the DCI responsible for
coordinating foreign operations and analysis, but it gave him few direct powers to
do so, and it left the FBI and the Armed Services to fulfill their respective missions
with little coordination with the DCI or each other. At the same time, moreover,
rapid demobilization of the military machine that had helped defeat the Axis had
also cost the intelligence system hard-won capabilities, particularly in support of air
operations and theater-level commanders. Such losses would have to be painfully
reconstructed in later conflicts.
Cold War Developments

The evolution of the American intelligence system during Cold War was in one
sense a playing out of the implications of these developments at the same time that
the technologies pioneered in World War II were being perfected, on both sides of
the Iron Curtain, to a terrifying and destabilizing degree. The new, Soviet “target”
proved impenetrable by the means that had worked well against the Germans and
Japanese. The Soviets’ own security and espionage capabilities, for example, saw to
it that the West’s nascent cryptologic advantage was nipped at the outset of the Cold
War.2 The Communist system of internal repression also ensured that Western espi-
onage operations behind the Iron Curtain had little chance either (with a handful
of notable exceptions).
The FBI was left alone to handle the internal security mission, which it did rela-
tively well, with some serious but limited abuses fostered by the crisis atmosphere
of the early Cold War. Communism never came close to achieving the appeal to
Americans that it garnered in other lands, and thus the nation did not face a signifi-
cant internal challenge to the Constitutional order. The foreign-based threat was
mainly from espionage. J. Edgar Hoover had learned in the 1920s that internal secu-
rity had to be federalized, professionalized, and centralized. Anything less in any of
these competencies would make the system ineffective against foreign spies and
subversives, and would allow federal agents to be politicized or diverted to repres-
sive intrusions on the rights of Americans. Hoover was no paradigm of apolitical
professionalism—the longer he served as Director, the more sensitive to criticism
he became, and the more apt he was to order his agents to harass those (like the Rev.
Martin Luther King, Jr.) whom he saw as his opponents (U.S. Senate Select
Committee 1976). Still, the Bureau did a creditable job against foreign-based espio-
nage, severely restricting Soviet intelligence operations in the United States at the
2
The Soviets had two devastatingly well-placed spies in the Anglo-American cryptologic
alliance: Kim Philby and William Weisband (Benson and Warner 1996, xxvii–xxviii).
beginning of the Cold War, and thereafter limiting their scope, which though still
damaging to national security, was far less than that suffered by other Western
states.
The Pentagon had to learn the difficult art of waging hot war and Cold War at
the same time. The Armed Services maintained control of battlefield intelligence
and counterintelligence, and had real problems with both—in part because hap-
hazard demobilization in 1945 had resulted in the loss of skill sets and collaborative
arrangements built up in wartime through painful trial and error. The “joint intel-
ligence center” construct that had well served campaigns in World War II was not
replicated in Korea and Vietnam (Marchio 2005). Support from “national technical
means” in Washington could not reach down below the theater-command level
until near the end of the Cold War, when it finally became possible for collectors
and analysts in Washington to provide intelligence via secure communications links
to the battlefield in anything like “real-time.” Local and theater-level commanders
were thus left to shift themselves with whatever organic intelligence they could pro-
duce and the sporadic support their home Services provided (Ewell and Hunt 1995).
They did so with considerable ingenuity and success in both the Korean and Vietnam
conflicts, and yet operational-level evaluation and analysis remained decentralized,
and technical collection efforts, while energetic and innovative, were not well inte-
grated with one another.
The U.S. Navy perhaps did more than any Service to link national and theater
concerns in the Cold War. This owed something to the comparatively more discrete
nature of naval operations and the larger space on ships for secure communications
equipment. It probably owed more to the Navy’s willingness to make its ships dou-
ble as intelligence platforms, serving collectors and analysts aboard and in
Washington. Real gains in understanding Soviet intentions and capabilities were
being made in 1960s, setting the stage for a revolution in Naval “OPINTEL”—which
would have implications for both naval operations and national strategy by the late
1970s (Ford and Rosenberg 2005, 380–83).
National-level intelligence in the Pentagon continued to be a virtual Service
monopoly until well into the 1960s. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tried to
remedy this in 1961 by creating the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to serve his
needs for analysis and insight into the Department’s sprawling intelligence fiefdoms.
DIA, however, had no authority over the Service agencies, and took over a decade to
mature in its own internal staffing and organization. Still, DIA’s advent and eventual
prominence fit with the centralizing trend in American intelligence and marked
another increment of intelligence clout for the secretary of defense.
The CIA had to grow in unforeseen ways to compensate for the weaknesses of
military intelligence. With America seemingly under the threat of a Soviet surprise
attack and even thermonuclear Armageddon in the early 1950s, the Agency felt the
need to undertake sustained technical collection work and research of its own on
Soviet intentions and capabilities, going well beyond the coordination and market-
ing tasks that some had projected for the CIA at its inception. The result was a series
of daring innovations in reconnaissance and analysis that expanded the frontiers of
engineering and social science. In partnership with the military, CIA led the efforts
to develop the U-2 spyplane and, soon afterward, the world’s first satellite imagery
platforms. CIA analysts built and ran for decades what amounted to the biggest
social-science research project in history in their effort to understand the Soviet
economy and Moscow’s capacity for war. The DCI’s Board of National Estimates,
moreover, drew together national estimates on the U.S.S.R., and in so doing man-
aged and encouraged a process that forced arguments among the agencies over
Moscow’s plans and led in turn to better collection and sharper assessments (Haines
and Leggett 2002).
With the Director of Central Intelligence now in the mix to represent “national”
intelligence concerns—and President Harry Truman concerned about the intelli-
gence failures that led to near-disaster in Korea—the table was set to address the
dilemmas posed by the scarcity of collectors and “platforms” that could serve both
national and departmental decision-makers. The Intelligence Community at last
had the opportunity and motivation to host a series of adversarial proceedings (in
the legal sense) to fix this. The trial run, as it were, came with the creation of the
National Security Agency (NSA) in 1952. The new NSA, at the insistence of DCI
Walter B. Smith and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, would answer to the secretary
of defense (rather than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as its predecessor organization had
done), but the DCI and State would henceforth have a recognized interest and influ-
ence over NSA’s programs and activities. This hybrid management form for signals
intelligence, moreover, soon served as a model for institutional innovations in the
reconnaissance field in 1961. Costly satellite development programs had to serve
both national and military decision-makers, and the analytical capacity to exploit
the voluminous “take” from these systems had to be pooled by the CIA and the mili-
tary. Thus the Community saw the creation in 1961 of the National Reconnaissance
Office—a joint CIA-Air Force organization to manage satellite acquisitions and
operations—and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, another CIA-
Department of Defense hybrid to analyze imagery from “national systems.”
The result of the technological and organizational innovation was a creditable
understanding of Soviet deployments and weapons progress, from which could be
inferred statements about Moscow’s capabilities and intentions. There was still
plenty of room for argument among the analysts watching the Soviet Union and the
policymakers who had to act on their judgments. The Soviets remained capable of
tactical surprise, as when they invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Grabo 2002, 115–16).
Nonetheless, the intelligence system was good enough to spot Soviet development
programs and deployments (as in Cuba in 1962) and to dampen impulses toward
overreaction.3 Good intelligence also helped check the tendency of what Eisenhower
called the “military-industrial complex” to plan and build for worst-case scenarios,
and thus helped to bring about more economical defense budgets (relative to what
they might have been at the height of the Cold War). Finally, the intelligence system
3
At least it was good enough on the American side—the Soviet intelligence system was still
generating such volatile scuttlebutt in the 1980s (Fischer 1997, 33).
by the late 1960s gave policymakers enough confidence to promote (both politically
and practically) arms control and “détente.”
Political Strains
The technical proficiency of U.S. intelligence improved, ironically enough, as the
policy consensus behind it faltered. The United States had stood against fascism
with a remarkable degree of national unity after Pearl Harbor, and many American
leaders and citizens saw Soviet Communism as being a similar danger. The biparti-
san agreement over the need to resist Moscow’s ambitions came about as close to a
consensus over national security as the United States is ever likely to sustain for an
entire generation, but even it was never universal or harmonious.
By the time the Nixon Administration came to office in 1969, the Cold War
seemed to have settled into a fairly static bi-polar competition, with little sign that
either side could make dramatic gains against the other with or without a cataclys-
mic general war. The Johnson administration felt obliged to dismantle most of the
covert influence infrastructure that had been built by the CIA in early 1950s as a
bulwark against Soviet political and possibly military advances in Europe and the
Third World. Communist internal security measures made covert-action opera-
tions behind the Iron Curtain futile, with the notable exceptions of Radio Free
Europe and a few others. They proved more successful—in both real and illusory
ways—in the Third World, and by the 1960s the CIA ran an extensive list of opera-
tions and support mechanisms. Growing exposure of the covert-action infrastruc-
ture and public embarrassment convinced the Johnson Administration to begin
dismantling it, however, and isolated failures under the Nixon Administration (par-
ticularly in Chile) hastened the decline (Karalekas [1975] 1988, 80–83). By 1975, covert
action had become, for a time, a vestigial component of the U.S. intelligence
system.
Debates within and among the major political parties grew louder and more
acrimonious as a nascent détente seemingly calmed U.S.-Soviet tensions in the
1960s and casualties mounted for American troops sent to Vietnam to halt
Communist gains in Asia. The Intelligence Community could not help but be
affected by these changes.
Vietnam was a severe strain on the intelligence system, illustrating the difficulty
of providing intelligence simultaneously to the battlefield commanders and to the
President and other decision-makers in Washington. American intelligence had dif-
ficulty divining enemy intentions, whether in Hanoi or at the tactical level, and the
war effort suffered both tactical and operational surprises. Despite a massive and
often tactically ingenious sigint effort (which is now being declassified), the North
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong engaged American forces largely on their own terms.
High-level North Vietnamese plans and intentions remained impenetrable (Hanyok
2002, 146–50).4 Counterintelligence was sadly lacking. The war also demonstrated
the difficulties of producing and applying intelligence in concert with an ally pos-
sessing gross asymmetries of resources and abilities; our South Vietnamese partners
had virtually no technical collection resources or skills, while we in turn depended
on them for human intelligence and language ability. Intelligence sharing was thus
crucial to the progress of the anti-Communist campaign, and yet it rarely achieved
more than local success.
The strains evinced by Vietnam and the spiraling costs of intelligence convinced
the Nixon administration in 1970 that the Intelligence Community stood in need of
reform. Under the leadership of James Schlesinger of the White House’s Office of
Management and Budget, the administration developed a twofold critique of the
Intelligence Community’s problems. According to Schlesinger’s Top Secret 1971
study, controlling the resources devoted to the new intelligence hardware had
monopolized the efforts of the IC’s managers, who had little choice but to concen-
trate on channeling the unprecedented funds involved, and who were dazzled by the
vast quantities of data that the systems collected. The boon was incomplete, how-
ever, as the analysts who had to make sense of the new data were figuratively drown-
ing in its torrents, with insufficient training, imagination, or funding to make the
most of its emerging opportunities. The answer, according to Schlesinger, was bet-
ter management of the IC by the DCI, and of the Pentagon’s own intelligence estab-
lishment (portions of which comprised a hefty share of the IC) by the secretary of
defense in concert with the head of the IC. The DCI could and perhaps should be
empowered to act as a “Director of National Intelligence,” Schlesinger argued, with
greater budgeting and programming powers to wring efficiencies out of intelligence
spending and to ensure that the IC’s systems and capabilities complemented one
another (Schlesinger [1971] 2006).
Schlesinger’s centralizing prescription would prove to be the dominant mode of
thinking about intelligence reform for decades to come, although its full impact
would not be immediate. The reforms barely began to be implemented when they
were postponed by political arguments that were new in the experience of the
Intelligence Community. President Nixon mandated a modest slate of changes in
response to Schlesinger’s diagnosis, and hoped that Schlesinger himself—nominated
for the post of DCI in late 1972—would supply his insights to fill up the want of new
powers in the reforms actually approved. Both Nixon and Schlesinger, however, were
soon distracted by the spreading Watergate scandal; the President nominated
Schlesinger for the post of secretary of defense within weeks of swearing him in for
the DCI job, and Nixon himself would resign the presidency the following year.
By then, Washington was a town riven by political and ideological arguments.
The foreign policy consensus that had pervaded for the last two decades had cracked,
and debates over the best policy toward Communism had arisen in each of the two
4
One of the most important declassified historical interpretation of the intelligence struggle
in Vietnam so far have been released by the National Security Agency; see in particular Robert
J. Hanyok’s work (2002) in the source notes.
major political parties. This growing discord had large effects on the American
intelligence system. The nation’s basic or grand strategy remained roughly the same,
but sustained arguments over how to implement it spilled over into discussions of
intelligence activities, particularly with regard to internal security, covert interven-
tion, and estimates of Soviet intentions.
Internal security had been ensured with the suppressing of the Communist
Party’s leadership in the 1950s. Domestic radicalism arose on the fringes of the anti-
war and civil rights movements, though it posed even less of a threat to the
Constitutional order than the Communists had done, and it nonetheless was firmly
dealt with by federal authorities. Those same authorities overreacted rather badly,
however, in employing intelligence powers and methods fashioned for the World
War II emergency to quell comparatively minor dangers. The overreach was mostly
due to the personality quirks of three men: J. Edgar Hoover, Lyndon Johnson, and
Richard Nixon, who ordered Bureau agents and Intelligence Community elements
to spy on Americans in seeking evidence of a Soviet or foreign hand in domestic
disturbances. Congress’s investigatory reaction to this over-reaction—most famously
through the Senate’s “Church Committee” hearings and report in 1975–76—essentially
put “domestic intelligence” out of business. It also had the salutary effect—encoded
in the (Attorney General Edward) “Levi Guidelines” in 1976—of stating that the gov-
ernment had no business monitoring the ways in which citizens lawfully exercise
their Constitutional rights.
Covert action overseas fell afoul of the same restrictive tendencies in Congress.
The “Hughes-Ryan amendment” to a foreign-relations authorization bill in late
1974 marked the first time that Congress in statute acknowledged the existence of
covert action—and vowed to oversee it. The mechanism put in place was cumber-
some, but it also offered faint but real endorsement for a continued covert-action
capability. Both political parties and both branches of government had effectively
pledged to preserve covert action, but the price for this tacit endorsement—if it can
be called that—was a risk of leaks and exposure if the operations in question ranged
too far outside a sometimes fleeting bipartisan agreement over prosecuting the Cold
War.
Sharp disputes among the intelligence analysts and policymakers over estimates
of Soviet capabilities and intentions—a preview of which was seen in the “Bomber
Gap” controversy in the 1950s—helped complicate the management of the Intelligence
Community from now on. As a result of the Vietnam War, a new political tactic was
introduced, usually by dovish opponents of continued American involvement in
Southeast Asia: the charge of “politicization.” In its typical form, an accusation of
politicization would proclaim that a hawkish Administration, or elements of it, had
neglected or distorted (i.e., politicized) less-alarming evidence and judgments put
forth by professional, apolitical experts in the Intelligence Community in order to
pursue some bellicose and ideologically driven policy goal. More hawkish experts
and members of Congress in the 1970s preferred to employ their variant of the polit-
icization charge—by claiming that high officials and even intelligence analysts were
ignoring evidence of a growing danger in a naïve pursuit of detente with Moscow. By
the time of the “Team A-Team B” exercise of 1976—in which DCI George H.W. Bush
sponsored competitive analyses of Soviet strategic power by CIA analysts and non-
governmental experts—both modes of the politicization charge had been honed to
serve as weapons by which rival policy preferences could be effectively attacked
through criticisms of the intelligence process that advised them.
In response to all this change in the legal and political climate for intelligence,
President Gerald Ford in early 1976 issued Executive Order 11905—the first public
governing guidance for the Intelligence Community. For its part, Congress over the
next two years created permanent oversight committees. The United States in this
way became the first modern nation to publicize and explain not only that it rou-
tinely conducted peacetime intelligence operations but also (at least in general
terms) why and how it did so. Thus the Intelligence Community, through the hap-
hazard genius of the American political system, survived the breakdown of the
postwar foreign-policy consensus and regained a working degree of political sup-
port far short of—but no longer dependent on—unanimity of geopolitical outlook
among policymakers. The system as it stood in the late 1970s had been given a firm
substructure of laws and a superstructure of oversight mechanisms. These were not
perfect by any means, but they were enough to keep the Intelligence Community
functioning and improving—with fits and starts—through the remainder of the
Cold War.
Conclusion
Intelligence in the United States grew from a mere appendage to the nation’s diplo-
matic, military, and internal security agencies to a multi-agency “Community” in
little more than half a century. By 1977, the United States had what may have been
the world’s most sophisticated and expensive (if not its largest or always its most
proficient) intelligence system. Its structure and performance still left a great deal of
room for debate and evolution, but U.S. intelligence was nevertheless good enough
to reassure American leaders on a day-by-day basis that the Soviet Union was not
on the verge of launching World War III. This accomplishment alone—for contrib-
uting to the stability of deterrence and the non-use of thermonuclear weapons—
may have been enough to justify the Intelligence Community’s existence and
expense, but there were others of lesser but still beneficial significance.
If there can be said to have been an overarching “strategy” for U.S. intelligence,
it was to deploy workmanlike capabilities across the board in all the major intelli-
gence disciplines, while pioneering truly exceptional collection systems based on
advanced technologies. The essential problem with this ad hoc strategy was that the
management, oversight, and practices of the resulting system only barely kept pace
with the growing complexity and expense of its capabilities. Correcting this situa-
tion was the work of decades, beginning in a serious way in 1946, but reaching a
sustainable momentum in the mid-1970s, as Congress took on a permanent role in

overseeing the financial and legal aspects of the Community’s activities.
The intelligence system that existed by the late 1970s would help American leaders
navigate the end of the Cold War. It would be unchanged in its essentials when the
Information Revolution began sweeping over the world’s governments, economies,
and societies in the 1990s. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent wars
in southwest Asia set in motion developments that would change the system signifi-
cantly, although the four main missions listed above (internal security, foreign opera-
tions, military support, and support to the President) still pertain today. In that sense,
the transformation of American intelligence in the first decade of the twenty-first
century was a refurbishment of the system that had been built by 1977, with a new
emphasis on integration—but not a shift of basic structure or mission.
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chapter 8
THE RISE AND FALL

OF THE CIA
rhodri jeffreys-jones
1. An Agency that Rose and Fell

The rise of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stemmed from the adoption of a
doctrine of central intelligence.1 That led to the foundation of the CIA in 1947. Once
established, the agency achieved ascendancy in the intelligence community, devel-
oped an effective U.S. analytical capability, and acquired a reputation for successful
covert actions. All this gave the CIA a high standing in government circles, and
increased the likelihood that policymakers would pay heed to its findings. The
agency became an icon of American culture, its acronym a source of worldwide
fascination, its business the business of the world’s greatest power. It made a signifi-
cant contribution to America’s national security and to world peace.
But by the early years of the twenty-first century the CIA had lost its former
high standing. Its fall may be traced to a number of earlier setbacks and difficulties.
The Bay of Pigs disaster of 1961 was a failed attempt to liberate Cuba from commu-
nism, and an unmistakable intimation of frailty. Then in the mid-1970s, the agency
came under attack from both ends of the political spectrum. Disclosures about its
assassinations policy and other malpractices alienated those on the left of the spec-
trum. Disclosures about its alleged manipulation of intelligence for political rea-
sons enraged right-wingers. The CIA recovered some of its standing in the 1980s,
but by the 1990s improved relations between Moscow and Washington threatened
the very existence of an agency that seemed to have become synonymous with the
1
I would like to thank my colleague David Stafford for his critical reading of an earlier draft
of this chapter.
the rise and fall of the cia 123
Cold War. Subsequently the CIA took some of the blame for not predicting the 9/11
attack, and much of the blame for inventing the “weapons of mass destruction”
scare that led to the Iraq war of 2003. At the end of 2004, an intelligence reform act
ended the primacy of the CIA in the American intelligence community.
The rise and fall of the CIA is not, however, a matter of simple chronological
progression. The seeds of decay were apparent from the beginning, and the agency
continued to do some excellent work even as its star waned. Moreover, the history
of the CIA is about more than its rise and fall. It has spawned a variety of thought-
provoking and often controversial debates.
2. Discussion Points
Some of the debates have been about democratic principles. Devotees of American
democracy were glad to see the CIA, a civilian agency, take center stage in an intelligence
community heavily populated by the military. But others of equally democratic inclina-
tion worried that the CIA was elitist, and dominated by male, white, Ivy League types. In
the knowledge that effective democracy depended on open government, a powerful
cadre of reformers demanded congressional oversight of the secret agency. Fears of
excessive secrecy fuelled complaints about the politicization of intelligence. What com-
plicated these controversies was that liberals and conservatives played alternating roles—
the CIA started life as the creation of liberals, and later became the darling of the Right.
Other debates have been about the effectiveness of the agency. From the begin-
ning, there were those who doubted whether the conduct and administration of
covert operations belonged in a civilian intelligence agency. Some critics argued
that covert operations would be counterproductive whoever undertook them, as
even when they succeeded they made America unpopular. Debate on the agency’s
intelligence analyses has been endless. Inevitably the CIA made mistakes, and critics
pounced on these. The agency’s inability to predict certain surprise attacks led to
especially strong opprobrium. Still another kind of debate focuses on the author-
ship of failure—was it always the fault of the agency, or did the CIA director some-
times act as the fall guy for the president? Clearly, any account of the rise and fall of
the CIA must take into account a variety of issues.
3. The Founding of the CIA

With the creation of the CIA in 1947, the United States for the first time had a per-
manent peacetime intelligence capability. America had previously engaged in war-
time intelligence activities, but on a temporary basis. While George Washington, for
example, had been a proficient spymaster, his intelligence activities were responses
to short-lived crises. Many years later in World War I, the State Department estab-
lished a more thoroughly organized intelligence system known as U-1, but by 1927 it
had been entirely dissolved ( Jeffreys-Jones 2002, 11–23, 60–79).
In September 1939, war once again broke out in Europe. By March 1941, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover suspected that America
might soon join that war, and that this would once again require a boost to the
nation’s intelligence apparatus. British intelligence had a high reputation in the
United States and by this time was on a war footing, so Hoover sent two officials to
find out how it worked. These officials, Hugh G. Clegg and Lawrence Hince, sent
back a critical evaluation, and Hoover used this as the basis of a report he submitted
to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. One matter upon which he commented was the
feeling within the British intelligence community that there might be an advantage
to combining MI-5 and MI-6, respectively Britain’s domestic and foreign intelli-
gence agencies (Charles 2005, 232).
President Roosevelt and his advisers now sent the New York attorney William
J. Donovan on a fact-finding mission to London. Donovan studied the covert
operations the wartime Special Operations Executive (SOE), as well as the more-
established MI-5 and MI-6. Although MI-5 and MI-6 never did merge, Donovan
returned home convinced of the virtue of a centralized intelligence system. In July
1941, Roosevelt established the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), and
put Donovan in charge. In December, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and America
was at war. Roosevelt and his war cabinet steadily ratcheted up the nation’s intel-
ligence capability. In June 1942, the president issued an executive order that replaced
the COI arrangement with a larger agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
This agency had a foreign remit that included covert operations, and its agents
operated with some distinction behind enemy lines. Donovan was once again in
charge.
Toward the war’s end, Donovan recommended that there should be a peacetime
central intelligence agency with a substantial capability. Donovan’s admirers have
hailed him as the father of the CIA—for example, Thomas F. Troy, an official CIA
historian, in his book about the CIA’s origins (1981). Others, such as CIA veteran
David F. Rudgers, argue that while Donovan was significant, he was just one of sev-
eral persuasive advocates of peacetime central intelligence (Rudgers 2000, 3). For by
the war’s end in 1945, there was an extensive lobby for a peacetime organization.
After Roosevelt’s death the new president, Harry Truman, disbanded the OSS, but
in 1946 set up an interim replacement unit, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).
This became the CIA the following year.
President Truman supported the idea of central intelligence as a means of coun-
tering the Soviet Union. The Soviets were an adversary to be feared because their
victory over Germany had empowered and emboldened them, and, above all,
because of their alien communist ideology. CIG’s very first tasking directive identi-
fied an “urgent need” for intelligence on the Soviets. However, Capitol Hill sup-
ported legislation setting up the CIA for a different reason. Senators and Congressmen
remembered the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. They vowed that America should
never again be caught by surprise, and supported a central intelligence agency that
would better protect America in the future ( Jeffreys-Jones 1997, 23, 25–26).
There were other reasons, too, for the establishment of the CIA. One was the
feeling that the British had bossed the international context in which the United
States had operated, partly through the operations of its vaunted secret services.
America now needed its own capability not just to protect its sovereignty, but also
because it had become a great power with worldwide responsibilities. Another fac-
tor was that in the depression years of the 1930s and then in the course of World
War II, the nation had become accustomed to setting up federal agencies to cope
with grievous problems. With the carnage of the recent war fresh in Americans’
minds, there was support for the idea that the latest new agency should be civilian
in character. Later on, there were other reasons why people supported the work of
the CIA, for example its ability to promote U.S. technological, scientific, and eco-
nomic ascendancy.
Others opposed the CIA, sometimes arguing that its creation and rise to promi-
nence were the result of an elitist conspiracy. In fact, conspiracy fears shaped the
CIA from the very beginning. From the moment when the Chicago Tribune learned
of Donovan’s plans for a peacetime agency there was a campaign in the press against
any super-agency on lines reminiscent of Germany’s hated secret police. Both
Donovan and Hoover fell under suspicion for allegedly wanting to preside over an
“American Gestapo.” What sealed the fate of both men was the fact that President
Truman was ill disposed toward them—he regarded Donovan as a boastful prima
donna, and disliked Hoover’s FBI because he believed it had a poor record on civil
liberties. The outcome of all these suspicions was a divide-and-weaken policy. The
National Security Act of 1947 gave the director of the CIA the further title of Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI), with responsibility to coordinate the work of the
entire intelligence community. However, it banned the CIA itself from operating
domestically, and prohibited the FBI from doing foreign work. Given the rivalries
between the two institutions, the result was decades of poor coordination, to the
ultimate detriment of national security ( Jeffreys-Jones 2007, 137–48).
Although the CIA lacked the authorization to spy at home, it did receive the
go-ahead to expand in another way. It could not just spy abroad, but also conduct
covert operations. This meant, for example, that it could secretly undermine or sup-
port a foreign government. Its extensive covert-action programs would later be con-
troversial (Prados 2006; Weiner 2007).
Some critics attributed those programs’ excesses to the weakness of congress-
ional oversight in the first seventeen years of the agency’s existence. Though the CIA
was the world’s first democratically sanctioned foreign intelligence agency and
Congress had the right and duty to oversee the expenditure of every dollar of tax-
payers’ money, until the mid-1970s legislators rarely interfered with the day-to-day
running of the agency. Their inaction was not an indication of weakness. It reflected
the fact that congressional leaders generally approved of the CIA’s activities, includ-
ing its covert actions. In the early Cold War years, they also operated on the principle
that this was a secret agency, and that imprudently asked questions might give rise
to damaging leaks (Barrett 2005, 458–60).
4. The Golden Years of Intelligence

In 1949, the Soviet Union shocked the world’s democracies by exploding a proto-
type atomic bomb. The earlier-than-expected timing of this technical breakthrough
stemmed partly from atomic espionage against the United States. Clearly there was
a need for the CIA and FBI to overcome the rivalries that divided them, and to con-
centrate on counterintelligence. Equally, it was evident that America would need to
compete in the realm of offensive espionage. America resorted to scientific espio-
nage of its own. The CIA’s Berlin office used seductive women as one method of
extracting secrets from eastern scientists, and sometimes to persuade them to defect.
This program did not weaken communist technology as much as its originators
hoped, but it did yield a scientific dividend for the United States (Maddrell 2006, 1,
79, 198).
Advances in Soviet military technology were alarming because they posed a
threat to American security, because the Soviet Union used its totalitarian apparatus
to hide its technology, and because the resulting obfuscation lent itself to opportu-
nistic distortion by what President Dwight D. Eisenhower would blisteringly label
the American “military-industrial complex.” The challenge for the CIA was not only
to steal Soviet secrets, but also to evaluate the Soviet arsenal in a more objective
manner, and to assess what the Kremlin intended to do with it. It was a secret agency
with the mission of opening up the secrets of America’s potential adversary.
Another question was this: the Soviets may have had the technology, but was
their economy strong enough to challenge America’s military ascendancy? How
quickly could they produce nuclear warheads and the means to deliver them, planes
and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)? President Eisenhower had military
experience and took an informed interest in such matters. More than most presi-
dents, he drove the intelligence agenda (Andrew 1995, 4, 199, 223). Allen Dulles, his
pick as CIA director (1953–61), had a matching interest in economic analysis. He
faced a daunting problem. In a command economy such as the Soviet Union’s, the
national currency is no guide to value, and it was no easy task to compare the cost
of a missile component with that of a glass of vodka. But by 1955 the CIA’s Office of
Research Reports had five hundred experts working on economic analysis, a greater
number than all the other analysts combined. They were able to show, in defiance of
Air Force contentions, that the Soviet economy was too weak to sustain a threaten-
ing level of bomber production (Zelikow 1997, 166–68).
Unable to send in spies at ground level, the CIA operated both below and above
the terrestrial surface. It helped British colleagues drill a tunnel right under the
heavily patrolled border into the communist sector of Berlin. The 450-yard
excavation was so situated that, prior to the East German authorities’ exposure of its
existence in 1956, technicians were able to listen advantageously to Soviet electronic
communications (Stafford 2003, 2). Aerial reconnaissance was a further source of
information. With Richard Bissell in charge, the CIA sponsored the U-2 plane,
which overflew Soviet test sites at altitudes beyond the reach of ground-to-air
missiles or fighter aircraft.
Equipped with high-technology cameras and operational from 1956, the U-2s
produced images in which President Eisenhower showed a personal interest. These
images ultimately showed that ICBM development was less advanced than the
Kremlin boasted. The “missile gap” of which the American military had warned was
just as much of a myth as the preceding “bomber gap.” This knowledge soothed
American nerves, and helped to save the world from a nuclear holocaust. And by the
time the Russians had developed a new missile and shot down a U-2 plane in 1960,
America had in place a spy satellite program (yet another Eisenhower/CIA initia-
tive) promising ever-more-sophisticated images of military developments behind
the iron curtain.
In tandem with its intelligence activities, the CIA ran covert operations. It had
an extensive program of secret propaganda, with activities ranging from the secret
subsidization of pro-American radio programs in Central Europe to buying up all
the ink in France to hamper the printing of communist literature at the time of the
1948 election. The agency passed dollars under the table to anti-communist maga-
zines like Britain’s Encounter. It operated anti-communist networks through private
American groups—students, organized labor, émigrés, intellectuals, women,
Catholics, African Americans, businessmen, and journalists. Some of these citizens
knew where the money was coming from, others did not. Most shared the anti-
communist goal of the CIA, though not all of them were happy about being subsi-
dized by a secret government agency (Wilford 2008, 8).
The CIA also ran covert-action programs. Some of the agency’s covert actions
were outright failures—its attempt (in collaboration with the British) to overthrow
the communist government of Albania in 1949, its futile encouragement of upris-
ings in East Berlin (1953) and Hungary (1956), and its effort to support a coup in
Indonesia in 1958. So effective was the CIA’s publicity and news-control machine,
and so united was opinion against the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War,
that these failures did little harm to the agency’s reputation.
Meanwhile, the CIA’s leaders were able to boast of a string of successes. The
communists fell short at the polls in France and Italy. There was also success in the
Philippines, where the CIA’s Edward Lansdale developed a counterinsurgency doc-
trine. Lansdale said it was better to educate than to bomb the natives. Rather than
send in the marines when a nation was threatened by communism, America should
help the locals to build and defend their own nation (Blaufarb 1977, 39–40). By 1953,
the Filipino communist insurrection was over.
The CIA supported foreign politicians who professed hostility to communism
even if those politicians were themselves undemocratic. In 1953, it encouraged a
coup against the democratically elected government of Iran, installing in power the
shah, a monarch who ensured that his nation would be a reliable source not just of
anti-communism, but of oil, too. In 1954, with President Eisenhower in active sup-
port, the CIA helped to overthrow the democratically elected government of
Guatemala. Critics complained that the Guatemalan coup favored the interests of
the U.S.-based multinational, the United Fruit Company, and that it inflicted
another right-wing dictator on a foreign nation (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1983,
220–21). But the trail was murky, and the CIA’s reputation as an operational
miracle-worker continued to blossom. Though the 1950s had been a decade of bril-
liant intelligence achievements, instead they entered CIA mythology as the golden
age of operations.
5. The Troubled 1960s

In January 1961, General Lansdale submitted to incoming president John F. Kennedy
an intelligence assessment of the situation in South Vietnam. He warned that the
communist insurgency was gathering pace, and recommended that the United
States should identify first-class local leadership and give them the means to over-
come the danger (Prados 2006, 337–38). Lansdale would remain opposed to U.S.
military intervention, advocating “de-Americanization” and an effort to win the
“hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people. Kennedy and his successor, President
Lyndon B. Johnson, ignored this advice by attempting to pursue counterinsurgency
and military tactics simultaneously.
Kennedy and his CIA similarly ignored the principle of indigeneity when plan-
ning for an agency-led invasion to land at Cuba’s Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Cuban
fighters repelled the invasion, and it failed to topple the Fidel Castro regime. In
preparing for the operation, the CIA had made no attempt to assess whether the
Cuban people would support it, and in the event they did not. Another factor con-
tributing to the humiliating defeat was the fact that Castro’s air force had been
expecting the attack and strafed the landing force—the CIA’s secrecy procedures
had kept only the American people in the dark.
In firing Dulles and Bissell for the Bay of Pigs disaster, Kennedy admitted that
he was equally to blame. But he explained to Dulles that under the American con-
stitutional system the president could only be replaced once every four years, so it
was the CIA director who had to be the scapegoat and resign. The punitive removal
of its top officials dulled the CIA’s pristine sheen, and the agency received another
blow at the end of the year—for in December 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) came into existence. The DIA was not a direct response to the Bay of Pigs,
having been in gestation for a number of years as the army, navy, and air force tried
to sink their rivalries and speak with a united and more powerful voice. But the Bay
of Pigs postmortem had identified military inexperience as a factor contributing to
the Cuban failure, and CIA pessimists had reason to dread that in the years to come
policymakers would listen to the agency with one ear cupped in the direction of the
Pentagon’s DIA (Mescall 1991, 159, 194–97).
In spite of being in some ways an intelligence disaster, the Cuban Missile Crisis
of the following year gave the CIA an opportunity to restore its standing. President
Kennedy had authorized the placement of forty-five Jupiter missiles in Italy and
Turkey. These were nuclear-tipped and within range of Soviet targets. Some analysts
had warned that Moscow would consider this a serious threat to the balance of
power, but Kennedy did not ask the CIA to assess possible Soviet reactions until
after he had taken the decision and was committed to deployment (Nash 1997, 3,
97). The Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev now reacted with an attempt secretly to
install in Cuba an equivalent array of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles—apparently he, too,
neglected to call for an intelligence assessment of the likely adversarial reaction
(Fursenko and Naftali 1998, 64, 71). American intelligence theorists at this time gen-
erally argued that in order to avoid the politicization of estimates, decision-making
and analytical processes should be kept apart. However, in the lead-up to the missile
crisis political-intelligence communications seemed to have broken down alto-
gether (Betts 2003, 60).
Nevertheless, the CIA emerged from the affair with credit. John A. McCone had
by now succeeded Dulles as director. He offended some of the old guard by moving
the agency away from its Ivy League orientation, and in the direction of technical
rather than human intelligence. Yet he still revealed a rare bit of individual human
intuition in guessing that the Soviets would place missiles in Cuba. McCone per-
suaded President Kennedy and his advisors to consider the implications in a meet-
ing on August 23, 1962 (May and Zelikow 1997, 35). On October 14, a U-2 photographic
overflight confirmed the existence of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. For a few days, the
superpowers squared up to each other and the world teetered on the brink of nuclear
war. But Kennedy had been given the time to prepare his options, and was able to
negotiate a compromise. Both the Jupiters and the SS 4/5s were withdrawn, and the
most dangerous moment in modern history had passed.
In the Vietnamese new year holiday (Tet) at the end of January 1968, commu-
nist forces launched a spectacular surprise attack on American positions and those
of their South Vietnamese allies. The Tet attack failed to inspire a general uprising,
and the American counteroffensive was so effective that well over half of the 84,000
communist attack force ended up as casualties. But the Tet initiative was neverthe-
less effective in that it destroyed the credibility of Lyndon B. Johnson’s administra-
tion’s claim that the war was going well. General William C. Westmoreland, the
commander of the U.S. military forces in Vietnam, had fueled the optimism by
insisting that his war of attrition against the enemy was succeeding. The sheer scale
of the Tet campaign made him look foolish, and damaged U.S. morale.
Tet had the effect of discrediting the military’s intelligence estimates compared
with those of the CIA. Back in 1966, CIA analyst Sam Adams had put enemy strength
at closer to 600,000 than the 270,000 figure that formed the basis of military attri-
tion claims. His larger estimate seemed to explain the enemy’s eventual ability to
mount an offensive (Adams 1975, 62, 64). In June 1971, leaked documents on
American decision-making on Vietnam—the Pentagon Papers—seemed to throw

the CIA in a good light, and Adams published his account of events in 1975, adding
to the impression that the CIA had shown a wise skepticism about a disastrous war.
It was all too easy to overlook the facts that military analysts, too, had had their
doubt about the Vietnam strategy, and that the post-McCone CIA leadership, what-
ever reservations it may have had, held back from telling Presidents Johnson and
Richard Nixon that the war was going badly—instead, the CIA’s leaders had deliv-
ered “intelligence to please.”
Meantime, trouble was brewing for the covert operators. In spite of his best
efforts, Lansdale was unable to persuade the White House and the military com-
mand to give counterinsurgency a chance, and to stop bombing the people whose
hearts and minds they were trying to woo. Then in Operation Phoenix, an effort to
counter the terrorist tactics of the enemy, the CIA itself ignored the principles of
counterinsurgency, and operated an assassination campaign against suspected com-
munist activists. Such operations were problems in themselves, rather than
solutions.
6. Revelations and Reform

If but slowly at first, the problems came home to roost. In a book published at the
start of 1967, the journalist Thomas B. Morgan argued that the CIA’s foreign “inter-
ventionism” was the prime cause of America’s unpopularity in the world—he meant
all the agency’s covert actions, not just the crimes and the failures (Morgan 1967,
9–10). But what really upset Americans were revelations about the CIA’s domestic
operations in violation of the agency’s charter. Just after Morgan’s study appeared,
the Californian Catholic magazine Ramparts exposed the agency’s use of U.S. vol-
untary groups like the National Students Association to conduct clandestine propa-
ganda around the globe. The national media made a fuss, the affair was a profound
shock to the intelligentsia, and the CIA’s operators beat an ignominious—though
limited—retreat from a cherished range of activities (Wilford 2008, 4–5).
Then in 1974–75, in the wake of the demoralizing Watergate scandal that had
forced President Nixon to resign, there was a flood of revelations. Americans were
shocked to read about Phoenix, about another assassination program aimed at for-
eign leaders like Castro, about the CIA’s part in the recent overthrow of the elected
government in Latin America’s oldest democracy, Chile, about the agency’s illegal
espionage activities against Vietnam War protestors, and about a whole range of
other controversial activities. The Senate and the House of Representatives launched
the biggest investigation in American history.
Though the chairman of the Senate committee, Frank Church, at first claimed
that the CIA was a “rogue elephant out of control,” he soon changed his mind
( Johnson 1985, 119). Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the House intelligence
inquiry that the president had personally authorized every covert action of recent
years (Olmsted 1996, 142). No longer seen as the prime culprit, the CIA survived.
But from now on it had to answer to more powerful congressional oversight by
committees set up in both the Senate and the House.
Since the 1970s, this oversight has varied in quality and intensity. Critics have
variously suggested that congressional vigilance collapses at times of crisis and
heightened patriotism, that over time oversight committee members become too
friendly with CIA officials, and that legislators only address intelligence inadequa-
cies in the wake of some shocking incident that has focused the attention of the
press—and thus the voters—on the need for scrutiny (Ransom 1984, 225; Smist
1990, 20–22; Johnson 2007, 344). Nevertheless, since the 1970s any president think-
ing of using the CIA for nefarious purposes has run the danger of a day of reckon-
ing with Congress.
President from 1977 to 1981, Jimmy Carter wound down the covert-action capa-
bilities of the CIA. This, however, did not save him from his own day of reckoning.
In 1979, disaster struck for his administration when Islamic leaders in Iran over-
threw the shah. The CIA had for years been warning about political repression in
Iran and in 1978 produced an assessment called “Iran after the Shah.” But not until
1979 did the agency begin to issue urgent alerts. With the DIA too closely aligned
with the shah’s military and Washington’s leadership turning deaf ears to the CIA,
the revolution caught America by surprise (Donovan 1997, 159–60). What made
matters worse was that the mullah-led Teheran government held hostage fifty-two
U.S. embassy staffers, and used captured documents to show that many of them had
been working for the CIA. The agency now disappointed the luckless Carter by
bungling a rescue attempt. When Ronald Reagan ran on the Republican ticket for
president in 1980, he prospered from the failings of Carter’s CIA.
7. Victory in the Cold War

President Reagan lived up to his promise to “unleash” the CIA. William Casey, his
choice as director, rebuilt the agency’s covert capabilities. As before, this became
evident in Latin America. In Nicaragua, a group known as the Sandinistas had
recently overthrown an invidious right-wing dictatorship. The CIA now trained
and paid a terrorist counterrevolutionary group known as the Contras, and tried to
ruin the new government by mining Nicaragua’s Corinto harbor, an action that
violated international law.
The CIA also broke its own country’s laws regarding both Nicaragua and Iran.
Congress had got wind of the CIA’s help to the Contras, and legislated against it.
There was other legislation that made it illegal to export arms to Iran. But with
Israeli help the agency brokered a deal whereby the Iranians illegally received
American tactical missiles in exchange for illegally routing CIA money to the
Contras. In the event, the whole exercise proved to have been unnecessary, as the
citizens of Nicaragua voted out the Sandinistas of their own accord in a free election
in 1990. Leaks about the Iran-Contra operation had by this time caused a scandal in
Reagan’s second term as president (1985–89). But the national mood had changed.
Most Americans did not just forgive Reagan and his CIA, they adored them.
While President Reagan had an endearing personality, it was his administra-
tion’s apparent “victory” in the Cold War that really impressed his admirers. The
debate about that victory came to center on the politicization of intelligence, a pro-
cess that had already loomed large in the 1970s.
When Henry Kissinger was national security advisor in the Nixon administra-
tion, he manipulated the intelligence product of the CIA. He exaggerated the Soviet
nuclear threat in order to persuade Congress to appropriate funds for an antibal-
listic missile (ABM) system that would potentially have given America a strategic
advantage over its Cold War adversary. With this card in hand, Kissinger was in a
stronger position in negotiations, and induced Moscow to agree to the strategic
arms-limitation treaties (SALT) of 1971–72. When CIA analysts showed there was a
history of Soviet infractions of such agreements, Kissinger suppressed the evidence
in order to bolster confidence in his diplomacy and win congressional approval of
the treaties. A safer world was the end that justified his duplicitous means, but when
the story inevitably leaked out, it meant that people were less likely to trust the CIA
and the intelligence process in the future.
At a time when President Carter was negotiating a further round of arms reduc-
tions, SALT II, a group of anti-Kissinger conservatives challenged the CIA’s inter-
pretation of Soviet data (Cahn 1998, 186). To placate its critics and try to win Senate
approval for its diplomacy, the government set up a system of “competitive esti-
mates.” Team A, the usual CIA analysts, looked at Moscow’s aggressive declarations
and saw them as “exhortative” (Freedman 1997, 138). But a more hawkish Team B,
non-CIA experts who looked at the same evidence on a confidential basis, dismissed
the idea that the communists were bluffing, insisting that they meant what they said
and constituted a real danger to American national security. The Senate failed to
ratify SALT II.
President Reagan’s administration called for a Strategic Defense Initiative, pop-
ularly known as “Star Wars” after the 1977 movie of that title. Whereas the ABM
system would have been ground-based, this time satellite-controlled laser beams
would destroy incoming enemy missiles. Once again, Congress agreed to fund an
expensive program that was justified by exaggerated intelligence estimates of Soviet
capabilities. Critics alleged that the agency’s Soviet expert Robert Gates (a future
director of the CIA) delivered politicized intelligence to please. The CIA played
another role, too, in the Reagan administration’s effort to win the Cold War and free
Europe from communism. It ran economic sabotage operations against the Soviet
oil industry, and secretly subsidized the anti-communist movement in the pivotal
state of Poland.
By 1989 the Cold War was over, and in 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved. Having
been in decline in the 1970s, the CIA now appeared to have climbed to new heights.
Its supporters argued that it had contributed to the collapse of European commu-
nism. Some of them claimed that the Star Wars program that the CIA’s intelligence
had underpinned had been an effort to induce emulative Soviet expenditure, a pro-
foundly clever ploy that broke the communist economies (Diamond 2008, 8).
8. Searching for a New Mission

However, the CIA was to be the victim of its own success. It had been a Cold War
agency. By the very act of winning the Cold War, it seemed to remove the reason for
its own existence. Victory had another unwanted consequence. With the elimina-
tion of the imminent communist danger, one could find fault with the CIA without
being unpatriotic. Critics now charged that the CIA had believed its own hyperbole
about the Soviet threat. They alleged that this had resulted in a rigid mindset, and a
failure to realize that the Soviet economy was in bad shape. Thus, the fall of European
communism had caught America by surprise, leaving it without a game plan for the
post-communist world.
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-Mass.), a respected figure in American politics,
called for the abolition of the CIA. Under fire from Moynihan and others, the agency
now experienced a damaging setback, the Aldrich Ames affair. Prior to his arrest in
1993, Ames had worked for the agency as a counterintelligence officer, but from 1985
he spied on a commercial basis for the Soviets and then, in the post-communist era,
for Russia. His treason damaged the American defense effort and led to the betrayal
of U.S. secret agents and the execution of several of them. The discovery that Ames
had operated with impunity in spite of leaving a trail of indiscretions damaged the
CIA’s reputation for counterintelligence.
The agency went through a difficult time, shedding a quarter of its staff in
1993–94 and going through five directors between 1991 and 1997. It undertook
reforms. George Bush, Sr., president from 1989 to 1993 and a former director of
the CIA, initiated a “Glass Ceiling Study” that encouraged the recruitment of
more women. The CIA additionally tried to reach out to a broader ethnic spec-
trum, and in 1995 President Bill Clinton issued an executive order ending its ban
on the recruitment of homosexuals. The agency also made an effort to be more
open about its activities. Such changes pleased some of its critics, yet annoyed
others who thought it was putting “political correctness” above national security.
But at least the survival of the agency was assured. Under the chairmanship first
of Les Aspin and then of Harold Brown, a presidential commission undertook
America’s biggest-ever single inquiry into secret intelligence. In 1996, it recom-
mended that the CIA should continue to function as an independent agency. It
also recommended against the idea that the DCI should give way to a more pow-
erful “intelligence tsar” who would preside in his stead over the entire intelligence
community.
One way in which the agency sought to survive was to search for new, post-Cold
War roles. By the end of the 1990s, it had identified an Islamist terrorist group, Al
Qaeda, as a danger to American safety. Al Qaeda was nevertheless able to strike a
devastating blow against America in the first year of the administration of President
George Bush, Jr. The inquest into why America had been unable to prevent the 9/11
attack was long and bitter. Politicians, scholars, and journalists identified causes for
the failure, and fixed the responsibility on a number of individuals and institutions.
The main official inquiry into the event listed five occasions in the twenty months
leading up to September 2000 when the CIA failed to pass on information about Al
Qaeda suspects to its rival institution, the FBI (9/11 2004, 355). However, the CIA did
not bear the brunt of the criticism, and even benefited from the fiasco—on the
premise that intelligence failure had resulted from intelligence underfunding, the
nation’s leaders increased the budget of the CIA in line with that of the entire intel-
ligence community.
9. The End of Ascendancy

More trouble lay ahead, however. When America invaded Iraq in 2003, the Bush
administration justified the action on the grounds that Iraq had been helping Al
Qaeda, and that its undemocratic regime was planning to produce chemical and
nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Subsequent investigations proved
that both assertions were false, that the nuclear WMD charge had been sup-
ported by a forged document, and that the CIA had delivered intelligence to
please instead of challenging the administration’s assumptions about Iraq. CIA
director George Tenet had been close to President Bush and had given his impri-
matur to the WMD claims, and he now had to resign.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 addressed
America’s security problems in ways that affected the CIA. It established what the
Aspin-Brown commission had rejected, a new post of director of national intelli-
gence (DNI). Unlike the now-defunct DCI, the holder of this post would not be
director of the CIA, and the hope was that the new arrangement would give the DNI
an authority to command the whole of the intelligence community that the DCI
had never managed to exert. The law aimed to end CIA-FBI bickering and was an
affirmation of the principle of centralized intelligence. Its admirers saw it as part of
the blueprint for a safer America (Lynch and Singh 2008, 116). For the CIA, though,
it meant a lower standing. Its intelligence findings would be less likely to challenge
the military’s in the future, and the agency was expected to redouble its covert-
operational activities.
These activities were certainly in evidence. When captured in various parts of
the world, Al Qaeda and other terrorist suspects were tortured in order to obtain
information on their plans and colleagues. From 2002, the U.S. base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, housed a prison for terrorist suspects, and other suspects were held in
compliant nations like Poland. The illegally kidnapped suspects were described as
having been “rendered” to locations convenient for their interrogation. For several
years, the press carried stories about the CIA’s prominent role in these operations.
The agency’s reputation sank to a new low. The titles of books being written
about the agency carried words like “failure,” “decline,” and “fall” and complained
about the phenomena of intelligence to please and politicization (Diamond 2008,
13; Goodman 2008, 147).
Not all of these books were reliable. Take, for example, Legacy of Ashes, a book
by a New York Times journalist that concentrated on the CIA’s failings and won
popular plaudits. Tim Weiner, the author, concentrated on the spicy side of history
and failed to consult scholarship in the field that might have led him to more bal-
anced conclusions (Weiner 2007; Johnson and Jeffreys-Jones 2008, 882, 886–87).
In spite of the bad press, the CIA was still capable of good work, for example in
the case of its contribution to efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear-weapon
technology. In 2003, CIA intelligence led to the seizure of a ship carrying nuclear-
weapon materials to Libya, and in the following year it uncovered a black market in
nuclear weapons technology involving Iran and North Korea, as well. Furthermore,
critics were startlingly unaware that the CIA’s errors were not always of its own mak-
ing. As Senator Church had discovered in 1975, the CIA is a creature of the executive.
Criticism was less evidence of the CIA’s decline than a symptom of it. For the
true nature of that decline rested in the agency’s loss of standing. It had relinquished
its ascendancy over and to a degree its independence within the intelligence com-
munity, and much of its reputation for objective analysis. Its capabilities remained,
but it was a fallen agency in the sense that its analyses now fell on deaf or unsympa-
thetic ears.
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chapter 9
BRITISH STRATEGIC
INTELLIGENCE AND THE
COLD WAR
len scott
The term “strategic intelligence” was developed by the early pioneers of “classical
intelligence theory” in the United States who combined their academic perspectives
with active involvement in the development of the American intelligence commu-
nity (Kent 1949; Hilsman 1952; Hilsman 1956; Jeffreys-Jones 2009). Sherman Kent,
who first published Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy in 1949, was per-
haps the exemplar of their attempts to shape public understanding of the value of,
and challenges facing, contemporary intelligence while helping develop the analyti-
cal capabilities of the CIA and the Office of National Estimates. “Strategic
Intelligence” has entered the lexicon of intelligence studies in the United States
though it has been used sparingly by students of British intelligence, even if they
share much of the focus and concern of their American counterparts.
1. Introduction
In Britain the pioneering academic studies of intelligence in the 1980s made only
fleeting reference to the term, and then to distinguish between the tactical and stra-
tegic (Andrew 1986, 17). The other leading canon of British intelligence studies,
I am grateful to Michael Goodman and R. Gerald Hughes for comments on an earlier draft of
this chapter.
british strategic intelligence and the cold war 139
Michael Herman’s Intelligence Power in Peace and War, published in 1996, alludes
only briefly to the concept of strategic intelligence (Herman 1996, 36).1 Although
much of the analysis is directly relevant to the subject, he appears skeptical of key
aspects of Kent’s approach. Both emphasize all-source analysis, but differences lie in
the scope and focus of intelligence. Herman quotes with approval one of the pio-
neering figures of British intelligence studies, Ken Robertson, who argues that “[a]
satisfactory definition of intelligence ought to make reference to the following:
threats, states, secrecy, collection, analysis and purpose. The most important of
these is threat, since without threats there would be no need for intelligence ser-
vices . . . [Intelligence’s] unique element is secrecy—the secret collection of someone
else’s secrets” (Herman 1996, 118).
This well accords with the observations of Sir Percy Cradock, Foreign Policy
Adviser to the prime minister from 1984 to 1992 and chair of the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC) from 1985 to 1992. The JIC is central to exploration of British stra-
tegic intelligence and Cradock noted that the committee “has a predilection for
threats rather than opportunities, for the dark side of the moon” (Cradock 2002, 4).
In considering threats, an interesting distinction is drawn by Sir Reginald
Hibbert, a former diplomat, conscious of the role and value of Foreign Office assess-
ments: “[g]ood secret intelligence is indispensable for coping with the threat in its
immediate practical, physical manifestations. But the assessment of the political
forces actuating the threat, that is to say of the forces which determine the degree of
reality in or underlying the threat, depends more on non-secret than on secret
information” (Hibbert 1990, 115).
2. Background
When Sherman Kent and his colleagues were grappling with the problems of post-
war intelligence and its organization the British too were seeking to learn lessons,
and adapt to the challenges of what became known as the Cold War. Lessons were
drawn both from the 1930s, when failure to develop an effective intelligence
machinery had deleterious wartime consequences, and from the war itself, when
new structures and organizations were developed and new intakes of talented indi-
viduals paved the way for the triumphs of Ultra and strategic deception. Several
contrasts between the British and American experiences are striking. Key texts in
intelligence theory appeared in the United States in the formative period of the
Cold War and the serious academic study of the subject gathered momentum.
1
As Herman explains: “Formal distinctions are made between so-called ‘strategic intelli-
gence’—institutionally the national and central departments and agencies . . . —and the so-called
‘tactical resources’ under the control of military commands, or the Victorians’ intelligence in the
field” (Herman 1996, 36). As he notes this is not to be confused with “the normal military
distinction between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command.”
James Wirtz recently noted that the study of intelligence emerged as a distinctly
American field, and that its practitioners aimed to combine “scientific method and
history” in their search for models of good practice (Wirtz 2007, 29). With this
came a degree of informed debate and a degree of openness that was in stark con-
trast to Britain, where lessons were considered entirely within very narrow
Whitehall confines. There was no public or parliamentary debate. The wartime
intake into the intelligence community had brought academics into all parts of
Whitehall. Exceptional individuals like Professor R. V. Jones did play a peacetime
role but most returned to academic life, in contrast to the United States, where
their personal and intellectual contribution had an impact on the development of
American intelligence in the Cold War (Winks 1987).2
The postwar JIC machinery reflected various aspects of wartime experience.
Until 1957 the JIC was a subcommittee of the chiefs of staff, when its role and in
particular its relationship to senior ministers was enhanced as it came under the
Cabinet Office. One of the key developments came in 1968 when the Assessment
Staff was created. Attempts to apply wartime lessons to defense intelligence took the
form of a new Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) within the Ministry of Defense (MOD)
that developed incrementally under the energetic leadership of Sir Kenneth Strong.
Atomic intelligence presented a series of organizational challenges that were resolved
when this was placed under the JIB in 1954 (Goodman 2008, 168–76, 186–88).
Effective centralization of defense intelligence came only with the centralization of
the higher defense machinery, and which led to JIB being replaced by the Defense
Intelligence Staff within MOD in 1964.
3. Cold War–Intelligence Historiography

Writing in 1998 Richard Aldrich argued that “no historical analysis of British
national security policy between 1945 and 1970, indeed even British government as
a whole, could be complete without an extended consideration of the work and
influence of the secret services in a broad range of areas” (Aldrich 1998, 3). For
decades, intelligence, as Christopher Andrew and David Dilks had noted in 1984,
had been a “missing dimension” (Andrew and Dilks 1984). This was partly explained
by the absence of sources and by official attitudes to disclosure. In the United
Kingdom a conspiracy of official silence prevented disclosure of wartime triumphs
and a culture of official secrecy permeated all aspects of British intelligence activity.
Academic interest in the subject was effectively nonexistent, and publication on the
subject became the preserve of journalists and specialist espionage writers who
2
For an account of the relationship between academia and development of the US
intelligence, see Winks (1987). For Jones’s account of his unhappy return to intelligence after 1946
see R. Jones (1989).
focused their energy and imagination on scandals and “molehunts.” The principle
remained that any disclosure of any secrets was anathema, even if the practice was
sometimes different (West 2004). Nowadays the importance of intelligence is
increasingly recognized in the academic study of national security.
Writing in the early part of the twenty-first century these attitudes to secrecy and
disclosure appear extraordinary. It was not until 1992 that Prime Minister John Major
publicly referred to the Secret Intelligence Service in the House of Commons. Until
then it had been a constitutional convention that the peacetime existence of SIS was
not admitted. The Joint Intelligence Committee also remained hidden from view.
That began to change with publication of the Franks Report into the Falklands War in
1982, when the JIC’s failure to anticipate or predict the Argentinean invasion was scru-
tinized. The Franks Report provided a description of the role and composition of the
committee and analyzed its conduct (Franks 1983, 94–95). Public understanding of the
importance of the JIC began to develop as the academic study of intelligence in Britain
gained momentum. Of interest was the 1983 study by Anthony Verrier that included a
detailed and seemingly authoritative account of the Joint Intelligence Organization as
well as other aspects of British intelligence (Verrier 1983, 9–10).
It was the advent of the Major government’s Waldegrave Initiative in 1993 that
began to open the archives for historians of British intelligence and national secu-
rity. Declassification of JIC records was accelerated to ensure conformity with the
thirty-year rule governing transfer of historical material to the National Archives
(formerly the Public Records Office). However the papers of the various regional
JICs (in Germany, the Middle East, and the Far East) have not been preserved in
their entirety (Cradock 2002, 2). And the extent of declassification is by no means
uniform. Sir Percy Cradock noted that only nine of twenty-six JIC assessments on
the 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis could be read (Cradock 2002, 241). Critics (and
indeed some defenders) of the JIC have argued its conclusions were often anodyne
and consensus-driven. These historical sources very rarely reveal differences in
assessment, in particular, between government departments. The recent release of
JIC secretariat records may provide potentially significant insights into the crucial
work of the Assessment Staff. Also of note is the decision by the Cabinet Office,
announced in April 2007, to commission an official history of the committee by Dr.
Michael Goodman of King’s College London.
4. Strategic Intelligence:
Scope and Focus
For Sherman Kent the term strategic intelligence denoted “high-level foreign posi-
tive intelligence.” This was “the knowledge upon which we base our high-level
national policy toward the other states of the world.” Kent structured his analysis
around the three “separate and distinct things that intelligence devotees usually
mean when they use the word . . . intelligence as a kind of knowledge . . . Intelligence
as the type of organisation which produces the knowledge . . . and the activity pur-
sued by the intelligence organization” (Kent 1949, ix). Although Kent alludes to stra-
tegic intelligence in the context of organization, it is with knowledge that he is
primarily concerned (Kent 1949, 133). Kent’s concern was with “the knowledge which
our highly placed civilians and military men must have to safeguard the national
welfare” (Kent 1949, vii). The scope and focus of this intelligence was broad in
nature, reflecting a vision of how the principles and methods of the social sciences
might be applied to understanding foreign countries (Winks 1987). Michael Herman
makes clear his skepticism at this approach, though as he notes it was highly influ-
ential in developing attitudes within US intelligence (Herman 1996, 114–18). The
term “knowledge” may also be seen as problematic and perhaps over ambitious.
Kent’s primary concern lay in the assessment and the estimating process. However
framed, and however labeled, strategic intelligence was nevertheless to procure
understanding of adversaries that was vital to national survival.
How far, and in what ways, the United Kingdom’s national survival was at risk
during the Cold War remains an intriguing question for those exploring the role of
intelligence in national security. How far, and in what ways, the Soviet Union threat-
ened that survival requires careful scrutiny of not only British (and other allied
assessments) but of course the Soviet capabilities and intentions that were the focus
of the estimates. Attempts to reach judgments on the veracity of British assessments
therefore remain contingent on the availability of information about Soviet inten-
tions and capabilities. In many areas these are matters of ongoing historical inquiry
and debate. In that sense the historiography of western and British Cold War intel-
ligence remains at an early stage. How we assess the assessments is discussed further
below.
5. Secret Interventions
Sherman Kent’s three uses of intelligence include the activities of intelligence orga-
nizations. When it came to the practice of American intelligence secret intervention
in the affairs of states or other actors has been prominent. American scholars and
practitioners have frequently taken for granted the assumption that such secret
intervention—what is termed covert action—is simply a part of intelligence. An
illustration of this is Loch Johnson’s authoritative five-volume collection on
“Strategic Intelligence” which devotes a whole volume to covert action ( Johnson
2007). For critics, in particular, secret intervention became synonymous with intel-
ligence and has long been the focus of debates about the legitimacy and morality of
intelligence in the Cold War. A recent critique of the CIA’s effectiveness placed much
of the emphasis on covert action (Weiner 2008). Critical assessments of British
intelligence have likewise focused on these activities (Bloch and Fitzgerald 1983;
Curtis 2003; Dorril 2000). Yet many would argue that covert action is conceptually
(as well as operationally, politically and ethically) distinct from the business of
“high-level foreign positive intelligence.” Michael Herman’s seminal text, for exam-
ple, provides no more than passing references to the role of “para-military activity”
(Herman 1996). More generally, many states do not see secret intervention in the
affairs of others states as the routine business of statecraft, and certainly so when it
comes to more controversial activities such as the overthrow of governments or the
assassination of leaders.
Nevertheless it is abundantly clear that Britain engaged in various forms of
secret intervention during the Cold War. It is equally clear that British covert action
long predated the Cold War (Verrier 1983; Brook-Shepherd 1998). Such postwar
intervention frequently took the form of plotting coups and overthrowing govern-
ments. The Special Operations Executive had been created in 1940 and tasked by
Winston Churchill with “setting Europe ablaze” (Twigge, Hampshire, and Macklin,
2008, 167–210). However, the experience of operating different organizations to
carry out espionage and subversion was not considered successful and SOE was
disbanded after the war, with some of its roles and personnel transferred to SIS
(Davies 2000). British Cold War terminology moved from “special operations” to
“special political action” and then to “disruptive action” (Davies 2000; Urban 1996;
Scott 2004). These semantic changes reflected broader shifts in policy. The “special
political action” of the 1950s, for example, was synonymous with overthrowing gov-
ernments and in some cases assassinating leaders. Such activities were prevalent in
the Middle East (Bower 1995; Lucas 2000; M. Jones 2004; C. Jones 2004; Aldrich
2001; Dorril 2000). Covert action ranged across a spectrum of activities, including
propaganda, where the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department played
the central role (Defty 2004; Vaughan 2004).
The Cold War was a conflict of ideas, values, and interests extending over forty
years that framed and informed all aspects of Britain’s security and foreign policy.
There were of course, other ideas, values, and interests involved. Disentangling the
Cold War from imperial and postimperial concerns remains a challenge for histori-
ans. The Malayan emergency, for example, and what was seen as Britain’s successful
counterinsurgency campaign against the Malayan communists, illustrates how Cold
War and colonial agendas merged (Kaplan 1990).3 How far British covert action in
regions like the Middle East can be studied through the perspective of the Cold War
and how far through the prism of imperial/postimperial interests raises complex
issues. The British-American instigated overthrow of the Iranian prime minister,
Dr. Mossadeq, in 1953, for example, reflected several perspectives: oil/economic
interests, British political influence within the Middle East in general, and Cold War
concern with Soviet influence and expansion. Whereas the Americans appear con-
cerned with Soviet encroachment, the British were arguably more exercised over
3
For discussion see Kaplan (2000). For a systematic critique of British foreign policy that
emphasizes the imperial over the Cold War paradigm, see Curtis 2003.
London’s political and economic interests, even if they were happy to emphasize the
Soviet role to engage Washington (Woodhouse 1982; Wilber 1954; Dorril 2000).
British covert action in Eastern Europe however was clearly designed to prosecute
the Cold War. Various accounts have detailed British attempts to foment and support
counterrevolutionary forces within the Soviet Union including the Baltic States
(Bower 1989) and the Ukraine (Aldrich 2001; Dorril 2000). These operations clearly
reflected judgments about the potential vulnerability of the regimes and the prospect
for their success. Such judgments proved to be mistaken and costly. The attempted
overthrow of Enver Hoxha in Albania ended in a debacle similar to the Baltic opera-
tions. In Albania, successful counterintelligence operations may have been crucial,
though Kim Philby (then SIS liaison officer in Washington) presumably betrayed the
operation to the KGB (Andrew 1986, 686–87).
These operations were in part the outcome of what Richard Aldrich character-
izes as a Cold War within Whitehall (and Washington), in particular concerning
whether to stop at containment of Soviet expansion or to “roll back Soviet domina-
tion in Eastern Europe by all means short of open warfare, including a programme
of resistance, subversion and psychological warfare” (Aldrich 2001, 21). Pressure to
fight the Cold War in this manner was pushed by the chiefs of staff and generally
resisted by the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, though various operations were
mounted. These reflected strategic assessments about the fragility of Soviet hege-
mony in Eastern Europe that were clearly not borne out by events. Aldrich has also
illuminated more controversial questions about whether Western covert action in
Eastern Europe was specifically designed to provoke Soviet repression in order to
destabilize and weaken Soviet hegemony (Aldrich 2001, 160–79).
The pattern of covert action prosecuted by the British may have followed a
similar trajectory as the Americans and the Soviets as the Cold War in Europe was
consolidated and the divisions of Europe ossified. Certain kinds of activities were
also constrained or curtailed. According to Christopher Andrew, the incoming Chief
of SIS, Sir Dick White, forbade assassinations by the service in 1956, reflecting con-
cern in quarters of Whitehall that SIS was no longer under adequate control (Andrew
1996, 691). Something of a renaissance of Cold War covert action occurred during
what has been called the “Second Cold War” in the 1980s. In Afghanistan SIS devel-
oped a relationship with one of the mujahedeen commanders, Ahmed Shah
Massoud (Urban 1996, 34–37). Massoud later emerged as the leader of the Northern
Alliance during the American-led invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11
(though by then Massoud himself had been assassinated by suicide bombers sent by
al-Qaeda shortly before the attack on the United States; Coll 2005, 123,151, 582–83).
The nature and extent of disruptive action has not been clarified by the British gov-
ernment. Richard Tomlinson, a disaffected former SIS officer, has written about SIS
activities in the 1990s (Tomlinson 2001). A former Security Service officer, David
Shayler, has also suggested that SIS was involved in assassination planning against
the Libyan leader, Colonel Ghaddafi (Dorril 2000, 793–94). At the inquest into the
death of the Princess of Wales, Sir Richard Dearlove, former Chief of SIS, denied
that the service conducted assassinations and specifically refuted Tomlinson’s
account of a contingency plan to assassinate the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic.

According to Dearlove, one officer had suggested such action to deal with someone
other than Milosevic who was involved in ethnic cleansing, but the suggestion was
“killed stone dead” after it was put down on paper. The idea, Dearlove stated, was
“out of touch with service practice, service ethos and it was not a proposal [to]
which consideration would be given” (Times 2008).
6. Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO)

In using the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Cabinet Office assess-
ment machinery as a vehicle to explore Cold War strategic intelligence it is impor-
tant to enter several caveats. First, while “high-level foreign positive intelligence”
was the principal focus of the committee, domestic security issues were also a con-
cern. The JIO, for example became tasked with assessments of the security situation
in Northern Ireland (O’Halpin 2008). And as mentioned “high-level foreign posi-
tive intelligence” was in the early decades concerned with Britain’s traditional impe-
rial (and then postimperial) interests and perspectives. It should also be noted that
the JIC was involved in producing weekly reviews and threat assessments, which as
Sir Percy Cradock notes, have either not been preserved or remain classified
(Cradock 2002, 2).
One potential pitfall in assessing JIC estimates is to take them as an undifferen-
tiated mass, when the work of the committee clearly covered a very wide variety of
issues and concerns. An obvious distinction is between assessments concerning for-
eign policy and those concerning defense. In a markedly lukewarm review of
Sherman Kent’s Strategic Intelligence and World Policy, one of his contemporaries,
Wilmoore Kimball, queried the use of the term “strategic intelligence” noting the
alternative terminology: “foreign policy” (Kendall 1949, 548). Writing in 1990, Sir
Reginald Hibbert, a senior British diplomat with experience of chairing regional
JICs in the Far East and Germany, expressed the view that the Foreign Office should
itself be conceived as a “huge assessment machine”(Hibbert 1990, 113). The develop-
ment of the national security imperative, defense intelligence, and the secret agen-
cies, Hibbert argued, had led to the growth of the JIC as a separate center of
assessment. Michael Herman, a former secretary of the JIC, described Hibbert’s
analysis as “a minor depth charge” (Herman 1991, 230). While accepting Hibbert’s
view that secret intelligence might constitute no more than 10 percent of the mate-
rial fed into the assessment Herman took a different view on the importance of
input from secret sources. Moreover, he argued, the contribution in defense and
national security was far more significant.
In Britain the role of the Foreign Office in the JIC process had long been pivotal
even before the JIO was moved to the Cabinet Office in 1957. From 1945 until 1983
the JIC was chaired by a senior Foreign Office official. This changed when the
Thatcher government accepted the recommendation of the Franks Report that the
chair should be appointed by the prime minister rather than nominated by the
Foreign Office. The aim was to facilitate a more critical and independent role.
Franks’ concern lay with criticism that the Foreign Office exercised an unduly close
control over the committee, a logic described by one later JIC chair as “flawed”
(Braithwaite 2000, 105). Writing in 1991, Michael Herman observed that “there is no
evidence that the changes recommended by the Franks Committee have made any
major difference” (Herman 1991, 234). Subsequently, indeed, several prime minis-
ters chose to appoint JIC chairs from the Foreign Office.
Whitehall culture has meant that JIC assessments are designed to provide an
interdepartmental consensus that mediated or synthesized conflicting positions. Or
as Michael Herman observes: “Arguably the British system legitimizes a consensus
around FCO views (and occasionally MOD ones, depending on the subject)”
(Herman 1996, 129). As a former JIC chair has mused: “The JIC works by consensus.
Ministers occasionally grumble that its assessments are boring or that they say
things that ministers would prefer not to hear. The first is hardly a criticism, while
the second is a positive accolade” (Braithwaite 2000, 105). The observation elicited a
quip from the former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, about the
“bland British system of understated consensus” (Shukman 2000, 118). Moreover,
what Herman refers to as “collegiality” in the system is another person’s recipe for
Group Think—a charge leveled at the JIC for its mistakes over the estimates of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction prior to 2003.
7. Intentions and Capabilities

One distinction often now drawn is between “secrets and mysteries” (Hennessy
2003, 1–43) Secrets can be discovered. Mysteries are unavoidably matters for specu-
lation. The distinction is helpful in understanding the different challenges in assess-
ing capabilities and intentions, though as Ultra demonstrated in the Second World
War, intentions can be discovered. Sometimes we can learn to understand the mys-
terious. The primary focus of British Cold War strategic intelligence concerned the
intentions and capabilities of the Soviet state, though it also came to encompass
other states and movements allied with, or directed from, Moscow. Of particular
importance was the People’s Republic of China, not least because of Britain’s con-
tinuing interest in its Hong Kong colony. Although initially Mao’s China was seen
by the JIC as an instrument of Stalin’s will, understanding of the complexities and
tensions in the relationship between Moscow and Beijing developed far earlier than
was the case in Washington (Cradock 2002, 83–85, 161–78.).
The central issue facing Britain’s national security after 1945 concerned the polit-
ical and military objectives of the USSR, and whether, how, and when these would
pose a threat to the United Kingdom. On this most basic of issues there was at first
disagreement within Whitehall. As early as 1944 both the chiefs of staff and the Secret
Intelligence Service believed that the Soviet Union would emerge as Britain’s next
adversary (Aldrich 2001, 43–63; Hennessy 2003, 1–43). Within the Foreign Office there
was greater reluctance to abandon hope of a working relationship, though by 1945–46
the consensus within Whitehall and the JIC was apparent. Stalin’s ambitions in
Eastern Europe were clear to Whitehall and on these fundamental matters the strate-
gic assessments appear to have grasped the essentials of the situation. As one of the
leading historians of postwar Soviet foreign policy has written: “It is now established
beyond a doubt that Stalin was determined to keep Eastern Europe in the Soviet
Union’s grip at any cost” (Zubok 2007, 21). More doubt and certainly more debate
surround the aims of his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, whose policies in particular
on Berlin helped precipitate confrontation and crisis with the West.
Whether Soviet motives in Eastern Europe were to be interpreted as part of a
purely defensive psychology or whether the Soviets posed a potential military threat
to Western Europe raised more complex issues of interpretation then as now.
Michael Herman commented in 1991 that: “the system has produced good political
analysis, but has been weaker in looking below the surface of military matters and
on those subjects where political and military factors interact. The view of the Soviet
Union during the Cold War emphasized Soviet military power without considering
very deeply what the power was designed to achieve” (Herman 1991, 235).
Getting the estimates of military capabilities right was nevertheless a major
challenge. A key element in the equation was Soviet conventional strength. At a time
when American forces were withdrawing and demobilizing, Soviet forces remained
in strength (though they also made huge reductions in the size of their armed
forces). The western estimate to which the British subscribed was of 175 active Soviet
divisions. This underpinned the belief that the USSR possessed overwhelming con-
ventional superiority. Moreover, the JIC suggested that “this total of 175 divisions
could be approximately doubled in 30 days” (Hennessy 2003, 23). And after the fail-
ure of NATO countries to provide the forces agreed upon at the 1952 Lisbon Summit,
reliance on nuclear weapons gained apace. It is clear that these estimates signifi-
cantly exaggerated Soviet strength by taking as active units those that were mere
cadres (Evangelista 1982-83, Duffield 1992). It has been suggested that information
on the actual situation was available although it was not until 1961 that the incom-
ing Kennedy administration sought to re-evaluate the conventional balance of
forces with a view to strengthening NATO and thereby moving away from a strategy
based on first use of nuclear weapons.
The central concern for British intelligence in the period after 1945 was Soviet
atomic (and later thermonuclear capabilities). This was an overriding priority as
the Cold War gathered momentum. Establishing when the Soviets would develop
an effective nuclear capability, and specifically when they would test an atomic
bomb, was of vital importance in British defense planning. In 1945 informed opin-
ion was divided over when the Soviets would have the necessary scientific knowl-
edge and technological ability, though no one doubted that they would eventually.
The first official British estimate in November 1945 concluded that the Soviets would
be able to produce a bomb, perhaps in as few as three years (Gowing 1974, 72). By
1948 the JIC believed that while it was possible the Soviets might have a bomb by
January 1951, the tentative prediction was that January 1954 was the earliest likely
date (Aldrich and Coleman 1989). Assessments of when the Soviets were likely to
test an atomic bomb had certainly underestimated both the Soviet scientific effort
and the extent of Soviet espionage and its role in the atomic effort (Gowing 1974,
67–68, 220–21).
The surprise generated by the Soviet test in August 1949 was shared in
Washington and created a perception of intelligence failure. Similar “failures” of
western intelligence over the testing of the Soviet thermonuclear weapons as well as
the surprise attack on South Korea in 1950, also reinforced a tendency toward worse
case analysis, most demonstrably in American misjudgment about the Soviet stra-
tegic threat (the bomber and missiles “gaps”). Such perceptions of failure reflected
expectations that failed to appreciate the formidable obstacles to western intelli-
gence gathering in the Soviet Union. Various authors have focused on the peculiari-
ties of the structure and organization of British atomic intelligence at this time,
though the most systematic study of the subject by Michael Goodman provides a
more balanced assessment (Goodman 2008, 36–56). According to Sun Tzu, fore-
knowledge (of the enemy’s intentions and dispositions) “cannot be obtained induc-
tively from experience, nor by deductive calculation” (Sun Tzu 1981, 90). Yet, on this
matter as in others during the formative and more dangerous years of the Cold War,
British (and indeed American) estimates had to be based on deductive and induc-
tive reasoning rather than accurate, timely, and reliable intelligence of a kind that
the allies had come to appreciate during their war on Germany.
The implications of this for understanding British strategic intelligence are crucial.
The central problem facing British (and American) assessments of Soviet intentions
and capabilities was the paucity of information. As MOD’s chief scientific adviser, Sir
Frederick Brundrett, explained to the defense secretary in 1955: “The real difficulty, of
course, underlying the whole of this business [atomic intelligence] is the fact that the
Russian Security is at a higher level than has ever previously been known in the world,
and, consequently, the information from which the Intelligence Authorities draw their
conclusions is extremely sketchy” (Twigge and Scott 2000, 232).
Some sources did exist, though these were usually limited and often peripheral.
An early source of atomic intelligence was returning German prisoners of war
whose work in the USSR provided some clues about Soviet plans and capabilities
(though from the mid-1950s they were a wasting asset; Maddrell 2006). Clandestine
aerial reconnaissance also offered various opportunities and when the CIA deployed
U-2 aircraft to Europe the operations involved RAF pilots and RAF bases. Successful
penetrations of the Soviet system by SIS (notably Oleg Penkovsky 1961–62 and Oleg
Gordievsky 1974–85) became apparent, though no archival-based scrutiny of their
work has been possible in the United Kingdom. Much has been made of Penkovsky’s
intelligence including during the Cuban missile crisis, though virtually all of this
concerns the American rather than British government (Schecter and Deriabin
1992). Most significantly (and for historians most frustratingly) SIGINT, and the
work of GCHQ, by far the largest UK Cold War intelligence agency, has remained
almost completely invisible to scrutiny.
Among the darkest secrets of the Cold War were (and are) the questions of how
nuclear war might have come and what would have happened if it had. The whole
of British defense planning was based on assumptions about what the Soviets would
be able to do once they had acquired significant nuclear capability to wage war. This
did not entail the assumption that they intended to do so. A war of aggression along
the lines pursued by Hitler was not part of the equation. American nuclear weapons
were a key element in deterring this. The risk was, however, as JIC put it in 1946 that
“the danger always exists that Russian leaders may misjudge how far they can go
without provoking war with America or ourselves” (Hennessy 2003, 19). The risk of
war by miscalculation was a pervasive theme. And it provided the framework for
concerns about how the Soviets might misinterpret American actions. In the 1950s
there was discussion within American political and military circles concerning the
idea of preventive nuclear war against the Soviet Union. Within Whitehall this gen-
erated concern both about the idea itself but also at how the Soviets might react.
Central to this concern was the importance of the UK as a base for US nuclear
bombers, Thor IRBMs and Polaris (and later) Poseidon submarines, all of which
were recognized as priority Soviet targets.
Differences between British and American strategic appreciations provide valu-
able illumination on various aspects of strategic intelligence as well as a means by
which British assessments can be measured (Cradock 2002, 271–80). What is clear is
that western intelligence-gathering capabilities underwent a transformation in the
1960s with the development of technological advances in particular in the field of
satellite photography. It was primarily satellite photography (corroborated by elec-
tronic intelligence and the espionage of Oleg Penkovsky), for example, that suc-
ceeded in dispelling the missile gap that had overestimated Soviet InterContinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities. Michael Herman makes an important obser-
vation when he records that Soviet baseline figures for the Strategic Arms Limitations
Treaty (SALT), Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) and Conventional Forces
in Europe (CFE) “contained few surprises,” reflecting the importance of new forms
of technical intelligence-gathering (Herman 1996, 242–43).
Of note was that British estimates were able to draw from this US satellite intel-
ligence. In general, the British and American intelligence services shared sources
and the intelligence communities shared assessments. The British saw US National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special Intelligence National Intelligence
Estimates (SNIEs). The Americans were shown JIC estimates. Joint estimates in
such areas as the Soviet nuclear stockpile were generated (Goodman 2008, 190). It
was not until the early 1960s that the British and Americans agreed on the Soviet
stockpile. As Sir Kenneth Strong observed: “Our exchanges with our estimates in the
U.S. are now so good that for the first time for some years British and American
estimates of the amounts of Soviet produced plutonium and U-235 are as nearly
identical as it would be reasonable to expect” (Twigge and Scott 2000, 242). Strong
noted, “for some years past the CIA estimate has been considerably greater than the
British one.” This reflected the pattern of greater American pessimism that perme-
ated most aspects of nuclear intelligence though it was the USAF rather than the
CIA that specialized in worse-case analysis.
Within Whitehall, there were also disagreements over Soviet capabilities, reflect-
ing different assumptions and methodologies (Twigge and Scott 2000, 242–46). The
Air Ministry and the JIB, for example, held different views on when Soviet MRBMs
would become operational, and how many ICBMs the Soviets would eventually
deploy. Yet it was recognized within the Air Ministry that such disagreements should
be resolved within the JIC machinery and that in the words of the Chief of the Air
Staff, Sir Thomas Pike, “of course these final assessments are subject to approval by
the JIC” (Twigge and Scott 2000, 246). Whereas US NIEs allowed footnotes to record
dissenting departmental views, JIC assessments were drafted to ensure departmen-
tal differences were subsumed under the collective consensus.
Important transatlantic differences nevertheless remained. And the more
ambiguous and tenuous the intelligence the greater the scope for diverging assess-
ments. Yet what is noteworthy is that many of the assessments drew from the same
material. Analytical methods not sources accounted for differences in assessment.
This was particularly so when it came to missile assessments. The American esti-
mates of Soviet ICBMs remain one of the best-documented cases of an estimate
flawed by politicization. Recent work on the British assessments indicates that the
British did not share the alarmist American estimate, although the British estimates
nevertheless erred on the side of caution (Dylan 2008, 777–806). With access to the
actual Soviet deployments it is clear that the most accurate estimates came from the
US Army and Navy intelligence organizations who were closest to gauging the Soviet
position. On the other hand, as Huw Dylan shows, the American estimates of Soviet
MRBMs and IRBMs were more pessimistic than the British (Dylan 2008) but they
were also more accurate. So the methodologies and mindsets that generated exag-
gerated American estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities, generated more accurate
assessments than the British at the theatre level.
8. Illusive Prizes
For much of the Cold War, Soviet capabilities were a significant challenge. Reading
intentions however, remained, as Cradock, notes the “great prize” (Cradock 1997,
43). As he also notes, a particular challenge for the JIC was the attribution of ratio-
nality to adversaries who were seen as irrational. As the Cold War developed and
vast concentrations of military power were built up by the two political-military
alliances, a form of stability was seen to develop. Underpinning this was the assump-
tion of rationality. It was assumed that Soviet leaders understood the condition of
mutually assured destruction. There is in general a prevailing tendency to see the
Cold War as a period of stability and to see the condition of mutual destruction as
a bulwark against the risk of major war. A corollary is to see nuclear weapons as a
stabilizing factor in international relations. Yet understanding of the “Second Cold
War” in the early 1980s challenges a number of accepted conceptions of the Cold
War and the role of nuclear weapons as well as illustrating the challenges for intel-
ligence at this time.
By 1981 the Soviet leadership had come to believe that the Reagan administra-
tion was seriously interested in launching a nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union
(Fischer 2006). The British learned of this through the espionage of their agent,
Oleg Gordievsky, who they were running within the KGB (Andrew and Gordievsky
1990). We do not yet have a clear picture of how Gordievsky’s intelligence was
assimilated into British assessments of the Soviet mindset. This awaits relevant JIC
papers and other archival disclosures. It nevertheless seems clear that British assess-
ments took more seriously the Soviet war scare and at an earlier stage than their
American counterparts. Moreover in November 1983 Soviet authorities misinter-
preted an annual NATO command-post exercise, Able Archer, which they mistook
for preparations for a real nuclear attack. Robert Gates, then Deputy Director of the
CIA, has commented that “the most terrifying thing about Able Archer is that we
may have been at the brink of nuclear war and not even known about it” (Channel
Four 2008). For historians, understanding the risk of inadvertent nuclear war in
November 1983 is at an early stage. Yet the importance of intelligence is clear, even
though its precise role in London, Moscow, and Washington awaits clarification.
What is nevertheless striking is the paramount failure of the Soviet system to under-
stand their adversary in Washington. It is also clear that the American intelligence
community failed to grasp the extent of Moscow’s paranoia.
In May 1984 the US intelligence community agreed on an SNIE that stated: “We
believe strongly those Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not
perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United
States” (Director of Central Intelligence 1984, 1). It was only later that an American
re-analysis concluded that the war scare reflected genuine Soviet fears (Gates 2006,
270–73). According to Robert Gates, opinion within the CIA on whether the Soviet
war scare in November 1983 was genuine or not began to change after a British
assessment was received in March 1984 that was based on Gordievsky’s material
(Gates 2006, 272). This episode is a further illustration of how British and American
intelligence shared assessments and of how British intelligence appears to have been
the more prescient.
9. Conclusion
This very brief survey of themes and issues in the study of British strategic intelli-
gence has aimed to illuminate aspects of Whitehall’s Cold War. When the Cold War
ended, Sir Percy Cradock, then chair of the JIC, invited its assembled members to
join him a in a glass of champagne. The JIC’s “champagne moment” came with the
proscription of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Cradock 1997, 121). In his
later reflections Cradock argued that the committee had a good story to tell, although
he cautioned against those who fail to recognize the limits of intelligence and hold
an “exaggerated idea of what it can achieve and a corresponding readiness to criti-
cise anything short of omniscience” (Cradock 2002, 290). How good the Cold War
story of the JIC reads will depend on how its assessments stand up over time as
archival disclosure proceeds. A fuller picture will depend on future disclosures from
Moscow though there is of course no reason to assume that such disclosures will
arrive soon or in sufficient scope and detail to enable historians to reach any sort of
definitive assessment. The inductive and deductive approaches of which Sun Tzu
was critical will surely remain as inescapable for Cold War historians as they were
for the Cold War practitioners.
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chapter 10
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN
WAR AND POWER POLITICS,
1914–2010
john ferris
Signals intelligence is the most secretive and important source of intelligence

(Kahn 1967). Ample evidence on the topic is freely available, enough to enable pow-
erful comments on many particulars, from which to draw useful generalizations.
The evidence on the issue before 1914 has long been open, as now is true for the
period between 1914 and 1945. The material after 1945 is thinner, but still useful. This
public archive, however, is rarely studied. Work tends to focus on a few matters, like
Enigma or Ultra, and to fetishize technique while ignoring effect. Without knowing
technique, one can get nowhere at all, but it alone cannot answer the final question,
how and why did all of this matter? This chapter will consider that question.
1. The Number of the Beast

Signals intelligence has many parts. Elint (electronic intelligence) derives infor-
mation from assessing electronic emissions, as traffic analysis does by observing
the patterns of signals systems. They matter as much as their more-celebrated
sister. Communications intelligence acquires information by means of reading
messages, especially encrypted ones. There, it becomes part of cryptology, the
art of the defense of and attack against secret messages (cryptography and
cryptanalysis). These techniques take many specialized forms which, linked to

developments in technology, modes of communication and systems of com-
mand, face constant changes and frequent revolutions. These circumstances
condition the discipline. Signals intelligence agencies must exploit one environ-
ment while adapting to changes in it. Alas, a good solution to one problem may
be bad for another—the better you are at solving one problem, the worse you
might be for another. Organizations focused on technique easily become fossil-
ized, slow to adapt to changes in their cryptologic environment, especially
because human skills well suited to one time are not to another. The very power
of cryptologic agencies in one epoch hampers their ability to handle a revolu-
tion. Again, while attack is hard, defense is harder. Communications intelligence
centers on the race between codebreakers and codemakers; the latter start with
a heavy handicap. The sole purpose of cryptanalysts is to attack codes, while
security is only one requirement in communication. Ciphers can be rendered
secure only at the expense of crippling signals, doubly so in the days before
machine cryptography, but even in the age of pretty good privacy. The real
problem in security systems is the people who use them, who will mishandle
rigorous protocols or else ignore the mean of communications which force their
use. Ultimately, most institutions place usability above secrecy. This is the cor-
rect decision, in principle, but it can be a costly one. The general solution is to
run risks with less important traffic while striving to provide the best security
possible to the most important. With high grade systems, the balance lies mar-
ginally in favor of codemakers, but in some eras it leans heavily one way or the
other: in the 1920s toward cryptanalysts, in the 1990s, against them.
Intelligence sources matter not because they are secret or sophisticated but
by providing accurate, relevant, and timely information for action. They rarely
tell the whole story straight from the horse’s mouth. Instead, they do so partially
and indirectly, by illustrating issues such as quartermaster’s accounts or the views
of second-rate figures, which illuminate those of someone more significant. Most
sources provide masses of fragments, or material of uncertain accuracy. Signals
intelligence, conversely, is marked by high reliability and mixed relevance.
Generally, it provides first-rate material on second-rate matters, and second-rate
evidence on first-rate issues, but sometimes it strikes like lightening. As a whole,
intelligence rarely shapes the formulation of policy but often guides its execu-
tion. Intelligence affects military tactics and diplomatic bargaining more than
strategy. In operations, the classic consequence of intelligence is to enable you to
concentrate your strength against an enemy’s weakness, or to shelter your vul-
nerabilities; in bargaining, it is to let you know the best deal you can achieve and
how to get there, which cards to play, or not. In diplomacy, intelligence lets one
understand another’s attitudes or long term policy; or reveals the existence of
something one did not know was happening, or confirms something one did; or
betrays the bargaining position of another side during negotiations; or gives one
the knowledge and opportunity needed to take the initiative, or disrupt another’s
efforts to do so.
signals intelligence in war and power politics, 1914–2010 157
2. The Birth of Signals Intelligence

For millennia, armies occasionally intercepted enemy messages in the field, though
this source rarely was major, while, since 1400, codebreaking significantly aided
diplomacy. The modern age of intelligence, however, began in 1914, because of
changes in sources, organization, and communication. Powerful means to collect,
assess, and use intelligence emerged from a combination of the general staff system,
telegraph, radio, and two new sources: imagery and signals intelligence, a fusion of
radio interception and codebreaking into a new discipline. Operational intelligence
and signals intelligence emerged suddenly, simultaneously, for the first time and the
same reason. The rise of radio enabled operational control and raised great prob-
lems for security. Control was possible only by giving the enemy intelligence; many
organizations would have been better served by not using radio at all. In August–
October 1914, signals intelligence agencies grew like mushrooms. Exploitation of
radio messages sent in plain language shaped the defensive victories by which
Germans wrecked a Russian Army in Prussia, and were whipped themselves in
France. Any defender in a developed area could communicate rapidly and securely
by landlines. In order to signal at all, any army in hostile territory had to use radio
to an unexpected degree. Since ciphers were cumbersome and speed essential, every
attacker sent crucial messages in clear. Generations of historians have sneered at
Russians for doing so before the battle of Tannenburg. Yet in France, Germans did
precisely the same, with identical results.
This war rested on a long struggle between great armies. Signals intelligence
affected it everywhere, varying with operational circumstances. In Russia, force to
space ratios were low, while breakthrough and exploitation were possible. Signals
intelligence, the predominant source, worked heavily for one side, the numerically
weaker one. The Russian army outnumbered its foes by two to one in manpower.
German and Austrian signals intelligence, however, constantly uncovered Russian
capabilities and intentions. They solved messages between corps and armies whereas,
on the western front after October 1914, most signals intelligence came from within
divisions. The military surprise of the war, Germany’s ability to smash an enemy so
much larger, stemmed above all from superiority in command and operational art.
These edges were sharpened by signals intelligence (Kahn, 1967, 298–354; Ronge
1930). The western front between 1915 and 1917, conversely, was characterized by
dense force to space ratios, elaborate defensive systems, and firepower which could
kill but not move. Breakthrough was difficult; exploitation impossible. Both sides
also possessed intelligence services of skill. Each penetrated the other’s intentions
and capabilities, making surprise rare. Intelligence cancelled out much of its own
effect, but not all. It affected thousands of small actions and dozens of great ones,
increasing one’s chances for victory, and reducing its price. No one source domi-
nated this front, but signals intelligence was the most valuable next to combat
troops. It was crucial to operations for both sides, and to reconstructing the enemy’s
order of battle. When breakthrough and mobility returned to the western front in
1918, signals deception and intelligence affected operations exactly as Ultra did
twenty-five years later (Ferris 1992).
Behind the struggle of armies was another between societies. Here seapower
was central, and signals intelligence. When the war broke out, the Royal Navy (RN)
created a small cryptanalytical bureau, Room 40, which, by luck, quickly received
copies of German codebooks. The RN took signals intelligence and security seri-
ously, more than did the German Navy. Yet this material proved tricky to use. The
RN tried to use signals intelligence hundreds of times, exactly as between 1940 and
1945, usually without success; most spectacularly at Jutland, because of problems of
organization, most routinely against U-boats, because aircraft were slow and their
ordnance primitive. If one gauged effect through operations alone, Room 40 would
be a failure—more British than German warships sank in the battles it brought
about; but Britain had battleships to burn and its reward was at the strategic level.
Here, intelligence and security were fundamental to the war at sea. Simple proce-
dures of security could achieve surprise for a fleet operation, twenty-four hours
warning eliminate that edge—and Britain easily won the war of knowledge. For
most days of the war, it knew what the main elements of the German navy were
doing and whether they planned to leave harbor. This situation, combined with
each side’s fear it might lose a great battle, the German reluctance to fight except on
the best of terms and Britain’s advantage in warships, were fundamental to the war
at sea—to stalemate in operations and Teutonic defeat in strategy. Room 40 denied
Germany the advantage of intelligence or surprise and wrecked its only (however
faint) chance to win the naval war, through its whittling strategy, by provoking war-
ships into ambushes by submarines or hidden forces (Beesley 1984).
At sea, signals intelligence strengthened the stronger side. So too, control of the
seas bolstered the bigger alliance. The blockade rested on Anglo-French seapower
and intelligence. When German transatlantic cables were cut and the United States
declined to let wireless messages in secret code be sent to or from its territory, the
Entente could read the world’s mail, in plain language. The interception of letters,
telegraph or wireless messages, let Britain know when firms were trying to break the
blockade, often triggering the use of detectives or consuls in neutral countries to
gather further information, which could be given to foreign authorities to justify
actions against their own. Thus, blockade struck as many enemies as possible and as
few innocents. It was enforced before the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court of Justice, a British national court enforcing international law,
which accepted communications intelligence as evidence, and had tough proce-
dures. Innocent vessels and cargoes could be held for months, disrupting shipping
schedules and endangering firms. Intelligence let Britain monitor the activities of
neutrals and friends, and the means through which it managed the blockade, with
the optimum mixture of ease and security. Blockade was a battleaxe rather than a
scalpel. Intelligence helped Britain wield it with accuracy. The blockade harmed the
enemy significantly, more than it did the allies. Without signals intelligence, the
blockade might have failed, or damaged Britain more than Germany (Bell 1937).
Many nations were neutrals after the war began, including the strongest one,
the United States. Victory turned no more on operations than on foreign policy.
Diplomatic codebreaking aided the allies greatly, and more than their enemies,
because they included three of the four leaders in that practice, while Germany
conducted foolish acts of hostility against neutral countries, passing ammunition to
anyone able to read its messages. The best-known, and probably the best, practitio-
ner of diplomatic codebreaking was Britain. In 1916–17, this source gave Britain
knowledge and leverage by solving German and American messages on the rela-
tionship between belligerent and neutral states over peace moves and U-boats.
Whitehall understood the secret maneuvers of rivals and foes and had the chance to
forestall them. It knew President Wilson would pursue aims it disliked, was hostile
to Britain and manipulated by Germany, but that if they did not upset the applecart,
sooner or later Germany would declare unrestricted submarine warfare and drag
Washington to war. This knowledge sparked a cautious policy of playing for time,
punctuated by public interventions like the Zimmerman telegram.
In 1913, some 100 codebreakers existed on earth. In 1917–18, perhaps 2,500 Britons,
2,500 Frenchmen, 2,000 Germans, 2,000 Austrians, 1,000 Italians, 1,000 Russians,
and 1,000 Americans worked in codebreaking and radio interception. Signals intel-
ligence was a success during this war, yet its limits were notable. It was hard to orga-
nize and use. Equipment remained clumsy and primitive as did the techniques of
attack and defense. Britain did best in signals intelligence, closely followed by Austria
and France, with Germany and the United States lagging, and Russia far behind. The
Allies surpassed the Central Powers, but not by much. In three areas, signals intelli-
gence affected events as much as it ever has done. It reinforced British material mas-
tery in seapower, producing the easiest great war the RN ever has faced and enabling
an unusually effective blockade. The Zimmerman telegram triggered American entry
into the war. Yet these allied triumphs were balanced by those of Austria and Germany
against the Russian army. Even more, the successes of the Entente and Central Powers
occurred at the same times, each countering the other before it led anywhere: in 1914,
Tannenburg matched the Marne, in 1917 the Zimmerman telegram countered the
Russian collapse. The greatest successes of signals intelligence in the First World War
exceed those of the Second, and their aggregate quality was equal. But it affected the
Great War less because, at the strategic level, each side’s successes cancelled each other
out, while intelligence was harder to use for dramatic results in operations.
Nonetheless, in a war where power was measured in the ability to produce hundred
of thousands of soldiers and millions of tons of steel, signals intelligence mattered.
3. Signals Intelligence
and Open Diplomacy
Between 1919 and 1939, diplomatic codebreaking was high in quality and competi-
tive. Every major state and many smaller ones had codebreaking bureaus, larger
than any before 1914. Excluding radio intercept personnel, in 1938, the British
Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS) had some two hundred members, as
did the German Forschungsamt and Pers Z. The codebreaking section of Soviet
intelligence had one hundred members, that of the American Army had twenty-
five, and that of the Italian army, forty-five. Between 1919 and 1932, at any time the
GC&CS read important diplomatic systems of twenty smaller powers and five great
powers, though that strength eroded by 1939. The Forschungsamt and Pers Z seem
to have been less good, cracking high-grade diplomatic traffic of states in Latin
America and eastern Europe, and middle-level codes of Japan, Italy, and the United
States. American codebreakers beat just one major state, Japan, and many smaller
ones. The story with codebreaking by other nations is less certain. Japan was beaten
by most great powers, but, aided by pinches (stealing codebooks from embassies), it
read high-level Chinese and middle-grade British and American traffic. During the
1930s, Italy read much diplomatic traffic of most countries in the Balkans and Latin
America, Spain, the United States, France and Britain—more or less at the GC&CS’s
standard. Unlike Britain, Italy relied not on cryptanalysis but pinches. When Italy
and Japan entered the war, their cryptanalysis slipped, whereas the GC&CS’s focus
on its techniques gave birth to Bletchley Park. Probably France did better than the
United States, though worse than Italy. The success of the USSR is uncertain—it
rated above France and perhaps led the world, aided by a systematic program of
pinches. Smaller states had great success. In codebreaking, Poland was a great power
(Alvarez 2000; Ferris 2005, 110–37; Irving 1968).
The significance of intelligence varies with international systems. In the 1920s,
liberal nations forced peace through power. Revisionist states were weak, the liberal
order was armed. France or Britain, with the initiative in diplomacy and the best
intelligence on earth, maintained the status quo. They could see the cards in their
opponents’ hands, after having picked the game—and the deck. From 1933, con-
versely, the liberal order became less cohesive and strong. Only the revisionists
played power politics. Growing in strength and number, they aimed to wreck the
order. Though Germany, Italy, the USSR, and Japan did not work together, when
one shook the status quo, all gained. It was easier for them to shake the system than
for other states to support it. A reactive power needs better intelligence than a strong
and active one—so to understand what is happening, what to do and how, it must
be right on more things. It must know the active power’s intentions, the latter merely
its own mind. Between 1933 and 1939 the status quo powers needed great intelli-
gence. They did not have it. In particular, codebreaking gave Britain, France, and the
United States little on the policy of Italy, Germany, and the USSR. Britain assessed
far better the aims of the revisionist state whose diplomatic traffic the GC&CS still
mastered, Japan. France got Italy right only at the turn of 1938/39, when codebreak-
ing demonstrated Italian hostility. The limits to intelligence were part of the prob-
lem of the status quo powers. Divided they stood and on the defensive, weaker than
the revisionist powers in intelligence and security, made to guess at their adversary’s
intentions and to play to their weaknesses.
The key battleground became central Europe—where the balance of power and
intelligence favored the revisionists. Germans and Italians monitored French and
British relations with local states, illuminating the diplomatic battlefield from all
sides. During the Munich crisis, the Forshungsamt listened as Czech leaders broke
the secrets of Prague, Paris, and London over the telephone; it learned how foreign
counsels were divided, that Britain and France aimed to avoid war and were pushing
Czechs to concessions. This material compromised Britain’s policy of keeping every-
one guessing, and the credibility of France. Intelligence was fundamental to the tac-
tics of Germany and Italy; less so their strategy. Intelligence favored those who needed
it for tactical as against strategic purposes; those who wanted to destroy the status
quo, as against those who wished to preserve it. Fighting on their chosen ground and
knowing their minds, the revisionist powers had better intelligence and used it
opportunistically. The status quo powers, inferior in information, were paralyzed by
uncertainty. Yet intelligence mattered less than incomprehension, stemming from
ideological differences. Statesmen of every country misunderstood each other’s aims
and character. Despite the high quality of intelligence, in 1938–41 the policy of every
great power failed. The GC&CS and the Forschungsamt did not stop Britain and
Germany from stumbling into a war neither planned in 1939. The NKVD did not
shield Russia from disaster in 1941, nor was the United States saved by MAGIC.
War transformed the value of signals intelligence. Diplomatic issues fell in
value, that of military matters rose, and a cryptologic revolution occurred. In 1918,
many states possessed signals-intelligence bodies, which unified interception by all
media, with traffic analysis and cryptanalysis against low-, medium- and high-grade
systems. After 1919, these bodies diverged. Some attacked only diplomatic telegrams
on cable, and others low-level military traffic via radio. A dichotomy emerged
between the meal of the day, diplomatic, and that tastiest in war, military. When war
again broke out, the states which first redeveloped signals intelligence had an edge;
so too, later on, those that best did so, or who mastered the revolution that occurred
as machines were applied to cryptology. Machine cryptography was not perfect.
Most systems used between 1919 and 1945 failed, while codebooks were secure if
used with skill. Good machine systems, however, sent messages with unprecedented
ease, volume, and security. They also forced a new era of cryptanalysis. One attacked
codebooks through individual analysis by language. One attacked machines through
quantity handling by machines and mathematics. Only Hollerith data processors or
custom-made versions of their victims, bombes or Purple analogues, had the calcu-
lating power needed to examine the permutations that determined the values of
groups enciphered in any key. Brute force could be wielded simply as a sledgeham-
mer. However, one could break any decent machine system, used properly, only
when brute force drove a chisel into the fractures of a system discovered by analysis
on abstract lines (Burke 1994; Devours and Kruh 1985).
In these areas, by 1939, states ranked differently than for diplomatic codebreak-
ing. In military signals intelligence, Poland, Finland, and Sweden matched many
great powers. Poland was the first country to break a sophisticated cipher machine in
service, a German military version of Enigma, as Sweden was to break a nonmorse
system, the German Lorenz system; they matched the best great powers in the most
innovative of cryptologic achievements (McKay and Beckman 2003). The signals
security of the Japanese navy was poor, that of the army good. Both were mediocre
in signals intelligence, where the Soviets were worse on defense and little better on
the attack. The French were better in each area, even more the Italians. American
military services relied on radio more than most and did well in the mechanization
of cryptology (Alvarez 2000; and Burke 1994). In 1939, however, Germany led the
great powers in these areas. Its military services treated radio as a normal means of
communication, and used it flexibly and securely through Enigma, a good system
which they used badly. They knew how to gather signals intelligence from enemy
radio nets, though Germans focused on easy systems and away from hard ones. This
produced failure after 1941, but until then, Germany won the wireless war.
Britain suffered from technical misjudgments about signals and security. Its
experts thought the publicity given to codebreaking from the last war would cripple
its value for the next. Such attitudes damaged the development of naval codebreak-
ing, while knowledge of Room 40 drove Germans to create one of their own. British
services underestimated their needs for radio, and misconstrued the wireless war to
come. The GC&CS focused on cable and codebook, losing expertise in radio; the
services underestimated the ease with which traffic could be intercepted and solved.
Their military intelligence services were small, and their techniques in some ways
fossilized. British signals security was mediocre, partly because of failures in the
mechanization of cryptology until late in the day (Ferris 2005, 138–57). Britain did
better in machine cryptanalysis. The GC&CS solved a primitive Japanese code
machine through mechanical means, as it later did the versions of Enigma used by
Italians and Spanish nationalists. It also came close to cracking the German version,
but still failed—close does not count in cryptology. Thus emerged a paradox. In
1939, Britain was weak in military signals intelligence and average in machine cryp-
tology, but it knew what to do when it saw Poles bearing gifts. Then, its unique
centralized system for intelligence let it surf a revolution, and bring cryptology from
the craftman’s bench into the machine age.
4. Ultra and Enigma

Intelligence shaped the Second World War more than the First, because it supported
firepower that could kill and move, while its effect was more one sided. Most Axis
intelligence services were mediocre, while Allied ones were good. Initially, however,
the side superior in intelligence and material used these advantages poorly.
Intelligence did little to prevent Axis successes before 1942, but from then, knowl-
edge multiplied the power of the stronger side. Usually, this story is distorted because
it is told only from the perspective of Allied sword against Axis shield at Ultra’s
peak. Actually, this war was a real competition. Axis signals intelligence scored suc-
cesses. The Allies suffered failures. The true story requires comparison of the clash
between all swords and shields through every theatre of the war.
The story of that clash on the eastern front remains uncertain. We know little
about Soviet cryptanalysis. Straws in the wind suggest it started low, rose slow, and
matched Germany only by 1943–44. In 1941, Germany read huge amounts of Soviet
traffic between even armies and army groups; its access declined slowly but in 1945
it still read much between corps and armies (Kahn 1978; Mendolson 1989). Yet this
Soviet traffic came almost exclusively from the front, because traffic in rear areas
went by landline. That gap shaped constant and crucial German errors about enemy
strength and intentions, like the 50 percent underestimate of Soviet strength in divi-
sions before Operation Barbarossa. From 1942 Germans increasingly fell victim to
Soviet deception, which hid key redeployments from rear to front. All told, signals
intelligence seems to have reinforced German power during 1941–42 and that of the
Soviets during 1943–45, aiding the stronger side in each case. Given the size of the
forces involved, signals intelligence may have mattered relatively less here than it did
elsewhere in Europe, and yet still have had its greatest effect.
Ultra was the most important and sophisticated source of intelligence during
this war. It was, however, never perfect, nor the best source on everything. Ultra
took words straight from the enemy’s mouth, but those words were rarely straight-
forward. Its value differed with time and theatre. Ultra became more successful and
useful over time, but its history was replete with sudden reversals of fortune. The
allies never read every important enemy message, or most of them. In 1944, Ultra
was useless on many key factors; before Overlord, it could not clearly define the
number of German tanks or armored divisions in France. Allied success against
enemy cryptographic systems took similar forms, although starting at different
dates. First came a period of limited, often fragmentary, access, coupled with major
problems in assessment. Then followed a breakthrough, producing high-level mate-
rial on a continual and current basis, leading to a long period of mature exploita-
tion, when analysts drew powerful conclusions about the enemy’s intentions and
capabilities. Technical achievements in cryptanalysis and battlefield success were
not linked in a simple pattern. In the Mediterranean campaign Ultra could have
been most useful when it was technically most primitive, and force to space ratios
and both sides’ strengths were low, rather than when it was mature, and both sides
were locked in a prolonged and high intensity struggle of attrition (Bennett 1979
and 1989; Hinsley 1979–84) Even worse, during 1939–41 Axis signals intelligence was
good. It followed the best models of the Great War; its success against Britain was
above the average for 1914–18 (Kahn 1978; Mendolson 1989). Britain, its cryptogra-
phy weak, lost the signals intelligence war in the Mediterranean and Atlantic for
much of 1940–42, at cost. U-boats could locate and attack twice as many convoys
when the German navy’s signals intelligence bureau, Beobachtungs-Dienst, worked
effectively and Ultra did not, than vice-versa. B-Dienst, Britain’s toughest foe,
resembled Room 40 in structure and aided operations (though not strategy) more
(Mallman-Showell 2003). Not until 1943 would the GC&CS match and then surpass
B-Dienst at sea. B-Dienst betrayed British intentions to attack Norway and aided
the wreck of warships in the Mediterranean and on the Murmansk run. Signals
intelligence shaped the destruction of more large British than German warships.
B-Dienst often let an inferior force chose its time and place of attack and maximize
its chances for successful contacts; the German navy won only when B-Dienst did.
Yet at a strategic level, these successes were minor—specialists have steadily down-
graded the effect even of the U-boat campaign. Their pursuit broke the German
navy, in an equal exchange with the RN, which still had battleships to burn. Other
things being equal, the more contacts, the better for the stronger side. Signals intel-
ligence reinforced the weaker side tactically, but not strategically. It let Germany
preempt the British in Norway and damage the Royal Navy, at the price of wrecking
the Kriegsmarine. B-Dienst would have enabled a whittling strategy; the Germans
declined it. Instead, they fought for its own sake, too often. They might have gained
more from fighting only when intelligence provided an edge, as Italy did. Italian
naval codebreakers were mediocre, but traffic analysis and solutions of low-
grade RN systems provided good intelligence. They supported a cautious—almost
craven—strategy of fleet in being, which, combined with attack by submarines,
mines, and the Luftwaffe, damaged the RN as much as did a better and larger
German Navy. Britain won these wars because its seapower was superior; Ultra
simply was the icing on the cake, and a thin one.
In cryptology as in war, that side wins which makes fewest mistakes. Between
1939 and 1941, Germany, Italy, and Britain raced to make the most. The Axis won.
They botched their security. The British and Americans made many mistakes in
cryptography, but took seriously any indication of risk to high-grade systems. Had
Germans done the same, Ultra never would have been born. The Axis did well at all
they could conceive, but they were more conservative than the allies. They were less
willing to employ women as cryptanalysts and reluctant to attack cipher machines.
Dr. Erich Huettenhain, a senior cryptanalyst at OKW/Chi, the Axis agency most
advanced in machine cryptanalysis, wrote that a good system, like Enigma or the
British Typex, properly used, was “unbreakable. It might be broken if a vast Hollerith
complex is used but this is only slightly possible.” The Germans failed to attack
Typex because the task was hard, resources scarce, and only massive and centralized
cryptanalysis could break a good machine system. This, the divided German system
could not provide. One member of B-Dienst called a unified system “a monster
organization” (Ferris 2005, 164–65; Ratcliff 2006). Britons called it Bletchley Park.
Divided Axis cryptanalysts assaulted Allied cryptography brick by brick, while one
Anglo-American wrecking ball leveled the enemy building.
The Germans were defeated not because they were bad, but because the enemy
was good. By 1942, a belt of redundancy in Anglo-American cryptography crippled
German cryptanalysts everywhere they turned: one-time pads, cipher machines,
and dozens of superenciphered codebooks with tables changed at blinding speed.
This system required more resources to sustain than the German one, but was more
secure. In order to crack any level of allied communications, the Germans had to
defeat one or more distinct cryptographic systems. Success against one rarely eased
attack against any other. All Enigma traffic was vulnerable, conversely, once Britain
cracked one basic system, and success against minor traffic compromised that of
significance. British and American signals intelligence services expanded by 3,000
percent in numbers, and pursued unprecedented forms of organization and tech-

nique. Italian and Germans stagnated in quantity and quality. In 1940, German sig-
nals intelligence personnel outnumbered British ones, but the tide turned fast. At
their peak, 20,000 Germans worked in signals intelligence, larger than the strength
of every such organization on earth put together in 1918; but the British and
Americans had 35,000 each. The Allies multiplied each other’s strengths. German
agencies divided them. They competed not against the enemy, but each other. They
could not transfer best lessons from one to another, nor pool their power, nor
acquire the resources their rivals did, nor understand the need to do so. When they
saw OKW/Chi’s Hollerith section, other Axis cryptanalysts were staggered yet did
not follow suit, largely because their governments would not get them such
machines. Cooperation between the western allies in signals intelligence was not
perfect, merely better than anything ever known before. British services cooperated
better with American ones than German agencies did with each other. The Allies
applied more brains and machines to signals intelligence, which had first call on
scarce resources; cooperative competition in the pursuit of common tasks honed
their performance. Bletchley Park developed the world’s largest concentration of
data-processing machines, attacking Enigma with perhaps fifty times the brute
force provided by the Holleriths at OKW/Chi. American naval and army codebreak-
ers each had twenty times that power. Bletchley cracked the German Lorenz system
by swinging the hammer of COLOSSUS, the last stage of electro-mechanical data
processing before the rise of the electronic computer. The Allies devoted greater
resources to codebreaking than the Axis because they had more of them, and more
centralized systems of decision making, and leaders who regarded the matter as
more fundamental (Smith 1993).
So, how many divisions had Bletchley Park? The war in Europe was won by the
big battalions. Signals intelligence did not make the Axis lose that war, but from
1942, it hastened their end. It budged the outcome of attrition in a high-intensity
clash between large and good armies on narrow fronts, and shaped the victories that
transformed the war. The invasions of Sicily and Normandy succeeded largely
because of the combination of knowledge provided by Ultra, especially in aiding
British deception, and German ignorance. Good intelligence on Allied strategic
capabilities and intentions was necessary for Germany to fight well on the defensive.
Weak in the best source for this need, signals intelligence, German leaders instead
acted on the reports of agents, mostly controlled by British intelligence. Where the
Germans were not deceived, they miscalculated, in part due to poor intelligence.
A combination of punches—signals security the jab, Ultra the hook, deception the
uppercut—flattened Germany’s intelligence, and armies. By preventing German
gains from signals intelligence when it needed them, Ultra produced both the Allies’
combination of punches and Germany’s glass jaw.
In the Pacific, the story was as much Japanese failure as American success. That
theatre was made for signals intelligence. Radio dominated communications for
small forces scattered over millions of square miles. Force to space ratios were low,
most elements of either side were out of contact with the other, and their dispositions
were masked. Rarely has the initiative had such power. Unexpected blows were hard
to handle—weeks might be required to redeploy naval or air forces from one base
to another, months to build the infrastructure to maintain large forces in a new area
or move soldiers by sea or land. To destroy twenty thousand men or two hundred
airplanes, capture one base or outmaneuver two divisions, transformed operations
in New Guinea, a theatre the size of the Mediterranean. The ability to concentrate
against the enemy’s weakness, to catch it by surprise and to profit from knowledge
of its intentions were unusually large, especially for that most complex of opera-
tions, amphibious assaults. Failures in these areas were unusually expensive. The
Americans dominated the allied effort in the Pacific everywhere but signals intelli-
gence, where the Commonwealth provided significant help. United States Navy
(USN) codebreakers usually read the most important signals of the Imperial
Japanese Navy (IJN). The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)’s systems were harder to
crack, with one exception, its code to cover traffic about troop and supply ship-
ments by sea. The allies mastered all codes about Japan at sea, but had no success
against those used for IJA operations until January 1944. Ultra gave American power
a razor edge, by showing how to execute lines of strategy and where to begin major
operations. The Japanese, conversely, intercepted plain-language traffic and had
mediocre capabilities in traffic analysis and against tactical codes. Poor signals intel-
ligence left them vulnerable to surprise, defeat in detail, and loss of the initiative
(Drea 1992; Prados 1995; Spector 1988).
Signals intelligence affected the war in the Pacific more than any other in his-
tory. During 1942 the USN was heavily outnumbered by a good enemy, but excellent
intelligence and command twice let it catch fractions of Japan’s navy by surprise.
This produced the battle of the Coral Sea, where the IJN, surprised but superior,
won an exchange of carriers yet failed in its objective; and the battle of Midway, and
the trade of four Japanese for one American carrier, after which the USN no longer
was outnumbered. Then, by shaping the capture of Guadalcanal, signals intelligence
sparked an eighteen-month campaign, where Japanese power began to crumble.
Signals intelligence was necessary for these victories, which transformed the Pacific
War. Operations in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands cost Japan more than its
foes, while it was less able to replace losses in aircraft, pilots, warships, and trans-
ports. Japan entered a struggle that least suited its resources, a prolonged battle of
attrition far from its centers of supply. Nowhere could the United States beat Japan
more than in creating a new system of logistics and fighting a war of material attri-
tion in undeveloped areas. Meanwhile, Ultra guided small forces of aircraft and
submarines precisely onto Japanese vessels over a large area, rather than having
them waste effort hunting elusive targets, in a terrible campaign of maritime
interdiction.
After eighteen months of bitter attrition, a few blows broke the outer crust of
Japanese defenses at New Guinea and the Marshal Islands, demolishing its navy and
air force at tiny cost, rendering useless every soldier on the forward line, and open-
ing a road to Tokyo. Ultra guided the USN’s great victory at the Marianas, though it
mattered less than it had at Midway, given the USN’s superiority in quality and
quantity. General MacArthur’s drive in New Guinea, however, happened only when
and because Ultra penetrated the IJA’s operational traffic. In 1942, Ultra blunted
Japanese power. In 1944, it guided the “island hopping” strategy, which short-
circuited Japan’s hopes to break American will through human attrition and shat-
tered its defenses cheaply. From November 1944, however, Ultra’s value declined, as
by-passing was abandoned, and Americans attacked Japanese strength head on.
With the IJN annihilated, access to traffic on maritime matters, Ultra’s strong suit,
became irrelevant. The IJA’s operational codes yielded more material than before,
but were hard to use, especially as the Americans intended to attack where Japanese
were strong, while MacArthur ignored Ultra whenever it did not say what he wished
to hear. Ultra, however, did shape the decision to use the atomic bomb, by convinc-
ing American leaders that the IJA was dangerous while its generals controlled
Japanese decision making, and intended to fight to the death of Japan, and many
Americans. The United States won the Pacific war because its forces and command-
ers were good and its resources great, but signals intelligence let it win far more
speedily and cheaply than otherwise could have happened.
5. Cryptology, Computers,
the Cold War, and After
After 1945, signals intelligence became industrialized, mechanized, mathematized,
and a central but concealed tool of state. Cryptology and computers became inter-
locked, driving each other to revolutions. Every year, brute force became stronger and
chisels sharper. Countries like Norway and Canada maintained signals intelligence
agencies larger than any on earth in 1938. Bigger powers had larger agencies; the
American National Security Agency (NSA) had the world’s largest concentration of
computers and PhDs. The signals intelligence services of the Cold War, the greatest in
history, were linked in alliances of unprecedented sophistication and locked in con-
stant struggle. The main task of hundreds of thousands of siginters and cryppies, east
and west, was to monitor each other’s capabilities and intentions, so to be able to say,
World War Three would not start today. (Aid and Wiebes 2001; Bamford 2002; Ford
and Rosenberg 2005). Signals intelligence continued to shape conventional conflict.
Alongside imagery, it was fundamental to the strategy of both sides and to the struc-
ture of the Cold War. They eliminated ignorance, uncertainty, and alarm about nuclear
forces and made the balance of terror stable. They focused on supporting millions of
soldiers in a worldwide competition against a peer, with the trump suit being the col-
lection of data on strategic issues through technical means. These strengths came at a
cost. Intelligence and strategic bureaucracies could not handle the host of material
they received, true, but often trivial in quality and overwhelming in quantity. This
produced bewilderment alongside illumination.
During the Cold War, when properly used, leading cryptographic systems
should have been unreadable—just like Enigma. But all such systems were vulner-
able to operating errors and surreptitious pinches of hardware and software. The
UKUSA alliance (Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States)
seems routinely to have read important messages of most countries. However, it
had limited success against its main adversary, because of good Soviet cryptogra-
phy, and victories of spies against signals intelligence in the early Cold War. In
1946–48, American attacks on NKVD traffic, VENONA, cracked the great Soviet
mole networks of that era, until a British traitor, Kim Philby, destroyed that access.
Meanwhile, an American traitor, William Weisband, wrecked a second Ultra that
British cryptanalysts had deployed against Soviet cipher machines (Benson and
Warner 1996). UKUSA occasionally tapped Soviet cables carrying military traffic in
low-grade systems in Europe and at sea, and solved its high-level traffic, and that of
other communist states. Meanwhile, Soviet signals intelligence was formidable.
Though perhaps less good than its western rivals in cryptanalysis, as ever, it was
aided by espionage. Its best-known success, penetration of USN cryptographic sys-
tems through the Walker spy ring, might have mattered in case of war. In 1967, the
KGB claimed that through cryptanalysis, “we read communications in 152 cipher-
systems of 72 capitalist countries; in 1967 we broke 11 cipher-systems, and decoded
188,400 telegrams overall” (Garthoff and Knight 1988). Lesser powers acquired
much material. Thus, the Dutch read many messages of western European and
third-world states, and foreign firms.
These facts enable hypotheses. Communications intelligence provided more
diplomatic information than ever before, but less often from the major traffic of
large powers—it yielded even more first-rate material on second-rate issues. No
longer did strong states regularly defeat each other, though this sometimes hap-
pened. Apparently, French cryptosystems were weak until 1970, while the United
States penetrated Soviet diplomatic ones between 1970 and 1974. Other such
instances will become clear. Otherwise, diplomatic codebreaking had two main
forms. The first was attack by strong states on weak ones, especially in Africa, Latin
America, and the Middle East. This material was useful in itself, given the impor-
tance of these regions, and also illuminated great-power politics. Secondary states
with weak cryptography but well-placed ministers can provide excellent commen-
tary on every great power to every other one. The second form is more peculiar. The
Cold War coalitions were stable. The signals intelligence struggle between them
focused on strategic matters. The members of these coalitions concentrated their
diplomatic communications intelligence against the people with whom they con-
ducted most diplomacy, their allies, and on the issues where they most competed,
bread and butter matters. Such material, often available through simple means, like
telephone intercepts, was easier to acquire than high diplomatic intelligence across
the great divide. Within these coalitions, diplomatic codebreaking shaped minor
rivalries and alliance management by the powers most responsible for and informed
about such matters. Notably, UKUSA members did not attack each other’s traffic;
some gentlemen did not read each other’s mail.
Between 1914 and 1989, signals intelligence was characterized by growth, links
to the leading edge of communications and data processing systems, increasingly
large organizations focused on increasingly arcane modes of collection, constant
change, frequent revolutions, and great significance. Its value varied with the
nature of the competition and the competitors. That value was greatest in one-
sided struggles, but usually each side scored during its turn at bat. Many argue that
these characteristics have become counterproductive. Since 1989, experts increas-
ingly have feared that public key cryptography and the Internet were damaging the
power of signals intelligence. Conversely, many worry that signals intelligence will
support unacceptable levels of state intrusion into private and public life. Advocates
of information-age warfare hold that its Cold War characteristics—size, bureau-
cracy, focus on technique and accuracy—were unsuited to emerging conditions;
hence, the discipline must bulk down and become more flexible (Bamford 2002).
The NSA’s “National Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century” responded to these
challenges by downgrading a central part of cryptology, the focus on security, aim-
ing instead to give consumers its most secret material through “interactive data-
bases” and to “anticipate warfighter intelligence needs—on time, anywhere, at the
lowest possible classification” (Ferris 2005, 288–300, 307–27). Meanwhile, the com-
puterization of command has transformed signals intelligence and security. With
data increasingly interactive or Internet based, traditional modes of attack have
slipped in status and new ones risen. The new killer applications are spies to steal
information and cyberwar to corrupt databases. The key danger from hackers is
less an ULTRA than a nuclear strike on data; an agent in place, conversely, can
betray one’s entire database of intelligence and command, in an unprecedented
way. Cyber defense must be geared to handle every possible enemy everywhere all
of the time. States, of course, think of defense and attack. Unclassified material
rarely mentions Computer Network Attack (CNA) but the topic has not been
ignored, simply treated with secrecy, as armies once did signals intelligence. Anyone
able to employ a hacker for love or money can gain from CNA, while attack some-
where is easier than defense everywhere. The entry costs are small, the potential
payoff large, and the consequences uncertain. Sooner or later some state will let
slip the bytes of cyberwar, with uncertain effect. CNA may wreck computers, or
replace true data with false, or fail.
Today, the accepted wisdom is that signals intelligence must change, or die.
Certainly, the terms of cryptologic power are turning. Some Cold War technical
disciplines are in decline, and the balance in communications intelligence may have
shifted even more from attack toward defense. A discipline which once bolstered
states against societies, and strong against weak, may be losing those characteristics.
Terrorists may have excellent signals security, or hackers attack as formidably as
states, while being harder to hit. Geospatial intelligence, a combination of GPS and
imagery, provides the first rival since 1914 to signals intelligence’s status as the lead-
ing source of information in military operations. Yet the mere fact of such changes
is not new; it is the norm. The discipline of signals intelligence has existed for almost
a century. Its techniques have changed constantly and fundamentally. The accepted
wisdom about its future often has been wrong. To say that signals intelligence must
change, is just to say that conditions are normal. There is no reason to think the dog
is dead yet.
REFERENCES
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Beyond, Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1 (Spring 2001).
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Bamford, J. 2002. Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.
New York: Anchor Press.
Beesley, P. 1984. Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914–1918. London: Oxford Paperbacks.
Bell, A. C. 1937. A History of the Blockade of Germany and of the Countries Associated with
Her in the Great War, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, 1914–1918. London: HMSO.
Bennett, R. 1979. Ultra in the West. London: Hutchinson.
———. 1989. Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941–1945. New York: William Morrow.
Benson, R. L., and M. Warner, eds. 1996. VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American
Response, 1939–1957. Washington: CIA/NSA.
Burke, C. 1994. Information and Secrecy: Vannevar Bush, Ultra and the Other Memex.
Methuen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press.
Devours, C. A., and L. Kruh. 1985. Machine Cryptography and Modern Cryptanalysis.
Dedham, Mass.: Artech House.
Drea, E. 1992. MacArthur’s Ultra, Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945.
Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
Ferris, J. 1992. The British Army and Signals Intelligence during the First World War. Slough:
Army Records Society.
———. 2005. Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays. London: Routledge.
Ford, C., and D. Rosenberg. 2005. The Admiral’s Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational
Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
Garthoff, R., and A. Knight, eds. 1988. The KGB’s 1967 Annual Report. The Cold War
International History Project 10 (March 1988): 218.
Hinsley, F. H., with E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ransom, and R. C. Knight. 1979–84. British
Intelligence in the Second World War, Its Influence on Strategy and Operation. Vols. 1–3.
London: HMSO.
Irving, D., ed. 1968. Breach of Security: The German Secret Intelligence File on Events Leading
to the Second World War. London: William Kimber.
Kahn, D. 1967. The Codebreakers: History of Secret Communications. New York: MacMillan.
———. 1978. Hitler’s Spies. New York: Collier.
Mallman-Showell, J. B. 2003. German Naval Codebreakers. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
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Cass.
Mendolson, J., ed. 1989. Covert Warfare. Volume 6, German Radio Intelligence and the
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Prados, J. 1995. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the
Japanese Navy in World War Two. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
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Ronge, M. 1930. Kriegs-und-Industrie Spionage. Vienna: Amalthea.
Smith, B. 1993. The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940–1946.
London: Presidio Press.
Spector, R., ed. 1988. Listening to the Enemy: Key Documents on the Role of Communications
Intelligence in the War with Japan. Wilmington: University Press of America.
chapter 11
THE PRESIDENT’S
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
kenneth m. absher
michael c. desch
roman popadiuk
1. Introduction
In the final year of his presidency, President George W. Bush issued an Executive
Order on February 29, 2008, reorganizing his President’s Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB) and renaming it, for the first time since the Kennedy
administration, the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB; whitehouse.
gov). The precursor to the PIAB and the PFIAB, the President’s Board of Consultants
on Foreign Intelligence Activities was established by President Dwight Eisenhower
in 1956 to provide the President with nonpartisan evaluation of the role and effec-
tiveness of U.S. intelligence collection, counterintelligence, covert action operations,
and intelligence analysis.
There are three broad areas that the board has addressed over the years. First,
the board has long concerned itself with the impact of new technologies or innova-
tive modes of organization on the collection and analysis of intelligence. Second,
the board has tried to analyze foreign political trends, such as its famous Team B
study of Soviet Cold War intentions. Finally, upon occasion the board has provided
an assessment of crisis management, whether undertaking a critical post mortem
after the Bay of Pigs debacle or bringing to the president’s attention a major failure
the president’s foreign intelligence advisory board 173
of leadership in the intelligence community, as it reportedly did in the case of

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Porter Goss. Despite these important activi-
ties, the board remains the smallest and least well-known part of the U.S. intelli-
gence community.
2. Why We Know So Little about the Board

To date, no detailed analysis of the PFIAB has been conducted primarily because
there is very little information publicly available about its activities over the years.
There are only a handful of studies of the board—two by the Congressional Research
Service and one by the Hale Foundation (a private association of retired intelligence
professionals), and neither contain much specific information about what issues
the board addressed, how it operated, and what impact it had on policy (Boerstling
and Best 1996; Congressional Research Service Report 1975; Hale Foundation 1981).
While there is a large and generally very good literature on the rest of the U.S. intel-
ligence community, it contains only a sketchy account of the PFIAB’s role.
Why has there been so little discussion of the PFIAB in the otherwise volumi-
nous literature on the American intelligence community? One possibility is that the
board has not been an important player in the major intelligence issues since its
inception. For example, the Church Committee staff ’s comprehensive “History of
the Central Intelligence Agency” devoted only a few pages to the board, remarking
in passing upon its “impotence” (Karalakas 1984, 74). We believe, however, that the
lack of discussion of the PFIAB is the result of two other factors. First, the board has
historically had access to the intelligence classified at the highest level from through-
out the entire intelligence community and has dealt with some of the most sensitive
issues the community has faced. It is not surprising that very few of its deliberations
and recommendations would be declassified, even after fifty years.
Second, in addition to the sensitivity of the issues it considered, the board also
falls under the purview of executive privilege, and, as such, its records are exempt
from mandatory declassification along with those of other high-level presidential
advisory bodies. The PFIAB is little known not because it has been irrelevant, but
rather because its secrets have been hidden behind two seals: secrecy and executive
privilege.
While there have been a number of efforts from within the PFIAB to assess its
role and function to better serve the president, current and former PFIAB personnel
have gone to great lengths to maintain a shroud of secrecy surrounding the board
(Armstrong 1984; Cherne 1984a; Six 1984; Weiss 1984). Long-term board member and
chairman Leo Cherne repeatedly emphasized to his fellow board members that
PFIAB was special in part because it was the one part of the U.S. Government that
never leaked. He also regularly refused to cooperate with investigations of the PFIAB
by other parts of the intelligence community and the congressional oversight
committees (Cherne 1988). Despite the cult of secrecy among board chairpersons,
members, and staff, there is actually a substantial amount of information available in
the public domain about the board’s activities. Press coverage of the PFIAB’s activi-
ties has been continuous. The board itself has made public, or at least semipublic,
important insights into its activities (PFIAB: A Special Investigative Panel 1999).
Additionally, there is a wealth of other open-source materials available that
shed light on the board’s activities. These include declassified PFIAB reports, PFIAB-
related material in other government publications like the Department of State’s
historical series Foreign Relations of the United States, and various CIA historical
publications. Memoirs of presidents and other high-level governmental officials
also contain important information about the activities of the board.
Even though the records of the PFIAB proper remain classified under the twin
seals of secrecy and executive privilege, there is a significant amount of primary-
source material relating to the board’s activities in presidential libraries from
Eisenhower through Clinton and other archives including the National Archives
and Records Administration (CIA’s CREST online documents), MIT Library
Archives (Thomas J. Killian Papers), National Security Archives (George Washington
University), and at Boston University (Leo Cherne Papers).
Finally, former PFIAB members have not always been reticent about discussing
their experiences with the board. Former PFIAB chairman Warren Rudman gave
extensive public comments about the board in a seminar he participated in at
Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government (Rudman 2002). Other former
PFIAB chairpersons, members, staffers as well as other members of the intelligence
community who interacted with the board consented to extensive and detailed
interviews, which have made it possible to reconstruct in great detail the activities
of the PFIAB, especially in recent years. For obvious reasons, most of these inter-
views were off the record, though without exception all interviewees were told this
would be an unclassified study (Absher, Desch, and Popadiuk in progress).
3. How the PFIAB Works

The PFIAB is housed in the Eisenhower Office Building on the White House
grounds. It operates on a part-time basis and, traditionally, has met approximately
every other month for two to three days, though President George W. Bush’s board
reportedly met on a monthly basis. While the board has regularly scheduled meet-
ings, they have also set up ad hoc sessions as needed and have created subcommit-
tees to deal with various issues. The board generally reports to the president through
the NSC advisor but does meet with the president on occasion.
PFIAB membership has fluctuated between six and twenty-one individuals
appointed by the president. The vetting process, however, usually involves the White
House personnel office. Members of the board have been drawn from business,
science, academia, the military, past practitioners in the fields of intelligence and
security affairs, and politicians. PFIAB members receive no salary; their compensa-
tion is limited to a per diem for the days they meet.
The board has a chairperson and an executive director appointed by the presi-
dent and, traditionally, has had a permanent executive staff of three to four mem-
bers. Here, too, the current board is different. President George W. Bush’s PFIAB
staff has grown to eight to ten members in his second term. The staff serves as the
institutional memory across administrations and has mainly been drawn from
intelligence experts from various government agencies detailed to the board. These
agencies absorb the salaries of those individuals since the PFIAB has no indepen-
dent budget. Most expenses are administrative, such as travel and office upkeep.
Board members can access the intelligence information from all sixteen agencies of
the American intelligence community—including the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
and the National Security Agency (NSA). Boards have also drawn upon nongovernment
experts, some of whom have served as paid consultants. In addition, board members
have traveled overseas as part of their fact-finding and investigations. PFIAB members
also have the latitude to pursue areas of their own expertise. For example, Leo Cherne, a
former chairman and an economist, spent extra time and effort dealing with various
government agencies on improving economic intelligence.
The PFIAB has been largely bipartisan, and members, while serving, have usually
shunned overt partisan politics. Eisenhower’s original board, for example, included
notable Democrats such as David K. E. Bruce, former Virginia governor and congress-
man Colgate Darden, and Joseph P. Kennedy. There have, however, been some excep-
tions to the rule. For example, Clark Clifford served as an advisor to President
Johnson’s 1964 campaign and even helped to draft State of the Union speeches while
he was the PFIAB’s chairman. Anne Armstrong, chair during Reagan’s presidency and
a close associate of then–Vice President Bush, served as the Texas representative of the
1988 Bush for President Campaign during her tenure on the PFIAB.
The functioning of the board depends not only upon the president’s direct interest
but also on the personal relationship he has with its members, particularly the chair-
person, as we make clear in the next section. Each president issues a new executive
order, or adopts the existing executive order of his predecessor, authorizing the cre-
ation of the board and listing its mandate. However, each of the mandates has remained
basically consistent with the early orders dictated by Eisenhower and Kennedy.
4. Historical Overview of the PFIAB

The history of the PFIAB can be divided into two phases, with the Carter years
serving as a dividing point. The early PFIABs fit the mold of a disciplined profes-
sional advisory board. This period included the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson,
Nixon, and Ford administrations. During these years the board’s membership was
small, averaging about eight to ten members. Board members were prominent indi-
viduals, many with substantial U.S. government experience and with certain mana-
gerial or technical skills that were relevant to intelligence matters. These early
boards, reflecting the intensifying technological race between East and West and the
growing sophistication of intelligence collection, tended to focus upon science and
technology issues and their roles in intelligence. The boards also met on a fairly
regular basis with the president. This was important both for the board’s own stand-
ing within the intelligence community as well as for maintaining the president’s
focus and interest in the board’s activities.
The Reagan administration revived the PFIAB following its disestablishment
under the Carter administration, thus ushering in the second historical phase of the
board. Indeed, the Reagan team made Carter’s failure to reconstitute the PFIAB a
campaign theme, holding it up as emblematic of the intelligence and foreign-policy
failures of the Carter presidency. This, however, was not necessarily an indication of
Reagan’s commitment to using the PFIAB. He did not establish his own board until
October of 1981, almost a year into his first administration. What’s more, the mem-
bers he appointed had little intelligence-related experience. This set a precedent for
future presidents’ attitudes toward the board as they would either ignore it (George
H. W. Bush and George W. Bush during his first term) or further politicize it
(Clinton).
4.1 Dwight D. Eisenhower

It is ironic that the first PFIAB, then known as the President’s Board of Consultants
on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA), was created by President Eisenhower
in January 1956 through Executive Order 10656 primarily to head off an effort led by
Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) to mandate congressional oversight of CIA and
American intelligence. Its initial membership was limited to eight and included
leading or former businessmen, military officers, diplomats, politicians, and educa-
tors such as Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Lieutenant General
James H. Doolittle, Mr. Benjamin Fairless, General John E. Hull, Joseph P. Kennedy,
Robert A. Lovett, and Mr. Edward L. Ryerson. Eisenhower also appointed to the
board some of the same leading scientists and engineers whom he had previously
tapped to work closely with the CIA and the private sector in the development of
the highly successful U-2 reconnaissance platform, such as William O. Baker of Bell
Labs. Such a combination of expertise became a model for efforts to stimulate new
technology to enhance the performance of American intelligence.
The PBCFIA produced forty-two separate recommendations for the president
and the DCI before Eisenhower left office. The president approved thirty-three of
the recommendations, and while most of the board’s agendas are still classified it is
possible to identify some significant achievements. Twenty-two of the board’s rec-
ommendations were aimed at trying to get the DCI to exercise greater management
of the intelligence community. An example of an intelligence-community initiative
established just before Eisenhower left office was the new joint CIA-Military
National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). It remained a very successful
intelligence community operation until the late 1990s. The PBCFIA also recom-
mended creating a new unified United States Intelligence Board (USIB).
4.2 John F. Kennedy

The failure of the CIA Bay of Pigs covert-action operation in April 1961 served as the
catalyst for President Kennedy’s decision to re-establish the board, which he did by
Executive Order 10938 on May 4, 1961. The language was similar to the executive
order issued by Eisenhower, but Kennedy renamed the board the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It also differed in another respect: Kennedy’s
order said the board members should be appointed by the president from “among
persons outside Government and on the basis of ability, experience, and knowledge
of matters relating to the national defense and security.” Kennedy stipulated that the
board should, in its advisory duties, conduct a “continuing review and assessment
of all functions of CIA” and other agencies in the intelligence community (Office of
the White House Press Secretary 1961). This authorized the PFIAB to review
American intelligence activities without having to wait for presidential direction.
Kennedy intended for the PFIAB to be a key advisory body to him on intelli-
gence issues, particularly those involving the intelligence community and covert
action. Indeed, issues involving covert action were discussed at twenty-one of the
twenty-five PFIAB meetings during Kennedy’s presidency. The administration was
deeply involved in numerous covert-action programs around the world at the time,
including efforts to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Kennedy also wanted sci-
entific talent to strengthen the gathering of hard intelligence and hoped that the
board would serve as the president’s watchdog over the government’s foreign intel-
ligence activities. The board submitted 170 recommendations to Kennedy, of which
he approved 125. At the board’s urging, the DIA was established in 1961 and the DCI
created the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology in 1963.
Kennedy, like, Eisenhower, kept his PFIAB small, appointing only seven mem-
bers initially. He reappointed MIT President Thomas Killian as chairman and added
two military officers (James Doolittle and Maxwell Taylor), three corporate leaders,
and an academic with WWII intelligence experience in the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS). Three of these men—Killian, William Langer, and Doolittle—had
previously served on the Eisenhower board.
The PFIAB played no role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the defining event
of the Cold War. This lack of involvement would also become an enduring charac-
teristic of future boards, which simply do not meet often enough to play a role in
managing an ongoing crisis. However, in one of the most important reports ever
issued by any PFIAB, the board reviewed the Cuban Missile Crisis and determined
that there had been insufficient clandestine agent collection operations in Cuba.
According to the board, the way intelligence indicators were improperly analyzed
and reported during the Soviet build-up may well be “the most serious flaw in our
intelligence system” (Killian 1992, 361–71). The result was a failed Special National
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that wrongly predicted that the Soviets would not
place offensive missiles in Cuba. Once the offensive missiles were discovered, how-
ever, the PFIAB said the intelligence community performed in an outstanding fash-
ion. The board also criticized the lack of U-2 flights over Cuba in the six weeks prior
to discovering the SS-4 missiles. While the PFIAB concluded that it could not estab-
lish the existence of a policy that prevented over-flying areas of Cuba where surface-
to-air missiles were present, it acknowledged that the CIA and others did believe
that such a restriction prevailed. Dino Brugioni, a senior National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC) official, claims that this restriction was in fact imposed
by senior policy officials at the White House (Brugioni 1991, 135–40).
4.3 Lyndon B. Johnson

After Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson chose to extend his Executive
Order 10938 as the authorizing document for the PFIAB and to keep the same mem-
bership. Clark Clifford was then the chairman of the eight-member board, having
succeeded Killian in April 1963. Johnson was not as intimately associated with the
board as Kennedy and attended fewer PFIAB meetings during his presidency.
Johnson preferred a low-profile board that would not become involved in political
controversies (PFIAB CD-ROM, 1). Despite this limitation, the breadth of the issues
studied by the Johnson PFIAB was impressive. For example, the board reviewed the
audio penetration of the American embassy in Moscow, the routing and analysis of
intelligence during the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and the Soviet penetration of NSA
through recruitment of a courier, Sgt. Jack Dunlap. The board also studied the
Israeli attack on the USS Liberty in 1967, the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo
in January 1968, the quality of intelligence leading up to the Tet Offensive in January
1968, the quality of intelligence prior to the August 1968 Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, and Soviet and Chinese science and technology developments.
The PFIAB’s recommendations led to the creation of the Defense Attaché sys-
tem in 1964. In response to several PFIAB reports and recommendations, the intel-
ligence community began to plan and develop a computer-based system for
managing, storing, and disseminating intelligence information. In August 1965, an
agreement was finalized on the future management of the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) that outlined the different responsibilities of the secretary of defense
and the DCI. The board also made recommendations to improve intelligence
reporting on the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese leadership, and the plans and
intentions of the People’s Republic of China in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive.
Finally, the board suggested measures to improve U.S. counterintelligence.
The close relationship between President Johnson and PFIAB Chairman Clark
Clifford was probably one reason why the board took on as many issues as it did,
and why so many PFIAB recommendations were implemented. On the downside,
while Johnson utilized the PFIAB, he met with it less often than did Eisenhower or
Kennedy, and thus began a disconnect between the president and the board that
worsened with future presidents. Johnson also blurred the institutional role of the
PFIAB, relying more on his personal contacts with many of his individual PFIAB
appointees than with the board as a whole. Chairman Clifford met Johnson one-
on-one to discuss intelligence and domestic political matters for which the presi-
dent sought his advice. In effect, he was a political advisor as well as PFIAB chair,
even participating in Johnson’s successful election campaign in 1964 and drafting
State of the Union speeches.
4.4 Richard M. Nixon

President Nixon issued Executive Order 11460 on March 20, 1969, superseding
Kennedy’s order, which Johnson had continued. It tasked his PFIAB to advise him
on the overall intelligence effort, to conduct a continuing review and assessment of
U.S. foreign intelligence activities, and to report its findings and make recommen-
dations to increase the effectiveness of the nation’s foreign intelligence effort. It also
directed the DCI and all department heads to cooperate with the board. One key
innovation was to task the board to provide an annual independent assessment of
the Soviet nuclear threat as a supplement to the regular assessments made by the
intelligence community. This latter requirement is not surprising given Nixon’s ser-
vice as vice president under Eisenhower during the bomber- and missile-gap scares
of the late 1950s.
The board met two days every other month, for a total of thirty-five meetings
during Nixon’s presidency. Nixon himself met with the board eight times in his
office, though it is unclear how often National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger
met with the board. According to long-time PFIAB staffer Wheaton Byers, Kissinger
kept the board at arm’s length because it was a threat to his own power. There were
several times, however, when PFIAB members General Taylor and Admiral George
Anderson wrote directly to the president. According to Byers, Nixon was initially
very engaged with the board and seemed to value its advice (phone interview 2006).
Once the Watergate scandal broke, however, the president and his staff lost interest
in independent advisory boards.
Although most of the reports and recommendations from the PFIAB are still
classified, we know from various declassified sources that the board examined the
Soviet threat, information handling, economic intelligence, and human intelligence.
Nixon’s PFIAB divided itself into a series of panels composed of members with
special knowledge or experience in a particular field. These included an informa-
tion-handling panel, a panel advising the president on how to achieve his goal of
keeping the U.S. Navy second-to-none, a technical panel that addressed topics such
as nuclear weapons and intelligence collection, a China panel, and a science panel.
This arrangement helped to keep members interested in meetings and topics
covered.
In the beginning, Nixon kept the PFIAB small, limiting it to ten members. Six
of them, including General Taylor as chairman, were holdovers from the Johnson
board. Newcomers included Nelson Rockefeller, Admiral Anderson, Dr. Franklin
Murphy, and attorney Franklin Lincoln. When Taylor resigned in April 1970, Nixon
named Admiral Anderson as the new chairman, and designated long-time advisor
and former Texas governor John B. Connally to fill Taylor’s vacancy. Other appoint-
ments included nuclear physicist Dr. Edward Teller.
The PFIAB made a total of seventy recommendations during Nixon’s presi-
dency, which included that the government centralize its handling of intelligence
information under the DCI, that the President oppose 1972 legislation that would
require keeping Congress better informed on intelligence issues, that better eco-
nomic intelligence should be collected by foreign-service officers and the CIA, that
the CIA should recruit operations officers with more linguistic and ethnic diversity
and leave officers in foreign countries for longer than their current two-year assign-
ment, and that the CIA recommendation to use an electro-optical imaging system
in American spy satellites be adopted instead of the Department of Defense (DOD)
proposal to continue using film cameras. The president approved the CIA recom-
mendation after Edwin Land, President of Polaroid and a PFIAB member, sup-
ported it.
4.5 Gerald R. Ford

Gerald Ford took office after Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974, and continued to
rely upon Executive Order 11460 as the mandate for his PFIAB. He came to depend
heavily upon the board as allegations of intelligence improprieties became wide-
spread. Senator Frank Church (R-ID) led the investigation in the Senate and
Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY) paralleled the effort in the House. This eventually
led to the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in
May 1976 and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in
July 1977. These committees would henceforth provide oversight of all U.S. intelli-
gence activities and agencies.
As a result of these congressional investigations, President Ford finally issued
Executive Order 11905 on February 18, 1976, which redefined intelligence operations,
banned assassinations, and increased oversight activities. This order included the
creation of the new Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) which was charged with
investigating the legality of intelligence community activities. The IOB under Ford
was not a part of the PFIAB, although its three members could also be members of
the board. The initial Ford board retained eleven Nixon members and then grew to
a total of seventeen with new appointments even though Admiral Anderson told
White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld that he thought the ideal board should
be limited to twelve members. As usual, the board met two days every other
month.
Under Ford, the board investigated the quality of national intelligence esti-
mates; the role of economic intelligence; the importance of human intelligence
(HUMINT) in learning the intentions of foreign governments and leaders; the rise
of international terrorism; the use of telecommunications for intelligence purposes;
postmortem investigations; and projecting future technological needs. In addition,
the board advised the president on whether he should claim executive privilege in
the case of AT&T cooperation with the NSA and the FBI in domestic surveillance
operations. The board also reviewed the operation by the Glomar Explorer expedi-
tion to salvage a sunken Soviet Golf-II class submarine in the Pacific Ocean. Finally,
the board studied improving HUMINT and concluded that identifying necessary
reforms was too large a task for it to undertake effectively. In its annual year-end
report meeting held on October 7–8, 1976, the board responded to presidential
inquiries that included identifying future major intelligence requirements of
policymakers out to 1985, determining what the intelligence community needed to
do to respond to policymaker requirements, proposing what major conceptual and
technological innovations were likely to emerge or might be invented during this
period, prioritizing what research-and-development (R&D) efforts the United
States needed to pursue given current intelligence needs and requirements, identi-
fying regions of instability, and pushing to expand open diplomatic and scientific
collection of information.
In contrast to previous boards, the Ford PFIAB focused less on technology and
its intelligence uses and more on the analysis of foreign states’ intentions and vari-
ous political and economic issues. This gradual shift was marked by the Team
A–Team B exercise of 1976–77. As a result of PFIAB dissatisfaction with the quality
of a specific National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Soviet Union, newly
appointed DCI George H. W. Bush agreed in May 1976 to a competitive analysis of
Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions.
Under this experiment, the board and the CIA agreed to create a CIA Team (A)
and a team of nongovernment experts (B) to examine the Soviet threat in three
areas: low altitude air defense, ICBM accuracy, and overall Soviet strategic objec-
tives. Team B took a hard-line stance on the USSR’s intentions and capabilities and
concluded that the CIA had consistently underestimated Soviet capabilities and
objectives. The leaks of the Team B analysis angered DCI Bush, and accusations flew
that the PFIAB was the source of the leaks.
4.6 Jimmy Carter

President Carter abolished the PFIAB with Executive Order 11984 on May 4, 1977,
but retained the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) with new members replacing
the old ones. According to Carter’s DCI, Stansfield Turner, a number of factors
influenced this decision. If Carter had kept the PFIAB, its membership would have
had to be completely changed because Turner thought the Ford board was too “right
wing” and would not work well with a Democratic president. But to replace the
Ford members completely would have been too cumbersome a task. Furthermore,
Turner saw no need for the PFIAB since he had both the SSCI and the HPSCI over-
seeing him. Finally, the president believed the overhauled NSC could handle the
tasks of the PFIAB (Turner 2006).
A Carter White House Transition Study Project noted that if the president
decided later that he needed such a board, it could be reconstituted quickly. Indeed,
in the wake of the Iranian take-over of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November
1979, the Carter administration explored the possibility of re-establishing the board
as an independent entity to examine the chain of events that had led to the hostage
ordeal. Late in the Carter administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski reportedly approached former Ford PFIAB chairman Leo Cherne about
reconstituting the board after the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in
Tehran. Cherne declined. Carter’s change of heart about the PFIAB was motivated
by the desire to deflect congressional action after the failed rescue operation. In the
end, Carter decided to postpone any action until after the 1980 election, and no
further action was taken as Carter was defeated by Ronald Reagan.
4.7 Ronald Reagan

President Reagan re-established the PFIAB by Executive Order 12331 on October 20,
1981. The PFIAB was authorized to review all American intelligence organizations
and was required to report at least twice a year on its findings. Reagan’s executive
order also specified which agencies and persons could request input from the PFIAB;
these included the CIA and the DCI.
In an effort to portray Carter’s foreign policy as weak during the presidential
campaign, Reagan had criticized him for not having a PFIAB. However, Reagan’s
attack appears to have been more a political ploy than a serious policy position
given that it took him almost a year in office before he created his own PFIAB. Part
of the delay was the result of an internal debate over who should serve as chairper-
son of the board: Leo Cherne or Anne Armstrong. Cherne was a long time member
of the PFIAB who knew its role well. Armstrong, a stalwart of Republican politics,
was regarded as a novice to the world of intelligence. Armstrong eventually became
chairperson and Cherne served as the vice-chair. Nonetheless, the re-establishment
of the board had support from several key individuals in the Reagan Administration
including the first national security advisor, Richard Allen, and William Casey, who
was Reagan’s campaign manager and subsequently his first DCI.
Reagan initially appointed nineteen persons to his PFIAB, far more than the
usual ten to twelve of previous boards. This board would be more political than
previous PFIABs, but it did have some members with extensive experience in intel-
ligence and national security. These included former members of the PFIAB under
Presidents Nixon and Ford such as Cherne. Political appointees included Alfred
Bloomingdale, Frank Borman, and Tom Moorer who had little experience with, or
substantive knowledge of, intelligence. The board expanded its membership con-
siderably, reaching twenty-one members at one point, and these increases made it
unwieldy. Armstrong thought that the initial board was too large and used her
political connections to convince Reagan and National Security Advisor McFarlane
to reduce the size of the board from twenty-one to ten members. In January 1988,
Reagan issued Executive Order 12624, which authorized expansion of the board to
sixteen members, the number it remained at for the rest of his presidency.
The board met every other month for two days at the White House. While
Reagan never attended a formal meeting of the PFIAB, on numerous occasions
individual board members did meet with him to discuss their studies and their rec-
ommendations. According to Cherne’s records, during his first term Reagan met
perhaps more frequently with PFIAB members but for shorter periods of time than
some of his predecessors. Vice President Bush attended at least one meeting of the
board in 1984 (Cherne 1984b). Normally, the PFIAB would send its written reports
to the NSC for review by the national security advisor before going to the
president.
One issue the board addressed was the discovery in 1985 that the new American
embassy under construction in Moscow was full of listening devices placed by
Soviet construction workers. In its 1987 report, the PFIAB recommended spending
$79 million to use advanced technology to purge the new embassy of these devices.
It also recommended transferring embassy security from the State Department to a
new agency reporting to the secretary of state. Reagan, however, appointed a second
outside panel of experts headed by former secretary of defense James Schlesinger to
study the problem, and they recommended destroying the top three floors of the
new embassy and rebuilding them while constructing a brand new six-story build-
ing to house sensitive operations. Ultimately, the Reagan administration imple-
mented neither recommendation.
The PFIAB also investigated the 1985 defection and re-defection of Soviet
KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko. In its 1987 report, the board criticized the CIA’s
handling of the defection. Also in 1985, nine U.S. individuals were arrested for
conducting espionage against the United States. Six had been espionage agents
working for the Soviet Union, one had spied for Communist China, one had been
an agent for Israel, and another had provided information to the Ghanaian
Government. Finally, the board examined the defection to the Soviet Union of
CIA officer Edward Lee Howard. In all these cases, the PFIAB made recommenda-
tions for improving personnel security and counterintelligence procedures at the
CIA and the FBI.
At Cherne’s prodding, the board also dealt with numerous issues of economic
intelligence. It looked at the intelligence side of the Strategic Defense Initiative and
the possible military applications of the space shuttle, concluding that it had very
little potential for military uses. The board also spent considerable time and effort
assessing other issues, including the state of the Soviet economy; the legitimacy of
new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms; Soviet plans and intentions con-
cerning the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START); assessment of Soviet fears
that the U.S. was planning a nuclear first strike against the USSR; the security of U.S.
Government communications in Washington, D.C.; leaks of classified information;
the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II; the need for supercomputers in
the U.S. government; the military’s lack of tactical intelligence during the invasion
of Grenada in 1983; and the counterintelligence problem posed by Cuban double
agents.
4.8 George H. W. Bush

President George H. W. Bush initially made no changes to the Reagan board and
issued no new executive order. While the staff continued its work only on proj-
ects initiated during the Reagan administration, there is no evidence of any
board meetings or any new tasking from the White House. Bush’s negative atti-
tude toward PFIAB was probably the result of his experiences with the Team B
exercise as DCI under President Ford. A former cabinet official, reflecting upon
his long service in various positions in a number of different administrations,
told us that he thought the PFIAB was not of much use except as a place to
appoint people as a political reward. He did not know of a single example of the
PFIAB doing anything that improved U.S. intelligence (Confidential Source B
2007).
Much like Eisenhower, though, Bush may have been forced to reconstitute the
board because of pressure from Congress. Chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee Senator David Boren (D-OK), in particular, sought to impose greater
congressional oversight of intelligence. One former board member recalls that
Senator Boren told President Bush that the SSCI would push for legislation requir-
ing a PFIAB if Bush did not appoint one himself. Former PFIAB Chair Anne
Armstrong and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft also reportedly helped to
persuade the president not to abolish it (Confidential Source F 2007). In June 1990,
using the existing Reagan executive order, President Bush restructured the board,
reducing it to six members who were experts in science, intelligence, and foreign-
policy issues. Of the original fifteen members of the Reagan board, only one
remained after the restructuring. In addition to keeping the membership small,
Bush reduced the scope of the board’s work. After the first Gulf War, this new board
undertook an influential study of the uses of intelligence in battlefield conditions
that helped to strengthen the cooperation between the national and military intel-
ligence organizations and helped to more clearly identify the latter’s intelligence
needs. Still, on significant issues such as reform of the CIA and the intelligence com-
munity, President Bush chose not to use the PFIAB, but to rely instead upon his
NSC and the DCI.
4.9 William J. Clinton

President Clinton issued a new Executive Order 12863, which authorized a PFIAB of
up to sixteen members, who were limited to serving two-year terms. Clinton also
made the IOB a standing committee of the PFIAB. All IOB members would be
PFIAB members and the chairperson of the IOB would be selected by the PFIAB
chairman. Under Clinton, the PFIAB met every six weeks, completing much of their
work outside of formal meetings. The board reportedly produced eighty-five reports
at the request of the president or National Security Advisors Anthony Lake or
Samuel Berger from 1993 to 2001.
After Taiwan-born nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee was accused in 1999 of stealing
secrets from the Los Alamos National Laboratory for China, Clinton asked the
PFIAB to investigate security at the nation’s national laboratories. This investigation
uncovered a twenty-year history of security and counterintelligence lapses at the
Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories. The PFIAB report found
numerous causes for those problems and was highly critical of the government’s
security measures at the weapons lab. In the end, the PFIAB report recommended
restructuring the DOE’s national nuclear strategy, safeguard protocols, nonprolif-
eration, and research and development efforts.
Under Clinton the IOB also conducted a public investigation of allegations of
CIA involvement in the 1990 death of an American citizen and the disappearance of
a Guatemalan guerrilla leader in 1992. The IOB also requested the CIA inspector
general to investigate all clandestine assets in Guatemala since 1984 for alleged
human rights abuses, but found no indication that U.S. government officials were
involved in or knew about the disappearance, torture, or death of U.S. or Guatemalan
citizens. But the review changed the intelligence community’s asset validation sys-
tem and the manner in which the CIA handled liaison with services suspected of
human rights abuses. Unlike previous PFIAB investigations, the DOE and Guatemala
reports were unclassified, which may indicate that Clinton sought to use them to
demonstrate that these problems began in previous administrations.
Finally, several of the key players on the Aspin-Brown Commission on the Roles
and Capabilities of the US intelligence community—Les Aspin, Warren Rudman,
Lew Allen, Zoe Baird, Stephen Friedman, Robert Hermann—were PFIAB members.
The commission was set up by Congress in 1994 in an effort to review the American
intelligence community in light of the end of the Cold War. Among its key findings,
the commission encouraged closer cooperation among the various components of
the intelligence community and deflected growing sentiment in Congress to dis-
band the CIA in the aftermath of the Aldrich Ames spy scandal. This panel was one
of the most public and closely watched board activities in its entire history ( Johnson
2004, 1–20). But it took the threat of congressional intervention in the form of the
Aspin-Brown Commission to get Clinton engaged with intelligence reform issues.
4.10 George W. Bush

President George W. Bush did not issue a new executive order reconstituting the
PFIAB upon taking office; rather, he relied upon Clinton’s Executive Order 12863.
He did, however, amend that Executive Order twice. President Bush’s May 14, 2003,
amendment via Executive Order 13301 simply expanded the maximum possible
membership of the IOB from four to five. On April 13, 2005, Bush further amended
the Clinton Executive Order with Executive Order 13376, which replaced all refer-
ences to the Director of Central Intelligence with the new title Director of National
Intelligence. During Bush’s first term, he met with the PFIAB only once. The board’s
chairman, former national security advisor to the first President Bush, Brent
Scowcroft, was removed as chairman at the start of the second term, likely as a result
of his public questioning of the administration’s Iraq strategy (Scowcroft 2002).
In Bush’s second term, the PFIAB took on a new life, largely due to the major
intelligence reorganization that took place. The new DNI John Negroponte met at
least once with the board and made it a habit to have periodic informal conversa-
tions with the board’s chairman Stephen Friedman. The PFIAB staff grew from the
customary three to four to approximately eight to ten, the board reportedly began
to meet on a monthly basis, and the chairman briefed the president on a monthly
basis. The board engaged in community-wide issues, with a particular focus on
human intelligence, in an effort to help meet the president’s goal of increasing this
capability by 50 percent. The board also studied the administrative structure of the
intelligence community. The board became aware of declining morale and concerns
about bad management at the CIA under Director Porter Goss. PFIAB member
Don Evans, a close personal friend of Bush, brought these concerns to the presi-
dent’s attention, which led to Goss’s dismissal. While the personal relationship
Evans enjoyed with Bush undoubtedly was a key factor in the success of his inter-
vention, Evans would not have had the opportunity nor the credibility to weigh in
on this issue if he were not a PFIAB member.
In the final year of his presidency, Bush issued an Executive Order on February 29,
2008, establishing a reorganized PFIAB. The newly christened President’s Intelligence
Advisory Board (PIAB) has an upper limit of sixteen members and now explicitly exam-
ines the domestic intelligence aspects of the post-9/11 threat environment. Members of
the PIAB cannot be currently employed with the federal government and, as has been
traditional, receive no compensation save for per diem and travel expenses. The IOB
remains in existence. The president appoints the executive director of PIAB who can, at
the president’s desire, serve in the same capacity on the IOB. The new order also directs
the PIAB to report its findings to the president and other appropriate intelligence com-
munity members (such as the DNI) twice a year and directs the DNI and other depart-
ment heads to render any necessary information and assistance to the PIAB.
5. Conclusions
Has the PFIAB been able to provide presidents with the type of advice from which
they, American intelligence, and the nation can benefit? Board proponents maintain
that the PFIAB has played and can continue to play a useful role both for the presi-
dent and for the overall intelligence community. In their view, the PFIAB is uniquely
positioned: it has clearance to review all of the most sensitive secrets and it has
direct access to the president. Thus, the PFIAB can serve as an amalgam of whistle-
blower, conceptual thinker, advisor, sounding board, or any other role the president
envisages. These roles are enhanced by the fact that the board is unfettered by any
bureaucratic links, oversight from other agencies, and limits as to its agenda.
Properly configured, the board has expertise unavailable within the rest of the intel-
ligence community. In short, it is positioned to be a powerful and effective tool that
supports the president’s efforts to implement policies, change organizations, and
manage the operations of the intelligence community.
Critics maintain that the board is duplicative, often populated by individuals
who lack real expertise, highly politicized with many political appointees who lack
the time and resources to consider issues in real depth, and critically dependent
upon the president’s commitment to use it. At best, in this view, the PFIAB appears
to function merely as a channel for the intelligence community to voice its concerns
and to advance its own agendas. Several former NSC advisors we interviewed could
not remember anything substantive coming out of the PFIAB, nor did they have any
remarkable memories of their interaction with the board. While various commis-
sions have praised the PFIAB over the years, they have also recommended numer-
ous steps to further enhance its role. Ironically, these recommendations have raised
questions about whether the board is actually fulfilling its mission and living up to
its potential or whether it is an institution looking for a clearer role.
Over the years, the board has evolved in terms of both structure and member-
ship to reflect the needs of the times and preferences of each president. In some
instances, the board has played a central role in advising the president and the intel-
ligence community (IC) on crucial issues of substance or procedure and has made
a significant contribution to the country’s national security. In other instances, the
board has been ignored, treated as a dumping ground for rewarding political cro-
nies. In the Carter administration, it was never even reconstituted. Needless to say,
in those instances, the board made little contribution to helping presidents get the
best intelligence they could.
Nevertheless, the PFIAB has, with these exceptions, studied almost every impor-
tant intelligence issue and problem since the Eisenhower administration. Moreover,
the board has made important recommendations—the establishment of the DIA,
the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Defense Attaché system—
that have clearly improved the intelligence community. At times the board’s recom-
mendations have been important factors in intelligence-related policy decisions.
Finally, while the board has not consistently lived up to its potential as an intelli-
gence advisory body for presidents in the past, these accomplishments combined
with its great potential is enough to warrant thinking about how the board might
be better utilized in the future.
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Agency: History and Documents, ed. W. M. Leary. Birmingham: University of Alabama
Press.
Killian, Jr., J. R. 1992. Memorandum for the President. In CIA Documents on the Cuban
Missile Crisis, 1962, ed. M. S. McAuliffe. Washington, D.C.: US Central Intelligence
Agency.
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Advisory Board. Washington D.C. (May 4).
PFIAB CD-ROM. 1964. JFK Assassination Record Review Board, Memorandum for the
File, Board Meeting (October 1–2).
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Best, Security at its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of
Energy. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1999. http://cio.energy.gov/pfiab-doe.pdf.
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National Security in the Twenty-First Century. Boston: Harvard University (April 22).
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opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002133.
Six, R. F. to A. L. Armstrong. 1984. PFIAB 1 Jan 1984–31 Nov 1985. Department of Special
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Collections, HGARC. Bethesda, Md. (September 27).
chapter 12
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW

ENFORCEMENT
frederic f. manget
1. Introduction
Intelligence and law enforcement occupy different worlds, but they are parallel worlds
that have common dimensions. The differences are legion. Missions, cultures, tools,
histories, authorities, restrictions, and resources, not to mention theory and practice,
are so often incompatible that wise and experienced managers of the two worlds have
often thrown their hands skyward and told their troops, “Just muddle through!”
On closer examination, however, there are enough similarities or at least points of
congruity that hope for a grand unified field theory continues to exist. For example, ask
any major Western intelligence service or national police force what their significant
missions are and each would answer: Stop terrorists. Catch spies. Block narcotics traf-
ficking. Smash weapons smuggling. At the highest levels of government-policy execu-
tion, intelligence and law enforcement may be viewed as different aspects of national
power (among others) to be applied to problems or threats to national interests. There
may be two mules pulling that load, but they should be heading in roughly the same
direction and held in tentative harmony by the harness and the mule driver . . .
Law enforcement seeks to subject those violating criminal laws to justice.
Prosecutions establish a description of a past criminal act in a trial proceeding and
judges and juries impose judgment. Evidence for and against a defendant is the
end use of law enforcement information. An accused person is entitled to protec-
tions and rules of process based on the basic compact between the people and the
This chapter article reflects the author’s personal unofficial views and not those of CIA or the
U.S. Government. The article was reviewed by CIA prior to publication.
government, such as the Constitution of the United States. Law enforcement must
engender enough evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
accused are presumed to be innocent. Openness, transparency, and fairness are the
essential hallmarks of the Western notion of criminal justice.
Detectives and intelligence officers may both collect and analyze information,
but they are different. Detectives try to meet specific and long-established legal
standards of probable cause, beyond a reasonable doubt, or preponderance of the
evidence. Intelligence does not provide evidence or proof, and it is hardly ever cer-
tain. It deals with threat-based national security imperatives and foreign entities
that take countermeasures and build denial and deception operations into a wilder-
ness of mirrors. (Lowenthal 4–7)
Intelligence looks at the world as it finds it, in order to provide estimates of what
is happening and what will happen to policymakers so that their decisions will be
better informed. Intelligence seeks a best guess of what reality may be. Protection of
secret sources and methods is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, and the discovery
of the prosecution’s information required by criminal proceedings is anathema.
There is always reasonable doubt. Corroboration is the best hope for a piece of intel-
ligence information, not proof. The violation of other nations’ espionage laws is the
heart of human intelligence activities. Treason, betrayal, compromise, deception,
seduction, double-dealing, and theft are tools of the trade (Baker 36–40).
2. From Many, One

The post–World War II experience in the United States, however, has been the con-
vergence of the two worlds. America’s experiment with centralized, all-source, inde-
pendent, and civilian intelligence began in 1947 with the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency. It was a creature of public statutory law, the National Security
Act of 1947, enacted by a democratic process and subject to the historical American
preference for checks and balances in government. The act specifically prohibited
CIA from having law enforcement powers or internal security functions.
That prohibition remains unchanged in the National Security Act today (sec-
tion 403–4a(d)(1)). It reflects the deep uneasiness surrounding the creation of the
CIA based upon fears that a unified intelligence and police force would tend toward
abuses associated with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union’s centralized security
and espionage apparatuses. It also stemmed from the resistance of the powerful and
long-established federal law enforcement agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
with its own mission, political support, history, and culture. (Riebling)
There were many aspects of this policy of separation of intelligence and law
enforcement. The CIA could not arrest anyone or issue subpoenas. The CIA could
not conduct electronic surveillance inside the United States (EO 12333 section 2.4(a)).
Intelligence community agencies could not collect foreign intelligence by acquiring
intelligence and law enforcement 191
information concerning the domestic activities of U. S. persons. Representatives of

intelligence-community agencies could not joint or otherwise participate in any
organizations within the United States without disclosing their intelligence affilia-
tion, except according to procedures approved by the attorney general. (Civiletti
13–15)
On the other hand, the FBI could not conduct espionage overseas. It had to
coordinate in advance with the CIA its intelligence-related activities and contacts
with foreign liaison and security services. Foreign intelligence information that
resulted from grand jury proceedings could not be shared with the intelligence
community. Prosecutors could not pass to non–law enforcement officials any for-
eign intelligence information resulting from criminal wiretap surveillance. The
separation was reflected in the organization of the FBI, the CIA, and the Department
of Justice and was referred to in shorthand as the “wall” (Hulnick 1997, 269).
Even from this beginning, however, the wall developed a number of one-way and
two-way mirrors. Although the CIA had no law enforcement powers, it could support
law enforcement activities. This became settled in intelligence law, both in executive
orders (EO 12333 section 2.6) and statute (National Security Act section 403–5a). In
1997, a specific and explicit law enforcement authority for the intelligence community
was added to the National Security Act. Upon the request of a law enforcement
agency, elements of the intelligence community may collect information outside
the United States about individuals who are not United States persons, even if the law
enforcement agency intends to use the information collected for purposes of a
law enforcement investigation.
Other parts of the National Security Act were added that required that other
federal agencies disclose to the Director of Central Intelligence foreign intelli-
gence acquired in the course of a criminal investigation (National Security Act sec-
tion 403–5b(a)(1)). Law enforcement agencies were later authorized by statute to
share with the intelligence community any foreign intelligence information that
was formerly withheld under the prohibition on disclosing information from a
grand-jury proceeding. (Collins 1261) Intelligence agencies were also allowed to
obtain access to electronic, wire, or oral interception information that had been
generated by a criminal investigation authorized under Title III of the U.S. criminal
code (PATRIOT Act).
The FBI’s overseas activities also expanded. The Department of Justice opined
in 1989 that the FBI has the authority to override customary or other international
law in its extraterritorial law enforcement activities. The FBI could investigate and
arrest fugitives in another state without the consent of the host government (OLC
Opinion 195). Supreme Court cases contributed to this trend. One held that an
extradition treaty was not the exclusive means by which the United States could take
custody of a suspect in a foreign country in which he had been apprehended by
persons acting on behalf of the United States without regard to the treaty’s provi-
sions (U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain 1992, 655).
Another held that the Fourth Amendment requirement that government
searches be “reasonable” does not apply to the search and seizure of property in a
foreign country owned by a nonresident alien who has no significant voluntary

connection with the United States (U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez 1990, 259). In addition,
the Ames spy case in the mid-1990s led to a reorganization of U.S. counterintelli-
gence lanes in the road between the FBI and the intelligence community. A new
statutory provision required intelligence agencies to immediately advise the FBI of
any information indicating that classified information may have been disclosed in
an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, which is a
potential crime under several U.S. laws (IAA FY 95 section 402a). It also required
prior coordination and consultation between the agencies for any further actions
they might take. In the mid-1990s, the FBI vigorously expanded the mission of the
legal attaches attached to U.S. embassies to enhance cooperation with foreign law
enforcement agencies, many of whom also had internal security and intelligence
functions as well.
Much of this convergence of worlds occurred because of the convergence of
targets. Both intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies were directed to
bring their rapidly overlapping methods to bear on the same individuals, organiza-
tions, and activities. The crime of espionage always had both a foreign intelligence
and a criminal law aspect, leading to overlapping FBI and CIA counterintelligence
activities that created a history of both friction and effective joint spy-catching. The
Intelligence Identities Protection Act was specifically added to the U.S. criminal
code to address a gap in the espionage and related crimes that seem to allow publi-
cation of the true identities of U.S. intelligence officers serving under cover. In the
1970s, the U.S. created and expanded a number of other extraterritorial crimes.
Violations of U.S. domestic criminal law could now be committed outside the ter-
ritory of the United States by foreign nationals. These included aircraft hijacking
and piracy, weapons proliferation (notably chemical and biological weapons), inter-
national narcotics trafficking, and organized crime. The U.S. later added terrorism
and related crimes and borderless offences such as the cybercrimes of computer
hacking and sabotage.
This resulted in a critical need to reconcile the intelligence imperative for
secrecy with law enforcement’s requirement for fair trials. As a result, the U.S.
amended the procedures by which information is introduced into criminal trial
processes. The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) was enacted in 1980 to
address the problem of greymail. Greymail is the risk that a defendant will publicly
disclose classified information that could damage national security interests of the
United States. Prior to the passage of CIPA, when criminal procedure rules required
that the defendant have access to classified materials, the government had to make
an uninformed guess as to what would ultimately be disclosed in the trial and how
much damage would occur. CIPA is meant to mitigate that uncertainty while keep-
ing the essence of those basic criminal processes required by long-held notions of a
fair trial in an adversarial judicial system.
CIPA is procedural rather than substantive, and thus does not affect the outcome
of whether classified information must be disclosed to the defendant or used in a
public proceeding. It does, however, limit the threat of ambush that dogged prosecutors
in earlier cases. CIPA requires notice of what classified information the defense intends
to use. It allows for the court to hear in camera (in chambers, not in a public court-
room) and ex parte (only one party—the government—is present) presentations in
order to review classified information and determine if it must be disclosed in order
to ensure a fair trial or otherwise meet criminal due process, discovery, and eviden-
tiary requirements. It also allows the government to propose unclassified substitu-
tions for classified information that would give the defendant the same ability to put
on a defense as would the use of the original classified information. The court also has
the ability under CIPA to fashion sanctions, including dismissal, in cases where the
government refuses to disclose the classified information at issue.
The government can use CIPA procedures to get evidentiary rulings from the
court on the classified information in advance of public hearings or trials. Once
those evidentiary rulings are made, the government then can assess the risk of pro-
ceeding with the prosecution and any resulting damage to intelligence interests that
might occur. The defendant still has the substantive rights to demand discovery and
proof, but the government can make a more rational and informed decision.
Intelligence officers cannot act with one eye looking over their shoulder at a theo-
retical future prosecution of someone, somewhere, for some crime that might
threaten some intelligence source or method, to be determined at some future time.
All of the criminal procedure requirements that are second nature to law enforce-
ment agents—Miranda warnings, search warrants, chain of custody integrity—
would seriously hamper intelligence collection (Fredman 1998).
CIPA processes have been challenged by numerous defendants on the grounds
that they violate fair-trial notions of due process under the Constitution, but the
law is settled that CIPA successfully—if slowly and painfully—holds both
Constitutional law enforcement rules and intelligence equities in a reasonable and
lawful balance.
Issues related to surveillance also led to another area in which law enforcement
and intelligence community components had to develop statutory rules of engage-
ment to reconcile different needs. In 1978 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) was enacted to establish a court to hear government applications for orders
authorizing electronic surveillance (and later, unconsented physical searches)
directed at foreign powers and agents of foreign powers, rather than potential crim-
inals or criminal evidence.
Searches by the U.S. government are constrained by the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution, which requires that searches be reasonable and in most cases
authorized by a judicial search warrant. (Hall) The issue that arose was whether
information gathered as foreign intelligence could be used as evidence by law
enforcement authorities to convict a criminal defendant. FISA required robust
secrecy and entirely ex parte hearings and application procedures, a rarity in crimi-
nal proceedings.
For many years, the legal reasoning in a seminal espionage case controlled the
approach of the U.S. government in counterintelligence activities (U.S. vs. Truong
1980). In the 1970s, U.S government counterintelligence uncovered a U.S. Information
Agency employee (Humphrey) who was giving classified diplomatic information to

a Vietnamese citizen (Truong) who then passed it to North Vietnamese officials
who were negotiating with U.S. representatives in Paris. The FBI, using a national
security rationale rather than a criminal standard under Title III, bugged Truong’s
apartment and tapped his phone over the course of a number of months. At some
point in the foreign counterintelligence surveillance, prosecutors from the
Department of Justice began to take an active part in directing the surveillance.
When the issue arose of whether the incriminating evidence surfaced by the
surveillance could be admitted in evidence in the criminal case against Humphrey
and Truong, the court opined that so long as the primary purpose of the surveil-
lance was collection of information relating to activities of a foreign power, the
resulting information could be used in the criminal case. But at some point during
the surveillance of Truong, the primary purpose changed and became collection of
information to support a prosecution. The court noted that the involvement of the
law enforcement officers determined the shift in the primary purpose of the collec-
tion, and thus information collected under foreign intelligence rules could not be
used for criminal trial purposes after the change of primary purpose. The “primary
purpose” test was adopted by a number of other federal circuits in cases where
issues of surveillance arose, and it was the basis of relationships between law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies and their rules of engagement, lanes in the road, and
tribal encounters for over twenty years.
The wall finally came tumbling down in 2002. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review (the appellate court for decisions made by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISC, which authorizes FISA searches and sur-
veillance), convened for the first time in history to hear an appeal brought by the
U.S. government from a FISC surveillance order imposing a number of restrictions
on the government based upon the wall and the primary purpose test. The FISC
opinion stated that it could approve FISA surveillance applications only if the gov-
ernment’s objective is not primarily directed toward criminal prosecution of the
foreign agents for their foreign intelligence activity.
The Court of Review did not agree. It said that at some point in the 1980s
(“. . . the exact moment is shrouded in historical mist”) the Department of Justice
applied the pre-FISA Truong analysis to FISA without justification (In re Sealed
Case 2002). There is now no need to find a primary purpose of either national secu-
rity intelligence collection or acquisition of information about a crime in order to
pass any wall established by FISA. The end of the wall is reflected in every major
recent review of U.S. intelligence policy and organization, which all call for increased
information sharing, unity of command and control, and removal of barriers to
joint and complementary action among elements of the U.S. government.
This convergence of law enforcement and intelligence missions and activities
has not reconciled the underlying bases for each sphere of activity, however. For
example, foreign intelligence surveillance differs markedly from that in criminal
investigations. In the criminal context, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
requirement usually requires a showing of probable cause and a warrant. But that is
not universal. The central requirement is one of reasonableness. The probable cause
standard is peculiarly related to criminal investigations and is often unsuited to
determining reasonableness of other searches (Board of Education v. Earls 2002,
828). The Supreme Court has repeatedly opined that that in situations involving
“special needs” that go beyond a routine interest in law enforcement, a warrant is
not required. The Court has found no warrant requirement in circumstances in
which the government faces an increased need to be able to react swiftly and flexibly
or when there are at stake interests in public safety beyond the interests in ordinary
law enforcement, such as response to an emergency beyond the need for general
crime control (In re Sealed Case 2002, 745–46).
Foreign intelligence collection, especially related to a threat to public safety, has
many of the characteristics of a special need. The executive branch of the U.S. gov-
ernment has consistently taken the position that foreign intelligence collection is far
removed from ordinary criminal law enforcement. Methodology and rules for
criminal searches are “. . . inconsistent with the collection of foreign intelligence and
would unduly frustrate the President in carrying out his foreign intelligence respon-
sibilities . . . (W)e believe that the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is inap-
plicable to such (foreign intelligence) searches” (Gorelick 1994, 63).
There are thus significant distinctions between searches undertaken for ordi-
nary law enforcement purposes and those done for intelligence purposes. (Howell
145–147) (Kris)
Foreign intelligence surveillance may be undertaken without probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed. The surveillance may be of considerable
duration and scope. Its purpose is to gather information about the intentions and
capabilities of foreign governments or organizations, rather than to obtain admis-
sible evidence of a crime. Yet, foreign intelligence gained through a wiretap may be
used as evidence in a criminal prosecution. The Department of Justice has ongoing
concerns that the increasing blur between law enforcement and intelligence activi-
ties will lead to the avoidance of criminal law protections by disguising a criminal
investigation as an intelligence operation, where less stringent restraints apply to
the government.
Counterintelligence in particular raises many of the difficult issues. Only a
small percentage of all counterintelligence cases can be considered for successful
prosecutions. Investigations of foreign intelligence agents are seldom conducted
from the outset as they would be if eventual prosecution were expected. Many
counterintelligence professionals believe that prosecutions should never be brought
against hostile foreign agents because it would only result in their replacement by
other unknown agents whose activities would not come to the attention of the U.S.
counterintelligence community.
The convergence of targets and especially the need to meet international terror-
ist threats caused a recent reorganization of the intelligence and law enforcement
communities. The Department of Homeland Security created in 2002 has compo-
nents that are deeply rooted in law enforcement and policing authorities, such as
customs, border patrol, and immigration. Yet it also has several components that
are part of the intelligence community, including an office of intelligence analysis

and even part of the Coast Guard. The FBI has created a new National Security
Service from its former counterintelligence and counterterrorism elements, all
under an executive assistant director reporting to the new Director of National
Intelligence (DNI). The Department of Justice has a new National Security Division
that combines the intelligence policy (the Office of Intelligence Policy Review),
counterespionage, and counterterrorism components of the Department under a
new Assistant Attorney General for national security. In 2002, the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act called for the creation of the National Counterintelligence
Executive (NCIX) to be the head of U.S. counterintelligence and develop govern-
ment-wide counterintelligence policies and plans. The NCIX is now under the new
DNI, created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA). New DNI centers such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
which often replicated previous DCI centers, were created to bring together, or
“fuse,” intelligence, law enforcement, and related efforts directed at joint targets.
The organizational hallmark of these centers was widespread and rapid sharing of
information and personnel.
This convergence should not mask the fundamental differences between the
two worlds, however. The United States continues to be wary of combining the
powers and authorities of intelligence and law enforcement regimes. (Thompson 6)
Intelligence activities require secrecy, swiftness, and latitude for success. Law
enforcement activities require openness, painstaking and often slow diligence, and
strict adherence to complicated legal rules of engagement for success. The authori-
ties and restrictions for each activity have been tailored to meet the unique charac-
teristics of each and maintain an acceptable level of checks and balances by
maintaining the real differences between the two areas. For example, in 1991 rules
for authorizing and conducting covert actions, and notifying Congress of such
actions, were codified and added as Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended. The general definition of covert action had several exceptions, one of
which was “traditional law enforcement activities” or support to them.
The legislative history of Title V contains descriptions of traditional law enforce-
ment activities, which include those conducted by the FBI to apprehend, or other-
wise cooperate with foreign law enforcement authorities to apprehend those who
have violated U.S. laws or the laws of other nations. It also includes activities of
other U.S. government agencies (such as DEA) that assist other countries, with their
consent, in the destruction or interdiction of narcotics supplies or products in those
countries. “Routine support” is specifically described as not a “backdoor instru-
ment of covert action” (Senate Report No. 102–85, 47–48).
This distinction is important because if an action of the U.S. government falls
within the definition of “covert action,” then a number of requirements must be
met to lawfully authorize it, all of which would be unreasonably burdensome for
law enforcement goals to be efficiently met. It is a clear indication that for many
purposes, the differences between intelligence and law enforcement should be
maintained and the policy of the United States is to separate the two.
An additional and still-current wall between intelligence and law enforcement

is the restriction on direct involvement by the military in domestic law enforce-
ment. Most of the agencies in the intelligence community are located within the
Department of Defense (DOD). Since the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the
DOD has been largely prohibited from participating in civilian law enforcement by
posse comitatus statutes, with the recent exception of the authority to assist law
enforcement counternarcotics activities. But military personnel may still not be
involved in the arrest and detention of suspects (Doyle 1995).
There is current interest in reviving proposals to create an agency whose opera-
tions would overlap in the middle between intelligence and law enforcement.
Commentators have raised the British domestic security service MI-5 as a possible
model. It would carry out an intelligence function separate from the law enforce-
ment mission now owned by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. It
would be directed toward collection and analysis of intelligence related to threats
within the United States, and to the disruption and prevention of such threats,
whether domestic, foreign, or international in nature. Reconciling a domestic intel-
ligence service with traditional foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement,
and ensuring that civil-liberties interests are not unduly affected in an area where
American public is wary, would be highly challenging.
Other issues arose as the world shrank, as well. These issues included oversight
by different sets of congressional committees with varying agendas. Judiciary, intel-
ligence, and defense committees are separate and different areas of responsibility.
Even though there is some effort to have sufficient “crossover” membership on all
concerned committees, there is still significant overlap, underlap, and opacity, all
enveloped by the fog of legislation.
Coordination of intelligence and law enforcement activities is a perennial if not
a daily issue. In the late 1980s, there were investigations into two international banks,
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro (BNL) who were alleged to have laundered money for criminal enterprises.
The investigations revealed that the CIA had acquired information about possible
crimes committed by the banks but had not made the information available to the
Justice Department. Most observers concluded that there was no effort by the CIA
to protect either of the banks or hide the information from the Justice Department,
but congressional committees recommended that procedures be established to
ensure that relevant information about international criminal activity collected by
the intelligence community would be made available to law enforcement, while still
protecting intelligence sources and methods (Snider et al. 1994).
As a result of the bank scandals, the Joint Task Force on Intelligence and Law
Enforcement was established in 1993. It was comprised of senior attorneys from CIA
and the Justice Department, and it made a number of recommendations to improve
information sharing, coordination, and the management of data searches and
retrieval. One was the creation of a Joint Intelligence-Law Enforcement Working
Group (JICLE) which began operations in 1994. Although JICLE has faded into the
bureaucratic graveyard, it is an example of the continuing efforts to bridge the gap
between intelligence and law enforcement operations by establishing methods to

keep channels of communication open and operating.
3. We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Badges

When intelligence activities relate to collection of information, they are governed by
rules significantly different than those that apply to law enforcement activities tar-
geting the exact same information. Intelligence information comes into the crimi-
nal process in two major ways. One is when intelligence collection results in
information that may be useful for the prosecution in developing its case in chief.
Law enforcement agencies routinely receive a great deal of information in dissemi-
nated intelligence reports that is for lead purposes only and remains classified and
under the general control of the originating intelligence agency. Law enforcement
agencies may use it to develop their own independently acquired information, but
not as evidence to be introduced in a public court proceeding. If the lead-purpose
information is important enough for the prosecutors to want to use it as evidence,
then the clash of civilizations and cultures is joined.
Most intelligence information is fragmentary, nebulous, riddled with alterna-
tive meanings, and related to “proximate reality,” rather than truth. It is an incom-
plete mosaic at best. If it were not, it would be news or history, not intelligence.
Concepts such as the general ban on hearsay testimony or the best evidence rule,
which are central trial procedure concepts in the United States, cannot be recon-
ciled with the intelligence concepts of compartmentation, need to know, and pro-
tection of sources and methods so that they will continue to generate intelligence.
Chain of custody issues and search warrants are not part of intelligence tradecraft.
“Beyond a reasonable doubt” is a concept alien to intelligence collection or
analysis.
Intelligence information also enters the criminal justice system because of the
prosecution’s efforts to comply with discovery rules requiring the disclosure to the
defense of certain types of information. Federal discovery obligations apply not
only to law enforcement agencies but also to other government agencies that are
aligned with the prosecution. Alignment occurs when another agency becomes an
active participant in the investigation or prosecution of a particular case. Alignment
is significant in counterterrorist and weapons-proliferation cases because of the
extensive cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies in those
areas.
The most important discovery rules are the constitutional requirements of the
Brady and Giglio cases, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) 16, and the
Jencks Act. Brady requires the government to disclose to the defendant any evidence
that is material to the guilt or punishment of the accused (Brady v. Maryland 1963).
Giglio requires the same discovery for evidence material to the impeachment of a
government witness (Giglio v. U.S. 1972). FRCrP 16 obligates the government to

disclose any relevant written or recorded statement of the defendant within the
custody or control of the government, and any documents or tangible objects that
are material to the defense, belong to the defendant, or are intended for use in the
government’s case in chief. The Jencks Act requires the government to disclose any
statements of government witnesses within its possession that relate to the wit-
nesses’ testimony.
Prosecutors generally conduct a prudential search of intelligence community
files prior to indictment because they have objective, articulable factors justifying
the conclusion that the files probably contain classified information that may have
an impact upon the government’s decision whether to seek an indictment, and what
crimes and defendants should actually be charged. The prudential search includes a
search for Brady and other information that would be the subject of the govern-
ment’s post-indictment discovery obligations.
Intelligence agency files must be reviewed in a particular criminal case based on
several factors. The first is whether the intelligence agency has been an active par-
ticipant in the investigation or prosecution of a case. If so, alignment generally
results and the agency’s files are subject to the same requirements of search and
disclosure as the files of the prosecuting attorney or lead agency (usually the FBI). If
the defendant makes an explicit request that certain files be searched, and there is a
non-trivial prospect that the examination of those files will yield material exculpa-
tory information, then courts usually also require a file review.
In addition, if prosecutors acquire information that suggests the defendant may
have had, or as part of his defense at trial will assert that he has had, contacts with
an intelligence agency, then some limited review by the affected agency is almost
always done. In such cases, a positive defense of acting pursuant to public authority
under FRCrP 12.3 may be implicated. Such a defense is based upon the notion that
if a defendant thought he was acting under a lawful and authorized directive by the
government, he would not have the required mental state of knowingly violating a
criminal law. In those circumstances, determining the existence and extent of any
contact between a defendant and an intelligence agency becomes important to the
prosecution’s case.
If the prosecution is required by these discovery rules to examine the volumi-
nous holdings of the intelligence community, it is a serious drain on law enforce-
ment and prosecution resources. If the prosecution is required by these discovery
rules to disclose intelligence information to the defendants, their attorneys, clerks,
secretaries, experts, and other defense team personnel, then the risk to the sources
of the information expands greatly. And if these process rules allow the defendants
to disclose the information in open court in order to have a fair chance to put on
their defenses, then the damage is no longer potential but actual. CIPA allows the
government to calculate and understand in advance the risk of going forward with
a prosecution, but it does not change the fundamental rules of criminal process.
A typical CIPA case involves classified information surfacing either from the
defendant’s own knowledge or from discovery obligations of the U.S. government
to allow defense counsel to search or use such information. The court usually con-
venes a pretrial conference to attempt to resolve as many issues as possible. It then
enters a protective order requiring appropriate security procedures and limited
access to the classified information, including in some cases even prohibiting defense
counsel from discussing some matters with the defendants themselves. The defense
is required to notify the government under section 5 of CIPA of what classified
information the defense intends to disclose. The government then attempts to chal-
lenge disclosure of the classified information based upon the regular procedural
objections to evidence (everything from not material to hearsay). The government
then tries to minimize damage by proposing unclassified summaries or substitu-
tions for any classified information that the court rules may be disclosed by the
defense. There is a provision for an interlocutory (pre-verdict) appeal of court rul-
ings, and a range of sanctions the court can use if the government does not allow
the defense to disclose the classified information. CIPA has been in effect for almost
thirty years, without significant amendment, and the general view of the U.S. gov-
ernment is that it has achieved its purpose.
Individuals in custody also create immediate conflicts between intelligence and
law enforcement. The criminal law system in Anglo-American jurisdictions (among
others) wants those in jeopardy of criminal penalties to have a level playing field.
Fundamental notions of what is fair include those explicitly set out in the Constitution:
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment right
to legal counsel. Assuming the U.S. government has lawful grounds for incarcerating
individuals other than to try them on criminal charges (such as holding enemy prison-
ers of war), application of such basic elements of criminal law would raise tremendous
barriers to acquiring information about future threats. The Miranda warning of the
right to remain silent and to have an attorney appointed and paid for by the state would
end almost any conceivable intelligence interrogation.
The status of detainees of the U.S. government in military custody at Guantanamo
Bay and other locations overseas has created an epic clash over how the U.S. criminal
system should treat them. As this is written, the first of the military-commission
proceedings are beginning. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the detainees have
a right to petition federal civilian courts for writs of habeas corpus to challenge their
detentions. Habeas corpus is a long-time staple of the criminal law system that allows
convicted federal prisoners another venue to allege they are being wrongfully held,
other than a strict appellate review. Use of the military criminal law system under
either the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or the laws of war does not
reconcile the fundamentally different ends of intelligence and law enforcement. The
UCMJ largely follows the civilian Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including a
version of CIPA.
The Supreme Court has also opined that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions apply to such detainees (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006). Article 3 states
that prisoners of war may not be forced to provide any information except name,
rank, and serial number. They may be asked for and even volunteer more informa-
tion, but no physical or mental torture or any other form of coercion may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.
Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed
to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. They also cannot be denied
regular visits from the Red Cross and packages from home (FM 27–10 para. 93).
Other issues arise when intelligence agencies provide direct assistance to law
enforcement organizations. The circumstances under which a defendant is rendered
to a court of competent jurisdiction may become litigated if the defense raises the
Toscanino exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine (based on
two seminal cases) holds that a trial court will not bar a trial based upon the condi-
tions under which the defendant is brought before the court (Ker v. Illinois 1886;
Frisbie v. Collins 1952). Even if the defendant is taken into custody and transported
before the court in some manner that is arguably unlawful, the court will not dis-
miss the case so long as the defendant can expect a fair trial before that particular
court. Toscanino was a Second Circuit decision that created an exception to the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine (U.S. v. Toscanino 1974). The court in Toscanino said that if the con-
duct of government agents who rendered the defendant to the court’s jurisdiction
was so outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court, then the court would at
least hear defense motions to dismiss based upon those conditions.
If an intelligence agency supplies resources of equipment, personnel, or techni-
cal assistance for a clandestine exfiltration or delivery of a prisoner, then it is pos-
sible that the conditions of the operation could be litigated. Disclosure of intelligence
sources, methods, and sensitive operational activities would be likely to be an issue
in such litigation. There has not been much historical success in raising the Toscanino
defense, but it has been raised.
Press reporting has also described renditions of individuals by the U.S. govern-
ment to a number of foreign jurisdictions, where the individuals then become sub-
ject to those other nations’ law enforcement systems. The renditions are described
as clandestine and do not involve formal extradition procedures that are a staple of
many treaties involving public law enforcement jurisdictional proceedings. Press
reports also describe claims by a number of individuals that they were delivered to
law enforcement authorities who tortured or otherwise abused them. It is not dif-
ficult to imagine the difficulties in avoiding such circumstances or defending against
spurious claims if secret intelligence resources are involved in such transport.
4. Go Directly to Jail. Do Not Pass Go.

Do Not Collect $200.
Enforcement of criminal laws is also a significant limitation on the ability of the
intelligence establishment to conduct particular activities. There is no comprehen-
sive and universal legal principle that exempts intelligence agencies from substantive
criminal prohibitions. Intelligence activities that might implicate a U.S. criminal

statute have to be reviewed one by one.
Intelligence agencies have special authorities that allow them to lawfully conduct
activities that could be unlawful if conducted by other federal agencies or private
individuals or organizations. Much of the authority granted to intelligence agencies
is based upon the need for secrecy and the fact that most intelligence activities are
directed at foreign governments, organizations, and individuals. International law
principles and treaties relating to extradition of criminal suspects have established
long-held norms about how to treat those accused of espionage and related crimes.
Such crimes have at their base clandestine actions by national governments that are
recognized and accepted by customary international law and formal conventions.
Accordingly, such crimes are deemed “political” crimes and are not subject to extra-
dition agreements.
A related concept is that of diplomatic immunity, in which certain diplomats
are beyond the reach of the criminal laws of any nation except their own. The only
sanction in such instances is not a law enforcement penalty, but rather the diplo-
matic one of expulsion from the territory of the host nation (the declaration of the
status of persona non grata). Intelligence officers with diplomatic immunity thus
do not have a get-out-of-jail-free card issued by the law enforcement authorities,
but they do have a free ticket home.
This latitude for action based upon special authorities is limited when a specific
criminal prohibition applies. For example, in the current executive order that is a
presidential charter for the U.S. intelligence community, there is a section that states:
“Consistency With Other Laws. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to authorize
any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States.” Further,
the intelligence authorization acts passed (until recently) on a near-annual basis
contained similar language.
The National Security Act uses similar language to limit the use of covert action
(National Security Act Title V). It establishes by statute the authority of the presi-
dent to use clandestine means to influence political, economic, or military condi-
tions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the U. S. government will not be
apparent or acknowledged publicly. The definition of covert action specifically
excludes traditional law enforcement activities. In order to authorize a covert action,
the president must issue a finding that meets certain requirements in the act. The
act states, however: “A finding may not authorize any action that would violate the
Constitution or any statute of the United States.”
This limit on intelligence activities created a grey area in which government
officials thrash around trying to reconcile law enforcement requirements with intel-
ligence authorities. Some U.S. criminal statutes are so broadly worded that a specific
exemption has been explicitly included to prevent otherwise authorized intelligence
activities from being at least arguably covered by the prohibitions. For example,
under Title 18 of the U.S. criminal code, it is a crime to intercept electronic com-
munications. Since intercepting electronic communications is the basic function of
signals intelligence (SIGINT), a large portion of the intelligence community would
be affected. Accordingly, the drafters exempted from the definition of the crime
electronic surveillance within the United States that is covered by FISA, as well as
the acquisition of foreign intelligence information from international or foreign
communications (18 U.S.C. sections 2511(2)(e)-(f) (2005)).
Cybercrime, in the form of fraud and related actions in connection with unau-
thorized access or damage to computer systems, also contains a specific intelligence
and law enforcement exemption (18 U.S.C. section 1030(f)(2005)). Other statutes
are broadly worded but not extraterritorial in application. Activities conducted
abroad that do not involve U.S. persons or property or have a sufficient nexus with
the territory of the United States may not be crimes.
Other criminal laws, however, are in fact clearly intended to apply to the activi-
ties of the U.S. government. For example, if possession of a biological or chemical
weapon does not fall within the exceptions in the criminal statutes implementing
the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (relating to the purpose of the
possession), intelligence agencies would be violating the law (18 U.S.C. sections
175(c), 229F(7) (2005)). The federal crime of torture specifically refers to persons
“acting under the color of law,” meaning those acting on behalf of an official gov-
ernmental entity. Torture is an extraterritorial federal crime and may not be autho-
rized by any federal intelligence, military, or law enforcement official (18 U.S.C.
sections 2340–2340A (2005)).
Unclear language in some criminal statutes and different circumstances that
have expanded the reach of others create problems for intelligence agencies and
their employees. In some statutes there is neither a specific exemption for otherwise
authorized intelligence activities nor a clear intent to extend the criminal law to
cover such activities. Wire and mail fraud statutes state that “whoever” obtains
money or property by means of false representations and uses the mail, telephone,
radio, or television to do so will be committing a federal crime (18 U.S.C. sections
1341, 1343 (2005)). There is no specific exclusion for otherwise lawful and authorized
intelligence activities. “Whoever” seems all-inclusive. If defrauding includes acquir-
ing secrets of foreign persons and organizations by subterfuge or deceit, intelligence
activities might be arguably included. In light of intelligence needed by the U.S.
national security policymakers, that would be absurd.
Another example is the crime related to provision of support to terrorists or
terrorist groups. It applies to, “whoever knowingly provides material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so”
(Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act section 303). There is no intelligence
exception in the text of the statute. There is no discussion of intelligence activities
in the legislative history and no explicit expression of congressional intent to include
or exclude intelligence activities from the definition of the crime.
On its face, that language would prohibit an intelligence agency and its employ-
ees from providing money or equipment to assist a human asset in establishing his
bona fides in order to penetrate a terrorist organization. Precluding the federal gov-
ernment itself from taking steps to fight international terrorism defies both logic
and the statutory purposes expressed in legislative report language. Providing
material support to a terrorist organization in order to penetrate and defeat it brings

the intelligence world—where all is not as it seems in many circumstances—into
conflict with a law enforcement system that is premised upon constitutional and
common law requirements of clarity, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, fairness,
and lines between right and wrong.
Other examples demonstrate the difficulty of using a law enforcement system
to impose limits on foreign intelligence activities. Intelligence agencies deploy offi-
cers and assets in the field under various types of cover. Cover protects their per-
sonal safety and their affiliation with the United States government. It requires
ruses, deception, false-flag persona, and misrepresentation. In the U.S. criminal
code, however, “(w)hoever falsely and willfully represents himself to be a citizen of
the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.” Such an act is a felony. There is no exception for intelligence activi-
ties. According to the strict statutory language, a non-U.S. citizen working for the
CIA cannot say that he is a U.S. citizen to anyone who is a potential intelligence
source.
In these circumstances, principles of statutory interpretation of criminal laws
are the only way to reconcile statutory intent with statutory language. The most
significant principle stems from the Nardone case, which states that criminal laws of
general applicability should not be interpreted to apply to actions of the govern-
ment as sovereign unless there is specific language to that effect (Nardone v. U.S.
1937, 384). Other rules of interpretation also require looking to the reasons for enact-
ment of the statute and the purpose to be gained by it, and construing the statute in
the manner which is consistent with such purpose. A statute should not be read
literally where such a reading is contrary to its purposes.
The difficulty with reliance on such rules is that Nardone is not universal in its
reach and each set of circumstances requires examination of the specific facts
involved. Advance review by legal counsel for intelligence agencies can help insulate
intelligence officers from exposure. Intelligence agency employees proceed at their
own peril when they carry out operations over the objections of agency counsel that
are based upon potential criminal liability. Yet in grey areas, employees could be
subject to criminal investigations for actions taken under the stress, danger, and
critical time pressures experienced in the field. A criminal investigation has highly
serious effects upon individuals and organizations, even if no charges or other sanc-
tions are ever brought after years go by.
Subjecting intelligence activities to advance legal review for potential criminal
activities and producing legal opinions in coordination with the appropriate crimi-
nal law enforcement elements of the Department of Justice is burdensome, slow,
and inefficient. The Department of Justice dislikes and resists formal declinations of
prosecution. Intelligence activities that raise such a risk are simply avoided.
The use of “dirty” assets also creates the same dangers. Sources of certain intel-
ligence information may be individuals who have committed crimes even though
their actions took place completely overseas. This can occur in areas such as terror-
ism, narcotics trafficking, and weapons proliferation. Law enforcement wants to
convict them or use them to convict others. Intelligence wants to use them to collect
information that will remain secret. This conflict is ancient, as illustrated by the
famous Biblical passage describing Joshua’s battle at Jericho. Joshua sent two men to
spy on Jericho, and Rahab the “harlot” hid them, lied to Jericho authorities, and
deceived all around her in assisting the Israelites. Continuing to use human assets to
collect intelligence after information surfaces tying them to a crime significantly
increases the likelihood that a successful criminal case cannot be brought against
them without seriously risking intelligence equities. In such a case it is very difficult
to serve both intelligence and criminal interests.
Concerns with criminal statutes also led to the passage of Title XI of the National
Security Act. It creates a statutory-interpretation presumption that domestic U.S.
laws implementing international treaties and conventions would not make unlaw-
ful otherwise lawful and authorized intelligence activities, absent express statutory
language to the contrary. Title XI recognizes that it would be exceedingly difficult
for the Departments of State and Justice to ensure that every new transnational
criminal convention and its implementing legislation contain a specific exemption
for intelligence activities. Trying to address issues of espionage, covert action, and
other unacknowledged national state activities in an international convention
would be close to impossible. Public discussion necessary to adopt such agreements
would be very damaging to the clandestine activities that the agreements sought to
protect. As a result, it was imperative to craft this rule of statutory interpretation to
make congressional intent manifest when it otherwise was silent.
Secrecy has not shielded intelligence agencies from scrutiny under criminal law
standards, either. All components of the U.S. intelligence community are required
by executive order and presidential direction to report possible violations of federal
criminal laws by employees, and certain specified federal criminal laws by any other
persons, according to procedures developed between the attorney general and the
intelligence organization involved.
In 1982, the then-serving attorney general and director of central intelligence
promulgated such procedures for CIA. They require the CIA’s General Counsel
(currently a Senate-confirmed, presidential appointment) to report to the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice and the FBI any information that an Agency
employee may have violated any federal crime, and any information that any person
may have committed any of a list of serious federal offenses such as those involving
intentional infliction or threat of death or serious physical harm, espionage, or per-
jury or false statements. Crimes reporting under those procedures is extensive. In
addition, in the late 1980s Congress created a statutory Inspector General for CIA.
The Inspector General’s duties include investigating possible violations of federal
criminal laws that involve programs or operations of CIA, and reporting any such
information to the attorney general.
Law enforcement can be a profound deterrent to intelligence activities, either
advertently or inadvertently. Criminal law can bar actions of even the President of
the United States. It is unlikely that government employees will be found guilty of a
crime if they are carrying out in good faith what is otherwise a lawful activity, since
they would not have the mens rea, or guilty mind, necessary for a crime to be proven.
Nevertheless, the threat of a criminal investigation itself can be a punishing and
debilitating experience for both the individuals and their agencies, often lasting
years in duration.
Intelligence issues also create problems for prosecutions when they arise in
almost any part of a criminal case. This is especially notable in prosecutions in two
areas of high interest and significance to both law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. Espionage prosecutions by their nature involve someone who has had
access to classified national security information. Such defendants already have
knowledge about the government’s case against them without any discovery or
chance for the government to minimize the risk of disclosure of sensitive informa-
tion through the CIPA process. The case in chief will almost always involve a high
risk that other sensitive information will have to be revealed to achieve a conviction,
thus multiplying in ways difficult to evaluate the damage already caused by the
defendant.
This significant additional hurdle for the prosecution also arises when an
employee of the intelligence community is charged with crimes other than espio-
nage. Typically these charges involve either some type of violation of anti-corruption
ethics laws or more often, violations of perjury laws or prohibitions of false state-
ments to Congress or others (such as inspector generals) investigating some aspect
of intelligence activities. The problem is multiplied when independent counsel pros-
ecutors operate without the usual check on prosecutorial discretion that operates
when the executive branch agencies decide on whether the damage of going forward
with a prosecution greatly outweighs the likelihood of achieving a significant convic-
tion for a major crime. This dilemma arose most notably during the existence of the
statutory independent counsel created to minimize possible conflicts of interest aris-
ing when the Department of Justice prosecutes senior U.S. government officials
(such as the Iran-Contra prosecutions) The statute creating the independent counsel
was not renewed by Congress after it expired, but the appointment of quasi-inde-
pendent special counsels by the attorney general continues.
Terrorism cases raise an additional problem for the prosecution. Terrorist acts
and the activities of terrorist organizations have at their base a violent attack on the
United States or its citizens and their property anywhere in the world. The national
security and intelligence elements of the U.S. government expend enormous efforts
to prevent such attacks. Law enforcement contributes to that pre-emption in a
number of significant ways, but fundamentally law enforcement actions are geared
toward capturing those committing crimes in the past and amassing evidence to
prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If a potential terrorist has not yet com-
mitted a terrorist act, the prevention role of the intelligence community prevails
and the retribution role of the law enforcement community has to stand to the side,
often to its future detriment in criminal trials.
In addition, the special authorities of the intelligence community have given
rise to a number of instances in which defendants assert the “CIA defense.” It is a
variation of the defense of public authority, in which a defendant essentially argues
that if he in fact did the acts as charged by the prosecution, he was authorized to do
so by the government itself (FRCrP 12; U.S. v. Rosenthal 1986, 1235–1237; Smith v. U.S.
1984, 432) Because the intelligence community operates in secrecy and in fact is law-
fully authorized to do certain activities that would be criminal violations if con-
ducted by private entities, the CIA defense can be a significant weakness in a
prosecution. If allowed under the rules of criminal procedure, a defendant may
demand much more discovery from the intelligence community, including testi-
mony by intelligence officials, and thus expand the greymail danger. It may also
raise doubts in the minds of jurors who have the generally widespread exposure of
the public to Hollywood notions of the CIA and other intelligence agencies having
roving bands of desperados with licenses to kill, all being directed by sinister con-
spirators to hide the aliens in New Mexico at all costs.
5. The World Is Flat, Except When

It Is Round
The post–World War II expansion of international law enforcement is creating new
challenges and problems for intelligence services. Increasingly, some nations are
advocating universal jurisdiction, in which certain of their criminal laws may be
applied to individuals with no connection to the country seeking to try them.
Jurisdiction generally has been restricted to the territory of a particular nation or to
its citizens. Universal jurisdiction would allow a national of Kenya to be tried in
Belgium for certain crimes (such as crimes against humanity or genocide) commit-
ted against Kenyans in Kenya. Other principles of international law have also
expanded the ability of a state to prosecute conduct that occurs outside its territory
(the protective principle, the objective territorial principle, the national principle,
and especially the passive personality principle, which allows a state to prosecute
someone for crimes against nationals of that state; U.S. v. Bin Laden 2000).
Demands for war-crimes trials have also led to the creation of international
institutions under the purview of the United Nations or the NATO Alliance. A num-
ber of international criminal tribunals were created to deal with charges against
individuals in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, for example. The
International Criminal Court (ICC) was also established by international conven-
tion as an ongoing venue for such charges to be heard.
The trial of two alleged Libyan intelligence operatives for the destruction of Pan
Am Flight 103 over Scotland was a hybrid legal proceeding demonstrating the high
cost of international joint ventures involving both law enforcement and intelligence.
The trial was held at The Hague, but the law applied was Scots law and the court was
composed of Scots judges. There was an extensive and costly trial, which involved
the first time in history that a CIA officer testified in a foreign criminal proceeding.
The split verdict left many participants unsatisfied with the result and the resources
it took to translate a vast, multinational intelligence and law enforcement effort to
identify those responsible for the terrorist act into a judicial proceeding bound by
rules of fairness, individual rights, and certainties needed for convictions.
The problems associated with intelligence and law enforcement under domes-
tic criminal statutes and systems is multiplied exponentially when foreign nations
attempt joint prosecutions under notions of international criminal laws that are
often vague and enforced in widely varying ways (e.g., “crimes against humanity,” or
“genocide.”) Intelligence information is very likely to become an issue in such situ-
ations as the executive agencies of the involved governments direct collection and
analysis against potential defendants who are also targets of intense foreign and
defense policy interest. By agreement with the prosecutors, such agencies establish
procedures for the tribunal proceedings minimizing exposure of intelligence sources
and methods. The sources and methods may be at risk because information in the
case could reveal highly sensitive information ranging from direct evidence of crim-
inal acts and intent (SIGINT intercepts of conversations of defendants discussing
the alleged crimes) to the location of wanted individuals sought by police depart-
ments (unmanned aerial vehicle electro-optical imagery of cars or houses where
such individuals might be located). Exposure of such information to foreign nation-
als involved in the prosecution or defense of war crimes would significantly increase
the risk of any participating nation’s intelligence secrets being exposed. At best,
international law is imprecise, uncertain, and dependent upon actions of foreign
nations and foreign courts. Criminal law enforcement, by contrast, requires preci-
sion, clarity, and predictability if it is to have political legitimacy.
6. Conclusion: Tomorrow Is Another Day

At the end of the day, the most pressing issues in the intersection of intelligence and
law enforcement will probably involve a balance between the parts of the two worlds
that are irreconcilable. In certain areas, intelligence equities should and will prevail,
and in other areas law enforcement will be the prime actor. In the grey area where
the two imperatives overlap, mission managers will have to further their own goals
while devoting reasonable efforts to avoid impeding the other’s mission.
The most pressing issue is the creation of a domestic intelligence organization
separate from law enforcement and foreign intelligence establishments. It is driven
by the most dangerous threat facing the United States: nuclear weapons in the hands
of suicidal terrorists such as al-Qaida, who would use them. The authorities, rules
of engagement, restrictions, safeguards, oversight, and resources for such an
intelligence organization would have to be established in a balance of national secu-
rity interests with privacy and other civil liberties.
A second issue is the extent to which traditional notions of due process in the
United States’ law enforcement system hamper or otherwise significantly restrict
the intelligence community in its primary roles of producing foreign intelligence
and supporting military operations. The right to remain silent does not apply to a
suicide bomber bent on destroying a city (Posner 2006).
Another issue relates to the appropriate use of the armed forces. Restrictions on
military involvement with domestic civilian law enforcement or even military oper-
ations against an enemy inside the United States may be out of date.
In addition, military law enforcement (including military commissions and the
enforcement of the laws of war) differs from civilian law enforcement. The current
effort to try non-state actors and unlawful combatants detained by the United States
in the war on terrorism by military commissions has led to litigation and confusion
in heroic proportions, and that is not over yet (Hamdan).
A further issue is the extent to which technical means of conducting surveil-
lance have advanced to such a degree that they intrude on Americans’ long-held
notions of the acceptable boundary between government scrutiny and citizens’
privacy. Reasonable expectations of privacy that grew out of many years of uncom-
plicated police work enforcing domestic criminal laws may not be appropriate for
the effective prevention of unidentified foreign terrorists. The recent debate regard-
ing amendments to FISA underscored the deep wariness many Americans have
about any extension of foreign intelligence collection by intrusive means inside
the United States or outside the United States when the target of the collection is a
U.S. person.
These issues are part of a seamless web and each issue affects the others, for the
most part. What is clear is that immediate post–World War II notions of the differ-
ences between one side of the border of the United States and the other do not fit
the world as we find it. Where, in fact, is cyberspace?
The divide between national security and law enforcement is, “. . . carved deeply
into the topography of American government” (Carter et al. 1998, 82). Intelligence and
law enforcement will continue to co-exist more or less peacefully, but there are con-
tinuing issues that probably have no better solution than the professionals of both
worlds, and their policy making masters, act in well-informed and well-intentioned
ways to support and deconflict their activities and missions. The different cultures
and narratives of each community are significant and important (Best). They affect
the view that each has of the other and of themselves. That affects the ability of man-
agers to manage them, overseers to watch them, and ultimately the ability of the U.S.
government to succeed in their areas of operation.
As one commentator noted, FBI officers are from Mars, from Fordham, from
the football team, from the Boy and Girl Scouts, from off the street. CIA officers
are from Venus, from Yale, from the tennis team, from the front row in class where
they always raise their hands, from a book-lined study, from academe (Gorman
2003).
Muddling through is part of the job.
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Manget, F. F. 2006. Intelligence and the Criminal Law System. Stanford Law and Policy
Review 17:415.
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
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National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
Posner, R. A. 2006. Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency.
Riebling, M. 2002. Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and the CIA. New York:
Touchstone.
Senate Select Committee On Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Senate Report No. 107–351, House Report
No. 107–792 (2d Sess. 2002).
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Snider, L. B., E. Rindskopf, and J. Coleman. 1994. Relating Intelligence and Law Enforcement:
Problems and Prospects. Washington: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence.
Thompson, B. G. 2006. The National Counterterrorism Center: Foreign and Domestic
Intelligence Fusion and the Potential Threat to Privacy, 6 PGH Journal of Technology
Law and Policy, 6.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1986).
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), reh’g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir.
1974).
United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
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Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001). Pub. L. No. 107–56,
115 Stat. 272.
chapter 13
THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL
COLLABORATION IN THE
GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE ERA
a. denis clift
Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution.

Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to
our enemies, justice will be done.
—George W. Bush (2001)
As President George W. Bush was delivering these words to the Congress and the
American people on September 20, 2001, officials at the Central Intelligence Agency
were working into the night acting on the President’s orders to launch a covert war
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Several CIA teams were formed. Each included paramilitary veterans, officers
with Farsi and Dari language skills, counterterrorists, and communicators. The first
team arrived in Panjshir, Afghanistan on September 27, 2001 (Crumpton 2005, 162,
170). Its gear included three heavy cardboard boxes, each containing one million
dollars in used hundred dollar bills, wrapped in bundles of $10,000, then plastic-
wrapped again in bricks of $100,000.
Contact was made within hours with a senior member of the Afghan Northern
Alliance opposing the Taliban. Talks were arranged and agreement was quickly reached
the evolution of international collaboration 213
on a strategy of cooperative action aimed at locating and targeting the Taliban and
al-Qaeda forces and engaging them with Northern Alliance forces, U.S. Special Forces,
and U.S. air power. Agreement was also reached on the establishment of a joint intel-
ligence cell to be located with the team at its compound. Intelligence collected by the
Northern Alliance would flow into the cell, then onward to the different echelons of
U.S. military and intelligence consumers. Intelligence received by the team from U.S.
sources would be shared via the cell with the Northern Alliance partners. The talks
went smoothly, and in the process a backpack containing $500,000 changed hands to
ease and facilitate early action by the Alliance (Schroen 2005, 90–92).
Over the next two months this partnership would grow and the intelligence
flowing from U.S. and allied Afghan sources would pinpoint Taliban units and their
leaders and al-Qaeda cells, training camps, and leaders. U.S. Special Forces and their
Afghan allies mounted ground attacks with precision and daring. U.S. Special Forces
operating under cover of darkness used portable lasers to mark the foe precisely for
devastating, precision U.S. Air Force bombing. Information from human intelli-
gence sources that could be obtained only by the Afghans was crucial to success on
the ground and from the air. By the end of the year, the Taliban were no longer in
power, and al-Qaeda was on the run.
2. Accountability
In the twenty-first century, U.S. intelligence is held accountable for acting within
the law respecting the rights and liberties of U.S. citizens. This said, intelligence is
also expected to contribute centrally to the safeguarding of the nation and the
advancement of the nation’s interests with timely warnings, assessments and analy-
ses of the highest caliber. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
the passage of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the
nation entered the era of national intelligence—the joining of domestic and foreign
intelligence into national intelligence. The post of Director of National Intelligence
was created, and the DNI was charged with ensuring that foreign intelligence and
domestic law enforcement agencies worked together in ways as never before with
information needed to protect U.S. citizens against future attack being shared and
acted on at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels.
In this new era—the cyber era, the era of threats from around the globe posed
not only by nation states but also by individuals, cells, and other non-state actors—it
has become increasing apparent that U.S. intelligence alone cannot not possibly col-
lect and analyze the data, the information and the intelligence necessary to meet its
responsibilities and carry out its safeguarding-the-nation mandate. Sharing arrange-
ments and international intelligence partnerships have become essential—witness
the partnership with the Northern Alliance. Effective international collaboration has
become a new standard against which the Intelligence Community is measured and
held accountable.
The first Director of National Intelligence, Ambassador John Negroponte, in
the new office for just a few months, published The National Intelligence Strategy of
the United States of America in October 2005. The Strategy set as a priority require-
ment the need to establish new and strengthen existing foreign intelligence relation-
ships to help meet global security challenges. It called on the Intelligence Community
to: Engage and invigorate friendly foreign intelligence services’ efforts that could aid
in the identification and disruption of terrorist organizations abroad and within
U.S. borders; coordinate closely with foreign intelligence services to inform a com-
mon assessment of threats and options in response; and, ensure that insights gained
from our foreign intelligence relationships inform intelligence judgments and
develop effective options in response (Negroponte 2005, 15).
In July 2008, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell underscored
and expanded on this evolutionary, centrally important international dimension in
Vision 2015 (2008a, 1, 13–14), his roadmap for the transformation of U.S. intelligence
into a globally networked and integrated Intelligence Enterprise for the twenty-first
century based on the principles of integration, collaboration, and innovation.
Given the broad spectrum of threats, looming budget constraints, and the need
for deep analytic expertise, the Intelligence Enterprise will have to expand its
network beyond the boundary of the traditional Intelligence Community. The
global nature of intelligence makes it imperative that we continue to seek
opportunities to collaborate with our allies and foreign partners. Our strategic
partnerships will include traditional international allies, opportunistic partners,
multilateral organizations, civil societies, academe, and industry. The U.S.
Intelligence Enterprise clearly benefits through increased global coverage, local
expertise, and improved synergies.
The DNI’s vision and guidance—his “makes it imperative” language on foreign

collaboration—move apace with the realization by the U.S. Intelligence Community
that if those accountable for U.S. intelligence are to exercise their mandate success-
fully they must adopt a philosophy of risk management rather than risk avoidance.
The latter has been the surest way to ensure that intelligence of high national-
security classification does not fall into the wrong hands, and to ensure that sensi-
tive methods and sources are neither revealed nor compromised. As a general rule,
intelligence organizations are not trusting by nature, and they have been inherently
doubtful about any sharing arrangement, whether temporary or long-term. In shar-
ing, they are telling someone else what they know, and inferentially—at least to the
initiated—what they do not know. They are opening the opportunity for further
probes on both the positive and negative sides of the issue at hand, and they are
vulnerable to having the information they have shared move beyond the second
party to a third party, fourth party, into the camp of an adversary to be turned to
their nation’s disadvantage.
Risk avoidance has turned a blind eye to the fact that intelligence shared can
become an intelligence multiplier—opening the partner’s door to critically
important information otherwise not available to the United States. If sharing is

working the way it wants it to work, the intelligence organization is taking steps to
safeguard those sources of information that must be protected, and safeguarding
those methods of collection it wishes to remain its own. At the same time, it is
acquiring information not available to it, information it is not capable of collecting,
human intelligence, for example, collected by a partner with the right mix of ethnic,
cultural, and language backgrounds enabling unique penetration of important
targets.
An appreciation of the value of risk management has taken on fresh urgency.
An understanding of the play of risk avoidance and risk management can be gained
from intelligence case studies in American history.
3. Franklin, the French, on to the

Twentieth Century
In the American experience, intelligence partnerships with other nations trace back
to the Revolutionary War. George Washington placed a high priority on the intelli-
gence networks he operated against the British and believed deeply in their value.
The French at the war’s outset took the decision to provide the colonists with secret
aid and soon enlisted Spain in a broadening covert action. In 1775, the Continental
Congress created the Committee of Secret Correspondence with oversight of for-
eign intelligence programs. Benjamin Franklin was one of the Committee’s found-
ing members. In 1776, the Congress named three commissioners headed by Franklin
to be America’s representatives in France, arranging cooperation, military and
material support from France, Spain, and other nations out of the public eye and
serving as the colonies’ chief propagandists.
The British spied on the Franklin commission. By all accounts, the commis-
sion’s secretary, Dr. Edward Bancroft, an American, was a British double agent
reporting on Franklin’s successful intelligence agenda with the French, his messages
written in secret inks, placed in bottles in the root of a tree in the Tuileries Gardens
to be retrieved by British Embassy staff for delivery to London. To all appearances,
Franklin seemed unaware of this treachery, but the late Director of Central
Intelligence Allen Dulles thought otherwise. “Perhaps,” he wrote, “the wily Franklin
really knew of it but did not want to let on that he did” (Dulles 1963, 34–35). As
America’s chief intelligence partner with the French, he may have found it of greater
value from time to time to pass false information to the British via Bancroft, their
trusted spy.
From the strategic perspective, the U.S-French intelligence partnership played
a positive role in the War for Independence. In World War I and World War II, new
intelligence partnerships would be shaped, this time among the British, the French,
and the Americans. If the colonists had needed French treasure and military strength
in the late eighteenth century, so the British and French were desperate for that
treasure and strength from America in the common causes against the Germans.
When the first units of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) arrived in
France in 1917, World War I had long since transitioned to brutal, grinding, posi-
tional trench warfare. Aerial reconnaissance and the intelligence derived from the
aerial photography had grown from an earlier fringe role to become central to each
commander’s decision-making process. The photography and the photographic
interpretation that guided the updates of annotated battlefield maps at headquar-
ters and in the field gave a clear picture of the enemy’s lines, emplacements, fortifi-
cations, and artillery positions, and assisted the commander in assessing the enemy’s
intent.
Both the British and the French gave high priority to regularly upgrading their
aerial reconnaissance capabilities. New aircraft, new generations of aerial cameras,
and new photographic techniques all contributed to the resulting, improved intel-
ligence product. The French, in particular, led in integrating aerial photography
with other intelligence in their intelligence department, the 2nd Bureau, to provide
a steady flow of updated all-source intelligence to the commander.
The AEF was light years behind. “U.S. Forces had no doctrinal basis for air
operations when they arrived in France in 1917; however, by the end of the first year,
they had managed to establish a base of understanding of how aerial observation
and photographic interpretation worked to support the demands of the forces.”
Initially, the AEF depended on the British and the French to learn the science and
incorporate the technology. Aircraft and cameras were borrowed. Some of the train-
ing was taught in French to Americans who did not speak French. They pushed on.
In this pioneering intelligence partnership, “The Americans employed the best aer-
ial photographic methods of the British and French, and proceeded to implement a
program to employ photographic talent” (Finnegan 2007, 224, 420). While the
American doughboy on the ground provided the margin of victory bringing fresh
brains, muscle, and fight to the beleaguered British and French forces, the British
and French contributed expertise to give the AEF the new generation of intelligence
capabilities required.
4. From Reluctant Ally, to Jedburghs,

to Special Partners
Twenty years later, the spirit of U.S.-U.K. intelligence cooperation had been replaced
by competitiveness between the two nations and a sense that each was more com-
fortable going it alone in intelligence. As the menace of Nazi Germany loomed
larger, the majority of Americans opposed being drawn into another European
conflict. The British knew they would again need U.S. industrial and military might
beside them in any new conflict. They pursued their reluctant ally-to-be on several
intelligence fronts.
The Royal Navy gambled its most secret technology, its new advanced radar able to
detect and track enemy aircraft, offering to share it with the U.S. Navy without expecting
anything in return. While the United States was distrustful at first, the offer would lead
to expanded, secret, technical exchanges. On a broader government-to-government
front, the British sent William Stephenson, the man called Intrepid, to establish a secret
organization in New York City titled the British Security Coordination Staff to share
information with the Army, Navy, and FBI, and to push for American aid and, eventu-
ally, American involvement in the war.
They courted U.S. World War I hero William “Wild Bill Donovan” who would
become President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first Director of the Office of Strategic
Services, flying him to London in July 1941 for meetings with the king and Prime
Minister Churchill and for a classified briefing on the war and British war needs.
The British Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral John Godfrey and his aide
Lieutenant Commander Ian Fleming traveled to Washington to promote closer
intelligence cooperation and to meet with the President (Stafford 1998, 229).
In 1940, Churchill had directed his new, Special Operations Executive (SOE) to
begin planning for the infiltration of special agents behind Nazi lines in France,
Belgium, and The Netherlands to organize local resistance and carry out sabotage.
“Set Europe ablaze,” the prime minister told his SOE chief. As an early act as head of
the new U.S. Office of Strategic Services once America had entered the war, Donovan
reached agreement on U.S. participation in these operations, and men with the req-
uisite physical and language capabilities were selected for training first in the United
States, and then Great Britain. Teams to become known as Jedburgh teams were
created—a leader, a number two, and a radio operator, a team consisting of the U.S.,
U.K., and a third member from France, The Netherlands, or Belgium, depending on
the country to be penetrated. The first of the teams parachuted into France just
before the 1944 D-Day invasion. The page had turned to a new chapter in interna-
tional human intelligence partnership (Beavan 2006, 11, 31, 109).
In parallel, as part of their separate intelligence efforts in mid-1940, the British
and the Americans had both had code breaking successes—the British breaking a
part of the German ULTRA code created on the ENIGMA encryption machines, the
Americans penetrating the Japanese diplomatic MAGIC created on the MAGIC or
PURPLE machines.
Still another chapter in international intelligence cooperation was now opening
with the disciplinary focus shifting from aerial reconnaissance and secret agents on
the ground to the business of signals intelligence—to the decryption and reading of
the enemy’s secret message traffic. Churchill took the decision, as part of his cam-
paign to bring the United States into the war, to open the door partially to ULTRA,
taking care not to reveal the scope of exploitation or the great importance of the
decrypted intelligence. Limited cooperation then began on both the ENIGMA and
MAGIC machines. In 1943, with the United States now a war fighting ally, the British
moved to full sharing of ULTRA, to include the cryptographic keys and codes, and
all intelligence from the deciphered product (Budiansky 2000, 239). From this work
would emerge a program of bilateral U.S.-U.K. intelligence cooperation that would
become known as the “special relationship.”
5. The National Security Act, Executive

Orders, and DCI Directives
On July 26, 1947, the Congress passed The National Security Act of 1947 placing the
separate military departments under a new Department of Defense, and creating
the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. The government
was reorganizing to avoid the strategic shock of another Pearl Harbor. President
Harry S. Truman would write: “The creation of the National Security Council added
a badly needed new facility to the government. This was now the place in the gov-
ernment where military, diplomatic and resource problems could be studied and
continually appraised. This new organization gave us a running balance and per-
petual inventory of where we stood and where we were going on all strategic ques-
tions affecting the national security” (Truman 1956, 59).
Intelligence was a core part of the strategic questions and problems. The
Director of Central Intelligence as head of the new CIA served as an advisor on the
National Security Council, where membership included the president, vice presi-
dent, the secretary of state, and secretary of defense. The Military Services and State
Department retained their intelligence organizations. In creating this new struc-
ture, the National Security Act focused on organization, providing no ground rules,
no mention of international intelligence cooperation. That would be the subject of
classified guidance behind the scenes.
The downside of any “special relationship” would be underscored early in the
Cold War years. British and American intelligence liaison officers were in both
Washington and London. Intelligence doors were opened, and through these
doors—at the State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence
Agency—the likes of Philby, Burgess, and MacLean, British officials spying for the
Soviet Union, would pass. The most sensitive issues would be discussed, with a puls-
ing hemorrhage of U.S. national security secrets to the USSR. The disciples of risk
avoidance would highlight the damage and demand a closing of the doors.
As the years unfolded from the 1940s through the 1970s, an expanding
Intelligence Community would emerge, to include organizations such as the
National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National
Reconnaissance Office. Tightly controlling guidance to the community on interna-
tional intelligence cooperation would appear publicly in Presidential Executive
Order 12333 of 1981:
The heads of departments and agencies with organizations in the Intelligence

Community or the heads of such organizations, as appropriate, shall:
Disseminate intelligence to cooperating foreign governments under
arrangements established or agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence.
National Security Agency whose responsibilities shall include:
Conduct of foreign cryptologic liaison relationships, with liaison for
Intelligence purposes conducted in accordance with policies formulated by the
Director of Central Intelligence; . . . (Executive Order 12333)
Similar controlling language would appear in the Director of Central Intelligence’s

1998 directive spelling out his authorities and responsibilities as head of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, stating that the DCI will: coordinate relationships between
elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or security services of
foreign governments, coordinate policy concerning foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence arrangements and conduct of liaison, and seek Presidential certification
with notification to appropriate committees of the Congress that sources and meth-
ods have been protected in any intelligence to be shared with the United Nations
(Warner 2001, 156–57).
6. Sharing during the Cold War

The Soviet Union emerged rapidly as the post–War War II superpower adversary
and within the confines of the risk avoidance philosophy much of the bilateral and
multilateral intelligence cooperation that evolved hinged on the new bipolar world.
With the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, the challenge of shar-
ing entered the new realm of a standing, formal, multinational alliance. Under
Article 5, an attack on one or more members would be considered an attack on all.
Nuclear deterrence and nuclear strike options were part of the responsibilities of
the Alliance. Intelligence would become one of the NATO International Military
Staff ’s six planning divisions.
As the number of NATO member nations grew from twelve to fifteen and
beyond, the risk of espionage, of theft of NATO secrets grew. The risk would manifest
itself in unpredicted and high places—witness 1974, when West German Chancellor
Willy Brandt’s longtime personal aide Gunter Guillaume was arrested and confessed
to being a spy for the East German Ministry of State Security and an officer in the
East German Army.
The Cold War NATO challenge of intelligence sharing would be to balance the
protection of sources and methods and the determination of “who had the need to
know” against the need for an Alliance militarily capable of handling either a con-
ventional or a nuclear attack (Clift 2002, 163–64).
During the 1960s and 1970s intelligence sharing would play in the monitoring
of Middle East peace agreements. With the outbreak of the October 1973 war,
high-altitude, U.S. SR-71 reconnaissance flights monitored the military action

between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights and Israel and Egypt along the Suez
Canal. President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger would help to guide the under-
standings reached in the disengagement agreement. As part of the assurances pro-
vided, U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft would begin flying monitoring missions
over the demilitarized zones in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. The resulting pho-
tography documenting the disposition of forces would be provided by the United
States to the parties as one of the confidence-building measures (Wilson 1999, 59).
7. First Steps toward Greater Risk

Management
With the coming of the 1990s and the demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact,
new dimensions of intelligence sharing would come to the fore. On August 2, 1990,
Iraq invaded Kuwait. A coalition force would prepare in Operation Desert Shield and
fight in Operation Desert Storm to drive Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait.
In the Department of Defense’s report to the Congress entitled The Conduct of
the Persian Gulf War, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell
wrote: “No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his
adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm was a success story.” General Norman Schwarzkopf, the
Commander in Chief of Central Command, in turn wrote, “The great military vic-
tory we achieved in Desert Storm and the minimal losses sustained by U.S. and
Coalition forces can be directly attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we
had on the Iraqis” (Department of Defense 1992, 333).
The coalition included nations with whom the United States had a longstanding
intelligence relationship, Great Britain, for example. It also included nations with whom
the United States had little if any intelligence dealings such as Syria and Nigeria.
Intelligence sharing in the coalition construct would have noteworthy particu-
lars that have continued beyond Desert Storm to contribute to more recent opera-
tions. The sharing would be for an unwritten contract period, that is, the length of
the operation. During the contract period, it would be important to make as much
actionable intelligence as possible available: to ensure military victory, to protect
coalition forces, and to ensure the cohesion and effectiveness of the coalition at the
government-to-government, political level.
The accountability of intelligence was paramount. The political leaders of the
coalition partners had to be persuaded, so that they could assure their publics that
they had a clear and accurate picture of operations, that their troops had the best
possible force protection, and that they could test media reports against intelligence
and operational reports coming from the theater of operations.
To provide the intelligence required, disclosure experts in the Intelligence

Community with approval from the highest levels guided the officers drafting
reports on how to include as much actionable intelligence as possible without com-
promising sensitive sources and methods. The concept of producing tear-line intel-
ligence reporting or perforated-line intelligence reporting would emerge from the
war in the Gulf. A report with every detail could be sent in its entirety at the most
sensitive level for U.S. eyes only. The most sensitive part of the report could be
stripped away and the key substance needed for action still transmitted to the coali-
tion partners. At the same time these reports were being sent to the commanders in
the field, they were being provided to the ministries of defense in the coalition part-
ners’ capitals (Clift 2002, 164–165).
By the mid-1990s, this intelligence sharing technique would come of age in the
Bosnian Peacekeeping Operations, and would be joined by other innovations. One
of the great ironies that the United States—the nation of immigrants—confronted
as it faced the new intelligence challenges of the post–Cold-War era, was its severe
limitation in working expertly in the growing numbers of foreign languages being
confronted. Too many U.S intelligence professionals spoke only the tongues of past
conflicts.
In the operations in the Balkans, the United States benefited greatly in Kosovo
and Bosnia from the different intelligence strengths of its coalition partners,
strengths such as expert language capabilities, good human intelligence, and good
cultural understanding of the peoples and societies of the region. United States–
deployed intelligence units created small, tactical national intelligence centers for-
ward, cells able to network with partners on adjoining flanks, centers able to take
decisions on the ground, and share intelligence with speed where needed.
8. Into the Twenty-First Century

Today, the United States is in a strategic environment where our forces are called
upon as allies and as coalition partners to provide forward deterrence, fight, pro-
duce forward stability, and ward off threats to the homeland. There is virtually no
military, geographic, cultural, ideological, or religious presence anywhere that is not
of relevance to the intelligence professional’s inquiry and assessment.
This is an era for intelligence in which the formerly dominant Cold War chal-
lenges of understanding force-on-force strategic and conventional military capa-
bilities and intentions have been subsumed in a far broader spectrum of challenges
and requirements. While it remains essential to have expert understanding of each
of the world’s nuclear and conventional military forces, we are now in a new threat
environment pitting nation states against individuals, cells and non-state actors
bent on murderous designs.
Today’s cyber- and information-age world presents a globalized setting marked

by increasing transnational challenges, health and the environment, failed and fail-
ing nation states, religious and cultural conflicts, international illegal narcotics,
drug, and human trafficking, growth in international gang activity, the proliferation
of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and international ter-
rorism. This is an era in which the computer, the Internet, cell phones, satellite com-
munications, fiber-optic wiring, and commercially available GPS positioning
devices—coupled with the ease in international travel—have given individuals and
groups large and small the command and control strengths, communications capa-
bilities and propaganda reach that only recently were beyond the imagination and
capability of all except a relatively few, powerful nation states.
It is against this background that the new era of intelligence sharing is emerging
in Afghanistan and Iraq. That sharing in Iraq today flows to the forces of coalition
members through the Intelligence Directorate of Commander, Multinational Forces
Iraq—as well as moving bilaterally and multilaterally up and down, out and back at
the different echelons.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the North Atlantic Council
took the decision that, first, NATO would enhance intelligence sharing and coop-
eration relating to terrorism and, second, that NATO would prepare to deal with
threats beyond the European theater. In the words of Secretary General Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer (2004), “The first element of a new transatlantic security consensus
is the need to project stability where it matters. In a strategic environment that is
marked by terrorism, failed states and proliferation, projecting stability is a precon-
dition for ensuring our security. If we do not tackle the problems where they emerge,
they will end up on our doorstep.”
At the 2002 Prague Summit, the Alliance reached agreement on the creation of
a new, highly capable, rapid-deployment NATO Response Force to provide an inte-
grated, interoperable land, sea, and air capability under a single command. In
August 2003, NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, its first mission, in fact, beyond Europe and the Atlantic
(http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm). New NATO Allies
such as Romania brought fresh thinking to the intelligence-sharing dimensions of
the ISAF challenge. “In today’s world, borders must no longer be considered geo-
graphic barriers; in fact, every NATO nation has a common border with the enemy—
transnational threats and terrorism . . . Currently, a major part of the military
intelligence acquisition process program is focused on the development of strategic
intelligence capabilities (mainly SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT) in order to serve
national interests and to improve the Romanian contribution to NATO intelli-
gence . . . This why Romania has developed deployable military intelligence collec-
tion assets (IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT), a part of which have already been
made available to the NATO Response Force” ( Jenkins 2004, 113–14, 116).
In early 2007, NATO gave formal structure to the ISAF multilateral intelligence
sharing with the opening of a Joint Intelligence Operations Center in Kabul,
Afghanistan. Many miles had been traveled since the link up of the first CIA teams
with the Northern Alliance six years before. The Joint Intelligence Operations
Center now facilitates joint intelligence operations among the ISAF member forces
and the Pakistani and Afghan armies (http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/mediaadviso
ry/2007/01-january/ma070123–12.htm).
9. The Decision Advantage

On July 30, 2008, President Bush signed a revision to the 1981 intelligence Executive
Order 12333. At the time of signing, the Intelligence Community had grown to six-
teen departments and agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of
State, Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance
Office, National Security Agency, and the United States Air Force, Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
The revised Executive Order takes into account the provisions of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the new national intelligence para-
digm, and the new, pre-eminent role of the Director of National Intelligence. On
international cooperation, the new Executive Order states—in more expansive,
more enabling language than its predecessor—that the DNI:
May enter into intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements and agreements
with foreign governments and international organizations; Shall formulate
policies concerning intelligence and counter-intelligence arrangements and
agreements with foreign governments and international organizations; and Shall
align and synchronize intelligence and counterintelligence foreign relationships
among the elements of the Intelligence Community to further United States
national security, policy, and intelligence objectives. (Executive Order 2008,
Sec. 1.3(b)(4))
In the implementing sections of the Executive Order, it is stated in section 1.6(f)

that “The heads of elements of the Intelligence Community shall: Disseminate
information or intelligence to foreign governments and international organiza-
tions under intelligence or counterintelligence arrangements or agreements
established in accordance with section 1.3(b)(4).” In the DNI’s statement for the
record on the executive order to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
there is amplifying language on the DNI’s policy formulating role stating that the
DNI establishes the overarching policy framework and that operational organiza-
tions such as the CIA and FBI are responsible for implementing the policies
(McConnell 2008, 8).
The more-enabling language in the Executive Order mirrors the expectations of
the nation that the Intelligence Community will, in the words of the DNI’s Vision 2015,
“create decision advantage for our customer—policymakers, military commanders,
law enforcement and homeland security officials. This means we collect and analyze
intelligence to improve our customers’ ability to make a decision while denying our
adversaries the same advantage.” In turn, it reflects the imperative of greater collabo-
ration with allies and international partners (McConnell 2008a, 1, 13).
The international cooperation philosophy and practices of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) offer an instructive example of how one member of the
Intelligence Community is acting on the broader intelligence-cooperation policy and
implementation guidelines. Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, U.S. Navy, the NGA
Director, cites the DNI’s guidance as he underlines the priority NGA is giving to
enhancing analytic cooperation and data standardization and sharing with partners
such as Australia, Canada, and Great Britain through the geospatial intelligence
Quadripartite Committee, and to building new partnerships that both augment ana-
lytical strength and give NGA more flexibility to focus more on the hardest intelligence
targets (Murrett 2008, inside cover letter).
The Director of NGA’s Office of International Affairs and Policy points to the
dramatic increase over the past decade of the number of countries that now engage
in imagery collection and analysis, a dynamic, competitive, sometimes adversarial
environment, which has the NGA working in every region of the world—more than
400 agreements with more than 120 countries—building geospatial intelligence
capacity “to enable international partners to operate in coalition environments,
transform and modernize their defense structures, and protect common interests”
(Eilenberger 2008, 5–6).
The NGA is in the forefront of the Intelligence Community in having recog-
nized that in the globalization era its success and its accountability depend on car-
rying out its geospatial-intelligence mission in a manner that is innovative, a manner
that in many ways is fundamentally new. While remaining alert to intelligence
sources and methods that must be protected, it shapes its work in the framework of
international partnerships that keep it on the cutting edge in a fast-moving, com-
petitive, highly technical, global environment.
There are growing examples of positive innovation elsewhere in the Intelligence
Community. The move from risk avoidance to risk management is as complex as it is
essential. The shifting is a reality, driven by the Community’s twenty-first-century
accountability to the nation. Old practices reaching back through the decades of the Cold
War and well before are blending and giving way to those that are bolder and more agile.
The evolution of international collaboration in the global intelligence era continues.
REFERENCES
Beavan, C. 2006. Operation Jedburgh. New York: Viking.

Budiansky, S. 2000. Battle of Wits. New York: The Free Press.
Bush, G. W. 2001. Address to a Joint Session of the Congress and the American People,
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010920–8.html (September 20).
Clift, A. D. 2002. Through the Prism of National Security: The Challenge of Intelligence
Sharing. Address to the Kennedy School, Harvard University, August 27, 2001, in Clift
Notes, by A. Denis Clift. Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College Press.
Crumpton, H. A. 2005. Intelligence and War, in Transforming U.S. Intelligence ed. Jennifer
E. Sims and Burton Gerber. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Department of Defense. 1992. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress,
Washington, D.C.
Dulles, A. 1963. The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
Eilenberger, D. Pathfinder, The Geospatial Intelligence Magazine 6, no. 2.
Executive Order 12333. 1981. United States Intelligence Activities. Washington, D.C.: The
White House (December 4).
Executive Order, Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence
Activities. 2008. Washington, D.C.: The White House (July 31).
Finnegan, T. J. 2007. Shooting the Front—Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic
Interpretation on the Western Front—World War I. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
Intelligence College Press.
Jenkins, E. S. 2004. Romania’s Potential Contribution to NATO Intelligence Capabilities,
Major General Sergui Medar and Colonel Gheorge Savu, as quoted in Intelligence
Sharing among NATO Allies, Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College
Press.
McConnell, J. M. 2008a. VISION 2015 A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence
Enterprise. Washington, D.C.: Director of National Intelligence.
McConnell, J. M. 2008b. Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record,
Executive Order 12333, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
(July 31).
Murrett, R. B. 2008. Pathfinder, The Geospatial Intelligence Magazine 6, no. 2 (March/April).
Negroponte, J. 2005. The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America
(October). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Scheffer, J. de H., NATO Secretary General. 2004. A New Atlanticism for the 21st Century.
Speech to Conference of the German Marshall Fund, Istanbul, Turkey (June 27).
Schroen, G. C. 2005. First In. New York: Ballantine Books.
Stafford, D. 1998. Churchill and Secret Service. Woodstock and New York: The Overlook
Press.
Truman, H. S. 1956. Memoirs. Volume 2, Years of Trial and Hope. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday and Company, Inc.
Warner, M., ed. 2001, Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1, The Authorities and
Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, effective 19 November 1998, in Central Intelligence Origin and Evolution.
Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
Website, http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm.
Website, http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/mediaadvisory/2007/01-january/ma070123-12.htm
Wilson, C. P. 1999. Strategic Reconnaissance in the Near East. Washington, D.C.: The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
part iv
INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION AND
PROCESSING
chapter 14
THE DILEMMA OF OPEN

SOURCES INTELLIGENCE: IS
OSINT REALLY
INTELLIGENCE?
arthur s. hulnick
1. Introduction
The American intelligence system has always been somewhat ambivalent about intel-
ligence material derived from open sources (OSINT), including media, journals, and
other publicly available sources. While intelligence managers often praised the utility
of OSINT, resources for the mechanisms by which the OSINT was gathered began to
shrink, even before the Cold War started to wind down. In the wake of the 9/11 ter-
rorist attack on the United States and the subsequent close examination of the
American intelligence system, enthusiasm for OSINT on the part of legislators, as
well as intelligence managers, resulted in a new emphasis on open sources.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 mandated the
creation of a new office dedicated to Open Sources, under the direction of the
newly created post of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), to be managed by
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This served to revive the almost-moribund
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), one of the oldest parts of the U.S.
Intelligence Community (IC), which became, in the new regime, the Open Source
Center (OSC). Despite the resurgence in OSINT, however, policy officials, the
ultimate recipients of finished intelligence, were not quite as enthusiastic about
OSINT as those who created the new system. This is a problem with deep roots.
230 intelligence collection and processing
Many years ago, when I was a member of the Intelligence Community Staff, a
distant predecessor of what is now the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Office (ODNI), I took part in a survey of policy officials and other intelligence con-
sumers to find out what they thought about the intelligence products they were
receiving. In talking with these officials, my colleagues and I learned that they had
little patience and less interest in reading analysis derived mostly from open sources.
Rather, they wanted material from spies, intercepts, or any of the other more exotic
sources available to intelligence analysts. Otherwise, they said, reading intelligence
analysis was like reading the New York Times, which most of them had already done
by the time they had reached their offices.
Nonetheless, among intelligence professionals, OSINT was rated highly as
source material for both collectors and analysts, and that seems to be true to this
day. Similarly, for case officers handling intelligence agents, the ability to compare
what their sources are telling them with what is being reported in the local media
has been a good way to verify the veracity of their contacts. Having easy access
to the media in the sources’ home countries through what was previously FBIS—
now the Open Source Center—has served as well. FBIS, one of the oldest compo-
nents of the CIA, not only provided translations of print and broadcast media, its
wire service brought reporting to those who need it quickly and efficiently.
For analysts, the FBIS translations made a quick scan of the media in their tar-
get countries an easy way to begin the day, after sorting through the more sensitive
materials that appeared in each in-box. As the intelligence system moved into the
computer era, FBIS was easy to access, and could still be relied on to capture not
only media reporting, but if asked, speeches broadcast by major world leaders, from
Fidel Castro’s hours-long tirades, to the convoluted messages that seeped out from
such closed societies as North Korea or Albania.
2. An Easy Way to Learn

OSINT has been an easy way to learn about intelligence targets, follow daily devel-
opments, or even discover news that might not otherwise appear in official report-
ing from overseas. Before the development of the World Wide Web, intelligence
officers had the luxury of obtaining hard copies of foreign media, and it was not
unusual to find analysts reading the press from their target countries in the national
languages, delayed only by the time it took for the subscriptions to reach them.
Now, of course, reading the foreign media is even easier—for those who have the
language skills—through the Web.
Generally speaking, most observers of the intelligence system will agree that
OSINT makes up about 80 percent of the material available to the intelligence ana-
lyst who is dealing with developments abroad. This might not be true in dealing
the dilemma of open sources intelligence 231
with such closed societies as North Korea or where the press is carefully controlled,
such as in Iran. OSINT may not be quite as useful in dealing with trans-national
issues, such as terrorism, narcotics flows, subversion, or guerrilla warfare, although
one can learn what other countries are doing to deal with these problems.
3. OSINT in the Private Sector

In the private sector, a number of services have sprung up over the years to gather
and analyze OSINT for commercial subscribers, in part to warn them of develop-
ments that might affect their business ventures abroad or even their investments
at home. These services, often organized ands run by intelligence veterans on a
twenty-four-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week basis, provide the same kinds of warn-
ing intelligence that the government’s watch centers do, as well as more in-depth
analysis for their customers.1 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
established a similar OSINT watch center to support its myriad and far-flung
components, reacting in part to pressure from the Congress, but also to the fact
that professional intelligence officers have restructured the way DHS handles
intelligence. The Open Source report is available to the public through the DHS
web site.2
OSINT is the main tool in the private sector for what has become a major field
of collection and analysis, known as competitive or marketplace intelligence. Private
firms are eager to find out about their competitors in the marketplace, and since
private intelligence operatives cannot, or should not, use traditional methods of
espionage or technical intelligence, since both would be illegal, they have to rely on
OSINT to gather and analyze intelligence for their consumers.3
In the private sector, competitive intelligence specialists use a category of OSINT
not often found in government. This is called “grey intelligence” and concerns
sources not readily available in the media, but available through digging into pubic
records such as financial filings and real estate data (Nelson and Sigurdson 1991,
17–34). Private-sector intelligence analysts then compile the marketplace data for
the firms that hire them. The final products are tailored to the requirements laid out
by the consumers, and may include both judgments about the target and policy
recommendations. In government, intelligence products never include advice about
policy.
1
One of the premier services in this regard is provided to the private sector by a company
called StratFor. Its analysis is available on the Web at www.stratfor.com.
2
www.dhs.gov.
3
The most comprehensive discussion of the use of OSINT in marketplace intelligence is
contained in work by Leonard Fuld of Fuld & Co. (1995).
4. OSINT and Early Warning

Despite what misgivings consumers might have had about OSINT, it finds its way
into many national intelligence publications, from early warning intelligence to
daily bulletins, in-depth studies, and national estimates. OSINT may even be found
in the President’s Daily Brief, one of the most sensitive of all intelligence publica-
tions, although the OSINT components that have driven the analysis may not be
specifically identified (Eisler 2008a). Thus, OSINT becomes part of the all-source
mix that analysts routinely use, along with human-source reporting and intelli-
gence from technical sensors. While the kinds of OSINT available to collectors and
analysts may have changed over the years, the principals of usage remain the same.
A good illustration of how OSINT worked in early warning concerned the death of
Konstantin Chernenko, the ailing general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in
March 1985. Although the IC knew that Chernenko was seriously ill, the Soviet govern-
ment tended to hide information about the health of its leaders, perhaps somewhat
uncertain about how the news would be received. Although there was no announce-
ment, when Chernenko died, Radio Moscow began playing somber “funeral music”
instead of its regular programming. A correspondent for the Washington Post picked this
up and cabled his bosses in hopes of a news scoop, but they apparently wanted more
proof and held the story. The IC also picked this up and was able to interpret the broad-
cast correctly and issue a warning notice, thus beating the press to the news.4
Years ago, when military forces were often involved in overthrowing civilian gov-
ernments in the developing world, the start of a coup meant seizure of radio stations
and, inevitably, the playing of martial music, as the military played the role of national
savior. It was also a signal that the coup had begun, thus providing warning and
alerting intelligence for Washington consumers, most of whom did not want to be
totally surprised by such events, even though there was little they could do. If there
were U.S. embassies in the countries concerned, they, too, would report the change in
government, but it always took them longer to do so because duty officers had to
clear their outgoing cables with the local American bureaucracy.
Today, early warning is made somewhat easier by the proliferation of twenty-
four-hour, seven-day-a-week television and radio news services, which have literally
thousands of stringers around the world just looking for events that might become
“breaking news.” Coupled with Indications and Warning centers at major U.S. com-
mands, which also monitor the media, it should be very difficult to miss an event that
ought to be brought to the attention of policy officials, alerted by 24/7 watch centers
among most of the Intelligence Community’s sixteen component intelligence agen-
cies. Of course, such a system, while picking up breaking news, could not be expected
to pick up from open sources something like the 9/11 terrorist plot, but it did see, very
quickly, reaction around the world to the attack on the United States.
4
For a more comprehensive look at OSINT against the Soviet Union, see Robert W. Pringle
(2003, 280–89).
5. OSINT and Current Intelligence

OSINT was in the early days, and is now, an important input to daily analysis.
When I was a working analyst, OSINT formed the basis for much of what I learned
about ongoing events, but what made my analysis special was the human-source
reporting and other sensitive inputs that allowed me to piece together current
analysis that went beyond what the press could report. Based on discussions
with analysts, that situation has not changed although the OSINT materials have.
Today the IC relies on Al Jazeera or other Middle East media to broadcast film
clips of Osama bin Laden or his associates to learn what they have to say, since it
does not appear that intelligence officials will get much closer to the terrorist leaders
as they hide out in the caves of Pakistan. While a lot of what is said seems to be
mostly propaganda and rhetoric, there are the occasional nuggets of information in
these speeches that may prove useful.
Clearly, OSINT is a useful tool, even if intelligence consumers want analysis from
more sensitive sources. Why, then, did resources for OSINT dwindle, forcing cut-
backs at FBIS and a threatened end to this important service? Perhaps it was the end
of the Cold War, although FBIS was shrinking even before that happened. It had lost
the unit that had carried out what was known as “content analysis,” the effort to try
to piece together conclusions from the news filtering out from Communist or other
closed societies, and its personnel were cut back, especially in the stations FBIS had
maintained overseas to pick up weaker broadcast signals and regional media. In a
world where intelligence operations had become increasingly sophisticated and tech-
nical, OSINT seemed like old news and lost a lot of its resource support.
6. OSINT and Intelligence Reform

Despite the cuts, a number of senior officials in intelligence management con-
tinued to argue the value of OSINT and sought to prevent the total demise of
FBIS. Finally, in the intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA), a seriously flawed attempt at a total revision of the intelligence system,
an Office of Open Source Intelligence was created, essentially resurrecting FBIS
in a new form and giving life to what had appeared to be a moribund enterprise
( Tucker 2008). Still, the new organization appears to be short on resources and,
like much of the current Intelligence Community, has been forced to rely on
contractors to perform some important functions, especially in analyzing OSINT
material.5
5
See, for example, Science Applications International Corporation SAIC Research Report,
Iranian Textbooks Content and Context, December 31, 2007.
Of course, OSINT today is not the same as it was during the FBIS era. The pro-
liferation of open sources, especially in the blogosphere, and in sources such as
Wikipedia, along with the explosion in other web sources, has expanded the world
of open sources to the point that there is just too much material to be absorbed.
Because of the proliferation of open source material, OSINT managers have to rely
on various forms of “data mining,” using computer-driven algorithms to sort
through the vast sea of sources to create useful and workable data bases. Anyone
who has “googled” a topic and received hundreds of thousands of hits will under-
stand this quite well.
A second development since the “old days” is that fact that today’s policy offi-
cials are all computer literate and are quite capable, if they have the time, of seeking
open sources without outside help. This is quite a generational change. I can remem-
ber when senior officials were incapable of turning on their computers, much less
using them efficiently, and some even had them removed from their offices because
they were just gathering dust. Coupled with the fact that intelligence, whether
OSINT or from more sensitive sources, is now delivered electronically to most con-
sumers, this has changed the way the Intelligence Community does business.
Another new development is the proliferation of information derived from
commercial overhead reconnaissance systems, such as “Google Earth.” These sys-
tems mimic the more sensitive imagery satellites launched at great expense by the
U.S. government. While the resolution of the commercial satellites may not be as
sharp as the more sensitive government-launched space vehicles, they have drawn a
lot of excitement and interest to the point that the National-Geospatial Intelligence
Agency (NGA), the unit that handles imagery analysis, has begun using images from
the commercial satellites just as other forms of OSINT are used (Eisler 2008b).
7. Why OSINT May Be Classified

While most OSINT materials are drawn from publicly available media and other
open sources, there is a good reason to treat some of the sources as sensitive, and
classify the finished, analyzed intelligence that is drawn from them, and not just to
convince policy officials that the analysis is worth reading. Jennifer Sims, a prolific
writer about intelligence issues, and a former U.S State Department official, now
director of intelligence studies at Georgetown University, points out that “intelli-
gence could, and should be classified . . . because of the insights you derive for the
decision-makers from that source”(Waterman 2008).
In fact, some open-source materials have been classified as well because of
copyright issues. Kim Robson, deputy director of the OSC pointed this out in
response to criticism from Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American
Scientists, who is an advocate for government transparency and a reduction in
secrecy, even in intelligence. She also argued that some OSINT should be classified
to protect the fact that the U.S intelligence system has recognized something our
adversaries want to hide. For example, she cited the possibility that an al-Qaeda
operative might have put something on a blog that his masters might not like. That
sort of information ought to be protected, Robson argued (Waterman 2008).
8. The Downside of OSINT

Given the fact that OSINT is a low-cost input in intelligence, practically if not totally
cost-free (except for packaging and handling), it might be hard for some to see that
there might be some downsides in the world of OSINT, besides the issues men-
tioned above (Hulnick 2002). The most significant of these is the probability that
some OSINT sources might contain misinformation, disinformation, secret mes-
sages, or nonsense. Intelligence analysts ought to be used to dealing with misinfor-
mation, ambiguous data, or conflicting reports, whether from OSINT or from other
sources. In fact, low reliability, conflicting reports, and ambiguity are the hallmarks
of intelligence sourcing.
Human sources often lie, or tell more than they know. Intercepts may be gar-
bled or suffer from poor translations. Imagery may be ambiguous, despite signifi-
cant advances in computerized interpretation. So it is with OSINT. That is why
analysts seek to compare all their sources, to see if they can reduce the level of uncer-
tainty or ambiguity. It is also why analysts are always seeking the “golden nugget” of
reporting that will tell them exactly what is happening—but that nugget almost
never surfaces.
Analysts should have the patience and skill to sort through OSINT to see if they
can find the most reliable interpretation of the information with which they work.
It is common knowledge that media reporting can be politically biased, especially in
the foreign environment. Political parties own newspapers or broadcast stations in
many countries, and nothing is more politicized or biased than the blogosphere.
Anyone can create a blog, and say whatever they please. Some of this, of course, is
nonsense so learning to separate wheat from chaff in the electronic world is a neces-
sary skill.
9. Disinformation in OSINT
Disinformation is more insidious and dangerous problem. Disinformation is a way
to denigrate an adversary or enemy by circulating false stories wrapped around a
nugget or kernel of truth, thus making the entire thing believable. For example,
during the Cold War, the Soviets circulated stories claiming that the CIA had created
the AIDS virus during the course of experimentation with drugs (Andrew and
Gordievsky 1990, 630–32). Of course, this was patently untrue, but the CIA did
engage in drug experiments, which were exposed during the Church Committee
investigations in the 1970s, so the AIDS claim became believable to many. Students
from the developing world who come to Boston University still repeat such claims,
despite all suggestions to the contrary.
More recently, al-Qaeda operatives have circulated articles denouncing Coalition
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as “crusaders” who want to reclaim land in the Middle
East, even though no respectable politician in the West has ever suggested such a
policy. Nonetheless, constant repetition of such disinformation only tends to cement
such beliefs in those who oppose Western policy, or who are looking for justification
for anti-Western attitudes. Disinformation should be easily recognizable to an intel-
ligence professional, but it may well play back to consumers who don’t know any
better. The problem of playback makes disinformation a difficult tool to use, and
that is why U.S. intelligence managers have been reluctant to employ it against our
enemies or adversaries.
Another potential hazard with open media, especially video clips, is stegano-
graphy, sending hidden messages in open media, not readily visible to the average
user, but recognizable to the intended recipients (Hulnick 2002, 568–69) In the
aftermath of 9/11, when Osama bin Laden and his henchmen were using video to
broadcast inflammatory messages, some believed that there might have been hid-
den messages designed to trigger more terrorist attacks. Whether or not such hidden
messages existed remains a mystery. Sending coded messages in open media, how-
ever, is an old technique in intelligence. In World War II, the British broadcasting
service routinely used its radio programs to send coded messages to agents on the
European continent. In theory, anyone not privy to the codes would understand the
words, but not be able to tell what they meant.
Another concern relates to the commercial imagery satellites mentioned previ-
ously. While only a handful of nations have been capable of launching so-called spy
satellites, now any nation and even terrorists can use Google Earth for intelligence
gathering and analysis. Terrorists might use the images to spot likely targets, and
national intelligence agencies could use the images to spy on their neighbors’ mili-
tary systems, or to deal with border disputes (Eisler 2008b).
10. Counterintelligence Aspects of OSINT

There are counterintelligence aspects of OSINT that must not be overlooked. If the
United States can use OSINT to learn about its adversaries and enemies, surely those
adversaries and enemies can do the same to the United States, but with a great
advantage. No country is more open than the United States, even among Western
industrialized nations. Although the United States has a highly developed and
extensive system for protecting national security and intelligence secrets, a great
deal of information is readily available. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
permits U.S. citizens to apply to the government for any material not otherwise
classified. So, agents of foreign powers, some of whom might be U.S. citizens, can do
the same thing. But, so much information is already in the public domain, the use
of FOIA is not often necessary.
During the Cold War, while the United States was spending billions of dollars
to build photo satellites and the high-flying U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, Soviet bloc
attaches were able to learn about the latest U.S. military hardware by going to air
shows or port calls, where the latest in aircraft or ships were displayed and often
open to visitors. The attaches could subscribe to Aviation Week magazine or other
such publications where detailed reports on technological advances were covered in
detail. Even more, they could go to hobby shops and purchase for a few dollars
models of the advanced weapons systems, which were often accurate in detail.
11. OSINT for Adversaries

All through the Cold War, and right up to the present, military publications put out
by the advanced military schools, the War Colleges, and what is now the National
Defense University (NDU) included unclassified articles by senior officers about U.S.
tactics and strategy. Even the CIA, in its periodical publication Studies in Intelligence,
printed unclassified articles, and later began to make these articles publicly available.
At one point, I received from the CIA a rather large box containing literally hundreds
of such released articles, and I had planned to try to edit them into some form of
publication. Fortunately, while I mulling how to sort through all the material, the
CIA invited the late H. Bradford Westerfield, a professor at Yale University and one
of the first academics to teach about intelligence, to publish a compilation of articles
drawn from Studies, so I was relieved of the task (Westerfield 1995).
The CIA has a rather mixed record, however, in permitting its current and for-
mer officers to write in open literature. The agency has encouraged some officers to
write books and articles while others have been told their manuscripts were contro-
versial and could not be released for publication. In order to put some regularity
into the manuscript review process, Admiral Stansfield Turner, during his tenure as
director of the CIA, established a Publications Review Board (PRB) to oversee the
release process. After he left the CIA, Turner was understandably upset when the
chapter he had written on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in his book Secrecy and
Democracy was returned marked “Top Secret—Handle via COMINT Channels
Only” and he was unable to use it (Turner 1985).
Despite the sometimes quirky rules the PRB followed, it regularly negotiated
with former agency officers to allow publication of their works, with changes
demanded by the various components of the Board. Sometimes, the rules seemed
to fly in the face of information already in the public domain. For example, the use
of the term “chief of station” was banned for a long time, even though the term was
widely circulated in the open press. At times, it appeared that the PRB was unaware
of the extent to which intelligence matters were covered in the open media.
The PRB denied some material because the Board believed the information
would confirm CIA operations that the CIA itself had not acknowledged. There
were, however, other issues to which some Board members objected but which the
Board cleared anyway. For example, several articles and book chapters I had written
denigrating the use of the polygraph as a security tool apparently raised the ire of
the Office of Security. Nonetheless, the PRB allowed me to use the material (Hulnick
2000, 96–97). Former agency colleagues agreed that the PRB was generally even-
handed in its treatment of manuscripts and was prompt and reasonable in deter-
mining what could be published.
Under Porter Goss, the former Republican congressman who took over the CIA
after George Tenet in the George W. Bush administration, the situation changed.
Goss, and his staff, often referred to as the “Gosslings,” tried hard to squelch publi-
cations and discourage serving as well as retired officers from writing for open pub-
lication. Thus, Tenet found himself embroiled in some controversy about his
memoirs, a self-serving explanation about why the CIA could not uncover the 9/11
plot and why it predicted that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction,
when in fact, Saddam did not (Tenet 2007).
Even more difficult was former CIA operative Valerie Plame Wilson’s effort to
explain her role, if any, in sending her husband, Ambassador Joe Wilson, to Niger to
find out if Saddam had been trying to buy nuclear material. Mrs. Wilson’s story
clearly blamed the Bush administration for attempting to denigrate Ambassador
Wilson’s effort, and the CIA severely redacted her manuscript. Mrs. Wilson then
hired a journalist, with no CIA connections, to write the parts of the story that were
out in the open literature but which the CIA had forbidden Mrs. Wilson from
writing herself (Wilson 2007).
12. No Longer Difficult

I had once written that learning about the CIA was difficult but not impossible
(Hulnick 1991, 89–99). Today, it’s no longer difficult. Former intelligence officers,
enterprising journalists, and even academics who have become focused on intelli-
gence and the intelligence process as a function of government, have produced a
significant number of articles, books, and anthologies that lay bare much of what
goes in American intelligence, not to mention significant works on other countries’
services. There are a few secrets left relating to sources and methods, and the inner
workings of the intelligence bureaucracy, but anyone who wants to know about the
secret agencies will not have a difficult time finding the information.
One of the best open sources for information about the U.S. government comes
from the Congress. The Congressional Research Service, a non-partisan analytic
organization, publishes detailed unclassified studies of government issues, includ-
ing intelligence and national-security matters. The George W. Bush administration
tried to prevent these publications from reaching the general public, but activists at
the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), who are opposed to excessive govern-
ment secrecy, have made an effort to make these studies available on the FAS Web
site.6
In fact the Bush administration has tried hard to curb the availability of gov-
ernment information, even when it is not properly classified confidential, secret, or
top secret. In the early days of the Bush administration, officials tried to re-classify
material that had already been released to the public. When that failed, the govern-
ment tried to label material as “sensitive,” even though it was not classified, so as to
restrict its circulation.
In the latest move, President George W. Bush ordered in May 2008 the creation
of the “Controlled Unclassified Information Office.” Apparently, Controlled
Unclassified Information (CUI) will be another way to restrict unclassified but
allegedly sensitive information from general circulation (Pincus 2008). Such cate-
gories already exist, including the category “For Official Use Only” (FOUO). In
addition, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has restricted
the circulation of some OSINT materials because the translations of the foreign
press may copyright laws (Aftergood 2008). All of these restrictions seem to have
the support of the Congress.
13. The Bottom Line

So, what is the bottom line? Is OSINT really intelligence? It is hard to find anyone
who would argue the negative, despite the downside issues I have raised here.
Hamilton Bean, a former consultant on OSINT to the IC, has gathered considerable
data, from congressional testimony to government statements, all lauding the need
for OSINT and supporting its use. His article in the International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (IJIC) provides a rather comprehensive review
of the literature on OSINT, almost all of it positive (2007, 240–57).
No one has been more outspoken about OSINT than Robert D. Steele, a former
Marine and CIA officer, who has spent many years writing and pushing emphasis
on OSINT. He has published several books and numerous articles on the subject,
and has created a consultant firm, Open Source Solutions, to promote OSINT. In
discussions with Mr. Steele, his zeal in support of OSINT is so overwhelming, it is
much like being confronted with a relentless used-car salesman. Conversations with
6
See www.fas.org and Steven Aftergood’s secrecy newsletter.
him tend to be very one-sided, in that he leaves few openings for rejoinders to his
rather intense presentations.
Steele argues that proper use of OSINT could replace some of the more secret—
and expensive—aspects of intelligence collection, claiming that “OSINT will dis-
place 80% of the dollars devoted to secret sources and methods . . .” (Steele 2007,
95–122). For those of us who have labored in the field of intelligence analysis, it is
difficult indeed to agree with Mr. Steele. There is no question that OSINT is impor-
tant and necessary, but human sources, imagery, and intercepts are the inputs that
make intelligence analysis special. The original concept in creating the Central
Intelligence Agency as a repository for data from all sources was wise at the time and
still remains sensible today.
OSINT has been lauded, nonetheless, by senior intelligence officials quite regu-
larly since the establishment of the Open Source Center. The Office of the DNI has
sponsored regular Open Source conferences, some of which have been open to the
public, to promote the use of OSINT. At one such conference in Washington in
September 2008, Michael Hayden, director of CIA, discussed some his own experi-
ences in using OSINT during his career as an Air Force Intelligence Officer. General
Hayden, now retired from the U.S. Air Force after having reached the rank of four-
star general, was one of the early advocates of establishing an Open Source Center.7
General Hayden had served as director the National Security Agency before taking
over the directorship of the CIA.
OSINT is indeed intelligence. It provides information about our adversaries
and enemies they might not want us to have. Properly interpreted, OSINT can be
just as enlightening as a well-informed secret agent, or an image from an unmanned
aircraft zooming in on a terrorist. In the end, what matters most in intelligence is
the system’s ability to deliver sound judgments to decision makers. If OSINT aids in
that process, then it is worth the cost and effort to collect and analyze it.
REFERENCES
Aftergood, S. 2008. Open Source Center Keeps Public in the Dark. Secrecy News. www.fas.
org (May 19).
Andrew, C., and Gordievsky, O. 1990. KGB: The Inside Story. New York: HarperCollins.
Bean, H. 2007. The DNI’s Open Source Center: An Organizational Communication
Perspective. International Journal of intelligence and CounterIntelligence 20, no. 2 (Fall).
Eisler, P. 2008a. Today’s Spies Find Secrets in Plain Sight. USA Today (April 1).
———. 2008b. Google Earth Helps and Worries Government. USA Today (November 12).
Fuld, L. 1995. The New Competitor Intelligence. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Hulnick, A. S. 1991. Learning about the CIA: Difficult but Not Impossible. International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 5, no. 1 (Spring).
7
See remarks by Director Michael V. Hayden at the DNI Open Source Conference,
Washington, D.C., September 12, 2008, available at www.odni.gov.
———. 2000. Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the 21st Century.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
———. 2002. The Downside of Open Source Intelligence, l. Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence 15, no. 4 (Winter).
Nelson, P., and J. Sigurdson. 1991. Intelligence Gathering and Japan: The Elusive Role of
Grey Intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 5, no. 1
(Spring).
Pincus, W. 2008. Keeping Secrets: A New Designation for Classifying Information.
WashingtonPost.com (May 10).
Pringle, R. W. 2003. The Limits of OSINT: Diagnosing the Soviet Media, 1985–1989.
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 2 (Summer).
Steele, R. D. 2007. Open Source Intelligence, in L. K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence,
vol. 2, From Spies to Policymakers. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
Tenet, G. 2007. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins.
Tucker, N. B. 2008. The Cultural Revolution in Intelligence: Interim Report. The
Washington Quarterly 13, no. 2 (Spring).
Turner, S. 1985. Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition. New York: Houghton
Mifflin.
Waterman, S. 2008. Analysis: Classifying Open Source Intelligence. www.SpaceWar.com
(September 17).
Westerfield, H. B., ed. 1995. Inside the CIA’s Private World. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press.
Wilson, V. P. 2007. Fair Game: My Life as a Spy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
chapter 15
THE TROUBLED
INHERITANCE: THE
NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY AND THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
matthew m. aid
He that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind.

—Proverbs 11:29
1. Deus Ex Machina
On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the forty-fourth President
of the United States. The Obama administration inherited from the administration
of President George W. Bush a U.S. intelligence community composed of sixteen
agencies and a budget of $47.5 billion that is in a state of flux and turmoil. Embroiled
in political controversies concerning the politicization of intelligence information,
domestic spying and the use of torture to extract information from terrorists, the
intelligence community is also striving to help the U.S. military win two ongoing
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while at the same time trying to reinvigorate its stalled
efforts in what the former Bush administration once referred to as the Global War
on Terrorism (GWOT). Moreover, the financial crisis that hit the U.S. economy in
the troubled inheritance 243
September–October 2008 will almost certainly have both short- and long-term
implications for the U.S. intelligence community that the Obama administration
must immediately confront (Ignatius 2008; Fletcher and Pincus 2008; Mazzetti
2008).
No branch of the U.S. intelligence community potentially faces greater scrutiny
by the new Obama administration and Congress than the National Security Agency
(NSA), the largest and arguably the most powerful member of the U.S. intelligence
community. As described in greater detail below, NSA still finds itself enmeshed in
a raging political controversy surrounding its warrantless domestic eavesdropping
activities that began immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as a debate
within the U.S. government concerning the effectiveness of its intelligence collec-
tion and reporting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the declining productivity of its
efforts to help find Osama bin Laden and the rest of his al-Qaeda terrorist organiza-
tion (Risen and Lichtblau 2008).
Generally speaking, NSA’s mission is simple and easy to understand. Since its
formation in November 1952, NSA has managed and directed all U.S. government
signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection and processing activities. It is the sole col-
lector and processor of communications intelligence (COMINT), the primary (but
not the sole) processor of foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT),
and since 1958 it has been the coordinator of the U.S. government’s national elec-
tronics intelligence (ELINT) program. NSA is also responsible for overseeing the
security of the U.S. government’s communications and data processing systems
(referred to within NSA as Information Security, or INFOSEC), and since the mid-
1980s NSA has also managed the U.S. government’s national operations security
(OPSEC) program ( Johnson 1995–99).
The National Security Agency sits atop a sprawling empire referred to within
the U.S. intelligence community as the U.S. Cryptologic System (USCS), formerly
called the U.S. SIGINT System (USSS), which consists of an ever-growing number
of American intelligence organizations that conduct the U.S. government’s national
SIGINT collection and processing mission under NSA’s nominal direction. In addi-
tion to NSA, the USSS is composed of the three so-called Service Cryptologic
Elements (SCEs)—the cryptologic elements of the U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command (INSCOM), the Naval Network Warfare Command (formerly
called the Naval Security Group Command), and the Air Force Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (formerly known as the Air Intelligence
Agency), as well as the thousands of SIGINT personnel assigned to the U.S. mili-
tary’s unified and specified commands and dozens of tactical intelligence units situ-
ated around the world. NSA also exercises operational control over the joint Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)—NSA clandestine SIGINT collection organization called
the Special Collection Service (SCS), which currently operates listening posts in
several dozen American diplomatic establishments around the world. But the
increasingly important role of the DEA, the CIA, and the three military services in
the SIGINT field has led to the diminishment of NSA’s control over the national
SIGINT effort. The result has been that over time, NSA has lost somewhat the
all-important “centrality-of-command” that it once enjoyed over the national

SIGINT effort (NSA 1994).
2. Reborn under Fire

The eight years from (2001 to 2009) were the most turbulent in NSA’s history.
President George W. Bush was an intelligence neophyte when he entered the
Oval Office for the first time on January 20, 2001. As NSA had done since Ronald
Reagan was inaugurated in January 1981, President Bush and his national-
security transition team were given detailed briefing papers concerning the
agency’s mission and capabilities, as well as the key issues confronting the
agency. At the time, the 32,000-man National Security Agency, which then had
an annual budget of less than $4.0 billion per annum, was struggling mightily
to transform and modernize itself with only mixed success to show for all of its
efforts. NSA worked hard to ingratiate itself with the Bush administration,
aggressively promoting its modernization and reform agenda with President
Bush and other senior members of the new administration, including Vice
President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (NSA 2000;
Hatch 2004; Aid 2000).
But less than nine months later, on September 11, 2001, NSA, like the rest of
the U.S. intelligence community, was thrown headfirst into a crisis of unimagi-
nable proportions. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, which resulted in 2,973 Americans
dead and thousands more wounded, were one of the most searing events in the
agency’s history. A series of declassified congressional studies and Blue Ribbon
panel reports all concluded that NSA did not commit any egregious errors in the
days and months leading up to the 9/11 attacks, with one report concluding that:
“Prior to 11 September 2001, NSA had no specific information indicating the date,
time, place, or participants in an attack on the United States.” The main problems
identified by these postmortem reports was that the intelligence material being
generated by NSA was not getting to many of the people within the U.S. govern-
ment who needed it the most, and that the people who did have access to NSA’s
SIGINT product at the CIA and FBI either incorrectly analyzed it or did not act
upon it (Aid 2003).
In the eight years since 9/11, NSA has dramatically transformed itself. NSA’s
budget has been dramatically increased every year since 2001, climbing to more
than $9.0 billion according to recent published estimates, accounting for approxi-
mately 20 percent of the entire U.S. intelligence budget. Billions of dollars have been
spent since 9/11 acquiring new hardware and software designed to improve NSA’s
ability to collect, process, and analyze the ever-increasing volume of material being
intercepted every day. NSA’s manpower strength has shot upward, which has raised
NSA’s manpower strength to about 35,000 military and civilian personnel. Moreover,
the size of the entire U.S. Cryptologic System (USCS), including the SIGINT per-
sonnel assigned to the CIA, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the
three military services, has grown to more than 60,000 military and civilian person-
nel since 9/11, making it by far the single largest component of the U.S. intelligence
community (Gorman 2007a; National Guard Bureau 2003).
3. Sigint and the Wars in Afghanistan

and Iraq
For the past eight years, the vast majority of NSA’s and the U.S. military’s SIGINT
collection assets have been committed to the two wars that the America military
is currently fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not all has gone well in these two
conflicts. Interviews and declassified documents reveal that NSA and the U.S.
military’s SIGINT units initially were not trained, manned, or equipped for the
counterinsurgency environments in which they had to operate. The efficacy of
SIGINT in both countries eventually improved, but only thanks to across-the-
board battlefield improvisation and the appropriation of hundreds of millions of
dollars needed to correct these deficiencies. (This section derived from Aid 2009,
chapter 16).
Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, NSA and the U.S.
military’s SIGINT units struggled to collect intelligence about the strength and
capabilities of the Taliban guerrillas fighting the U.S. forces. The first U.S. military
SIGINT units that deployed to Afghanistan in 2001–2002 had virtually no linguists
who understood the languages spoken in Afghanistan. The Taliban guerrillas did
not make much use of conventional radio sets or advanced cellular telephone tech-
nology. Instead, the Taliban relied on Japanese-made walkie-talkies called ICOMs,
which could only be intercepted at close range by radio scanners comparable to
what any person can purchase at their local Radio Shack store. The problem was
that the U.S. Army combat units rotating into Afghanistan in 2002–2003 brought
with them no SIGINT equipment capable of intercepting or locating Taliban walkie-
talkie transmissions, leaving U.S. field commanders virtually blind on the battle-
field. Some Army commanders resorted to covertly purchasing commercially
available radio scanners in the Kabul souk and giving them to their uncleared Afghan
interpreters in order create their own ad hoc SIGINT capability.
This has meant that most of the intelligence generated by SIGINT in
Afghanistan since at least 2004 has not come from NSA’s national-level SIGINT
assets, but rather from low-level tactical SIGINT collected by the Afghan inter-
preters assigned to every U.S. and NATO combat unit in Afghanistan down to
platoon level. Interviews with U.S. Army and NATO intelligence specialists
returning from Afghanistan have revealed that the overall importance of the tacti-
cal intelligence information provided by these interpreters has been enormous.
Tactical SIGINT has become the most important source of battlefield intelligence
in Afghanistan, providing the majority of the “hard” intelligence information
concerning the intentions, troop movements, combat strength, supply status, and
morale of Taliban guerrillas.
For instance, in 2005 SIGINT confirmed that the Taliban guerrilla forces were
larger and better equipped than at any time since the U.S. invasion in October
2001. In one encounter after another, Taliban guerrilla units demonstrated a level
of sophistication and flexibility not previously seen, and their extensive use of
ICOM walkie-talkies allowed them to closely monitor U.S. forces and prepare
ambushes. SIGINT has also proven to be over the years to be an invaluable means
of finding and eliminating Taliban “high value targets,” such as senior insurgent
field commanders. In March 2003, SIGINT was used by U.S. Army Green Berets to
track down and kill Haji Satar, the Taliban commander responsible for the mur-
der of an irrigation engineer from El Salvador named Ricardo Munguia in north-
ern Kandahar Province. The ability to exploit Taliban ICOM walkie-talkie traffic
has saved the lives of hundreds of American and NATO troops in Afghanistan,
providing hundreds of warnings to field commanders that the Taliban were about
to attack them based on intercepted enemy walkie-talkie traffic. SIGINT has
become the principal means of assessing Taliban battlefield casualties. A U.S.
Army officer with the 10th Mountain Division who participated in Operation
Mountain Lion in Helmand Province in April 2006 recalled that after a clash with
Taliban fighters outside his firebase, intercepted ICOM traffic revealed that the
Taliban had just lost nineteen dead and double that number wounded in the
engagement.
The exact same thing occurred in Iraq after insurgents began attacking U.S.
occupation forces during the summer of 2003. Desperately short of qualified Arabic
linguists and untrained in counterinsurgency warfare, NSA and the U.S. military
SIGINT units in Iraq struggled to comprehend the enemy they were now facing, who
wore no uniforms, had no training camps or bases, and did not possess a clearly
defined communications network that the SIGINT interceptors could identify and
exploit. The SIGINT equipment that the U.S. military brought with it to Iraq, although
well suited for conventional warfare, proved to be useless in the crowded and densely
populated cities of Iraq against an insurgent enemy that did not use conventional
radios. So NSA and the U.S. military were forced to junk most of the SIGINT equip-
ment that they had, and replace it with off-the-shelf radio scanners and other equip-
ment purchased from commercial radio vendors in the United States.
Newly released documents confirm that SIGINT initially was only a marginal
contributor to the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. Battlefield
successes against the Iraqi insurgents that could be directly attributed to SIGINT
were few and far between during the early days of the insurgency. For example, in
the fall of 2003 SIGINT helped the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment destroy an insur-
gent cell in the town of Rawa in al-Anbar Province that was helping foreign fighters
infiltrate into Iraq from neighboring Jordan, followed by the destruction of another
cell further to the north that was smuggling foreign fighters into Iraq from Syria.
NSA was also able to produce intelligence information in 2003 and 2004 revealing
that Iraqi insurgent groups were being financed by former members of Saddam
Hussein’s regime based in Syria and from sympathizers elsewhere in the Arab world.
But as of the end of 2003, the lack of actionable intelligence information coming
from SIGINT was a source of serious concern, with a former NSA liaison officer in
Iraq recalling that “There were some very, very unhappy people down in those divi-
sion headquarters” who were angry about NSA’s inability to get them the intelli-
gence they needed.
In the fall of 2003 the first cellular telephone networks were built in Iraq,
which went online in February 2004. Iraqi insurgents and their allied foreign
fighters quickly began using these networks to communicate with one another,
allowing the American SIGINT operators for the first time to begin exploiting
insurgent communications. The first notable instance where SIGINT coverage of
insurgent cell-phone traffic helped win an important engagement during the war
in Iraq occurred during the Battle of Fallujah in November 2004, where 10,000
U.S. Army and Marine infantrymen were pitted against more than 2,000 Iraqi
insurgents and foreign fighters in a bloody street-by-street battle for control of
the city of Fallujah. After two weeks of ferocious fighting, thanks in part to SIGINT
the U.S. forces managed to retake the city at a cost of seventy Marines killed and
hundreds more wounded. But telephone intercepts and interrogations of cap-
tured insurgents revealed that 2,000 insurgents, including most of the senior
commanders of the foreign fighters belonging to al-Qaeda in Iraq, escaped from
the city before the battle.
Between 2005 and 2007, SIGINT became an increasingly important source of
intelligence information about the locations and activities of the Iraqi insurgents
and their allied foreign fighters. But it was not until spring of 2007, four years after
the invasion of Iraq, that SIGINT finally began living up to its fullest potential, pro-
ducing the best intelligence then available to U.S. commanders about the identities
and locations of the insurgent cells throughout Iraq. According to one source,
between February 2007 and May 2008 the volume of SIGINT reporting from inside
Iraq increased by 200 percent, leading to the capture or killing of more than 600
“high-value target” insurgent commanders and the capture of 2,500 Iraqi insur-
gents and foreign fighters belonging to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Between October 2007 and
April 2008, one NSA SIGINT unit in Iraq was credited with generating intelligence
that led to the capture or killing of 300 insurgents and a 25 percent drop in Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) attacks inside Iraq.
Much of the credit for SIGINT’s increased effectiveness in Iraq belonged to
General David H. Petraeus, who assumed command of U.S. forces in Iraq in January
2007. According to sources familiar with U.S. intelligence operations in Iraq, Petraeus
was acutely aware of the vital importance of intelligence, especially SIGINT, in
counterinsurgency warfare, and made much more effective use of SIGINT against
the Iraqi insurgent than his predecessors had.
4. The Thin Red Line

But back at home there are recurring signs that NSA itself is still struggling to mod-
ernize and reform itself. A host of problems continue to bedevil the agency. The
NSA’s bureaucracy has once again ballooned in size, with a resulting decrease in
operational efficiency caused by the retrenchment of stifling bureaucratic practices
and procedures at the top levels of the Agency’s management structure (Aid 2007).
NSA’s director, Lt. General Keith B. Alexander, admitted in 2007 that his agency was
still struggling to keep up with the ever-increasing number of intercepts pouring
into Fort Meade (Gertz and Scarborough 2007). And those intercepts that NSA was
able to process, analyze, and report were still not getting to consumers as fast as
General Alexander wanted (NSA 2007). And NSA finds itself spread perilously thin.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to eat up the vast majority of NSA’s
resources, forcing the Agency to give short-shrift to many previously important
intelligence targets, such as the former Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Bosnia,
and the national narcotics interdiction program. The draining away of resources
from North Korea, for example, has been a cause of great concern since 9/11 because
the United States has admittedly almost no spies operating inside North Korea, and
from a SIGINT perspective North Korea is an extremely tough target to monitor
(Sanger 2005).
Many of NSA’s biggest and most important equipment modernization pro-
grams remain years behind schedule and billions of dollars over budget. For exam-
ple, press reports in 2007 revealed that one of NSA’s most expensive modernization
programs, code-named Turbulence, was still experiencing significant delays and cost
overruns (Gorman 2007c; Gorman 2007d). The agency is also currently suffering
from a critical electrical-power shortage at its Fort Meade headquarters complex.
The situation has become so grave that in many NSA offices at Fort Meade the
installation of new computers and data processing systems have been put on hold
because there was not enough electricity to run them, and NSA’s power grid has
become so overtaxed that there have been occasional brownouts of key operational
offices for as much as half a day (Gorman 2007b; Gorman 2007f ).
There have been reports of persistent and pervasive personnel shortages at NSA
in virtually every critical specialty, including high turnover rates among key person-
nel at the top of the Agency’s management ranks. For instance, in the seven years
since 9/11, there have been four directors of the SIGINT Directorate at a time when
stability at this position was most needed. Maureen A. Baginski, who led the orga-
nization through 9/11, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, left the Agency in
April 2003 to become the head of the FBI’s new intelligence directorate. Her succes-
sor, Army Major General Richard J. Quirk, III, left in August 2006. His replacement,
the highly respected Major General Richard P. Zahner, lasted only seven months on
the job before being “kicked upstairs” in May 2007 to become deputy undersecre-
tary of defense for intelligence. Zahner’s replacement was yet another Army officer,
Major General John DeFreitas, III, whose tenure at Fort Meade remains in doubt as
the Army scrambles to find qualified officers to fill vacant senior intelligence billets
in the United States and overseas.
There has been heavy attrition among the Agency’s middle-level managers. In
some months, NSA officials report that losses of personnel have exceeded the num-
ber of personnel that NSA has recruited and brought on board (confidential inter-
views). The Agency has also experienced recurring problems recruiting and retaining
linguists who speak the exotic languages used in Iraq and Afghanistan with the
degree of fluency required. For example, attempts by NSA in 2001–2 to hire first-
generation emigrants living in the United States who speak Pashto, Urdu, and Dari,
the main languages spoken in Afghanistan, immediately ran into roadblocks
imposed by the ever-omnipresent security officials, who forbade their use. An
American intelligence officer was quoted as saying: “NSA cannot get anyone through
the background check and vetting process. . . . They have created an unachievably
high standard for hiring” (confidential interviews; Scarborough 2007).
Declining morale is also a growing problem within the Agency. In February
2007, NSA’s new director, Lt. General Keith Alexander, commissioned an internal
study by a group of senior Agency officials to examine the current state of affairs
within NSA. In April 2007, the review panel, chaired by George “Dennis” Bartko,
NSA’s deputy chief of cryptanalysis, issued its report. The report found that NSA:
“. . . lacks vision and is unable to set objectives and meet them.” The study also found
that the deeply fragmented NSA was going through what was described as an “iden-
tity crisis,” with the Agency’s staff searching for “unity of purpose” (Gorman 2006;
Gorman 2007e).
By all accounts, the U.S. military’s SIGINT units are in even worse shape.
Resources everywhere are stretched to the limit. Interviews have confirmed that the
number one problem facing the U.S. military’s SIGINT system is personnel, or lack
thereof. Over the past six years, frequent and lengthy deployments in Iraq and/or
Afghanistan, coupled with the military’s extremely unpopular “stop-loss” policy of
arbitrarily extending the terms of service of many SIGINT specialists have for all
intents and purposes exhausted the military’s corps of SIGINT personnel. The U.S.
military has not been able to retain many of their well-educated and highly trained
SIGINT personnel, with some military SIGINT units reporting that more than
50 percent of their first-term recruits were not reenlisting because of the severe
hardships associated with repeated tours of duty away from their families in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Major Jeff Lauth, the director of operations for the U.S. Air Force’s
97th Intelligence Squadron at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, which provides
SIGINT collection technicians to fly aboard the U.S. Air Force’s RC-135 reconnais-
sance aircraft, admitted that as of the summer of 2005, his unit had only 35 percent
of its authorized complement of linguists. The U.S. Air Force as a whole was missing
almost 50 percent of its airborne cryptologic linguists as of 2006 (Iwicki 2005, 51;
Hebert 2005; Fast 2006).
There have also been pervasive equipment shortages to contend with, brought
on by the intensive demands of fighting three wars simultaneously. Equipment
shortages have meant that SIGINT collection equipment has to be kept in Iraq and
Afghanistan, leaving very little for troops to train on upon their return to the U.S.
from their overseas tours of duty. As a result, training and readiness levels of mili-
tary SIGINT units based in the United States have declined steadily over the past six
years. Army and Marine Corps intelligence commanders have confirmed that the
equipment in the military’s SIGINT units is worn out from nonstop usage in the
harsh and unforgiving battlefield environments of Iraq and Afghanistan and is
urgent need of refurbishment or replacement. Moreover, replacement equipment
purchases have not kept pace with field losses. Shortages of highly skilled mainte-
nance personnel and spare parts have led to frequent equipment outages at inop-
portune moments in Afghanistan and Iraq (confidential interviews).
5. Stellar Wind: The NSA Domestic

Eavesdropping Program
The most pressing and thorniest task facing the Obama administration is what to
do about NSA’s highly controversial domestic eavesdropping programs, which was
first publicly revealed in December 2005 by the New York Times. The initial purpose
of these programs, whose codename has recently been reported as Stellar Wind, was
to try to locate al-Qaeda terrorist cells suspected of still operating in the United
States without referring the matter to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Activity
Court for approval (Risen and Lichtblau 2005a; Risen and Lichtblau 2005b; Isikoff
2008; Klaidman 2008).
Little is reliably known about how these NSA programs were conducted or
who was spied upon. Their genesis can be traced back to late September 2001, only
two weeks after the 9/11 attacks had taken place. U.S. military was in the process of
preparing to invade Afghanistan, and the U.S. intelligence community strongly
suspected that al-Qaeda was still directing cells of “sleeper” agents inside the
United States from their Afghan sanctuary. The problem was that there was no
hard intelligence information to confirm or refute this suggestion. At Vice
President Dick Cheney’s urging, NSA began intercepting all telephone calls, faxes
and email messages between the United States and Afghanistan using new author-
ities granted them by President Bush. Thus was born the NSA eavesdropping pro-
gram that was later designated the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) by the
Bush administration. In the months that followed, NSA initiated a number of
related SIGINT collection and analytic programs that sought to identify and
locate international terrorists operating in the United States, none of which have
been publicly acknowledged by the White House (confidential interviews; Hayden
2006; Tenet 2007, 237).
One of the big question marks surrounding the NSA domestic eavesdropping
programs is how many people were monitored by NSA, and more importantly, why
their communications were tapped. According to the New York Times, “. . . NSA
monitored without warrants on up to 500 people in the United States at any given
time . . . Overseas, about 5,000 to 7,000 people suspected of terrorist ties are moni-
tored at one time, according to those officials” (Risen and Lichtblau 2005a). But U.S.
government officials have denied that the number of people monitored was any-
where near this large. In an August 2007 interview with the El Paso Times, the
Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Mike McConnell, said that the number
of NSA eavesdropping targets inside the United States was “. . . 100 or less. And then
the foreign side, it’s in the thousands” (Roberts 2007).
For better or for worse, President Obama has inherited this toxic legacy from
the Bush administration, and his administration must necessarily confront a series
of thorny legal and policy issues directly relating to the NSA domestic eavesdrop-
ping programs.
The first question that must be addressed is the legality of these NSA programs.
Bush administration officials have long argued that they were legal, citing a series of
still-secret Top Secret Codeword legal briefs written by then-White House legal
counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and Justice Department lawyer John C. Yoo, which
posited that the president’s wartime powers gave him the authority to bypass the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and order NSA to conduct warrantless
surveillance operations without reference to the FISA Court (White House 2006;
U.S. Department of Justice 2006). These briefs served as the legal underpinnings for
a Top Secret presidential directive that was endorsed by the then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft, then signed by President Bush on October 4, 2001. This Top Secret
directive, which remains the national policy document authorizing all of the NSA
domestic eavesdropping programs, has only once been referred to in public in a let-
ter written in 2007 by the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral John M. “Mike”
McConnell, which stated that: “Shortly after 9/11, the President authorized the
National Security Agency to undertake various intelligence activities designed to
protect the United States from further attack. A number of these intelligence activi-
ties were authorized in one order, which was reauthorized by the President approxi-
mately every 45 days, with certain modifications” (confidential interviews; Lichtblau
2008a; Director of National Intelligence 2007).
But it has become increasingly clear that the legal justifications for the NSA
eavesdropping programs were always paper-thin, at best. A host of prominent
American constitutional scholars, including the dean of the Yale Law School, have
unequivocally stated that the Bush administration’s arguments over the legality of
these program were facetious and without any legal foundation since it contradicted
over two hundred years of accumulated constitutional case law, which has found
that the U.S. Constitution always trumps the president’s wartime powers (Koh
2006). Within the Bush administration, debate raged for years over the legality of
the NSA eavesdropping programs. A number of senior Justice Department officials
found that the administration’s legal justifications for these programs were, at best,
deeply flawed, with the former head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC), Jack L. Goldsmith, admitting that he “could not find a legal basis
for some aspects of the program,” adding that “It was the biggest legal mess
I have ever encountered.” (Goldsmith 2007; Lichtblau 2008a; Gellman 2008). More
recently, a number of recent federal court decisions have rejected the Bush admin-
istration’s claims that the president’s wartime powers superseded the Constitution,
which calls into question the overarching question of whether any of the domestic
spying activities conducted by NSA, regardless of their accomplishments, were legal
to begin with (Lichtblau 2008b).
There is now near-unanimous agreement that the one component of the NSA
eavesdropping effort that was always on the shakiest of legal grounds was the pro-
gram whereby the largest American telecommunications giants gave to NSA the
billing records of all their American clients, which NSA’s banks of super computers
then ‘data mined’ looking for connections between individuals in the United States
and known or suspected terrorists overseas. In addition to these telephone billing
records, NSA’s computers also sifted through meta-data records relating to email
messages, internet searches, bank wire transfers, credit-card transactions, and travel
records received from other companies or government agencies, such as the FBI.
From a purely legal standpoint, the ship may have already sailed on the question of
whether the American telecommunications companies violated federal or state laws
because in July 2008 Congress gave them what amounts to retroactive immunity
from prosecution for all acts they committed on behalf of NSA (Gorman 2008;
Shane and Johnston 2007).
The second issue that needs to be examined is why the Bush administration
deliberately ignored the strictures of the 1978 FISA law, and chose instead to keep all
aspects of the NSA eavesdropping program away from the FISA Court. Former
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Hayden have admitted that the
FISA Court had been deliberately ignored, but they argued that these steps were
necessary because of operational exigencies, such as the need to respond rapidly to
threats identified by the program. Their arguments boiled down to this: The 1978
FISA law was an antique artifice not designed for twenty-first-century telecommu-
nications technologies, and the FISA Court was incapable of rapidly processing and
rendering judgments concerning the huge number of eavesdropping warrants that
would have been required by the NSA program (Hayden 2006). But these argu-
ments appear to have little merit. In a March 2005 report on the U.S. intelligence
community’s performance against the Iraqi WMD programs, NSA reported that
FISA “ . . . has not posed a serious obstacle to effective intelligence gathering.” It
should be noted that at the time NSA made this statement, the Agency’s domestic
eavesdropping programs had been ongoing for almost three and a half years
(Commission on Intelligence Capabilities 2005, 375).
The third issue that needs to be confronted is to answer the nagging question
why the White House deliberately chose to run the NSA domestic eavesdropping
programs “off the books,” that is to say, why were the NSA eavesdropping programs
run directly from the office in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building of David S.
Addington, chief council to Vice President Dick Cheney, rather than by the U.S.
intelligence community. This harkens back to the dark days of the Iran-Contra
scandal in the mid-1980s, where senior Reagan administration officials ran a series
of “off-the-books” covert operations of questionable legality from the offices of the

National Security Council in the West Wing of the White House (Gellman 2008;
Lichtblau 2008a).
The fourth, and perhaps the thorniest, issue facing the Obama administration
is the vexing question of how this and the Bush administration’s other highly clas-
sified domestic intelligence programs could have been effectively regulated given
the intense veil of secrecy that covered them. Knowledge of the NSA eavesdropping
programs within the U.S. government was deliberately kept to a bare minimum by
the Bush administration. According to a former senior Justice Department official,
Jack L. Goldsmith, key officials inside the U.S. government and the U.S. intelligence
community were barred from having access to any information about the NSA
eavesdropping programs despite their clear “need-to-know” in order to perform
their duties. With the exception of four senior officials, all Justice Department offi-
cials were barred from access to details concerning the NSA domestic eavesdrop-
ping programs, including the heads of the Justice Department’s Civil and Criminal
Divisions. NSA’s inspector general and lawyers from NSA’s general counsel’s office
were also denied access to key legal policy documents relating to the domestic eaves-
dropping programs by Vice President Dick Cheney’s office (Goldsmith 2007).
The same principal of “need to know” was even more rigorously applied to
Congress. Although the senior leadership of both houses of Congress and the intel-
ligence committees were given periodic briefings about the NSA eavesdropping
programs, they were not given all the information they needed, nor were they able
to seek advice and counsel from their staffs or other members because of the White
House–imposed secrecy provisions. These onerous restrictions made it impossible
to conduct effective congressional oversight of the NSA eavesdropping programs.
Early on in the program, a number of senior Democrats on both the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees raised objections concerning the probity and legal-
ity of the program with both the White House and NSA itself, but tangential evi-
dence indicates that their concerns were given short-shrift or ignored entirely
(Death of an Intelligence Panel 2006).
The final question that needs to be addressed is given the Bush administration’s
deliberate circumvention of existing federal statutes governing spying on Americans,
and the detour taken around all regulatory and oversight controls that were estab-
lished to prevent this sort of thing from happening, what revisions need to be made
to the 1978 FISA law and related federal statutes in order to restore the Fourth
Amendment privacy and civil liberties protections of Americans? The need for a top-
to-bottom review of these statutes would appear to be absolute given that declassified
documents show that the formerly strict rules that barred NSA from spying on
Americans except under certain tightly defined circumstances have been loosened
considerably since 9/11. Of particular concern is the fact that since 9/411, much of the
onus for making the decision as to whether an American can be spied upon is made
by NSA collection managers at Fort Meade, who can, at their discretion, disseminate
to their consumers in the U.S. government information concerning U.S. citizens if
they believe that it is of “foreign intelligence” value. It is the author’s belief that placing
the authority for making these decisions in the hands of mid-level NSA collection
managers is inherently dangerous and potentially subject to abuse (NSA 2004).
6. Back to the Future

It is clear that the obstacles confronting NSA are concerned are steep. At the top of
the list is the urgent need for the restoration of the U.S. intelligence community’s
regulatory regime that governed NSA prior to 9/11, as well as a return to full con-
gressional and judicial oversight over the Agency and its operations. The agency’s
faulty equipment procurement systems needs to be fixed, NSA’s personnel and
equipment shortfalls must be rectified, morale improved, and the agency’s costly
modernization and internal reform programs need to be revitalized and enhanced.
At the same time, NSA must strive harder to increase the level of its productivity in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the so-called Global War on Terrorism, as well as take
further steps to ensure that its intelligence product gets to the U.S. government
officials who need it in a timely manner and in a format that they can use. And all
this must somehow be accomplished in the context of the forbidding, fiscally aus-
tere environment that the United States now finds itself, which most likely will result
in cuts in NSA’s future operating budgets. It is not a promising situation, but NSA
is too important to U.S. national security to be permitted to fail.
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chapter 16
HUMAN SOURCE
INTELLIGENCE
frederick p. hitz
Does the experience gained and do the lessons learned in Cold War spying carry
over to a time of holy terror where the gatherers of intelligence are targeting suicide
bombers and an unstructured alliance, “Al Qaeda,” dedicated to driving Western
powers out of the Middle East? That’s the question posed in this chapter, because
former President George W. Bush and the U.S. Congress made a big bet in enacting
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that a revitalization
of human source intelligence, that is, traditional spying, is critical to the prevention
of future 9/11s.
Both the 9/11 Commission and the Silberman-Robb Commission studying
the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) intelligence failure have con-
cluded that an absence of well-placed human sources on the ground was directly
responsible in a major way for these disasters. The president and Congress
concurred in these judgments and are determined to reconstruct and reinvigo-
rate U.S. spying capabilities against the terrorist target. There is little discern-
ible dissent from this conclusion. The real question is, of course, how to do it
successfully.
Will the old-time religion of spotting, assessing, developing, and recruiting
agents by spy handlers operating from positions in official installations abroad
be as successful against Islamist fundamentalists as it was against the Soviets
during the Cold War, or are there new lessons to be learned and new mountains
to climb in operating against a formless, non-state band of fanatics promoting
an “ism”?
At present, the administration and Congress appear to have concluded that

spending more money and hiring more spy runners are the answer.1 In 2004, the
president charged the director of the Central Intelligence Agency with increasing
the cadre of U.S. case officers by 50 percent. This was based on an assumption that
humint (as human source intelligence is called in the federal bureaucracy) was per-
mitted to atrophy in the years following the end of the Cold War in 1991 and needs
a special infusion of support to get back on track. The further assumption made by
the president and Congress is that if a new investment in additional human resources
is made, coupled with a reinforced emphasis on speaking the difficult languages of
the Middle East (that is also to be bumped up to produce 50 percent more hard
language speakers), we will soon be in a position to steal the information needed to
avoid future 9/11s and Iraqi WMD intelligence fiascos.
This chapter will question whether that optimism is well founded. Can the les-
sons learned about spying in the Cold War be re-worked to lead to success in a time
of holy terror? Do the motivations to spy for the West remain relevant—the desire
to grasp freedom and spread democracy—or are they successfully blocked by con-
cerns about a new Crusade and foreign exploitation of oil wealth? We shall first
examine the seven deadly sins of espionage and then see how they hold up under
today’s conditions. Finally, we shall address the question of whether human source
intelligence gathering—humint—is destined to play much of a role in countering
international threats to the United States and the West in the twenty-first century.
Before moving to a discussion of why spies choose to spy, we ought to describe
what we are talking about. Spying has a long history, stretching back to biblical
times. Tribes, ethnicities, and other authorities have always wanted to know what
their enemies or rivals were planning to do to them or how they might act to protect
a perceived interest. If the rival power refused to share the information, it had to be
stolen or suborned.
In medieval and renaissance times, spies infiltrated the courts of rival kingdoms
and principalities to acquire the secrets that might undermine them or keep them
at a safe distance—and they were called ambassadors.
George Washington believed strongly in the value of intelligence. He arrived at
an understanding with the Continental Congress in 1775 that it would create a sepa-
rate secret committee, the Committee of Secret Foreign Correspondence, whose
mission it would be to furnish General Washington with un-vouchered, unaccount-
able funds that he could spend to hire spies to protect the Continental Army. One
of those spies, an untutored but enthusiastic young schoolmaster, Nathan Hale, vol-
unteered to go behind the British lines on Long Island in 1776 to spy, but he was so
green that he was immediately captured and hanged. Although he was clearly
1
The terms “spy handler,” “spy runner,” and “case officer” will be used interchangeably in this
text. They refer to the intelligence operations officer, CIA or otherwise, whose job it is to recruit
and run spies overseas to collect intelligence information on behalf of the United States. This is
what most intelligence officers do—they run spies. They do not actually steal the secrets
themselves.
human source intelligence 259
temperamentally unsuited for espionage, Hale had been willing to try it because his
country and fellow soldiers so desperately needed intelligence about the British
Army’s plans and whereabouts in New York.
More recently, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Britain and
other colonial powers used espionage to defend their empires. “The Great Game,” as
Kipling called it, was employed to prevent the czarist Russians and their French
allies from interfering with Britain’s economic and political domination of the
Indian subcontinent. Britain sought to train up natives, or white sahibs who could
pass for natives, to hang out in the bazaars or go on surveying missions in the out-
back to keep track of hostile efforts to undermine its influence.
In World War I, Britain used its skill in breaking foreign diplomatic codes to
intercept German radio messages threatening interference with neutral shipping in
the North Atlantic or planning an alliance with Mexico to return territory “stolen”
from it by the United States during the Mexican War. These messages were secretly
shared with President Wilson to lay the groundwork for his decision to enter the
war on the allied side in 1917. Here was modern technology employed to enhance
the espionage effort against hostile communications of enemy states that the collec-
tor then used very effectively to get help for its cause.
The period between the wars saw a lot of espionage for hire, as different newly
enfranchised states in central Europe and the Middle East sought to establish them-
selves and protect their independence but did not have the experience or money to
pay for an intelligence service of their own. The rise of fascism led to efforts by the
Axis powers to infiltrate the West, including the United States, where J. Edgar Hoover
was finally instructed by President Roosevelt in 1939 to go after Nazi plans to sabo-
tage U.S. cargo bound for European ports. This was the first recognition that the
United States was disadvantaged by not having a peacetime civilian intelligence ser-
vice and led in the fullness of time to the chartering of the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) under General William Donovan during World War II, and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947. In between, of course, the United States had suf-
fered the mammoth disaster of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, about which we had
had no warning. In the postmortems about the event it was hotly debated as to
whether this was a failure of collection or analysis, but in the end, an otherwise
skeptical President Truman was convinced that the United States needed a civilian
spy service and CIA was created.
This brings us to the era of modern espionage. The charter of the fledgling CIA
in 1947 was to make the CIA the action element in the U.S. government to carry out
George Kennan’s clarion call to oppose the westward drive of the postwar Soviet
Empire, the policy of containment. CIA was empowered to do this by spying and
through covert political operations—“covert action”—which ran the gamut from
black propaganda to funding democratic political parties in Italy and elsewhere, to
sending in sabotage teams behind the iron curtain to roll back communism. It was
a mammoth assignment and a gigantic project, which neither the State nor Defense
Departments wanted to take on, so it fell to the CIA, the new kid on the block. It
began to succeed after a very slow start in the late forties, into a meaningful effort to
penetrate and infiltrate Soviet agent networks in the West by the mid-sixties. The
Soviets, of course, had been quite successful in launching espionage operations
against its future allies in the West, beginning in the mid-1930s, before the war, and
continuing with the successful effort to steal U.S. atomic secrets which led to the
testing of a Soviet nuclear bomb in 1948, five years in advance of most intelligence
predictions.
It is appropriate to concentrate on the legacy of Soviet espionage operations
mounted by Western intelligence agencies during the Cold War period that ran
from 1946–1991 to establish the base line of knowledge about espionage and to assess
the current challenges posed by Islamist terrorism. The reason for this is clear. For
forty-five years, this was the principal mission of the U.S. intelligence agencies. This
is what we had to learn to do after the CIA was chartered in 1947 at the outset of the
Cold War, and how we learned it.
Covert action (political operations where the hand of the United States is
intended not to show) should also be considered, because this was also a critical part
of the CIA’s mission. Nevertheless, after observing the extent to which it has become
impossible under current circumstances of around-the-clock worldwide media
coverage and expanded congressional oversight to mount these operations in
secrecy, they are likely to play but a small part in the intelligence war on terrorism.
In sum, it is best to look principally at what the United States knows about human
spy operations. Why do spies spy?
To begin, we have to define what spies are seeking. I have borrowed in the past
from Kim Philby’s definition of espionage as the collection of “secret information
from foreign countries by illegal means” (Philby 1968, 49). I am no longer sure that
this epigrammatic formulation gets it all. For example, calling information “secret”
connotes something formal, as if there is a requirement that it be formally adjudged
to be so and be so stamped. In reality, we don’t care about definitions. We are con-
cerned with information that the owner of it wants to protect, regardless of its
intrinsic sensitivity.
Secondly, the spy universe is no longer adequately defined by “foreign coun-
tries.” It includes Al Qaeda or the Taliban or the Iraqi insurgents or the Albanian
Serbs or the rebels of Darfur—whatever transnational group is engaged in hostile
action against Western interests.
Finally, “illegal means” is too Marquis of Queensbury. We are talking about
“stealing” secrets. This is no parlor game, but a down-and-dirty effort, electronic or
human, to get at the intentions of the enemy, to strip his cupboard bare.
That is what makes the core question of why spies spy so compelling. However
the spy may dress it up or the good spy runner may sugarcoat it, a spy is betraying a
trust. He or she is revealing to a third party information that he or she, his friends,
family, and professional associates are prohibited from sharing. It is an act that has
profound consequences.
Finally, why do we need to do this at all? How much information essential to the
protection of the West from future suicide bombings is actually secret and cannot
be acquired by studious data mining of the internet or good investigative police
work? This has traditionally been a tough question to answer, but may be less so
now given the offensive posture most Western leaders want their intelligence and
domestic security agencies to assume. The goal now is to prevent another 9/11,
Madrid train bombing, or 7/7 British underground attack from occurring, not just
finding out who did it after the fact. If intelligence and domestic security are in a
pre-emptive and preventive mode, they will need accurate and timely intelligence
about future attacks before they occur, which means penetrating the terrorist cells
while they are still planning the attacks.
Obviously, this is a brave new world. Cold War successes include several
instances where timely intelligence about a then-current state of mind helped
Western leaders avoid a disaster. A clear example is the intelligence information
provided to President John F. Kennedy in October 1962 by U.S./U.K. spy Colonel
Oleg Penkovsky during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Penkovsky reported that Soviet
General Secretary Khrushchev had not been fully supported in the Politburo and
the General Staff in his decision to introduce Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
(IRBMs) to Cuba. That nugget, concurred in by former U.S. ambassador to the
Soviet Union Llewelyn Thompson sitting at Kennedy’s side, gave the President the
room he needed to attempt a different strategy than that being urged on him by
the U.S. military. Instead of bombing Cuba into the stone age to take advantage of
the fact that our U-2 spy planes had provided us with clear evidence of Soviet mis-
sile installations on the island and the Soviets did not yet know that we knew,
President Kennedy decided to give General Secretary Khrushchev an opportunity
to step back from a confrontation that might have led to the beginning of World
War III. He gave away the advantage of a surprise bombing in favor of a strategy of
“quarantine” or embargo, to give Khrushchev an opportunity to reverse an impul-
sive decision, not supported by his own military and political leaders.
The successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of timely
intelligence information permitting a Western political leader to act carefully before
he might have been forced to embark upon a radical course of action that might
lead to war, or accept a fait accompli. This is what the political leaders of Western
democracies expect their intelligence and domestic security services to provide
every day against potential terrorist attack. As former director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet observed after 9/11, in the intelligence business, a .350 batting average
won’t do; you’ve got to bat 1.000. Unfortunately, this rate of success is infrequent, if
not impossible.
Furthermore, access to this kind of intelligence will be far more difficult in an
era of Islamist terrorism. The groups that have formed to mount suicide attacks
against the West are not nation-states yet. They are not subject to pressure from
their peers if they go over the line. Their actions cannot be condemned before the
community of nations in the U.N. as Ambassador Stevenson did with the Soviets in
1962, showing the world the U-2 photographic evidence of the Soviet IRBM instal-
lations on Cuba. Instead, Al Qaeda looks to many observers like a terrorist franchis-
ing operation, providing money and know-how to local bands of terrorists who
plan to attack local targets. Its ranks appear to be continually replenished by
like-minded radical Islamists throughout the Muslim world. In this way, the terror-
ists are operating world-wide more like individual terrorist cells, taking advantage
of targets of opportunity, and susceptible perhaps to penetration by local law
enforcement more than national intelligence entities.
In any event, if the West is to be successful against this new wave of holy terror,
it will have to penetrate the terrorists’ inner sanctum and steal their plans and it will
have to make use of every sophisticated surveillance capability in its arsenal to detect
the perpetrators.
This will, of course, bring other ramifications. Civil libertarians may be shocked
at the changes called for to gather pre-emptive intelligence against terrorists: longer
periods of administrative detention for terrorist suspects; more intrusive surveil-
lance techniques used against suspects; and elimination of privacy protections. This
has certainly been the reaction in some quarters of the United States to passage of
the USA PATRIOT Act shortly after the 9/11 attacks, particularly since we have had
the good fortune to escape further large scale attacks since 2001.
Recognizing the enormity of the challenge, how well has our past experience
during the Cold War prepared us to penetrate the inner councils of the holy terror-
ists? Which of the vulnerabilities described as the seven deadly sins or secrets of
espionage can be exploited to gain the intelligence information we need to protect
us against a suicide bomber? Why have spies spied for us in the past and why might
they spy for us now?
Case officers sent abroad to gather intelligence information for the United
States are for the most part not themselves spies. They might be in time of war and
in other special circumstances, but primarily, real case officers are empowered to
recruit and run spies, hence my preference for the terms spy runner or spy handler.
The reasons for this are quite logical. Most Americans have no possibility of infil-
trating a terrorist cell or Wahhabist Madrassa. They don’t look like Iraqis, Afghanis,
or Pakistanis and, sadly, they don’t begin to speak the local languages well enough.
Their assignment is to pick out and make the acquaintance of individuals who do
have the entrée to these restricted target circles. Or find local collaborators in the
host intelligence service who will help them do so. It is an extremely difficult assign-
ment, especially when one considers the low state of opinion toward the West held
by many Middle Easterners today. Yet it can be done if we adapt and modify the
techniques we used to recruit spies against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
At least we will not be spending inordinate amounts of time just getting physically
close to our target subjects. The USSR was a closed society for the greater part of its
history; so meeting and assessing potential Soviet friends was a highly complicated,
time-consuming task.
The first point of approach to a potential spy might be ideological. What philo-
sophical and political interests does a targeted individual possess that are compati-
ble to the recruiter’s interests or can be made to appear so?
This was the genius of Soviet recruiters in the 1930s, approaching the intelligen-
tsia of Britain and the United States in the midst of the Great Depression. They
could point to a massive failure of the U.S./European capitalist model with all the
innocent people thrown out of work because of the alleged greed of Wall Street
speculators. They could cite the remarkable strides being made in socialist Russia,
building a worker-peasant partnership that was lifting the Soviet Union out of the
feudalism of the czars to become a modern industrial state in two generations. Men
like the infamous “Cambridge Five” at Trinity College, Cambridge, in the mid-1930s
observed waiters at high table stuffing their pockets with crusts of bread while the
toffs discussed Keynes’s latest economic theory to get the country back on its feet
and were disgusted.
Similar kinds of contacts were being made in New Deal Washington. Alger Hiss
at State, Harry Dexter White at Treasury and Lauchlin Currie in the White House
were Soviet sympathizers, later spies, who were initially drawn to Soviet commu-
nism by the contrast between the depredations of Western capitalism in the 1930s
and the promise of the USSR.
Nonetheless, there is a considerable gap between commitment to an ideology,
even one that espouses violent overthrow of the government to which the adherent
ostensibly owes allegiance; and the commitment to spy under the direction and
control of a foreign power. Lines are crossed there with which the idealist will have
difficulty. Not everyone involved in the spy game in a significant position believes
that the “heroic spy” who betrays his country for “pure” ideological motives is the
genuine article. Russia’s great spymaster Viktor Cherkashin, who handled both CIA
spy Aldrich Ames and FBI spy Robert Hanssen, has written recently that in his expe-
rience, no spy ever betrayed his country and friends for purely ideological reasons
(Cherkashin 2005, 28, 310). Cherkashin writes that there is always something more
involved.
Where does ideology take you in a time of holy terror? Are there spies lurking
among the Islamist fundamentalists, willing to betray their cells and co-religionists
to prevent the imposition of a fourteenth-century caliphate? Will they believe that
Osama and his top lieutenants are offering a poisoned chalice that will prevent the
Arab world from realizing its modern potential? How do we identify such individu-
als? Will they be courageous enough to drop a note in a U.S. diplomat’s car? Who is
to say? All indications are that it will be a tremendous feat just to lay the ground-
work for such a possibility. There are few face-to-face opportunities for Islamist
radicals to converse with Westerners under circumstances where there is not a
shooting war taking place or a struggle over alleged Western incursion in the Middle
East. The ideal contact, of course, would be with a leader who shares Islamist goals
for a rebirth of the power and prestige of Muslim identity and culture in the Middle
East but believes that the imposition of sharia law and the continued opposition to
empowerment of women are the wrong paths to follow. The biggest knot to undo
may well be the corruption of the Koranic ideal of jihad as encouraging martyrdom
by suicide bombing. At present, there is no sign that Muslim clerics who dispute the
terrorists’ interpretation of jihad and martyrdom are willing to stand up in number
and call for a different interpretation.
Soviet Communism also enjoyed a brief phase in the 1930s of appearing to be
the antidote for unbridled and ruinous capitalism. Time revealed its true face. The
same thing may happen to Islamist fundamentalism as increasing numbers of

inhabitants of the Middle East come to recognize that a holy war based on terroris-
tic attack on innocent civilians is not a formula for progress in attracting invest-
ment and meeting economic and population demands in the region. It is only
negative. Western intelligence may pick off some of the dissidents who oppose
Wahhabism and Salufism but it will require far more contact with the movers and
shakers in this arena than we currently enjoy.
Futhermore, this struggle is more likely to be joined, at least at the outset, in
the public domain than in the secret world of classic espionage operations. To be
sure, Western nations and their allies in the Middle East are vigorously seeking
intelligence information to disrupt and pre-empt future terrorist attacks; but it
is more likely to be developed as a consequence of greater physical and electronic
surveillance at international borders, in subways, and in radical mosques than it
is from human sources in small cells, which will be particularly hard to penetrate.
In that sense, we shall see an increasing interdependence between foreign intel-
ligence services like CIA and Britain’s MI-6 with their domestic security part-
ners, the FBI, MI-5 and local police forces. Such successes as we may enjoy in this
brand-new enterprise will come as a consequence of timely and accurate forensics
and excellent police work more than cloak-and-dagger operations. Furthermore,
as we have seen in the criticisms mounted by the 9/11 Commission, this intelli-
gence information will have to be instantly and widely shared, so immigration
officials and first-responders will be in a position to act. This will, of course,
necessitate for the CIA and FBI and their foreign counterparts the alteration of a
lifetime of professional habits. “Compartmentation” and grand-jury secrecy and
“need to know” may be preserved in certain instances to protect the name of a
critical source but must be cast aside when it is a question of preventing a suicide
bombing attack. On this issue of creating an “information-sharing environment,”
there is still a long road to be traveled, despite the efforts set forth in statute in
the U.S. Intelligence Reform Bill of 2004 to mandate it.
Spying occurs most often in exchange for a monetary payment or some other
tangible benefit to the spy, such as medical care or help with practical personal
problems. It is the essential lubricant of this bizarre form of commerce. If the truth
be known, most intelligence services prefer it that way. They analogize it to a fee for
services rendered, without the complications of faith in a given system or ideology.
It is less messy.
Money was critical in the recruitment of Aldrich Ames by the Soviets in 1985.
Ames was a thirty-year CIA Soviet Affairs operations officer whose career had
topped out at mid-level. He believed he was under-valued by his management and
ought to have been promoted to a senior command position in the clandestine ser-
vice long since, when he faced a financial dilemma in the spring of 1985. He had just
returned from an undistinguished overseas assignment in Mexico City where his
long-term problem with alcohol abuse had resurfaced and made his efforts to culti-
vate and recruit Soviets impossible. In addition, he had determined to divorce his
wife, from whom he had separated before undertaking his Mexico City assignment,
and marry Rosario Descazes, an attractive Colombian diplomat whom he had

befriended in Mexico. To do this, he believed he needed a major cash infusion to pay
off debt and fund the alimony he would have to pay in the divorce. He also saw
Rosario as a person of expensive tastes whose lush spending habits he would have to
support in the future.
Ames was a volunteer to Soviet intelligence in order to gain enough money
to position himself for the future with his new wife. If he had any ideological
reasons for his actions they were secondary. He had participated in a number of
boozy lunches with an intelligent Russian TASS correspondent when he was
stationed at the U.N. in New York in the 1970s, and they talked about the waste
and futility of the destructive competition between the two superpowers. It
might therefore have been concluded by Soviet intelligence that Ames had lost
the faith and was ripe for recruitment. Nonetheless it was Ames who took the
initial step toward the Soviets, and he did it to earn $50,000 for the names of
several Soviet spies that Ames believed the Soviets already had a line on. This
was in April 1985, and Ames claims that this was the extent of his commitment
to the Soviets at that time.
Viktor Cherkashin states in his autobiography that he was successful in moving
Ames from the one-time betrayal of allegedly already-compromised Soviet cases for
$50,000 to “the big dump” in June 1985 when Ames revealed the names of all the
Soviet agents working for the United States for an as-yet-unnegotiated sum of money
(Cherkashin 2005, 29). In other words, Ames decided to betray every secret about
Soviet operations of which he was aware from one of the most sensitive positions in
U.S. intelligence on the basis of Cherkashin’s representation that he had crossed the
Rubicon with his April transaction, and he might as well disgorge everything he
knew and profit handsomely from it, because he could never be sure if he didn’t that
a U.S mole in Soviet intelligence would not inform CIA that the KGB had acquired a
new penetration of American intelligence. The only way Ames could protect himself
from such a contingency, Cherkashin claims he argued, was to denounce every U.S.
operation against the Soviets. In this genuine wilderness of mirrors, it was a question
of betraying a potential informant before he betrayed you.
I do not know whether or not to credit Cherkashin’s explanation of Ames’s
decision to go beyond his April revelations for what turned out to be the payment
of a $1.7 million bonanza for the biggest disclosure of counterintelligence informa-
tion to the Soviets during the Cold War. To further complicate the picture,
Cherkashin’s gloss could be a mischievous ploy to divert attention from an as-
yet-undiscovered additional Soviet/Russian penetration of U.S. intelligence.
Nevertheless, there are echoes of Cherkashin’s explanation in what Ames told his
FBI inquisitors after his arrest in 1994, and in what he told the CIA inspector gen-
eral’s investigators subsequently.
In any event, the payment to Ames was the biggest commitment of money for
espionage by the Soviets during this period. The KGB’s contemporaneous payments
to the FBI’s Robert P. Hanssen, while smaller in total, bought equally damaging U.S.
secrets.
Not to be overlooked among the tools available to spy recruiters are

non-monetary forms of reward. On many occasions in the Middle East and in loca-
tions where medical care is not up to Western standards, the offer of a life-saving or
life-changing medical procedure is more valuable than cash to a potential spy or a
family member.
Happily, these advantages remain available in confronting the challenge of
Islamist terrorism. The advertisement of immense monetary rewards has not yet
been successful in leading to the capture of Osama bin Laden but it brought in
Saddam Hussein and several prominent Al Qaeda operatives. In addition, this is an
area where the United States working through surrogates can be very effective. It
may not be possible for an American case officer to get close to an appealing terror-
ist target individual, but a cooperating Pakistani or Jordanian intelligence officer
might and can relay the offer of U.S. monetary or material assistance or do it in his
own name, supplied by the United States. There are myriads of ways to skin this cat.
The critical thing to remember is that even in the face of overwhelming counter-
pressure—of control in the case of Stalin’s police state, and anti-Western dogma in
areas of the Middle East—there is always a window of opportunity for the spy run-
ner to gain an advantage created by human need or greed.
Let me reverse field at this point and make the bizarre observation that some-
times money or material assistance may not help and may even hinder agent recruit-
ment. It may be that an act of human friendship comes to mean more between
individuals than filthy lucre. There was something in the relationship between Oleg
Penkovsky and U.S. Army Colonel Charles MacLean Peeke in Turkey in the early
1950s when both were serving as their respective country’s military attaché that
awoke Penkovsky’s respect and kindled his determination to volunteer to the United
States. Just because U.S. intelligence has the capacity in most instances to play the
money card does not mean that it is appropriate to do so.
Ideological commitment and a need for money are two more or less affirmative
reasons for becoming a spy. Less admirable in this twisted analysis of the seven
deadly sins of espionage is a desire for revenge or to settle a long-term grievance.
Robert P. Hanssen, the FBI spy for the Soviets, wanted to show his departed
father and loyal spouse that he could amount to something and provide adequately
for his family, or so his psychiatrist deduced from long interviews with Hanssen in
jail (Hitz 2002). He also wanted to get back at those in the FBI who called him
“Dr. Doom” behind his back and never let him into the inner circle of the Bureau’s
infamous “locker room” culture. Thus Hanssen, a conservative Catholic who
attended an Opus Dei church with then-Director of the FBI Louis Freeh, betrayed
to the Soviets every secret that came across his desk during a twenty-year, on again–
off again career as a Soviet spy. His treachery took place even though he never shared
Soviet values or a communist ideology, and never demanded payment from the
Soviets commensurate with the value of the information he transferred. Although
they were nearly contemporaneous in their spying, Hanssen was never paid what
Ames got from the Soviets. Why? In a secret world where the opportunities to settle
scores or gain revenge on a system that undervalues the case officer are limited,
betraying the organization’s secrets by becoming a spy offers a way out. It is remark-
able how many successful U.S. and Soviet spy cases during the Cold War contained
the elements of teaching one’s own government or spy service a lesson for having
passed over or failed to recognize the superior qualities of a disappointed intelli-
gence operative.
Revenge and score settling were not all on the U.S. side during the Cold War.
Pyotr Popov was not deterred in his decision to betray his Soviet military intelli-
gence comrades in Vienna by any love for the Soviet leadership. He had seen his
family liquidated in part and their Ukrainian landholdings collectivized by order of
the Supreme Soviet, so he had no use for Stalin’s secret police.
Oleg Penkovsky believed that he would never be promoted to field rank in
Soviet military intelligence because his father had fought for the White Russians
against the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. Despite the fact that he had amassed a fine
record during the Great Patriotic War, and he had friends in high places, he
never believed that the top job would be open to him because of this blot on his
family past. This clearly contributed to his decision to spy for the British and
Americans.
What is important about many of these Cold War cases of espionage for pur-
poses of revenge is that they involve insiders who make their decision to betray,
knowing to whom they wish to convey their basket of secrets and how they want to
do it. In the cases of Ames and Hanssen they knew they wanted to be dealing with
their storied opposite number Viktor Cherkashin, because of his experience, com-
petence, and well-established reputation for safeguarding his agents. For example,
Cherkashin carried details from Ames’s debriefings in person to Moscow rather
than trust the KGB’s encrypted electronic transmissions. That situation will likely
not obtain in the future.
During 1985, which was called the “year of the spy” because of the number of
espionage cases that came to light and to a conclusion during that year, such as the
Walker spy ring in the U.S. Navy, it was fair comment to talk about “spy wars.” That
referred to Western intelligence agencies doing battle with the KGB to suborn each
other’s operatives to achieve penetrations for counterintelligence reasons primarily.
This is not how the game will unfold with Islamist terrorism, the West’s top-priority
intelligence concern now. The CIA is not working eyeball-to-eyeball, elbow-to-
elbow against Al Qaeda’s intelligence arm, nor are the Pakistanis or the Jordanians.
As far as one can make out, our knowledge about who makes operational decisions
and how they are made in choosing Western targets for attack is nonexistent. This
means the entire proposition of penetrating Al Qaeda to exploit individual griev-
ances or frustrations is much more complex.
The 9/11 Commission Report makes that abundantly clear. It notes that
Mohammed Atta, the Egyptian ringleader of the 9/11 hijackers, experienced some
difficulty in keeping all of his seventeen colleagues in line during the run-up to the
infamous day of attack. Several wanted to depart the United States without any
assurance that they would be able to return for the event, in order to take care of
personal business. If the CIA or FBI had been able to identify or understand the past
histories and personal rivalries roiling this group it might have succeeded in pulling
one or two of them off during their two-year preparations for the attack.
Because there is no Al Qaeda embassy or cultural mission in Washington,
London, or Karachi, we do not even see or know against whom we are operating for
the most part. What Western intelligence services are up against is more akin to
detective or basic police work. We shall have to identify Islamist cells and peel back
the onion one layer at a time to identify targets.
It is a far more challenging puzzle than looking at a cadre of Soviet or Chinese
officials and trying to determine who the intelligence officers are, and then assessing
their vulnerabilities. For the most part, we are still in the position of trying to figure
out who and where the bad guys are.
As is by now clear, none of the deadly sins of espionage so far enumerated exist
in an isolated state. A spy may betray his country for both ideological and monetary
reasons but also to wreak revenge on a system that has not recognized and employed
his talents to the fullest. The following three sins of espionage are similarly inter-
twined. An agent might be entrapped through a sexual ploy that he is determined
not be revealed to his employer. The spy may not be ideologically drawn to the spy-
master’s cause but is afraid to confront his situation and allows himself to be black-
mailed or intimidated by the spymaster. Finally, there may be an element of ethnic
or religious solidarity in the spy’s affirmative response to the spymaster’s pitch.
Neither the British nor the American intelligence services made much use of sex-
ual entrapment during the Cold War. This was in all likelihood a decision not made
for reasons of scruple, but rather because it didn’t work. Soviets and central Europeans
were used to a much more rough-and-tumble lifestyle than their Western counter-
parts and a secretly photographed liaison with a luscious female not your wife or a
same-sex partner would not lead to a betrayal of state secrets in most instances.
When the shoe was on the other foot, however, the Soviet intelligence services
profited handsomely from a tradition of launching “swallows” at lonely Western
officials, trapped in tightly controlled if drab circumstances behind the iron curtain.
“Swallows” were well-trained female Soviet intelligence officers schooled in all the
arts of Western allurement, like Tatiana Romanova in Ian Fleming’s From Russia
with Love. Their job was to seduce the unwary or oversexed Westerner and the KGB
would be waiting behind the arras to photograph the liaison, unbeknownst to the
hapless victim. The pictures would then be used to get the Western diplomat to
“cooperate” with his Soviet hosts or face exposure to his embassy.
The question then is does spying for sex offer any prospect for success against Arabs
in the Middle East who have taken up the cause of Islamist fundamentalism? On the
surface, the answer would appear to be a quick yes. Sex outside of wedlock and Islam is
against Koranic scripture. If an Al Qaeda Islamist zealot were entrapped in a sexual liai-
son with a Western non-believing wench, would that not be a promising basis on which
to get him to spill the beans or collaborate against his terrorist buddies?
One would think so, but the evidence of such clumsy efforts at sexual compro-
mise as occurred at Abu Ghraib in 2003 would argue otherwise. There is no evi-
dence that sexual intimidation or humiliation whether by dressing Arab prisoners
in female undergarments or taunting them before female guards produced any pos-
itive intelligence. Perhaps the most promising avenue in using sex as a tool against
Islamists might be to try to trap them into failing to respond appropriately to a
sexual slur cast at one of their family members, such as loss of virginity.
For the most part, I believe Western intelligence operators are too naïve about
the sexual mores of Arab Islamists to use sex as a tool for espionage. Abu Ghraib is
a clear indicator of that.
Related to spying for sex is the use of blackmail and intimidation as a recruit-
ment tool for spies. And in a vein similar to sex, American and British intelligence
have traditionally shied away from using extortion as a tool. As in the opposition to
the use of sex, the reluctance is less from moral scruple than for reasons of opera-
tional effectiveness. Perhaps we are too conditioned in the West to think that it is far
more productive to rely on positive reinforcements like money or ideology to lure
someone into treachery than the threat of exposure or intimidation. Or maybe we
are just not very good at threatening reprisals or blackmail.
Yet there is an element of blackmail and coercion in every spy relationship.
Once a spy has crossed the Rubicon and delivered secrets to his handler he can’t go
back to status quo ante. He is a traitor and has betrayed his trust. Victor Cherkashin
played on this vulnerability in urging Aldrich Ames to make the “big dump” in
June 1985, after he had sold $50,000 worth of secrets in April. According to
Cherkashin, he made Ames believe that if he did not bring out all the names of
Soviets spying for the Americans one of them might in time denounce him.
Likewise, even after confessing espionage for the Soviets to his priest at his wife
Bonny’s insistence, and promising to give the wages of his sin to Mother Theresa,
Robert Hanssen found himself back in a few years supplying the Soviets with criti-
cal information. He told them about the FBI’s techniques for shadowing Soviet
diplomats in New York and the listening post the United States was building under
the new Soviet Embassy in Washington. Espionage is a bit like the irreversible bond
forged by the Mafiosi—once in, you can seldom get out. The act of spying creates
an intimidating pressure to continue and to conform.
There is no incontrovertible way to make the events reportedly taking place at
Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and in the mysterious secret CIA prisons in Eastern
Europe directly applicable to this discussion of the role of blackmail and intimida-
tion in espionage, but it is relevant. The reported use of water-boarding and other
highly coercive techniques to make Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) talk even
though he was allegedly a mastermind of the 9/11 attacks arouses concern in some
quarters as to the seeming lack of limits on the techniques the spy services are
empowered to use to extract intelligence information. If the CIA is perceived not to
be bound by the U.S. government’s own strictures against torture or the use of cruel
and inhuman punishment in defiance of customary international law, won’t that
spill over to their normal espionage activities? Won’t potential and existing spies
wonder what’s in store for them if they get caught cross-wise with their spy handler
or a misunderstanding develops about their access or reporting? It sounds far-
fetched but these events never take place in a vacuum. Just as it is known in the
world of espionage which services honor their obligations to pay the relatives of
captured or executed spies the moneys earned by them, so it is known how spy ser-
vices treat and protect their agents.
Fortunately, U.S. intelligence agencies have not been fully exempted from the
McCain Amendment to the Detainee Treatment Act which became law in December
2005, and which forbids U.S. personnel from using coercive interrogation tech-
niques not set forth in the U.S. Army interrogation manual that prohibits torture
and cruel and inhuman punishment.
A powerful motivation for spying and one that is often under-appreciated is
simple friendship. As noted earlier, Oleg Penkovsky was drawn to American mili-
tary attaché Charles MacLean Peeke when they served together in the 1950s in
Ankara. His admiration for this tall army officer was clearly one of the reasons he
volunteered to spy for the West some years later. He was already beginning to
become alienated by the crass favoritism accorded the select nomenklatura who but-
tered up their superiors to gain extra privileges and cushy assignments in the Soviet
system. He contrasted this with the perceived professional approach of the Americans
who went about their business in a straight-forward manner. To be sure, Penkovsky
was already looking for another vessel into which to pour his confidence, having
lost faith in his own, but Colonel Peeke gave him someone to look up to as the
embodiment of that new value system.
Finally, unilateral recruitments when they occur between intelligence officers in
official liaison with one another appear to be based at least in part on friendship.
When an American intelligence officer leans over a glass of whisky and asks his
opposite number in a European service to hand over a particular report that had
hitherto been embargoed to the United States he is asking for a favor that in time
might ripen into a unilateral recruitment to espionage for the United States. Where
the United States has been in a strong position to materially aid the career as well as
the personal wherewithal of such an official, the temptation to step over the line and
accept spy tasking from the United States has been strong.
In the global war on terror, such as it is, in which the Bush administration has
been engaged since 9/11, personnel in friendly intelligence services in the Middle
East are certain to have become particular targets for development and then recruit-
ment. Middle Eastern intelligence services with close ties to their populations and
cultures have a bottomless appetite for Western technological and material assis-
tance. Consequently, we have reached important unilateral understandings with
some intelligence and political chiefs in the region as a result of our willingness to
spread our good fortune around.
One of the strongest motivations for spying and one with obvious relevance
today is a common ethnic, cultural or religious tie between a spy and the country or
entity that recruits him. The most gripping case in American annals is that of
Jonathan Pollard who was arrested in 1985 for spying for Israel. Pollard was as an
American Jew working in Naval Intelligence who passed thousands of sensitive doc-
uments to Israel out of apparent concern for that country’s well-being. Although
Pollard had denied that he spied for Israel because he is a Jew, his sympathy for the
Israeli cause and his view of his “ethnic obligation” to help Israel belie his protesta-
tions. He appears to have suffered some anti-semitism growing up in South Bend,
Indiana, as part of a small minority in a tough neighborhood that may have accen-
tuated his Jewish identity. In any event, he developed a strong admiration for the
state of Israel from an early age, even attempting to volunteer for military service in
Israel while still an undergraduate at Stanford during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
In short, service to Israel became an obsession and Pollard volunteered to spy for
the Israeli intelligence service passing quantities of classified information on a whole
range of delicate subjects to his Israeli spymaster, not just secrets bearing on issues
related to the state of Israel. He was caught, tried, and found guilty of spying for
Israel and is now being held in life imprisonment. Periodically, the government of
Israel petitions the U.S. president to release Pollard, arguing that he has paid his debt
for the crime of espionage between allies but the United States has never relented.
This is one of the clearest instances of espionage for ethnic and religious reasons.
The particularly close ties that bind American Jews to Israel are paralleled to
some degree in the relationship between some Chinese-Americans and the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), at least in the eyes of the Chinese government. Larry
Wu-Tai Chin, an intelligence officer in the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, sold secrets to the PRC for more than thirty years, from 1952 until his arrest
in 1985. Although the U.S. government based its legal prosecution of Chin on the
theory that he did it for the money ($140,000 was proven to have changed hands,
but maybe as much as a million dollars was paid Chin over the length of his service
to the PRC), there are indicators from his statements at trial that ethnic sympathy
for the PRC also played a large part in his treachery. To be sure, Chin liked to gamble
and he speculated on real estate so he welcomed the money, but the U.S. Attorney
who prosecuted him declared at trial, that “The man’s (Chin’s) mind and his heart
have been in China.” He wanted to speed the rapprochement not only between the
PRC and the United States but also between the peoples of the two countries.
It would appear that the PRC believes that there are particular reasons why
Chinese-Americans are open to a recruitment pitch to spy for China. Perhaps it boils
down to the PRC’s belief that ethnic Chinese everywhere take pride at seeing the PRC
reclaim a position of cultural and economic pre-eminence that it once enjoyed.
Nonetheless, there is little question that Chinese intelligence aggressively pursues
this hoped-for feeling of ethnic solidarity in its approach to Chinese-Americans.
What relevance do the factors of ethnic and religious solidarity as the bases for
recruitment to espionage have in the current period? Clearly, the attitude of the
PRC to the vulnerability of Chinese-Americans to an appeal to a common heritage
remains an issue. What about the vulnerability of Arab-Americans or Muslim
Americans to appeals for Islamic solidarity against the crusading Western infidels in
Iraq?
There have been few publicized stories of Al Qaeda attempts at recruitment in
the United States beyond the Jose Padilla and the John Walker Lindh cases and the
Lackawanna Muslims who were all volunteers. But the impact has been far greater
in a counterintelligence sense. There appears to be an underlying mistrust of Muslim
Americans or Arab-Americans in the security area that manifests itself in the inabil-
ity of many patriotic members of these groups to get security clearances when they
offer their services to the U.S. government for sensitive anti-terrorist assignments
such as translating Internet and other communications from Middle Eastern lan-
guages into English. To me, this seems shortsighted and a return to the spirit that
enabled the United States to intern Japanese-Americans during the Second World
War. Apparently, many of these clearances are failing because some of the Muslim
Americans still have close relatives living in Middle Eastern hot spots. While one
must be sensitive to the possibility of blackmail or family pressure, if the candidate
has a clean record as an American citizen the assumption should be made in favor
of that citizenship and he or she should be given the opportunity to serve until cir-
cumstances prove otherwise. From all indications about the extraordinary delay
encountered in the translation of intercepted messages by NSA and the FBI, there is
a demonstrable need for native speakers of Middle Eastern languages.
The fact is this hostile attitude toward the region and toward Islam generally is
a product of our own cultural ignorance that we will have to change if we are to be
successful dealing with the Al Qaeda threat.
On offense, a similar deficiency is present. The 9/11 Commission reported that
only nine American students majored in Arabic studies in 2002. The New York Times
noted six months after the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report that the fig-
ure for Arabic studies concentrators in 2003 was 22. This will not permit the United
States to operate effectively against terrorists in the Middle East if our language
capacities and cultural understanding are so limited. It will be hard enough to find
ways to merely develop contact with Arabs who might have access to terrorist tar-
gets but if we cannot speak to them or understand them when we get there, the job
will be almost impossible.
Finally, there were many instances during the Cold War and before, when the
only way to account for the motivation of a spy or spy runner or to explain his
extraordinary actions in pursuit of a mission was that he loved the métier for its
own sake. Of nobody was this truer than Allen W. Dulles, diplomat-intelligence
officer during World War I in Vienna and Bern, where in his own telling he had an
opportunity to meet V. I. Lenin prior to Lenin’s return to Moscow in a sealed train,
but gave it up for a tennis game. After a successful career between the wars working
as a New York lawyer in international finance, he joined General William Donovan’s
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and was sent back to be chief of station in Bern.
There, as a quasi-overt operative, he performed brilliantly, opening his doors, in his
own words, to “purveyors of information, volunteers, and adventurers of every sort,
professional and amateur spies, good and bad” (Srodes 1999, 227).
Dulles made and maintained contact with Hitler assassination plotters and a spy
who reported on the Nazi V-1 and V-2 rocket projects. By far his most important
source, however, was Fritz Kolbe, code-named George Wood, who after being thrown
out of the British military attache’s office in Bern in 1943 as a provocateur, found his
way to Dulles. Kolbe (Wood) was special assistant to a top Nazi diplomat entrusted
with the most important missions involving the Nazi military high command. So
from 1943 until the end of the war against Germany, this forty-three-year-old spy
provided Dulles and the Americans with voluminous documents containing the dip-
lomatic and military correspondence of the leaders of the Third Reich.
Dulles’s espionage tradecraft was also taxed to the limit. With Nazi diplomatic
cables being carried to him in reams, Dulles sent the sexiest forward from Geneva
to Lyon in a secret compartment on a train, where they were picked up and trans-
ported by bicycle to Marseilles, for Corsican smugglers to fly them to Corsica whence
they could be flown to Washington, D.C. In early 1944, Kolbe’s intelligence informa-
tion was so timely on Nazi rocket construction sites and assassination plotting
against Hitler that it ended up on President Roosevelt’s desk.
No wonder Allen Dulles found it so difficult to return to the routine practice of
law after OSS was disbanded in 1945. He believed fervently in the need for a U.S.
civilian intelligence service and testified to that effect before the Senate Armed
Services Committee in April 1947, just prior to passage of the National Security Act
of 1947 that created the Central Intelligence Agency. Although he would not become
Director of Central Intelligence for another six years, Dulles’s involvement in the
early shaping of the CIA in covert action and estimative intelligence was critical. He
wrote a book on The Craft of Intelligence which attempted to give spy running a
patina of professionalism, but underneath it all for him, it was still “The Great
Game” of Kipling’s India. It was important and it was fun.
Sadly, not all the practitioners of the spy game possessed Allen Dulles’s sense of
duty and patriotism. Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen were spies for the Soviet
Union and Russia for whom just money and ideology could not alone explain their
motivation to betray the United States.
Ames was a bundle of conflicting sentiments. Yes, he needed the money, but his
hubris was such that he took no care in the spending of it. He ran up credit card
debt of many thousands each month and pursued a lifestyle clearly far in excess of
his government salary. He simply did not believe anybody in the CIA was clever
enough to catch him and this narcissism led him to take foolish risks such as pur-
chasing his Arlington residence with cash and talking about his operational plan-
ning over open telephone lines. He thought he was so good at the game of espionage
and his colleagues were such boobs that he failed to file contact reports on his meet-
ings with Soviet officials, believing that that might go undetected.
Hanssen was a quite different character. He eschewed the flamboyant life style
of an Ames and, by his own determination, never made a personal meeting with his
Soviet handlers. He needed the money the Soviets paid him to send his children to
expensive schools and to upgrade the family’s standard of living but his espionage
was not bottomed on money alone. Like Ames, Hanssen had little regard for his FBI
colleagues. They ridiculed his dark suits and formal manner but he considered him-
self to be a lot smarter than they, especially on technological matters. And this
caused him to take some unnecessary risks. For example, he often visited his own
personnel file online to see if anybody suspected him of being a Soviet agent. He
even waylaid an official report headed for one of his superiors to check to see if it
contained any derogatory information on him.
Hanssen was quite bored with his State Department assignment keeping track
of foreign diplomats in Washington and yearned to be back in the espionage spot-
light supplying the Soviets with meaningful secrets. All this came from a convinced
political and social conservative who remained strongly anti-communist through-
out his years of espionage for the Soviet Union.
How does one account for these blatant contradictions? Is it all just the money?
My reading of Hanssen and the letters he wrote his spy handlers that were filed as
affidavits in his criminal trial is that like Ames, he felt he was invincible. He did not
believe the Russians knew his identity and he did not think anyone in the Bureau
was smart enough to trip him up. This hubris joined with some of fate’s ironies (for
example, he was the FBI officer chosen to search for the third mole after Edward Lee
Howard’s and Ames’ treachery could not explain all the compromised Soviet cases
in 1986, and he was that mole) to convince Hanssen that he could always stay one
jump ahead of his pursuers. I believe he relished that thought. He enjoyed being the
one person who did know what was going on. Until he became overly burdened
with his betrayal and his need to live several lives and he almost came to relish his
capture. “What took you so long?” he reportedly asked his FBI captors.
Thus one of the qualities Western intelligence must be looking for in its present
day pursuit of individuals prepared to betray their friends, family, professional asso-
ciates and country to spy for us is a relish for the game of espionage itself. More than
or in addition to money, sex, ideology, revenge, or ethnic solidarity, a potential spy
must be comfortable in the duplicitous role-playing and manipulation of people
that spying often demands. Furthermore, he or she must be good at it.
This hurried run-through of the basic motivations for human intelligence
gathering indicates that humint is still very relevant to the intelligence challenges of
the present era. However, spy tradecraft will be utilized in a setting quite different
from that of the Cold War. Many of its applications will be in circumstances more
reminiscent of law enforcement’s penetration of the mafia than the spy wars of the
80s with the Soviets. Humint will also be strongly dependent on technology, for
quick reporting and sharing of information. It will also extend to non-traditional
sources of information—as for example in the case of the medical doctor in
November 2008 who witnessed a terrorist act in Mumbai in a luxury hotel and
reported it via twitter to his home office in the United States, which then shared it
with the appropriate government officials. The only factor that remains constant in
the world of espionage is the subject on which it acts: the human being, with all his
quirks, complexities and, thank goodness, weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
REFERENCES
Cherkashin, V. 2005. Spy Handler. New York: Basic Books.

Hitz, F. 2002. Inteview with Dr. David Charney (May).
Philby, K. 1968. My Silent War. New York: Grove Press.
Srodes, J. 1999. Allen Dulles: Master of Spies. Washington, D.C.: Regnery.
chapter 17
UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING
INTELLIGENCE
a. walter dorn
1. Introduction
The United Nations has become a player, albeit a reluctant one, in the global intel-
ligence game. This may come as a surprise to some given the inability of the United
Nations to live up to its peace and security ideals, the ad hoc nature of its responses
to global crises, the disinclination of nations to share intelligence with it and,
finally, its reluctance to even consider itself an intelligence-gathering organization.
But the United Nations has privileged access to many of the world’s conflict zones,
particularly through its peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Its uniformed and civil-
ian personnel form the eyes and ears of the world organization in hot spots like
Afghanistan, the D. R. Congo, Sudan, Haiti, and Lebanon. With over 115,000 mili-
tary, police and civilian peacekeepers, the United Nations now deploys more per-
sonnel to the field than any other organization or institution except the US
government.1 UN personnel report on the latest developments at the frontiers of
world order and in the midst of civil wars.
The fact that the United Nations is neither technologically advanced nor psy-
chologically equipped to conduct covert surveillance means that it has relied mostly
on overt human intelligence (HUMINT). Peacekeepers have traditionally used
1
The UN deploys to the field some 80,600 troops, 2,200 military observers, 12,300 police,
5,700 international civilians, 12,300 local civilians and 2,300 UN volunteers in fifteen peacekeeping
direct observation while on patrol, at checkpoints or observation posts, having been

tasked with verifying if the conflicting parties, who have accepted the UN presence,
are adhering to their cease-fire and other commitments. Direct monitoring has
helped stabilize and resolve some conflicts but, in the post-Cold War world, human
observation has proven far from sufficient. With new mandates, the United Nations
is gradually including other types of intelligence, including imagery intelligence
(IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT), and is currently developing intelligence
structures within its missions.
One key motivation for this expansion, stemming directly from the organiza-
tion’s charter, has been to provide the secretary-general with adequate information
to inform the Security Council, especially to meet the Article 99 responsibility to
warn of threats to international peace and security. This is a crucial function, but in
the more than one hundred conflicts in which the secretaries-general have inter-
vened, often using peacekeeping, only one intervention started with a formal
Article 99 invocation (the Congo 1960). There were dozens of implied invocations,
but most of these were late warnings or statements of support for warnings already
provided by member states. The secretary-general and his staff have briefed innu-
merable informal Council meetings on threatening developments in the field but
these were not direct invocations of Article 99 because the secretary-general did not
place a new item on the agenda or call a formal meeting (Dorn 2004, 305). In the
majority of new or escalating conflicts, no warning was issued at all to member
states, including the invasion of South Korea in 1950, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica, Bosnia, in
1995, even though peacekeeping missions were operating in these areas or nearby.
A key factor in the paucity of early warning in the past has been due to the
absence of deep intelligence. To be convincing, UN indicators and warnings must
clearly identify and follow emerging threats. This necessitates not only targeting
specific information, but also having the means for thorough analysis, which the
United Nations has lacked. Furthermore, UN management has seldom appreciated
the value of intelligence. As a result, the UN had inadequate means for intelligence
fusion and consensus building, as well as ways to move critical information across
departments and up the chain of command.
Initially the United Nations even shunned all types of intrusive gathering of
information because it felt it could not afford to lose credibility or tarnish its image
as an impartial mediator by opening itself to accusations of employing covert or
misleading techniques to gather information. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld
voiced this opinion when he refused to support the establishment in 1960 of a
permanent UN intelligence agency saying that the United Nations must have “clean
hands” (O’Brien 1962, 76). Clearly he was referring to common tools employed in
operations as of 30 August 2009 (United Nations 2009). A list of principal UN peacekeeping

missions 1947–2006 and their locations can be found in the Oxford Handbook on the United
Nations—see Doyle and Sambanis (2007, 328–32).
united nations peacekeeping intelligence 277
the murky world of espionage such as theft, bribery, eavesdropping, and other ille-
gal elements that the United Nations is committed to reducing.
A hands-off approach to peacekeeping intelligence (PKI) sufficed during the
Cold War when most PKOs merely monitored cease-fires or agreements agreed to
by national militaries. Other than the United Nations Operation in the Congo
(ONUC) in the early 1960s, peacekeepers were rarely involved in enforcement
actions, and thus expressed little desire for the type of hard intelligence that was
required for conventional military operations. However, a new generation of PKOs
after the Cold War placed peacekeepers in much more complex and hostile environ-
ments in which no government held firm control, law and order had broken down
or was on the verge of collapse, and the use of force against UN personnel was quite
possible (Smith 1994, 174–75). Almost all UN missions of the twenty-first century
have been created by the UN Security Council “acting under Chapter VII,” which is
the enforcement section of the UN Charter, making robust actions possible.
The difficult and dangerous environment of many PKOs in the post-Cold War
era forced the United Nations to change its approach to intelligence, in part to
enhance the safety of its own personnel. UN peacekeepers found themselves uncov-
ering and intercepting large arms shipments, overseeing fragile regional cease-fires,
monitoring controversial elections, supervising law enforcement agencies, disarm-
ing unwilling factions, mediating between hostile belligerents, providing humani-
tarian assistance, protecting civilian populations at risk, and engaging in armed
combat. The United Nations learned through difficult trials that both the safety of
its peacekeepers and the success of its missions depend strongly on gathering
actionable and secret intelligence (Dorn 1999, 2). Information about the intentions
and actions of conflicting parties, especially “spoilers” of peace processes, became
essential. To meet the early warning challenge, the United Nations needed not only
to observe the overt dispositions and weapons of the main actors but also to gather
secret intelligence about their motivations and plans. Especially in hazardous areas
like the Congo, Darfur, Haiti, Iraq, Lebanon and Sierra Leone, special intelligence
skills were required in order to uncover hidden plans for aggression, ethnic cleans-
ing, genocide, or attacks upon UN peacekeepers. Notably, much intelligence has to
be gathered without tipping off the perpetrators who seek to evade detection
(Dorn 1999, 3).
Fortunately, as the United Nations sought to grapple with the enormous chal-
lenge of intelligence, a community of practitioners and academics worked together
to examine how various intelligence skills could be applied to peacekeeping. The
growth of peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War was paralleled by a growth in
the study of peacekeeping intelligence. Conferences on PKI have been held in
Europe and North America (de Jong, Platje, and Steele 2003; Carment and Rudner
2006) and the United Nations has welcomed studies of its operations. Naturally, the
textbook approach to explaining national intelligence has spilled over into the
examination of PKI. Like other organizations, the skills needed by the United
Nations cover the entire intelligence cycle of planning/direction, gathering, and
analyzing information and then disseminating the resulting intelligence.
2. The Intelligence Cycle
2.1. Planning/Direction
Because the United Nations has not succeeded in grappling with the challenge of
headquarters intelligence, it does not provide much direction to the intelligence
units in the field, leaving it to the missions to determine their own priority informa-
tion requirements (PIRs), sources, and methods. When intelligence units were first
set up systematically in 2005–6, many missions devised their own terms of refer-
ence, organizational structures, and “implementation directives” for the units.
The distinction between strategic, operational, and tactical information is often
not made clear by UN headquarters, so the daily and weekly situation reports back to
New York often contain a mixture of such information. However, UN headquarters
does make specific inquires into particular aspects of field missions, thus pointing to
the activities in which it is interested. The flow of information is mostly unidirec-
tional. People in the field often complain about the lack of information/intelligence
and direction coming from New York (e.g., the “black hole” into which their reports
descend). Still, New York also has a considerable range of available information that
it shares occasionally, though not systematically, with the field through emails, “code
cables,” encrypted faxes, calls, video teleconferences, and visits.
2.2. Information-Gathering
The UN’s information sources include its member states (at times their intelligence
agencies), the UN specialized agencies, the media, and non-governmental organiza-
tions, in addition to its own field personnel. Frequently, governments have been an
important source of warnings and critical information. UN headquarters in New
York provides a key venue for informal information exchanges between govern-
ments and the UN Secretariat, which runs the PKOs. In the field, UN personnel
often meet with officials in the national embassies. Liaison officers also gain infor-
mation from the host government and the conflicting parties, as well as local orga-
nizations. Benefitting from the information technology (IT) revolution, the United
Nations also expanded its databases, geographical information systems, media
feeds, email alerts and inter/intranet sites. It is also making greater use of surveil-
lance technology.
With the growing availability of commercial satellite imagery, the United Nations
has begun to receive and purchase such imagery, though not in near-real time and
the imagery is mostly used to produce paper maps. There are no agreements for the
automatic transfer of national satellite information to the United Nations and very
high resolution imagery (below half-meter) is provided only occasionally on a “need
to know” basis, that is, when the nation feels the UN needs to know.
Soldiers from various nations now routinely deploy to UN field operations with
their contingent-owned night vision equipment, which varies greatly in capacity
between contingents (mostly Generation 2+). Thermal (IR) scopes and goggles are
still rare in PKOs, as are radars for ground and aerial surveillance. Aerial reconnais-
sance using digital cameras is, by contrast, increasingly common and proving to be
an invaluable form of observation. In several missions, forward-looking infrared
(FLIR) cameras have been deployed on helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Other
technologies remain desperately needed in UN field missions to enable effective
early warning and proactive peacekeeping (Dorn 2007).
Notwithstanding the wonders of the “sensor revolution,” information gathered
from devices may not reveal the intentions of leaders. For this, HUMINT remains
invaluable. Indeed, during the United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) an
informant gave the UN advance warning of the genocide and even of the planned
killing of UN peacekeepers. However, UN headquarters in New York did not inves-
tigate or disseminate this information further, nor did it propose plans to prevent
an escalation. Headquarters felt that, as a policy, it could not run undercover (dis-
guised) intelligence-gathering operations that would open the United Nations to
criticisms of lacking transparency, of misleading citizens, and of bias against one
side of a conflict. (Dorn 2005, 459). UN peacekeepers can, however, strive to develop
good relations with the local populace. This greatly enhances civil-military coop-
eration (CIMIC), wins trust, and ultimately provides valuable information sources
that also enhance “force protection” (Ankersen 2006, 108). In certain missions, the
United Nations has hired paid informants, though this remains a grey area for the
organization.
Table 17.1 illustrates the limits of intelligence gathering in PKOs. The range of
acceptable activities will, of course, depend on the mandate and circumstances of
the mission. But a general categorization on a relative scale is possible, based on
ethical, practical, and legal grounds.
2.3. Information Analysis

Vigorous collection of information invariably leads to masses of data that pose a
challenge to analyze and process. To facilitate early warning and to produce timely
responses, the United Nations has a need for a sophisticated analytical capacity to
extract the most useful information to avoid data overload. For instance, early
warning is more easily achieved when specific information is targeted, such as the
importation of armaments and the control over natural and other resources.
During the Congo mission from 1960–64, it was vital for the United Nations to
understand the policies of mining companies that backed Katangese secession
and the breakup of the country. Since the 1990s the UN has investigated compa-
nies and individuals in the Congo, Angola, and West Africa that have broken
Security Council sanctions and has even begun to “name and shame” them pub-
licly (Cortright et al. 2007, 349).
Table 17.1 The Information-Gathering Spectrum for the United Nations, from
Permitted to Prohibited
Permitted Questionable Prohibited
(White) (Grey) (Black)

Visual observation
–From fixed posts –Observers concealed
–From vehicles –Observers camouflaged
–From aircraft –Observation using unauthorized entry
–Observers out of mission area –Using sting operations
Sensors
–Visible (video) – Thermal (IR), X-ray, radar, metal and explosives detection
–Satellite –Hidden devices –Covert tracking devices
–Ground sensors (acoustic/seismic) –Using captured devices
Human Communications
UN personnel: –Clearly identified –Unidentified –Undercover/disguised
Informants: –Unpaid –Rewarded –Paid (agents)
Listening devices: –Message interception (SIGINT) –Warrantless wiretaps
* Unencrypted messages * Encrypted messages
* Tactical level * Strategic level
Documents
–Open source (public) –Private –Classified(non-UN) –Stolen
<————— increasingly overt increasingly covert —————>
In this century, the rising UN demand for better situational awareness allowed
the organization to overcome its traditional resistance to the establishment of intel-
ligence bodies within UN field missions. Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMACs) have
been set up in many PKOs (Shetler-Jones 2008, 518). Though the quality of JMACs
varies considerably between PKOs, they all possess analytical teams tasked with
producing balanced, timely, and systematically verified information to support
ongoing operations and senior policymakers, especially the mission head, who is
usually a special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG). The UN’s former
discomfort about intelligence has been tempered by the realization that intelligence
gathering does not necessarily entail underhanded methods that are illegal or sub-
versive. JMACs generally collect, evaluate, and analyze information to aid decision-
makers in a legitimate and balanced fashion.
Progress in creating a formal intelligence capacity at UN headquarters has been
much slower than in the field, despite a number of serious attempts at UN reform.
In 1987, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, frustrated by the lack of information
that inhibited early warning and proactive responses, created the Office for Research
and Collection of Information (ORCI). Its mandate was to assess global trends,
prepare profiles of various countries, regions, and conflicts, and provide early warn-
ing of emerging “situations,” as well as monitor refugee flows and emergencies.
Unfortunately, in the lingering Cold War environment ORCI was branded as unde-
sirable by governments fearing UN intrusion into sovereign affairs and a possible
pro-Soviet bias. A number of US senators, including Bob Dole, initially alleged it
would provide a cover for Soviet espionage in the United States. ORCI was also
under-staffed and under-equipped, and unable to carry out deeper analysis of inter-
national developments and direct information gathering in the field. It did not issue
significant early warnings (Dorn 2005, 443). Moreover, at the time of ORCI’s cre-
ation the UN had only a half-dozen missions in the field, all of which were small,
totaling less than ten thousand personnel. A half decade later, over eighty thousand
peacekeepers were under the UN’s operational control in over a dozen missions
worldwide, some in the world’s worst hotspots like Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.
To manage this large increase in the number and size of PKOs, Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali created the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) in 1992. ORCI was disbanded and a Situation Center was established within
DPKO in 1993. The SitCen included a 24/7 Duty Room where knowledgeable offi-
cers could refer peacekeepers to appropriate headquarters officials. To tap into
information networks of national governments and to conduct in depth analysis so
crucial to early warning, an Information and Research (I&R) Unit was created
within the SitCen in September 1993. It consisted of a half dozen officers provided
at no cost by France, UK, Russia, and the United States. These gratis officers were
“connected” to the national intelligence services of their countries, having been
drawn from them. They provided invaluable information, though their work was at
times controversial (Van Kappen 2003, 5).2 They focused on peacekeeping but they
also provided assistance to other departments and to the secretary-general. Their
reports included information on arms smuggling and other covert assistance to
warring factions. They evaluated the motivations of parties and developed threat
assessments, scenarios and forecasts. They even reported on some planned and
actual assassinations (Dorn 2005).
Unfortunately, the I&R unit was dissolved in February 1999 when a group of
developing countries voted in the General Assembly to require the UN Secretariat
to discontinue the use of all gratis officers. Such personnel were almost entirely
from the developed world which alone could afford to pay their salaries to live in
New York. Perceiving an unfair advantage to the developed world, the non-aligned
group of countries wanted the several hundred “gratis provided” positions opened
up to their nationals and paid for through the UN’s regular budget (Dorn 2005,
2
The I&R unit’s composition posed a potential problem: incoming information might be
biased toward the interests of the providing state, but in practice such natural biases could be
taken into account and were deemed acceptable. More information is generally better than less
and often the nations balanced each other. The I&R Unit was requested to produce consensus
reports, though officers from certain nations took the lead in writing the reports on issues where
they had the expertise.
459). But new funds, provided mostly by the developed world, came very slowly.
The disbanding of the I&R unit constituted a great setback for the United Nations
in terms of information analysis, but the I&R experience and model still provides
useful lessons for the future.
In accordance with the recommendations of the Brahimi Report (2000),
Secretary-General Kofi Annan tried to create an Information and Strategic Analysis
Secretariat (ISAS) to serve his Executive Committee on Peace and Security but this
reform was blocked by the non-aligned movement (essentially the developing
world). The debate over intelligence proved controversial and complex. What some
viewed as information-collection was considered intelligence-gathering by others,
and what was called “strategic intelligence” by some was labeled “espionage” by oth-
ers. Not all understood the difference between strategic and tactical intelligence and
the dividing line between these two was often blurred (Van Kappen 2003, 3). Strategic
intelligence was needed by the higher levels of UN management, while tactical intel-
ligence was required by personnel engaged in daily operations on the ground.
The UN in 2009 finally received approval to create an Assessment Unit within
the Office of Military Affairs of DPKO. It will be given analytical responsibilities and
should provide a boost for PKI in the field as well as at UN headquarters.
2.4. Information Dissemination

A significant problem for early warning (including Article 99 invocations) and for
proactive peacekeeping is whether information reaches the right people and bodies
who appreciate its value and can respond to it effectively. The major powers alert the
Security Council of new threats when they feel it is in their national interest to do so.
If they do not raise the matter, it often means they do not want it raised. If the secre-
tary-general forces the matter upon them by invoking Article 99, he risks raising the ire
of one or several Security Council members. The only time when the secretary-general
can claim special privilege is if he possesses information unavailable to the major pow-
ers, or unreleased by them, that can move them to action. With the expansion of peace-
keeping, there are instances when this holds true. A review of selected cases reveals
significant intelligence successes and failures. The growing literature provides insights
into the UN’s attempts at incorporating intelligence into its field missions.
3. Case Studies of
Peacekeeping Intelligence
The many successes and failures of peacekeeping have produced valuable lessons.
An analysis of missions shows the gaps in intelligence, and how the recognition of
this inadequacy has pushed the UN’s approach to intelligence forward over the six
decades, though certainly not in a linear fashion.
The first PKOs were observer missions and commissions tasked mainly to
“observe and report,” though they sometimes had other responsibilities, at least in
name, for example, the “supervision” of a peace agreement. At first, the commis-
sions were multinational bodies, in which national delegates received instructions
from home governments on how to vote and lead the operation, but soon (late
1940s) the military leaders came under the operational control of the UN secretary-
general. During this period, the concept of the “soldier-diplomat” arose as the
peacekeeper was often asked to perform unusual tasks, such as mediating between
local combatants and negotiating with local leaders, but intelligence gathering was
not one of them.
At its outset, the United Nations struggled to create and run missions in Greece,
Indonesia, Korea, Palestine, and Kashmir. An instructive case of the UN’s failure to
provide early warning came at the outbreak of the Korean War.
3.1. United Nations Commission on

Korea (UNCOK), 1948–50
In 1949, the UN General Assembly mandated the UN’s small mission in Korea,
UNCOK, to report on developments which might lead to military conflict on
the Korean peninsula. In the months prior to the North Korean attack in June
1950, the Commission heard many allegations of an imminent invasion based
on information supplied by defectors, captives, secret operatives, and South
Korean political leaders. Nevertheless, UNCOK did not issue any urgent warn-
ings back to UN headquarters, relying instead on US information and analysis,
including a report that it was “as safe in Korea as in the United States” (Paige
1968, 73). Days before the invasion, two UNCOK military observers from
Australia surveyed troop deployments along the south side of the 38th parallel
by jeep. They could only view up-close the South Korean army since the North
would not permit entry. On June 23 they returned to Seoul to report that the
South Korean force was in no condition to carry out a large-scale attack. The
UN officers failed to see indications of an impending attack from the north and
also failed to note the weakness of South Korean forces to withstand an attack
(Dorn 1996, 265). Two days after their report, on June 25, North Korea launched
a full-scale invasion, leading to the fall of the capital, Seoul, within only three
days.
The Korean observation mission still proved useful, even if it was only in late
warning. Secretary-General Trygve Lie first learned of the invasion from the US
assistant secretary of state in a midnight call, but was able to obtain direct confirma-
tion from UNCOK before reporting on the situation to the Security Council later in
the day. This intervention by the secretary-general, using information corroborated
by an objective source (UNCOK), helped convince otherwise skeptical delegates to
vote for the Council resolutions to restrain and later to repel the North Korean
forces (Lie 1954, 331–32).
Lie’s successor, Dag Hammarskjöld, was a great innovator who, along with
Canada’s Lester Pearson, helped resolve the Suez Crisis in 1956. They pioneered the
first peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), to stand
armed between the armies of Egypt and the invading forces from Israel, France and
the United Kingdom to prevent small fights from escalating to war. Building on this
success, Hammarskjöld proposed and developed an even larger force for the Congo
in 1960.
3.2. United Nations Operation in the

Congo (ONUC), 1960–64
ONUC (1960–64) was a unique mission during the Cold War, employing consider-
able armed force. It foreshadowed modern peacekeeping operations in many ways.
It was larger than any other mission the United Nations created during the Cold
War, involving about twenty thousand personnel at its peak, with diverse responsi-
bilities: interposition between hostile parties, forcing disarmament, enforcing peace,
policing, providing security for technical and aid personnel as well as officials and
refugees, training Congolese security forces, restoring law and order, preventing
civil war, and securing the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries, sometimes by force.
In its campaign against Katangese mercenary forces, ONUC carried out air attacks,
even dropping bombs. Clearly such tasks required military intelligence that is an
integral part of combat operations, but ONUC’s civilian leadership initially justi-
fied the absence of an intelligence system on the grounds that ONUC’s military
forces were supposed to play a more passive traditional peacekeeping role.3 Even the
Force Commander, Swedish Major General Carl von Horn, suggested that the word
intelligence should be “banned outright” from the lexicon of the United Nations
(Dorn and Bell 1995, 14–15).
However, after the ONUC’s mandate was transformed in February 1961 to
include an enforcement dimension to take “all appropriate measures to prevent
the occurrence of civil war . . .,”4 the need for an intelligence structure was gradu-
ally accepted by ONUC’s leadership. An intelligence organization was established
and named, for perceptual reasons, as the “Military Information Branch” (MIB)
rather than the “Intelligence Branch.” However, the MIB heads called themselves
Chief Intelligence Officers, having been drawn from the intelligence branches of
their militaries. The MIB was to gather intelligence for four purposes: to enhance
security of UN personnel, to support specific operations, to warn of possible out-
breaks of conflict, and to provide estimations of outside interference (Dorn and
Bell 1995, 15).
3
For a detailed account of the disagreement between ONUC’s military and civilian leader-
ship over ONUC’s mandate and intelligence and military capacities see Von Horn’s Soldiering for
Peace (1966).
4
SC Res. 161 (1961), 21 Feb. 1961.
Over time, the MIB came to play an important role in ONUC. It developed a
range of secret activities including signals intelligence (SIGINT) from intercepted
radio messages, photographic intelligence (PHOTOINT) from aerial reconnais-
sance, and human intelligence (HUMINT) from prisoners, informants, and agents.
The mission even employed “interrogators” to obtain information from captured
mercenaries.
The SIGINT component began in February 1962 when the secretary-general’s
military adviser agreed to the establishment of a radio monitoring organization
under the MIB. The MIB benefited from code crackers to deal with encrypted
messages sent by mercenaries. The radio intercepts generated voluminous intelli-
gence, uncovering facts and details crucial for operations. ONUC learned of
Katangese bombardment missions, troop movements, arms shortages, and hidden
arms caches. They were able to prevent Katangese forces from bombing the
Elizabethville airport and attacking Albertville (Dorn 1999, 9). Other intelligence,
indicating an impending mercenary attack, provided the trigger for major UN
combat operations.
To facilitate PHOTOINT the Swedish government dispatched aircraft specially
equipped for photo-reconnaissance and provided a photo-interpretation detach-
ment. Aerial intelligence provided ONUC with vital information during its cam-
paign in Katanga, and the MIB was able to reappraise its estimation of Katangese air
capabilities.
HUMINT was gleaned from interrogations of prisoners and asylum-seekers
from the Katangese Gendarmerie and bureaucracy using UN methods that remained
within the bounds of the Geneva Conventions. These interrogations resulted in
valuable information, including the uncovering of the names of many mercenaries
and the location of several large arms dumps. Informants, both unpaid and “on tap”
(paid), provided useful information, including the location of a large cache of air-
craft engines and parts. ONUC kept contact with informants within the Katangese
government and outside of the Congo that aided in estimating the number of for-
eign mercenaries. However, the use of agents by the MIB approached the limits of
UN intelligence-gathering techniques. The negative repercussions that could ensue
if the United Nations were discovered employing spies in the Congo or elsewhere
seemed to outweigh the benefits the activity might provide. Thus ONUC did not
systemize the use of agents. That was something the United Nations did much later,
in the 1990s in Somalia and in the subsequent Congo operation.
The UN Operation in the Congo of the 1960s had very little contact with
national intelligence agencies. Though the United States promoted the mission in
the Security Council and was the largest financial backer, the CIA did not exchange
information with the mission. This is not surprising since the CIA was involved in
nefarious activities in that country. At one point it was planning the assassination
of the Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, who was being guarded by
the UN (United States Senate 1975, 33). The MIB’s successes in gathering useful
intelligence were mostly its own. It was the UN’s first intelligence body and a very
important potential model for providing peacekeepers with information crucial
to the success of their mission. Indeed, the Congo Operation revealed the neces-
sity of including an extensive intelligence component in a sophisticated UN mili-
tary operation. But the lesson was not actually learned until after the Cold War
ended.
The UN Operation in the Congo, though successful, proved so difficult and
costly in lives (250 fatalities) and finances ($400 million) that the United Nations
almost went into bankruptcy. It was saved only by financial injections from the
Kennedy Administration. The UN did not return to Africa with a peacekeeping
mission for a quarter century. Here again, in Namibia, the lesson about the need for
intelligence was hard won.
3.3. United Nations Transition Assistance Group

(UNTAG) in Namibia, 1989–90
The UN peacekeeping experience in Namibia in 1989 demonstrated both the dan-
gers of insufficient intelligence and later the benefits of possessing solid awareness
about the actual situation on the ground.
A strategy for free elections and an end to South African rule over Namibia was
outlined in the Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). However, it took ten years of
substantial sanctions and international pressure as well as Cuban agreement to
withdraw its troops from Angola, for Pretoria to finally bargain seriously. A UN
peacekeeping operation (UNTAG) was launched on April 1, 1989, to prepare for
elections scheduled for seven months later that would give Namibia its first chance
at an independent government.
The first crisis occurred on April 1, 1989, when the South African foreign minis-
ter, Pik Botha, announced that infiltrators from the South West Africa People’s
Organization (SWAPO) were conducting armed incursions along the northern
border of Namibia from neighboring Angola. During the early hours of that day,
just as the cease-fire between South Africa and SWAPO was to begin, armed gueril-
las entered Namibia from Angola, where they were supposed to have been confined.
The number of fighters returning to Namibia numbered in the hundreds (Pérez de
Cuéllar 1997). But UN officials were only privy to South Africa’s interpretation of
the events, which alleged that a full-scale invasion was underway and that four to six
thousand guerillas were expected to cross the border. Under pressure from Pretoria,
the secretary-general allowed South African armed forces to be released from their
bases to deal with the alleged menace. These forces killed three hundred SWAPO
members in a “Nine Day War.”
Officials from the United Nations were quick to interview captured SWAPO
guerillas, who said they had been told to cross into northern Namibia so the United
Nations could supervise and instruct them. They claimed to have no hostile inten-
tions (Cliffe 1994, 89). The next day Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO leader, denied violat-
ing the cease-fire agreement, stating the SWAPO soldiers had been in Namibia long
before the cease-fire and were celebrating when South African forces attacked
(United Nations 1989).
Unfortunately, of the three hundred UN military observers envisioned for
UNTAG, only a small fraction of them were in Namibia, none at the border, when
the conflict began, so the United Nations was torn between the two stories. While
Nujoma had either lied or been mistaken in saying no cross-border movement had
occurred, it also became clear South Africa had exaggerated fears of a full-scale
invasion. In reality, the situation was well under control and further escalation was
unlikely (Cliffe 1994, 88). But the entire Namibian peace process had been jeopar-
dized at its start and the United Nations appeared confused. Fortunately, the United
Nations was able to restore respect for the mission.
The secretary-general proposed a restoration of the cease-fire and a halt of
cross-border movement. A joint commission of Angolan, Cuban, and South African
representatives agreed to a withdrawal procedure which began on April 9. The
United Nations established assembly points in northern Namibia manned by UN
forces. Fighters associated with SWAPO reported to these points and were then
escorted by UN personnel to SWAPO bases inside Angola. On May 4, the full com-
plement of 4,540 UN peacekeepers were in Namibia and by May 13 the South African
forces had all returned to their bases. On May 15, UN verification took place to
assure South Africa that all the guerillas had been removed, and the election phase
of the process began.
The events of April had caught the United Nations off guard. It was unable to
confirm South African exaggerated claims of guerilla incursions. Nor did the UN
foresee any of these difficulties before the mission started, demonstrating a failure
of early warning and information gathering, since there had been clear signs of
potential conflict. Nujoma had asserted that it was wrong for SWAPO fighters to be
confined to Angola. He had also wrote that he anticipated violence. De Cuéllar
admits these factors “should have warned us of a possible intent to infiltrate fighters
into Namibia” (Pérez de Cuéllar 1997, 310). Greater vigilance in observing warning
signs and in deploying observers rapidly in anticipation of the start of the mission
might have averted the crisis and saved hundreds of lives.
Another problem arose during the summer when South Africa, fearing the
party it supported would lose the election, tried to discredit SWAPO by alleging the
organization was imprisoning and torturing hundreds of people in its camps in
Zambia and Angola. A UN Mission on Detainees investigated these allegations dur-
ing the summer by gathering lists of reported detainees and comparing them with
lists of released detainees, finding that at least 1,100 alleged prisoners had already
been released. The United Nations also visited twenty-two sites in Angola and eight
in Zambia. Ultimately, they found no evidence of people being illegally detained.
On November 1, immediately prior to the Namibian elections, South Africa
again dramatically announced that several hundred SWAPO fighters were about to
cross the border. This time their assertion was entirely false, likely designed to influ-
ence the elections. By now, however, the United Nations had communications
specialists who were able to investigate the South African claim that radio messages
on the UN’s own wavelengths provided evidence of a buildup. These “messages”
were found to be fraudulent. Also, UN monitors searched the Namibia-Angola bor-
der and found it to be peaceful. Foreign Minister Botha soon acknowledged the
radio messages had been a hoax, but it was never ascertained from where the infor-
mation originated, probably South Africans opposed to the independence process.
Thus the increase in UN personnel and specialists coupled with attention to intel-
ligence and counterintelligence facilitated a rejection of South Africa’s fraudulent
allegations.
The UN mission in Namibia, UNTAG, was the first mission in a large expansion
of PKOs at the end of the Cold War. These missions not only increased in number,
they also were large, with wider mandates and, as in Namibia, forced the United
Nations to grapple with the need for intelligence. But the lesson was learned inad-
equately and not early enough to help the ill-fated mission in Rwanda.
3.4. United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda

(UNAMIR), 1993–94
In August 1993 Rwandan President Habyarimana’s regime reached an agreement
with the rival Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF; Tutsi) at Arusha, Tanzania, on power
sharing between the two groups that was supposed to bring Rwanda multi-power
rule. To assist in the implementation of the agreement, UNAMIR, commanded by
Canadian Major-General Roméo Dallaire, arrived in Rwanda in October 1993. Six
months later, extremists led the Hutus, who comprised about 85 percent of Rwanda’s
populace, to perpetrate a genocidal massacre of the minority ethnic group, the
Tutsis, who comprised about 14 percent, as well as many Tutsi sympathizers. The
genocide consigned over half a million Rwandans to their deaths.
The perpetrators of the genocide were important government officials who made
meticulous plans, including stockpiling arms caches and training Hutus to conduct
mass killings. The massacres began after two surface-to-air missiles brought down the
plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi to Kigali, the Rwandan capital,
on April 6, 1994. Almost immediately the slaughter of Tutsis and Hutu moderates
began. It was perpetrated by Hutu-dominated militias, called Interahamwe, as well as
the Gendarmerie and the Presidential Guard. Ten paratroopers who were part of the
Belgian contingent of the UN force were disarmed and murdered as they sought to
protect the Rwandan Prime Minister, who was assassinated. From Kigali the genocide
swept across the country systematically resulting in the slaughter of hundreds of
thousands.
Evidence suggests that a strengthened intelligence capability within the United
Nations could have unveiled the plans for the genocide. An important clue lay in
the flow of illicit arms. In January 1994, the Human Rights Watch Arms Project
asserted that the Habyarimana (Hutu) regime sought to distribute nearly two
thousand assault rifles to civilians loyal to the president’s party, the MRND
(Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement). The

report cautioned, “it is frightening to ponder the potential for abuses by large
numbers of ill-trained civilians equipped with assault rifles.”5 After the 1993 Arusha
agreement no weapons were supposed to enter Rwanda, but the Security Council
Resolution and the Arusha agreement were clearly being flouted. Grenades were
being sold alongside fruits at markets in Kigali (Prunier 1995, 184). UNAMIR offi-
cials were aware of, but were unable to cope with or even monitor, the illicit arms
transfers. General Dallaire tried but was unsuccessful in obtaining UN approval to
increase intelligence gathering, to conduct searches, and to confiscate weapons
(Dorn and Matloff 2000, 18).
The most explicit warning came from HUMINT. A former security aide to
President Habyarimana and a leader in the Interahamwe militia disclosed a macabre
plot to wreak violence against the country’s Tutsis. This informer, who asked to be
called “Jean-Pierre,” said he had been ordered to compile lists of Tutsis that he
thought were to be used for their extermination. He alleged that his militia was being
trained to kill one thousand people in twenty minutes. He also said the organizers of
the genocidal plan included leaders of the extreme factions of Habyarimana’s party,
the MRND, who wanted to block the establishment of the new government and force
UNAMIR to withdraw by engineering violence against it. Referring to a plan to assas-
sinate deputies at the swearing-in ceremonies, he said if “Belgian soldiers resorted to
force [to prevent the assassinations] a number of them were to be killed and thus
guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda” (Gourevitch 1998, 42–43). Jean-Pierre
also pointed out exact locations of Interahamwe weapons caches. This information
was directly verified by an African UN peacekeeper who, without his uniform,
accompanied Jean-Pierre to the MRND headquarters where he saw the large stock-
pile of arms. Jean-Pierre said he would be willing to offer further information but
wanted a UN pledge for protection and asylum (Dorn and Matloff 2000, 20).
General Dallaire sent faxes to New York, including the famous “Genocide Fax”
of January 11, 1994, containing the above information. He recommended the
informant be granted protection and outlined his plans to raid arms caches within
thirty-six hours to prevent them from being used in the plots. Unfortunately,
New York could provide no guarantees to the informer and Dallaire was denied
permission to raid the weapons caches. Instead he was told by Kofi Annan’s assistant
to divulge the plan to the government head, President Habyarimana, whose inner
circle included members who were developing the plot. By denying guarantees for
Jean-Pierre, by failing to seek further confirmation and information on a continu-
ing basis, by vetoing Dallaire’s preventative actions, and by failing to provide the
Security Council with Dallaire’s warnings, New York blundered (Dorn and Matloff
2000, 21). Jean-Pierre broke off contact and on April 6, 1994, the genocide began in
full force. Shortly after the president’s plane crashed, which was likely part of the
plot, Dallaire rushed to Rwandan military headquarters where he tried to convince
5
Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War, Human
Rights Watch Arms Project 6, no. 1 (January 1994): 27.
the military chief of staff, Col. Théoneste Bagosora, to calm the situation, unaware
that the colonel was one of the main instigators (Dorn 1996, 266). Even after the
killing began, some time passed before the United Nations could determine that the
vast majority of the slayings were centrally organized and overwhelmingly perpe-
trated by Hutus against Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Dallaire complained of being
“deaf and blind” in the field. He later told the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation:
“The UN does not have intelligence gathering structure . . . that is not within our
philosophy nor in our mandate” (Dallaire 1994, 12).
The Rwandan genocide could have been foreseen and probably prevented.
What was absent was informed political will in the UN Secretariat and the
Security Council to make bold decisions, to foster intelligence-gathering, and to
develop new structures and means for early warning and prevention (Dorn and
Matloff 2000, 44). In addition to the clues of the pending disaster provided by
HUMINT and the prodigious arms flow, other factors such as the training and
activities of the Interahamwe, the reputations of the plotters, and Rwanda’s long-
standing pattern of ethnically based human-rights violations pointed to a loom-
ing crisis. Had UNAMIR possessed a competent intelligence unit able to combine,
analyze, and assess all this data, as well as to gather further information to cor-
roborate it, especially to verify evidence provided by informants, then the case
for preventative measures to avert the catastrophe would have been much stron-
ger. That case could have been based on a broad multi-source process supple-
menting HUMINT with other sources. This multi-source process would have
inspired more confidence in the intelligence at UN headquarters, conceivably to
precipitate a change in the mandate, or at least a manoeuvrist interpretation of
it. This would have allowed Dallaire to carry out the necessary pre-emptive oper-
ations that might have stabilized the situation or brought time for reinforce-
ments to prevent the genocide (Cammaert 2003, 25). Sadly, this did not occur,
and the United Nations again learned the deadly cost of inadequate intelligence
gathering and analysis.
After the hard lessons of the 1990s, the United Nations entered the twenty-
first century chastened and wiser. It began to develop a more robust intelligence
architecture and utilize a more advanced set of tools. The missions in Kosovo,
the Congo and Haiti proved to be pioneering. Technologies are now proving to
be key “tools of the trade,” though still underutilized instruments in the modern
toolbox.
4. Monitoring Technologies
While UN operations have relied mostly on human observers, who provide an
essential presence on the ground, there is a growing awareness of the limitations of
human monitoring. The range of vision is limited, especially at night, and large
areas are extremely difficult to cover. More often than not, the United Nations has
been unable to observe arms smuggling and illegal resources exploitation that fuel
violent conflicts. Visual observation is rarely sufficient to follow the many indica-
tors, including the movements of rogue groups and illegal aircraft in remote areas.
In addition, when violence breaks out visual monitoring may become exceedingly
dangerous (Dorn 2007).
Modern monitoring technologies are slowly being introduced to help the
United Nations address these problems. Technologies increase the range, effective-
ness, and accuracy of observation. Most modern militaries have incorporated
sophisticated devices into their standard equipment, but the United Nations has
only used some monitoring technologies in some missions, mostly in an ad hoc and
unsystematic fashion. Digital and video cameras, for example, often brought per-
sonally, have provided valuable evidence of violations and atrocities. The United
Nations has yet to deploy remote-controlled video cameras to monitor potential
flash points, except in Cyprus where closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras are
located along the Green Line. The UN owns several hundred night-vision image
intensifers but these are older and too few to meet requirements. Thermal imagers
that can potentially extend the range of night vision are not in the UN stockpile,
and the United Nations has no direct experience with seismic or acoustic ground
sensors. Radar is another untapped technology that could allow monitoring the sky,
the ground, and even underground, for example, to detect arms caches or mass
graves. Neither does the United Nations routinely deploy motion sensors that could
easily serve a useful alert function. Only in missions where technologically advanced
nations deploy with their national kit (equipment), can sporadic examples of
advanced technologies be found. The Irish Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in Liberia
used Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) for perimeter surveillance of its camps. In
Lebanon, certain European contingents deployed air surveillance radars.
Cameras and advanced sensors on mobile platforms, like aircraft or even ground
reconnaissance vehicles, can provide enormous benefits for speed and safety. The
United Nations, however, uses these systems in only a few missions. For example, in
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Chilean helicop-
ters and a Uruguayan fixed-wing (CASA turboprop) aircraft are equipped with FLIR.
These have proven useful in anti-drug and anti-gang operations. Unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) have yet to be deployed for reconnaissance by the United Nations,
though they were flown by a partner (EUFOR) to temporarily assist the UN mission
during the Congo election period in 2006. Neither has the United Nations used teth-
ered balloons that can provide observation from high over large strategic areas.
Clearly the United Nations needs higher levels of technology to bridge the
“monitoring gap” between its headquarters mandates and its field capabilities.
DPKO is evaluating modern monitoring technologies and improving its policies,
doctrine, and training materials with the encouragement of troop-contributing
countries. It also hopes to build on its recent progress with Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) to create user-input GIS databases, allowing data to be more easily
organized, analyzed, and shared. It hopes to increase its in-house expertise to select
and maintain key technologies, and to apply innovative methods of technology-

aided monitoring.
The United Nations has proven it has the capacity to use high technology, as
evidenced by its world-class communications and information technology (CIT)
architecture. It is now expected to develop at least modest means of technical moni-
toring, including a technology support service. Technology offers increased situa-
tional awareness needed for accurate threat and risk assessments, and for proactive
operations. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies are rapidly increasing
in capacity and decreasing in cost, making this option increasingly appealing.
5. Twenty-First Century PKI

In the early part of the century, the United Nations finally discovered the value of
systematized intelligence in its field operations. After four decades of ignoring and
even deriding the concept (except in the Congo, 1962–64), and a decade (1990s) of
struggling to find a place for it, the United Nations began systematically creating dedi-
cated intelligence bodies and resources within its peacekeeping operations (PKOs). In
2006, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations adopted a policy that a JMAC and
a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) should be established in all PKOs (DPKO 2006).
Furthermore, several field missions have engaged in “intelligence-led operations,”
which are conducted either to gain intelligence or driven in timing and objectives by
intelligence. In some cases, the operations are actually commanded or controlled by
one of the intelligence sections of the mission (e.g., the J2 or “U2,” short for UN intel-
ligence branch of the force). For example, in the UN Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the J2 at the regional (Eastern Division) head-
quarters in 2006–7 was given control over the movements of soldiers in the field, task-
ing them to obtain information about dangerous rebel groups hiding in the jungle.
The UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) also pioneered
the practice of intelligence-led peacekeeping. In 2006–7, in order to gain ascen-
dency over illegal gangs that controlled large sections of some Haitian cities, par-
ticularly the capital Port-au-Prince, MINUSTAH made active use of the Force
headquarters U2, the U2 units in the battalions of the national contingents, as well
as the vital JMAC. The latter was an integrated unit created in 2005 that employed
military officers, police, and civilians (local and international) to gather and ana-
lyze tactical, operational, and strategic information to produce actionable intelli-
gence. The mission extensively used local informants (“assets” in intelligence-speak)
to determine the locations and activities of gang leaders that ruthlessly ruled their
fiefdoms in the slums of Port-au-Prince. MINUSTAH also engaged in sophisti-
cated Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) before taking forceful opera-
tions against the gangs, in which soldiers’ lives were dependent on accurate
intelligence. These intelligence-led operations helped the United Nations to take
the initiative and to control the “battlespace,” as well as minimize the risks to its
own personnel and to innocent civilians. Using that approach the mission was
largely successful in overcoming the armed gangs, which enabled it to move on to
more subtle problems like hostage-taking, illicit trafficking in drugs and people,
widespread corruption, humanitarian assistance (particularly after natural disas-
ters), and building up indigenous capacity in the security and judicial sectors.
In Haiti and other operations like the UN mission in Kosovo, an important
source of intelligence for the United Nations has been its member states. Among
them the great powers possess the largest volume and most sophisticated intelli-
gence. Yet often intelligence is not shared with the United Nations because the great
powers are afraid their intelligence sources may be compromised or that certain
technical capabilities may be revealed (Van Kappen 2003, 7). The UN Secretariat has
a reputation for being unable to keep information secret.6 As one official remarked
in exaggerated fashion: “If you even think about something in this [UN Secretariat]
building, it is known in 189 capitals the next day” (Van Kappen 2003, 7).
Like other states, the “great powers” are more inclined to provide intelligence to
UN missions when their own troops are part of the mission, especially if they are at
risk. In some cases, they keep the information within the contingent or regional
grouping, resulting in some contingents and individuals in a UN mission being bet-
ter supplied with intelligence than others. For example, in Bosnia a Canadian dep-
uty theatre commander with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
could receive imagery intelligence from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) but could not share it with his commander from India because the latter
was not from a NATO nation (Smith 1994, 177; Wiebes 2006, 32). Similarly, during
the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), the Belgian
Commander received NATO intelligence on condition that the intelligence section
of UNTAES be manned exclusively by NATO countries. As Belgium was the only
NATO country in UNTAES, NATO intelligence could not be shared with persons
from any other nation, including the Commander’s Russian deputy, which angered
both him and the major troop contributors such as Russia, Pakistan, the Ukraine,
and Jordan (Van Kappen 2003, 7).
Though the United States has a general policy of not providing highly classified
documents to the United Nations, it has made exceptions for tactical battlefield
information in times of crisis to enhance the safety of UN “Blue Helmet” troops
( Johnson 2003, 364). Other Western nations do so as well. The fact remains that
intelligence support is much greater when a nation’s own troops are deployed.
In the end, the relationship between national intelligence and the world organi-
zation raises the essential question: when does international security become an
6
UN headquarters and field operations employ a rudimentary classification system (UN
restricted, UN confidential, secret, top secret, for eyes only of XX) but this system is not enforced.
Nationals working for the mission often share information and documents with their home
nations and UN situation reports are routinely sent from national contingents to their
headquarters back home.
extension of national security? Each nation must answer this question for itself. But
from the longer-term and wider human perspective, it is clear that the United Nations
should be given the means to achieve its goals of securing greater peace. In addition,
as nations face the flow of illegal drugs, weapons of mass destruction, international
criminal activities, and terrorism, they all have an interest in helping the United
Nations combat renegade behavior in the world (Johnson 2003, 369). Moreover, the
globalization of intelligence—information not just for peacekeeping and conflict
resolution but also to deal with weapons proliferation, drugs, and crime—is some-
thing all nations, and especially the most powerful ones, need to consider. Inevitably,
global problems require global solutions. There is little doubt that global problem-
solving will require the further development of peacekeeping intelligence.
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chapter 18
PRIVATIZED SPYING: THE

EMERGING INTELLIGENCE
INDUSTRY
patrick r. keefe
1. Introduction
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Senator Bob Graham,
the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, called for “a symbiotic
relationship between the intelligence community and the private sector” (Graham
2001). Across the United States, there was a sense that the country was under siege,
and that all citizens, including those in private industry, should do their part to help
secure the homeland and identify and thwart emerging threats. During the decade
that preceded the attacks, the American intelligence community had seen its bud-
gets and staffing levels dramatically reduced, to an extent that even as President
George W. Bush announced an ambitious new “war on terror,” America’s spies found
themselves shorthanded—untrained in the languages spoken by the terrorists,
unable to crack new communications technologies, and generally lagging behind
their counterparts in the private sector. Following the American invasion of Iraq in
2003, commentators, lawmakers, and scholars grew concerned about the Pentagon’s
growing use of private military contractors to augment allied forces on the ground.
But few noticed or remarked upon the fact that another private sector industry had
been rapidly emerging during the same time frame, to assist America’s spies. Recently
retired CIA agents were trading in their blue government badges for green contrac-
tor badges and returning to the same jobs at the same desks at Langley, but for pri-
vate-sector salaries. Dozens of new firms were springing up in the Washington
privatized spying 297
suburbs, specializing in everything from language translation to analysis, from

designing new surveillance technologies to supplying actual ex-military and intel-
ligence veterans to perform operations on foreign soil.
By 2008, the relationship between U.S. intelligence and the private sector had
grown so symbiotic that it was often impossible to disentangle the two. Despite the
longstanding principle that certain sensitive duties are “inherently governmental,”
and should be performed only by government employees, corporate contractors had
become instrumental in the most delicate and classified areas of intelligence work.
Fewer than half of the individuals working at the National Counterterrorism Center
were actually government employees (Miller 2006). Civilian contractors with no mili-
tary training in interrogation were questioning detainees; several were implicated in
the torture scandals at the Abu Ghraib prison (Singer 2005). In Baghdad, contractors
were recruiting informants and handling agents in support of frontline combat units
(Miller 2006). At the CIA station in Islamabad, private contractors sometimes out-
numbered government employees by three to one (Miller 2006).
“Homeland security is too important to be left to the government,” former
National Security Agency (NSA) director Ken Minihan observed, and to the extent
that the government lacks the relevant capabilities or resources in a time of crisis,
this assertion seems unassailably true (Ratliff 2005). But when national security and
intelligence become a lucrative for-profit industry, a certain danger arises that the
symbiotic relationship between the intelligence community and the private sector
can turn dysfunctional, and ultimately even exploitative. Minihan no longer works
for the government; he is managing director of Paladin, a venture-capital firm that
invests in homeland-security companies. Like thousands of talented and experi-
enced intelligence professionals, he left the government for more lucrative opportu-
nities in the private sector. Not unpredictably, this brain drain has intensified, rather
than alleviated, the intelligence community’s dependence on private contractors.
No definitive tally of how much precisely U.S. intelligence spends on the expen-
sive services of contractors has been made public, but one estimate, inadvertently
released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2007, is
that a staggering 70 percent of the aggregate intelligence budget is now devoted to
private contracts (Shorrock 2007). It should go without saying that many individu-
als and firms entered the emerging intelligence industry following September 11 out
of a sense of patriotism and national duty; indeed, some of the major contractors
lost employees in the attacks. But the fact remains that these firms are market-
driven, for-profit entities, and after the collapse of the dot-com economy just prior
to September 11, many entrepreneurs perceived economic opportunities in the new
intelligence and homeland security boom. “Every fund is seeing how big the trough
is and asking, How do I get a piece of that action?” a Bethesda venture capitalist told
a journalist in 2005. “When the IT industry shut down, post-bubble, guess who had
all the money? The government” (Ratliff 2005).
However patriotic they might be, contractors must ultimately answer to their
shareholders and to the bottom line, and as such, there is a subtle but fundamen-
tal misalignment between their priorities and incentives and those of their clients
in America’s intelligence community. This misalignment and some of the pathol-

ogies that it engenders have received relatively scant attention in the press and in
scholarly literature, but will represent an important avenue of inquiry in years to
come. This chapter outlines the history and dynamics of the outsourcing of U.S.
intelligence, the sometimes wasteful and expensive dysfunction of the contracting
process, the nature of the brain drain from the government to the private sector,
and the prospects for greater oversight, understanding of the phenomenon, and
reform.
2. Origins of Intelligence Outsourcing

Some might argue that the privatization of intelligence is not in fact a new devel-
opment. Many of the chief players in the current intelligence boom are major
systems integrators, or “body shops,” the traditional “beltway bandits” of the mili-
tary-industrial complex: companies like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman,
and Boeing. In addition to building ships, missiles, and other forms of military
hardware, these firms have been integral to America’s intelligence-gathering opera-
tions for decades, constructing surveillance satellites and airplanes and other sys-
tems to capture and process communications intelligence and overhead imagery.
Even the NSA, which had a long history of constructing its own technical systems
in-house and was often said to be ten years ahead of private-sector research and
development, relied for years on the close cooperation of private American com-
munications companies in supplying the agency with copies of telegrams entering
or leaving the United States (Keefe 2005, 145).
But the scope and degree of intelligence outsourcing in the first years of the
twenty-first century was unprecedented, and attributable in large part to the pro-
nounced reduction in the size of the intelligence community throughout the 1990s.
Due to a convergence of the so-called peace dividend following the collapse of the
Soviet Union and a broader national trend toward privatization and reducing the
size of the government, agencies throughout the intelligence community experi-
enced severe budget cuts. Government-wide, President Bill Clinton cut the federal
workforce to its lowest level since 1960, and intelligence agencies were especially
hard hit (Shane and Nixon 2007). The NSA had twenty thousand civilian employees
in 1990, and fifteen thousand by 2000 (Bamford 2008, 106). By 2005, due to down-
sizing throughout the 1990s and a rash of departures during the brief, disastrous
directorship of Porter Goss, fully half of the CIA’s workforce had five years of expe-
rience or less (Weiner 2007, 503).
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, the intelligence community needed so-called surge capacity—a rapid
infusion of workers with the kinds of precise skill-sets required to track and combat
terrorist networks. The CIA and other agencies began hiring back former employ-
ees who had retired or been laid off. In those early months, America’s spies were
“still in the catch-up mode,” according to Timothy Sample, a former CIA analyst
and staff director of the House Intelligence Committee (Klein 2007). In some cases
it was necessary to bring in private contractors because federal personnel ceilings
established in the interests of cutting the federal workforce made it impossible to
hire new recruits as government employees. But in many instances the process was
driven simply by the exigencies of the situation: the necessary skills did not exist
inside the government, and the agencies needed to bring trained linguists, analysts,
operators, technologists, and codebreakers into the fold as soon as possible. The
privatization boom was born not of market forces but of sheer necessity. As one
slide in a 2007 presentation by an acquisitions official from the Office of National
Intelligence put it, “We can’t spy . . . if we can’t buy!” (Shorrock 2007).
Before long, scores of fledgling companies began peddling their goods and ser-
vices to the intelligence community. Some of these companies provided man-
power—former military and intelligence professionals with years of experience in
analysis or operations and the all-important security clearances necessary to work
as contractors for the agencies. In other cases the start-ups offered new technologies
to gather, analyze, process, or distribute intelligence.
Even prior to the attacks some in the intelligence community had observed the
level of innovation on display in the private-sector technology firms of Silicon
Valley and argued that the government should pursue a more entrepreneurial
approach to new technologies. In 1999 the CIA established its own venture capital
fund, known as In-Q-Tel, after the wizened inventor, Q, in the James Bond films
(Laurent 2002). But after September 11 more and more money was channeled into
new intelligence technologies, and before long the traditional military-industrial
contractors were establishing their own intelligence and homeland-security divi-
sions, concocting new products to track terrorists, secure borders, and predict
attacks, and acquiring smaller startup firms themselves. Virginia’s homeland-
security industry grew more during the five years after September 11 than any other
industry in the commonwealth (Kranz 2006). At Booz Allen Hamilton, a contractor
so closely intertwined with the work of American espionage that a former deputy
director of the CIA once called it “the shadow intelligence community,” revenue
doubled between 2000 and 2007 (Shorrock 2005; Wysocki 2007). Cofer Black, the
chief of the CIA’s counterterrorism center, left the agency to join the controversial
private military contractor Blackwater USA, and soon established Blackwater’s own
espionage outfit, Total Intelligence Solutions (Scahill 2008).
Between 2002 and 2006, the number of contractor facilities cleared for work by
the NSA grew from 41 to 1,265 (Walker 2007). According to figures released by the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2008, the CIA employs some thirty-
six thousand contractors in espionage-related jobs, along with roughly one hun-
dred thousand full-time government workers (Miller 2008). The private intelligence
boom has turned the Washington-area counties of Loudoun, Fairfax, and Howard,
where most of the contractors set up shop, into three of the wealthiest jurisdictions
in the United States (Goldstein and Keating 2006).
To some degree, an intelligence community that is largely privatized is in keep-
ing with the prevailing trends across the government. Today the number of private
federal contractors is four times the size of the civilian federal workforce itself
(Wysocki 2007). But privatizing intelligence introduces a host of complex consider-
ations that do not arise when a government opts to privatize public transportation,
say, or social welfare programs. By 2006, Lockheed Martin was placing help-wanted
ads for private sector “counterterrorism analysts” to work as interrogators in the
American prison at Guantanamo Bay (Weiner 2007, 312). On the front lines of
American foreign policy, in professional activities that are exquisitely delicate, nec-
essarily secret, and infinitely consequential, the United States has placed matters in
the hands of individuals who answer not to the government, but to corporations,
and whose nebulous status often places them outside of a readily discernible chain
of command, and beyond legal liability in the event that anything should go awry.
Indeed, the secrecy surrounding intelligence work and the nature of the contracting
system as it currently exists have managed, in this most sensitive area of government
activity, to turn the fundamental orthodoxy of privatization on its head: whereas
proponents of outsourcing argue that it is the government that is mired by high
costs and inefficiency, in the intelligence business, private-sector contracts often
lead to wild cost overruns and poor performance. As it turns out, privatization can
occasionally be dangerously inefficient itself. As President Harry Truman cautioned
in 1941, “I have never yet found a contractor who, if not watched, would not leave
the government holding the bag” (Truman, 1945, 46).
3. Pathologies of the Contracting Process

The standard rationale for privatizing government functions is that efficiency gains
are realized by introducing competition and allowing specialized private firms to
compete to deliver the best product at the cheapest price. But in the intelligence con-
text, and especially in the case of big-ticket technology contracts, this scenario seldom
plays out in so straightforward a manner. To begin with, due to the specialized exper-
tise required, the urgency with which government agencies need to jump-start new
initiatives, and other factors, many contracts are awarded for intelligence work with-
out competitive bidding. A recent study by the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform found that roughly half the money spent on all federal contracts
in 2006 was awarded under circumstances which fell short of “full and open competi-
tion.” No-bid contracts alone accounted for $103 billion in 2006, a 43 percent jump
from the year before (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2008).
This tendency to grant contracts without competition is especially prevalent in
the intelligence context, and deprives the government of the ability to shop around
for the most feasible project proposal or the most attractive price. Provided the
contractors strive to produce successful products on time and on budget, this might
not be a major problem, but given the kinds of ambitious technologies that intelli-
gence agencies often seek to acquire, the monopolistic role played by certain con-
tractors can occasionally lead to escalating costs, lapsed deadlines, and products
which fail to perform. In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security hired Booz
Allen in a no-bid contract for $2 million to help the fledgling agency develop its
own intelligence operation. By December 2004, payments to the firm had exceeded
$30 million, and department lawyers found the deal “grossly beyond the scope” of
the original contract. They advised DHS officials to invite other companies to com-
pete for the work, but more than a year passed before any other firms were allowed
to do so, and in the interim, that original $2 million agreement had grown, through
a second no-bid contract, to $73 million (O’Harrow 2007).
Part of the problem is that in addition to the absence of competition, many
intelligence contracts are “cost plus,” meaning that there is no penalty if a contractor
exceeds the original cost estimate offered during the bidding process, even if that
estimate was decidedly unrealistic. Because many of the contracts in question are
awarded in secret and involve highly classified technologies, runaway costs can esca-
late into the billions before Congress, watchdog groups, or the press become aware
of the problem. This tendency was on display in the case of an ill-fated program
called Trailblazer, which NSA officials hoped would revolutionize the manner in
which the agency processed and sorted through the millions of communications
intercepts that the agency collects each day. In 2002, NSA awarded a $280 million
contract to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a major intel-
ligence contractor. With 43,000 employees and $8 billion in annual revenue, SAIC is
larger than the departments of Labor, Energy, and Housing and Urban Development
combined (Bartlett and Steele 2007). Its biggest customer is the NSA, and it does so
much work for the agency that SAIC, which is based in San Diego, is sometimes
known as “NSA West.” But Trailblazer may have been overly ambitious from its
inception, and SAIC failed to provide computer experts with the technical and
management skills to successfully create the system. Subsequent investigations by
Congress and NSA’s inspector general criticized the agency for “inadequate man-
agement and oversight” of the program, and “confusion” over what Trailblazer was
designed to accomplish. By the time the agency finally pulled the plug on the pro-
gram, it had cost taxpayers some $1.2 billion, and had never succeeded in getting off
the ground (Gorman 2006). One CIA veteran familiar with the program declared it
“a complete and abject failure” (Hirsh 2006). Still, for contractors this sort of failure
is seldom punished. In fact, it is often rewarded. When NSA sought to create a new
program, ExecuteLocus, that would be a successor to the failed Trailblazer, the
agency needed a contractor. SAIC got the job (Harris 2007).
Any efficient relationship between intelligence agencies and private contractors
must be governed by a logical series of incentives for success and disincentives
for failure; but in the perverse context of intelligence contracting, these incentives
can occasionally seem dangerously out of whack. California Representative Henry
Waxman, who chairs the House Oversight Committee, believes that there are
endemic problems in the government contracting process, and that outsourcing
“can be a prescription for enormous fraud, waste and abuse” (Waxman 2007).
Especially where highly technical, highly ambitious, highly classified intelligence
contracts are concerned, there would seem to be a danger that the incentives will
align in such a way that contractors become inclined to promise more than they can
deliver, for less money than will be required, knowing that once they secure the
contract they will be rewarded rather than penalized for delays, cost overruns—and
even outright failure. “Writing winning proposals is different from building win-
ning hardware,” Albert Wheelon, founder of the CIA’s Directorate of Science and
Technology, observes (Taubman 2007).
This discrepancy became especially clear in another recent case, involving
another major contractor. In 1999 the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
awarded a contract to Boeing to develop a new constellation of satellites that would
gather overhead images for America’s defense and intelligence agencies. The high-
concept system was dubbed the Future Imagery Architecture, or FIA. Boeing had
little experience with electro-optic satellites, however, and before long the contrac-
tor began exceeding cost projections and blowing deadlines. Some of the actual
responsibility for overseeing and monitoring the progress of the contract had itself
been outsourced—to Boeing—and at least initially, Boeing managers may not have
been entirely straightforward with their government clients about the problems
they were encountering. “Look, we did report problems,” Ed Nowinski, who ran the
project for Boeing, would later say. “But it was certainly in my best interests to be
very optimistic about what we could do” (Taubman 2007). By 2005, $10 billion had
been spent on the system, including at least $4 billion in cost overruns, and not a
single satellite had gotten off the ground. Director of National Intelligence John
Negroponte terminated a large part of the contract, giving the work to Boeing’s
rival, Lockheed Martin, which had more experience building this sort of satellite.
Ironically, this may be an instance in which more competition for contracts actually
led to inefficiency and failure, because an “incumbent” contractor like Lockheed
may have had less incentive than Boeing, which was a relative newcomer to this
particular technical field, to make promises at the bidding stage that it would not be
able to keep. The New York Times eventually described the expensive demise of FIA
as typical of the “Panglossian compact” between contractor and government, in
which the contractor’s incentives encourage optimism and salesmanship, even in
the face of failure and delays, and ever-escalating costs for the agency and the tax-
payer. As if to underline the institutional advantages of contractors vis-à-vis their
government clients, Boeing demanded, and received, a “kill fee” of $430 million dol-
lars after being fired from the project (Taubman 2007).
Satellites systems are inherently and perhaps uniquely complex, and the FIA
debacle received enough scrutiny from Congress and the press that intelligence offi-
cials have vowed to reform the process for commissioning and overseeing the devel-
opment of spy satellites in the future. A Director of National Intelligence Mike
McConnell has remarked that whereas some European countries “are able to build,
launch, and operate a new satellite system in about five years and for less than a bil-
lion dollars,” America’s satellites can “take more than ten years and cost billions of
dollars to develop.” McConnell called for “a more disciplined, agile acquisition pol-
icy,” and this is undoubtedly a sound proposal (McConnell 2007). But whatever the
particularities of the problem when it comes to satellite development, the failure of
FIA also seems symptomatic of the deeper and more intractable asymmetry of
interests that characterizes the government-contractor relationship. There is more
than one way to read Lockheed’s recent advertising slogan, “We Never Forget Who
We’re Working For.”
4. Personnel: The Brain Drain

and “Bidding Back”
If the kinds of runaway multibillion-dollar boondoggles exemplified by technology
contracts like Trailblazer and FIA suggest that in some instances the outsourcing of
intelligence can actually have a deleterious effect on American national security,
another slightly more prosaic problem associated with the privatization of intelli-
gence is the precipitous brain drain that the espionage industry has engendered.
Training spies and conducting the kinds of rigorous background checks necessary
to grant and maintain high national security clearances is expensive work, and has
traditionally been perceived as an investment that the United States government
makes in its career personnel. But as private contractors grew more integrated into
the work of America’s intelligence agencies following the attacks of September 11,
many government employees were tempted to retire and join contractors, who
could then lease them back to their previous employers, and pay them higher sala-
ries to do the same work (This process is known as “bidding back.”). The scenario
mirrors a similar dilemma faced by the Pentagon in dealing with private military
contractors: a shortfall in trained staff drives the government to seek outside con-
tractors and pay a premium, but that very premium then drives trained government
staff to leave, intensifying the shortfall, deepening the government’s dependence on
the contractors, further driving up the premium the government is obliged to pay,
and so forth as the cycle continues. An arrangement that was designed to alleviate a
problem ends up exacerbating and prolonging it, and irrespective of their often
noble intentions, the contractors assume a relationship with the government that is
effectively parasitic.
The difference for taxpayers between the cost of a government employee and
the cost of a private contractor, who apart from the color of the badge they are
wearing are similar in every respect—two individuals of similar experience and
capability, performing similar tasks—is not trivial: intelligence agencies pay approx-
imately $125,000 a year for each government employee, and $207,000 for contract
workers performing similar services (Miller 2008). Moreover, the process feeds on
itself; no sooner has the government invested in its own employees in order to
develop in-house expertise, than those newly minted experts leave the government
for private-sector work. Two-thirds of the Department of Homeland Security’s
senior officials and experts have departed for private industry (Lipton 2006). A 2006
Office of National Intelligence report complained that “contractors recruit our own
employees, already cleared and trained at government expense, and then ‘lease’
them back to us at considerably greater expense.” (Office of the Director of National
Intelligence 2006). At times, this poaching grew so brazen that former CIA director
Porter Goss actually had to warn several firms to stop recruiting CIA employees
directly from the agency cafeteria (Miller 2006).
One especially pernicious effect of this process is that today many new recruits
to the agency assume from the outset that they would be foolish to make a career in
government service. “[N]ew CIA hires adopted their own five-year plan: get in, get
out, and get paid,” Tim Weiner observes in A Legacy of Ashes, his recent history of
the CIA (2007, 313). For intelligence agencies, the danger is not only that they will be
exploited in the short term by contractors who allow the government to invest in
training and clearing employees, only to hire those employees away and then bid
them back for exorbitant rates. More troubling is the danger that in the long term
the agencies will fail to establish and retain a solid cadre of seasoned career intelli-
gence officers. A CIA director, Michael Hayden, warned that the agency needs to
guard against becoming a “farm system” for contractors (Willing 2007).
If this process has managed, nevertheless, to assume a certain inexorability in
recent years, it is due at least in part to the fact that it is not merely the rank and file
of U.S. intelligence who migrate into private industry, but senior officials as well.
The directors and deputy directors of the agencies frequently leave government to
become handsomely paid executives or board members at major contractors, and
top executives at these firms are often appointed to senior positions in the agencies
as well. The higher the seniority level, in fact, the more symbiotic the relationship
between the intelligence community and the private sector. Three of Booz Allen’s
current and former vice presidents previously worked as intelligence agency direc-
tors, including former CIA head James Woolsey. Former NSA director William
Studeman is now vice president of Northrop Grumman. NSA’s former deputy
director, Barbara McNamara, joined the board of the contractor SAIC (Shorrock
2005). SAIC’s board includes former NSA director Bobby Ray Inman, former CIA
director John Deutch, and former Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird and William
Perry (Gorman 2006). And until he was appointed Director of National Intelligence
by President George W. Bush, Mike McConnell was a senior vice president at Booz
Allen, as well as a former director of the NSA, and the chairman of the Intelligence
and National Security Alliance, an industry trade group that fosters networks and
contracts between intelligence agencies and the private sector (Klein 2007).
To be sure, this kind of cross pollination is both natural and in many cases
desirable for the intelligence community: the closer the relationship with private-
sector firms and the more communication between senior administrators, the
more effectively contractors should be able to respond to the needs of the agencies.
But there may also be some respects in which this lucrative revolving door between
the agencies and industry risks confusing the best interests of the agencies with the
business objectives of the contractors. William Black, Jr., left the NSA in 1997,
after a thirty-eight-year career, to become a vice president at SAIC. Black returned
to the agency in 2000, and shortly thereafter took charge of the Trailblazer ini-
tiative and awarded the contract to his former employer, SAIC (Gorman 2006).
There is no evidence of misconduct on Black’s part, but is there not at least the
appearance of a conflict of interest?
The chief priority of private corporations is to maximize revenue, whereas the
chief priority of the intelligence community is to detect and deter threats to national
security and to do so in as cost-effective a manner as possible. These priorities will
not always dovetail, and when they diverge, the agencies will rely on the impartial
judgment of their most senior administrators. But as profit-maximizing actors
well-schooled in bureaucratic maneuvering, the contractors go to great lengths to
exert influence over those administrators and persuade them that the interests of
intelligence and industry align. In this effort, they often enlist other former agency
officials. Some ninety homeland security officials assembled in the wake of
September 11 have gone on to become executives, consultants, or lobbyists for com-
panies doing domestic security business, and a similar proportion have left the vari-
ous intelligence agencies to become contractors or lobbyists themselves (Lipton
2006). Federal law prohibits senior executive-branch officials from lobbying former
government colleagues or subordinates after they leave government, but only for a
year, and a variety of loopholes enable newly minted lobbyists and executives to
begin exerting an influence promptly upon their departure from office. “[W]orking
virtually immediately for a company that is bidding for work in an area where you
were just setting the policy—that is too close,” one former inspector general of DHS
remarked. “It is almost incestuous” (Lipton 2006).
Nor are legislators immune from the influence of contractors. Intelligence and
homeland security have become lobbies like any other in Washington. Lockheed
spent $47 million on outside lobbying between 1997 and 2004; SAIS spent $8.6 mil-
lion. In 2004, Pat Robert, who was then chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, received nearly half of his Political Action Committee money from six
key contractors (Shorrock 2005). In one notorious incident, Representative Randy
“Duke” Cunningham took millions of dollars in outright bribes when he served on
the House Intelligence Committee, in exchange for steering lucrative contracts
toward the defense contractor MZM (Mazzetti 2006). While the Cunningham case
is surely anomalous in its degree of overt corruption, it does seem clear that whereas
the actions and positions of intelligence officials and lawmakers who serve on the
intelligence committees should ideally be governed exclusively by the dictates of
America’s national-security needs, the large sums of money associated with the
intelligence business have the potential to muddle cool assessments of what big-
ticket expenditures should be undertaken and which contractors to hire. As more
and more work is outsourced to contractors, it would behoove the national-security
establishment to evaluate dispassionately the merits and risks of outsourcing intel-

ligence. But the close professional and financial ties that the contractors enjoy with
agency officials and the relevant members of Congress make such a dispassionate
evaluation decidedly difficult.
5. Conclusion: Oversight,
Further Research, and Reform
One thing is certain: private contractors have become a major fact of the contemporary
landscape of American intelligence operations, inextricably entwined with the work of
the agencies. In 2008, the Office of National Intelligence released some statistics on
contractors, indicating that 27 percent are involved in actual intelligence collection and
operations, 19 percent work in analysis, and 22 percent manage computer networks or
perform other technology functions. These figures do not include contractors working
at companies that actually build satellites, computer systems, and other hardware. If
those kinds of “non core” functions were included, according to Ronald Sanders, chief
human capital officer for national intelligence, contractors would account for roughly
70 percent of the U.S. intelligence workforce (Miller 2008).
As the scope of the outsourcing and some of the unanticipated consequences
associated with it have become clear, an interesting consensus has emerged among
agency officials and staff, as well as lawmakers and watchdog groups, that it repre-
sents a major problem (The only quarter from which there has not been vocal con-
cern about the development, in fact, is that of the contractors themselves). In 2007,
CIA Director Michael Hayden initiated a series of reforms, including a new rule
barring contractors from hiring away CIA employees and then bidding them back
to the agency within eighteen months of their departure. He also initiated a review
process to identify “which of our jobs here at CIA should be done by staff, and
which of our jobs should be done by contractors or a ‘mix’ of contractors and staff.”
Hayden vowed to trim contractor staffing by 10 percent (Pincus and Barr 2007).
These incremental reforms notwithstanding, it is highly unlikely that the com-
ing years hold a major diminution in the role played by contractors in U.S. intelli-
gence. Even as Hayden initiated his reforms at CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) announced that it plans to invest a further $1 billion in outsourcing core
intelligence tasks of analysis and collection (Pincus 2007). And at this point the
intelligence community is so reliant on contractors that however dysfunctional the
situation becomes, endeavoring to return the genie to the bottle by reversing or
undoing the privatization of intelligence in a comprehensive manner would likely
be impossible, and unrealistic. “If you took away the contractor support,” a former
CIA official told the Los Angeles Times, “they’d have to put yellow tape around the
building and close it down” (Miller 2006).
A more useful approach in the coming years would be to seek to understand

the dynamics of outsourcing and contracting, in order to develop greater over-
sight and control of the problem, both at the agency level, where inspectors gen-
eral could be much more aggressive in policing wayward contracts and potential
conflicts of interest, and in the Congress, where lawmakers responsible for appro-
priations and intelligence oversight should have an informed understanding of
the types of work that are being outsourced. The available literature on intelli-
gence outsourcing is scant; the phenomenon has emerged at such a rate that the
study of the phenomenon is lagging seriously behind. Only one full-length study,
the useful 2008 book Spies For Hire, by the journalist Tim Shorrock, has been
published to date, and there are numerous areas and issues ripe for further exami-
nation by scholars, journalists, agency officials, congressional committees, and
independent watchdog groups.
Specific practices, such as bidding back, should be curtailed by the agencies,
with the encouragement of Congress, but in the longer term it seems unlikely that
the intelligence community will resolve the brain drain challenge unless it
increases compensation for talented and experienced government employees.
Some measures could be introduced to stop major technology contracts from
growing out of control, chief among them a stipulation in the language of the
contract itself that certain threshold levels of overrun or delay will trigger notifi-
cation of the relevant congressional committees, so that runaway initiatives like
Trailblazer and FIA can be stopped before billions of dollars are wasted. But more
broadly, the dynamics of the intelligence contracting process, the Panglossian
compact between contractor and agency, and the relationship between competi-
tion and efficiency in this secret and highly technical arena, should be studied and
better understood.
At the dawn of the Cold War, President Dwight Eisenhower warned Americans
about the “grave implications” of the “conjunction of an immense military estab-
lishment and a large arms industry.” As he left office, Eisenhower witnessed the
emergence of a sprawling peacetime armaments industry to satisfy the country’s
security needs in a new strategic environment. He intuited that the dependence of
the government on this profit-driven industry ran a major risk of distorting, in
ways large and small, the broader interests of the nation, and cautioned that “only
an alert and knowledgeable citizenry” could insure that the meshing of the defense
establishment and private industry did not pervert or corrupt the national interest
or America’s ideals.
From the vantage point of 2009, it may be that like the military-industrial com-
plex, the existence of the espionage-industrial complex has become a foregone con-
clusion, so deeply entrenched, and so vital, for all of its shortcomings, to the nation’s
security, that it can never be undone. But it is not too late for scholars and practition-
ers to study and debate the dynamics of intelligence privatization, and tackle, in a
rigorous manner, the critical question of what tasks, if any, are so “inherently gov-
ernmental” that they should not, under any circumstances, be outsourced to the
private sector.
REFERENCES
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on America. New York: Doubleday.
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Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Majority Staff, United States House of
Representatives. 2008. More Dollars, Less Sense: Worsening Contracting Trends Under
the Bush Administration. Report for Chairman Henry A. Waxman (June).
Goldstein, A., and D. Keating. 2006. D.C. Suburbs Top List of Richest Counties. Washington
Post (August 30).
Gorman, S. 2006. Little-Known Contractor Has Close Ties with Staff of NSA. Baltimore
Sun (January 29).
Graham, B. 2001. Report on Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 2002, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (September 14).
Harris, S. 2007. The Success of Failure. Government Executive (April 4).
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February 8).
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(October 18).
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Miller, G. 2006. Spy Agencies Outsourcing to Fill Key Jobs. Los Angeles Times
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———. 2008. 27% of U.S. Spy Work is Outsourced. Los Angeles Times (August 28).
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Executive (May 12).
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to the U.S. National Intelligence Strategy. Unclassified Report (June 22).
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Post (June 28).
Pincus, W. 2007. Defense Agency Proposes Outsourcing More Spying. Washington Post
(August 19).
———, and S. Barr. 2007. CIA Reduces Its Reliance on Contractors. Washington Post
(June 10).
Ratliff, E. 2005. Fear, Inc. WIRED (December).
Scahill, J. 2008. Blackwater’s Private CIA. The Nation (June 9).
Shane, S., and R. Nixon. 2007. In Washington, Contractors Take on Biggest Role Ever.
New York Times (February 4).
Shorrock, T. 2005. The Spy Who Billed Me. Mother Jones (January/February).
———. 2007. The Corporate Takeover of U.S. Intelligence. Salon.com (June 1)
———. 2008. Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
Singer, P. W. 2005. Outsourcing War. Foreign Affairs (March/April).

Taubman, P. 2007. In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids.
New York Times (November 11).
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January 1935 to April 1945. Washington, D.C.: United States News.
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org/irp/nsa/walker.pdf (May).
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Security Contracts, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform (February 8).
Weiner, T. 2007. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday.
Willing, R. 2007. Contractors Playing a Major Role in U.S. Intelligence. USA Today
(April 25).
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Street Journal (March 30).
chapter 19
GUARDING THE
BORDER: INTELLIGENCE
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN CANADA’S
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
arne kislenko
1. Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much attention on both sides of the
U.S.-Canadian border has been directed toward the two countries’ immigration
systems. In part this stems from the obvious fact that the perpetrators were foreign-
ers who had gained entry to and plotted the attacks from the United States. Though
spared the violence so graphically witnessed south of the border, Canadians remem-
bered the December 1999 arrest of Ahmed Ressam, a refugee claimant who, with
fraudulent Canadian identity documents and a car full of explosives, tried to gain
entry to the United States to blow up Los Angeles International Airport (Wark
2004–5, 73–75). In this respect, 9/11 rekindled the simmering debate in both coun-
tries that immigration policies, particularly in Canada, were far too lax. Many in
Canada feared a “Canadian connection” to the attacks and suspected that porous
borders were behind it. Some public opinion polls shortly after 9/11 suggested that
in fact the vast majority of Canadians favored some sort of North American secu-
rity perimeter, and common entry requirements for immigrants and refugees. While
guarding the border 311
opinions were more sharply divided about accepting American policies to achieve
this, it is clear that in the first few months of the post-9/11 world Canadians worried
significantly about their border (Andreas and Bierksteker 2003, 36–37). The Canadian
government moved quickly to counter such fears through a host of measures,
including the December 2001 “smart border” accord with the United States: a thirty-
point commitment to better integrate intelligence and law enforcement activities
on border security.
However, concerns about Canada’s borders did not disappear. Government
officials, political lobbyists, journalists, scholars, and average citizens in Canada
have since weighed in on the immigration-and-border-security question with
numerous arguments. The federal government predictably tried to straddle the
divide, denying any fundamental weakness in its immigration policies or national-
security apparatus, while simultaneously implementing the new “anti-terrorist Act”
with Bill C-36 and the supposedly more enforcement-minded Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), with Bill C-11.1 Refugee advocacy groups and immi-
gration lawyers hurried to deny any connection between immigration and terror-
ism, ultimately equating any suggestion to the contrary to racism and xenophobia.
The political right joined their counterparts south of the border in portraying
Canada as a safe-haven for criminals and terrorists, in places guarded, as one U.S.
Senator demonstrated, only by orange pylons.2
One of the top experts on intelligence and security matters in Canada, Reg
Whitaker, points out that exaggerations and mythologies continue to frame the
border-security question in Canada. He also notes that such myths have serious
consequences in terms of trade, domestic politics in Canada, and, indeed, Canadian
sovereignty. Whitaker argues that far from being a “Club Med” for terrorists as some
allege, Canada’s connections to acts of terror are few. Moreover, he and other experts
contend that the main focus of government should be to pursue better security and
intelligence within the parameters of multiculturalism, while maintaining its com-
mitment to human rights and civil liberties (Whitaker 2004–5, 53–70, Keeble 2005,
359–372).
Those assertions, however, have not dissuaded critics of border-security and
immigration policy in Canada. National Post columnist Diane Francis wrote a sting-
ing indictment of Canada’s immigration system and by extension the failure of
1
For an excellent overview of antiterrorist legislation in Canada see R. Daniels, P. Macklem,
and K. Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada´s Anti-terrorism Bill (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2004).
2
The comment was made by Senator Byron Dorgan (D-North Dakota) in October 2001
during debate on the USA Patriot Act (2001). He noted that over the 4,000-mile land border
between the United States and Canada there were 128 ports of entry, of which 100 were unstaffed at
night, defended instead by “an orange rubber cone, just a big old orange rubber cone.” Dorgan
railed that “[I]t cannot talk. It cannot walk. It cannot shoot. It cannot tell a terrorist from a tow
truck. It is just a big fat dumb rubber cone sitting in the middle of the road.” United States
Congressional Record (Senate), October 25, 2001, page S10990–S11060, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
congress/2001/s102501.html (accessed November 8, 2003).
multiculturalism in her book Immigration: The Economic Case (2002). Author

Daniel Stoffman leveled a similar attack, aimed more at the supposed myth of
demographic need, in Who Gets In: What’s Wrong with Canada’s Immigration
Program, and How to Fix It (2002). Journalist Stewart Bell drew out the connections
between immigration and terrorism with his book Cold Terror: How Canada
Nurtures and Exports Terrorism around the World (2004). Together they joined a
chorus of retired bureaucrats-turned-critics like William Bauer, a former ambassa-
dor, member of the Immigration Refugee Board (IRB), and winner of the Raoul
Wallenberg Humanitarian Award; Martin Collacott, another former ambassador
who penned the Fraser Institute Public Policy Occasional Paper, Canada’s
Immigration Policy: The Need for Major Reform; and Charles Campbell, once the
vice-chairman of the Immigration Appeal Board and author of Betrayal and Deceit:
The Politics of Canadian Immigration (2000). All lamented the adoption in Canada
of liberal immigration policies as a “national religion,” and the consistent failure of
the federal government to address the structural weaknesses of the system as well as
the possible links between terrorism and global migration. They also echoed the
concerns of former CSIS Director Ward Elcock, who in a 1999 report to a Special
Senate Committee on intelligence matters noted that, next to the United States,
Canada likely harbored more terrorist organizations than any other country in the
world (Andreas and Bierksteker 2003, 31–32).
Yet against the backdrop of the ongoing “war on terror,” the American occu-
pation of Iraq, and the increasingly hawkish mentality of the U.S. national security
and law enforcement communities since 9/11, many have rallied in defense of
Canada’s approach to security issues. They point out that no direct link existed
between Canada and the 9/11 plots, contrary to American perceptions. Howard
Adelman, a professor of philosophy and founder of the Center for Refugee Studies
at York University in Toronto, reproached critics of Canada’s immigration system
for failing to “seriously engage scholarly literature,” and in doing so, making
“numerous egregious factual errors” (Adelman 2003, 16–19). More bluntly, Adelman
accused critics of scare-mongering and racism.
Developments in the United States fuelled such accusations. The creation of
the Homeland Security Agency was seen by many Canadians as an illustration of
growing paranoia in the United States. The general tightening of restrictions
along the shared border, and the increased scrutiny of Canadians seeking admis-
sion to the United States only added to such concerns. The detention and removal
to Syria of Maher Arar—a Canadian citizen transiting through New York’s John
F. Kennedy International Airport in September 2002—to many graphically illus-
trates the excesses of law enforcement with a siege mentality.3 Some commentators
noted that an “ideology of borders” took hold in Washington. Many Canadians
3
Arar was returning to Canada from a trip to Tunisia when intercepted by American
officials at JFK airport. Held on suspicion of his involvement in terrorist organizations, he was
fear similar attitudes creeping north. Measured against the weight of American
economic and political influence, Canadian policies at the border could in fact be
drastically changed. If unchecked, American ideals about security could easily
dominate Canada’s immigration system, ultimately producing a “fortress North
America” continental culture with respect to law enforcement (Andreas 2005,
449–64, Rudd and Furneaux 2002, 1–5). With this in mind, calls for a review of
Canada’s policies are often seen as a “red flag,” really advocating an American-
style system.
Scholarship on the U.S.-Canadian relationship and their respective immigra-
tion systems is substantial. However, when it comes to examining other specifics,
such as the immigration intelligence process and problems in enforcing Canadian
immigration laws—as this paper seeks to do—scholarship is exceedingly thin. As
intelligence expert Anthony Campbell points out, only recently have intelligence
issues factored into Canadian foreign, defence, or security policies (Campbell, 2003,
159). With respect to the immigration system, intelligence matters still do not com-
mand much attention. Few who have worked on the intelligence and enforcement
side of Canada’s immigration system would, or could, compromise their positions
by speaking publicly. Most naturally wish to avoid being labeled a disgruntled
bureaucrat. Nearly all realize that documentary and statistical evidence comes
almost exclusively from academia and the government itself, neither of which is
predisposed to support any fundamental criticism. Ultimately, this makes for an
environment ill-suited to open and honest debate. Rather than being a matter of
public discourse, questions about Canada’s immigration policy are distinctly politi-
cal, more about ideology than reality.
deported to Syria—where he was born and still held citizenship. The fact that he is a citizen of
Canada, and traveling on a Canadian passport, was evidently not considered important by U.S.
authorities. Arar spent nearly a year in a Syrian jail, where he alleges he was regularly tortured.
He was released and returned to Canada in October 2003. In February 2004 the Canadian
government invoked a Commission of Inquiry headed by Associate Chief Justice of Ontario
Dennis O’Connor to investigate and report on the actions of Canadian officials in the case. In
September 2006 O’Connor released his report exonerating Arar and affirming that he had no
links to any terrorist activity. The report also determined that Arar had been tortured in Syria.
After months of negotiations with his legal counsel, in January 2007 the federal government of
Stephen Harper issued a formal apology to Arar and agreed to a $10.5 million settlement, with
another $1.0 million to cover legal fees. However, the United States refused to acknowledge any
wrongdoing in the Arar case, or to cooperate with Canadian officials during the inquiry. Arar
remains on a “watch list” in the United States for suspected involvement with terrorists
organizations. Since January 2004 Arar’s lawyers have been before American courts seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for violations of his civil, constitutional, and international
human rights.
2. Intelligence Collection in
Canada’s Immigration System
Canada’s immigration system is governed principally by two federal government
bureaucracies: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Canadian
Border Services Agency (CBSA). Until 2003 CIC was responsible for intelligence
and law enforcement for dealing with immigration matters, but control of these
functions now rests with CBSA, which was created that year through a realignment
of CIC with Canada Customs. CBSA falls under the jurisdiction of Public Safety
Canada, which was itself created in 2003 to centralize five agencies and departments
dealing with national security matters, including the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
The Canadian Border Services Agency employs more than 13,000 people, over
7,000 of whom are uniformed officers staffing 1,200 points of service across Canada
and 39 international posts. Border control occurs at 119 crossings with the United
States and 13 international airports. CBSA also operates at Canada’s largest mari-
time ports, select rail depots, and major mail-processing centers. With respect to
legislative authorities it administers and enforces over ninety acts of Parliament,
federal and provincial government regulations, and international agreements.4
Immigration intelligence units within CBSA gather, analyze, and disseminate intel-
ligence collected from a wide range of operations both in Canada and abroad by
partner agencies. For example, it works with a number of law enforcement and
intelligence partners in the United States in international joint-management teams
that police the border in fourteen different regions (Sokolsky 2004–5, 48). Focus is
on border security: primarily threats to visitor, refugee, and citizenship programs
within Canada immigration’s system. In this capacity CBSA works with a number
of other Canadian intelligence services, including the CSIS, the RCMP, and the
Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC), as well as provincial, regional, and
municipal police forces. CBSA is part of the Integrated National Security Assessment
Center (INSAC), which was created in 2004 to coordinate efforts of law enforce-
ment and security agencies in Canada.
The CBSA Immigration Intelligence structure is centered on the National
Headquarters (NHQ) branch in Ottawa, with regional units throughout Canada and
Migration Integrity Officers (MIO) working at diplomatic posts abroad. All work to
determine the admissibility of persons seeking admission to Canada and the legality
of non-citizens remaining in the country. The network is also designed to assist
Canadian visa officers working overseas in the issuance of visas and permits to come
to Canada. The NHQ Immigration Intelligence Branch consists of three main com-
ponents, all working as part of its Tactical Intelligence Division: the Modern War
4
Canada Border Services Agency website, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca, accessed November 2008.
Crimes Unit, the Security Review Unit, and the Organized Crime Unit. Through
these units, NHQ provides all direction and support on matters dealing with terror-
ism, war crimes and crimes against humanity, organized crime, and illegal migra-
tion. As well, it is responsible for document security and fraud detection: providing
training, bulletins, and other intelligence to partners within Canada and abroad.
NHQ also handles most intra- and inter-governmental intelligence sharing, as well
as decision making on policies and program development. Regional units are respon-
sible for field operations and anti-fraud detection throughout Canada, most focused
on major urban centers such as Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal.
Migration Integrity Officers work in select international locations where popu-
lations, transport routings, and criminal syndicates relevant to illegal immigration
operate. They deal extensively with local immigration, intelligence, and law enforce-
ment agencies as well as international airlines. Their primary function is the inter-
diction of persons and documents involved in illegal migration. As vital as the MIO
function on the “front line” of border security is, there are only forty-five positions
staffed abroad. Nonetheless, they have been successfully in curbing the flow of ille-
gal migrants to Canada: by the government’s account, up to 72 percent—or 6,400
people—of known traffic in 2003.5
CBSA officers at Canada’s ports of entry collect intelligence on a variety of
issues every day. In addition to dealing with the traveling public at large, including
legitimate Canadian citizens, residents, visitors, and immigrants to the country,
CBSA handles a wide array of cases in which Canadian immigration law is violated.
These include persons who come to Canada to live, work, or study without proper
legal authority; who misrepresent themselves at the port of entry with respect to
identity or purpose; who attempt to enter the country with serious criminal histo-
ries; and refugee claimants, often lacking valid identity documents. Many cases in
this spectrum—and particularly the trafficking of some refugee claimants—involve
criminal and, occasionally, terrorist syndicates. Collecting intelligence on the pat-
terns of such arrivals is essential, and one of the most important functions CBSA
front-line officers perform. This includes establishing from where the persons being
trafficked originate, by what transportation networks they came to Canada, what
travel documents were used, and what contacts they have in the country.
Examinations at the port of entry help to elicit such information, as do person and
baggage searches. Frequently, intelligence is also gathered from members of the
traveling public, those awaiting trafficked persons, airlines, other Canadian govern-
ment agencies, foreign governments, and open-source material.
Canada Border Services Agency is also a key provider and consumer of intel-
ligence through its partnerships within the Interdepartmental Operations Group
(IOG). Formed in 2003, it brings CBSA together with the Department of Justice
and the RCMP to investigate cases under Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and
War Crimes Act. The IOG helps to coordinate the prosecution and extradition of
5
Canada Border Services Agency website, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca, accessed November 2008.
individuals tried in Canada for such offences and liaises with foreign governments
involved in any cases. CBSA is responsible for applying appropriate legislation
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) or the Citizenship Act.
The Resource and Information Management Center in CBSA’s Modern War Crimes
Unit provides intelligence to internal and external partners. It maintains a large
open-source library with materials drawn from government reports, non-
government organizations (NGOs), newspapers, magazines, academic journals
and proceedings, and a variety of scholarly publications dealing with human rights
in numerous historical and contemporary contexts.6
The Center also develops and maintains the Modern War Crimes System: an
open-source inventory of people, issues, events, and organizations of interest to
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Analysts, such as those within the Visitor
Information Transmission (VIT) unit, specialize on individual programs in the
immigration system as well as specific geographic regions, with input and direction
from the Modern War Crimes Unit in Ottawa. The information is made available to
CBSA officers in Canada and MIOs serving abroad to assist them in their screening
of persons seeking to enter Canada. There are presently five regional war-crimes
units in Canada responsible for screening persons coming to Canada for possible
war-crimes violations. The majority of these cases involve refugee claimants who
typically arrive in the country without valid documentation. Enforcement falls
within the scope of CBSA’s legislative mandates, principally under IRPA, through
which war-crimes violators in Canada are prosecuted. The handling of cases involv-
ing war crimes is determined by its Intelligence Coordination and Research Division.
In instances where further investigation or deliberation is required the RCMP and
Department of Justice assist. In some cases intelligence is contributed by or shared
with CSIS. The Intelligence Coordination and Research Division is in many respects
the central intelligence point for CBSA. In addition to disseminating intelligence
and providing training for all agency staff, it also liaises with other Canadian
government departments and foreign partners.
3. Problems at Canada’s Borders

The reality for many who have worked on the intelligence and enforcement front
inside Canada’s immigration system is simple: there is a serious need for reform.
The problems are many. Front-line decisions made by CBSA officers at the borders
have often been negated by duty managers, as well as by adjudicators and the
courts, based solely on personal beliefs—not within the context of legal interpreta-
tions or reasonable doubt. At Toronto’s Lester B. Pearson International Airport, for
6
Department of Justice Canada website, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/wc-cg/oms-ams.
html, accessed November 2008.
example, some immigration supervisors have gone as far as ordering their crews
not to report or detain anyone. This is also common practice at local enforcement
offices, such as the Greater Toronto Enforcement Center (GTEC), the largest one
in Canada. Management periodically “reminds” officers that detention facilities are
scarce and that the economic costs are too high. They also privately chastise some
officers for writing too many enforcement reports. Some managers have even taken
it upon themselves to adjudicate cases before any hearings could be held, releasing
persons detained under law by front-line officers shortly after their arrival at hold-
ing facilities.
Such inner workings speak to a fundamental problem of the system. Management
and staff have generally dismal relations. Far from being unified in any approach to
their work, front-line officers and managers often resent one another. In addition to
the normal personal conflicts and pressures of any workplace, there is the problem
of rank, experience, and philosophy. For example, duty managers at Pearson Airport
do not always have the most experience. In fact, in the late 1990s many front-line
immigration supervisors were hired without any practical immigration experience.
Some were taken from other government departments, while others were hired
directly off the street through competitions. The result was that crews at Canada’s
busiest international airport were led by people with little training or understand-
ing of the job. At higher management levels the same trend has continued, ulti-
mately producing a bureaucratic hierarchy that seldom reflects knowledge or
expertise and—at best—is mired in mediocrity.
Compounding matters is the fact that few professional incentives exist for the
front-line officer. Pay is relatively low, especially when factoring in the stress of
quickly rotating shifts and the often very confrontational nature of the job.
Promotion is based exclusively on performance in job competitions, which usually
stress theoretical knowledge over practical experience. Practical experience is in
fact often a disincentive. Officers who are recognized for their skills, good judg-
ment, and strong work ethic usually have far greater workloads. They are expected
to chaperone new officers, handle the most sensitive or difficult cases, and com-
pensate for those who work at a bare minimum of efficiency. There are no financial
or professional inducements, and no official recognition from managers. Even
strong team bonds with co-workers are considered dangerous in management’s
efforts to break up “cliques.” The end result is that the best officers tend to quickly
burn out, seek other employment, or—worst of all—become cynical and jaded
bureaucrats.
Immigration intelligence and enforcement is also undermined by a lack of
training, equipment, and exposure to the work of other security agencies. Basic
training of CBSA officers is nine weeks long, but heavily focused on customs mat-
ters rather than immigration. In-depth investigation training—interview skills,
document analysis, and intelligence debriefings—exists in short supply. Officers are
left to their own devices to gain an understanding of patterns and developments in
international relations, current affairs, national histories, and cross-cultural issues.
Equipment, such as ultraviolet lights and microscopes used in the detection of
fraudulent documents, is often even scarcer than training. Access to new technolo-
gies and improved information databases remains limited.
The 2003 realignment of federal agencies and departments that created CBSA
was supposed to remedy these shortcomings. However, the merger of Canada
Customs and Canada Immigration at the border has been confused, leaving many
officers, particularly on the immigration side, unclear as to their mandate. Front-
line CBSA officers staffing the “primary inspection line,” or PIL, focus principally
on goods and baggage, a consequence of having former Canada Customs officials
running CBSA. Most officers receive precious little training on immigration mat-
ters, yet they ask questions as immigration officers in the initial examination of all
passengers. They have the authority to grant admission to foreign nationals depend-
ing on their applications for entry, and otherwise may refer persons to a secondary
examination by CBSA immigration officers. The process is not mandatory. In fact
when compared to the numbers of people who are admitted at the PIL, those sub-
ject to immigration examinations are few.
The problems with this system are enormous. First, given the high volume
of persons on any international or trans-border flight, PIL officers cannot realisti-
cally spend much time on passengers. The average examination consists of only a
few basic questions, a computer check, and the decision to refer for secondary
examinations—usually no more than two or three minutes. Without adequate
training on what to look for with respect to immigration issues, frequently CBSA
officers admit persons into Canada without much consideration. Notorious in this
respect is CBSA’s spring and summer hiring of university students under the Public
Service Commission’s job-creation programs. After just a few days of rudimentary
training, these students become Canada’s front-line defense. At the height of sum-
mer, when international travel is at its peak, it is commonplace to see at Canada’s
major international airports twenty-one-year-olds with no real understanding or
experience guarding the gates. The issue is fiscal, calculated in terms of “person
hours” needed to manage PIL, which in turn gives life to budgets, staffing require-
ments, and—ultimately—bureaucratic power.
Secondly, the reality of border security and immigration matters almost entirely
eludes the Canadian public. Even well-educated people have gross misunderstand-
ings about the system. Media accounts of high-profile cases are often strewn with
factual errors. They carelessly toss out words like “arrest,” “detained,” and “deporta-
tion,” despite the fact that such terminologies have specific legal and administrative
meanings, and regardless if the case actually involved such procedures. Moreover,
seldom is the proverbial “other side” given. While a depiction of government bun-
gling or the avaricious nature of its officials is quite common, few stories ask hard
questions about the person involved: were the grounds for their incarceration valid?
Is this person a terrorist? The government itself is also responsible for such misinfor-
mation. Bound by Canadian privacy laws, and lacking an effective media-relations
wing, the government is purely reactive. It seldom attempts to present another side
to an argument, and instead is perceived as inept by Canadians already disenchanted
with government bureaucracy.
Indeed, most Canadians know nothing of what transpires at their nation’s bor-
ders. Many think that people arriving in Canada without proper identification are
immediately sent back, or imprisoned in “camps” until hearings can be held. Few
understand the division of legal responsibilities, or the actual structure of govern-
ment departments and processes. Even fewer appreciate the fact that the vast major-
ity of illegal arrivals in Canada are released into the country after only very cursory
examinations. They are shocked to find out that Canada’s example of detention
“camps” is the low-security Toronto Immigration Holding Center on Rexdale
Boulevard in Etobicoke, the former Heritage Inn hotel, capable of holding no more
than 120 people.
The same naïveté is demonstrated when it comes to the very definition of
“refugees.” The word conjures up images of hollow-eyed, starving masses, or des-
perate victims of war-torn countries. Sadly, that reality of course exists, and some
of the people coming to Canada most certainly meet the definition. Unfortunately,
a great number do not. Instead, they are nothing more than economic migrants
seeking opportunities in a better country. While understandable, this is not, and
realistically cannot be, a determinant of any country’s immigration system. If it
were, there would be no system of which to speak. National policies and con-
cerns would be invalidated, and the migration of people totally unchecked. The
vernacular is important. To those working within the system, there is a distinct
difference between “refugees” and “refugee claimants.” The former are recog-
nized and processed overseas by Canadian officials. The latter term describes
someone coming to Canada to pursue a refugee claim. It makes no presumption
of validity, and, under law, is governed by specific restrictions. However, refugee
advocates, the media, and refugee claimants themselves make no such distinc-
tion. They use the emotionally charged term “refugees” despite any legal specif-
ics. The result is that people are defined as “refugees” regardless of the veracity of
the claims. In the world of public opinion, this is a noticeable and effective device
(Collacott 2006).
In many respects the basic logistics of traveling to Canada undermine claims to
refugee status under international and national definitions. Rather than seeking to
avail oneself of the protection of the first state to which they flee, as prescribed by
the Geneva conventions on refugee protection, people coming to Canada have, by
virtue of air traffic patterns, usually come through one or more other nations. Many
have in fact resided, often legally, in a third country for a considerable period. While
few would admit to this, officers at Canada’s borders routinely find in their posses-
sion documents, papers, receipts, photographs, and other evidence suggesting a
long sojourn outside the alleged country of persecution before coming to Canada.
On a relatively frequent basis, officials seize valid passports and identity documents
issued by Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and other democratic countries en route to
legitimate holders who have just made refugee claims in Canada against third coun-
tries. Dramatizing the point further, in 2001, Canada received a total of nearly
thirty-seven thousand refugee claimants, of which thirteen thousand crossed over
from the United States (Andreas and Bierksteker 2003, 31). Officers derisively refer
to those from the United States as “refugee shoppers.”7 Furthermore, many refugee
claimants file only after having been in Canada for months, even years without any
legal status.
Claimants also arrive with clearly dubious stories. Very few have any pertinent
documentation to support their claims. More revealing is the fact that many have in
their possession other claims that were successfully pursued in Canada, the immi-
gration equivalent of cheat-sheets. Many cannot accurately account for timelines,
known events pertinent to their alleged persecution, or the very basic political or
economic dynamics of their country of origin. Under examination, many refugee
claimants often concede the implausibility of their stated claims. Officers and critics
of the system are convinced that it was precisely the frequency of such revelations
that ultimately led to the “streamlining” of refugee claimant examinations at the
border, a procedure which under the previous Act (1976) replaced more formal and
adversarial interviews upon arrival with “refugee kits” that the person can fill out at
their leisure upon release in preparation for determination hearings. The relative
ease of making a refugee claim frustrates other immigrants who have come to
Canada legally. After years of hard work, waiting, being evaluated, and then making
the transition to a new Canadian life, these people see refugee claimants as queue
jumpers. The negative perception of refugee claimants held by many Canadians—
new and old—is accentuated with revelations that under the old Act there were in
effect no limits to the number of times a person could claim asylum (Collacott
2006). It was commonplace for officers to encounter individuals returning to
Canada for their second or third refugee claim—despite being refused, ordered
away, and obviously having little problem re-entering or leaving the alleged country
of persecution.
Originally, Bill C-11 was designed to curb these abuses. Introducing the bill for
a second reading in the House of Commons in 2001, then–Minister of Immigration
Elinor Caplan argued that the changes would be “tough” while maintaining Canada’s
humanitarian obligations. New penalties were to be created to deal with trafficking
in humans. Grounds for detention and the criteria for establishing inadmissibility
were to be clarified. She placed heavy emphasis on barring serious criminals,
human-rights violators, and terrorists. The refugee determination system was to be
“streamlined” by consolidating steps, and restricting multiple claims. Acts of fraud,
misrepresentation, and defaults on sponsorships were also to be targeted. Caplan
7
For example, in 2001 the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) reported that of the approximate 817,000 Tamil asylum seekers in the world, roughly half
(400,000) were in Canada, making Canada the largest recipient of Tamil refugee claimants in the
world. Canada Immigration reported that of these the majority first presented themselves at the land
borders, coming from the United States. Despite this fact, the number of Tamil claimants in the US
for 2001 was just 40,000—lending much credibility to the idea of refugee “shopping” (Citizenship
and Immigration Canada Weekly Intelligence Digest, June 2001). In light of this situation, in
December 2002 Canada and the United States signed a bilateral agreement recognizing one another
as “safe havens” for asylum seekers in an attempt to eliminate cross-border refugee claims.
stressed that by closing the “back door,” Canada’s immigration system could open
the “front door,” and more effectively focus on attracting highly skilled workers,
reunifying families, and protecting genuine refugees.8
Criticism against the bill was swift. Before the House of Commons special
immigration committee, representatives from the Canadian Bar Association and
Amnesty International denounced the proposed changes on the grounds that
Immigration Officers would have extraordinary powers. Some lawyers suggested
they would become like a “secret police.”9 The Canadian Bar Association vehemently
opposed what it referred it to as the “sweeping, unrestricted and draconian powers
of arrest and compelled examination” that would be granted officers. It also attacked
the proposed elimination of the Immigration Appeal Division, restrictions on leave
to appeal for judicial review by the Federal Court on decisions made by visa officers
overseas, and special authorities of the Minister in cases involving serious criminal-
ity or alleged terrorism.10 The Canadian Council of Refugees warned that the bill
had a “heavy enforcement emphasis,” and “promotes negative stereotypes about
refugees and immigrants and caters to xenophobia and racism within Canadian
society.” The Council also opposed the use of the term “foreign national” to describe
non-citizens on the grounds that it was pejorative. At the heart of these criticisms
were concerns that the number of hearings and appeals for refugee claimants in
Canada would be dramatically reduced.11 Criticism was also aimed at plans for
expanded detention facilities in Canada, measures to expedite the removal of failed
claimants, and increased interdiction efforts against the use of fraudulent docu-
ments and human trafficking, the latter two which are seen by advocates as the only
means for refugees to come to Canada.
A significantly reformed bill ultimately passed. The Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act in fact created a new layer of appeals through the Refugee Appeal
Division, which automatically reviews failed claims within IRB structure. Refugee
claimants are now technically barred from making multiple applications, but may
come back to Canada and apply for a “risk assessment” determination to remain
rather than face immediate and permanent removal. Far from being regarded as
“foreign nationals,” permanent residents of Canada are now entitled to virtually all
the rights of citizenship. Under current port-of-entry policy guidelines, residents
are not supposed to be examined by officers at all—despite the fact that under law
their right to enter Canada is conditional, and regardless of the fact that much abuse
8
Speech by Elinor Caplan, Minister of Immigration, in the House of Commons, February
2001, at http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambers/house/debates/021_2001, accessed November
2003.
9
“Immigration Law Reform Bill,” Public Broadcasting Service at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/canadalaw.html, accessed November 2003.
10
Letter to Parliamentary Committee on Citizenship and Immigration and MPs, Canadian
Bar Association at http://www.cba.org/CBA/News/2001_releases/PrintHtml.asp?DocId=45404,
accessed November 2003.
11
Canadian Council of Refugees Bill C-11 Brief, March 25, 2001, at http://www.web.net/~ccr/
c11summ.htm, accessed November 2003.
of Canadian resident status exists. Moreover, and contrary to its critics, Bill C-11 has
not translated into a dramatic expansion of officers’ powers. Their authorities over
refugee claimants in particular remain largely the same as they were under the old
legislation. There are no in-depth examinations at the ports of entry, no immediate
removals, and no increased detentions.
Having removed the investigative structure from the front lines, refugee deter-
mination in Canada basically relies on the honor system. Refugee claimants are asked
a series of statutory questions, such as “have you ever been a member of your coun-
try’s government?” “have you ever supported any organization that supports the
overthrow of any government?” and “are you a member of any political group that
condones the use of violence?” While fingerprinting and photographing improperly
documented arrivals in Canada is routine, little can be done right away to check the
person’s background, let alone his or her intentions. Confronting a habitually under-
funded and over-taxed determination system, the reality is that thorough back-
ground checks are not always conducted on individuals coming to Canada.
The ultimate determination of one’s claim rests with the IRB, an organization
widely discredited on a number of fronts. First, membership on the IRB is by political
appointment, thus bringing in the specter of patronage, and, equally, political influ-
ence.12 Secondly, appointments are seldom made on the basis of experience with any
dimension of immigration law, or law in general. Very few with front-line experience
ever sit on the board. Third, procedural rules of the IRB inherently favor the refugee
claimant given the emphasis on forms they filled out in the absence of an adversarial
system. Departmental mandates often undermine the work of government hearings’
officers, and they are routinely encouraged to concede cases from certain countries
regardless of veracity. Negative decisions by the IRB are disproportionately rare, a fact
no doubt at the center of Canada’s uniquely high refugee-claimant acceptance rate,
which has consistently stood as the proportionally highest in the world for many
years. Even more notoriously liberal countries like Norway accept proportionately
fewer claims, based primarily on a much more rigorous investigative approach to
determination. For example, in 2000 Canada recognized the refugee claims of 1,600
Pakistanis and 2,000 Sri Lankans, while the rest of the world combined recognized
just 500 (Stoffman 2002, 26–27). For some this demonstrates Canada’s generosity and
deep humanitarian concerns. For others it represents just how poorly the IRB func-
tions. Even in simple terms, the structure of IRB decision-making is skewed in favor
of acceptance. Negative decisions quite logically require legal justification in prepara-
tion for appeals and subsequent court proceedings. Until fairly recently, positive
decisions required nothing more than an affirmation.
Worse than just government bungling, these problems are in effect security
threats. No system is perfect. A weak system is, however, more vulnerable. Assertions
12
Ibid. This is a point of rare convergence between critics and defenders of the refugee-
determination system. For example, in response to proposed changes under Bill C-11 the Canadian
Council of Refugees welcomed the consolidation of IRB hearings, but called for a more
“transparent, professional and accountable” appointment process.
that no terrorists exist in Canada, and that there are no connections between immi-
gration and terrorism, are equally as dangerous as the belief that all foreigners are
dangerous. The fact that Canada has not endured any attacks, and that the events of
9/11 lacked a clear Canadian connection, is not a vindication of the system.
Intelligence gathered by Canada’s law enforcement and security agencies is, of
course, highly classified and politically volatile. However, there is abundant, unclas-
sified evidence to suggest the presence of subversive groups in Canada. Multicultural
populations in cities like Toronto are rather obvious potential sources of fund-
raising, safe haven, and recruitment for criminal and terrorist organizations. It is
profoundly naïve to assume that whereas other centers like New York, London, and
Paris have witnessed exactly such trends, Canada would somehow be different.
Moreover, Canada’s liberal immigration controls reinforce the likelihood of these
patterns. With respect to refugee determination in particular, this is a particularly
salient argument. A higher rate of overall acceptance is, in and of itself, a factor in
attracting subversive organizations. Moreover, according to government figures
between 1990 and 2000 there were over 320,000 refugee claims at airport ports of
entry alone. Nearly 58,000 of these people possessed fraudulent documents or no
documents at all.13
An excellent illustration of the security problem with respect to refugee deter-
mination can be seen with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since the
early 1980s Canada has taken in many Tamils fleeing Sri Lanka’s brutal civil war. In
fact, Canada quickly developed one of the largest Tamil communities in the world.
However, amongst those refugees seeking asylum were members of the LTTE and
other groups widely condemned by the international community for their brutality,
including against fellow Tamils. The LTTE established numerous front organiza-
tions in Canadian Tamil communities and built extensive criminal enterprises—
involved in extortion, weapons procurement, drug and human smuggling, and acts
of serious violence, including murder, against rival gang members (Bell 2004, 47–83).
After many years of debate and politicking, in April 2006 the government of Stephen
Harper officially named the LTTE a “listed entity” under anti-terrorism legislation
and the Criminal Code. The decision followed the lead of many other countries,
and effectively recognized the LTTE as a national security threat to Canada.
Even before the official ban there were attempts to break up LTTE operations in
Canada. However, deporting suspected members of the organization proved
extremely difficult. Unveiled in 2001, Project 1050 was a widely publicized, multi-
agency operation to round-up Canada’s Tamil gangs. After years of investigations,
in October of that year police and immigration officers arrested 51 individuals asso-
ciated with two rival organizations: AK Kannan (or the AKK), and the Valvettithurai
(or VVT). The AKK—named after the AK-47 assault rifle- is a branch of the People’s
Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam Liberation, while the VVT started as an off-
shoot of the LTTE before quickly morphing into a criminal syndicate based in
13
Citizenship and Immigration Canada Intelligence and Interdiction Report 1990–2001, July
2001.
Toronto. Most if not all of those arrested had come to Canada by making refugee
claims. All of them had serious criminal histories in Canada. Many were connected
directly to parent organizations in Sri Lanka. Yet despite the evidence, all but ten
made it back on to Canadian streets. Witnesses against the accused were too afraid
to come forward. Testimony against their clients was discredited by lawyers because
it came from members of rival gangs. Immigration judges at the IRB over-turned
detention orders, convinced that despite their records the accused posed no danger
to the Canadian public. Fully two years after Project 1050 was implemented only two
individuals were removed from Canada. One returned in October 2003. The rest
pursued numerous appeals both to the IRB and the Federal Court of Canada
(National Post, November 22, 2003) to prevent their removal or incarceration.
While some point out that cases like this demonstrate Canada’s commitment to
due process and a fair judiciary, others consider it a classic example of an immigra-
tion system gone awry. In the spring and summer of 2009 such concerns were
accentuated when Canada, and more specifically Toronto, became the centre of
international Tamil protests in response to the Sri Lankan government’s aggressive
offensive to finish the LTTE off militarily. For several weeks demonstrators blocked
major venues and roads in Toronto, many unabashedly waving the LTTE’s notori-
ous flag: seen by other Canadians as a terrorist symbol. Rumors abounded that the
protests were at least to some degree orchestrated by senior LTTE officials operating
in Canada. Moreover, maintaining sophisticated networks within Canadian Tamil
communities, the LTTE may still have some political life left. With large numbers of
increasingly frustrated and desperate supporters to draw from, it is not unreason-
able to harbor concerns about the continuing national security threats posed by the
LTTE or its successors in Canada.
Critics point out that in addition to being a possible security problem, Canada’s
refugee determination system has undermined the nation’s best intentions.
Concordia University political science professor Stephen Gallagher characterized
the system as “dysfunctional” in a 2002 report to the Canadian Institute of
International Affairs. Former IRB official William Bauer described current policies
as a “massive corruption of the noble concept of political asylum.” At the heart of
their criticisms is the fact that by focusing on refugee determination at the nation’s
borders, Canada has neglected humanitarian responsibilities abroad. Whereas in
the late 1980s Canada resettled over two hundred thousand people deemed to be
conventional refugees overseas, it currently deals on average annually with just thir-
teen thousand displaced by war, famine, and natural disaster (Stoffman 2002, 27).
With such calamities showing no sign of decline in the twenty-first century, the
explanation can only lie with government policy.
Many critics blame in the first instance the law itself, and in particular the April
1985 Singh decision by the Supreme Court of Canada. The case involved seven appel-
lants, six of whom claimed association with the Akali Dal Party—a Sikh organiza-
tion fighting for the independence of the Punjab from India. Four of the six Indian
nationals were refused admission at the border. One eluded an immigration inquiry
and was subject to arrest. Another was admitted as a visitor. The seventh appellant,
a Guyanese national, had gained admission on fraudulent documents and was

arrested for working illegally. All seven subsequently claimed refugee status and were
denied. Their applications to the Immigration Appeal Board for re-determination
were also refused, as were their requests for judicial review by the Federal Court of
Appeal. The Supreme Court, however, intervened on behalf of the appellants. It
ruled that any person in Canada was entitled to protection under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms—not just its citizens or legal residents—and that
all refugee claimants were thus entitled to oral hearings of their cases (See Marrocco
and Goslett 2003; Campbell 2000, 72–75).
Critics believe that the Singh decision has encouraged waves of refugee claims
that to any reasonable observer would be considered entirely bogus. They point to
claims from people against a host of countries where state persecution has never
been established by any international humanitarian agency or independent observer:
for example, Hungary, Czech Republic, or Costa Rica. Some critics rightly note that
under Canadian law refugee claims from the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and other democratic countries are also entertained. In fact, throughout
much of 2008 nationals of North and South America made up the majority of refu-
gee claims made at Canadian ports. While representation from Haiti, Colombia, or
even Mexico may be understood, CBSA officers noted substantial numbers from
Saint Vincent, the Grenadines, and St. Lucia, none considered widely as “refugee-
producing countries.” Tying up the legal system, and costing Canadians untold
expenses, such claims have done little to enhance the credibility of Canada’s refugee
determination process.
From the vantage point of intelligence and law enforcement, another impor-
tant issue is the connection between refugee claimants and international criminal
or terrorist organizations. The business of people smuggling is one of the world’s
largest illicit enterprises, and the groups that deal in it reads like a who’s-who of
crime (McFarlane 2001, 199–208). With UN estimates that fifty million people are
on the move as refugees and refugee claimants, very clearly the market for business
is good. Canada is a prime destination for persons smuggled here through the use
of fraudulent documents at significant, often overwhelming costs. Depending on
the case, the logistics of air travel, and the type of documents used, these criminal
syndicates can charge anywhere from several thousand dollars (US) to tens of thou-
sands. Very often, they exact their price by forcing their client to work for them or
their associates upon arrival in the target country, usually in other criminal opera-
tions like prostitution and the drug trade.
While Canada has joined other countries in joint efforts to interdict the traf-
ficking of people, it is an almost insurmountable problem so long as refugee deter-
mination remains so encompassing. Many people fail to realize that in coming to
Canada—as opposed seeking determination overseas in their country—refugee
claimants are inextricably linked to this deplorable criminal syndicate. Operations
by groups in many countries are quite sophisticated, and usually involve an elabo-
rate array of document forgers, agents, safe houses, money launderers, and other
tools of the trade. There are even classes for would-be refugees where they are taught
what questions to expect by the immigration officials upon their arrival and how to
respond. Some criminal syndicates even have reach within foreign governments,
from which they illegally obtain authentic passports and other documents. Others
stage break-ins at consular posts overseas to steal legitimate visas. Most groups also
target Canadian passports, among the most sought after in the world by virtue of
their few visa restrictions in foreign countries and the relative ease with which hold-
ers can cross borders. With little recognition of the problem and weak punishments
for offenders, the business is unlikely to stop soon.
Having worked closely with immigration lawyers and refugee advocates in pre-
paring the IRPA, the government has not introduced any particular effective changes
to the existing order. Critics argue that in fact the new Act propagates bureaucratic
backlogs, makes it harder to get rid of people deemed undesirable, and generally
undermines any enforcement mandates (Stoffman 2002, 171–72). Officers within
the system share the same dim view. After the initial shock of 9/11, and concerns
about Canada’s security vulnerabilities, it’s back to normal. Defenders of the system,
and perhaps many Canadians in general, would no doubt oppose any radical reform.
Liberal sensibilities are frayed by suggestions that laws and policies be changed to
give officers more power, that the number of rights and appeals within the system
be limited, or that Canada work more closely with the United States on border secu-
rity. They would be horrified to even hear recommendations for more detention
facilities, and a more adversarial approach to things like refugee determination.
However, at issue in this respect is knowledge, a better understanding of what actu-
ally takes place. Canadians are not unequivocally naïve or apathetic. They should be
allowed through open public discourse to learn the realities of what goes on with
Canada’s border security. All sides should be heard—no matter how disagreeable
the sound. As Canada embarks on a new century it faces a changing national iden-
tity and consciousness, at the heart of which lies immigration. This is both the
dilemma and the reality for all Canadians.
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Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Department of
Justice Canada website, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/wc-cg/oms-ams.html.
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chapter 20
EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION
william g. weaver
robert m. pallitto
1. Introduction
Renditions, the surrendering of persons to foreign jurisdictions, are commonplace
in modern international affairs. When these transfers are made in accordance with
treaty, and, if necessary, enabling statutes, and through a stipulated procedure, they
are “ordinary” renditions. But over the last decade, the United States has pursued a
policy of rendering people to nonjudicial authorities outside of treaty and legal
processes, actions usually accomplished through kidnapping and forcible removal
from an asylum country to the receiving jurisdiction. These transfers have become
known as “extraordinary renditions,” but they are certainly not renditions in the
traditional sense. For one thing, the term “rendition” is a legal term of art, connot-
ing conformance with an established line of legal precedent, authorization under
treaty and enabling statutes, and accepted practice in international law. On the other
hand, “extraordinary rendition” is not a legal term of art and is an act accomplished
specifically and purposefully outside of legal venues. It is usually undertaken pre-
cisely because of a belief that legal processes will not yield the desired transfer to the
receiving jurisdiction or will be too slow in coming to that result.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never taken up the question of forcible removal of
persons to foreign jurisdictions outside of treaty and on presidential authority alone.
Neither has Congress ever authorized such activity (Committee on International
Human Rights 2004; Garcia 2005). Here we describe the historical development of
extraordinary rendition 329
presidential claims to power in this area, how those claims have been treated by the
courts, and how that history informs present practices.
Although renditions were contemplated from the beginnings of the republic,
presidents have historically made no claim to authority to render persons outside of
treaty processes. As recently as 1979, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department
of Justice opined that the Shah of Iran could not be extradited to his home country,
because “the President cannot order any person extradited unless a treaty or statute
authorizes him to do so” (Hammond 1979). Nevertheless, since the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, the United States has pursued extraordinary rendition as a
policy tool to combat terrorism (Committee 2004; Mayer 2005). Acts by the United
States include not only the forcible removal of persons from foreign countries, but
the kidnapping of persons from U.S. soil and surrender to foreign jurisdictions for
torture (Mayer 2005). For example, in the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen
changing planes in New York City while returning from vacation, the United States
seized Mr. Arar and flew him in a government jet to Jordan, where he was then
delivered to Syria for torture (Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 [2008]).
It is instructive to understand the historical backdrop behind these actions and
how we managed to get to the point where the executive branch may claim plenary
power to engage in extraordinary rendition.
2. Early Development
At the founding of the United States, the understanding was that the president had
no authority to render a person to a foreign jurisdiction without acting pursuant
to a treaty and, if a non–self-executing treaty, without the authority of enabling
legislation. In answering a request from the French minister to the United States
for the rendition of certain people making war against France, Thomas Jefferson,
then secretary of state, wrote, “no person in this country is authorized to deliver”
persons to a foreign jurisdiction except in accordance with treaty (Jefferson 1792).
This view was confirmed by an opinion of U.S. Attorney General Charles Lee in a
matter concerning a Spanish subject taking haven in the United States against
criminal charges in Spanish Florida. There, General Lee found that the “United
States are in duty bound to comply [with the rendition request]; yet, having omit-
ted to make a law directing the mode of proceeding, I know not how . . . a delivery
of such offender could be effected. . .. This defect appears to me to require a par-
ticular law” (Lee 1797, 69–70).
And Roger Taney, also in the capacity of U.S. attorney general, found in 1833
that there was no presidential authority, absent a treaty, to render two men accused
of piracy by Portugal. In that case, Taney wrote, “It is not in the power of the
President to send them to any other tribunal, domestic or foreign. . . . There is no law
of Congress which authorizes the President to deliver up [the prisoners,] and we
have no treaty stipulations with Portugal for the delivery of offenders. In such a
state of things, it has always been held that the President possesses no authority to
deliver up the offender” (Taney 1833, 559).
Finally, in this line of attorney general opinions, in 1841, in a message to Secretary
of State Daniel Webster, Attorney General Hugh Legare, characterizing the case of
Holmes v. Jennison and the studied practice of his predecessors, wrote, “According to
the practice of the executive department, as appears from the official correspon-
dence both of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Clay, your predecessors in office, the President
is not considered as authorized, in the absence of any express provision by treaty, to
order the delivering up of fugitives from justice” (Legare 1841, 661).
In Holmes v. Jennison (1840), Holmes, the asylee, petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court on a writ of error to determine whether a governor of a state may constitu-
tionally seize a person and render that person to a foreign country (39 U.S. 540).
Counsel for Holmes felt comfortable in stating that “no President of the United
States, no Governor of Canada, and lastly, no King of England, has ventured to act
in a case of this kind, except by legislative authority, or by treaty, which is tanta-
mount to a law” (ibid., 560). While the matter concerning presidential authority was
not an issue to be decided in Jennison, what comment there is supports the conclu-
sion stated by Holmes’s counsel. Therefore, without a treaty in force, the president
historically was without power to sua sponte surrender fugitives or others to foreign
powers.
Indeed, the executive branch has on occasion expressly disavowed power to
render persons outside of treaty or statute. For example, in 1825 a request from the
acting governor of Canada met with the response from Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams that “I am instructed by the President to express his regret to your
Excellency, that the request . . . cannot be complied with under any authority now
vested in the executive government of the United States” (ibid., 582–83). The stated
basis for this want of authority was that the “stipulation between [the United States]
and the British government, for the mutual delivery over of fugitives from justice,
being no longer in force, and the renewal of it by treaty, being at this time a subject
of negotiation between the two governments” (ibid., 583).
Even when acting pursuant to treaty, the president was called to task. In the
unpopular and contentious rendition of accused murderer and mutineer Jonathan
Robbins to the West Indies for trial and possible execution under British court
martial, the public roundly condemned President John Adams for making the
return in the absence of enabling legislation and under circumstances where the
United States had concurrent jurisdiction to try Robbins ( Wedgwood 1990).
Adams suffered vituperative and emotional attacks, even though Article 27 of the
Jay Treaty required the signatories to “deliver up to justice all persons, who, being
charged with murder or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall
seek an asylum within any of the countries of the other.” So the understanding
that the president was without power to send asylum residents to foreign jurisdic-
tions in the absence of treaty and statute seemed relatively well settled prior to the
Civil War.
Nevertheless, this history is either ignored or misunderstood by some federal

courts. For example, in Eain v. Wilkes, a 1981 case out of the Seventh Circuit, the
court found that, “Prior to the enactment of the original version of [the extradi-
tion statute], the Executive exercised complete control over extradition without
reference to the courts. . . . Thus, from 1794 to 1842 the Executive had unfettered
discretion in this area” (641 F.2d 504, 513, Note 13). In support of this misconcep-
tion the court cites an 1843 attorney general opinion, but that opinion makes
clear that the rendition in question was made pursuant to treaty and a statutorily
authorized legal process requiring a showing of evidence sufficient to sustain the
charge against the asylee if the case were to be tried in the United States. Attorney
General John Nelson noted in his opinion that “the case, then, is, within the
treaty, sustained by the evidence prescribed by it, acted on by a magistrate having
authority to entertain it, upon complaint duly and regularly made; the proceed-
ings, with the judgment of the magistrate, have been certified to the executive
authority, and the surrender of the fugitive authoritatively demanded” (Nelson
1843, 208). This particular case was made difficult not by the law, but by the fact
that the asylee was a woman, who was sought for the murder of her husband in
Scotland. It is certainly an inapposite opinion for the Seventh Circuit panel to
rely upon, for the rigor in following treaty, statute, and legal decorum is marked
in this case.
3. The Arguelles Affair

The first major break with the doctrine surrounding renditions came during the
Civil War, with a politically and emotionally charged case that vexed President
Abraham Lincoln. Like the case of Arar, this action involved the seizure of a foreign
citizen in New York City during a time of war and performed only on naked presi-
dential authority.
In 1863, José Augustin Arguelles, a Spanish subject, and the lieutenant governor
of Colon, Cuba, intercepted a ship transporting slaves from Africa in violation of
Spanish law (J. F. B. 1864). Arguelles claimed a large reward for the interception and
then conspired with others to have 141 of the slaves declared dead of smallpox and
then sold to plantation owners. He then fled to New York City where he took own-
ership of a Spanish-language newspaper. Spain wanted Arguelles back for prosecu-
tion, and because of evidentiary requirements of Spanish law his presence was
necessary to secure the release of the Africans he had sold into slavery (Russell 1863;
Dulce 1864).
The United States at the time had no treaty concerning extradition with Spain,
but President Lincoln nevertheless ordered Arguelles’s seizure and return to Cuba.
This caused cascades of both criticism and praise, with the Copperheads, or Peace
Democrats, complaining that here was finally dispositive evidence of the tyranny
of Lincoln and the abolitionists and moderates praising Lincoln’s wise use of exec-
utive discretion. In language reminiscent of some post-9/11 sentiments, M. Du
Pays, in the Liberator, exclaimed dramatically, “Liberty offers no complaint of this
‘violation of the right of asylum.’ She cries—‘If there is no law for this process, then
make one; meanwhile, serve me!’ ” (Du Pays 1864). And an article in the normally
moderate New York Times exhorted, “Hurl him [Arguelles] over the Tarpeian rock”
(J. F. B. 1864).
On the other side, General John Fremont, pursuing nomination for the presi-
dency, proclaimed, “To-day we have in the country the abuses of military dictation
without its unity of action and vigor of execution; an Administration marked at
home by disregard of Constitutional rights, by its violation of personal liberty . . . and,
as a crowning shame, by its abandonment of the right of asylum dear to all free
nations abroad” (Fremont 1864). The language of indignation crested even higher,
with exclamations that “the Sultan of Turkey never exercised a more absolute des-
potism” (Harper’s Weekly 1864) and “Napoleon committed no greater offence against
national law when he sent the kidnapped Deputies to Cayenne” (Phillips 1864). The
eruption over the incident threatened the Republican Party and forced the U.S.
Senate to put off an investigation in order to save Lincoln and the party from embar-
rassment (ibid.).
Lincoln’s action took the law by surprise and exposed a decided lack of judicial
opportunity or willingness to interfere with the executive fiat of the matter. But
Secretary of State William H. Seward succumbed to congressional pressure to
release correspondence concerning the rendition and to issue a legal defense of the
president’s actions. Seward’s defense of Lincoln was long-winded but weak, for
there was not much for him to rely upon. He invoked the law of nations as justifi-
cation for the rendition, but gave little attention to why the president should be
seen under the Constitution as possessing sole power to meet such international
obligations (Seward 1864).
In a rather uncomfortable argumentative turn, considering the nature of
Arguelles’s crimes in Cuba, Seward pointed to cases where escaped slaves from for-
eign countries were returned at executive discretion. In discussing the return of a
slave who had stowed away aboard a U.S. ship to his Danish owners, Seward noted,
“The point once conceded that Denmark alone has the right to pronounce upon the
condition of this man, that she has pronounced him a slave, and the property of a
Danish subject, I see no difference between the President’s authority to restore a
ship or any other property belonging to a subject of a foreign power, which has been
improperly taken from his possession” (ibid., 51). From this observation, Seward
improbably claimed that “[t]he extradition of criminals, under the law of nations
and the Constitution of the United States, ‘is precisely and unequivocally the same’
as that of the surrender of prizes, has never been refuted, and is believed to be
impregnable” (ibid., 50). Other than Seward’s assertion, there seems to be no seri-
ous legal analysis finding that persons and property are to be governed by the same
standard of return or rendition, except in the unholy cases where a person is legally
held to be property.
4. The Twentieth Century

The Arguelles case is clearly an anomaly and not representative of an expansion of
presidential power, for if it were it would have been used readily in the years and
decades after the Civil War or in other periods of declared war by the United States.
The case stands alone for over 125 years, with Henry Wade Rogers, later to become a
judge on the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals, noting twenty years after
Arguelles’s rendition, “The action of the Executive in the case referred to is now gen-
erally regarded as having been an enormous usurpation of power” (Rogers 1884).
With advances in technology and personal mobility, new questions concerning
extradition began to surface. While apparently there was no legal distinction
explored during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries between cases involving
extradition from U.S. soil and the capture and rendition of people in foreign venues
by agents of the United States, there is no evidence that these cases would be treated
differently. It was certainly reasonable under the law of the time to assume that no
matter where or how the United States seized a foreign national, it could only extra-
dite or render that person in conformance with treaty and statute. But a line of cases
under the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine began to develop, which clouded the issue of the
requirement of conformance to treaty in extradition and rendition matters (Frisbie
v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 [1952]; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 [1886]). In these cases, it was
generally held that the kidnap and presentation of criminal defendants in U.S.
courts did not require the dismissal of prosecution for violation of due-process
rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Frisbie, “The power of a court to try a per-
son for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s
jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction’” (342 U.S. 519, 522). This doctrine
followed an ancient common-law practice of judges in not inquiring as to how
criminal defendants made their way to the courts, though the basis of this practice
is often put into question by commentators and judges.
Taking the doctrine as claimed by its adherents, it does little to provide a legal
ground for extraordinary renditions. Even after the establishment of the doctrine,
beginning with Ker v. Illinois in 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court still adhered to the
pre-Arguelles principle that extradition out of U.S. custody was to be performed
only under treaty and statute. In a unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes found in Valentine v. United States (299 U.S. 5 [1936]) that “[t]he power to
provide for extradition . . . is not confided to the Executive in the absence of treaty or
legislative provision” (ibid. at 8). In Valentine, two U.S. citizens were accused of
crimes in France and were arrested awaiting extradition by U.S. authorities. The
crimes allegedly committed were extraditable offenses under a bilateral treaty
between the United States and France, but the arrestees filed a habeas corpus action
“upon the ground that because the treaty excepted citizens of the United States, the
President had no constitutional authority to surrender the respondents to the
French Republic” (ibid., 6).
The Supreme Court found that the president had no independent authority to
render U.S. citizens without express authorization under treaty or statute. The
Court made no indication that non-U.S. citizens not subject to extradition by treaty
would be accorded any less protection and indeed stated, “It necessarily follows that
as the legal authority does not exist save as it is given by act of Congress or by the
terms of a treaty, it is not enough that statute or treaty does not deny the power to
surrender. It must be found that statute or treaty confers the power” (ibid., 9).
As stated above, as recently as 1979 the executive branch adhered to the histori-
cal doctrine of abnegating presidential authority to extradite or render persons in
the absence of treaty and statutory provisions. But beginning in the late 1980s, a
very guarded use of kidnappings and “renditions to justice” were carried out
(Committee 2004, 15–17). This use increased post-9/11 and these actions were no
longer “renditions to justice” (transfers into the hands of foreign judicial systems),
but transfers of people to foreign powers for torture or warehousing.
5. Post 9/11 Use of Extraordinary Rendition

The war on terror conducted since the tragedies of 9/11 relies on extraordinary ren-
dition as a technique for obtaining information from persons thought to be terror-
ists. But unlike the Arguelles affair, which was carried out in the open with vigorous
debate from all sides, the modern practice of extraordinary rendition is shielded by
secrecy. The current practice of extraordinary rendition needs to employ secrecy for
several reasons. First, extraordinary rendition as now utilized by the United States
probably violates a number of legal prohibitions on torture and the facilitation of
torture. The Human Rights Project of New York University Law School, together
with the New York City Bar Association, thoroughly investigated and analyzed the
legal status of extraordinary rendition and issued an excellent report detailing that
analysis. The report, entitled “Torture by Proxy,” found that the Geneva Convention
(GC), the Convention against Torture (CAT), the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Immigration Act all prohibit “the practice of
transferring an individual, with the involvement of the United States and its agents,
to a foreign state in circumstances that make it more likely than not that the indi-
vidual will be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment”
(Committee 2004, 13). These legal prohibitions pose a problem for the open use of
extraordinary rendition. To admit use of the practice risks exposure to negative
public opinion (at the very least) and possibly to legal sanctions as well. Thus, some
level of official denial is necessary to avoid such problems.
Additionally, the actual process of extraordinary rendition depends on secrecy
at both ends of a given operation. These seizure operations must be conducted in
secret as they do not rely on (and actually avoid) use of state force by the nation
Table 20.1 Varieties of Rendition

(1) Within United States: (2) From United States to (3) From United States to
Authorized by Ker-Frisbie country of foreign country
Doctrine. U.S. laws apply. citizenship (Arar):
(Arguelles): Could No legal authority.
be authorized by
treaty, but laws
against facilitating
torture apply.
(4) From foreign country to (5) From foreign (6) From one foreign
United States: Could be country to country country to another
authorized by treaty, but of citizenship: No foreign country: No
laws against facilitating legal authority. legal authority.
torture apply.
(7) From country of citizenship (8) Within country of (9) From country of
to United States: Could be citizenship: Laws citizenship to foreign
authorized by treaty, but of country apply. country: No legal
laws against torture apply. authority
where they occur. The torture facilities where rendition subjects wind up must also
operate in secret in order to preserve their operations and desired effect. In addition
to fear of public/legal opposition, then, the very purpose of extraordinary rendition
missions is a reason for covering the process with a protective cloak of secrecy.
Finally, the methods of identifying suspects and effecting their capture need to
be kept secret to prevent operations from being compromised. In several cases filed
against the United States by persons subjected to extraordinary rendition, the
Department of Justice has asserted the state-secrets privilege, the most powerful
privilege against disclosure available to the government. The privilege is virtually
always successful (Weaver and Pallitto 2005; Fisher 2006).
There are several different possibilities concerning renditions. Referring to table
20, a subject can be rendered from the United States, from her country of citizen-
ship, or from a foreign country (other than the United States or her country of citi-
zenship). And the subject can be rendered to the United States, to her country of
citizenship, or to a foreign country. These combinations generate nine outcomes,
represented in table 20 above. Two of them can be discounted for the purposes here.
Rendition within the United States (box 1) cannot truly be an extraordinary rendi-
tion, and the laws of the United States alone apply. Likewise, rendition within the
subject’s home country (box 8) is not extraordinary rendition, as only the laws of
that nation apply. Thus, we are left with seven relevant potential outcomes. Each of
them has actually occurred.
Those involving the United States as place of origin or destination (boxes 1, 2, 3,
4, and 7) could arguably be covered by treaty. The others (boxes 5, 6, 8, and 9) con-
stitute U.S. involvement in the affairs of a sovereign nation and therefore cannot
look to treaty law for support. We must repeat, at this point, the key distinction
between rendition and extraordinary rendition: the former contemplates a subject

delivered to the custody of the judicial system, while the latter scenario does not
involve the judicial system. The rendition of a citizen to her home country from the
United States so that the citizen can stand trial in her country might be governed by
treaty. If so, the terms of the treaty would provide legal authority for the United
States to effect rendition. But could treaty authority ever legalize the rendition of a
citizen to her home country where she would remain outside of the judicial
process?
It is here that the anti-torture laws apply: the United States is legally barred, as
noted above, from delivering an individual to a nation where she is likely to face
torture. Thus, if the United States were to enter into a treaty providing for rendition
with a country known to practice torture, then individual cases might arise where
rendition (though authorized by the treaty) would violate other treaties or U.S.
laws. The “Torture by Proxy” report cited above anticipates in its analysis an execu-
tive branch claim that, despite congressional action in the area of anti-torture laws,
the president retains emergency powers to act. The landmark case of Youngstown
Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer governs questions of emergency presidential powers, and
as the report’s authors point out, Youngstown establishes categories for presidential
emergency action. When Congress has legislated in the area where the president
wishes to act contrary to congressional policy, his power is at its “lowest ebb,” accord-
ing to the Supreme Court in Youngstown. Such is the case with rendition: the report
cites several instances of clear congressional action with regard to prevention of
torture. Thus, it is problematic to argue that the president retains emergency pow-
ers that justify extraordinary rendition.
But it is unwise to rely on Supreme Court precedent alone to analyze the legal-
ity of presidential action, since courts have historically been unwilling to trench on
presidential power in areas involving foreign activities and national security policy
(Pallitto and Weaver 2007). But recent cases arising in the context of the war on ter-
ror give reason to pause, because they suggest in various ways that the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts may, in fact, be entertaining more expansive concep-
tions of executive power than those previously accepted by the courts.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (542 U.S. 507 [2004]) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (415 F.3d 33
[2005]) require discussion: Hamdi because of the Supreme Court’s gesturing toward
greater implied executive powers, and Hamdan because of the D.C. Circuit’s refusal
to allow the petitioner to assert his rights under the Geneva Convention. The
Hamdan ruling certainly gives the government a basis for arguing that human-
rights provisions in treaties do not create a right of action for individual petitioners
and that therefore violation of those provisions entails no legal consequences.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld is often described as a rebuke to the Bush administration, and
there is certainly language in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion suggesting lim-
its to the president’s emergency powers (as well as a role for the Court in marking out
those limits). The Court cautioned that the “state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens” (542 U.S. 507, 592).
Further, the opinion drew on earlier jurisprudence to reject “a heavily circumscribed
role for the courts” in cases involving civil liberties during wartime (ibid., 603).
Moreover, the portion of the holding setting out due process requirements for
“enemy combatant” cases does indeed establish a limit on what the president can do
with such cases. However, the Court’s interpretation of the Authorization to Use
Military Force (AUMF) to justify wide-ranging emergency action should give us
pause, for while the Court stopped short of addressing the scope and nature of Article
2 emergency powers, they certainly showed a disinclination to look closely at the
nexus between congressional authorization and presidential war-making actions.
Thus, the AUMF serves to authorize and justify things that go far beyond its terms.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in July
of 2005. Two aspects of the Hamdan ruling have important implications for the
future of extraordinary rendition. First, the court ruled that Hamdan could not
assert rights under the Geneva Convention because the convention is not self-
enforcing. Rather, it is an agreement between contracting parties (nations) who
alone can seek remedies for its breach. As the Court put it, “This country has tradi-
tionally negotiated treaties with the understanding that they do not create judicially
enforceable individual rights” (415 F.3d 33, 38). Thus, the executive branch is respon-
sible for deciding whether and how to apply treaty provisions, but no one may
complain to a court about what they decide. Second, the court ruled that the presi-
dent, qua negotiator of a treaty, would be given almost complete deference in the
interpretation of that treaty. The court ruled that “[t]o the extent there is ambiguity
about the meaning of [Geneva Convention] Common Article 3 as applied to Al
Qaeda and its members, the President’s reasonable view of the provision must
therefore prevail” (ibid., 42). The ruling obviously lends support to the practice of
extraordinary rendition: it eliminates treaty-based arguments against the practice,
and vests in the president the authority to interpret his actions as consistent with
treaty obligations. Courts, then, will have limited ability to constrain (or even
review) presidential actions in the rendition context because it is governed to a sig-
nificant extent by treaty provisions.
With the exception of the Immigration Act, all of the prohibitions on facilitat-
ing torture listed above are potentially implicated by the D.C. Circuit’s ruling on the
legal status of human rights treaty provisions. Alongside the Geneva Convention,
the CAT, the Refugee Convention (RC), and the ICCPR could all fail as sources of
human rights protections, because all of them are treaty-based human rights pro-
tections and therefore do not create private rights of action. The FARRA, in turn,
was passed by Congress to implement the CAT, but under Hamdan it, too, could fail
if confronted with the president’s contrary interpretation of the CAT treaty itself,
for FARRA’s purpose was to implement a presidentially negotiated treaty.
In June of 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit. The Court
found that provisions of the Geneva Conventions invoked by Hamdan had become
part of U.S. law via the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and that therefore the
procedures used to try Hamdan did violate the law. However, the basis for the ruling
was U.S. domestic law rather than treaty provisions. The Supreme Court did not
address the questions of treaty application and interpretation decided by the D.C.
Circuit—since the Court ruled on a narrower decisional ground instead—and so

they remain to be settled by the Court in the future. Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling
is not authoritative, but its conclusions are troubling nonetheless.
6. Conclusion
Extraordinary rendition is now a relatively common practice of the United States
government, even if its status in law is unsettled. Hundreds of extraordinary rendi-
tions have apparently taken place since the events of 9/11. This has sometimes
angered other countries and people around the world. For example, some twenty-
five Central Intelligence Agency employees have been indicted in Italy for the kid-
napping and extraordinary rendition of a radical imam (see, e.g, Povoledo 2008). It
is unclear how successful this practice has been, since the process, and the results,
are almost completely hidden to public view.
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part v
INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS AND
PRODUCTION
chapter 21
ADDRESSING
“COMPLEXITIES” IN
HOMELAND SECURITY
gregory f. treverton
This chapter explores a new category of intelligence problems, “complexities.”

Those seem particularly present in assessing terrorist groups and so protecting the
homeland. The challenge is what intelligence and other agencies can usefully say
about them for policymakers, ranging from senior leaders of government to police
on the street. This chapter first defines complexities and explores their implications,
then looks at several examples of how complexities might be addressed in counter-
terrorism intelligence and law enforcement.
1. “Complexities” and “Wicked Problems”

Most intelligence questions about nation-states fell, and fall, into the frequently
used distinction between puzzles and mysteries.1 Puzzles have an answer in princi-
ple; intelligence just may not know it. North Korea has X nuclear devices. Mysteries
This chapter began as a working paper done as part of a project on intelligence for terrorism
and homeland security for the Swedish Emergency Management Ageancy (SEMA). SEMA merged
in 2009 with two other agencies to form the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB in the
Swedish acronym). The author is grateful to SEMA and his Swedish colleagues, especially Wilhelm
Agrell, Lars Nicander, Jan Leijonhielm, and Magnus Ranstorp.
1
On the distinction between puzzles and mysteries, see Treverton (1994) and Nye (1994,
82–93). For a popular version, see Treverton (2007).
344 intelligence analysis and production
Table 21.1 Puzzles, Mysteries, and Complexities

Type of Issue Description Intelligence Product
Puzzle Answer exists but may not be known The solution

Mystery Answer contingent, cannot be known, but Best forecast, perhaps with
key variables can, along with sense for scenarios or excursions
how they combine
Complexity Many actors responding to changing “Sensemaking”? Perhaps done
circumstances, not repeating any orally, intense interaction
established pattern of intelligence and policy
are future and contingent, with no definitive answer even in principle. Whether
North Korea will dismantle its nuclear programs is a mystery. But mysteries have
some shape; we know what variables matter most in producing an outcome, and we
may have some historical evidence about how they interact. “Complexities,” by con-
trast, are mysteries-plus.2 Table 21.1 displays the range from puzzles to complexities.
Large numbers of relatively small actors respond to a shifting set of situational fac-
tors. Thus, they do not necessarily repeat in any established pattern and are not
amenable to predictive analysis in the same way as mysteries. Those characteristics
describe many transnational targets, like terrorists—small groups forming and
reforming, seeking to find vulnerabilities, thus adapting constantly, and interacting
in ways that may be new.
The critical differences between mysteries and complexities turn on shape and
“boundedness.” Mysteries are mysteries; they cannot be solved. But they do have the
shape provided by history and perhaps some theory, both specific to the issue at
hand and more general, including inferences from other cases. Those provide clues
to what factors are important, what indicators bear on those factors, and how those
factors may combine to produce outcomes.
A nice example of dealing with a mystery arose at a May 2008 workshop, an
example from the private sector, not the public. The mystery was whether a given
country would suffer a financial crisis. Drawing on a wide set of cases across the
world, one bank developed a warning system based on a set of statistical indica-
tors—and formalized it into a signal system. Yet only one in three warnings eventu-
ated into an actual currency crisis. The reason was that mysteries are contingent.
They depend. In this case, governments could take corrective action to make the
warning not come true. As a result, the warning was broadened to include the risk
of policy tightening—for instance, by increases in interest rates. The warning
became that a crisis was likely if no tightening occurred.
Because mysteries have some shape, sharp discontinuities are rare. They are
bounded. In the example above, only one in three predicted financial crises actually
occurred. Most governments are not overthrown; most coups fail. Intelligence most
2
The terms are from Dave Snowden (2003). His “known problems” are like puzzles and his
“knowable problems” akin to mysteries.
addressing “complexities” in homeland security 345
often is wrong about mysteries when adversaries seek to surprise, as the rich litera-
ture on surprise attack attests.3 In those cases, the shape derived from history and
theory becomes the attackers’ friend and the assessor’s enemy. Witness that shape
turned into conventional wisdom that wars in the Middle East keep proving wrong,
for instance, that attackers wouldn’t start wars they couldn’t win on the battlefield.
In contrast, complexities have much less shape and so are less bounded. Because
history, comparable cases, and theory may be lacking, what to look for is not clear.
Nor are the factors that will be important or how they may interact to produce an
outcome. In these circumstances, uncertainty is very high and hard to reduce.
Moreover, many of the actors driving complexities—for instance, transnational
actors like terrorists—will also seek surprise. In those circumstances, one of the few
relative advantages of complexities is that there is no common wisdom that becomes
the adversary’s friend. September 11 drove home that anything can happen and so
put an end, for a time at least, to the nostrums beginning with “they couldn’t” or
“they wouldn’t.”
Complexities are similar to what are sometimes called “wicked” problems.
Indeed, for present purposes they may be the same. A “wicked” problem might be
distinguished from a “tame” one. A tame problem, somewhat like a puzzle:
• Has a relatively well-defined and stable problem statement.
• Has a definite stopping point, that is, we know when a solution is reached.
• Has a solution which can be objectively evaluated as being right or wrong.
• Belongs to a class of similar problems which can be solved in a similar
manner.
• Has solutions which can be tried and abandoned (Conklin 2001, 11).
Interestingly, wicked problems were first defined in urban planning. In 1973, Horst
Rittel and Melvin Webber, both urban planners at the University of Berkley, pub-
lished “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning” in the journal Policy Sciences.
The authors observed that there is a whole realm of social-planning problems that
cannot be successfully treated with traditional linear, analytical approaches to urban
planning. They called these “wicked” (that is, messy, circular, aggressive) in contrast
to relatively “tame” problems, such as mathematics, chess, or puzzle solving. Rittel
and Webber’s work continued to focus on the nature of ill-defined design and plan-
ning processes. They wrote:
The classical systems approach . . . is based on the assumption that a planning
project can be organized into distinct phases: “understand the problems,” “gather
information,” “synthesize information and wait for the creative leap,” “work out
3
The classic work on surprise attack is Wohlstetter (1962). See also Betts (1982). Not
surprisingly, Israeli scholars have been especially interested in surprise attack, for instance,
Kam (1988) or Bar-Joseph (2005). A path-breaking study of intelligence in a crisis is “One Hell
of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Kennedy, Castro and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958–1964 (Fursenko and
Naftali 1997). Wilhelm Agrell (2005) has written on early warning signals in relation to crisis
management in “Förvarning och samhällshot.”
solutions” and the like. For wicked problems, however, this type of scheme does
not work. One cannot understand the problem without knowing about its
context; one cannot meaningfully search for information without the orientation
of a solution concept; one cannot first understand, then solve. (Rittel and Webber
1973, 161)
“Wicked problems are ill-defined, ambiguous and associated with strong

moral, political and professional issues. Since they are strongly stakeholder depen-
dent, there is often little consensus about what the problem is, let alone how to
resolve it. Furthermore, wicked problems won’t keep still: they are sets of complex,
interacting issues evolving in a dynamic social context. Often, new forms of wicked
problems emerge as a result of trying to understand and solve one of them”
(Ritchley 2007, 1–2).
A year after Rittel and Webber’s seminal article, in his book “Re-designing the
Future,” Russell Ackoff posited a similar concept (although in less detail), which he
called a “mess,” and which later became a “social mess.”4
In a list similar to the one for tame problems, complexities might be character-
ized in the following ways:
• There is no definite formulation of a wicked problem.
• Wicked problems have no stopping rules.
• Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, right or wrong but,
rather, better or worse, good enough, etc.
• There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked
problem. Every wicked problem is essentially unique and novel.
• Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because there
is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts
significantly.
• Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable)
set of potential alternative solutions, nor is there a well-described set of
permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.
• Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
• Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another
[wicked] problem.
• The causes of a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The
choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s resolution.
• The planner has no right to be wrong (Rittel and Webber 1973, 161).
This list betrays the origins of wicked problems in policy, not intelligence, and
in planning, not assessment. In principle, it is possible to imagine wicked problems
that were not characterized by social complexity. Indeed, in the examples from
planning, much of the social complexity derives from the stakeholders, whose inter-
ests cannot be separated from the planning problem at hand. (That is a nice reminder
that stakeholders have interests in intelligence assessments as well, interests that the
4
Ackoff ’s book is Re-Defining the Future (1974). On “social mess,” see Horn (2001).
assessment process ignores at its peril. An uncertainty that is, for one stakeholder,
simply a giant headache may be, for another, an opportunity to seek budgets to
build hedges.)
Nor need social complexity always make for wicked problems. In the planning
example, the interactions that shaped the use of an urban space might be complex
but perhaps could be rather simply mapped at the level required for certain kinds of
planning. Here, though, social complexity is of the essence of wickedness; it makes
it difficult to tame the wickedness.
2. Terrorism as Complexities
At the extreme, complexities could become purely random, what Snowden calls
“chaotic” problems. At that point, the quest for understanding becomes pretty fruit-
less, by definition. Most of the work on so-called chaos theory is an effort to limit
the chaos, to find regularities, or complicated interactions amidst what looks like
purely random behavior.5 At the extreme, intelligence’s role would be like the
speechwriters in the joke German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt used to tell on him-
self. His speech-writers tired of his never using their text, and so on one occasion,
when he actually was reading a speech, he got to the bottom of a page and read,
ringingly, “I feel very strongly about this, and here are the seven reasons why!” When
he turned the page, all he found was “You’re on your own, Mr. Chancellor.”
Intelligence would say to policymakers: “We have discovered that this problem is a
complexity. You’re on your own.”
Plainly, that is not good enough. Modern terrorists are not so different in scope,
strategy, intention, and source from other international security threats past and
present that we should throw away all traditional problem-solving and analytical
frameworks. The mystery-complexity distinction is really a continuum. So the chal-
lenge in addressing terrorism as complexity is to import concepts but carefully,
always mindful that they may be wrong, that we may be surprised, and that new pat-
terns or theories may be required. Some of what we might apply, carefully, is what we
knew but forgot. Just as the very calibrated, political nature of the terrorists on the far
left in the 1960s and 1970s made us forget that for most of history terrorism was
about mass killing, so too we were prone to exaggerate just how different their reli-
gious motivations made the terrorists of the 1990s and 2000s. We now know better.
They have more in common with previous terrorists than we thought.
5
For instance, for Crutchfield relative measures of both randomness and structure are
necessary for determining a system’s complexity. At the extremes, the system is structurally simple.
Statistical complexity—which is correlated to structure—is greatest in the intermediate regime. In
complexity literature, this intermediate regime is referred to as the “edge of chaos,” and is where
some of the most interesting system behaviors occur—such as surprise, innovation, and phase
transitions. See Crutchfield (1994).
There is also more continuity in tactics. A dozen years before September 11, my
RAND colleague, Brian Jenkins, wrote: “The nightmare of governments is that sui-
cidal terrorists will hijack a commercial airliner and, by killing or replacing its crew,
crash into a city or some vital facility.”6 Notice that not only was he prescient about
the possible attack mode, but he also attributed that prescience to governments as
well. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld focused attention in the
intelligence war on terrorism on the “known unknowns,” the things we know we
don’t know, and, especially to the “unknown unknowns,” the things we don’t know
we don’t know.7 In this case and others, what is just as important are the “unknown
knowns”—the things we knew but have forgotten or didn’t know we knew.
Writing in 1996, well before September 11 or the Iraqi insurgency or the London
bombings, Walter Laquer also wrote presciently, and described the complexity of
the terrorist threat.
Scanning the contemporary scene, one encounters a bewildering multiplicity of
terrorist and potentially terrorist groups and sects. An individual may possess the
technical competence to steal, buy, or manufacture the weapons he or she needs
for a terrorist purpose; he or she may or may not require help from one or two
others in delivering these weapons to the designated target. The ideologies such
individuals and mini-groups espouse are likely to be even more aberrant than those
of larger groups. And terrorists working alone or in very small groups will be more
difficult to detect unless they make a major mistake or are discovered by accident. . . .
Society has also become vulnerable to a new kind of terrorism, in which the
destructive power of both the individual terrorist and terrorism as a tactic are
infinitely greater. New definitions and new terms may have to be developed for
new realities, and intelligence services and policymakers must learn to discern the
significant differences among terrorists’ motivations, approaches, and aims.8
A listing of the characteristics of terrorists, as we now understand them, might

be the following:9
• Terrorism is predominantly a phenomenon of group psychology, where a
social system of sympathizers and supporters exerts multiple influences on
individual behavior.
• There is not single root cause of terrorism, like poverty; rather there are
multiple paths to terrorism.
• Terrorist groups and their supporting social systems are embedded within
evolving institutional and political structures and complex religious belief
systems.
6
See his “The Terrorist Threat to Commercial Aviation” (1989, 10).
7
The distinctions were not new with Rumsfeld but he used them, famously, in a Pentagon
press briefing, December 12, 2002. For the transcript, see http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636
8
See his “Postmodern Terrorism” (1996).
9
This list is from Nancy K. Hayden, who also provides a rich set of citations to the relevant
literature for each. See her The Complexity of Terrorism: Social and Behavioral Understanding,
Sandia National Laboratories, forthcoming.
• Terrorist actions have several, perhaps many, audiences, and evolve with
responses by those audiences.
• Terrorists innovate and adapt in response to changes in both
counterterrorism measures and independent events.
• Self-organizing terrorist groups form primarily through social networks; as
such their structure is largely a function of those social ties.
• Decentralized terrorist networks facilitate resiliency in operations, diffusion
of ideology and innovation, and distribution of resources and information.
The list is daunting, and much of it is a description of complexity. But it also pro-
vides places to start, evidence to look for, and suggestive patterns to try.
3. Addressing Complexities
with Organizations
The fight against terror, to be sure, introduces dramatic new elements of dynamism,
complexity and uncertainty. Its complexity, for instance, breaks down both hori-
zontal and vertical specialization in organization; it may be more important to get
a particular piece of information to the infrastructure manager on the front lines
than it is to get it to the prime minister. Moreover, none of the traditional responses
by organizations to increased uncertainty—for instance, creating self-contained
subunits with specific functional responsibilities—is really relevant to homeland
security.
Rather, newer information-processing models suggest that organizations will
seek to develop information systems for gathering information at points of origin,
performing analysis, and directing customized information to any number of deci-
sion-makers in the hierarchy. For domestic intelligence in the fight against terror,
“information sharing” initiatives are almost a perfect analogy to this guidance, seek-
ing to collect and analyze information at many points in the enterprise, and get the
information many decision-makers need to them when they need it. The analogy
extends still further, for recent research suggests that better information systems
still may not mitigate all of the negative characteristics of the environment.
Productive options for redesigning organizations then will most likely take one of
three courses—changing structural components; introducing or expanding infor-
mation systems, or an integration of both strategies.
In looking closer at decision-making processes, traditional organization theory
applied two criteria to decisions: How fast are they, and how comprehensive—that
is, are all relevant factors pertaining to the decision included in the process? The rub
is that the criteria are often at odds with the each other. Fast decisions often come at
the cost of comprehensiveness, and vice versa. Moreover, these criteria for decisions
also bear on the design of organizations. In traditional organizations, fast decisions
tended to be associated with a decentralized authority structure and fewer hierar-

chical levels between the operating levels of the organization and executives
(Eisenhardt 1989, 543–76). Most pre-September 11 law enforcement organizations
were variations of that model.
By contrast, comprehensive decisions implied information processing and
vetting through the hierarchy to a centralized decision authority. If characteristics
of the environment required comprehensive decision processes, then, in the tradi-
tional view, organizations should maintain hierarchical structures or invest in
information systems that could exceed the capacity of the hierarchy to process
decision-related information. This logic suggested that enterprises operating in a
highly uncertain environment should: 1) maintain vertically specialized hierar-
chies; 2) decentralize decision-making authority to levels of the organization that
can immediately process and use new information as it is acquired; and 3) increase
the use of information technology directed at gathering and analyzing data and
information from the environment.
In contrast, if high dynamism were the chief characteristic of the environment,
then organizations needed to make fast decisions, and they needed information
processes that sorted the most critical information from the environment for deci-
sion making. In addition, the hierarchical structure should be reduced to keep
decision processes closest to operational activities. Organizations in dynamic envi-
ronments needed to invest in information technology that facilitated lateral and
vertical information sharing.
Finally, complex environments presented unique challenges to organizations
because they required decision-making processes to be both comprehensive and
fast. For example, partners, competitors, rules of engagement, political stakehold-
ers, the geographical differences of different operating locations all represented dif-
ferent points of view and different kinds of information that that needed to be
integrated in making decisions—an apt characterization of homeland-security
intelligence enterprise. As a result, the guidance to organizations was to maintain
the vertical specialization of hierarchy to match the complexity of information pro-
cessing with other actors in the environment but, at the same time, decentralize
decision-making authority to keep decision speed high at levels close to operations.
Information technology was to be directed at enhancing analysis capability to
increase decision-making speed and to increase scanning and synthesizing infor-
mation from the environment. Table 21.2 summarizes these considerations:
In other areas of public policy, such as software development and project design,
experts are developing ways of identifying wicked problems and coping with them.
DeGrace and Stahl apply wicked complexity to computer engineering (DeGrace
and Stahl 1998). To deal with wicked problems better, Rittel had developed the
“Issues Based Information System” (IBIS), a framework that enables groups to break
problems down into questions, ideas, and arguments. Expanding on IBIS, computer
scientist Jeff Conklin recently developed gIBIS (“graphical IBIS”). Now Director of
the CogNexus Institute (http://cognexus.org/), Conklin also developed Dialogue
Mapping, a meeting facilitation skill usually supported by a software tool. By taking
Table 21.2 Operating Environments, Decision Requirements, and Design Considerations

Salient Characteristic of Decision
Operating Environment Requirement Design Considerations
High uncertainty Comprehensive • Vertical specialization

• Decentralization
• IT to collect, analyze
High dynamism Fast • Limit hierarchy IT to share vertically and
horizontally
High complexity Fast and • Maintain vertical specialization
comprehensive • Decentralization IT to analyze, scan,
synthesize
a group’s conversation about a problem and structuring it as an issue-based dia-

gram, Dialogue Mapping enables groups to further understand and frame the prob-
lem appropriately, which is believed to be an important step in tackling wicked
problems.
More recently, researchers have applied wicked problems to private-sector
strategy. Between 1995 and 2005, John Camillus completed three research projects
that provided insights into wicked strategy problems. He concluded that companies
can tame—but they cannot solve—wicked problems. To do so, companies should
(Camillus 2008):
• Involve stakeholders, document opinions, and communicate. Since
stakeholders will disagree, it’s important to involve them early on in the
discussions about the nature of the problem and how to solve it. The goal is
not to get everyone to agree but to get everyone to understand each other’s
positions so that people can work together to find ways to manage the
problem. It is also important to document the ideas and concerns
continually. This provides an opportunity for communication with
employees throughout the organization.
• Define the corporate identity. While trying out different ways to deal with a
wicked problem, the organization must still stay true to its strategic intent.
It must be sure that its actions align with its values, competencies and
aspirations.
• Focus on action. Since it will be impossible to identify the right strategy,
companies shouldn’t think through every possible option. Instead they
should experiment with a few that are feasible. However, any path taken will
have unforeseen consequences that will require changes in strategy. It is
important to learn from those mistakes and not try to avoid them.
• Adopt a “feed-forward” orientation. Since wicked problems are unique they
require novel solutions. To take a “feed-forward” orientation, companies
need to discover how to envision the future. Scenario planning, looking out
ten, twenty, or even fifty years, helps executives get into the mindset of
imagining the type of plans they might need to succeed in the future.
4. “Sensemaking” in Homeland Security

It was the particular challenges of dealing with high complexity—exactly the cir-
cumstances of the fight against terror—that led to a related line of thinking about
organizations and process, sensemaking.10 In the United States, that approach was
spurred by looking at major failures, like the Three Mile Island nuclear accident or
the space shuttle Challenger disaster.11 These examinations sought to understand
how complexity could blind people to emerging catastrophes or create vicious cycles
that could lead to major failures in crises. For instance, while the pre-September 11
FBI was perfectly shaped for law enforcement—decentralized into geographically
defined units, with a flat hierarchy and thus the ability to make decisions fast—it
and its fellow law-enforcement organizations were not designed for the complex
environment of the terrorist threat.
While the first approaches to knowledge management tended to treat knowl-
edge as a durable object that could be transferred, stored, accessed, and used—in
short, learned—sensemaking treated knowledge as an ephemeral social construction
that must be created, is difficult to move across boundaries (“sticky”), is “recontex-
tualized” in moving from one context to another, is subject to decay and destruction,
and must be “reaccomplished” from day to day. For the sensemaking approach,
information was less learned by the organization than created by it.12 The language
of “information sharing” dominates current discussion of the homeland-security
enterprise. Yet from a sensemaking perspective, the goal is not sharing information
but jointly creating it across national, local, and private organizations.13
The sensemaking perspective is also suggestive for more fine-grain processes
within individual agencies and across homeland security, especially analytic pro-
cesses as they encounter the complexity of the terrorist threat. The ongoing stream
of events is likely to include some disruptive “environmental jolts” that—when
bracketed for further attention—can trigger a process of “sense-losing.”14 In sense-
making, the aim is to help groups move from an orderly context to a chaotic context
and then reconstruct a new orderly context. In shaping those processes, the watch-
words are:15
• Social: People don’t discover sense, they create it, usually in conversations.
Those conversations are critical.
10
The term derives from Karl Weick (1995).
11
See, for instance, Perrow (1984) and Weick (2001).
12
The foregoing description is from Program on National Security Reform, “Project on
National Security Reform Literature Review,” no date. As of May 14, 2008: http://www.pnsr.org/
pdf/Organizational_Structure_Literature_Review_draft.pdf
13
Lt. John Sullivan of the Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department refers to this process as
“coproduction.”
14
See Meyer (1982, 515–37) and Orton (2000: 213–34).
15
See Weick (1995). The watchwords and description are from Weick (undated).
• Identity: The first identities that surface in an inexplicable event, identities

such as “victim” or “fighter,” lock people in to overly limited options.
Moving beyond first identities is imperative.
• Retrospect: Faced with the inexplicable, people often act their way out of their
puzzlement by talking and looking at what they have said in order to discover
what they may be thinking. The need is to make it possible for people to talk
their way from the superficial, through the complex, on to the profound.
• Cues: People deal with the inexplicable by paying attention to a handful of
cues that enable them to construct a larger story. They look for cues that
confirm their analysis; and in doing so, they ignore a great deal. Expanding
the range and variety of cues is important.
• Ongoing: Sensemaking is dynamic and requires continuous updating and
reaccomplishment. Groups can’t languish in thinking “Now we have it
figured out.”
• Plausibility: What is unsettling when people face the inexplicable is that they
tend to treat any old explanation as better than nothing. That is healthy, but
the first plausible account can’t be the last possible story.
• Enactment: Most of all, in inexplicable times, people have to keep moving.
Recovery lies not in thinking then doing, but in thinking while doing and in
thinking by doing. People need to keep moving and paying attention.
The watchwords are pretty abstract, but they suggest the goals both in design-
ing organizations and especially in fashioning processes within and across them.
Mindfulness is critical, both in the sense of being open-minded but also in the sense
of being aware of just how uncertain the complexity of reality can be and how pos-
sible it is that the group will be surprised. Suppose, for instance, the U.S. FBI and
CIA officers who met in New York in June 2001 had engaged in a sensemaking con-
versation, instead of mutually holding back information they weren’t sure they
could pass to each other. They might have led to the joint discovery of where two of
the September 11 terrorists had been and in fact were. Broadened, it might have
introduced flight schools as a jolt, a jolt that might then have triggered another
round of conversation in an effort to make some sense of that inexplicable piece.
5. Sensemaking in Law Enforcement

The May 2008 workshop referred to earlier discussed a law enforcement example
that wasn’t called sensemaking but sprang from a very similar motivation. The
emphasis on “intelligence-led” policing came out of Kent, England a generation
ago. The logic was that it was better to prevent the twenty-first crime than to solve
the twenty that came before. In that sense, what has been going on is a long experi-
ment at whether that proposition can be made to come true. The challenge is that
HEADING
hypo 1
hypo 2
ind. hypo 3
ind.
ind.
HEADING
HEADING
HEADING
HEADING
HEADING
Figure 21.1 Mapping Associations and Hypotheses.
police generally are inclined to make any case they can, rather than deferring to take
up particular cases or concentrate on prevention—the latter especially requires
making sense of a complex environment.
The European Union defines organized crime as more than two people engaging
in serious criminality with some permanence, where the goal is power or financial
gain. The definition is elaborated, but that is the core. Types of crime are less useful
as a category, for those tend to remain relatively constant; what police need to focus
on is behavior. In that sense, the police live not in a world of limited information but
in one of huge information; the problem is relevance. As an example, investigations
are law enforcement’s main tool, but the critical information is that which is not in
the investigation. From a police perspective, justice ministries include many “integ-
rity huggers” who make it hard to get at some information that is in police registers.
Much of what passes for “strategic analysis” in law enforcement is too general to
be helpful—“the price of heroin is falling in Russia,” for instance, which doesn’t
really help local law enforcement in Sweden. The goal of this analysis, rather, is to
establish some priorities. It seeks to work in both directions up and down a ladder,
both from the top down with seven strategic areas, both regional and functional
(Balkans, eastern Europe, human smuggling, cocaine, criminal organizations
(prison or motorcycle gangs, for instance), and from the bottom up through known
or suspected criminality among groups or individuals. The time horizon is about
three years. One Swedish gang began as the Muslim Brotherhood, but then become
the “Original Gangsters”; its leader was described as better in jail—both safer and
more able to lead. Sometimes honor is more important than turf; for reasons more
of the former kids in Gothenburg took on the Bandidos criminal gang.
The process begins with a very open-ended brainstorming, much like that
described in work on sensemaking, with stickies on a whiteboard, looking for
groups and associations. Once that board is full, then the “fish,” in figure 21, begins
to organize that brainstorming:
The fish metaphor in that tasking is illustrated by the tail, the backbone keeps it
all together, and the result comes out through the mouth. As the figure suggests,
competing hypotheses are added, and one set of associations (in one fish) might be
decomposed into a separate fish of hypotheses and associations. The process pays
particular attention to resources and capabilities, which are key, as well as the legal
business in which crime groups are engaged. It also looks at countermeasures that
particular gangs take, like throwing away their cell phones or carefully reading court
documents for hints about investigative strategies. Secondary criminality is also
important because, on the Al Capone principle, it may be a way to get criminals off
the street even if they cannot be caught at their major crimes.
Ideally, one output of the process would be indicators, which could then be fed
back as tasking or things to look for. On the whole, though, the people on the street
know suspicious behavior, though there are sharp differences among organizations;
Customs may notice but the Coast Guard less so. Observations relevant to those
indicators get put in the criminal intelligence register. The main outputs are target-
ing and priority setting. (In language, law enforcement in Sweden finds it necessary
to talk of “problem,” for “threat” is the province of the military.) The point is not
“strategy” in some grand sense but something more operational. That includes
sharing information through the register with those who can use it.
In some ways, it was easier to penetrate the Italian gangs, for they were ethnic and
somewhat territorial. While technology lags behind the needs, sometimes help comes in
strange ways. The riots in the mid-2000s in Copenhagen sparked by what Muslims
regarded as provocations were bad for business, including criminal business, so the
Black Cobra gang discouraged the rioters. Is there risk of a gang-geek alliance? So far, the
answer seems less in crime than in terrorism. Gangs have not used the Web as a recruit-
ing device to the same extent, but rather have relied on it more for communication.
6. Concluding Words:
Intelligence and Policy
Virtually all of the 2000s’ postmortems of intelligence called for more creativity in
analysis—a steep hill to climb. Yet, psychologists are eloquent that busy, harried
people are less likely to be creative.16 Rather, creativity arises from reflection, from
16
For an exploration, from a sensemaking perspective, of how creativity unfolds in large,
complex organizations of long standing, see Drazin, Glynn, and Kazanjian (1999, 286–307).
Oldham and Cummings found that employees were most creative when they worked on complex,
challenging problems under supportive, not controlling, supervision. See Oldham and Cummings
(1996, 607–34).
down time. An experiment might create a cell for understanding, say, Al Qaeda and
its strategy. That cell might be enjoined from current production but instead
empowered to reflect, to go to conferences, to walk in the park, to consult outsiders,
to brainstorm, and the like, passing insights only when it had them.
Sensemaking is a step in this direction, a continuous, iterative, largely intuitive
effort to paint a picture of what is going in the environment of a target. It is accom-
plished by comparing new events to past patterns, or in the case of anomalies, by
developing stories to account for them. Sensemaking is, in fact, done everyday in
current intelligence, which is a continuous, largely informal effort to update the
story line on an issue. It also underlies the key warning concept of recognition or
discovery of patterns of behavior.
The aim would not be to examine rigorously alternative assumptions or out-
comes, but rather to prompt analysts to be continually on the lookout for different
types of patterns. It would be, to employ another concept used by organizational
decision-making experts—to promote mindfulness within the analytic intelligence
organization.17 According to organizational literature by proponents, mindful-
ness—an intellectual orientation favoring continuous evaluation of expectations
and assumptions—is found in many organizations that successfully deal with high
levels of complexity and uncertainty, such as aircraft carriers and nuclear power
plants. Such organizations do very effective sensemaking of their environments, as
is indicated by exceptionally low rates of accidents (a minor equivalent of an intel-
ligence failure). According to Weick’s theory and some associated research, high
levels of mindfulness are associated with, among other things, a preoccupation with
past and potential failure and a learning culture in which it is safe and even valued
for members of the organization to admit error and raise doubts.
For intelligence, enhancing mindfulness would be a process, not a tool.
Sustaining mindfulness among time-pressed consumers would be even more diffi-
cult than getting them to read alternative analysis papers on occasion. Again, a port-
folio of research and experiment would make sense. RapiSims are one example of
ways to let consumers work through the various implications of different intelli-
gence conclusions, and to do it all at their desks.18 Robust decision-making is simi-
lar in spirit. It uses the power of computers to let analysts (and decision-makers)
alter variables through hundreds of scenarios, looking for assessments (or policies)
that are robust across a wide range of those scenarios. If being too close to consum-
ers breeds bias but being too far away leads to irrelevance, why not test this proposi-
tion with experiments, giving analysts different degrees of proximity to policy and
the policy agenda? Indeed, this might not be done through experiment but through
17
See, for example, Weick and Sutcliffe (2001).
18
Enabled by increasingly sophisticated spreadsheet-based programs, these would allow
consumers to manipulate variables to generate alternative outcomes. Decision-makers could
quickly and easily explore a range of possibilities in a way that is more likely to be retained than if
presented in a long and dry formal tome. See https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/Kent_Papers/
vol3no2.htm.
mining the experiences of the many intelligence analysts who have served rotations
in policy positions. In the end, analytic practice will not be reshaped until the prod-
uct of analysis is reconceived—not as words or bytes in a finished document but as
better understanding in the heads of policymakers.
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Hayden, N.K. Forthcoming. The Complexity of Terrorism: Social and Behaviorial
Understanding (Livermore, Calif.: Sandia National Laboratories).
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Jenkins, B. 1989. The Terrorist Threat to Commercial Aviation, P-7450. Santa Monica:
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University Press.
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27:515–37.
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Oldham, G. R., and A. Cummings. 1996. Employee Creativity: Personal and Contextual
Factors at Work. The Academy of Management Journal 39, no. 3 (June): 607–34.
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Reorganization of U.S. Intelligence. Journal of Management Studies 37, no. 2 (March):
213–34.
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Treverton, G. F. 1994. Estimating Beyond the Cold War. Defense Intelligence Journal 3 (Fall): 2.
———. 2007. Risks and Riddles. Smithsonian (June).
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http://www.bus.umich.edu/FacultyResearch/Research/TryingTimes/Rules.htm.
———. 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.
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University Press.
chapter 22
THE INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS CRISIS
uri bar-joseph
rose mcdermott
1. Introduction
The US analytical intelligence community is in crisis. However, contrary to much
popular opinion, this crisis did not start in recent years. In fact, evidence for funda-
mental weaknesses within the system can be traced back at least to the 1960s, includ-
ing such dramatic examples as the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, through
the 1970s, surrounding such events as the Khomeini revolution in Iran and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, into the 1980s with the unforeseen collapse of the
USSR, and reaching beyond the 1990s failures to anticipate Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
or the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests until today. In this sense, recent major
intelligence failures such as the lack of proper warning prior to the 9/11 terrorist
attack, the entirely mistaken estimate of Iraq’s WMD capabilities, and the dubious
claim that Iran had “halted its nuclear weapons program,” merely represent recent
peaks in a long historical valley of failed national intelligence estimates. Indeed,
during this time of an ongoing war on terrorism, when intelligence is far more
important than absolute levels of military power in many ways in determining out-
come, the performance of the American intelligence community is, probably, the
poorest since its establishment in 1947. Here we investigate some of the fundamen-
tal explanations for this situation.
The causes for these failures have been the subject of numerous studies, starting
with Wohlstetter’s (1962) classic study of Pearl Harbor. Since then, the research in
this field has yielded excellent general as well as more specific explanations for failed
intelligence estimates, as well as a vast body of proposals on how to fix the defects in
the intelligence process that produce them (for a recent review, see Bar-Joseph and
McDermott 2008). To date, this research has not shown how the impact of obstacles
to high-quality analysis is shaped by a specific intelligence environment, or why
certain kinds of organizations are more likely to fall victim to specific obstacles,
while others remain less susceptible. In order to tackle these questions, we suggest
here another approach to the problem. Instead of the more commonly used induc-
tive approach, we propose a more deductive one that frames the study of American
intelligence failures within the broader context of the American intelligence culture.
Such an approach can provide not only a better understanding of what cracks in the
foundation have led to such failures, but also provides a more effective structure
upon which to reformulate the system, primarily by helping reformers to accept
things that cannot be changed, change the things that can and need to be changed,
and effectively distinguish between the two.
A first cut at explaining the sources for pervasive intelligence failure reveals two
main factors that account for such consistently poor performance. First, the per-
sonal quality of the analysts themselves contribute to an inability to see what is
there, a tendency to see what is not there, and a fundamental restriction in meta-
cognitive perspective, which does not allow each individual to properly interrogate
his or her own inferential processes, strategies, beliefs, or ask how these dynamics
might influence assessments based on them. In other words, common psychological
traits result in unmotivated biases in information processing which lead to system-
atically mistaken estimates in analysis. These factors can be seem as internally
determined.
A second factor remains more externally driven. The political environment
affects both intelligence consumers’ and producers’ views that the intelligence prod-
uct is not only a means to achieve effectively foreign policy goals but also a political
commodity that can be used to advance political and bureaucratic interests. Biased
outcomes in this instance result from bureaucratically incentivized or personally
motivated manipulations in the production and use of intelligence analysis.
Obviously, these two internal and external processes often go hand in glove and
each can serve to exacerbate the effect of the other. Since they commonly result in
biases which move in the same direction, the tendency is not for such effects to
cancel each other out; rather, their combined effect aggregates the error across ana-
lysts who share the same perspectives and incentives, further accentuating both the
nature of the error itself, and the confidence associated with the mistaken estimate,
as each participant gains greater assurance from the endorsement of others in the
process.
In seeking to explain the specific ways in which such effects manifest within the
context of the American intelligence culture in particular, we outline several specific
aspects of this culture in order to locate the specific domains in which such effects
are most likely to emerge, and the ways in which such biases remain particularly
pernicious.
the intelligence analysis crisis 361
Accordingly, the first part of this chapter discusses eight important characteris-
tics of American intelligence culture. On this basis, we identify and analyze two
main sources of intelligence estimate failures: unmotivated and motivated biases.
Each of these elements will be discussed in the following sections. In summarizing
this discussion, we suggest a number of mechanisms that may limit the impact of
these biases on intelligence estimates.
2. The American Intelligence Culture
2.1. The Concept of Intelligence Culture

While the concept of “strategic culture” had been widely used since the 1980s in
order to explain the different ways in which nations formulate their national-
security strategies, the systematic study of “intelligence culture” is a relatively new
one. The idea was used in the 1970s in order to describe the general atmosphere
within the CIA (for example, Marchetti and Marks 1974). In addition, in the early
1990s, the role of general cultural barriers in restricting effective intelligence fore-
casts was demonstrated (Bathurst 1993). However, despite this fact, a more in-depth
investigation into the impact of the intelligence culture itself on the behavior of spe-
cific intelligence organizations has only started in recent years (for example, Hastedt
1996; Turner 2004).
We define “intelligence culture” here in a manner consistent with the estab-
lished definition of “strategic culture” used elsewhere ( Johnston 1995; Katzenstein
1996; Gray 2006), as encompassing modes of thought and action derived from per-
ceptions of national historical experience, aspirations for self-characterization, and
distinctive state experiences, with respect to the role of intelligence information and
analysis in shaping foreign policy. As such, intelligence culture interacts with pre-
existing psychological obstacles to effective information processing to reduce or
enhance their impact on the quality of the intelligence product.
2.2. The Culture of the CIA

A preliminary study of the CIA suggests eight specific cultural traits that represent
pervasive aspects of the intelligence culture we describe:
• Ethnocentricity and cultural insensitivity: Being the product of geostrategic

isolation and “lack of history,” combined with the first pilgrims’ ethos of
“a City upon the Hill,” this prominent characteristic of American culture is
highly relevant to the analytical community. Since intelligence analysis
requires deep understanding of foreign countries, cultures, languages,
mindsets, and operational codes, ethnocentricity is, perhaps, the intelligence

community’s most important source of weakness. It is manifested in two
main forms:
a. Foreign language deficiency that hampers the effective collection and use
of available sources of information. Out of two hundred case officers that
were sent to Korea in 1950, none spoke Korean, a limitation which
became a leading factor in the complete CIA failure to penetrate North
Korea. Lack of Farsi-speaking personal in the embassy in Teheran and in
the US intelligence community at home limited the American ability to
understand firsthand the inner process that led to the collapse of the
regime of the Shah in Iran in 1979 (see discussion below). Insufficient
number of Arabic-speaking personnel in the community was, and still is,
a major cause of ineffectiveness in the current war on terrorism as well.
This pervasive and enduring lack of sufficiently skilled linguists speaks
not only to the endemic ethnocentrism and lack of cultural sensitivity in
the American intelligence culture, but also demonstrates its inability to
quickly adapt and learn from repeated mistakes over time as well.
b. The interaction between ethnocentricity, a lack of understanding, apathy
to different societies, and obstacles to information processing, primarily
unmotivated biases, is likely to exacerbate possibilities for the creation of
pathologies such as “mirror-imaging.” Mirror imaging results when a
leader, a high-level group, or even citizenry of one country assume that
others are just like them, and thus fail to fully understand the differing
motives and incentives that may drive others to behave in different ways.
This pathology played, for example, an important role in facilitating
intelligence blunders such as the failure to forecast the Indian nuclear
tests in 1998.
• Club mentality: Until recent years, the veil of secrecy under which
intelligence agencies operated limited their ability to recruit workers openly.
As a result, agencies like the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), which
served as a model for the creation of the CIA, tended to recruit manpower
on the basis of the “one member brings another” principle, and the CIA
copied this system. This “old boys’ network” recruitment strategy led to a
homogenous, largely white male Ivy League CIA beginning in the 1940s
which did not really begin to change until the early 1980s with the massive
recruitment of non–Ivy League university graduates. Since this early strategy
gave heavy, indeed almost restrictive, preference to the recruitment of
American-born Caucasians, it turned the CIA into an organization to which
American citizens from the Soviet and the former Soviet block, or Third
World countries, especially Muslims, had a slim chance of joining. The
result was the enhancement of ethnocentricity and cultural insensitivity, the
weakening of HUMINT capabilities, and a growing dependency on foreign
(and occasionally unreliable) intelligence services.
• Mass production: For almost a hundred years now, capital-intensive

economics, mass production, and large-scale assembly lines have dominated
American industry. This mode of production, which proved its effectiveness
in WWII, had a major impact on the way the CIA built its own intelligence
production lines, emphasizing quantity over quality. This resulted in waves
of massively indiscriminate recruitment of case officers, analysts, and agents
when the need arose, or political circumstances enabled, and a low quality
of professionalism and expertise within the CIA’s ranks. Thousands of
immigrants from Eastern Europe were recruited by the CIA at the beginning
of the Cold War in order to build anti-communist undergrounds in the
Soviet satellites (none were operational); two hundred case officers were
sent to Korea in 1950 and recruited thousands of Korean and Chinese
“agents;” a successful small-scale covert operation in Laos was turned into a
far less successful large-scale operation in 1965; and two thousand new
analysts and case officers joined the agency in a mass recruitment when the
Reagan administration came to power in the early 1980s and in the post-9/11
period. As these examples illustrate, it is not clear that having more people
for their own sake, without the experience and tradecraft that is gained in
years of intelligence training and practice, enhances the quality of the
intelligence received; rather, such growth may just as often obscure useful
information in the midst of increasingly internecine bureaucratic networks
and procedures. Especially without a clear strategy for the effective
implementation and integration of new hires, less can in fact be more in
such contexts, particularly if secrecy concerns remain paramount.
• Money can buy anything: The combination of a free market ideology and the
vast financial resources of the CIA yield the tendency to use money as a
means to compensate for the agency’s weaknesses in other domains. The
result is the preference for buying, rather than cultivating by other means—
first and foremost ideology—HUMINT sources and political influence. For
example, in building up the anti-communist networks in Eastern Europe in
the late 1940s, an effort that was based on experience gained in WWII, the
CIA used payments rather than ideology to carry out the mission. And
unlike the Soviet services that used ideology as the main tool to recruit
excellent sources during the 1930s and the 1940s, the CIA’s main tool of
recruitment was money. Experience shows that ideologically motivated
sources are more effective than financially motivated ones, and certainly
more likely to sustain their services once payoffs or surveillance ceases.
The same is true with regard to gaining political influence. The CIA
bought the Italian elections in 1947, financed the demonstrations that led to
the collapse of Mussadeq in Iran in 1953, bribed Japanese politicians in 1950,
had King Hussein of Jordan on its payroll, controlled the Laotian Parliament
in the mid-1960s, and financed, without direct involvement, the anti-Soviet
Mujahidin in Afghanistan. Current strategy to buy the allegiance of the local
sheiks in Al-Anbar province in Iraq represents a continuation of just such a

short-sighted strategy. While financial incentives can work for a period of
time, and certainly in the presence of a supporting military occupation, they
are unlikely to lead to the kind of internal shifts of hearts and minds that
ideological capture can create, which can then continue to survive in the
absences of supporting infrastructure.
• Public relations and sales promotion: The American culture which highlights
salesmanship as a central means to promote value, combined with
aggressive bureaucratic competition (see below), and the fact that the CIA
was the “the new kid on the block” in the national-security apparatus
(lagging behind the Pentagon and the State Department) led the CIA to
emphasize public relations as a means to improve its public image and
status within the administration. Unlike any other secret agency, the CIA
had an Office of Public Affairs from its inception in 1947, and it invested a
lot in describing failure as success, exaggerating the value of potential covert
operations, and hiding the “family jewels.” This proclivity, combined with a
tamed media (at least until the early 1970s) enabled the CIA to describe
humiliating failures such as its covert operations in the Korean War, or in
Indonesia in 1958, as major successes. Such a strategy also helped the CIA to
limit public damage at least somewhat from humiliating failures such as the
failed Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, or the completely mistaken assessment
of Iraq’s WMD capabilities in 2002. The end result was that in many cases
the CIA invested far more in covering up its blunders than in fixing the
weaknesses that caused them. This tendency can also be seen in the CIA’s
attempts to hide the spies that emerged in their own midst, most notably
Aldrich Ames, and their inability to uncover those operatives while they
were in charge of sensitive information within the agency.
• Technology as panacea: The legacy of American triumphs over geographic
and other natural obstacles, and its pioneering technological developments
(for example, the Manhattan project), have made preference for problem
solving by technological means another dominant trait of the American
intelligence culture. Combined with the impact of ethnocentricity, this
characteristic yields a strong preference within the intelligence community
to address problems through the extensive use of sophisticated technology
over more traditional human intelligence means. Generally, this propensity
helps to explain the US intelligence community’s superiority in collection by
technical means (TECHINT) and weakness in collection by human sources
(HUMINT). At the analytical level, it explains the preference for the use of
quantitative techniques over more traditional qualitative methods of
assessment. In some areas, such as economic intelligence, it may produce
high-quality estimates. In other, more subtle arenas requiring greater
political or military acumen or sensitivity, the use of mechanical means
might enhance the detrimental impact of unmotivated biases, by enabling
inexperienced and culturally insensitive analysts to ignore complicated
realities and contradictory information. A typical example of this problem

can be seen in the method of assessing the strength of the Viet-Cong by
means of body-counting that, to a large extent, turned the issue of who was
winning the war into an exercise in bookkeeping, without any clear
understanding of the degree of motivation in the underlying population
regardless of casualties. By focusing on body counts, assessments failed to
understand the ways in which local actors might deliberately recategorize
natural deaths in order to appear more successful or to gain more resources,
while simultaneously refusing to recognize the ways in which large numbers
of deaths actually helped generate the blowback effects which fueled the
larger political insurgency.
• Emphasis on Operations over Analysis: The CIA’s preference for operations
stemmed, so it seems, from an interest in changing the reality that it failed
to understand. It was enhanced by the American “can do” mentality, the
Cold War reality, and a bureaucratic interest in showing policymakers the
value of the agency as a problem solver. The result was a greater emphasis
on covert operations in intelligence collection and analysis. Dulles, for
example, had little interest in strategic analysis but he was very enthusiastic
about covert action. The ‘Bay of Pigs’ operation was carried out, despite the
odds against it, to show Kennedy the CIA’s ability to get rid of a major
problem in the shape of Castro. And even during the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis, covert operations against Castro took place, despite the fact that they
could have led to an escalation of a nuclear crisis. At the same time, the
CIA’s Directory of Intelligence received less attention, primarily because it
lacked the “glory” of covert action.
• Aggressive bureaucratic competition: Although bureaucratic competition is a
universal pattern in organizational behavior, the competition within the US
intelligence community appears more intensive than in other intelligence
communities. This is due to the impact of two factors: the capitalist
heritage, which promotes competitive, achievement-oriented, society-
concerned assertiveness; and the confederated structure of the community,
which results from the fear of a centralized intelligence apparatus that
might threaten basic individual freedoms. High-level bureaucratic politics
interacts primarily with motivated biases and produces two main patterns
of behavior:
a. Lack of cooperation, which occurs first and foremost in the domain of
information sharing. While compartmentalization may justify this type
of behavior on professional grounds, political competition seems to be
the main cause for the ineffective distribution of critical information.
Examples of the destructive impact of lack of cooperation on effective
intelligence analysis include the FBI refusal to deliver critical information
to other consumers prior to Pearl Harbor, and the instruction of the
Naval Chief of War Plans, Admiral Turner, to avoid distribution of Magic
material to the Navy command in Pearl Harbor. Lack of cooperation also
contributed to other intelligence failures, and the inability to provide

warning prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
b. Intelligence to please. This pattern of behavior, which many
intelligence makers in the US (but not in Israel or Britain, for
example) regard as fairly normative, is motivated by the desire to gain
influence in the policy making process by providing the kind of
information a leader wants to hear, at the cost of a less objective and
accurate intelligence product. The American presidential system seems
to make political pressures on intelligence makers more problematic
than in parliamentary democracies. The most recent example
of such political pressures involves the 2002–3 estimate of Iraq’s WMD.
3. Unmotivated Biases and

Intelligence Failure
The study of obstacles to high-quality information processing has yielded a large
number of mechanisms that appear to systematically hinder this process. Here we
focus on three of them:
a. Belief perseverance, which overlaps or is closely related to mechanisms
such as confirmation bias or polarization effect, is a process by which
individuals assimilate new information into preexisting theories in
biased ways. In particular, individuals typically accept at face value
information which accords with their beliefs without subjecting it to
strict inferential tests, interpret mixed or ambiguous information as
consistent with preexisting beliefs, and tend to dismiss evidence that
runs contrary to those theories, or at the very least subject such data to
more exacting standards of credibility, than they would data which
confirms previous beliefs. In this way, an analyst will tend to interpret
evidence in ways which are most likely to support their preexisting
beliefs, and least likely to change their views. This can make it extremely
challenging for even a preponderance of evidence which runs contrary
to established beliefs to penetrate an analyst’s viewpoint (Lord, Ross,
and Lepper 1979).
b. Judgmental Heuristics are biases that can unconsciously lead to systematic
errors in prediction, especially under conditions of uncertainty, by affecting
estimates of frequency and probability based on factors such as
representativeness, availability, and anchoring, which often fail to
systematically track with objective probabilities (Kahneman, Slovic, and
Tversky 1982). In representativeness, observers are more likely to judge a
person or event as more representative of a larger category, such as
“terrorist” for example, to the extent that such a person is similar to others
drawn from the larger category on stereotypic features. Availability bias
occurs when individuals estimate events to be more likely to the extent that
they are easy to remember or access; so, for example, after the attacks of
9/11, domestic security focused on protection of planes and airports
because that was the most salient reference, rather than focusing on how
the enemy might shift strategy to another area precisely because increased
security made such air traffic attacks more challenging. Finally, anchoring
reflects the fact the estimates and judgments often change less quickly than
might be objectively warranted. Once made, such calculations become
anchored and adjustments take place slowly and incrementally, even when
the environment demands more radical shifts in understanding. It thus
proved difficult for the CIA to understand, for example, that Gorbachev
represented authentic change in the Soviet system, and was not just trying
to lull the Americans into a false sense of security so as to catch them later
unawares.
c. Groupthink, which unlike the previous two mechanisms is a syndrome that
affects the dynamics within small groups and can create mutually reinforc-
ing and impenetrable cycles of false belief, as each member of a group
perpetuates the collective consensus in pursuit of personal appreciation
( Janis 1982). In these dynamics, the critical factors remain the personal
self-esteem, social support, status, and camaraderie which each member
derives from group membership, which renders challenges to the group
particularly threatening from a psychological perspective. Members would
rather keep their doubts and objections to themselves rather than risk
social sanction, isolation or rejection from the group.
It can be assumed that a number of the CIA’s cultural traits enhance the impact
of each of these specific mechanisms more than others. Given, for example, that the
estimation process is more demanding for analysts who lack first-hand knowledge
of their subject or the necessary linguistic skills, they are likely to resort more often
to various forms of heuristic judgment as a means to simplify the process. Similarly,
club mentality is likely to increase the impact of groupthink, since individuals from
a similar background tend to think similarly more than individuals from different
backgrounds, and the likelihood of dissenting voices in such closely knit groups is
likely to be lower.
A typical example which shows how certain patterns within CIA culture were
channeled through unmotivated biases to create intelligence estimation failures is
the mistaken estimate of the stability of the Iranian Shah’s regime prior to the
Khomeini revolution in 1979. Clearly, social revolutions are major events and their
accurate assessment not only necessitates the use of secret sources but a clear
comprehension of the social, political, and psychological mechanisms that pre-
cipitate, encourage, and support them. In 1978, the CIA lacked both sources and
comprehension.
In August 1978, the CIA estimated that there was no threat to the Shah’s regime
(Weiner 2007, 369). On September 28, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) paper
predicted that the Shah “is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten
years” (Bill 1988, 258). The CIA assessed on October 27 that “the political situation is
unlikely to be clarified at least until late next year when the shah, cabinet, and the
new parliament . . . begin to interact on the political scene” (Kurzman 2004, 1). Less
than a hundred days later the Shah left Iran.
There are a number of explanations for the CIA’s estimation failure. Some of
them focus mainly on American political commitments to the Shah which created
a major obstacle to high quality collection and analysis (for example, Conlin 1993).
But Robert Jervis, who as a consultant for the CIA conducted the most thorough
investigation into this fiasco, concluded that the agency lacked the elementary tools
to grasp the nature of events as the revolution unfolded. To start with, the American
embassy in Teheran was a typical example of Lederer and Burdick’s classic concept
of American missions abroad as S.I.G.G., or “Social Incest in the Golden Ghetto”
(Lederer and Burdrick 1958). Its members did not have the linguistic skills (almost
none of them spoke Farsi), they were isolated from nongovernmental segments of
the Iranian society, having few connections with the secular opposition, and no
connections at all with the pro-Khomeini segments that incited the revolution.
A typical result of this isolation was the fact that despite requests by analysts, the
CIA station in Teheran failed to get cassette tapes by Khomeini that were circulated
freely in the streets ( Jervis 2006, 16).
At the time, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence employed only two political
analysts in its Iran section, and they did not understand the essence of Iranian poli-
tics, society, or culture. Iran, moreover, was not a subject for intelligence analysis in
the DIA and the State Department’s Intelligence and Research (INR) office, and the
CIA’s analysts did not use academic expertise to compensate for their intrinsic limita-
tions (Jervis 2006, 21–22). The end result was that the CIA erred in understanding the
causes for the Shah’s reluctance to use his power against the opposition, estimated
him to be stronger than what he was, remained unaware of the serious nature of his
cancer and the ways in which it both shifted his emphasis and diminished his abilities,
completely misunderstood the role of religion and Khomeini, and failed to see that
since the Shah was perceived by the nationalists as an American puppet he (and not
the USA) had become the main target of national frustration (Jervis 2006, 23–25).
With lack of detailed information about the dynamics behind the making of
the CIA’s Iran estimates in the fall of 1978, we cannot point to specific cultural straits,
beyond ethnocentricity and cultural insensitivity, that were channeled through
unmotivated biases to create this failure. But the role of these cultural factors
becomes clear when the American intelligence estimate is compared to the Israeli
one. Unlike the American diplomatic, military, and intelligence personnel, the staff
of the Israeli embassy in Teheran included a number of people, including senior
ones, who were born in Iran and immigrated to Israel. Consequently, they knew the
country, politics, and culture very well and had the necessary linguistic skills to
communicate with people on the ground. The former Israeli military attaché in
Iran, Yaacov Nimrody, who was born in Iran, was doing private business there in
1978. In his memoirs he described how, following a visit to the Island of Kish that
had become the Iranian elite’s luxurious resort, he reached the conclusion that cor-
ruption on the one hand and popular frustration on the other created a consider-
able threat to the regime’s stability. His estimate was enhanced following visits to
the bazaar in Teheran, talking with merchants, and other contacts. Toward the end
of the year, after he saw that the Shah’s picture had been removed from the wall in
an office he visited, he concluded that it was the end of the Shah’s regime. With this
type of information and analysis one can understand why in September 1978 Israeli
officials reached the conclusion that the situation in Iran “was not good” and rec-
ommended putting an end to investments there and pulling Israeli assets from the
country (Nimrody 2003). Recall that in this same month, the American intelligence
estimate expected the Shah’s regime to stay in power throughout the next decade.
4. Motivated Biases
Motivated biases typically refer to those which derive from strong personal incen-
tives. The literature has often discussed these biases in terms of strongly negative
emotional feelings such as guilt, shame or rage (Janis and Mann, 1977). Occasionally
these biases are discussed in terms of “wishful thinking,” in that analysts tend to
believe things that they wish were so, for personal or professional reasons (Levy
2003; Jervis 1976).
But motivation can come in many forms, and often motivated biases overlap
with political and professional incentives structures, such that individuals who
know that they will get a raise or promotion if they produce evidence that is consis-
tent with the preexisting desires or beliefs of policymakers will have additional
reason to search for, and fail to challenge the credibility of, such information because
they desire the political perquisites that will result if they give their sponsors the
information they want.
Individuals may or may not be aware of the impact of these personal and pro-
fessional incentives on their behavior. Certainly, most people would at least be more
aware of their personal or professional motivations than they might be of their
more unmotivated inferential processes. However, affected individuals may not
agree that such influences necessarily represent a problem, especially if policymakers
are more likely to use information which aligns with their plans. Many analysts may
have their own pre-existing motivated ideological biases for wanting to support
such policy positions themselves. Indeed, these people may have self-selected into
working in these environments for this very reason, because they wanted to work in
support of causes they believe are important. Yet once in place, their strongly held
beliefs may prove a hindrance to more objective analysis and interpretation of
information which runs contrary to those theories.
The discussion of the role of motivated biases in intelligence practices usually

focuses on the politicization of the intelligence product, also known as “intelligence
to please” (i.e., the intentional tailoring of intelligence estimates to accord with the
political preferences of consumers). This, indeed, is the primary problem with intel-
ligence policy making in the United States. But motivated biases can also lead to the
opposite result. When senior intelligence officers believe that they know better than
their political bosses where the national interest lies and how to achieve it, they
sometimes pursue a policy of their own. This was evidenced, for example in the
1920 military-intelligence plot against British Prime Minister David Lloyd George
that aimed to end his rapprochement policy with the Soviet Union; the 1924 intel-
ligence plot against the Labor party (the “Zinoviev Letter” affair); Israel’s
“Unfortunate Business” of 1954, which intended to create a crisis in Egypt’s relations
with the west in order to prevent the British forces’ evacuation of the Suez Canal,
and was carried out without the knowledge, and against the policy, of the prime
minister; and the behavior of Israel’s Military Intelligence chief on the eve of the
1973 Yom Kippur War, who because he was certain that he knew the situation better
misled his superiors with regard to critical information concerning the imminent
threat (Bar-Joseph 1995 2005; Bennett 2006).
Intelligence estimates are also influenced by bureaucratic interests. Because of
the direct correlation between the magnitude of the threat and their budgets, naval
intelligence is more likely to highlight the threat of a rival navy, just as the air force
is likely to do with the menace of the opponent’s air force, for example. The bomber
and the missile-gap debates of the 1950s are two examples of the way motivated
biases shaped intelligence estimates in the United States.
History shows that while in other countries motivated biases can be channeled
into “intelligence to please” and bureaucratic competition, as well as anti-governmental
action, the specific nature of US intelligence culture makes the last pattern quite rare.
Indeed, the only significant case in which CIA chiefs acted in contrast to presidential
preference was the Bay of Pigs episode, where they presented the operation’s chances of
success as being far higher than their actual estimate (Kornbluh 1998). Far more com-
mon is the CIA’s tendency to tailor its reports according to the political needs of the
White House.
The CIA’s politicization of intelligence represents an acquired cultural trait.
Until the mid-1960s the agency was quite clear of it, just as the Second World War
OSS reports were a fine example of objective analysis. The legacy that dominated
the CIA during that period was that of Sherman Kent, “the father of American intel-
ligence analysis,” who regarded the separation of analysts from policymakers as the
best means to preserve high-quality intelligence products (Kent 1949, 200). Indeed,
one can hardly find any traces of “intelligence to please” in the agency’s reports that
were submitted to President Eisenhower who—being an experienced intelligence
consumer—was himself aware of the limits of intelligence and the need to keep it
objective. But the Johnson administration’s need for positive estimates on the
Vietnam War started changing this situation. After 1965, CIA reports from Saigon
began to be colored in more optimistic tones (Allen 2001, 188–93), and under con-
siderable political pressure DCI Richard Helms—probably the best DCI in the
agency’s history—had to accept the Pentagon’s optimistic estimation of the Viet
Cong Order of Battle for fear that failing to do so would alienate his agency’s rela-
tions with the White House (Weiner 2007, 267–69). DCI George Bush’s readiness to
allow a politically biased scrutiny of the CIA’s estimate of Soviet military power,
which led to the Team A–Team B debate, added another dimension to the politiciza-
tion of the agency’s reports (Prados 1986; Prados 1993).
The politicization of the CIA’s estimates reached its peak during the first years
of the Reagan administration. Under William Casey as DCI and Robert Gates as
DDI, CIA analysts were pressured to produce estimates that portrayed the USSR as
the mighty “evil empire” and the master of international terrorism, presented a
number of states, such as Mexico and Iran, as being on the verge of becoming com-
munist, and minimized the evaluation of Iran’s involvement with terrorism to suit
the administration’s policy. The intentional exaggeration in the power of the Soviet
menace was one of the major causes for the CIA’s failure to correctly estimate the
collapse of the USSR (Goodman 2008).
In comparison to the CIA under Casey and Gates, Tenet’s CIA estimates with
regards to Iraqi WMD capabilities and links with al Qaida seem almost sincere,
although it is obvious by now that the agency systematically corrupted the intelli-
gence process in order to provide the administration with the products that would
justify the invasion of Iraq (for example, Pillar 2006). What seems even more strik-
ing than the CIA’s yielding to political pressures is the buildup by the Pentagon in
2002 of a special intelligence unit, known as the Office of Special Planning (OSP)
under Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, whose sole task was to
produce intelligence reports confirming the administration’s public accusations
against Saddam Hussein. That the most senior officials in the administration
regarded intelligence estimates as merely a political commodity, and that no one
among the intelligence chiefs came forward to protest this perception, constitutes
vivid testimony of the level that “intelligence to please” achieved in the United
States. As far as is known, this feature of intelligence culture is unique to America
and does not exist in other liberal democracies.
This claim is also validated by the political and academic debate that has been
taking place in the United States since the 1980s (since approximately the time when
Casey became DCI) about how politicized the intelligence product should be. This
is a unique debate concerning values and norms that rarely if ever exists anywhere
else in the world—a clear indicator by itself of the legitimacy which the politiciza-
tion of intelligence had gained within American intelligence culture. It involves dis-
tinguished academic scholars such as Richard Betts who maintain that a strict
separation between intelligence and policy “may preserve the [intelligence] purity
at the price of irrelevance” (1980, 109), as well as intelligence chiefs such as DCI
Robert Gates who regarded the CIA’s “unprecedented access to the Reagan admin-
istration” as a major achievement and a key to “a dynamic, healthy relationship”
(Gates 1987/8, 225–26). On the other side stand professionals such as Pillar (2006)
and Goodman (2008) who follow the tradition of the forefathers of intelligence
analysis in the United States, such as William Langer who ran the OSS’s Office of
Reports during WWII and Sherman Kent, who succeeded Langer and later headed
the CIA’s Office of National Estimates.
Without getting into the details of this debate, a number of points should be
made. First, none of the preachers for close relations between intelligence and poli-
cymakers publicly supports political pressure on intelligence or the motivated tai-
loring of intelligence reports according to the political needs of the administration.
Second, non-American participants in the debate such as Jones (1989), Harkabi
(1984), Handel (1987), and Bar-Joseph (1995) systematically endorse the more tradi-
tional stand, and regard close relations between intelligence analysts and policy-
makers as a major potential threat to the quality of the intelligence product. Third,
although the main justification for a close relationship between intelligence and
politics is the interest in making intelligence more relevant for policy making, recent
actual experience shows that cooking intelligence can lead to a weakened status for
the agency within the governmental apparatus and in the public eye. Fourth, a cor-
rupted intelligence product that yields political outcomes, such as the October 2002
NIE on Iraq’s WMD capabilities, can have a far more negative impact on American
national security interests than a non-corrupted and less influential product.
5. Conclusions
In order to improve the performance of intelligence analysts, academic students of
the subject should look deeper into the cultural causes and consequences of the
American intelligence culture on analytic performance. It may prove beneficial as
well to compare the American intelligence culture to cultures within other intelli-
gence organizations in order to generate suggestions as to how to better manage,
shift, or exploit the American culture so that it will nurture a more successful and
accurate professional analysis environment.
Changing any culture is very difficult, and often the process is quite slow.
Instigating such change demands cooperation between politicians and intelligence
chiefs to work together to mitigate those aspects of the American intelligence cul-
ture that operate to impede the production of objective analysis. One way to achieve
this laudable goal is to establish a more open and transparent recruitment policy.
This represents a major means by which to overcome ethnocentrism and club men-
tality. In particular, emphasis needs to center on recruiting United States citizens
with Third World background or language skills.
In addition, the agency needs to work harder to recruit and promote “open-minded”
personal, especially for analytical positions. Professional incentives should be structured
to reward accuracy, even when such assessments run contrary to the established political
wisdom, or the stated desires of intelligence consumers. At the very least, analysts should
know that their jobs will not be at stake should they offer analysis which runs contrary
to political pressures. In addition, less-frequent rotation and longer-term service in the

same analytical positions can serve as an effective means by which individuals can gain
a sustained and intimate understanding of their area of research.
Finally, serious attempts to diminish the impact of political pressure on the
production of intelligence can help reduce the likelihood of pernicious errors in
estimation and analysis. For example, passing a law which criminalizes political
pressure designed to change intelligence estimates, or punishes those who force
intentional change for political reasons constitutes a good first step in changing the
incentive structure which encourages this kind of behavior. Such a shift in tactics is
comparable to the normative change in attitudes toward sexual harassment which
followed the public institutional sanctioning of such behavior in the workplace.
Each aspect of the American political culture that we identified above has the
potential to interact with the politicization of intelligence in a way which renders
biased estimates. Such assessments, while possibly more useful for a policymaker
already bent on a particular plan, does a disservice to the longer term security needs
of the state. Fostering a culture in which contrary information and analysis is wel-
comed, and where politicization it kept to a minimum, at least at an organizational
and institutional level, can go some distance toward mitigating some of the more
extreme biases which result from the interaction of encapsulated environments
operating under institutional political pressure.
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chapter 23
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS:
TECHNIQUES FOR BETTER
GAUGING ENEMY POLITICAL
INTENTIONS AND MILITARY
CAPABILITIES
richard l. russell
1. Introduction
One of the most important, and yet daunting, tasks for intelligence analysts is to
gauge enemy political intentions and military capabilities. Analysts need to marry
political-intention and military-capability assessments to form a threat assessment
for policymakers. As Richard Betts explains, “a threat consists of capabilities multi-
plied by intentions; if either one is zero, the threat is zero” (Betts 1998, 30). The
failure of intelligence analysts to accurately gauge political intentions, military capa-
bilities, or both can result in strategic intelligence catastrophes. If policymakers are
not given warning of impending war, they are denied windows of opportunity to
work diplomatically to head it off a crisis before the first shots are fired.
Analysts are responsible for informing policymakers about the military capa-
bilities of foes. These capabilities can come in the form of tanks, armored personnel
carriers, artillery, helicopters, and aircraft for waging conventional military opera-
tions. They might also come in the form of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—in warheads sitting on top of ballistic
missiles for waging unconventional warfare at a higher end of the conflict spectrum.
Or military capabilities can come in the form of small arms, ammunition, explo-
sives, and rockets wielded by terrorist, militia, and insurgent forces for waging
unconventional warfare at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. But it is equally
important in the assessment of military capabilities not to concentrate on the mea-
surable and quantifiable to the neglect of the less precise, non-material capabilities
such as the quality of morale, military doctrine, leadership, intelligence, logistics,
and training (Handel 2003, 12).
Analysts too need to gauge political intentions, or the willingness, to use mili-
tary capabilities to achieve political ends. As Clausewitz teaches, military force and
war are extensions of politics by other means (Clausewitz 1989, 87). Often the gaug-
ing of political intentions is comparatively more difficult than the gauging of mili-
tary capabilities because the latter entails armed forces which can be numbered and
tallied to form a rough baseline or order-of-battle assessment. If many military
capabilities deal with “hardware” that can be seen and touched, political intentions
are “software” that is buried inside the heads of enemy leaders that—more often
than not—is imperceptible by intelligence analysts.
How might intelligence analysts strengthen their assessments of enemy political
intentions and military capabilities to avoid strategic intelligence debacles? Some
intelligence professionals, scholars, and critics argue that a basket of analytic tech-
niques collectively called “alternative analysis” or “competitive analysis” offers strong
prospects for strengthening future intelligence performances. This chapter briefly
reviews the calls for competitive analysis from outside reviews of American intelli-
gence performances. It examines major competitive analytic techniques and some
efforts by the American intelligence community to put them into practice. The dis-
cussion then turns to the formidable bureaucratic, cultural, intellectual, and human
collection hurdles that will inhibit effective competitive analysis practices in the
American intelligence community. The chapter concludes with recommendations
for doing better competitive analysis under the auspices of the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI).
2. Calls for Competitive Analysis

after Intelligence Failures
The United States has experienced over the past decade some of the most cata-
strophic intelligence failures since the founding of the intelligence community with
the National Security Act of 1947. The Central Intelligence Agency, which had been
the lead American intelligence agency for assessing threats to the United States,
blundered in gauging the military capabilities and political intentions of enemies in
Iraq and al-Qaeda.
competitive analysis 377
The CIA’s assessments of Iraqi military capabilities manifested in weapons of

mass destruction had been wildly inaccurate. The CIA in the run up to the American-
and British-led war in 1991 to liberate Kuwait from occupying Iraqi forces had
grossly underestimated the sophistication of Iraq’s biological and nuclear weapons
programs. More than a decade later in the run up to the American and British 2003
invasion of Iraq, the CIA had assessed that Iraq had robust weapons of mass destruc-
tion programs, when in fact Iraq’s WMD programs had been dilapidated since 1995
(Russell 2007, 76–85).
American intelligence badly blundered in accurately gauging al-Qaeda’s
unconventional capabilities to wage war against the United States prior to the
September 11 attacks, although it had more accurately gauged al-Qaeda’s political
intentions. The CIA to its credit had provided strategic warning to President
George Bush in the summer 2001 that al-Qaeda was planning a large attack against
American interests. But the CIA lacked specific intelligence pointing to the 9/11
conspiracy and the FBI failed to recognize the significance of information FBI
field agents had acquired about al-Qaeda members’ pilot training inside the
United States and to share that information broadly in the intelligence commu-
nity (Russell 2007, 71–76).
The scope and magnitude of these failures brought about a slew of outside
investigations of the intelligence community. President George W. Bush, for exam-
ple, appointed a commission to examine the American intelligence community’s
capabilities to assess foreign WMD capabilities. The WMD Commission report
was one of the most insightful and thoughtful investigations of intelligence com-
munity’s performances. But its findings, unfortunately, were overshadowed by the
public limelight grabbed by the 9/11 Commission, whose report was a national
best-selling book, a notable achievement for a government investigation. The 9/11
Commission’s report, however, was long on personal and political drama but not
nearly as insightful or strategic in its assessment of the intelligence community as
the lower public profile WMD Commission report. The WMD Commission rec-
ommended that “The DNI should encourage diverse and independent analysis
throughout the intelligence community by encouraging alternative hypothesis
generation as part of the analytic process by forming offices dedicated to indepen-
dent study.” (WMD Report 2005, 405)
The critique that the intelligence community lacked competitive or alternative
analysis echoed those of earlier outside investigations of intelligence-community
performances. The Jeremiah report, for example, found that the failure of intelli-
gence community to warn of India’s denotation of nuclear weapons in 1998
stemmed in part from a prevalent mindset that India would not test nuclear weap-
ons and risk negative international reaction as well as from an inability to conduct
effective devil’s advocate analysis to counter prevailing, and profoundly wrong,
conventional wisdom at the CIA (Pincus 1998, A18). The Rumsfeld Commission in
1998 similarly concluded that the intelligence community did not have the analytic
depth or methods to accurately assess the global proliferation of ballistic missiles
(Goldberg 2003).
3. Competitive Analysis Techniques

The analytic task for competitive, or as some observers prefer, alternative analysis is
to penetrate, critique, challenge, and develop analyses that run counter to prevailing
conventional wisdom, worldviews, and mindsets that are the orthodoxy embedded
in intelligence assessments of enemy military capabilities and political intentions.
Worldviews or mindsets are a set of expectations through which analysts see the
world, and events consistent with these sets of beliefs are embraced as valid and
accepted, but those that conflict with mindsets are discarded (George 2004, 312). As
Richard Heuer observes, analysts perceive—as do policymakers, statesmen, law-
makers, and everyone else, for that matter—the world through a “lens or screen that
channels and focuses and thereby may distort the images that are seen” (Heuer
1999, 4). Roger George rightly warns, “While mindsets can be helpful in sorting
through incoming data, they become an Achilles’ heel to professional strategists or
intelligence analysts when they become out of touch with new international dynam-
ics. Knowing when a mindset is becoming obsolete and in need of revision can test
the mettle of the best expert” (George 2004, 312).
Common wisdom and mindsets are nurtured by group discussions and social
pressures to conform to consensus thinking. Irving Janis brilliantly captured this
phenomenon in foreign-policy decision making and coined the term “groupthink.”
In group decision making groups, “members tend to evolve informal norms to pre-
serve friendly intragroup relations and these become part of the hidden agenda at
their meetings” ( Janis 1982, 7). Janis used the term “groupthink” as shorthand to
explain group dynamics where members are striving for unanimity, which over-
rides their incentive and motivation and ability to realistically assess alternative
judgments ( Janis 1982, 9). Janis focused on policy making, but these observations
equally apply to the making of intelligence assessments. Many commentators have
speculated that “groupthink” was at work in the abysmal intelligence assessments
that Iraq was working on robust WMD capabilities just before the 2003 war.
Competitive or alternative analysis is a basket of various analytic techniques for
steering away from the groupthink or common wisdom that veers strategic intelli-
gence assessments over intellectual cliffs. Alternative analysis is the term often
applied to a range of analytic techniques used to challenge conventional thinking
on an intelligence problem (George and Bruce 2008, 309). Competitive analysis is
similar and refers to the use of competing sets of analysts or analytic units to uncover
different assumptions, evidence, and alternative perspectives and to illuminate an
intelligence problem better than conventional wisdom (George and Bruce 2008,
310). There is a vast array of competitive analysis methodologies. By one account,
there are more than two hundred analytic methods that intelligence analysts might
exploit ( Johnston 2003, 9).
Some of these methodologies take their bearings from rational-choice theory
that increasingly dominates the academic disciplines of political science and inter-
national relations. Rational-choice approaches consist of methodologies that
leverage statistics, or large N-studies, to quantify political phenomenon in order to

make mathematical and computer models to try to predict future behavior. But
these approaches teeter on the cusps of irrelevance because the explanatory powers
of the theories generated by these methodologies often are inconsequential, and
not even interpretable, for policymakers. As one thorough review of rational-
choice security-studies literature assessed, “The growing technical complexity of
recent formal work has not been matched by a corresponding increase in insight,
and as a result, recent formal work has relatively little to say about contemporary
security issues” (Walt 1999, 8).
On the other hand, qualitative case-study analysis that often taps history for
lessons learned is more readily consumed and appreciated by policymakers and
implicitly dominates the day-to-day production of intelligence analysis in the intel-
ligence community. Of the qualitative competitive analytic techniques, several loom
large as potentially effective tools for better gauging enemy military capabilities and
political intentions: key assumptions checks, devil’s advocacy, team A and team B
exercises, red cell exercises, contingency analysis, high impact of low probability
scenarios, and scenario building (George, 2004, 318–21). Jack Davis rightly calls these
techniques “challenge analysis”, which could be undertaken after analysts have
“reached a strong consensus and are in danger of becoming complacent with their
interpretative and forecasting judgments” (Davis 2008, 168). These are not necessar-
ily mutually exclusive techniques. Some sophisticated competitive or alternative
analyses might mix, match, and blend these techniques to challenge conventional
wisdom and mindsets to avoid poorly assessing enemy military capabilities and
political intentions.
Key assumptions checks press analysts to explicitly identify the foundational
assumptions and factors or “drivers” on which the conclusions of their analyses are
based (George 2004, 318). With the benefits of twenty-twenty hindsight it is easy to
see that a key assumptions check in the run up to the 2003 war with Iraq of the
assessment that Saddam Hussein was actively reconstituting his WMD programs
would have been useful. Another key assumptions check of the assessment in the
summer of 1990 that Iraqi Republican Guard forces were building up along the
border with Kuwait with the aim of politically coercing the Kuwait royal family and
perhaps mounting only a limited military border incursion would have been useful
to highlight some “fast and loose” assumptions that Saddam would risk too much
by invading all of Kuwait (Russell 2002, 194–97).
The goal of a devil’s advocate is to robustly critique conventional analytic wis-
dom and to make a persuasive argument using the same data that an alternative
conclusion is the best assessment. As Robert Jervis explains, devil’s advocacy analysis
increases the chances that analysts “will consider alternative explanations of specific
bits of data and think more carefully about the beliefs and images that underlie”
their judgments ( Jervis 1976, 416). A devil’s advocate analysis of Iraq’s WMD
capabilities in the run up to the 2003 war would have been invaluable. The devil’s
thesis could have been that contrary to the common wisdom in the intelligence
community and the CIA, Iraq does not have active WMD capabilities. Such a devil’s
advocate argument could have used the debriefings of a key Saddam loyalist and
former head of Iraq’s WMD program, Hussein Kamil, who told the United States in
1995 that Iraq’s WMD programs were mothballed. Hussein Kamil’s reports were
dismissed at the time, in part, because of doubts about his reliability and the failure
of his information to conform to the conventional mindset (Russell 2007, 81–82).
Team A and Team B exercises involve intelligence community analysts making
an assessment from intelligence data and sharing that same data with a group of
scholars and practitioners outside the intelligence community and tasking them to
make an alternative assessment. The insider and outsider assessments are then com-
pared and examined to determine strengths, weaknesses, and ultimate persuasive-
ness. Team A and Team B exercises are exceptional rather than the norm and caused
a huge controversy inside the intelligence community, which resented outside intru-
sion into its domain when an exercise was famously run in 1976 during the Cold
War on the assessments of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons forces. The outside
Team B “raised important questions about Soviet doctrine and objectives but did
not provide an answer with any sophistication,” concluded strategist Lawrence
Freedman (Freedman 1986, 138).
The National Intelligence Council (NIC). under the Clinton administration
orchestrated some Team A and Team B–like exercises. It commissioned private
think tanks to write “parallel estimates” to those being written inside the intelli-
gence community (Treverton 2003, 133). Parallel estimates could be used to probe
the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).
Such efforts might well be undertaken as the norm, rather than as exceptions, in the
NIE process, which should focus on only those issues of the greatest strategic con-
sequence to American security.
Multiple advocacy is another competitive analytic technique. Political scientist
Alexander George proposed this technique for policy decision making, but it can be
used for intelligence assessments as well. Multiple advocacy encourages competitive
analysis and forces analysts to take “partisan” analytic positions to evaluate against
the assessments made by other analytic partisans to ensure a full airing and hearing
of all aspects of an intelligence problem (George 1980, 201). A multiple-advocacy
exercise could be undertaken, for example, using Arab and Iranian scholars outside
of the intelligence community to debate strategic perspectives, especially military
capabilities and political intentions, of the United Arab Emirates and Iran regarding
several islands in the Persian Gulf over which both states claim sovereignty.
Red cell exercises entail assembling groups of analysts to role play foreign leaders
and military commanders and to develop policies and actions against American
interests. Red team analysts try to escape from American strategic mindsets and to
act and behave in the same manner as foreign enemies. Red cells are often composed
of country experts (George 2004, 320). The technique is also called “red teaming,”
which simulates how potential enemies might threaten American interests or respond
to U.S. actions and policies aimed against them (Treverton 2003, 38). A red cell or
team, for example, could be assembled to represent Iran’s clerics, president,
intelligence services, and Revolutionary Guard and military commanders and tasked
with developing a strategic campaign to oust American political, economic, and mil-
itary presences out of the Persian Gulf to achieve Iranian hegemony.
Contingency analysis challenges conventional analyses, which generally assess the
most likely outcome or scenario in international events by posing another question
such as “what if?” Contingency analysis asks what would be the cause and conse-
quences if an unlikely event—sometimes called a “wild card”—occurred (George, 320).
Conventional wisdom on the Chinese-Taiwan dispute, for example, is that China
would not want to undertake the political and military risks of invading the island.
Much analysis starts with this premise and then builds an argument around why the
Chinese would not or could not invade Taiwan. A competitive contingency analysis
would start with the question, if the Chinese military is one day tasked by political
authorities to invade, how would they do it? (Russell 2001b, 77). As another example,
conventional wisdom holds that Iran is years away from acquiring nuclear weapons
that could be delivered by Iranian ballistic missiles. A contingency analysis might look
to see what “wild cards” or shortcuts might the Iranians take to get nuclear weapons
capabilities much sooner such as by the outright purchase of nuclear weapons from
the cash strapped nuclear weapons states of Pakistan and North Korea.
High impact of low-probability scenarios is a closely related competitive analy-
sis technique that focuses on what is conventionally assessed to be an unlikely future
event, but, if it were to occur, would have enormous negative consequences for
American security interests (George, 321). This technique is particularly well-suited
for strategic warning because analysts put aside projections of what they think will
likely happen and focus on how trends could come about which would be the most
damaging to American interests (Davis 2007, 182). One high-impact, but perhaps
low-probability, scenario would be al-Qaeda’s theft or capture of nuclear weapons
from Pakistan. Analysts would have to speculate on how al-Qaeda would politically
leverage nuclear weapons or even use them to attack American cities.
Scenario building tasks analysts to “brainstorm” and envision a broad array of
scenarios for a potential military conflict. Analysts take the conventional wisdom
about the potential conflict and the assumptions on which it is based and explicitly
identify all of the uncertainties that are embedded in the assumptions. And from
the areas of uncertainty identified, analysts develop a matrix of possible alternative
scenarios to the conventional wisdom (George, 321–22). The NIC during the Clinton
administration, for example, “brainstormed” major NIEs in unclassified discussions
with experts from outside the intelligence community (Treverton 2003, 133).
A conventional-wisdom assessment might be, for example, that Pakistan fully
controls its nuclear weapons inventory. Analysts could pick apart the assumptions
on which this assessment rests and then envision scenarios in which these assump-
tions could unravel such as massive Pakistani civilian unrest, protests, riots, or civil
war between military factions, concerted al-Qaeda attack of specific nuclear-weap-
ons depots, or a military coup dominated by militant Islamists who could give
nuclear weapons to al-Qaeda.
4. Efforts to Implement
Competitive Analysis Practices
The DNI, a post created with the intelligence reforms instituted in 2004, is taking up
outside calls for implementing competitive analysis efforts inside the intelligence
community. The former DNI Admiral Mike McConnell claimed that the intelligence
community was addressing the analytic problems identified by the 9/11 Commission
and the WMD Commission with the formation of “ ‘devil’s advocate’ and alternative
analyses, examining, for example, whether avian influenza can be weaponized and
how webcams could aid in terrorist planning” (McConnell 2007, 55).
The NIC under the DNI’s direction also is incorporating competitive analysis
into NIEs. The former NIC Chairman Thomas Fingar said his job was to ensure
that there was as much competitive analysis as possible before intelligence reports
are completed and commented that “The interesting thing is not when analysts
agree. It’s when they disagree” (Mazzetti 2007, 5). Former NIC Vice Chair Gregory
Treverton echoes this sentiment: “If intelligence doesn’t challenge prevailing mind-
sets, what good is it?” (Treverton, 2003, 5). The use of competitive analysis in NIEs
is noteworthy because the NIE on Iraq’s WMD programs written in October 2002—
which was used for Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation in February 2003
to the United Nations Security Council to justify war to oust Saddam Hussein’s
regime—was deeply flawed.
The CIA claims to be doing more competitive analysis as well. The CIA’s
Directorate of Intelligence, for example, has set up a unit that conducts red cell
analytic exercises that are speculative in nature and sometimes take a position that
is at odds with the conventional wisdom (WMD Report 2005, 406; George 2004, 320).
The agency also has infused competitive analysis techniques into its training pro-
grams for newly hired intelligence analysts (Marrin 2003, 619).
5. Hurdles to Effective
Competitive Analysis
It is easy for outsider observers to call for competitive analysis. It is easy too for
high-level intelligence-community bureaucrats to insert competitive-analysis slides
into their PowerPoint briefings to appease outside critics. But the real and effec-
tive implementation and practice of competitive analysis demands skills and an
intellectual environment that does not sit well inside the American intelligence
community.
Notwithstanding the siren calls from some quarters that competitive and alter-
native analysis is the “answer” to American intelligence failures in gauging enemy
capabilities and intentions, it is important not to lose sight of the reality that many
times common wisdom and mindsets in the intelligence community are right. As
historian Ernest May reminds us, the ability of analysts “to interpret other peoples’
politics is always limited. Their easiest course is to assume that another government
will do tomorrow what it did yesterday, and ninety times out of a hundred events
justify such an assumption” (May 1984, 537).
That caveat aside, shortages of analytic talent will hamper competitive analysis
in the intelligence community. As the WMD Commission found, the predominance
of inexperienced analysts in the intelligence community “have a difficult time stat-
ing their assumptions up front, explicitly explaining their logic, and, in the end,
identifying unambiguously for policymakers what they do not know [italics in origi-
nal]. In sum, we found that many of the most basic processes and functions for
producing accurate and reliable intelligence are broken or underutilized” (WMD
Report 2005, 389).
The unquenchable thirst for current intelligence production, moreover, is a
huge barrier to effective competitive or alternative analyses at the working level of
the intelligence community, especially at the CIA. Political-military analysts work-
ing on conflicts often are peppered with daily and even hourly tasking for the pro-
duction of current intelligence. They simply do not have the luxury of time needed
to sit back, read, and think more broadly about strategic intelligence problems to
develop even a common wisdom, much less alternative analyses. The immediate
always takes precede over the “nice to have,” the category into which competitive
and alternative analysis falls among working level analysts.
Those analysts who might have a purview for conducting alternative analysis
often focus on the methodologies, but lack the substantive expertise on a target
country or region to fill in the inputs. The creation of permanent teams or offices
responsible only for competitive analysis methodologies divorced from regional
or political-military expertise for gauging enemy capabilities and intentions is
not an especially productive route to better analysis. Illustrative of this problem,
I recall working crushing analytic workloads on Iraq in the mid-1990s as a
political-military analyst. I was visited one day by a colleague from an office
devoted to foreign “denial and deception.” Denial refers to efforts by adversaries
to prevent their activities from being seen or heard by American intelligence while
deception refers to practices to feed American intelligence misleading informa-
tion or to misdirect attention away from clandestine activities (Bruce and Bennett
2008, 122–23). After a polite exchange of pleasantries, my colleague appeared
rather proud of himself when he shared his assessment that Saddam Hussein’s
regime was active in “denial and deception” to hide his WMD capabilities.
I thanked him for his “unique” insight and hustled him out of the office as fast as
I could to get back to meeting my current intelligence deadlines. At the end of the
day, competitive or alternative analysis demands expert analysts for the intellec-
tual input. No matter how sophisticated or sexy a methodology is, its results could
only be as good as the analytic and intelligence input. As the old adage has it,
“garbage in, garbage out.”
The CIA is short on its own substantive experts, however. The CIA is deluged
with new analysts from a hiring binge undertaken after 9/11. About half of today’s
analysts have less than five years of experience in the intelligence business
(Mazzetti 2007, 5). Inexperienced analysts might do just fine summarizing or
gisting the latest cables with readouts from human sources, satellite imagery, or
intercepted communications, but they are ill-suited for effective red-teaming
exercises when they need to think in the strategic perspectives of a potential
enemy. Inexperienced analysts, moreover, might look at very narrow and special-
ized intelligence topics and be intellectually unable to step away from tactical
minutia to focus on operational, strategic, or grand strategic levels of analysis of
foreign rivals.
The CIA too is short on the production of human intelligence that sheds light
on the political intentions of adversaries. The CIA, in fact, has failed to produce
high-level human sources in the war councils of the enemies the United States has
faced in the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, during the Korean and Vietnam
wars, and most recently in the wars against al-Qaeda and Iraq (Russell 2007, 97).
Ultimately, some human intelligence is essential input for competitive or alternative
analysis techniques. Accurate human intelligence is needed to form a critical mass
of actual empirical evidence to lend more weight to one analytic assessment over
others. Otherwise, competitive analysis risks becoming an academic exercise of
marshaling speculation against more speculation, and of not giving much in the
way of “value added” insight to harried policymakers.
The institutionalization of a permanent competitive analysis poses other prob-
lems. As Richard Betts points out, institutionalizing devil’s advocacy would be akin
to institutionalizing the “crying wolf problem” and that group or individual would
be bureaucratically indulged and disregarded (Betts 2007, 42). Mark Lowenthal
echoes these reservations; “one of the prerequisites for alternative analysis is that it
provide a fresh look at an issue” but as soon as alternative analysis is “institutional-
ized and made a regular part of the process, it loses the originality and vitality that
were sought in the first place” (Lowenthal 2006, 132). Former senior CIA official
Douglas MacEachin rightly cautions that a permanent office for alternative analysis
runs risks of irrelevance: “Because the job is to produce ‘out-of-the-box’ ideas, the
product is too often received with a predisposition to see it as the product of an
assignment to ‘come up with crazy ideas that have little to do with the real world’ ”
(MacEachin 2005, 129).
Effective devil’s advocacy, or real competitive and alternative analysis, demands
an intellectually open environment to flourish. Alas, the working environment in
the CIA resembles a Middle Age feudal-lord system where managers are loath to
surrender working-level analysts to till other intellectual fields absent orders being
transmitted from higher levels in the managerial command. These orders most
often come in order to staff task forces working the crisis du jour and writing cur-
rent intelligence, not for doing longer term strategic analysis and warning of poten-
tial conflicts that loom over the horizon.
I remember from my working-level intelligence-analyst days in the mid-1990s

that I was intellectually uneasy with conventional assessments that Saudi Arabia
lacked strategic interest in nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia was not in my direct line
of analytic responsibilities so no one in CIA’s management chain gave my concerns
any notice. I ended up researching and writing as a scholar my own devil’s advocate
analysis that argued that Saudi Arabia had both the political intentions and means
to develop a nuclear weapons capability. I eventually published the article in a secu-
rity studies journal, which had a keen interest in the topic that the CIA lacked
(Russell 2001a, 69–79).
Analysts who have strongly divergent views and are deeply troubled by
conventional-wisdom assessments percolating in the intelligence community’s
hallways ought to be able, and indeed rewarded, with an intellectual refuge some-
where in intelligence community. They need a shelter to escape their daily current
intelligence responsibilities and to take up substantive and intensive research and
analysis to mount a devil’s advocate or competitive analysis to challenge persistent
mindsets.
6. Clearing Obstacles to
Competitive Analysis
With all of these bureaucratic and intellectual hurdles to competitive analysis in
the bowels of the CIA, the best place to do effective and substantive competitive
analysis of war and peace challenges probably would be the NIC under the DNI’s
wing. The NIC as it is configured today, however, is too small and lean. It tradi-
tionally has served more as a clearing house for analysis coming up from the
bowels of the intelligence community than as a center to create its own, original
strategic analysis. The creation of the DNI’s office, moreover, has further bur-
dened the NIC. It now has to deal with more current intelligence and staffing
responsibilities such as briefing books, talking points, and testimonies for the
DNI, who naturally turned to the NIC for his staff support. In the aftermath of
the 2004 intelligence reforms and the creation of the DNI, the NIC arguably is
less capable today than it had been in the past to expand its strategic research
agenda.
The NIC ought to have a research and analysis unit that is sufficiently funded
and resourced to accommodate rotations by working-level analysts seeking a refuge
from daily chores of current intelligence to be real “devil’s advocates” and research
and write provocative devil’s advocate analysis with strategic assessments that chal-
lenge the conventional wisdom in the intelligence community over potentially
high-impact issues. The prestige of working in the NIC for a tour might help analysts
overcome the ire of their line and office managers who are loath to surrender their
“bodies” to other offices.
The NIC staff also should be beefed-up with outside scholars and experts who
could come in for limited tours, not entire careers, to infuse the intelligence com-
munity at the top with substantive expertise that the community fails to develop on
its own. The Brown Commission wisely made this recommendation more than a
decade ago, but its call fell on deaf ears. It recommended transforming the NIC into
a “National Assessments Center” which would be a more open and broadly focused
analytic entity than the working levels of intelligence community analysts, most of
whom today are amateurs, and more aggressively exploit linkages to scholarly and
outside expertise not found inside the intelligence community (Intelligence
Community Report, ch. 8, 91).
Bringing in top scholarly talent too would carry the gravis needed to call seri-
ous attention to alternative and competitive analysis, which if carried out in the
working levels will more likely fill burn bags of classified trash than capture the
attention of National Security Council senior directors and assistant secretaries at
the departments of state and defense. The NIC too could draw in additional expertise
from the outside to focus competitive analysis attention to the most strategically
dangerous issues the likes of political stability of countries with nuclear weapons
inventories or on the cusp of acquiring these capabilities.
The DNI should look to supplement NIC research capabilities with an indepen-
dent think tank for the intelligence community analogous to the independent
research think tanks that work principally for the military services and the Department
of Defense. The RAND Corporation, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the Institute
for Defense Analyses are Federally Funded Research and Development Centers that
have long and distinguished traditions of conducting strategic research for the mili-
tary. A new center for the intelligence community could be modeled after the
Pentagon’s independent centers. As the WMD Commission called for—again, to
deaf ears—a not-for-profit “sponsored research institute” for the intelligence com-
munity that could reach out to outside expertise from the private sector and conduct
strategic research unencumbered by the tyranny of current intelligence production
inside the intelligence community and be a focal point for a robust external alterna-
tive analysis program (WMD Report 2005, 399).
A new independent center should be given a broader research charter than the
bowels of the intelligence community. The intelligence community only looks at
foreign military capabilities and intentions, but is blinkered when it comes to assess-
ing American policy and military capabilities. And yet, a sophisticated understand-
ing of American military strengths and weaknesses is critical for doing effective
competitive analysis such as red teaming. Foreign military leaders in Tehran, Beijing,
and Moscow, for example, study the American military closely and are looking for
chinks in its armor and ways to best attack us in future contingencies. It is an ironic
twist that as things stand today, foreign adversaries have more expertise on how the
American military fights wars than the American intelligence analysts who would
fill the ranks of red teams.
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Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
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chapter 24
DECISION ADVANTAGE
AND THE NATURE OF
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
jennifer e. sims
When asked what makes for good intelligence analysis, Thomas Fingar, the U.S. Deputy
Director of National Intelligence, quickly replied: “Well, I’d say, good analysts” (Fingar
2004). There is, in fact, something quite ordinary about an intelligence analyst’s job.
Analysts must be able to frame a problem, research it, analyze its components, identify
the causal factors involved, and then communicate conclusions to an audience. Such
elements of critical thinking and knowledge building are of the same kind as those
skills employed in academia and are familiar to most who have spent time there. And
yet, there was something missing from Dr. Fingar’s response. As a professor from
Stanford University and a career intelligence analyst in his own right, he knew what he
was leaving out: the world in which the intelligence analyst must exercise critical think-
ing. This world differs sharply from the scholar’s intellectual domain. The shape
of that world, which has become the focus of so much attention since 9/11, and the
impact it has had on the analytic profession, are the subjects of this chapter.
1. The Ordinary and the Extraordinary

According to Mark Lowenthal (2006), a former senior intelligence executive, good
critical reasoning requires what amounts to a mental “triple play”: “. . . thinking
about our thinking while we are thinking.” Reasoning is hard work, he points out,
and building knowledge requires an ability to make one’s premises and methods
explicit so that one can learn in a way that can be replicated. Science has made this
contribution to society at large; it has perfected methods of reason and critical
thinking, enabling those who master these skills best to be, in general, more per-
suasive than others because they minimize bias, slant, and personal preference in
argumentation. Intelligence analysts performing their jobs well are constantly
engaged in critical thinking and reasoning. Trained to eliminate their own cogni-
tive biases, they also learn to recognize the circumstances when bias is most likely
to seep into their work unexpectedly, for example when estimating the future or
considering mysteries such as how a foreign leader will react to an event that has
not yet occurred. In these skills, and in those of communicating effectively through
the written and spoken word, sophisticated analysts are not that different from
each other, whether employed in intelligence, academia, gambling, business, poli-
tics, or medicine.
Yet to suggest that the job of an intelligence analyst stops here, with the tasks of
critical thinking and clear writing, is to overlook the obvious and most difficult
aspects of the work: secrecy, urgency, deception, and influence. Secrecy is involved
either because an intelligence analyst’s sources of evidence are sensitive or the poli-
cymaker’s interest in the subject matter must be concealed. This sensitivity means
that the analyst is unable to test thoughts or evidence with as wide a body of experts
as might otherwise be desirable. These restrictions may arise for sound reasons,
such as classification requirements and “need to know”; but they also arise for poor
ones, such as bureaucratic regulations, distrusted or incompatible communications
technologies, or, in the U.S. case, poor networking opportunities among the sixteen
agencies that make up the Intelligence Community (IC).1 And because intelligence
serves policy, analysts must provide results when they are needed for decision, not
necessarily when all the data are in. Time pressure tends to increase the value of
available evidence and reliable sources, rendering intelligence analysts particularly
vulnerable to manipulative adversaries who know that the most effective way to
exercise malicious influence may be through corrupting their target’s trusted intel-
ligence channels. For these and other reasons, intelligence analysts must be trained
to recognize and cope with deception—that is, deliberate efforts by adversaries to
frustrate, taint, or disrupt their work. Here, intelligence analysis becomes tradecraft.
After all, a scientist rarely analyzes specimens that lie not only in the Petri dish but
from it as well.
But perhaps the most difficult and unusual aspect of intelligence analysis is
the analyst’s responsibility to influence decision-makers without conveying any
1
This point about analytic stovepipes has been made repeatedly since 9/11 and has inspired
renewed efforts to encourage interagency networking. However the need for collaborative,
interdisciplinary work was recognized earlier than this. The CIA created the interdisciplinary Arms
Control Intelligence Staff in the 1980s (to support arms-control negotiations) and launched the
movement toward interagency centers such as the counterterrorism and counterproliferation
centers and the Balkan Task Force during the 1990s.
decision advantage and the nature of intelligence analysis 391
preference concerning the choices available. With this objective, intelligence analysis,
when compared with other types, borders on the bizarre. This is because most ana-
lysts do have a sense of which choice will more likely gain advantages for their own
side. Moreover, they develop a stake in their methodologies which, if successful in
explaining past outcomes, shape expectations about future ones. This is no less true
for intelligence experts. If, then, the policymaker chooses a course that is at odds with
these expectations, how does an intelligence analyst not conclude the policymaker is
wrong?
The answer has always been simple in theory but difficult in practice: the intel-
ligence analyst must seek to influence but not to judge the policymaker, including
the validity of his requests for additional collection on a stubbornly held view. The
analyst must be willing to give pros and cons while remaining distant from those
assessments of risk and gain that plant policy making firmly in the territory of poli-
tics, not science. This distinction is what Carmen Medina, director of the CIA Center
for Studies in Intelligence, has called the difference between integrity and neutrality
(Medina 2002, 35–40). While analysts must care about outcomes—they want their
clients to win—they must be willing “to say things that are uncomfortable for the
Pentagon or the State Department and that are not compatible with the goals of
policymakers” (Medina 2002, 40).
In democracies, this requirement is particularly important because political
leaders are accountable to the public for their choices while intelligence profes-
sionals work in secret and rarely face public scrutiny. Moreover, in the U.S. sys-
tem, intelligence experts are generally prohibited from systematically collecting
and analyzing information on their own side’s institutions, strategies, and
actions even if this information could be important to decoding what an adver-
sary might be up to. Although the intelligence briefers who meet with decision-
makers on a regular basis may come to appreciate structural weaknesses in their
own side’s decision-making processes or cognitive biases held by the principals,
they are properly prohibited from reporting these or producing finished prod-
ucts that discuss how adversaries could exploit these weaknesses to gain an
advantage.2
Of course, such reticence is not universal. It certainly was not a feature of Stalin’s
intelligence services, which were repeatedly purged for suspected disloyalty while
simultaneously urged to identify slackers in the chain of command (Andrew and
Mitrokhin 1999). Other intelligence services, including those in several democratic
states, have collected against domestic targets, making them perhaps more suscep-
tible than the U.S. system is to being hijacked by a governing elite intent on protect-
ing its political tenure even at the expense of the state or its democratic processes
2
Such rules are not universal in the intelligence business. Indeed, during the U.S. Civil War,
one of General McClellan’s subordinates reported intelligence that the South had fewer troops
than the North at a critical juncture; when McClellan still refused to believe the report and
refrained from attack, the officer took the intelligence and reports of McClellan’s failings to his
superiors.
(Andrew 1995).3 For example, the professionalism of the Mexican intelligence ser-
vice has been repeatedly damaged by failures to distinguish between political mis-
creants or adversaries and true threats to the state (Rodriguez 2003). But in mature
democracies such as Britain, the role of intelligence services in domestic collection
arguably makes the analysts’ jobs easier; they can use their access to domestic intel-
ligence to conduct net assessments and thus improve their estimation of the adver-
sary’s evolving strategy.
That more restraint must be exercised in the modern U.S. system should not,
however, prevent the intelligence analyst from caring about his own side’s success or
the outcomes of the policies they are supposed to inform. Successful intelligence
provides advantages to decision-makers they would not otherwise have, so an ana-
lyst must know the decision-maker’s frame of mind and strategy well enough to
help the policymaker succeed. Intelligence forges a relationship of trust between
partners seeking wins for their team. Thus, good intelligence is both objective and
subjective and herein lies the essence of the analyst’s conundrum: to be an expert
and critical thinker, targeted for manipulation, legally denied relevant knowledge,
responsible for advising, but prohibited from judging. Maneuvering through this
terrain is more than science; it is art.
2. The Art and Practice of

Intelligence Analysis
Intelligence may be defined as the collection, analysis, and dissemination of infor-
mation for decision-makers engaged in competitive enterprises. Its purpose is to
gain competitive advantages over adversaries—that is, to help one side win over the
other. There are two ways to accomplish this goal: One is to collect better informa-
tion than the opponent does; the other is to degrade the opponent’s ability to gather
and deliver winning information.4 Intelligence systems therefore have four critical
functions: to collect, to anticipate the competitor’s moves, to convey what is learned
to one’s own side in time to aid decisions, while at the same time skewing, degrad-
ing, or disrupting a competitor’s decision-making by blocking or manipulating the
information flowing to him. Whereas conventional wisdom suggests that analysis is
a stand-alone function, it actually is not. Analysts are critical to all aspects of what
3
The Watergate affair, which brought down a U.S. president, was triggered in part by the refusal
of heads of intelligence agencies, including DCI Richard Helms, to participate in unconstitutional
domestic collection activities at the president’s request. This refusal led Nixon to hire his own
“plumbers” to collect against leakers he believed were trying to undermine his administration.
4
Of course in win-win competitions, the job of intelligence is to alert a decision-maker
should an opponent’s gains threaten to surpass his own.
has been called the intelligence cycle—from engaging the decision-maker, through
requirements, collection, production, and delivery.
Before examining the analyst’s role at each of these stages of the intelligence
cycle, the issue of covert action merits discussion. The U.S. defines covert action as
any effort to change the economic, political, or military situation overseas without
divulging the U.S. government’s hand (Sec. 503(e) National Security Act of 1947 [50
U.S.C. 413b]). Such efforts constitute secret policy, not intelligence in the strict sense
of the term. That covert action is often performed by intelligence services for secu-
rity reasons does not make it the same thing as “intelligence”—unless, of course,
one decides to define intelligence as anything intelligence agencies do. Of course, as
a special form of policy, covert action still requires very customized intelligence
support for effective decision-making.
This distinction between the intelligence function and secret policy is impor-
tant. Analysts supporting covert action must distinguish between those executing
the policy (often intelligence officers whose choices will be constrained) and those
creating and guiding it (political appointees or elected officials responsible for the
policy). Special problems can arise as these analysts become caught between loyal-
ties to the success of an operation conducted by their colleagues and the wishes of a
political leadership whose objectives may suddenly and secretly change, putting the
mission and even lives at risk. Analysts cleared for access to information of a covert-
action program also come to know the origins of overseas events that they are
unable to divulge to other analysts or even to some of the policymakers they sup-
port who are not cleared. This disconnect can cause serious management and per-
formance problems and exacerbate issues of elitism and distrust among analysts
who are otherwise trained to collaborate.
Collection
To collect information on opponents requires getting access to them, a way to watch,
hear, or otherwise sense their activity, and a means for getting whatever is learned
safely back to the people who need it. Analysts may do some of this sensing them-
selves either directly or indirectly through open sources such as the media. But they
also help increase the productivity of the more formal collection disciplines such as
signals (SIGINT), human (HUMINT), imagery (IMINT), or measurement and sig-
natures intelligence (MASINT) by steering their platforms, sifting through the data
acquired for relevant information, and then turning this raw product, which might
consist of electronic signals, equations, or shadowy images, into useful information.
Often co-located with these collectors, analysts thus perform the processing
and exploitation function for them, and then pass the results to all-source analysts.
For example, photo-interpreters can find evidence of missiles, underground
nuclear facilities, or mass graves in imagery that may appear as simply disturbed
earth to the untrained eye. Cryptanalysts are experts at breaking the codes that
hide the content of messages sent by an adversary. Counterintelligence analysts are
experts in the adversary’s deceptive skills and habits that may reveal camouflaged
tanks where others see a forest of trees.5 Linguists can tell whether seemingly
innocuous statements from a human source include language conveying veiled
threats or duplicity.
Analysts also help collectors understand their target better so their sensors
can be better positioned or made more efficient. This kind of analytic production
may never reach all-source analysts, but it is nonetheless critical for tuning collec-
tion to targets. For example, analysts processing communications may find that
an intercepted call to a terrorist was made in error, went to the wrong person
because of an equipment malfunction, or involved a person who turned out not
to be the person of interest but someone with a similar name. In these cases, the
analyst may advise the collector to reposition the platform or to collect more
information on the source of the problem with the phone. Those with access to
how the information was acquired can tell when faults in the sensor itself may
have skewed or tainted the results. Those managers responsible for building and
guiding a collector’s sensors may also turn to analysts for help in designing or
acquiring the next generation of them—whether they are human beings or imag-
ing satellites.
Analysts aid collection in another, very difficult way: they help protect sources
and methods of collection by advising decision-makers of the risks of revealing
what they know, whether through a sudden change in military tactics or in the
wording of a demarche. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made strategic
and tactical choices during WWII that, though momentarily disadvantageous, were
designed to keep Hitler from knowing the Allies had broken German codes. As an
informed consumer of intelligence, Churchill helped in this way to sustain Allied
advantages over the long term. Unfortunately, not all consumers are aware of the
relationship between their decisions today and the availability of intelligence tomor-
row. In the modern U.S. system, the analyst bridges the intelligence and policy
worlds to perform this role and is responsible for conveying to busy policymakers
the possible costs of acting on what sensitive collection methods have revealed.
Done well, this should be an enabling process, not a constraining one. Analysts can
suggest ways policymakers might mask how they know what they know in order to
protect sensitive assets that may provide decisive advantages in the future. But the
process requires tact, excellent knowledge of the sources at risk, and a good relation-
ship with the policymaker. To perform this function well requires balancing the
decision-maker’s interest in winning today against his interest in winning tomor-
row using equally rich information.
5
Counterintelligence can be either offensive or defensive and each of these involves active
and passive measures. Passive defensive CI involves locks, vaults, and classification systems. Active
defensive CI involves surveillance, dangles, etc. Offensive CI tries to spoof the opponent so his
intelligence is degraded. The passive form is camouflage; the active form usually involves double
agents and deception. Counterintelligence analysts are experts in how the adversary does all of the
above. Ideally, their work is passed on to all-source analysts to be integrated into estimates of an
adversary’s future behavior and to develop indicators and warnings of deception.
The stakes in this kind of work are very high and can be life-and-death matters
that put analysts in a squeeze between policymakers desperate for information and
collectors trying to protect the lives of assets. Oleg Penkovsky, a clandestine agent
for the United States during the Cold War, was a prolific producer during the Berlin
Crisis and periods of heightened tension during the 1960s; he was caught just before
the Cuban Missile Crisis—possibly as a result of overuse. In contrast, before WWI,
the British succeeded in hiding the fact they were tapping into American as well as
German communications on a single transatlantic cable; eager to draw the United
States into the war while not revealing their source, they suggested that a provoca-
tive German message, the Zimmerman telegram, was actually acquired using spies
in Mexico. In cases such as these, collaboration with policymakers to preserve criti-
cal intelligence assets often falls to those intelligence analysts working most closely
with them.6
Anticipation and Requirements

To anticipate an opponent’s moves and to help policymakers design effective ways
to counter them, intelligence professionals must be able to visualize the unfolding
competition, including its key events and decisions. This is largely the job of the all-
source analyst with complete access to processed and exploited data and good
knowledge of the strategies underlying policy. Gaining access to this information
requires collaboration with both collectors, who must divulge the reliability and
credibility of their information, and decision-makers, who must divulge their plans.
To do this, analysts develop relationships of trust that must be nurtured by all par-
ties if the intelligence process is to work well. The analyst then separates what is
known from what is not and advises collectors on whether and how to attempt to
minimize the latter.
The analyst’s role in alerting collectors to new requirements for information is
not just one of passively conveying the needs as expressed by the decision-maker. If
it were, the intelligence system would stay fixed on the priorities of the moment and
be unable to warn. Analysts are an intelligence system’s experts on what might go
wrong and the indicators that policy failure may be imminent. Whether policymak-
ers like it or not, analysts must help the intelligence system anticipate losses in order
to prevent them and convey to collectors what is needed to do so. New analytical
methodologies may also require new data on an otherwise well-researched prob-
lem. In the U.S. system, all-source analysts are not simply topical experts; they have
special archival and acquisition responsibilities. They develop requirements for col-
lectors to fill gaps in baseline knowledge, increase confidence in what is known, and
discern what is knowable from what is not.
6
This story has been abbreviated to make a point. In fact, the British intelligence service
withheld knowledge of the intercept from its own policymakers until cover for the intercept could
be devised.
Conveying Knowledge
For all the work that goes into requirements, collection, and anticipation, intelli-
gence will fail if it does not have a reliable and flexible system for analyzing and
conveying the results of these activities to decision-makers through oral briefings,
written products, films, or images. Analysts are the principal intelligence officers
responsible for these products. In the United States, these products are generally of
four broad types: basic reports and databases, analyses, assessments, and estimates.
The first or basic form of intelligence product includes a cataloguing of all that
is known on a given topic. One might, for example, list all the parts of the nuclear
fuel cycle for analysts new to a nuclear-weapons account. Analyses of this data essen-
tially establish patterns or cause-and-effect relationships among variables. For
example, an analysis of the data on nuclear facilities might show that the majority
of states seeking nuclear weapons try to do so by acquiring both uranium-enrichment
and reprocessing technologies.
An assessment is a special kind of analysis in which an expert judges what the
data mean in a given case. For example, all-source analysts may look at what has
been collected on country X’s nuclear capabilities and assess that it has a nuclear
enrichment capacity in excess of what the country would need if its sole intent were
to generate nuclear power. Assessments that trigger policy responses may be inte-
gral to the monitoring of treaties or formal undertakings between governments. In
U.S. practice, however, deciding whether, given the evidence, parties remain in com-
pliance with treaties—often referred to as treaty verification—has traditionally
remained the policymakers’ and not the intelligence analyst’s responsibility.
An estimate is a statement of probability—an analyst’s judgment that, given
certain assessed capabilities, country X probably intends to develop nuclear weap-
ons. Estimates tend to be controversial precisely because substantial uncertainty
exists. Analysts narrow down the prospective outcomes to the most likely ones,
indicate why and how they have done so, and reveal what critical information might
change their conclusions. Because individual analysts may interpret intelligence or
weigh contributing factors differently, their estimates regarding outcomes often
vary. If the U.S. president wants to know in such circumstances what the IC as a
whole thinks, all the analytic experts must gather to discuss and resolve their differ-
ences in an effort to achieve consensus. This process can lead to log-rolling in which
analysts trade their favored view on one topic for winning language they prefer on
another, distorting outcomes and resulting in watered-down language. In the pro-
cess, efforts to satisfy the decision-maker’s desire for unanimity may obstruct his
desire for clarity, sharpness of view, or granularity regarding areas of contention.
Collaboration, Trust, and Intuition: The Art of

Intelligence Analysis
Whether learning about sources, protecting them, evaluating them, or conveying the
meaning of their messages to decision-makers, analysts must cultivate trust among
their colleagues in the intelligence and policy making domains. The idea that analysts
can be successful at this while remaining isolated from the rest of the intelligence
function or, more seriously, from the nexus with policy, is a dangerous misconcep-
tion. Apart from a very few specialists who become known more for their expertise
in arcane subject matter than for their ability to relate to people, an analyst’s job is
people-oriented and dependent on interpersonal skills of the highest order.
As in every occupation, some good analysts are less skilled in dealing with people
than others are. This can lead to problems when stratification occurs within intelli-
gence organizations—particularly in modern bureaucratic governments. Stratification
is not in itself the problem. If promotions are based on analytic and interpersonal
skills, the intelligence process can work well and even overcome organizational inflex-
ibilities. After all, bureaucratic layers can provide certain benefits such as quality
checks on immature analytic products, oversight of relationships with intelligence
users and collectors, and protection and guidance for fledgling analysts trying their
wings in briefings or when first summoned to the legislative branch.
If, however, analysts are promoted for their topical or analytical expertise
despite poor interpersonal skills, bureaucratic layers can lead to dysfunctional
results. Any good analyst can become protective of his track record, including his
methodologies and conclusions. But those with poor interpersonal skills may find
it hard to deal with others’ critiques, particularly if generated using techniques such
as devil’s advocacy, red-teaming, or similar tests for cognitive bias that can become
competitive or adversarial. Some analysts may find it difficult to resolve substantive
differences with others and therefore may be more inclined to log-roll solutions or
dig in their heels when pressed. If such senior analysts rise to the top of intelligence
organizations, they may find it very hard to relate to senior policymakers who do
not see the world or their topic as they do. Here, the mantra of speaking truth to
power can reinforce an analyst’s sense of righteousness and perceptions of politici-
zation when faced with policymakers’ questions. The nomination hearings for for-
mer Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates became a showcase for these
kinds of tensions. Whereas some analysts charged that the nominee skewed intelli-
gence to support policy, Gates and his supporters argued that the analysts them-
selves were stubborn or recalcitrant when shown the weaknesses in their work.
Policymakers can, in turn, fail to listen to good intelligence because of prejudi-
cial assumptions about those providing it. With an intuitive grasp of what they
think is true, decision-makers about to make a controversial choice may fear they are
getting intelligence designed to fix their thinking—that is, to demonstrate they
are wrong. They may come to believe that intelligence officers are overlooking con-
trary evidence or weighing it poorly. They may even exercise the prerogative to look
for themselves, engendering concerns about cherry-picking sources. This was the
essence of the controversy involving pre-war intelligence at the Pentagon, when
senior executives decided to conduct their own review of CIA analysis. According
to one policymaker involved, the incident was prompted by a deep sense that
intelligence had a “view” that might not fit with the facts; to the analysts, policy-
makers were shopping for facts from unreliable sources that fit comfortably with
their own rigid point of view. In this way, mistrust can pervade the intelligence pro-
cess and eventually cripple it.
The senior analyst’s dilemma is particularly acute if he is very knowledgeable

but unable to convey artfully this knowledge to others or to be satisfied by incre-
mental progress in persuading others of his views. Quoting Robert R. Bowie, histo-
rian Ernest R. May (1986) has observed that the art of intelligence involves subtle
influence—a careful adjustment of the cognitive maps in the head of the policy-
maker—maps that almost certainly bias perceptions but are nonetheless essential
for decisiveness in conditions of uncertainty. Yet intelligence analysts can become
frustrated with policymakers’ mindsets, especially when faced with the prospect of
failed policy after so many years of work. After all, these analysts may have made
their careers as experts in the particular field while the political appointee may be
seen as a four-year interloper rolling back gains the analyst has presumably helped
achieve. Dedicating oneself to improving decision-making and then standing back
when it risks failure is courting a career of cognitive dissonance.
Should an analyst prove unable to mask disdain in these circumstances, the
policymaker will feel it. This disconnect can lead to so much distrust that the rela-
tionship breaks down, potentially leading to an intelligence failure. An equally bad
scenario occurs when an analyst, fearful of not being accepted and thus not suc-
ceeding in his job, begins to feed the policymaker what the latter wants to hear. This
pathology might be referred to as “privatization” of intelligence because the motive
is personal. If, however, policymakers try to change analytic products by insisting
on the inclusion of discredited evidence to support a particular conclusion, the
results will likely be similar. If products are changed in such circumstances, the ana-
lyst’s failure of intellect or interpersonal skill in resisting inappropriate influence
may be faulted, though the arguably greater error is attributable to the policymaker
who tried to skew the intelligence in the first place. This pathology is commonly
referred to as “politicization” because the objective is to twist intelligence to support
a desired policy outcome. But politicization is in practice hard to identify because
policymakers ought to question intelligence judgments as they collaborate with
analysts to achieve decision advantage (see Betts 2007).
After all, the art of delivering the meaning of new data can only be perfected
when the adjustment of cognitive maps is a two-way affair. The analyst needs to
know the policymaker’s strategy given his vulnerabilities and the nature of the over-
all competition. Intelligence products are only useful if they are relevant. And esti-
mates of an adversary’s future moves cannot be convincing if they neglect how one’s
own weaknesses might affect the other side’s choice. An analyst intent on not just
delivering facts but the meaning of these facts to policymakers must know the lat-
ter’s frame of mind or context. In most democracies, intelligence services are not
permitted to study the quirks and vulnerabilities of their own side. To know these,
they must cultivate decision-makers in such a way that this intimacy is not viewed
as intrusive or off-putting. It is often forgotten that Sherman Kent (1965), who is
often cited as the greatest advocate of objectivity in intelligence affairs, also said this:
“(O)f the two dangers—that of intelligence being too far from the users and that of
being too close—the greater danger is the one of being too far” (187). Truth and
power exist on both sides of the relationship.
Second, analysts trained to convey only the facts and to do so objectively want
to avoid reading more into the facts than they can defend using only tangible
evidence, critical thinking, and scientific measurement. Yet this scientific bias can
also lead to failure. If interpretations that find meaning in gesture, gut instinct, or
hunches, are discouraged, products can become not just objective but also sterile,
risking the gift, perhaps, of insight. Teaching analysts to believe that critical think-
ing is the only way to gain or deliver knowledge can lead to loss of imagination
and failure of discovery. Washington Post columnist David Brooks has called such
necessary intuition the art of understanding “dog-whistle politics”: the messages
conveyed beyond normal hearing. Training analysts to ignore what they can’t
hear, touch, or feel can make analysts intolerant of ambiguity, uncomfortable
with an opponent’s delivery of intentional double meanings, and unable to see or
advise on ways to cope with artifice. The eminent psychologist Jerome Bruner
(1966) has written that art, trickery, and intuition are the servants of the capacity
to know. Done well, intelligence analysis uses all of it; the key is keeping these
skills in good balance.
Nowhere is Bruner’s point brought home more forcefully than in the domain
of counterintelligence—especially when it is offensive in design. The idea of coun-
terintelligence, often referred to as denial and deception (or D&D), is to block,
deflect, or degrade an adversarial intelligence service, sometimes through trickery.
Denial—the blocking function—seems straightforward. It is not. Decisions about
what information would be dangerous to release to the public or to an adversary
one is trying to influence involve weighing costs and gains. Analysts can help ensure
secrecy is efficient by helping to make these judgments. Sometimes releasing for-
merly secret information can help to achieve policy objectives—such as convincing
an opponent that the United States knows it has cheated on a treaty or has engaged
in illicit sales of nuclear material. Classification decisions also should be purposeful,
and analysts play an important role in them, particularly when the object is not just
to deny information to an adversary, but to deceive him.
Deception requires five essential ingredients: a useful deceit to convey to the
other side, the capacity to deny the truth about what one is really up to while main-
taining good collection against the adversary, a trusted channel for delivering the
deceit, and good appreciation of the strategic context so that what one triggers is
not worse than what one intended to avoid. Deception can be tactical, as when case
officers live their cover, or strategic, as when the Allies in WWII used inflatable
tanks and double agents to convince Hitler that they intended to land at Pas de
Calais instead of Normandy. In either case, but particularly when conducting stra-
tegic deception, analysts are vital to the enterprise. Through close interaction with
policymakers, analysts not only help design plans that the other side will believe,
but can help monitor whether the trickery is working.
Similarly, defensive counterintelligence works best when analysts understand
the connection between what the adversary is trying to learn or do and policymak-
ers’ strategic intent with respect to countering him. The idea is not simply to block
the adversary from damaging the intelligence activity of one’s own side through
deceit, but to translate the discovery of his attacks into an opportunity for policy.
After all, his efforts in these regards are evidence of his frame of mind, intentions,
and weaknesses—all of which may be of strategic importance. For example, con-
sider the FBI’s arrest of the Russian agent found bugging the State Department’s
conference room during the summer of 1999. Had the FBI’s counterintelligence
analysts brought this information to the NSC instead of immediately arresting him,
the White House would have had the opportunity to consider whether the sloppy
tradecraft involved indicated Vladimir Putin wanted the arrest and subsequent
media attention for domestic political reasons. Policymakers could then have
decided what they wanted to do about it.7
Seeing the connection between counterintelligence analysis, whether defensive
or offensive, and strategic purpose requires an artful and imaginative turn of mind.
Moreover, it requires an extremely close working relationship between analyst and
policymaker; otherwise critical opportunities for turning tables on the adversary
might be missed. It is not surprising that, when gaps grow between decision-makers
and analysts, one of the first areas to suffer is counterintelligence.
3. The Production Process in Practice

If the function of intelligence seems linear if not straightforward in theory, it can
become positively industrial in practice: data goes each morning to numerous ana-
lysts who process it, form it into pre-set molds, and drop the standardized products
over the decision-makers’ thresholds. Pressures of time and money put a premium
on efficiency and standardization. Absent better metrics for allocating and defend-
ing budgets, performance appraisals, and improving the work, quantity substitutes
for quality in measuring performance.
Given that the purpose of all this effort is ostensibly to give decision-makers
advantages over adversaries when handling diverse, rapidly changing issues, the
industrial model would seem a prescription for failure. Yet, it is also attractive: per-
formance can seemingly be measured by weighing piece-production rates and out-
put. The more complex and wide-ranging an intelligence system, the more it is
likely to opt for this approach, suffer from its perils, and generally miss the point.
At risk, obviously, is the quality of tradecraft and the careful management of
relationships that lie at the heart of what makes intelligence work. Having taken a
close look at the day to day activities of U.S. analysts, innovative IC executive Carmen
Medina is concerned. She notes that the emphasis in the CIA has long rested on
aggregating data, looking for new developments that require interpretation or pro-
vide additional insight, and conveying these to the policymaker through new fin-
ished products. As Carmen Medina has described it:
7
I am indebted to John MacGaffin, a former CIA operations officer and counterintelligence
expert, for this example.
(Analysts) spend the first quarter or more of their workday reading through the
“overnight traffic” to determine what is new. They report what is new to their
colleagues and superiors and then often to the policy making community. The
“new thing” may be an event . . . (or) an item of intelligence reporting on a
situation of interest—from signals, imagery, human-source, open source or other
type of collection. This basic model has guided the DI’s work for decades.
(Medina 2002, paragraph 4)
Given the abundance of information available to decision-makers and the non-

traditional adversaries they face, Medina suggests reorienting from regular assess-
ments of current developments—which policymakers do pretty well themselves—to
“complex analysis of the most difficult problems” (Medina 2002). By making this
suggestion, Medina implicitly endorses the decision made by Secretary of State
Colin Powell when, shortly after taking office, he cancelled production of The
Secretary’s Morning Summary, a daily compilation of overseas developments long
regarded as the Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s premier product. Powell
wanted think pieces instead.
Indeed, what would seem to be needed, instead of routine products gener-
ated on predictable cycles, is customized support—products produced and
judged according to standards set by craft, not assembly-line production or
metrics. Unfortunately, in the post-9/11 environment, customizing U.S. intelli-
gence runs into several additional problems. The first concerns demographics:
industrial processes are tidy, efficient answers to the need to train, integrate,
and supervise large cohorts of new analysts mandated by Congress, while releas-
ing the most experienced and trusted to retirement (see Gosler 2005).8 The sec-
ond concerns agenda: current intelligence, driven by the nation’s counterterrorism
priorities and defensive orientation toward late-breaking developments, has
become the principal form of production. This emphasis, no fault of the new
recruits, threatens to deepen their knowledge of how to turn out regular gists or
summaries at the expense of interpretive skills based on long-term and deeply
anchored expertise. Such expertise, accompanied by a sense of the strategic con-
text and a capacity for analytic give-and-take, is what policymakers seem to
most value when deciding to invest in a trusted relationship with intelligence
counterparts (Davis 1995). This kind of conversation is a refined art. Analysts
cannot read-in for these skills, they must be mentored in them. And the men-
tors are leaving at a faster rate than they are being replaced (see Mihm 2007).9
8
Although the newer cadres may be more familiar and at ease than their predecessors were
with the technologies available for sharing and networking on the web, these technologies may
need to be gradually introduced given concerns about digital espionage.
9
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) projections, as cited by the General Accountability
Office (GAO), are that 60 percent of white collar and 90 percent of executive employees will be
eligible to retire by 2010. Assuming these include senior experts, and that the IC is representative of
the federal government, the intelligence analyst corps faces a potentially massive turnover with
implications for training, supervision, and quality assurance.
4. What Is to Be Done?
With the above thoughts in mind, the challenge for the discipline of intelli-
gence analysis seems less structural than process related. Improving intelligence
analysis—a skill much more sophisticated and complex than connecting the dots—is
harder than just hiring more good analysts. It involves developing insight out of
deep knowledge and connecting this knowledge to strategy. This latter step is what
separates intelligence from CNN and the rest of the news media. Intelligence looks
for relevant, conflict-winning information in a highly privileged environment
where competitions involve life and death and the survival of states. In this business,
failure is less about getting it wrong than losing an advantage to an adversary.
Success does not necessarily require 100 percent accuracy. Rather, success is about
enabling decisive moves based on superior situational awareness. For some deci-
sions, less-than-perfect accuracy may be enough; indeed, comprehensive reporting
could confuse, not clarify the situation. Knowing what is required to gain advan-
tages in intelligence and thus a diplomatic or military edge is an interactive matter
that, by necessity, involves the decision-maker. It is in cultivating these close and
trusted relationships with policymakers that U.S. analysts face their biggest road-
blocks of both structural and cognitive kinds. It is time for serious efforts to over-
come them—to dispense with red lines in favor of disciplined partnership instead.
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Andrew, C., and V. Mitrokhin. 1999. The Mitrokhin Files: The KGB in Europe and the West.
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Betts, R. 2007. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security.
New York: Colombia University Press.
Bruner, J. 1966. On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press/
Davis, J. 1995. A Policymaker’s Perspective on Intelligence Analysis. Studies in Intelligence 38,
no. 5. https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/95unclass/Davis.html.
Fingar, T. 2004. Personal Communication.
Gosler, J. R. 2005. The Digital Dimension. In Transforming U.S. Intelligence, ed. J. E. Sims
and B. Gerber. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Kent, S. 1965. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Hamden, Conn.: Archon
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Lowenthal, M. 2006. Forward. In David T. Moore, Critical Thinking and Intelligence
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May, E. R. 1986. Introduction. In Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessments between
the Two World Wars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
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no. 3. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publica-
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Intelligence College Press.
chapter 25
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
IN AN UNCERTAIN
ENVIRONMENT
william m. nolte
1. Introduction
A decade ago, a chapter summarizing intelligence analysis, let alone offering an
assessment of the literature on the subject, would have had few resources to draw
on. The section on the literature would have been, if nothing else, very brief. A few
journals, including the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
and Intelligence and National Security, published articles on analysis. (As did CIA’s
Studies in Intelligence, but with relatively little of its work unclassified or declassified
at that time.) Analysis appeared, however sporadically, in histories of intelligence, or
of the CIA, or of particular events, but for the most part the emphasis in this litera-
ture was on espionage or covert action. In intelligence fiction as well, the emphasis
was largely on the very real human drama of clandestine collection, rather than on
the less dramatic work of intelligence analysis. Tom Clancy’s decision to base much
of his work on the Jack Ryan character, that is, the analyst turned man of action,
provided an often-ironic touch, however improbable, to his early works.
This emphasis in the literature mirrored, at least to some degree, the empha-
sis within the intelligence services. Here I am speaking primarily about the ser-
vices of the United States, though I suspect it is largely true of other services as
well. For most of the history of modern American intelligence, the training and
education of the analytic workforce largely came with them to the job. That is to
say, most of their formal education took place in colleges or universities before
intelligence analysis in an uncertain environment 405
they entered government service. Analytic training within the services for many
years consisted of relatively short courses on an agency’s “writing style” or the
formats governing analysis and reporting in a given agency. But there was little or
nothing to match the intense initial training provided to officers selected for the
CIA’s clandestine service, to cite one example. Analysts could pursue advanced
degrees on their own, or perhaps take short courses on a new geographical or
topical area to which they had been assigned. But much analytic “training”
remained the on-the-job variety. Only in the late 1990s did the CIA’s intelligence
directorate begin to offer an extensive (and, in pre-9/11 budgets, expensive) pro-
gram of analytic training interspersed with on-the-job analytic assignments. At
roughly the same time (1999), Richards Heuer’s The Psychology of Intelligence
Analysis appeared (Heuer 2006).1
2. The Volatile Environment

In retrospect, the 1990s were an important period in the development of intelli-
gence analysis, complicated to some degree (as will be noted later) by a relatively
austere budget climate, certainly in the case of the American services. This develop-
ment will permit this chapter to avoid repetition of basics covered in such works as
Heuer’s, Mark Lowenthal’s Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2008), and the very
fine Analyzing Intelligence, edited by Roger George and James Bruce (2008), among
other recent work (see reference list).
Overriding such developments internal to the craft of intelligence, however, the
1990s transformed the environment in which analysts operated. That decade
brought the end of one important environmental factor confronting intelligence
and the intensification of another. In the first instance, the end of the Cold War
removed a large part—the dominant part—of the raison d’etre of Western intelli-
gence.2 For decades intelligence agencies and their staffs had been able to rely on the
constant presence of the Soviet Union occupying the greater part of both their bud-
gets and their attention. This target environment was never completely static, of
course, but relative to the first years of the twenty-first century, it looks remarkably
stable. Even when other actors drew the attention of the Western national security
instruments, including intelligence, they came, in the case of China, North Vietnam,
Cuba, or the authoritarian states of the Nasserite Middle East, with significant
1
One development external to the Intelligence Community should also be noted here, and
that is the growth of intelligence studies as an academic discipline, including programs at
undergraduate and graduate levels focused on intelligence analysis.
2
This is especially true for the United States, which, at least since the 1970s, had placed a far
smaller portion of its “intelligence” efforts into counterintelligence or state security efforts than
most nations.
reflections of Soviet ideology, views toward the United States and the West, and
even equipment, doctrine, and technology. A Soviet-built T-72 tank remained a
T-72 tank, at the tactical level, whatever flag it flew and whether it was painted for
European or desert conditions. For decades, the overriding objective of Western
intelligence was to assess the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union, its
allies, and its surrogates. And then it was gone.
The loss of the Soviet Union, along with the “peace dividend” that followed,
created major problems for Western intelligence services. At one level, bureaucratic
and structural realities associated with modern civil services made it at least diffi-
cult for the intelligence services to react with agility (a favored term, in wish if not
in practice) in adjusting to the new post–Cold War environment. More importantly,
no new environmental metaphor emerged to replace that of the Cold War in defin-
ing national security for the United States and its allies. For the decade after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, events moved to the fore several candidates for this
conceptual design, starting with the “New World Order” associated with the First
Gulf War. Since 2001, of course, we have dealt with the “Global War on Terrorism”
as a proposed metaphor. To an unfortunately great extent, however, the national
security instruments of the United States continue to reflect a “post–Cold War”
sense of mission, purpose, and structure (Arquilla 2008; Robb 2007).
To be thinking, even implicitly, in “post–Cold War” terms in 2008 or 2009 is
extraordinary. Who, by way of comparison, thought of the national security envi-
ronment of 1964 or 1965 in “post–World War II” terms?
If the collapse of the Soviet Union ended one defining element of the national
security environment, the information revolution (and all it has wrought, includ-
ing, to a great degree, globalization) preceded that event, continued through it, and
will remain a driving force in national security affairs for years, if not decades, to
come. The duration of this transforming change, its pervasive impact, and its two-
edged implications make this the center of any effort to renew twenty-first-century
analysis and analytic methodology.
In attempting to confront the national security challenges presented by changes
in information technology (and information behavior, a related but different issue),
many of the leading military thinkers and planners of the 1990s thought in terms of
a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) (Owens 2000). Some in the intelligence
professions, including this author, even began to think and write about an analo-
gous “revolution in intelligence affairs” (Barger 2005; Nolte 2005). Partly this was a
recognition that momentous changes in defense and military affairs cannot fail to
have an impact on the intelligence professions, support to the military being a pri-
mary function of intelligence.
In more recent years, several critics, drawing on the experiences in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and in the war on terror in general, have pointed to the shortcomings
of the RMA literature (Shachtman 2007). Without question, some of the statements
and projections of the RMA visionaries (especially the thought that information
technology would “eliminate the fog of war”) were excessive. But it would be hard
to deny that information and related technologies have had a profound effect on
the way recent wars have been fought and future wars will be fought. In what we
now call second- and third-generation warfare, or industrial warfare, the line infan-
try soldier was something of lowest-common-denominator cannon fodder. This is
a harsh term, to be sure, and is in no way intended to dishonor those who served in
those roles. But compare the investment in an infantryman anywhere from the
Napoleonic Period through Vietnam to the investment in front-line personnel in
the first decade of the twenty-first century and a dramatic difference emerges. Leave
aside for the moment that these personnel are human beings and fellow citizens, no
commander in the twenty-first century will expend these resources—and the invest-
ment they represent—in ways accepted as inevitable only a generation or two ago.
In many respects, intelligence, especially intelligence analysis, had its own coun-
terpart to second- and third-generation industrial warfare. The relatively small
group of highly skilled analysts and researchers in the Research and Analysis branch
of the World War II Office of Strategic Services were gradually replaced, in many
agencies, by thousands and thousands of analysts largely engaged in “production,”
that is, the nearly industrial process of extracting from the voluminous collection of
both technical and human intelligence agencies information of value for transmis-
sion to a set of largely anonymous “customers.” In many instances, the industrial
nature of this effort was reinforced by a process that did not involve the direct
involvement of living, breathing customers, but of bureaucratized (even industrial-
ized) “requirements lists,” produced at some level and renewed at some level by the
customers, but too often the belated and often outdated perceptions of staffs built
solely for the purpose of producing such lists.
In the information environment of the Cold War, the relatively (and only rela-
tively) small volume of material involved and the relatively static nature of the
adversary permitted this often-creaky system to function, although never with great
agility or efficiency. Nevertheless, it worked, creakily and inefficiently in many
respects, but no more inefficiently (and ponderously) than the major adversaries it
was deployed against.
3. The Ongoing Information Revolution

If the end of the Cold War (and the subsequent loss of target focus) marks one
component of the environmental shift that has transformed national security in the
last two decades, the information revolution, in all its consequences is the factor
that did not end but which intensified. It is important to note at the start that the
emphasis here is not on information technology per se, though the information
revolution clearly begins at the technological level. The information and communi-
cations technology of the twenty-first century is, literally, the carrier for a far broader
range of effects, wonderfully described over a decade ago by Frances Cairncross as
“the death of distance” (1997).
The implications of this truly revolutionary change in information need not be

elaborated here.3 One implication on intelligence, however, must be addressed.
Until the twentieth century, as Michael Herman has long noted, intelligence equaled
information. Whether it came from clandestine or “open” sources rarely mattered
(Herman 1996). The historical reality was that political and military leaders (espe-
cially the latter) generally operated in an environment in which accurate “intelli-
gence” generally meant little more than they could observe with their own eyes.
Any—repeat, any—information that spoke to the health of a political rival or the
state of the roads on an army’s line of march, was precious because information on
such matters was generally both scarce and painfully (sometimes tragically)
unreliable.
In this environment, information scarcity was the norm not the exception. In
the twentieth century, with the rise of totalitarian regimes whose first (or nearly
so) order of business was information control in service of state security, even the
flows of information formerly available, especially in the period from the Congress
of Vienna to the First World War, when the Great Powers operated with a high
degree of openness and comity, were closed off. The Red Army did not exactly
welcome officers to observe its operations or maneuvers. In the case of both Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union, such outside observers as did obtain access to
military equipment and bases, for example, were likely to be treated to deception
operations far more sophisticated than those generally experienced a generation
or two before.
This development forced responses even from democratic states. One impor-
tant and direct consequence was the development of larger and more complex
intelligence organizations to collect, evaluate, and analyze information. The other,
slightly more indirect, was a steady increase in the emphasis on clandestinely
acquired information, with the resulting devaluation of information openly
acquired. This development, already underway in the Second World War, acceler-
ated in the Cold War, especially in what became a “golden age of technical intelli-
gence.” For the first time in history, keeping a commander informed of what was
over the next hill could be, at least in many circumstances, as easy as showing the
commander a picture (or image) of the reverse slope. Moreover, the satellites pro-
ducing those images were also capable of providing information from other sen-
sors, including signals and measurement intelligence.
Technology has nevertheless proven at the very least a “dual-use” factor. Within
a generation, the satellite imagery that was one of America’s most jealously guarded
secrets of the Cold War became a commercial product. And encryption, once
reserved for communication of the most sensitive secrets of state, became ubiqui-
tous. All the while, of course, the volume of information increased at exponential
rates. The characteristic information condition of intelligence, that is, information
3
Not, it must be noted, the first such revolution. And almost certainly not the most
important (Eisenstein 1979).
scarcity, almost overnight became an environment of information overload. Roberta

Wohlstetter’s use of the signal to noise ratio in intelligence and warning remains
valid (Wohlstetter 1962). It’s just that the imbalance between noise and signal has
increased dramatically.
This is not to say that only the “noise” has increased. So has the signal, if by that
we mean the amount of information being produced in a global environment on
issues affecting national security. In the Cold War, it was easy to say that the place-
ment and readiness of Soviet forces in the western Soviet Union or Eastern Europe
was high-priority national security information. Information on a potential trans-
mission of virus from an animal to humans may have been important, but not criti-
cally or immediately as a national security issue.
As the first decade of the twenty-first century has made clear, the military and
political intentions and capabilities of rival states, whether peer rivals, near peers, or
regional peers, continue to represent a significant measure of what we may call the
“standing requirements” for intelligence services. Other traditional issues for intel-
ligence collection and analysis, including economics and trade, also show no sign of
disappearing from the agendas of intelligence recipients. At the same time, however,
terrorism, international public health, food safety, climate change, large-scale
human rights abuses and other issues, that at one time may have been peripheral to
national security concerns, or tangential to great-power interactions of confronta-
tions, have assumed greater (and greatly volatile) significance in national security
affairs. The reality of such a varied and volatile environment will shape the intel-
ligence future, including the future of intelligence analysis.
4. Beyond Production:
The Analytic Future
At least in the American intelligence services, generations of new employees have
been introduced to the “intelligence production cycle.” For readers who slept
through that briefing or never received it: the recipients of intelligence have infor-
mation needs, which they transmit to intelligence producers, who then transform
information needs into intelligence requirements. For the most part, this means
looking at the respective sources of intelligence (or “ints,” as in humint, sigint, etc.)
and asking which “int” can support which need. Leaving aside the all-too-human
and all-too-bureaucratic tendency for these sessions to deteriorate into a frenzy of
every int responding to every need (except for some politically or bureaucratically
unattractive ones) with “We can, we can!” this process then leads to the assignment
of collection requirements to the various int-specific agencies. Who then collect
against that requirement, using their respective sources and methods, process the
collection by various means, and convert it into a format (or product) that is then
conveyed to the requestor. Who, in the final stage of the cycle, then provides feed-
back that can then be incorporated into another round of requirements setting,
setting in motion another production cycle.
Mild sarcasm notwithstanding, the darned thing worked. In an industrial age,
in an otherwise industrial setting, against a relatively fixed and finite set of targets,
this not only worked (with less than full efficiency, to be sure); it even has value for
the future (Krizan 1999). Some intelligence problems will almost certainly lend
themselves to this process for many years to come. Such assurances notwithstand-
ing, the production cycle, even modernized to resemble a “production process,” will
be inadequate to meet the needs of the intelligence future, especially but not exclu-
sively the analytic future.
In part, this reflects the limits of the very idea of production, let alone its collec-
tion component. For years, experienced analysts in several agencies could joke about
the younger analyst who, asked where his or her “traffic” came from, would respond
by mentioning the room or office where they picked up the day’s collection “take.”
Over time, the room may have disappeared, replaced by electronic delivery of newly
collected material, but the process varied little beyond the format. To a greater degree
in “single-source” agencies (the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency and its predecessors, for example), but still to a lesser degree in
the “all-source” world, analysis was a byproduct of collection. It would be only a
slight exaggeration to say that the Cold War American intelligence apparatus ulti-
mately became a heavily capitalized data-collection industry, with renewal of the
industry and its capital investment as a major—if not the major—interest of the
community’s leadership. Estimates may vary of the ratio of spending on collection
versus analysis, but whether that ratio was 8:1 or 16:1, the emphasis was clear.
Moreover, most of this collection expenditure was on clandestine collection,
especially technical collection, for in truth, the Cold War represents, at least from the
Cuban Missile Crisis, a golden age for technical intelligence.4 Working against a
denied target in the Soviet Union (or a set of denied targets, including Soviet allies
and surrogates), this was an occurrence of consequence for the United States and its
allies. The Soviets, emblematic of twentieth-century totalitarian states, placed infor-
mation control at the center of state security efforts, and they were by and large very
good at these efforts. For the United States and its allies, experiencing a golden age in
technical intelligence during the Cold War was an enormous and fortunate achieve-
ment, although the use of the word fortunate should not be taken to minimize the
innovation, imagination, and effort that made such good fortune possible.
If there is to be an “intelligence process cycle” for the twenty-first century with
an equally successful outcome, collection seems an inadequate description of the
component bearing responsibility for gathering, assembling, and creating informa-
tion. First of all, the range of national security issues and the nature of the actors
4
The reference here to “a” golden age rather than “the” golden age is purposeful. Institutions,
like civilizations, may have more than one golden age, depending on such factors as leadership,
creativity, and success in dealing with changing environments.
engaged in those issues will little resemble the powerful but ponderous totalitarians
of the last century. Denied targets and closed societies will remain, as in North
Korea, but these will be exceptions. Dangerous exceptions to be sure, but exceptions
nonetheless (Glionna 2008). A more characteristic issue will be the closed or secure
project within a relatively (to one degree or another) open environment. Iran’s
nuclear establishments, and certainly its plans for its nuclear effort, will be closed
and treated as state secrets. But Iran itself is a significantly open society, as an hour
or two on the web will attest, and open-source information and expertise will gain
in importance even as Iran continues its “secret” programs and resembles, in certain
areas, an at-least-partially closed state.5 Non-state issues in national security (that is
to say issues that exist largely apart from the interests of intent of a single govern-
ment) will be even more “open,” though the policies of states in encouraging, dis-
couraging, or otherwise dealing with a given development will remain, to varying
degrees, state secrets.
This is certainly true of such issues as climate change. It is almost certainly truer
of such issues as demographic change and international public health. At first
instance, the intelligence analyst’s challenge in dealing with public health will not be
to task clandestine collection resources, but to know as much about this issue, or
some component of it, as his or her counterpart at the Public Health Service, the
Centers for Disease Control, or in one of several schools and departments at the
nearest state university.
This raises, as it must, the issue of open-source information, which the author
prefers to describe as an issue of both open-source information and open-source
expertise. The bank robber Willie Sutton famously said he robbed banks “because
that’s where the money is.” Twenty-first-century analysts will truly need to rely first
on “collection,” but to a greater degree research and communication with open
sources and experts for the simple reason “that’s where the information is.”
The American intelligence community has been under pressure to rely more on
open-source information for over a decade. And it has taken steps to respond to this
pressure. But it has not made the conceptual change from acting because the
Intelligence Reform Act mandates it or because Congress keeps bringing it up to
acting because it fully acknowledges that the twenty-first-century operating envi-
ronment demands the change. It must make the fundamental shift of believing that
in the twenty-first-century intelligence will be about information, not about secrets.
Some part of the information will be secret or otherwise classified of course, either
because it reflects sources and methods or because it reflects the confidentiality of
advice provided to the president and other decision makers. The fact remains, how-
ever, that an age of intelligence, golden or not, is over.
This is not to suggest that the United States should retire its clandestine col-
lection capabilities. It does mean that the balance, first of all in investment, but
5
It is worth keeping in mind, in Iran and in other states, even “technical” programs, such as
those involving weapons development, are never just technical programs. For the impact of
political decisions on such programs, see DeVilliers et al. (1993).
more importantly in focus, must shift toward “where the information is.” As
noted above, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act mandated
greater use of open source information. In the early days of the “DNI era,”
implementation of this seemed to offer great promise. Without question, prog-
ress in both open source and its intimate companion, information sharing, have
been made. But the reality remains that open source, however it may now be
described at the DNI level as “the source of first resort,” remains a stepchild in
US intelligence. Add to that the truly unfortunate decision to relegate, and there
can be no gentler word, open-source issues to the “collection” directorate of the
office of the DNI, and then to sublet open source operations to a renamed
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, itself long a stepchild within CIA, and
the outcome was predictable. Whatever progress the DNI has achieved has been
inadequate to keep pace with the emerging information environment. In other
words, progress at pace .2X, in an environment moving at pace X, ultimately
translates into “falling behind” or even failure. The late Peter Drucker once
noted that inside an organization there are only costs; the benefits are felt out-
side. And subordinating open source to “collectors” would have been like IBM
leaving the decision on personal computers to executives schooled in main-
frames. In fact, to a great degree that happened, with similar and predictable
consequences for IBM.6
Accepting open-source information and expertise as the source of first resort
means nothing without a shift in the power balance within the US intelligence com-
munity. This means empowering analysts to be researchers, and it means finally
achieving the long-stated goal of creating an analyst-driven rather than collection-
driven intelligence system. This means empowering analysts to fill “collection gaps”
not by simply tasking collection components (although this must remain part of
the strategy for filling what should be called “analytic gaps” or “knowledge gaps”),
but by empowering them to commission research, build their own networks of out-
side experts, and to do so without begging permission from collectors and security
officers. Empowered analysts will not just “process” collected information or data;
they will be intimately involved in the creation of new information, in collabora-
tion, it should be emphasized, with “collectors” and others, including security and
counterintelligence officers.
This is a critical point. Much has been made of former DNI McConnell’s
decision to update the “need-to-know” principle in American intelligence to one
6
More than a decade ago, Ruth David, then the deputy director for science and technology at
the CIA, spoke frequently of the need for an “agile intelligence enterprise,” with the thought that
such an enterprise would emphasize “speed, flexibility, and capacity through collaborative
operations.” Although one can point to progress in making American intelligence more
collaborative if not more agile, the question remains of measuring progress not by the internal
metric of “how far we’ve come,” but by the external metric of what the external environment
demands (David 1997).
premised on “responsibility to provide.”7 But this remains little more than a goal in
an operating environment in which the potential benefits of sharing information,
building networks, and so on, are not weighted equally with security concerns.
5. Analyst and Client:

A Fiduciary Relationship
Empowering the analyst means empowering the analyst’s role as fiduciary agent for
the recipient of that analysis. Here again, the industrial model of intelligence pro-
duction shows its age. The idea that the “customer” provides information needs,
which are then converted into intelligence requirements, which are in turn parceled
out to the various agencies, which in turn collected and processed information,
which was then analyzed and turned into “product” of various forms, which is then
provided to customers, who on digesting the product create a revised set of needs,
provided a certain rough transparency to an otherwise obscure process.
On the other hand, it rarely ever operated that way. Too often, needs were
bureaucratized into requirements lists, which may or may not have reflected the
needs of the current set of “customers.” Over time, of course, as the flow of informa-
tion and intelligence increased exponentially in volume, so did the production of
product, all of which ended up in the in baskets of customers far too busy to update
their requirements. From time to time, agencies accused of “collecting for collec-
tion sake,” would come up with questionnaires and other devices for measuring
“customer satisfaction,” often to the puzzlement of “customers” who could not fig-
ure out who these people were who were submitting this call for data or why those
people, whomever they were, thought the customer had time to fill out some
questionnaire.
Too often, the production cycle became the production conveyer, with the end
of the line being the burn bag or, in a more recent time, the delete key. Two factors
contributed to this. The first was a desire, laudable on its own terms, to keep the
7
This is an important initiative on the part of the DNI. Nevertheless, American intelligence
continues to operate in an environment in which the value of protecting information, including
sources and methods, remains something to be balanced against the value of sharing that
information. Without question, over time this had evolved toward a situation in which risk
management or cost/benefit analysis of whether and how to expose information could become
merely a “cost analysis” or even a “potential cost analysis,” with little reference to real or potential
benefits. That said, a serious research and investment effort in twenty-first-century intelligence
requires inclusion of counterintelligence and security in such an effort. Perhaps the outcome is
primacy for “responsibility to share” with a renewed understanding of the validity of “need to know.”
customer out of the production process itself. This was laudable, first of all, to avoid
politicization; secondly because, as noted, the customers were busy.
The second factor was a tendency to see the analyst as the marketing represen-
tative for the collector. That is, the analyst represented his or her collection “int.” In
almost a decade coordinating national intelligence estimates, I cannot recall a CIA
analyst announcing “you’re on your own on this one, gang. The humint on this is
terrible.” Or an NSA analyst saying “the only material we have on this is from a for-
eign service that is the dumping ground for every incompetent in the ruling class.”
One might notice a certain reticence on the part of an agency representative, a pre-
occupation with shuffling his or her papers when called on, but rarely a willingness
to support a judgment that seemed at odds with the information coming from that
agency’s collection.
This is not as craven as it may sound. Group think is at least as dangerous as a
failure to integrate analysis, and there is a certain wisdom—almost in Madisonian
terms—of having agency analysts defend their agency’s collection.8 Excessive inte-
gration (and the “group think” likely to emerge from such excess) of the American
intelligence establishment remains as much a threat to an effective intelligence effort
as does inadequate integration. It may be, however, that we are now at a point where
some shift in the sense of “who the analyst works for” is required. This may entail
supplanting the view of the recipient of intelligence from customer to client, with
the analyst’s fiduciary responsibility toward that client superseding his or her
responsibility to an individual agency.
Fiduciary relationships, as opposed to commercial relationships, have at their
core the belief that the professional’s primary responsibility is to the achievement of
the client’s interests, not the professional’s. A car salesman may see a personal ethi-
cal responsibility in suggesting that a car is larger than I need. He or she does not
have a professional responsibility to do so. My financial advisor has, on the other
hand, a fiduciary responsibility to advise me against a sale or purchase he considers
unwise. In the end, if I insist, the advisor should put through the sale. Unless, of
course, he or she believes that to do so would undermine his or her status as a
professional. I can, along the same lines, decline my physician’s advice that bungee
jumping is not exactly what my aging retinas need. He can, in turn, suggest that if
I ignore his advice I should seek another specialist.
All of this suggests a more interactive replacement for the traditional produc-
tion cycle. When CIA launched its first Galileo project in 2005,9 the judges were
8
It was commonplace during the 1970s for journalists to applaud the leadership on the Senate
Watergate committee of Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, then to lament that for some reason
this visionary leader continued to vote for tobacco subsidies. In the best Madison terms, of course
Senator Ervin voted for such subsidies, confident he could represent the economic interests of his
constituents, permit his reelection, and be assured that senator from other states would outvote him.
9
Galileo, now under the sponsorship of the DNI, is a project in which intelligence officers
submit papers, produced on their own time, on some aspect of innovation as applied to the
intelligence process.
astonished by the number of entrants urging the intelligence community to pursue

wiki and blog technologies. Many thought this was simply unacceptable, but within
a very short time intellipedia was born, and one gathers that something approach-
ing routine blogging now takes place not only among analysts but with clients as
well.
It is right to look with some concern at such interaction between analysts and
clients, as well, one might suggest, as between collectors and clients. But here we are.
This is the information environment we are in, for better or for worse. The most
likely outcome, of course, is that it will be “for better and for worse.” Healthy institu-
tions, almost by virtue of their health and alertness to their operational environ-
ments, tend to maximize the value of such developments while minimizing their
downsides. The Army’s response to companycommander.com is an extraordinary
case of institutional health. Faced with an uncontrolled—along with unencrypted
and unauthorized—exchange of information from company and platoon officers
in Iraq, on personal-computer email, the Army faced an obvious decision: shut this
down and punish the violators. Instead, the Army took on companycommander.
com (now part of Army Knowledge Online), providing ground rules and security.
This is what healthy institutions do. They align with their environment, they
embrace change, and, in the national security professions, they do so with the result
of enhancing the odds on mission success, and perhaps saving lives. A fresh look at
the intelligence process and the roles therein can achieve that result for American
intelligence. At the center of this effort must be an analytic workforce empowered
to act as the fiduciary agents of the clients they serve. If one of the concerns with
such a development is that of potential “clientitis,” we need to look at our last issue,
the ethics of analysis.
6. Empowering the Analyst: Research

and Analytic Development
One consequence of the information environment of the last twenty years or so has
been the phenomenon known as “volume, velocity, variety.” With seemingly stag-
gering speed, and with no prospect the phenomenon will slow or disappear, infor-
mation scarcity, the characteristic intelligence environment since it became the
world’s second oldest profession has given way to chronic, systemic information
overload.
To a degree, the information environment that has produced this result has
also provided tools for coping with it, part of the ongoing “dual-edged” impact of
most information processes. Information technology in various forms continues
to be employed in ever-expanding ways to support the analytic effort. In the
American case, the surge of investment since September 2001 has brought a dra-
matic increase in both human and technical resources. Less certain is whether
growth (or “increased production”) can ever keep pace with an information envi-
ronment exploding at Moore’s Law pace. It is even less certain that growth can
serve as the strategy for dealing with an operational environment in which the
target is expanding across multiple (volume, variety, velocity) dimensions. Finally,
it is doubtful, again citing the American example, that the budget surge of the
post-9/11 era will continue. One consequence of the release of the top figure for
America’s National Intelligence Program will be that both Congress and the pub-
lic will weigh future increases of a budget pushing past $50 billion per year severely
against other, competing needs.10
A final consideration in coping with this explosion is that the client community
is unlikely to expand apace with the growth of collection. In other words, growth at
the front end of the process does not guarantee commensurate growth in process-
ing and analytic resources. Nor does it promise any relief for the user confronting
extraordinary “in-box” demands.
What is to be done? One option would be to insist that growth remains a strat-
egy and that intelligence occupies a privileged call on public resources. This could
be described as “the way we’ve always done it—but more!” strategy. An alternative
would be to seek qualitative rather than quantitative strategies for dealing with the
challenges ahead. For the analyst this means a direct confrontation with the demand
for increased production. One chronic qualitative concern, often expressed (inter-
nally but also by external commissions and oversight bodies) but never fully acted
on, is the tendency for current or short-term analysis to drive out strategic or long-
term analysis.
Perhaps the time has come to reverse that trend, with the explicit stipulation
that this is not a problem that can be “grown out of.” Adding an additional 10 or 15
percent to the analytic workforce (unlikely in the budget environments of the next
several years) with no changes in strategy and leadership discipline will only add to
the glut. As an alternative, intelligence leaders need to take a cue (actually more than
one) from their military colleagues.
The first change should involve commitment to a “staffing ratio” that commits
a percentage of the analytic workforce to long-term or strategic work. Whether that
involves 5 percent, 10 percent, or some other number is less important than a com-
mitment to “fence off ” this investment from deflection to current issues.
Such an arrangement would also require the development of structures to
support the long-term research effort. Again, the military provides an important
an instructive model, in the research centers located at all of the major service war
and staff colleges. Intelligence researchers would use similar facilities not only to
conduct their own studies, but to extend their analytic and research networks, and
10
Even within the national security, intelligence will face pressure from military forces
requiring significant re-investment after extended wartime deployments, state and local homeland
security agencies seeking federal funding to compensate for depressed local budgets, and even a
possible desire to place more investment on diplomatic and international development
instruments of national security.
to support teaching and other mentoring of less-senior analysts. Simply stated,

many of the truly important innovations in the American military since the 1970s
have come from a commitment to such long-term research and (human) develop-
ment efforts. The Center for Army Lessons Learned and the lessons-learned cul-
ture it and similar efforts elsewhere in the military have built and strengthened,
radical (in terms of the military status quo) efforts such as Colonel Douglas
MacGregor’s Breaking the Phalanx, and even the recent field manuals on counter-
insurgency and stability operations would simply not have been possible without
policies and structures that balance the short-term against the longer term
(MacGregor 1997). If intelligence (and with it the State Department and homeland
security) are to carry their weight, with the military, in the twenty-first-century
national security establishment, they must have both a leadership commitment to
such efforts and the resources to make those efforts meaningful and successful.
7. The Ethics of Twenty-First-Century

Analysis
For most analysts, the controversy over the role of intelligence in failing to warn of
the 9/11 attacks (connecting the dots, and so on), however severe, paled in compari-
son to many of the accusations raised over the role of intelligence analysis in the
period preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is one thing, even in the most severe
of circumstances (Pearl Harbor or 9/11), to be found wanting in skill or methodol-
ogy. It is quite another to be thought of as complicit in a plot to politicize intelli-
gence as part of a concerted effort with policymakers to mislead a country (or
countries, in this case) debating whether to go to war.
However tragic the costs of a failure to warn or analyze correctly, analytic fail-
ures are, in the intelligence profession, a cost of doing business. This cost, in the
most extreme cases, of course, is measured in human lives, a burden that cannot be
ignored or understated. But physicians lose patients, and any medical student who
cannot cope with that reality should consider other career options. The same is true
for intelligence professions.
“Cooking the books” remains, nevertheless, a far deeper and more corrosive
infraction. This is especially true for intelligence officers serving in open and demo-
cratic societies that have made the decision to permit the creation of powerful and
secret institutions of state in the common defense. Historically, professions had
been identified by their commitment to a code of ethics, in part because of fiduciary
responsibilities of the sort described above.
In larger measure, an ethical sense is essential to public service (where all actions
are taken with the public’s money and in the public’s name) and most centrally in
those public services that authorize its members to perform actions enjoined from
the public at large. Police officers and judges can use lethal force or incarcerate their
fellow citizens, the military are authorized the privilege of conducting societally
approved violence. Intelligence officers are permitted to lie, deceive, and eavesdrop
on other persons, and to do so under a veil of secrecy.
In the American case, the intelligence services operated in this environment
without meaningful supervision for the first three decades of their modern exis-
tence, a situation reversed after the 1970s. In other countries, even democratic ones,
the ratio of intelligence history to overseen intelligence history is even more dra-
matic. That notwithstanding, the reality of external (usually legislative or parlia-
mentary) oversight, in some cases augmented by judicial review, is now almost
universally understood if not fully practiced.
The first ethical principle for intelligence analysts, then, is one they share with
their colleagues in other aspects of the intelligence establishments. That is, they
must understand that the days of intelligence as a secret service operating under no
restraint but reasons of state or “the wishes of the crown” are over. In the democra-
cies, intelligence will operate under law and within the values of their larger, spon-
soring society. They must understand, as must their publics, that they operate at
times on the edges of that value system, and that many of their fellow citizens would
prefer not to the things intelligence officers (or police officers, for example) do in
their name. But the basic principle remains: the limits of conduct permitted for an
intelligence service’s conduct will be set and must be set external to that service.
For analysts, much of the discussion that follows springs from the desire to put
into practice the long-espoused sense that the purpose of intelligence is “to bring
truth to power.” Before proceeding, we must stipulate that no amount of expertise,
no level of exposure to information—openly or clandestinely acquired—gives intel-
ligence a monopoly on truth. The supply rooms of intelligence agencies do not list
crystal balls as standard office equipment. We need to consider this reality when we
think of the role of the recipient of intelligence, and his or her responsibility to
choose to accept the judgments of intelligence, to reject them in favor of other
sources (including past experience, personal knowledge, or even “gut” instinct), or
to accept selective portions of the intelligence presented.
That last option may appear problematic, at least within near memory of a
period in which the “cherry picking” of intelligence was described and was frequently
and loudly denounced as both unusual and unusually venal. In reality, of course,
decision makers, civilian and military, have always used intelligence selectively, and
they always will. Sometimes successfully and to their credit; at other times, less suc-
cessfully. The reality is that intelligence will never be the only “source” with which
decision makers can and must deal. Many years ago, a president of the American
Historical Association gave as his presidential address something called “Every Man
His Own Historian,” (Becker 1931) and to a great degree, every decision maker in the
twenty-first century will be his or her own intelligence collector and intelligence
analyst. This has always been the case, and intelligence has often found itself over-
ruled by decision makers on grounds of prior experience, alternative (and private or
even personal) sources of information available to the decision maker, or an unwill-
ingness to reconsider long held beliefs. We should not, to be sure, eliminate total
folly as an element in the decision-making process.
It will always be so. In an age where the decision maker can turn to his or her
laptop and either e-mail a private network of experts or “Google” the subject under
discussion, the role of the decision maker in selecting from various assessments
(or using those assessments selectively) grows ever larger. The analyst has a respon-
sibility to bring truth to power; there is no corollary responsibility on the part of the
decision maker to accept that version of the truth, though it is to be hoped that its
rejection is based on something more than its inconvenience to a decision or
policy.
One of the reforms of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
was the establishment of an analytic integrity officer within the office of the Director
of National Intelligence. In the first phase of that program, the analytic integrity
officer has made significant progress in establishing doctrine, to use a military term
not altogether popular in “civilian” intelligence services, governing analytic stan-
dards.11 One can argue that much of their work (e.g., properly describing the quality
and reliability of sources, distinguishing between intelligence fact and analytic judg-
ment, maintaining analytic consistency or highlighting changes in analysis) reflects
“standards” that should have been implicit in analysis from all time and for all
time.
There is, however, the virtue of making such standards explicit and indoctrinat-
ing (another often unpopular term) analysts to understand that they have a profes-
sional responsibility to those standards that must at least require them to resist
such factors as “the way we’ve always done it,” or “this is the way my supervisor
wants it,” or “this is what my agency’s collection says.” It may be too early to say
whether these standards become imbedded in the professional identity of American
intelligence analysts, but their promulgation nevertheless represents a large step
toward the declaration that the analyst is more than an end stage to a production
process, one in which the interest of the producer can challenge if not supersede
the interest of the client.
Failures and missteps notwithstanding, the creation and operation of large-
scale, secret, and powerful intelligence organizations within the world’s democra-
cies is one of the significant achievements in twentieth-century governance. These
organizations did not emerge full-grown or fully developed, but changed over time
and with changing times. Late in the century, the democracies adjusted to the
demands to bring these most “secret services” under increased measures of legal
regulation and legislative or parliamentary oversight. For analysts as for other pro-
fessionals within the intelligence services, an understanding of their responsibilities
within these frameworks is a final, critical ethical consideration. As twenty-first-
century analysts grapple with all the challenges outlined above (and more than a
11
Under the leadership of first professor Nancy Tucker of Georgetown and then professor
Richard Immerman of Temple University.
few not mentioned here), they need remember that they operate on license from
societies that permit their intelligence services to operate in ways not permitted
most citizens. As police officers and military personnel are warranted to use lethal
force on society’s behalf and under rules created not by the services themselves but
by leadership external to those services, so intelligence officers (including but not
limited to analysts) must operate within similar frameworks.12 The late-twentieth-
century development that places even the most secret of a democratic society’s
secret services under legal, legislative, and even judicial oversight represents an
extraordinary chapter in the history of intelligence. It remains yet another part of
the complex, uncertain, and often volatile operating environment facing twenty-
first-century intelligence professionals, including analysts.
REFERENCES
Arquilla, J. 2008. Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military.
Chicago: Ivan Dee.
Barger, D. 2005. Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs. Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation.
Becker, C. 1931. Everyman His Own Historian. Presidential Address, American Historical
Association.
Cairncross, F. 1997. The Death of Distance. Boston: Harvard University Business School
Press.
David, R. A. 1997. The Agile Intelligence Enterprise: Enhancing Speed, Flexibility, and
Capacity through Collaborative Operations. Draft in possession of the author.
DeVilliers, J. W., R. Jardine, and M. Reiss. 1993. Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb.
Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec.).
Eisenstein, E. 1979. The Printing Press as an Agent of Change. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
George, R. Z., and J. B. Bruce, eds. 2008. Analyzing Intelligence. Washington, D.C.:
Glionna, J. M. 2008. The Information Fortress Known as North Korea. Los Angeles Times
(November 14).
Goldman, J., ed. 2006. The Ethics of Spying. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press.
Hehir, B. 2002. International Politics, Ethics, and the Use of Force. Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs (Summer/Fall).
Herman, M. 1996. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
12
See Hehir (2002) for a review of the just-war tradition, one possible frame of reference for
intelligence officers. A question this author puts to his University of Maryland students is whether
one can substitute “intelligence” for “war” in Fr. Hehir’s discussion of just-war tradition and find
that tradition applicable. The volume edited by Jan Goldman (2006) is also useful. James Olson’s
work (2006) has the advantage beyond utility of also being fun, with the inclusion of fifty or so
ethically challenging scenarios for intelligence action, along with comments from academics,
former intelligence officials, clergy, and students, among others.
Heuer Jr., R. J. 2006. The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. New York: Novinka Books.
Krizan, L. 1999. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone. Washington, D.C.: Joint Military
Intelligence College, 1999.
Lowenthal, M. M. 2008. Intelligence from Secrets to Policy. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly.
Macgregor, D. A. 1997. Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st
Century. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
Moore, D. T. 2006. Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Joint
Military Intelligence College.
Nolte, W. M. 2005. Rethinking War and Intelligence. In Rethinking the Principles of War, ed.
A. McIvor. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
Olson, J. M. 2006. Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying. Washington, D.C.: Potomac
Books.
Owens, W. A. 2000. Lifting the Fog of War. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.
Robb, J. 2007. Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization.
Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons.
Shachtman, N. 2007. How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks
Are Social—Not Electronic. Wired 15, no. 12.
Wohlstetter, R. 1962. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Palo Alto: Stanford University
Press.
chapter 26
THE DILEMMA OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE
richard a. best, jr.
1. Introduction
The United States Intelligence Community has long been a matter of keen interest
to the public and, increasingly, to historians and political scientists. Yet, for both the
public and scholars, the focus has usually been on the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and its human agents gathering information in exotic locales and occasion-
ally engaging in covert or not-so-covert activities against states, groups or individu-
als that are seen as threatening American interests. Some attention is also given to
CIA analysts who try with varying degrees of success or failure to put together what
may begin as random dots into a recognizable picture that will enlighten the
Agency’s readership as to the interests, concerns, and goals of foreign entities. The
reality is, however, that other U.S. intelligence agencies in the Department of Defense
(DOD) actually contain the bulk—probably over 80 percent—of intelligence per-
sonnel in the Federal Government and consume a similar share of the intelligence
budget. It is also the DOD agencies that have undergone the most far-reaching
transformations in the past few years and whose future presents the greatest chal-
lenges to national-security policymakers.
The intelligence offices of the Army and Navy date back to the earliest years of
the Republic. They, along with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) established in
1961, and the intelligence agencies of the Marines and Air Force, continue to special-
ize in the analysis of foreign military developments (and DIA is responsible for
The views expressed in this chapter are Mr. Best’s and do not represent those of any
government agency.
the dilemma of defense intelligence 423
managing defense attachés posted at U.S. embassies throughout the world). Their
responsibilities largely reflect their historic mission of providing support to the
operating forces. However, three large technical agencies that are part of DOD—the
National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)—were established to manage
technical collection and dissemination efforts for the entire Intelligence Community,
not just DOD. They do not concentrate solely on military targets but provide intel-
ligence in response to a wide variety of military and civilian requirements that are
established in an interagency process.
These three technical agencies in DOD (at times in close collaboration with
CIA) have been responsible for dramatic technological developments that have
served as a catalyst for what some term a military-technical revolution. In particu-
lar, they have made possible a linkage of precise intelligence with precision guided
munitions that has altered the way wars are to be fought in the twenty-first century,
reduced the danger of nuclear holocaust inherent in the strategic planning that pre-
vailed during the second half of the twentieth century, and decisively influenced
military force-planning with major budgetary implications.
Yet the contribution of these agencies has not been fully appreciated and the
relationship between them and the leadership of the Intelligence Community has
often been misrepresented. Over the years, various intelligence reformers have
argued that NSA, the NRO, and the NGA should be transferred out of DOD and
placed under the direct control of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) or,
more recently, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). These proposals have
not been accepted, but not merely because of the bureaucratic clout of DOD and
the congressional armed services and appropriations committees. No Washington
observer discounts the significance of bureaucratic turf, but the inherent need for
these agencies to remain part of the larger defense effort even as they also support
non-defense consumers has always won out in the end.
Since the Eisenhower administration the U.S. Intelligence Community has been
challenged to find a way to ensure that multibillion-dollar signals-intelligence
(sigint) and satellite-reconnaissance efforts are carefully coordinated to meet the
needs of all agencies and are managed to avoid duplication of coverage and waste of
resources that has from time to time occurred. For decades inadequate cooperation
has frustrated intelligence leaders in all agencies—DCIs and DNIs, secretaries of
defense, national security advisers, and indeed presidents—yet no ready solution
has as yet presented itself.
Terrorist attacks in 2001 gave the American public a vision of a divided, “stove-
piped” Intelligence Community whose member agencies did not work well together
and which could not even share vital information with each other. Means to encour-
age better coordination was a principle recommendation of post-9/11 investigations
and, in response, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
established the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with greatly
expanded tasking and budgeting authorities over the entire Intelligence Community,
including the DOD agencies. That Act did not, however, remove NSA, the NRO, and
the NGA from DOD and the statutory authorities of the secretary of defense were
left intact. Given the limited public understanding of the role of these agencies, it is
unsurprising that some believe that real reform has been thwarted and are convinced
the 9/11 Commission’s agenda remains incomplete.
2. The Three Technical Agencies

There is not a large literature about the technical intelligence agencies of DOD.
Their work is technical and lacks the drama of human agents. Many of their activi-
ties are undertaken in obscure buildings by civilian and military officials whose
names rarely come to public attention. The historical offices of these agencies pre-
pare valuable and carefully researched monographs, but delays in declassification
and limited release to the public do not encourage widespread understanding of the
role of these agencies within the Intelligence Community.
The National Security Agency, located at Ft. Meade, Maryland, was secretly
established by President Harry Truman in 1952 to centralize the sigint and commu-
nications security efforts of the entire Federal Government. Although U.S. success
in breaking Japanese codes prior to and during World War II was well publicized,
postwar efforts were scattered and there was grave concern about sigint capabilities
during the Korean War. Truman consolidated the sigint efforts of the services in a
single agency responsible for collection in response to requirements of national
policymakers. NSA developed into a large organization comprised of both civilian
and military personnel that has provided unique intelligence to policymakers and
that, as a combat support agency, also developed extensive ties to operating forces.
In the post–Cold War environment, NSA has faced difficult challenges as new types
of communication—cell phones, fax machines, the Internet, etc.—have expanded
and sophisticated encryption has become easily available. Efforts to gather intelli-
gence on terrorist groups with domestic links led NSA into controversy and
criticism.
The National Reconnaissance Office, headquartered in Chantilly, Virginia,
develops and operates reconnaissance satellites. It has a distinguished history of
technical accomplishments; for policymakers the arrival of “national technical
means” of verification in the 1960s made possible a series of arms-limitation agree-
ments that would not have been possible otherwise. Satellite-derived intelligence
regarding Soviet capabilities had a direct influence on U.S. weapons-acquisitions
policies, probably allowing the United States to avoid costly weapons programs that
would otherwise have been deemed necessary. Satellites have of course always been
big-ticket items and the post-Cold War determination to reduce defense spending,
the growth of the civilian satellite market, and the increasing availability of imagery
from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have called into question the need for major
investments in new and very expensive cutting-edge satellite technologies.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, slated to move to Ft. Belvoir in

Springfield, Virginia, was created in 1996 (as the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency) to combine the Defense Mapping Agency, various DOD imagery offices,
and CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center. Far from World War II ana-
lysts looking at aerial photographs over light tables, today’s geospatial intelligence
(geoint) aims at computerized presentations of data from multiple sources, includ-
ing satellites and UAVs, to support precise targeting and carefully focused military
operations. The NGA, like NSA, is a combat support agency and serves military
commanders down to tactical levels, along with national customers.
It would be difficult and invidious to weigh the contributions of these agencies
in comparison with the CIA (and it has to be noted that there has been operational
cooperation between each of the three and the CIA at various times). Nevertheless,
their efforts have altered the nature of warfare and peacemaking/peacekeeping in
ways that were not anticipated when the CIA was established in 1947. The ability to
see behind forbidden borders, to sift endless volumes of international communica-
tions, and to present intricate imagery to all levels of decision-makers has altered
the nature of both policy making and warfare. To a large extent the availability of
intelligence from many different sources and in almost limitless quantities in “real-
time” to both policymakers in Washington and battlefield commanders has helped
to dissolve the practical significance of traditional (and statutory) distinctions
between national and tactical intelligence.
Human intelligence (humint) remains vital, but its techniques are classic and
improvements are a matter of selecting and training more and better agents; invest-
ing more in human intelligence is necessary but it is unlikely that the trade will be
revolutionized. Technical systems, on the other hand, have changed dramatically in
the past few decades and the implications of these changes for the management of
the Intelligence Community as a collective entity are not well appreciated.
3. The Evolution of Coordination

The National Security Act of 1947 established the position of Director of Central
Intelligence but did not envision an official responsible for the direct supervision
of a variety of different agencies. It was only with the establishment of NSA a half-
decade later and the subsequent commitment to large and costly programs of
satellite reconnaissance that the Eisenhower Administration, concerned about
both the Soviet threat and budgetary solvency, sought to achieve greater coordi-
nation among growing intelligence agencies to contain costs and avoid duplica-
tion of effort. Eisenhower’s DCI, Allen Dulles, a veteran of the Office of Strategic
Services in World War II, nevertheless, preferred to concentrate his attention on
the traditional clandestine missions of the CIA and rebuffed even direct entreaties
from the president to work on community-wide organizational issues. John
McCone, Dulles’ successor as DCI, attempted to extend his authority to NSA and
DIA and established a National Intelligence Program Evaluation (NIPE) Staff to
review intelligence efforts across the Community. Agreement was also reached on
a strategic reconnaissance program with a leadership team for the nascent NRO
was established with the CIA and DOD sharing leadership. His efforts to wield
greater control over defense agencies were, however, successfully resisted by
Secretary of Defense McNamara.
Richard Helms, DCI from 1966 to 1973, was, like Dulles, a product of CIA’s
clandestine services and rebuffed entreaties to focus on community-wide issues. In
a 1971 directive, President Nixon emphasized the importance of the DCI’s commu-
nity-wide responsibilities, advising Helms to “give the role of community leader-
ship your primary attention and, delegate, as much as possible, the day-to-day
management of the CIA” (quoted by Garthoff 2007, 303). Helms was not responsive
to these instructions but did rename and expand the NIPE as the Intelligence
Community Staff.
On the other hand, Stansfield Turner, DCI under President Carter, tried to
achieve a much higher degree of centralized control of the Intelligence Community;
he sought in particular, “full control of these collection agencies” (quoted by
Garthoff 2007, 136). He created community leadership positions for collection,
analysis, and resource management and intended that they provide him with a
significant degree of authority, direction, and control over DOD’s technical agen-
cies. Ultimately, Turner did not achieve his ambition of creating a centralized intel-
ligence community in large measure because President Carter chose not to overrule
DOD’s insistence on maintaining its managerial authorities. His general approach,
however, as described in his memoirs, influenced many interested in reorganizing
the intelligence effort, including several outside commissions in subsequent
decades.
Beginning in the 1970s there was considerable congressional encouragement for
community-wide management initiatives and interest in legislating a charter for
intelligence activities. Although specific charter legislation was not enacted, a suc-
cession of executive orders, E.O. 11905, E.O. 12036, and E.O. 12333, signed by Presidents
Ford, Carter, and Reagan respectively, was adopted that provided among other
things a leadership role for the DCI that extended to all intelligence agencies, includ-
ing the major DOD agencies. (This principle was included in several amendments
to the National Security Act during the 1990s.) The DCI was to develop the annual
budget for national intelligence activities, produce and disseminate national foreign
intelligence, and assign analytic tasks to intelligence agencies. The DCI would also
establish and chair interagency bodies to determine priorities for collection and
production. Yet in the same executive orders and statutes, the secretary of defense
retained authorities to direct, operate, control, and provide fiscal management of
DOD agencies.
Although the DCI coordinated the preparation of the budget for the National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) that included the technical agencies in DOD,
he did not really have authority to make final decisions. The budgetary authorities
of secretaries of defense—reinforced by the roles of the powerful armed services

and appropriations committees—have had a predominant influence on the acquisi-
tion programs and operations of the three technical intelligence agencies.
DCIs and DNIs have had to negotiate within these constraints. Differences
between the DCI’s staff and DOD were inevitable; disputes arose over organiza-
tional issues—DOD and officials in Intelligence Community Staff argued over
ownership of reconnaissance programs which had to share many components with
the other DOD non-intelligence satellite programs. Few questioned that NSA had
to be responsive primarily to DCI tasking, but arguments arose over direct support
to military forces and in regard to some sigint collection undertaken by the CIA.
Under Turner there was an atmosphere of acrimony that probably encouraged sub-
sequent DCIs to avoid major confrontations with secretaries of defense.
Given their DOD-centric culture and the fact that the secretary of defense ulti-
mately controlled their budgets, NSA and its sister agencies were also inclined to be
responsive to the support of combatant forces. Without access to classified records,
it is not possible to judge the results of day-to-day arguments between national and
defense missions over the years, but it can be reasonably assumed that the process
of establishing priorities inevitably left some participants feeling that they had not
achieved their optimum goals.
It was not only budget authorities and military culture that influenced the rela-
tionships between DCIs and the technical agencies of DOD. The world outside the
United States is always the focus of Intelligence Community attention. The need to
gain information on Soviet missile, air, and submarine bases was the key justifica-
tion for building satellite systems in the Eisenhower administration. Intercepted
Soviet communications would hopefully provide indications and warning of the
dreaded attack in Central Europe. Strategic intelligence was costly but it had a pro-
found influence on the design of weapons systems for decades and the negotiation
of strategic arms control agreements. Yet, in large measure these were primarily
issues for Washington-level policymakers and not the operating forces deployed
throughout the world. For many years, much sensitive information whether from
signals intelligence or from overhead imagery was not shared with the operating
forces beyond the most senior levels and even they were not necessarily fully briefed.
In the 1970s, Turner and others could reasonably argue that giving DCIs greater
control over the budgets, programs, and personnel of the NSA, NRO, and the pre-
decessors of the NGA would facilitate the orchestration of reconnaissance systems
in support of a relatively narrow range of top-level priorities for Washington
policymakers.
The evolution of military technology generally and intelligence technology in
particular has, however, dramatically altered the relationship of the national intel-
ligence agencies and the operating forces. Although combining “real-time” intelli-
gence with precision-guided munitions was achieved in the latter stages of the
Vietnam War, this capability came of age during the Gulf War of 1990–91 when
video footage of missiles finding their ways to specific buildings or automobiles was
widely published. Desert Storm led many observers to envision a “military technical
revolution” that would demand that the United States adopt new weapons systems,
new doctrines and strategies, along with changed force dispositions. Whether mili-
tary technical revolution is an accurate characterization is an issue that lies beyond
the scope of the current discussion, but the ramifications of the Desert Storm expe-
rience were profound for the Intelligence Community. The need to closely link
“sensors and shooters” became a familiar mantra. Various approaches were taken to
facilitate the use of information from national systems by combat commanders.
President Clinton made support to military operations a principal mission of intel-
ligence agencies. The campaign in the former Yugoslavia provided an opportunity
to refine techniques even if there were unfortunate mistakes such as the bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on the assumption that the building was related to
defense procurement.
Much of the planning for the attack on Iraq in 2003 was based on planned use
of intelligence to locate key Iraqi targets that could then be neutralized, facilitating
a rapid advance on Baghdad with far fewer troops than many (including the Joint
Chiefs of Staff) believed were required. General Tommy Franks described the per-
vasive use of intelligence from satellites and other sources:
Our reconnaissance capability covered a wide band of the electromagnetic
spectrum. And visual imagery from UAVs and medium and high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft—presented in both live video and digital photography—
was augmented by satellite coverage. Sensors on these platforms provided not only
daylight photography, but also an infrared-detecting capability that could identify
the heat radiating from vehicle engines … or a man’s body. Synthetic aperture radar
scanning from aircraft and satellites could detect the shape of armored vehicles,
trucks, or artillery pieces. And JSTARS reconnaissance aircraft could pinpoint
moving vehicles in any weather or light condition:” (Franks 2004, pp. 446–47)
In 2003 with state-of-the-art intelligence capabilities, the United States and its
allies were able to complete the mission of removing the Iraqi regime of Saddam
Hussein in less than a month (even if the postwar reconstruction took somewhat
longer than anticipated). The changes in the ways that national intelligence was
used in Desert Storm, Bosnia, and Iraq inevitably would change the way it had to be
managed in the future.
4. September 11 Shocks the System

The attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, not
unnaturally called into the question the ability of the federal government to acquire
and disseminate information on potential threats to the U.S. homeland. A funda-
mental problem perceived in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was the failure of
intelligence agencies to share information and the resulting inability of analysts to
“connect the dots.”
Investigations by the two congressional intelligence committees, the National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission)
and, subsequently, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the WMD Commission), led to a
number of recommendations for reforming the Intelligence Community.
The spotlight quickly centered on the CIA and the FBI and the larger failure of
law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share information and work closely
together. The 9/11 Commission described how a “wall” had been erected between
intelligence and law enforcement information that had a direct influence on efforts
to share information about the 9/11 attackers. The wall between law enforcement
and foreign intelligence was to a large extent torn down in a number of important
pieces of legislation beginning with the USA Patriot Act of October 2001.
In general public interest was not focused on the intelligence agencies in DOD.
The 9/11 Commission did not demonstrate that poor coordination of the defense
agencies had contributed to 9/11. (NSA did come under some criticism for not shar-
ing certain intercepts that might have involved U.S. persons and terrorists, but that
probably derived from the application of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
[FISA] and not poor coordination by DOD.)
Nevertheless, the 9/11 Commission, strongly supported by the families of those
lost in the 9/11 attacks, drew upon earlier recommendations by Turner and others to
argue for a National Intelligence Director to “manage the national intelligence pro-
gram and oversee the agencies that contribute to it” (9/11 Commission Report 2004,
411). Placing a single cabinet-level official in charge of the entire intelligence effort
would, it was assumed both by the 9/11 Commission and many in Congress, help
ensure proper threats were identified, appropriate collection tasking established,
and relevant information shared.
5. The Era of the DNI

Election year commitments by both parties to enact most of the recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission ensured that legislative action was inevitable in 2004. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the position
of Director of National Intelligence as head of the Intelligence Community. The
DNI essentially inherited the community-wide responsibilities of the DCI while the
occupant of a newly established position of Director of the CIA assumed the DCI’s
duties for the day-to-day operations of the CIA.
Prior to 2004 the statutory authorities of the DCI to establish collection and
production priorities and to prepare the National Foreign Intelligence Program bud-
get were counterbalanced by the statutory authorities of the secretary of defense to
receive budgetary allocations and to execute the budgets of these agencies. An analy-
sis of the complex mechanisms of defense budgeting processes and procedures lies
beyond the scope of this discussion, but, during consideration of the bills that even-
tually became the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the
secretary of defense and members of the two congressional armed services commit-
tees were determined to protect DOD’s organizational interests even as intelligence
reformers were equally determined to establish a DNI with the authority to manage
the entire Intelligence Community. After considerable wrangling, the final text of
the Act provided that the DNI would provide guidance to DOD for developing the
National Intelligence Program budget (and would participate in the development of
the budgets for primarily military intelligence programs). In addition, the DNI
would monitor the implementation and execution of the NIP by defense (and other)
national-level agencies. The DNI also has significant authorities to reprogram funds
and transfer personnel within certain limitations. However, in deference to DOD, the
Act also included a provision (section 1018) that changes would be made “in a man-
ner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of
the departments of the United States Government concerning such departments.”
The legislative balance reflected in such language demonstrated the degree of ambi-
guity necessary to win passage of the legislation and of course accommodated elements
of bureaucratic turf. Government departments and congressional committees are never
keen to see large parts of their domains transferred out from under them. There is a more
fundamental issue, however, that undoubtedly influenced the final text of the legislation.
If the DNI were to have complete authority, direction, and control of the national intel-
ligence agencies of DOD, the existing direct linkages between these agencies with DOD’s
operating forces, could be compromised. These linkages have become vastly more per-
vasive and integral to military operations than those existing as recently as the 1980s
when DCI Turner’s efforts to gain control of NSA, the NRO, and NGA were rebuffed.
Given the integration of intelligence into military planning and operations that
had occurred since the end of the Cold War, it was not seen as reasonable to remove
the producers of this information from DOD. Making combat commanders work
through an ODNI bureaucracy would at least complicate operations. In addition,
acquisition strategies for intelligence systems are closely linked to weapons systems
whose acquisition is completely under the purview of DOD. Accordingly, Congress
sought to compromise; it gave the DNI authorities, staff, status, and independence
that DCIs never possessed, but it still did not cut the ties that bind NSA, the NRO, and
the NGA to DOD. In choosing to split the difference, Congress may not have provided
the response that many sought but it avoided drastic changes that others feared.
6. The Special Challenge of Satellites

The complexity of the relationship between the Intelligence Community and DOD
is reflected in current disputes over the future of satellite reconnaissance programs,
which can serve as a case study of the larger problem. The Intelligence Community
and military commanders depend upon satellite-derived information to meet both

national and military intelligence needs, but satellite reconnaissance programs are
integrally related to other space programs involving communications, early warn-
ing, space control, and precision navigation. All depend on the Air Force launch
vehicles. What affects one aspect of these complicated networks of relationships has
implications for many others.
At present satellite programs are facing crucial decision points. A number of
assessments in the past few years have expressed deep concerns about the state of
satellite programs that have included several failed acquisition efforts involving
multi-billion dollar losses; a space workforce, a high portion of which is approach-
ing retirement with insufficient replacements being trained; uncertainties about
how much reliance should be placed on commercial imagery; inadequate research
and development; and growing competition from other countries. One review con-
cluded that: “After decades of success and clear leadership in space, our ability to
develop and field new capabilities is plagued by a persistent pattern of overruns,
delays, and cancellations, while global space technology spreads and other nations
are vigorously pursuing competitive space-based capabilities” (Institute for Defense
Analyses 2008, 1). For its part, the House Intelligence Committee judged in 2008
that “current trends with respect to the space constellation indicate that it will soon
be incapable of satisfying the national security needs” (U.S. Congress 2008, 2).
As a result, many seek a comprehensive “space architecture” that would set forth
prioritized and well-defined objectives for satellite acquisition (including ground
components) to meet both national and military needs, appropriately balanced
between cost and risk, and realistic delivery schedules. With such an architecture in
place, it would be possible to draw up acquisition schedules and to initiate budget-
ary requests. Congress has called for such an architecture for several years but has
not considered the executive branch’s response satisfactory.
From its inception in 1961, the NRO has in a variety of different ways come
under the shared authority of the DCI/DNI and DOD/Air Force. In addition, given
the nature of the space industry, it is difficult to conceive that current problems
could be resolved, or even realistically addressed, if the NRO were essentially trans-
ferred from DOD to the DNI. It is noteworthy that a prominent group of experts on
space issues recently took a diametrically opposite approach, recommending that
the NRO be removed from the Intelligence Community and placed under a national
security space authority who would report to both the DNI and the secretary of
defense and to whom would be assigned the functions currently assigned to the
NRO, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, and other organizations and
possessed of authority to formulate and execute budgets for space efforts across the
government. (Institute for Defense Analyses 2008, 18, 21).
Furthermore, there is interest both in Congress and in DOD in providing the
military services with separate operationally responsive space systems not launched
or operated by the NRO. Separate satellites for DOD might be useful in some cir-
cumstances, but high costs would be involved and it is doubtful that such a move
would facilitate the development of a comprehensive space architecture.
There are a number of intertwined issues affecting space programs that

extend in different directions. Some suggest that high-quality commercial imag-
ery and relatively inexpensive UAVs can meet likely DOD requirements in an era
of limited wars and peacekeeping operations. They argue that heavily investing
in advanced space technologies is not cost-effective. Others counter that advanced
satellite technologies might produce decisive, if as yet unforeseen, advances. If
the United States does not make the necessary investments in future space tech-
nologies, other countries, it is feared, may forge ahead. Furthermore, they note
that if highly skilled personnel and research-and-development facilities are
allowed to disappear, recreating such capabilities would be enormously difficult
and time consuming.
Ultimately, the future of space surveillance will have to be decided by weighing
competing concerns and agency perspectives. The question for policymakers is how
to structure the decision-making process and how to address the imperatives of
national policymakers and military commanders within budgetary limitations.
7. The Way Ahead

The relationship between the DOD agencies and the ODNI is a crucial one that
is in many ways similar to other organizational relationships affecting the
national security effort of the federal government. Government officials in both
the executive and legislative branches are familiar and comfortable with hierar-
chical “stovepipes.” Most intuitively understand authority, direction, and control
and placing one person in charge of an effort and holding him or her responsible
for results. Accordingly, many within and outside the executive branch, most
recently the 9/11 Commission, have sought to establish a single leadership posi-
tion for U.S. intelligence with something approaching “authority, direction, and
control,” including budgetary control, but it has not happened for different rea-
sons at different times.
The challenge facing the U.S. Intelligence Community is to find a creditable
way to coordinate efforts of the various agencies, especially those in DOD, to fulfill
intelligence requirements that exist in every echelon of government. The first two
DNIs, John D. Negroponte and J. M. McConnell, actively sought to use their posi-
tion to improve interagency coordination and ensure that information is shared
throughout the government. There appears to be consensus that their efforts left
much to be done and President Barack Obama’s DNI, retired Admiral Dennis
C. Blair, is dealing with a work in progress.
The need for close coordination between the ODNI and NSA, the NRO and the
NGA will remain even if the three national agencies remain organizationally in DOD.
The mechanisms for coordination will depend not only on a large number of inter-
agency committees and working groups but also on the evolution of a common
Intelligence Community culture, a task perhaps made easier by the maturation of a

workforce that came of age after the end of the Cold War. There will have to be a period
of organic growth in meeting the intelligence needs of these disparate consumers.
Some success has been achieved in building a new “intelligence culture” based
at least as much on a need to share information rather than a need to protect secu-
rity. Steps that appear relatively small to outside observers such as requiring the
acceptance of badges from one agency at all others and mandating assignments in
other agencies prior to promotion to senior positions send real-world messages to
intelligence officials at all levels. Much has depended and much will depend on the
working relationships achieved by senior intelligence leaders or required by presi-
dents. A strong and persisting contest of wills between a DNI and a secretary of
defense would be hugely entertaining for the media, but it would probably not make
the Intelligence Community more effective.
There are other efforts to reform the national security structures of the federal
government to adapt to changing conditions where demands on government shift
rapidly from traditional state-to-state relationships, to international terrorists, or to
natural or man-made disasters. As is the case with the Intelligence Community,
these reform efforts may not be dependent on changes in authority, direction, and
control of multiple agencies, but upon developing means to allow and require flex-
ible and agile responses as the national interest changes.
The experience of the Intelligence Community since 1947 demonstrates the
challenges involved and the difficulties in finding the right solution to problems of
interagency coordination. In a genuine crisis, key leaders maintaining constant con-
tact can force coordination, but a president and his cabinet officers can only moni-
tor so many crises at a given time. The press of government business in the
twenty-first century will likely require better structures to facilitate cooperation at
all levels of government on a day-to-day basis. The experience of the DCIs and
DNIs in coordinating the work of large agencies in DOD should be useful in indi-
cating the difficulties and limitations as well as the inevitable influences of changing
conditions in the outside environment. There are no textbook solutions, perhaps
not even a single optimum approach. Both practitioners and scholars will, at the
least, need to be aware of the dilemmas facing those all those who must deal with
complicated security environments under heavy pressures.
REFERENCES
Franks, T., with M. McConnell. 2004. American Soldier. New York: Regan Books.
Garthoff, D. F. 2007. Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, 1946–2005. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books; first published, CIA Center
for the Study of Intelligence, 2005.
Institute for Defense Analyses. 2008. Leadership, Management, and Organization for
National Security Space: Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the
Organization and Management of National Security Space. Alexandria, Va. (July).
U.S. Congress. 2008. 110th Congress. 2nd sess. House of Representatives. Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. Report on Challenges and Recommendations for United
States Overhead Architecture. House Report 110–914. (October 3).
U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. 9/11
Commission Report. Washington, D.C.
part vi
INTELLIGENCE
DISSEMINATION
chapter 27
THE POLICYMAKER-
INTELLIGENCE
RELATIONSHIP
mark m. lowenthal
Introduction
Although intelligence operations—meaning espionage, technical collection, covert
action, and counterintelligence—are the central themes of the popular view of
intelligence, nothing is more central to intelligence than the relationship between
the policymaker and the analyst. As former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
Richard Helms said in his memoirs, “the absolute essence of the intelligence pro-
fession rests in the production of current intelligence reports, memoranda
and National Intelligence Estimates on which sound policy can be made” (Helms
2003, 237).
This chapter proceeds from three key points:
1. The centrality of the analyst (producer) relationship with the consumer (or
policymaker). Providing intelligence analysis to policymakers is the
essential function of the overall intelligence process.
2. Intelligence serves policymakers. Intelligence exists as part of the larger
apparatus that works for policymakers. Intelligence has no meaningful
function beyond this relationship, no independent existence. Thus, it is
not a relationship of equals. The government is run by and for
policymakers, the most senior of whom govern by virtue of having won an
election, which then gives them the right to appoint other senior officials
438 intelligence dissemination
in policy positions. Although some appointments may be made to senior

intelligence positions as well, the largest part of the intelligence structure
will be untouched by elections or changes in government. They can be
viewed as being non-partisan or simply as part of the permanent
government bureaucracy. In the United States, intelligence officers
describe the relationship succinctly: “There are policy successes and
intelligence failures. There are never policy failures and intelligence
successes.”
3. The strict line, at least in Western intelligence practice, between
policymakers and intelligence officers. In brief, the very strict rule is that
intelligence officers do not make policy, nor do they make policy
recommendations in their intelligence analysis. This separation is
maintained to ensure that the intelligence analysis is objective, stemming
from the view that if intelligence officers were to make policy
recommendations they might be tempted to shade their ongoing analysis to
show that their recommendations had been correct.
Even with these fairly simple and straightforward ground rules, the relationship
between the policymaker and the intelligence analyst can be difficult and even frac-
tious. This can be caused by personalities, by the issues being dealt with or by the
very nature of the relationship itself, which is not one of equals, within an often
tense atmosphere. The experience of the intelligence services in the United States,
Britain, and Australia in the aftermath of the analysis of Iraqi WMD (2002) is per-
haps the hallmark of how this relationship can go seriously wrong despite the best
of intentions on both sides.
Definitions
Like any other profession, intelligence has its own jargon. “Consumer” is a word
often used to denote the policymaker. The word “client” is used as well. Neither of
these words is particularly apt, despite their widespread use. Client is perhaps most
problematic when it means a dependent relationship. Client is slightly more accu-
rate when it means someone who engages the professional services of another,
although this also implies a commercial aspect to the relationship that is again inapt.
Customer is sometimes used as well, running into the same economic issue.
Consumer is perhaps better, as it means one who consumes, or uses something (in
this case, intelligence) but it again has an economic connotation. The problem with
the economic inference is that it suggests a more symbiotic relationship than is the
case. In economics, the buyer and the seller both need each other and, although they
may not be equals, they are interdependent. This is not the case for intelligence and
policy. The relationship is not symbiotic in that the policymaker can exist without
the policymaker-intelligence relationship 439
the intelligence officer but the opposite is not true. Thus, it is best to think of these
consumers more straightforwardly as policymakers.
On the other side of the relationship, we have the producers. If we think of the
policymaker as a consumer, then the phrase producer is apt. The intelligence officer
produces what the policymaker consumes. But the production metaphor has pit-
falls of its own. It suggests a somewhat mechanical process by which intelligence
analysis is churned out, almost like sausages. Indeed, intelligence officers do refer to
the intelligence process—meaning the steps by which requirements are defined,
intelligence is collected and processed, then analyzed and then disseminated to the
policymaker—as intelligence production. Such a process exists and is followed
every day. It makes sense and it tends to work—much of the time. But intelligence
analysis is not the result of a mechanical process; it is the result of an intellectual
process. Production is a regularized process of multiple steps used to create the
same outcome time after time—an assembly line of some sort. Intelligence analysis
is about as far from this idea as one can get. Production also emphasizes outcome in
numbers. How many widgets did we produce today? Again, this bears little relation-
ship to a rational intelligence process. So, just as policymaker (vice consumer) is
preferable on one side of the relationship, intelligence officer or analyst is preferable
on the other—if for no other reason than to establish the proper framework for the
relationship and its expected outcomes.
Expectations
What, as Sigmund Freud famously asked, do they want? Not the same thing. Let us
begin with mindsets. The policymakers, whether they are elected or appointed by
those who are elected, are optimists. They believe that they can make things happen
for the better. That is one of the reasons they seek higher office. Therefore, what
they want is success for the policies they espouse or put into action. The ultimate
determinant of the relative success of these policies is not the policies themselves
but the reactions of the voters. Re-election is an endorsement, an affirmation of
approval by the voters. Defeat is the ultimate rejection.
Within the context of their relationship with intelligence, policymakers also
expect that their intelligence agencies have the ability to respond to any and all
issues that arise, no matter how remote or obscure. This cannot be true, even in
an intelligence community as large as that of the United States. However, the
perception on the part of the policymakers continues to exist. Moreover, the
behavior of intelligence officers tends to reinforce this policy perception. During
a crisis—no matter how obscure or ultimately inconsequential—the intelligence
officers will do all they can to meet every policymaker need, to shine in the
moment of crisis. Of course, the intelligence officers have little choice. They have
no “bait-and-switch capacity,” that is, they cannot offer to provide intelligence
on Country X, about which there is a fair amount known, to displace the ongo-
ing concern over Country Y, which is currently in crisis but is relatively obscure.
However, the net result of the intelligence officers’ efforts is to reinforce the ini-
tial policymaker perception that the intelligence agencies can and do cover any
and all countries and issues.
Finally, policymaker expectations tend to change the longer the policymaker
remains in office. According to a former senior intelligence officer, new administra-
tions or governments tend to start off being very impressed with what their intelli-
gence agencies can do for them, even though many of these policymakers have
served in government before, although likely in lower positions. However, over
time, the policymakers become jaded and will ask to see “the good stuff,” as if the
intelligence officers have been holding out on them. When they are told that they
have been seeing “the good stuff,” the policymakers are disappointed (McLaughlin
2005).
What intelligence officers want more than anything else is access. They want to
know what policies are being developed or pursued so they can focus their analysis
on these areas and thus contribute to the policy process. They want policymakers
to read their analysis. They want to brief senior policymakers, which is the ultimate
form of access. (This is not to suggest that intelligence officers do not also want their
nation’s policies to be successful. They do, as committed and patriotic citizens.
But they do not have the same personal investment in these policies as do the
policymakers, for the reasons noted above.)
These very different motivations and expectations are fraught with peril and
can lead to serious problems in the policy-intelligence relationship, as will be dis-
cussed below.
One way to understand the nature of the policy-intelligence relationship is to
look at how they interact throughout the intelligence process.
Requirements
If one starts from the point that intelligence officers do not make policy, then
requirements should be the realm of policy officers. After all, requirements are a
definition of those topics, issues, areas and countries about which policymakers are
most concerned. It is up to the policymakers to make this determination. Most
often, this has been done informally, with intelligence officers playing “catch up,”
usually after the fact. It has been rare for policymakers to offer precise guidelines as
to their intelligence requirements. There are several reasons for this. One is that
policymakers do not have the time to do so and they have rarely seen the need to do
so, assuming that the intelligence officers will follow in their wake and respond
accordingly. Another reason is the policymakers’ unstated concern that if they create
such a list, the intelligence officers will concentrate only on those items on the
list and nothing else. Some policymakers may also fear that their issues will come
out lower on the requirements list and therefore would prefer no list, leaving them
free to levy requirements to which some intelligence officers are more likely to
respond.
The requirements issue has become more problematic in the post-Cold War
world. During the Cold War, according to DCI Robert Gates, roughly 50 percent of
all intelligence funds and activities went to some aspect of the Soviet problem: the
Soviet Union itself, its allies, its surrogates, and so on (Lowenthal 2009, 13). This
made requirements rather simple: there was the Soviet Union (broadly defined) and
there was everything else. There were brief intervals during the Cold War during
which the Soviet Union was not the primary concern but these were ephemeral. In
the absence of a large, monolithic threat there is much more jockeying for primacy
among different priorities and among different constituencies in the policymaker
community. The increased emphasis on the terrorist issue in the aftermath of 2001
has not made this easier. Rather, terrorism has made requirements more difficult
because it not only involves a foreign-based threat but also has domestic implica-
tions (cells based in one’s own country) as well as involving various first responders
(police, fire, emergency management) in a new and still-evolving concern called
homeland security.
These policy qualms notwithstanding, intelligence officers prefer to have a
specific list of policy preferences or requirements. This contradictory view stems
from the concern of intelligence officers that, unless they are given a means by
which to allocate collection and analytical resources, they will be held responsi-
ble for everything worldwide and will be more likely not to give proper prece-
dence to the key issues. The irony here, of course, is that even with a requirements
or priority system, intelligence officers still will be held responsible for events
worldwide.
However, if the policymakers do not establish a firm set of priorities, or if they
fail to update their priorities regularly, the intelligence officers are left in a difficult
position. They must respond to the stated needs of the policymakers as well as to
the most pressing issues. In the absence of policymaker guidance do the intelligence
officers act according to their own view of where they should put their greatest
effort, knowing that they are, in effect, usurping a policy function, or do they simply
continue to follow the old priorities, assuming these exist, despite the fact that these
are now dated? There is no good answer to this conundrum, although most intelli-
gence managers would likely favor risking usurpation rather than risking
irrelevance.
The problem with any intelligence-requirements system is that it cannot be
expected to foresee all of the events that are likely to arise once the priorities have
been established. There will always be new contingencies, or “ad hoc requirements,”
as they are often called, that will require a change—perhaps only short term—in
priorities and allocation of collection and analytic assets.
Collection
Collection should follow from requirements, assuming these have been set. If they
have not, then the collection managers again have to make educated “best guess”
decisions on collection priorities.
Beyond the priorities issue, the policymaker-intelligence officer relationship
most comes into play on collection issues that are not space-based—that is,
human collection (HUMINT, or espionage) broadly defined, or the use of air-
craft near or over foreign borders. These types of collection engage the policy-
intelligence relationship because they entail political risks, which space-based
collection does not. HUMINT is illegal in whichever country it is undertaken.
Any time an agent is caught there are political costs. If the agent has diplomatic
status he or she will be expelled. However, if the agent has non-official cover (that
is, cover based on some non-diplomatic reason as to why he or she works is in
country), then he or she is subject to the nation’s criminal justice system and cre-
ates further political costs and concerns.
Overflights by aircraft (or maritime intrusions by ships) also can entail political
and diplomatic costs. The classic case was the downing of a U-2 spy airplane over
the Soviet Union in May 1960. Given the sensitivity of these flights, each one was
approved by President Dwight Eisenhower. Ironically, in 1960 he did not want to
approve any more flights, fearing a possible Soviet interception and knowing that
the United States was close to achieving a space-based imagery capability. Intelligence
officers urged one last flight to observe Soviet missile sites. Eisenhower agreed, the
U-2 was shot down and the United States initially denied any knowledge or respon-
sibility, a cover-up that failed when the Soviets produced the pilot, Francis Gary
Powers, alive. Eisenhower had to reverse himself and to admit authorizing the
flights.
Policymakers have also curtailed collection activities for a variety of reasons.
Several presidents reined in human collection in Iran lest these activities upset the
Shah and his secret police, SAVAK. Thus, when the Shah fell in 1979, the United
States had few contacts with the new rulers of Iran. Similarly, President Jimmy
Carter curtailed U-2 flights over Cuba as a gesture to Fidel Castro—only to be sur-
prised by the acknowledgment that there was a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.
The tension here is obvious: intelligence collectors want to collect as much
intelligence as they can. Policymakers may be more concerned about political rami-
fications. However, there is an obverse side to this relationship. If the policymakers
approve a risky collection activity, the intelligence officers want to know that they
will be supported by those policymakers who made the decision and not left as
scapegoats should the collection go awry.
Parameters for accepted collection activities may also change over time. In 1995,
it was revealed that some Guatemalan officers who had been recruited by the CIA
had been involved in human-rights abuses. DCI John Deutch promulgated a new
set of collection guidelines, requiring that potential sources first be vetted for human
rights or criminal activities before they were recruited. Deutch argued that these
rules would still allow recruitments but would avoid unsavory surprises. But, at the
same time, he officially reprimanded those officers who had made the earlier recruit-
ments, which had happened long before the new guidelines were in place. This
after-the-fact imposition of standards cost Deutch much credibility at the CIA. It
also made clandestine service officers more cautious as to the people they might
approach (Gertz 2002, 69). CIA officials argued that no new recruitments were ever
denied under the Deutch rules, but officers held that many recruitments simply
were never made so as to avoid the issue entirely. The Deutch rules were abandoned
in the aftermath of 2001.
Analysis
Analysis, as was noted above, is the central interface between policymakers and
intelligence officers. This centrality derives from several factors. The first is the role
of analysis as the main intelligence contribution to the policy process. The second
is sheer numbers. Dozens and dozens of intelligence reports go over to the policy-
makers each day, from briefings for the president to memos or briefings for much-
lower-level officials. This is the aspect of intelligence that policymakers see most
often. Collection activities, most of them performed by satellites, also take place
daily but few of them will require policymaker decisions. Operations, discussed
below, do not occur that often either.
The first tension that intrudes in analysis stems from the differing expectations
noted above. Policymakers want success for their policies. They are optimists,
believing they can make things happen. Intelligence analysts are skeptics. They are
not certain that events will go one way or the other. Indeed, they are trained to think
of multiple plausible outcomes, several of which may not be pleasing to the policy-
makers. They may be able to give a rough order of likelihood, in which the preferred
outcome is first, but they cannot wholly exclude less positive outcomes, until they
begin to see events unfold. This is the core of what is known as estimative analysis.
Policymakers can react to this type of analysis in any number of ways. They may
accept it, listen to it and ignore it, take issue with it or attempt to get the analysis
changed. The reaction depends entirely on the policymaker and how he or she views
the issue and the intelligence officers. The reaction also depends on how much the
policymaker can accept the fact that intelligence tends to deal with ambiguities and
not certainties. A classic case was the fate of DCI John McCone, whose projections
on what actions were necessary to achieve victory (large ground forces, mining
Haiphong harbor) in Vietnam were unsettling to President Lyndon Johnson, who
favored a more incremental and, initially, limited approach. Johnson began to
exclude McCone from deliberations. McCone resigned as he saw his access dwindle
(Powers 1979, 165–67).
Because the relationship favors the policymaker, there is no perceived penalty

for the policymaker to ignore the intelligence analysis, except for the fact that a
poor decision may result. Of course, this outcome may result even if the intelligence
is heeded. The most dangerous outcome is politicization, meaning that the intelli-
gence is changed to please policymakers. This can happen in either of two ways.
The policymaker can either subtly or directly request that analysis be changed.
Or, the intelligence officer, knowing the policymaker’s preferred outcome, can initi-
ate the change, perhaps without even telling anyone. Politicization is probably the
most feared result in policy-intelligence relations in analysis. It is not clear how
often it actually happens, however. The most recent concern about politicization
arose concerning the intelligence produced in late 2002 in the United States, Britain,
and Australia assessing the state of Iraq’s WMD program. When it became clear that
these estimates were wrong, some critics asserted that the intelligence agencies had
bowed to political pressure, especially in Washington and London. Interestingly,
external post-war reviews of intelligence in all three nations each found analytical
flaws in how the assessments were produced but none found any evidence of politi-
cization (Senate Report 2004, 273, 283–84; Butler Report 2004, 76, 78, 80; Flood
Report 2004, 168).
One way that intelligence has been politicized in the United States has been the
recurring publication of unclassified versions of the key judgments (KJs) of national
intelligence estimates (NIEs). NIEs are as seen one of the most important types of
analysis written by U.S. intelligence, assessments in which most, if not all, intelligence
agencies take part to give their considered views of the likely directions of major issues.
NIEs are signed by the DNI and given to the president. KJs should be the main points
that are made in the estimate, written in somewhat shorter form to give busy readers
the gist without having to read the longer (often, much longer) estimate. Since the
Iraq WMD NIE (October 2002), the KJs of several subsequent estimates on Iraq or
terrorism have been published in unclassified format, often at the request of Congress.
These KJs have then become political cannon fodder in debates between the parties in
Congress and between Democrats in Congress and the Bush administration. Often,
partisans on one side or the other would “cherry pick” (that is, quote very selectively
from) the NIEs to prove their political stances. In October 2007, DNI Mike McConnell
announced that he would no longer publish unclassified KJs. However, in December
2007, an NIE on Iran’s nuclear program reversed the views held two years earlier, stat-
ing that the weaponization portion of Iran’s program had been halted in 2003 (National
Intelligence Council 2007). This was a significant change from past assessments. Some
observers also saw it as limiting the ability of the Bush administration to take action
against Iran. The changed assessment forced McConnell to reverse his decision and to
publish these KJs as well.
Perhaps it is useful that the fears of politicization are far greater than the actual-
ity of its occurrence if for no other reason than this serves as a constant warning
against this most intellectually corrupting of outcomes.
Iraq WMD intelligence analysis, coupled with but more important than 9/11 in
the United States, has proved to be a decisive moment in policymaker-intelligence
relations. It set off a quest for improved tradecraft and standards, both within the
intelligence community and imposed from without by order of Congress. The new
office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) promulgated new analytic
standards. If looked at analytically, these standards reflect the real or perceived flaws
underlying the Iraq WMD NIE. But these standards tend to be somewhat mechanis-
tic and they recognize that they may not achieve the stated goal: more accurate analy-
sis. In other words, an analyst can do each step in the standards (vet sources, think of
alternative explanations, and so on) and still come up with an errant bottom line.
This emphasis on improved accuracy indicates a significant change in how policy-
makers view intelligence. Simply put, the policymakers want intelligence analysis to
be more accurate more often. Few would argue with the desirability of this goal but
most intelligence professionals—and the more discerning policymakers—would
also recognize that this is very difficult to achieve. Here again lies the trap of the
“production” metaphor. A regularized process should result in more reliable
outcomes.
In the United States, policy-intelligence relations hit a nadir in 2004, with
George W. Bush administration officials and pro-administration press charging
that the intelligence community was “at war” with the administration and work-
ing to promote the election of Senator John Kerry. At one point in 2004, a senior
intelligence official called one of the president’s top aides to assure him that the
intelligence community was not trying to get Senator Kerry elected. This appears
to be an example of the expectations roller coaster noted above. The Bush admin-
istration came into office with apparently high regard for intelligence. President
George W. Bush requested that DCI George Tenet attend the president’s daily
briefing six days a week—something that had never happened before. (Past pres-
idents were briefed by CIA officers or by their own senior officials who had been
briefed by CIA officers.) Thus, the access goal came true at the highest level. But
when the Bush administration became disenchanted—largely as a result of the
stresses in Iraq, relations plummeted and probably never wholly recovered for
the rest of Bush’s term. Indeed, in one of his valedictory press interviews,
President Bush said his biggest regret “was the intelligence failure in Iraq” (ABC
World News 2008).
It is also important to remember that the policymakers are not a monolithic or
unitary entity. They are often rivals, both between departments and within depart-
ments as well. Often, more than just a specific policy decision rides on the outcomes
of their deliberations. Career advancement may be at stake as well. Therefore, policy-
makers may seek intelligence that supports their point of view or undercuts a rival’s.
This obviously puts intelligence officers in a difficult position. The best they can do
is to adhere strictly to their professional standards and avoid any policy prescrip-
tions in their analysis. But even this professional refuge may not protect intelligence
officers from the suspicion, if not the wrath, of policymakers who believe that the
intelligence has been written to aid rivals’ positions. This may become another
opportunity for politicization, as policymakers seek intelligence that will support
their views. This type of situation can also cause a rupture in the policy-intelligence
relationship if policymakers believe they cannot trust the intelligence officers, whom
the policymakers see as part of a rival’s support system.
The obverse of this set of problems is the intelligence officer’s response when
his or her analysis is ignored or refuted, either of which are wholly acceptable behav-
iors on the part of the policymaker. The analyst may be tempted to “shop around”
his or her analysis, to find some other policymaker who may be more willing to take
it seriously. This is an extremely dangerous choice for several reasons. First, it likely
oversteps the accepted norms of what an intelligence officer can do. Second, even if
the intelligence officer does find a more receptive policymaker, there are likely to be
costs to the analyst’s relationship with the first policymaker. This policymaker may
view the analyst’s behavior as duplicitous or as taking sides in a policy debate. Thus,
the analyst will risk losing credibility with the original policymaker on all future
issues. The game may not have been worth the candle. It would probably be better
for the analyst to make a second attempt to explain to the first policymaker why the
analysis has come out as it has. If the policymaker still is not receptive, the intelli-
gence officer can go up through the intelligence chain to explain to superiors why
he or she is concerned but, at the end of the day, the views or lack of receptivity on
the part of the policymaker will rule.
In the United States, Congress increasingly is requesting that analysis be written
by intelligence agencies for its specific use, as opposed to receiving copies of intelli-
gence analysis written for the usual executive-branch policymakers, which had
been past practice. Given the separation of powers in a nonparliamentary system,
this new type of request puts intelligence managers in a very difficult position.
Intelligence agencies work for the executive branch. They support the president or
cabinet-level policymakers and their staffs. Some significant portion of the Congress
will always be in opposition to any president. These members are likely to use intel-
ligence as one more means of questioning, if not attacking outright, the president’s
policies. Again, the best recourse for the intelligence officer is to adhere to strict
professional standards and to write the analysis in as straightforward a manner as
possible, not slanting it for any given reader. This will not prevent cherry picking or
some level of politicization from the opposition in Congress or resentment on the
part of executive-branch policymakers but it will keep standards intact. If an intel-
ligence manager is faced with directly competing priorities he or she has two unpal-
atable choices: delay work for the principal client, the executive-branch policymaker,
or delay work for Congress, who controls your budget.
Finally, policymakers can request that analysis be written as a means of provid-
ing cover for their decisions. The 2002 Iraq WMD estimate is a good example. This
estimate was requested by the Senate, not the president. The intelligence commu-
nity was given three weeks to update the 1998 estimate so that the Senate could have
the benefit of fresh intelligence prior to voting on a resolution authorizing the presi-
dent to use force to compel Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions on disarming its
suspected WMD. The resulting estimate made the case for continued Iraqi posses-
sion of chemical and biological weapons, a nascent nuclear capability—none of
which were found—and a missile program to deliver these weapons (which turned
out to be accurate). Ultimately, the Senate voted 77–23 to authorize the use of force.
When allied forces subsequently found no evidence of the WMD programs posited
in the NIE, many senators blamed the estimate for their vote, even though only six
senators had actually read the estimate. Other senators said they read the KJs or
were briefed on the estimate but neither of these actions was the same as reading the
entire NIE and would have provided a somewhat minimal basis for so consequen-
tial a vote (Raju et al. 2007). Still, the intelligence community could not counter-
argue, in large part because the estimate had been largely in error. Nor could the
intelligence community have refused to prepare the estimate in the first place, even
though senior officials understood the political rationale behind the Senate
request.
Budget
The intelligence budget is an important component in the policy-intelligence rela-
tionship. In the United States, the budget process also gives a second group of policy-
makers—Congress—an opportunity to determine the direction of all intelligence
activities.
The typical budget tension is that intelligence managers want more resources
and policymakers want to hold down costs. The argument for increased intelli-
gence resources is made more difficult by two facts. First, other than the office of the
DNI and the CIA, all other U.S. intelligence offices exist within cabinet depart-
ments, where they must compete for portions of the departmental budget with
many other constituencies, several of whom likely are seen as being more central to
the core mission of that department. For example, in the State Department, the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research will always come in a poor second (at best)
when up against any of the regional bureaus, which control the embassies around
the world. Second, it is much more difficult to determine what one gets for any
allotted amount of intelligence. The U.S. intelligence budget has two components,
the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program
(MIP). In September 2009, DNI Dennis C. Blair said that the overall intelligence
budget is now $75 billion. How does one evaluate the return on investment for that
sum: so much collection, so much analysis, so many operations? Or does one value
the expenditure by all of the bad things that did not happen: terrorist attacks, politi-
cal surprises overseas? Can these non-events be attributed to intelligence expendi-
tures? Unlike most other government activities, it is very difficult to relate means to
ends in intelligence budgets.
The same dynamic recurs in Congress, which has the power to make the actual
fiscal allocations to intelligence (as opposed to the budget sent up to Congress by
the President, which is a proposal but nothing more). Again, intelligence programs
are a tough sell, made more difficult in the legislature because the intelligence
programs are now competing with myriad domestic needs as well—all of which are
much more important to the legislators and their constituents. Indeed, when com-
pared with these other budget priorities, intelligence will often appear as an almost
“painless” place to make some budget savings.
For all of these reasons, intelligence budgets tend to be on a political roller
coaster, facing steep dips and rises but few periods of steady funding. This is espe-
cially problematic for intelligence as sudden infusions of funds cannot immedi-
ately make up for prolonged periods of shortfalls. For example, the U.S. intelligence
budget underwent severe reductions in the decade between the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the 2001 terrorist attacks—the so-called peace dividend. DCI
George Tenet has estimated that during this long financial drought, the intelligence
community lost the equivalent of 23,000 positions across all agencies. Most intell-
igence professionals would agree that the intelligence agencies were much less
capable by the end of this decade than they had been at the beginning. The large
sums added to the intelligence budget since 2001 only began to bear fruit years
later. It takes perhaps four or five years before an analyst is fully capable; the
National Clandestine Service estimates that it takes seven years before an officer is
ready to operate fully independently. It takes ten to twelve years to build the com-
plex collection systems that are put into orbit. However, intelligence officers can-
not take refuge in budget shortfalls to explain why they have failed to anticipate
some event or why they cannot produce all of the expected analyses. In the ideal
world, the requirements process would take into account current capabilities but
this is rarely the case.
Operations
Covert action is another pressure point in the policy-intelligence relationship.
Covert action refers to political activities undertaken overseas in which the fact of
external involvement will not be evident and will be plausibly deniable. Like espio-
nage, covert action is a politically high-risk intelligence activity. Here again, we have
competing sets of expectations. Policymakers are often drawn to covert action as
these seem to offer attractive ways to achieve outcomes when other ways either
seem less productive or too time-consuming. At the same time, policymakers differ
widely on the amount of risk or level of violence they are willing to tolerate. In the
United States, ordering a covert action is an intensely personal action for the presi-
dent, as he must sign the authorization for any covert action. The president cannot
delegate, escape, or evade his responsibility, which may serve to temper what he is
willing to order. For example, Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton had more
reservations about the covert actions they would authorize than did John Kennedy.
Indeed, Kennedy authorized more covert actions in his two-plus years in office than
did Dwight Eisenhower in the previous eight years (Weiner 2007, 180).
Intelligence officers are eager to be supportive of policymakers in an area where

they have a unique expertise. This is a realm where only intelligence can deliver.
However, intelligence officers do not want to be asked to undertake covert action
that has so many limitations on it as to render the activity feckless. Even more
importantly, intelligence officers do not want to be left as the scapegoat for a covert
action that does not succeed. They want political cover. After all, no covert action is
undertaken without a political order. Once again, however, the “policy success,
intelligence failure” rule may apply.
Paramilitary operations, such as support to the Contras in Nicaragua or the
Mujahedin in Afghanistan, tend to be the most problematic as they are larger and
tend to last longer, often several years. The intelligence officers in the field will have
developed strong professional and personal relationships with the forces they are
supporting. Policymakers will not. If a decision is made to end the paramilitary
covert action—usually because it does not seem to be succeeding despite the time
and resources put into it—the intelligence officers will not want to abandon their
forces while policymakers may be less concerned. In the end, of course, the policy
decision will prevail but it may lead to lingering resentment on the part of the intel-
ligence officers. If nothing else, they may be much less willing to undertake further
covert actions, fearing that they will lack political support as the action unfolds.
Conclusion
In democracies it is especially important to have strict rules regarding the behavior
and governance of those agencies that have coercive capabilities. Thus, armed forces
operate under the doctrine of civilian control, Constitution and laws limit the pow-
ers of the police and the courts, and the intelligence agencies operate within a set of
guidelines—some of which are written down and some of which are not but are
largely understood. However, most of the issues that arise in the policy-intelligence
relationship are not written down with any precision—other than the requirements
of the budget process and the authorizing of covert action. Everything else depends
on the nature of events and, above all, on the nature of the personalities involved.
Since the creation of the U.S. intelligence community in 1947, it is fair to say that
no administration has entirely avoided conflicts between policymakers and intelli-
gence officers. Harry Truman was not satisfied with the intelligence he received on
a number of topics. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 prompted one of
the first cries for “intelligence reform.” Relations in the Eisenhower administration
were generally good, prompted in part by the degree of access that DCI Allen Dulles
had via his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. As noted, however,
Eisenhower did not initially want to authorize the last U-2 flight but did so at the
request of the intelligence agencies. The heavy emphasis on operations in the
Kennedy administration led to the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and severe disenchantment
with the CIA, although this did not prevent the president and his brother, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy, from continuing operations designed to kill Castro and
topple his regime. The intelligence community’s performance in the October 1962
Cuban missile crisis did much to restore intelligence for Kennedy. As noted, Lyndon
Johnson had trouble accepting intelligence analysis that ran counter to his prefer-
ences. The intelligence agencies also could not come up with good estimates to
determine the relative progress being made in Vietnam. On the other hand, Johnson
was very supportive of and very impressed by the results of satellite imagery (Launius
et al. 2001, 125). Richard Nixon was suspicious of the entire permanent bureaucracy
in Washington and tried to use the CIA to curtail the investigation into Watergate,
the obstruction of justice that cost him his presidency. Under Gerald Ford, the intel-
ligence community became mired in the most serious investigations ever under-
taken, as a result of the “Family Jewels” exposé in the New York Times in December
1974. At the behest of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and White House Chief of
Staff Donald Rumsfeld, Ford fired DCI William Colby, who was seen as being too
cooperative with congressional investigation committees. Jimmy Carter, as noted,
had qualms about certain types of collection and operations and also felt that intel-
ligence let him down in Iran. Ronald Reagan pledged to “restore intelligence” but
his loose style of direction led to the illicit support of the Contras in Nicaragua, in
direct contravention of a series of laws, which led to a severe political crisis. George
H.W. Bush, who had served briefly as DCI after Colby, probably had the most placid
relationship with intelligence since Eisenhower. Bill Clinton, as noted, also had
qualms about certain types of operations, and was often indifferent to the intelli-
gence community overall. Finally, the ups and downs of intelligence in the George
W. Bush administration have been noted.
We end where we began, by emphasizing the two factors that are most telling in
the policymaker-intelligence relationship. First, the relationship is and should be
dominated by the policymakers, who have contested and won an election. They
have the right to govern, to make decisions, to create budgets and to order opera-
tions. Second, intelligence is a service that is provided to the policymakers. It is an
important and useful part of the policy process but its role is determined by the
policymakers, not by the intelligence agencies.
REFERENCES
ABC World News. 2008. Interview with President George W. Bush (December 1).
[Butler Report] Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2004. Report of a
Committee of Privy Counsellors. London (July 14).
[Flood Report] Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies. 2004. Canberra
(July 20).
Gertz, B. 2002. Breakdown: How America’s Intelligence Failures Led to September 11.
Washington: Henry Regnery.
Helms, R., with W. Hood. 2003. A Look Over My Shoulder. New York: Random House.
Launius, R. D., H. E. McCurdy, and R. Bradbury. 2001. Imagining Space: Achievements,

Predictions, Possibilities, 1950–2050. San Francisco. Chronicle Books.
Lowenthal, M. M. 2009. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 4th ed. Washington: CQ Press.
McLaughlin, J. 2005. Conversation with author (September).
National Intelligence Council. 2007. Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. Washington,
D.C.; available online at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf
(November).
Powers, T. 1979. The Man Who Kept the Secrets. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Raju, M., E. Schor, and I. Wurman. 2007. Few Senators Read Iraq NIE Report. The Hill,
available at http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/few-senators-read-iraq-nie-
report-2007-06-19.html (June 19).
[Senate Report] Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments
on Iraq. 2004. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Washington, D.C. (July 7).
Weiner, T. 2007. Legacy of Ashes. New York: Doubleday.
chapter 28
ON UNCERTAINTY AND THE

LIMITS OF INTELLIGENCE
peter jackson
1. Introduction
On 27 March 2003 soldiers of the First Reconnaissance Battalion of the United States
Marine Corps were encamped on the edge of an abandoned airfield near Qalat Sukhar
in east-central Iraq. A perimeter observation team, having identified a string of lights
in the distance, reported the possible presence of an Iraqi force in a position to threaten
the battalion’s position. This information was combined with earlier reports of a pos-
sible threat to the recently secured airfield. A decision was taken by First Marine
Division to call in an air strike on what was thought to be an Iraqi column. Marine
Corps jets then mounted a sustained attack on the suspected convoy. Subsequent
reconnaissance patrols discovered dozens of bomb craters but no sign of enemy vehi-
cles of any kind. One officer concluded that there was no armed column. He judged
that the lights identified by marine observers were those of a town seventeen miles
distant and that the heat-sensitive targeting systems used by the bombers most likely
attracted to an abandoned truck or possibly even a farmer’s tractor. An “embedded”
journalist with the reconnaissance battalion summed up the affair in the following
terms: “. . . under clear skies, in open terrain with almost no vegetation, the Marines
don’t have a clue what’s out there beyond the perimeter. Even with the best optics and
surveillance assets in the world, no one knows what happened to nearly 10,000 pounds
of bombs and missiles . . . It’s not that the technology is bad or its operators incompe-
tent, but the fog of war persists on even the clearest of nights” (Wright 2004, 180).
This episode was by no means an isolated anomaly in the overall experience of
American forces participating in the invasion of Iraq. Despite the aspirations of
on uncertainty and the limits of intelligence 453
influential elements within the American military establishment to achieve “domi-

nant battlespace awareness” (Ferris 2004, 54), Clausewitzian fog and friction con-
tinue to exercise a powerful influence over military operations at the opening of the
twenty-first century.
Nor has uncertainty been reduced significantly at the level of strategic assess-
ment. The case of the mistaken estimates by British and American intelligence con-
cerning Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction is only the most prominent
of recent “intelligence failures” to have had a dramatic impact on international poli-
tics at the turn of the new century. But Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and
the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were hardly alone in this misjudg-
ment, which played such a prominent role in the run-up to the invasion. Virtually
all western intelligence communities made similar errors in assessing Iraqi inten-
tions and capabilities. Postmortems conducted in the aftermath of the invasion of
Iraq revealed the extent to which estimates of the threat posed by that country were
characterized by ambiguity and speculation. Uncertainty remained a defining fea-
ture of decision making. Ambiguity and uncertainty made it possible for long-
standing assumptions about the nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, along with
firmly held preconceptions about the best way to deal with it, to dominate American
and British policy toward Iraq in 2002–3.
The history of intelligence in war and international relations suggests that this
state of affairs is the norm rather than the exception. Nor are things likely to improve.
While the practice of intelligence has undergone successive and often-radical trans-
formations, neither the essence of intelligence work nor the nature of intelligence
information has changed in any fundamental sense. Despite revolutionary changes
in communications and information-processing technology over the past two cen-
turies, uncertainty remains as prominent a factor as ever both on the battlefield and
in international affairs (Van Creveld 1985). The reason for this is that, although tele-
graphs, radios, computers and satellites have all transformed the character of intel-
ligence work, the nature of intelligence has remained unchanged.
2. Thinking Systematically about

the Limits of Intelligence
Richard Betts has identified a number of “inherent enemies” of intelligence which
“grow out of the human condition and the dynamics of the intelligence function
itself.” These enemies, he argues, are “if not quite intractable, then close to it” (Betts
2007, 12). Chief among these “inherent enemies” for Betts are the physical limita-
tions of cognitive processes; the diverse number of threats facing national security
and the dynamic relationship between intelligence officials and political decision
makers (Betts 2007, 12–37). Another way to consider the permanent challenges to
effective intelligence is to think in terms of interdependent categories of limitations

linked directly to the nature of intelligence as an element of politics. I have argued
elsewhere that the nature of intelligence, which must be distinguished from the
changing character of intelligence practices, imposes formidable obstacles in the
way of its effectiveness ( Jackson 2005). These obstacles fall into four (necessarily
overlapping) categories: time and space, organization, politicization, and cognition.
Careful consideration of these issues points inescapably to the conclusion that not
only will decision makers and policy formulators continue to operate in an environ-
ment of uncertainty, but also that levels of uncertainty are liable to increase in direct
relation to the importance of the issues at stake.
2.1 Time and Space

Problems of time and space impose inescapable limitations on decisions of all kinds.
The need to gather accurate and relevant information, analyze it, and then integrate
it into decisions while it is still useful, has always been one of the most difficult but
important challenges in all aspects of human life. The central reason for this is that
the social world is fluid rather than static. This means that the situation described
by any given intelligence report is liable to change before the relevant information
can be analyzed and integrated into the decision-making process. In this sense most
intelligence information is “time bound” and its usefulness depends upon the speed
at which it can be transmitted and analyzed. This remains the case despite the tre-
mendous revolution in information technology wrought by the invention of elec-
tricity, telegraphs, and supercomputers (Van Creveld 1985, 19–21). There is a
two-sided equation that should be applied in order to understand the difficulties
inherent in using short- and medium-term intelligence. The speed with which
information can be acquired, transmitted, and analyzed must be measured against
the speed with which the situation this intelligence describes is liable to change. The
impact of technology on the latter half of this equation (situational change) is insuf-
ficiently appreciated by John Keegan in his otherwise interesting discussion of “real
time” intelligence (Keegan 2003, 20–28). This limitation has always applied more to
information on short- and medium-term intentions and capabilities than to long-
range “strategic” assessments.
Time and space constraints operate in particularly invidious ways in moments
of heightened threat. Scholars and practitioners have long noted that the most com-
mon source of compromise in the quality of intelligence analysis is haste (e.g. Grabo
2004, 109–12; Betts 2003, 62 and 2007, 28–29, Jervis 2006b, 14–15). “There is always
tension” one observer has rightly stressed, “between what facilitates timely decision
and what promotes thoroughness and accuracy in assessment” (Betts 2007, 47).
Another, closely related, difficulty is that a fraught security environment tends over-
whelmingly to reinforce a tendency to focus on “current intelligence” at the expense
of contextual analysis and medium to long-range forecasting (Kerr et al. 2005; Jervis
2006b, 45–46). The US intelligence community has sought to remedy this problem
by adjusting analytical priorities to make longer-term “strategic” assessment an
integral component of the responsibilities assigned to all analysts (Intelligence

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004, 18). But this is unlikely to solve the
problem during crises, when there is always increased pull from the policy-word for
current, and often raw, intelligence ( Jackson 2009 285). The formidable difficulties
inherent in estimating short-term intentions will remain a central cause of intelli-
gence failures. They are products of the inescapable dynamics of time and space.
The dynamics are at least as powerful as ever in the twenty-first century. The
requirement for speed in decision making, which so often leads to oversimplifica-
tion and snap judgments about complex issues, is more pressing than ever in an era
of nuclear weapons and unprecedented levels of worldwide travel. Massive strategic
surprise, and even national annihilation, can now be achieved in the time it takes
for an attacker to deliver a ballistic missile strike. As one of the scientists involved in
the construction of the first atomic bombs wrote, nuclear weapons provided poten-
tial aggressors with a weapon that was both “potentially destructive beyond the
wildest nightmares of the imagination” and also “ideally suited to sudden unan-
nounced attack” (cf. Freedman 2003, 33). The stakes are higher and decisions need
to be taken more quickly than ever before—both in committee and on the battle-
field. Yet, despite the staggering technological advances of the last century, the
human brain does not function much more quickly or efficiently than it did one
hundred, or even one thousand, years ago. The impossibility of guaranteeing against
surprise attack remains the fundamental unresolved dilemma of strategy in the
nuclear age. The ever-increasing speed with which massive force can be concen-
trated and brought to bear has eaten away at the advantages provided by ever-more-
powerful information-processing and communications technology (Wirtz 2003).
Nor has technology provided intelligence with the means to overcome time and
space considerations when dealing with the “asymmetric threat” posed by terror-
ism. Efforts to track potential terror suspects across international borders are
scarcely more effective in the early twenty-first century than they were in the late
nineteenth century. The awesome surveillance power provided by modern technol-
ogy, everything from passport databases that include fingerprint- and retina-
recognition information to unmanned aerial drones providing steady streams of
imagery and signals intelligence from the remotest corners of the world, has not
allowed states to control the movement of terror suspects or to locate and capture
(or destroy) the most notorious leaders of al-Qaeda. And the emergence of the
World Wide Web provided terrorist groups with a precious resource both for mobi-
lizing support and for coordinating their operations. The Internet is a problem as
well as an opportunity for intelligence surveillance. On the one hand, it has pro-
vided a new source of information. On the other hand, it has dramatically increased
the sheer amount of information that must be monitored. Challenges to effective
analysis stem just as often from an excess as a lack of information (Bets 2007, 30).
The result is that twenty-first-century intelligence services operate in a world of
more openness but also more mysteries (Dupont 2003, 17–19).
The attendant difficulties in sifting through what is an almost-incomprehensi-
ble mass of information are only partially alleviated by technology such as the
Echelon program. Echelon is essentially a highly sophisticated computer program

designed to monitor both the flow and content of signals in the ether and travelling
along fiber-optic cables. The United States, Britain, and the other members of the
UK–USA signals-intelligence alliance use Echelon to eavesdrop on everything from
private business negotiations to unclassified foreign military and diplomatic mes-
sages in a system based on “watch-lists” generated by “consumer” agencies (such as
the CIA or the FBI in the United States and MI6 or the Security Service in Britain).
Watch-lists are comprised of linguistic constructions that are programmed into the
Echelon “dictionary” to be highlighted for analysis. Through the Echelon network
the various national SIGINT agencies submit watch-lists to the listening posts of all
UK–USA SIGINT agencies. They are thus almost immediately able to dip into the
intercepted communications of their allies in an eavesdropping network that covers
virtually the entire globe and extends deep into space (Bamford 2001, 408–28;
Campbell 2001). But these procedures cannot entirely replace human judgment
concerning what is relevant and what is not. Moreover, Echelon notwithstanding,
advances in commercial encryption programs have made it increasingly difficult to
monitor the communications of non-state actors of all kinds. The image of Western
SIGINT and IMINT agencies as all-seeing and all-hearing technical leviathans
remains a myth that sells spy novels but does not reflect the reality of intelligence
practice at the opening of the twenty-first century. Indeed, the evidence suggests
that the Russian secret police, using late-nineteenth-century practices, were more
effective at penetrating and thwarting the activities of anti-Czarist opposition
groups across Europe in the early 1900s than are today’s vast intelligence and coun-
terterrorist agencies in their efforts to meet the challenge of transnational Islamist
terrorism.
2.2. Cognitive Limits

A final barrier to the effective use of intelligence information stems from limitations
of human understanding. While the human brain is an immensely powerful instru-
ment for processing information, there are evident restrictions on our ability to
comprehend the social world. In order to make sense of complex phenomena, the
brain develops a matrix of concepts (or preconceptions) whose relationship to one
another enables it to impose order on its external environment. The price of this
order is a systematic simplification of complex physical and social realities. The
result is that belief systems—assumptions and expectations concerning the nature
of social life—condition the way human beings understand their environment. As
David Hume observed in the eighteenth century, the mind cannot function in any
area beyond that immediately accessible to the senses and to memory without
employing a set of preconceptions about the social world (Kuhns 2003, 88–90).
The problems that these issues present for the management and use of intelli-
gence are manifold. Scholars and intelligence practitioners have frequently under-
lined the way preexisting ideas and expectations shape both the collection and
interpretation of intelligence (Heuer 1999, 1–29, 111–72; Jervis 2006a). The minds of
analysts are unexceptional in this regard. They are inclined to search for, and seize
upon, information that confirms existing beliefs and desires. A detailed study of the
“analytical culture” of the American intelligence community conducted in the after-
math of the September 11 attacks underlines the invidious effects of “confirmation
bias”: the practice of looking for evidence to confirm the existing hypotheses based
on previous analysis. One analyst interviewed for this study describes the effects
of cognitive confirmation bias in practice: “When a request comes in from a [policy
making] consumer to answer some question, the first thing I do is to read up on the
analytic line . . . check the previous publications and sort through the current traffic.
I’ve looked at our previous products, and I’ve got a good idea of the pattern; so,
when I sort through the traffic, I know what I’m trying to find” ( Johnston 2005, 6).
The danger of this psychological reflex for intelligence analysis is the tendency to
filter out evidence that challenges preconceptions and predispositions. This is what
psychologists term “cognitive dissonance”: the mind’s tendency to resist knowledge
that contradicts established beliefs (Festinger 1957; Wickland and Brehm 1976, 19;
Jervis 2006a; Betts 2007).
Cognitive dissonance is also central to another endemic problem in intelligence
analysis: analysts’ tendency to neglect “negative information,” that is, the lack of
evidence that one would expect to surface in reporting if a hypothesis is correct.
This was an important flaw in both British and American assessments of Iraqi
weapons’ capabilities in 2002–3. In neither case did the “patchy” character of raw
intelligence on this subject cause analysts to reconsider their operating assumption
that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons. Even the failure of the UN
inspection team led by Hans Blix to turn up evidence of unconventional weapons
systems, despite the fact that its searches were intelligence-led, did not prompt a
consideration of alternative explanations in British or American assessments (Butler
et al. 2004, 51–57; Silberman-Robb et al. 2005, 124–27). As Robert Jervis has observed,
“[n]egative reports rarely, if ever, led to requests for follow-up [reports] whereas
positive ones did.” This is because “[b]y its nature, positive evidence is much more
striking and vivid than its absence” (Jervis 2006b, 25).
Another persistent and intractable problem linked to cognitive bias is “layering”:
a practice in which intelligence pictures are constructed from previous assessments
without integrating the ambiguities or uncertainties of these assessments into the
final estimate. The result is “a false impression of certainty for analysts’ ultimate
judgment” (Silberman-Robb et al. 2005, 124). Assessments of Iraqi weapons pro-
grams provide a good example of the negative effects of layering. In both the US and
British cases, intelligence estimates of Iraqi capabilities were based on previous expe-
rience of the regime’s behavior and previous analytical judgments concerning the
existence of unconventional weapons. There are striking similarities between key
assessment of Iraqi weapons program prepared by the British Joint Intelligence
Committee in September 2002 and by the American National Intelligence Council in
October of that year. Both documents drew heavily on previous assessments and
both expressed the judgment that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons
with greater certainty than had previously been the case despite the fact that no hard
evidence had arrived to support this conclusion. Judgments were qualified but, as
assessments were layered on top of one another, the number and strength of the
qualifications decreased steadily, particularly in the summaries provided to policy
consumers at the beginning of both documents. This aspect of the British and
American intelligence on Iraq was singled out for criticism in the public enquiry into
the performance of the intelligence services commissioned by the Bush administra-
tion in the United States. A report on the same theme prepared by a committee
chaired by Lord Robin Butler made similar criticisms of British assessments (Butler
et al. 2004, 152–52; Silberman-Robb et al. 2005, 172). The result was that both British
and American estimates of Iraqi capabilities did not reflect the uncertain character
of the raw intelligence and analytical product upon which they were based (Aldrich
2005, 83–88; Jervis 2006b; Betts 2007, 115; 2009, 285–88). The effects of layering help
explain why, once the assessment process was exposed to detailed scrutiny after the
fact, most observers were surprised at the thinness of the intelligence base upon
which estimates of Iraqi weapons programs were constructed.
Two further examples of the way preconceptions can create cognitive distortion
are a bias toward continuity and “mirror-imaging.” The cognitive processes of the
brain create a bias toward looking for evidence that fits with historical experience.
This bias allows the mind to comprehend the social world efficiently without the
time-consuming process of considering and rejecting myriad possible interpreta-
tions (Heuer 1999, 17–29; Jervis 1976, 117–28). It can create serious distortion in the
process of interpreting intentions however. Mirror-imaging (the tendency to project
one’s own logic onto others) and other forms of ethnocentric analysis are another
pitfall that has frequently compromised assessment (Jervis 1985). Both of these cog-
nitive flaws were present in assessment of Iraqi policy. Longer-term experience, and
in particular the memory of having underestimated Iraq’s non-conventional capa-
bilities in 1990–91, was an important factor in both British and American estimates.
Robert Jervis has described this process as one of “overlearning” (Jervis 2006b, 27–28).
It is interesting that the flawed assessments of Iraqi intentions and capabilities pro-
duced in 2002–3 can be attributed to overreliance on precisely the kind of long-term
contextual analysis that the 2004 reforms have attempted to promote (see above).
This points to the intractable character of the obstacles in the way of intelligence
efforts to perform efficiently and reduce uncertainty. Reforms can have little impact
in rectifying this problem because, as Betts observes: “cognition cannot be altered by
legislation . . . [p]reconception cannot be abolished; it is in one sense just another
word for model or paradigm—a construct used to simplify reality, which any thinker
needs to cope with complexity” (Betts 2007, 46).
2.3 The Politicization of Intelligence

Closely related to cognitive limitations is the third type of obstacle to accurate and
effective intelligence: the pervasive problem of politicization. Because the identifi-
cation and interpretation of threat is essentially a political activity, the possibility
that intelligence information will be distorted by ideological bias is present at every

stage of the intelligence process. From the outset, political assumptions determine
what is considered a threat and what is not. This, in turn, conditions what informa-
tion is gathered and what is deemed important. Just as importantly, such ideological
assumptions also shape the way incoming intelligence is analyzed.
Intelligence can be politicized in several ways. Among the most common is the
tendency for intelligence assessments to be formulated to complement prevailing
orthodoxies and predetermined policies (Hulnick 1986; Handel 1987; Westerfield
1997; Betts 2003). This “top-down” model of politicization is a product of the
dynamic relationship between intelligence “producers” and decision making “con-
sumers.” While this phenomenon is often understood as overt pressure by the lat-
ter on the former to produce estimates that conform to preexisting beliefs and
policy assumptions, politicization in practice is nearly always far more subtle.
“Politicization is like fog” a CIA analyst once testified. “Though you cannot hold it
in your hands, or nail it to a wall, it does exist, it is real and it does affect people”
(Jervis 2006b). Political distortion can often arise from a desire among intelligence
officials to exercise influence, or at least to avoid marginalization, by producing
estimates that complement existing policy orientations. To challenge either politi-
cal or institutional orthodoxies is to run the risk of becoming ostracized, which
can have negative effects on the careers of analysts or intelligence managers. The
most difficult type of top-down politicization to measure is also the most difficult
to control: the semiconscious or even unconscious manipulation of information
and analysis in free-flowing conversations between intelligence managers and pol-
icy consumers. These exchanges, significantly, are more common the higher one
goes up the chain of decision. High-level decision makers rarely have time to read
detailed assessments. They instead tend to receive intelligence in the form of oral
briefings (Betts 2007, 18–19).
It has been persuasively argued that some politicization is not only inevitable, it
is desirable. Intelligence producers must be responsive to the needs of policymakers.
Betts has gone so far as to imply that intelligence professionals must choose between
“incorruptibility or influence” (Betts 2007, 66–103). This is to push an important
point too far. While it is true that intelligence must be close enough to policy to
provide guidance on crucial issues, ideally intelligence producers should avoid hav-
ing any kind of stake in a given line of policy. It is of course naïve to say that intel-
ligence analysts will not have policy preferences. The crucial point is that their
preconceptions and predispositions should remain as free as possible from the
wider political considerations that political leaders must take into account when
making decisions.
A second type of politicization is the intrusion of bureaucratic politics in the
intelligence process. This is often produced by competition between ministries or
departments for political influence, for greater resources or, most often, for both.
The bureaucratic organization of the modern state, particularly of large states with
substantial resources, makes the politicization of information within the machinery
of government all but inevitable. Ministries or departments tend to develop their

own corporate identities. This leads them to identify institutional interests and to
pursue these interests, often in competition with other ministries or departments.
Amy Zegart has analyzed the corrosive impact of bureaucratic rivalry between the
FBI and the CIA on efforts to share potentially vital information on suspected ter-
rorists on US soil before September 11 2001 (Zegart 2007). This can result in both
conscious and unconscious distortion of intelligence information at various levels
in the decision-making process. The political and financial agendas of various
bureaucracies tend to condition the way in which they interpret political and stra-
tegic issues and thus the way in which they use intelligence pertaining to these
issues. The results can range from an institutional reflex toward viewing certain
kinds of threats as more dangerous or more pressing than others, to the deliberate
exaggeration of threats in an effort to gain a larger share of the national budget or a
more prominent voice in government counsels. This kind of politicization is a cen-
tral reason why, for example, service intelligence agencies tend to produce more
pessimistic forecasts in peacetime than do their civilian counterparts (Freedman
1986; Prados 1986; Herman 1989; Andrew 1992; Betts 2007, 23–24).
A third type of politicization is produced by systemic ideological bias. Members
of the same policy making community tend to hold similar ideological convictions.
These convictions in turn condition operating assumptions about the social world.
Such “belief systems” function as a perceptual lens through which that world is
interpreted. They play a central role in determining what constitutes a threat and
what does not. Belief systems further condition the way intelligence is interpreted
and the way it is integrated into the policy process (George 1979). Their effects are
predictably most pronounced in confrontations between belief systems. Calculations
of such crucial issues as the intentions of other actors or the dynamics of the bal-
ance of power are often filtered through an ideological prism, which distorts infor-
mation and skews strategic appreciations. The classic examples of this are probably
British and French estimations of the worth of the Soviet Union as an ally against
Nazi Germany during the 1930s. These assessments were based as much on ideologi-
cal assumptions about the nature of Soviet communism as they were on balanced
assessments of Soviet war-making potential. Calculations of Soviet power were
shaped to a significant extent by a combination of ideological mistrust and ethnic
assumptions about Slavs and their suitability for modern war (Neilson 1993; Buffotot
1982; Jackson 1999).
There is a particular danger of politicization when intelligence services are used
as tools of policy. Use of intelligence to implement, rather than guide, policy have
often proved very damaging for both the agencies involved and the governments
that have deployed them in this way ( Johnson 1989 and 1992; Treverton 1989).
Episodes such as the Bay of Pigs, botched assassination attempts on Cuban premiers
or Palestinian terrorists, and illegal arms sales to Iran all involved intelligence agen-
cies acting as instruments in the execution of policy. All, moreover, created grave
political difficulties for Western governments and raised serious questions about
the legitimacy of intelligence activity (Prados 2006). A recent variation of this trend
is the use of intelligence information to justify pre-emptive military action to the

public in an attempt to build support for a chosen policy (Hastedt 2005; Jackson
2009). Although the use of intelligence as a tool in the exercise of power is fraught
with potential problems, it will almost certainly continue. Intelligence services have
almost always been involved in covert operations. This is because intelligence net-
works often offer the best, and sometimes the only, means of acquiring the informa-
tion needed for planning and executing of secret interventions. Moreover, they can
usually provide the secrecy and plausible deniability that are the essential compo-
nents of any successful covert action (Rudgers 2000; Scott 2004).
In sum, the various manifestations of politicization in the policy process all
flow from the basic fact that intelligence is fundamentally a political activity.
Consequently, they cannot be eradicated. Requiring either producers or consumers
to step outside their individual ideological perspectives would be to demand that
they approach intelligence without the frame of reference required to comprehend
it. Assessments of Iraqi intentions and capabilities provide only the most recent
evidence of the enduring effects of politicization on intelligence efforts to reduce
uncertainty and inform policy. Four separate public enquiries on both sides of the
Atlantic concluded that intelligence assessments were not politicized. The problem
with these conclusions is that they were all based on a very narrow conception of
politicization: defined as overt interference by political leaders to influence the
assessment process (Hutton 2004, 319–21; Butler et al. 2004, 110, 152; SSCI 2004;
Silberman-Robb et al. 2005, 187–91). The result is that important dimensions to the
relationship between intelligence and policy in both states has been obscured.
The British system of assessment is particularly vulnerable to political distortion
because the assessment machinery of the JIC is so firmly embedded within the gov-
ernment’s decision-making apparatus. The JIC is, if anything, even more “customer
driven” than its US counterpart. Indeed policymakers from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense and other departments sit on the JIC
alongside the heads of intelligence agencies. In this function they perform a peculiar
dual role. In their role as policymakers, they play a central role in commissioning
intelligence assessments that are intended to inform policy. And in their role as mem-
bers of the JIC, they are responsible for approving these assessments once they have
been forwarded upward from the Assessments Staff. Assessments are also forwarded
for scrutiny to Current Intelligence Groups as part of the JIC process (Herman 2007;
Davies 2006, 318–321). The potential for the “pull” architecture of the British system to
produced politicized assessments has received little attention in the existing literature.
Yet this is precisely what may have happened in the case of assessments of the threat
from Iraq. No re-assessment of both received intelligence and the judgments concern-
ing Iraqi capabilities were undertaken after the team of UN inspectors led by Dr. Hans
Blix failed to turn up evidence of illegal weapons programs in early 2003 (Butler et al.
2004, 92). This may well have been because no such assessments were commissioned
by the policymakers sitting on the JIC itself. Commitment to a policy of force by
this time made any such assessments redundant and even undesirable. The Butler
Committee’s judgment that JIC assessments were not “pulled in any particular
direction to meet the policy concerns of senior officials on the JIC” may well reflect
a desire not to see the JIC blamed for the decision to invade Iraq. But it also obscures
an important structural vulnerability in the British intelligence machine.
Intelligence assessment was also clearly politicized in disputes between the
Pentagon and the State Department over policy toward Iraq. In September 2002,
hawkish elements within the Pentagon established a rival assessment organ respon-
sible for producing estimates of the political situation in Iraq. This Policy
Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, also known as the “Office of Special Plans”
(the renamed Northern Gulf Affairs Office) was placed under the direction of
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. This newly constituted unit
reported directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul
Wolfowitz. It had access to high-grade raw intelligence and functioned as an alter-
native assessment organ and used this material to prepare consistently alarmist esti-
mates about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and about links between Saddam
Hussein and international terrorism that were rejected by experts within both CIA
and the State Department. These reports were forwarded to the White House with-
out coordination with other agencies and were used by Vice-President Dick Cheney
in arguments for a warlike posture against Iraq in the run-up to the Second Gulf
War (Bamford 2004, 307–20; Betts 2007, 93–94).
The problem of politicization is exacerbated by the exigencies of the current war
on terror. The decline of long-standing normative limitations on open interference
in the internal affairs of other states has gathered momentum since September 11.
The notion of “pre-emptive self defense” emerged as a central pillar of US strategic
doctrine under the Bush administration in 2002 and has not been formally renounced
since. As long as pre-emption remains a component of the foreign and security poli-
cies of major states such as the United States and Britain, it will be necessary for their
leaders to use intelligence information to provide public justification, and thus legiti-
macy, for pre-emptive action. Intelligence was employed in this way by both the
American and British governments to strengthen public support for the invasion of
Iraq in 2003. The British government took the unprecedented step of publishing an
intelligence dossier, written by the chairman of the JIC, which included both wide-
ranging assessments and raw intelligence obtained by MI6. Great emphasis was laid
on the judgment that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and would not
hesitate to use these against Britain and other Western countries (UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office 2002). The result was that the British government was plunged
into one of the more serious political crises in recent memory (Jackson 2008). In the
United States parts of the October 2002 NIE were similarly declassified and were
cited by both Secretary of State Colin Powell and by President George W. Bush in
public pronouncements aimed at boosting support for war against Iraq. As in the
British case, the use of intelligence in this way redounded on the Bush administra-
tion, particularly after months of intensive searching turned up no evidence that Iraq
possessed any functioning weapons of mass destruction. The ensuing crisis resulted
in two congressional inquiries and the early resignation of the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet (SSCI 2004; Silberman-Robb 2005).
The problem of the politicization of intelligence is unlikely to recede in the

years to come. In an age of massive intelligence machinery, ever-increasing budgets,
and ever-greater masses of information, the tendency for intelligence to be distorted
by ideological assumptions and political agendas is greater than ever. These factors
will only increase the danger that intelligence will become politicized to suit the
belief systems and policy agendas of analysts and decision makers. The best that can
be hoped for is probably that all participants in the intelligence and policy process
understand the tendency of politics to distort the effective collection, collation,
analysis, dissemination and use of intelligence.
2.4 Structures
The final major limitation stems from the challenges inherent in structural or orga-
nizational design. Security environments are fluid and constantly throw up new
types of challenges with which intelligence organizations must cope. This is a per-
manent condition that will always limit the effectiveness of intelligence organiza-
tions, which are always established to meet a particular set of security requirements.
Organizations provide the structures and processes that are necessary for the effec-
tive analysis and exploitation of intelligence. The structural design and various
organizational cultures of the US intelligence community have come under partic-
ular scrutiny at the end of the Cold War. This scrutiny was intensified by the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the US and by the issue of Iraqi WMD after the inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003. The work of official commissions in Australia, Britain and the
United States (SSCI and HPSC 2003; 9/11 Commission 2004; SSCI 2004; Silberman-
Robb et al. 2005; Butler et al. 2004; Flood et al. 2004) along with that of a number of
scholars and former practitioners (Hastedt 1996, 2007; Zegart, 2006, 2007; Odom
2003) has resulted in a range of (often radical) proposals for reforming and restruc-
turing the US intelligence community. Yet there are strong grounds for skepticism
that structural reforms can make a significant difference in improving intelligence
performance or reducing uncertainty.
The most important reason for this is that socio-economic and technological
change, along with the march of both domestic and international politics, ensures
that the security environment in which decision makers and intelligence agencies
operate remains fluid and diverse. This means that structures put in place to deal
with certain types of current threats will often be inadequate for dealing with new
challenges in the future. Intelligence agencies must therefore remain, to an impor-
tant degree, in a constant state of organizational flux as they adapt to changes politi-
cal and technological environment in which they operate. The problem, however, is
that since the Second World War, these agencies have emerged as huge bureaucratic
leviathans with embedded institutional cultures that are difficult to restructure and
reform. They tend instead to become “muscle-bound”—very good at some tasks
but less flexible and thus less well-suited to meeting a range of different challenges
at the same time. This is particularly the case in the western democracies, where
intelligence agencies tend to be staffed by career civil-servants who cannot easily be
removed but are often resistant to the idea of re-training ( Jackson 2005; Zegart 2006
Jervis 2006b).
The need for intelligence structures creates other problems for the effective use
of information. In the modern era of industrial-scale collection from a vast array of
sources, intelligence organizations have out of necessity become increasingly large
and complex. Larger organizations inevitably mean that intelligence must pass
through more levels or stages in the process of collection, analysis, and dissemina-
tion. Each stage functions also as a potential “filter” through which intelligence
passes in the necessary process of sorting relevant from irrelevant information. The
larger the organization, the greater the danger that relevant information will be fil-
tered out along with irrelevant “noise” (Wohlstetter 1962). Crucial information will
often become lost in the machinery of collection and analysis.
There are other aspects to the problem of structural organization. In particular,
the emergence of relatively independent agencies (and even departments within
agencies) for the collection and analysis of different types of intelligence has thrown
up barriers to the effective sharing of both information and expertise. Information
instead flows to decision makers in “stove-pipes” and opportunities for corrobora-
tion and coordination of effort are lost. It is too rarely acknowledged that this is not
a new phenomenon. During the 1930s, failure to coordinate the work of the British
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) with that of the service intelligence agencies
and the Industrial Intelligence Center led to important mistakes and mispercep-
tions when it came to understanding the nature and dimensions of the threat from
Nazi Germany (Wark 1985; Andrew 1985; Maiolo 1998). The same problem of lack of
coordination between agencies prevented the effective exploitation of potentially
crucial intelligence on the activities of suspected terrorists before the September 11,
2001, attacks (9/11 Report 2004, 160–73, 215–77, 339–60).
The difficulties inherent in organizing and managing the vast intelligence-
gathering machinery that emerged during the twentieth century are, if anything,
more formidable than ever. The period since the end of the Cold War has thrown up
a series of new security challenges with which intelligence communities must cope.
The CIA, for example, is now charged with providing analyses of a bewildering
array of potential threats, from infectious disease pandemics to the proliferation of
nuclear technology to the pressing question of transnational terrorism. Another
difficulty confronting efforts to rationalize and restructure US intelligence is the
immensity of the task at hand. There are now sixteen agencies charged with the col-
lection of intelligence and counterintelligence in the United States, most of which
have annual budgets of more than $1 billion. Large and influential organizations are
often able to resist pressure for root-and-branch structural change. And the sheer
scale of the US intelligence community seems to defy effective central control and
rational organization.
In the aftermath of the September 11 and the erroneous assessments of Iraqi
weapons programs, new structures were introduced to enhance co-operation and
improve the quality of analysis. These include the establishment of the Department
of Homeland Security, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the creation of the post of Director of

National Intelligence (DNI). The aim of the TTIC, established in May 2003, is to
“fuse and analyze all-source information related to terrorism” and thus to “close the
seam” between the antiterrorism efforts of the CIA and FBI. The function of the
NCTC is to an “intelligence support to operations to counter transnational terrorist
threats against the territory, people, and interests of the United States of America”
(IRTPA 2004; Sims 2007, 11–46).
Yet expectations that the current round of reforms and restructuring within the
American intelligence community will reduce levels of threat and uncertainty are
likely to be disappointed. Both the DHS and the DNI are new structures designed to
deal with new problems. Yet it should also be remembered that the creation of new
institutions can lead to other, often unforeseen, difficulties. The DHS, for example,
is a massive agency comprising 180,000 people drawn from twenty-two different
federal agencies. Predictably, its functioning has been seriously hampered by inter-
nal turf battles, most notably between the Transport Security Agency and the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency. Disagreement between these two
sub-agencies of the DHS over their respective responsibilities and authority as well
as over their share of the department’s budget have led to what one former official
has described as “a civil war within the US government” (Mintz 2005). This infight-
ing has been cited as one of the major reasons that little progress has been made in
fulfilling many of the department’s key tasks: improving the security of chemical
plants, railways, and other elements of America’s national infrastructure. Nor,
finally, has the DHS leadership been successful in securing influence over high-level
policy debates.
The creation of a Director of National Intelligence is the most important of the
measures taken to reform the American intelligence community since the end of the
Cold War. But in order for the post to function effectively the various independent
intelligence agencies, including the powerful and well-funded services within the
Pentagon, will all need to accept some limitation on their authority and indepen-
dence. The Department of Defense, in particular, has proved unwilling to acquiesce
to this measure without a struggle. It is particularly unlikely that the military intel-
ligence agencies will ever share control of their core function of tactical intelligence
collection. True reform in this regard will require “presidential muscle” that has so
far been lacking (Betts 2007, 139, 146–47). Predictably, congressional allies of the
Pentagon were able to secure compromises in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act that leave considerable ambiguity as to the precise control the DNI
will enjoy over the Pentagon intelligence services, which consume approximately 80
per cent of the total US intelligence budget (Betts 2007, 151–52). One congressional
representative on the House Armed Services Committee has remarked on the
“murkiness and ambiguities” of the legislation and attributed this to “compromises
that had to be made” in order to get the bill through both houses of Congress
(Pincus 2005).
Yet another potential drawback inherent in the decision to create a Director of
National Intelligence is that it has created yet another layer of bureaucracy between
the level of decision and the agencies responsible for the collection, collation and
analysis of raw intelligence. The DNI will, in theory at least, stand above the heads
of the other services and will assume primary responsibility for briefing the presi-
dent and the cabinet. Such restructuring has obvious advantages, but it will also
create yet another filter through which most information must pass before it reaches
key decision makers. Such inevitably increases the danger that important informa-
tion will either be filtered out or distorted by the belief systems and bureaucratic
agendas of officials in the office of the DNI. The possibility that this office might
develop an institutional identity of its own has not been considered in the commen-
tary that has been made on the reforms to date. A more efficient and better coordi-
nated intelligence effort is far harder to obtain in practice than it is in legislation and
presidential decrees. Bureaucratic struggles over such crucial issues as operational
control and the authority to determine budgets are a permanent fact of life, particu-
larly in the case of the vast leviathan that is the US intelligence community.
A final danger is that the far-reaching reform and restructuring measures now
being implemented, which include profound changes in the recruitment and oper-
ational practices of the CIA, will create structural imbalances and leave the machin-
ery of collection and assessment excessively skewed toward the threat of transnational
terrorism. The Bush administration has accepted and implemented many of the key
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. But this commission did its work in the
fraught atmosphere that prevailed in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks. It
focused virtually exclusively on the problem of terrorism and its 567 pages predict-
ably pay scant attention to other strategic priorities that shape national-security
policy. Its recommendations reflect this priority. While few would deny that terror-
ism poses the most imminent and important threat to American national security,
it would be rash to assume that this will continue to be the case even in the immedi-
ate term. One of the unfortunate effects of the terrorist attacks of 2001 was to remove
human security issues such as infectious diseases and the environment from the list
of key threats to the US national interest. And international politics have not stood
still while the United States and its allies have been waging the “war on terror.”
Political and military developments across the globe, and in the Asia-Pacific region
in particular, will continue to impact upon key American interests and will there-
fore continue to require the attention of the US intelligence community. Other
challenges will emerge that cannot be foreseen. Intelligence machinery that is over-
whelmingly structured to meet the threat of terrorism will not necessarily be best
placed to meet the problems posed by future events. To counter these problems
observers have frequently called for greater institutionalized sharing of information
and even “all-source fusion” (9/11 Commission 2004; Sims 2007). In response, inter-
departmental organizations have been developed to coordinate assessments and
thus achieve something closer to “all-source analysis.” But there is always the danger
that these organs, such as the British Joint Intelligence Committee, the American
National Intelligence Council, or the recently established Directorate of National
Intelligence, might develop institutional identities of their own and thus reproduce
some of the same problems that they were intended to resolve. An even greater
danger, one also underlined by Betts, is that structural reorganizations and reforms
will create as many, or more, problems as they will fix, and will increase as many
vulnerabilities as they reduce (Betts 2007, 34, 125–58). Many of the barriers to infor-
mation sharing, and in particular the existence “stove-pipes” in which intelligence is
insulated as it passes up the management and decision-making hierarchy, were cre-
ated as a result of lessons learned from Soviet penetration of Western intelligence
from the 1930s through the 1950s. The newly established Directorate of Intelligence
has instituted an important shift from “need to know” to “responsibility to provide”
(Lowenthal 2008, 304–5). It is not unreasonable to wonder whether this significant
reform of cultural practices (if it is successful) will not create new vulnerabilities in
the US intelligence and security community. In keeping with long-standing trends
in the history of politics and war, these lessons have been forgotten as new lessons
about the importance of information sharing were learned in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks.
The attacks of September 11, followed by misjudgments concerning Iraqi weap-
ons systems, serve as further illustrations of the essential problem of organization as
a limiting factor on the effective use of intelligence: intelligence structures have
always evolved in response to changes in the security environment. They have virtu-
ally never changed in anticipation of new threats. As a result the existing intelligence
structures are nearly always aimed at dealing with familiar problems and are by
definition less well suited for coping with threats that lie in the future. This may
sound like a truism. The point, however, is that this reality is too rarely acknowl-
edged in both the scholarly and more-popular literature on intelligence. The result
has been the perpetuation of unrealistic expectations of what intelligence can and
cannot do and what it should and should not be expected to do.
3. Conclusions
It is important to emphasize that the above four categories of inherent limitations
on intelligence and intelligence practice can only be properly understood in relation
to one another. They rarely, if ever, exist independently. They tend instead to be
mutually reinforcing. The need for speed of assessment, for example, will usually
accentuate the distortive effects of preexisting beliefs and policy commitments.
“Time constraints” observes Rob Johnston in his study of “analytical culture” within
US agencies, “affect both the general analytic production cycle and analytic meth-
odology by contributing to and exacerbating cognitive biases” ( Johnston 2005, 21).
Similarly, the development of organizational boundaries and institutional identities
can create or exacerbate bureaucratic rivalries and lead to the politicization of
assessments. Above all, the iniquitous effects of politicization are linked to the ines-
capable limitations on human understanding. Cultural predispositions and ideo-
logical preconceptions always affect what questions are asked, what threats are
deemed worthy of attention, as well as what conclusions are derived from available
information.
Two chief conclusions arise out of the preceding discussion of the natural limits
of intelligence. The first is that truly objective intelligence assessment is an ideal
rather than an obtainable reality. Ongoing efforts to rationalize and restructure the
intelligence process are unlikely to produce a system that is suitable for the security
challenges of the future. This is not to say that intelligence officials should not con-
tinue to strive for better organization or for objective truth. It is instead to underline
the complexities and ambiguities inherent in a process that is fundamentally politi-
cal and which attempts to monitor an environment that is evolving constantly.
Whereas the character of intelligence practice has changed dramatically over time,
the complex and uncertain nature of intelligence has remained constant.
The second conclusion, which follows from the first, is that foreign and security
policy will always be formulated in an atmosphere of uncertainty. Intelligence can
sometimes provide crucial insight into the intentions and capabilities of other
actors. At times it can even make a decisive contribution to the success or failure of
a given strategy. But it cannot, and will never, remove uncertainty as a factor in the
great strategic and diplomatic questions facing national policymakers. Decision
makers must therefore be realistic in what they expect from their intelligence ser-
vices. Those responsible for policy decisions must be aware of the nature of intelli-
gence information and, in particular, must be wary of making, or claiming to make,
crucial political decisions based on secret intelligence. The case of the invasion of
Iraq should serve as a salutary warning of the dangers of such a mistake. Intelligence,
even very good intelligence, can never entirely remove uncertainty. Nor can it serve
as the basis for national strategy.
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chapter 29
THE PERILS OF
POLITICIZATION
paul r. pillar
1. Introduction
Objectivity is inherent to the meaning of intelligence. It is part of what distinguishes
intelligence from salesmanship, propaganda, political campaigning, and other
forms of advocacy, not to mention from deceit and disinformation. Intelligence
officers share with academic social scientists the goal of objectivity, as well as an
introspective concern about the difficulties of achieving it. Some social scientists,
critically analyzing their own professions, have questioned whether complete objec-
tivity ever is attainable. Perhaps it is not, but that does not mean there is no such
thing as objectivity or that it is not one of the standards for distinguishing good
intelligence (and good social science) from the bad.
Objectivity is even harder to achieve in intelligence than in academia. Intelligence
exists to serve the needs of those who make and execute public policy. Otherwise it
would be a pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake—at best a duplication of what
can be done at least as well outside government, and at worst a waste of public funds.
Intelligence organizations operate within larger bureaucracies. Typically, as in the
United States, they are part of the same branch of government as those who execute
policy. Their chiefs are part of a chain of command in which they report to the same
senior policymakers whose preferences are nonetheless not supposed to influence
the judgments and analysis of their agencies. Proper support to policy is quite differ-
ent from advocacy of policy, but working in an environment in which everything
revolves around policymakes it extremely difficult to exclude the influences of policy,
including pernicious influences as well as proper ones. The environment is the
antithesis of a university, where social scientists enjoy academic freedom.
the perils of politicization 473
The policymaker’s own needs point to the same difficulty from a different angle.
Political leaders have to muster support for their policies. The ability to do so is
generally viewed as one of the hallmarks of strong leadership, at least as much as the
ability to devise sound policies to be sold. The selling of policy may involve spin
rather than outright dishonesty, but either can form the basis for politicization.
Politicization is the compromise of the objectivity of intelligence, or of how
intelligence is used, to serve policy or political aims. Preferred images that become
the basis for politicized intelligence need not come only from senior policymakers.
They may come from more broadly shared popular perceptions—common wisdom
that is difficult to challenge. Or at least, the common wisdom is difficult to challenge
without enduring a heavier burden of proof and greater skepticism than do judg-
ments that conform to the common wisdom.
Another possible source of politicization are intelligence officers themselves,
who are thinking creatures who form private opinions of what their government is
doing and in that sense are not policy eunuchs. Politicization in line with such pri-
vate opinions probably is a less frequent occurrence, however, than politicization
driven by policymakers’ preferences or common wisdom. The private opinions of
intelligence officers do not have the environment-shaping power of either official
policy or broadly shared popular perceptions. Moreover, because objectivity is
intrinsic to the concept of intelligence, it also is intrinsic to the professional identity
and self-esteem of intelligence officers. For intelligence officers to politicize their
product on behalf of their own political or policy preferences would unavoidably
be, to some degree, self-destructive.
Given the imperatives of policy making and the power of public sentiments, it
should be unsurprising that politicization arises frequently, in conspicuous as well
as countless inconspicuous ways. The United States’ foreign policy—although by no
means the only place where it arises—has been littered for decades with episodes of
politicization, associated with some policies generally regarded as successful as well
as with unsuccessful ones. A prelude to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, for example,
was an intelligence estimate that the USSR probably would not bring nuclear-armed
missiles into Cuba. The members of the United States Intelligence Board who issued
the estimate knew that any contrary judgment would have been unwelcome news to
the Kennedy administration, which already had publicly played down the possibil-
ity of strategic missiles being introduced to the island. As Graham Allison (1971, 191)
observed in his classic study of the crisis, “The implications of a National Intelligence
Estimate concluding that the Soviets were introducing offensive missiles into Cuba
could not be lost on the men who constituted America’s highest intelligence assem-
bly.” During the Vietnam War, when the Johnson administration and the U.S. mili-
tary command were anxious to show progress amid flagging public support for the
war, they pressured intelligence officers to revise estimates of enemy troop strength
that would have implied a lack of progress (Allen 2001, 243–54). In the 1980s, the
Reagan administration’s dominant policy theme of needing to stand up to threats
from the Soviet Union led to scuffles with intelligence officers and revision of assess-
ments, such as on the issue of whether Moscow was supporting international
terrorism (Woodward 1987, 124–29). The George W. Bush administration’s huge

effort to muster public support for the invasion of Iraq in the wake of the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks included the selective use of intelligence reporting to conjure up an
“alliance” between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida (Pillar 2006).
Such history demonstrates that politicization is not the product of any one
group of aggressive policymakers, although the audacity with which different poli-
cymakers have relied on it certainly has varied. Nor is it the product of any one
group of pusillanimous intelligence officers. Countering politicization is not a task
for a Diogenes, wandering with his lantern in search of an honest man. Politicization
has roots in the very nature of political leadership, of intelligence, and of the rela-
tionship between them.
Politicization takes two basic forms, although some prefer to apply the term
only to the second. The first is the public use of intelligence—directly by policy-
makers or indirectly instigated by them—that is intended to bolster support for
their policies, and that involves misleading the public about some aspect of the
subject at hand. The second form is the influence of political or policy preferences
on the judgments of intelligence services and intelligence officers.
2. Public Use of Intelligence

Policymakers have strong reasons to try to use intelligence in publicly selling their
policies. Because intelligence is supposed to be objective, it bolsters the credibility of
any sales campaign. It adds what are perceived as hard facts—from sources that
skeptics may find difficult to question—to what might otherwise be dismissed as
mere exhortation from policymakers. It can make an act of choice appear to be one
of necessity. Intelligence adds authority to any case for a policy.
Policymakers’ own public use of intelligence may not seem, at first glance, to
concern intelligence services directly. The latter have little or no control, after all,
over what the policymakers do with their material. Such public use does involve
intelligence services, however, in several ways. The use that is made of intelligence
and its impact on policy debates is an inherent part of intelligence, broadly and
properly defined. Again, this is part of what distinguishes intelligence from other
forms of inquiry, such as academic research, that are not tied to the process of mak-
ing public policy. Intelligence officers are taught that part of their job is not just to
assemble accurate information and to make sound judgments based on that infor-
mation, but also to present the information and the judgments in a form useful to
policymakers. Thus the subsequent use, including public use, of their material does
and should concern them.
Sometimes intelligence services get dragged directly into the public spotlight by
policymakers anxious to obtain their imprimatur for decisions they are about to
make or actions they are about to take. During the missile crisis, a major part of the
Kennedy administration’s public case for imposing a naval quarantine on of Cuba

was the presentation by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to the United Nations Security
Council of photographic evidence, collected by intelligence aircraft, of the Soviet
missile emplacements. Four decades later, the Bush administration’s public case for
invading Iraq featured a presentation by Secretary of State Colin Powell to the
Security Council, centered on supposed Iraqi programs to develop unconventional
weapons. With the evidence of those programs sketchier and less direct than the
photographs of missile sites in Cuba, the incentive for the policymakers to place
intelligence’s stamp of authenticity on the case was all the greater. Seated directly
behind Powell, prominent in the camera frame, was Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet. The earlier request by members of Congress for an intelligence esti-
mate on the same subject, to be hastily prepared before the members voted on a
resolution authorizing the war, had a similar purpose. Although the estimate was
classified, members supporting the war would use it as a public rationale for their
votes.
Intelligence services also sometimes get dragged into public debates over policy
not just by policymakers but by their opponents, who look to intelligence to serve
as a check on the policymakers’ public excesses and inaccuracies. This usually hap-
pens when policies turn sour and fingers start pointing to people and agencies to
blame. When a policymaker misused intelligence in publicly presenting a mislead-
ing public case, critics ask, why didn’t our intelligence service speak up to correct
him?
No matter who does the dragging, once an intelligence service is involved in
public debate over policy, it finds itself extremely difficult either to extract itself
from the debate or to avoid politicization while immersed in it. Its fundamental
handicap is the structural one of working directly for the same political leaders who
are selling the policy. Or to put it more bluntly, how does one stand up against the
boss, especially in ways that will make his political task far more difficult?
But isn’t this, some might say in Diogenes-like fashion, a simple matter of hon-
esty? If the truth is different from what political leaders are uttering, what is so hard
about pointing out the truth? Would that it be so simple. Politicization seldom
entails just the conveying of a falsehood that facts would directly disprove. Far more
often it is a matter of analysis, emphasis, characterization, interpretation, sugges-
tion, wording, or innuendo. It is less a misstatement of facts than a presentation of
selected facts in a manner designed to convey misleading messages. A prime exam-
ple was the same Bush administration’s stitching together of selected scraps of
reporting to convey the impression of the supposed alliance between Iraq and
al-Qaida.
Intelligence officers skate on especially thin ice if they dare to challenge their
political masters publicly on matters of analysis or interpretation rather than simple
facts. Policymakers are entitled—indeed, obligated, as a proper performance of
their role—to make their own analysis of the situations they confront when making
policy. Analysis, moreover, can be wrong. Intelligence analysts’ interpretation of any
given situation may turn out to be mistaken, and the policymakers’ interpretation
to be correct. No code of professional conduct tells intelligence officers when their

analytic disagreements with policymakers are rooted in honest differences in inter-
preting ambiguous situations and when they stem from politicized interpretations
designed to sell a policy.
Even when intelligence officers are confident they smell politicization, they have
no good recourse to counter it publicly. If the policymakers’ selective use of intelli-
gence reporting conveys only a partial and thus misleading picture of a threat or
opportunity overseas, intelligence officers could round out the picture only by tak-
ing the initiative to do so. This would amount to engaging at their own behest in a
public debate with policymakers. Intelligence services have no license to do that.
Attempting it would quickly subject them to charges that, far from attempting to
present a complete and objective rendering of an issue to the public, they instead
were pursuing their own policy agenda.
Intelligence services thus find themselves in the uncomfortable situation of
vouching, implicitly or explicitly, for the individual intelligence-based facts that
policymakers may adduce in constructing a public case but being unable to ques-
tion publicly whether the facts really imply what the policymakers are suggesting
they imply. In this way the service may become associated in the public mind with
analysis with which it disagrees, not to mention with policies based on that analysis.
It provides its imprimatur whether it wants to or not.
This form of politicization, given the incentives of political leaders to indulge in
it, is almost inevitable. Its severity depends on how much of a challenge policymak-
ers face in mustering the necessary support for their policies. The most serious
politicization in the Johnson administration’s public portrayal of the Vietnam War
came when public dismay over the costs of the conflict had made sustained support
for the expedition especially problematic. Politicization associated with the inva-
sion of Iraq reflected the inherent challenge of mustering support for the extraordi-
nary step of launching an offensive war. That challenge was considerable in both
the United States and Britain, where the government of Tony Blair—unlike in the
United States—eventually acknowledged that policy and intelligence had been
improperly commingled in the run-up to the war.
3. Policy Influence on Intelligence

The second basic type of politicization—the slanting of the judgments and other
substantive output of intelligence services—is of more direct concern to profes-
sional intelligence officers, most of whom never are in the public eye. The two types
are not entirely distinct, however. Classified intelligence judgments underlie public
debate about policy insofar as they leak, they become the basis for unclassified state-
ments by policymakers, or they affect the public deliberations of legislators. Some
of the most contentious instances of politicization of classified intelligence prod-
ucts have been contentious precisely because they have played a role in public argu-
ments about controversial policies.
This form of politicization is commonly and simplistically conceived as intel-
ligence officers succumbing to arm-twisting by policymakers. Viewed this way,
combating politicization appears to be a simple matter of intelligence officers mus-
tering enough courage and fortitude to stand up to such pressure. Again, reality is
much more complicated.
Direct pressure by policymakers is neither ubiquitous nor an especially effective
way to influence intelligence judgments, notwithstanding the previously mentioned
example of it regarding enemy troop strength in Vietnam. Attempts at exerting such
pressure are not common. Attempt that are made often are not successful. Such
pressure is clearly a breach of the proper roles of policymaker and intelligence offi-
cer, and thus only the most bullheaded policymakers tend to use it. As a violation of
proper roles, it is relatively easier for intelligence officers to parry, knowing they
have propriety on their side and that any reasonably objective observer would agree
that propriety is on their side. Part of the emotional reaction of many intelligence
officers to any such blatant attempt at pressure would be for dander to rise and
defenses to be put up against such an affront to their professionalism. Arm-twisting
is distressing to anyone on the receiving end, and it would be among the lowest of
low points for any intelligence officer who experiences it. But it represents only a
small proportion of politicization.
Most politicization of the work of intelligence officers rests on those officers’
keen awareness of what policymakers want to hear, without those preferences ever
having to be communicated directly. Intelligence officers know what policymakers
want to hear partly through their observations of discussions inside government
councils. They know it partly from how policymakers react to different intelligence
products. Mostly they know it, as any observant citizen could know it, from the
publicly available indications of policymakers’ objectives and the arguments they
are using to win support for those objectives. Awareness of what policymakers
would like intelligence to say, not the method through which that awareness is
imparted, underlies politicization.
That intelligence officers are part of a hierarchical bureaucracy with policymak-
ers at the top is what gives mere awareness of preferences the power to politicize. In
a perfect world of orderly decision-making and completely open-minded decision-
makers, hierarchy would not be a problem because decision-makers would always
be seeking unvarnished and unbiased input, including input from their intelligence
services. In the much different real world of politics and policy making, decision-
makers more commonly arrive early at their own conclusions and devote most of
their attention to the sometimes difficult task of mobilizing support for the policies
they have selected. Anything that makes that task even more difficult is likely to
annoy or anger them. Knowing this is a powerful influence on anyone, including
intelligence officers, who work for the policymakers.
Displeasing the policymaker, through intelligence products that make his polit-
ical task harder rather than easier, can spoil an intelligence officer’s day in numerous
ways. The cost can be as simple as a critical or biting remark, which, if coming from
a powerful person, can be a major blow to a relatively powerless one. The cost may
take the more pointed form of accusations that the intelligence officers involved are
not team players and are not supporting policymakers as they are supposed to. The
costs may be especially acute for the most senior intelligence officers, who must deal
directly with policymakers, regularly and face-to-face. They are likely to feel the
most pain from any suggestion that they are not team players, because to do their
job they to some extent are co-opted onto the policy team. The specific sanctions
may include exclusion from the policy making circle, making them even more inef-
fective and irrelevant, or loss of their positions altogether. Whatever is the politiciz-
ing effect on senior intelligence officers, a ripple effect is felt down through the
organizations that they lead.
At all levels of an intelligence service, a standard measure of success is the extent
to which policymakers appreciate and use the service’s products. One of the bright-
est feathers in an intelligence officer’s hat is a compliment from a senior policy-
maker about something the officer produced. Although in the perfect world such
compliments would reflect the quality and insightfulness of intelligence products
regardless of whether or not they imply support for current policies, in the real
world the compliments are highly correlated with the implied support. Intelligence
officers’ appetite for kudos is thus another unseen but significant channel for
politicization.
Any politically inconvenient exercise of independence by an intelligence ser-
vice—in the form of judgments implying that current policies are ill-advised—
weakens the service’s ability to exercise independence again by offering further
politically inconvenient judgments. Annoying the policymaker once makes it riskier
to annoy him again. An intelligence service, like any other segment of government,
has only a limited supply of fuel to burn in fighting bureaucratic battles. It must
choose which battles it will try to fight. Repeatedly waging battle opens intelligence
officers to charges that they are pursuing their own policy agendas. Such charges,
even if untrue, make it harder to wage the next battle credibly. This was true to some
degree of U.S. intelligence during the run-up to the Iraq War, in which supporters
of the war inside and outside government repeatedly accused intelligence officers of
having separate policy agendas. The battles fought over the manufactured issue of
terrorist links further diminished what stomach intelligence officers might other-
wise have had to raise doubts about Iraqi weapons programs, which were not a
manufactured issue but instead the subject of widely shared perceptions.
An intelligence service’s standing to resist policymakers’ pressures and prefer-
ences is weakened by anything that puts the service in the policymaker’s doghouse.
This includes not only previous judgments that appear to run against current policy
but also any conspicuous intelligence failure. An example was the behavior of
Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, whose standing in John Kennedy’s
White House was weakened by the intelligence assessment that had said the Soviets
were unlikely to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. When a pessimistic draft
intelligence estimate about Vietnam—which would have been unwelcome reading
for the Kennedy administration, eager as it was to show progress in the American-
assisted counterinsurgency effort there—reached McCone’s desk a few months
later, he remanded it with instructions to the analysts to heed the views of military
and civilian policy officials who saw the situation more optimistically. The analysts
revised the estimate accordingly. After several more months of deterioration in
Vietnam showed the analysts’ earlier pessimistic judgment to be correct, McCone
apologized to them for his patently policy-driven interference and promised not to
do the same thing again (Ford 1998, 12–18).
4. Intelligence Responses to Influence

The common conception of politicization is an oversimplification not only in
equating the influence of policy with arm-twisting by policymakers, but also in
thinking only of an intelligence service making judgment X rather than judgment
not-X. Intelligence judgments tend to be viewed in stark binary terms. Politicization
occurs, according to this view, only if an intelligence service says X, the correct judg-
ment is not-X, and the service would have said not-X in the absence of policy
influence.
Reality is more complicated in several respects, one of which is that most intel-
ligence judgments are matters of degree rather than yes-or-no, X-or-not-X proposi-
tions. Questions for intelligence analysts are more often “How powerful is an
adversary’s military?” rather than whether he has a military at all, or “How rapidly
is the adversary expanding his military?” rather than whether he is expanding it at
all. They are more often about how close is a relationship between a regime and a
terrorist group than about whether there have been any contacts at all between the
two. They are about how much impact a counterinsurgency effort is having rather
than whether it is having any impact at all. Politicization would be much less fre-
quent, and the few instances of it easier to identify, if intelligence judgments were
analogous to a switch with only two positions. But instead they are more like a slid-
ing lever, which even subtle and unseen influences can nudge one way or the other.
Intelligence judgments are matters of degree also in the sense that they are
determinations of probability amid uncertainty, even if they are not expressed in
explicitly probabilistic terms. The main reason for this is that a topic becomes an
issue for intelligence in the first place because important information is ambiguous
or missing, often due to an adversary’s effort to conceal it. (Otherwise the topic
would instead be a matter for routine reporting by some other component of gov-
ernment.) Another reason is that intelligence often is called on to make projections
about the future, in which uncertainty stems less from an adversary withholding a
secret than from the inherent indeterminacy of complex events and their depen-
dence on decisions that foreigners have not yet taken. For each of these reasons,
intelligence judgments involve subjective probability and degrees of likelihood and
unlikelihood. Even modest and unseen political influence can move the expressions
of likelihood a few degrees in one direction or another.
Another respect in which reality departs from the oversimplified concept of
politicization is that many major intelligence issues, including ones that turn out to
be controversial, have multiple components. They involve not one judgment—
although popular perceptions may reduce them to that—but rather judgments on
many different sub-issues. The issue of Iraqi unconventional weapons programs
prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a prime example. Although the
popular view of this issue was a simple yes-or-no one of whether Saddam Hussein’s
regime had weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence analysis involved many
discrete judgments about different weapons or delivery systems, each of which in
turn was founded on several sub-judgments about the significance, if any, of differ-
ent pieces of evidence.
Yet another complexity is that intelligence judgments are not the product of a
single intelligence officer but instead the outcome of a process of negotiation and
review involving many people and often multiple agencies. Anything that influences
the thinking of some of those people—even just a few of them, or perhaps only one
of them—can influence the shape of the collective judgment.
Considered together, these complexities of intelligence judgments—that they
are the product of many different people, considering many different questions,
each of which can have many possible answers along a continuum of possibilities—
add up to an enormously large number of opportunities for any outside influence,
including policy or political influence, to have an effect. The opportunities typically
are so numerous that it would be surprising if awareness of policymakers’ prefer-
ences did not have at least some influence on most intelligence judgments.
Two other realities about intelligence analysis make the opportunities even
more apparent. One is that politicization usually is not a matter of policy influence
pushing against strong arguments that are pushing in the opposite direction. Far
more typically, given the inherent uncertainties surrounding any issue that becomes
a subject for intelligence, no strong arguments push intelligence analysts toward any
particular conclusion. This means that even a very slight influence—which might
be merely an awareness in the backs of some analysts’ minds of what message poli-
cymakers would prefer—is sufficient to tip judgments in one direction or another.
An illustration is the work of analysts at the National Security Agency in inter-
preting intercepted communications surrounding what became known as the Gulf
of Tonkin incident in August 1964. At issue was whether North Vietnamese torpedo
boats had attacked two U.S. destroyers on the high seas, two days after an undis-
puted attack on one of the destroyers when it had been closer to the North
Vietnamese coast. An NSA historian later aptly described the question as an “ana-
lytic coin toss,” given the murky and ambiguous nature of the available information
(Hanyok 2000, 38). The preference of the Johnson administration was clear; it
wanted to declare that an attack had occurred, with the incident becoming the stim-
ulus for a Congressional resolution authorizing the later large-scale U.S. military
intervention in Vietnam. Consistent with that preference, the NSA analysts said that
a second attack had indeed taken place. Research over the subsequent four decades
suggests they were wrong (Moise 1996). Intelligence work is filled with analytic coin
tosses, even though very few of the issues involved ever get the public notice that
this one did.
Another relevant reality is that intelligence judgments are not to be equated
with intelligence products. The products include papers that contain judgments,
but how the judgments are presented in a paper greatly influences the message con-
veyed. Differences of wording, construction, and placement can convey much dif-
ferent impressions based on the same judgments. “X is true, except for Y1, Y2, and
Y3” sends a much different message than “X is false, except for Z1, Z2, and Z3,” even
if substantively and logically they add up to the identical judgment. Merely putting
a sentence in a different part of a paper, with the wording of the sentence unchanged,
can change the overall message of the paper—which is why intelligence analysts
sometimes tussle at length over which judgment will have pride of place in the first
lines or first paragraph of an assessment. The importance of presentational matters
opens up vast additional opportunities for policy influence to have an effect. Indeed,
such matters provide some of the most fertile ground for politicization, because
artful crafting of an intelligence product can leave the policymaker satisfied (or at
least not displeased) while leaving intelligence officers comforted by the thought
they did not abandon their underlying judgments.
Most politicization takes the form of countless subtle adjustments, to judg-
ments or to how judgments are presented, within the innumerable spaces within
which such adjustments are possible. Some of these adjustments are sufficient to
cross the invisible line that separates—in the common, oversimplified view of intel-
ligence—a judgment of X from one of not-X. Many other adjustments do not cross
that line. Some politicization shapes intelligence products that become widely
known or even causes célèbres; many other instances of it go unnoticed. Very few
instances of politicization can be proven to be such, because of the impossibility of
demonstrating what an intelligence service would have said on the same topic but
in a different policy environment. Many of the politicized adjustments take place at
some subconscious level at which even the intelligence officers involved would not
recognize or acknowledge them as such. But it is politicization nonetheless.
Occasionally the adjustments are consciously made and much more readily rec-
ognizable. When they are, intelligence officers search for formulas that placate the
policymaker but enable them to say to others and, perhaps most importantly, to
themselves that they did not compromise their integrity. Usually such formulas
involve semantic or classificatory legerdemain. The controversy over Soviet support
to terrorism was handled by laboriously negotiating an intelligence estimate that did
not say the USSR was supporting terrorist groups per se but said enough about Soviet
support to revolutionary movements that have used terrorist methods for the Reagan
administration to claim publicly that intelligence backed its assertion that Moscow
was behind international terrorism (Garthoff 1994, 25–26). In the controversy over
Communist troop strength in Vietnam, the “circle was squared,” in the words of the
CIA’s senior negotiator on the matter, with an estimate that simply omitted by
definition from total Communist strength certain militias that the intelligence offi-
cers had thought ought to be included. This kept the bottom-line number—the one
that would be most quoted and noted—below the figure the military command was
determined to stay below. Readers of the estimate had to turn to footnotes and back
pages to get the more complete picture (Allen 2001, 252).
Politicization can affect any aspect of an intelligence service’s work, not only the
substance and presentation of its judgments. Politicization can be reflected in what
intelligence officers do not do. For example, they might not subject hypotheses that
conform to the policymakers’ preferences to as much questioning and scrutiny as
hypotheses that contradict those preferences. Awareness of policy preferences
almost certainly was a factor in the U.S. intelligence community’s failure to raise
more searching questions about seemingly less probable (but as it turned out, more
accurate) explanations for Saddam Hussein’s behavior regarding unconventional
weapons programs—explanations that would have negated the policymakers’ main
argument about Saddam’s regime posing a threat.
A related pattern concerns management’s handling of draft assessments within
an intelligence service, which typically involves multiple levels of review and revi-
sion. Intelligence managers chary of running afoul of the policymakers with whom
they interact apply different standards according to whether the assessment under
review would be welcome or unwelcome to the policymaker. Knowing the unwel-
come ones may draw return fire from the policymaker, the manager will ask
tougher questions, impose heavier burdens of proof, and be more likely to remand
drafts for further work than with assessments unlikely to elicit a negative reaction
from policymakers. This kind of management resistance is another way to spoil the
day of an intelligence officer who has worked hard on an assessment. Working-
level intelligence officers respond by introducing a similar asymmetry in their
analysis of the available information, by adjusting their judgments or presentation
of their judgments to make them more palatable to the policymaker, or by not
attempting to produce at all any assessments that policymakers will attack (or,
what may be almost as bad for the working level intelligence officer, that policy-
makers will ignore) and instead spending their time on products that will get a
better hearing.
More generally, what questions an intelligence service does or does not investi-
gate, and what assessments it decides to write or not to write, constitute an impor-
tant aspect of its output and of the overall substantive message it sends, and thus
another opportunity for politicization. The selection of questions, in other words,
can be just as important as the shaping of answers. No intelligence service has the
resources to investigate more than a small fraction of the questions that it legiti-
mately could investigate. In a non-politicized world, intelligence officers choose
which questions to examine based on their prior understanding of worldwide
threats and of what general subjects are most pertinent to the national interest.
Politicization is introduced when policymakers repeatedly ask the intelligence ser-
vice to dig into specific questions aimed at producing material to support specific
rationales for policy. No matter how scrupulously the intelligence service tries to
conduct its inquiries in an unbiased manner, its overall product is biased because
the questions it is investigating and thus the material it uncovers are oriented toward
supporting certain favored hypotheses over other hypotheses. Sheer quantity, not
quality, of uncovered material sends a politicized message. A prime example was the
Bush administration’s repeated requests to the U.S. intelligence community to look
for any links between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida.
5. Implications and Prospects

Some amount of politicization of intelligence is inevitable, as suggested by how
often it occurs. It is inevitable not because of moral failings among either policy-
makers or intelligence officers, and not because of epistemological principles that
worry introspective social scientists. It is inevitable because intelligence exists to
serve policymakers and works within organizations headed by policymakers.
Does the unavoidability of politicization matter? In one respect it does not; the
same strong policy preferences that underlie politicization imply that—on issues on
which such preferences exist—policymakers are unlikely to be diverted from the
course they have set no matter what intelligence says. In two other respects, how-
ever, it does matter. One is that insofar as legislatures or the public can influence
policy, they may be more likely to endorse bad policies because politicized intelli-
gence has given them inaccurate images of the situations the policies are supposed
to address.
The other respect is that policymakers themselves may suffer a form of self-
inflicted delusion, in which they interpret intelligence that has been influenced by
their own perceptions as confirmation of those perceptions. The subtle ways in
which politicization usually works may leave policymakers unaware of the extent to
which it is working. This is especially true of the impressions created by selective
attention to certain questions over others. It is easy for a policymaker to react to the
flow of intelligence he receives on a particular topic by thinking “there really must
be something there,” while forgetting that it was his own interest in the topic that
stimulated the flow.
Combating politicization, therefore, is worth attention and effort. It cannot be
eliminated but can be reduced. Intelligence becomes better to the extent that it
becomes less politicized.
The first hurdle to be overcome in countering politicization—and it is a sur-
prisingly high one—is merely to acknowledge it when it occurs. The indirect and
often invisible ways in which it works, with a scarcity of overt arm-twisting, is one
reason acknowledgement comes hard. Another is the reluctance of intelligence offi-
cers to admit when they have been a part of politicization, because this may seem
equivalent to admitting that they lack integrity. Yet another is the political interests
of the policymaker.
Because politicization is rooted in the structure of government, fundamental

improvements would entail a revision of the structure. Because the specific under-
lying problem is the close organizational connection between intelligence services
and policymakers, the implied remedy is to make that connection less close. As with
almost any organizational issue involving intelligence, however, there are costs and
trade-offs. Intelligence officers have long debated among themselves the relative
advantages of being close to, or farther removed from, the policymaker. Closeness
buys exposure and presumably relevance; distance buys objectivity. The debates
most often are resolved in favor of closeness, but objectivity as well as relevance is a
desired trait in intelligence.
Another possible organizational fix is to make intelligence services as fully
accountable to some other master—generally a legislature—as it is to the policy-
makers they serve now. In the United States, pressures from an opposition party in
Congress have to some degree offset politicizing pressures from within the execu-
tive branch. But here too there are trade-offs. Dual accountability entails the dis-
comforts of working for two different bosses, and the potential for still antagonizing
one by being responsive to the other.
Ultimately the proper placement of an intelligence service depends on what is
conceived to be the most important mission the service is expected to perform. If its
most important job is to support the policy of the day, even if the supporting intel-
ligence is sometimes politicized, then it ought to be as firmly wedded to executive
policymakers as most services are now. If its biggest service to the national interest
is instead to provide a check on policymakers when policy is misguided, then a
much different arrangement, with greater separation between intelligence officers
and policymakers, is called for. Each of these functions has been demanded of intel-
ligence services at one time or another. Which of the two to emphasize is not self-
evident; nor is this a question that intelligence officers themselves can answer.
REFERENCES
Allen, G. W. 2001. None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam.
Allison, G. T. 1971. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown.
Ford, H. P. 1998. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962–1968. Washington:
CIA History Staff.
Garthoff, R. L. 1994. The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold
War. Washington: Brookings Institution.
Hanyok, R. J. 2000. Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin
Mystery, 2–4 August 1964. Cryptologic Quarterly 19:1–55.
Moise, E. E. 1996. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press.
Pillar, P. R. 2006. Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq. Foreign Affairs 85:15–27.
Woodward, B. 1987. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987. New York: Simon and
Schuster.
chapter 30
LEADERSHIP IN AN
INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATION:
THE DIRECTORS OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AND THE CIA
david robarge
1. Introduction
For over six decades, the directors of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the directors of
the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) have headed the world’s most important
intelligence agency and, until 2005,1 oversaw the largest, most sophisticated, and
most productive set of intelligence services ever known. From January 1946 through
1
The position of DCI was established by an executive order of the president in January 1946
that created the Central Intelligence Group, and was given statutory basis in the National Security
Act of 1947 that established the CIA. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (IRTPA, effective 2005) abolished the position of DCI, which had been charged with
overseeing the US government’s other intelligence organizations along with managing the CIA.
Those responsibilities now are assigned respectively to two new positions: the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) and the DCIA.
January 2009, twenty DCIs and DCIAs2 have served through eleven changes in pres-
ident; scores of major and minor wars, civil wars, military incursions, and other
armed conflicts; two energy crises; a global recession and the onset of another; the
specter of nuclear holocaust and the pursuit of arms control; the raising of the
Berlin Wall and the fall of the Iron Curtain; the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; and the arrival of international terrorism on the shores of America and
the war against it overseas. During that time, the directors (as they collectively will
be called here) participated in or oversaw several vital contributions that intelli-
gence made to US national security—strategic warning, clandestine collection,
independent analysis, overhead reconnaissance, support to war-fighters and peace-
keepers, arms-control verification, encouragement of democracy, and counter-
terrorism—while managing controversies brought on through a host of failures in
collection, analysis, security, and leadership.
The responsibilities of the directors grew exponentially after January 1946,
when President Harry S Truman created the CIA’s fledgling predecessor, the Central
Intelligence Group, and whimsically presented the first director, Sidney Souers, with
a black hat, black cloak, and wooden dagger, and designated him the “Director of
Centralized Snooping” (Andrew 1995, 164). At that time, the director had no CIA to
run, no independent budget or personnel to manage, no authority to collect foreign
secrets, and no power to bring about a consensus among agencies. Maybe that is
why Souers, when asked not long after his appointment, “What do you want to do?”
replied, “I want to go home” (Braden 1977, 10).
Then came the first overhaul of the United States’ military and intelligence
machinery with the National Security Act of 1947, which declared that the director
“shall be the head” of the CIA; “advise” and “make recommendations” to the
National Security Council (NSC) on intelligence activities; “correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to national security”; “be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods”; and “perform . . . such additional services of common con-
cern” as the NSC directs (Warner 2001, 29,30). Two years later, the Central Intelligence
Agency Act laid down the director’s and the CIA’s administrative rubrics. Over the
next several decades, the directors would manage thousands of employees and bil-
lions of dollars and would have an important part in guiding many thousand and
many billions more.
George H. W. Bush, the eleventh director (1976–77) called the job “the best . . . in
Washington” (Turner 1985, 24), but arguably it also was the toughest—largely
because the director really did not “direct” something called “central intelligence.”
He was responsible for coordinating national collection and analysis, but he lacked
the unambiguous authority to do so, faced formidable competitors in other agen-
cies, and, unlike a cabinet secretary, had no constituency to support him. He had to
2
Two DCIs served before the CIA was established. They were followed by sixteen DCIs
whose tenures fell under the National Security Act. When the IRTPA went into effect, the
incumbent DCI became the DCIA. His replacement has been the only DCIA as of this writing.
leadership in an intelligence organization 487
walk the knife’s edge between politics and politicization and was the handy scape-
goat for intelligence missteps often committed or set in train years before. Lastly, he
had to deal with the overarching reality that, as Allen Dulles (1953–61) wrote,
“Intelligence is probably the least understood and most misrepresented of the pro-
fessions” (Dulles 1963, 5)—not just by much of the public, but by many of the poli-
cymakers for whom the directors worked and the members of Congress who
oversaw the CIA’s activities.
The purpose for establishing the position of director and the CIA under law in
1947 was to help avoid another Pearl Harbor surprise by taking strategic intelli-
gence functions from separate departments and elevating them to the national
level. The director was to have been the only adviser to the president with the insti-
tutional capability of presenting him with unbiased, non-departmental intelli-
gence. The seemingly straightforward phrases in the National Security Act, however,
only gave the director the potential to be a leader of the intelligence community.
Whether a given director came close to being one was a result of the interplay of
personalities, politics, and world events. With line authority only over the CIA, the
director depended on his powers of bureaucratic persuasion and, most vitally, his
political clout at the White House to be heard and heeded. Richard Helms (1966–
73) often noted that the secretary of defense was the second most powerful person
in Washington, whereas the director was “the easiest man in Washington to fire. I
have no political, military, or industrial base” (Osborne 1973, C2). Moreover, the
director’s showcase product—national-level analysis—often carried the implicit
message, “Mr. President, your policy is not working.” Presidents often have had
unrealistic expectations about what the CIA can achieve operationally and analyti-
cally, and they usually did not appreciate hearing from their directors that the
world was more complicated and uncertain than they had anticipated. No wonder
R. James Woolsey (1993–95) said his version of the job’s description could be writ-
ten very simply: “Not to be liked” (Lathrop 2004, 117).
2. Historians and the Directors’ Impact

An inconsistency exists between the fairly extensive bibliography on the directors
and historians’ evaluation of their personal contribution to US national security.
Nearly as many biographies have been written about the directors as about members
of the American foreign policy community with comparable status—the secretaries
of state and defense, the presidents’ national security advisers, and the chairmen of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the twenty heads of the largest agglomeration of
secret services and/or the preeminent intelligence agency among them in what used
to be called the Free World generally have not been perceived as being nearly as influ-
ential as most of their counterparts. Historians have regarded a number of secretar-
ies of state and defense—notably George Marshall, Dean Acheson, John Foster
Dulles, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and Henry Kissinger—as major players in
the diplomatic and military developments of their times, as are at least three national
security advisers—McGeorge Bundy, Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.
The directors are another matter. Only three—Dulles, William Casey (1981–87),
and George Tenet (1997–2004) after 9/11—usually are considered to have had an
impact rivaling that of the other top foreign-policy officials in the administrations
in which they served. The rest rarely get mentioned in most foreign-affairs sur-
veys—although Helms and William Colby (1973–76) may come up when the
Agency’s “time of troubles” in the 1970s is discussed. Even in overviews of the CIA
and the intelligence community, only a handful—Hoyt Vandenberg (1946–47),
Walter Bedell Smith (1950–53), Dulles, John McCone (1961–65), Casey, and possibly
Helms—are portrayed as making noteworthy contributions to the way the US gov-
ernment conducts intelligence activity.
That consensus may derive from conceptions of the proper place of intelligence
practitioners in the foreign-policy process. Intelligence, the premise goes, should be
detached from policy so as to avoid cross-corruption of either. If intelligence ser-
vices have a stake in policy, they may skew their analyses or become aggressive advo-
cates of covert action. The intelligence community must remain a source of objective
assessment and not become a politicized instrument of the incumbent administra-
tion. Accordingly, as heads of the community, the directors were to be “intellocrats”
who administered specialized secret functions, not to benefit any departmental
interests but to advance policies set elsewhere in the executive branch—specifically,
the White House.
Until 2005 when the office of the director of National Intelligence was created,
the DCIs and DCIAs reported exclusively to the National Security Council and truly
served at the pleasure of the president. Indeed, much of every director’s influence
was directly proportional to his personal relationship with the chief executive. At the
same time, and somewhat paradoxically, after incoming presidents began choosing
“their” directors in 1977, the nonpartisan stature of the position diminished and,
along with it, its independence. The (overstated) practice of “new president, new
Director”3 did not always translate into greater influence. The president’s national
security adviser and the secretaries of state and defense usually still had more access
to the Oval Office.
The situation was not much different at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.
Directors came and went, but bureaucracies stayed. When directors tried to “clean
house” (James Schlesinger [1973] and Stansfield Turner [1977–81]) or manage
Only four of the ten changes in president that occurred from the creation of CIA in 1947
3
through 2001 involved the immediate replacement of the director: Dwight Eisenhower reassigned
Smith and put in Dulles in 1953 (but not, unlike the instances that follow, for any “political”
reason); Jimmy Carter removed Bush and, after a failed first nomination, selected Stansfield
Turner in 1977; Ronald Reagan replaced Turner with Casey in 1981; and Bill Clinton dismissed
Robert Gates and appointed Woolsey in 1993. As of this writing, Barack Obama has nominated
Leon Panetta to replace Michael Hayden—potentially the fourth “political” appointment.
through loyalists from previous jobs (Turner, John Deutch [1995–96], and Porter
Goss [2004–06]), the result was administrative disarray and low morale. For these
reasons and more, no director ever had a chance to become as autonomous as J.
Edgar Hoover at the FBI, or to be assessed as having more than an episodic impact
on US foreign-policy achievements.
3. The Directors in Profile

Allen Dulles once told Congress that the CIA “should be directed by a relatively
small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick
at that particular job” (Time 1967, 16). While Dulles’s advice may be applicable to the
heads of the Agency’s directorates and offices, hardly any part of his statement was
borne out over the history of the director’s position. Elite, yes; but neither small in
number nor anonymous—many were well known in their various pursuits when
they were nominated. And even if they were willing to stay for the long haul, few
did. In late 1945, an interdepartmental committee that was developing a plan for
a national-level intelligence agency recommended that its director be appointed
for a long term, preferably not less than six years (Department of State 1996).
Testifying to Congress in early 1947 about the proposed National Security Act, Dulles
asserted that appointment as director “should be somewhat comparable to appoint-
ment to high judicial office, and should be equally free from interference due to
political changes” (CIA Historical Intelligence Collection 1947).
The reality of a director’s tenure was otherwise. The average time they served
was just over three years, and only five directors stayed at least four. Moreover, the
new directors often rearranged the senior executive ranks at the Agency as well. The
consequences of these frequent “regime changes” must further be considered in
light of the fact that most new directors had next to no time to settle in and read in.
Over half had to face foreign policy or intelligence-related crises within their first
month.4 In other instances, major events immediately preceded the director’s
arrival.5 Soon after his appointment in 1950, Walter Bedell Smith said, “I expect the
worst and I am sure I won’t be disappointed” (Lathrop 2004, 110). Most subsequent
4
These included: the Chinese incursion into North Korea in 1950; the death of Stalin in 1953;
the US military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965; France’s withdrawal from NATO
and a marked upsurge in the Cultural Revolution in China in 1966; the Yom Kippur war and the
fall of the Allende regime in Chile in 1973; the publication of the leaked Pike Committee report in
1976; the breakdown in the SALT II talks in 1977; a military coup attempt in recently democratized
Spain in 1981; the assassination of the Lebanese prime minister in 1987; the official breakup of the
Soviet Union in 1991; and a deadly terrorist attack in Egypt in 2004.
5
The signing of the Vietnam War peace accords in 1973 and the terrorist shootings outside
the CIA headquarters compound in 1993.
directors likewise were not. Perhaps the best advice they could have received from
the presidents who picked them was, “Be ready to hit the ground running.”
Who have the directors been? These are the salient demographic facts about the
twenty directors from 1946 to 2009 (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence 1998):
• They were born in fourteen different states. Most hailed from the Midwest
(nine) and the Northeast (eight). One was born in the Southwest, one in the
West, and one overseas.
• They attended twenty-two different colleges, universities, and graduate or
professional schools.6 Eight finished college, and ten others went on for
post-graduate degrees. One, Smith, completed only high school.
• They ranged in ages at the time of their appointment from forty-three
(Schlesinger) to sixty-seven (Casey) with an average age of fifty-five.
• Before their appointments, the directors came from a variety of walks of life,
some from more than one. Six served in the military, eight had been
government officials and/or lawyers, five came from politics, academe, or
journalism, and three had been in business. All three branches of
government and three of five military services have been represented.
• Importantly, considering that they immediately or soon had to deal with
major international events, nineteen of the directors had direct or indirect
experience with intelligence as practitioners or consumers of intelligence, or
members or managers of intelligence-related organizations before their
appointments. This breadth of experience distinctly sets them apart from
the secretaries of state and defense, a minority of who have had comparable
experience with diplomacy and military affairs since 1946.7
4. A Leadership Typology
Given the abovementioned legal and political constraints they have lived under, can
Directors be regarded as leaders, as opposed to heads of organizations or chief
administrators? Was US intelligence noticeably different because a certain individ-
ual served as director? Did directors have—could they have had—a leadership role
commensurate with that of their counterparts at State and Defense? One way to
6
Amherst, the US Naval Academy, and Yale each have had three alumni as directors;
Columbia, Georgetown, Oxford, and Princeton each have had two. Only one of the Yale graduates
(Bush) was a member of Skull and Bones.
7
Direct experience as practitioners or managers: Souers, Vandenberg, Roscoe Hillenkoetter,
Dulles, Helms, Colby, Casey, Webster, Gates, Tenet, Goss, Hayden. Indirect experience as
consumers: Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, Bush, Turner, Woolsey, Deutch. No appreciable
experience: William Raborn.
begin answering those questions is through serial biography and group analysis. In
contrast to clandestine-services officers, however, directors have not been examined
in such a fashion. They do not fit into categories like “prudent professionals” and
“bold easterners,” and they lack the sociological homogeneity needed to be thought
of, or to think of themselves as, a network of “old boys” or, in William Colby’s words,
“the cream of the academic and social aristocracy” (Alsop 1968; Hersh 1992; Jeffreys-
Jones 1985; Spears 1991; Colby and Forbath 1978, 180). Biographers attached those
labels largely to former operators in the Office of Strategic Services who joined the
early CIA and then stayed on, a situation that applies to only three directors—
Dulles, Helms, and Colby.
This heterogeneity does not mean, however, that the directors cannot be ana-
lyzed collectively. At least some aspects of the many models applied to political and
corporate leaders can be used with the directors, although empiricism or utility
may suffer—complex personalities and complicated situations are sometimes made
less square to fit more easily into the models’ round holes, or so many different
holes are created that comparisons among individuals become too hard to draw.
A straightforward approach to the directors would take into account the institu-
tional and political limitations on their authority, the objectives presidents appointed
them to accomplish, and the personality traits they exhibited and managerial meth-
ods they used during their tenures. What were the directors told to do (mission) and
how did they go about doing it (style)? With those questions addressed, an evalua-
tion of their effectiveness can be made. How well did the directors do what they
were expected to do, given their authorities, resources, and access (record)? What
“types” of directors, if any, have been most successful (patterns)?
Using this perspective, five varieties of directors are evident.8 The first is the
administrator-custodian or administrator-technocrat, charged with implementing,
fine-tuning, or reorienting intelligence activities under close direction from the
White House. Examples of this type have been Souers, Hillenkoetter, Raborn,
Woolsey, and Tenet before 9/11. Usually appointed at a time of uncertainty about the
intelligence community’s roles and capabilities (the late 1940s and the mid-1990s),
these directors tried to maintain stability in the CIA’s relationships with other
Community agencies, Congress, and the public. Their main goal was to do better
with what they already had, and to avoid distractions and scandals that would add
to the uncertainty they were trying to manage. What differentiated custodians from
technocrats was “energy level.” The former had a very low-key style, almost to the
point of acting like placeholders and time-servers (Souers, Hillenkoetter, Raborn).
The latter energetically pursued administrative changes designed to make the CIA
and the Community more responsive to policymakers and better adapted to a new
political environment (Woolsey, Tenet).
The next type is the intelligence operator—directors who were current or former
intelligence professionals tasked with devising, undertaking, and overseeing an
8
The DCIA serving at the time of this writing, Hayden, is excluded from the analysis because
no historical perspective can yet be brought to bear on his tenure.
extensive array of covert action, espionage, and counterintelligence programs in

aggressive support of US national-security policy. Four directors fit this category:
Dulles, Helms, Casey, and Tenet after 9/11. The presidents they served were eager to
use all of the US government’s secret capabilities against America’s adversaries, and
they relied on their directors’ knowledge of and experience with operations to help
them accomplish that end. The director as intelligence operator may have empha-
sized different secret activities depending on individual backgrounds and predilec-
tions, and the targets they worked against. For example, Dulles and Casey were
devotees of covert action, while Helms preferred to work with espionage and coun-
terintelligence. Because of the prominent place secret activities had in American
foreign policy when they served, this type of director generally served longer by
far—seven years on average—and became more heavily involved in policy decisions
than any other type.
The high level of secret activity during those long tenures recurrently produced
operational mishaps, revelations of “flaps,” and other intelligence failures that hurt the
CIA’s public reputation and damaged its relations with the White House and Congress.
The Bay of Pigs disaster under Dulles, the ineffective covert action in Chile under
Helms, and the Iran-Contra scandal under Casey are prominent examples. This kind
of director might have known more than others about what the CIA could do, but was
less likely to be a sound judge of what it should not be doing (Hoeksema 1978, 193).
Failures, indiscretions, and other such controversies in turn have led to the
departures of those intelligence-operator directors and their replacement by man-
ager-reformers charged with “cleaning up the mess” and preventing similar prob-
lems from happening again. There have been two kinds of manager-reformer
directors. One is the insider—a career intelligence officer who used his experience at
the CIA to undertake low-profile, slow-and-steady changes and redirect its activities
during or after a time of political controversy and lack of certitude about its direc-
tion. Two directors functioned as manager-reformer insiders. William Colby, an
operations veteran with a career dating back to the OSS, sought to rescue the CIA
from the political tempests of the mid-1970s and to regain some of the Agency’s lost
prestige through his policy of controlled cooperation with congressional investiga-
tors and targeted termination of questionable activities. Robert Gates, a long-time
Soviet analyst who had worked on the NSC in two administrations and also served
as deputy director for intelligence, moved the Agency into the post-Cold War era
after a period of undynamic leadership.
The other type of manager-reformer is the outsider, who was chosen because of
his experience in the military, business, government, politics, or academe to imple-
ment a major reorganization of the CIA and the intelligence community, or to
regroup and redirect the Agency, especially after major operational setbacks or pub-
lic conflicts over secret activities. Seven directors were manager-reformer outsiders:
Vandenberg, Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, Turner, Deutch, and Goss. Collectively
they were responsible for more major changes at the CIA or its predecessor than any
other category of director. For example, under Vandenberg, the CIG acquired its
own budgetary and personnel authority, received responsibility for collecting all
foreign intelligence (including atomic secrets) and preparing national intelligence

analyses, and coordinated all interdepartmental intelligence activities. Smith—in
response to intelligence failures before the Korean War and to infighting among
operations officers—centralized espionage and covert actions, analysis, and admin-
istration by rearranging the CIA into three directorates and creating the Office of
National Estimates to do strategic forecasting. In effect, he organized the Agency
into the shape it has today.
Schlesinger and Turner facilitated the departure of hundreds of clandestine-
services veterans in their quests to streamline the Agency bureaucracy, lower the
profile of covert action, and move the CIA more toward analysis and technical col-
lection. Deutch, who had wanted to be secretary of defense and not director, reori-
ented the Agency significantly toward being a military support organization. Goss
was the only one in the group who had previously worked at the Agency, but he was
selected because he headed the intelligence oversight committee in the House of
Representatives. Taking over during imbroglios over collection and analytic failures
connected with the 9/11 terrorist attacks and assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction, he set about revamping the Agency’s work on international terrorism.
Most directors in this category were far more concerned about achieving their
objectives quickly than about angering bureaucratic rivals or fostering ill will among
subordinates. Largely because they accomplished so much—or tried to—and did
not worry much about whom they antagonized along the way, some of them were
among the most disliked or hardest to get along with of any directors.
Finally, there are the restorers: George Bush and William Webster. Like the
manager-reformer outsiders, they became directors after the Agency went through
difficult times—they succeeded Colby and Casey, respectively—but they were not
charged with making significant changes in the way the CIA did business. Instead,
they used their “people skills” and public reputations to raise morale, repair politi-
cal damage, and burnish the Agency’s reputation. Bush, a prominent figure in
Republican Party politics, went to Langley to mend the CIA’s relations with Congress
and use his amiability to improve esprit de corps and put a more benign face on the
Agency. Webster, a director of the FBI and former federal judge, brought a quality
of rectitude to an Agency mired in scandal and helped raise its stature in the com-
munity and with Congress and the public.
When these five types are placed in chronological order, two definite patterns
emerge: (1) After directors’ tenures noted for their ineffectiveness or controversy,
presidents have in all but one instance replaced the incumbent administrators or
operators with manager-reformers or restorers.9 (2) Insiders always have been suc-
ceeded by outsiders—indicative of the fact that the former either come to be
regarded as “tainted” or as too constrained in their ability to change the Agency.10
9
Souers/Vandenberg; Hillenkoetter/Smith; Dulles/McCone; Helms/Schlesinger-Colby-Bush;
Casey/Webster-Gates; Woolsey/Deutch; post-9/11 Tenet/Goss. Raborn/Helms is the sole exception.
10
Dulles/McCone; Helms/Schlesinger; Colby/Bush; Casey/Webster; Gates/Woolsey; Tenet/Goss.
One index of how much a given director tried to change the CIA is the extent
of personnel realignment in the Agency’s senior ranks—deputy and assistant dep-
uty directors, 7th-Floor staff chiefs, and heads of upper-echelon functional offices—
that he instituted within his first year. Counting the number of new and different
names reveals some general, but not definitive, correlations with types of directors.
Restorers and (slightly less so) manager-reformers did the most personnel shuffling,
while administrators and operators did the least. The case of the restorers may seem
surprising at first, given that they do not have a mandate to institute major changes.
However, realigning responsibilities and encouraging departures is consistent with
their mission to improve the CIA’s political standing and public image. In addition,
a push-pull dynamic may be present with both as restorers and reformers. As they
take direct steps to relocate and replace senior managers, those officers may decide
on their own that they do not want to work under a new kind of leader under a dif-
ferent set of rules.
That administrators and operators do the least rearranging at the top fits their
respective agendas. As “tinkerers” not charged with large-scale disruptions, adminis-
trators keep in place the current cadre of careerists who know the bureaucratic ins and
outs and can best help them implement their modest adjustments. Operators who are
charged with aggressively using the Agency’s secret warfare capabilities do not want to
weaken it by reassignments and departures of experienced clandestine service officers
at the onset or in the midst of campaigns against international adversaries.
5. Key Variables to Success

The directors have performed their duties in an interlocking environment of legal
authorities, institutional relationships, and personal ties to policymakers. More
than any other factor, the extent to which they have compensated for their office’s
inherent statutory and political weaknesses by building bridges to the White House,
other intelligence organizations, and Congress has determined whether their ten-
ures have been regarded as successful or not.
Legal Limitations
The National Security Act of 1947 gave the director clear authority over the CIA’s
core missions of collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence and keeping opera-
tions secure, and as is evident by the strong verbs used in those sections of the law:
perform, protect, evaluate, correlate, disseminate.11 In contrast, the director’s authority
11
The CIA’s covert-action authority was not spelled out in the 1947 law but was bestowed in
later NSC directives.
over interagency affairs was delimited by the weak language used in the law—advise
and recommend—forcing him to find ways to overcome the preponderant power of
the secretary of defense, who historically has controlled five-sixths of the United
States’ intelligence resources.12
The First Customer

The most important factor in the director’s ability to surmount his legal limitations
has been his relationship with the president. The CIA is more of a presidential ser-
vice organization than any other in the US government, and it remains the only
member of the Community whose first customer is the president and not a cabinet
secretary, agency head, or military-service chief. This special quality has been both
a boon and a bane because presidents have their own appreciations of intelligence
and their own ways of dealing with the CIA and their directors. Some presidents
have been experienced with intelligence or have been fascinated with it or with cer-
tain kinds of secret information or operations. Other presidents had little experi-
ence with intelligence, or did not care about it, or did not like it or the CIA. As
former deputy director of Central Intelligence Richard Kerr aptly put it, “a number
of administrations . . . started with the expectation that intelligence could solve every
problem, or that it could not do anything right, and then moved to the opposite
view. Then they settled down and vacillated from one extreme to the other” (Kerr
and Davis 1997, 31).
Directors’ relations with their presidents often followed a similarly erratic
course, largely set by how the chief executive chose to run his national-security
decision-making apparatus. Some began by regarding the director as their senior
intelligence adviser and saw him regularly. Occasionally that degree of contact con-
tinued; more often, it did not. Other presidents preferred from the start having their
national-security advisers function as their principal intelligence officers—notably
Nixon with Kissinger and Carter with Brzezinski. Then there were the various ways
presidents chose to run their White Houses: Eisenhower with his military staff
structure; John Kennedy and his loose agglomeration of ad hoc working groups and
catch-as-catch-can meetings with advisers; Lyndon Johnson’s congressional
cloakroom approach, in which the “real deals” were made in informal settings
12
Under the IRTPA, the new DCIA is simultaneously in an inferior and superior legal
position compared to the DCI. With the creation of the position of DNI as supermanager of the
community, the DCIA was “demoted” to the status of agency head. At the same time, however, the
IRTPA asserted the DCIA’s authorities over collection and analysis in straightforward terms—
collect, perform, correlate, evaluate, direct, and coordinate—and designated him as National
HUMINT Manager. In the recent rewrite of Executive Order 12333 that provides presidential
guidance over US intelligence activities, the DCIA’s control of liaison relationships and HUMINT
operations was diluted—he now only coordinates them—but elsewhere the CIA is charged to
collect, analyze, produce, disseminate, and conduct various parts of the intelligence process and has
sole authority to engage in covert action in peacetime unless the president directs otherwise.
outside the NSC; Richard Nixon’s notorious “Berlin Wall” of advisers (Kissinger,
H. R. Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman) who controlled access to the Oval Office;
and Bill Clinton’s notorious disorganization that often rendered the daily schedule
irrelevant by mid-morning.
A few directors were close to their presidents (Casey/Reagan, Tenet/George W.
Bush); some had cordial, businesslike relationships (Dulles/Eisenhower, Helms/
Johnson); some had only infrequent contact (Hillenkoetter/Truman, Turner/
Carter); and some had tense relationships (McCone/Johnson, Helms/Nixon) or no
relationship to speak of (Woolsey/Clinton). Closeness, however, was not an abso-
lute good for the directors. Some paid a cost for being too close, or trying to be.
They wore out their welcomes, or became too committed to the success of covert
actions, or were accused of politicization, or became linked with controversial
policies. It was not an automatic benefit for the Agency or the director for him to
be able to say, as William Casey did, “You understand, I call him Ron” (Kovar 1999–
2000, 36).
Directors sometimes could work around the physical, administrative, and even
psychological obstacles presidents erected, most importantly by changing the look
and content of the daily briefing product provided to the White House since 1946—
the Daily Summary, the Central Intelligence Bulletin, the President’s Intelligence
Checklist, and the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). But the president decided how he
would receive the information it contained: in writing or with a briefing; on his
own, from the director or a senior Agency officer, or the national-security adviser;
and by itself or combined with other departments’ material. His feedback guided its
coverage and even its appearance.
Even with that input, however, what was a director to do when Johnson said
that “the CIA is made up of boys whose families sent them to Princeton but wouldn’t
let them into the family brokerage business”; and told Helms, “Dick, I need a paper
on Vietnam, and I’ll tell you what I want included in it” (Lathrop 2004, 174, 339). Or
when Nixon returned a thick package of PDBs given to him during the transition
period unopened, called Agency officers “clowns,” and asked, “What use are they?
They’ve got 40,000 people over there reading newspapers” (Helgerson 1995, 91;
Helms 2003, 410; Powers 1979, 256). The directors often served at the clear displea-
sure of the presidents, who ordered them to act and then often tried to deny—not
very plausibly—that they had anything to do with the outcome. Bill Clinton
remarked that cutting the intelligence budget during peacetime was like canceling
one’s health insurance when one felt good (Lathrop 2004, 344). But presidents have
not always been the best stewards of the resources of the Agency they have so often
called on to help implement—and, in more than a few cases, salvage—their foreign
policies.
That nexus between intelligence and policy helps explain a clear partisan prefer-
ence that presidents have displayed since 1946 for the different types of directors
described above. Republicans have appointed or retained all of the categories and all
of the Agency insiders. Democrats have appointed or retained only administrators
and manager-reformers and with one exception (Johnson/Helms) have never chosen
or kept on an insider. The variable here may be experience with foreign policy and
intelligence. Presidents with less of both—mostly Democrats13—have a limited
understanding of what the CIA does and can do and are cautious about using it
aggressively. At the same time, they appear to regard the Agency as a current or poten-
tial problem that needs close management or significant change. Presidents with
more experience in both areas—all Republicans14—seem more confident in their
judgments about the CIA, are more willing to pick types of directors who best fit
specific situations, and are much more inclined to entrust intelligence practitioners
with national-security responsibilities and with implementing changes at Langley.
Bureaucratic Skills
A few presidents at least made a bow toward giving their directors authority over
other intelligence agencies—such as Kennedy with McCone and Nixon with Helms
and Schlesinger—but in most cases the community’s center of gravity meandered
between CIA Headquarters, the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, and the West Wing. Some
directors—especially four of the strongest-willed manager-reformer outsiders,
Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, and Turner—tried hard to be true leaders of the com-
munity. McCone, a former business tycoon, used the US Intelligence Board as if he
were chairman of “Intelligence Inc.” But most other directors chose to run the CIA
primarily and went about their community functions as an aside. Helms watched
his boss McCone fight most of the time futilely against the Pentagon and decided
that the best way for the Agency to “stay at the table” was to stay away from inter-
agency disputes. Internally, some directors tried to resolve the Agency’s “culture
wars” between the “spooks” and the scholars, and between the so-called prudent
professionals who ran spies and the “cowboys” who did covert action—but most
left that internal sociology alone. While two manager-reformer/outsiders, Schlesinger
and Turner, tried to rein in the operations directorate with large-scale personnel
reductions, the CIA’s corporate culture has proven very resistant to directors’ efforts
to change it.
Oversight and Accountability

One defining characteristic of the directors was that they were the most unsecret
heads of any secret agency in the world. They lived in the nebulous zone between
secrecy and democracy, clandestinity and openness. They headed the world’s first
13
Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, and Clinton are the Democrats. The Republicans are
Ronald Reagan (although he had some exposure to intelligence affairs as a member of the
Rockefeller Commission investigating CIA activities in the United States) and George W. Bush.
Obama’s choice of Panetta fits the pattern described here.
14
Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, and George H. W. Bush. To some extent Reagan fits this group
also; although he lacked foreign policy experience, he had a definite foreign policy agenda and
strong ideas about using US intelligence services to carry it out.
publicly acknowledged intelligence service. While some countries guard the identi-
ties of their intelligence chiefs, the directors were public figures, held to account for
what the CIA, and to some extent the community, did and did not do. The whole
process of vetting a prospective director was uniquely transparent among intelli-
gence services. His confirmation hearings usually were open, and as far back as John
McCone’s in 1962—the first in which any senators voted against a nominee for
director—often have been used for partisan purposes and political theater. Two
other nominations received significant numbers of “no” votes (Bush and Gates),
and four had to be withdrawn (Theodore Sorensen, Gates,15 Michael Carns, and
Anthony Lake).
The contrast between the two worlds in which directors existed—secret and
public—fell into stark relief from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, when the rela-
tionship between intelligence and democracy in the United States underwent a sea
change. Statements from two directors of that period capture the magnitude of the
shift. After he was appointed in 1966, Richard Helms said, “I think there’s a tradition
that the CIA is a silent service, and it’s a good one. I think the silence ought to begin
with me.” In 1978, William Colby, looking back on the “time of troubles” he had
recently suffered through, said that such a “supersecretive style of operation
had . . . become incompatible with the one I believed essential” (Ranelagh 1986, 614;
Colby and Forbath 1978, 334).
After that, pragmatic openness became the directors’ watchword in dealing
with their political monitors. As the Cold War foreign-policy consensus shattered
for good, directors increasingly had to contend with all the various organs of
accountability: special commissions, watchdog groups, the courts, the media, and,
most importantly of course, Congress. Later directors could scarcely imagine the
halcyon days of their predecessors’ dealings with Capitol Hill in the 1950s, when
oversight often was overlook.16 It is hard today to envision what it was like in 1956,
when the director briefed Congress a handful of times a year at most and almost
always left with a figurative, if not literal, blank check. One of the Agency’s legisla-
tive counsels, John Warner, told of an encounter he and Dulles had with one of the
CIA subcommittees in the late 1950s:
It was sort of a crowded room, and [the subcommittee chairman, Representative]
Clarence Cannon greets Dulles [with] “Oh, it’s good to see you again,
Mr. Secretary.” He thinks it’s [Secretary of State John] Foster Dulles, or mistakes
the name; I don’t know. Dulles, he’s a great raconteur. He reminds Cannon of
this, and Cannon reminds him of that, and they swap stories for two hours. And
at the end, [Cannon asks,] “Well, Mr. Secretary, have you got enough money in
your budget for this year [and] the coming year?” [Dulles replies,] “Well, I think
we are all right, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.” That was the budget
hearing. (Kuhns 2001, 48)
15
Gates was nominated twice. His name was withdrawn during contentious hearings in 1987.
16
Barrett (2005) and Snider (2008) provide full treatments of congressional oversight.
The era of congressional benign neglect ended during the period 1974–80, with
the adoption of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring a presidential finding for
covert actions; the Church and Pike Committee investigations; the establishment of
the House and Senate permanent oversight committees; and the passage of the
Intelligence Accountability Act mandating that Congress be “promptly and fully
informed” of covert actions. After that flurry, the directors’ relationship with
Congress was altered forever. For a few eventful years, William Casey tried to stand
as the immovable object against the irresistible force; as Robert Gates observed,
Casey “was guilty of contempt of Congress from the day he was sworn in” (Gates
1996, 213). The trend was soon back on track, however, and by the year 2000, Agency
officers were briefing Congress in some fashion an average of five times a day, and
the director’s frequent testimony on the Hill was a headline-grabbing event.
6. Measures of Success and Best Practices

By what objective standards, used as appropriate for their time and mission, can the
directors’ records be evaluated? A not-exhaustive list would include:
• Having an impact on foreign policy;
• Maintaining or rebuilding good relations with the president and Congress;
• Retaining or expanding budget and personnel resources;
• Raising the CIA’s standing in the Intelligence Community and with the
public; and
• Inspiring the Agency workforce and instituting durable internal changes.
With the measures of effectiveness established, what were the best practices that the
most effective directors used most of the time? Looking at the directors collectively,
those who met most of the above standards most of the time:
• Declared their goals and explained their purposes at the outset as specifi-
cally as was feasible, thus allaying uncertainty and confusion, and
enabling mid-course corrections to be more comprehensible to the
workforce.
• Centralized authority for strategic planning but delegated responsibility for
administration.
• Used mostly Agency professionals to implement programs and changes,
and minimized the role of outsiders with personal connections to them.
• Adapted to how presidents ran their White Houses and chose to use
intelligence.
• Recognized that ambiguous legal authorities do not trump presidential
support in bureaucratic disputes.
• Avoided the appearance of partisanship and policy advocacy.
• Dealt with Congress proactively and openly.

• Responded to public criticism promptly and firmly but not defensively.
At the cornerstone-laying ceremony for the CIA’s Original Headquarters
Building in 1959, President Eisenhower said:
In war, nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the
strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper
interpretation of those facts. In peacetime, the necessary facts . . . and their
interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term
national security. . . . To provide information of this kind is the task of the
organization of which you are a part. No task could be more important. (CIA
Center for the Study of Intelligence 1996, 19)
Since 1946, the directors have carried out that task for informing national secu-
rity policy making in war and peace, in flush times and lean, amid accolades and
scorn. No one of their various leadership styles insured success. Their standing and
accomplishments depended largely on circumstances they could not influence:
presidential agendas, world events, and domestic politics. On occasion, with the
right conjunction of circumstances and personalities, directors reached the inner
circle of the national-security apparatus and left the CIA better off when they
departed. More often, they did not. As director John Deutch succinctly remarked,
“[i]t’s a very hard job” (Lathrop 2004, 118)—and, judging from the difficulty Barack
Obama had in finding someone to nominate as DCIA, apparently not a very attrac-
tive one, either.
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part vii
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
chapter 31
THE FUTURE OF FBI

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
THROUGH THE LENS OF
THE PAST HUNDRED YEARS
raymond j. batvinis
Counterintelligence is the business of identifying and dealing with foreign

intelligence threats to the United States. Its core concern is the intelligence services
of foreign states and similar organizations of non-state actors, such as transnational
terrorist groups.
Counterintelligence has both a defensive mission protecting the nation’s
secrets and assets against foreign intelligence penetration and an offensive mission
of finding out what foreign intelligence organizations are planning to better defeat
their aim.
Office of the National

Counterintelligence Executive
I will weep for thee. For this revolt of thine me thinks, is like
another fall of man.
—William Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 2, Scene 2
506 counterintelligence
1. Introduction
The year 2008 celebrated the one hundredth anniversary of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)—the principle investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The history of the “Bureau” as it is often referred to, is a truly American saga: a tale of an
institution that has become an inextricable feature of the American experience. (The
organization was called the Bureau of Investigation and Division of Investigation before
the change was made in 1934 to its current name. For simplicity “Federal Bureau of
Investigation” and “FBI” will be used throughout this chapter.)
Remarkable growth and transformation are also evident in this story. Originally
envisioned as a modest investigative agency; the FBI, over ten decades, has emerged as
the most powerful investigative agency in the world. Today, with a force of twenty-five
thousand employees serving at home and most foreign countries, one can only begin
to grasp its uniqueness; in effect, a national investigative and intelligence service
responsible for all criminal, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence matters—in a
single agency. This chapter will address only the FBI’s foreign counterintelligence
function; briefly tracing its evolution through an examination of the key events and
issues that effected its growth as the principle civilian counterintelligence service of
the U.S. government.
2. Early Years
The FBI was founded in 1908 to serve as a permanent investigative force for the U.S.
Department of Justice. Its mandate was the enforcement of federal laws by collect-
ing evidence for government use in criminal or civil proceedings. One of these stat-
utes was espionage against the United States. With no foreign enemies to fear at the
time the FBI focused on other issues during this period of progressive reform: fraud,
waste, and even morality under the so-called Mann Act, a law that made the trans-
port of a woman from one state to another for immoral purposes a federal offense
(Whitehead 1956, 17–25).
World War I thrust espionage to center stage of America’s national security
agenda—a priority that the government was ill prepared to handle. With no prece-
dents, no human talent or experience to draw from nor any counterespionage ser-
vice in existence, President Woodrow Wilson was forced to rely on a loose
arrangement of agencies that included the FBI, the War Department’s Military
Intelligence Division (MID), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) together with
hundreds of state and local police agencies nationwide, all with no history of work-
ing together on a common mission.
German espionage and sabotage in the United States illuminated this hopeless
arrangement. A case in point was the massive explosion that occurred on June 16,
the future of fbi counterintelligence 507
1916, at the Black Tom munitions terminal located near Jersey City, New Jersey,
which cost two lives and at least twenty million dollars of damage to war supplies
destined for the Britain and France. On January 11, 1917, a mysterious fire destroyed
the Canadian Car and Foundry Plant at Kingsland, New Jersey, resulting in another
seventeen million dollars in damage followed the next day by a an explosion at a
DuPont plant nearby. The investigations of these incidents were generally charac-
terized by interagency rivalry, stalled investigations, and a few insignificant arrests
that failed to produce sufficient evidence of German government inspired sabotage
(Witcover 1989, ch. 2, 189–90).
American counterintelligence disarray only worsened after the war. With Russia
in Lenin’s hands and communism spreading throughout Europe, America found
itself in the grip of a new hysteria: fear of home-grown and foreign-inspired anar-
chy aimed at government overthrow. These anxieties were fueled when a group
called the “Anarchist Fighters” began sending letter and package bombs to promi-
nent citizens around the country during the summer of 1920. One bomb sent to
Attorney General of the United States A. Mitchell Palmer prematurely detonated
killing the bomber and damaging Palmer’s Washington, D.C., home. The shaken
Palmer quickly declared a nationwide emergency and began connecting “the dots as
[he] saw them” noted one historian. In his mind “communism had triumphed in
Russia and was sweeping Europe in a wave of uprisings. American communists
leaders had proudly allied to Moscow” and then “announced their own blueprint
for takeover.” As Ken Ackerman has written, by late 1919 “anyone who didn’t see the
danger on the horizon seemed like a fool” (Ackerman 2007, 385).
Turning to J. Edgar Hoover, then a twenty-five-year-old Justice Department
attorney, Palmer set up an all-source intelligence Justice Department repository
called the General Intelligence Division (GID). Records were collected, collated, and
regularly updated on suspected anarchists as well as ethnic, labor, and civil-rights
leaders and organizations throughout the country. Foreign newspapers, magazines,
and periodicals from countries such as Lithuania, the Soviet Union, Romania,
Portugal, and Italy together with pamphlets published by ethnic organizations in
major U.S. cities were indexed and updated for later reference (Ackerman 2007,
340–41).
Relying on GID information, Palmer ordered Hoover to work with the
Immigration Service, then an arm of the U.S. Department of Labor, to identify dan-
gerous aliens and arrange for their deportation. Armed with arrest warrants, signed
by the attorney general, FBI agents, together with immigration officials and local
police, launched nationwide raids rounding up and imprisoning en masse, accord-
ing to one very rough estimate, between five and ten thousand so-called alien radi-
cals, anarchists, and communist-party sympathizers (Ackerman 2007, 389).
Palmer’s massive dragnet was conducted without the authority or even knowl-
edge of William Wilson, the secretary of labor, who had been absent for months from
his office for family health reasons. In the spring of 1920 Louis Post, a senior Labor
Department official opposed to these questionable arrests, was appointed acting sec-
retary. A month later Post forced the release of fifteen hundred jailed aliens and then
dismissed the charges for insufficient evidence. Before Post finished, practically all of
those charged were released. The American public, warned by Palmer to expect a
revolution, were puzzled when nothing happened, and then shocked at the unex-
pected release of these so-called terrorists. Bewilderment soon turned to outrage
when the government’s disregard for the basic civil liberties was made public.
3. Turning Away
Palmer’s actions dramatically slowed counterintelligence development in the United
States. The popular view was that the government’s counterintelligence function
was a threat rather than a useful tool for combating foreign espionage. As a result
the GID closed in 1921 ending further collection of intelligence information. The
closing the MID’s counterintelligence operation soon followed. “With [these deci-
sions], any chance of developing a functional counterintelligence sharing system
capable of protecting U.S. interests from foreign intelligence aggression” one histo-
rian noted, was “delayed for another fifteen years” (Batvinis 2007, 44).
Further contraction followed in the fall of 1923 with the nomination of Harlan
Fiske Stone as attorney general. Calvin Coolidge, who became president on the
death of President Warren G. Harding, purged Harding’s cabinet, removing Interior
Secretary Albert B. Fall, later imprisoned in the wake of the “Teapot Dome” scandal,
and attorney general and Harding political crony, Harry Daugherty, who Stone
replaced.
Stone appointed J. Edgar Hoover as acting director of the FBI in May 1924.
Hoover took control of a demoralized agency which, in the words of one historian
“gathered evidence in a haphazard fashion,” a failure that routinely jeopardized suc-
cessful government prosecutions. Stone’s clear and straightforward order to Hoover
was to end intelligence investigations of Americans and reform the FBI. Hoover
later documented his instructions in a six-point memorandum: five dealt with FBI
reform while the sixth point, seminal in its implication for a fundamental course
direction, insisted that the Bureau act strictly as a “fact-gathering organization”
pursuing “activities [that] would be limited strictly to investigations of violations of
criminal law” (Whitehead 1956, 68). Stone’s order ended foreign counterintelligence
investigations. In what would be referred to as the “Stone Doctrine” the attorney
general established a rule which governs the U.S. intelligence policy today: the fed-
eral government cannot investigate anyone for exercising a constitutional guarantee
of free expression unless sufficient facts indicate the person is engaged in criminal
activities to support a political objective.
Hoover soon began modernizing and professionalizing the Bureau by weeding
out incompetence, implementing scientific law-enforcement techniques, and inves-
tigating fraud. FBI responsibilities expanded in 1933 when Congress passed an
omnibus crime bill federalizing jurisdiction over matters that were previously a
state responsibility. Crimes such as bank robbery, bank burglary, kidnapping, and
fugitives were assigned to Hoover’s Bureau. Exploiting front-page headlines touting
the nationwide capture of a collection of colorful crime figures such as “Pretty Boy”
Floyd, “Machine Gun” Kelly, and John Dillinger, Hoover transformed the reputa-
tion of the new FBI in a decade while creating the image of the fearless “G-Man,” a
legend that would elevate Hoover and the FBI to almost mythical levels in the
nation’s imagination (Burrough 2004, 5–19).
Yet with no single federal agency responsible for counterespionage, theft of gov-
ernment secrets remained easy prey for Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union. With
the arrival in the United States in 1933 of Boris Bazarov, the new Russian intelligence
station chief, acquisition of military secrets became, the “key goal” for the Russians
(Sibley 2004, 25). By leveraging its connection with the American Communist Party
and President Roosevelt’s interest in developing trade, Moscow reaped hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of scientific research for Soviet use. At the same time
German agents also walked off with America’s most important military technology
with an ease that defied comprehension (Batvinis 2007, ch. 2).
4. Counterintelligence Reform
FBI counterintelligence reform began in February 1938 following the discovery of a
major German espionage ring which had been operating for years in the United
States. It was soon closed down with the conviction of four low-level operatives, but
not before public revelations of embarrassing investigative missteps by Hoover’s
vaunted FBI (Batvinis 2007, ch. 1). In the fall of 1938 President Roosevelt substan-
tially increased FBI, ONI, and MID counterespionage budgets, followed in June
1939 by the presidential creation of the Interdepartmental Information Conference
(IIC). Composed of the heads of the MID and ONI with Hoover as chairman, the
IIC served as a center for policy coordination and dispute resolution. The GID was
reopened, a special liaison unit was formed for contact with cabinet departments, a
plant protection program was created to tighten up personnel and physical security
at American industrial facilities and weekly IIC meetings were held to hammer out
jurisdictional agreements. One typical accord called for FBI investigation of civil-
ians (citizens and aliens) because of their potential prosecution in federal courts
while MID and ONI handled soldiers, sailors, and marines under the Uniformed
Code of Military Justice, requiring prosecution in military courts. The president
insisted that the FBI serve as a “clearing house” by ordering all federal agencies to
report any allegations of espionage or sabotage to the FBI for investigation. State
and local police agencies around the country were encouraged to report similar
suspicions to the FBI as well (Batvinis 2007, 67–68).
In July 1939 the first FBI counterespionage training school was held for its spe-
cial agents in charge followed soon after by a special FBI counterespionage school
for selected South and Central American police officials. Liaison with foreign police
and security agencies accelerated. For years State Department restrictions forced
Hoover to use subterfuges in exchanging information with friendly foreign security
services. Freed by the IIC mandate, formal sharing arrangements began in 1939 with
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police followed in July 1940 by FBI facilitation of the
establishment of British Security Coordination, the MI6 station in New York headed
by William Stephenson (Secret History 1999, 3–7).
5. Counterintelligence Growth
The year 1940 witnessed three events which greatly affected the FBI’s counterintel-
ligence growth. The first, a counterespionage investigation, provided the FBI with
an education that it could receive in no other manner. The next two involved presi-
dential orders concerning electronic interception of conversations and the creation
of a foreign intelligence service.
The FBI investigation of the so-called Ducase beginning in February 1940 was
a watershed in the FBI’s counterintelligence history. Named after Frederick
Duquesne, one of the ringleaders, the case started when William Sebold, a German-
American, forcibly recruited into espionage in Germany in 1939 by the Abwehr,
promptly told all to the FBI upon his return to America. Using Sebold as its double
agent in (the first in FBI history), the FBI uncovered a massive German espionage
ring which concluded in June 1941 with the arrest of thirty-one spies and the iden-
tification of another fifty un-indicted co-conspirators living outside the United
States.
During the eighteen-month life of the case the FBI learned many lessons includ-
ing the techniques of double agentry, espionage tradecraft, accommodation
addresses, dead letter boxes in major cities throughout the world, shortwave wire-
less deception, and military coordination in response to unexpected moves by the
Abwehr. As a result, German espionage in America was shattered on the eve of Pearl
Harbor, while at the same time positioning the Bureau well for the wartime espio-
nage realities to come (Ronnie 1995).
The technological advancements after the First World War that made household
radios a permanent fixture in America, in turn led to stiff competition among entre-
preneurs eager to get into the broadcast business. Congressional efforts bring ratio-
nality to this new industry led to the passage of the Comprehensive Communications
Act of 1934, which created the Federal Communication Commission to oversee the
new industry. One drawback to the law, however, was a permanent ban on govern-
ment use of intercepted electronic communications as evidence in criminal trials.
Throughout the 1930s the Supreme Court of the United States consistently upheld
this provision with the final government appeal struck down in December 1939—
three months after the Second World War erupted in Europe.
President Roosevelt has been described as an attorney who saw issues not as
legal or illegal, but as matters of right or wrong. By banning wiretapping, Roosevelt
reasoned, the Court had not considered the espionage and sabotage menace facing
America, a threat that he believed demanded the exploitation of every advantage
for the nation’s protection ( Jackson 2003, 68–69). Ignoring the Court’s ruling the
president ordered the attorney general of the United States, Robert Jackson, in May
1940 to instruct the FBI to begin wiretapping foreign embassies, consulates, and
other suspected foreign espionage and sabotage platforms, an order which led
Hoover to report by summer’s end that “all conversations into an out” of the
German, French, Italian, Russian, and Japanese embassies were being recorded
(Batvinis 2007, 133).
Two months later President Roosevelt secretly ordered J. Edgar Hoover to set up
the first secret foreign intelligence service in the nation’s history. The targets of the
new “Special Intelligence Service” (SIS) were Latin American capitals where FBI
agents, posing as businessmen, stole political, diplomatic, economic, and military
information for use by U.S. government policymakers. The SIS successfully oper-
ated for seven years ending in May 1947 when its functions were consolidated into
the newly created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During its lifespan it contrib-
uted significantly to the FBI’s counterintelligence progress as well as the later startup
of CIA. Hundreds of German agents were seized in Latin America and secretly
shipped to U.S. prisoner-of-war camps until their repatriation after the war.
Important tactical and strategic intelligence was acquired, and thousands of secret
radio communications were intercepted by the war’s end. Using leads provided by
British code-breakers, SIS operatives together with special agents in the United
States successfully exploited double agents as part of the famed “Double-Cross” sys-
tem in the run-up to the Allied invasion of Normandy. So effective was the FBI
against Germans intelligence that Guy Liddell, a senior MI5 officer with access to
Abwehr Ultra, confided to his diary that “he [Abwehr] considers the FBI a far more
formidable obstacle than the British secret service” (Liddell 1943).
Axis espionage diverted attention away from Soviet wartime intelligence activi-
ties in the United States. Stalin’s forces suffered horrendous losses while tying down
millions of German troops on the Eastern Front, a fact which led to the nagging
White House fear that the Soviet Union would abandon the West by negotiating a
separate peace deal with Germany as it had in 1917. It was this reality that forced the
Roosevelt administration to soft pedal relations with Moscow.
Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall ordered the Army Security
Agency (ASA) in 1943 to begin efforts to decipher censored Soviet diplomatic cable-
grams in search of an answer to this concern. Thousands of censored messages were
collected from as many governments as possible, particularly America’s wartime
partners Canada, Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand. Soon a small team of
army code-breakers discovered that the system used by the Soviets for the encoding
and decoding, full-proof when used properly, had been fatally compromised by
Moscow’s duplication and distribution of the one-time code pads to its diplomatic
establishments worldwide (Benson and Warner 1996, 83).
Over time precious intelligence, hidden so carefully, steadily emerged. No evi-

dence of a separate Stalin-Hitler deal was ever found. Army officials, however, were
stunned to read of large-scale Soviet espionage during the war against the United
States, Canada, and Great Britain using a vast network of agents in key wartime U.S.
government agencies and industries supplying Moscow with a storehouse full of
important secrets. Even more startling was the discovery that the details of the
Manhattan Project, the top-secret codename for the construction of the first atomic
bomb, had been in Soviet hands since the early 1940s (Benson and Warner 1996, 79).
In 1948, five years after Venona (the ASA codename for the project) began, the
FBI and ASA joined forces; and using the raw decryptions containing only code-
names of Soviet agents the Bureau began widespread, top-secret investigations
which soon laid out the full range of Soviet espionage during the Second World
War. Among the more than one hundred and fifty Soviet agents uncovered were
David Greenglass, brother-in-law of Julius Rosenberg, British physicist, Klaus Fuchs,
and the young Harvard University physics student, Theodore Hall; all three work-
ing at Los Alamos, New Mexico—the very heart of the atomic bomb research proj-
ect. Also revealed were Harry Dexter White, assistant secretary of the treasury,
Lauchlin Currie special assistant to President Roosevelt and Alger Hiss, a senior
State Department official who played a major role in establishing the United Nations
(Benson and Warner 1996, 84).
6. FBI Counterintelligence
and the Cold War
Throughout the Cold War FBI counterintelligence focused primarily on the KGB
and the military intelligence arm of the Soviet General Staff, the GRU. Like a chess
match between two skilled opponents, an unrelenting shadow struggle ebbed and
flowed for more than forty years, each side seeking an advantage by careful move-
ment of its pieces across an international board in a deadly war of wits.
The FBI also faced the intelligence services of Poland, Hungary, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania—all ideologically bound to serve Moscow’s
intelligence needs. Operating from Washington, New York City, and other platforms
around the country these new surrogates acted as force multipliers for Moscow. As
Russian and FBI sparring deepened the focus of these matches increasingly centered
on New York City. One historian explained that United Nations headquarters offered
the KGB “an even larger and more important capability in New York” than it had at
its embassy in Washington. For example, by January 1983, 330 Soviet nationals worked
at the U.N. Secretariat (UNSEC) with another 310 members assigned to the Soviet
Mission to the United Nations (SMUN), plus additional Russians working as jour-
nalists or commercial roles. Reliable information suggests that approximately 30 to
40 percent of these officials were KGB or GRU officers, many of whom gradually
moved into positions of “authority and influence” (Barron 1983, 241). Add to this siz-
able threat the Bloc officers, after 1960 the Cubans, and in 1974 the arrival in
Washington of Peoples Republic of China diplomats and one gets a sense of the mag-
nitude of the Cold War threat facing FBI counterintelligence.
7. FBI Counterintelligence—
A Second Reform
A second period of FBI counterintelligence reform began in 1975 following
President Richard Nixon’s resignation in the wake of the Watergate scandal and his
replacement by Gerald Ford. The new president sought to improve government
intelligence and counterintelligence transparency following revelations of illegal
government activities conducted against American citizens particularly during the
Vietnam War. Ford’s successor, President Jimmy Carter, went even farther by order-
ing a Department of Justice examination of FBI counterintelligence policies—an
inquiry which revealed a hodgepodge of confusing rules, regulations, and levels of
authority developed over three and a half decades that frequently resulted in deci-
sions that violated the civil rights of American citizens. To correct these anomalies
Attorney General Edward Levi brought rationality to the conduct of both FBI
domestic intelligence and foreign counterintelligence investigations ordered the
creation of new guidelines, and, for the first time, a check-and-balance system of
oversight of FBI counterintelligence activities that included new levels of review
for even the most intrusive procedures. Counterintelligence investigations were
subjected to scheduled review to determine the necessity for continuing an inves-
tigation. Special Agents now knew where their investigative authority began and
ended, what investigations they could and could not conduct, with specific time
limits placed on investigations. Three decades later despite continued modifica-
tion, and refinement in the face of changing foreign intelligence realities these
guidelines remain the governing rules for FBI counterintelligence investigations
(Nolan 2008).
Curiously, it was an FBI-induced double-agent operation in 1977 codenamed
Lemonaid that further reformed FBI counterintelligence. It started when a U.S.
naval officer, posing as a person desperate for money, handed an officer an envelope,
containing an offer to spy for the KGB, as he disembarked a Soviet cruise ship in
New York following a trip to the Caribbean. Soon the double agent was embarked
on a cat-and-mouse adventure with three KGB officers assigned to the United
Nations in New York.
Attorney General Griffin Bell, determined to slow Soviet espionage in the
United States, used Lemonaid as a test case by determining that the two KGB officers
handling the double agent assigned to the UNSEC had no diplomatic immunity
while a third, then working in the SMUN, was immune. At Bell’s request President
Carter authorized the FBI arrest of both KGB officers under UNSEC cover on espio-
nage charges and a persona non grata action against the third KGB officer assigned
to the SMUN. Both officers were later convicted and sentenced to fifty years in
prison (Washington Post 1978).
This case had an important impact on counterintelligence. Flagrant KGB espio-
nage use of the United Nations, particularly the UNSEC, was curtailed with the
imprisonment of two of its officers. For the first time the FBI could speak publicly
about these matters using the court trial evidence in case studies for briefings to
government agencies and private companies. In the end President Carter exacted a
high price from the Soviet leadership for exchanging the two officers by demanding
the release of five prominent soviet dissidents including Anotoliy Sharansky, who
later became deputy prime minister of Israel (Washington Post 1979).
For almost four decades FBI counterintelligence electronic surveillance was
conducted solely on presidential authority, a practice that ended with congressional
passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) on October 25, 1978. This
law created procedures for federal-government electronic-collection requests for
foreign intelligence through a special court, known as the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. The FISA court judges, who are selected by the Chief Justice of
the United States, rule on all government petitions for foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence electronic interception. These applications and decisions remain
classified to prevent public disclosure of the investigative target as well as govern-
ment sources and methods.
Two years later, the FBI acquired another weapon for investigating spies. This
time it was the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) passed on October
15, 1980. Until CIPA the government was handcuffed in its attempts to prosecute
espionage agents by “gray mail,” a term applied to a defendant’s demand of the
government for all information that he was accused of providing to a foreign
intelligence service in order to prepare an adequate trial defense. The govern-
ment’s fear was that the defendant or his attorney could further harm U.S. national
security interests by publicly releasing the information, thus exposing sensitive
information to other foreign adversaries. The new law alleviated this problem by
authorizing the trial judge to decide what government information the defendant
needed. Both sides would make their case to the judge who would then decide the
defendant’s needs. Based on the judges’ findings the government could then
decide if public revelation of the information was offset by the value of successful
prosecution.
These two national security legislative landmarks have been keys to an increase
in foreign espionage convictions over the past thirty years. In a study on Americans
who spied against the United States, researchers identified one hundred and fifty
individuals arrested and convicted of espionage between 1947 and 2001. One hun-
dred and nine convictions occurred following FISA and CIPA passage (Herbig and
Wiskoff 2002, 31).
8. FBI Counterintelligence Advancement

President Ronald Reagan chose to go after the Soviet Union head on. Characterizing
it as the “Evil Empire” he embarked on a crusade, not simply to get along with Moscow,
but rather to use the power of his presidency to force an end to the Soviet Union for-
ever, using FBI counterintelligence as a weapon in the pursuit of his Soviet agenda.
Until Reagan came to office travel controls on Russian and Bloc diplomats were
lax and rarely enforced, unlike American officials based in Moscow where all travel
was strictly controlled. Legislation creating a new Office of Foreign Missions (OFM)
inside the Department of State changed this equation by significantly strengthening
FBI surveillance of foreign intelligence officers in the United States. A foreign dip-
lomat’s travel in the United States was now on a quid pro quo basis with a country’s
travel policy toward U.S. diplomats. Suddenly Russian and Bloc diplomats were
required to inform OFM in advance of any planned travel which would then make
all necessary arrangements including plane reservations, hotel accommodations,
rental vehicles and specific travel route if using their own vehicle. The new law even
required OFM to make any purchase requested by an embassy costing more than
twenty-five dollars. To drive the point home President Reagan selected special agent
of the FBI James E. Nolan, then serving as the Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s
Intelligence Division, and one of the Bureau’s foremost counterintelligence experts,
to head the OFM with the rank of U.S. ambassador—the first serving FBI agent ever
to be honored in this fashion. Among the many later enhancements was the selec-
tion in 1988 of Raymond Mislock, a senior FBI executive, as the director of security
for the U.S. State Department (Nolan 2008).
Following the arrest in May 1985 of former navy officer John A. Walker on
charges of spying for the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration undertook a
further series of measures to enhance FBI counterintelligence. In addition to
strengthening the special agent complement for counterintelligence, a senior FBI
official was assigned for the first time to the National Security Council to serve in
the Intelligence Directorate as the director of counterintelligence programs. Reagan’s
decision was an unprecedented move that placed counterintelligence near the fore-
front of national security policy making.
Soviet intelligence suffered its most crushing blow when President Reagan
decided to reduce the bloated Soviet diplomatic staffing levels in the United States.
Following repeated Soviet refusals to do so voluntarily, the White House took action.
A formula based on the number of American diplomats in the Soviet Union and
Soviets in the United States was developed that called for the elimination of fifty-
five diplomatic positions from the Soviet Embassy, UNSEC, and SMUN. Relying on
FBI information, the government expelled only intelligence officers including “the
entire leadership of the KGB and GRU” together with “all KGB Line Chiefs and key
intelligence officers.” This abrupt departure of so many talented and experienced
personnel was a painful disruption for the KGB bureaucracy, one that left a large
gap in their effectiveness which they never really overcame (Major 1995, 10).
9. Conclusion
Two decades have passed since the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union.
As for the KGB threat, it has disappeared only to be replaced by smaller yet equally
aggressive successor called the SVR. The threat posed by her satellite services has
disappeared, replaced by a collection of peaceful East European nations eagerly
shifting their alignment to the west. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the
Asian giant which emerged from isolation less than four decades ago, today has a
military and foreign intelligence capability that will pose enormous (as evidenced
by the Chi Mek espionage case) challenges for the United States in the decades to
come.
Today the threat facing FBI counterintelligence is no longer mere deterrence of
classic theft of government classified information. The overriding mission is pre-
vention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including biological,
radiological, and chemical devices that will become more readily available, trans-
portable, and more easily dispersible as the century unfolds. The new century will
also be an era in which nations will pursue another nation’s economic and trade
secrets with the same vigor (if not more) that it seeks military and political secrets.
Given the enormity of the U.S. economy and the huge government and private
investments in cutting-edge technology research the challenge facing FBI counter-
intelligence will come, not just from China, but from smaller nations and foreign
companies willing to steal in their eagerness for any advantage in our globally com-
petitive world.
Critics claim that the FBI’s law-enforcement structure is inadequate for twenty-
first-century counterintelligence realities and should be replaced by a separate ser-
vice staffed by counterintelligence officers, presumably with no law-enforcement
powers. Richard Posner argues that the FBI should revert to an American version of
Scotland Yard’s “Special Branch,” which investigates espionage cases referred from
the British Security Service. One source with vast American counterintelligence
experience who disagrees with Posner, noted that today western security services
view the FBI with “naked envy” for the flexibility provided by criminal, counterin-
telligence, counterterrorism, and intelligence responsibilities under one roof.
Others, including William H. Webster, the only American ever to serve as both the
director of the FBI and the CIA; Louie Freeh, a former director of the FBI and the
Deputy for the National Counterintelligence Executive; and M.E. “Spike” Bowman,
take a different view. They point out that the FBI has routinely adjusted to the
changing foreign intelligence challenges over the past century and continues to do
so. Any necessary reforms, they warn, should be made within the FBI rather than
wasting a decade or two creating a separate counterintelligence agency (Posner,
Secrecy and Power, 2007, 120–138; Webster 2008; Freeh 2005; Bowman 2008).
A more important question is this: should the awesome responsibilities for U.S.
internal security and foreign counterintelligence be separated from an organization
made up of highly skilled men and women, grounded in the importance of civil
liberties, trained in the rule of law, answerable to the U.S. Department of Justice, or
placed in the hands of officers working in some type of separate counterintelligence
service. Some would argue, yes! Others would note that America is a nation of laws
which places devotion to civil liberties above all else and, in the end, that is why
America’s counterintelligence function should remain with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
REFERENCES
Ackerman, K. D. 2007. Young J. Edgar. New York: Carroll and Graf.

Barrett, J. Q. 2003. That Man: An Insider’s Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Barron, J. 1983. KGB Today. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
Batvinis, R. J. 2007. The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas.
Benson, R. L., and M. Warner, eds. 1996. Venona. National Security Agency and Central
Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C.
Bowman, M.E. 2008. “Spike.” Interview by author. (October 15).
Burrough, B. 2004. Public Enemies. New York: Penguin.
Freeh, L. 2005. My FBI. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Herbig, K. L., and M. F. Wiskoff. 2002. Espionage against the United States by American
Citizens, 1947–2001. Monterey, Calif.: Defense Personnel Security Research Center
(July).
Jackson, R. H. 2003. That Man. New York: Oxford University Press.
Liddell, Guy. 1943. Unpublished personal diary entry for October 22. Provided to author
courtesy of Mr. Dan Mulvena.
Major, D. 1995. Operation “Famish.” Defense Intelligence Journal (Spring): 10–22.
Nolan, James E. 2008. Interview by author (October 3).
Posner, R. 2006. Not A Suicide Pact. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2007. Uncertain Shield. New York: Oxford University Press.
Powers, R. G. 1987. Secrecy and Power. New York: Free Press.
Ronnie, A. 1995. Counterfeit Hero. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press.
Secret History of British Intelligence in America, 1940–1945. 1999. Author unknown.
New York: Fromm International.
Sibley, K. A. S. Red Spies in America. 2004. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Washington Post. 1978. “N.J. Jury Convicts 2 Soviet Spies” (October 14): A1.
Washington Post. 1979. “Soviet Union Exchanges 5 Dissidents for Two Spies” (April 28): A1.
Webster, William H. 2008. Interview by author (November 7).
Whitehead, D. 1956. FBI. New York: Random House.
Witcover, J. 1989. Sabotage at Black Tom. Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin Books of
Chapel Hill.
chapter 32
TREASON: “ ’TIS WORSE

THAN MURDER”
stan a. taylor
kayle buchanan
1. Introduction
Is treason worse than murder? This chapter explores the origins of concerns about
treason and the evolution of laws to prevent it. The relationship between trust
and treason and the role of trust in the development of democratic societies will be
noted. We will also distinguish between the legal definition of treason and the word
as it is more commonly used. The next section will explain why traditional treason
laws are rarely used to prosecute traitors and discuss the development of anti-
espionage laws. Finally, we will draw from our own database and from other data
sources on traitors to identify and illustrate various motivations for treason and
note some of the changes over time in those motivations.
2. The Origins of the Concept of Treason

The historical origins of legal or constitutional provisions meant to deter treason
are clouded somewhat by the fog of antiquity, but they are inextricably involved
with oaths and pledges of loyalty to rulers. If these oaths and pledges were betrayed,
then the power to rule might be lost to another group or individual. Thus, the mod-
ern word treason evolved from the ancient Latin word traditio which referred to the
treason: “ ’tis worse than murder” 519
act of delivering, ceding, or literally, handing over something—in this case, the
power to rule (Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. “Treason”). But the act of treason
existed long before it could be spoken in Latin or any other language. It is an ancient
concern and, as Dame Rebecca West (1964, 140) notes, “has been carried on since the
beginning of history.” The subtitle to this chapter is taken from Shakespeare’s King
Lear. When informed of the possible treason of his son and daughter, King Lear
cries out, “ ‘tis worse than murder” (2.4.28). The question is, why was treason deemed
to be worse than murder? The answer appears to rest in the perceived significance
of keeping oaths and pledges on the larger society.
Walter Burkert quotes the famous Athenian orator Lycurgus (396–323 BC) who
argued that “it is the oath which holds democracy together.” Burkert (1985, 250) con-
cluded from this that “religion, morality and political organization have been linked
by the oath, and the oath and its prerequisite altar has become the basis of both civil
and criminal, as well as international, law.” An eighteenth-century British jurist,
Solicitor General William Murray (1742–54), once wrote in the early Omycund and
Barker case that “no country can subsist a twelvemonth, where an oath is not thought
binding; for the want of it must necessarily dissolve society” (Tyler 1834, 7).
Lycurgus, Burkert, and Tyler are expressing the idea that “if we had no oaths we
would have no law, and if we had no law we would have mere anarchy, and so we
must bind ourselves with the law, and keep the law by oaths”1 (Cornwell 1997, 310).
And the oaths to which each of these writers is referring are those that bind subjects
to be loyal to the sovereign. At its heart, the evil of treason is not merely that it is a
social deviation, as argued by Carlton (1998, 14), but that it ultimately erodes the
heart of civil society. According to West, “no society, capitalist, socialist, or commu-
nist, can survive for ten minutes if it abandons the principle that a contract is sacred”
(1964, 156).
One can see that both ancient and modern commentators saw treason as some-
thing worse than passing military information to an enemy. Rather, they believed
that treason erodes trust and threatens the cohesiveness of civil society. Individual
societies, as well as civilization itself, require loyalty. This requirement is not unrea-
sonable. From prehistory down to the present time social order has been built on
trust. Absent generalized trust, primitive societies might have continued as frag-
mented, warring, and isolated clans. In such a condition, the very development of
the modern state might not have occurred.
Oaths of fealty were given and faithfulness to those oaths was generally expected
and most often kept. Obviously such oaths were frequently broken, but they were
not broken with impunity. This notion existed in classical and medieval times and
continues to exist in modern times. It was early expressed in the ancient maxim:
protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjetio protectionem (protection draws allegiance,
and allegiance draws protection) and came to be accepted in every society (West
1964, 13). As states gradually developed political and judicial systems, the importance
1
This idea is so well expressed that we wanted to use it even though it is from an historical
novel in a speech uttered by none other than King Arthur.
of loyalty to the state or the sovereign was included in written laws. Judicial systems
themselves, to some extent, developed to adjudicate violations of such pledges or
requirements of loyalty. The same is true of modern times. Virtually every modern
state prohibits treason. Perhaps no one has captured the destructive effect of trea-
son more succinctly than did West: “The traitor’s offense is that he conspires against
the liberty of his fellow countrymen to choose their way of life” (1964, 370).
Contemporary social-capital theorists have picked up this same theme. A review
of the works of Putnam (2000 and 1993), Huntington (1996), Bellah and others
(1991), and Fukuyama (1995) reveals that each, although using different approaches,
accepts trust as an essential ingredient in building and maintaining civil societies.
They argue, in different ways, that trust was essential in nurturing the growth of the
modern state; that treason and betrayal were viewed as heinous crimes against the
social order; and that trust is necessary even in the modern world to create and
maintain healthy democracies.
Using a very different methodological approach, Axelrod (1984) has demonstrated
the role of trust in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. If the players of these games
may be seen as a “community,” then trust is a necessary variable in building that com-
munity and is only demonstrated in subsequent rounds of the game. Even top man-
agement consultants have emphasized the need for trust in any organization (Covey
2006, 26). Stephen M. R. Covey quotes a well-known American athletic coach (Joe
Paterno) as saying, “Whether you’re on a sports team, in an office or a member of a
family, if you can’t trust one another there’s going to be trouble” (Covey 2006, 10).
3. Definitions and Legal Developments

Like most words, treason has multiple meanings. In common usage treason may be
used quite broadly to refer to any kind of betrayal—ranging from the betrayal of
one’s friends all the way up to betraying one’s nation and everything in between. For
legal purposes, however, treason must be more tightly defined. The betrayal of one’s
friends or family may do harm to a few individuals but, absent criminal activity,
states are not interested in it. However, states are concerned about treason. They
have enacted laws that specifically define the kinds of actions which may be treason-
ous to the state and have attached punishments to those laws.2 Most of these laws
define treason as giving aid or comfort to an enemy state in such a way as to dimin-
ish or threaten the security of one’s own state, or as the witting betrayal of one’s own
country by waging war against it or by purposely aiding its enemies.
This legal concept of treason developed within the British common-law tradi-
tion and ultimately was divided into two streams—high treason and petit treason.
High treason could be committed only against the monarchy while petit treason
2
The Free Dictionary contains a summary of the treason laws of several nations.
could be committed against another person with whom one had a contractual or
subordinate relationship. A servant harming an employer, for example, would be
petit treason. High treason came to be called treason while petit treason became
absorbed in general criminal law.
But even what originally was called high treason—the betrayal of the monarchy—
was quite different from the contemporary concept of treason. To be guilty of treason in
ancient times meant that a traitor had to act in some way to harm a significant member
of a monarchy or even engage in some activity that might possibly terminate a dynasty.
For example, the first British Parliamentary act to define treason was the 1351 Treason
Act. That act, and several others that have followed, still constitute the British legal
approach to treason. The original 1351 law, enacted during the reign of Edward III, said:
When a Man doth compass or imagine the Death of our Lord the King, or of our
Lady his Queen or of their eldest Son and Heir; or if a Man do violate the
King’s Companion, or the King’s eldest Daughter unmarried, or the Wife of the
King’s eldest Son and Heir; or if a Man do levy War against our Lord the King in
his Realm, or be adherent to the King’s Enemies in his Realm, giving to them Aid
and Comfort in the Realm. (Treason Act of 1351)
According to the BBC, if one translates that into contemporary English, it reads:
“[Y]ou can’t kill, conspire against or wage war against the king and his family. You
also can’t have sex with his wife, heir’s wife, or his unmarried eldest daughter. And
the act goes on to rule out actions against the chancellor, treasurer, and various
categories of senior judge” (BBC 2008, paragraphs 2 and 3).
The 1351 Act encapsulated the common-law tradition of treason and in so doing
prohibited fighting against the king and aiding the king’s enemies as well as banned
the contemplation of the king’s death. This act, and those that followed, came to
encompass “virtually every act contrary to the king’s will and became a political tool
of the Crown” (Jrank, s.v. “Treason”). The 1351 Act has been altered over the centu-
ries (in 1495, 1695, 1702, 1708, 1814 [this version banned disembowelment as punish-
ment!], 1842, 1848, and 1998), but the essential goal of the original 1351 Act still exists.
It is to prevent harmful acts against the state and its rulers.
The American tradition is a little different. Some was borrowed from the British
common law tradition (the requirement for two witnesses, for example), but the
primary difference is that the prohibition against treason in America was written
directly into the 1787 US Constitution. Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution
defines treason in the following words:
Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them,
or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall
be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The Congress shall have Power to
declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.
American phraseology was changed to avoid what the freshly victorious colonists
disliked about the British tradition. After all, they were traitors themselves, according
to British law. But neither the British nor the American approach has resulted in a
fundamental legal framework that has worked effectively in punishing treason. It is
somewhat ironic, in fact, that none of these acts have been particularly useful in either
preventing or punishing the most seditious traitors in modern history—those who
provided classified information to the Soviet Union before and during the Cold War.
Both the legal rigors and the evidentiary requirements of traditional treason laws, in
both the United States and the United Kingdom, have caused these governments to
seek to prevent treason through other approaches that offer more flexibility.
It is not that the traditional treason laws have been repealed or significantly
altered. As we will see below, both British and American citizens who aided Germany
or Japan by participating in propaganda efforts during the World War II were
accused and mostly convicted of treason. But the increasingly technical aspects of
war meant that there were many more subtle ways to harm national security. Treason
laws needed to be broadened. The primary danger became citizens “aiding and
abetting” hostile foreign states by revealing sensitive government information, the
possession of which by a foreign nation might threaten the nation’s security. The
likelihood of giving a foreign state some kind of edge in the ability to wage war or
even to diminish an advantage of one’s own state in a highly competitive interna-
tional system needed to be prevented.
To do this, states began to draft new types of treason laws that are usually
referred to as espionage laws. The British adopted the Official Secrets Act in 1889.
The intent of the act was to “enable the government to withhold information on
official activities, regardless of subject or importance, by claiming the information
was secret” (Polmar and Allen 2004, 471). This Act has been amended many times
(1911, 1920, 1939, and 1989) but the essential intent has been the same. This law, it was
hoped, would deter British citizens from revealing information to agents of a for-
eign state that would damage Britain.
The United States began a long series of anti-espionage acts with the Espionage
Act of 1917. Related statutes threaten punishment for intentionally and willfully
“gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign governments” that
might be used to damage the United States or to give some kind of an advantage to
a foreign nation (Polmar and Allen 2004, 220). Revealing ciphers and codes as well
as defense information has also been covered by various statutes. All of these laws
have been adopted to supplement traditional treason laws.
As evidence that traditional treason laws have not been effective in the fight
against contemporary treachery, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom
has used its treason laws to prosecute traitors who have transferred sensitive and
classified information to other states. Most of those convicted of treason in both the
United States and the United Kingdom, at least over the last half century or longer,
were convicted because they participated in propaganda efforts for the governments
of Japan and Germany during World War II. But even those numbers were small
and the effects of the propaganda were minimal. In the U.K., William Joyce
(“Lord Haw Haw”) and John Amery were convicted of treason in 1946 and 1947 for
participating in German propaganda efforts during World War II. Joyce enjoys the
unique position of being the last U.K. citizen to be executed for treason. The only
Cold War case of treason in the U.K. involved Marcus Sarjeant who was convicted
of violating the 1948 Treason Act.
In the United States, Robert Best, Douglas Chandler, Mildred Gillars (“Axis
Sally”), Iva Toguri d’Aquina (“Tokyo Rose”), Towiya Kawakita, and Martin James
Monti were all convicted of treason for participating in propaganda efforts for
either Japan or Germany during World War II. In both countries, the damage done
by the Axis propaganda was minimal. Evidence exists that the voices of these trai-
tors as they aired their lonely views to Allied troops may actually have been a bless-
ing to them; such broadcasts more often than not were thought risible and even
steeled Allied fortitude (FBI “Famous Cases,” s.v. Tokyo Rose).
Ironically, in both countries, the traitors who have done arguably the least dam-
age have been prosecuted under the traditional and most punitive treason laws—
the very laws under which it is the most difficult to obtain prosecution. The modern
traitors who have done the greater damage have been prosecuted under espionage
laws and were neither charged with, nor convicted of, treason. Rather they were
convicted of violating various anti-espionage laws because it was much easier to
obtain convictions under the British Official Secrets Acts or the various Espionage
Acts in the United States.
In one of America’s most famous betrayals, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg pro-
vided vital information about the construction of atomic bombs to their Soviet
handlers. They were exposed as spies for the Soviet Union through the revelations
of Klaus Fuchs, the German-British scientist who had worked on the Manhattan
Project. But in their 1951 trial, they could not be charged with treason because the
American treason law embedded in the Constitution prohibited cooperation with
war-time enemies of the United States.
In summary, in spite of the existence of traditional anti-treason laws in the
United States and the United Kingdom, most twentieth-century traitors have been
prosecuted under anti-espionage laws instead. Virtually the only treason convic-
tions in both the United States and the United Kingdom have been those involving
a few individuals who collaborated with Axis powers by broadcasting pro-Axis pro-
paganda during the Second World War.
4. Expanded Treason Targets

One of the more dramatic developments in the attempt to prevent treason has been
broadening the treason definition to include revealing proprietary economic or
industrial information to another state. Indeed, information about another state’s
economic and industrial development, particularly if it pertains to weapons devel-
opment, is a high priority on the lists of many countries. What MI5 said about the
United Kingdom is true for the United States and other Western nations:
In the past, espionage activity was typically directed towards obtaining political
and military intelligence. In today’s high-tech world, the intelligence requirements
of a number of countries now include new communications technologies,
IT, genetics, aviation, lasers, optics, electronics and many other fields.
Intelligence services, therefore, are targeting commercial enterprises far more
than in the past (MI5 n.d.).
If the information revealed is officially classified, then it is clearly within the frame-
work of the American Economic Espionage Act of 1996 or its British counterparts.
But even revealing proprietary information, not officially classified as secret, may
violate various economic or industrial espionage- or secrecy-act provisions. Some
nations, particularly China, Taiwan, Japan, and France, have been known to use
their intelligence officers to gather economic information from other states as a
means of staying more competitive in the international economy (Schweizer 1993).
A former director of the American Office of the National Executive for
Counterintelligence (ONCIX) recently pointed out that China, for example, has
been attacking the information systems of military, intelligence, and industrial
organizations in the United States and in other states for many years (Van Cleave
2007, 2).
In a well-known 1971 case of economic espionage, French intelligence reported
to its government that U.S. President Richard Nixon was going to devalue the U.S.
dollar in a few weeks. Armed with that knowledge, the French government “made
millions selling dollars and buying francs on world markets” (Polmar and Allen
2004, 207). Nevertheless, the distinction between economic treason and merely
gathering open-source industrial information has not been easy to define.
In sum, at least up until World War I, most acts of treason involved revealing to
an enemy some aspect of troop location or details of military plans. Since then,
however, technical information, perhaps a mathematical equation or a technical
drawing of some kind of weapons system or even some proprietary information
from one of over thousands of defense contractors, has been more often than not
the commodity of treason.
5. Treason: How Much and Why

Determining the extent of treason in any country is not easy. Unless some gov-
ernment agency makes public a list of treason cases, one can only speculate about
the extent of treason in that country. Even the availability of an official list does
not answer all of the questions satisfactorily. Such lists only include those trai-
tors who are caught and successfully charged and, obviously, do not include
anything about those unknown to the state. Moreover, such lists may not include
those who have inadvertently “prejudiced the safety of the state” (to quote from
the British Official Secrets Act of 1911) and never have been accused or charged
with a crime. Finally, such lists do not include those traitors who are continuing
their treason but are under various kinds of covert surveillance in order for the
government to increase their knowledge of the nature and extent of the espio-
nage ring.
We do know, however, from official sources a little about the extent of foreign
intelligence collection against certain states. Both U.S. and U.K. domestic intelli-
gence agencies have released estimates of the number of foreign nations who are
trying to secure national security information from them. According to MI5, at
least twenty foreign nations “are actively seeking UK information and material to
advance their own military, technological, political and economic programmes”
(MI5 2007). The director of the American ONCIX reported that “140 foreign intel-
ligence services [were trying] to penetrate the United States or U.S. organizations
abroad” (Brenner 2007, 5). And in 2007 the American FBI reported that they “opened
51 new cases of economic and or industrial espionage and continued pursuing 53
from previous years” (ONCIX 2007, 7).
States are reluctant to release full details of treason cases for fear that it may
send danger signals to the foreign intelligence officers who are handling traitors.
Such signals might cause the foreign intelligence officers to alter their operating
methods before other members of the rings can be detected. That is, one traitor
might be arrested but others being handled might go undetected. Media stories
about treason are not always accurate; they may be released prematurely causing a
ring of traitors to temporarily end their treason until more secure handling meth-
ods can be established. A few private sources do publish such lists but scholars are
reluctant to rely on them since they are not official government documents. By far
the best source in any Western government is the relatively unknown unit within
the U.S. Defense Department’s Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA). The
unit is known as the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC).3
Their Recent Espionage Cases published in 1985 was a landmark in official informa-
tion about American traitors. They have published frequent updates including their
Espionage Cases 1974–2004: Summaries and Sources, published in 2004, and Changes
in Espionage by Americans: 1947–2007, published in 2008. We are not aware of offi-
cial, reliable, and publicly available sources on the incidence of treason in the United
Kingdom.
In 1997, Taylor and Snow, drawing primarily from PERSEREC publications,
court documents, personal interviews, and contemporary newspaper accounts,
3
All students of intelligence and national security owe a huge debt of gratitude to
PERSEREC and its staff. Even their Web site does not do justice to the extent and quality of their
work. Anyone interested in American traitors ought to review their most current products on their
Web page. They publish the only primary-source collections of information about Americans who
commit treason. We are indebted to them for much of the information on Americans reported in
this chapter.
created a database of 139 Americans who, from 1945 to 1994, betrayed their country.
Much of what follows below is an update and revision of that earlier article. Since
the publication of that article, an additional 45 individuals have been convicted or
officially charged with treason giving us a database of 184 cases of treason in the
United States to use as a basis for our analysis. We also use some anecdotal evidence
from the United Kingdom as well as from other nations merely to illustrate types of
motivations.
Determining motivations for any action is difficult, sometimes even for the
actor. Self-deception often prevents any of us from fully understanding why we act
the way we do. Self-insight is all the more difficult when our actions are illegal or
immoral.4 Identifying motivations behind treason and betrayal must be understood
as an earnest effort and not as something carrying a divine imprimatur. And it
becomes all the more tentative when one groups traitors into four or five categories.
West (1964, 107) is correct when she asserts that every traitor takes a different path.
They often have multiple and overlapping motives that make it difficult to place
them in single categories.
In spite of these caveats, it is useful to look at various motivations for treason if
for no other reason than to gain some insight that might inform government agen-
cies as to what to look for in both pre-employment background checks and in-
service security checks. The following analysis utilizes information from Taylor and
Snow (1997, 101–10) as updated by PERSEREC publications (see Herbig and Wiskoff
2002), and from contemporary court and media sources about individual traitors.
Our research suggests that nearly all motivations for Americans engaged in trea-
son between 1947 and 2008 can be put into four general categories, often with a few
unique, almost idiosyncratic, motives interlaced within the four. The four principle
categories are ideology, money, disgruntlement, and ingratiation (see figure 32).
Other Unknown
Disgruntlement 6.0% 4.9%
4.3%
Ingratiation
5.4% Money
48.9%
Ideology
30.4%
Figure 32.1 Distribution of Primary Motives for Treason, 1947–2008.
4
Terry Warner is one of the more perceptive writers on the effects of self-deception. See
Arbinger Institute (2000), which is primarily Warner’s work.
5.1 Ideology
Ideology has been a significant motivation for treason throughout the twentieth
century. The rise of fascism and communism seemed to catch the imagination of
many people and provide a raison d’être for life as well as for treason. From 1936 to
1945, many in the West sympathized with one side or the other and justified treason
by their belief that either Germany or the Soviet Union needed help. Britain pro-
vided traitors for both sides of this struggle—Oswald, Joyce, Amery, and others
supported the fascists while the Cambridge Ring and many others supported com-
munism. Similarly in America, a few traitors supported fascist propaganda efforts;
however the greater damage was done by the large number of pro-communist trai-
tors, including the Atomic Spy Ring, but reaching into the highest ranks of American
politics.
At least to the degree that anyone acts on a single motivation, ideology was a
dominating factor during World War II and up to 1950. But in the early 1950s the
American Atomic Spy Ring was rolled up and by 1964 the Cambridge Spy Ring
was pretty much moribund or in Moscow. So, at least in the West, the role of ide-
ology in treason diminished from then on. That was not the case in the Soviet
Union where many of those who betrayed their country because they believed the
Soviet system had brought ruin to Russia, continued their treason for ideological
reasons up to the mid 1980s. Thus, Penkovsky, Polyakov, Gordievsky, Fedorenko,
and others all either risked their lives or lost their lives while reporting to Western
intelligence officers, almost solely for ideological reasons. And, following West
(1964, 166), we do not classify people “whose only ideology was self-help” as ideo-
logical traitors.
On the other hand, Western spies became increasingly motivated by money,
although glints of ideology crept in at times. In our database covering from 1947
to 2007, just over 30 percent of American traitors betrayed their country for ideo-
logical reasons. However, interesting changes have occurred over that time.
Beginning in approximately 1990, the percentage of American traitors motivated
by ideology began to increase. According to Herbig (2008, 69) “spying prompted
by divided loyalties has become the most common motive for American espio-
nage, replacing spying for money as the primary motive.” What Herbig calls
divided loyalties, for simplicity we call an ideological motive. Since 1990 “offend-
ers are more likely to be naturalized citizens, and to have foreign attachments,
connections, and ties. Their espionage is more likely to be motivated by divided
loyalties” (Herbig 2008, i). The number of native-born traitors has declined sub-
stantially while the number of naturalized citizens involved in espionage has
increased significantly.
Some thought that the end of the Cold War would signal an end to ideology as
a motive for treason. But in the United States, two developments brought about in
increase in ideologically motivated treason. First, a dramatic increase in interna-
tional trade (often called globalization) brought about changes in employment,
manufacturing, and immigration. This brought more and more immigrants, both
legal and illegal, into America and many of these people either maintained strong
attachments to their countries of origin or became susceptible to appeals from their
home countries to provide useful information to them about America.
Second, beginning in the 1990s, a new form of fascism arose—Islamo-Fascism.
Particularly in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Western Europe, a grow-
ing number of young Moslems fell under the sway of radical Imams and have com-
mitted what can be called treason. The British MI5 reports that they have convicted
twenty-seven British citizens under various criminal or civil terrorist acts between
2002 and mid-2007 (MI5 2007). In every case the traitors were trying to further a
radical Islamic cause. The first American Moslem known to betray his country for a
terrorist group (al-Qaida), Ali Mohamed, was convicted in 1986. Since that time,
four additional American citizens have revealed or tried to reveal classified infor-
mation to al-Qaida. Others who have been arrested for supporting al-Qaida have
been found not guilty or their trials are pending. One American, Adam Gadahn, has
the distinction of being the first American since World War II to be charged with
treason. Gadahn is not in American custody and occasionally appears in al-Qaida
videos denouncing America and the West.
5.2 Money
In our database of 184 traitors, 49 percent were motivated by money. That has
changed over time. From the end of World War II up to 1969, 15 of our traitors spied
for money; during the 1970s, 16 spied for money; during the 1980s (the Decade of
the Spy), 51 spied for money; and from 1990 to 2007, 9 spied for money.5 Herbig
(2008, 30) avers that since 1990 “money has not been the primary motivations for
espionage.” Before 1980, 34 percent of American traitors received no money for their
treason, during the 1980s, 59 percent received no money for their treason, and from
1990 to 2007, 81 percent received no money for their treason. One difference exists
between our database and Herbig’s. She has counted the amount of money that
traitors have received while we have ascribed money as a primary motive for espio-
nage based on the facts of the case. In any case, people who turn to treason to get
rich might want to think again.
Often latent greed may be enhanced by clever foreign intelligence officers who
offer villas on the Mediterranean (or, more accurately during the 1980s, dachas on the
Ural). Aldrich Ames, who betrayed the United States for nine years while employed by
the CIA, reported that he “felt a great deal of financial pressure” and that it was the
stress from that pressure that led him to conceive “a scam to get money from the KGB”
5
We note both the beginning and the ending dates of espionage, but place the individuals
into the decade that they began their treason, rather than when they were arrested.
(US Senate 1994, 11). Once addicted to the money, and prodded by an avaricious wife,
Ames just got in too deep and continued treason until he was caught in 1994.
Greedy employees of secret agencies often have no source to turn for additional
money other than treachery. Thomas Patrick Cavenaugh, an engineer for Northrop
Corporation, was working on a project dealing with what was then called “quiet
radar” when he faced what he called a financial crisis. He contacted what he thought
was a “KGB agent” (actually an FBI agent) who offered him $25,000 for the classified
information Cavenaugh was holding in his hand. When arrested, Cavenaugh
matter-of-factly said: “There was this piece of paper. I thought it might be worth
$25,000. I took the avenue of least resistance. I didn’t have the foggiest idea of how
to rob a bank” (San Francisco Examiner 1987).
When William Bell was arrested in 1981 for providing classified information
about sensitive technologies being developed at Hughes Aircraft to Polish intelli-
gence (then, merely an arm of the KGB) he revealed this dilemma very clearly. When
asked if he had sympathies for the Polish government, he replied, “No, Mr. Zacharski
[his Polish handler] had found a fool who needed money. I had a weak spot. He
took advantage of me” (US Senate 1986, 118).
More recently, Herman Simm, an Estonian defense official who was responsible
for intelligence liaison with NATO, was arrested in September 2008 for espionage.
While the case has not gone to trial at the time of this publication, it does appear
that he worked for the Russian SVR (the successor to the KGB) for approximately
thirteen years. Unfortunately for NATO, Simm handled very sensitive material relat-
ing to cyber-defense systems, according to an Estonian government official. In the
absence of a trial and conviction, all judgments must be tentative; however, even a
fairly senior bureaucrat would find it difficult to purchase “several pieces of valuable
land and houses including a farmhouse on the Baltic Sea and a grand white-painted
villa outside Tallinn” (Times Online 2008) on a bureaucrat’s salary.
Sometimes the desire for more money becomes a secondary motive and gets
mixed in with primary motives. For example, Larry Wu-Tai Chin was a Chinese
American who joined the Communist Party in China in 1942 but who worked for
the U.S. government from 1948 to 1985, the last twenty-nine years of which for the
CIA. He actually appears to have been a Chinese intelligence mole first placed
inside the U.S. Army as an interpreter who then moved into the CIA and reported
to China for over thirty years. Chin became adjusted to his Western lifestyle and to
the money he earned that allowed him to become addicted to gambling. So it was
a combination of both ideology and money that motivated his treason (PERSEREC
2004, 9).
Another case of mixed motives is the case of Jonathan Pollard who, as an intel-
ligence analyst for the U.S. Navy, began selling classified information to Israeli
intelligence. Pollard’s confession asserts his ideological sympathies for Israel.
Nevertheless, more detailed studies of the case reveal that both Pollard and his wife
were really enjoying the influx of money from Israeli intelligence (Polmar and Allen
2004, 506–7). Money continues to be a motive in treason, but it has become a sec-
ondary motive or is mixed with other motives.
5.3 Ingratiation
Ingratiation becomes a motive when information is betrayed to foreign sources in
order to fulfill friendship or love obligations or in order to make a favorable impres-
sion on someone whose approval is desired. The classic ingratiation examples
occurred during the Cold War and often involved the use of sexual “honey-traps” to
attract and, if necessary, blackmail potential traitors to deliver secret information.
This theme is the standard plot of many novels and movies about spying, but has
actually been a factor in very few treason cases. But the case of the treason by FBI
agent Richard Miller illustrates ingratiation perfectly. Even though his job perfor-
mance had not been sterling, he was assigned to counterintelligence in Los Angeles
in 1981. In 1984, after a series of extramarital affairs, Miller met Svetlana Ogorodnikov,
who described herself as a KGB major and with whom he became sexually involved.
After being arrested for treason, Miller argued that he was trying to ingratiate him-
self with Ogorodnikov, but he was eventually convicted of treason.6
The end of the Cold War seemed to bring about a great decrease in ingratiation
as a motive for treason. But others factors also contributed to its decline. One was
the gradual realization that intelligence agents who are part of a well-adjusted fam-
ily make better agents than do those who are sexually promiscuous, emotionally
impaired, and susceptible to blackmail (Parker and Wiskoff 1991, 32–35).
5.4 Disgruntlement
Like ideology, disgruntlement is a motivation of growing importance for treason.
By disgruntlement we refer to the sense of personal dissatisfaction that stems from
feelings of being underappreciated, underpaid, and overworked. People entrusted
with a nation’s secrets, to the degree possible, need to be treated fairly in a comfort-
able work environment.
Attrition occurs in every profession, but when employees of secret intelligence
agencies find out that they are neither “Q” nor James Bond or Jack Ryan, or when
poor evaluations begin to roll in or when advancement opportunities begin to fade,
job dissatisfaction may appear.
When retail store clerks become disgruntled, they have limited ways to strike
back against their employers. But when employees of secret agencies become dis-
gruntled, or not entirely “gruntled” (to borrow a phrase from Oscar Wilde), they
can do tremendous damage by turning to treason. Nearly every employee in any
6
Although some of the information about the Miller case came from articles in the Los
Angeles Times written by William Overend and published on 24 October 1985, 7 November, and 15
July 1986, Mr. James McQuivey interviewed Miller’s son for a class project.
Commandment” in his “The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence,” a for-

mer Director of the CIA’s Counterintelligence Center states this need succinctly:
“Honor Thy Professionals” (Olsen 2001).
Brian Patrick Regan worked both for the U.S. Air Force and the National
Reconnaissance Office for twenty years, yet was arrested for treason in 2003. Regan
complained frequently to fellow workers that his pension was too small and that he
was dissatisfied with his job, but he received no career counseling. “Among indi-
viduals with access to highly classified information in a workplace, realizing that
volunteering to spy is a potential outlet for people who are demoralized or resentful,
management should redouble efforts to maintain a cohesive work environment”
(Herbig and Wiskoff 2002, B12).
One pernicious practice that is currently causing workplace dissatisfaction in
U.S. agencies is the practice of replacing workers with outside contract employees.
One former student of the senior author reported that, after thirteen years in the
Directorate of Operations, she left the agency, began working for an outside intel-
ligence contractor, and is now back at the agency doing essentially the same work
she was doing as an agency employee, but for much more money. It is true that most
contract employees do not enjoy the same benefits that they enjoyed as agency
employees, but the short-term benefits of much higher salaries seem to outweigh
the longer term benefits of a government career. Former Director of National
Intelligence John Negroponte once remarked that the use of outside contractors
was like “leasing back our former employees” (Pincus 2006, A3). Although the num-
ber of employees of the U.S. Intelligence Community is classified, the figure of
“about 100,000” has been talked about quite widely, even by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Moreover, the Associate Director for
Human Capital at the ODNI has said that 27 percent of the civilian and military
intelligence work force are contract employees (Sanders 2008). This appears to reg-
ular employees as a slap in the face and may contribute to some disgruntlement.
Before leaving motivations for treason, one additional motivation ought to be
mentioned, primarily because it seems to insinuate itself into one or more of the
motivations listed above. William Kampiles, a CIA low-level employee, stole an
operations manual for the American KH-11 digital satellite surveillance system and
sold it to the Soviet Union for $3,000. But Kampiles then notified the CIA of his
actions and asserted that he was now capable of being a double agent for the gov-
ernment. The money appears merely to have been a means of convincing the CIA
that he could be assigned to more important clandestine operations. His childhood
dream was to work for the CIA and when he could do no better than a watch officer
in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations cable room, he turned to treason. While alert
personnel officers might have counseled him and set out a more satisfactory career
path for Kampiles, the element of fantasy played a major role in his case. Taylor and
Snow (1997, 118) call this the “James Mitty” syndrome because it “combines the
allure of a James Bond life style with a Walter Mitty sense of fantasy.”
How many of the other traitors in our database were also motivated by fantasy
may never be known, but it does appear in several cases. The 2006 British case of Cpl.
profession would like to earn more money, hopes to advance in the ranks more
quickly, and even may have some sympathy for foreign causes—but that may not
turn into treason if they believe they can resolve their problems through a proactive,
fair, and open human-relations system. On the other hand, if their work is not
appreciated, if they are underpaid, if they are passed over for promotions, and if
they are under stress, they become prime targets for foreign recruitment or turn
into self-made traitors.
As noted by Herbig (2008, 70), “One third of all 173 individuals [in their current
database] experienced life crises 6 to 8 months before they began espionage. . . .”
Obviously, employees in many professions undergo personal crises, but when
employees of secret agencies have failed marriages, serious illness, family tragedies,
health problems, and so on, they need special attention. Harold Nicholson, a former
CIA operations officer, attempted to explain his motivations for treason, if he can
be believed, by saying, “I reasoned I was doing this for my children—to make up for
putting my country’s needs above my family’s needs and for failing to keep my mar-
riage together for having done so” (Lathrop 2004, 386). A leading international
human-relations consulting organization reported in a global 2008 survey that the
four leading reasons for employees leaving their companies were inadequate base
pay, stress, lack of promotion opportunity, and inadequate career development
(Watson Wyatt 2008, 15). Some of these sources of disgruntlement could be miti-
gated by more proactive and aggressive personnel practices.7
Many former students (in the U.S., the U.K., Canada, and New Zealand) of the
senior author have gone into intelligence work and have suggested that enlightened
management practices, collegial work conditions, the absence of “cronyism” in
advancement and assignments, and getting employees to “buy in” to the mission of
their agency all equate to better job satisfaction. More careful pre-employment
descriptions of future careers and better career management are also essential.
According to Aamodt (2007, 305), “work motivation and job satisfaction are deter-
mined by the discrepancy between what we want, value, and expect and what the
job actually provides.” Also, “employees compare what the organization promised
to do for them . . . with what the organization actually does. If the organization does
less than it promised, employees will be less motivated to perform well and will
retaliate by doing less than they promised” (Morrison and Robinson 1997, 226–56).
Some who have left intelligence work have reported that even an occasional
verbal expression of appreciation would have made a difference in their feelings
about their careers.
Stella Rimington, a former director of MI5, appears to appreciate the impor-
tance of making employees feel wanted. In her novel about a fictional MI5
employee, she has the woman’s supervisor say to her, “Liz, your work is highly val-
ued” and “[y]ou’ve done exceedingly well” (Rimington 2004, 52 and 172). Not many
intelligence officers can claim to have heard these words. Under the “Second
7
We are grateful to David Daines, Vice President for Human Resources, Nu Skin
Enterprises, for directing us to the Watson Wyatt Global Survey.
Daniel James (born Esmail Mohammed Beigi Gamasai) involved money, ideology,
ingratiation, and a sense of fantasy (Evans 2008). James had “worked as a salsa dance
teacher, casino croupier and nightclub bouncer [and] was described as a ‘Walter Mitty’
character” by his agency (Cardham 2008). James was in the Territorial Army and was
called up for action in Afghanistan as an interpreter because of his fluency in Farsi and
Dari. He was found guilty of violating the Official Secrets Act by emailing NATO
troop movements to a military attaché in Iran (Cardham 2008).
The management of secret agencies must be more vigilant, both in recruiting
and in career development. When one reviews some of the cases mentioned above
(Richard Miller, Aldrich Ames, David James, Harold Nicholson, and others whose
cases were not reviewed above), it is appropriate to remember what Rebecca West
said about Harry Houghton. Houghton was a British Cold War spy who was a
known wife-beater, alcoholic, philanderer, liar, black marketer, and security risk, yet
was assigned to a sensitive naval underwater weapons base in England. About him,
West said, “this was not the place to put an alcoholic extrovert” (West 1964, 276).
6. Summary and Conclusion

While many investigations of treason focus almost solely on individual traitors or
on aggregations of, we have taken a slightly different approach. We have tried to set
the stage for understanding both the historical development of expectations of loy-
alty as well as the vital role trust plays in social development. It is out of this setting
that treason—for treason is but the loss of trust—does become “worse than mur-
der.” With this understanding we are able to see why the ancients developed concern
about treason.
We have also seen that laws to prevent treason, because of their ancient origins,
have not provided the flexibility and breadth needed to be useful against the most
pernicious treason, the handing over of state secrets to foreign powers. Hence, most
nations (we have focused on the United Stated and the United Kingdom) have
developed statutory laws to prevent espionage such as the British Official Secrets
Act and the American Espionage Act and their subsequent revisions.
As we turned to the actual motivations of traitors, we pointed out the difficulty
of ascribing motives to any behavior, but continued by looking at the motives of
ideology, money, disgruntlement, and ingratiation. We also noted the occasional
appearance of fantasy as a motive. We saw that ideological motives emerged quite
strong out of World War II, then faded somewhat in the 70s and 80s, but became the
dominant motive in the 1990s, primarily because of globalization and terrorism.
Globalization and the increasingly complex concept of international power and
influence are factors that put extreme strain on existing treason laws.
Money, which was not a particularly strong motive up to the 1970s, became
quite strong during the 1980s, but nearly disappeared in the twenty-first century.
Disgruntlement was not much of a factor in espionage until the 1980s and has con-
tinued to grow. The tragedy of disgruntlement is that it is the most easily prevent-
able of all of the motives for treason.
While this chapter is focused solely on treason, those who want to learn more
about the prevention of treason should look at the sections of this Handbook that
deal with counterintelligence as well as other works on counterintelligence, such as
Pincer (1988), Brenner (2007), Olsen (2001), Van Cleave (2007), Sarbin and others
(1994), and Taylor (2007a and 2007b). Treason is a more serious national issue than
many realize. It threatens the ability of society to remain securely intact, and the
number of ways to betray a state’s portfolio of power has proliferated. However,
despite the reality of this threat, measures intended to prevent treason need to be
carefully considered. “It would be a tragedy if we destroyed freedom in the effort to
preserve it” (West 1964, 238).
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chapter 33
THE CHALLENGES OF
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
paul j. redmond
1. Counterintelligence Definitions
Counterintelligence, known in the trade as “CI,” is a complex, controversial subject
that is hard to define. Only at the strategic level are there reasonably consistent defi-
nitions of counterintelligence. According to the current, official U.S. government
definition: “Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities con-
ducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt or protect against espionage, other intel-
ligence activities, sabotage or assassination conducted for or on behalf of foreign
powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organi-
zations or activities.”1 A former senior counterintelligence officer of the KGB’s First
Chief Directorate2 defines CI as “special activities of security organizations autho-
rized and directed by the government to protect the State and its citizens against
espionage, sabotage and terrorism.”3
The Russians also have an institutional definition for counterintelligence or kon-
trrazvedka—“State agencies granted special powers in the fight against the intelli-
gence services (razvedka) of other states and the subversive activity of organizations
and individuals used by those services. Counter-intelligence is one of the instru-
ments in the hands of the political authorities of the state” (Mitrokhin 2002).
1
Executive Order 12333, Sec. 3.5, as amended on July 31, 2008.
2
The First Chief Directorate was the foreign intelligence arm of the Soviet KGB, and is now
named the SVR.
3
Colonel General Oleg Danilovich Kalugin, former Chief of Directorate K
(Counterintelligence) of the KGB First Chief Directorate, October 2008.
As is the case with the Russians, a British definition of counterintelligence

includes countersubversion—“. . . protection of national security against threats
from espionage, terrorism and sabotage from the activities of foreign powers and
from activities intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by
political industrial or violent means.4”
While these strategic definitions are mostly in agreement in that they mention espi-
onage, sabotage, and terrorism, they encompass a wide diversity of activity, a variety of
professional skills, and a range of tactical purposes and means. As a former national
counterintelligence executive observed, “Across the profession, there are vast differences
in understanding of what counterintelligence means, and how it is done, and even the
basic terminology it employs” (Van Cleave 2008). CI means different things to different
organizations and intelligence officers, and encompasses a wide continuum of activities
from analysis of observed events through the aggressive operational activity of mount-
ing deception operations, from conduct of espionage investigations to the intensely per-
sonal, clandestine activity of recruiting and securely managing human sources among
the enemy—without simultaneously being deceived.
The U.S. military, which runs “offensive” counterintelligence operations against
the enemy, places CI under the overall umbrella of “force protection.”5 The FBI,
which is part of the U.S. Department of Justice and is the “lead” U.S. agency in the
field, does engage in operational CI activity but it tends to emphasize CI as a law
enforcement activity, counterespionage, or the identification and successful prose-
cution of spies.
The Central Intelligence Agency embraces under the rubric of counterintelli-
gence a very wide variety of activities. They include the recruitment and manage-
ment of sources within foreign intelligence services; “asset validation” to prevent the
opposition from deceiving the U.S. intelligence community by running sources they
actually control; the maintenance of good operational “tradecraft” to prevent the
opposition from uncovering American intelligence-collection operations; analysis
of the capabilities and intentions of the foreign intelligence opposition; and coun-
terespionage operations with the FBI. To other national security or defense agencies
not engaged in operational intelligence activities but rather consumers and analysts
of intelligence information or custodians/producers of other sorts of national-
security data, counterintelligence means primarily programs to prevent the enemy
from stealing secrets. Agencies such as the United States Department of Homeland
Security actually engaged in government operations have to design programs to
protect not only sensitive technical programs and intelligence data but also to
defend, at the tactical level, against terrorist organizations suborning employees
to facilitate the infiltration of terrorists and/or weapons into the United States.
4
British Security Service Act of 1989.
5
Defined as “[p]reventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of
Defense Personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information.”
Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
a 0073, amended through October 17, 2008.
the challenges of counterintelligence 539
The end of the Cold War brought even more complications to the definition
and conduct of counterintelligence by the United States. While U.S. intelligence
agencies tried, with an almost complete lack of success, to run deception operations
against the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, counterintelligence meant mostly
counterespionage against the efforts of the Soviet Union, its allies and, to a lesser
degree, China to steal secrets. The break-up of the Soviet Union mostly eliminated
the espionage activity by the states of Eastern Europe but Russia and China have
remained counterintelligence threats. Moreover, a host of new ones have emerged
including “non-State actors” such as terrorist organizations and the drug cartels.
The post-9/11 era has further complicated matters by raising the bureaucratic and
operational issues of the relationship between counterterrorism and counterintel-
ligence, not to mention the perennial conundrum of defining and coping organiza-
tionally with the overlapping roles of counterintelligence and security. The
intersection of the roles of CI and security leads, in turn, to the question of where
the CI function should reside within an organization. Further confounding the
definition of CI, the advent of the “cyber” era has raised the issue of “cyber CI” and
how a national defense entity protects itself against attacks on its databases, elec-
tronically controlled operations, and digital communications.
Even the basic terminology of CI is not universally shared. Different intelli-
gence/security services within the same government use different words. The
German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) uses the term “Gegenspionage” which,
translated literally, means “the countering of espionage,” but the internal security
service, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, BfV, uses the term
“Spionageabwehr” which means “counter espionage.”6 In English, “counterintelli-
gence” is even spelled differently: “counterintelligence,” “counter intelligence” and
“counter-intelligence.”7
The various organizational positions and levels of status and influence within
government agencies that the CI function occupies also reflect the complexity of the
subject. Perhaps because of Russia’s Byzantine cultural heritage and the conspirato-
rial roots of the Bolsheviks, the external part of KGB, the First Chief Directorate and
its successor organization the SVR, places tremendous emphasis on CI. It maintains
an entire organization, Directorate K, in Moscow. The SVR also has a CI career
track and a CI section, referred to as Line KR, within each residency.8 Except tem-
porarily in the aftermath of spy scandals and major operational failures, the CIA
historically has put less emphasis on CI. Although it has not established a separate
CI operations officer track within the National Clandestine Service, it does have
career CI officers at CIA Headquarters and some posted abroad. Perhaps most curi-
ously, during the latter part of the Cold War, the head of CI in one European service
also had as his duties legislative and public affairs.
6
Dr. Dirk Doerrenberg, former Director of Counterintelligence for the BfV, December 2008.
7
The terms counterintelligence and CI will be used interchangeably in this chapter.
8
The Russian intelligence representation abroad, the equivalent of a CIA “station” is called a
“residency.”
This diversity of approach is also reflected in CI’s relationship to the security func-
tion in various organizations. In the U.S. National Security Agency, the functions are
fully merged in the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence. From the
Edward Lee Howard spy case9 the CIA learned the painful lesson that lack of internal
communication can lead to disaster. In this instance, there had been no effective sharing
of information among the Directorate of Operations, Office of Security, and Office of
Medical Services. As a result, the CIA as an institution did not recognize Howard as a CI
threat. At the CIA, counterintelligence and security are still separate organizations, but
the interchangeability of personnel appears to make for effective cooperation.
In addition to the complexity of the subject, one other factor makes CI hard to
discuss in public. It is probably the most arcane and certainly among the most
secret, conspiratorial, and “sensitive” of intelligence activities. Thus, it is a very hard
subject to describe to the “uncleared” reader in anything but the abstract. The fol-
lowing discussion of the multifarious aspects of CI endeavors to overcome this dif-
ficulty by describing situations and cases. In the interests of security and ease of
getting publication clearance, some of these cases have been “sterilized,” but the
writer hopes they remain faithful to the lessons they reveal.
Regardless of the complexity of the subject, the diversity of the functions and
activities it encompasses, and the “spooky” nature of the business, one basic rule
must apply to counterintelligence: “all things in moderation.” Because there was a
belief that the Soviets had penetrated the CIA, during the 1960s and early 1970s CI
reigned supreme, paralyzing operations against the Warsaw Pact by assuming that
the KGB knew of and controlled all operations. During the tenure of DCI William
Colby in the mid-1970s, there was a reaction to this mindset that destroyed CI at the
CIA and lead to spies in the Agency going undetected and the flowering of opposi-
tion-controlled cases. These two periods represent a typical sine wave of either too
much or too little CI in the U.S. intelligence community. The waves oscillate in radi-
cal reaction to the previous peak, rarely staying in the moderate range required to
deal rationally with the hard issues of counterintelligence.
2. The Various Aspects of

Counterintelligence
2.1 Counterintelligence as Counterespionage

“Catching spies,” or counterespionage, which is the detection and neutralization of
human spies, is probably the first thing that comes to mind when the general public
Howard, a former CIA case officer, was identified in 1985 as spying for the KGB, and
9
escaped to the USSR where he subsequently died.

thinks of “counterintelligence.” It is also the easiest to describe since there are many
well-documented, important spy cases. This is indeed a very important aspect of CI.
During the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact and its allies such as Cuba had spectacular
success in penetrating every U.S. government agency engaged in national security
(except apparently the Coast Guard), most defense contractors, and the U.S.
Congress. An informal historical review of Cold War spy cases shows that at any one
time there were at least seven significant spies working for the enemy in the U.S.
national security establishment.
During that tense era in international affairs, four spy cases alone could have
given the Soviet Union a decisive advantage if war had broken out. The Walker spy
case in the U.S. Navy10 provided cryptographic key material and encryption equip-
ment design data enabling the KGB to read over a million messages, which would
have allowed the Russians virtually to neutralize the deterrence of the American
submarine-based missile systems. The Clyde Conrad spy ring11 provided the Soviets,
via the Hungarian military intelligence service, the details of the U.S. Army’s opera-
tional plans and communications in Western Europe, which could have provided
the Warsaw Pact a decisive advantage in a ground war in Western Europe. Robert
Hanssen, who worked for both the KGB and GRU12 off and on for about twenty
years before his arrest in 2001, passed the Soviets enough documentary data to neu-
tralize U.S. efforts to continue a viable democratic government in time of a nuclear
war. Aldrich Ames, an equally notorious spy who worked for the KGB for about
nine years until he was arrested in 1994, compromised nearly all the CIA’s human
sources working against the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s.
These four spy cases capture the spectrum of ways in which espionage cases
begin. The Ames case resides at the end of the spectrum that is hardest to pursue,
empirical indications that there is a problem—secrets are getting to the opposi-
tion—but no clues as to how. In the mid-1980s, the KGB started, in a rather rapid-
fire manner, to arrest CIA’s Soviet sources. After a period of analysis, false trails, and
inattention to the problem, a joint CIA-FBI examination of the very large number
of officers aware of the compromised cases produced a small number of people on
whom to concentrate. This process eventually focused on Ames, chronologically
linking his operationally approved contacts with a Russian in the Washington
embassy to financial transactions. When combined with some suggestive source
reporting, this effort enabled the FBI to mount a very skillful investigation culmi-
nating in his arrest.
The Ames episode represents the extreme difficulty of pursuing a case when the only
way to attack the problem is massive analysis of the people aware of the cases compro-
mised. So-called knowledgeability or “bigot lists” are a farce in the U.S. government.
10
John Walker, a U.S. Navy Communicator, started working for the KGB in 1968 and along
with his brother, son, and a friend spied for the Soviets for about seventeen years.
11
Conrad, a retired U.S. Army Sergeant, was arrested in 1988 as part of a spy net in the U.S.
Army, which by that time had existed for seventeen years.
12
The GRU is the Russian military intelligence service.
Even in the rare cases where good records actually exist, they are almost useless because
hundreds of employees can know about an operation. The FBI found in the mid-1980s
they could not pursue the compromise of a Soviet source because about 250 people at
one field office alone had knowledge of the operation (Bromwich 1997). On the other
hand, non-American CI officers can have an easier time both in protecting their opera-
tions and investigating losses. Knowledgeable CI professionals in the U.S. government
estimate that fewer than ten KGB officers knew the identities of Ames and Hanssen, and
a former senior Greek intelligence officer recently stated to the media that only three of
his colleagues knew the identity of Steven Lalas, a State Department communications
officer who spied for the Greeks from 1977 to 1993.13
So-called lead information is helpful in starting and pursuing an espionage inves-
tigation in direct proportion to its specificity. Multiple CIA human sources in three
different Warsaw Pact intelligence services provided information over many years that
the Hungarian Military Intelligence Service had a very valuable source in the U.S.
Army’s V Corps in Germany. Through one human asset involved in the actual process-
ing of the product but not knowledgeable about the source, the CIA was even able to
inform the Army of specific documents passed and the disturbing fact that amend-
ments to operational plans were occasionally reaching the Red Army Headquarters in
Moscow before they were issued to U.S. forces. Eventually, after many years and a mas-
sive investigation based on a large accumulation of diverse lead material, plus some
good luck, the Army was able to identify Clyde Conrad (and a net of associate spies) as
the source. Conrad was subsequently arrested and successfully prosecuted by the
Federal Republic of Germany. The CIA had multiple sources reporting on the case.
However, because of excellent compartmentation within the Warsaw Pact intelligence
services, no single source had more than a few small pieces of the puzzle. As a conse-
quence this very damaging operation ran for many years before enough information
accumulated to allow the U.S. Army investigators to focus on Conrad.
While “lead information” is much more valuable than a well-founded suspicion
of a CI problem, the pursuit of leads can be extraordinarily difficult and fraught with
the potential for mistakes. For years the CIA and FBI fruitlessly pursued lead infor-
mation from the 1960s indicating that a CIA officer had volunteered to provide
information on the Agency’s operations in the USSR. Many years later during the
course of the intensive research which led to the Aldrich Ames spy case, it became
clear that this “old lead” from a Soviet intelligence source was his garbled version of
a U.S.-controlled volunteer, a walk-in to a Soviet installation in the United States. In
the early 1980s, the CIA received from two separate, well-placed KGB officers similar
information that a CIA “communicator” had an operational meeting with the KGB
in a North African city during a particular time period. The Agency and the FBI
chased that “lead” for years until it became clear, following his arrest, that John
Walker was the person the Soviets met on that occasion. At that time, senior and mid-
dle-grade KGB officers apparently assumed all communicators worked for the CIA.
13
Statement by retired General Nikolaos Gryllakis, former head of Greek security. Undated
translation/transcription of Greek television show, “Fakeli” (files).
The Walker spy case illustrates how empirical data pointing to a CI problem
and general lead information is not enough to unearth a spy. During the 1970s and
early 1980s, Navy flag officers had expressed anger and extreme frustration that
Soviet electronic collection ships seemed to appear regularly at just the right places
and times to conduct intercept operations during U.S. naval maneuvers, particu-
larly in the Mediterranean. This was an obvious indication that the Soviets some-
how had insight into U.S. operational planning. During this period the CIA did
disseminate one CI report from a Soviet intelligence officer who alleged that the
USSR had achieved massive success in reading U.S. Navy communications. Even if
these two straws in the wind had been considered together, which they probably
were not, they did not provide a sufficient basis to attack the problem. The start of
the case had to wait until the best kind of lead came along, the specific identification
of a spy by a source or, as in this case, a “snitch.” Walker’s former wife, apparently
drunk, called an FBI office to say her husband was a spy; the FBI acted on the lead
and Walker was eventually arrested. Often the problem with pursuing snitch leads
is persuading superiors to take them seriously, as happened in a case involving
another KGB penetration of the U.S. Navy, when security authorities discounted the
statement of a discontented wife that her husband was a spy and his espionage
career thus ran four years longer than it should have.
Two other cases illustrate the supreme value of specific source information, the
other end of the continuum from purely empirical indicators of a CI problem.
Resourceful and persistent operational work by the FBI, with help from the CIA,
lead to source reporting unambiguously identifying Robert Hanssen as a spy (Risen
2003, A1). Likewise, the KGB defector Vitaliy Sergeyevich Yurchenko14 provided
enough specific information to enable the CIA within minutes to identify former
employee Edward L. Howard as a KGB asset.
Other factors also play a role in starting espionage investigations. Through the
security/polygraph process the CIA has identified individuals who had been directed
to apply for employment by foreign intelligence services and most recently, appar-
ently by terrorist organizations.15 The espionage investigation of Jonathan Pollard16
was started because of the alertness and CI consciousness of a fellow employee. While
the KGB, with its massive resources, caught U.S. spies in the USSR through surveil-
lance of CIA officers, only rarely have Western security services had similar success.
Defectors represent a special case as sources of spy leads. Historically, they have
been gold mines for data in starting investigations; but once the excitement of their
defection is over, they have told all that they know and attention toward them
lags, they often start to make up stories. During the effort which led to Ames’s
14
Vitaliy Sergeyevich Yurchenko, a senior KGB counterintelligence officer, defected to the
CIA in Rome in August 1985 and redefected to the USSR three months later.
15
The prospect of a polygraph examination has also deterred existing spies from applying to
CIA for employment or accepting an assignment there.
16
Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. Navy civilian intelligence analyst, was arrested in 1985 for spying
for Israel.
identification as a spy, a defector from the then KGB’s internal security component,
the Second Chief Directorate (now FSB), concocted a story for his American handler
about the recruitment of a CIA officer in Moscow. It turned out that he made up the
story to retain the attention of the CIA and FBI. All espionage investigations should
view all spy leads with skepticism, at least initially, and they should judge leads on
Oscar Wilde’s principle that “the truth is rarely pure and never simple.”
Another maxim which applies to counterespionage and CI in general is “your
CI capability is only as good as your records.” Leads to spies are more often than not
ambiguous and fragmentary. CI analysis has been described as trying to do a mono-
color jigsaw puzzle with pieces fitting in multiple places or not at all, or more sim-
ply, the archaeological reconstruction of shards from a broken pot. Records in the
form of formal data in storage or, as was the case in the two examples cited below,
institutional memory, are invaluable in resolving leads. In the mid-1980s, a European
service obtained from a source in a Warsaw Pact intelligence service the detailed
description for a dead drop site that the source knew only had been cased and writ-
ten up for an important spy. Investigation and surveillance of the site proved fruit-
less. Several years later, a CIA source in another country identified a spy who was
connected to the dead drop site, thus reinforcing the evidence against the spy and
resolving the original lead. The connection was made only because the intelligence
officers involved happened to remember the original dead drop data, not because
there were organized holdings of such information.
Another case where institutional memory played a major role involved an infor-
mal discussion between a CIA officer and a senior member of a European service. The
subject was lead information to KGB penetrations in the U.S. computer industry,
where the principal spies had European and South Asian connections. The Western
European officer noted the leads “sounded” similar to information acquired from a
completely different source several years earlier. He went home and confirmed his
suspicions from his service’s rather good records and the CIA eventually found simi-
lar data residing in the proverbial shoe box under a desk. The connection of the data
considerably expanded and refined the investigation. It is hoped that the advent of the
cyber era and “link analysis” is now being used to correlate leads and identify spies
more systematically. However, data processing and manipulation should not be
viewed as a substitute for professional expertise gained by career CI professionals with
years of experience. The two CIA officers who played the major role in identifying
Aldrich Ames as a spy followed their instincts in focusing on him as a candidate and,
using their vast knowledge and experience, were even able to accurately construct,
from fragmentary data before his arrest, a significant part of his KGB meeting plan.
2.2 Counterintelligence as “Asset Validation”

The vetting of sources or “asset validation” usually, and too narrowly, is applied to
human sources by American intelligence services. This counterintelligence function
is at the very heart of all human collection operations and it should be applied also
to technical collection and SIGINT operations.17 It is critically important to deter-

mine to the degree possible that the source is not a fabricator or under opposition
control. The disastrous CURVEBALL source, who reinforced the Bush administra-
tion’s predisposition to believe Iraq had a weapons-of-mass-destruction program,
is a classic example. He was a source of German intelligence that was dealing with
the Pentagon’s Defense Humint Service (DHS), and he was never properly vetted
until after his data were used to support the invasion of Iraq. It is equally critical to
determine, if possible, whether a source may be under the control of the opposition
and thus used to provide disinformation or lure officers out onto the street for a
contact, where they can be apprehended and noisily declared persona non grata.
During the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact and its allies enjoyed spectacular success
in running controlled cases against the CIA. During much of the Cold War, all the
“sources” the CIA was running against Cuba were controlled by its intelligence ser-
vice. With a very small number of possible exceptions, the same parlous state of
affairs existed in the operations against East Germany. The KGB, unlike most
Western intelligence services, reflexively favored running controlled cases and
mounted many “dangle” operations.18 The same conspiratorial mindset that moti-
vated the KGB to attempt many controlled operations led them, as a matter of
course, not to trust their own sources. Thus they engaged intensively, one might say
obsessively, in testing and validation. In the mid-1980s American CI officers were
amazed to learn that a former U.S. military officer was still the subject of elaborate
testing by the KGB about ten years after he started working for the Soviets and had
been of enough value to meet personally with a KGB general and directorate chief.
It is clear that the Warsaw Pact’s success in running cases against American
intelligence was at least partly a function of American naïveté, lack of professional-
ism, and the refusal of officers to believe their case could be a fabricator or con-
trolled by the opposition, particularly when promotions were involved. It must be
emphasized, however, that asset validation is a very difficult task, particularly when
the source is handled in a “denied area”19 and there are few, if any, other sources of
“collateral” information on which to rely for comparison. Most Western intelligence
sources in denied areas are “met” only briefly for a very quick passage of informa-
tion or are handled impersonally by dead drops or clandestine electronic commu-
nications. There is no regular opportunity for personal meetings and the type of
17
SIGINT or signals intelligence is one of the many examples of “int” terminology including
MASINT, IMINT, and HUMINT imposed on the U.S. government by the Department of Defense.
Some civilian, professional intelligence officers prefer “human espionage” to HUMINT.
18
“Dangle” is the term of art for an individual controlled by a CI service who is put in the
way of a hostile service, making himself as attractive as possible in the hope the service will take
him on as an agent, a “double agent.” The American media, displaying their usual ignorance of the
intelligence business, have taken to describing spies such as Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen as
“double agents,” apparently because they were employees of intelligence organizations. They
should be labeled spies or penetrations.
19
“Denied area” is an intelligence term of art describing an extremely hostile operational
environment with heavy surveillance.
systematic debriefing that can identify and pursue issues related to the source’s
validity. In the absence of any sources of its own within the opposition service to
warn them, Western services running cases in denied areas have had to rely on the
value of the intelligence provided, corroboration of its validity by other sources, if
available, and the operational circumstances surrounding the case—particularly
how it started.
This is a very complicated, difficult business. It is not a science. In one Warsaw
Pact country in the 1970s, an individual purporting to be an officer of the internal
security service volunteered by note to the CIA. He was handled impersonally by
dead drop over many years and provided valuable information concerning his ser-
vice’s plans to run controlled cases against the CIA and other operations against the
U.S. embassy. He even warned of an impending ambush by the internal security
service. Because he had been of established value, CIA CI officers were stunned to
learn, at the end of the Cold War, that the case had been controlled from the begin-
ning. It appears that his country’s internal security service, taking the long view so
alien to Western services, was trying to establish him as a contingency asset for a
major disinformation operation in the future. It is noteworthy that the only doubts
about the case were expressed by the initial case officer who picked up the first dead
drop. He observed people in the area and expressed the view that they might have
been surveillants. This case reinforces the informal maxim of some CI officers: “the
answer (to the validity of the case) always resides in the first 10–15 pages of the file.”
A source in another Eastern European country had been providing valuable,
validated military R&D data for many years when his handling officer was ambushed
by the security service when meeting the asset on the street in the capital. CI offi cers
at the CIA assumed the source had been compromised because of a mistake on his
or the Agency’s part and only learned to their amazement after the Cold War that the
case had been controlled all along. The Eastern European service had been running
the case for years to have something “on the shelf ” to use against the CIA, should the
need arise. As the chief of the service said, he did not care that they were passing valu-
able information because it hurt only the Russians, not his own country.
Three other cases illustrate another aspect of how the validation of sources is
not easy and a decision to declare a case controlled should not be made lightly. At
the height of U.S.-Soviet tensions in the 1960s, an East European intelligence official
living behind the iron curtain volunteered to American intelligence and started pro-
viding CI information on Warsaw Pact spies in the West. While the information
appeared to have potential, CI officers began doubting his bona fides when he also
began suggesting that Western intelligence officer’s travel into other Eastern
European countries to recruit senior communist intelligence officers whom he
believed to be disaffected. Given the Cold War atmosphere and the operational con-
ditions then prevailing behind the iron curtain, such suggestions were ludicrous.
Some CI officers, not unreasonably, concluded that he was a controlled case trying
to lure the CIA into an operational fiasco in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the CIA
and an allied service continued to run the case and he turned out to be the one of
the most valuable sources of CI information in history. It became clear over time
that the individual was mentally unstable and his outlandish operational sugges-
tions were the result of his ignorance of life on the other side of the iron curtain and
his assumption that Western services were as powerful as those in the Soviet Bloc.
The Soviet engineer who started volunteering by note during a period when
timid management precluded the Agency from replying to his overtures is another
example illustrating the need to persevere despite well-founded, in fact compel-
ling, doubts. Because of the CIA’s passivity over a considerable period of time, the
engineer eventually out of frustration pounded on the trunk of the car of a U.S
diplomat who was filling his tank at one of the diplomatic gas stations in Moscow,
an area very well covered by KGB surveillance, both static and mobile. The combi-
nation of this suicidal means of volunteering, plus the obscurity and initially
incomprehensible nature of the data provided, logically led officers at the CIA to
believe he was a controlled case, until knowledgeable engineers and experts in the
DOD determined that his production was extraordinarily valuable. That case
turned out to be the most significant run by the CIA against the USSR during the
Cold War.
Another case involved risk taking. The CIA had been running a source in Europe
who returned to Moscow with the expectation of being assigned to an office with
access to a veritable gold mine of military information. After his return home, a
source provided the CIA enough information to make it clear that the KGB had
learned something of the operation but was apparently following an investigative
avenue that probably would not lead quickly to this potentially superb source. He
eventually signaled for a contact and CI officers had to calculate the odds on whether
the KGB had found him and was setting the Agency up for an ambush. Based on a
seat-of-the-pants assessment of known KGB investigative intentions, the likelihood
of a huge payoff in intelligence product, plus a lot of hope, the CIA decided to make
the contact. It came off without incident and produced a massive amount of very
valuable intelligence.
The in-place source or defector who does not tell you all he knows, either to
protect himself or to apply future leverage, is another challenge to asset validation.
The most famous such case is Alexander Orlov, a senior Bolshevik intelligence offi-
cer, who defected in Canada in 1938 because he thought he was about to be assassi-
nated as part of the Great Purge. He knew the identities of most of the important
spies working for the Soviets in the West, including the high-level penetrations of
the British government; but he did not reveal this information, having sent a mes-
sage to Stalin via the head of Bolshevik intelligence saying that he would tell all if
anything happened to himself or his family. The only effective way to get a full
debriefing from a source inclined to hold back is to subject him to an officer with an
in-depth, intimidating knowledge of the subject matter and good human-relations
skills. When the principal CIA case officer handling Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy20 first
met him in a hotel room in London, he asked him whether so-and-so (by first name
20
Penkovskiy was a Soviet military intelligence officer who worked for the United States and
Great Britain from 1960 to 1962.
and patronymic) had issued him the dreary sack of a suit he was wearing. So-and-so
was the apparatchik who issued civilian clothing to Soviet military intelligence
officers traveling abroad. The intimate knowledge on the part of the CIA officer
would have sufficiently impressed Penkovskiy and created enough rapport to mini-
mize any inhibitions.
While it depends on disciplined attention to detail, great expertise, unbiased
analysis, healthy skepticism, and sense of conspiracy, asset validation, like counter-
espionage, is not a science or a bureaucratic exercise. It is an art which is aided
greatly by an experiential, intuitive understanding, in other words, “feel.” One note-
worthy case involved an engineer who volunteered in Moscow with plans for a new
Soviet aircraft. The initial approach of this would-be source and data provided sim-
ply did not “feel” right to the CI officers examining it in Washington. There was
simply something “off ” about his “presentation.” When overhead satellite coverage
imaged an aircraft on a runway which resembled the volunteer’s reporting, some CI
officers asked “How much plywood and balsa wood did it take to build that fake?”
The volunteer did turn out to be controlled. On the other side of the coin, similarly
skeptical officers were on too many other occasions successfully fooled by the KGB,
which resulted in the loss of operational techniques, noisy persona non grata decla-
rations, and some successful disinformation operations.
The vetting of SIGINT information and sources, and the product of other tech-
nical collection operations, is one of the most difficult and perhaps the most con-
troversial aspect of “asset validation.” The SIGINT practitioners stand on the
assertion, “SIGINT never lies.” SIGINT is often based on cryptanalytic successes or
major technical collection breakthroughs and it is almost impossible for intelli-
gence officers to gain enough access to the operations to make independent judg-
ments about the sources. SIGINT, as now practiced in the West, presents a fertile
area for the opposition to engage in deception and disinformation operations.
3. Counterintelligence
as Disinformation Operations
The section above on source vetting described the difficulties of determining
whether a human source is valid. This section looks at the issue from the other side:
the purposes and techniques of running operations against the opposition, in order
to control their activities, misinform them, trap them, or get them to reveal their
operational techniques and capabilities. In the early 1920s, the State Political
Directorate (OGPU) of the Soviet Union penetrated existing, anti-Communist
organizations. Instead of eliminating them, it co-opted and expanded them into an
organization that had the operational name, “The Trust.” This control enabled the
OGPU effectively to neutralize a large part of the opposition to the Bolsheviks.
During World War II deception and disinformation played a vital role in opera-
tions against Germany. Prior to the Normandy invasion in 1944, the British used
apprehended Nazi spies, along with a massive disinformation campaign involving
the creation of an entirely fictitious Allied army corps, to persuade the Germans
that the invasion would be directed against the Pas de Calais, not Normandy. The
success of this operation was, of course, founded on superb British CI operations,
which identified and neutralized all Nazi sources in Great Britain, thus eliminating
any sources still working for the Germans who could have cast doubt on the infor-
mation provided by those under British control. The British were also greatly aided
in this effort by excellent intelligence on German reactions to the deception cam-
paign afforded by successful decryption of German military communications.
Another spectacular World War II success involved an elegant, if macabre, opera-
tion in which the British arranged to have float ashore in Spain the perfectly docu-
mented corpse of an ostensibly drowned British officer carrying fake war plans. The
corpse successfully misled the Germans into thinking the allies intended to invade
Sardinia and Greece instead of Sicily. In this operation, the British illustrated their
skill at disinformation, counterintelligence, and attention to detail, by using the
corpse of an individual who had died of pneumonia, a cause of death that appar-
ently displays pathological signs similar to drowning.21
After receiving data from Aldrich Ames on almost all CIA’s human source oper-
ations against the USSR in 1985, the KGB, apparently under pressure from the Soviet
leadership, quickly started arresting these sources, which ran the risk of alerting
CIA to a CI problem and jeopardizing Ames. To mitigate this risk, the KGB CI
Directorate conducted a number of disinformation operations to try to explain
away the compromises of the American sources. In the summer of 1985, a KGB offi-
cer working for the CIA in Africa who was compromised by Ames went on home
leave carrying operational directions to a dead drop containing a large number of
rubles, which he planned to spend while on vacation. He did not return from home
leave. Instead the CIA received information from a source in Europe that the officer
had been arrested picking up the dead drop in Moscow. At about the same time, the
CIA and FBI received essentially the same story about this compromise from another
KGB source. After Ames was identified as a spy, it became clear that the KGB knew
that both the sources were working for the Americans and, to protect Ames, used
them as unwitting vehicles to misinform U.S. Intelligence before they found ways to
lure the officers back to the USSR.
The United States intelligence community has not distinguished itself in run-
ning controlled sources against the opposition. While the U.S. military allegedly had
success in running “perception management” operations against Iraq before opera-
tion Desert Storm, the American effort during the Cold War was consistently unsuc-
cessful. The U.S. military policy is that “Offensive Counterintelligence Operations”
(OFCO) are run to protect and enhance national security. The Defense Intelligence
21
This operation is described in the 1956 movie, The Man Who Never Was.
Agency subscribes to the following succinct objectives of double agent operations as

summarized from the book, The Double-Cross System by Sir John C. Masterman.
The objectives are: 1. Control the adversary’s espionage system and by doing so, in
effect make him work for you. 2. Identify, neutralize or suppress new agents and
spies. 3. Obtain information on the personnel and methods of the adversary service.
4. Secure access to adversary codes and ciphers 5. Gain evidence of the adversary’s
intentions. 6. Influence the enemy’s operational intentions. 7. Systematically deceive
the enemy (Masterman 1972). Item 5 represents a very important example where
“counter” intelligence can greatly assist “positive” intelligence. Considerable insight
into an adversary’s policies and intentions can be gained from knowing the thrust
and focus of his intelligence-collection activities.
In its own operations and in cooperation with the military services, the FBI has
sought to convince the opposition of a dangle’s value in an effort to induce hostile
intelligence services to handle the operation in the United States, which would give
the Bureau very valuable information on how they operate in America. The CIA,
with very rare exceptions, has not tried to run controlled operations; rather it has
served merely to coordinate such operations run abroad by other agencies.
The lack of U.S. success in this area during the Cold War is at least partly attrib-
utable to the KGB’s success in penetrating U.S. intelligence. Ames and Hanssen,
complemented by other lesser-known sources in the military, provided the KGB
with detailed information on the double-agent program, all the doctrine, the com-
plete “play book” of operational techniques and many, if not all, the specific opera-
tions. The apparent success of deception operations against Iraq prior to Desert
Storm bespeaks a salutary improvement in the U.S. CI posture, because it shows
Saddam Hussein did not have the valuable sources within the U.S. intelligence
establishment enjoyed by the KGB.
as Operational Tradecraft
In any organization engaged in intelligence collection, the imposition of the highest
possible standards of operational security, or tradecraft, is a critical counterintelli-
gence function, particularly in the intelligence services of Western democracies.
Unless the discipline of good operational security is forcefully imposed on the aver-
age American case officer,22 the default will be sloppy or non-existent tradecraft.
22
The term “case officer” has been used to designate the operations officer who manages a
human source or, in a broader sense, the officer in charge of a technical collection project. Under
the influence of Washington-based personnel professionals, this title apparently has been replaced
by the bureaucratic term “core collector.”
Putative sources will be met in the dining room of a posh hotel literally next to the
U.S. embassy. Operational failures will be explained away by the case officer’s state-
ment that he was using “semi-clandestine” tradecraft, and officers operating in alias
abroad will call home on cell phones. In the early twenty-first century the use of
sloppy tradecraft presents the U.S. intelligence community with a daunting and
critical challenge. An entire generation of new American case officers is getting its
initial, formative, “on-the-street” experience in the war zone of Iraq, meeting sources
with armed and sometimes armored military or paramilitary escorts or within for-
tress compounds. This sort of “tradecraft” bears no resemblance to the clandestine
operational activities required to recruit and manage human sources elsewhere.
as the Recruitment
and Running of CI Sources
The very best way to engage in counterintelligence activities is to have a valid source,
or preferably sources, in the opposition service who can tell you what spies they
have, or are trying to develop, in your government or defense industries; what tech-
nical, cyber, or disinformation operations they are running or plan to mount; and
what they are doing to detect and negate your own intelligence-collection opera-
tions. The acquisition of such sources is a controversial subject. It is a fact that most
of the productive counterintelligence sources acquired by the West during the Cold
War were volunteers. Armchair media and academic experts advocate a passive
approach, denigrating the use of resources to pursue actively the recruitment of
foreign intelligence officers. This approach ignores a significant fact. Many of the
volunteers acted only after, and probably as a result of, exposure to, and cultivation
by, American intelligence officers. In addition, to get the most from a source requires
cultural understanding and great substantive expertise, which cannot be learned
from a file, book, movie, or television series, and can be gained only by close, long-
term engagement with the opposition.
Unfortunately, the best example of an extraordinarily productive counterintel-
ligence human source is FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen, who volunteered to and
worked for the KGB and GRU off and on for about twenty-one years. Over his spy
career Hanssen informed the Soviets/Russians of human-source operations the CIA
and KGB were running against the Soviet Union/Russia; some truly exquisite and
productive technical and SIGINT collection operations; details of the double-agent
program; and, of signal importance, full details of the FBI’s counterintelligence pro-
gram and operations against the Russians. This latter body of data gave the KGB/
SVR an enormous advantage in acquiring and managing sources in the United
States.
6. Counterintelligence:
Developing Issues and Challenges
Much of the material used above to describe the various aspects of counterintelli-
gence is of Cold War vintage. Even though that body of historical data continues to
shed light on the modalities of CI, several new factors and issues must be taken into
account, not least the role of counterterrorism.
6.1 Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism

The practical goals of counterintelligence and counterterrorism (CT) are identical:
the identification and neutralization of secret organizations engaged in secret opera-
tions to attack the United States and its allies. However, the difference in the nature
of the threats has caused U.S. bureaucracies to separate the functions, particularly at
the CIA and the FBI. Counterintelligence professionals thus face the challenge of
ensuring that all the rules and standards of their discipline, such as operational secu-
rity/tradecraft, asset validation, and counterespionage, are observed in the CT arena.
Since the Cold War never led to a military clash between the superpowers, the
CI emphasis was on uncovering and neutralizing espionage, that is, on the stealing
of secrets. The United States and some of its allies are now engaged in shooting wars
and it must defend against sabotage and terrorist attacks both by state and “non-
state” entities. Therefore CI must work to protect not just secrets, but installations,
operations, communications, and data storage as well as people. Today a hostile
intelligence entity might be just as likely to be planning to kill or kidnap a U.S. offi-
cial as to recruit him as a spy. Civilian CI officers should recognize the increasing
relevance of the U.S. Department of Defense’s concept of “force protection,” which
includes CI in a broad program of security disciplines to protect people, facilities,
equipment, and operations.
6.2 Counterintelligence: The Cyber Threat

and Denigration of Compartmentation
The so-called cyber threat has recently been described as the “new frontier” of coun-
terintelligence. The cyber era has greatly complicated the work of counterintelli-
gence officers. It is now much easier for an insider to steal vast amounts of national
security information simply by downloading data onto devices such as thumb
drives or to insert “malware” into networks to facilitate data exfiltration from remote
platforms when plain hacking has been unable to penetrate the network.
There exists at the human, professional, and management levels a mutual dis-
affinity between CI officers and the “computer people.” The former are mostly the
proverbial “social science majors” who are not computer experts and who, by expe-
rience, think in terms of human spies. The latter, by technical training and experience,
are motivated to create the smoothest flow of data to as many people as quickly as
possible. The technical approach is best illustrated by Deputy Defense Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz’s statement that “the U.S. intelligence system needs to be adapted to
the information age . . . we must emphasize speed of exchange and networking to
push information out to people who need it, when they need it, wherever they are”
(Inside the Pentagon 2002).
The complications for CI created by the onset of the computer age are being exac-
erbated by the post-9/11 conventional wisdom that failure “to connect the dots” led to
that disaster. The 9/11 Commission Report emphasized the need to change the “mind-
set” in the intelligence community from “need to know” to “need to share” (Director
of National Intelligence 2008, 6). The Director of National Intelligence, Vice Admiral
J.M. McConnell (Ret.), and his Associate Director and Chief Information Officer
Major General (Ret.) Dale Meyerosse, took the policy a step further by decreeing that
“need to share” would become “responsibility to provide” (Director of National
Intelligence 2008, 9). Regardless of the lip service paid to security and statements
about “managing risk,” this new policy will inevitably lead to a further breakdown in
compartmentation, as more and more networks are interconnected, easing the work
of spies and making the work of identifying and neutralizing them more difficult.
In addition to the understandable tendency of the computer people to speed the
widest possible dissemination of data and the post-9/11 mindset to do away with
“need to know,” the American tendency to think mostly in terms of technical solu-
tions comes into play in the issues facing counterintelligence. The National
Counterintelligence Executive has recently emphasized that “. . . computer architec-
ture and the soundness of electronic systems” are a key CI issue (Warrick and
Johnson, 2008, A1A). Professional CI officers thus face three major challenges. One is
to remind management that people are always involved, whether as an insider spy or
as an opposition intelligence officer attacking U.S.-national-security organizations
through electronic means. The second challenge is that CI professionals must learn
enough about data processing and networks to communicate and work effectively
with information management officers. Only with this basic knowledge can CI offi-
cers force a rational balance between information flow and dissemination and the
need to find technical ways sensibly to restrict data and to establish techniques and
procedures quickly to identify the inevitable hostile activity within and among net-
works. This issue presents intelligence officers with the third challenge: to inculcate
CI awareness into the professional culture of information-technology professionals,
who alone have the expertise to design the necessary policies and systems.
6.3 Counterintelligence: Law Enforcement

and National Security
Another dysfunction similar to that between CI officers and computer experts exists
between CI officers and law enforcement. Counterintelligence officials are intent on
protecting national security by identifying and neutralizing threats posed by hostile
intelligence entities. Law enforcement officers at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
are almost exclusively focused on making successful prosecutions, with the result that
once the arrest of a spy is imminent or has taken place, CI considerations are not allowed
to come into play. For instance, in one recent case, DOJ prosecutors included in the
charging documents all of the considerable body of data known to have been passed to
the opposition by the spy in order to intimidate him into accepting a plea agreement.
While that ploy succeeded, CI officers were greatly hampered doing a damage assess-
ment because the spy and his lawyer quickly figured out precisely what the government
knew and refused, despite the terms of a plea agreement, to expand on its knowledge.
In another instance, CI officers gained personal access to a foreign intelligence
officer who had been handling a minor spy in the United States. That officer, in
effect, volunteered to help the CI officers but the government chose to go ahead
with an arrest and well-publicized prosecution, which eliminated any chance the
officer would help U.S. authorities identify other spies the foreign intelligence ser-
vice was running against the United States. Another incident involved a technical
collection operation uncovered by outstanding CI work. Law enforcement officers
at the management level would not even consider using the still-secret discovery for
a possible disinformation operation. Rather, they insisted on a public announce-
ment of the find and a noisy expulsion of a foreign intelligence office. American CI
professionals face the challenge of stimulating discussion at the National Security
Council level to determine whether national security issues can be given equal
importance to prosecutorial considerations in such cases.
REFERENCES
Bromwich, M. R. 1997. Office of the Inspector General Department of Justice Report, A Review
of the FBI’s Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activities of Aldrich Hazen Ames.
Unclassified Executive Summary (April 21).
Director of National Intelligence. 2008. United States Intelligence Community Information
Sharing Strategy (February 22).
Inside the Pentagon. 2002. Deputy Defense Secretary Backs New Approach to Processing
Intelligence (September 26).
Masterman, J. C. 1972. The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972.
Mitrokhin, V. I., ed. 2002. KGB Lexicon, The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s Handbook London:
Frank Cass.
Risen, J. 2003. “Jailing in Russia Is a Reminder that Spy Wars Still Smolder,” New York Times
(June 16): A1.
Van Cleave, M. 2008. “Meeting Twenty-First Century Security Challenges 2008 The NCIX
and the National Counterintelligence Mission: What Has Worked, What Has Not and
Why.” Washington Post (April 3): A1.
Warrick, J., and C. Johnson, 2008. “Chinese Spy ‘Slept’ in U.S. for Decades.” Washington
Post (April 3): A1.
chapter 34
CATCHING AN ATOM
SPY: MI5 AND THE
INVESTIGATION
OF KLAUS FUCHS
timothy gibbs
1. Introduction
From 2001 onward the British government has declassified substantial volumes of
archival material held by the Security Service, the organization commonly known
as MI5. This has brought into the public domain a range of fascinating documents
and files relating to the work that organization, dating from its creation in 1909 to
the early Cold War. Counterintelligence has always formed a significant part of the
Service’s remit, and consequently academics and journalists with an interest in this
subject now have unprecedented access to a rich source of primary material on the
British experience of that side of the intelligence equation (Gibbs 2007).
One of the first of MI5’s Cold War files to be declassified related to the investiga-
tion of Klaus Fuchs, the German-born physicist and Soviet “Atom Spy” who was
arrested in 1950 and served fourteen years for offences related to atomic espionage.
Fuchs, a refugee who fled to Britain from Nazi Germany in 1934, played a significant
role in the development of the atomic bomb through his work on the Manhattan
project, while simultaneously passing top-secret information on the joint British
and American program to representatives of Soviet intelligence. Following the con-
clusion of the war, Fuchs took a post on the British atomic weapons program, based
at Harwell near Oxford, but continued to provide intelligence to the USSR. In total
his espionage career spanned eight years and the information he provided played an
important role in the development and testing in 1949 of the USSR’s first successful
atomic device (Holloway 1994 and Rhodes 1995). This chapter examines how Fuchs
was identified as an “Atom Spy” in 1949 and describes the MI5’s investigation, which
concluded in early 1950 with the successful arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment
of this highly significant Cold War figure. Key issues discussed include the difficul-
ties encountered by MI5 and the incipient British atomic program in the sphere of
security, the vital role of Signals intelligence (SIGINT) in the investigation of Fuchs,
and the high-risk but ultimately successful approach taken by MI5’s key interroga-
tor, William Skardon. This case study will also highlight both the unparalleled level
of international intelligence cooperation between the British agencies and their
American counterparts, which made the resolution of this case possible, and some
of the frailties in the Anglo-American alliance that were brought to the fore by the
exposure of Fuchs as an Atom Spy.
2. VENONA and the Spy Called REST

In August 1949 MI5 received intelligence from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), one of their closest foreign liaison partners, which suggested that a British
participant in the Manhattan Project, the wartime effort to construct an atomic
bomb, had been providing secret information on the program to a Soviet espio-
nage handler in New York in 1944 (Fuchs File, KV2/145). Coming in the same
month that the Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic month, this intelligence
was understandably of great concern for the British government and for the Service
itself. A counterintelligence investigation was immediately opened in London to
identify the spy and to ensure that he could pose no further threat to Western
security.
The reliability of the lead intelligence was indisputable. It came from an
American SIGINT program which had been launched in 1943 to examine Soviet
cables sent between Moscow and the various Soviet diplomatic offices in the United
States during the Second World War. This program, later known by the codename
VENONA, had originally been led by the American army’s SIGINT agency and
later fell under the control of the National Security Agency (NSA). VENONA was
one of the most closely guarded secrets in the U.S. intelligence community, and
incredibly both the president of the United States and the Central Intelligence
Agency were not made aware of its existence until the early 1950s (Andrew 2001,
188–89; for more general details of VENONA, see Warner and Benson 1996; Haynes
and Klehr 1999). This was despite the fact that VENONA had revealed significant
espionage penetration of several American government departments during the
war, including the White House, the Treasury, the State Department, and the pre-
cursor to the CIA, the Office of Strategic Services, and had played an important, if
catching an atom spy 557
hidden, role in several postwar spy scandals (for more details see Lamphere and
Schachtman 1986; Robert Lamphere was the lead FBI investigator on VENONA
casework).
Although access to the program and its product was tightly controlled on the
American side of the Atlantic, VENONA material was shared with all three British
intelligence agencies. GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters),
Britain’s postwar SIGINT agency, actively participated in the program, sending ana-
lysts to work on the material with their American counterparts. This exceptional
and uniquely close collaboration was a direct consequence of the Britain’s strong
performance in the sphere of SIGINT during the Second World War and of the
exceptionally close wartime cooperation between the organization’s predecessor,
the Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park, and their American
counterparts (Rudner 2004). Meanwhile, both Britain’s overseas intelligence ser-
vice, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Security Service itself had officers
who were indoctrinated into the VENONA secret, to allow the British agencies to
examine leads stemming from the program. Although the sharing of this extremely
secret intelligence greatly assisted the Service’s efforts in the Fuchs case and other
subsequent counterintelligence investigations, it also ensured that the Soviets were
kept abreast of the threat to their various wartime agents, as one of the SIS officers
with access to the VENONA material from 1949 onwards was SIS Head of Washington
Station, the Soviet double agent Kim Philby (Andrew 2001).
The VENONA-derived intelligence provided to MI5 by the FBI in the late sum-
mer of 1949 strongly suggested that a member of the British atomic mission in New
York in 1944 had been involved in espionage, although the identity of the spy was
obscured by the use of the codename REST. The FBI had conducted initial enquiries
into the spy, and felt that they had identified a strong candidate in Klaus Fuchs, but
the British preferred to do their own investigation in order to confirm the American
assessment (Lamphere and Schachtman 1986, 134). As the case progressed, further
biographical information was forthcoming from VENONA, indicating that the spy
had a sister living in the United States whom he had visited during the war on sev-
eral occasions. It was briefly assessed that Fuchs’s close colleague Rudolf Peierls
might also fit the profile of the spy provided by VENONA, but by the end of
September he had been ruled out, leaving Fuchs as the only viable candidate.
Two factors can be viewed as instrumental in the identification of Fuchs; the
accurate and reliable Signals intelligence produced by VENONA, and the uniquely
close intelligence-sharing relationship between Britain and the United States. The
subsequent successful operation against Fuchs was made possible by the initial
intelligence breakthrough offered by VENONA. Such was the level of Fuchs’s com-
mitment and the reliability of the tradecraft employed by him and his various Soviet
handlers that it is highly unlikely that his espionage activities would ever have been
uncovered, were it not for the intelligence from VENONA messages. Fuchs claimed
after his arrest that he had decided against continuing his espionage activities,
but the veracity of his comments cannot be confirmed. At the very least, it can be
stated that were it not for the role of the codebreakers on the program and the
preparedness of the American authorities to share this intelligence with the British,
this well-placed and resourceful agent would probably have remained at the center
of the British atomic program into the 1950s and beyond.
3. Fuchs Identified—
Embarrassment for MI5
The identification of Fuchs as REST permitted MI5’s investigation to become more
focused. However, it was hardly welcome news for the Security Service. A review of
the scientist’s security file quickly revealed that he had been investigated on several
previous occasions and on each occasion doubts had been raised as to his suitability
for secret work (Fuchs File, KV2/1245). Despite the adverse information held in the
Service’s records that suggested that he might pose a security risk, it had repeatedly
been assessed that the danger to national security from his employment was out-
weighed by his potential value to the British atomic research program.
Following his arrival in the United Kingdom in 1934, Fuchs had succeeded in
pursuing postgraduate studies in physics and received a Ph.D. from Bristol University.
Although he was initially interned in Canada by the British authorities in 1940 as an
“enemy alien,” it was quickly established that he was not a Nazi sympathizer and he
returned to the United Kingdom in January 1941. Just five months later, he was
employed by Rudolf Peierls to work on British atomic research at the University of
Birmingham (Peierls 1985, 160–64). Although the research being conducted at this
stage was largely theoretical, the British government had accepted that an atomic
bomb was an achievable goal and that it might be a weapon of considerable signifi-
cance in the present conflict and consequently the work was highly classified.
Accordingly, Fuchs was to be vetted for his suitability for the role by the Security
Service. Unfortunately due to factors that remain unclear, the clearance of Fuchs
was delayed until several months after he had begun his work, and in this interim
period he had already made a very strong impression on his supervisors.
Even once his vetting had begun, the scrutiny Fuchs received was limited. The
initial MI5 investigation involved a check of the Service’s databases. This yielded
one adverse trace, a report from the Gestapo for the Bristol police from 1934 which
named Fuchs as an active Communist and anti-Nazi agitator. In response MI5
enquired about Fuchs with his local police force in Birmingham, and also circulated
his name among their agent stable in the German émigré community. Although the
police had nothing to report on Fuchs, a Service source, KASPAR, stated that Fuchs
was “very well-known in Communist circles.” He was tasked to find out more about
Fuchs, but in the interim MI5 officers allowed themselves to be persuaded by offi-
cials in the Ministry of Aircraft Production, which was responsible for the atomic
program, that the scientist should continue in his post at Birmingham. This decision
had far-reaching consequences. At precisely the time that MI5 was considering his
case, Fuchs contacted the Soviet embassy in London and volunteered his services to
their military attaché Simon Kremer.
The granting of this initial clearance was highly significant as it offered Fuchs
the opportunity to become entrenched in the program. The scientist’s abilities and
resourcefulness quickly allowed him to become even more firmly established, mean-
ing that he was not removed from his post despite the provision of further adverse
reporting the following year. During a subsequent investigation ahead of his natu-
ralization proceedings, intelligence from KASPAR suggested that Fuchs had been
involved in a certain amount of “propaganda activities,” and was backed up by a
report from an individual who had attended the same internment camp as Fuchs
and had identified him as a close associate of Hans Kahle, a prominent German
Communist and fellow-internee. These pieces of intelligence did lead to new inves-
tigation of Fuchs, which was more intrusive than the initial check into his back-
ground and included the interception of his mail under a Home Office Warrant.
However, this coverage was only maintained for two weeks, an effort which can best
be described as token. After this period it was assessed that the negative reports
relating to Fuchs were counterbalanced by the lack of incriminating mail at his
address and by a second police report from Birmingham that indicated that while
in that city, the scientist had “little or no time for political matters,” and that as a
consequence he could be permitted to remain in his current position and be granted
British nationality.
With this endorsement, Fuchs was allowed to continue his work on the British
program and established such a strong reputation that he was one of the first scien-
tists to be sent across the Atlantic to assist the Americans on the Manhattan Project
in 1943. At this point MI5 were again asked to make an assessment of the risk involved
in employing Fuchs, and reached the extraordinary conclusion that he was “rather
safer in America than in this country as . . . it would not be so easy for Fuchs to make
contact with Communists in America and that in any case he would probably be
more roughly handled were he found out.” This assessment betrayed both the lim-
ited understanding of realities of atomic research on the part of MI5, and a com-
plete underestimation of the sophistication of the international Soviet espionage
network. The move to the United States, which eventually took Fuchs to Los Alamos,
transformed his access to sensitive information on atomic-weapons research, greatly
increasing his potential to assist the Soviets. Even before he had crossed the Atlantic,
the KGB had already lined up a new handler for him in the United States.
Following the conclusion of the war, MI5’s efforts to assess the risk posed by
Fuchs once again left the organization open to criticism. One MI5 officer, Michael
Serpell, raised doubts about Fuchs in 1946, shortly after the exposure of another
British “Atom Spy,” Alan Nunn May. Again, Fuchs’s level of experience and ability to
contribute to the British program counted in his favor, and substantial pressure was
placed on MI5 to grant Fuchs clearance (Fuchs File, KV2/1245). Although MI5 did
conduct an investigation, again involving the interception of his mail, the scope and
level of intrusion was limited and the results were inconclusive. The officer who
made the final call was Roger Hollis, the future Director General of the Security
Service who was later to be accused by several of his former colleagues of being a
Soviet mole. In retrospect the file, however, suggests that the principal factor in
Fuchs’s clearance was not the connivance of Hollis or any other Soviet mole, but the
general inability of the Security Service and administrators of the British atomic
program to strike the right balance between expediency and security.
The problem of striking this balance is one that continues to exercise the intel-
lectual powers of vetting professionals across the globe. That the Service struggled
with this issue during the war and in the years immediately afterwards was under-
standable; in the period in question, the notion of “protective security” barely
existed, and the vetting policy of the British government was limited and inconsis-
tent. During the war, the demand for individuals with particularly valuable skills
such as Fuchs far exceeded the supply, and it can be confidently asserted that with-
out the preparedness of both the British and American governments to take calcu-
lated risks on certain individuals, the atomic bomb would not have been completed
in 1945. After the war, unlike in the United States, where a blanket ban of individuals
linked to the Communist Party was established under the Federal Loyalty Program,
there was an admirable reluctance in Britain to institute a formal policy on similar
lines across the whole of the government sector. Although the British government
accepted in the wake of the exposure of the espionage of Alan Nunn May that CPGB
members should not have access to sensitive information, the number of posts cat-
egorized as involving such information was small (Hennessy and Brownfeld 1982).
In the atomic sphere, the situation was made still more difficult by the perceived
necessity of individuals like Fuchs with experience of Los Alamos who could help
build a British atomic bomb, as the wartime atomic partnership had been destroyed
by American congressional legislation. In this context MI5’s preparedness to acqui-
esce to the demands of the overseeing government department, the Ministry of
Supply, and grant Fuchs clearance was understandable, even if subsequent events
demonstrated conclusively that it was misguided.
4. Exploiting the Lead

The identification of REST as Fuchs was only the first step. Despite the fact that the
intelligence from VENONA was of unquestionable accuracy, it could not be used in
any form of legal proceedings (VENONA documents, FBI FOIA Electronic Reading
Room). The British would have to look elsewhere for admissible evidence of Fuchs’s
involvement in espionage. The MI5 officers handling the case were informed explic-
itly by Sir John Cockroft, Fuchs’s boss, that it would not be sufficient merely to
remove the scientist from his post (Fuchs File, KV2/1246). His central role in the
British postwar program, as well as his extensive knowledge of the Manhattan
Project, meant that Fuchs would be a significant asset to the Soviet Union if he were
to be successfully exfiltrated across the iron curtain, a fact that had not escaped the
attention of the Soviets themselves (Weinstein and Vasiliev 1999, 315). Consequently,
in order to completely neutralize the risk of defection, Fuchs would have to be suc-
cessfully prosecuted and imprisoned for his espionage activities.
It was quickly recognized that to secure this outcome the scientist would either
have to be caught in the act of passing sensitive material to an espionage contact or
be coaxed into making a confession that could be submitted as evidence in court.
Should neither of these options prove achievable, Fuchs would still have to be
moved away from Harwell and his access to secret material would need to be cur-
tailed, but it would have to be accomplished in such a way that he did not decide to
defect across the iron curtain. Catching the spy in the act required both for him
to attempt to meet an espionage courier and for MI5 to have adequate coverage to
ensure that such an assignation did not slip under their radar. Given that the
VENONA messages relating to Fuchs’s espionage activities dated from 1944–45,
there was no guarantee that he remained involved with the Soviets; John Robertson,
one of MI5’s investigators, wryly observed that this approach was like “looking in a
haystack for a needle which has ceased to exist” while even if Fuchs were to contact
a handler “it may be at a single secret meeting of less than a minute’s duration, any-
where and at any time in a period of months” (Fuchs File, KV2/1246). Moreover,
MI5 recognized that if Fuchs had been a spy since the war he would be by this stage
be highly experienced and “well versed in the security measures used by Soviet intel-
ligence,” which would render interception of his mail or telephone unlikely to pro-
vide any significant intelligence.
Surveillance of Fuchs was made more difficult, somewhat ironically, by vari-
ous measures put in place to protect the security of Harwell itself. Despite these
limitations, full-time coverage of Fuchs was maintained in order to provide reas-
surance that he was not likely to slip away from the country unnoticed. At the
same time his telephone lines and mail were intercepted under a Home Office
Warrant. The inability of the Service to do anything more than monitor Fuchs, in
the forlorn hope of picking up some out-of-the-ordinary movement or activity to
indicate that a meeting or drop might be imminent, appears to be a common
theme among counterespionage investigations of the period. After all MI5 had to
be wary of provoking Fuchs by any form of direct approach as this might lead him
to defect, and as was commented in the Fuchs file, the British authorities would
have no legal means of preventing him from undertaking such a step (Fuchs File,
KV2/1247).
The covert phase of the Fuchs investigation highlights effectively the limitations
within which MI5 and other counterintelligence organizations must operate against
espionage suspects. Even with constant vigilance and the monitoring of communica-
tions over long periods, there is no guarantee that the suspect will undertake any
action of significance. In the case of Fuchs, the historical nature of the intelligence
relating to his espionage activities made MI5 question whether even the level of cov-
erage they were employing would yield results and it is likely that modern-day orga-
nizations have similar experiences. MI5 could not, however, continue to monitor
him indefinitely; they were under pressure from both the British and American
atomic authorities to ensure that his access to secret material was curtailed as soon as
possible.
5. A Gamble—The Interrogation
After two months of checking his mail and telephone and monitoring his move-
ments, MI5 decided that Fuchs should be interviewed (Fuchs File, KV2/1246).
Although this was a high-risk approach that offered no guarantee of success, Fuchs’s
position at Harwell and the pressure from the United States meant that a proactive
strategy was necessary. Fortunately for MI5, Fuchs himself volunteered the perfect
pretext for an initial interview. In November the physicist informed Henry Arnold,
the Security Officer at Harwell, that his father, a Quaker theologian, was considering
moving to Leipzig in Soviet-controlled East Germany, as he had been offered a chair
at a university in that city. Arnold, who had been made aware that Fuchs was under
investigation in September, informed him that it was possible that his father’s move
might affect his security status and that he would have to refer the matter to the
Security Service.
This presented MI5 with the perfect opportunity to question Fuchs without
giving him the impression that he was under investigation for espionage. The sig-
nificance of the case was underlined by the fact that MI5’s director general, Sir Percy
Sillitoe, personally briefed the prime minister, Clement Attlee, ahead of the inter-
rogation to obtain his blessing. Once Attlee’s assent had been obtained, along with
clearance from the FBI and GCHQ, William Skardon, one of MI5’s most accom-
plished interrogators, was dispatched to Harwell to interview Fuchs. Skardon, a for-
mer Special Branch detective, had joined the Service during the war and had
established a strong reputation as a psychologically astute interrogator. His brief in
this case was ostensibly straightforward: to convince Fuchs that it was in his inter-
ests to confess to his espionage activities. However, as Kim Philby, the hugely suc-
cessful Soviet double agent was later to observe, under the British legal system, MI5
was in an extremely weak position against Fuchs and if he refrained from admitting
any wrongdoing at all he stood “a very good chance of getting off altogether” (Philby
1999, 257).
The faith MI5’s leadership had in Skardon’s ability was such that he was given
complete control over the conduct of the interrogation, despite the extraordinarily
high stakes. The former policeman’s strategy was meticulously prepared and
extremely effective. His goal at the first interview was to develop an understanding
of Fuchs’s psychology and gain his trust, in keeping with his general interrogation
strategy (Moss 1987, 133). He also intended, if a suitable opportunity arose, to sug-
gest to Fuchs that the Security Service were aware that he had passed information to
a Soviet handler, but that this was a less important matter than his father’s proposed
relocation to East Germany. This was designed to encourage Fuchs that if he wanted
to remain at Harwell, it was in his interests to make a full disclosure of his espionage
activities.
On December 21 Skardon arrived unannounced at Harwell and interviewed
Fuchs alone. In keeping with the pretext of Fuchs’s father’s new job, he focused ini-
tially on that issue but also encouraged the scientist to talk more widely about him-
self and his past, and deliberately refrained from interrupting him. Fuchs freely
admitted that he had been a member of a student group with links to the Communist
Party while he was in Germany and that he had been friends with the prominent
German communist Hans Kahle during his brief time in internment camp. However
he denied any involvement with the Communist Party in Britain.
When Fuchs began to talk about his move in the United States in 1943, Skardon
felt confident enough to introduce the issue of the espionage directly, asking almost
casually, “Were you not in touch with a Soviet official or Soviet representative while
you were in New York? And did you not pass on information to that person about
your work?” Fuchs denied the accusation somewhat ambiguously, stating, “I don’t
think so,” but did not deny it outright. Skardon brushed aside Fuchs’s protesta-
tions, making it quite clear to the scientist that he did not believe him. However, he
deliberately did not dwell on the matter and succeeded in moving the conversation
on to a new subject. By taking this action, Skardon managed to suggest to Fuchs
that MI5 was aware that he had participated in espionage during the war but also
that these historic espionage activities were less significant than the current matter
of his father. Skardon had also correctly assessed that Fuchs was keen to remain at
Harwell, and he successfully implied to the scientist that that this might be a viable
option if he made a full admission of his espionage activities. In retrospect the
notion that Fuchs could believe that an admission of guilt would allow him to
remain in place might appear far-fetched, but Skardon correctly judged that the
scientist’s overinflated view of his own importance to Harwell would lead him to
reach that conclusion.
Although the interrogator was to return to London empty handed, he was able
to report confidently that he was sure that the identification of Fuchs as the spy was
correct and was able to offer reassurance to his colleagues at the Service that Fuchs
was not likely to attempt either to flee to the Soviet Union or to kill himself. He had
also succeeded in establishing a strong relationship with Fuchs through the face-to-
face contact offered by the direct interview. Skardon then left Fuchs alone for two
weeks, a shrewd move designed to allow the scientist to consider his options. He
returned briefly to Harwell in late December and informed Fuchs that due to his
father’s planned move he would have to leave Harwell and take an academic post,
but again made no reference to the New York affair.
The job proposal offered a fallback position for MI5 should Skardon fail to elicit
a confession. Arranging for Fuchs to take a comfortable university job, away from
secret information, might at least reduce the risk of his defection. Skardon then
waited for Fuchs to make the next move, a bold strategy given the pressure on both
him and MI5 to conclude the case. His patience was rewarded on January 23 when
Fuchs requested another interview. It was evident that the scientist’s resistance was
broken and he calmly recounted his espionage career to Skardon, admitting to pass-
ing the Soviets substantial secret material over an eight-year period, including “the
full design of the atom bomb.”
Skardon’s achievement in eliciting a full confession from Fuchs is difficult to
overstate. When compared with the subsequent failure of FBI interrogators to
obtain similar admissions of guilt from the American “Atom Spies” Julius Rosenberg
or Theodore Alvin Hall, the advantages of his measured and patient approach
become even more evident. At the same time MI5 should be commended for their
preparedness to countenance such an upfront and direct approach to Fuchs. Though
the personal strain on Fuchs from his long double life undoubtedly made him more
vulnerable, the ability of Skardon to formulate firm and accurate assessments of his
state of mind and effectively to persuade his superiors to trust his judgment in this
most delicate of cases is particularly laudable, but is also testament to the faith held
in him by his management.
6. The Aftermath—Relief
and Recriminations
The scale of the espionage admitted by Fuchs shocked both his colleagues at Harwell
and the investigators handling his case. A trial was arranged rapidly and since Fuchs
was prepared to plead guilty to breaching the Official Secrets Act, it was concluded
within hours. The judge sentenced Fuchs to the maximum penalty of fourteen
years. Although there was considerable relief on the part of MI5 and the British
atomic authorities that he had been successfully disrupted, there remained consid-
erable concern about the likely consequences of the case, in particular in relation to
Britain’s hopes of reestablishing an atomic partnership with the United States
(Acheson 1969, 315).
The exposure of Fuchs’s espionage, and in particular the fact that he had worked
on the Manhattan Project and had therefore had access to “American secrets,” led to
widespread criticism of British security standards and made London’s goal of
atomic collaboration even harder to achieve. Britain’s case was not helped by the
actions of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who had been incensed by the failure of
MI5 to arrange for Fuchs to be interviewed by his officers immediately after the
scientist’s arrest. Hoover became convinced, incorrectly, that MI5 were actively
opposed to an FBI interview and responded by ordering that his own organization
break off cooperation with all British agencies. His attempts to prevent them from
accessing American signals intelligence was blocked by U.S. SIGINT chief, Carter
Clarke, who pointed out that such a move would be contrary to the postwar agree-
ments signed between the two governments, but he had more success in the atomic
sphere (Klaus Fuchs Documents; Gibbs 2008, 194). In a classic example of his mas-
tery of Washington bureaucracy, Hoover used both closed hearings of congressio-
nal committees and off the record briefings of key Administration and congressional
figures to criticize the British for both their security failings and for their handling
of the Fuchs case (Klaus Fuchs Documents; Gibbs 2008, 309). In response, the direc-
tor general of the Security Service, Sir Percy Sillitoe and his Washington representa-
tive Geoffrey Patterson were forced to make several humiliating and sycophantic
direct approaches to the director himself. Although cordial relations were eventu-
ally restored, following the FBI’s successful identification and arrest of Fuchs’s cou-
rier in the United States, Harry Gold, Hoover’s ability to bend the British to his will
was amply demonstrated, as was the relegation of Britain to the role of junior part-
ner in the “special intelligence relationship.”
British hopes of a reestablishment of the wartime atomic partnership were to
remain unfulfilled until 1954, largely due to implacable opposition from Congress,
while the outcry in relation to the Fuchs case also had far-reaching implications for
British security procedures. In order to demonstrate that standards had improved,
the British government conducted a series of reviews into vetting procedures, which
eventually led to the establishment of new, more intrusive enquiries into individu-
als’ personal and political history in order to confirm their suitability for access to
sensitive information (Hennessy and Brownfeld 1982; Gibbs 2008, 291).
7. Conclusion
MI5’s file on the Fuchs case presents a fascinating portrait of a counterintelligence
agency struggling to deal with an unprecedented and poorly understood espionage
threat. In retrospect, the flaws in the vetting system that allowed Fuchs access to
sensitive atomic intelligence over an eight-year period look particularly glaring, but
it is worth bearing in mind the context in which the clearance decisions were made
before condemning MI5 completely.
The Service’s handling of the counterespionage investigation of Fuchs was con-
siderably more effective and compares positively with that of their American coun-
terparts (Gibbs 2008). Although the VENONA program’s codebreakers deserve the
credit for the identification of Fuchs, the subsequent investigation, culminating in
Skardon’s interrogation, was well planned and perfectly implemented. Skardon’s
success in obtaining a confession from Fuchs can be contrasted with the problems
encountered by FBI interrogators with other US-based atom spies such as Theodore
Hall and Julius Rosenberg. The international dimension of the Fuchs case requires
further attention and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to do more than scratch
the surface of this subject. Nonetheless, as a final point, it is worth highlighting once
again that while the exceptionally close collaboration between the British and
American intelligence communities made the successful conclusion of this case
possible, the exposure of Fuchs’s espionage both imperiled the future of this unique
relationship and dealt a significant blow to Britain’s hopes of a rapid reestablish-
ment of a similar partnership in the atomic weapons sphere.
REFERENCES
Acheson, D. 1969. Present at the Creation. New York: W.W. Norton.

Andrew, C. M. 2001. ULTRA in Postwar Perspective. In Action This Day, ed. R. Erskine and
M. Smith. London: Bantam.
Benson, R. L., and M. Warner, eds. 1996. VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American
Response, 1939–1957. Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency and National
Security Agency.
Gibbs, T. S. 2007. Studying Intelligence: A British Perspective. In Strategic Intelligence, vol. 1,
ed. L. K. Johnson. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
———. 2008. British and American Counterintelligence and the Atom Spies, 1941–1950. PhD
dissertation, Cambridge University.
Haynes, J. E., and H. Klehr. 1999. VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Hennessy, P., and G. Brownfeld. 1982. Britain’s Cold War Security Purge: The Origins of
Positive Vetting. The Historical Journal 25, no. 4:965–74.
Holloway, D. 1994. Stalin and the Bomb. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Klaus Fuchs Documents. FBI Freedom of Information Reading Room, J. Edgar Hoover
Building, Washington D.C.
Klaus Fuchs Security Service File, KV2/1245-KV2/1269. The National Archives, London.
Lamphere, R. L, and T. Schachtman. 1986. The FBI and KGB War. New York: Random
House.
Moss, N. 1987. Klaus Fuchs, the Man Who Stole the Atom Bomb. London: Grafton.
Peierls, R. 1985. Bird of Passage—Recollections of a Physicist. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
Philby, R., H. Peake, and M. Lyubimov. 1999. The Private Life of Kim Philby. New York:
Little, Brown.
Rhodes, R. 1995. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Rudner, M. 2004. Britain Betwixt and Between: UK Sigint Alliance Strategy’s Transatlantic
and European Connections. Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 1:571–609.
VENONA Documents. FBI Freedom of Information Electronic Reading Room. http:/
/foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/venona.htm.
Weinstein, A., and A. Vasiliev. 1999. The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The
Stalin Era. New York: Random House.
part viii
COVERT ACTION
chapter 35
COVERT ACTION,
PENTAGON STYLE
jennifer d. kibbe
1. Introduction
Until September 11, 2001, covert action had long been the province of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
however, not only gave Washington a new enemy, but changed its conception of
how best to fight that enemy, leading to a newfound emphasis on Special Operations
Forces (SOF). Resources dedicated to SOF have increased significantly since 9/11,
and even though they still account for only a small portion of the total military
budget, SOF have become an increasingly important weapon in the U.S. national
security arsenal. This, in turn, has raised significant questions about whether some
of what SOF are doing is covert action and if so, whether there is appropriate con-
gressional oversight of those operations.
The research field of military covert action is, in some ways, an extremely small
one, in the sense that very few scholars have focused specifically on this issue. This
is, perhaps, not surprising given the difficulty in researching a topic that is, in gen-
eral, highly classified. There are, however, three different literatures that discuss at
least some aspect of the issue. The overall topic of covert action is covered in the
intelligence literature, although it focuses almost exclusively on the CIA’s role in
conducting it. The military literature discusses the nature and expansion of SOF
although, as will be explained later, the Pentagon essentially defines the issue of
military covert action away, claiming that only the CIA conducts covert action. As a
result, the SOF literature must be read with a careful eye to precise definitions and
interpretations. The third relevant body of literature is the scholarship that has
focused on both the U.S. and the international legal ramifications of conducting
570 covert action
covert action. This chapter is an attempt to draw these disparate strands together
while mapping the way forward for future research. After explaining those parts of
U.S. law that pertain to military covert action, the chapter lays out exactly what SOF
are and the various sources of confusion in analyzing them. Next, this chapter details
the myriad ways in which SOF’s size and authority have expanded since 9/11 and
considers the different types of risks that are posed by that expansion. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the future directions that research in the field
should take.
2. Covert Action Under U.S. Law

Covert action is defined in U.S. law as activity that is meant “to influence political,
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly”
(Intelligence Authorization Act 1991; hereafter IAA). It is, therefore, an active instru-
ment of foreign policy, as opposed to intelligence per se, which entails collecting
and analyzing information for policymakers to use in conducting foreign policy.
Although it is often used interchangeably with the term “clandestine,” the two are
legally distinct: “clandestine” refers to the tactical secrecy of the operation itself,
while “covert” refers to the secrecy of its sponsor (Kibbe 2004, 104). Thus, a clandes-
tine mission that is part of a declared war might be conducted in secret in order to
increase its chances of success, but once it has taken place, the country sponsoring
the mission would acknowledge having done so. On the other hand, a state might
undertake an activity such as issuing propaganda, where the activity itself is quite
public but the country’s sponsorship of it remains hidden, thus rendering it a covert
action.
Although covert action is most often associated with such high-profile and
controversial actions as the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation or the U.S. overthrows
of the regimes in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), it comprises a wide range of
activity, from propaganda and disinformation to political influence operations,
economic destabilization, and paramilitary operations (L.K. Johnson 1989; Treverton
1987, 13–28).
According to the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, an outgrowth of the Iran-
Contra scandal which is still the governing legislation on covert action, any depart-
ment or agency of the United States Government that intends to undertake a covert
mission must ensure that two requirements are met: 1) that the action be conducted
pursuant to a written presidential finding that it is important for U.S. national secu-
rity; and 2) that the congressional intelligence committees are notified of the action
as soon as possible after the finding has been issued and before the operation begins,
unless “extraordinary circumstances” exist, in which case the President must fully
inform the committees “in a timely fashion” (IAA 1991; Kibbe 2007, 62).
pentagon style 571
The 1991 law also specified, however, a few exceptions to the basic definition of
covert action. The law exempts both intelligence and traditional counterintelli-
gence activities, but the most relevant exception for the current discussion is that
concerning “traditional military activities or routine support to such activities”
(IAA 1991). The interpretation of this phrase, which is not defined in the law itself,
plays a central role in the debate over which actions taken by the military consti-
tute covert action and thus require a presidential finding and congressional notifi-
cation. Some discussion of the legislative intent underlying the term is presented
in Kibbe (2004) and Meyer (2007),1 but for the fullest understanding, one should
also consult the Conference Committee’s report (U.S. House of Representatives
1991; hereafter H.R.) and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report (U.S. Senate
1991).
In explaining their intent, the conferees distinguished between two time frames
and set different standards for what constitutes traditional military activities in each
period. During the period during or right before acknowledged hostilities (as in
Iraq or Afghanistan, for example), anything the military does, as long as it is under
the control of a military commander, is to be considered traditional military activ-
ity, even if U.S. sponsorship of it is not acknowledged (H.R.1991).
As for unacknowledged activities undertaken “well in advance of a possible or
eventual U.S. military operation,” the determination of whether or not they are
traditional military activities depends “in most cases” upon whether they constitute
“routine support” to such an operation (H.R. 1991). The conferees (referencing the
Senate Intelligence Committee’s report) considered “routine support” to be unilat-
eral U.S. activities to provide or arrange for logistical or other support for U.S. mili-
tary forces in the event of a military operation that is intended to be publicly
acknowledged (even if that operation ends up not taking place). Examples cited by
the Senate committee included caching communications equipment or weapons in
an area where such a future military operation is to take place; acquiring property
to support an aspect of such an operation; and obtaining currency or documenta-
tion for use in such an operation (U.S. Senate 1991). “Other-than-routine” activities
that would constitute covert action if conducted on an unacknowledged basis
include: recruiting or training foreign nationals to support a future U.S. military
operation; efforts to influence foreign nationals to take certain actions during a
future U.S. military operation; and efforts to influence and affect public opinion in
the country concerned (U.S. Senate 1991).
This two-stage framework for defining the “traditional military activities”
exception to covert action regulations raises several questions. First, it leaves unre-
solved the distinction between routine and non-routine support during the period
“well in advance” of any acknowledged U.S. military presence. What if SOF con-
ducts an unacknowledged operation that is unilateral but is not one of the three
1
Note that while much of the substance of Meyer’s discussion of the legislation’s intent is
accurate, the committee reports cited are actually those from 1990, the year before the law was
actually passed.
572 covert action
specific actions listed as examples of routine support? One can imagine a possible
debate about whether the operation could be accurately interpreted as providing
routine support.
A larger issue is the meaning of the word “anticipated” in terms of delineating
the first time frame with the much lower bar for what constitutes traditional mili-
tary activities. The conferees defined “anticipated” hostilities as those for which
operational planning has already been approved. However, as Kibbe notes, at least
some in the Pentagon have interpreted that as granting them the power to under-
take activities “years in advance” of any overt U.S. military involvement (2004). This
interpretation would seem to conflict with Congress’s two-stage framework; “years
in advance” clearly fits more accurately within its second time period, where the
traditional military activities determination rests on whether or not it can be con-
sidered routine support.
Beyond the interpretation of the word “anticipated,” the Bush administration
advanced several other arguments to bolster its position that the increased activity
by special operations forces since 9/11 falls under the rubric of traditional military
activities. One popular formulation is that the current “war on terrorism” is just
that—a war—and therefore any military action taken to prosecute it, unacknowl-
edged or not, is not a covert action. To support this argument, many in the admin-
istration pointed to Senate Joint Resolution 23, which authorized the use of force in
response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. That resolution authorizes the presi-
dent: “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organiza-
tions or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons” (U.S. Senate
2001). There is debate about just how broadly the resolution should be interpreted,
but at least some legal experts contend that it grants the president virtually unlim-
ited legal authority as long as he “determines” that a particular target has some con-
nection to Al Qaeda (Kibbe 2004, 108).
Others in the Bush administration interpreted the situation even more broadly,
contending that, as a result of the 9/11 attacks, any act undertaken as part of the “war
on terror” is part of the self-defense of the United States and, thus, a traditional
military activity that does not require a presidential finding or congressional notifi-
cation. Some administration critics, however, took issue with the Bush administra-
tion’s expansive interpretation of traditional military activities (Kibbe 2004, 108).
Whatever the reasoning used, the bottom line is that during the Bush adminis-
tration, the Pentagon established the position that only the CIA conducts covert
action, legally speaking. The military, by contrast, conducts what it calls “opera-
tional preparation of the battlefield”; in essence, traditional military activity. Hersh
quotes a knowledgeable unnamed source as noting that “[t]he President signed an
Executive Order after September 11 giving the Pentagon license to do things that it
had never been able to do before without notifying Congress. The claim was that
the military was ‘preparing the battle space,’ and by using that term they were able
pentagon style 573
to circumvent congressional oversight. Everything is justified in terms of fighting

the global war on terror” (Hersh 2008).
The Senate Intelligence Committee tried to clarify the parameters of military
covert action by including language in the 2004 Intelligence Authorization Act
explicitly declaring that all unacknowledged SOF activity in foreign countries where
regular U.S. military forces are not already present is covert action. The new lan-
guage, however, was strongly opposed by the Pentagon and both Armed Services
Committees, on the grounds that it misconstrued or even ignored the traditional
military activities exception and, in the end, no new restriction on special opera-
tions was enacted (Kibbe 2004, 107).
Since that time, the degree to which Congress has attempted to challenge the
Pentagon on this issue is not publicly known (it is possible legislators have done so
in classified settings). There have been some indications, however, that at least some
members are uncomfortable with the Pentagon’s increasing latitude in unacknowl-
edged operations. In the spring of 2005, for example, Rep. David Obey (D-Wisc.),
then the ranking minority member on the House Appropriations Committee,
intended to offer an amendment cutting off all funding for national intelligence
programs unless the president agreed to keep Congress fully informed about covert
activities conducted by the military. He then announced that he had changed his
mind because the White House had promised fuller cooperation. Obey later told
Seymour Hersh that “the White House reneged on its promise to consult more fully
with Congress” (Hersh 2008). At the time of this writing, it is still too soon to know
where the Obama administration stands on the issues of military covert action and
notification of Congress.
The irony in the debate about military covert action and whether it is skirting
congressional oversight is that numerous scholars contend that that oversight is
not particularly stringent in the first place (Ott 2003; McDonough, Rudman and
Rundlet 2006; Walker 2006; Kibbe 2008; Snider 2008). Congressional oversight of
intelligence is hampered by its split jurisdiction among the Intelligence, Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees, partisanship on Capitol Hill, and
Congress’s inherently subservient position (to the executive) in terms of access to
information.
In just one example of how the oversight of CIA covert action may not be the
ideal standard to hold up as a model, the law provides that in “extraordinary cir-
cumstances,” the president can meet his obligation to notify Congress of a covert
action finding by notifying just the leadership of the House and Senate and the
leadership of the two Intelligence Committees (the so-called Gang of Eight), instead
of briefing the two committees in their entirety. These Gang of Eight briefings are
governed by strict rules, including that no staff be present and that the attendees not
take notes or disclose the information to anyone, including other members of the
committees or legal counsel. They cannot even discuss the issue with other mem-
bers of the Gang of Eight. In effect then, although those in the leadership may have
the information, they have been effectively silenced. According to an aide to a mem-
ber of the Gang of Eight, notification of a finding “is just that—notification, and
574 covert action
not a sign-off on activities. Proper oversight is done by fully briefing the members
of the intelligence committee” (Hersh 2008).
Nonetheless, intelligence scholars generally agree that, while still in need of
improvement, Congress’s oversight role is a critical one. Few suggest that any covert
action is being conducted without at least some oversight from within the executive
branch, but when policy officials have to face the added step of explaining such
operations to members of Congress, the chances are that much greater that the
appropriate questions about the potential risks involved will get asked.
3. Special Access Programs

Besides the definition of covert action, which is covered under the law regulating
intelligence, the other U.S. legal element that plays a role in the question of military
covert action stems from the legislation governing the military. Established by
Executive Order 12958 (Clinton 1995), special access programs (SAPs) are sensitive
programs that impose “need-to-know and access controls beyond those normally
provided for access to confidential, secret, or top secret information” (U.S.
Department of Defense 2008; hereafter DOD). According to the order, programs
are only to be given this beyond-top-secret designation when an agency head deter-
mines that the vulnerability of or threat to specific information is great enough that
normal classification procedures are inadequate (Clinton 1995). By law, the congres-
sional defense committees (i.e., the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed
Services Committees and Appropriations Defense Subcommittees) are to receive
thirty days’ notice of an SAP before it begins (Special access programs 2006).
However, the Bush administration asserted that the president’s right to classify
information is a constitutional one that may not be limited by the Congress and,
thus, reserved the right “especially in wartime” to immediately establish SAPs with-
out notifying Congress (Kibbe 2007, 65–66).
The law specifying the reporting requirements for SAPs also states that the
Secretary of Defense must submit an annual report to the defense committees list-
ing a “brief description” of each program, including its “major milestones,” its actual
cost for each year it has been active and its estimated costs in the future (Special
access programs 2006) One caveat, however, is that the SAP reporting process has
been criticized for falling far short of effective oversight. According to military ana-
lyst William Arkin:
A list of names gets sent forward with a one or two-line description of what the
program is, and there are literally a half dozen people within the entire U.S.
Congress who have a high enough clearance to read that report. So, when you’re
talking about hundreds of programs, and then you’re talking about layers of
different types of special access programs, I think we can all agree they don’t get
very effective oversight. (Arkin 2005)
pentagon style 575
Further limiting the chances of effective congressional oversight, there are three
categories of special access programs, one of which is a “waived SAP,” meaning that
the defense secretary can waive the reporting requirement for a program if he deter-
mines that inclusion of its information in the report to Congress “would adversely
affect the national security” (DOD 2006b). In such cases, the secretary must provide
the information to the chairman and ranking minority member of each of the
defense committees (Special access programs 2006). The problem with this proce-
dure, however, is the same as that of the provision whereby the administration can
notify just the Gang of Eight in the case of covert actions deemed to be too sensitive
to brief to the whole committees. Hersh provides a case study on how SAPs, pro-
tected from too many questions, can lead to a veritable Pandora’s box in his account
of how the program authorizing SOF units to coercively interrogate high-value
detainees in Afghanistan morphed into the Abu Ghraib scandal in Iraq (Hersh
2004).
4. Special Operations Forces

The debate about military covert action centers on Special Operations Forces
(SOF). The importance of the definition of covert action, the traditional military
activities exception, and SAPs becomes clear when viewed in conjunction with
the considerable increase in SOF’s size, budget, and responsibilities since 9/11.
First, though, it’s important to clarify what SOF are. Special operations forces are
elite forces that are considered “special” in two distinct ways: first, by using unique
skills that regular forces do not have, and second, by performing more conven-
tional missions at a high level of proficiency and in situations involving very high
stakes or political sensitivity (Fitzsimmons 2003, 206–7). One of the difficulties
inherent in discussions of military covert action is that descriptions of SOF’s mis-
sions and structure include two cross-cutting dichotomies that can create confu-
sion. First, SOF operations are often categorized in terms of whether they are
direct (SOF working “directly against enemy targets themselves”) or indirect (try-
ing to achieve objectives by working with indigenous forces and populations)
( Tucker and Lamb 2007, 153). Broadly speaking, SOF missions are categorized as
shown in table 35.
While this distinction is useful as an overall guideline, it is important to under-
stand that the line between the two categories is not impermeable. Note, for exam-
ple, that the Pentagon’s definition of unconventional warfare includes the language
“predominantly conducted by, with, or through indigenous or surrogate forces,”
leaving open the possibility that U.S. personnel might, in some cases, conduct guer-
rilla warfare themselves (Tucker and Lamb 2007, 154).
A second, more informal distinction that is commonly made, however, is that
between overt, unclassified, or “white” operations and/or forces, and classified or
Table 35.1 Direct and Indirect Special Operations Forces (SOF) Missions
Direct SOF Missions
Counterterrorism offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism (DOD 2008)
Counterproliferation actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States
(DOD 2008)
Direct Action short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions which employ specialized military
capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets (DOD 2008)
Special Reconnaissance reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as special operations to collect or verify information
of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in
conventional forces (DOD 2008)
Information Operations actions taken to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial information, information systems, and
decision making while protecting those of the United States (DOD 2008)
Indirect SOF Missions
Unconventional Warfare “a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly
conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces.” Includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla
warfare, subversion, sabotage and intelligence activities (DOD 2008)
Psychological Operations planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals (DOD 2008)
Foreign Internal Defense “actions of a foreign government to curb subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. SOF’s primary
contribution is to organize, train, advise, and assist host-nation military and paramilitary forces”
(Tucker and Lamb 2007, xix)
Civil Affairs activities involved in either establishing and conducting military government or civil administration
until civilian authority or government can be restored; minimizing civilian interference with military
operations; limiting the adverse impact of military operations on civilian populations and resources
(Tucker and Lamb, xix)
pentagon style 577
“black” operations and/or forces. Confusion results from the use by some of the
term “black” to refer to both covert and clandestine missions, thus blurring the line
drawn by the legal definition of covert action. Further muddying the issue is the fact
that, while many associate black operations with direct missions such as covert raids
designed to kill terrorists and white operations with such indirect missions as train-
ing foreign counterterrorist forces, in reality, the dividing lines between direct/indi-
rect and black/white do not completely correspond. Thus, while many counterterrorist
operations are conducted covertly, they could be conducted overtly, on an acknowl-
edged basis as well. Similarly, indirect missions such as training foreign internal
defense forces, for example, are usually conducted in uniform, but some training of
foreign covert forces might well be done out of uniform on an unacknowledged
basis. Compounding the issue further still, some of the SOF missions that can be
conducted overtly can also be conducted by some elements of the conventional
forces (Fitzsimmons 2003, 209–10).
A third source of confusion in terms of the definitions of SOF’s roles and mis-
sions arises from the fact that particular units within SOF are associated with cer-
tain types of missions and are thus typically thought of as being either overt or
covert. The units traditionally involved in white special operations include Army
Special Forces (SF, or Green Berets), most Ranger units, most of the Navy SEALs,
two Marine Special Operations Battalions, and numerous aviation, civil affairs, and
psychological operations units.
The black operators, referred to as special mission units, fall under the Joint
Special Operations Command (JSOC), and comprise the elite units of each service’s
special operations forces: 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Delta
Force), Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, or SEAL Team 6),
the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron, the Army’s 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment and 75th Ranger Regiment, and the highly classified Intelligence
Support Activity (ISA, known more recently as Gray Fox).
The problem is that although the JSOC units (which are not formally acknowl-
edged by the Pentagon) are thought of as specializing in direct action, even that
distinction is not iron-clad. Thus, for example, Gray Fox conducts both direct strike
missions (covert) and intelligence missions, which could be either covert or merely
clandestine (Smith 2007). Conversely, although regular Special Forces are known
for their indirect foreign internal defense missions, they do train for (overt) direct
action missions as well.
One final source of confusion is that JSOC’s special mission units can operate
independently, in coordination with the CIA (but under JSOC’s direction) or on a
CIA-directed operation. The distinction is important in terms of the law governing
covert action (and the corresponding congressional reporting requirements), but
the authority under which operations that become public knowledge have been
conducted is often unclear in public accounts, making it hard to determine the
exact contours of the problem without having classified access. What is clear is that
in those situations where JSOC operates independently but in coordination with
CIA (for example, CIA agents and local assets making contacts for the JSOC
578 covert action
operatives), Congress only receives a partial picture of how the money it authorized
for the CIA operation is being used (Hersh 2008).
It is easy to see, then, how confused discussions of SOF and the question of
military covert action can get, particularly because many journalists, analysts, and
possibly even some legislators are unaware of the overlapping categories and defini-
tions and often use the terms inaccurately. When the question involves covert action,
where the answer stems from a precise legal definition surrounded by gray area,
using the same terms to mean different things at best only further adds to the prob-
lem and, at worst, creates opportunity for obfuscation.
5. The Expansion of Special

Operations Forces
Whatever terms are used to describe SOF, their expansion in size and responsibili-
ties since 9/11 is undeniable (Scarborough 2004, 1–28; M. Johnson 2006; Smith 2007,
235–73). This growth is the result of a combination of factors, including the increased
prominence of unconventional threats, their successful record in Afghanistan, and
former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s commitment to transforming the
military into a leaner, more agile organization capable of combating post–Cold War
irregular threats (M. Johnson 2006, 273; Kibbe 2007, 60). The amount allocated to
SOF has more than doubled since 2001, to a total budget of more than $7 billion
(Lardner 2008). In addition, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the
Pentagon’s main planning document for the next four years, aimed to increase SOF
personnel, which numbered 50,000 at the beginning of 2006, by 14,000 through
2011, at a cost of nearly $28 billion (DOD 2006c; Kibbe 2007, 60).
Beyond these tangible increases, however, Rumsfeld also made several institu-
tional changes that had important ramifications for SOF’s scope and authority. In
addition to replacing those military leaders he deemed too tentative in enacting the
changes he envisioned, Rumsfeld increased Special Operations Command
(SOCOM)’s authority in January 2003 by making it a supported, as well as a sup-
porting, command, meaning it could now plan and execute its own missions (if
authorized by the secretary and, if necessary, the president), rather than serving
solely in a support role for the regional commands. Several authors describe
SOCOM’s new status as freeing SOF from restrictions imposed by the regional
commanders, enabling them to react immediately and conduct the terrorist “man-
hunts” Rumsfeld wanted (Hersh 2004; Scarborough 2004, 27; Smith 2007, 248).
Another significant change came in 2004 when President Bush issued a new
Unified Command Plan, designating SOCOM as the lead military command in the
war on terrorism. Other less dramatic but still significant moves in Rumsfeld’s quest
to elevate SOF in the military hierarchy included increasing JSOC’s headquarters
pentagon style 579
from a two-star to a three-star command, giving its commander more authority in

his dealings with other military officers (Kibbe 2007, 61) and placing the deputy
commander of SOCOM on the twelve-person Deputies Advisory Working Group,
which was made a permanent part of the Defense Department’s senior manage-
ment structure in March 2006. As Stevenson notes, “no other combatant com-
mander was so privileged” (Stevenson 2006, 39–40).
In addition to these structural changes, Rumsfeld continually fought for
increased freedom for SOF, or more accurately JSOC, to pursue suspected terrorists.
Although information regarding such highly classified plans is hard to come by for
obvious reasons, there have been some notable reports of his success in this regard.
According to Hersh, sometime after 9/11, Rumsfeld created a Special Access Program
granting JSOC units blanket advance approval to kill or capture and, if possible,
interrogate high value targets (the program that led, eventually, to Abu Ghraib;
Hersh 2004).
In the spring of 2004, after a two-year turf war with the CIA and the State
Department, Rumsfeld signed, with Bush’s approval, a classified order granting
SOF broad new authority to attack the Al Qaeda network anywhere in the world,
as well as “a more sweeping mandate to conduct operations in countries not at
war with the United States” (Schmitt and Mazzetti 2008; see also Hersh 2005).
According to the New York Times, the order specified fifteen to twenty countries
where Al Qaeda operatives were thought to be either operating or have sought
sanctuary, including Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and several other
Persian Gulf States (although it expressly excluded Iran; Schmitt and Mazzetti
2008). Nearly a dozen SOF raids have reportedly been carried out since then in
“Syria, Pakistan and elsewhere,” some “in close coordination with” the CIA and
some in support of CIA-directed operations. The order apparently requires vary-
ing levels of approval for different states, with Somalia, for example, needing only
the approval of the defense secretary, but select other countries, including Pakistan
and Syria, requiring presidential approval (Schmitt and Mazzetti 2008). Special
operations forces’ reach was reportedly expanded yet again in late 2006 as they
were authorized to conduct cross-border operations from southern Iraq into Iran
(the CIA would soon join them under the auspices of a presidential finding; Hersh
2008).
Another important step in the expansion of SOF’s operational scope came in
early 2006 with the signing of the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
Terrorism, which ordered the Defense Department “to undertake a broad campaign
to find and attack or neutralize terrorist leaders, their havens, financial networks,
methods of communication and ability to move around the globe” (Shanker 2006,
16). The new counterterrorist strategy was soon followed by a set of three opera-
tional plans implementing it. One of the plans set out “precisely how U.S. special
operations troops would “find, fix, and finish” terrorist leaders. The plan signifi-
cantly expanded the role of special operations forces, placing them in embassies in
a wide number of Middle Eastern capitals to gather intelligence and, where necessary,
carry out covert action . . .” (Smith 2007, 266).
580 covert action
The question of SOF operating independently out of embassies triggered more

of the bureaucratic infighting that had accompanied Rumsfeld’s campaign to have
SOF, and thus the Pentagon, lead the “war against terrorism” (Kibbe 2007, 70).
A two-year review of the issue finally led to a presidential directive staking out at
least rough agreement on each agency’s “lanes in the road,” and designating the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as the authority responsible for ensur-
ing that all parties lived up to it. Although the extent of the Pentagon’s control over
the “war on terrorism” is a continual issue, particularly for the CIA, the problem
reportedly lessened in the post-Rumsfeld regime, mainly because of the long-estab-
lished relationships among his successor, Robert Gates, Director of National
Intelligence Mike McConnell, and CIA Director Michael Hayden (Starks 2007).
By late 2008, no in-depth analysis had yet been done regarding the extent to
which Gates and other new key military leaders subscribe to Rumsfeld’s vision of
muscular SOF conducting unfettered counterterrorism raids around the world.
Anecdotally, there have been conflicting indications. On the one hand, the new
SOCOM commander, Adm. Eric Olson, made clear in May 2008 that he would not
be exercising SOCOM’s authority to conduct its own missions separate from the
regional commands, saying he intended to focus instead on coordinating the mili-
tary’s counterterrorism operations around the world (Shanker 2008, 10). On the
other hand, however, the Pentagon seems to have continued using JSOC just as
aggressively in the nearly two years since Rumsfeld’s departure. In early 2007, it was
reported that a highly classified JSOC unit had conducted raids into Somalia from
Ethiopia in an attempt to target Al Qaeda operatives fleeing the Ethiopian army’s
invasion (Gordon and Mazzetti 2007), and in July 2008, Bush authorized SOF to
conduct raids into the highly sensitive Pakistani tribal areas (Schmitt and Mazzetti
2008).
Certainly there is no sign of any reversal of SOF’s popularity in the future. As
one SOF officer noted, “Everyone is infatuated with SOF . . . To do anything against
SOF would be absolute sacrilege on both sides of the aisle” (Naylor 2006). Indeed,
during the 2008 presidential campaign, both candidates promised to expand special
operations forces. The question is, which parts of SOF will get the attention, the
white or black units? There has been increasing discussion in the literature that Al
Qaeda is more of a global insurgency than just a terrorist network and that, there-
fore, the fight against it is better conceived of as a global counterinsurgency than as
a “war against terrorism” (Kilcullen 2005; Gompert and Gordon 2008; Roper 2008).
Consequently, there has been an increased call for the Pentagon to shift its emphasis
away from JSOC’s “hunter-killer” teams and to focus more on the counterinsur-
gency tactics aimed at winning “hearts and minds” that are the trademark of the
unclassified SOF units like the Green Berets (Kilcullen 2005; Naylor 2006; Tucker
and Lamb 2007).
Some of this newfound enthusiasm for counterinsurgency has begun to show up
in the military’s doctrine and pronouncements, helped in no small part by the tac-
tic’s at least partial success in Iraq. One cannot assume, however, that that necessarily
means the United States intends to deemphasize military covert action. First, as
pentagon style 581
explained above, there is the fact that some indirect action can also be covert. Second,
many of those who stress that the United States should be fighting a counterinsur-
gency campaign include covert direct action as one of its necessary components. As
one of their five pillars of counterinsurgency, Morgenstein and Vickland, for exam-
ple, call for the “discriminate use of force [emphasis in original] such as Special
Operations Forces (SOF) hunting jihadists in Afghanistan and North Africa. Our
SOF capabilities must be expanded to more effectively hunt down those we cannot
convince to end their destructive crusade” (Morgenstein and Vickland 2008, 4).
A relevant case in point of the murkiness of what lies ahead, despite all the lip
service being paid to indirect counterinsurgency measures, is the military’s new
Africa Command (AFRICOM), launched in October 2007. Africa Command was
designed as a hybrid military command in the sense that it is to conduct a combina-
tion of stability operations, development, and humanitarian assistance, coordinat-
ing with the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) on the latter two tasks. Many scholars, not to mention African states, have
been skeptical of the Pentagon’s stated intentions, however, pointing out that its
previous operations in North and East Africa, although similarly couched in the
terminology of counterinsurgency and development, have in practice included a
healthy component of JSOC strikes aimed at eliminating individual terrorists
(Berschinski 2007; Stevenson 2007).
6. Risks
The unprecedented expansion in SOF’s size, authority, and geographic range since
9/11 has brought with it a variety of risks. The first set of such risks are the interna-
tional legal implications of unacknowledged operations conducted by the military.
Under international law, using formal military personnel to conduct a covert mili-
tary operation (in a country with which the United States is not at war) constitutes
an act of war (Stone 2003, 11). While the same is true of covert action taken by the
CIA, “most of the world has come to look at CIA de facto wars as a way of life
because most powers benefit from their own CIA-equivalents operating in foreign
countries” (Stone 2003, 12). The prospect of the U.S. military operating wherever it
wants on a covert basis, however, is not likely to be a welcome development. “The
world will rightly ask: Where does it stop? If the U.S. employs SOF to conduct deni-
able covert action, then is the next step a clandestine tomahawk missile strike, or
maybe even a missile strike whose origin is manipulated to conceal U.S. finger-
prints?” (Stone 2003, 12).
Moreover, there are additional legal ramifications of military covert operations
for the individual personnel involved. The law of war is predicated upon the main-
tenance of a clear distinction between combatants and civilians, through the use of
a uniform or distinctive insignia (Parks 2003, 508). Special operations forces
582 covert action
conducting unacknowledged military missions constitute a clear violation of that

principle. Under the Geneva Conventions, military personnel wearing civilian
clothing and acting as spies and saboteurs are guilty of perfidy, an international law
violation, and would be denied prisoner of war status and protection if captured
(Parks 2003, 511–513; McAndrew 2006, 159).2 Moreover, military personnel caught
conducting covert operations could also be classified as unlawful combatants and
lose their combatant immunity from prosecution for committing acts that would
otherwise be criminal under domestic or international law (Stone 2003, 12; Yoo and
Ho 2003, 221). In addition, U.S. policy, in the form of the Defense Department’s Law
of War Program, explicitly requires that “[m]embers of the DoD [Department of
Defense] Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, how-
ever such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations” (DOD
2006a).
It is important to note that this issue is not relevant in the event SOF are cap-
tured by members of Al Qaeda. As many have pointed out, Al Qaeda is not a party
to and does not abide by the Geneva Conventions in any case (technically, captured
SOF would be crime victims, or hostages; Dunlap 2002, 29; Yoo and Ho 2003,
216–19).3 Rather, these risks come into play in those situations where U.S. military
personnel are captured (by other government forces) while conducting covert oper-
ations in countries with which the United States is not formally at war, even when
the target of those operations is some terrorist entity and not the country itself.
Washington might well be able to sweep an incident under the official rug in the
case of allies, as it has seemingly done in the case of the Italian attempt to prosecute
CIA agents for the extraordinary rendition of an Egyptian terror suspect. One can
imagine a very different outcome, however, if the country involved were Iran or
North Korea.
Several sources point out that this highlights one of the fundamental differ-
ences between covert operations conducted by the CIA and those conducted by
SOF. In the case of the former, operatives fully understand from the outset that they
will be working covertly and that, should they be captured, they cannot expect any
formal protection from either the United States government or international law.
Military personnel, however, begin their service under a very different understand-
ing: that if they follow all lawful orders, if they are captured, they will receive the
protection of both the government and the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, mili-
tary commanders cannot require SOF personnel to actively hide their military iden-
tity, and thus their status as lawful combatants, to their own detriment, which means
the military may have problems conducting such missions effectively (Stone 2003,
13). While it is possible for members of SOF to voluntarily agree to forego those
protections, this creates several additional problems. First, while those individuals
2
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977 (Protocol I), art. 37.
3
Although, as Yoo and Ho argue, the law of war does apply to the overall conflict with Al
Qaeda, as it has been defined by the Bush administration (2003, 209–15).
pentagon style 583
may have agreed to a new “bargain” defining their service, it nonetheless sets the
precedent to the outside world of members of the U.S. military acting covertly and
runs the risk of lessening the protection afforded other, uniformed U.S. military
personnel who are subsequently captured (Kibbe 2004, 113). Second, the methods
used to solicit volunteers are “fraught with the dangers of undue influence, peer
pressure, traditional military values . . . and, perhaps most important, [the lack of]
informed consent” (Stone 2003, 13).
Beyond the possible contraventions of international law, unacknowledged
military operations also risk damaging both the United States’ image in world
opinion and its relations with other states. As Smith points out, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has been highly
critical of the U.S. Predator missile strikes against Al Qaeda militants in Yemen
and Pakistan (2007, 266). It is unclear under whose aegis (CIA or SOF) these
strikes have been conducted but, as explained earlier, what is distasteful to the
rest of the world when the CIA does it will be even more damaging to
Washington’s standing when conducted covertly by the military. Furthermore,
particularly in the case of military covert operations being discovered in coun-
tries with which the United States is not already at war, the state involved is
likely to resent its sovereignty being infringed upon. At best, the state could
become less willing to cooperate with U.S. policy wishes and, at worst, might try
some sort of reprisal.
Another category of risks posed by SOF’s rapid expansion are more logistical
and bureaucratic in nature. One issue is whether it is even possible to expand SOF’s
ranks to the degree envisioned without undermining their very “specialness.” Special
operations forces are distinctive for being the most highly trained military person-
nel but, between the military’s overall retention problems and the pressure to pro-
duce more SOF warriors quickly, many fear that some of their training will inevitably
be degraded. Other problems stemming from SOF’s expansion include other forces
and agencies resenting SOF’s new prominence and the problem of SOF and CIA
operatives unknowingly interfering with each other in the field (Fitzsimmons 2003,
213; M. Johnson 2006, 287–88; Kibbe 2007, 71–2).
Finally, there is also the seemingly more mundane risk that covert operations
conducted with little or no oversight can court criminal activity, a scenario that has
played itself out in at least one particularly relevant case. In the early 1980s, the
Reagan administration used the covert SOF Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) to
help prosecute its war against Nicaragua’s Contras with minimal oversight. By the
middle of the decade, ISA’s wings had been clipped and several senior officers were
court-martialed for their roles in various arms deals and financial scandals, in what
became known overall as the Yellow Fruit scandal, after the code name for one of
ISA’s front companies (Emerson 1988; Hersh 2005).
One of the dangers of expanding SOF’s size, authority, and geographic reach so
rapidly and significantly is that, when that expansion is combined with the legal
gray areas in the definition of covert action, it becomes even easier to either hide
military covert action from congressional oversight on purpose or for it to be
584 covert action
overlooked by accident. Either way, the danger is that the above risks are not being
given the appropriate consideration.
7. Future Research Directions

The preceding discussion points to some logical avenues for future research. First,
there is an ongoing need for further clarification of what unacknowledged military
operations have been conducted since 9/11, whatever they are called by the Pentagon.
It is, obviously, not an easy task, given their classified nature and the military’s reluc-
tance to concede the possibility even exists. Given the risks involved in such opera-
tions, however, and the likelihood that they will continue in the near future, the
issue is simply too important to leave unresolved until the relevant records are
declassified.
In a related vein, another important avenue will be to follow the evolution of
the Pentagon’s counterterrorism-cum-counterinsurgency strategy as it is applied in
key regions such as North and East Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East to see
just what its implications are for military covert action. Africa Command will be a
particularly interesting case study to watch as it unfolds. One interesting twist on
the issue is, if in fact the military does intend to move significantly away from JSOC-
style counterterrorist strikes, whether it will be able to effectively do so, or whether
the culture Rumsfeld nurtured in the Pentagon and in some areas of SOF has already
become too ingrained.
Another vital area for research is on the legislative side. There is an important
need for thoughtful solutions to the problem of congressional oversight and its
weakness in terms of both military and CIA covert action. September 11 changed
America’s national security landscape and the multi-faceted expansion of SOF is
part of Washington’s reaction to that change. Perhaps it is time for Congress to
update the language in the covert action legislation to take SOF’s evolution into
account. Finally, Congress is notoriously difficult to reform, so some attention
should be paid to exploring not just the best solution to Congress’s inefficacy prob-
lem but also to the most effective way to get members of Congress to implement
that solution.
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———. 2006b. Directive No. 5205.07: Special Access Program (SAP) Policy, January 5
(Incorporating Change 1, February 25, 2008). http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/
d5205_07.pdf, accessed December 27, 2008.
———. 2006c. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/
QDR20060203.pdf, accessed December 27, 2008.
———. 2008. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint
Publication 1–02, April 12, 2001 (As Amended through October 17, 2008). http://dtic.
mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/, accessed December 27, 2008.
U.S. House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 1991.
Conference Report on Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991. 102nd Cong.,
H.Rept. 166.
U.S. Senate. Joint Resolution. 2001. Authorization for Use of Military Force. 107th Cong., 115
Stat. 224.
U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 1991. Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1991 for the Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Government. 102nd Cong., S. Rept. 85.
Walker, M. B. 2006. Reforming Congressional Oversight of U.S. Intelligence. International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19:702–20.
Yoo, J. C., and J. C. Ho. 2003. The Status of Terrorists. Virginia Journal of International Law
44:207–28.
chapter 36
COVERT ACTION: UNITED

STATES LAW IN SUBSTANCE,
PROCESS, AND PRACTICE
james e. baker
CIA operates only within the space given to us by the

American people . . . That space is defined by the
policymakers we all elect and the laws our representatives
pass. But once the laws are passed and the boundaries set,
the American people expect CIA to use every inch we’re
given to protect our fellow citizens.
—Gen. Michael V. Hayden, Council on Foreign
Relations, 2007
In 1954, at the height of the Cold War, the Doolittle Committee concluded:
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is
world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in
such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.
The Committee was reporting to President Eisenhower on the covert activities of

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During the Cold War, covert action may
have been perceived as the “no rule” option and, not for the first time, a policy
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the National Security Council, or any other
entity.
588 covert action
panacea. Plausible deniability allowed the superpowers to keep the Cold War cold,
even if covert proxies were engaged in very hot and overt conflicts. Covert action
was also a political tool that allowed the United States to employ a full spectrum of
conduct in support of a containment policy, even where such conduct might seem
contrary to publicly stated principles. Covert action (real and perceived) also came
to play a disproportionate role in defining public and international perceptions of
the United States and certainly the CIA, sometimes overshadowing the CIA’s base
work of intelligence collection and analysis.1
The past may be prologue in a twenty-first-century conflict against non-state
threats, as well as state threats, where access to and control of weapons of mass
destruction is a central front in the intelligence conflict. Consider the words of for-
mer CIA Director Hayden:
Never before have we faced an enemy so completely committed to our
destruction and so completely irresponsible with human life. Al-Qa’ida is willing
to sacrifice both its own operatives and the Muslims for whom it professes to
fight. This enemy, unprecedented in our history, requires a response that also has
no model in our past. (Hayden 2008a)
Covert action is specially suited for conducting finite offensive operations against
non-state actors within failed states or states unwilling or unable to detain or expel
such actors, or at least to take such action in public. If wielded effectively and wisely,
the instrument is nimble, rapid, and enduringly secret. Covert action also offers a
range of tools to disrupt proliferation supply chains. In the words of Director
Hayden, “We identify the illegal sellers and buyers of technology and expertise. And
we use covert action to disrupt illicit transfers” (Hayden 2008b). There is also a
direct historical link to the past. Extremists of the state and non-state variety have
emerged from past covert actions: Iran in 1953 and Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Successful in their time, the impact of these not so covert actions persists, and not
always in favorable ways.
There are distinctions as well between Cold War covert action and today’s covert
action (see Baker, 2007; Daughtery, 2004). First, while the instrument remains in the
toolbox for strategic political use, the signature covert action of the twenty-first
century to date is the offensive counterterrorism operation—a missile strike or a
rendition—rather than the foreign policy coup. New contexts may also place stress
on new and unintended applications of law in the cyber arena and in the area of
export and trade controls. That is not to say, if one believes press reports, that covert
action does not remain a foreign policy tool, perhaps on the fringe of efforts to
1
In the words of then–Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates (1987/88),
Because of the media’s focus on covert action, however, it is worth pointing out in
passing that over 95 percent of the national intelligence budget is devoted to the
collection and analysis of information. Only about three percent of the CIA’s people are
involved in covert action. By citing those figures, I do not pretend that covert action is
not an important aspect of the CIA’s activities. It certainly attracts the most attention
and controversy.
united states law in substance, process, and practice 589
influence and change political regimes in countries hostile to U.S. interests. However,
it would seem that in this context it will more likely remain a policy panacea.
Second, today’s covert operations are conducted with more regulated proce-
dural oversight within the executive branch than those authorized decades ago.
Cold War covert action was largely conducted in a statutory vacuum, marked by
informal congressional oversight, if any. The National Security Act of 1947 autho-
rized the CIA to “perform such other functions as the President or the National
Security Council may direct” (sec. 103(c)(8)), a phrase some but not all understood
within the executive branch to encompass covert action.2 However, covert action
remained legally rooted in the president’s constitutional authority as commander in
chief, chief executive, and in the area of foreign relations. Rules existed, at least in
the form of internal processes. But an external statutory and oversight regime did
not emerge until the 1970s and 1980s as Congress came to appreciate that the ben-
efits of regulating the instrument outweighed the risks of not doing so. Here, too,
covert action has played a disproportionate role in shaping the law, most notably
with the creation of the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees in the
wake of revelations about assassination plots and other activities (U.S. Congress
1977, HR 658; U.S. Congress 1976, SR 400), and then with amendment of the National
Security Act in 1991 after the Iran-Contra affair (Intelligence Authorization Act
1991).3
Significant as well, covert action today is expressly an instrument of presi-
dential policy. It always was; however, presidents sought and in some cases
achieved two degrees of plausible deniability. First, that an activity was con-
ducted by or on behalf of the United States, and second, that the activity was
conducted with the knowledge or assent of the president. Not anymore. The law
is direct—while the U.S. role in a covert action may not be apparent or acknowl-
edged publicly, lawful covert action may only be conducted with the written
approval of the president.
This chapter contains four sections. Section 1 describes the core elements of
the U.S. legal regime, including the definition of covert action and the “traditional
activity” exceptions, the elements of a covert action finding, and the thresholds
and requirements for congressional notification. Section 2 describes some of the
substantive limitations on the conduct of covert action. Section 3 describes the
nature of executive branch legal practice in this area of the law. Section 4 draws
conclusions about the role of national security law in the context of covert
action.
2
See National Security Council Directive 10/2, June 18, 1948, establishing a “new office of
Special Projects . . . within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations”
“under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947;” see also Banks and
Raven-Hansen (2002–3, 698–99).
3
See also the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.
590 covert action
1. The U.S. Legal Regime

The U.S. legal regime combines elements of constitutional, statutory, and executive
law, all informed by historical practice. The regime also blends overt law with clas-
sified directive and guidance. Thus, as with an iceberg, much of the law, like the
practice itself, remains unseen below the waterline. Further, because covert action
draws on all of the intelligence functions—collection, analysis and dissemination,
liaison, and counterintelligence—practice and appraisal in this area requires paral-
lel knowledge of the corresponding law in each functional area.
Legal analysis of covert action passes through the Constitution and begins in
detail with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The act provides the
framework in which covert action is intended to occur. As the language suggests and
the legislative history reflects, each clause finds antecedent root in an historical or
legal dispute between the executive and the legislature over covert action.
Covert action is defined as:
an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political,
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
publicly . . . (National Security Act 1947, sec. 413b(e))
The legislative history adds an interesting twist:

It is not intended that the new definition exclude activities which were heretofore
understood to be covert actions, nor to include activities not heretofore under-
stood to be covert actions. In other words, the new definition is meant to clarify
those activities that require presidential findings and reporting to Congress; not to
relax or go beyond previous understandings. (U.S. Congress 1991, S. Doc. 102–85)
Significantly, the definition is act rather than actor based. Thus, while the partici-
pating agency’s identity may be relevant in determining whether an activity is
“excepted” as “traditional,” it is the conduct and the manner of the conduct that
defines covert action, not the identity of the participating agency.4 It is also impor-
tant to note that the act’s definition identifies the covert nature of the activity in the
disjunctive—the U.S. role will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. Therefore,
even where a host nation may be aware of an activity, it may nonetheless be “covert”
because the states involved intend to deny involvement.
Also significant, the act’s positive definition is qualified; it “does not include”
traditional diplomatic, military, or law enforcement activities or “activities the pri-
mary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence” and certain other intelligence
activities (National Security Act 1947, sec. 413b(e)). Of course, what is traditional
evolves over time, just as customary international law may evolve through the
4
In contrast, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (enacted in
1974 and repealed in 1991), which required the president to report CIA covert operations to the
appropriate committees of Congress, was directed exclusively to activities of the CIA.
practice of states. Counterterrorism activities, like renditions, predator air strikes,

and cross-border raids, which may once have been considered covert, extraordi-
nary, or both, today may be considered ordinary and perhaps in some contexts
traditional, whether conducted by CIA or military personnel. But that judgment
will depend on the actual who, what, where, when, and how of operational detail. As
a result, the critical question today may no longer be “is this covert action,” but
rather one of “due process.” Whether the activity in question is conducted pursuant
to a general finding or pursuant to the military orders, is it receiving a measure of
policy, legal, and operational review, within an accountable process of approval that
is commensurate with the policy risks and benefits at stake?
If the conduct in question is covert action, the act delimits the manner and
method by which the action or activity shall be approved. As a threshold, the presi-
dent must determine in a written finding that “an action is necessary to support
identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the
national security of the United States” (National Security Act 1947, sec. 413b(a)).
Findings must also specify those U.S. government agencies authorized to fund or
participate in the conduct, as well as whether any third party, including contractors
and foreign states or persons, may fund or participate in the action.
Findings may not authorize a covert action that has already occurred. If “imme-
diate action by the United States is required and time does not permit the prepara-
tion of a written finding,” the president may authorize an action verbally, provided
a written record is contemporaneously made and reduced to a written finding
within forty-eight hours after the decision is made (National Security Act 1947,
sec. 413b(a)(1)). This language addresses potential constitutional concerns that
might arise were the statute read to limit the president’s capacity to defend the
United States in exigent circumstances.
1.1 Presidential Decision and U.S. Policy

The National Security Act makes express what constitutional practice reflects—
covert action is a presidential instrument. Lest there be any doubt on this point
within the executive branch, Executive Order 13,470 states:
The National Security Council (NSC) shall act as the highest ranking executive
branch entity that provides support to the President for review of, guidance for,
and direction to the conduct of all foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and
covert action, and attendant policies and programs. (Executive Order 13,470,
sec. 1.2(a))
But, whereas in the case of intelligence collection the president is a consumer,

with covert action, he is the essential policy actor as well as the essential source of
legal authority for the conduct of covert action. As the military is an instrument of
national policy, the CIA (or such other entities as may be authorized to undertake
covert action) is also an instrument of both presidential and U.S. policy. Four legal
policy observations follow from this point:
592 covert action
First, the president and NSC, and not just the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) and the Director of the CIA (DCIA), are accountable for the policies and the
values U.S. covert action reflects. It also means that the success or failure of covert
action is a presidential success or failure, and not the CIA’s alone to bear.
Second, the implementing entity may not have the same measure of zeal or
intent as the president in executing an action, or vice versa. The president should
ensure that his objectives are shared and implemented as he intends.
Third, perceptions regarding the success or failure, as well as the morality and
legality of covert action, can spill over and impact the intelligence community and
intelligence mission generally. Ill-founded or poorly executed covert activities can
undermine public support for the intelligence mission generally and not just for the
specific covert action function.
Fourth, the personalities and perspectives of presidents (and their senior
national security advisors) will also influence the application of law. That is because
much of the National Security Act is procedural rather than substantive in nature.
While providing general authorization to conduct covert action, the act does little
to delimit the manner of its use. Rather, the law seeks to compel a secret, but none-
theless rigorous, process of review. Thus, each president will need to determine not
only what is required by law, but also define their normative expectations regarding
the process of approval and review and the circumstances, if any, where deviation is
warranted. In this area, like others, the president will receive the process he tolerates,
accepts, or demands.
Therefore, just as the president must decide how he will define his role as com-
mander in chief, each president should consider with just as much thought the
manner in which he will “command” the covert action instrument. For example,
will he review activities in detail, or provide general mission guidance? If the latter,
will he delegate policy responsibility and accountability to a subordinate “com-
mander” or subordinate mechanisms of approval, like the Deputies Committee? In
what manner will the president (or his alter egos the assistant to the president for
National Security Affairs [APNSA] and DNI) appraise the conduct of covert action
to ensure that it is effective and that it is lawful? In the military context, the results
are often evident, and the media and other actors can prompt the president’s atten-
tion. Not so in the covert context. Finally, in what manner will the president define
his relationship with Congress, starting with the manner and tone with which con-
vert activities are notified to Congress?
1.2 Congressional Notification

1.2.1 Initial Notification
Once a finding is signed, the National Security Act contemplates three means of
initial notification to the Congress.
(1) The President shall ensure that any finding approved pursuant to [this
section] shall be reported to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as
possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert action
authorized by the finding. . . . (National Security Act 1947, sec. 413b(c)(1))
In practice, this means written notification of the finding and a briefing to both
members of the committees and designated staff “cleared” for these compart-
ments.5
(2) If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding
to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United
States, the finding may be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and
minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the
congressional leadership as may be included by the President. (National
Security Act 1947, sec. 413b(c)(2))
This is a so-called Gang of Eight notification. Three brief comments are warranted.
First, this reporting mechanism is specific to covert action; although it might serve
as a model for other intelligence or military activities, the law does not recognize it
as a reporting mechanism for intelligence activities other than covert actions.
Second, it follows that if notification is made to the “Gang of Eight,” notification is
not made to congressional staff. This may delimit opportunities for appraisal, audit,
validation, and unauthorized disclosure. Third, it follows that to the extent the pres-
ident authorizes notification to an additional “member or members,” the legal basis
for using this mechanism may diminish in proportion to the number of additional
members briefed.
(3) Whenever a finding is not reported pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this
section, the President shall fully inform the congressional intelligence committees
in a timely fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving
prior notice. (National Security Act 1947, sec. 413b(c)(3))
This option preserves, and arguably recognizes, the president’s authority to with-
hold notification altogether. The public record does not reflect whether presidents
have made use of this provision since it was enacted in the Intelligence Authorization
Act of 1991. At the time of passage of these amendments, President George H. W.
Bush indicated in an exchange of letters with the intelligence committees that he
did not anticipate withholding notice beyond 48 hours (Bush 1992; U.S. Congress
1991, S. Doc. 102–85, 233). However, “the 48-hour rule” is lore, not law. It is a political
undertaking that is not binding on future presidents.
5
As of 2008, there were fifteen members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
twenty-one members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence 2008; U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
2008). The number of staff members “cleared” for covert-action programs is not publicly released.
General Hayden reported that, in 2007, CIA experts gave “more than 500 briefings to congressional
members and staff ” and the CIA issued about 100 congressional notifications on sensitive
programs. General Hayden personally briefed Congress nine times in 2007, on issues such as
renditions, detentions, and interrogations (Hayden 2008a).
594 covert action
1.2.2 Significant Changes and Undertakings

The act also states that:
The President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees . . . are
notified of any significant change in a previously approved covert action, or any
significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding, in the same
manner as findings are reported. . . . (National Security Act 1947, sec. 413b(d))
As a matter of executive-branch practice, this notification is done in the form of a

Memorandum of Notification (MON), which provides the committees with notifi-
cation of significant changes or undertakings under the aegis of a parent finding
(National Security Decision Directive 286, 1987). Of course, as in the case of “tradi-
tional activities,” there is room for interpretation as to what constitutes “a signifi-
cant change” or a “significant undertaking.”
Distinctions and thresholds in this area are critical. They determine whether
ongoing covert conduct is approved by the president or is initiated and approved at
a subordinate policy or operational level. They also determine the scope of congres-
sional notification, if in fact notification occurs at all. As a result, the process and
practice of approving MONs is as important, if not more important, than the pro-
cess and practice of approving findings themselves. One can imagine that where the
president has granted broad or generalized authority in a framework finding, such
as to address a national security concern like terrorism or nonproliferation, where
and how the president, his policymakers, and his lawyers define these threshold
terms can be critical in determining what measure of internal- and then external-
review-specific initiatives or operational proposals receive, if any. Moreover, it may
be that the undertakings and changes present the greatest operational and policy
risks and benefits, whether they are deemed significant or not. Nonetheless, there
may be incentives, sound and otherwise, for operators to minimize the significance
of activities to avoid additional processes of internal review followed perhaps by
congressional notification.
The legislative history to the 1991 amendments to the act describes these terms
in relation to “a change in the scope of a previously-approved finding to authorize
additional activities to occur” or a “significant activity” under a previously approved
finding (U.S. Congress 1991, S. Doc. 102–85, 234–35). However, this language does
not move far beyond the statutory language itself. National Security Decision
Directive 286 (henceforth NSDD-286; 1987) goes further in describing the import of
these terms.
In the event of any proposal to change substantially the mean of implementation
of, or the level of resources, assets, or activity under a Finding; or in the event of
any significant change in the operational conditions, country or countries
significantly engaged, or risks associated with a special activity, a written
Memorandum of Notification (MON) shall be submitted to the President for his
approval. . . . An MON also shall be submitted to the President for his approval in
order to modify a Finding in light of changed circumstance or passage of time; or
to cancel a Finding because the special activity authorized has been completed or
for any other reason.
Of course, this directive was issued after the Iran-Contra crisis and before the 1991
amendments, but it shows how law incorporates executive practice in this area.
Subsequent presidents may interpret these terms differently, but at minimum,
NSDD-286 sets a congressional and public baseline expectation.
1.2.3 Fully and Currently Informed

Finally, the act imposes a third reporting requirement on the executive, and specifi-
cally the DNI.
To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized
disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and
methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of National
Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the United
States Government involved in a covert action–
(1) shall keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of all covert actions which are the reasonability of, are engaged in by, or
are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the
United States Government, including significant failures. (National Security Act
1947, sec. 413b(b))
It follows, at least from an executive-branch perspective, that this might be done

with the same mechanism used to report the threshold finding or MON to the full
committees and staff or a limited number of members, if at all. The language also
contemplates a measure of discretion to protect sources and methods. (A presi-
dential lawyer might say the language recognizes the president’s authority over
state secrets.) Further, as a matter of constitutional law, the DNI, DCIA, and such
other heads of departments are subject to the direction of the president as chief
executive, especially in this area because covert action is inherently presidential in
character.
1.2.4 Assessment
After the controversies of the 1980s involving first, the 1983 mining of Nicaraguan
harbors, and then, the Iran-Contra affair, systemic issues involving the separation
of powers and covert action appeared to find a period of stability, even maturity.
This was a product of the law itself, which, in its array of reporting options, pre-
sented a constitutional compromise between the views of the political branches, at
least at the moment that the amendments were enacted in 1991.
To the extent a singular view can be attributed to Congress in 1991, the insti-
tution was of the view that prior notification, if not consultation, was required
(U.S. Congress 1991, S. Doc. 102–85, 226–40). The executive, on the other hand,
took the view in 1991 that notification was a matter of comity and not law, not-
ing that presidents had engaged in covert action since George Washington with-
out formal requirements of notification (Bush 1992; Knott 1996). Thus, the
branches were left to work out in factual and political context-specific reporting
expectations.
596 covert action
However, there are indications, including in the Intelligence Authorization Acts

for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, which have either been vetoed or failed to pass
out of Congress, that the notification and reporting regimes are in tension. Among
other things, recent drafts of these bills have contained provisions seeking to condi-
tion the spending of covert action appropriations, or a percentage of appropriations,
on the intelligence committees receiving a briefing on “all ongoing covert action pro-
grams” (U.S. Congress 2008, H. Doc. 110–665, sec. 105). In addition, other provisions
have sought to create a position of inspector general within the Office of the DNI with
responsibility for, among other things, conducting frequent reviews of all covert-
action programs and reporting the results to Congress (U.S. Congress 2008, H. Doc.
110–665, sec. 421; U.S. Congress 2007, S 3237, sec. 304). As with the definition of covert
action itself, each of these draft provisions suggests legislative concern regarding the
status, extent, and substance of the notification and reporting regime.
Ironically perhaps, some of the legislative friction appears to derive from the use
of covert action modalities to report activities that did not involve covert action,
including the Terrorism Surveillance Program.6 In addition, members of Congress
expressed frustration regarding the manner in which information regarding a Syrian
site attacked by Israel in September 2007 was not shared with the intelligence com-
mittees (U.S. Congress 2008, H. Doc. 110–665, Committee Statement and Views).
At this juncture, it is not clear whether these data points represent short-term
issues reflective of particular personalities, or long-term trends reflective of inher-
ent tensions implicit in the separation of powers between the political branches.
Three observations follow.
First, the relationship between the branches has appeared to function better
when based on contextual judgments rather than constitutional absolutes. It has
also worked better between branches, when the chairs and ranking members of the
committees view themselves as an institutional team, rather than partisan watch-
dogs regulating the intelligence oversight process.
Second, from a congressional standpoint, the legislature is not without recourse
if, on an institutional level, it wishes to assert its influence over the covert-action
instrument. Notified or not, the funding power will ultimately constrain the execu-
tive; existing funding and the “Reserve for Contingencies” is not exhaustive (National
Security Act 1947, sec. 414(a)).7 Moreover, the committees may assert displeasure
with the manner of reporting through use of the funding authority and, in some
cases, the appointment power in other functional areas. Finally, individual mem-
bers may assert their influence through informal processes, including contact with
the president.
Third, from an executive standpoint, lawyers should not overlook that the pres-
ident acts at the zenith of his authority when he acts with the express authority of
6
For a discussion of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, see Baker (2007, ch. 5).
7
For examples of Congress terminating funding for U.S. covert action, see the Clark and
Tunney amendments (International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976; Department
of Defense Appropriation Act 1976) discussed in Brown (2008, 35).
the Congress in conjunction with his own constitutional authority. Legal observers
will recognize this proposition as a reflection of Justice Jackson’s paradigm in
Youngstown (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 1952, 636). But it is a constitu-
tional truism, not just case law. However, for reasons of ideology, personality, or
partisanship, a congressional role is often grudgingly embraced. While the intelli-
gence relationship between the branches requires careful contextual analysis and
individual determinations, presidents should consider that it is not just presidents,
but their subordinates, who act at the zenith of their authority when action is autho-
rized by the president and meaningfully notified to Congress.
Where legal authority is clear and clearly invoked, operators in the field will
take greater risks. Meaningful congressional involvement is accomplished through
the process of notification, authorization, and appropriation. This same process can
also serve to validate covert action policies and as a bellwether of potential reaction
in the event of disclosure.
1.3 Executive Process

If the National Security Act is the legal skeleton, executive process is covert action’s
bureaucratic flesh and blood. The substantive threshold for a finding is low—
“important to the national security” (National Security Act 1947, sec. 413b(a)); how-
ever, the procedural threshold is relatively high. This reflects the fact that the
president must authorize covert action. More importantly, it reflects that in light of
the policy and legal risks associated with covert action, presidents have subjected
proposals and activities to defined processes of review (Brown 2008, 33). This is
expressly recognized by executive order:
The NSC shall consider and submit to the President a policy recommendation,
including all dissents, on each proposed covert action and conduct a periodic
review of ongoing covert action activities, including an evaluation of the
effectiveness and consistency with current national policy of such activities and
consistency with applicable legal requirements. The NSC shall perform such other
functions related to covert action as the President may direct, but shall not
undertake the conduct of covert actions. The NSC shall also review proposals for
other sensitive intelligence operations. (Executive Order 13,470, sec. 1.2(b))
Additional presidential directives may further enumerate internal process.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2 (1993), for example, stated that “[t]he
Attorney General shall be invited to attend meetings [of the NSC] pertaining to his
jurisdiction, including covert actions.” However, these are selective data points.
Executive-branch directives, and more importantly, the actual practice in handling
of covert-action proposals, MONs, and the conduct of activities pursuant to exist-
ing authorizations, remain below the waterline of public observation and therefore
appraisal. Moreover, because this process is internal to the executive branch, it is
subject to executive-branch exception or amendment, with general or case-specific
approval by the president. This is risky, because in this area, as in other areas of
national security practice, the twin necessities of secrecy and speed may pull as they
598 covert action
do against the competing interests of deliberate review, dissent, and informed

accountable decision-making.
These risks magnify the importance of a meaningful process of ongoing execu-
tive appraisal. Here the public record reflects that the president has directed a peri-
odic review of ongoing programs. He has also assigned to the DNI responsibility to
“oversee and provide advice to the president and the NSC with respect to all ongo-
ing and proposed covert action programs” (Executive Order 13,470, sec. 1.3(b)(3)).
2. Legal Limits and Permits

In addition to providing broad authority to act, the law imposes certain general
limitations. First, “[a] finding may not authorize any action that would violate the
Constitution or any statute of the United States” (National Security Act 1947,
sec. 413 (a)(5)). Thus, contrary to some misperceptions, covert action is not “extra-
legal” or a “no-rule” option, at least as a matter of U.S. law.
Second, and related, Congress specifies in each Intelligence Authorization Act
(when passed) that the appropriation of monies for covert action does not consti-
tute authority for activities that otherwise would violate statute or offend the
Constitution.8 In context, the executive branch may take yet a different view regard-
ing the impact of a specific authorization and appropriation of money, but the gen-
eral point is made. While Congress may exempt covert activities from the reach of
U.S. law, as, for example, the law exempts intelligence agencies from certain pass-
port and visa requirements, such exemption should not be assumed through refer-
ence to the appropriation of money alone.
Third, “[n]o covert action may be conducted which is intended to influence
United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media” (National
Security Act 1947, sec. 413b(f)). This admonition is repeated in executive order, as
well (Executive Order 13,470, sec. 3(jj)). The key qualification is found in the verb
“intended.” Violation of this provision requires what criminal lawyers know as spe-
cific intent, or perhaps, in the policy context, a degree of certainty as to impact by
which one should be deemed to have intended the reasonable consequences of their
actions. This is a necessary qualification. Surely, the goal of any covert action is to
influence U.S. policies by influencing events abroad. In turn, one would expect that
the success or failure of such actions shapes public opinion and the media. The
purpose behind this provision is therefore to prohibit the use of the covert-action
instrument to directly influence U.S. processes by, for example, running propaganda
in U.S. media. The risk of “blow-back” nonetheless remains. For example, an activ-
ity may be sufficiently covert that U.S. political, policy, and media actors do not
realize that the events they are observing are inspired in whole or in part by U.S.
8
See, for example, the Intelligence Authorization Act 2004, sec. 302.
action, and may not reflect the true nature of the local factors at work. Moreover, a
more direct form of “blow-back” can occur when unwitting U.S. actors intervene to
disrupt or reveal an “illicit” activity, not realizing that it is in reality an authorized
covert activity.
Fourth, as is generally known but often misunderstood, “assassination” is pro-
hibited by presidential executive order. President Ford initially issued this prohibi-
tion in 1976 following revelations during congressional hearings of certain “CIA
assassination plots” during the Cold War. The text states: “No person employed by
or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to
engage in, assassination” (Executive Order 12,333, sec. 211). A number of points bear
mention.
This prohibition is found in an executive order, not U.S. criminal law. That
means, among other things, that the president may amend, interpret, or suspend
the prescription and do so in a classified manner. But it is the president alone who
has authority to do so.
“Assassination” is not defined in the executive order. Some public commentary
exists on what the term might mean in U.S. practice, including comments by a for-
mer president (Clinton 2001). However, while the views of one president may be
persuasive, they are not binding on a future president. Therefore, anyone consider-
ing this prohibition from inside or outside the U.S. government should ensure that
the statements of law on which they rely are authoritative. An authoritative view
would necessarily draw on classified as well as unclassified documents and derive
directly from the president.
The public record reflects that presidents have not applied the prohibition to
targets that the president or his lawyers determine constitute lawful military targets
under the law of armed conflict.9
This illustrates a fifth point—whether or not an action would violate the execu-
tive order, other U.S. laws, including criminal laws, may apply, including those pro-
visions in Title 18 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice implementing the law
of armed conflict. These same provisions may also “apply” through the potential
application of international law by foreign actors who take a different view of inter-
national law or their own law than the United States. This may alter the tactical risks
for those in the field. It may also change the strategic risks of action in situations
where international observers may perceive U.S. actions as “assassination,” “extraju-
dicial killing,” or “terrorism,” even if the United States does not. The negative impact
of such perception on U.S. national security—in the form of public goodwill, intel-
ligence liaison, and enemy propaganda—may outweigh the benefits of any contem-
plated action.
Sixth, the president has directed that:
No agency except the Central Intelligence Agency (or the Armed Forces of the
United States in time of war declared by the Congress or during any period
9
For further discussion, see Baker (2007, ch. 7–8) and Reisman and Baker (1992, 57–59,
69–72, 126–71).
600 covert action
covered by a report from the President to the Congress consistent with the War
Powers Resolution, Public Law 93–148) may conduct any covert action activity
unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a
particular objective. (Executive Order 13,470, sec. 1.7(a)(4))
Although the president’s directive acknowledges its own avenue of presidential

exception, two normative points are established. First, the CIA is the lead agency for
the conduct of covert action. Second, the order contemplates that during periods of
conflict, military units may play a larger or even normative role in the conduct of
covert action, or activities that would constitute covert action if undertaken by the
CIA. The United States has been in conflict since 9–11 and will likely remain so for
the indefinite future.
3. Legal Templates and Practice
3.1 Structural and Contextual Questions

In U.S. practice, a number of structural issues recur. A few examples illustrate. First,
policymakers, operators, and lawyers will need to make threshold determinations
regarding conduct. What conduct is contemplated and does the conduct constitute
“covert action?” If not, where does it fall on a factual or legal continuum that
includes diplomacy, collection, liaison, and covert action? The line between these
legal rubrics is not always precise, or sometimes even apparent.
There is room for legal policy judgment, as well. For example, where lawful
alternatives are available—perhaps one can reasonably conclude that additional
authority is needed to proceed or take the view that it is not, or perhaps even argue
that the conduct amounts to liaison—are there advantages in terms of accountabil-
ity, risk-management, and effect in getting express approval?
If the conduct in question constitutes covert action, who should or who must
authorize the activity? Does it fall within an existing authorization? If so, will the
conduct nonetheless constitute a “significant undertaking” or “change?” If not
already authorized, what process of policy review and authorization is required or
appropriate? Here, it is apparent that legal emphasis may be placed on the dissec-
tion of the statutory terms, as well as on the dissection of classified legal and factual
precedent. Equal emphasis should be applied to testing facts and assumptions and
in validating adherence to a timely, but meaningful process of review. As important,
if the conduct in question is not covert action, perhaps because it is a traditional
military activity or has become so over time, is the conduct authorized? And, is the
conduct in question subject to a process of policy, operational, and legal review
commensurate with the importance and risks involved, whether or not the law
requires such review?
Next, who must or should be informed within the executive branch? The answer
may be intuitive in the case of authorizing officials; it may be less intuitive when
determining which persons or institutions should know, perhaps to avoid unin-
tended consequences, such as the different forms of “blow-back” described above.
Likewise, in context, is congressional notification required, either as a matter of
initial notification or ongoing reporting? If so, pursuant to what mechanism, and
who may trigger that mechanism? If not required, is it nonetheless prudent to
inform select members of the congressional leadership?
In addition to these recurring structural questions, contextual questions of
operational detail will also arise. If the conduct is covert action, is it lawful in con-
cept and is it lawful in the manner and means of execution, at least as a matter of
U.S. law? An intuitive template follows:
1. U.S. Law
a. Constitutional
b. Statutory
i. Title 50
ii. Title 18
iii. Other
c. Executive
i. President
ii. Attorney General
iii. ODNI directives
iv. Other
2. International Law
3. Foreign Law
Operation of the template is illustrated with respect to hypothetical options involving
an extremist target at a point location. A partial, non-exhaustive checklist follows.
Domestic Law
Authorization: What is it? If the conduct constitutes “covert action,” is it already
authorized? If authorized, does it nonetheless amount to a significant undertaking
or change? If not, is subordinate approval nonetheless required? (If it is not covert
action, what process of review and approval is applicable? If not covert action, are
there redlines that might make it so and are policymakers and operators aware of
those redlines?)
Operational Review: If covert action is contemplated, might the same policy
objective be achieved through other lawful methods, and do those alternative meth-
ods mitigate risks or offer preferred means from the standpoint of legal values, opera-
tional detail, or security effect? If circumstances change on the ground, are the
necessary procedural and legal redlines in place? What questions of authority, if any,
must be pursued up the chain of command, for example: estimates in collateral dam-
age or transboundary locations? Likewise, what changes in fact might alter legal advice
and outcomes, for example: what if the target relocates to a protected location?
602 covert action
Targeting: Does the intelligence support the use of force in anticipatory self-
defense? Against this target? Are alternative means available to accomplish the same
goal, that is, is the use of force necessary? What means of validation have been used
to confirm the identity of the target? Once the identity is verified, is the target a law-
ful military target, as understood in the context of a conflict against extremists? Are
the methods and means contemplated consistent with the law of armed conflict?
For example, understanding that this is covert action, do the means contemplated
cross into the realm of perfidy or treachery under U.S. criminal law implementing
the law of armed conflict? Has the risk of collateral consequences been evaluated
and factored into operational detail? Is the process used to authorize the conduct in
covert channels consistent with the application of the law of armed conflict? In
military channels? If not, why not, and are the reasons based on well-founded law,
legal policy, or policy distinctions?
Capture: In the event the target seeks to surrender or is captured, are there rules
of engagement that will guide operators in applying U.S. law and executive direc-
tion? If a suspect is captured, are there rules of conduct in place regarding the treat-
ment of detainees that are consistent with U.S. laws involving the treatment of
detainees and torture? Further, to the extent third parties are involved in U.S. actions
or U.S.-directed actions, what safeguards, if any, are prudent or required by law to
ensure third-party compliance with U.S. law?
Rendition: If the target is seized or captured, is third-country rendition con-
templated? Is it possible? In the absence of ordinary processes of extradition, what
means of identity validation will be used? Are third-country assurances regarding
the treatment of persons rendered necessary to comply with U.S. laws on torture
and humane treatment? At what level of authority and in what form must such
assurances take?
International Law
Regardless of how the U.S. interprets its law, including U.S. law implementing inter-
national law, do other states and actors share the U.S. view of international law? If
not, what are the legal and policy risks of action, or inaction? What are the risks in
countries where U.S. operators may be deployed? With respect to the status of any
persons killed or captured in the course of conduct? In the manner of international
response to U.S. actions? Are there reasonable operational means to mitigate these
risks? Have the policy and legal policy risks been accurately and fully identified for
decision-makers so that they can assess the potential risks and benefits of
proceeding?
Foreign Law
Will the conduct in question violate local law, including local law implementing
international law and conventions to which the United States is not a party or may
not feel bound, but that might otherwise impact the conduct of third-party states?
If so, what are the ramifications if the conduct is discovered? If rendition is contem-
plated, will transit routes trigger foreign laws applicable to extradition?
Here, decision-makers must assess not only the legal consequences of law viola-
tion, but also the operational and policy risks. For example, if discovered or dis-
closed, will U.S. actions result in critical operators being foreclosed from entering or
transiting key countries? Will U.S. aircraft, intelligence, civil, or military, be denied
flight clearances? Will U.S. diplomacy and liaison relations be harmed?
Appraisal: If disclosed, is the United States prepared to disclose the predicate
information informing the decision to undertake the activity? Is the United States
prepared to assume responsibility for an action, including through the identifica-
tion and protection of persons in the field? If disclosed, will other states assume a
reciprocal right of action and what impact will that have on U.S. interests and pub-
lic order generally? If disclosed, and acknowledged, how will the U.S. describe its
actions in law and policy?
3.2 Legal Practice

As these illustrative questions might suggest, there is an art to providing meaningful
legal review in this area of practice. First, the lawyer must understand process (or
the lack of process) in order to determine where he or she might best engage deci-
sion-makers and provide proactive advice. Knowledge of process also provides a
point of comparison, so that the lawyer can advise decision-makers on how the
process used may deviate from the norm and what may be known or unknown as a
result. Where so much is secret, legal and policy trip-wires are an essential compo-
nent of meaningful legal advice, for example, “this is properly done as liaison, but it
may become ‘covert’ if X and Y were to happen.” Moreover, there is opportunity for
operators and policymakers to evade their lawyers through self-characterization of
their actions or hidden alternative processes of decision.
Second, once in the room, the lawyer needs to hold his or her place. This is
accomplished by knowing the law and the history that informs the law, wherever
it is found. And, it is accomplished by obtaining the confidence of policymakers
and operators so that the lawyer can ask essential questions without being co-
opted in the process. This is done in part by meeting deadlines, making account-
able decisions as opposed to engaging in avoidance tactics, and keeping secrets
secret.
Third, the lawyer should serve as counselor. Covert action law is process ori-
ented. The National Security Act is not prescriptive in approach, but rather seeks to
guide the president to review proposals carefully. That means there may be multiple
legal paths to the same end result. The lawyer guides toward lawful outcomes; the
counselor guides to preferred outcomes. The counselor also tests facts and assump-
tions, tests the validity of the process used, and distinguishes between what is lawful
and what is wise. The lawyer may be specially suited to play these roles based on
training and based on his or her neutral policy and budgetary status.
604 covert action
Most of all, practice requires moral integrity and self-confidence. That is

because, in theory, the lawyer’s judgments will not be subjected to validation at the
time of decision; if they are evaluated, they will likely be evaluated in the context of
investigation or inquiry when memories may vary or wane depending on the issue
in question. Lawyers in this area also operate under pressure. First, there is the pres-
sure of being an outsider on the team and not quite belonging. Second, the lawyer
operates under national-security pressure. Covert action is an extraordinary instru-
ment; presumably, there are extraordinary reasons for its use, including the protec-
tion of U.S. lives. Therefore, extraordinary pressure exists to get to “yes,” or to ignore
or evade well-founded procedural thresholds.
But if the lawyer is true to his or her duty, they must be prepared to say “no,”
or more likely “yes, but . . .” Some lawyers say “no” because they are cautious. But
if policymakers and operators are fulfilling their duties, they will seek to use all
of the legal space Director Hayden described (Hayden 2007). They will define
that space based on the advice of counsel doing their duty, by saying “no” when
lawful limits are reached (and providing lawful alternatives and guidance well
before that point). If counsel is not put in the position of saying “no,” then
national security decision-makers should not be confident that operators are
considering all available options, which is distinct from deciding to use those
options.
4. Conclusion: The Role of Law

Whatever one’s historical perspective, covert action is a critical instrument in the
counterterrorism and nonproliferation toolbox. Thus, presidents should consider
the manner in which they command and wield the instrument with the same depth
and thought as they consider their role as commander in chief. This includes con-
sideration on how best to wield the law, law defines operational space (Hayden
2007).
National security law serves three purposes. First, it provides substantive
authority to act. Second, it embeds essential process in executive practice and pro-
tects against the national security pathologies of speed and secrecy. Third, law is a
national security value. It can reflect America’s highest ideals, it can distinguish the
United States from its opponents, and values embedded in law, like accountable
process, improve security result.
The three roles of national security law are true in the context of covert action,
as well. This point may at first seem counterintuitive, in that one reason an action
may be conducted covertly is to mitigate the risks of violating or appearing to vio-
late transnational law. However, especially where covert action is concerned, policy-
makers, operators, observers, and most of all presidents, should embrace the role
of law.
Substantive Authority
The president wields broad authority to use the covert action instrument. There are
few direct limitations. While Congress can play an important role in validating its
use through external review, the law makes clear what historical practice reveals—
covert action is and remains an instrument of presidential policy. However, execu-
tive actors should recall that the president acts at the zenith of his authority when
pursuing covert action strategies within the context of a meaningful process of
notification and review. Meaningful internal and external appraisal also helps to
ensure that U.S. actions are effective and lawful.
Process
Good process is essential to effective, lawful, and wise use of the covert action instru-
ment. The law, in statute and executive regulation, recognizes as much by placing
emphasis on the framework of decision-making as opposed to the substance of
decision. Good process identifies enduring consequences and not just immediate
gains; it prevents “blow-back”; and it ensures that essential facts are known and
unknown facts are identified. And yet, the pressure to deviate is strong. Presidents
and operators alike should ask whether the action is being conducted covertly, or
under a “traditional” rubric to avoid scrutiny, to avoid internal or external appraisal,
or as a matter of operational and policy necessity. They should also ask whether
procedural deviations are necessary, or intended to evade review and dissent. The
answer to an ineffective and untimely process is not to evade the system, but to
change it, or the persons who make it so. Finally, the president and his intelligence
alter egos, the APNSA and DNI, should recall that the president receives the process
he tolerates or desires. It is through effective process—timely and meaningful—that
the United States can best wield the covert action instrument wisely, lawfully, and in
a manner consistent with America’s values.
Values
In substance and process, the law reflects America’s values. These values directly
contribute to security to the extent they guide a meaningful and accountable deci-
sion-making process. They also contribute directly to policy success, by limiting the
methods and means of coercion to those that are necessary, proportionate, and dis-
criminate, and thus least likely to offend and most likely to garner intelligence, dip-
lomatic, and popular support.10 And, they contribute indirectly to U.S. national
security by underpinning America’s moral authority to lead and demand support in
alliance or liaison. Where America is perceived to act outside the law and its own
legal values, U.S. actions can serve as a source of negative propaganda and a tool of
the opponent’s recruitment.
10
For an elaboration of this argument, see Baker (2007, ch. 3).
606 covert action
Policymakers should be cognizant that strategic covert actions of the past are
now known in part or in whole. The question of disclosure seems to be a matter of
time—when, not whether, disclosure occurs. Tactical covert actions may enjoy
greater prospect of enduring secrecy. As a result, it is good policy, and not just
an internal reflection of morality, that covert actions reflect U.S. national security
values in policy and law.
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Powerful Advisors. Project on National Security Reform.
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and His Administration’s Efforts to Capture Osama bin Laden: Interview by Tom
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Large 90 (1976): 153.
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States Intelligence Activities. Federal Register 73, no. 150: 45,325.
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chapter 37
COVERT ACTION:
STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES
william j. daugherty
1. Introduction
Covert action is a tool of American statecraft that traces its roots as far back as the
Revolutionary War.1 Then, at the secret direction of and oversight from the Second
Continental Congress’s Committee of Correspondence, diplomat Silas Deane was
detailed to Paris to seek aid from the French. He found the Republic’s foreign
minister, Charles Gravier Comte de Vergennes, more desirous of avenging French
losses against the British for the Seven Year’s War than he was anxious about assisting
a presumptuous rebel group whose chances of success were not assured. Vergennes
As required of all current or former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, this
manuscript was submitted to the CIA’s Publications Review Board to insure that it does not
contain any information appropriately classified under Agency regulations and United States laws.
The approval of this material by the CIA neither constitutes authentication of the material nor
implies CIA endorsement of the author’s views.
1
History tells of many regimes, from before the Roman Empire to the present, that have
employed what an intelligence professional of today would recognize as covert action to achieve
political and military objectives. While this article will visit covert-action operations conducted by a
few foreign as well as American governments, discussions related to governmental processes for
formulating, implementing, and reviewing covert-action programs pertain only to those of the U.S.
government. For intelligence operations, including covert-action operations, for regimes dating to
the Roman Empire and earlier, see Rose Mary Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust
in the Gods but Verify (London, 2005), and her excellent works on early intelligence in general.
strengths and weaknesses 609
was also smart enough to realize that openly supporting the American revolution-
aries would entail serious and costly repercussions from the British. Vergennes’
solution was to recruit, clandestinely, a famous personage, the opera composer and
playwright Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, to create an ostensibly legiti-
mate business enterprise to serve covertly his policy decision to aid the Americans.
Thus it was that Rodrigue Hortelez et Cie opened for business, conducting legiti-
mate enterprise while clandestinely channeling laundered monies, secretly acquired
munitions, and other essential military supplies to General George Washington’s
Continental Army. These materials proved decisive in various American victories
and ultimately to American success in the Revolution (Knott 1996, 30).2
Intelligence officers and scholars today would easily recognize the elements of a
successful covert-action program in Rodrigue Hortelez et Cie: two governments
collaborating secretly to further political aspirations beneficial to both; the employ-
ment of a legitimate business as an overt front for conducting a secret mission; reli-
ance on a respected personage possessing no apparent connection to either
government to lend legitimacy to the enterprise; operations conducted at the direc-
tion of the highest levels of each government; and the utilization of covert method-
ologies (i.e., tradecraft) to cloak their activities and insure secrecy.3
Since then, for over 233 years covert action has been a tool relied upon by many
American presidents, including all post-World War II chief executives, who exercised
by design or by dint of circumstance a robust American foreign policy. Covert action
was used in the early 1800s to expand the boundaries of the United States, later to
shore up relations with foreign nations, to protect American economic interests as
well as American lives and property overseas. In the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury, covert adjuncts to overt policies were implemented to overthrow governments
through subversion or paramilitary actions, secretly fund elections, instigate trade
union strikes, support revolutionary or nationalist movements and incumbent
regimes alike with equal fervor, destabilize national economies through manipula-
tion or sabotage, take down terrorist groups and narcotics cartels, and more. Perhaps
most important, covert action was a vital component to America’s strategy for con-
taining communist expansion and winning the Cold War, the policy set forth in the
seminal directive, NSC-68, which guided American foreign policy for four decades
and nine presidents.4 “Clearly, covert action was viewed as part of the nation’s Cold
War arsenal to do battle against the forces of communism” (Snider 2008, 260).
In its simplest form, the objective of a covert-action program is to influence a
foreign audience—a government, a population, one particular leader, a non-state
actor (e.g., narco-cartel or terrorist group)—to alter its policies or actions in ways
2
Knott’s work is perhaps the definitive coverage of early covert action. See also Christopher
Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only (1995), and John J. Carter, Covert Operations as a Tool for
Presidential Foreign Policy in History From 1800 to 1920 (2000), for additional material on covert
action operations early in the new American republic.
3
Not all covert-action programs are allied with friendly governments, but many are.
4
United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 7 April 1950.
610 covert action
that benefit or support the goals of the government that is conducting them.5
Importantly, almost by definition covert action is only a supplement to an estab-
lished and publicly articulated foreign policy, that is, a sub rosa adjunct to diplo-
macy, trade incentives and sanctions, aid and assistance programs, financial
inducements or restrictions, military training programs, agricultural credits, etc.,
that developed and energized in concert to achieve a president’s policies toward a
foreign country, a geographic region, or an issue. Per force, covert-action programs
and their component operations are not traditional intelligence programs like
information collection and counterintelligence operations, but instead are elements
of a government’s foreign and national security policies. And as such, for the United
States, such programs are truly presidential: created by presidential directive, man-
aged by the president’s foreign intelligence service, and overseen by White House
national security officials, including the president personally in many cases.
By its very nature, when directed against a foreign government or population,
covert action often constitutes a clandestine intrusion into the legal sovereignty of
the nation or nations targeted, a violation of both international law and the United
Nations charter. As such, reliance on covert action can be risky for a democratic
government should a program become compromised and subjected to scrutiny by
the media. A program directed against a hostile government (e.g., against the Soviet
Union during the 1945–91 Cold War) is more likely to be justifiable to the public
than when aimed against or within a neutral or allied nation, or when methods
employed strike the public as excessively hostile. Here, the government risks serious
public rebuke.6 Nor may the general citizenry within a democracy necessarily share
5
The official definition of covert action is enshrined in the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 102–88, 105 Stat. 429 (1991), section 503 [c] [4] [e], and states that “Covert action
is an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will
not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but which does not include (1) activities the primary
purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional
activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs,
or administrative activities; (2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support for
such activities; (3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government
law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or (4) activities to provide routine
support to the overt activities [other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)], of other
United States Government agencies abroad.” Discussion of the different and evolving definitions of
covert action may be found at Daugherty (2004, 12–17), and Johnson and Wirtz (2004, 253).
6
Since 1974 and the requirement that the president send to Congress a covert-action Finding,
Congress has shared responsibility with the president for the underlying wisdom of a covert-action
program. A Finding is a document under the president’s signature in which he “finds” the
proposed covert-action program to be in the national interest. In 1975, Congress halted funding of
a U.S. covert intervention into a civil war in Angola, and likewise later convinced President Reagan
to change his mind about the wisdom of sponsoring a regime change in Surinam, determining
that there were no American national security interests involved in either country. The House
Intelligence Committee convinced Reagan to drop a proposed program in Africa, and both Reagan
and President George H.W. Bush to curtail programs targeted at Panama. See Daugherty (2008, 95,
197); Snider (2008, 273–76).
the policy objectives of its leaders which the covert-action programs are to support.
The Reagan administration’s inability to convince much of the public and Congress
of a communist threat in Central America led to harsh criticism of the administra-
tion as the CIA-run covert-action programs in that region received sustained media
exposure.
Most risky, politically speaking, are the secret programs undertaken by one
democracy to change the policies of another democracy. The compromise of such a
program could entail severe political (and perhaps economic) consequences, at least
in the short term, and even if not just the fact that an ally would interfere in anoth-
er’s democratic processes usually generates a lack of trust on the part of the target
government and population against the sponsoring government. Any type of posi-
tive relations between the two could be seriously and negatively affected for months
or years. But, risky or not, it has been done.
In 1940, the British government under Winston Churchill conducted a dedi-
cated and intense covert-action program within the United States with the objec-
tives of moving the government and populace away from isolationism and toward
supporting the British in the European war that had begun two years prior. The
ultimate objective was to convince the Americans actually to enter the war on the
side of the British. The British employed many of the elements of covert action,
particularly various types of propaganda and political action, including recruiting
agents of influence within and without the American government who had direct
access to President Franklin, D. Roosevelt (Mahl 1998).7 It is questionable how much
progress the British were making with members of Congress and with the public, as
the effort became moot with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941, and German’s subsequent declaration of war against the United States on
December 11. The British program is still unknown to the vast majority of Americans,
and how the British efforts would have been viewed by Americans at the time had
the program become public knowledge may only be guessed. But one can imagine
that it would not have been well received in some segments of society, just in prin-
ciple if for no other reason.
Arguably, a starker example of the dangers of a democratic government under-
taking covert-action operations in the sovereign territory of another democracy
was L’Affaire du Rainbow Warrior, the sinking of the Greenpeace trawler in the
Auckland, New Zealand, harbor in 1985 (Porch 1995; Sunday Times 2000). The
destruction of the boat, which was used in protests against the French government
for its nuclear tests in the South Pacific, resulted in the death of one person and had
been personally approved by French President François Mitterrand and carried out
by a saboteurs from the French military foreign intelligence service, the Direction
Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (D.G.S.E.). The consequences included disruption
of cordial relations between the French and New Zealanders, the resignation of the
7
Thomas Mahl’s Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States 1939–1941
is a sound accounting of the British efforts, which have mostly gone ignored by American
historians.
612 covert action
French minister of defense, the sacking of the head of the D.G.S.E., and an apology
(two decades hence) from Mitterrand himself. New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance
received world-wide approbation, but not with the United States government,
which refused to condemn the act (nor did the British government), and so in turn
resulted in a significant alteration in the long-standing ANZUS (Australia-
New Zealand-United States) multilateral defense policy. From this event, one may
surmise that, in all but the most critical of circumstances, the costs to a democratic
government conducting a covert-action program in the sovereign territory of an
allied democracy, are potentially not worth the risk.
Covert-action operations are managed by intelligence agencies because they
are the only such organizations that possess the expertise in clandestine opera-
tional methodology and financial resources to conduct them with the requisite
secrecy. And, too, intelligence organizations usually have a corresponding analyti-
cal branch whose all-source products can provide insights into the effectiveness
of the overall program at any given time and guidance for improving it. Covert-
action programs are composed of subordinate operations that may include: pro-
paganda—white, gray, and black; political/economic action—a category of
influence operations limited only by imagination; paramilitary operations and
“special activities” (operations that utilize the resources of a paramilitary struc-
ture, such as the clandestine exfiltration of a compromised individual from hos-
tile territory); and information warfare—the destruction of a computer or the
manipulation of its data through undetected intrusion (Daugherty 2004, 71–89;
Berkowitz and Goodman 2000, 143–44; Johnson and Wirtz 2004, 254–58).8 One
umbrella covert-action program may include one or more of these categories,
depending upon the objectives sought and how provocative the sponsoring
government wishes to be, with propaganda being the least and paramilitary
operations the most provocative ( Johnson 1989).
2. Strengths and Weaknesses:

Two Eternally Ambiguous Factors
Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of covert-action programs and operations
is, often, a relatively straightforward task. For example, operational costs (risk, fund-
ing, and other resources) may at times be assessed within reasonable limits and then
juxtaposed with the known or projected costs of alternative overt policy options to
aid policymakers in deciding whether to proceed. But there are aspects of covert-
action programs that are far more difficult to gauge, and they are particularly worth
8
Covert-action disciplines might be described or identified slightly differently (e.g., Johnson
and Wirtz 2004, 253–59), but there is unanimity with respect to the basics.
reflection, as they are arguably the two most important: judging success, and creating
policy coherence.
Determining Success
Presidents turn to covert-action programs for a number of reasons, some more
valid than others, but many times they do so for one simple: it works. It may not
work perfectly; indeed it may just barely achieve any of its objectives. It may not be
as clean, easy, quick, or cheap as envisioned. It certainly is not a guarantor of a suc-
cessful policy conclusion. But it may nonetheless (and despite its inherent risks and
flaws) still ultimately produce results sufficient to make it an attractive adjunct to a
president’s foreign policy. This seems to be particularly so when the program targets
are either hostile political entities (governments or non-state actors such as terrorist
groups) or populations divided on critical issues (e.g., Americans as assessed by the
British just prior to World War II). Irrespective of other advantages, if covert-action
programs did not possess some record of success as defined by the policymakers—
usually the achievement of a stated policy objective—or did not hold some promise
that the policy objectives could be achieved, it is doubtful that presidents would be
willing to accept the multiple risks that naturally inhere in these programs. (It is
worth noting here that covert action is no more immune to risk than any other
routine intelligence activity.)
In assessing the results of an umbrella covert-action program, or its individual
operational components, the concept of “success” must be considered in isolation
of other strengths and weaknesses, for it has different definitions dependent upon
the evaluator’s perspective (Daugherty 2004, 8). A policymaker would no doubt
consider a covert-action program to be a success if (a) it achieves the intended
policy objectives and (b) the sponsorship role of his government remains hidden,
at least for a suitable number of years afterward.
However, the intelligence officer who is managing such a program might con-
sider it a success merely if good agents are securely recruited and trained, and the
attendant operations are managed without any compromises or breaches of secrecy.
This officer, the intelligence professional, might consider a failure to achieve policy
goals as irrelevant, especially if he thought that the goals were unattainable in the
first place. That is, what a president seeks to accomplish might not be possible for
reasons having nothing to do with the operational aspects of the program (it might
just be a stupid idea, if nothing else). Part of any covert-action program is risk
assessments—the odds of achieving policy goals, chances of compromise versus
value objectives to be gained, and value of the objective versus the cost in money,
resources and, perhaps, lives expended to achieve the objective. The policymaker’s
calculus of these risks will not infrequently differ from that of the intelligence pro-
fessionals managing the program and running the individual operations. To posit
one extreme example, a policymaker might consider the capture or death of a for-
eign national recruited as an agent for the program to be acceptable in the long run,
while the case officer handling the agent might well not.
614 covert action
Still, if ordered to implement and manage such a program regardless of the risk
assessments, intelligence officers will do so even when a policy failure is forecast to
be virtually certain.9 But from the officer’s narrower operational perspective, the
program might otherwise be a success if his own operational objectives are met, for
example, if the result is the secure handling of the agent and the agent’s achievement
of his assigned tasks.
“Success” may also depend upon when, in the bright light of history, one assesses
a covert-action program. Judgments in the immediate aftermath might well see the
program as a marvelous achievement; but as circumstances unfold over the years or
decades, the results may be reckoned differently. The program could be viewed in
the long term as either making no ultimate and positive difference in the world it
was intended to shape, or, worse, as causing an outcome far worse than the ill it was
intended to heal (Codevilla 1992, 5–6; Daugherty 2004, 5; Prados 2007, 293). The
difference in perspective between the time a program is terminated and at some
point years or decades later can at times be the difference between night and day.
So much so, in fact, that the possibility of highly negative consequences manifesting
in the longer term should give pause to adherents of subverting or replacing an
established foreign government no matter how odious. Indeed, history shows that,
in the longer run, the undesirable consequences of overthrowing governments fre-
quently outweigh the shorter term gains.
In the well-known case of Iran, where in 1953 the United States engineered the
removal of the popularly elected prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh and the
(re-) installation of Shah Reza Pahlavi (who had fled the country and its violence),
the Shah’s subsequent inability to gain the support of his people and his unwilling-
ness to tolerate dissent led his regime to institute cruelly oppressive measures justi-
fied by “internal security” requirements (Daugherty 2001, 29–39; 2000, A15; Snider
2008, 261–62). Even his foreign intelligence collection programs were aimed not at
determining what hostile governments might be planning, but toward reporting on
the anti-regime activities of dissident Iranians abroad. The viciousness of the
Iranian government’s response to dissenters, even those with legitimate grievances,
helped spark the rise of the revolutionary movement that ultimately impelled the
Shah to flee the country in 1979. The Eisenhower administration viewed the return
9
In the history of the CIA, there have been instances in which the Agency as an institution,
as well as officers individually, have argued against a president’s intentions to conduct a covert-
action program. When a president insists, the Agency will salute and follow orders, although
individual officers may opt out of such programs, usually without damage to their careers.
Notably, President Richard Nixon insisted on at least two programs that Agency officers repeatedly
argued were ill-advised either because the risks of failure and compromise were too high or
because the policy bases for the operations were unsound—the Chilean program in 1971–73, and a
program in Iraqi Kurdistan from 1973 to 1975 (Daugherty 2004, 174–77). Similarly, President John F.
Kennedy might not have continued with the Bay of Pigs operation had he known that mid-level
Cuban specialists in CIA and the Department of Defense had rejected the premise that an invasion
would inspire an anti-Castro uprising, or that amphibious warfare experts would have pointed out
that the Bay of Pigs—a swamp—was no place to land an invasion force.
of the Shah as a successful containment of a potential Soviet move to bring strategi-

cally situated Iran within its ambit. The longer term consequences, however, were to
make possible a revolution that replaced the Shah with an Islamic regime that was
not only more oppressive and generally anti-West, but also virulently and unrelent-
ingly anti-American.
The 1954 ouster of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, hailed as key step in containing the
spread of Communism in the western hemisphere, brought a military dictatorship
to Guatemala that, over the next four decades, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of
thousand Guatemalans and bolstered anti-American sentiment on the Latin
American continent (Cullather 2006; Snider 2008, 261, 262–65). A failed covert-
action program to overthrow the leftward-drifting Indonesian regime of Ahmed
Sukarno in 1956–57 only moved Sukarno further to the left (Conboy and Morrison,
1999; Smith 1976; Snider 2008, 261, 263–65). Despite the embarrassment that flowed
from the compromised Indonesian effort, the Eisenhower administration contin-
ued to possess an arrant overconfidence in the ease and utility of regime replace-
ment. This attitude led President Eisenhower to begin planning for the overthrow
of Cuba’s new revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro, which was continued with little
critical questioning by the Kennedy administration. The subsequent “invasion” by
ill-prepared exiles at Cuba’s Bay of Pigs was an unmitigated disaster for Kennedy,
and set the stage of fifty years of antagonistic Cuban-American relations while stok-
ing still more anti-American anger in the southern hemisphere (Kornbluh 1998;
Jones 2008). The Afghan program of the 1980s was clearly a policy success for the
Reagan administration in that the Soviet occupying forces suffered a dramatic mili-
tary loss—a loss that helped pushed the corrupt and decrepit Soviet government to
the brink of collapse (Bearden and Risen 2003). But the quick abandonment of
Afghanistan by the following administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton
allowed the Taliban to gain control of the country and provide a haven for the fanat-
ical terrorist group Al-Qaeda.
Moreover, success in using covert action to effect regime change led to the
wrong lessons being learned and an over-reliance on a tool that in fact has only a
limited utility. The 1953 overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran and
the reinstallation of the pro-West Shah was considered so successful by the
Eisenhower administration that it allowed them to see regime reversal as a cheap
and easy fix to governments that had fallen, or might fall, under Soviet influence.
Thus, the Eisenhower moved forward with the ouster of Arbenz in Guatemala
in 1954 (against the warnings of the CIA officer who managed the Iran program),
the attempt to reverse the Sukarno government in Indonesia in 1956–57, and the
planning for the overthrow of Cuba’s Castro regime near the end of the admini-
stration.10 That the Indonesian program failed in no way diminished the
Eisenhower administration’s zeal for regime reversal; it was a valuable lesson
ignored (Daugherty 2004, 141–44).
10
The officer was Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt. See Roosevelt (1979).
616 covert action
But while historians will question whether the long-term consequences justi-
fied the short-term policy successes, it is unlikely that presidential administrations
will expend much time peering into the future while they are faced contemporane-
ously with a serious foreign-policy predicament. If they see regime removal or
another covert-action program as a solution to that problem, they will use it. In this
respect, perhaps the danger is not that covert action will be utilized, but that it will
be done so without sufficient understanding of its limitations and of the potential
of longer term negative consequences. Perhaps more than most human endeavors,
large-scale covert action is vulnerable to the Law of Unintended Consequences, and
presidents should not accept too blithely the ready assurances of his policymakers
that covert action is the solution.
Ensuring Policy Coherence

Which takes us to the second of the important but equally ambiguous elements,
policy coherence. Policy coherence, in terms of covert action, is an admixture of
politically justifiable and operationally sound objectives accompanied by an estab-
lished process for the thoughtful and thorough approval, review, and oversight of
the covert-action program and its component operations. In light of the obvious
and negative political risks to a president from a program failure or compromise, a
reasonable observer might find it easy to assume that covert-action programs are
always entered into only after sober assessment and clarification of objects. The
facile approval of covert-action programs or the absence of a clearly defined pur-
pose would seem counterintuitive. Yet, at times presidents have omitted applying
any meaningful process that would identify potential pitfalls, to their later embar-
rassment and to the detriment of American foreign-policy interests ( Johnson and
Wirtz 2004, 383–86).
Ultimately, then, policy coherence leading to a successful conclusion
(i.e., achievement of the political objectives), including a determination as to
whether a covert-action program is wise in the first place, depends on the presi-
dent—his motives, his care about detail, his willingness to reflect on possible
outcome assessments, his understanding of the history and culture of the
nation(s) that will be involved (either as objective or because of geographical
proximity), and, certainly as important as any, his adherence to an established
approval and oversight process. Regarding this last factor, significant deviation
from or the wholesale jettisoning of an established oversight process removes
necessary expertise (operational, political, geographical, etc.), multiple political
and operational perspectives, vital risk assessment, and collective wisdom from
the president’s awareness. This greatly reduces the chances of “success” no matter
how defined. “If the first rule for doctors is to do no harm. . . . surely the rule for
occupants of the White House should be to avoid the avoidable blunders in
decision-making” (Pious 2008, 2). Presidents since Eisenhower have created
formal high-level interagency committees within the White House to conduct
methodical reviews of covert-action programs (Daugherty 2004).11 But as the

president creates the review and oversight process, likewise can the president
choose ignore it. But at his own peril.
The importance to a president of a thorough and knowledgeable interagency
review process for a covert-action program may be deduced from what is absent
when such a process is ignored. “An operation is poorly conceived and executed.
Risk and opportunities are not accurately assessed. Past failures are not remem-
bered and play no role in the assessment of risk. Authorization does not go through
a formal staffing and briefing process that would allow the president to consider all
risks and benefits and all objections raised by knowledgeable officials, but rather
involved one or two close confidents who press their own point of view. The presi-
dent often expresses a sense of foreboding about the risks of proceeding, yet against
his better judgment allows himself to be convinced by these officials to authorize
the operations” (Pious 2008, 26–27).
Two notable case studies support the importance of submitting covert-action
programs to the intense scrutiny of interagency reviews. United States government
manipulation of (i.e., interference in) national elections in Chile, which was a fully
functioning constitutional democracy at the time, began in 1964 under President
John F. Kennedy, with the limited objective of preventing socialists and Marxists
from winning office. But the Chilean public nonetheless elected a Marxist, Salvador
Allende Gossens, to their presidency in a democratically constitutional vote in the
summer of 1970, an outcome that personally outraged the anticommunist President
Richard M. Nixon and impelled his foreign-policy alter ego, National Security
Advisor Henry A. Kissinger, to claim that the Chileans needed to be rescued from
their own stupidity. Under Nixon’s personal direction the Chilean program became
an attempt to preempt Allende’s subsequent inauguration, and then to undertake a
covert-action program to damage severely the Chilean economy as a method to
undermine Allende’s administration. Faced with stiff resistance from officers in the
State Department, the CIA, and even within his own White House staff, Nixon and
Kissinger cut out the White House advisors and assumed exclusive control of the
operations, even to the extent of keeping it secret from the U.S. ambassador in
11
Usually the first national-security document promulgated in a new administration lays out
the interagency process for the systematic approval, review, and oversight of foreign-policy
programs in general, with intelligence programs (including covert action) usually falling within
the jurisdiction of the process. In general, the groundwork is done in the relevant agency, or
agencies, and then proceeds to three levels of White House committees. First is an interagency
working group of senior officers across the community, then to a committee composed of the
deputy cabinet secretaries and agency heads, and then to the highest level, a committee of cabinet
secretaries and agency heads. The president’s national security advisor chairs the highest level
committee save for when the president sits in. This process insures that programs are coordinated
among agencies, consensus reached when possible at the appropriate level, and that the remaining
decisions are truly presidential in nature.
618 covert action
Santiago. Though Nixon finally backed off after Allende’s accession to office, events
set in motion eventuated in the death of the democratically elected Chilean presi-
dent, a U. S. congressional investigation that spread far beyond the Chilean pro-
gram, and deep resentment on the part of Chileans that resonated throughout Latin
America (Gustafson 2007; Daugherty 2004, 171–74; Snider 2008, 271–73).
Yet another foreign-policy debacle occurred when staff-level officials in the
Reagan White House plus the Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey
(operating as part of the president’s inner circle), facing certain resistance or even
obstruction from intelligence professionals and lawyers within the CIA and Justice
Department, deliberately ignored the president’s own established covert-action
review process and undertook illegal operations that, had they been conducted
according to federal statutes, presidential executive orders, and NSC procedures,
would have fallen under the rubric of covert action. National Security Council staff
members, working outside established procedures and legal authority, sold advanced
weaponry to the radical Islamic regime in Tehran (contrary to U.S. policy of not
dealing with nations sponsoring or conducting terrorism) and used the financial
proceeds to fund the Nicaraguan Contras (at a time when the U. S. Congress had
prohibited support to the Contras; Draper 1991; Walsh 1997; Cohen and Mitchell
1989).12 The full extent of the president’s knowledge of his subordinates’ actions are
unknown and probably never will be fully discerned, but all evidence points to a
certain level of awareness, and even tacit approval of some steps. When the “opera-
tions” conducted by the amateurs on the White House staff became public, there
was a lengthy investigation and trials by a special prosecutor, hearings by a joint
House-Senate investigating committee, and even calls for the president’s impeach-
ment. Moreover, friendly or allied foreign governments that had been pressured
strongly by the administration not to deal with Iran, or which had been denied the
right to purchase the same weapons that had been sent to the “enemy” Iran, were
vocally critical of the Reagan White House, resulting in a diminution of trust,
cooperation, and credibility.13
While the Reagan presidency survived, the scandal was a deep stain on his his-
torical legacy and resulted not only in revised White House procedures, but also in
the institutionalization of the CIA’s internal covert-action approval procedures
(Daugherty 2004, 103–105). Most tellingly, measures to prevent a recurrence were
enshrined in federal law via the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 (P.L. 102–88,
105 Stat. 429, 1991).
12
National Security Decision Directive-2, National Security Council Structure, of 12 January
1982; replaced with National Security Decision Directive-159, Covert Action Approval and
Coordination Procedures, 18 January 1985; further refined in National Security Decision
Directive-286, Approval and Review of Special Activities, 15 October 1987, following the Iran-Contra
scandal.
13
For example, the Jordanian government of King Hussein, arguably America’s best ally in
the Middle East, had been turned down when it requested to buy I(mproved)-HAWK antiaircraft
missiles and spare parts, items that were sold to Jordan’s foe, Iran (Daugherty 2004, 57).
Thus, both the Chilean covert-action program and the Iran-Contra scandal
illustrate the perils of covert action’s greatest weakness: a president who abuses the
process. But let this point be clear: even a thoughtful and thorough good-faith
application of such processes will not guarantee operational or overall program
success, neither long nor short term, if for no other reason than intelligence opera-
tions are inherently fraught with risk. However, the absence of such a process almost
certainly guarantees a failure bearing with it serious and long-lasting consequences
for a president’s legacy and for American foreign policy.
3. Other Strengths and Weaknesses

of Covert Action Programs
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, presidents rely on covert action because it
achieves their foreign-policy objectives often enough and well enough to make it
worth the risks and costs. And while perspectives relative to success and policy
coherence may be opaque, there are other elements in covert-action programs
related to inherent strengths and weakness that are not. These other considerations
provide policymakers a clearer basis for deciding whether a covert-action program
should be pursued and, if so, what types of operations it should be composed.
Prime among these is the view that covert action gives the president a policy
option for influencing the behavior of a foreign government or target, an option
between the slow, steady (and not always effective) deliberateness of diplomacy and
the immediate forceful and violent hammer of military force (Daugherty 2004,
19–20).14 In the words of Henry Kissinger: “we need an intelligence community that,
in certain complicated situations, can defend the American national interests in the
gray area where military operations are not suitable and diplomacy cannot operate”
(as quoted in Johnson and Wirtz 2004, 371). Covert-action operations run the gamut
from long-term, discreetly subtle influence efforts stemming from cleverly decep-
tive propaganda operations, through the more noticeable and confrontational
political and economic action operations, to highly visible regime-threatening
paramilitary operations or operations intended to undermine a regime by destroy-
ing some or part of its economy ( Johnson 1989).15 Overt use of military force should
always be the last policy of choice in a democracy, and yet democratic governments
may also find it necessary to undertake more dynamic measures than diplomatic
14
This is often referred to variously as “the third way,” or “the quiet option.”
15
University of Georgia Regents Professor Loch K. Johnson has thoughtfully constructed a
list of over thirty generic covert action operations, moving up the scale from long-range subtle
steps to ways in which the rapidly moving hammer of paramilitary force might be applied, giving
the reader a broadly drawn picture of covert tools available to the president to support his overt
policies ( Johnson 1989).
620 covert action
negotiations or to bide time while awaiting other overt coercive measures to produce
results. The nearly limitless variety of covert-action operations (at times, limited
only by the imagination of those managing the operations) gives a president an
enviable amount of flexibility and responsiveness in: (a) deciding how to proceed,
(b) deciding at what pace to mount the operations, and (c) controlling the extent to
which the president desires to provoke, confront, or threaten. The wide range of
operational possibilities especially serves the president well when yoked to a ful-
some overt policy. In short, covert action not only provides a president with a third
way or third option, it also “serves as a force multiplier for U.S. foreign policy goals”
(Gustafson 2007, 133–34).
Along this same line, the range and variety of covert-action options available to
the president permit him to calibrate the amount of pressure he desires to put to the
target audience, and to maintain at least a modicum of control over the conse-
quences of the operations. As the target responds or fails to respond to the applied
influence operations, the president may ease or increase their scope, pace, or inten-
sity as changing circumstances dictate. The wide scope of operational possibilities
lets the president ratchet up (or down) the pressure on the target audience in a
deliberate and measured way, in steps from the almost totally benign (e.g., news-
paper editorials and documentary films) to the highly provocative (e.g., sabotage
and training of/support to insurgent groups and revolutionary movements; Johnson
1989; Daugherty 2004, 21–22).
In this respect, it is especially difficult to underestimate the advantages of covert
action when the policy focus is a regime that is unstable or erratic and capable of
inflicting or causing great harm, whether locally, regionally, or internationally.
Without the ability to calibrate the degree of confrontation or to respond to chang-
ing events, the success of a program would, in a very real sense, be left much more
to chance than to human planning and control. Although not covert action, a useful
lesson can be gleaned from Kennedy’s actions during the Cuban missile crisis: “The
president, who had recently read Barbara Tuchman’s book The Guns of August,
reflected on the miscalculations of the great powers that had led to war in 1914 . . . ‘We
were not going to misjudge . . . or precipitously push our adversaries into a course of
action that was not intended or anticipated’ ” (White 1997, 115). In short, Kennedy
was not going to let events control the crisis, he was going to control the events.
Covert action allows a president to do just that, to the extent that any human can.
Yet another strength of covert action, and one not lacking in importance, is that
until one ascends a goodly way up the scale of operational possibilities, the costs of
a covert-action operation (or indeed, of an overall program) can be surprisingly
inexpensive.16 A graffiti artist may be paid the equivalent of a dinner at a good
16
“Costs” as used here refers only to the funds specifically appropriated for the program by
Congress and expended by the CIA. The amount spent on covert-action programs is often
significantly overestimated by historians, since it is usually only the large—and inevitably
costly—programs that become public knowledge. But the vast majority of covert-action
operations and programs do not become public, at least not in any detail, and the last element of
restaurant to spray paint on a few walls slogans criticizing a proposed government

policy; the editor of a foreign newspaper or academic journal may receive the equi-
valent of only a few hundred dollars a month to place an occasional article in a
medium read by the policy elites; the provision of desk-top publishing capabilities
to a pro-democracy movement forced underground by a dictatorship not only may
keep that movement alive, it may also cost no more than a few thousand dollars; a
political party may require less than a hundred thousand dollars to promote a “get
out the vote” effort to benefit party candidates; a labor leader may receive only a few
thousand dollars to instigate and pay for a nation-wide strike intended to under-
mine the credibility of his government. Presidents (and Congress, which must pay
for them) are not unaware that the great majority of covert-action operations fall
under the “cheap to middling” cost range, and this factor as much as any may make
covert action an attractive choice for presidents.
For the American system of government, a significant strength of covert action
is that it is regulated by Congress. The United States is the only government in the
world that subjects covert-action programs to such routine and sustained scrutiny
by a legislative body, and while advocates of a strong presidency may view this
circumstance as a negative, it is not, for multiple and substantive reasons. The fact
of the matter is that the executive branch of the American government does not
have a monopoly on foreign-policy knowledge, or wisdom, or integrity or good
judgment. Congressional notification of covert-action programs, as required by
federal law, insures that additional perspective and knowledge will be brought to
bear, making a weak program stronger and a strong program even better.
Congressional support of a covert-action program will provide political protection
to a president should the program fail in a very public way (although “shared blame”
might at times be a more apt description). Congressional oversight can prevent a
president from ordering an unwise program or one that does not contribute to
America’s national security. But perhaps most important of all, congressional over-
sight is part and parcel of America’s constitutional system of checks and balances.
As such, congressional oversight of and involvement in covert-action programs
only strengthens a democratic system in which the people are sovereign and the
executive accountable to the people for its actions.
these programs to surface are the costs. The fact of the matter is that the average cost for the
majority of operations and umbrella programs is surprisingly low, relative to other alternatives,
such as military intervention. However, John Prados asserts that “covert operations, especially
when successful, usually lead to long-term U.S. economic and military assistance to governments
that, absent such aid, would not endure” (Prados 2007, 293). Not exactly. The examples Prados
cites are only large-scale programs that do entail substantial down-stream expenditures; this is
not necessarily the case for many programs. Moreover, any large-scale foreign-policy program,
overt or covert, will acquire always costs that extend well over time (decades in many cases) if for
no other reason that the United States can be financially generous to allies and friends. Thus, it
can be misleading to attribute these overall long-term multi-agency costs only to a covert-action
program run for a discrete period of time within a much longer timeframe of U.S. government
support.
622 covert action
But covert-action programs are not a collection of unalloyed strengths. The

positive aspects must be balanced against unavoidable but well-recognized weak-
nesses. The most obvious is that, as with all intelligence operations and programs,
covert action is not immune from risk, nor from Murphy’s Law (anything that can
go wrong will; and in a corollary, will usually do so at the worst possible moment),
nor from mistakes on the part of those managing the operations. At heart, covert
action is a very human endeavor that deals with human actions and reactions (com-
plicated by occurring in foreign lands with far different cultures), and so covert-
action operations will forever be subjected to the gremlins of mind-numbing
unpredictability, Kennedyesque endeavors at controlling events notwithstanding.
A second weakness is that, as operations become more provocative and con-
frontational, the chances of failure escalate as well. And escalating as well are the
odds that the failure will become an international scandal that embarrasses the
president or, worse, weakens his credibility and effectiveness in the international
scene. A failure resulting from an abuse of presidential power will threaten his polit-
ical standing at home and perhaps his historical legacy. This is (or should be) espe-
cially worrisome when the covert-action program includes paramilitary operations
or political/economic operations intended to undermine or destroy a nation’s sys-
tem of government or its national economy. In these instances, covert action may be
seen by the target nation as act of war and provoke a response in kind.17 Another
covert-action Achilles heel revolves around the ability—or, more likely—the inabil-
ity to keep the existence of the program secret as it moves up the confrontational
ladder. Simply put, the more provocative or threatening the operations, the more
apt they are to come to the attention of the target country’s internal security service:
an occasional editorial subtle in content appearing in a local newspaper will be
difficult to recognize as a part of an intelligence operation and so chances are slim
that this would create suspicions; a labor movement that strikes frequently may begin
to raise questions within government circles as to its financing or direction; a para-
military unit training insurgents against a dictatorship within or just across a
country’s borders comes to everyone’s attention and will be actively pursued by the
target government’s security and/or military forces. The better the internal security
mechanism and the more determined its members, the greater the possibility that at
some point the covert-action program and its recruited agents will be uncovered.
Continuing this thought, some covert-action programs can become so large,
so noticeable, so pervasive, so obvious to virtually anyone, that they simply cannot
retain their secrecy. Despite CIA denials or refusals to comment officially, there
was no question at the time of the Agency’s involvement in the Nicaraguan anti-
Sandinista Contra program (especially after a CIA contract aircraft was shot down
in-country and a captured American crewman’s subsequent confession; Snider
2008, 287–98). Nor was there any question of the CIA’s involvement with Afghani
tribes in the years of the Soviet Union’s occupation of that country (Snider 2008,
17
There is some thought that John Kennedy’s assassination was the product of Cuban leader
Fidel Castro, whom Kennedy had first tried to oust from power and then tried to kill.
283–85). Moreover, once the annual funding levels of such programs reach the
tens, or even hundreds of millions, of dollars, it becomes difficult to sustain the
secrecy of an intelligence involvement, despite the program’s official billing as a
totally indigenous effort. These types of programs give rise to a question, still
unsettled (and beyond the scope of this chapter), about whether they would
be better run overtly by the Defense Department instead of as an “overt-covert”
program of the CIA.
The president who expects quick results in a foreign policy initiative should
avoid covert action as it rarely can produce anything (anything positive, at least)
within the short- or even intermediate-range timeframe. The relationship is clear
and direct: the more subtle, the less expensive, and the less confrontational the
covert-action, the longer a covert-action program will require to produce results.
Developing covert-action programs requires intelligence to be collected, potential
agents to be spotted, budgets to be determined, developed. It takes months for a
covert-action program to be fully operational and, finally, ready to begin producing
visible results. Only then will the target audience begin feeling the intended influ-
ence and to act upon the new stimuli. And too, covert-action programs—to be
managed effectively back home—must be fully coordinated, and frequently so,
among all of the pertinent agencies involved in the overall policy. Covert action
does not work well alone because it is an adjunct of the overall policy, so extensive
and continuing coordination among the participating agencies an absolute neces-
sity. (And, needless to say, covert action is not a substitute for the lack of a coherent
policy; it is not a foreign-policy silver bullet that will cure difficult and lingering
problems when an administration has been unable to develop the overarching
policy.) Collaterally, then, covert action is neither an effective tool for the resolution
of a crisis, nor is it able to resurrect a failed policy.18
4. Conclusion
Covert action will always be a tool of American foreign policy, and that of many
other nations well, its strengths and weaknesses notwithstanding. Whether it works
in any given instance will continue to depend on many factors that are beyond the
control of the president and of the intelligence professionals. It perhaps works best
when it is applied at the margins, when it provides an extra bit of “push” in the
direction local events are already heading. It most problematic when the program is
intended to generate a major shift in the direction of events on the ground, or create
a new direction in entirety. Smaller is cheaper, much more likely to build on a pre-
existing movement, less noticeable and hence less threatening to the opposition
government or security apparatus, and more secure in terms of the tradecraft
18
These points are laid out in Daugherty (2004, 51–52).
624 covert action
required in recruiting and handling agents. Still, as was seen in Afghanistan in the
1980s, large, obvious, expensive, and violent has its place.
But regardless of the size, scope, and objectives of any covert-action program,
there is one certain fact: in a United States without an Official Secrets Act but with
a national media that, after Watergate and Vietnam, blends a fundamental mistrust
of government actions and officials with aggressive investigative capability, it is
much more difficult for the executive to keep secret large or controversial covert-
action programs. This is coupled with the ever-present belief in a democratic society
with an unfettered press and a dedication to the proposition that the people (in
whom the national sovereignty resides) eventually have a right to know the full his-
tory of their country and what the government has done in their name. And that
includes the complete history of their country’s foreign policies. Thus, in America
there is a near-inevitability of (a) large covert-action programs losing their “covert-
ness” and coming to the contemporaneous attention of, well, just about everyone;
and (b) covert-action programs becoming public knowledge with the passage of
time and the declassification of pertinent documents. This inevitability points to
what should perhaps be a prime consideration of any president contemplating
covert action: that the program goals should be compatible with American values
and interests. When the program finally becomes public knowledge, the American
people should be able to say, “That was a worthy objective” (Daugherty 2007, 51).
REFERENCES
Andrew, C. 1995. For the President’s Eyes Only. New York: Harper-Collins.
Bearden, M., and J. Risen. 2003. The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final
Showdown with the KGB. New York: Random House.
Berkowitz, B. D., and A. E. Goodman. 2000. Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Carter, J. J. 2000. Covert Operations as a Tool of Presidential Foreign Policy from 1800 to 1920:
Foreign Policy in the Shadows. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edward Mellon Press.
Codevilla, A. 1992. Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century. New York: Free
Press.
Cohen, W., and G. J. Mitchell. 1988. Men of Zeal: The Inside Story of the Iran-Contra
Hearings. New York: Viking.
Conboy, K., and J. Morrison. 1999. Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia
1957–1958. Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute Press.
Cullather, N. 2006. Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in
Guatemala, 1952–1954, 2nd ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press).
Daugherty, W. J. 2001. In the Shadow of the Ayatollah: A CIA Hostage in Iran. Annapolis,
Md.: United States Naval Institute Press.
———. 2004. Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency. Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky.
———. 2007. The Role of Covert Action. In Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed.
L. K. Johnson. New York: Routledge.
Draper, T. 1991. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs. New York: Hill and Wang.
Gustafson, K. 2007. Hostile Intent: Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974. Dulles, Va.:
Potomac Books.
Johnson, L. K. 1989. On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations. American Journal of
American International Law 86, 2 (Oct.): 284–309.
———, and J. J. Wirtz. 2004. Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World.
Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Co.
Jones, H. 2008. The Bay of Pigs. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kornbluh, P. 1998. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.
New York: New Press.
London Sunday Times Insight Team. 1986. Rainbow Warrior: The French Attempt to Sink
Greenpeace. London: Hutchinson.
Mahl, T. E. 1998. Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States,
1939–1941. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s.
Pious, R. M. 2008. Why Presidents Fail: White House Decision Making from Eisenhower to
Bush II. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Porch, D. 1995. The French Intelligence Services: A History of French Intelligence Services from
the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Prados, J. 2007. The Future of Covert Action. In Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed.
L. K. Johnson. New York: Routledge.
Risen, J. 2000. Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran. New York Times (April 16): A15.
Roosevelt, K. 1979. Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Sheldon, Rose Mary. 2005. Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods but
Verify (London).
Smith, J. B. 1976. Portrait of a Cold Warrior. New York: G.P. Putnam’s and Sons.
Snider, L. B. 2008. The Agency and the Hill: The CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004.
Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence.
Walsh, L. E. 1997. Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up. New York:
W. W. Norton.
White, M. J. 1997. Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis.
part ix
INTELLIGENCE
ACCOUNTABILITY
chapter 38
THE ROLE OF DEFENSE

IN SHAPING U.S.
INTELLIGENCE REFORM
james r. clapper, jr.
The performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) prior to the terrorist
attacks of September 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was consistently
questioned and ultimately led to sweeping intelligence-reform legislation in 2004.
While several commissions, national-security think tanks, and Congress weighed in
during this tumultuous period, it was the 9/11 Commission that proved to be the
primary catalyst for legislative remedies.1
This chapter will examine the intelligence-reform movement since 9/11, with a
particular emphasis on Defense Intelligence reforms. It will explore the role of
Defense Intelligence in shaping and implementing law and subsequent executive
guidance and policy. It also highlights how long-term, trusted relationships among
several key intelligence officials in place during 2007–8 were a critical factor in
moving successfully through a number of contentious policy issues. Finally, the
chapter concludes with my views on the work still to be done to bring the full spirit
and intent of the intelligence-reform movement to fruition.
1
One of the more important commissions investigating intelligence performance during this
period was the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction, which did not publish its report until March 31, 2005. Although
widely known as the 9/11 Commission, its official name is The National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States.
630 intelligence accountability
2. The Drive to Reform

The National Security Act of 1947 established a new national-security structure
within the United States, including the first components of a national Intelligence
Community (IC).2 In 1950, a new Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Lt. Gen.
Walter Bedell Smith, began to shape the nation’s disparate intelligence agencies into
something recognizable as an “Intelligence Community,” a term first used during
his tenure (Warner 2001, 6). He maneuvered the Department of State and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff out of clandestine operations and pushed successfully to bring the
signals-intelligence capabilities of the armed services under civilian control.
Since that time, a seemingly endless series of studies has examined the IC,
typically prompted by a real or perceived abuse of power or shortfalls in the
community’s performance.3 The Cuban Missile Crisis drove much of the reform
in the 1960s. Concern over the conduct of covert operations and government
abuses of Americans’ civil liberties fostered many of the reforms in the 1970s that
led to greater oversight in both the legislative and executive branches.4 The sign-
ing of Executive Order 12333 by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 was the then-
new president’s effort to protect the rights of Americans and outline the roles
and responsibilities of the members of the IC, particularly the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI). Many of the proposed intelligence reforms of the 1990s were
the result of pressure to reap a “peace dividend” by downsizing the IC after the
end of the Cold War.5
The executive branch once again found itself under significant pressure to
reform the IC after the 9/11 Commission report, released just before the 2004 presi-
dential election. Initially, President George W. Bush’s National Security Council,
working with the senior leadership in the IC, publicly responded to the report by
drafting several new executive orders that strengthened the management authority
of the DCI.6 Neither the Congress nor its constituents found them sufficient and
continued to push for legislation.
2
The original members of this early intelligence system were the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Departments of Justice, State, War, and Navy.
3
For more information on the history of intelligence reforms, see DNI Mike McConnell’s
“Overhauling Intelligence” in Foreign Affairs or the ODNI publication, “Six Decades of Intelligence
Reform.”
4
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was created in 1976 and the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence followed in 1977.
5
The House Permanent Select Committee’s Staff Report (IC21) and the Aspin Brown
Commission (formally titled “Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence”)
are examples of some of the calls to downsize intelligence.
6
President Bush signed four executive orders on August 27, 2007: “Directing the Strengthened
Management of the Intelligence Community”; “Establishing the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC)”; “Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans”; and
“Establishing the President’s Board on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties.”
the role of defense in shaping u.s. intelligence reform 631
The consensus of those pushing more aggressive reforms, including an assertive

group of family members of the victims of 9/11, began to coalesce around the belief
that the IC needed stronger, more centralized management and that the current
construct—a DCI charged with both overseeing the performance of the IC as well
as managing the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—
was unworkable. This was certainly central to the recommendations included in the
9/11 Commission Report released in July 2004 and echoed in the draft legislation
approved by the Senate.7 The proposal to create a strong Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) was far more contentious within the House of Representatives,
which advocated a different vision for intelligence reform.
Despite significant obstacles, the Congress managed to push through, and
President Bush signed, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA) in December 2004. The new law created a DNI whose primary responsi-
bilities were to serve as principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters, to
manage and oversee the programs and activities of the sixteen components of the
IC—half of which are statutorily housed within the Department of Defense—and
to determine the National Intelligence Program (Section 102).8 While the IRTPA
gave the DNI strengthened authorities in a number of areas, neither the Congress
nor the American public were willing to go so far as to create a Department of
Intelligence, a dream of some reformers. At the end of the day, IRPTA did not pro-
vide the DNI much more latitude than the DCI had in managing the IC.
The opposition to centralizing too much authority in a DNI was led by the
Department of Defense and the members of Congress on the armed services com-
mittees, most notably Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) and Senators Carl
Levin (D-MI), John Warner (R-VA), and Ted Stevens (R-AK). In the fall of 2004, the
Congress had worked to a stalemate, and the legislation was in jeopardy. Reform-
minded members of Congress, led by Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Joseph
Lieberman (D-CT) and Representative Jane Harman (D-CA), were concerned that
this rare opportunity to pass reform legislation might be squandered if they com-
promised their original positions significantly to ensure passage. This compromise
included what became a controversial provision—Section 1018.
Section 1018 essentially states that the president shall issue guidelines to the DNI
explaining how the DNI will manage the components of the IC without abrogating
the statutory authorities of other members of the executive branch.9 Many in the
IC and those who closely follow the IC immediately recognized that Section 1018
7
Some in the Senate, notably Senators John McCain and Arlen Specter, had actually drafted
legislation that would in essence create a Department of Intelligence.
8
The National Intelligence Program is a budgetary aggregation straddling sixteen
components which supplanted the National Foreign Intelligence Program. The FY08 top line for
the NIP is $42.7 billion.
9
Section 1018 states: “The President shall issue guidelines to ensure the effective
implementation and execution within the executive branch of the authorities granted to the
Director of National Intelligence . . . in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory
responsibilities of the heads of departments . . .”
effectively neutered the legislation. To be a bit more generous, it did, in military par-
lance, help promote “unity of effort” within the IC but did not compel “unity of com-
mand.” The governance system created by the new law relies on the “cooperate and
graduate” approach rather than the Clausewitzian “compel one to do your will.” Those
who sought a strong, central authority figure for intelligence were disappointed.
Section 1018 was written by defense advocates to protect the Department of
Defense, but it also prevented the DNI from unilaterally making decisions that
would affect the intelligence elements of the Department of State, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, and others. The CIA is the only
intelligence component other than the Office of the DNI not housed within a cabi-
net department and that, by statute, reports directly to the DNI.10
Not long after the first DNI, Ambassador John D. Negroponte, was appointed
and the Office of the DNI (ODNI) established, it became apparent that creating
reform-minded new policies and programs for the IC would be difficult if not
impossible. Whether the topic was personnel management, training, information-
sharing, coordination of activities in the field, or the improvement of analysis,
Negroponte found that his proposed policies and plans overlapped and often con-
tradicted plans and policies already in place—many statutorily based—within the
other departments. He quickly learned that the new management paradigm was not
that much better than the old DCI model, which relied heavily on the goodwill and
cooperation of the departments.
While it is true that Department of Defense intelligence and intelligence-related
activities are subject to many of the authorities granted to the DNI in the IRTPA, it
is the Secretary of Defense who ultimately exercises “authority, direction, and con-
trol” over the eight DoD elements designated as members of the IC.11 The DNI’s
authorities do not extend to operational or tactical control over any DoD compo-
nent. Thus, defense intelligence components must achieve a delicate balance between
supporting the DNI and responding to the priorities he establishes while at the
same time delivering the optimal set of capabilities to support the Department of
Defense.
2.1 The “Dream Team” and its Window of Opportunity

After the Republican Party suffered defeat in both houses of Congress in the fall of
2006, President Bush made a number of changes in his national-security leadership
team. By early 2007, he had a new DNI, J. Michael McConnell; a new Director of the
10
The language from the IRTPA, Sec 104A: “The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall report to the Director of National Intelligence regarding the activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency.”
11
Under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, the following DoD elements are
designated as elements of the IC: “NSA, DIA, NGA, NRO, ‘other offices within the DoD for the
collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs,’ the intelligence
elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps . . .”
Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA), Michael V. Hayden; a new Secretary of Defense

Robert Gates, and a new Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (myself), in
place. All four of us were intelligence veterans who had worked together for decades.
We had all been responsible one or more times for managing the day-to-day opera-
tions of a major intelligence agency. We had all been through several rounds of intel-
ligence reform in our careers and understood the difficult job the DNI had undertaken.
Both Mike Hayden and I had advocated for something akin to a Department of
Intelligence during the debate on the IRTPA legislation, which clashed with the views
of our then boss, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
In early 2007 we all faced significant challenges in our new jobs, but we knew,
given the loopholes in the law, that the DNI job that Mike McConnell had accepted
was perhaps the most difficult and thankless, and we all vowed to help him carry
out his mandate. We recognized that the viability of the IC and the safety and secu-
rity of the American people (and the security of many outside the United States)
depended on our improving the performance of U.S. intelligence.
Director McConnell expressed his reservations to President Bush about accept-
ing the position and told the president he would need his support in order to make
any progress on intelligence reform. The president agreed and Secretary Gates
pledged his assistance as well. In one of our earliest meetings, I offered to do my part
to help the new DNI, and, with the agreement of Secretary Gates, we created a new
position—the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI), which is dual-hatted as the
Under Secretary for Intelligence (USD(I)) reporting to the Secretary of Defense and
as the DDI reporting to the DNI. By doing this, I believed I could use both sets of
my delegated statutory authorities (the Secretary’s delegated authorities over DoD
components, as well as the DNI’s delegated authorities) to further the DNI’s objec-
tives and work more directly on his behalf. Secretary Gates and DNI McConnell
quickly signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) creating the DDI position in
May 2007, “dual-hatting” my position. The DNI and Secretary of Defense later
approved an annex that elaborated on my duties and responsibilities as the DDI.
According to the MOA, the DDI serves as the principal advisor to the DNI on
all matters concerning DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security-related
matters. The DDI reports to the DNI on three key areas: requirements, intelligence
activities, and general “advice and assistance.” As a member of the DNI staff, the DDI
assists in the execution of DNI responsibilities for the oversight of defense intelligence
matters. Under this construct, the DDI will receive direction from the DNI and then
implement that direction as the USDI, capitalizing on the authorities delegated by
the Secretary of Defense to the USDI. The DDI assists the DNI in bringing greater
synchronization across the IC by establishing policies and plans for the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise that comport with DNI guidance.12
12
The Defense Intelligence Enterprise consists of the eight DoD components previously cited
as members of the IC, as well as all other intelligence elements, including those of the Combatant
Commands, within the Department of Defense.
The first test of the viability of this new concept came with the development
of the DNI’s new policy on joint-duty assignments. Joint duty is a civilian per-
sonnel rotation system aimed at encouraging and facilitating assignments among
elements of the IC.13 Joint-duty assignments assist in developing IC employees
and leaders with an enterprise-wide perspective, cultivating cross-organizational
networks and facilitating information sharing. This is an example of a sound,
logical initiative that proved very difficult to implement. As a result of Section
1018, the IRTPA did not transfer the personnel-management authorities over
intelligence personnel accorded the Secretary of Defense when it charged the
DNI with establishing this new personnel policy.14 Thus DoD would have
to change its personnel policy before the new joint-duty policy would have any
significant effect.
The idea of joint-duty assignments for members of the IC had been around
for more than a decade but was given increased prominence during the 9/11
Commission debates. Although many believed that the IRTPA created the joint-
duty program under the DNI, in fact a similar IC Assignment Program had been
in place under the DCI since the mid-90s. It foundered, as year after year fewer
agencies sent their best and brightest out on rotation and many pushed for
“waivers” that would allow them to create their own rules on what constituted a
rotational assignment.
Although I supported both the spirit and intent of the joint-duty assignment
program, I quickly learned in my new job as USD(I) the difficulties it would present
within the DoD. Military intelligence officers could not be governed by it, and DoD
civilian intelligence officers were managed under DoD rules. Wearing my DDI hat,
I worked to create rules within the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System
that would support the joint-duty program while at the same time not “abrogate”
the Secretary’s authorities. After many months, my staff and I finally pushed it
through the Department, but not without great difficulty.
This was the first of many seemingly intractable policy issues that I and the
other members of the IC Executive Committee grappled with as the DNI con-
tinued to push for reforms.15 On many occasions, as I developed intelligence
policy for DoD, and the DNI developed national intelligence policy for the
larger IC, we found ourselves at legal impasses as a result of Section 1018. Despite
our desire to work toward a reasonable solution, we were informed time and
again that legally we could not compromise. We were advised the Secretary of
Defense could not legally cede his authority to anyone outside of DoD, even if
he wanted to do so.
13
The military has had a similar system in place since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act in 1986. A seminal work on the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the joint duty concept for the
military is Locher (2002).
14
See 10 U.S. Code 83.
15
The EXCOM is composed of the heads of the sixteen components of the IC, and the
USD(I).
2.2 Executive Order 12333

The difficulties that the DNI had in formulating policy were magnified by chal-
lenges unique to the IC: creating unity of effort in addressing the domestic threat,
formulating the intelligence program and budget, changing the culture of secrecy
and “need to know,” and establishing a new and healthy relationship between the
ODNI and the CIA.
Congress was becoming increasingly impatient with what it believed was a lack
of progress on these fronts, despite an ever-growing DNI staff. What the Congress
and others failed to acknowledge, however, was that the systemic flaw created when
Section 1018 became part of the IRTPA could not be overcome by the DNI staff or
any cooperative group of IC leaders. The only recourse left to the DNI, short of
rewriting the legislation, was to develop the presidential guidelines referenced in
Section 1018. The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, after conversations with
the DNI, felt this was a necessary next step and encouraged the president to begin
the effort to revise Executive Order 12333.
President Bush charged DNI McConnell with redrafting Executive Order 12333,
which had been in place, with few revisions, since 1981. Executive Order 12333 is the
foundational document issued by the president governing how the IC will operate
while safeguarding the rights and civil liberties of all Americans. Even the smallest
changes to this executive order are not undertaken lightly. McConnell’s policy staff
began this effort in the early fall of 2007 by bringing together the IC agency deputies
and the senior policy and legal officials of the IC for a two-day offsite to discuss
what changes to the order should and should not be made. The group at the offsite
was encouraged to take off their parochial hats and put on their “good government”
hats in formulating changes to the executive order that would better allow a DNI to
do his or her job. The group drafted a fairly lengthy list of recommended changes to
the executive order, but recommended that the DNI not change the section that
protected the rights and civil liberties of the American people.
Several early and important decisions made by the DNI set the redrafting of the
executive order on a productive course. After the initial offsite, McConnell estab-
lished a senior leadership group that included Secretary Gates and me and worked
closely with us throughout the drafting process. Both the Secretary and I vowed to
help him engage constructively throughout the process and keep the lines of com-
munication open, even when we faced the most difficult and contentious issues.
Later, once the DNI had completed an initial draft of the changes to the executive
order, the NSC staff established a Principals Committee, a Deputies Committee,
and a group of “trusted agents” whose responsibility was to work through the policy
and legal issues raised during the redrafting, until only the most difficult policy
choices were left. These were then elevated to my level, or if necessary, to the level of
the “Principals,” which included the National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley,
DNI McConnell and Secretary of Defense Gates.
After a great deal of debate and deliberation throughout the winter and spring
of 2008, these groups produced an extensive revision to Executive Order 12333,
which President Bush signed on July 30, 2008. Few believed this could actually be
accomplished before the end of the administration. But McConnell, Hayden, Gates,
and I recognized that we had only a narrow window of time for us to take advantage
of the lessons learned subsequent to the enactment of the IRTPA and the unique
alignment of experienced senior officials.
A few deeply felt issues came close to scuttling the entire effort. The most sig-
nificant of these issues for the Department of Defense was the challenge of resolving
how Section 1018 was to be interpreted and implemented. On the one hand, we
recognized that Section 1018 preserved the authorities and responsibilities of the
Secretary of Defense in the world of national intelligence, critical to the support of
the war fighter during times of conflict. Not only did many officials within DoD feel
strongly about the necessity of preserving these authorities—the armed services
committees felt strongly as well. On the other hand, we recognized Section 1018
hamstrung the DNI in his efforts at reform. Finding some middle ground was
clearly necessary.
The DNI felt strongly that he needed the executive order to affirm that the
“presumption” would be that he was not abrogating the authorities of the other
department heads, unless the departments could prove otherwise. That is, the bur-
den of proving he was violating their authorities rested with the departments and
the DNI would be free to exercise his authorities up until he was “proven” to be in
violation. This was objectionable to all of the departments, but it was left to DoD
to devise the argument opposing this language, as well as to help craft suitable alter-
native language.
After many weeks of haggling over this language, Hadley, Gates, and McConnell
personally crafted language that would sufficiently explain how Section 1018 is to
be interpreted and applied. In essence, the new language in the executive order’s
“presumption clause” still maintains that the DNI may not abrogate departmen-
tal authorities. However, there is an important codicil. It now states that “direc-
tives issued and actions taken by the Director in the exercise of the Director’s
authorities and responsibilities” shall be implemented by the elements of the IC.
It adds that any department head who believes that a directive or action of the
DNI violates the requirements of Section 1018 of the IRTPA must bring the issue
to the attention of the DNI, NSC, or the president for resolution. While this may
seem convoluted and nuanced, the EO language makes clear that all IC compo-
nents must implement what the DNI tells them to implement, regardless of
potential conflicts with departmental directives. It also creates a mechanism
whereby departments can bring any potential violations of Section 1018 to the
attention of the DNI, and if necessary up the chain of command all the way to the
president. In the end, the DNI felt the EO language gave him the presidential
“cover” he needed to push his policies through. Historians may someday wonder
why so much intellectual energy and effort was put into addressing this one issue,
but only such effort is necessary to reach consensus in the world of high-stakes
policy negotiations.
As the debate over the presumption clause was underway, Secretary Gates and
I were obligated to represent DoD’s institutional viewpoint and remind all parties
that the Congress had not been willing to more strongly centralize the DNI’s author-
ities. DoD also wanted to ensure that we honored an agreement made between Vice
President Dick Cheney and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees dur-
ing the IRTPA debate to inform the committees of any presidential guidelines that
would affect Section 1018. In a somewhat unprecedented decision, DoD, DNI, and
other stakeholder departments agreed to brief Congressional oversight committees
on the actual language of EO 12333 prior to the president’s signature.
Despite what were at times heated debates, in the end, we all were satisfied that
the revised executive order represented a “good government” compromise, and the
language that clarified Section 1018 would help the DNI promulgate new policies
without abrogating existing authorities of the department heads. That said, with-
out the trust and mutual respect established over decades among the president’s
senior intelligence team, I believe the successful revision of EO 12333 would have
been in doubt.
3. Where We Go from Here

For true, systemic intelligence reform to take place, both internal and external pres-
sure must be consistently applied for the IC to change its culture, its practices, its
procedures, its deeply held beliefs about itself and its role in a changing world.16 As
new notions of how to conduct the business of intelligence in a democratic society
faced with a serious domestic threat are explored, the DNI should have the where-
withal to implement good ideas quickly, and if warranted, institutionalize them in
new statutes and policies.
Good policy is the key to getting things done in Washington. Although bureau-
cratic and unglamorous, the IRTPA and EO 12333—including subsequent DNI and
DoD intelligence policy directives that will follow—are the legal and policy under-
pinnings of the current intelligence reform movement. While revising EO 12333 was
an important step in bolstering the DNI’s ability implement lasting policies, it does
not—and really cannot—resolve all of the IRTPA’s ambiguity. I have come to believe
that we will not see legislation that gives the DNI unambiguous authority in the
near term nor do I believe much more authority is warranted.
I no longer believe as strongly as I once did in greater centralization of intelli-
gence activity or authority, and have changed my views on the establishment of a
Department of Intelligence. Intelligence has become an integral function within
most national-security organizations, and I realize that the individual needs of each
16
See Barger (2005) and Gill, Marrin, and Phythian (2009).
department for tailored intelligence outweighs the benefits of more centralized

management and control. Five years after signing IRTPA, the time has come for
professionals both within as well as outside the IC to reengage in the debate over
how much centralized management of intelligence is prudent.
Regardless of the outcome of that debate, IC still has much work to do to resolve
the ambiguous lanes-in-the-road issues, which often lead to turf battles, particu-
larly within the area of homeland defense. We need to find less expensive but effec-
tive ways to collect data, analyze it quickly, and make that analysis relevant. The
notion, adopted by the DNI, of intelligence providing a “decision advantage” must
apply not only to the policymaker but to the soldier in Baghdad or Kabul who also
needs to have the right intelligence allowing him to react faster than the enemy.17 We
need to share more and hoard less information especially with our domestic state,
local, and tribal governments, and with our international partners.
I will end with two final thoughts on the future of U.S. intelligence. First, for the
DNI to achieve truly meaningful intelligence reform, the DNI cannot afford to wait
for Congress to clarify IRTPA, rather the DNI must rely on the willingness of the
Department of Defense to carefully balance the DNI’s national intelligence priori-
ties with the burgeoning requirements within Defense for timely, relevant, and
actionable intelligence. This cannot be done unless the Secretary of Defense and the
DNI work in full partnership to accomplish the nation’s security objectives, as
Secretary Gates and Director McConnell have done.
Second, people matter. The makeup of the intelligence leadership team must
be chosen carefully, not only for their years of experience and knowledge, but for
their ability to be team players. Five years after the passage of IRTPA and more
than a year after revising EO 12333, the new administration and the incoming
intelligence team inherit an Intelligence Community that is in a state of transfor-
mation, and the individuals leading the IC will still have a unique opportunity to
continue the initial reform efforts. While the IC has made great strides since 9/11
in improving information sharing, for example, there is still work to be done.
Based on my experience within the IC and Defense Intelligence Enterprise, the
following should be among the priorities of the IC in the new administration:
reforming intelligence acquisition, investing in analytical tradecraft, continuing
security-clearance reforms, strengthening security and counterintelligence activi-
ties, maximizing community collaboration, and forging closer intelligence rela-
tionships with foreign partners. Each of these areas will require strong leadership
and interagency collaboration to develop and implement policies that will sustain
long-term reforms.
17
As described by Jennifer Sims, “. . . the key to intelligence-driven victories may not be the
collection of objective ‘truth’ so much as the gaining of an information edge or competitive
advantage over an adversary. Such an advantage can dissolve a decision-maker’s quandary and
allow him to act. This ability to lubricate choice is the real objective of intelligence.” For more
information, see the DNI’s Vision 2015, http://www.dni.gov/Vision_2015.pdf and Sims (2009).
REFERENCES
Barger, D. G. 2005. Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND.
DoD Directive 5143.01. 2005. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (November 23).
Executive Order 12333 3 C.F.R. 200. 2008. United States Intelligence Activities.
Gill, P., Stephen Marrin, and M. Phythian. 2009. Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and
Questions. London.: Routledge.
IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. 1996. [Internet]. Washington, D.C.:
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives. Available from
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21_toc.html, accessed
December 10, 2008.
Locher, J. R. 2002. Victory on the Potomac. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
McConnell, M. 2007. Overhauling Intelligence. Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4.
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States. 2004. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2007. Six Decades of Intelligence Reform.
Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of General Counsel. 2007. Intelligence
Community Legal Reference Book. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence. 1996. [Internet].
Washington, D.C.: Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States
Intelligence Community. Available from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/int/report.html,
Sims, J. 2009 and B. Gerber, eds. 2005. Transforming U.S. Intelligence. Washington, D.C:
Treverton, G., and W. Agrell, eds. 2009. National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and
Future Prospects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
United States Congress. 2004. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Report 108–796.
Warner, M. 2001. Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution. Washington, D.C.: Center for
chapter 39
INTELLIGENCE AND
THE LAW IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM
ian leigh
1. Introduction
This chapter addresses the legal framework within which security and intelli-
gence agencies operate in the United Kingdom. It first discusses the legislative
charters of the three main agencies, before dealing with their accountability to
ministers, Parliament and the judiciary. Discussion then moves to the significant
impact of human rights standards upon the agencies’ work and current and
future trends.
2. The Legal Status of the Agencies

It is striking that the main institutions of the UK intelligence community have sur-
vived both the ending of the Cold War and 9/11 with little change in essence. The
main change since 1945 has been external: the official acknowledgement of the exis-
tence of the three main agencies and the granting of statutory charters to the
Security Service (MI5) in 1989 and to the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6)
and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in 1994. Prior to
intelligence and the law in the united kingdom 641
these legal reforms the agencies (or, rather, their predecessors1) had been created
secretly in the early twentieth century, and without reference to Parliament, under
prerogative powers.
The relevant statutes are the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence
Services Act 1994 (the latter covering SIS and GCHQ). Other parts of the intelli-
gence machinery—especially those concerned with intelligence analysis—such as
the Defence Intelligence Staff and the Joint Intelligence Committee are creatures of
the prerogative and remain outside the statutory framework. A separation is made
between security and policing, with the agencies enjoying no powers to arrest or
prosecute—even in the fields of counterterrorism and counterespionage these are
the province of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, with whom the ser-
vices work closely.
Prior to the 1989 legislation the Security Service’s work was governed by the
Maxwell-Fyfe Directive—a brief administrative charter named after the home sec-
retary who issued it in 1952—which emphasized the Service’s role in the “Defence of
the Realm,” together with its duty to behave non-politically (Lord Denning 1963).2
The Service was, nevertheless, responsible to the home secretary and its director-
general had a right of access to the prime minister. The Security Service Act 1989
reaffirmed the existing constitutional position under the Directive (the Service was
accountable only to ministers and not to Parliament) but cast it in statutory form.
However, the Act did provide an explicit statutory basis for the Service’s work. The
impetus for doing so came from concerns that the Service’s use of surveillance and
personal information violated the European Convention on Human Rights (see
further below).
Government Communications Headquarters3 (GCHQ)—the signals intelli-
gence agency—came to public attention in the mid-1980s, largely because of a pro-
tracted industrial dispute about the ban on officers there belonging to a trades
union4 and disclosures about wartime code-breaking, but it lacked a statutory remit
until 1994. The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) was not even officially acknowl-
edged to exist until 1992.5 The Intelligence Services Act 1994 provided a statutory
charter for both agencies and it also filled notable gap in the 1989 Act by creating for
all three agencies a statutory committee of parliamentarians, drawn from both
Houses of Parliament—the Intelligence and Security Committee (Lustgarten and
Leigh 1994, Coda; Wadham 1994).
1
The Secret Service Bureau, the forerunner of both MI5 and MI6, dated from 1909; Andrew
(1986, ch. 2). The predecessor of GCHQ, the Government Code and Cipher School, was established
1n 1919; http://www.gchq.gov.uk/history/index.html.
2
See also http://www.mi5.gov.uk//history.html.
3
http://www.gchq.gov.uk/.
4
The decision was unsuccessfully challenged in the courts: Council of Civil Service Unions
v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
5
http://www.mi6.gov.uk/output/sis-home-welcome.html.
Three parts of the intelligence structure are outside the statutory framework—the
Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the
Intelligence Assessments Staff.6 The role of the first two especially has come under close
scrutiny as a result of events surrounding the use of intelligence in the public justifica-
tion of the United Kingdom’s involvement in the war in Iraq. The Defence Intelligence
Staff is part of the Ministry of Defence and supports the armed forces by analyzing
information, from open and covert sources, and providing assessments both for them
and for the Joint Intelligence Committee. The head, the Chief of Defence Intelligence
(who reports to the minister of defence) is also responsible for co-ordination of intel-
ligence throughout the armed forces. The Joint Intelligence Committee sits at the hub
of the intelligence machine, in the Cabinet Office, formally connecting it with govern-
ment. It is responsible for tasking the agencies (especially SIS and GCHQ) and for
providing intelligence assessments based on the agencies’ output which are circulated
within government, including to the relevant ministers. The JIC membership meets
weekly and includes not only the heads of the security and intelligence agencies, but
also senior officials from the Cabinet Office, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence,
the Home Office, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Treasury.
Although MI5 is a security agency, MI6 is responsible for intelligence, and
GCHQ for signals intelligence and information security, all three agencies have the
common statutory functions of the protection of national security, protecting the
economic well-being of the United Kingdom7 and assisting (the police or customs)
in preventing or detecting serious crime. The statutory approach to national secu-
rity differs markedly, however, between the Security Service and the other agencies.
This is undoubtedly because of civil-liberties sensitivities about the impact of
domestic security operations, although strictly the legislation does not prohibit
domestic operations against appropriate targets by SIS and GCHQ (nor prohibit
MI5 from working overseas).
Consequently the Security Service’s statutory aims (section 1 of the 1989 Act)
are more closely defined than with the other agencies: in its case the protection of
national security, including (but not limited to) protection against threats from
espionage, terrorism, and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers,
and “actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by
political, industrial or violent means” (“counter-subversion”). The breadth of these
aims reflects the Cold War origins of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive. In practice, how-
ever, counterterrorism now accounts for more than 80 percent of MI5’s effort and
resources. Since the end of the Cold War the controversial area of countersubver-
sion, which many believed betrayed a bias against radical political and pressure
groups, has been dormant (Lustgarten and Leigh 1994, ch. 14). In view of the politi-
cally sensitive nature of its role in the domestic arena, there are two important safe-
guards that limit the Service’s work.8 Collection of information must be restricted
6
For details see: National Intelligence Machinery 2006.
7
Limited, however, to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.
8
Security Service Act 1989, s. 2(2).
to what is “necessary for the proper discharge of its functions” (and likewise its dis-
closure). The director-general is also responsible for ensuring that “the Service does
not take any action to further the interests of any political party.”
The Intelligence Services Act takes a much broader approach to SIS and
GCHQ—referring to “the interests of national security, with particular reference to
the defence and foreign policies of Her Majesty’s Government.”9 The emphasis on
the policies of the government of the day, rather than on overriding national inter-
ests is an oblique acknowledgement that the priorities of these agencies are set
through “tasking” approved at ministerial level in the annual submission “United
Kingdom’s National Requirements for Secret Intelligence.”
Within these broad parameters the functions of MI6 are “to obtain and provide
information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British
Islands. [and] . . . to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such
persons” (Intelligence Services Act 1994, s. 1(1)). The coy reference to other “other
tasks” is of course polite usage for a range of actions from espionage to covert action,
many of which will be illegal according to the laws of the country where they are
undertaken.
Government Communications Headquarters has two roles: signals intelligence
and information assurance. In relation to the first its brief to conduct all types of
signals interception (and disruption) and decryption.10 The second (and more
defensive) role is that of providing technical advice on communications and infor-
mation-technology security to government departments and the armed forces.11 A
significant omission is the failure of the 1994 legislation to detail the arrangements
for international co-operation (especially with the United States’ National Security
Agency, the NSA) which is known to affect much of GCHQ’s work (Richelson and
Ball 1990).
4. Accountability
Historically accountability for security and intelligence matters within the United
Kingdom has been almost exclusively the preserve of the executive branch—a posi-
tion tolerated until relatively recently by both Parliament and the judiciary (Lustgarten
and Leigh 1994). Since the 1970s, however, and in accordance with reforms in many
9
ISA ss. 1(2)(a) and 3(2)(a). GCHQ’s functions can also be exercised under s. 3(2) “in the
interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in relation to the actions or intentions
of persons outside the British Islands;” and “in support of the prevention or detection of serious
crime.”
10
“[T]o monitor or interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions and any
equipment producing such emissions and to obtain and provide information derived from or
related to such emissions or equipment and from encrypted material.” ISA 1994, s. 3 (1) (a).
11
s. 3 (1) (b).
other countries there has been pressure for greater Parliamentary scrutiny (Born and
Leigh 2007; Born, Johnson, and Leigh 2005; European Commission for Democracy
through Law 2007). To some extent this has been deflected by the creation under the
Intelligence Services Act 1994 of the Intelligence and Security Committee—a com-
mittee of parliamentarians but not a select committee as such. Ministers have also
been reluctant to share responsibility with the judiciary, although judicial commis-
sioners and tribunals have been given a limited role and the traditional deference of
the courts in dealing with matters of national security is beginning to lift.
4.1 Ministerial Responsibility

Ministerial responsibility for the Security Service is through the home secretary,
although operational control is in the hands of the director-general. The Secret
Intelligence Service and GCHQ both come under the authority of the secretary of
state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. Operational control is in the hands
of the chief and director, respectively, who are appointed by the minister.12 Each
agency head is required to give an annual report to the prime minister and the
secretary of state.
It would be wrong, however, to equate the position of the agencies with conven-
tional government departments of state, responsible to a secretary of state. There is
a marked departure from the prevailing British constitutional position by which
ministers are legally responsible and officials are anonymous and, legally speaking,
invisible. Statutory provisions give the heads of the agencies a right of direct access
to the prime minister13 who, despite the services’ departmental associations, has
traditionally assumed overall control and acted as the government mouthpiece on
intelligence matters. Moreover, unlike normal civil-service heads of department the
director-general of the Security Service, the chief of the SIS and the director of
GCHQ are named in law as having day-to-day responsibility.
The reason is undoubtedly to provide a safeguard of the services’ neutrality in
party political terms. Indeed, political neutrality is explicitly addressed by provi-
sions that require the heads of all three agencies to ensure that the services do not
take any steps to further the interests of any UK political party.14
Formerly there was an important non-statutory convention that reinforced the
autonomy of the agencies and preserved a certain distance from ministers: the sec-
retary of state would receive advice from the head of the agency but would not see
the intelligence on which it was based. It is unclear to what extent this principle is
still observed. In the changed climate after September 11, 2001, there is evidence that
ministers are more regularly and closely involved with the agencies. Intelligence has
become more visibly central to government decision-making and direct briefing
from the Security Service to other ministers has become commonplace.
12
ISA, ss. 2 and 4.
13
SSA, s. 2(4) and ISA, ss. 2(4) and 4(4).
14
SSA 1989, s. 2; ISA 1994, ss. 2 and 4.
Furthermore some of the services’ actions require explicit ministerial approval

by the responsible secretary of state. Unlike many other countries in which judicial
authorization is required, in the United Kingdom telephone tapping or mail open-
ing (which may also be undertaken by the police) falls into this category: the secre-
tary of state is responsible for authorizing it under warrant.15 Another instance
where ministers are given specific powers concerning individuals is the field of
detention of terrorist suspects and the deportation of foreign nationals on grounds
of national security.16 Diligent ministers will clearly require convincing and detailed
supporting evidence from the agencies before they approve such actions. In the cur-
rent context of use of counterterrorist powers, for example, a close and continuous
dialogue between the home secretary, his officials and the Security Service is inevi-
table. Similarly the implications of the actions of SIS and GCHQ for diplomatic and
foreign relations create an imperative for consultation with the foreign secretary. In
some instances this is buttressed by legal requirements also: when immunity is
required from legal liability under UK law for actions abroad (i.e., for offences over
which the UK courts exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction) the foreign secretary
may give authorization (Intelligence Services Act 1994, section 7).
4.2 The Intelligence and Security Committee

Westminster moved toward adopting parliamentary oversight of intelligence rela-
tively late: whereas the US Congressional oversight committees had been established
in the aftermath of Watergate in the 1970s and Australia created a parliamentary
committee (initially just for ASIO, the domestic agency) in 1979,17 in the United
Kingdom the 1989 Act omitted any parliamentary oversight involvement. The
Thatcher government’s position was that it would not be feasible for any parliamen-
tary body to straddle the ring of secrecy that must necessarily separate the agencies
and their ministerial masters from the public. By 1994 governmental resistance had
sufficiently weakened to allow for a committee of parliamentarians to examine lim-
ited aspects of the agencies’ work. The Intelligence and Security Committee (“ISC”),
established under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, examines the expenditure, pol-
icy, and administration of all three security and intelligence services and is com-
posed of nine members drawn from both the Houses of Parliament.
The Committee differs from parliamentary select committees in being statu-
tory, rather than being established under the standing orders of Parliament with a
membership approved by Parliament itself, or reporting to Parliament. Its members
15
RIPA 2000, Part 1. In practice, the home secretary, foreign secretary, Northern Ireland
secretary, the secretary of state for defense, and the second minister in Scotland.
16
Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Immigration Act 1971.
17
Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act 1979; Australian Security Intelligence
Organization Amendment Act 1986. Other agencies (ASIS, the intelligence agency, and DSD, the
signals-intelligence agency) remained outside this scheme until recent reforms until the
Intelligence Services Act 2001.
are appointed from both Houses of Parliament by the prime minister after consulta-
tion with the leader of the Opposition, rather than Parliament itself.18 The method
of reporting departs from the select committee model also: the Intelligence and
Security Committee’s reports to the prime minister, although, subject to editing,19
its reports are subsequently laid in Parliament.
Although in each of these respects the predominance of the executive is main-
tained some of the differences are relatively minor in practice. For example, mem-
bers are nominated by the party whips (as they are for select committees), despite
the formal legal requirement, and membership is in practice in proportion to the
strength of the three main political parties in the House of Commons, although this
is not a requirement under the Act. Moreover, the ISC’s remit “to examine the
expenditure, administration and policy” of the three services20 mirrors the usual
terms of reference of a departmental select committee.
The prime minister has, however made conspicuous use of patronage in
appointing the chair of the ISC: following the initial term of Tom King (the former
Conservative defense minister) the chair has been held by a succession of govern-
ment ex-ministers (Ann Taylor, Paul Murphy, Margaret Beckett, and Dr Kim
Howells) some of whom have later returned to office. This trend is disappointing on
several levels. It appears that appointment of chairman of the ISC has been used a
political consolation prize for re-shuffled ministers (the ISC has always been a com-
mittee that travels regularly overseas). Moreover, confidence in the independence of
the committee has been weakened by the failure to rotate the chairmanship with the
Opposition and the suspicion that the prospect of early return to government for
the person appointed may inhibit their independence and outspokenness.
Although the ISC has power (as with a parliamentary select committee) to send
for persons and papers, in other respects its information-gathering powers are lim-
ited. The agency heads may refuse to disclose “sensitive information,”21 that is infor-
mation that might lead to the identification of sources, other forms of assistance
given to the agencies, or operational methods; information concerning past, pres-
ent, or future specific operations; or, information provided by a foreign government
which does not consent to its disclosure is included. Within these categories refusal
is discretionary. The head of one of the three agencies may disclose the information
if satisfied that is safe to do so.22 Moreover, the responsible minister may order dis-
closure of sensitive information to the committee in the public interest notwith-
standing,23 so over-ruling the agency head concerned. While the ISC may request
18
ISA 1994, s. 10.
19
ISA, s. 10(7): “if the publication of any matter in a report would be prejudicial to the
continued discharge of the functions of either of the Services or, as the case may be, GCHQ, the
Prime Minister may exclude that matter.”
20
ISA 1994 s. 10(1).
21
ISA, schedule 3, paragraph 4. In addition, ministers have power to withhold “non-sensitive”
materials on grounds similar to those that apply to select committees; ISA, schedule 3, para. 3(4).
22
ISA, schedule 3, paragraph 3(2).
23
ISA, schedule 3, paragraph 3(3).
“information,” it does not have power to demand particular documents, even those
referring to the policy, administration, or expenditure of the agencies. Its usual
modus operandi is to receive briefing documents from the agencies, setting out
policy. Nor is there a statutory right to see officials at a level lower than the director
or director-general (in practice, however, members routinely meet officers at all
levels during site inspections).
The ISC is legally required to produce an annual report and—at its discretion—
it produces additional ad hoc reports on topics of interest or where requested to do
so. Reports are delivered to the prime minister and, thereafter, published, with any
deletions agreed upon on security grounds.24 The timing of publication is effectively
with the prime minister rather than the committee and on occasion the committee
has complained of unnecessary delay in publishing some of its findings.25 The prime
minister can in the last resort insist on the deletion of material from the published
report on security grounds, although if this led to public dissent from the members
of the committee it would perhaps be counterproductive. In practice the committee’s
annual published reports contain noticeably more asterisks indicating excised pas-
sages than reports from the Security Intelligence Review Committee in Canada or
the Australian Inspector General. This suggests that the editing power is used with
excessive caution and also has the unfortunate consequence of perhaps unfairly
weakening public confidence in the thoroughness of the ISC’s investigations.
Generally speaking the ISC has drawn mixed reviews for its work (Gill 2007;
Phythian 2007; Leigh 2007; Glees, Davies, and Morrison 2006). Most commentators
accept that it has built up a relationship of trust with the agencies (with only excep-
tional leaks of confidential material) and that this has enabled it to investigate mat-
ters above and beyond those in its remit, including some with operational aspects.
It has been seen as fulfilling an educative role in bridging the secret and political
worlds (Defty 2008). Others, however, have seen the relationship with the agencies
as too close or on occasion naïve and have contrasted the quality of its investiga-
tions with those of a judicial or Privy Council inquiry (Aldrich 2005).
The Brown government sought to respond to some criticisms of the ISC
through Green and White Papers on The Governance in Britain in 2007 and 2008
respectively (Ministry of Justice 2007, para. 89–96; Ministry of Justice 2008, para.
235–44). Having initially raised the prospect of legislative reform of the ISC the
concrete proposals that emerged after consultation in the 2008 were more modest:
that the prime minister should consult the leader of the Opposition over appoint-
ments to the committee (as happens for select committees), the possibility of the
ISC being free to hold some briefings in public, minor changes to way in which
committee’s reports are debated in Parliament, to its staffing, and possibly its
premises. More fundamental change, for example to the reporting process itself,
was rejected.
24
ISA, s. 10(6) and (7).
25
Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report for 1999–2000, Cm. 4897, para. 103.
4.3 Judicial Oversight

The agencies are also overseen by judicial commissioners, who were appointed ini-
tially under the 1989 and 1994 Acts but now work within the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (“RIPA”). These procedures were initially introduced
in a (successful) attempt to ward off a finding that the previous regime violated the
European Convention on Human Rights.26 The Intelligence Services commissioner
is responsible for reviewing and reporting upon the issue and authorization, by the
relevant minister, of warrants for operations by the agencies.27 The interception
commissioner (established under section 57 of Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act) reviews the issue and authorization of warrants to intercept mail and telecom-
munications by the intelligence and security agencies and law-enforcement organi-
zations. There is also a tribunal, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which is
established to investigate public complaints against the agencies or about intercep-
tion.28 The commissioners report annually to the prime minister on their work and
their reports are in turn laid before Parliament.
Although, as stated above, the commissioners and Tribunal may be sufficient to
satisfy the largely formal demands of the European Convention on Human Rights,
there are reasons to doubt their overall effectiveness as instruments of accountabil-
ity or for instilling public confidence. Each operates within a tightly prescribed legal
jurisdiction with the result that there are no publicly recorded examples of a tribu-
nal finding against any of the services (of several hundred cases brought over
approaching two decades29) or of a finding by the commissioner that a warrant or
authorization has ever been improperly issued (although in several dozen instances
the agencies have admitted to purely technical breaches).
5. Human Rights Concerns

The Human Rights Act 1998, which came into force in October 2000, has had a sig-
nificant effect on the response in the United Kingdom to 9/11 as part of the so-called
global war on terror. Even before that, however, the influence of the European
26
The 1989 Act was treated as sufficient reason by the Convention organs to take no further
action in cases brought (by Patricia Hewitt and Harriet Harman and dating to their involvement
with the National Council for Civil Liberties) involving alleged surveillance and recording of
personal details by the Security Service; Council of Europe Resolution DH(90) 36 of 13 December
1990. See also Esbester v UK, App. No. 18601/91, 2 April 1993.
27
RIPA, s. 59.
28
RIPA, s. 65.
29
Of more than 600 complaints determined by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal
between 2001–7 only 1 (against the police, by its own employees) succeeded: HC Debs vol. 491,
c. 857w, 23 April 2009; C v The Police and Secretary of State for the Home Department, IPT/03/32/H.
For an earlier detailed breakdown, see H. C. Debs. vol. 436, cols 435–36 w, 12 September 2005.
Convention on Human Rights had been felt in the security and intelligence agen-
cies. Prior to the Human Rights Act steps arising from counterterrorism measures
would have been challenged—often after several years’ delay—at the European
Court of Human Rights. Now, however, domestic courts have an obligation to inter-
pret statutory powers as far as possible in a way that conforms to the European
Convention on Human Rights and, where this is impossible to achieve, may give a
declaration of incompatibility. Public authorities such as the police, prosecutors,
and the security services are under a duty not to violate a person’s Convention rights
(regardless of their citizenship).
5.1 Privacy and Surveillance

The common law in England does not contain a right of privacy. The European
Convention on Human Rights Article 8, which refers to a right to respect for private
life, home, and correspondence, has, however, had an important impact on the work
of the security and intelligence agencies, both as regards the collection and handling
of personal information on alleged security risks and concerning interception of
communications and other forms of surveillance.
Although the Convention permits restriction of the right to respect for private
life where necessary in a democratic society in the interests of (inter alia) national
security, this is with the important pre-condition that the restrictions must be
authorized by law. The need to provide a statutory foundation in order to defend
potential litigation at the European Court of Human Rights was a prime motivation
leading first to the codifying of the longstanding practice on telephone tapping,
then the placing of the agencies onto a statutory footing and, finally, the introduc-
tion of comprehensive legislation to regulate all aspects of surveillance, whether by
technical means or human agents.
Realization that the prerogative basis of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive in the case
of the Security Service was insufficient to satisfy Article 8 of the Convention led
directly to the introduction of the Security Service Act 1989 in an attempt to defend
cases that were then-pending cases at Strasbourg. It was necessary in order to satisfy
the Convention demands (as interpreted under the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg
court) to establish formal legal limits and controls over the Service’s work and some
legal mechanisms, even if these were not courts proper, for dealing with complaints
about abuses and violation of rights.
The practice of interception of communications was shrouded in mystery until
a Privy Counsellors’ committee confirmed in 1957 that both “phone tapping” and
mail opening were conducted on the authority of a warrant issued by a secretary of
state. These have since been extended to cover interception of telegraphs, faxes,
electronic mail, and text messages. Although the origins of these warrants are
obscure, the government relied on the prerogative as legal authority for this prac-
tice until it was successfully challenged before the European Court of Human
Rights in the Malone case (Malone v UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14). Following that decision
a statutory scheme for interceptions was enacted—initially in the Interception of
Communications Act 1985 but now contained in the Regulation of Investigatory

Powers Act 2000. This permits warrants (still issued by a minister, rather than a
judge) for the prevention or detection of serious crime, in the interest of national
security or for safeguarding the country’s economic well-being. The system is over-
seen by a judicial commissioner who reports annually.
The need to demonstrate a clear legal basis for other forms of state surveillance
in order to comply with Article 8 also led in 2000 to the introduction of an umbrella
regime for covert surveillance by the services and the police—the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act. The Act provides for authorization of “intrusive surveil-
lance” (of a person in private premises or a private vehicle) in the case of suspected
serious offences; authorization is by the secretary of state and the grant of authori-
zation is overseen by the judicial intelligence services commissioner. The legislation
also covers “directed surveillance” and the use of “covert human intelligence sources”
(i.e., informants) to obtain private information about an individual, although in
these instances the criteria for authorization and level of control (within the agen-
cies at a senior level) are less stringent.
The European jurisprudence on what safeguards are required when an agency
holds security files on individuals is steadily evolving. It is by no means certain that
legislation drafted to meet the standards of the 1980s is still adequate. For example,
the Convention organs are beginning to exercise an increasingly skeptical approach
to the question of when it is necessary to retain information on security files: in a
recent case from Sweden the Court found a violation of Article 8 because of the age
of the personal data stored (Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden E CtHR, 6 June
2006). It is possible that UK legislation may be vulnerable in the same way since it
leaves much to administrative procedures within a somewhat generalized legal
framework.30
The same point applies to aspects of the interception regime: the European
Convention jurisprudence has continued to develop since the introduction of the
legislation31 and there is the possibility that it may have overtaken the domestic law.
Indeed in 2008 the European Court of Human Rights found that a program of mass
interception of ‘external’ communications passing between the Republic of Ireland
and the UK operated by the Ministry of Defence under warrant between 1990 and
1997 violated Article 8, because the statutory basis was insufficiently clear and
detailed.32
The impact of the Convention is also beginning to be felt as domestic tribunals
try to apply ECHR standards to access to information. Thus, although generous
exemptions apply freedom-of-information and data-protection legislation for the
30
Section 2(2) of the 1989 Act requires the director-general to ensure that there are
arrangements limiting the collection of information to that necessary for the proper discharge of
the Service’s role or for preventing or detecting serious crime.
31
See especially Weber and Saravia v. Germany, Application no. 54934/00, E Ct HR, 29 June
2006.
32
Liberty and Others v United Kingdom, Application no. 58243/00, E Ct HR, 1 July 2008.
benefit of the security and intelligence there has been some limited success for com-
plainant. The Information Tribunal (National Security Appeals Panel) has held in
one case involving a request by the Liberal Democrat Member of Parliament
Norman Baker that the government cannot rely upon a blanket claim that denial
of access to any files would harm national security, rather claims must be consid-
ered on an individual basis.33 The decision by any of the agencies to issue a
Neither Confirm Nor Deny response to an information or access request can be
challenged before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.34 It is clear, then, that chinks
are beginning to appear in the all-enveloping legal cloak of secrecy over security and
intelligence files.
5.2 Intelligence and the Courts

The courts have long recognized that decisions based on national security are for
the government and that judges have neither the necessary information nor the
competence to assess these questions. As Lord Diplock put it in the GCHQ case
“National security is the responsibility of the executive government; what action is
needed to protect those interests is. . . . a matter upon which those upon whom the
responsibility rests, and not the courts of justice, must have the last word. It is par
excellence a non-justiciable question. The judicial process is totally inept to deal
with the sort of problems which it involves.”35
This approach has been followed both in wartime and in peacetime in a line of
cases going back to the First World War. Although it still applies in the modern era,
the principle must now be qualified: where the government advances arguments
that are contradictory or has chosen to act in a way that interferes more than neces-
sary with individual rights then the courts may intervene—as the House of Lords’
landmark decision in the Bellmarsh detainees case shows (A v SSHD [2004] UKHL
56; [2005] 2 WLR 87).
So far as practical and evidential difficulties of handling secret material in court
are concerned, attitudes are now more also skeptical. The European Court of Human
Rights has insisted that the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) requires courts to
accommodate some form of adversarial challenge to intelligence material even if
normal trial procedures, such as full cross-examination, cannot apply. This has led
in recent years to procedural innovations such as the introduction of the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission and, more widely, of special advocates who are
security-cleared.
33
Baker v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHRR 1275.
34
Vincent C Frank-Steiner v Data Controller Secret Intelligence Service IPT/06/81/CH
(26 February 2008); Hilton v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2005] UKIT
NSA1; Gosling v SSHD [2003] UKIT NSA4 (1 August 2003); Hitchens v SSHD [2003] UKIT NSA5
(4 August 2003).
35
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374, 412.
5.3 Developments since 9/11

Some aspects of the European Convention system have proved a significant con-
straint on government’s counterterrorist measures. Firstly, it is a longstanding
judicial interpretation that the expulsion of non-nationals by a Contracting State
may give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where substantial
grounds are shown for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of
being subjected to torture or degrading treatment or punishment in the country
to which he is returned.36 A second constraint comes from a European Court of
Human Rights decision that a person facing deportation on grounds of national
security had to be given an effective means of challenging this before a judicial
body.37 This led to the creation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
(SIAC), a special legal forum in which intelligence material can be presented with
limited disclosure to the deportee and the use of security-cleared lawyers (special
advocates38). Together these two aspects have severely limited the UK govern-
ment’s ability to remove from the country terrorist suspects, especially those in
the country as political refugees.
Rather than adapt the criminal trial process to allow the available intelligence
to be presented in court in a prosecution the government opted in the aftermath of
9/11 to take the course of “executive measures” to deal with these individuals
(Bonner 2007). This led to introduction of a regime of detention without trial
under Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. Famously in
December 2004 the House of Lords (the country’s final appellate court) ruled that
the provisions in the 2001 Act dealing with detention without trial of non-nationals
were incompatible with the European Convention, despite a purported derogation
from Article 5 (the right to liberty).39 A majority of the court found that because of
the potentially devastating consequences of an attack the government was not
wrong to invoke the derogation, but that the powers that it claimed on this basis
were disproportionate.
When the Part IV powers lapsed they were replaced under the Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2005 with control orders—in effect a system of house arrest based on
intelligence. The judicial procedure under the 2005 Act for supervising non-derogating
control orders allows for parts of the proceedings to be closed to the person against
whom the order is proposed and for the appointment of a Special Advocate,40 with a
36
Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, 467–68, para. 88; Cruz Varas v Sweden (1992)
14 EHRR 1, 33–34, para. 69–70.
37
Chahal v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413.
38
Special advocates were introduced by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act
1997, s. 6. They have access to closed material and represent the deportees’ interests but may not
take instructions from the deportee; see the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Rules (as
amended), Rules 36–38.
39
A (FC) and Others (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56.
40
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, sch. 1. See further Secretary of State for the Home
Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46.
limited role for the court in supervising whether the secretary of state’s decisions were
flawed, according to judicial review principles.41
6. Current and Future Trends
6.1 Agency Reform

Unlike the United States, in Britain 9/11 has resulted in only modest institutional
reform of the security and intelligence agencies. The main response has been a sub-
stantial increase in the resources and personnel available to the Security Service,
and a redirection of its priorities away from Irish terrorism toward international
terrorism. Both the Security Service and the SIS are known to have recruited sub-
stantial numbers of additional officers, although precise figures have not been
published.
There is no Department of Homeland Security, despite calls from the Conser-
vative Opposition for the creation of one. Much more modestly a new unit, the
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), was created in June 2003 as the United
Kingdom’s center for the analysis and assessment of international terrorism. It is
housed within the Security Service (since this the lead agency for counterterrorism
in the United Kingdom) and is responsible to the director-general of the service
(National Intelligence Machine 2006, 16). Its role is to analyze and assesses all intel-
ligence relating to international terrorism, whether domestic or abroad, and to pro-
duce threat assessments for other government departments and agencies. Although
originally created to improve co-operation between MI5 and the police, following
September 11, JTAC membership has broadened to include representatives from
eleven government departments. It is conceivable that JTAC might in time develop
into a fully autonomous organization but at present it operates with departmental
representation under the wing of the Security Service and without affecting the
responsibilities of other departments and agencies.
The Butler review of intelligence prior to the Iraq war (Review of Intelligence
on Weapons of Mass Destruction 2004) proposed safeguards over future public uses
of intelligence and suggested changes in MI6, Defence Intelligence and JIC practice,
resulting in two reforms to the central intelligence machine. The first was the
combining of the roles of secretary to the Joint Intelligence Committee and
intelligence coordinator into a permanent secretary of intelligence, security, and
resilience whose responsibilities now also include giving strategic guidance to the
intelligence community and accounting for the resources devoted to the agencies
under the Single Intelligence Account. The second was the creation within the Cabinet
41
Ss. 3 (2), (6), (8), (10) and (11).
Office of a post of professional head of intelligence analysis with a brief to “advise

in the security, defence and foreign affairs fields on gaps and duplication in analyst
training, on recruitment of analysts, career structures and interchange opportuni-
ties” (National Intelligence Machinery 2006, 25).
6.2 Use of Intercept Evidence

Closely related to the legal developments described earlier is the controversy over
whether prosecution is a better option than disruption of terrorist networks and
detention. Government ministers have repeatedly stated that executive measures
(such as detention without trial and control orders) are justified because informa-
tion in the hands of the security and intelligence agencies cannot satisfy the crimi-
nal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, or could not be given in evidence
without compromising sensitive sources. The Newton Committee recommended
building on the example of SIAC and relaxing the prohibition in criminal cases to
allow trial before a security-cleared judge (Privy Counsellors Review Committee
2003) or introducing special anti-terrorist courts, as has happened in the Republic
of Ireland and in Spain (and to a lesser degree with the Widgery courts in Northern
Ireland). So far, however, the government has tabled no proposals on these lines.
In this context the potential use of material obtained by interception of com-
munications is significant because it offers the apparent prospect of using strong
evidence that incriminates terrorist suspects in their own words. Unlike many other
countries, in the United Kingdom material obtained from interception is not gener-
ally admissible as evidence in legal proceedings. Intercept is used as a source of
information in investigations and for executive measures, and to assist disruption of
terrorist activities. The ban on intercept evidence has the effect both of maintaining
a degree of secrecy and also insulates the practice from effective legal challenges.
The reason for the bar is less a concern about the invasion of privacy than the
wish to maintain some element of secrecy concerning the procedures. However,
there are some unjustifiable anomalies—for example, evidence obtained by bug-
ging can be given and the ban does not apply to all courts and tribunals. A notable
exception is the Special Immigration Appeals Commission where intercept evidence
may be given in closed session.42
A debate has been raging inconclusively within government departments for
several years about lifting the restriction (Intelligence and Security Committee,
2005 para. 92–94). The apparent reason for failure to agree has been continuing
concerns over the scope of disclosure likely to be ordered by the courts and in par-
ticular that this cannot be predicted in advance, with the risk that confidential
sources might therefore be compromised. In a careful comparative review in 2006
42
Exceptions also apply for closed proceedings of the Proscribed Organisations Appeals
Commission and concerning Control Orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The
government has proposed further exceptions for closed proceedings in appeals against Treasury
freezing orders and coroner’s courts: Privy Council 2008, paras. 20–23.
Justice described the ban as “archaic, unnecessary and counter-productive.”43 In

2008 a Privy Counsellors’ review, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, came out cautiously
in favor of allowing such evidence provided a legal regime sufficiently protective of
national security could be constructed (Privy Council 2008). The Chilcot report set
a series of strict tests that any legal scheme would have to satisfy before introduction
of intercept evidence—all of which focus on national-security interests. These
include apparently sacrificing the virtues of independent decisions on prosecution
(by giving control to the intercepting authority), originator control over disclosure,
and a refusal to acknowledge that exculpatory disclosure in a fair trial (i.e., of infor-
mation that may assist the defense) may place justifiable additional burdens on the
agencies (Privy Council 2008, para. 91).
As the challenge of dealing with a heightened threat of terrorism stretches into
the medium to long term it is clear that further adjustments like these can be
expected between the once-discrete worlds of intelligence and law. On the one hand
human rights demands have clearly shaped the agencies’ working practices, espe-
cially where they impinge on privacy. The European Convention on Human Rights
is unlikely to diminish in importance in future and in practice the agencies now pay
close attention to its demands. On the other hand the need to regularize counter-
terrorist measures from the exceptional form that they took after September 2001 is
likely to lead to further reforms to allow for the creation of more security-friendly
legal environments. Innovations like the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
and special advocates are often regarded by practicing lawyers as regrettable incur-
sions into the principle of open justice (Forcese and Waldman 2007). Nevertheless,
there are likely to be a number of other such developments in future as intelligence
and law attempt to find a modus vivendi.
REFERENCES
Aldrich, R. 2005. Whitehall and the Iraq War: The UK’s Four Intelligence Enquiries.
Irish Studies in International Affairs 16:73–88.
Andrew, C. 1986. Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community London:
Sceptre.
Bonner, D. 2007. Executive Measures, Terrorism, and National Security. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Born, H., L. Johnson, and I. Leigh, eds. 2005. Who’s Watching the Spies: Establishing
Intelligence Service Accountability. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books.
Born, H., and I. Leigh. 2007. Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services. In
Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security: Yearbook of the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute 2007, ch. 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Defty, A. 2008. Educating Parliamentarians about Intelligence: The Role of the British
Intelligence and Security Committee. Parliamentary Affairs 61, no. 4:621–41.
Denning, Lord. 1963. Lord Denning’s Report. Cmnd. 2152.
43
Justice 2006 at para. 168.
European Commission for Democracy through Law. 2007. Report on Democratic Oversight
of the Security Services in Council of Europe States, Study 388/2006 (CDL_DEM
2007-001). Strasbourg (Council of Europe).
Forcese, C., and L. Waldman. 2007. Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from
Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of “Special Advocates” in
National Security Proceedings. Ottawa. Canadian Centre for Security and Intelligence
Studies, Carleton University.
Gill, P. 1994. Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State.
London: Frank Cass.
———. 2007. Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: The Case of the UK
Intelligence Security Committee and the “War on Terror.” Intelligence and National
Security 22, no. 1:14–37.
Glees, A., P. Davies, and J. Morrison. 2006. The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain’s Intelligence
and Security Committee. London: Social Affairs Unit.
Intelligence and Security Committee. 2005. Annual Report for 2004–5, Cm. 6510.
———. 2006. Report into the London Terrorist Attacks of 7 July 2005, Cm. 6785.
Justice. 2006. Intercept Evidence: Lifting the Ban. London, Justice.
Leigh, I. 2007. Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence in the UK: A Critical Evaluation. In
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, ed. H. Born
and M. Caparini. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Lustgarten, L., and I. Leigh. 1994. In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary
Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ministry of Justice. 2007. The Governance of Britain. Cm. 7170.
———. 2008. The Governance of Britain—Constitutional Renewal, Cm. 7342-I.
National Intelligence Machinery. 2006. London: HMSO.
Phythian, M. 2007. The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability Intelligence and
National Security 22, no. 1:81.
Privy Counsellors Review Committee. 2003. Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001
Review. London. H.C. 100 (2003–04).
Privy Council Review of Intercept as Evidence. 2008. Cm. 7324.
Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005. H.C. 1087
(2005–6).
Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of a Committee of Privy
Counsellors, 2004, H.C. 898 (2003–4).
Richelson, J., and D. Ball. 1990. The Ties That Bind. 2nd ed. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Wadham, J. 1994. The Intelligence Services Act 1994. Modern Law Review 57:916–927.
chapter 40
RETHINKING
THE STATE
SECRETS
PRIVILEGE
louis fisher
1. Introduction
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration relied extensively
on the “state secrets privilege” to prevent private litigants from gaining access to
agency documents sought in cases involving NSA surveillance, extraordinary ren-
dition, and other intelligence programs. In these lawsuits, the Justice Department’s
primary citation was United States v. Reynolds (1953), the first time the Supreme
Court recognized the state-secrets privilege. The pattern over the past half cen-
tury has been for federal judges, based on Reynolds, to give “deference” and even
“utmost deference” to executive claims about the sensitivity and confidentiality of
agency records, often without ever looking at the disputed document. As explained
below, the Supreme Court was misled by the government in 1953 and there is cur-
rent interest in having Congress enact legislation to assure greater independence
for the federal judiciary and provide a more even playing field for private
litigants.
2. Three Widows Seek Justice

The Reynolds case began on October 6, 1948, with the explosion of a B-29 over
Waycross, Georgia. Five of eight military crew died in the crash; four out of the five
civilian engineers assisting with confidential equipment on board also perished. Three
widows of the civilian engineers sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act to determine
if there had been negligence by the government (Fisher 2006, 1–4). In particular, they
asked for the official accident report. The government argued in court that disclosure
of the report would do grave damage to national security. A half-century later, after
the government had declassified and released the report, it was obvious that it con-
tained no state secrets. Instead, it showed that the government had acted negligently
by not installing proper equipment. The Court, misled by the government about the
presence of national security secrets, never looked at the document.
The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 authorizes federal agencies to settle claims
against the United States caused by negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees
acting within the scope of their official duties. Congress directed federal courts to
treat the government in the same manner as a private individual, deciding the dis-
pute on the basis of facts and with no partiality in favor of the government. The
United States “shall be liable in respect of such claims . . . in the same manner, and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, except that the
United States shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment, or for punitive dam-
ages” (ibid., 14–16). If there was any “balancing test” to be applied by federal courts
in these cases, Congress had supplied the standard. The government was to be
treated the same as any other litigant.
Other than the exceptions listed in the statute, Congress authorized courts to
adjudicate claims against the government and decide them fairly in light of avail-
able facts. Congress empowered the courts to exercise independent judgment. There
was no reason for judges to accept at face value a government’s claim that an agency
document requested by plaintiffs was somehow privileged, without the court itself
examining the document to verify the government’s assertion. To uncritically accept
the government’s word would be to abdicate the court’s duty to protect the ability
of each party to present its case fairly in court. It would leave control entirely in the
hands of self-interested executive claims.
The widows’ lawsuit, filed on June 21, 1949, was assigned to Judge William H.
Kirkpatrick in the Eastern District in Pennsylvania. Representing the women were
Charles J. Biddle and Francis Hopkinson of Drinker Biddle & Reath, a prominent
law firm in Philadelphia. Biddle submitted thirty-one questions to the government,
requesting that it provide answers and submit copies of identified records and doc-
uments. The first question asked whether the government had directed an investi-
gation into the crash. If so, the government was to attach to its answer a copy of the
reports and findings. The government acknowledged that there had been an inves-
tigation but refused to produce the accident report (ibid., 31). No claim of state
secrets was invoked.
rethinking the state secrets privilege 659
The last two questions sought information about possible mechanical or engi-
neering defects on the B-29 for three months immediately preceding the crash. Was
it necessary at any time to postpone a scheduled flight of the plane because of those
defects? The government said “No.” The last question asked whether the govern-
ment had prescribed modifications for the B-29 engines to prevent overheating and
to reduce fire hazards. If so, when were the modifications prescribed? If any modi-
fications had been carried out, the interrogatory asked for details. The government’s
answer to this crucial question was a blunt “No” (ibid., 35). When the declassified
accident report was discovered on the Internet in 2000, the falsity of that answer
was obvious.
Judge Kirkpatrick was guided by several earlier rulings on access to government
documents considered too sensitive, privileged or secret to be shared with a private
plaintiff. Judges concluded that the documents should be given to the court to inde-
pendently determine and verify whether the government had accurately character-
ized the contents. Part of the lesson from these cases was that if the government
declined to release a document to the court it could lose the case. Struggles over
access to government documents provided a common theme to these lawsuits, with
district courts often deciding that private plaintiffs were entitled to agency records.
One court, referring to the sovereign’s command Soit droit fait al partie (Let right be
done to the party), added: “But right cannot be done if the government is allowed
to suppress the facts in its possession.”1 Other courts pointed out that the Federal
Tort Claims Act placed the United States, with respect to claims covered by the stat-
ute, on a par with private litigants.2 When the government withheld documents on
the ground that a report was privileged, a court could, and did, insist that the report
be turned over for inspection in the privacy of the judge’s chambers.3
In a case decided by a district court on May 12, 1950, a private party brought a tort
claims action against the government after the crash of an Air Force plane. The gov-
ernment refused to permit the private parties to see public documents, including the
official investigative report of the accident. The court insisted that the Federal Tort
Claims Act required judges to adjudicate disputes in an independent manner and
assure that plaintiffs had adequate access to documents to prepare their case: “It is not
the exclusive right of any such agency of the Government to decide for itself the privi-
leged nature of any such documents, but the Court is the one to judge of this when
contention is made. This can be done by presenting to the Judge, without disclosure
in the first instance to the other side, whatever is claimed to have that status. The
Court then decides whether it is privileged or not. This would seem to be the inevi-
table consequence of the Government submitting itself either as plaintiff or defen-
dant to litigation with private persons.”4 The court ruled that the plaintiffs had shown
good cause to have the requested materials submitted to them by the government.
1
Bank Line v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 801, 804 (D. N.Y. 1948).
2
Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 356, 357 (D. Pa. 1948).
3
Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203, 204 (D. N.Y. 1949).
4
Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255, 257–58 (D. La. 1950).
Guided by these lower court precedents, Judge Kirkpatrick decided on June 30,
1950, that the report of the B-29 accident and the findings of the Air Force’s investi-
gation “are not privileged.”5 The widows were entitled to have the documents pro-
duced. The Justice Department presented to Judge Kirkpatrick a number of letters,
affidavits, and statements, explaining why the documents should not be released to
the plaintiffs. One affidavit signed by Maj. Gen. Reginald C. Harmon, Judge Advocate
General of the U.S. Air Force, stated that information and findings of the accident
report and survivor statements “cannot be furnished without seriously hampering
national security, flying safety and the development of highly technical and secret
military equipment.” Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter stated that the
B-29 carried “confidential equipment on board and any disclosure of its mission or
information concerning its operation or performance would be prejudicial to this
Department and would not be in the public interest” (Fisher 2006, 52–53). It would
be discovered, a half century later, that the accident report disclosed nothing about
the plane’s secret mission or the confidential equipment. Intentionally or not,
Finletter’s statement was a red herring.
As the government learned in district court and the Third Circuit, refusal to
release a document to a federal judge meant losing the case. Judge Kirkpatrick
directed the government to produce for his examination several documents “so that
this court may determine whether or not all or any parts of such documents contain
matters of a confidential nature, discovery of which would violate the Government’s
privilege against disclosure of matters involving the national or public interest.” The
documents included the accident report and statements of the three surviving crew
members (ibid., 56). When the government failed to produce the documents for his
inspection, he ruled in favor of the three widows.
The government appealed his decision to the Third Circuit. To the government,
the ultimate issue was whether federal statutes “and the Constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers creates in the head of an executive department a discretion, to
be exercised by him, to determine whether the public interest permits disclosure of
official records” (ibid., 61). No one had argued that confidential or state secrets
should be “disclosed” to the public. Delivering documents to a district judge, to be
read in chambers, cannot reasonably be called disclosure. The government essen-
tially argued that access to evidence in a trial would be decided not by the judiciary
but by one of the parties to the case: the executive branch.
On December 11, 1951, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s decision:
“considerations of justice may well demand that the plaintiffs should have access to
the facts, thus within the exclusive control of their opponent, upon which they were
required to rely to establish their right of recovery.”6 In tort claims cases, where the
government had consented to be sued as a private person, whatever claims of public
interest might exist in withholding accident reports “must yield to what Congress
evidently regarded as the greater public interest involved in seeing that justice is
5
Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 472 (D. Pa. 1950).
6
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1951).
done to persons injured by governmental operations whom it has authorized to

enforce their claims by suit against the United States.”7
In addition to matters of public law, the Third Circuit concluded that granting
the government the “sweeping privilege” it claimed would be “contrary to a sound
public policy.” It would be a small step, the court said, “to assert a privilege against
any disclosure of records merely because they might prove embarrassing to govern-
ment officers.”8 The court rejected the government’s position that it was within “the
sole province of the Secretary of the Air Force to determine whether any privileged
material is contained in the documents and . . . his determination of this question
must be accepted by the district court without any independent consideration of
the matter by it. We cannot accede to this proposition.”9 To hold that an agency head
in a suit to which the government is a party “may conclusively determine the
Government’s claim of privilege is to abdicate the judicial function and permit
the executive branch of the Government to infringe the independent province of
the judiciary as laid down by the Constitution.”10
3. Misleading the Supreme Court

Having lost in district court and the Third Circuit, the government petitioned
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. After looking to history, practices in the
states, and British rulings, the government for the first time began to fully press the
state secrets privilege: “There are well settled privileges for state secrets and for com-
munications of informers, both of which are applicable here, the first because the
airplane which crashed was alleged by the Secretary [of the Air Force] to be carrying
secret equipment, and the second because the secrecy necessary to encourage full
disclosure by informants is also necessary in order to encourage the freest possible
discussion by survivors before Accident Investigation Boards” (Fisher 2006, 97).
The fact that the plane was carrying secret equipment was known to newspaper
readers the day after the crash (ibid., 1–2). The central issue, which the executive
branch repeatedly muddled, was whether the accident report and the survivor state-
ments contained secret information. As it turns out, they did not (ibid., 166–69). In
its brief, the government invoked “the so-called ‘state secrets’ privilege,” asserting
that the claim of privilege by Secretary Finletter “falls squarely” under that privilege
for various reasons. Nothing in the government’s argument had anything to do with
the contents of the accident report or the survivors’ statements. Had the trial judge
looked at those documents he would have seen nothing about military secrets or
7
Ibid., 994.
8
Ibid., 995.
9
Ibid., 996–97.
10
Ibid., 997.
confidential equipment. Yet the government’s brief continued to mislead the

Supreme Court on the contents of the accident report. It asserted: “to the extent that
the report reveals military secrets concerning the structure or performance of the
plane that crashed or deals with these factors in relation to projected or suggested
secret improvements it falls within the judicially recognized ‘state secrets’ privilege”
(ibid., 98–99). Why use the indirect language of “to the extent”? Did the report
reveal military secrets or not? In the case of the accident report and the survivor
statements, the extent was zero.11
On March 9, 1953, the Supreme Court ruled that the government had presented
a valid claim of privilege. It did so without looking at the accident report. Divided
six to three, the Court offered confused and incoherent principles of judicial super-
vision: “The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate
for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect.”12 If the government can withhold docu-
ments from a judge, even for in camera inspection, there is no possible basis for a
court to “determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of
privilege.” In this posture, the court is forced to accept at face value an assertion by
the government, an assertion that in this case was false. Nor is there any reason to
regard in camera inspection as “disclosure.” The Supreme Court reasoned that in
the case of the privilege against disclosing documents, the court “must be satisfied
from all the evidence and circumstances” before it decides to accept the claim of
privilege.13 Denied access to documents, the judge has no “evidence” to evaluate
other than self-serving claims and assertions by executive officials.
The Court cautioned that judicial control “over the evidence of a case cannot be
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”14 If an executive officer acted capri-
ciously and arbitrarily, a court would be unaware of that behavior without reading
the disputed documents. Deciding the case as it did, the Court surrendered to the
executive branch fundamental judicial duties over questions of privileges and evi-
dence. The Court served not justice but the executive branch. In this type of case
involving confidential documents, the courtroom is converted into a safe house for
executive power. Private litigants have no chance of success.
The Supreme Court had two valid avenues before it. It could have followed
the path taken by the district court and the Third Circuit and decide in favor of the
three widows because the government refused to release the accident report and the
survivor statements. It could have directed the government to give those documents
to Judge Kirkpatrick for in camera review. Instead, the Court selected a third option
that was the least justified, assuming on the basis of ambiguous statements pro-
duced by the government that the claim of state secrets was justified. In so doing, it
For access to the accident report, see pages 10a–68a of http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/

11
reynoldspetapp.pdf.
12
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
13
Ibid. at 9.
14
Ibid. at 9–10.
produced a jumbled decision that gave a green light to future courts to undermine
the rights of private litigants who sought fair procedures. Unwilling to look at the
documents, the Court risked being fooled. As it turned out, it was, raising disturb-
ing questions about the capacity of the judiciary to function as an independent,
competent branch in the field of national security.
4. Fraud Against the Court

Judith Loether was seven weeks old when her father, Albert Palya, died in the B-29
crash. As she grew up, she learned that he had been killed while applying his exper-
tise as a civilian engineer to develop secret equipment. When she turned forty-one,
she had a better appreciation of how young her father was at the time of the acci-
dent. She focused more closely on the B-29 crash and the special equipment it car-
ried. On February 10, 2000, she stayed overnight with friends and used their
computer. For the first time she entered the combination “B-29” plus “accident” into
a search engine. The first hit took her to a Web site run by Michael Stowe, Accident-
Report.com. He had a hobby of collecting and selling military accident reports
(Fisher 2006, 166). He told Judy Loether he had the accident report she wanted. She
began reading it with great care, expecting to find passages on state secrets. To her
surprise, there were none. The report contained a few references to “secret equip-
ment,” but she already knew that from newspaper stories about the crash. She
decided to locate the two other families involved in the Reynolds litigation: the sur-
vivors of William H. Brauner and Robert E. Reynolds. Patricia Reynolds had remar-
ried and now had the name Patricia Herring.
Loether, the Brauners, and Herring decided to sue the government for deceiv-
ing the federal courts. Eventually they turned to the law firm that had brought the
original case, Drinker Biddle. The firm filed a motion for a writ of coram nobis,
charging that the government had misled the Supreme Court and committed fraud
against it. The writ is a motion to a court to review and correct its judgment because
it was based on an error of fact. In 1827, Justice Joseph Story explained the funda-
mental principle at play: “Every Court must be presumed to exercise those powers
belonging to it, which are necessary for the promotion of public justice; and we do
not doubt that this Court possesses the power to reinstate any cause, dismissed by
mistake.”15
Two principles of law compete. One is the general rule of judicial finality. As
expressed by the Supreme Court in 1944, society is well served “by putting an end to
litigation after a case has been tried and judgment entered.”16 Courts cannot be
expected to relitigate every case. However, a court needs to revisit a judgment if it
15
The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 10 (1827).
16
Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944).
discovers that fraud has cast a shadow over the original ruling. Tolerating fraud in a
case undermines respect for judges and lowers confidence in the courts. The injury
is not to a single litigant. It is to the entire institution of the judiciary.
On March 4, 2003, Wilson M. Brown III of Drinker Biddle petitioned the
Supreme Court for a “writ of error coram nobis to remedy fraud upon this Court.”
The petition asked the Court to vacate its decision in Reynolds and reinstate the
original judgment by the district court; award the widows and their families dam-
ages to compensate them for their losses; and award them attorneys fees and single
or double costs as a sanction against the government’s misconduct (Fisher 2006,
176–77). Armed now with the declassified accident report, the petition could iden-
tify specific negligence by the Air Force that led to the accident. The government
filed a brief opposing the petition. Without explanation, the Court on June 23, 2003
denied the petition.17 The three families had to start over again in the lower courts.
On October 1, 2003, the families filed an action in district court. They argued
that the government’s action “was intended to and did subvert the processes of this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court” (ibid., 188). In
an opposing brief, the government denied that the statements signed by Finletter
and Harmon constituted lies: “neither Secretary Finletter’s claim of privilege, nor
General Harmon’s affidavit, makes any specific representation concerning the con-
tents of those documents [the accident report and witness statements]” (ibid.,
190–91). If they did not make those representations, what was the purpose of their
statements? It was because of what they said in their statements that both the dis-
trict court and the Third Circuit supported in camera review and the Supreme
Court concluded that the accident report contained secret information.
The government had a reason to withhold the accident report from Judge
Kirkpatrick. The report revealed clear negligence on the part of the Air Force, which
did not install heat shields and failed to brief the civilian engineers before the flight
on the use of parachutes and emergency aircraft evacuation (Fisher 2006, 192–93).
Had Judge Kirkpatrick seen the report, it would have been obvious that the govern-
ment had lied on its response to Question 31 of the interrogatories, which asked
whether any modifications had been prescribed for the B-29 engines to prevent
overheating and reduce the risk of fire hazard. The government’s answer: “No.”
(ibid., 35). Looking at how the government responded to other questions and com-
paring the responses with the accident report, one can see other answers that are
either inaccurate or false.
Through its own doing, the government had problems. The first was negli-
gence by the Air Force. Why not simply concede mistakes and pay the widows the
sums that Judge Kirkpatrick had awarded: $80,000 each to Phyllis Brauner and
Elizabeth Palya, and $65,000 to Patricia Herring? (ibid., 58). In their brief in 2003
to the district court, the three families offered this explanation: the government’s
desire to “fabricat[e] a ‘test case’ for a favorable judicial ruling on claims of an
executive or ‘state secrets’ privilege—a case built on the fraudulent premise that
17
In re Herring, 539 U.S. 940 (2003).
the documents in question contained ‘secret’ military or national security infor-

mation” (ibid., 193).
District Judge Legrome D. Davis held oral argument on May 11, 2004. Both sides
spent considerable time trying to understand the meaning of the Finletter-Harmon
statements. Wilson Brown said that the Finletter statement “could not have been
clearer” in saying that the Air Force objected to releasing the documents because
they were “concerned with this confidential mission and equipment of the Air
Force,” and that there was an intent on the part of the government to suggest to the
courts that these documents “contained references to confidential missions and
descriptions of confidential equipment that were secret.” The government denied
that the Finletter statement made representations “regarding the contents of the
report or . . . that the report actually contains any specific description of the equip-
ment or the nature of the mission, although there actually is an allusion to the
nature of the mission” (ibid., 196–97).
Throughout this litigation, apparently no one ever asked the government point-
blank: “What are you talking about? Are Finletter and Harmon saying that the acci-
dent report and the survivor statements contain military secrets or state secrets?” It
was in the government’s interest to keep matters ambiguous, implying something
without ever saying it. It was the responsibility of the plaintiffs and the judiciary to
crystallize the issue. Instead, they left the cloud in place.
Judge Davis released his decision on September 10, 2004, granting the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss and instructing the Clerk of Court to “statistically close
this matter.”18 He deferred to the government with this reasoning: “In all likelihood,
fifty years ago the government had a more accurate understanding ‘on the prospect
of danger to [national security] from the disclosure of secret and sensitive informa-
tion’ than lay persons could appreciate or that hindsight now allows.”19 That was an
assumption on Davis’s part. It also improperly implied that “disclosure” to Judge
Kirkpatrick would have been disclosure to the public.
The families appealed to the Third Circuit. On September 22, 2005, the appel-
late court decided for the government. The second paragraph signaled how the
court would rule: “Actions for fraud upon the court are so rare that this Court has
not previously had the occasion to articulate legal definition of the concept. The
concept of fraud upon the court challenges the very principle upon which our judi-
cial system is based: the finality of a judgment.”20 What the Third Circuit ignored
was a competing principle: assuring that the executive branch—in court more than
any other party—does not mislead or deceived the judiciary.
Did the accident report contain information so crucial and sensitive for
national security that it could not be shared even with a judge in chambers? The
Third Circuit pointed to three possibilities: “The accident report revealed, for
18
Memorandum and Order, Herring v. United States, Civil Action No. 03-CV-5500-LDD
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2004), at 21.
19
Ibid. at 8, citing Halperin v. NSC, 452 F.Supp. 47 (D.D.C. 1978).
20
Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005).
example, that the project was being carried out by ‘the 3150th Electronics Squadron,’
that the mission required an ‘aircraft capable of dropping bombs’ and that the mis-
sion required an airplane capable of ‘operating at altitudes of 20,000 feet and
above.’ ”21 The last two elements were not sensitive. Newspaper readers the day
after the crash were aware that confidential equipment was on board a B-29 flying
at 20,000 feet and that the aircraft was capable of dropping bombs. That’s what
bombers do. If for some reason reference to the 3150th Electronics Squadron was
sensitive, the court could have directed the government to redact that information
and release the rest of the accident report to the families. On May 1, 2006, the
Supreme Court refused to take the case.22
5. Asserting Judicial Independence

The value given short shrift in this coram nobis case is the need to protect the integ-
rity, independence, and reputation of the federal judiciary. The Supreme Court in
the 1953 Reynolds case accepted at face value the government’s assertion that the
accident report and survivors’ statements contained state secrets. That assertion
proved to be false. By accepting the government’s claim without examining the doc-
uments, the Court appeared to function as an arm of the executive branch and
failed to exercise independent judgment. When courts operate in that manner, liti-
gants and citizens lose faith in the judiciary, the rule of law, and the system of checks
and balances and constitutional government.
Deciding questions of privileges and access to evidence is central to the conduct
of a trial by the judge. In his standard treatise on evidence, John Henry Wigmore
recognized the existence of “state secrets” but also concluded that the scope of that
privilege had to be decided by a judge, not executive officials. He agreed that there
“must be a privilege for secrets of State, i.e. matters whose disclosure would endager
[sic] the Nation’s governmental requirements or its relations of friendship and
profit with other nations.” Yet he cautioned that this privilege “has been so often
improperly invoked and so loosely misapplied that a strict definition of its legiti-
mate limits must be made” (Wigmore 1940, vol. 8, ‘2212a; emphasis in original). On
the duty to give evidence, Wigmore was unambiguous: “Let it be understood, then,
that there is no exemption, for officials as such, or for the Executive as such, from
the universal testimonial duty to give evidence in judicial investigations” (ibid.,
2370). Wigmore posed the key question: Who should determine the necessity for
secrecy? The executive or the judicial branch? As with other privileges, it should be
the court: “Both principle and policy demand that the determination of the privi-
lege shall be for the Court” (ibid., 2379).
21
Ibid. at 391 n.3.
22
547 U.S. 1123 (2006).
In 1975, Congress enacted procedures covering the rules of evidence, including

Rule 501 on privileges. It clearly directed courts to decide the scope of a privilege.
The rule covers all parties to a case, including the government. It does not recognize
any authority on the part of the executive branch to dictate the reach of a privilege.
There is no acknowledgment of state secrets. The only exception in Rule 501 con-
cerns civil actions at the state level. Rule 501 provides: “Except as otherwise required
by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience. . . .”23 (emphasis added).
Executive officials who invoke the state-secrets privilege often understand that
the branch that decides questions of relevance, privileges, and evidence is the judi-
cial, not the executive. On February 10, 2000, CIA Director George J. Tenet signed a
formal claim of state secrets in the case of Richard M. Barlow, adding: “I recognize
it is the Court’s decision rather than mine to determine whether requested material
is relevant to matters being addressed in litigation” (Tenet 2000, 7). His language
acknowledges that a party in court, including an executive agency, is subordinate to
judicial direction and rulings.
If the government decides to invoke the state-secrets privilege, courts have
many effective methods to protect their integrity. They can tell the executive branch
that if it wants to assert the privilege, even to the point of withholding requested
documents from in camera inspection, it will lose the case. That was the position
taken by the district court and the Third Circuit in Reynolds. It was the proper posi-
tion and the Supreme Court would have protected its dignity and independence by
adopting the same policy. It failed to do so and paid a price, as did the three widows
and constitutional government.
In the past, courts have not hesitated to advise the executive branch that it will
lose a case if it refuses to release documents. In criminal cases, it is has long been
understood that if federal prosecutors want to charge someone with a crime, the
defendant has a right to gain access to documents to establish innocence. For exam-
ple, in 1946 the Second Circuit reminded the government that when it “institutes
criminal proceedings in which evidence, otherwise privileged under a statute or
regulation, becomes importantly relevant, it abandons the privilege.”24 The Watergate
Tapes Case of 1974 involved executive privilege, not state secrets, but in ruling against
President Nixon the Supreme Court recognized that in a criminal case, where defen-
dants need information to protect their rights in court, the President’s general
authority over agency information could not override the specific need for
evidence.25 “The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the
23
88 Stat. 1934 (1975).
24
United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946).
25
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules
of evidence.”26
The Court explained that it was not deciding about the need for relevant evi-
dence in civil litigation. Still, lower courts have told the government that when it
brings a civil case against a private party, it must be prepared to either surrender
documents sought by the defendant or drop the charges. Once a government official
seeks relief in a court of law, the official “must be held to have waived any privilege,
which he otherwise might have had, to withhold testimony required by the rules of
pleading or evidence as a basis for such relief.”27 The choice: Give up the privilege or
abandon the case. The issue of privilege is one for the judiciary.28 In 1961, the Fifth
Circuit insisted that federal agencies “cannot hide behind a self-erected wall evidence
adverse to its interest as a litigant.”29 Other decisions underscore the principle that
when the government brings a civil suit, it waives any privilege.30
These examples cover cases brought by the government, either criminal or civil.
What rules apply when a private party brings a case against the government, as in a
tort claims action? In Reynolds, both the district court and the Third Circuit told the
government that if it insisted on withholding the accident report and the survivor
statements, it would lose. The Supreme Court permitted the government to with-
hold documents and prevail. To prevent abuse of the judiciary, a trial court must at
least conduct in camera review to examine the government’s claim of privilege,
including state secrets. As noted in a 1980 case: “Any other rule would permit the
Government to classify documents just to avoid their production even though there
is need for their production and no true need for secrecy.”31
In 1977, private citizens sued the government after the arrest of over a thousand
persons who demonstrated against the Vietnam War. The plaintiffs subpoenaed
White House tapes. The D.C. Circuit rejected the position that a presidential privi-
lege of confidentiality “was absolute in the context of civil litigation.”32 The court
emphasized that there is “a strong constitutional value in the need for disclosure in
order to provide the kind of enforcement of constitutional rights that is presented
by a civil action for damages, at least where, as here, the action is tantamount to a
charge of civil conspiracy among high officers of government to deny a class of citi-
zens their constitutional rights and where there has been sufficient evidentiary sub-
stantiation to avoid the inference that the demand reflects mere harassment.”33
26
Ibid., 709.
27
Fleming v. Bernardi, 4 F.R.D. 270, 271 (D. Ohio). See also United States v. Cotton Valley
Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719 (D. La. 1949), judgment aff ’d, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
28
Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1958).
29
NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 1961).
30
United States v. San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 33 F.R.D. 513, 515 (D. Texas 1963); United
States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524, 529 (D. Colo. 1964); General Engineering, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 367, 376
(9th Cir. 1965).
31
American Civil Liberties U. v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1980).
32
Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
33
Ibid. at 247.
Courts must take care to restore confidence in the judiciary, in the sanctity of the
courtroom, and the system of checks and balances. The state-secrets privilege is qual-
ified, not absolute. Otherwise there is no adversary process in court, no exercise of
judicial independence over the evidence needed, and no fairness accorded to private
litigants who challenge the government. In 1971, the D.C. Circuit stated that an
“essential ingredient of our rule of law is the authority of the courts to determine
whether an executive official or agency has complied with the Constitution and with
the mandates of Congress which define and limit the authority of the executive. Any
claim to executive absolutism cannot override the duty of the court to assure that an
official has not exceeded his charter or flouted the legislative will.”34 To grant an
executive official absolute authority over agency documents would empower the
government “to cover up all evidence of fraud and corruption when a federal court
or grand jury was investigating malfeasance in office, and this is not the law.”35
6. Reform Efforts
Scholars have begun to focus on the scope and legitimacy of state secrets. William
Weaver and Robert Pallitto published an important article in 2005 that criticized
“judicial timidity” and “congressional ineffectiveness” in providing institutional
checks (Weaver and Pallitto 2005, 86). Unless restricted, the state secrets privilege
“threatens to undermine the constitutional balance of power and to invade public
interests” (ibid., 112). Their book-length analysis in 2007 examined state secrets his-
torically and as applied after the terrorist acts of 9/11 (Pallitto and Weaver 2007). The
post-9/11 period noted a marked increase in agency efforts to withhold documents
sought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and a sharp increase in the
number documents classified (Nather 2005). The state secrets privilege was invoked
regularly by the Bush administration to block litigation challenging National
Security Agency surveillance conducted without a warrant and the practice of the
executive branch to take suspects to another country for interrogation and torture
(Fisher 2008, 285–360).
Legal studies conclude that the judiciary “has largely failed to accept its critical
role of monitoring and limiting secrecy” (Fuchs 2006, 132). Case after case involving
disputes over the state-secrets privilege and FOIA requests underscore “the growth
of judicial deference to government secrecy claims, which has evolved into a form
of broad acceptance that is neither required by the Constitution nor intended by
Congress” (ibid.). There is no necessary relationship between secrecy and national
security. Secrecy by government agencies can deny information needed to protect
against attacks and “may harm the nation” (ibid., 139).
34
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
35
Ibid. at 794.
To protect the interests of private litigants and strengthen judicial indepen-

dence, Congress can pass legislation to rewrite the rules of evidence, encouraging
federal judges to more closely scrutinize agency claims of state secrets (Stilp 2006,
854–57). In its efforts to oversee the activities of the executive branch, Congress
depends in part on federal courts to hear disputes from private plaintiffs who charge
that the president or executive agencies have violated statutes or the Constitution
(Frost 2007, 1953). If courts adopt the standard of “deference” or “utmost deference”
to executive claims about state secrets, they forgo their opportunity and duty to
determine improper and illegal executive conduct.
A recent study by Robert Chesney explains that the “great flaw” in Reynolds was
the decision of the Supreme Court to hold in favor for the executive branch without
ever examining the disputed accident report (Chesney 2007, 1287). There may be
some grounds for courts to employ the Reynolds “reasonable danger” test in decid-
ing if national-security information warrants protection, but that factor has no
application “when it comes to deciding whether a given document or other source
actually references such sensitive information” (ibid., 1288). The Court in Reynolds
“should have ensured that the [accident] report really did discuss the nature of that
equipment (and that it did so in a manner not reasonably capable of redaction)”
(ibid.). Also, Congress can decide to replace the “reasonable danger” standard “with
a less deferential test, thus giving greater weight to the role of the judiciary as an
institutional check on the executive branch” (ibid., 1311).
Unlike other legal issues that find their way into court, federal judges generally
dismiss any effort to balance competing interests of the litigants (Kinkopf 2007,
492). Courts hold that if they are satisfied that a state-secrets claim has been validly
asserted by an executive agency, “the privilege is not subject to a judicial balancing
of the various interests at state.”36 At most, a plaintiff ’s “private interests must give
way to the national interest in preserving state secrets.”37 Other courts will put an
individual’s interest on one side of the scale and place “the collective interest in
national security” on the other side.38 No individual could ever prevail with that
type of balancing test: one person against three hundred million. But what is the
national interest or the collective interest? There was no national interest in con-
cealing from the Supreme Court government negligence in the B-29 case, and no
national interest in the executive branch falsely claiming that the accident report
contained state secrets. There is no national interest in allowing the executive branch
to make claims about a document without an independent court examining the
document, in camera if necessary. It is in the national interest for courts to uncover
abuses and illegalities by executive agencies instead of leaving them under the rug.
Federal judges regularly point to the greater expertise in the executive branch
regarding matters of national security. At the same time, however, executive agencies
have a capacity to misstate and exaggerate national arguments in order to prevail in
36
El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F.Supp.2d 530, 536, 537 (E.D. Va. 2006).
37
Ibid. at 539.
38
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007).
court. How much does this inherent bias in agency claims undercut the presump-
tion of superior expertise? As Jeremy Telman has pointed out, federal courts “have
been inexplicably obtuse in ignoring the conflict of interest inherent in the govern-
ment’s invocation of the Privilege and inexcusably callous in dismissing the rights
of individual litigants who cannot vindicate their rights due to the Privilege”
(Telman 2007, 505). If federal agencies are charged with illegal conduct, they should
not be given immunity against litigation by invoking claimed expertise over national
security (ibid., 527).
The House and Senate Judiciary Committees have both been active in crafting
legislation to increase judicial independence when reviewing executive claim of
state secrets. The House committee held hearings on January 29, 2008, and the
Senate committee on February 13, 2008. The Senate committee approved its bill,
S. 2533, on April 24, 2008 (Perine 2008), and issued its report on August 1, 2008 (U.S.
Senate 2008). As explained in the report, “in the burgeoning literature on the privi-
lege, it is hard to find a single positive view on the current state of the law” (ibid., 4).
Federal courts “have reached inconsistent results, and litigants have been left to
‘flounder under the ad hoc procedures and varying standards employed by the
courts today’ ” (ibid.). Courts “have refused to review key pieces of allegedly privi-
leged evidence, given unwarranted deference to the executive branch on the danger
of disclosure, upheld claims of state secrets even when the purported secrets were
publicly available, and dismissed lawsuits at the pleadings stage, without consider-
ing any evidence at all” (ibid., 5). When courts fail to examine disputed documents,
“they leave open the possibility that the privilege will be used to cover up Government
wrongdoing, thereby denying justice to litigants and giving the executive branch the
ability to violate statutes and constitutional rights with impunity” (ibid.).
A number of organizations encouraged Congress to enact legislation to give the
judiciary and the executive branch clearer guidance on use of the privilege. These
groups included the American Bar Association, the bipartisan Constitution Project,
constitutional scholars, and former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Patricia M. Wald
(ibid., 6). The purpose of the Senate bill, which agrees in many respects with legisla-
tion drafted by the House Judiciary Committee, is to make judicial review “more
regular and more rigorous—and to protect all legitimate state secrets” (ibid., 11).
The Senate bill requires courts to consider evidence for which the privilege is
claimed, gives parties an opportunity to make a preliminary case without begin
stopped at the pleadings stage, and allows courts to develop procedures that will let
a lawsuit proceed, such as directing the executive branch to produce non-privileged
substitutes for secret evidence. Although many of these techniques are presently
available, few courts invoke them (ibid.). The bill requires federal judges to look at
the evidence the executive branch claims is privileged rather than depend solely on
agency affidavits and declarations (ibid.). Part of the purpose of the legislation is to
preserve the adversarial process that the U.S. system of litigation depends on to seek
the truth in court (ibid., 12). To permit that, the bill rejects “excessively deferential”
standards of judicial review, such as “utmost deference” to executive claims, and
instead extends “weight and respect” to executive assertions while subjecting those
claims to “rigorous, independent judicial scrutiny” (ibid., 12). In prompting federal

courts to apply the state secrets privilege in accordance with new statutory stan-
dards, the bill seeks to protect “fundamental values, including constitutional rights,
individual liberties, checks and balances, accountable Government, and access to
justice” (ibid. 36).
REFERENCES
Chesney, R. M. 2007. State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation.
George Washington Law Review 75:1259–332.
Fisher, L. 2006. In the Name of National Security: Unchecked Presidential Power and the
Reynolds Case. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
———. 2008. The Constitution and 9/11: Recurring Threats to America’s Freedoms.
Frost, A. 2007. The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers. Fordham Law Review
75:1931–64.
Fuchs, M. 2006. Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary
Secrecy. Administrative Law Review 58:131–76.
Kinkopf, N. 2007. The State Secrets Problem: Can Congress Fix It? Temple Law Review
80:489–98.
Nather, D. 2005. A Rise in “State Secrets.” CQ Weekly Report (July 18): 1958–66.
Pallitto, R. M., and W. G. Weaver. 2007. Presidential Secrecy and the Law. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Perine, K. 2007. Senate Bill Responds to Heavy Use of State Secrets Privilege by Bush.
CQ Weekly Report (April 28): 1120.
Stilp, E. M. 2006. The Military and State-Secrets Privilege: The Quietly Expanding Power.
Catholic University Law Review 55:831–66.
Telman, D. A. J. 2007. Our Very Privileged Executive: Why the Judiciary Can (and Should)
Fix the State Secrets Privilege. Temple Law Review 80:499–527.
Tenet, G. J. 2000. Declaration of Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege and Statutory
Privilege. Prepared by George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, in the case of
Richard M. Barlow v. United States, Congressional Reference No. 98–887X, U.S. Court
of Federal Claims.
U.S. Senate. 2008. State Secrets Protection Act. Senate Report No. 110, 442, 110th Cong.,
2nd Sess.
Weaver, W. G., and R. M. Pallitto. 2005. State Secrets and Executive Power. Political Science
Quarterly 120:85–112.
Wigmore, J. H. 1940. Evidence in Trials at Common Law. 10 vols. 3rd ed. Boston: Little,
Brown.
chapter 41
ACCOUNTING FOR THE

FUTURE OR THE PAST?:
DEVELOPING
ACCOUNTABILITY AND
OVERSIGHT SYSTEMS TO
MEET FUTURE
INTELLIGENCE NEEDS
stuart farson
reg whitaker
Introduction
The public face of security and intelligence in Canada was until very recently pro-
vided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS), two agencies that formed part of the old Ministry of the
Reg Whitaker served as both an Advisor to the O’Connor Commission and as Chair of the
CATSA review. Stuart Farson served as Director of Research for the Special Committee and as an
expert witness for the Arar Commission.
Solicitor General. This portfolio was not traditionally viewed as a place of “good
news.” An overarching culture of secrecy within the executive branch meant that
these agencies, and the minister responsible for them, could not discuss any suc-
cesses publicly. In fact, what only came to light in the media tended to foretell of
either abuses committed or failures experienced. Unlike the Home Office in the
United Kingdom, the Ministry of the Solicitor General portfolio was never consid-
ered to be a senior one. Perhaps as a result, ministers and the senior bureaucrats that
served the Department tended to look at their responsibilities as mere stepping
stones to better things. At best they wanted to move on without their reputations
being tarnished; at worst they hoped to demonstrate that they had handled any
scandal effectively.
The attacks against New York and Washington in September 2001 had a pro-
found impact on how the Canadian government and the Canadian people have
come to view the “secret world” on several levels. The multifaceted response of the
United States (U.S.) government has changed the way Canadian political elites now
view security and intelligence matters. Where there was traditionally no intelligence
culture, one is now developing. In part, this is the result of Canada’s intelligence
community having gained the ear of government, particularly over the conse-
quences of not protecting the American “back door.” The possibility of unilateral
U.S. actions over the border has also not been missed (Farson 2006). With more
than 80 percent of Canadian foreign trade heading to the United States, the Canadian
economy is now perceived as extremely vulnerable so long as the U.S. government
sees “security trumping trade.” Actions by the United States have also focused
Canadian attention on the rules and procedures governing marine and air trans-
portation both in terms of cargo and passengers. As well, a new focus has been given
to the possible vulnerability of critical infrastructure, particularly that affecting
both sides of the border.
Governmental action has been at once swift and extensive. One of the most
important developments has been the adoption by Parliament in double-quick time
of an omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-36). This provided controversial new
powers to assist the police in their investigations and the prosecution of suspects. It
also dealt with many issues that had been on the intelligence community’s wish list
for some time, such as enabling legislation for the country’s signals intelligence
agency, the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), which
included a provision to allow for the interception of communications involving
Canadians in Canada. Another important action was the structural reorganization
of the security function within the Canadian government. While the United States
has undertaken the largest governmental reorganization since the Second World
War by bringing together a vast array of institutions under a new Department of
Homeland Security, Canada has also restructured those arms of government
responsible for domestic security under a single organization with intelligence
organizations at its core (Farson and Whitaker 2008). The old portfolio of the
Ministry of the Solicitor General is gone. In its place is the new Ministry of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness (now Public Safety Canada or PSC). In addition
accounting for the future or the past? 675
to the various agencies that formed the old framework, several others have been
added. These include the new Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), responsi-
bility for critical infrastructure protection and emergencies, as well as certain
involvement in health risks. A third important action has been the provision of
significant additional funding for the various intelligence organizations that make
up Canada’s intelligence community to fund additional resources and new
technologies.
One area where there was initial forward momentum, but which has subse-
quently regressed, concerns ministerial responsibility for the security and intelli-
gence sector. During the Liberal administration headed by Prime Minister Paul
Martin, Anne McLellan combined the role of deputy prime minister and minister
of public safety and emergency preparedness. This gave her responsibility not only
for all the security and intelligence functions but also special responsibilities for
agencies and staff in the Privy Council Office, which included the International
Assessment Staff and policy responsibilities for both the Communications Security
Establishment and matters of national security coordination. This made her in
effect a security and intelligence czar, having overall policy responsibility for national
security and the day-to-day running of all intelligence organizations—foreign and
security intelligence—except those lodged in the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence (DND),
which provided defense and military intelligence. When the new post of national
security advisor (NSA) is included, she had some seven deputy ministers reporting
to her. Significantly, under Martin the NSA advisor reported directly to the prime
minister and his deputy, not through the office responsible for foreign and defense
policy. This situation has been reversed under the current Conservative administra-
tion. Not only is there no deputy prime minister to provide the joint role, but the
NSA reports once again through foreign and defense policy statements. This leaves
the prime minister as the only minister responsible for the policy, coordination, and
other national security roles provided by the PCO.
The U.S. response to the attacks has also affected Canada’s foreign and defense
policies. Though not persuaded to enter the invasion of Iraq to oust the regime of
Saddam Hussein, the Canadian government and military have become extensively
involved in both the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the conflict with the Taliban.
As with PSC, the DND has received significant additional funding to purchase new
modern equipment, expand the various forces, and develop new intelligence
capabilities.
Public perception of security and intelligence has also changed since September
11, 2001. In part this is due to media coverage, much of it emanating from the United
States, which some would argue has verged in some instances on fearmongering
(Curtis 2004; Mueller 2006), often epitomized by certain “experts” suggesting that
“it was not a question of if but when” terrorists would obtain weapons of mass
destruction. But other factors have also played their part. The debates in Parliament
over the Anti-Terrorism Act, its subsequent three-year review by House of Commons
and Senate committees, the publication of papers from academic conferences
(Daniels et al. 2001; Daubney et al. 2002; Osgoode Hall Law Journal 2003), Canada’s
first legal text on National Security Law (Forcese 2008), and books by leading jour-
nalists (Bell 2004; Bell 2005; Shepard 2008) and human-rights advocates (Pither
2008) have all added to the mix, as has—to borrow Loch Johnson’s phrase—“the
season of inquiry” that has overtaken national security Ottawa. Three public com-
missions of inquiry have focused attention on national security matters. Two have
related aspects (Canada, Commission of Inquiry 2006; Canada, Internal Inquiry
2008); the other reflects unfinished business from the 1980s (Canada, Air India
Commission). Of the three, the one dealing with actions of Canadian officials
regarding Maher Arar has so far reverberated the loudest. It has raised again ques-
tions of the propriety of RCMP national security activities, this time over the shar-
ing of intelligence with their U.S. counterparts, and has brought once again to the
forefront concerns over the rights and liberties of Canadians, particularly those of
Arab extraction or Muslim religious affiliation (Whitaker 2008). The other two
commissions have as yet not had much impact. While the inquiry regarding the
actions of Canadian officials relating to Abdullah Almalki, Amed Abou-Elmaati and
Muayyaed Nureddin has issued a public report, its proceedings were not public, and
it was not asked to make policy proposals. The third commission, that dealing with
the bombing of Air India Flight 182 in 1985, has still to report, and while its hearings
were open to the public, it has so far not made printed transcripts in both official
languages available (visual transcripts were available on CPAC). While these ele-
ments have all reverberated to some extent in the public mind, they probably pale
by comparison to Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, where the number of sol-
diers killed in action continues to advance rapidly. Recent polls, however, indicate
that the majority of Canadians, particularly those in Quebec, currently want Canada
out of Afghanistan before its scheduled departure date in 2011 (Chung 2009).
While there have been distinct signs of a developing intelligence culture of late
that has accompanied the recent significant changes to Canada’s national security
structure and financing, there has been little concomitant development of the over-
sight and accountability systems responsible for monitoring Canada’s national
security apparatus. Given that these changes had involved substantial resources
geared primarily toward greater effectiveness and broader involvement internation-
ally in combating contemporary threats and have been responsible to some extent
though the expansion of powers and mandate for placing the human rights and
liberties of certain Canadians in serious jeopardy, this imbalance is worrisome. To
date two official proposals have been put on the table. The first originated during
the Martin administration. It started out as a proposal to establish a permanent
committee of Parliament to cover national security matters. A published consul-
tant’s paper, however, changed the nature of this body very significantly to a com-
mittee of parliamentarians, modeled implicitly after the British Intelligence and
Security Committee, that the prime minister of the day would appoint and control.
The second proposal is found in the policy review conducted by the Arar inquiry. Its
terms of reference required Justice O’Connor to make recommendations about
possible review mechanisms to cover the RCMP’s national security activities. In so
doing he was instructed to examine domestic and international review models and
to consider how any recommended mechanisms might interact with existing
Canadian review bodies. We believe neither of these proposals fully meets Canada’s
needs. Furthermore, they are unlikely to be adequate on two critical grounds. First,
rather than improving the political accountability of ministers to Parliament, which
many experts currently agree is now defective across government broadly, it will
further weaken it. Second, the Arar Commission’s report failed to identify how its
proposal would scrutinize activities for their effectiveness.
We suggest in this paper that these proposals are symptomatic of two things.
First, they epitomize thinking that reflects past practices in individual agencies
rather than future ones across the community. Thus, the primary objective is to
rectify past wrongs by putting in place mechanisms that will prevent similar
events occurring in a particular organization in the future. Second, it adopts a
negative view of oversight and accountability, not the positive potential aspects of
democratic practice that some senior U.S. officials have come to envisage.1 Here
the proposals tend to reflect a more negative view and a grudging acceptance by
the executive branch of government that oversight and accountability systems are
necessary nuisances, albeit ones that permit those in elected office to control “bad
news,” not as potentially useful tools for improving the activities of the security
and intelligence organizations under their control or as means of protection
against unwarranted attacks in the media.2 In both instances the history of over-
sight and accountability processes is one that reflects minimalist steps taken in a
piecemeal manner, leaving significant elements without scrutiny and accountable
in theory only.
The remainder of this chapter is broken down into several sections. We start by
dealing with some contentious issues. Thus, we define what we mean when we use
certain terms. We then briefly look at how systems of oversight and accountability
have developed among Canada’s longest and most enduring intelligence partners.
We focus here particularly on causes, legislative practices, and shortcomings. This is
then followed by an examination of how Canada has developed its own systems.
Here the emphasis is on external procedures and independent institutions, not
those operating within individual agencies or within the community at large. Our
1
Some with administrative responsibility for U.S. intelligence view oversight in a positive
light. When the Special Committee of the House of Commons on the Review of the CSIS Act and
Security Offences Act visited Washington in 1990, it met with senior intelligence officials. When
asked how he felt about oversight, a former Director of Central Intelligence responded: “When it
first came in, we fought it tooth and nail. But now we wouldn’t do without it. When we’re falsely
maligned in the media, we have someone to call who can set the record straight. And when
Administration limits our resources, we have people to go to bat for us who understand our needs.”
2
It is important to note that consultants are briefed on how to approach position papers and
that commissions of inquiry have traditionally been executive instruments in Canada. Thus,
regardless of being chaired by a judge, their approach is limited by the terms of reference provided
by the executive.
purpose in this section is primarily twofold. First, it is to illustrate that even close
allies have followed different paths. Second, it serves to show that Canada, while
initially getting off to a sound start, has failed to keep pace not only with its key
intelligence allies but also with the changing threat environment. Finally, we suggest
what a system of oversight and accountability that will meet Canada’s future needs
might look like and what it would do.
Contentious Issues
It is important at the outset to understand what we have in mind when we use cer-
tain key terms. A quarter century or more ago, the term oversight was most fre-
quently used to depict the various processes of governance by which the three
branches of the U.S. government scrutinized various institutions and their activi-
ties. Such oversight served several separate but often-related purposes. These often
differed in their chronological application, some occurring after the fact, some
before. They also differed in the degree to which they could effect control over par-
ticular institutions. In some cases, they had a direct controlling impact; in others
they only had an indirect one. In still yet others, they had none at all. However, the
term is now used much more broadly to apply to democratic forms of governance
of quite different stripes, Westminster systems included. We employ the term here
in a general sense to mean scrutiny of government action before, during, and after
the fact, dealing with both matters of propriety and efficacy. We neither suggest that
oversight necessarily implies a controlling impact, as some observers insist, nor do
we employ the term “review” except where it refers to specific oversight bodies or
where it implies specific after-the-fact scrutiny.
Accountability is another contentious term that has been used to imply a
wide variety of democratic processes from transparency of government to answer-
ability to voters. As with oversight it can serve many purposes. It can, for example,
be used to effect control, to provide explanations, to provide assurance, and as a
learning experience. Similarly it can vary in terms of the point at which it occurs
( Whitaker and Farson 2009). Significantly, it can also vary in terms of what is at
stake, who provides it, and to whom. However, we use the term here in a very
specific, quite narrow sense, its role as a constitutional convention in Westminster-
model governance. This meaning is in juxtaposition with another constitutional
convention—ministerial responsibility. In this model, of which Canada provides
but one variation, ministers of the crown are legally and politically responsible for
all the actions and inactions of the departments and agencies in their respective
portfolios.
We also recognize that the term ministerial responsibility is contentious on
at least three grounds. First, modern government is now so large and complex
that it is impossible for ministers to be involved in all the workings of their
departments and agencies. Second, in many instances we find that persons other
than ministers now have legal responsibilities for some of the actions in con-
junction with ministers. Finally, new institutions have been established that
require certain specific people—accounting officers—to respond to questions.
Nevertheless, while public servants may testify before Parliament, only ministers
have an obligation to account—political accountability—for the various actions
and inactions in and to the House of Commons. Thus, we see oversight, ministe-
rial responsibility, and accountability as connected but different concepts.
Oversight is not accountability, but it may it may lead to it. Similarly, while other
persons may provide Parliament with accounts, they do so at the minister’s
behest. And while reports prepared by various review and oversight bodies may
be tabled in Parliament, it is the tabling there by the minister that leads to
accountability.
Scrutiny of governmental institutions may serve quite different objectives. They
may lead, as stated above, to accounts of governmental action. But here there is an
underlying motive that needs to be considered. What is the intent of that account?
Some, as Peter Gill has questioned, may be more symbolic than real (Gill 1989).
Others, as the late Richard Erickson posited, may be more about the capacity to
provide an account, or as he termed it “account-ability” (Ericson 1995). Arguably,
when it comes to the intelligence sector, there are two primary objectives—to assess
whether organizations act within the bounds of propriety and national values
and whether they operate with appropriate efficacy. But these objectives, as we will
see later, have subsets.
The Impact of Scandals on Canadian Allies

The movement toward greater intelligence oversight and accountability took on
a new level of urgency in the 1970s after a spate of intelligence scandals came to
light among the various partners to the UKUSA agreement. In at least four of the
so-called five eyes, the revelations created a crisis of confidence that necessitated
a more public investigation of the abuses these scandals portended than had
hitherto been the case.3 The extensive reports that ensued led to new modes of
scrutiny and, in some instances, to new legislation, new organizations and new
modes of oversight and accountability. In some instances, the external proce-
dures that were established were comprehensive, covering abuse and impropri-
ety, procedures for ensuring the propriety of organizational action, the efficacy
3
Only Britain was not riven by an intelligence scandal that required investigation. However,
after the Falklands War the British government struck a committee to review events that touched
on intelligence (United Kingdom 1983).
of institutions and their functions, as well as complaints against the organiza-

tions involved by both outsiders and employees. In others, the emphasis largely
fell on preventing impropriety and noncompliance with law, regulations, policy,
and governmental directives. In some instances, no external procedures were put
in place at all.
In the United States following the Watergate scandal and allegations in the
New York Times that the Central Intelligence Agency had conducted illegal opera-
tions within the United States, reports by both the executive and legislative
branches of U.S. government led to new permanent select committees on intelli-
gence in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Their purview
extended over all intelligence organizations operating on behalf of the United
States.4 These committees have a history of meeting regularly in private and
obtaining numerous briefings in a given year. They may subpoena both persons
and documents to ensure information is forthcoming. When testifying, witnesses
may be placed under oath regarding their truthfulness. Significant security proce-
dures too must be followed. Committee proceedings are normally closed to the
public. Sensitive information must be stored in a secure environment. Their staffs
must have appropriate security clearances.
Another significant consequence of the scandals of the 1970s included the adop-
tion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978. This prescribed procedures
for collecting foreign intelligence through physical and electronic surveillance. An
important provision of this legislation was the establishment of a system of judicial
oversight. Warrants empowering such surveillance between foreign powers and
their agents, which might include American citizens or permanent residents, now
had to be approved by specially designated judges appointed to a newly created
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Though the various commission and committee reports recommended
strengthening the role of the inspector general of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), this advice was not followed when independent inspectors general were cre-
ated by statute for some thirteen departments of government in 1978. The CIA had
to wait until after the Iran-Contra scandal of the late 1980s to have its own statuto-
rily enabled independent inspector general (IG-CIA; Snider). The IG-CIA has to
report semiannually to the select committees and to the director of the CIA. The
mandate of the IG-CIA is multifaceted, covering matters of propriety, impropriety,
as well as employee complaints. To fulfill its obligations the IG-CIA is guaranteed
by law prompt access to the director, agency personnel, and contractors, as well
as to necessary records. The IG-CIA is also authorized to place such persons under
an oath. Most U.S. intelligence organizations now have some form of inspector
4
President Gerald Ford established the U.S. President’s Commission on CIA activities within
the United States under his vice-president, Nelson Rockefeller, in December 1974. The Senate
created a special committee under Frank Church in January 1975. The House followed in February,
its committee initially being chaired by Lucien Nedze and later by Otis Pike.
general. Agencies falling within the remit of the Department of Defense, however,
are subject to two: an independent one covering the entire department and an indi-
vidual administratively appointed one for their own organization. As we will see,
the idea of an inspector general’s role has subsequently been taken up by several
other jurisdictions (Weller 1996).
Not surprisingly political scientists have evaluated how well these oversight
institutions have worked, on what they have focused, and how effective they have
been. One study conducted in the 1980s has been particularly insightful
(McGubbins and Schwartz, 1984). It posited that Congress tended to be very
good at what it called “fire alarm” issues but not very good at conducting “police
patrols.” Here the authors distinguished between matters that might cause public
alarm and the more mundane issues that might be uncovered by proactive and
long-term scrutiny. While there was the opportunity for speedy political payout
in the case of the former, the latter offered no such guarantees. More recently
congressional analysts have suggested that congressional oversight is less effec-
tive when the presidency and the both the Senate and House of Representatives
are in the hands of the same party. Another factor that has caught the critic’s eye
concerns the overabundance of committees and their subcommittees overseeing
particular institutions, the new Department of Homeland Security being a case
in point.
In New Zealand, concerns over the arrest and unsuccessful prosecution
of Dr. William Sutch, a former secretary general at New Zealand’s United Nations
office in New York and a former head of the Department of Industries and
Commerce, on Official Secrets Act charges led to an investigation by the chief
ombudsman as to whether the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service was even
necessary (New Zealand 1976). An important consequence of Sir Guy Powles’s
report was the adoption by the New Zealand Parliament in 1977 of legislation that
provided for the lawful interception or seizure of communications.
In the wake of the Pine Gap controversy and the so-called Murphy raid on
the offices of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) the
Labour Government of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam established the Royal
Commission on Intelligence and Security with Justice Robert Hope as chair. This
commission drew two particularly important conclusions. First, it recognized
the need for a greater level of political scrutiny and accountability. Second, it
advocated a more national approach to intelligence collection with a view to
overcoming the bureaucratic rivalry that it had observed between the Departments
of Defence and Foreign Affairs ( Jones and Ungerer 2008, 165). An important out-
come of this inquiry was the establishment by statute of the Office of National
Assessments (ONA) by the Liberal government of Malcolm Fraser. In addition to
providing a location for a centralized assessment of foreign intelligence, with a
direct reporting relationship to the prime minister, the ONA also had an impor-
tant oversight role regarding the effectiveness of the various intelligence collect-
ing agencies.
The Introduction of
Legislative Committees
Legislative committees did not become part of the process outside the United States
until much later. It was not until 1996 that the Intelligence and Security Committee
(ISC) was formed in New Zealand. It differs from ordinary Select Committees of
the House of Representatives in being established by a statute that specifically binds
the Crown (New Zealand 1996a). Its membership must consist of five parliamentar-
ians, two of whom must be the prime minister and the leader of the Opposition. Its
staff is appointed by the Cabinet Office and must be security cleared. The ISC must
hold its meetings in private in a secure environment, unless there is a unanimous
vote to do otherwise, and in accordance with the Standing Orders of the House of
Representatives. The ISC’s reports to the House must consider the needs of security.
In fact, the Act specifically includes penalties for breaching security. The purview of
the ISC is broad. Its reports may cover any of New Zealand’s intelligence and secu-
rity agencies. The ISC is specifically prevented, however, from duplicating matters
that fall within the jurisdiction of the inspector-general of intelligence and security
(I-GIS). The I-GIS was also established by a special statute in 1996 which specifically
set out to “increase the level of oversight and review of intelligence and security
agencies by providing for the appointment of an [I-GIS]” (New Zealand 1996b).
The office holder serves a three-year term and must be a former High Court judge.
The I-GIS also has a broad remit and may investigate matters pertaining to any of
New Zealand’s intelligence or security agencies. The matters are, however, limited to
those concerning the possible impropriety of actions by the various agencies,
complaints made against them, or evaluating the propriety of measures undertaken
by them and compliance with law. The I-GIS, however, may consult with the con-
troller and auditor general to avoid duplication of investigative effort and with
other bodies—the ombudsman, the privacy commissioner and the human-rights
commissioner—about its office’s functions. The annual reports of the I-GIS must
be submitted to the prime minister who must in turn table them in Parliament in a
timely fashion. The I-GIS may also with the prime minister’s concurrence report to
the ISC either in general or about specific matters. Until 1996 New Zealand used the
British first-past-the-post (FPP) electoral system. In that year, however, it changed
to a mixed-member-proportional (MMP) electoral system. The Green Party, cur-
rently the third-largest holder of seats in Parliament, is critical of the Intelligence
and Security Committee. It argues that its membership is outdated, typifying the
old days of FPP, not the new MMP system as it only has the government party and
the official Opposition one represented on it. Furthermore, it believes the mandate
is limited:
It’s allowed to look only at the policy, administration and expenditure of these
intelligence agencies. . . . It is forbidden from seeing any “operational” information
about the intelligence services. It means, for example, that the committee can
never get to the bottom of why in 1996 two SIS agents invaded the Christchurch
home of an anti-free trade activist, Aziz Choudry. So it is very hard for the
committee to find out what policy the SIS or the GCSB are actually carrying out.
Consequently, the committee can’t really develop effective “policy” for these
services. The committee has to take the SIS’s word that it is doing the right thing.
(Locke 2000)
Other criticisms levied by the Green Party concern the very limited amount of time
that the committee meets and the extremely limited detail provided by its reports to
Parliament (Locke 2000).
Parliamentary oversight in Australia was first initiated in 1988 by the formation
of a joint committee of the two houses of the Australian Parliament to cover ASIO
alone. In 2001, the Committee’s mandate was expanded through the Intelligence
Service Act of to cover the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the
Defense Signals Directorate (DSD). At the time this left the Defense Imagery and
Geospatial Organization (DIGO), the Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO) and
the ONA outside its purview. This, however, remains limited to matters of adminis-
tration and budget, leaving the inspector-general (see below) to deal with legality
and propriety, including of the operational activities of the various agencies.
Australia’s involvement in Iraq led the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO,
ASIS and DSD (PJCAAD) to assess the intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction. Consistent with one of its recommendations, the Australian govern-
ment established an inquiry under Philip Flood to consider both the effectiveness
of the intelligence community’s current oversight and accountability mechanisms
and the delivery of high-quality advice to government. Its report subsequently con-
cluded that:
The limitation of the Committee’s mandate to ASIO, ASIS and DSD reflects a
range of historical and policy issues. In relation to DIGO, the legislation that
established the Committee was prepared before DIGO came into existence. In
relation to ONA and DIO, the principal argument has been that, as assessment
agencies, they do not engage in the sensitive activities that warrant additional
parliamentary scrutiny over and above that provided by the relevant Senate
Legislation Committee. While recognising those distinctions . . . the Inquiry does
not find them compelling reasons for continuing to limit the parliamentary
scrutiny of some intelligence agencies. (Australia 2004, ch. 4)
With specific regard to Australia’s intelligence assessment agencies it observed that:

In recommending that DIO and ONA become subject to the Parliamentary Joint
Committee, the Inquiry is conscious that some of the factors which make it
appropriate for ASIO, ASIS and DSD to be subject to the Committee are not
relevant to DIO and ONA. As assessment agencies, they do not undertake acts
that might, without specific legislation, be illegal. Nor do ONA and DIO impinge
on the privacy of Australian citizens. However, the functioning of Australia’s
intelligence agencies is a matter of greater public interest and scrutiny than it has
been in the past; and that interest is now strong in relation to assessment agencies as
well as collection agencies. In these circumstances, it is appropriate that the
parliament and, through it, the public should enjoy greater confidence in the
activities of the assessment agencies. Moreover, ONA in particular, as the agency at

the peak of the foreign intelligence structure, and which has an oversight role,
should be subject to scrutiny in the way that other agencies are. (Australia 2004,
ch. 4; emphasis added)
The report also recommended that the community should be subject to periodic
external review every five to seven years (Australia 2004, ch. 4). In 2005, the
Committee was reformulated once again as the Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Intelligence and Security, reflecting a broadening of the Committee’s mandate as
recommended by the Flood Commission. The Committee is specifically prevented
from investigating operational matters. Nevertheless, it has significant powers to
obtain truthful evidence. These include the subpoena of witnesses and documents
and penalties for failing to appear or knowingly giving false testimony. There are
also penalties for leaking classified information. Meetings of the Committee may
occur while Parliament is prorogued. Reviews conducted of the various intelligence
agencies can only occur in public with the express permission of the responsible
minister. Those occurring in private must be held in a secure environment. While
there appears to be no formal vetting process for the Committee’s nine members,
their staff must all be cleared to the same level as employees of ASIS. Significantly,
the Committee has been given the task of providing reviews of relevant legisla-
tion after they have been in operations for specific periods.
The Office of the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence (I-GIS) was
first established in 1986. Following the Flood inquiry’s recommendations its author-
ity has also been expanded to cover all of Australia’s intelligence agencies. Its man-
date is entirely to do with matters of propriety, focusing on whether the intelligence
collection agencies operate within the law, behave with propriety, have regard for
human rights and comply with ministerial directives and guidelines. This is achieved
through inspections and inquiries conducted in private, the latter including those
that stem from complaints against the intelligence agencies or at the request of a
responsible minister. The incumbent has considerable powers to obtain informa-
tion. These include the right to subpoena witnesses and documents, take evidence
under an oath, and enter premises. The I-GIS provides annual reports to the prime
minister who must table them in Parliament. Deletions may only be made on
grounds of national security but these must be shared confidentially with the leader
of the Opposition. To avoid the duplication of investigations the I-GIS may confer
with both the auditor-general and the commonwealth ombudsman. The I-GIS also
has a specific right to share information with royal commissions. To ensure the
office’s independence the incumbent is appointed by the governor-general for a
fixed term and cannot be dismissed by the government.
Unlike the other members of the alliance, the United Kingdom did not have any
statutory framework covering any of its intelligence agencies until 1989 when the
Security Service Act was adopted by Parliament. This provided enabling legislation
for the Service and established the Office of the Security Service Commissioner and
a tribunal to hear complaints against the service. Parliament’s only contact with the
process was through the commissioner’s annual report, which was provided to the
prime minister and subsequently tabled in the legislature. In 1994, further legisla-
tion was adopted that provided a statutory basis for two other agencies, the Secret
Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Headquarters. The leg-
islation also expanded the complaints process to these agencies and established the
Intelligence and Security Committee. Unlike the New Zealand and Australian
examples, this was not a committee of Parliament but a committee composed of
nine parliamentarians drawn from the two Houses of Parliament. In addition to
administrative and budgetary matters, its remit also included policies covering the
three agencies. No purview over defense intelligence agencies was provided. Its
reports go to the prime minister who in turn is obliged to table them in Parliament,
subject to deletions on national security grounds. Not being a parliamentary com-
mittee, the committee’s small staff is drawn from members of the Cabinet Office
who are already vetted. They therefore may also be removed from their function by
the prime minister.
In 2000, the British Parliament adopted the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act. It was largely the result of a need to bring matters into line with the European
Commission on Human Rights. The Act consolidated the role of commissioners
and tribunals and created new ones under the interception of communications
commissioner and the intelligence services commissioner.
The Impact of Scandals on Canada

Canada too has had its scandal and inquiries. Revelations in the press of allegedly
unlawful acts committed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security
Service in the province of Quebec against separatist elements led eventually to the
establishment of a commission of inquiry chaired by Justice David McDonald. Its
report spurred the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau to replace the RCMP
Security Service with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). This was
accomplished in 1984 by the adoption of new enabling legislation (the CSIS Act).
While not providing the new Service with law enforcement powers, the Act did
provide for new modes of review and oversight systems and specific lines of
accountability. The review processes were placed under two new bodies, the
Inspector General of CSIS (IGCSIS) and the Security Intelligence Review
Committee (SIRC). Unlike the Australian model where the I-GIS is a truly inde-
pendent body, the IGCSIS is merely an official reporting to the deputy minister of
(now) PSC. The office’s responsibilities are all focused on propriety and compli-
ance with law and policy and remain focused on one organization alone CSIS, just
as they were in 1984. The IGCSIS is obliged to provide a certificate to the respon-
sible minister. This certificate is not passed on to Parliament, only to SIRC. The
other review body, SIRC, is not part of the executive arm of government. It consists
of persons who cannot be members of Parliament but must be Privy Counsellors.5
Each member of the committee serves a fixed term and is required to take an oath
of secrecy. The body has a multifaceted mandate covering complaints, matters of
impropriety and propriety, as well as monitoring performance and instructions
given to the Service. The committee has broad powers of access to the Service.
These do not extend to those relating to subpoenas or placing witnesses under an
oath, except where SIRC serves as an administrative tribunal to hear complaints.
Besides advocating that the RCMP Security Service should be replaced by a civilian
organization, the McDonald Commission recommended the establishment of a
parliamentary committee that would have purview over all of Canada’s intelligence
community. This idea was rejected by government the day. In fact, the legislation
envisaged parliamentary involvement in only two respects, to receive the annual
reports of SIRC, and to conduct a statutory review of the legislation after it had
been in operation for five years.
Further Developments
Several further actions have occurred since 1984 that have increased oversight and
accountability. In the mid-1980s the government amended the RCMP Act to estab-
lish a commission to participate in the investigation of complaints against the
RCMP. This office was designed with general law enforcement in mind, not the
specialized dimensions of national security activities. The Commission was not
given responsibilities for reviewing any matter other than those directly related to
complaints. Furthermore, the head of the RCMP was given a right to see all com-
plaints made against an employee of the Force and to initiate an investigation before
the Commission was involved. In 1989–90, a Special Committee of the House of
Common on the Review of the CSIS Act and Security Offences Act (hereafter the
Special Committee) fulfilled its statutory obligation to provide a “comprehensive
review of the provisions and operation” of the two Acts. However, it found it could
not receive the answers it needed, even from SIRC, which had been positioned dur-
ing the debate concerning the adoption of the legislation as a “surrogate for
Parliament.” Nor was it permitted to see the various reports produced by SIRC, the
Inspector General, or of the Director of the Service. To rectify this situation, the
Special Committee recommended a permanent parliamentary committee similar
to that which the McDonald Commission had put forward. This recommendation
along with most others was rejected by the Government (Canada, House of
5
The idea was that they were once members of Parliament or provincial legislators who had
held ministerial office and had been members of Cabinet. In practice, many appointees had no
parliamentary experience and were simply declared Privy Councilors for appointment purposes.
Commons 1990). Only three positive steps eventuated. One concerned the decision
to provide a public version of the Director of CSIS’s annual report. Another con-
cerned Parliament’s decision to adopt the Special Committee’s fallback position, the
establishment of a Sub-Committee on National Security, albeit one without ade-
quate access to the secret world. The third concerned the agreement by the auditor
general to conduct an audit of Canada’s intelligence community, its study on
accountability practices being published in 1996.
In the same year, an MP who had served on the Special Committee addressed
one of the other concerns of that committee when he placed a motion on the order
paper to establish a degree of oversight for Canada’s signals intelligence organiza-
tion. The government acceded to this and established by order-in-council the
Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment. At the time this
office was only given a compliance mandate. As part of the omnibus Anti-Terrorism
Act of 2001 the CSEC, which had previously existed only as the result of various
orders-in-council, was provided with an enabling statute through an amendment to
the National Defence Act (Farson 2001). The commissioner’s office was similarly
enshrined in the same statute, which provided it with a threefold mandate: to review
the activities of the organization to ensure that its activities were in compliance with
law; to investigate complaints against the CSEC where considered necessary; and to
advise the attorney general of Canada regarding any breaches in the law. To be
appointed the commissioner must have held judicial office. Once appointed the
commissioner holds office for a fixed term and can only be dismissed for cause. To
fulfill the office’s function, the commissioner has the same powers as any commis-
sioner created under Part II of the Inquiries Act. These extend to the issuing of
subpoenas and the placing of persons under an oath. The commissioner is also
required to submit a report to the responsible minister who in turn is obliged to
table it in Parliament. The Anti-Terrorism Act also required Parliament to conduct
a review of the legislation after it had been operation for three years.
Some Comparisons with

Canada’s Close Intelligence Partners
When Canada’s close partners are considered, stark contrasts are evident. Each
country involved has established a committee to scrutinized intelligence organiza-
tions and their activities in which only current legislators participate. In the U.S.
case, two committees were established by Congress by resolution. In both New
Zealand and Australia, committees of Parliament were established by statute. In the
United Kingdom, a statute was employed to establish a committee of parliamentar-
ians not of Parliament. In every instance particular precautions were taken to ensure
both access to secret information and the security of that sensitive information. In
Australia, this extended to penalties for leaking information. The purview of the
committees is considerable. In the U.S. and Australian cases, all intelligence

organizations fall within their remits. In the Australian case, intelligence assessment
agencies have recently been included in the mix, illustrating an increased interest in
the efficacy of such organizations in particular and the community in general.
What can be covered differs somewhat. In the United States there are no official
limits, reflecting Congress’s status as a separate branch of government. By contrast,
Australia and New Zealand limit their committees to administrative and budgetary
matters. In the United Kingdom policy is also included. Canada has no such
organization.
Most of the countries employ some form of inspector general with specific
roles for identifying impropriety, ensuring propriety, and responsibilities for inves-
tigating complaints. Most enjoy positions of independence, security of tenure, and
considerable investigative powers. The IGCSIS fails on all counts.
Current Canadian Proposals

As indicated above, there are two important proposals being considered in Canada.
One concerns the establishment of a national security committee, the other a
replacement for the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC-
RCMP).
A Committee of Parliament or a Committee

of Parliamentarians
From its beginnings in 2003 the Martin government set out to address what it
referred to as the “democratic deficit”6 by increasing the role of Parliament in the
affairs of government. This included a commitment to establish “a National Security
Standing Committee in the House of Commons” (Farson and Whitaker 2007). But
by the time the government had tabled its Action Plan for Democratic Reform in
Parliament, this had changed to a “National Security Committee of Parliamentarians.”
Instead of having a committee that enjoyed all the powers and privileges under the
constitution, the government now appeared to be advocating something akin to the
British model, an executive instrument that the administrative arm of government
could appoint and control, which had the appearance of being of Parliament
through its membership but which, in fact, was not. This theme was continued in a
consultant’s discussion paper that was issued by the PCO (Canada 2004a). This
paper looked both backward and forward. A section of the paper deals with the old
distinction between review and oversight, defining review as meaning “a survey of
6
While Canadians generally respect the work their individual MPs do, they do not have high
regard for parliamentarians as a group as polling has consistently demonstrated.
the past” and oversight as only being apposite to the congressional system and nec-
essarily implying “supervision.” Thus, it posits that ministers alone have oversight
responsibility, leaving by implication the role of review to others. This discussion is
not helpful on two grounds. First, it does not recognize the changing practice or
understanding of oversight that has emerged, especially in Westminster-modeled
systems of governance outside Canada. In terms of national security practice, for
example, judges not ministers have the final say regarding warrant applications.
Second, it fails to acknowledge that Parliament operates in the future as well as the
past. For example, in order to vote supply it needs to know: What will you use the
funds for? Not just: How did you spend your funds previously? The paper, however,
also looks forward and examines the intent of the committee. Significantly, it
acknowledges that it is “to improve the effectiveness of our security arrangements
as well as accountability for them.” It further posits:
[o]pen democratic scrutiny—consistent with the needs of security—will improve
the credibility of security and raise public awareness of the importance of good
security. The national security committee should be a part of our overall security
system, one as much dedicated to the security of Canada as the security agencies
themselves. (Canada 2004a)
Surprisingly, perhaps, the paper made no mention of what agencies the committee
should cover.
While Parliament was not sitting, the government established a committee of
parliamentarians to consider and comment on the consultant’s paper. The committee
came out firmly in favor of a committee of Parliament, not a committee of parliamen-
tarians, that would scrutinize all present and future agencies, departments and review
bodies in the intelligence community. In the strongest language, it posited that the
creation of such a committee should not derogate from Parliament’s privilege to call
for persons, papers, and records, nor diminish the role of any other parliamentary
committee. Having considered various options, it decided in favor of an innovative
joint committee of Parliament, one that was established by statute and could work
through prorogations and dissolutions. It considered that its members should be
appointed by the prime minister and hold tenure until a new committee was appointed
with a new Parliament. To ensure independence, none would be ministers, parliamen-
tary secretaries, whips, or parliamentary officers. It believed also that it should appoint
and control its own staff and that significant resources would be needed (Canada,
Interim Committee of Parliamentarians, 2004b). Significantly, it also acknowledged
that Canadians were more concerned about national security than ever before.
A New System for Scrutinizing RCMP

National Security Activities
The system in which the CPC-RCMP operated had long been criticized because it
permitted the police themselves to investigate complaints about the policing of gen-
eral law-enforcement matters. Little concern, however, had been expressed about its
capacity to deal with national security enforcement complaints, particularly those

concerning intelligence matters, until the treatment of Maher Arar became public
knowledge. This event, however, led the Martin government to establish a public
inquiry not only to determine what involvement Canadian officials had in the pro-
cess but explicitly to make policy recommendations regarding the establishment of
an arms-length review mechanism to cover the RCMP’s national security activities.
When the Commission of Inquiry reported in December 2006, Justice O’Connor
concluded, not surprisingly, that the accountability and review mechanisms gov-
erning the RCMP’s national security activities were inadequate. He put this down in
large part to the expanded role that the RCMP now performed under the Anti-
Terrorism Act following the September 11, 2001, attacks. He believed that the most
effective form of review would be one that looked at all RCMP activities. He there-
fore recommended expanding the role of the existing review body and giving it new
powers and responsibilities. He further recommended that this body should also be
responsible for the national security activities of the CBSA, Citizenship and
Immigration (CIC), Transport Canada, The Financial Transactions and Report
Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) and Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT) and that the existing review bodies governing CSIS, and the CSEC should
remain in place (Canada, Commission 2006, 18–22).
A major contribution that the commission made is in the area of cooperation
and integration. There are two planks to its proposal. One is the introduction of
“statutory gateways.” These would permit the ICRA, SIRC and the CCSE to exchange
information, conduct joint investigations and co-ordinate and prepare reports. The
second is the establishment of a body called the Integrated National Security Review
Coordinating Committee to ensure that such joint efforts and gateways are func-
tioning properly and that there is a central entry point for complaints.
It may be argued that this commission also looked backward and forward. It
did not adopt quite such a blunt interpretation of the distinction between review
and oversight as had the consultant’s paper. Furthermore, it did see many review
bodies as hybrids in the sense that they considered both matters of propriety and
efficacy. Nevertheless, it came to consider review in this case being primarily consis-
tent with compliance with law, regulations and policy directives. Significantly, it
neither considered matters of efficacy being part of the new review body’s concerns
nor attended to the issue of what institution might have such responsibilities during
its proceedings. It did, however, conclude that they should not be conducted by the
same body as they required different skill-sets (Canada, Commission 2006, 523).
In addition to developing and recommending a new review mechanism for the
RCMP’s national security activities, the terms of reference of the policy-review sec-
tion of the Commission’s mandate had two other requirements. On the one hand,
Justice O’Connor was obliged to examine certain domestic and international review
models. And on the other he had to consider how any recommended mechanism
might interact with other Canadian review bodies. The Policy Report does examine
all the extant Canadian review bodies. In addition, it examines the systems in place
in eight foreign countries, including all of Canada’s longtime intelligence partners.
It is surprising to note that none of these analyses consider either the strengths and
weaknesses of these various options or the possibility of a “review” function for
legislatures or their committees. One might assume that in the commission’s terms
these legislatures do not perform reviews but only conduct oversight. As the
Commission considered its recommendations, the idea of a committee of parlia-
mentarians or a committee of Parliament was proceeding along a separate track.
This, however, does not absolve the Commission from considering how its reforms
should mesh with whatever parliamentary oversight mechanisms might be created.
This it did not do either in its studies of international models or in its final report.
Instead the Commission remained largely silent about the role of Parliament. No
consideration, for example, is given to the problems that the Special Committee had
in fulfilling its statutory obligation in general or, in particular, obtaining access to
information about how SIRC conducted its reviews and investigations (Farson
1995). There is but one vague reference and one significant omission. On the ques-
tion of the efficacy of organizations and their activities, the Commission merely
suggests that this is something that perhaps Parliament might like to consider. As is
the practice nowadays, when new legislation is adopted or institutions established,
there is often a recommendation that they are reviewed after they have been opera-
tion for a few years. In the case of the new mechanism that the Commission recom-
mended, it posited that this should not be done by Parliament, but by some
“independent person” appointed by the Government.
Changing the Intent and

Identifying the Flaws in the System
The two proposals that are on the table might be said to fall into the category of two
steps forward, one step backward. They both address and make positive contribu-
tions but at the same time detract from their positive intent. In certain respects they
address past activities or perceptions. Neither really addresses two fundamental
questions: What is it that a system of oversight and accountability should accom-
plish? Is the oversight and accountability system—as a whole—likely to be effective
and achieve this overall aim?
Intent
Arguably, the intent of the system it is to do five things: to investigate and address
in a fair-minded manner to all concerned the abuse of coercive and intrusive power
if and when it has occurred; to ensure that existing procedures encourage and
enhance the propriety of actions by national security agencies in accordance with

national values and ethics; to address complaints that may be lodged against the
various organizations in a way that is fair to both complainant and agency person-
nel (and offers a safe vehicle for would-be whistleblowers); and to ensure that the
organizations themselves fulfill their respective mission in a way that is effective,
efficient, and reflects due economy. And finally, it should ensure that government
is fully accountable to the House of Commons for the entire security and intelli-
gence community.
Flaws in the Current System

The current system is flawed in certain key respects, in part because the system itself
has developed in a piecemeal fashion, addressing only certain aspects of individual
agencies and their practices. Thus, there is no single body that has considered the
whole system on a regular basis. While some organizations have systems in place
that provide adequate evaluation of impropriety in national security affairs, others
like the RCMP do not. Similarly, while some agencies have an adequate complaint
system in place, others such as the RCMP again do not. While some sympathy may
be given to the idea of the police first investigating complaints in general law enforce-
ment, this is not appropriate in national security affairs. In addition, no organiza-
tion currently offers a suitable location where would-be whistle-blowers may come
to air their concerns without at the same time jeopardizing their careers or falling
foul of security regulations. Few organizations have in place an independent system
that assesses on an ongoing basis whether the extant laws, regulations and policies
continue to encourage propriety of action or whether they are adequate to meet
agency needs. Of particular importance here are changes in technologies and their
capacities as well as changes in surveillance requirements. It seems also to be forgot-
ten that ineffective organizations, whether they stem from an insufficiency of
resources, inadequate management practices, substandard recruitment, poor train-
ing, or an outdated organizational culture, are just as useless to the security of
democracies as are organizations that abuse their coercive and intrusive powers.
Unfortunately, independent oversight for efficacy is almost nonexistent for most of
Canada’s security and intelligence community. None exists for any entity falling
under the DND or contributing to Canada’s foreign intelligence capabilities. This
needs to be addressed not merely in terms of the individual agencies concerned but
also in terms of the community as a composite body, particularly concerning such
matters as the coordination of effort, the sharing of information between elements,
and the incorporation of the parts played by analytical and assessment units (as the
Australians have done).
Another dimension of the efficacy question concerns the effectiveness of
the various review and oversight mechanisms themselves. With the exception of the
O’Connor Commission no independent assessment of any of these bodies has

occurred since the Special Committee’s review of the CSIS Act in 1990. A routine
check needs to be made every few years not only to ensure that they are using appro-
priate research techniques and methodologies but also to ensure that they have not
been co-opted by the very agencies that they have been established to scrutinize.
Finally, the system of accountability of ministers individually and the government
collectively for national security matters is particularly weak. At the core of this
issue lies the lack of knowledge that parliamentarians are permitted to have about
the administrative practices, budgetary requirements, policy processes and direc-
tives, and the overall efficacy of the various organizations that constitute the com-
munity. This lack of access to accurate knowledge may be responsible for the
sporadic interest that Parliament has demonstrated in the past on the subject. Also
important is the lack of trust that intelligence bureaucrats have in the capacity of
parliamentarians to deal with national security issues in a manner that is not overly
partisan. Unfortunately, there is evidence on this point that parliamentary commit-
tees do sometimes behave in this manner and abuse public servants who are not
always free to speak as freely as they might wish (Sutherland 1991). However, there
is equally evidence to support the view that parliamentary committees can provide
detailed scrutiny of intelligence organizations without partisan rancor.7 Here
bureaucrats would do well to remember that just as they largely do things out of the
public eye, a good deal of the work of committees is similarly done by committees
of Parliament. In fact, the entire proceedings of certain committees covering national
security matters have been conducted in private.
Some Solutions
One should not present a picture, however, that merely providing parliamentarians
with access and allowing Parliament to establish a committee will get the job done.
The history of the Canadian Sub-Committee on National Security reveals that it
quickly lost focus and failed to be very active. Rather it will be essential to establish
a committee by statute, laying out such matters as its mandate, the powers it has
available, the requirements of secrecy and security, how its members are appointed,
the tenure they have, when the committee may meet and operate, the oaths to be
undertaken, the appointment and vetting of staff, and which reports are to be
referred to it for consideration.
But care is in order here too. The fact that a committee is established by statute
may not necessarily provide optimal results. If constructed in such a way that
responsible ministers form part of its membership, it may be too easy to prevent the
7
The Special Committee proceeded without demonstrating any partisan division and only
voted on one matter in private.
sort of disclosure that is necessary for parliamentarians who are not privy to the
inner workings of the committee or to the sensitive information its members have
seen, to learn from their reports. This seems to have been the case in New Zealand.
On its face, the system there looks as if it should work well but in practice it may be
more symbolic than substantive. For this reason it may not be appropriate for min-
isters responsible for security and intelligence organizations to be members of the
committee. In fact, they should be prepared to attend before the committee to
answer its questions, not control its process.
Our preference is to follow the Australian model with certain modifications.
While there is a strong argument that the committee should not see operationally
sensitive information, we believe it should consider policy matters, as the British
ISC does, and come to understand Canadian capabilities and capacities. In terms of
purview, the organizational extensiveness of both the Australian and American sys-
tems, covering collectors of intelligence as well as analytical organizations, seems
appropriate. In short, we see the committee as having access to any organization
that may be defined as an intelligence or security organization as the New Zealand
legislation requires. The committee would benefit from having all the various
reports prepared by oversight and review bodies referred to it for consideration
along with other independent reports like those prepared by commissions of
inquiry. Related to this, there may be a benefit if the government requests the com-
mittee to have the terms of reference of relevant commissions of inquiry privately
considered before they are formally adopted. We would also see the committee
being responsible for conducting statutory reviews of legislation and organizations,
such as the Canadian Air Transportation Security Act (CATSA) review,8 or any new
committee to consider RCMP national security activities.
A general word of warning is in order about legislative committees. Students of
Congress have noted that legislators may tend to pursue “fire-alarm” issues. It may
therefore be advisable for the staff of such a parliamentary committee to be specifi-
cally charged with those activities (under the direction of the committee) that might
best fall under the rubric of “police patrols.”
The ideas of the O’Connor Commission’s regarding statutory gateways and a
Coordinating Committee are very important and deserve support. However, they
need also to have another focus. A parliamentary committee would equally need
to know what the various review committees are doing and vice versa. Thus, the
8
The Special Committee and the CATSA review provide useful lessons. To be effective, both
required security-cleared staff to conduct research and investigations. The Special Committee’s
staff was not vetted. The CATSA review process, because it was a ministerial responsibility, did.
Significantly, the CATSA review involved much “police patrol” work. Though its report was tabled
in Parliament, it was largely ignored and responses to recommendations by government not
considered. A better approach might be to place the onus on Parliament to appoint an
“independent person” to conduct a five- year statutory evaluation of any institution chosen to
review the RCMP’s national security activities. In this way, Parliament could still be responsible for
the review process and be in a position to call the responsible minister to account for the actions
resulting from the review.
situation might be enhanced by the coordinating committee having the chair and
the vice chair of the parliamentary committee as members.
The O’Connor Commission was not asked to consider the effectiveness of the
existing oversight mechanisms covering CSIS and the CSEC. Therefore, it recom-
mended a third area of expertise covering all the remaining security and intelligence
review bodies with the exception of those falling directly under DND. We see no
reason to exclude DND organizations from the mix. Furthermore, the roles of the
CCSE, SIRC and the IGCSIS deserve further rationalization. Here the experience of
the British Government under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
provides a useful lesson. Of importance here is whether the IG’s role is sufficiently
independent to be really the “eyes and ears” on the Service, even for the minister
alone. Furthermore, we remain unconvinced that the role of SIRC and that of the
IGCSIS cannot be rolled into one. The question of SIRC’s continued existence in its
current form also deserves consideration. If a parliamentary committee were estab-
lished, would SIRC still need to consist of a five-member committee? Could it not
be headed by a single commissioner, as is the case with the CCSE, with similar pow-
ers to those under the Inquiries Act? There is also the issue of complaints and their
adjudication by administrative tribunals. It is worth recalling two points here. First,
the O’Connor Commission was concerned about the matter, calling, in particular,
for a central entry point for complaints because it was concerned about public con-
fusion regarding the process. Second, the McDonald Commission recommended a
separate institution from review bodies. The traditional argument by SIRC about
the benefits of being involved in both the review and complaints processes may no
longer be valid if there is a central entry point through the coordinating committee
to which it would be a party. Could the coordinating committee not only be a gen-
eral entry point for all complaints but also be directly responsible for functional
commissioners and tribunals, following along the lines of British consolidation of
commissioners in 2000? This would ensure that all commissioners would be legally
qualified, provide significant cost savings through consolidation, and provide com-
plainants with overlapping organizational complaints with easier access. The issue
of public knowledge of any complaints process is an important one. While bodies
can be much more transparent now and can identify their practices broadly through
the use of the Internet, would-be complainants have to know about the body in
question before such information can be helpful. Thus, the system might also want
to take advantage of traditional resources that can be brought to bear, namely par-
liamentarians, for whom dealing with the various problems of constituents is an
everyday occurrence. Members of Parliament could thus be specifically designated
as persons to whom an initial complainant could be made. They in turn would be
required to forward the complaint to the proposed coordinating committee, under
whose auspices the complaint could be addressed in a secure environment.
One final argument on behalf of a leading parliamentary role in national
security oversight should be made. As mentioned earlier, diminished ministerial
responsibility has been a worrying trend generally in parliamentary democracies.
Given the extraordinary secrecy surrounding national security, potential evasion of
ministerial responsibility for the workings of the secret world is an especially press-
ing concern. In practice, existing oversight and accountability mechanisms have
sometimes been used by governments to divert attention from ministerial respon-
sibility to focus exclusively on the actions of appointed officials. Oversight bodies
created within the executive sphere have often been reluctant to direct attention at
the political level, and this has even been true of public inquiries concerned about
receiving a supportive response from government for their recommendations.
Parliament is the only branch of government that has a direct constitutional obliga-
tion to hold ministers of the Crown responsible where appropriate. Thus, any over-
sight system that lacks a strong parliamentary presence as an integral part of the
overall process will almost certainly fail to enforce ministerial responsibility. This
point reinforces our stipulation that ministers of the Crown should not under any
circumstances be members of parliamentary committees overseeing national secu-
rity, and should participate only as witnesses before such committees to have their
ministerial actions scrutinized by the parliamentarians.
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chapter 42
“A VERY BRITISH
INSTITUTION”:
THE INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY COMMITTEE
AND INTELLIGENCE
ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM
mark phythian
1. The Origins of Intelligence

Oversight in the United Kingdom
The introduction of formal mechanisms for intelligence oversight in the United
Kingdom was a result of the legislation of the late 1980s and early 1990s that put
Britain’s security and intelligence agencies on a statutory footing. In 1989 the
Security Service Act placed the activities of the Security Service, MI5, on a statutory
basis for the first time. Prior to this, the only official guidance as to the nature of
MI5’s work was that contained in the 1952 Maxwell-Fyfe Directive, the existence of
which was revealed to the public via Lord Denning’s 1963 report into the Profumo
affair (Denning 1999). This had defined MI5 as being dedicated to the “defence of
the realm” from “external and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage
and sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations whether directed from
within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive to the State.”
While it stated that MI5 should be “absolutely free from any political bias or influ-
ence,” it also emphasized that ministers should “not concern themselves with the
detailed information which may be obtained by the Security Service in particular
cases, but are furnished with such information only as may be necessary for the
determination of any issue on which guidance is sought.”
The 1989 Act also provided for closer ministerial oversight of MI5. There was a
suspicion—widespread on the Left—that this had been limited in the past. Indeed,
the comments of a succession of former ministers from the 1960s and 1970s sug-
gested that the Service had enjoyed what amounted to a quasi-autonomous status,
while former Prime Minister Harold Wilson offered little reassurance in his treat-
ment of the agencies in his anatomy of British government, The Governance of
Britain.1 The 1987 publication of former MI5 officer Peter Wright’s memoir,
Spycatcher, with its account of how Wright and his colleagues, “bugged and burgled
[their] way across London at the State’s behest, while pompous bowler-hatted civil
servants in Whitehall pretended to look the other way” (Wright 1987, 54) heightened
concerns, particularly as the Thatcher government’s attempts to prevent publica-
tion via the Australian courts were widely interpreted as confirmation of the sub-
stance of Wright’s claims.
All of this was a long way from the picture provided by Lord Denning in his
1963 Profumo affair report, which had explained how:
The members of the [Security] Service are, in the eye of the law, ordinary citizens
with no powers greater than anyone else. They have no special powers of arrest
such as the police have. No special powers of search are given to them. They
cannot enter premises without the consent of the householder, even though they
may suspect a spy is there. If a spy is fleeing the country, they cannot tap him on
the shoulder and say he is not to go. They have, in short, no executive powers.
They have managed very well without them. We would rather have it so, than
have anything in the nature of a “secret police.” (1999, 170–1)
Hence, one purpose of the 1989 Act was to restore public trust in MI5, and to
this end it provided that, the “Director-General shall make an annual report on the
work of the Service to the prime minister and the Secretary of State and may at any
time report to either of them on any matter relating to its work.” Furthermore, the
Act provided for a commissioner to review the issuing and renewal of warrants
authorizing the entry to or interference with private property, who would produce
an annual report to the prime minister which would be made public after the
1
Chapter 9, “The Prime Minister and National Security,” stretched to just over one page.
Following six uninformative sentences, the chapter closed by revealing that “[t]he prime minister
is occasionally questioned on matters arising out of his responsibility. His answers may be
regarded as uniformly uninformative. There is no further information that can usefully or
properly be added before bringing this Chapter to an end.” See Wilson (1976, 167–68).
“a very british institution” 701
removal of any matter “prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of

the Service.” Finally, it also provided for a Tribunal which would investigate com-
plaints against the Service.
That the move to place MI5 on a legislative footing arose out of the dilemma
posed by the impact of European legislation on British politics and the incompati-
bility of an unregulated security service with European human-rights legislation,
rather than out of any sense that it was a desirable end in itself, was clear from the
fact that no parallel legislation was introduced in respect of either the Secret
Intelligence Service, MI6, or Government Communications Headquarters, GCHQ,
at this time. However, the existence of the 1989 Act created an anomalous situation
which could not continue indefinitely. The realization of this fact, alongside
increased select-committee assertiveness regarding oversight and the experience of
the Scott Inquiry into the “arms-to-Iraq” affair, all played their part in the Major
government’s introduction of the Intelligence Services Bill in 1993, placing MI6 and
GCHQ on a level statutory playing field to MI5.
As with the 1989 Act, this stipulated that both the chief of MI6 and director of
GCHQ would provide an annual report to the prime minister and secretary of state
on the work of their respective agencies and provided for the appointment of a
commissioner and a Tribunal to investigate complaints. But the Act went further
than this to create the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), a nine-member
committee of parliamentarians (but, significantly, not of Parliament) drawn from
both the House of Commons and House of Lords, to oversee the security and intel-
ligence agencies. Its members were to be appointed by the prime minister, meet in
closed session and produce reports for the prime minister, who would lay them
before Parliament after removing material considered “sensitive” and therefore
prejudicial to the activities of the agencies if made public.
Hence, while an important first step forward, this was also a rather cautious
step. The Committee was accountable to the executive and only through the execu-
tive was it accountable to the legislature. It could not determine the published con-
tent of its reports or the timing of their publication. This arrangement would be a
continual source of soul-searching and debate within the ISC and across Parliament
generally as to whether the committee should be reconstituted as a select committee
of the House of Commons, directly accountable to the legislature. At the time, the
opposition Labor Party made it clear that, while voting for the Bill, it favored select-
committee status for the oversight body. It would be two years later, with the increas-
ing likelihood that they would form the next government, before the Labor Party
began to distance itself from its earlier enthusiasm for genuine parliamentary
oversight.
The final key piece of legislation establishing the framework for the statutory
operation of the security and intelligence agencies and their oversight is the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, RIPA (2000). This introduced an intercep-
tion of communications commissioner and replaced the commissioners appointed
under the 1989 and 1994 Acts with a single intelligence services commissioner (ISC),
and the Tribunals set up in the 1989 and 1994 Acts with a single Investigatory Powers
Tribunal. However, its primary purpose was to take account of technological devel-
opments, chief amongst which was the advent and development of the Internet and
new means of electronic communication, and ensure the compatibility of UK legis-
lation in these areas with European human-rights legislation.
2. The ISC’s Record

However, the mere creation of official oversight bodies does not of itself guarantee
effective oversight. While prescriptions for effective oversight differ, partly because
of the different ways in which “oversight” can itself be defined, it has usefully been
suggested that the following closely-linked elements are vital in any effective over-
sight body:
• independence
• the ability to maintain secrets
• access
• adequate staffing/expertise and investigative powers
In addition, a further element is recognized as being essential—the existence of
political will on the part of the overseers (Born and Johnson 2005, 235–39). Overall,
the ISC’s performance with regard to these criteria has been mixed at best, with
advances co-existing alongside excessive deference to the executive and only limited
political will.
2.1. Independence
On a positive note, the ISC was tasked with performing intelligence oversight from
scratch, with no more guidance as to how to go about this in practice than that pro-
vided by the bare bones of the 1994 Intelligence Services Act. It put considerable flesh
on these in the years thereafter, expanding its remit in the process and producing
reports that have developed in range and depth (see table 42). In practice, it also took
an interest in operational matters, despite these falling outside its formal remit—for
example, in investigating issues relating to the Kosovo campaign, WMD prolifera-
tion, Sierra Leone, and the Mitrokhin affair. Moreover, it introduced not insignifi-
cant accountability with regard to the agencies’ finances, previously an area of very
limited transparency even at ministerial level. Indeed, until 1994 there was no exter-
nal auditing of the agencies’ accounts. It is also undoubtedly the case that the very
existence of the ISC gave the agencies cause to reflect on proposed actions in advance
of undertaking them. The ISC’s first chairman, former Conservative Secretary of
State for Defense and Northern Ireland Tom King, at one time referred to, “a ten-
dency now within the agencies to ask what the Intelligence and Security Committee
would think if they embarked on a certain course of action” and suggested that this,
Table 42.1 The Published Output of the ISC, 1994–2008

Date Title No. Paragraphs
May 1995 Interim Report 11

December 1995 Security Service Work Against Organised 9
Crime
March 1996 Annual Report 1995 41
February 1997 Annual Report 1996 54
October 1998 Annual Report 1997–98 72
April 1999 Sierra Leone 17
November 1999 Annual Report 1998–99 90
June 2000 Report into the Security and Intelligence 79
Agencies’ Handling of the Information
Provided by Mr Mitrokhin
November 2000 Annual Report 1999–2000 108
March 2001 Interim Report 36
June 2002 Annual Report 2001–02 96
December 2002 Inquiry into Intelligence Assessments and 50
Advice Prior To the Terrorist Bombings on
Bali 12 October 2002
September 2003 Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction- 145
Intelligence and Assessments
March 2005 The Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence 131
Personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay
and Iraq
April 2005 Annual Report 2004–05 94
May 2006 Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 146
7 July 2005
July 2007 Rendition 256
January 2008 Annual Report 2006–07 149
The government began the practice of publishing a formal response to the ISC’s reports beginning in
October 1998, with a response to the ISC’s 1997-98 annual report. In addition to the published reports,
most of which are available, along, with the government responses, at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.
uk/intelligence.aspx, in 1996 the Committee produced two reports which have never been published.
The second of these concerned agencies’ work ‘in the Interests of the Economic Well-Being of the
UK’, while even the title of the first remains classified.
“could be used in the future against Ministers who want intelligence in areas that the
agencies do not think fall within their remit” (Hansard 2001, col. 1149).
2.2. The Ability to Maintain Secrets

One fundamental early aim of the ISC was to establish the confidence of the agencies
themselves. King would subsequently allude to the initial Australian experience
with intelligence oversight, wherein what he termed the “awkward squad” was
selected to sit on the oversight body, and consequently enjoyed little co-operation
from the agencies. In terms of members’ ability to keep secrets, they have succeeded
in this. To date, there has been no instance of ISC members leaking information
and, in the parliamentary debate that follows the publication of the ISC’s annual
report, members have maintained the “ring of secrecy.” Early fears by intelligence
insiders that certain types of MP could not be trusted with state secrets have, to
date, proved unfounded. Where leaks have occurred, these seem to have originated
with officials rather than ISC members, who pride themselves on their ability to
maintain the trust of the agencies (Sengupta 2008; Norton-Taylor and Dodd 2008).
However, this does not mean that they have enjoyed the complete trust of the agen-
cies in return and, as discussed below, the executive has consistently supported the
agencies in limiting just how far inside the “ring of secrecy” ISC members can be
allowed.
Indeed, more recently, far from seeking to push back the boundaries of secrecy
relating to intelligence and security, the ISC seems to have become an advocate on
behalf of the agencies and executive in seeking to extend it (Sengupta 2008). If the
Committee saw itself as less of an advocate on behalf of the agencies and more of a
body designed to hold them to account on behalf of Parliament it might, as Richard
Norton-Taylor has suggested; “regard the media not as an enemy, but as an ally in
the search for the truth behind “national security” claims and as a protector of fun-
damental rights” (Norton-Taylor 2008b).
2.3. Access
At the heart of the issue of whether oversight is to be real and effective rather than
tokenistic is the issue of the access to information—the other side of the secrecy
coin. In this respect it is worth noting that the obligations placed on intelligence
agencies as a result of oversight legislation are much more far-reaching in the
United States than the United Kingdom. American congressional committees
have a right to all the information regarding covert action they ask for, but in
addition agency heads have a legal obligation to keep the committees “fully and
currently informed” of all such actions though “to the extent consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information
relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods.” While, in practice, this has
amounted more to an “invitation to struggle” than an automatically honored
right, it nevertheless contrasts starkly with the situation in the United Kingdom,
where legislation merely requires the agencies to respond to requests from the ISC
for information, placing a considerable premium on the ISC’s ability to divine the
right questions to ask.
There has been evidence of an ongoing tension over the question of access since
the earliest days of the ISC, but two key examples illustrate it well enough. The first
concerns the reports of the commissioners established by the 1989 and 1994 Acts
and who, since 2000, have operated under the terms of the RIPA. From their earliest
days both commissioners began a practice of producing their annual report on their
work in two parts. While the first was published, the second was a confidential annex
which dealt with issues which could not be explained without disclosing “sensitive”
information.2 In its 1998–99 annual report, the ISC argued that it should be granted
access to these confidential annexes, arguing that: “Access to the complete reports
would allow the Committee to note the way in which the Agencies follow the regu-
lations and procedures set out by the law and checked by the Commissioners, and
hence allow us to form an opinion on the Agencies’ administration in this vital area”
(ISC 1999, para. 36). In its response to the report, the government declined, arguing
that because such information was regarded as “sensitive” under the terms of the
1994 Act it would not to be made available to the ISC (H. M. Government 2000b,
para. 12). The ISC returned to the issue in the following year’s annual report, further
explaining that: “it is still important for us to see the classified annexes to be able to
establish the corrective action that the Agencies have introduced following the
Commissioners’ identification of errors and thus fulfil our statutory requirement to
oversee the Agencies’ administration processes” (ISC 2000, para. 35). Again, the gov-
ernment refused the ISC’s request (H. M. Government 2000c, para. 15). In a 2000–01
interim report published in anticipation of the forthcoming 2001 general election,
the Committee again raised the issue and the government again declined to make
the reports available. In its 2001–2 report, the Committee, now chaired by Ann
Taylor, again requested access, this time going so far as to warn that this was neces-
sary for the Committee, “to fulfil its statutory requirement to oversee the Agencies’
administration processes” (ISC 2002, para. 29). When the government again refused
access, the ISC gave up on the question of access to the annexes. If, as it said, access
was necessary for the ISC to fulfill its mandate, it was now settling for partial fulfill-
ment of that mandate.
Secondly, the ISC’s 2006–7 annual report revealed a long-running tug of war
between the ISC and the agencies and government over access to a ministerial sub-
mission concerning an unspecified issue in an unspecified year, in the course of
which the agencies and government had used such a shifting set of justifications as
to suggest a weak basis for their refusal to allow the ISC sight of the submission.
Using some of its strongest language of criticism, the ISC suggested that this raised
questions about the government’s commitment to reform of oversight, about which
Prime Minister Gordon Brown had then been speaking publicly (ISC 2008, para. 10,
Annex B). In its response, the government confirmed its refusal to allow the ISC
sight of the document, but without clearly explaining its reasoning (H. M.
Government 2008, para. W).
While the ISC’s decision to raise this issue in so prominent a way in its annual
report might be considered an act of assertiveness, a number of qualifying points
are worth making. Firstly, this dispute went on for years behind the scenes without
being mentioned once in an annual report. As a result, Parliament was unaware of
this refusal until 2008. Secondly, when the 2006–7 annual report was finally debated
2
The reports of both commissioners are available at http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/
accountability/commissioners_and_tribunal/reports.aspx.
in the House of Commons in July 2008, none of the ISC members who spoke in the
debate raised the issue and backbench efforts to do so were brushed off by the home
secretary. Thirdly, the ISC proudly records in the preface to each of its annual reports
that no material has been redacted from its reports by the executive without the
ISC’s consent, to some a disturbing symptom in itself. In this case, the ISC could
well have refused to agree to the executive redactions made in relation to the
Committee’s account of this dispute as a means of underlining the seriousness of
the issue, but chose not to do so.
2.4. Adequate Staffing/Expertise and Investigative Powers

This is an area closely related to the question of access and one that has been, if
anything, more problematic still. On the basis of its early experiences, in its first
annual report the ISC felt able to assure the prime minister that it considered its
structure appropriate to its task. However, by the time of its 1997–98 report, it was
arguing that an investigatory arm was required, one that would, “reinforce the
authority of any findings that we make, and be an important element in establishing
public confidence in the oversight system” (ISC 1998, para. 69).
At the same time, debate inside the ISC kept alive the question of the desirabil-
ity of a move toward select-committee status. One reason why a narrow majority of
ISC members came to believe that select-committee status was unnecessary was
that they saw an alternative in the further evolution of the ISC via the establishment
of an investigatory arm. As ISC member Yvette Cooper argued:
At the moment, information is provided by agency chiefs and by Ministers at
their discretion, which raises a difficult point: how can we have proper oversight
if the very people whom we are supposed to be overseeing are determining what
information we get? That severely jeopardises the Committee’s ability to
pronounce with authority on important intelligence issues. Credibility demands
knowledge and knowledge demands the power to verify—the power to check
what is going on. Until now, the ISC has not had that power, and that reduces its
credibility in the public mind, as well as in Parliament’s mind. None of that
means that I suspect the agencies of any wrongdoing; it means simply that we on
the Committee lack the ability to pronounce with confidence that all is well. We
cannot come to the House, put our hands on our hearts and say that all is well,
because we do not have the power to know. (Hansard 1998, col. 610)
By the time the ISC produced its 1998–99 report the government had consented
to the appointment of a single investigator, despite some agency unease. The
investigator, whose terms of reference were dictated by the prime minister rather
than the ISC, occupied an interesting position. Before providing a report on an
issue for the ISC, the investigator was required to consult with the agency involved,
“so as to allow the Head of the Agency to determine whether any particular material
should be withheld from the Committee.” Hence, further inside the “ring of secrecy”
than ISC members, the investigator could well be obliged to withhold information
from them.
The investigator was John Morrison, a respected former intelligence profes-

sional, whose work was praised by the ISC in successive annual reports. However, in
2004 he appeared on the television current-affairs program Panorama where he, in
effect, supported claims that the prime minister, Tony Blair, had exaggerated the
threat posed by Iraq in making the case for war in the 2002–3 period. When Blair
used the word “threat” in relation to Iraq, Morrison said, he “could almost hear the
collective raspberry going up around Whitehall.” As former intelligence official
Brian Jones put it, when Morrison;
used the word “raspberry” . . . he cut right through the layers of confusion and
hype to the very heart of the government’s Iraq problem. Even if the intelligence
community had “established beyond doubt” that Saddam had continued to
produce chemical and biological weapons, which it had not, that could not be
translated into a threat that could only be dealt with by war. When pressed that
the prime minister’s argument was about a risk Saddam might use them, at least
regionally, and we would inevitably get sucked into such a conflagration and thus
there was a threat to British interests anyway, Morrison replied succinctly: “No,
that’s piling supposition upon supposition.” ( Jones 2004)
As a result, Morrison was effectively sacked; his rolling contract was simply not
renewed. As a consequence, from 2004–8, the ISC had no independent investigatory
capacity, an extraordinary case of an oversight body voluntarily relinquishing inves-
tigative capacity and returning to the unsatisfactory situation outlined by Yvette
Cooper in 1998.
2.5. Political Will

For many the litmus test of the ISC’s effectiveness would occur when it had to tackle
a controversial issue that would involve it demonstrating its political will by dealing
with an issue of great political sensitivity that perhaps pitted it against the executive
to which it was accountable. The post-9/11 “war on terror” was to provide the con-
text for a series of such challenges. However, the ISC’s record in meeting them has
been mixed at best. The first of these came in the form of the Iraqi WMD contro-
versy, which the ISC examined in 2003. Its limited investigative capacity and staff,
pressure on the time of MPs from competing demands, and seeming reluctance to
challenge the government and add to its political woes over Iraq, all contributed to
a report that was partial, where the language of criticism was exceedingly mild, and
that damaged the reputation of the ISC, especially when its report was viewed in
relation to the much more thorough and critical Butler report into intelligence on
WMD that was published the following year.
How judgments are phrased and how material is ordered in such publications
are significant and contested matters that help determine how readers understand
what is put before them. In the case of the ISC’s Iraqi WMD report, the language
and ordering employed had the effect of minimizing the impact of any criticisms
that the report did contain. Moreover, its judgments were questionable. For exam-
ple, its judgment regarding the absence of political pressure on intelligence staff
was proved to be wide of the mark by subsequent revelations. Its view that there
was “convincing intelligence that Iraq had active chemical, biological and nuclear
programmes and the capacity to produce chemical and biological weapons” (ISC
2003, para. 66) was somewhat undermined by the post-war withdrawal as unsound
of the intelligence that had underpinned all of the headline claims in the Downing
Street dossier of September 2002. Worse still, it subsequently transpired that, in
reaching its conclusions about the convincing nature of the intelligence, the ISC
had been informed by the head of MI6 about the withdrawn intelligence, but on
condition that this fact was not mentioned in its report. Politicians’ use of intelli-
gence in making the case for war was a key part of this controversy, but one which
the ISC studiously avoided. Finally, it is now clear that the agencies were not as
open with the ISC as they might have been during this investigation. A combina-
tion of limited political will and limited investigatory capacity had resulted in a
report with clear limits (see Phythian 2008). Any assessment of the effectiveness of
the ISC over this issue must also take into account the fact that were it not for
a series of unpredictable events, its report would have represented the final word
on UK intelligence on Iraqi WMD—there would have been no Butler report,
which was to be more open about and critical of politicians’ use of intelligence in
making the case for war and much more forensic in its analysis of intelligence
performance.
In 2005–6 the ISC investigated the 7 July 2005 (7/7) London suicide bombings
and whether this plot had been preventable and hence represented a case of intel-
ligence failure. At the time of the bombings, politicians and intelligence officials
had claimed that the perpetrators were “clean skins” unknown to police or MI5.
However, it later transpired that two of them, Mohammad Siddique Khan and
Shazad Tanweer, had been monitored as part of a wider intelligence operation. The
ISC concluded that the failure to monitor and investigate Khan and Tanweer more
thoroughly prior to the bombings was a consequence of resource limitations and,
in this context, was “understandable.” As it wrote: “It is possible that the chances of
identifying attack planning and of preventing the 7 July attacks might have been
greater had different investigative decisions been taken in 2003–2005. Nonetheless,
we conclude that, in light of the other priority investigations being conducted and
the limitations on Security Service resources, the decisions not to give greater
investigative priority to these two individuals were understandable” (ISC 2006,
para. 56).
However, the wider intelligence operation that Khan and Tanweer had seem-
ingly stumbled onto the fringes of resulted in arrests and a high profile trial which,
in April 2007, resulted in the conviction of five men who had plotted to explode
ammonium nitrate fertilizer bombs at a range of heavily populated targets. With
these convictions came the lifting of reporting restrictions, and with this lifting it
became clear that surveillance of Khan and Tanweer had been more extensive than
previously indicated. Through this trial, rather than via the earlier ISC investiga-
tion, it now became known that:
MI5 followed the pair as they drove hundreds of miles around the UK,
photographed them and recorded their voices. They followed Siddique Khan to
his mother-in-law’s home, made inquiries about his telephone, and listened to
bugged conversations in which he talked about waging jihad. Yet they failed to
identify either man, and cut short their investigations into the pair after deciding
that they did not pose as high a risk to the country as other suspects under
investigation. (Cobain, Norton-Taylor, and Vasager 2007)
This knowledge called into question the thrust of the ISC’s earlier conclusions,
raising once more the question of the extent of agency co-operation with the ISC.
Prime Minister Tony Blair had earlier resisted calls for a public inquiry into the 7/7
bombings on the grounds that: “If we ended up having a full scale public inquiry . . . we
would end up diverting a massive amount of police and security service time and
I don’t think it would be sensible” (BBC News 2005). However, an inquiry that sought
to explain why the bombings had occurred would inevitably have had to consider the
role of the decision to go to war in Iraq in radicalizing young British Muslims and so
could well have revealed a degree of governmental culpability. Instead, the govern-
ment focused on the “what happened” question by producing a narrative account of
the events of 7 July 2005. The decision to publish this alongside the ISC’s report drew
the ISC into the government’s presentational strategy and had the unfortunate effect
of giving the impression that the ISC was now a branch of the executive. With certain
of that report’s findings now being called into question, Blair still refused to hold the
public inquiry that a growing number were demanding, and instead asked the ISC to
re-investigate the 7/7 attacks. In so doing he implicitly accepted that their initial
report had clear limitations and put the Committee in a catch-22 situation that could
only further undermine its credibility with Parliament and public.
The ISC had already considered the ethical implications of UK involvement in
the “war on terror” in a 2005 report into the handling of detainees by UK intelli-
gence personnel in Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay, and Iraq by the time it turned
its attention to the question of UK knowledge of or involvement in the US practice
of extraordinary rendition. This inquiry found that “routine” evidence sharing
with the United States in 2002 had led to two British residents in Ghana, Bisher
al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna, being rendered by the CIA first to Afghanistan and
then to Guantánamo Bay. Although the UK agencies “used caveats specifically pro-
hibiting any action being taken” when they handed over the intelligence, the US
authorities simply ignored the caveats. As the ISC concluded: “This case shows a
lack of regard, on the part of the US, for UK concerns. Despite the Security Service
prohibiting any action being taken as a result of its intelligence, the US nonetheless
planned to render the men to Guantánamo Bay. They then ignored the subsequent
protests of both the Security Service and the Government. This has serious impli-
cations for the working of the relationship between the US and UK intelligence
and security agencies” (ISC 2007, para. V).
Another case that the ISC looked at in the course of this inquiry was that of
Binyam Mohamed, a British resident arrested in Pakistan and rendered to Morocco,
where he claimed he was tortured, before being transferred to a US detention cen-

tre in Afghanistan and then to Guantánamo Bay. The ISC reported that no mem-
ber of MI6 had any contact with Mohamed, but that one member of MI5 did
interview him in Karachi in 2002 for three hours, and that the “interview was con-
ducted by an experienced officer and was in line with the Service’s guidance to staff
on contact with detainees” (ibid., para. 102). However, in August 2008 the High
Court found that this interrogation was unlawful and ruled that MI5 “continued to
facilitate” the interrogation of Mohamed after he was abducted from Pakistan and
flown to Morocco even though its officers “must also have appreciated” that he was
being detained and interrogated by officials “of a foreign government.” The Court
concluded that: “The relationship of the United Kingdom government to the
United States authorities in connection with [Mohamed] was far beyond that of a
bystander or witness to the alleged wrongdoing” (Norton-Taylor 2008a). In October
2008 the home secretary, Jacqui Smith, asked the attorney general to investigate
possible “criminal wrongdoing” by MI5 and the CIA in relation to the detention
and interrogation of Mohamed. While these developments clearly raised questions
about MI5 compliance with human-rights law, and hence aspects of the ISC’s
report into extraordinary rendition, ISC Chair Margaret Beckett declined sugges-
tions that the ISC should reinvestigate Mohamed’s case, claiming that; “individual
cases are matters for the tribunal. The Intelligence and Security Committee inves-
tigates the policy and, indeed, the implementation of the policy by the agencies;
the tribunal looks at individual cases” (Hansard 2008a, col. 469). However, there
was nothing preventing the ISC from revisiting this case. Its Rendition report had
itself focused on individual cases, while there was a further precedent in the
Committee’s 1999–2000 inquiry into the decision not to prosecute Soviet spy
Melita Norwood (the Mitrokhin report). In short, Beckett’s rationale was flimsy
and once again the ISC appeared more like a creature of the executive than a
check on it.
By this time, intelligence oversight in the United Kingdom was clearly beset
with problems of capacity as well as confidence with the ISC struggling to pro-
duce its annual reports on a timely basis—so much so that by 2008 they could
hardly be considered to be annual. The 2006–7 annual report was finally pub-
lished in January 2008, some eighteen months after the previous annual report,
and was only debated in Parliament in July 2008, limiting the effectiveness of par-
liamentary oversight not just of the intelligence and security agencies, but also of
the ISC. The need to investigate the question of extraordinary rendition was the
principal reason for this delay, once again exposing the limited investigatory
capacity of the ISC, a problem greatly exacerbated by its decision to dispense with
the services of its only investigator. The subsequent need to re-examine the case
of the 7/7 bombers meant that the 2007–8 annual report would not appear until
2009. Although its re-examination of the intelligence in relation to the 7/7 suicide
bombers was submitted to the prime minister in July 2008, publication was
delayed by Downing Street until 2009 for legal reasons (Norton-Taylor and
Dodd 2008).
3. The Question of Reform

A high degree of public confidence in the ISC has come to be seen by the govern-
ment as being essential to retaining public confidence in the agencies themselves,
and especially important against the background of increased taxpayer funding and
in the context of debates about the precise degree to which civil liberties need to be
surrendered to the pursuit of security in an age of domestic Islamist terrorism.
As a consequence of all this, in 2007 the Brown government felt obliged to
both publicly recognize some of the limitations of the ISC, the first time a govern-
ment had openly done so, and propose reforms. By this time, the limitations of
the ISC were quite broadly recognized. Both the Conservative and Liberal
Democrat opposition parties were by now in favor of moving closer toward a
select committee-style system for intelligence oversight. Moreover, now that the
“war on terror” had led the ISC to investigating ethical and human-rights issues,
its work was coming under fresh scrutiny from the parliamentary committee on
human rights and an all-party parliamentary group on extraordinary rendition
established in December 2005.
Brown’s reform proposals were introduced via the July 2007 green paper on The
Governance of Britain. This recognized that for the security and intelligence agen-
cies to command full public support for and confidence in their work, “it is impor-
tant that the representatives of the people hold them to account in an appropriate
manner, while respecting operational sensitivities” (H. M. Government 2007,
para. 89). As a result, the government would consult on reforming the statutory
basis on which the ISC operated “to bring the way in which it is appointed, operates
and reports as far as possible into line with that of other select committees” (ibid.,
90). The green paper proposed tackling specific criticisms of the ISC by, for exam-
ple, approving the re-appointment of an independent investigator (although, pre-
sumably, this is something the ISC could itself have done whenever it wanted to),
and removing barriers to co-operation between the ISC and the Home Affairs and
Foreign Affairs select committees (barriers which the Blair government had itself
erected). In presenting this to Parliament Brown outlined how:
As the security agencies themselves recognise, greater accountability to
Parliament can strengthen still further public support for the work that they do.
So while ensuring necessary safeguards that respect confidentiality and security,
we will now consult on whether and how the Intelligence and Security
Committee can be appointed by, and report to, Parliament. And we will start now
with hearings, held in public wherever possible; a strengthened capacity for
investigations; reports subject to more parliamentary debate; and greater
transparency over appointments to the Committee. (Hansard 2007a, col. 817)
Thereafter, in a 25 July 2007 speech outlining his intention to publish the United
Kingdom’s first national security strategy, Brown reiterated how “the Government
are consulting on how in future the ISC should be appointed and should report to
Parliament—where possible, with hearings in public, a strengthened capacity for
investigations, reports that are subject to more parliamentary debate and greater
transparency over appointments to the Committee” (Hansard 2007b, col. 841).
By March 2008, The Governance of Britain white paper had been published,
firming up the proposals earlier outlined in the green paper, allowing for appoint-
ments to the ISC to be made in consultation with the leader of the Opposition, but
pulling back from earlier suggestions that hearings could be held in public, or that
the ISC may be able to report to Parliament rather than the executive. Perhaps this
reflected the cautious approach to reform on the part of the ISC itself. The ISC had
submitted its own proposals on reform to the prime minister, and its cautious
approach was clearly evident in Margaret Beckett’s intervention at the end of
Brown’s speech unveiling the white paper, where she asked him to confirm, “that he
recognises—as, I believe, does the Committee—the importance of maintaining the
delicate balance between a welcome greater openness to Parliament and the public,
and maintaining the operational effectiveness of those agencies on which our secu-
rity so much depends” (Hansard 2008a, col. 935).
Moreover, given the risks involved in employing a single investigator, as demon-
strated by John Morrison (i.e., if the investigator turned critic, an extensive role would
lend considerable weight to those criticisms), the white paper now suggested that a
pool of individuals with differing expertise be established, on which the ISC could
draw on an ad hoc basis depending on the nature of any given requirement. Finally, it
suggested that the chair of the ISC should open the annual parliamentary debate in
the House of Commons on its report, rather than a government minister as had been
the practice, and that these debates should also be held in the House of Lords.
The question of Parliament’s role in debating the work of the ISC is an area
where reform needs to go further. While the white paper proposed allowing the
chair of the ISC to open debates and allowing a debate on the annual report in the
House of Lords, where greater expertise on matters of intelligence and security is to
be found, the House of Commons still needs to play a greater role. As matters stand,
the debate follows publication of the annual report. Where publication is delayed,
as in the recent past, so too is debate on intelligence matters in the House of
Commons. Debates should be held more regularly and not simply tied to the annual
report’s publication. The ISC has, over the years, produced a number of special
reports on especially important issues—ranging from Sierra Leone, to the Bali
bombings, Iraqi WMD, the 7/7 bombings, and extraordinary rendition—but there
is no mechanism for ensuring that these are also debated in Parliament. Moreover,
the time allocated for the current debate is inadequate and barely provides time for
any backbench questioning of the government or ISC.
In the July 2008 debate on the ISC’s 2006–7 annual report, for example, aside
from the opening and closing speeches for the government and opposition parties,
just nine MPs were called to speak, six of whom were members of the ISC. An addi-
tional six MPs, one of them an ISC member, made interventions during those
speeches. Hence, just eight backbench MPs took or had the opportunity presented
by the debate to hold the ISC to account. It is hard to view this as the culmination
of an annual oversight cycle.
Amidst all the talk of reform, it needs to be borne in mind that, in essence, the
executive and the legislature have divergent reasons for supporting oversight and its
reform. Moreover, there is no historical example of the introduction or strengthen-
ing of intelligence oversight being undertaken from a position of absolute executive
strength. As Home Secretary Jacqui Smith helpfully explained in opening the July
2008 debate, from the executive’s perspective; “in addition to ministerial and judicial
oversight, it is essential that Parliament and, through Parliament, the wider public
can be assured that the security and intelligence agencies are fulfilling their lawful
duties efficiently and effectively. That is the role of the Intelligence and Security
Committee—the ISC” (Hansard 2008b, col. 455). This begs the obvious question of
what happens when the ISC finds evidence that is likely to further diminish trust in
the agencies? Should it, or does it, consider how any shortcomings or criticisms
should be revealed or aired so as to minimize any further erosion of public trust?
For the legislature and public, on the other hand, oversight is at least in part a
response to the liberal democratic dilemma concerning security intelligence—that
while security intelligence agencies exist to protect key liberal democratic freedoms,
citizens, in guarding their freedoms, should be cautious of them lest the remedy is
corrosive of the very rights that the agencies exist to protect—and to the vastly
increased cost of the enterprise in the post-9/11, post-7/7 world. In the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, £54 million was pumped into MI5, MI6, and GCHQ and “directed
towards more collection (including surveillance, interception and agent-running),
investigation, and dissemination of intelligence” (ISC 2002, para. 71). In the wake of
the 7/7 London suicide bombings, a further £85 million funding was announced, to
be split over the three years 2005–8, in order to facilitate the early delivery of
increased capacity to counter the threat of international terrorism. This meant that
by 2008, government spending on intelligence and counterterrorism stood at £2.5
billion per year, with increased investment scheduled to continue so that by 2010–11
it would reach £3.5 billion per year, approximately three times its level at the time of
the 9/11 attacks (H. M. Treasury 2007). Alongside this increased cost, legislative
oversight is also increasingly important now that MI5, MI6, and GCHQ’s perfor-
mance is much more closely related to ensuring the physical safety of UK citizens
from a real and existing domestic terrorist threat.
In this changed context MPs from both governing and opposition parties rec-
ognized the Brown reforms as being essentially cosmetic. In terms of the proposed
reform of ISC appointments, ISC member Richard Ottaway cautioned that:
“Appointments by the Committee of Selection are a good idea, but let us not kid
ourselves that they will produce a fresh set of characters. The system will continue,
and the usual types will surface. To that extent, the process is largely cosmetic”
(Hansard 2008b, col. 481). Similarly, Ottaway felt that while it, “is right and proper
that the Committee Chairman should introduce the debate . . . it will not change the
tone of the debate much, other than that she will get more than 10 minutes in which
to make her speech” (ibid.).
At the same time, the reforms suggested by the Brown government do not
address the tension inherent in the ISC’s format, one that is felt not just by outside
commentators but is shared by members of the ISC themselves, of what exactly is

their role? As Richard Ottaway put it: “I feel most uncomfortable with the question
about the precise role of the ISC. Is it with the agencies or against them? Does it
provide oversight or a check or balance? The Committee’s job is defined, as is the
job of a Select Committee, as the provision of oversight of policy, finance and
administration. That definition is wide and vague, and can be broadly or narrowly
interpreted. During my time on the ISC, I have seen a narrow interpretation. A Select
Committee has more freedom to range and is wide-ranging in its scope” (ibid., 483).
In a similar vein, shadow home secretary Dominic Grieve voiced his concern that:
“To an extent, we are guided by what members of the Committee say, although I am
always conscious that there is a danger of them going native and ceasing to be the
upholders of the interests of the House. When that happens, it is because they are
lured magnetically into a world where the fact that rooms and secret information
are made available to them gently and subtly affects their judgment. They are grate-
ful for being made privy to matters that are not available to other people . . . That is
one of the inherent tensions in the different roles that one plays in Government and
in the House” (ibid., 465).
Hence, more far-reaching reforms are necessary. These would include a chair
and a majority of members being drawn from opposition parties. In particular,
appointing a chair from an opposition party would be a significant reform. During
its first term the Blair government seemed to recognize the significance of this and
retained former Conservative Secretary of State for Defense and Northern Ireland
Tom King as Chair—indeed, the ISC made its most significant progress under King.
The Butler Report into UK intelligence on WMD recommended that in future the
chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee should be someone “who is demonstrably
beyond influence, and thus probably in his last post” (Butler 2004, para. 597).
A similar logic should apply to the chair of the ISC. The ISC has now had successive
chairs who have left the Committee on being recalled to the Cabinet. The chair
should not be a politician who seeks or would accept a role in a current govern-
ment. The 1994 Intelligence Services Act states that no member of the ISC should be
a minister, but appointing recently retired ministers who are liable to, or harbor
hopes of, recall to government is not so far removed from the appointment of serv-
ing ministers.
Gordon Brown had two opportunities to implement this reform—both of which
occurred during the period in which he was publicly discussing the need for reform
of the ISC—first, when former Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett was appointed
Chair in January 2008 (which meant that in the space of a year she went from giving
evidence to the Committee during its extraordinary rendition inquiry, as the minis-
ter responsible for MI6, to conducting such inquiries—or declining to become
involved in them), and then when former Foreign Office Minister Kim Howells, still
young enough to aspire to move from the range of junior ministerial posts he has
held to date to become a secretary of state, replaced Beckett as ISC Chair.
A further reform concerns investigative capacity. The apparent commitment
to “a strengthened capacity for investigations” was hardly realized in the limited
proposals around the appointment of investigators. In July 2007 Gordon Brown

spoke of immediate reforms that would be followed by future legislation, suggesting
potentially far-reaching reforms. However, the apparent commitment to legislate
was not a feature of the March 2008 Governance of Britain white paper, and by the
time of the July 2008 debate seemed a fading prospect.3 In addition, the ISC should
have its own staff, rather than rely on staff provided by the Cabinet Office, a situa-
tion that creates a potential conflict of interests. As Labor MP Andrew McKinley
explained: “The Clerk of the House and his colleagues act as colleagues of the Chair
of Select Committees. They ask the Chairperson, ‘Would you like me to do this?’ or
‘Would it be a good idea to do that?’ That may happen in the ISC, but one cannot
escape the fact that whoever provides the secretariat for that Committee is in the
Cabinet Office, and that is unhealthy. It provides no reassurance that the role of the
Clerk is the same as it is for other Select Committees” (Hansard 2008b, col. 486).
Other reforms that would enhance the power of the Committee include the
power to call and compel the attendance of witnesses, control over the timing of its
publications, and enhancing the support staff resources to a level comparable with
those of select committees. Finally, but most importanrly—because many of the
above reforms would flow from this final one—the ISC should be recast as a select
committee of the House of Commons. This would recognize not just the centrality
of security to the post-9/11, post-7/7 domestic and international political agendas,
but also the vastly increased taxpayer investment in security and intelligence in the
years since the ISC was established.
4. Conclusions
While parliamentarians are careful not to criticize individual members of the ISC,
nothing that the ISC has done in the years since 1994 has convinced its critics that
select-committee status for the oversight body is no longer necessary. In 1999 the
influential Home Affairs Committee both recognized the “significant step forward
over previous arrangements” that the ISC represented, and also reiterated its view
that oversight should be undertaken by a select committee, concluding that: “In our
view, it is inevitable that the intelligence services will one day become accountable
to Parliament. That is the logical outcome of the process of reform embarked upon
by the previous Government . . . the accountability of the security and intelligence
services to Parliament ought to be a fundamental principle in a modern democ-
racy” (Home Affairs Committee 1999, para. 48). Not surprisingly, the government
3
In that debate, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith explained: “The Government have not ruled
out the possibility of legislative change in the future, but believe that the package of measures
outlined in the White Paper will significantly increase the Committee’s transparency and
accountability to Parliament” (Hansard 2008b, col. 458).
rejected this conclusion (H. M. Government 2000a). However, and significantly for
some, in doing so it said: “The Government is not convinced that there is a strong
case for change in the fundamental structure of these arrangements now,”4 opening
up the possibility of a future progression. At the same time, the ISC itself admitted
to the existence of a dissenting minority on the Committee on this issue (ISC 1999,
para. 7), although without saying just how significant this minority was (on the
basis of the November 1998 parliamentary debate this could well have been as close
as 5–4 against).
To use the distinction utilized by Loch Johnson in analyzing US intelligence
oversight, it might be said that the ISC has performed better at the routine “police
patrol” dimension of oversight than in response to the “fire alarms” that have
resulted from politically sensitive and controversial issues.5 Overall, it has performed
poorly in relation to the “fire alarms” of Iraqi WMD and the 7/7 suicide bombing,
while serious questions remain over the depth of its report into extraordinary ren-
dition. However, there is a sense in which this is a reflection of its approach to the
question of oversight and its inability to decide whether and how far it should have
an investigatory function, how far it is designed to hold the agencies and, crucially,
the executive alongside them, to account on behalf of Parliament and public, and
how far it is designed to manage the agencies on behalf of the executive and thus be
able to reassure Parliament that they provide value for money. Do the ISC’s mem-
bers see themselves as being involved in contests over information and power, as
commentators such as Peter Gill have suggested they should be (Gill 1996), or in a
co-operative venture designed to ensure optimum agency efficiency and perfor-
mance? This is a tension that should have been more clearly resolved by this stage of
the Committee’s development. Having said that, the post-9/11 “war on terror” seems
to have strengthened the Committee’s belief in the primacy of its management
function and made it even less willing to be critical of the agencies. A shift to select-
committee status would help resolve this tension, and certainly make the Committee
more assertive in relation to the executive. The reforms announced by Gordon
Brown have turned out to be more cosmetic than real, designed to revive public
confidence in the agencies and parliamentary confidence in the ISC whilst safe-
guarding current arrangements.
Tellingly, Foreign Secretary David Miliband, in closing the July 2008 parliamen-
tary debate, termed the ISC “a very British institution” (Hansard 2008b, col. 495)—
a seeming recognition of its limitations given that British political development has
come to be characterized as having resulted in no more than a “managed populism”
(Marquand 2008). That the ISC is a “very British institution” is also, of course, a
reflection of the circumstances that led to the security and intelligence agencies
being placed on a statutory footing and oversight being introduced in the first place,
4
Ibid., my emphasis. In June 2000, in the House of Commons, ISC member Dale
Campbell-Savours said that “the word ‘now’ in the Government’s response was fought over and it
indicates the way in which we are going” (Hansard 2000, col. 512).
5
See Johnson (2005).
which were essentially those of reactive damage limitation rather than a proactive
response to an existing democratic deficit in this area. In June 2000 ISC member
Dale Campbell-Savours told the House of Commons: “The arguments about
whether the ISC is a Select Committee will simply be cast aside by history. The pro-
cess is inevitable; it will happen” (H. 22.6.00. col. 512). This should be the case, but
greater parliamentary assertiveness will be required to ensure that what is necessary
also proves inevitable, and that intelligence oversight progresses beyond the con-
fines of that “very British institution,” the ISC.
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chapter 43
THE POLITICS
OF INTELLIGENCE
ACCOUNTABILITY
glenn hastedt
Accountability is one of the core concepts in a democratic order. It is also a concept

whose meaning and application to real-world problems is anything but simple.
Accountability is not responsibility. To be responsible is to have an obligation to act.
Accountability is not control. To be in control is to be in a position to order and dictate
action. To be accountable is to have an obligation to explain and justify one’s actions.
Contained within the straightforward obligation to explain and justify one’s actions are
a series interrelated sets of questions that transform the concept of accountability into
a political question in which the targets of accountability, the standards employed, the
identity of those making accountability judgments and the purpose of the account-
ability inquiry are all contested. In short, they are political questions. In this chapter we
begin by introducing the various questions contained in the concept of accountability.
Next we examine each in turn as they relate to intelligence accountability. We close by
discussing the resulting contextual and political nature of intelligence accountability.
1. Dimensions of Accountability
The first dimension of accountability is who is accountable: individuals, organi-
zations, or the entire system? There is nothing automatic about identifying an
accountability target.
The choice is a crucial one because it specifies where corrective action and pun-
ishment must be meted out. The greater the focus on the entire system the more
responsible are those who created the system or currently are in charge of it. Thus,
high-ranking policymakers have a vested interest in directing accountability issues
away from a systemic focus to one the looks at the actions of subordinate individu-
als and organizations (Romzek and Dubnick 1987).
To whom one is accountable is the second dimension. Strict definitions of
accountability see it as being externally oriented with the ultimate arbitrator of
accountability being the citizenry at large. More expansive views argue that one can
also be accountable to peers and professional standards. Two subsidiary questions
exist here. One is whether it is better for there to exist a single point in the political
system at which the obligation to explain and justify one’s actions exists or if there
should be multiple points where this takes place. A single point of accountability
provides clarity in standards and expectations but it is easily overloaded, increasing
the likelihood that individuals and organizations will not always be held account-
able. Multiple points of accountability have the opposite problem. They increase
coverage but lose clarity of purpose, thus raising the possibility of buck passing and
sending mixed signals regarding standards of acceptable behavior. Another subsid-
iary question is to whom, if anyone, are overseers accountable? Another way to
phrase this question is to ask if accountability is a singular act or if it is a chain of
decisions in which the judgment of the guardians is in turn subject to review by
others (Mulgan 2003).
The third dimension involves the subject of the accountability inquiry. For
what is one held accountable? Two broad possibilities exist that are not mutually
exclusive. One could be held accountable for not properly following agreed-upon
processes and procedures or one could be held accountable for the quality of the
product produced. If this is the case then two further possibilities present them-
selves. One could be accountable for particular products or for the overall quality of
the products produced. Both of these general approaches contain conceptual prob-
lems that weaken accountability. In the first case the presumption exists that there
are clear standards for best practices or at a minimum clear rules that guide decision
making. In the second case the presumption exists that not only can we measure
success and failure but that we understand the reason for success and failure.
The purpose behind the accountability inquiry is the fourth and final dimen-
sion contained in the obligation to explain and justify one’s actions. Accountability
narratives agree that the end point of the accountability process is the rendering
of a judgment. Where they differ is on how to conceptualize this. Three interpre-
tations are particularly relevant to understanding intelligence accountability. The
most traditional narrative sees the accountability judgment as falling along a con-
tinuum for absolution of wrongdoing at one end to the imposition of sanctions
at the other. A second narrative stresses that the purpose of accountability is to
improve performance. The stress here is on judgments as part of a dialogue and
providing feedback. This outcome is seen as particularly relevant when best prac-
tices are unclear and outputs difficult to measure. A third view that argues a major
the politics of intelligence accountability 721
purpose of accountability proceedings is to manage expectations. Managing

expectations has both positive and negative dimensions. On the positive side it
involves a learning dialogue in which those who are being held accountable and
those making judgments come to a more realistic appreciation of what is possible
and appropriate. On the negative side it degenerates into a blame game. The blame
game is especially likely to occur and learning especially difficult in the aftermath
of a crisis because the learning capacity of leaders and organizations is low (Boin
et al. 2008).
2. Intelligence Accountability:
Who Is Accountable?
Individual intelligence officials, intelligence organizations and the entire intelli-
gence system all have either been held accountable or the subject of calls for account-
ability. Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs) have been the center of accountability
inquires on numerous occasions. DCI William Casey faced accusations of politiciz-
ing intelligence virtually throughout his tenure. Casey also faced scrutiny from the
Senate Intelligence Committee for his failure to adequately brief them on the CIA’s
mining of Nicaraguan harbors. Another DCI who found himself under attack both
from forces within the CIA and outside of it was Richard Helms. Internal opposi-
tion and calls for accountability arose over his handling of intelligence on the U.S.
invasion of Cambodia. Concluding that President Nixon had made up his mind,
Helms did not circulate a CIA paper challenging the value of such a move, leading
some intelligence analysis to circulate an unprecedented petition of protest within
the CIA. Helms would later be convicted of perjury for his testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his nomination to be ambassador to Iran.
Helms stated the CIA was not involved in the overthrow of Salvador Allende.
Information presented to the Church Committee indicated the opposite. Helms
was given a two-year suspended sentence and fined.
Intelligence organizations especially the CIA have come under periodic account-
ability scrutiny. In 1956 Senator Joseph McCarthy famously announced to his
colleagues in the Senate “I have roughly 100 pages of documentation covering
incompetence, inefficiency, waste, and Communist infiltration in the CIA which
I am holding in the hope that a [investigative] committee will be established so that
I can turn the information over to it” (Ransom 1970, 163). President John Kennedy
placed General Maxwell Taylor in charge of investigating the CIA after the Bay of
Pigs failure. Twice Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan introduced legislation to abol-
ish the CIA. In 1991 he was moved to act by the CIA’s failure to anticipate the end of
the Cold War. In 1995 it was the failure to uncover the presence of spies such as
Aldrich Ames in a timely fashion.
Calls for holding the intelligence system accountable are also a periodic feature
of the American political process. Most often this has taken the form of a general
inquiry into its operation as part of a broader interest in improving overall govern-
ment efficiency or the general organization of foreign policy. By their very nature
such inquiries do not easily lend themselves to the implementation of fundamental
system-wide changes. Such was the case with the 1948 and 1953 Hoover Commissions,
the 1975 Murphy Commission and the 1993 Gore Commission (Hastedt 2007). On
occasion these inquiries are motivated by specific concerns and do become highly
contentious affairs. The 1975 Church Committee looked into the activities of the
CIA, FBI, NSA, and other intelligence agencies. More recently the tragic events of
11 September 2001 called into question the functioning of the entire intelligence
system. Neither of the two major changes that followed from this inquiry threat-
ened the fundamental operation of the intelligence system as it existed prior to
those attacks. A new organization was created (Department of Homeland Security)
and a new office was created (Director of National Intelligence).
To Whom Is One Accountable?
No single point of accountability exists for intelligence officers, organizations, or
the intelligence community as a whole in the U.S. political system. There were ten
investigations into Pearl Harbor. The Church Committee (Senate), Pike Committee
(House), and Rockefeller Commission (White House) all looked into allegations of
CIA wrongdoing in the 1970s. A presidential commission and two Senate commit-
tee investigations looked into intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
Most hidden from view and nearly invisible to outside observers is professional
accountability. Writing in 1983 George Allen attributed much of the then-current
criticism of intelligence to a lapse in professionalism. “Deficiencies in expertise,
unmet responsibilities and corporate weakness are apparent in most of the so-called
intelligence failure from Pearl Harbor through the Bay of Pigs to Iran” (Marrin and
Clemente 2006, 643). Similar observations have been directed at intelligence work
from the end of the Cold War to the 9/11 attacks to intelligence work done on Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction.
Possession of expert knowledge and a corporate identity are core aspects of a
professional identity. Both are problematic for intelligence, a condition that leads
some to define intelligence as a semiprofession or craft (Marrin and Clemente
2006). Wilhelm Argell raises the fundamental question regarding expertise in the
title of his article, “When Everything is Intelligence, Nothing is Intelligence” (2002).
Boundaries must be established. Historically this has led to debates about whether
covert action and counterintelligence are intelligence, or is intelligence restricted to
analytical activities (Godson 1979). It has also engendered debates over whether the
intelligence community is made up of one profession or several that mirror the
organizational home from which they engage in intelligence work or the skill-set
they employ. Calls for outsourcing intelligence only compound the problem of skills
and identity.
Even if intelligence is restricted to analysis questions arise over how to define its
core assumptions, methodologies, challenges, and concepts. The development of a
consensus on intelligence best practices promises to be more of a political process
than an analytic one in which internal debates and external events will determine
which position triumphs. Such has been the case, for example, in the debate over
whether intelligence analysts should be kept close to policymakers (the Gates school)
or far apart (the Kent school). The Kent school initially was the dominant paradigm
but was overtaken by the Gates school as concerns grew that intelligence was becom-
ing increasingly irrelevant to policy. Today concern for politicizing intelligence has
reopened the debate.
Frequent points of reference for thinking about intelligence as a profession are
medicine and law (Marrin and Clemente 2005 and 2006; Fisher and Johnston 2008).
While intelligence methodologies may hold strong similarities with these profes-
sions an important difference is absence of an equivalent body to the American
Medical Association or American Bar Association that is empowered to establish
entrance requirements to the profession, establish standards of learning, or to disci-
pline members for unprofessional behavior. This is not to say that peer review of
intelligence is absent. The first informal internal postmortems of intelligence esti-
mates began in the early 1950s. Soon there would be implemented a semiannual
postmortems of all National Intelligence Estimates (Steury 1994, 98–99).
Sitting atop of professional accountability sits corporate or organizational
accountability. It too operates largely in secret although of late its findings have
become more public. The key instrument of organizational accountability is the
Office of the Inspector General (IG). The record of the IG in the intelligence com-
munity as an instrument of accountability is testimony to its political and contested
nature. The CIA has had an IG since 1952 but it was only in 1989 that an independent
IG appointed by the president and approved by the Senate was created. Up until
that time IGs in the CIA were appointed by the DCI (Kaiser 1989). DCI William
Webster raised several objections about moving toward a more independent IG. He
feared that a presidentially appointed IG would compete with the Senate for over-
sight powers over the CIA and might not fully cooperate with the DCI on sensitive
matters. In particular Webster cited his statutory responsibility to protect sources
and methods. L. Britt Snider, who would later serve as the CIA’s IG, notes that in the
end the legislation passed because a compromise with the CIA was reached on the
powers of the IG (it was denied subpoena authority) and to head off what oppo-
nents of the bill saw as potentially even less desirable legislation (Snider 2001).
The CIA’s Inspector General reports have covered a wide variety of topics and
have not shied away from controversial topics. Subjects covered have included the
quality and politicalization of intelligence assessments and whether a covert-action
program had exceeded its mandate, the failure to identify Aldrich Ames as a Soviet
spy in a timely fashion, the CIA’s reported involvement with the Contras and cocaine
trafficking to the United States, the improper handling of secret material by DCI
John Deutch, and the quality of the CIA’s intelligence gathering and analytical work
on terrorism prior to the 9/11 attack. In this last study CIA IG John Helgerson con-
cluded that fifty to sixty CIA officers knew that two of the hijackers may have been
in the U.S. but did not inform the FBI about the potential threat they posed. He also
recommended that former DCI George Tenet be held accountable for having earlier
failed to establish a strategy for neutralizing al Qaeda. Not all inside or outside the
CIA agreed with these findings (Lotrionte 2008). In a move some viewed with great
concern for its impact on the IG’s independence, in 2007 DCI Michael Hayden
began an investigation into Helgerson’s service as IG. Another controversial report
written by Helgerson’s office surfaced in November 2008. It concluded the CIA had
lied to Congress and withheld key information from investigators about the shoot-
ing down of a private plane carrying U.S. missionaries in Peru in 2001 over its sus-
pected involvement in drug trafficking. The report had been turned over to the
Justice Department, which closed its investigation in 2005 without taking any action.
With the revelation of its existence Hayden stated the internal review was “still open”
and said outside experts were being consulted on the matter. Representative Peter
Hoekstra who released excerpts from the unclassified report called the CIA’s actions
“tantamount to obstruction of justice” (Warrick 2008, A1).
The first two levels of intelligence accountability discussed here are consistent
with an expansive view of accountability. Those that favor a strict definition of
accountability stress the requirement that the person or body that makes the
accountability judgment must be external to the person or organization explaining
their actions. This position directs our attention to legal-political accountability that
is exercised by public officials. Traditionally the elected public official to whom
intelligence is accountable is the president. Throughout the early Cold War years it
was taken as a given by members of Congress that intelligence was an executive
function. The line of accountability running from intelligence to the president is,
however, a cloudy one. A core problem is presented by the concept of plausible
denial, the notion that the president must have the ability to deny knowledge of an
intelligence activity. Helms in testifying before the Church Committee had this to
say about CIA plans to assassinate Fidel Castro: “it was made abundantly clear . . . that
the desire was to get rid of the Castro regime . . . I think that any of us would have
found it very difficult to discuss assassination with a President of the U.S. I just
think we all had the feeling that we’re hired out to keep those things out of the Oval
Office” (Treverton 1990, 72). The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Act sought to strengthen the
accountability link between intelligence and the president in the area of covert
action by requiring a presidential finding approving them be sent to Congress
within forty-eight hours of it being given.
A second problem with presidential accountability is the manner in which pres-
idents approach intelligence and understand it. Presidents have come to define
themselves as existing apart from the intelligence system rather than as an integral
part of it. They see themselves (and allow others to see them) as recipients of intel-
ligence. Moreover, for presidents to hold intelligence accountable they must under-
stand it. Absent that understanding holding intelligence accountable easily
degenerates into making intelligence into scapegoats and targets of convenience.
Robert Gates observed that “presidents and their national security teams are usually
ill-informed about intelligence capabilities; therefore they have unrealistic expecta-
tions of what intelligence can do for them” (Gates 1989, 38–39). Two long-time intel-
ligence officials have made a similar observation, noting administrations start “with
the expectation that intelligence could solve every problem, or that it could not do
anything right, and then moved to the opposite view. They then settled down and
vacillated from one extreme to the other” (Kerr and Davis 1998–99, 51).
On occasion, presidents have turned to special commissions as an instrument
of intelligence accountability (Hastedt 2007). Creating a presidential commission is
a valuable option for presidents because it offers the prospect of depoliticizing a
problem and fending off charges of a presidential whitewash while also forestalling
a congressional inquiry. This said, their underlying purpose is not necessarily to
engage in an accountability inquiry and they are anything but nonpolitical. Among
the other purposes assigned to commissions are legitimizing the need for govern-
ment action, providing symbolic assurance to the public that the government is
aware of a problem and taking steps to deal with it, policy analysis and problem
solving, and conflict management. Their political character is guaranteed by the
circumstances surrounding their creation and the nature of their recommenda-
tions. Partisanship is a reoccurring feature of the founding of presidential commis-
sions taking the shape of an upcoming election expected to bring a new party into
power (the first Hoover Commission), a national tragedy (the 9/11 Commission), an
increasingly divided and suspicious public (the WMD Commission) and presiden-
tial distrust of intelligence (the Schlesinger Commission). Solutions are political for
three simple reasons: presidents do not create commissions to criticize their poli-
cies, members of commissions are appointed because they are trustworthy, and
solutions are not self-implementing.
Congress was slow to involve itself in intelligence accountability issues for phil-
osophical and structural reasons. Philosophically members of Congress endorsed
the view that intelligence was an executive-branch responsibility. They quite con-
sciously sought not to be informed. Senator John Stennis, who chaired the Senate
subcommittee on CIA oversight, observed in 1971 that “you have to make your mind
up that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such, and shut
your eyes some and take what is coming.” DCI William Colby similarly observed
that with regard to congressional oversight “the old tradition was that you don’t
ask” ( Johnson 1985, 7). It was only in the mid-1970s that this sense of trust and defer-
ence began to give way largely as a result of revelations of CIA and intelligence-
community excesses at home and abroad.
Structurally the problem was the multiplicity of committees with conflicting
agendas involved in intelligence oversight. Senator Mike Mansfield had argued for
addressing this failing in 1956 when he introduced a resolution calling for the
creation of a joint congressional committee on central intelligence. It was only with

the creation of the Church and Pike Committees that the political impasse over
creating such committees was broken and a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and a House Permanent Special Committee on Intelligence were created.
Congress today takes a more active interest in holding intelligence accountable
although this has not always translated into effective oversight as philosophical and
structural problems remain. One of the core findings of the 9/11 Commission’s
inquiry was the urgent need to overhaul Congress’s system of intelligence oversight,
a system it described as dysfunctional. Philosophical differences over how to best
realize intelligence accountability continue to exist at various levels. Most funda-
mentally, legislators continue to disagree over whether to pursue a fire-alarm or
police-patrolling approach to oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). In the for-
mer instance, accountability issues arise only after an intelligence surprise, covert-
action failure, or some other misstep has taken place. In the later case a proactive
approach is adopted where the pursuit of accountability is tied to trying to antici-
pate problems or at least catch them in their early stages. When the question turns
more directly to intelligence oversight a wide range of attitudes toward intelligence
affects how legislators carry out their accountability responsibilities. Loch Johnson
has captured this diversity in outlook, classifying the role definitions adopted by
intelligence overseers into four categories: ostriches, cheerleaders, guardians, and
lemon-suckers or skeptics ( Johnson 2008).
Even slower to involve itself in intelligence accountability issues than Congress
has been the judiciary (Manget 1996). Only lately has it become an active player in
the oversight of intelligence. Until the 1970s judges had little to say about intelli-
gence activities and while more active today, they tend to be deferential to the exec-
utive branch in intelligence matters as they are in foreign policy more generally. The
war against terrorism has brought forward a lengthy series of cases involving
accountability questions. One set of issues involves the Bush administration’s
domestic surveillance program. In 2002 Bush by-passed the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court that had been especially created in 1978 to deal with this type of
intelligence gathering and authorized the National Security Agency to undertake a
variety of surveillance activities within the United States. A second point of contro-
versy involves the civil liberties of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they
have been held without trial and interrogated. The Bush administration claimed
that the detainees did not have access to U.S. courts and could be held as long as the
president felt appropriate because they were unlawful enemy combatants captured
on the battlefield and because Guantanamo Bay was not part of the United States,
and that Bush had the authority under the Constitution to deny the Geneva Prisoner
of War Conventions to combatants captured in Afghanistan. Both of these policies
have produced numerous challenges to the legality of the administration’s actions
but they did not produce a prompt and clear-cut verdict that forced the administra-
tion to halt its policies. Instead the litigation continued until Congress passed new
legislation regarding domestic eavesdropping and the Obama administration came
into office and made a decision on the Guantanamo Bay facility.
Positioned at the outermost layer of intelligence accountability is the public-at-

large. There are two different ways that public accountability can operate. In the first,
voters can hold elected officials accountable for the actions of the intelligence com-
munity as part of a chain of accountability. Two conditions must be met for this to
happen. A clear link must exist between the intelligence activity being held in
account, and second, voters must cast their ballot on the basis of this connection.
Neither is likely to be met. We have already spoken to the accountability-clouding
problem of the doctrine of plausible denial. To this can be added the relatively low
salience (and knowledge) of foreign-policy issues in the voter’s calculus compared
to such factors as party identification, incumbency, and service to the constituency.
The second means by which the public-at-large can hold intelligence account-
able is by acting as “the court of public opinion.” R.V. Jones offers just such an
accountability standard, arguing that intelligence officials need to be able to “defend
their decisions before the public” ( Jones 1989, 42). John Chomeau and Anne Rudolph
agree, stating that the major moral principle in constructing covert-action plans
should be that they are “the sort of thing that would be acceptable to the American
people, if its details were revealed” (2006, 124). Viewed this way, the public acts as a
source of political leverage which policymakers can use to either continue with a
line of action or move to terminate.
A weakness inherent in both approaches to accountability oversight is the
absence of a fixed standard. The public supported bans on assassination after reve-
lations before the Church Committee but was far more willing to tolerate if not
endorse assassination after 9/11. A similar change in outlook took place with regard
to warrantless spying on Americans.
About What?
Intelligence has been held accountable both for the products it produces and the
process by which they are created. Product-intelligence accountability focuses on
the end result of intelligence work. It is the mainstay of intelligence accountability
inquiries in large measure because intelligence products lend themselves more fully
to a scoreboard mentality of hits and misses. They are highly visible discreet events.
Warning was given or it was not. Estimates are right or wrong. Covert action worked
or it did not. Citizen rights were respected or violated. Approached in a scoreboard
fashion accountability inquiries tend to adopt an overly deterministic view of events.
As the 9/11 Commission put it, there was a failure to connect the dots. Yet dots
can be connected in many ways and it is only after the fact that the correct way of
connecting the dots is clear. At the time many plausible possibilities may exist, as
documented in Roberta Wohlstetter’s study of the attack on Pearl Harbor (1962).
What is true for analysis is also true for other aspects of intelligence work. Covert-
action plans may have been defective from the outset but the after-the-fact, now-
obvious reasons for failure may not be apparent at the time.
Process accountability in intelligence focuses on the method and manner by
which intelligence products are created. Two problems immediately arise in making
judgments about how to structure process accountability inquiries. The first is how
to establish the boundaries of the intelligence-estimating process. Most pointedly,
does one include the consumer of intelligence? In practical terms this translates
into: does one look for the accountability in intelligence failures solely within the
intelligence agencies themselves or does one include tasking failures by policymakers
and the failure of policymakers to accept and act on the intelligence they receive? A
second problem is how to conceptualize the intelligence process. Is it a sequence of
steps, an intelligence cycle, or is it a messier process in which the core activities of
tasking, collection, analysis, reporting and feedback constantly loop into one
another in a process with no clear-cut beginning or end point? From an account-
ability perspective a very real tension exists between these two characterizations.
Accountability is a much more straightforward issue in the former case, making it
an attractive model to use in looking for problems and holding people and organi-
zations accountable for their actions, yet the second view may be a more accurate
portrayal of how the intelligence estimating process operates and thus the one to
which judgments about behavior ought to be framed.
Process intelligence accountability can and has extended beyond analysis to
apply to covert operations and intelligence-gathering activities. The debate here is
far ranging. Positioned at one end is the view expressed by General Jimmy Doolittle,
who chaired a commission on covert action for President Dwight Eisenhower. He
observed “we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world
domination by whatever means and at whatever costs. There are no rules in such a
game” (Report of the Special Study Group, 1984, 144). Positioned at the other end of
the spectrum are those who would get out of the covert-action and covert-
intelligence-gathering business as personified by Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s
often-quoted 1929 statement that “gentlemen do not read each other’s mail” (Pfaff
2006, 68).
In between these two end points can be found a host of attempts at establishing
best-practices benchmarks. Jones states that intelligence “should be conducted with
minimum trespass against national and individual human rights” ( Jones 2006, 37)
Tony Pfaff asserts that intelligence “must always take care not to act in such a way
that disregards the notion that individual human life and dignity are valuable for
their own sake and that people should be treated as an end themselves and not
merely as means” (Pfaff 2006, 67). The just-war doctrine is cited by many as the
proper a reference point for thinking about standards for covert action and intelli-
gence collection (Hulnick and Mattausch 2006).
Questions of process and product accountability come together in the debate
over the politicalization of intelligence (Betts 2003). Politicalization is taken to mean
the unwarranted intrusion of the political into intelligence. Virtually by definition
politicalization is seen as unnatural and corrupting. This position grows out of the
view that intelligence and politics are two different worlds and that they operate
according to different logics. The logic of intelligence inquiry is one of discovering
truth. The logic of politics is promoting values and agendas. Intelligence arguments
are settled by citing evidence. Political arguments are settled by invoking power and
bargaining. From an accountability perspective, this position places the burden of
explanation on policymakers who have intruded into the world of intelligence. Not
all accept this dichotomy of the intelligence and political worlds. Intelligence is a
corporate product in which knowns and unknowns coexist uneasily with ideologi-
cal and conceptual models of how the world works—or should work. From this
second perspective, a thin line exists between managerial responsibility and manip-
ulation of analysis to suit policy. Here, accountability resides on both sides of the
policymaker–intelligence relationship.
Both sides of the politicalization debate were present in Robert Gates’s stormy
and failed DCI confirmation hearings. Melvin Goodman, former CIA division chief
in Soviet Affairs, accused Gates of politicalizing intelligence analysis of the Soviet
Union and intelligence related to covert action. Harold Ford, who also served in the
CIA as an intelligence officer, seconded that opinion asserting that Gates’s pressure
on intelligence officials went “beyond professional bounds and clearly constitute a
skewing of intelligence.” These views were countered by testimony from another
former intelligence officer, Graham Fuller, who stated “I have never seen Gates
engage in anything that can loosely be called politicalization of intelligence”
(New York Times 1991).
To What End?
All three of the potential accountability outcomes noted at the outset have occurred
within the field of intelligence accountability. One well-known example of account-
ability intended to identify and punish wrongdoers and absolve others of blame was
the Roberts Commission, set up in 1941 by President Franklin Roosevelt to examine
the reasons for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. It. singled out Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short for “dereliction of duty” and found that
Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had “ful-
filled their obligations” (Kitts 2006, 31).
A second narrative stresses that the purpose of accountability is to improve
performance. The stress here is on judgments as part of a dialogue and providing
feedback. This outcome is seen as particularly relevant when best practices are
unclear and outputs difficult to measure. Intelligence would at first glance appear to
be a logical site for the practice of this type of accountability. Standing in its way are
problems of secrecy and compartmentalization that set limits on the spread of les-
sons learned, the resistance to change that comes from deeply entrenched analytical
mind sets, bureaucratic survival instincts, and the high profile nature of periodic
intelligence failures that easily lead to blame games. While perhaps not qualifying as
a dialogue, the Schlesinger Report produced in 1971 for President Nixon is an exam-
ple of an accountability inquiry brought on by longstanding concerns over the size
of the intelligence-community budget and the management and organization of
the intelligence community (along with Nixon’s more immediate distrust of intel-
ligence analytical products) that produced meaningful changes in the operation of
the intelligence community (Warner 2008).
Just as potentially damaging to the learning potential of dialogue and feed-
back are efforts to regularize and institutionalize accountability. Routinization
leads to hollow accountability in which process triumphs over substance (Boin
et al. 2005, 102). An example is found in early CIA efforts to provide regular feed-
back on early intelligence estimates. Sherman Kent observed that as the postmor-
tem process became institutionalized and covered more and more estimates its
impact began to fade. Rather than identifying new problem areas it highlighted
well-known problem areas and information deficiencies for which there were no
good solutions. After a few years the postmortem process had run its course and
faded away (Steury 1994).
Particularly prevalent in intelligence accountability probes has been the goal of
managing expectations and with it have come frequent blame games (Boin et al.
2005; Romzek and Dubnick 1987). The reason for this lies first and foremost with
three of the defining characteristics of most intelligence work that contribute to a
crisis accountability atmosphere and the underlying dynamics of crisis account-
ability. First, intelligence involves high stakes. As stated in the CIA’s Strategic Intent
2007–2011 document, “we are the nation’s first line of defense. We accomplish what
others cannot accomplish and go where others cannot go.” Second, intelligence is
conducted largely in secret, as are most of its routine accountability proceedings. As
a consequence its potential and limitations as a factor in American foreign policy
making are not well understood, producing all-too-frequent heroic and demonic
assessments. Third, while its successes often go unreported, its failures are well
publicized.
Accountability blaming as a strategy has several component parts. A first is to
place the onus for explaining and justifying actions on some individuals and orga-
nizations and not others. Central to the success of this effort is the framing of the
problem. One important framing tool is found in setting the terms of reference
given to an accountability inquiry body. The Roberts Commission was instructed to
“provide bases for sound decisions [regarding] whether any derelictions of duty or
errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contrib-
uted to” the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor (Kitts 2006, 26–27). Its terms of refer-
ence excluded an examination of into the actions of senior civilian officials in
Washington. In empowering the inquiry into intelligence estimates on Iraqi weap-
ons of mass destruction, President George W. Bush placed out of bounds questions
of how intelligence was used by policymakers. The focus was to be strictly on the
collection of information and the construction of estimates.
Another example of framing is provided by the controversy over who was
responsible for destroying CIA tapes of interrogations of detainees at secret prisons.
After hearing the testimony of Jose Rodriguez, the head of the CIA’s clandestine
services, to the House Intelligence Committee, Rep. Peter Hoekstra, the ranking
Republican member, stated that Rodriguez “may not have been following instruc-
tions” when he ordered the tapes destroyed and that the incident raised “the trou-
bling prospect that there’s a thread of unaccountability in the spy culture . . . I believe
that there are parts of the intelligence community that don’t believe they are
accountable to Congress and may not be accountable to their own superiors.” In
rebuttal Rodriguez’s lawyer asserted that his client had acted only after “determin-
ing from agency lawyers that it was not illegal to do so.” His lawyer also maintained
that Rodriguez had met “several times” with DCI Porter Goss and that Goss was
never critical of Rodriquez’s decision. Others familiar with the destruction of the
tapes indicated that White House officials were not as actively involved in the mat-
ter “as they might have been or should have been” (Pincus and Warrick 2008, A3).
A second element of an accountability blaming strategy is to create (or block)
an accountability trail. A central aim of Democratic congressional overseers has
been to establish the identities of those involved in approving waterboarding as an
interrogation technique. Memos uncovered reveal that the Justice Department
informed the CIA in 2002 that its interrogation methods would not be considered
violations of anti-terrorism laws and that the same year a CIA lawyer advised the
Pentagon on interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay. Still the CIA was
not comfortable with simply being told it was legal. A stronger statement of support
was sought and in 2003 and again in 2004 DCI George Tenet obtained memos from
the White House endorsing its interrogation tactics. Blame blocking action was
taken by Attorney General Michael Mukasey in February 2008 when he declared
that since the Justice Department had declared such activities legal in the past it
could not now investigate whether a crime had occurred. The CIA defended its
destruction of the interrogation tapes by asserting that the videotapes were part of
an internal review and not an investigation that arose from allegations of wrongdo-
ing and therefore did not have to be preserved.
A third component part of an accountability blaming strategy is to claim credit
for having solved the problem. Nowhere was the claim of success greater than in the
case of the creating the DNI. In signing the legislation creating a DNI Bush called
the measure “the most dramatic reform of our Nation’s intelligence capabilities
since President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947. Under
this new law, our vast intelligence enterprise will become more unified, coordinated,
and effective” (Hastedt 2007, 443). Another example comes from the Department of
Justice’s response to a released report by its IG undertaken in 2007 that the FBI was
widely circumventing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain the
personal records of Americans. It issued almost twenty thousand national-security
letters as part of this end run from 2003–6. When confronted with this, the Justice
Department stated that the findings should come as no surprise since the bulk of
these took place before the FBI introduced procedural changes to better control and
track requests for national-security letters. In essence, there no longer was a
problem.
6. The Future of Intelligence

Accountability
Accountability in government is easiest to conceptualize when means and ends are
clear; actors are arranged in a hierarchical pattern; and the primary judgmental
decision involves guilt or innocence. Little attention has been given to this scenario
in discussing intelligence accountability because none of these conditions are pres-
ent. Ends and means are complex and ambiguous. A multitude of actors are held
accountable in a variety of ways and in a variety of settings. And while punishment
is one accountability outcome, so too are learning and managing expectations,
especially shifting blame.
None of this makes intelligence accountability impossible. It does make it con-
tingent on circumstances and inherently political. Successful intelligence oversight
requires recognizing its fundamentally political nature rather than denying it and
seeking to apply an inappropriate hierarchically grounded accountability model.
Deleon (1998) characterizes accountability environments such as that in which
intelligence operates as anarchic because uncertainty exists over cause/effect rela-
tions and ambiguous or conflicting preferences exist over possible outcomes. As in
world politics, anarchy is not to be seen as an absence of rules or chaos but as a
condition in which there is not a single force to impose the rules of proper behavior.
The rules may be quite stable or they may be in flux depending upon the power
relations and values of key actors.
So it is with intelligence accountability. Following Mulgan (2003), two inter-
secting dimensions of political activity are particularly important for the success of
intelligence accountability efforts under the conditions highlighted here. First, close
supervision by those holding intelligence accountable is necessary. This requires
continuing to develop professional standards, strengthening IGs, encouraging a
guarding outlook among congressional overseers, making presidents part of the
intelligence process rather than standing apart from it, and educating the public.
Close supervision is not an act of altruism but a necessary act of self-interest under
anarchy. Second, it requires continuing and open debate on the part of the various
overseers on the nature of the intelligence function, the proper methods for pursu-
ing those objectives, and standards for evaluating intelligence products. No final rest-
ing place necessarily will be reached in this debate, but the debate itself is necessary
for intelligence officials to better understand and anticipate how their actions are
likely to be viewed when they are called upon to explain and justify their actions.
Failing these two sets of activities, the intelligence accountability blame game will
show few signs of abating in the future.
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Press.
chapter 44
ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
michael andregg
1. Introduction
The terms “ethics” and “spies” do not combine easily since spies routinely break the
laws of target countries and sometimes engage in many practices that polite society
deems immoral from theft to extortion, blackmail, murder and other crimes. Yet
every government employs spies when it feels that vital interests are at stake.
Large governments today employ tens or even hundreds of thousands of people
in vast intelligence systems where only a few are engaged in classical espionage or
covert operations. Many others collect information through technical means, ana-
lyze information, distribute results to policymakers, or act on it through propa-
ganda, psychological, political or economic operations. But they all function as
parts of organized systems in service to governments. So about a generation ago the
American intelligence community (IC) adopted the term “intelligence professional”
to cover classical spies, the case officers who handle them, and a myriad of other
jobs done by national intelligence systems.
The main distinction between “national security intelligence” and the many
other types of intelligence is its connection to military preservation of the state as
an institution. Therefore I will spend some time here on Just-War Theory and on
hard cases like torture and assassination, which cause the most distress when
discovered.
But those are details that can obscure more fundamental truths from politi-
cians and operators caught in the thicket of intense moral dilemmas under
time-urgent circumstances, often surrounded by danger to themselves and to
the state they serve. Such environments can be so intense and unusual that
operators often find the musings of academics irrelevant to the problems they
face accomplishing missions of life and death and, they pray, getting home alive
themselves.
Therefore, rather than building slowly to conclusions, this essay will begin with
the highest order goals of true intelligence professionals as distinguished from the
thieves and thugs who work for other secret institutions on this earth today. At
every step of this thought journey, a cardinal question should be kept in mind.
What distinguishes agents of malignant, murderous police states from benign intel-
ligence professionals who work for more legitimate governments and the good of
all? Remember, dictators, terrorist organizations, and organized crime cartels also
employ spies, intelligence analysts, and operators. Many employ assassins. How is
our theoretically moral intelligence professional to navigate the severe dilemmas he
or she will certainly face as s/he strives to accomplish missions with life-or-death
consequences for large numbers of people?
And finally, why? Why care at all about ethics in the land of deception, betrayal,
and occasional death, where stakes seem so high that all rules seem sometimes dis-
posable? Because in the long run the nation is better served by understanding how
ethics apply even to these extreme environments. Because missions, agencies, and
countries benefit when long-term and unintended consequences are considered.
And because operators and analysts as human beings with families are much better
off personally if the long-term, global, and personal consequences of their dilem-
mas are thoroughly understood.
2. Wisdom and the Ethos of

Professionals in Intelligence
What is the essential difference between an intelligence professional who works for
a civilized government, and a person with the same title who monitors political dis-
sidents, harasses many, tortures some, and kills a few for his or her dictator? It is not
just who they work for. The shortest answer is “wisdom” for which ethics is an
essential ingredient.
How does wisdom differ from intelligence and the lesser categories of informa-
tion intelligence professionals deal with? If the answer to that were simple, problems
on earth would be rare. Three dimensions stand out. First, even fully assessed, all-
sourced, finished “intelligence” must be combined with values for wisdom to emerge
ethics and professional intelligence 737
(Andregg 2003) and not just random values. Second, wisdom looks at longer term,
wider scale consequences of acts than mere intelligence. Third, it understands human
nature and organizational evil. Evil groups can take the honest efforts of good, hard-
working people and focus them on evil goals (Adams 1998). Compartmented intelli-
gence organizations are especially adept at that. Over 2,500 years ago Sun Tzu wrote:
“Knowledge leads to victory and spies lead to knowledge. The goal is not merely
advance warning, but understanding how something set in motion will turn out” (Sun
Tzu 1963, ch. 13). Without wisdom about human nature and the dynamics of organiza-
tions, understanding how things will turn out is quite impossible. Without ethics
things will often turn out very badly, especially in the domains where spies work.
In the American IC and in many others, analysts and operators are taught to
stay out of making policy, which is the province of elected politicians and their rep-
resentatives. Therefore urging “wisdom” (whatever that is) or “ethics” as goals for IC
employees is an unusual concept. You can read one million words in texts on trade-
craft or doctrine and not encounter either of those terms.1 Yet we observe a world
where agents of a Nazi Gestapo should be distinguished from agents of more civi-
lized governments. One leads to decay and destruction of the state while the other
can safeguard citizens and cultivate a better future for us all. We also observe a
world where many police state governments have recently transformed. Each of
them had intelligence services before and after, but each had to think quite deeply
about what makes for a healthy intelligence service instead of the malignant kind
that exist to serve evil powers and corrupt leaders.
Recurring scandals with torture and other extreme measures have caused the
large intelligence services in the west to encourage a new emphasis on professional-
ism. The experience of physicians and attorneys who professionalized their trades
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries suggests that this process requires
codes of professional ethics, and some loyalty to the profession itself—not just to its
clients. Before codes of “ethics” must come some very deep thinking among practi-
tioners about an “ethos” which is more about who they are at core than what they
do, and what their professional identity should be (Pierce 2007, 7–10). This is nei-
ther easy nor quick, and cannot be imposed from above but must be grown organi-
cally among practitioners themselves. Marrin and Clemente concur (2006, 642–65),
focusing especially on the medical model. Of course politicians, administrators,
laws, rules, and regulations have their roles. But when agents in the field face life-
and-death dilemmas what really matters is what is in their own hearts.
Having gone through that process as best I could, I say to the collectors, ana-
lysts, and operators of this earth that even though it is often forbidden by your
1
One of the funnier moments in my journey to this conclusion was when I asked a group of
about forty intelligence professionals who was responsible for wisdom in their products. There was
a rare and immediate consensus that this was NOT them. Some comedian in the back offered that
this was the job of politicians, which was met with much laughter followed by a sucking sound as
many in the room remembered what a disaster that could be.
governments, you should try to sneak a little wisdom past their armor-plated filters.
Consider this a tiny psychological operation for the good of all, including you.
What are the universal missions of every true intelligence professional? They are,
in strict priority order:
1. Safeguard survival of the human species and of civilization versus

barbarism.
2. Help your government or client to clearly understand what is truly going
on.
3. Provide early and accurate warning of dangers (opportunities are
optional) and
4. Suggest solutions to such problems regardless of personal consequences.
“Regardless of personal consequences” is a recurring theme because govern-

ments and politicians often do NOT want to hear the truth much less wisdom. In
fact, estimating how much truth the boss can stand to hear is one of the most deli-
cate assessments many professionals make. This is a classic dilemma of accuracy
versus “relevance” (meaning, if leaders won’t listen to you it does not matter how
right you are). “Speaking truth to power without fear or favor” is often extolled as a
prime virtue for good analysts. The shattered careers of intelligence professionals
who dared this bear witness to limits on such idealistic enthusiasm. In police states
reckless truth tellers may die (Wright 2008; Everett 1989).
There are hundreds of thousands of other missions that intelligence profession-
als are assigned by their institutions. But true professionals are loyal not just to their
institutions no matter how hard institutions try to ensure this. Safeguard humanity;
protect innocents; warn your employers of dangers and suggest solutions based on
realistic assessments of the way things really are. Murderers for the Mafia are loyal
to their mob alone, as suicide bombers are to their terrorist group. Intelligence pro-
fessionals must be loyal to their profession as well as to some higher order goals such
as I outline above, only then to their employers.
3. The Varieties of Spies Face

Diverse Dilemmas
There are many varieties of intelligence professional, and those who write ethics
codes for them quickly realize that some face dilemmas quite different from others.
Any text general enough to cover them all becomes useless pablum, and legalistic
attempts to write down exactly what each should do in every circumstance produce
huge books of rules that are often ignored when crises come (if not every day). So
I spend a moment here on how values differ among major types of intelligence
professional (Andregg 2007b, 52–63).
Collectors’ primary value is protecting sources, methods, and their own

anonymity. Accomplishing missions is always a value, but I focus here on
differences.
Operators are most concerned with operational security (secrecy of everything
from everyone except their team) to protect their missions, people they employ, and
themselves.
Analysts’ main values are truth, objectivity, accuracy, and relevance (which
includes timeliness and usefulness of information as well as access to someone’s
ear or eye). The most common corruption of those goals is “politicization”
of their products from pressure to skew results to please some politician or
policymaker.
Managers must guard their budgets and their agency’s image in the press. They
are thus classical bureaucrats who must also deal with some rather unusual person-
nel issues.
Policymakers must retain their power against domestic competition (often
fierce), which means that values sacred to others (like truth, prudence, national
ideals, and so forth) are often sacrificed for political expediency.
Some dilemmas that intelligence professionals encounter illustrate their range
and difficulty. So I paraphrase six cases below, some borrowed from others (Goldman
2006, 394–407).
1. A very attractive, married and religious female case officer has

befriended a target (a.k.a. person) whom her agency wants to recruit as
a high-value source. He has made it clear that he wants to take their
budding romance to “another level” and is known to reveal a lot in
pillow talk. The stakes are very high and pressure for “results”
(actionable intelligence) is intense. What should she do, and more
pointedly, what would you truly do in this dilemma? The distinction
between “shoulds and woulds” is important.
2. You are commander of a Special Forces reconnaissance team at war. Your
boss is a fanatic who takes unnecessary risks with others’ lives. He orders
you to send your team deep into enemy territory to get closely guarded
information on what would likely be a suicide mission for nothing very
important. Do you obey his order and send your men to almost certain
death? Or do you go in with them just far enough to camp out and
fabricate a plausible report to save them? Does it make any difference
whether you are required to lead the team yourself, or can assign your
least-valued junior officer to that task?
3. You have a super source who has often risked his life to provide great
information about a ruthless terrorist organization. He reveals the place
and time of a leadership meeting where you could kill them all with
precision guided munitions. The problem is, you would have to kill him
too. What to do? Compound this dilemma by making him a her, say a
cook, or by assuming the meeting will be held in a school full of innocent
children. Compound it again by assuming that the purpose of the meeting

is to assemble a weapon of mass destruction that would then be sent to
operators in one of your major cities. What to do?
4. You are a manager in a poorly run intelligence organization where you
encounter waste, fraud, and abuse daily. Your superiors all drive fancy
cars and live in more expensive homes than their salaries would support.
The secrecy rules and oaths that protect essential national knowledge
protect the abusers of national trust just as well. Your inspector general’s
office is a graveyard for embarrassing truths, the walls decorated with
remains of whistleblowers. You have discovered that a major defense
program is a boondoggle with zero chance of success, but graft from that
is one reason for all those fancy cars and homes. The press is eager for
scandals. What can you do? And what should you do? Does it matter if
your government is a ruthless dictatorship, or a nominal democracy
striving for higher ideals?
5. You are a technical collector and in the course of perfectly appropriate
surveillance you acquire insider stock information that could make you a
fortune if exploited, which you could do without detection. Your mother
needs an expensive operation and your children are in college. Before you
decide what you would really do, consider this variant. Now you have
discovered a plot to murder many innocents, but to reveal that to law
enforcement might compromise your method of collection. Your
superiors firmly order you to stick to your original mission, to protect
your sources and methods and to forget the many innocents who are
about to die. What should you do, and what would you do?
6. You are a professional intelligence officer at any level and observe at a
secret briefing that your sovereign has gone completely nuts. He intends
to drive the country over a cliff fulfilling his fantasies. He is surrounded
by sycophants, but you take your oaths seriously and you have sworn both
to preserve the secrets of your institution no matter what and to “preserve,
protect, and defend the nation against all enemies foreign or domestic.”
[Dealing with commanders gone mad or grossly immoral is a more
common problem for real intelligence professionals than many
appreciate]. What should and would you do?
One can go on with such scenarios, but I emphasize metaquestions now. No
matter what scenario, deeper questions are how one decides what to do, and who
decides. Should you obey the law or a book of rules for secret groups and opera-
tions? Obey commanders? Consider consequences carefully so you can choose the
least evil among your unattractive options? Can you consult your personal con-
science or some church, synagogue, or mosque? And what role should consequences
for you and your loved ones play, since the stakes are so high for others? This is
where the musings of philosophers and theologians are relevant. So we consider
next the “Just-War Theory” and its connections to other professions.
4. Just-War Theory and Connections

to Military and Church Ethics
“Just-War Theory” (henceforth rendered JWT) is the most commonly cited western
framework for thinking about military ethics. It has two parts: jus ad bellum (is the
war just?) and jus in bello (how may war be conducted justly?). It was developed in
the early fifth century CE, and is attributed to St. Augustine of Hippo, but has been
embellished by many others. This worthwhile endeavor should be tempered by rec-
ognition of the scandals of churches, because they have put a great deal of thought
and effort into how to cultivate professional identities with strong moral cores.
Since they cannot achieve perfection, and sometimes dive right into the gutters
where politicians and spies live, you can be certain that perfection will not be
achieved among intelligence professionals who must face life-and-death extremes
in their daily and unusual work.
National security intelligence has been joined at the hip to military affairs from
birth. So before discussing the principles of JWT that endure throughout time and
diverse circumstances (like discrimination between combatants and innocents, and
proportionality of force used to defeat evils) we benefit from looking at some even
more abstract roots.
Western philosophers divide theories of ethics into three categories. Deonto-
logical theories focus on rules and search for the best rules for any circumstance
which should then be followed strictly. Consequentialist (or utilitarian) theories
focus on consequences, and so lend themselves to “ends justify means” thinking.
Kant is often cited as a father of deontology and John Stuart Mill of utilitarianism.
Of course expediency, utility, rules, and rules that may be broken in extreme cir-
cumstances were principles of politics and war long before western philosophers.
Finally, there is virtue theory, which is harder to define and for which there is less
consensus. Virtue theory is attributed to Aristotle, and it resonates well with con-
cepts like “Duty, Honor, Country” and similar codes for military heroes.
At the most abstract level, any serious decision involves three things: an actor,
an act, and consequences of the act. Virtue theory concentrates on the actor, deon-
tological theories concentrate on the morality or lack thereof of acts, and conse-
quentialist theories focus on what happens after. The issue of whether ends justify
means used, or not, is common here. Therefore I remind all that the means chosen
generally determine the actual ends achieved. Much writing about ethics reflects
historical experience with unintended consequences. And evil methods often have
quite profound unintended consequences.
In professional intelligence organizations today consequentialism predomi-
nates by far although there are always bureaucratic forces that strive to make every-
thing rule-based. Lip service is paid to ephemeral virtues and values, but heroes
who exemplify those virtues are often crucified for doing what is right instead of
what they are told to do. In fact, one of the most recurring dilemmas reported by
veterans is how often their bureaucracy becomes an enemy of virtue or at least of

them. Therefore an item in the “Research Agenda” should be how to better protect
whistleblowers (a.k.a. leakers) who dare to inform their country of criminal or
incompetent behavior in organizations designed to keep secrets tightly.
Now, a few details on JWT itself. Some authors cite as many as eleven prime
principles to be considered, but most focus on seven summarized as:
1. Just Cause, declared by a

2. Proper (legitimate) Authority, with a
3. Right Intention, and a
4. Reasonable Chance of Success, as a
5. Last Resort after all better solutions have been tried. In just war, one must
be
6. Proportional (i.e., force used to defeat an evil must be proportional to
threat).
7. Finally your war and your conduct of war must Discriminate between
combatants and the many innocents who are in the area of operations.
The primary virtue of JWT is that it provides a systematic way to think about
these issues. The primary weakness of JWT is that it is seldom used in actual prac-
tice (Yoder 1991, 296). And no matter how virtuous your leaders or civilized your
army, you may be attacked by barbarians who could not care less about such con-
cepts. So real armies and prudent politicians must be ready to deal with such con-
tingencies. That is why when crises come, expediency in the interests of survival
tends to trump the musings of philosophers.
This potent reservation noted, Col. Virendra Varma, retired from thirty years of
military intelligence for the Army of India (Varma 2007, 21) writes: “It is a fact that
‘Laws of War’ are often violated or ignored, but humankind is better with them than
without.” A similar perspective should be applied to all laws, rules and writings
about ethics. Of course people and institutions will fail—this is guaranteed, but it is
not a reason to abandon the quest for standards. Without some law and some ethics
we all may become barbarians. And the essential strategic struggle of the modern
era is between civilization and barbarism.
5. Worst Case Scenarios versus

Real Situations
National security intelligence is dominated by “worst case scenarios” which are one
part quite appropriate and one part highly misleading. Since the primary mission of
IC’s is protecting the state from military disaster and since military history is filled
with cases of surprise attack including sometimes novel weapons, it is utterly appro-
priate for military systems to consider the worst possible contingencies and to rec-
ognize that enemies are doing everything they can to keep their own capabilities
and intentions secret.
On the other hand, this can easily lead to a kind of professional paranoia well
known to thoughtful professionals. An example is fear of a terrorist armed with a
“suitcase nuclear bomb.” Many dollars have been spent in America since September
11, 2001, to guard against such an attack. Yet no less an expert on terrorism than
Brian Michael Jenkins of RAND observed that this is probably an utter fantasy given
real terrorist capabilities and physical limitations that apply even to the most
advanced nuclear weapons states ( Jenkins 2008). Others are more concerned, like
Bruce Hoffman, who objects to “excessive” due process in the prosecution of alleged
terrorists (Hoffman 2008, 3–8).
Carefully reasoned perspective does not yield huge appropriations from
Congress, while Hollywood scare scenarios do. Derivative consequences can include
torture as public policy, rationalized as necessary to find the elusive terrorist with
the hypothetical suitcase nuke, and extraordinary renditions where suspected ter-
rorists have been kidnapped from streets in Italy (the case of Hassan Mustafa Osama
Nasr) or arrested at borders (the cases of German citizen Khaled el-Masri and
Canadian citizen Maher Arar) then sent to secret prisons or to allies known to tor-
ture prisoners in hopes that actionable intelligence may be obtained. There can be
serious adverse consequences of the lack of ethical boundaries on acts like these
done (no matter how sincerely) in the name of national security.
When suspects are completely innocent as in the last two cases, liaison relation-
ships with long-time allies like Germany and Canada can be grievously damaged.
And even when the abducted was a genuine rabble rouser (Nasr, an Islamic mullah
also known as Abu Omar), Italy’s government ultimately felt obliged to prosecute
twenty-six CIA personnel involved in his abduction (along with five of their own
security personnel) for violating laws of Italy. Criticizing American foreign policy is
not a crime in Italy, but kidnapping certainly is.
Partly because of such real cases of extraordinary measures gone awry, the top-
ics of torture and assassination, and when, if ever, they are justified for national
security purposes have dominated discussion of intelligence ethics in the English-
language press. So it is to these hard cases I turn now.
6. Torture and Assassination

Fears like these have led to much literature in America and elsewhere on how we
might deal with “ticking-time-bomb” scenarios and villains so dangerous that killing
them without due process, or torturing them when caught, seems to many the right
thing to do. One leader of the “all-gloves-off ” school in America is Alan Dershowitz,
a Harvard Law professor who wrote in the San Francisco Chronicle and Los Angeles
Times that we should establish torture as US policy under extreme circumstances,

institute training in torture for interrogators and hire special judges to adjudicate
cases arising therefrom in special laws for that purpose (Dershowitz 2002, A19; 2004,
M5). He (and allies like Fritz Allhoff 2003, 105–118) are opposed by others who point
out the many negative consequences of violating international treaties we have signed
that expressly forbid torture under any circumstances, a qualification found almost
nowhere else in international law (Miles 2006).
Israel has also considered these issues quite deeply and created very specific
codes on how much “physical pressure” can be legally applied to suspects under a
wide range of circumstances. In fact, Israel has gone beyond that to consider when
assassination may be legal, or in their gentler language, “targeted killings.” Amos
Guiora has written extensively about these extreme challenges from his perspective
as a legal officer for the Israeli Defense Forces (seventeen years, during three of
which he was the principal legal officer required to sign off on targeted killings in
Gaza; Guiora 2007). When I asked him which were the most severe moral dilemmas
he faced during his time with the IDF it was this issue of authorizing targeted kill-
ings with their high potential for deaths to nearby innocents.
One can spend a lifetime reading such things, pros and cons and odd circum-
stances extending from real cases of ticking time bombs hidden in real hotels or
children buried in places they will die if left unrescued, to unreal but very scary
scenarios of suitcase nukes being smuggled into capitol cities. So rather than review
those further I choose to tell the reader my conclusions because they are far simpler
and therefore easier to understand and act upon should you agree. It should be
obvious that not all do.
First, in the most extreme cases, if my wife, daughter, and community were in
lethal danger from barbarians, I would do anything to save them including torture
or killing without due process. However, I would not recommend my country adopt
these as policies, nor violate laws and international treaties, nor train bureaucracies
to adjudicate that. Rather, I would do whatever seemed the necessary evil acts under
extraordinary circumstances, then surrender to the mercy of a court and the opin-
ions of twelve duly-chosen peers to judge whether I had decided properly. Extreme
cases make terrible law, and rationalizing extreme measures to face hypothetical
challenges is a road to the police states I abhor.
Second, I urge all to learn the limits on torture as a means for acquiring action-
able information under extraordinary circumstances. The U.S. Army has consider-
able experience with interrogation under difficult, time-urgent circumstances where
lives of comrades and country are at real risk. Having reflected on that very seri-
ously, U.S. Army field manuals for interrogation (FM 34–52, 1992; FM 2–22.3, 2006)
point out that torture yields false information much more commonly than true
information, and ultimately squanders precious intelligence resources chasing the
false leads of people who will say anything they think you want to hear. Determined
enemies are also taught to lie when they break, just like our soldiers are. Furthermore,
and this is not a secondary point, the moment we accept torture as official policy we
have blessed the same treatment of our soldiers caught by our enemies. Finally,
again not secondary, the fundamental struggle between civilization and barbarism
cannot be won by out-barbaring the barbarians.
That is the ultimate illusion. So I repeat an earlier claim. In the final analysis,
the means chosen to do a thing usually determine the real consequences achieved.
Unintended consequences are especially common in covert actions. Inflicted by a
hubris encouraged by secrecy and challenged by severe events, we often think we
can predict how things will turn out. But so often we are wrong. It is incumbent on
democracies to recognize that we can win despite fighting with “one hand tied
behind our back.” Restraint on governments’ use of force animated America’s
Constitution with its Bill of Rights, one of which specifically excludes “cruel and
unusual punishments.” Those words were written by men who had seen the decay
phase of unrestrained rule by dictators. They are our greatest strength.
So I agree with Benjamin Franklin who wrote: “Those who give up essential
liberties for a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” And I extend
that by asserting that those who resort to evil methods will usually harvest evil
consequences.
Finally, I urge intelligence professionals anywhere to recognize how truly rare
those extreme, worst-case scenarios are. The vast majority of you will never see a
case so severe. But if you do, I recommend the virtue-based method of choosing
behavior under extreme circumstances, rather than the rule-based or strictly utili-
tarian models.
7. Review of Literature
The best review of English-language literature on these issues I have seen is an essay
by Hans Born and Aidan Wills from the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control
of Armed Forces presented at Pisa, Spain, in September of 2007. Jan Goldman’s
2006 work is also a superb collection of twenty-three essays written by others from
1978 to 2003. Each provides entrée to a literature that is quite thin compared to
operational issues. Mark Lowenthal’s much-used text has a chapter on ethical issues
(Lowenthal 2006, 255–273). Finally, there are memoirs by almost all retired Directors
of Central Intelligence, most of which express some moral thought at their level,
but only one of which I recommend here, Honorable Men by Willam Colby (1978).
Some recent books by former CIA case officers are also worthwhile (Olson 2006;
Mahle 2005; and Daugherty 2004). For scathing critique try Legacy of Ashes by Tim
Weiner (2007) of the New York Times.
Latin America is often neglected in works of this kind, so I asked the best expert
I know on Latin American intelligence agencies, Dr. Russell Swenson, Director of
the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research at our National Defense Intelligence
College (2009). His reply was so interesting and relevant on so many levels, I include
it without editing.
It may seem a curious thing, but there is no literature I am aware of that expressly
deals with intelligence ethics in Latin America in the abridged sense in which
commentators typically see it. At the same time, in a larger sense, nearly all
intelligence literature on the region, in Spanish, Portuguese and English,
addresses the perverse human rights effects of aligning military, police and
civilian leadership for domestic control, often through secretive (intelligence)
means.
Audiences large and small with whom I have interacted in Latin America
quickly understand that intelligence ethics describes the large realm of choice-
making that lies beyond the reach of laws, or law enforcement. But even though
there is that understanding, the theme in intelligence schools has been focused
on how to carry out operations more efficiently and what is legal and illegal
rather than on what might be right and wrong in the society’s context. A rare
exception is the recent inception of case-method teaching in Brazilian national
police circles, which will probably lead to intelligence ethics training and
debate.
There seems to be no good reason to single out the phenomenon as a
separate topic within intelligence studies and in the literature on this region, nor
for that matter in work on other marginally Western or non-Western societies
where intelligence is oriented almost exclusively toward domestic control, and
where the concept of intelligence ethics remains operationally devoid of meaning,
in part, and in good catch-22 fashion, because of the lack of discussion among
practitioners or others.
Therein lies a dilemma which all true professionals face. In theory, national
security intelligence exists to protect the state against external enemies. But in prac-
tice it is often deployed against domestic critics. Thus do noble protectors of the
state turn into oppressors of the poor or powerless. This phenomenon is by no
means confined to Latin America.
Consider the mukhabarat of Islamic countries. They have external enemies,
but many are better known for torturing local dissidents than for coups against
foreign powers. When the United States sought venues to send potential terrorists
for “enhanced interrogation” they were most often Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and Syria. So I asked my best friends of Islamic literature if they could find any-
thing about intelligence ethics there. They replied with quotes from the Qu’ran on
treatment of prisoners, taking of hostages, and when it is OK to wage war against
fellow Muslims, but no documents were found pertaining to ethics for modern
intelligence agencies in Islamic lands. Finally we found a quote from the Qu’ran
on point: “Oh you who believe! Avoid many suspicions indeed some suspicions
are sins. And spy not, nor backbite one another” (Surah Al-Hujurât verse 12,
Bughale 2008).
Seeking help from Asia I asked several Japanese and Chinese colleagues. I got
back words about the exemplary role of the ancient ninja, and Sun Tzu’s chapter
on employment of spies in the “Art of War.” But that focuses on how best to use
these most valuable of assets with little on how to use them ethically. In fact,
extreme liberality is recommended when employing spies, since one well-placed
spy can be as useful as an army corps. The assumption that home teams are the
good people who may use any means necessary to defeat their evil enemies seems
nearly universal. I note that the ninja controlled themselves through codes of per-
sonal honor that included loyalty to their sovereign or employer, but went beyond
that. This reinforces my interest in virtue ethics. Others cite “Bushido Ethics” as
the font of all warrior ethics in Japan (Ota 2008). Japan’s University of Military
Affairs suggested Yoshito Kita’s essay on treatment of POWs and international law
(Kita 2004).
I asked my best contact in Russia for help. He knew of no literature on ethics for
the KGB or its successors, not surprising, but he thought it a novel idea worth con-
sidering further. Cristiana Matei has written a great review of the reform of
Romania’s intelligence agencies, focusing on oversight to protect civil liberties in
this newly westernized country (Matei 2007, 629–60). The essential role of a critical
and vigilant media stands above her other observations. Yates (2008) has compiled
ethics codes of Australian security groups.
In Israel I found more on the ethics and dilemmas of spying. A sampler that
spans the range from gushing apologia for spies to damning critique is Raviv and
Melman’s Every Spy a Prince, Gordon Thomas’s Guideon’s Spies, and Victor
Ostrovski’s By Way of Deception. Ostrovski is considered a traitor by defenders of
the Mossad because he reveals things so dark they strain credibility. But even defend-
ers know the Mossad is rough, ruthless toward enemies, and sometimes cruel even
to its own people, a style accepted because of the enemies of this nation. Another
critic, a much more experienced former Mossad operator than Ostrovski, was Ari
Ben-Menashe who wrote Profits of War (1992) regarding the Israeli role as arms
broker during the Iran-Contra scandal. Finally, you find both dark and light in
Ephraim Kahana’s “Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence” (2006) and in a
lucid and concise review of core concepts by Shlomo Shpiro (2007, 3–6).
Everywhere is the essential dilemma that no matter what the rules are, when
nations feel their survival is at stake even countries founded on respect for rule of
law find ways to rationalize breaking rules, or change the rules to meet perceived
need. For a vivid example from the Israeli experience, after terrorists killed eleven
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games of 1972, Mossad resolved to assassinate
everyone directly involved. A killer team was formed whose modern successors are
the “kidon” who do sanctioned assassinations to this day. Over several years they
located and killed most of the men with Olympic blood on their hands. But they
also murdered a completely innocent man in Lillehammer, Norway (Ahmed
Bouchiki). This was one of those “similar name, wrong guy” mistakes. That is an
ever-present risk with extreme measures, along with injuring innocents nearby, so
I urge readers who will become intelligence professionals to ask themselves what
has become of the murderers in this case. Attorneys can help you with the law, and
bureaucracies can help in their ways. But none of those things can do much for a
man who has murdered innocents and has a conscience. And if you have no con-
science of your own, what will protect you from the tidal forces of governments that
pull even decent people toward serving police states rather than the higher ideals of
what could be a noble profession?2
8. Questions for the

Future / Research Agenda
A. How can we cultivate an enlightened professional identity for spies and for the
many other employees of official intelligence agencies?
Building a positive professional identity should be a primary mission of schools
for intelligence professionals. This is not mere tradecraft. They should study how
professional identities are cultivated in other fields, like medicine, law, journalism,
and clergy, including their failures. In each case one can find excellent examples,
noble codes and ideals, and corrupted cases where “ethics” are rationalized as “what
works for me” or “what is good for our institution.” The special dimension for
intelligence professionals is the lack of accountability. Power tends to corrupt even
the most open system; secret power systems and the people in them are especially
vulnerable to this. Hubris corrupts all professions.
B. How can oversight by polite society be improved without sacrificing protec-
tion of genuinely essential national secrets? And a corollary:
C. How can we better protect whistleblowers who are essential to healthy
democracies?
Oversight of secret power systems is notoriously weak and governmental sys-
tems are no exception to that rule. The United States provides many vivid examples
of Congress trying to control our secret services only to be bamboozled by people
whose jobs include lying for a living. For example, the Congress enacted specific
laws (called the Boland Amendments) forbidding clandestine operations to target
Nicaragua in the early 1980s only to find that a secret army was created, funded, and
deployed to wage war against Nicaragua by clever deceptions and rationalizations.
That ultimately created the scandal called “Iran-Contra” (Johnson [1989] 1991).
A Congressman I knew well then with inside knowledge told me that the oversight
committees were created to “overlook, rather than to oversee.”
One of many dilemmas overseers face is what to do about whistleblowers
who leak secrets to them, or to the media, trying to reveal wrongdoing in the secret
2
Regarding the morality of that affair, Kenneth Waltzer who is a good friend of Israel and
has a conscience that recognizes why morality matters, wrote in a review of Spielberg’s film
(Munich) about the murder of the Olympic athletes and revenge against their killers: “There was
indeed rough justice in these hits and, contrary to the filmmakers, Mossad agents ordered to carry
them out, sometimes constrained by prime ministers, sometimes not, never had second thoughts
or ethical questions about most actions” (Walzer 2006, 171). He interviewed the original kidon
team, so he had good reasons for these conclusions.
services. On the one hand, what they do is essential to a healthy democracy, but on
the other hand they have violated oaths to keep their agency secrets. Thus they can
be thrown in jail for being heroes. Punishment of whistleblowers tends to be
extreme, ranging from loss of job to prosecution in democracies, and to loss of life
in more ruthless political systems. Loss of security clearance means loss of career
in intelligence systems. Any enlightened intelligence system should recognize the
positive value of letting insiders point out waste, fraud, abuse, or mere errors
caused by groupthink. Finding practical ways to protect out-of-box thinkers in
secret power systems is more difficult than in normal bureaucracies, and it is not
easy anywhere.
D. How can we better protect operators and analysts from their own security
systems?
One of the most common observations of veteran intelligence professionals
I have spoken with is how quickly their own system can mistreat them, especially if
they object to anything wrong with the system. This is not identical to whistle-
blower dilemmas because it can happen to anyone. Bureaucratic retaliation against
critics occurs everywhere, but is especially fierce in systems that think their mission
is about life and death, and which use threats as a part of their normal operating
tool kit. Far-sighted ICs should put serious attention on how to treat their employ-
ees better than production workers on factory lines.
E. How can intelligence systems better engage citizens in benign intelligence col-
lection for the good of all, without degeneration into police state forms of state
surveillance of everything and everyone? And closely related:
F. How can the revolution in information technology be better applied to intelli-
gence affairs to preserve essential liberties as well as the health of the state?
Allen Dulles among others recognized that at least 80 percent of what people
need to know for good advice to governments is not secret, but openly available in
the publications of polite societies. Of course some of the most important intelli-
gence targets are the dangerous secrets of paranoid, militant groups. But most of
what we need to know is right out there in open sources. So the gold standard of
advice to presidents, prime ministers, and kings has always been some blend
of open-source and secret information. The revolution in information technologies
is now changing the balance of secret versus open sources.
Today engaged citizens can get satellite images of places on earth that only the
most elite could see a generation ago. A private civilian investigator can buy a dos-
sier on most people with richer content than the FBI could get a generation ago.
And a pro at the NSA of the United States or in the Mossad of Israel can track com-
munications worldwide and get customized profiles on just about anyone in the
developed world with the push of a button (except of course for the terrorists they
seek most fervently) aided by software that merges thousands of databases in sec-
onds. The dilemma they face is that the analyst or operator is still stuck with the
same twenty-four hours per day, two eyes, and one brain that they had all along.
And the avalanche of information available to anyone with the right access can bury
the important bits they really need to know in mountains of extraneous data.
Furthermore, electronically indexed data is seldom as current as what lies in

heads whose written words may be published in a few years, if they are ever pub-
lished in English at all. Vast amounts of data exist in non-European languages, in
non-digitized places, and in heads that are discreet about the most valuable things
to know (Steele 2001).
So collaboration is the name of the new game, as it has been in science for
decades. But scientists are accustomed to sharing data, and open review. The obses-
sion with secrecy that typifies intelligence communities has been overrun by the
daily need to bring many brains to common problems. Therefore, far-sighted intel-
ligence communities should put serious effort into studying how academics and the
media have managed to collaborate better despite their competitive forces, to create
more accurate answers more quickly than could be done before.3 The trick for ICs
is getting that value added without losing the relatively few secrets (like military
plans or how to build nuclear or biological weapons) that truly should be kept from
as many people as possible (Politi 2003, 34–38).
9. Conclusions
Let us be realistic for a moment. No government is likely to hire you to be an intel-
ligence professional (or spy) based on your resume as an ethical leader. In fact, while
they are not moral morons and always claim to hire only people of the highest
integrity, intelligence administrators are actually a bit afraid of real “ethics” and
discussion thereof (see “Ethics Phobia” by Jan Goldman 2007, 16–17). Michael
Herman said it best when he declared that the profession of intelligence, like gov-
ernment itself, is probably not for those with exceptionally delicate consciences.
Still, we need spies with moral compasses like never before.
So what is one to do when faced with dilemmas that most people will never see,
and seldom even dream of outside of Hollywood movies? These are my conclusions.
First, do no harm wherever possible, and hold innocents sacred. It is our mis-
sion in life to protect innocents from the ruthless and the strong anyway; do not let
the governments that employ you forget why they were created in the first place.
Second, if that fails or is inadequate to some task of the ticking-time-bomb
variety, chose the lesser of evils among your alternatives. Of course there are some
circumstances where a vast evil has surrounded itself with innocents for protection
3
One of my more interesting assignments was addressing that issue for a group of
intelligence professionals who recognized that something was wrong when the media and
academics get better answers faster than the professionals who advise Presidents. The problem is
that such senior people usually retire soon after, and the urge to reform is lost before the
bureaucracy responds. The second DNI (Mike McConnell) recognized this, and ordered more
collaboration and some study of how to collaborate without revealing the family jewels. Whether
that urge will endure depends again on a new administration and the third DNI, Dennis Blair.
against you, and there are severe times in history when this kind of encapsulation
must be lanced. But we should minimize such times, and recognize that every inno-
cent sacrificed on the way to some allegedly greater good represents a real and tragic
failure on our parts.
Finally, you must blend the rule-based, consequential and virtue ethics into an
integrated whole. You must be able to work with different languages, worldviews,
and people so this is not a novel problem; it is just demanding. Bureaucracies will
try to make you obey rules at all times; do not let them erase the ancient virtues
from your soul. They will try, but when you are in the field facing life and death for
real, ancient virtues and inner morality are the only anchors you can truly count on.
The bureaucrats and attorneys will be far away in air conditioned rooms, thinking
about how they might do what only you can.
That said, do not forget why rules were created. Ninety-nine percent of the time
it is better to obey them because they were written by people elected or authorized
to write rules based on experience far beyond any single mind. The Nobel Laureate
Dalai Lama reconciled this seeming contradiction thus: “You should understand
rules well enough to recognize the rare times they should be broken.”
But enough talk and philosophy; the innocents of the earth need practical pro-
tection, and even civilization itself is under siege today by the barbarians of our
time.
Be professionals and protect them.
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part x
INTELLIGENCE IN
OTHER LANDS
chapter 45
INTELLIGENCE IN THE
DEVELOPING
DEMOCRACIES: THE QUEST
FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
EFFECTIVENESS
thomas c. bruneau
florina cristiana (cris) matei
1. Introduction
In their path to consolidation, developing democracies strive to ensure the demo-
cratic transfer of political power, gain legitimacy with elites and civil society, reform
and restructure their legal systems and economy, and, maybe most importantly,
develop democratic civil-military relations (CMR)—that is establishing new secu-
rity institutions (to include intelligence agencies) that are under democratic civilian
control, and are effective and efficient (Bruneau and Boraz 2007, 1–24).1 Of these
many tasks, the democratization of intelligence agencies is by far the most challeng-
ing, as effectiveness and efficiency call for secrecy, while democratic control involves
transparency, openness, and accountability. Some scholars say that “democracy and
secrecy are incompatible” even in long-established democracies (Holt 1995, 1). One
1
Bruneau and Boraz study intelligence as a subset of CMR, conceptualized as a trinity—
democratic civilian control, effectiveness in achieving roles and missions, and efficiency.
758 intelligence in other lands
can legitimately question if democratization of the intelligence agencies is an impos-

sible target for developing democracies, specifically considering the repressive
activities of the previous non-democratic intelligence agencies? Are there any
formulas for success to the many challenges? Where do they come from—the past,
the intelligence agencies in the so-called intelligence community (IC) themselves,
those outside the IC (domestic and foreign), or all of the above?
This chapter discusses the “quest” for transparency and effectiveness of the
intelligence systems in the developing democracies.2 It first reviews the literature on
intelligence reform in new democracies, followed by the role of intelligence in non-
democratic regimes, legacies from these regimes in transitional democracies, and
the challenges involved as well as achievements in reforming intelligence in the
developing democracies.
2. Review of the Relevant Literature on

Intelligence and Democratic Consolidation
While the literature on intelligence is replete with studies on the reform of intelli-
gence in the established democracies (such as the United States, United Kingdom,
and Israel), there is much less on how the developing democracies tackle intelli-
gence reform after the demise of the non-democratic regimes. This is due to many
reasons, but probably most important is that in some newer democracies intelli-
gence still remains a “taboo” subject, which limits researchers’ and scholars’ access
to information, and an “intelligence literature” is yet to be accepted as valid in the
academic environment.
Despite these challenges, a few prominent scholars and respectable regional and
international institutions have researched and published on intelligence reform in the
developing democracies. The Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces (DCAF), The RAND Corporation, the Center for Civil-Military Relations
(CCMR), Studies in Intelligence, Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and
Intelligence and National Security Journal contribute a variety of valuable materials on
the topic.3 Virtual libraries and databases like the Federation of American Scientists
(www.fas.org) are as well tremendous sources for information and research in the
realm of intelligence and democracy.
2
Due to the peculiar characteristics of intelligence (including the secrecy that inevitably
envelops intelligence activities and budgets, and prevents us from ensuring a credible cost-benefit
analysis), our analysis will not include efficiency; thus, it will be limited to two of the afore-
mentioned parameters of the CMR trinity—control and effectiveness.
3
Additionally, not only do CCMR and DCAF publish articles and books on intelligence and
democratization, but they also focus their efforts toward assisting the emerging democracies to
revamp their intelligence apparatuses, through various seminars and courses.
intelligence in the developing democracies 759
Virtually all of the literature on intelligence in the newer democracies focuses

on how to achieve control and transparency. This is a natural concern of all devel-
oping democracies due to what the intelligence apparatuses did in the non-
democratic regimes, but there is much more involved in the security-democracy
equation: effectiveness (and efficiency). This chapter aims to fill in the gap in the
literature, in that it looks at intelligence reform in the developing democracies from
both the control and effectiveness dimensions.
3. Intelligence and the

Non-Democratic Regimes
Admittedly, nondemocratic regimes (in all their forms—authoritarian, totalitarian,
etc.), create and use intelligence agencies to ensure the “survival” of the regime.
As distinguished scholar Michael Warner skillfully puts it, non-democratic regimes
“feel themselves beset by enemies from rival classes, races, or creeds, and they build
‘counterintelligence states’ . . . to defend themselves from wreckers, saboteurs, kulaks,
or non-Aryans” (Warner 2008). They use their intelligence apparatuses (known as
“political polices”) to control, intimidate, manipulate, abuse, and oppress real and/or
imaginary “ideological enemies,” both domestically and abroad, with no respect for
human rights and liberties, and without being democratically accountable to the
people, but rather to a few political leaders. Examples include Romania’s Securitate,
Germany’s Stasi, Czechoslovakia’s StB, Russia’s KGB, Chile’s DINA, Brazil’s SNI and
ABIN, and so forth. With time, as the regimes tend to increasingly rely on the intel-
ligence agencies, their power and size heighten, and they shift from “political polices”
to “independent security states.” Independent security states gain incremental auton-
omy from the regime and insulation from any scrutiny. Such intelligence apparatuses
existed in Brazil (SNI), Iran (SAVAK), Chile (DINA), and South Africa (BOSS).
4. Intelligence and the Developing

Democracies
4.1 The Legacies of the Non-Democratic Regimes:

Challenges to Intelligence Reform
Since the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization with the 1974 Revolution
in Portugal, there has been a boom of democracy throughout the globe. A great
many non-democratic regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa underwent
fundamental changes (either through peaceful or bloody revolutions), aspiring to

become consolidated democracies (Bruneau and Boraz 2007, 1–24). They held free
and fair elections, instituted market economies, and fostered the creation of civil
societies. But while the economic, political, and societal “indices” of democratiza-
tion may be “high” in a certain country, it cannot be considered a “consolidated
democracy” until having thoroughly overhauled their intelligence apparatuses,
from repressive and uncontrolled state security systems into democratic communi-
ties, both effective and transparent. This, however, is easier said than done, because
the “new” intelligence systems always come with a “package.”
First, intelligence agencies carry a “stigma” of their non-democratic past and
transgressions, which linger for decades in peoples’ hearts and minds. As in most
cases the new services are built on the ruins of the former, non-democratic intelli-
gence agencies (preserving the personnel, premises, and other assets of the non-
democratic institutions), this triggers the populace’s disdain and mistrust. As Larry
Watts states in a regional study on Eastern Europe, “transition populations tend to
favor the destruction of intelligence apparatuses, not their reform” (Watts 2004).
Older democracies, too, lack trust in the emerging democracies’ intelligence, which
negatively impacts foreign assistance to intelligence reform and cooperation.
Suspicion is further fueled by what Williams and Deletant call “the culture of gull-
ible cynicism” inherited from the non-democratic regimes—a form of negative
campaigning (via rumors, disinformation, and planted articles reinforced by the
new competitive politics), aimed at preserving the image of the state as an erratic
and unruly body (Williams and Deletant 2000, 16–20).
Second, intelligence agencies lack professionalism—expertise, responsibility
and corporateness via formal and structured personnel routines and traditions,
through strict entrance requirements, continuous professionalization programs, a
code of ethics specific to each organization, professional associations, as well as
mechanisms enabling cumulative learning and improvement (Marrin and Clemente
2006, 644). Developing democracies lack of all these. To begin with, hiring new
personnel is rather difficult, considering the population’s loathing of the intelli-
gence agencies. In the attempt to deal with the staffing issue, emerging democracies
tend to preserve the intelligence personnel of the non-democratic regimes (now
“true supporters” of democracy). Yet, since “old habits die hard” there is always the
risk for these personnel to operate as in the past, limit employment possibilities for
a new generation of intelligence experts, and/or convey their “best practices” to the
new personnel. As Williams and Deletant note when talking about post-communist
intelligence agencies in Europe, “if there is continuity with the pre-1989 corporate
culture, it may be as harmful as it is integrative” (Williams and Deletant 2000,
16–20). Professionalization of intelligence in the developing democracies appears,
therefore, to be a vicious cycle.
Third, the transition governments have little (or no) experience on how to
undertake intelligence reform. While old democracies have the luxury of time and
availability of research materials to build such expertise, emerging democracies are
orphaned in these resources. And, whatever reform pattern the old democracies
followed are generally neither suitable nor alluring to the new democracies to “bor-
row.” In addition, reform of the intelligence agencies in the emerging democracies
is only a part of a comprehensive transformation of the state and government insti-
tutions. Governments tend to be more focused on economic and political reform
than security, which leads to perfunctory intelligence reform initiatives, through
meager resource allocation and precarious management.
Fourth, in some non-democratic regimes intelligence was a monopoly of the
military (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Honduras, and Spain). Military intelligence still
enjoys autonomy and has considerable power even in these newer democracies.
Further challenges arise from inadequate legislation, hasty retirement and/or
firing of the old intelligence personnel, corruption and even penetration by orga-
nized crime groups and cartels of security agencies, of which the newly created
intelligence agencies take advantage, to carry on their obscure practices and resist
democratic control and transparency.
4.2 Transforming Intelligence: Reaching Transparency

and Effectiveness
Considering all the aforementioned challenges, some obvious questions are raised.
How do developing democracies professionalize their intelligence agencies and
make them effective and transparent? How do they manage to break the wall of
“distrust” between the citizens and intelligence agencies? How can they make the
people understand that intelligence is “needed” and how can they trust that the IC
no longer works against them?
From our research, we have learned that, if there is willingness to change, and/
or a strong external drive, revamping intelligence can be successful. Many emerging
democracies fought the legacies of the non-democratic regimes and reached a bal-
ance between secrecy and transparency. Essentially, the reform followed two paths:
one drawn by democratic consolidation and the other drawn by the contemporary
security environment. Reform, thus, first focused on making intelligence account-
able, more open and transparent. It encompassed creating new intelligence systems,
establishing new legal frameworks for them, and, most importantly, bringing them
under democratic control. Reform did not attach much importance to the effective-
ness (or efficiency) of the IC, because, as previously mentioned, the lack of account-
ability rather than effectiveness was the problem during the non-democratic
regimes. Nevertheless, the advent of the less predictable security threats (to include
terrorism in all its forms, organized crime, etc.) changed the reform focus, from
asserting and maintaining control, to effective fulfillment of roles and missions, and
cooperation with domestic and foreign counterparts, which increasingly empha-
sized intelligence effectiveness.
Eastern European countries had an additional spur for the intelligence reform,
which prompted them far ahead of their confreres from Latin America or Africa:
the prospect of NATO and EU membership (a status desired as a formal “attestation”
of their democratic consolidation and enhanced security capabilities), coupled with

the two organizations’ membership requirements and incentives. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization is a collective defense and security organization while the EU,
although it focuses primarily on economic and development cooperation, also pro-
motes security reform within the framework of its European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP). After 1989, the two institutions focused on advancing peace and
stability to Eastern Europe by opening their doors to new members and equally
assisting aspirant and non-candidate countries to consolidate their democracies
and increase their security capabilities. Their various assistance programs, partner-
ships, and/or membership requirements, galvanized the region’s security reform
process in general and intelligence in particular.
Not all emerging democracies, however, succeeded in “revolutionizing” their
intelligence agencies to make them both transparent and effective, in some cases,
because the countries themselves failed to become democratic (Russia), or because
intelligence remained embedded within the armed forces, which maintain their
own intelligence activities and lack civilian oversight and transparency (Russia and
Indonesia; Tsypkin 2007, 268–300; Conboy 2004, 15–248).
4.2.1 Creating New Intelligence Agencies: Reforming Organizations

and Personnel
When undertaking reform of the intelligence structure, some emerging democra-
cies decided to preserve their monolithic intelligence apparatuses inherited from
the non-democratic regimes (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland).
Others divided them into multiple agencies (for example, either a few civilian,
police, border guard, military, foreign, and domestic agencies, or all), to avoid the
monopolization of power by one single agency as in the past, foster competition
and cooperation, and strengthen democratic control (Romania, South Africa and
Brazil). In either case, the countries opted to retain former non-democratic person-
nel in the new structures, which afflicted the intelligence agencies’ reputation, no
matter the reasons for said continuity.4 The personnel’s deeply entrenched paro-
chial views, involvement in corruption and organized crime activities, as well as
recurring politicization, “metastasized” the democratization of the intelligence for
years. Countries had, therefore, to subsequently undertake tedious downsizing and
vetting processes of their intelligence agencies, paralleled by new personnel recruit-
ment and professionalization procedures, which will be addressed below.
Some countries that had fortuitous geographic surroundings and/or enjoyed
outside security guarantees opted to completely overhaul the agencies and remove
all personnel from the past (Czechoslovakia), even with the price of losing the agen-
cies’ intelligence capabilities for quite a few years (Watts 2004). Conversely, coun-
tries located in conflict regions and/or without security guarantees from outside,
4
Some of the units continued to exist, as effective intelligence collection was a priority due to
the perception of various threats.
could not afford such a drastic reform. Weeding out all intelligence personnel from
the past would have undoubtedly crippled the ability of their intelligence agencies
to ensure the security of their countries, which would, perhaps, trigger the spread-
ing out of insecurity to their territories. They rather embarked on incremental
downsizing of the legacy personnel (Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Albania). In parallel, some new democracies undertook formal vetting (lustration)
processes to cleanse the new services of the personnel compromised either by their
actual contribution to repressive activities or by their membership in specific divi-
sions of the past repressive intelligence agencies (Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Peru). In Eastern Europe, a particular case of the overall vetting process was the
screening of the officials who would work with NATO-classified information. This
proved very effective mainly because the state authorities vested to conduct the
background checks established close relationships with NATO (through coordina-
tion and direct monitoring by NATO), and followed the alliance’s effective proce-
dures and criteria (Matei 2007a; Matei 2007b, 629–60; Watts 2004).
While purging the former non-democratic intelligence personnel was without
any doubt indispensable for the transformation of intelligence, it had unexpected
outcomes, which affected its effectiveness. The purged personnel were often rehired
by other institutions, with no vetting requirements (which allowed them to con-
tinue their practices in the new institutions), opened their own private businesses
(thus competing with the state agencies, as they had greater resources to procure
modern equipment), or became involved in serious corruption and organized crime
activities. And, no matter how many former personnel were removed, a certain
number still continued to function in the new agencies. Moreover, many files “dis-
appeared” during or after the transitions, which made impossible the carrying out
of a proper background check; the screening process was routinely manipulated by
the old personnel, while the legitimacy of those carrying out the vetting was doubt-
ful (they had not been subjected to any prior screening; Matei 2007a; Matei 2007b,
629–60; Watts 2004).
To compensate for the “loss” of the legacy personnel, some developing democ-
racies opened the doors of their intelligence services to younger generations
(Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Hungary, and Brazil). They established explicit
admission requirements and personnel management policies, in line with the agen-
cies’ specific roles and missions and personnel criteria. Professionalization oppor-
tunities, continuous education and training, promotion systems based on merit
and performance, a team-oriented work environment, and attractive benefit pack-
ages brought in bright, open-minded graduates from universities or representatives
of civil societies, with no involvement with the past intelligence and faultless con-
duct. As Shlomo Shpiro notes, old-fashioned “[d]ark and dusty corridors, lined
with wooden filing cabinets, softly spoken Russian, and dashing case officers” were
“quickly replaced by computer whiz kids, ambitious junior management and staff
often more concerned with pension benefits . . .” (Gill 2008, 651–54).
The revamping of the intelligence organizations and personnel was not thor-
oughgoing and/or transparent in all countries. In Brazil, a good number of former
SNI personnel are still powerful. According to Jane’s Intelligence Digest, SNI person-
nel’s integration into ABIN and their new career path remain unclear; the SNI’s
heirs remain a influential independent cluster within the agency, engaging in all
sorts of illicit operations (for example, illegal phone tapping), and insulated from
the management’s scrutiny (Jane’s Intelligence Digest 2008). Similar incidents occur
periodically in Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, at a minimum in Latin America.
Admittedly, a reliable screening of the old personnel is still desired, in particular in
those countries that did not have outside incentives and support.
4.2.2 Establishing Legal Frameworks for Intelligence

As noted above, the intelligence apparatuses were central to the non-democratic
regimes, routinely infringing upon human rights and liberties. Establishing a com-
pletely new legal framework for intelligence, which pledges that the new intelligence
systems serve the security interests of their nations and citizens versus a privileged
class, is hence cardinal in the emerging democracies. It should clearly define the
responsibilities and powers of the intelligence agencies as well as the types and
mechanisms of control and oversight, including: delineating what the intelligence
agencies can and cannot do, who is in charge of the intelligence, and who controls
and oversees its activities, personnel, and funding; stipulating the circumstances for
interagency coordination and/or international cooperation; and ensuring the intel-
ligence personnel are responsible before the law in case of abuses, and/or benefit
from legal protection if they observe the legally-agreed-upon guidance and direc-
tions. Furthermore, to reach an optimal balance between effectiveness and trans-
parency, emerging democracies need to enact legislation that allows citizens and
civil-society representatives to access government information. This is particularly
important when countries attempt to “over-classify” every piece of government
information, in the attempt to arbitrarily limit the public’s access to information,
disregarding democratic norms.
By and large, numerous emerging democracies have gradually developed legal
frameworks for their newly created intelligence agencies. Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Romania, and South Africa now have robust legal frameworks, stipulating new
mandates for intelligence, control, oversight, accountability, and transparency.
As unprecedented events unfolded (such as the terrorist attacks in the United States
on September 11, 2001), which had a devastating impact on national, regional, and
global security, countries adjusted their legal frameworks on intelligence and secu-
rity, to enhance the intelligence effectiveness in combating asymmetrical threats
(to include terrorism). That is, to increase powers of the ICs, foster interagency
coordination and enable international cooperation. Yet, even in the countries that
have a robust legal framework, some gaps in the legislation are permissive to intel-
ligence misconduct and violation of human rights and liberties for political reasons
and/or personal vendettas versus national security purposes (Romania, Brazil).
As Peter Gill states, “new laws may provide a veneer of legality and accountability
behind which essentially unreconstructed practices continue to the detriment of
human rights and freedoms (Gill 2008, 5–7).
4.2.3 Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence

Placing intelligence under democratic civilian control became a key focus of both
the democratically elected civilians and civil-society representatives in most of the
emerging democracies, as well as scholars in the established democracies, and col-
lective security organizations’ membership requirements. Control is needed to
ensure intelligence agencies work within specific limits and respect the legal frame-
work imposed upon them. With the increased emphasis on augmenting intelligence
agencies’ abilities to better fight the current security challenges, there is even more
need for robust democratic control mechanisms in place to make sure the ICs do
not use national security and terrorism prevention as excuses to become intrusive
in citizens’ private lives. And, finally, democratic control is needed to boost the
effectiveness of the intelligence forces.
Intelligence control (consisting of direction and oversight) is ensured by the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government, internal arrange-
ments of the intelligence agencies themselves, or external mechanisms (at both
domestic and international levels). Executive control usually sets forth the intelli-
gence priorities and directives, roles and missions, as well as basic structures and
organization. Responsible bodies may include ministries of defense, directors of
intelligence communities, national security councils, and/or other means of inter-
agency coordination. Legislative control (also known as congressional or parlia-
mentary control and oversight) acts as a balance to the executive control, and
generally encompasses the establishment of the legal framework for intelligence, as
well as control and review of the intelligence’s activities, budgets, and personnel.
Responsible bodies are in general standing or ad hoc committees within the legisla-
tures, and their staff. The committees enact legislation, review budgetary and staff-
ing decisions, vet nominees, and open inquiries regarding abuses or other intelligence
problems. Additional independent institutions may function in support of the par-
liaments to assist with budget reviews and/or protect citizens’ rights against intelli-
gence intrusion (for example, courts of audits, offices of the advocate of the people,
or ombudsmen). Judicial review ensures the agencies use their special powers
according to the law, and protects citizens’ rights from the agencies’ intrusive collec-
tion and searches. Responsible bodies in general include courts of justice. Internal
control consists of legal-accountability mechanisms functioning within intelligence
organizations themselves (for example, counsels, inspectors general [IGs], as well as
agencies’ intrinsic professional codes of ethics and institutional norms). External
control consists of the review of the intelligence organizations by “outsiders” (free
press, independent lobbies and think tanks, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and international organizations).
Whether an act of free will, or imposed by outside, most developing democra-
cies shaped (at least on paper) various formal tools for controlling the activity of
intelligence agencies (Argentina, Brazil, Romania, and South Africa); they created
national security councils, committees in the parliament, IGs, courts and ombuds-
man offices, appointed civilians in command positions within military intelligence
establishments, and the like. In some countries, the nascent and spirited civil
societies and media waged an “informal” oversight campaign, which complemented

the existing formal mechanisms (Argentina, Guatemala, Romania). Yet a series of
obstacles hindered the effectiveness of the democratic control and oversight of the
intelligence in virtually all developing democracies. First was the intelligence agen-
cies’ resistance to any form of scrutiny, due to insufficient trust in the “amateurs”
who controlled them, doubt that the politicians considered national security a pri-
ority, and belief that more freedom from any oversight constraint would increase
their effectiveness in safeguarding national security. This is even more problematic
in those countries that have mostly military intelligence, which opposed any form
of control and oversight from civilian authorities and thus continue to enjoy high
autonomy. Second was the insufficient time for state institutions to mature and
become legitimate; during the first transition years, governments were repeatedly
contested and in many cases impeached, and therefore, had little time to build legit-
imacy to be able to institute control. Nor did they make intelligence reform and
control a top priority. Moreover, the institutions of control and oversight resisted as
much as possible the task to scrutinize intelligence activities, mainly because they
did not want to be associated with the “stigmatic” intelligence agencies, preferred to
be able to deny knowledge of operations (avoid looking as if they disregarded any
illegal activities), lacked sufficient knowledge of security and intelligence matters to
be able to have an informed opinion, and had modest or no political incentives to
render such work. Third, corruption, favoritism, nepotism, and blackmail (includ-
ing blackmail with the files kept by the non-democratic regimes)—common lega-
cies of the authoritarian regimes for all developing democracies—were also
impediments to democratic control. Fourth, with regard to external control, chal-
lenges derived from limited or nonexistent access to government information, leaks
to civil societies and the media, and the media’s propensity to sensationalism versus
objective coverage (Boraz and Bruneau 2006, 28–42).
In order to improve their democratic control capabilities, some developing
democracies embarked upon more serious reforming and advanced democratic
control, aiming at raising public interest on intelligence and security matters,
increasing civilian awareness and competence in the field of security and intelli-
gence, institutionalizing processes that support transparency and effectiveness, fos-
tering a political culture that supports and trusts intelligence in society and inside
the IC, as well as professionalizing the intelligence services (Boraz and Bruneau
2006, 28–42).
To raise public interest, countries stimulated regular informed public debates
and meetings on security and intelligence matters. In Argentina and Brazil, for
example, politicians regularly discuss the need for civilian control and other intelli-
gence-related matters (Boraz and Bruneau 2006, 28–42). In Colombia, as well, with
the continuing violence and greater understanding of the key role of intelligence in
ensuring national security, representatives of the government, NGOs, the press, aca-
demia, and even the populace are debating intelligence issues (even though few are
well-enough informed to provide rigorous control of the intelligence apparatus);
this generated a nascent literature on intelligence and security in Colombia (from
roles and missions to control and effectiveness), as well as strengthened the popula-
tion’s trust and support for intelligence and security forces (Boraz 2008, 141).
Furthermore, NGOs and the media have spawned regular debate via exposing intel-
ligence scandals and failures to the public. In Romania, the media have played a
crucial role in promoting democratic control of intelligence.
Efforts were devoted to increase intelligence outsiders’ awareness and compe-
tence in intelligence. This happened in South Africa, due to political and institu-
tional bargains made during processes of democratic transition (Boraz and Bruneau
2006, 28–42). In Romania, it happened after numerous media scandals, due to
NATO/EU integration requirements, and following September 11, 2001 (Matei
2007a; Matei 2007b, 629–60; Matei 2007c, 219–40). Countries opened up their intel-
ligence training schools to civilians who might one day become involved in the
oversight process. The Romanian IC took this one step further in that some agen-
cies have allowed citizens, not necessarily involved with national security, to study
in their education facilities, without any constraint to work for the IC or in the
oversight committees (Matei 2007d, 1–20). Besides, international cooperative train-
ing arrangements, the media, and open source available materials have also helped
civilians learn about intelligence. Taken together, these endeavors have enabled
decision-makers to make better and informed decisions on national security and
intelligence issues, improved transparency and democratic control, raised mutual
respect between ICs and outsiders, and deepened coordination and cooperation.
To increase transparency and effectiveness, in some countries civilians took a
keener role in reviewing and updating national security and intelligence documents,
budgets, and activities (increased access to intelligence [security clearances], regular
hearings etc), as well as fostering interagency coordination and cooperation.
Romania provides a good example of how democratic control can improve the
effectiveness of the intelligence agencies; it has progressively developed robust
executive and legislative mechanisms to bring the IC under democratic control,
which: reduced the exaggerated number of agencies (there were at least nine in the
2000s); defined clearer roles and missions for the agencies; enforced coordination
and cooperation among them and with other security institutions; conducted
inquiries and hearings; and vetted and fired intelligence directors and personnel. In
particular, to ease access to intelligence, the parliament enacted a law which allows
parliamentarians and other government officials access intelligence without secu-
rity clearance (which worries IC members with regard to leaks), as well as a leak
prevention law to protect intelligence secrecy (Matei 2007b; Bruneau and Matei
2008, 909–29). Colombia is also a good example. President Alvaro Uribe in 2002
took strong personal control over the intelligence and other security institutions to
strengthen the agencies’ effectiveness in fighting the high internal threat posed by
FARC, AUC, ELN, and individual drug traffickers. His direct involvement not only
increased national security, but also the legitimacy of the government as it handled
security matters sensibly (with President Uribe being reelected in 2006; Boraz 2008,
130–45). These have not only strengthened legitimacy of the government, but also
increased the IC effectiveness.
In Brazil, the wiretapping scandal in late 2008 may provide an opportunity for
the government to step in and further overhaul ABIN and other intelligence agen-
cies (for example, for example clearer roles and missions and personnel vetting),
which will perhaps improve ABIN’s credibility, on the one hand, and strengthen its
effectiveness and professionalism, on the other hand.
Of particular importance has been the professionalization of the intelligence
agencies (expertise, corporateness, and responsibility), which the developing
democracies have strived to accomplish through various education and training
programs for intelligence personnel, security clearances to access to classified infor-
mation, as well as instilling a responsibility for democracy (Argentina, Brazil,
Romania, and South Africa).
All these efforts have helped several developing democracies foster a political
culture that supports and trusts intelligence in society and inside the IC. Yet not all
developing democracies have public awareness of the need for democratic civilian
authorities to advance democratic control and oversight of the IC. In Russia and
Moldova, for example, democratic control of the intelligence agencies is either non-
existent or undeveloped (Boraz and Bruneau 2006, 28–42). In Spain, the intelligence
reform has not gone far enough since the country’s transition to democracy, even if
the end of the Cold War, dangerous security environment due to terrorism, and
involvement of the intelligence agencies in numerous scandals call for IC transfor-
mation (Gimenez-Salinas 2003, 78–79).
4.2.4 Reaching Effectiveness in Fulfilling Roles and Missions

When working out the ineluctable “security versus democracy” quandary that ham-
pers intelligence reform, the developing democracies need to undertake more than
creating new intelligence agencies, and bringing them under legal bases and demo-
cratic civilian control. Channeling unremitting efforts toward intelligence effective-
ness is, too, important. The bottom line is intelligence safeguards national security,
and, today, when international terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and
organized crime are the main security threats for most countries, intelligence effec-
tiveness is vital.
To be effective, intelligence agencies need to: follow elaborate plans or strategies
(for example, national security strategies, or intelligence doctrines) developed by
competent entities (for example, national security councils, directors of intelligence
or specific interagency coordination bodies); and receive sufficient resources (for
example, political capital, money, and personnel) to enable them implement the
assigned roles and missions as best possible (Bruneau and Matei 2008, 909–29).
Effectiveness also involves coordination and cooperation among agencies (to
include intelligence and information sharing, common databases, networking, and
mergers).
As noted before, newer democracies initially paid little attention to effective-
ness of the intelligence agencies, partly because of the intelligence agencies’ role in
the non-democratic past, and the authorities’ reduced awareness of the need for
and role of the intelligence in safeguarding the national security. Brazil and Colombia
are great examples in this sense. In Brazil, administrations did not consider effec-
tiveness a priority in the overall intelligence reform until the gang threat emerged
dramatically in 2006 in the major cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, and the
Pan-American Games were about to commence in 2007. In Colombia, on the other
hand, effectiveness became important only following major scandals exposed by the
media and the emerging internal conflicts (Bruneau 2007a; Bruneau 2007b).
Establishing cooperation and coordination mechanisms was also challenging,
due to political infighting, competitive agencies (for political versus effectiveness
reasons), deeply ingrained bureaucratic routines and mentalities, and tepid atti-
tudes toward sharing. In Romania, bringing all the intelligence agencies under the
umbrella of a “community” was delayed for years due to the above-mentioned chal-
lenges, as well as the public’s fear of a “return of the Securitate,” if the agencies unite
under one roof, and especially if Securitate personnel still work in the intelligence
agencies.
At the international level, cooperation was even more difficult, due to enduring
Cold War mindsets, suspicion, and mistrust. In Argentina, in spite of the Secretariat
of Intelligence’s (SI’s) good start on international cooperation to avert and counter
Islamic terrorism (especially with the United States intelligence agencies), the
agency lost its credibility due to involvement with Russian mafia and former KGB
agents (Antunes 2008, 109). In Europe, old democracies refused to believe in the
“transformation” of the newer democracies’ intelligence apparatuses and feared
that cooperation would entail leaks or passages of classified information to
“unfriendly” third parties. For example, NATO countries worried that if former
satellites of the USSR became full NATO members, they would pass the Alliance’s
classified information to Russia. Indeed, some countries continued to rely on the
Soviet Union for expertise for many years after the end of communism: their ICs
either remained under KGB mandate until the collapse of the Soviet Union, or
maintained close relationships with Moscow (including common training with
Russian intelligence; Watts 2004). Therefore, in return for membership, NATO
demanded the aspirant countries remove and replace all personnel who had for-
merly been involved in human rights abuses or operations against the Alliance, as
well as with doubtful behavior. This had yet another negative effect on cooperation.
Various “benevolent” influence groups, interested in minimizing intelligence effec-
tiveness, used propaganda to say that NATO wanted all old personnel out in order
to weaken the agencies, which was not the case; NATO countries knew a complete
removal would seriously have affected Human Intelligence (HUMINT) coopera-
tion with the developing democracies (especially in tackling terrorism and orga-
nized crime), whose ICs had great HUMINT capabilities (Watts 2004).
Then again, the immediacy and multifaceted nature of terrorism and other
asymmetrical threats called for changing the intelligence agencies from rigid
bureaucracies to flexible and well-designed institutions, staffed with creative intel-
ligence professionals. After the tragic terrorist attacks in the United States (2001),
Spain (2004), the United Kingdom (2005), and elsewhere, effective intelligence
became top priority in many countries (both old and new democracies). Decision
makers focused on increasing intelligence budgets and resources (personnel, equip-
ment, education, training) changing doctrines, regulations, and other norms of
intelligence, as well as improving interagency cooperation and coordination.
To strengthen coordination and cooperation at the national level, virtually all
newer democracies adopted/improved anti-terrorism legislation, created clearer
roles and missions for their agencies, improved recruitment standards, education
and training (relying on foreign assistance provided by older democracies), and
established specific mechanisms to enable information sharing (for example, offices
of integrated analysis or interagency centers for combating terrorism and organized
crime). Moreover, in some countries, the agencies opened more to the society
(through partnership and public-relations campaigns) in order to both make the
public aware of the threats and need for intelligence as well as to ensure future
recruits. Romania has been very involved in educating the public on security mat-
ters, besides ensuring education of the civilians that oversee IC activity, as has been
presented above. The Romanian Domestic Intelligence Service (SRI), which is the
country’s main institution in combating and preventing terrorism, travels habitu-
ally throughout the country to inform students, academia, and others on the
national security threats, as well as on the Romanian IC capabilities to counter
national security threats. Whenever possible, the IC also involves the civil society in
meetings and discussions, as well as practical exercises on combating terrorism and
organized crime (Matei 2007a; Matei 2007b, 629–60; Matei 2007c, 219–40).
At the international level, countries strengthened cooperation (bilateral, trilat-
eral, regional, global) and intelligence sharing, even if secrecy and national interests
continue to prevail when undertaking cooperation. In Latin America bilateral coop-
eration is generally considered good with most, if not all, countries. In Europe,
again, NATO and EU are credited with strengthening of intelligence cooperation of
the former Eastern European communist countries, through the requirements
imposed by the EU’s Acquis Communautaire and NATO’s membership action plan
(MAP), as well as the expertise and assistance provided by the two organizations.
To a greater or lesser degree, regional cooperation became a prerequisite for
membership (Matei 2008, 37–57). On the other hand, the global war on terrorism,
which brought nations together in combat (including intelligence), has as well
increased cooperation among partners and allies and thus advanced intelligence
effectiveness.
5. Conclusion
Having an intelligence system that is equally transparent and effective is a quan-
dary in any democracy, because of two conflicting demands: secrecy (required by
effectiveness) and transparency (required by democratic control, openness, and
accountability). Older democracies have had time, an arsenal of studies on intel-

ligence reform available, capable elected officials, and support and awareness on
intelligence matters from outside, so as to be able to minimize the conflict of
transparency and effectiveness; and still they fail in one way or another. The
United States’ egregious failures in intelligence coordination and cooperation
prior to 9/11 are telling examples in this context. For emerging democracies, this
is even more problematic, due not only to the inertia of intelligence communities
toward change (which is common in all democracies), but also legacies of the old
regimes, and lack of interest from or fear of involvement of the responsible elected
civilians.
Yet, democratization of intelligence is not an impossible task for the developing
democracies. Letting go of the past and transforming intelligence may have been a
“Sisyphean” effort, to alienate a haunting past of secrecy and moral torture, as well as
to transform people and mentalities, but in some countries it has resulted in a proper
balance between secrecy and transparency. To ensure democratic consolidation,
countries strived primarily to bring their intelligence agencies under control and
ensure a level of transparency. Countries thus established new agencies, brought
them under legal bases, set up executive, legislative, judicial and internal control and
oversight mechanisms, and allowed vocal civil societies to develop and question the
IC activities. Furthermore, in a few developing democracies, elected officials
embarked upon a campaign for more assertive democratic control: better direction
and oversight practices, improved public access to documents, and, frequent debates
on national security and intelligence issues. More robust democratic control of the
intelligence agencies has paved the way toward democratic consolidation as well as
effective intelligence organizations, “serving under knowledgeable politicians who
may not be able to quantify IC performance, but who will know a ‘job well or poorly
done’ when they see it” (Boraz and Bruneau 2006, 28–42). In addition, as the new
security challenges are more complex, reforming intelligence focuses increasingly on
augmenting effectiveness. Improved standards for the recruitment and training of
intelligence personnel, increased coordination and cooperation systems (including
common fighting in the war on terrorism) have made intelligence agencies more
effective. In Europe, reforming and democratizing intelligence had an additional
effective boost: EU/NATO desire and the two organizations’ membership demands.
Other emerging democracies, however, failed to democratize their intelligence
apparatuses, mostly because they fell short in consolidating their democracies, their
responsible officials did not undertake robust intelligence reform, or because intel-
ligence apparatuses remained embedded within the military, eluding any form of
civilian oversight and transparency. Reforming intelligence is a work in progress;
therefore, hopefully, these countries will have effective and transparent intelligence
agencies as well, in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, all in all, the developing democracies that successfully imple-
mented democratic reforms and control mechanisms for intelligence, have now
more professional, trusted, and effective intelligence, which enjoy greater public
support, and therefore do a better job in defending their countries and citizens.
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chapter 46
THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES OF RUSSIA
robert w. pringle
1. Introduction
In Russia, the security and intelligence services have always been critical to formation
of the country’s foreign and domestic policies. For the tsars’ ministers, Communist
Party general secretaries, and post-Cold War Russian presidents, intelligence and
counterintelligence have dug out dissent at home, punished it abroad, and stolen
critical military and scientific technology for the state and its ruling elite. During
the course of the Soviet Union’s existence, intelligence frustrated enemy intelligence
operations and provided the information necessary to build nuclear weapons. While
neither Soviet nor tsarist intelligence services could save their political masters from
incompetence and corruption, they served as a force multiplier in international
politics. Analysis of Soviet and post-Soviet intelligence services is bedeviled by the
problem of sourcing. The historiography of Russian intelligence is very much like
an account of modern Egyptology: historian and archivists busy trying to decipher
the past from limited and contradictory material, always aware of the limits of the
evidence (Khlevnik 2004, 1–8, 328–44).
While there have been a staggering number of books on the Soviet Union and
Russia, almost none address the role of the services in Soviet domestic and foreign-
policy decision making. Amy Knight, one of the best students of security policy put
it best: “The Soviet security police looms as an uncertain variable for scholars,
mainly because we have no commonly accepted conceptual framework to explain
its role in the system. The KGB has never received much scholarly attention in the
West” (Knight 1988, xvi).
the intelligence services of russia 775
Our understanding of the Soviet and post-Soviet services has been improved
somewhat since 1990 with the opening of some of the Communist Party and police
archives, as well as the publication of Western counterintelligence material. Especially
important was the declassification and release of more than two thousand deci-
phered intelligence cables between Russian intelligence residencies (intelligence sta-
tions) and Moscow, classified for decades as Top Secret/Venona (Haynes and Klehr
1999, 339–71). Furthermore, the last two decades have seen the publication of mem-
oirs by Soviet and East European officials: especially important are books by Oleg
Gordiyevsky and Vasili Mirokhin, which were co-authored by Christopher Andrew.
Yet, the revelations have stirred rather than halted debate. Every major issue of
Russian intelligence history since 1917 remains controversial and shrouded by
debates over sources—human and paper.
2. Intelligence Services
Soviet and post-Soviet intelligence services have seen themselves as the “sword and
shield” of the revolution and the Russian state. For Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik
leadership, a revolution without a firing squad was ridiculous. Lenin created the
CHEKA (Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and
Sabotage) on 20 December 1917 under the leadership of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, a Polish
Bolshevik who had spent much of his adult life in prison and exile. Dzerzhinsky
grew the CHEKA by 1921 into a massive security bureaucracy of 250,000 officials—
compared to that of the Tsarist Okhrana and Corps of Gendarmes, which never
totaled more than 15,000. The CHEKA rapidly assumed control of foreign intelli-
gence, counterintelligence, signals intelligence, and the border guards. For the
CHEKA, the real issue was the destruction of the enemies of the new regime from
the tsar and his family to parish priests. Estimates of executions between 1917 and
1921 vary, but the usually accepted figure is 140,000. Dzerzhinsky and his deputies
played a critical role in the Civil War, operating against Whites, Greens (anarchists),
and foreign armies. The CHEKA also guaranteed the loyalty of the newly-minted
Red Army by assigning CHEKA officers in military units, executing suspected trai-
tors, and holding hostage families of dubious officers (Leggett 1981, 17; Andrews and
Gordievsky 1991, 52–63; Mitrokhin 2007, “By the Church Gates”).
The history of the revolutionary CHEKA is a dominant myth in the history of
Russian intelligence. Soviet and Russian intelligence officers have adopted the title
Chekist to this day, whether they served in the GPU (1922–23), OGPU (1923–34),
NKVD (1934–46), MGB (1946–54), or KGB (1954–91). Dzerzhinsky dubbed his men
as “knights of the revolution,” “men with clean hand and warm hearts” and so they
have largely seen themselves. Russian intelligence and security officers are paid on
the twentieth of the month to commemorate the formation of the CHEKA, and
former Russian President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB lieutenant colonel, contin-
ues to praise past and present Chekists for their service to the state.
2.1 Stalin and Repression

Among the most bitterly disputed issues in Soviet history is the role of Joseph Stalin
and the human cost of his rule. Stalin from the 1920s placed his bureaucratic allies
in the security police, and moved key subordinates between the police and Party
bureaucracy to insure control of the competent organs of state control. The first
sophisticated study of repression was Robert Conquest, The Great Terror in 1966.
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s masterful Gulag Archipelago (1972–76), which was smug-
gled out of the Soviet Union a decade later, provided the first detailed account of
what Solzhenitsyn dubbed “our sewage disposal system.” Solzhenitsyn showed both
the West and a few Russian readers how critical to the terror was a system of correc-
tive labor camps (Gulag of Chief Directorate Camps) which included hundreds of
camp complexes and special settlements for exiles (Conquest [1966] 1990;
Solzhenitsyn 1972–76, vol. 1).
Crucial to the power of the security service was a network of informers that
penetrated every institution and communal apartment building. In 1934, the NKVD
had 27,000 paid and 279,000 “volunteer” informers. By the end of Stalin’s death, the
number of volunteer informants was in the millions. Informers acted out of revenge;
to gain privileges such as new housing and foreign travel; and out of fear. In the
Stalin years—and after—denunciations sent hundreds of thousands to prison
camps and firing squads. Orlando Figes has written an outstanding study of infor-
mants, The Whisperers. His research notes for the book are an excellent source for
Soviet social, as well as intelligence, history (Figes 2007, 125136).
Prisoners built canals and roads, mined for gold and nickel, logged and farmed.
They also died by the hundreds of thousands. Recent revelations from the archives
suggest that between 1930 and 1953 there were a total of 36.5 million sentences of
prison, exile, and execution for 25 million people. These statistics are unreliable,
incomplete, and notoriously difficult to deal with. Orlando Figes put the number of
executions during the period at approximately one million. Anne Applebaum’s
study of the forced labor camps put the number of deaths in prison and camps dur-
ing the same period at over two million. The Memorial Society has made a major
contribution to our understanding of the Stalin years by identifying mass-grave
sites, and publishing lists of victims; biographies of senior secret police officials; and
documents signed by Stalin and other members of the leadership sending 38,000
men and women to their deaths (Applebaum 2003, 578–86; Figes 2007, 667).
Stalin never lost control of the secret police. He met regularly with senior
Chekists and encouraged their subordinates to write to him with their recommen-
dations and denunciations. While the Great Terror ended in 1938, a “lesser terror”
continued until his death. Minority nationalities were punished with deportation
(Chechens) or decimation (the Balts); hundreds of military officers went to their
death for incompetence or disloyalty; while Jews came close to exile because of
trumped up charges of ethnic disloyalty (Parrish 1996, 1–39).
Stalin died while plotting another purge on 5 March 1953. Stalin’s successors
immediately sought to distance themselves from Stalin’s policies of terror. The doc-
tors’ plot was ended and the surviving physicians were freed. More than a million
prisoners were freed from the Gulag, and in July 1953 Beria and his senior assistants
were arrested and shot five months later. The real issue for Nikita Khrushchev his
colleagues was how to strip the police of its power and restore the legitimacy of the
Communist Party. The Ministry of State Security was renamed the Committee of
State Security, a new set of younger leaders were selected from the second tier of the
Party bureaucracy, and it was placed under political scrutiny. More than sixty senior
security officers were tried for espionage and treason (not crimes against human-
ity), and a few like Abakumov were shot (Parrish 2004, 449–59).
During the Khrushchev era (1955–64), the KGB remained under close Party
control. Khrushchev pushed for some de-Stalinization, including the rehabilitation
of hundreds of thousands of the martyrs—living and dead of the Stalin era, and the
publication of memoirs and novels critical of the Gulag. (The most important of
which was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, One Day of Ivan Denisovich, published in 1962)
In 1964, the KGB played a critical role in the bloodless coup that deposed Khrushchev.
Party traditionalists used the KGB to isolate the Party leader and later held him
incommunicado before his “trial” before the Central Committee (Zubok 2007,
189–91). Leonid Brezhnev, the new General Secretary, rewarded both the KGB and
the Ministry of Defense for their support in the coup. For the security service, it
meant expanded power and responsibilities.
The KGB became by 1970 the largest integrated intelligence and security service
in the world. Most of this bureaucratic growth was the result of Yuri Andropov, who
became Chairman in 1967. Andropov expanded the bureaucratic fiat of the KGB
into surveillance of religious and political dissidents, creating the Fifth
(Counterintelligence within the Intelligentsia) Directorate in 1967. In 1974,
Solzhenitsyn, KGB codename “Pauk” (spider) was charged with betrayal of the
motherland and expelled. Andropov also brought the KGB into the war against cor-
ruption and organized crime. Abroad, the KGB expanded its residencies, concen-
trating on the collection of scientific and technical intelligence, covert action, and
counterintelligence (Andrews and Mitrokhin 1999, 307–22).
Despite the KGB’s record, the service had to cope with the defection of several
crucial officers. Moreover, despite Andropov’s desire to root out corruption, he was
never allowed to investigate, let alone prosecute, corruption in the Party elite. As
Brezhnev’s health declined, Andropov used the KGB to advance his cause by allow-
ing leaks embarrassing the veteran Party leader. In November 1982, Brezhnev died
and Andropov assumed the mantle of Party leadership. Andropov, despite his zeal
for reform and a return to “Leninist norms,” was unable—even with stepped up
KGB surveillance of the population—to stop the economic decline of the country,
and he died in early 1984.
When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in March 1985, he began a

new set of political policies to restore Party legitimacy and arrest economic decline.
Known in the West as glasnost and perestroyka (transparency and restructuring),
they were initially supported by the KGB, who shared his concerns about economic
stagnation and international isolation. Gorbachev saw the KGB as an elite and
uncorrupted institution, but sought—like every Soviet leader since Stalin—to
maintain bureaucratic control of the security police. The KGB, however, quickly
came to believe that Gorbachev threatened the stability of the Communist system.
Glasnost encouraged nationalist sentiments in the non-Russian Republics, and a
more honest appraisal of Soviet history—particularly of the Stalinist era—eroded
the popularity and legitimacy of the Communist Party. Failure of economic restruc-
turing and inflation, the birth of real politics, and open anti-Soviet demonstrations
caused many KGB officers to throw in their lot with traditional Party leaders who
were plotting a coup d’état. Unfortunately for them, 1991 was not to be a replay of
the 1964.
The August 1991 coup was a charade. Second-tier KGB officers refused orders to
storm the Russian White House and remove Russian leader Boris Yeltsin. The coup
leaders—including KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov—were unable to act deci-
sively and the three-day coup failed. The coup essentially led to the disintegration of
the Soviet Union into fifteen nation states. Kryuchkov was arrested, the KGB was
broken up into several separate services, and the new foreign intelligence chief even
gave the US ambassador the schematics of the KGB bugging attack against the
Embassy. More than one euphoric journalist and not a few scholars announced the
KGB was dead. They were premature in their obituaries.
3. Foreign Intelligence
Internal security rather than foreign intelligence was the priority of the CHEKA.
The foreign intelligence arm of the CHEKA was created on 20 December 1920. Like
the Tsarist Okhrana, which conducted operations from Paris in the last years of the
tsarist regime, the CHEKA identified émigré politicians as the most dangerous
threat to the stability of the regime. CHEKA foreign operations thus were initially
designed to penetrate and neutralize émigré organizations and their foreign sup-
porters. An ingenious counterintelligence operation known as the Trust lured anti-
Bolshevik politicians and foreign supporters like Boris Savinkov and Sidney Reilly
back to Russia where they were killed (Andrews and Mitrokhin 1999, 25–35).
Given their long history of foreign underground operations, it is not surprising
that Soviet foreign intelligence developed unique tactics and cover. Intelligence offi-
cer served under both diplomatic and non-official cover. Most major success came
from officers operating under non-official cover—illegals in the jargon of the
trade—who recruited code clerks and began a brilliantly conceived program of
signing on young and disaffected members of the British ruling class. The spotting,
recruiting, and running of “the Ring of Five,” men who rose to positions of promi-
nence in the foreign office and intelligence services, was perhaps the most spectacu-
lar victory of Soviet foreign intelligence. Soviet intelligence also made important
recruitments in Germany, the United States, Japan, and Canada. Communist parties
in these countries served to identify recruits and run important sources (Andrews
and Mitrokhin 1999, 42–88.).
Stalin’s security services also hunted down the enemies of revolution. Whites
and later Trotsky’s organizations were penetrated, and their leaders were kidnapped
or murdered. The NKVD’s greatest success was the murder of Leon Trotsky in
Mexico in 1940 by an assassin hired and trained to murder Stalin’s enemy. The mas-
termind of the murder, Pavel Sudoplatov, wrote a self-serving memoir of his role.
Also killed by the NKVD were defectors, who had the temerity to betray Moscow
(Sudoplatov 1994, 65–86). The NKVD also carried out a number of domestic mur-
ders for Stalin, including that of the wife of Marshall Grigory Kulik in 1940, and the
great Yiddish actor Solomon Mikhoels in 1948, according to a recent biography of
Stalin (Sebag-Montefiore 2004, 316–33).
During the 1930s and 1940s, Soviet tradecraft (konspiratsiya) was more sophis-
ticated than any other service. Residencies were divided into lines—PR (political
Intelligence), X (Scientific Intelligence), KR (Counterintelligence), and N (Illegals),
being the most prominent. Case officers recruited, developed and ran agents on the
streets of American, European, and Asian cities. Though idealism gave way to money
as the major reason men and women spied for the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death,
Soviet case officers continued to find and run agents with access to scientific, politi-
cal, and military information. For example, the KGB residency in London ran Melita
Norwood for more than half a century. In the 1960s, the residency, working with
illegals, ran a penetration of the British Admiralty for several years (Andrews and
Mitrokhin 1999, 115–16).
Following World War II, Moscow could also depend on the services of the intel-
ligence services of the Warsaw Pact countries. The East German HVA, the foreign
intelligence service run by Marcus Wolf, was exceptionally successful in penetrating
the West German security and intelligence services. While many officers in the satel-
lite service dislike Moscow’s tutelage and a few even defected to the West, the KGB
received excellent scientific and technical and military intelligence. One source of
the HVA, an American army sergeant, provided reams of reports on America’s sig-
nal intelligence programs (Herrington 1999, 249–372). While Wolf ’s biography is
self-serving, it provides interesting details of the KGB-HVA entente (Wolf 1997).
3.2 The Far Neighbors: Military Intelligence

The NKVD and later the KGB often referred to their military intelligence colleagues
as “the far neighbors.” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the “Near Neighbors”;
these designations referred to their location in regard to security police headquar-
ters at the Lubyanka.) Military intelligence, known as the Fourth Department of the
General Staff, and later as the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate), also had spec-
tacular successes in the 1920s and 1930s. GRU illegals recruited important sources in
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. As was the case with the civilian
service, almost all military intelligence agents were recruited on the basis on ideol-
ogy and not money or compromise. “Well-wishers” (dobrozhitelya) were the pri-
mary source of military, political, and technical intelligence. In the case of both
services, many of the most effective intelligence officers, case officers, or agent han-
dlers, were non-Russians, Jews, Poles, Latvians, and Germans, all of who served the
revolution selflessly and most of whom perished in the Terror of the late 1930s
(Kolpakid and Prokhorov, chs. 3–4).
The GRU developed during the Stalin years into an all-source intelligence ser-
vice, a responsibility it maintained through the Soviet and post-Soviet years. Military
attaches were posted to diplomatic missions, with responsibility to liaison with host
services and conduct agent recruitment and running. The GRU had responsibility
for military signals intelligence, and in the post-Stalin years long-range aerial sur-
veillance. The GRU also developed an ability to collect and analyze information on
foreign countries’ weapons and military production. The GRU also was responsible
for a daily intelligence report to the general staff, which incorporated information
from all sources (Kolpakid and Prokhorov, ch. 12).
3.3 Warning and Intelligence

The German invasion of the Soviet Union of 22 June 1941 represents one of the
greatest intelligence failures in history, and one that haunts the leaders of Russia to
this day. Within the Soviet Union and now Russia, the issue has been of more than
academic interests, raising issues about Stalin, the role of the Communist Party, and
the competence of the Soviet intelligence services. Stalin received more than 100
specific warnings from the GRU and the KGB. Russian Military Intelligence GRU
illegal agent Richard Sorge, who while living under cover as a journalist recruited
sources with access to German and Japanese war plans, provided Moscow with the
date of the attack. Other GRU and NKVD agents provided detailed information
about German order of battle and tactics.
Stalin had by 1941 so intimidated the GRU and NKVD leadership that they
censored raw intelligence reporting. On one report, Stalin wrote; “You can send this
source to his [expletive deleted] mother! This is not a source but a disinformer”
(Murphy 2005, xv). Stalin dismissed predictions of the attack; ordered the arrest of
case officers he felt were leading the Soviet Union into war; and refused to allow
intelligence officers to review or analyze agents’ reports. The intelligence failure of
22 June 1941 has caused Soviet and Russian political leaders to make “warning” the
major task of the services (Murphy 2005, 137–73).
A possible natural reaction to Operations Barbarossa was the Soviet services’
jaded—not to say paranoid—view of the West following World War II. The KGB
saw Western intelligence’s hand in every foreign and domestic problem facing the
country from foreign radio broadcasts to military operations on the borders. In the
1980s, KGB Chairman Vitaliy Fedochuk warned the Central Committee about the
threat of mixed marriages between Soviets and foreigners and the nefarious sup-
port for American musicians at international music concerts (Albats 1994, 180–82).
Far more dangerous was the creation of a program called RYaN (The Russian ini-
tials for Nuclear Rocket Attack) in the late 1970s that demanded that KGB and GRU
residencies find evidence of a US nuclear first strike. The hyping of poor informa-
tion, combined with the lack of any intelligence analysis, took the United State and
the Soviet Union close to crisis in early 1980s. An excellent account of RYaN, and
Soviet warnings, was written by Benjamin Fischer, and can be found on the CIA
website.
3.4 Intelligence and War Fighting

Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence services played a critical role in victory
over the Nazis. Stalin became a sophisticated consumer of intelligence during the
Great Patriotic War. NKVD and GRU officers played key roles in maskirovka (stra-
tegic deception) that led to major victories at Stalingrad, Kursk, and White Russia.
Foreign intelligence served as a forced multiplier, by providing detailed infor-
mation on the strategies and tactics of both the Germansand Stalin’s war time allies.
The Red Orchestra, a network of spies in Western Europe, provided detailed infor-
mation of German order of battle and strategy. In the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom, Soviet agents produced information on military and scientific
issues. Soviet agent handlers, under both diplomatic cover and as illegals, sent back
thousands of reports on every aspect of Anglo-American grand strategy. There were
Soviet agents in the White House, the State and War Departments, and the OSS,
America’s first civilian intelligence service. In 1944, there were six Soviet agents at
Los Alamos providing details on the American nuclear-weapons program, Soviet
codename Enormoz (Haynes and Klehr 1999, 287–330). In 1945 when Harry Truman
became president, Stalin knew infinitely more about the American weapons pro-
gram than he did. From 1945 to 1949, Beria headed the Soviet nuclear program,
assembling slave labor to build facilities, and encouraging with terror and rewards a
core of scientists to build the bomb. The Soviet successful test of a nuclear weapon
in 1949 was a result of the marriage of Soviet science and intelligence.
Another crucial ingredient of the Soviet victory was counterintelligence. A new
service SMERSH (Smert Spiyonam or Death to Spies) was established within the
Ministry of Defense. Its chief, Viktor Abakumov, created a domestic counterintelli-
gence regime that denied German intelligence access to the Soviet rear. More criti-
cally, SMERSH maintain a series of “radio games” using captured and turned
German agents to feed the German intelligence service misleading information. By
1943, Moscow was able to manipulate Berlin’s perception of Soviet strategy. (Stephan
2004, 61–107).
During the Cold War, the Soviet leadership used the services much as they had
in World War II in managing crises and hiding secrets. Maskirovka was used to
deceive the United States during several crises: in 1962 the Soviet Union moved
more than forty thousand combat troops and nuclear-tipped missiles to Cuba using
wartime measures of denial and deception. The codename for the Cuban operation,
Anadyr, was the name for a river in eastern Siberia. The KGB also worked with the
military-industrial complex in hiding “secret” cities where weapons of mass destruc-
tion were manufactured.
The KGB was integrated into national planning in the Communist Party
Politburo and the Defense Council. Until the end of the Soviet era, KGB officers
continued to hold military ranks, the KGB chairman with the rank of General of the
Army. Senior Soviet Intelligence Officers played key roles in the decision to crack
down on dissident regimes in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. On Christmas
day 1979, KGB commandos stormed the presidential palace in Afghanistan and
killed the Afghan leader and his entourage (Zubok 2007, 259–64).
3.5 Technical Intelligence

The Soviet state lost most of its signal intelligence capacity with the emigration of
the tsarist service’s best officer. The regime quickly developed a signal intelligence
capability, in large part through the recruitment of their opponent’s code clerks.
Soviet illegals recruited several important sources, including two British code clerks.
Both the KGB and the GRU developed sophisticated signals intelligence depart-
ments, collecting intelligence from field stations, ships, and from diplomatic estab-
lishments. The largest signals intercept site outside the Soviet Union was located at
Lourdes, Cuba, where both the GRU and KGB intercepted messages transmitted by
satellites. The KGB yearly reports for the 1960s and 1970s indicate the KGB and GRU
sent approximately one hundred thousand messages to the Central Committee
annually. The annual report for 1960 stated that the KGB intercepted and decrypted
messages from fifty-two countries. By 1967, the KGB was able to decrypt 152 cipher
system employed by a total of 72 states (Andrews and Mitrokhin 1999, 337–54; Zubok
1994, 23).
Very little is known about the GRU satellites. All arms-control treaties between
the United States and the Soviet Union noted “national technical means” were to be
used to verify the agreements by monitoring the adversaries’ weapons systems, sug-
gesting Moscow’s trust in their systems. The GRU has recently posted copies of
satellite photographs of Washington DC on their website and offers photography
for sale through a proprietary company. (www.agentura.ru/dossier, accessed 8
November 2008)
3.6 Covert Action

Covert action, like many Soviet intelligence tactics, had its origins in tsarist Okhrana.
(The Okhrana bribed many French journalists to support investment in Russia and
a Franco-Russian alliance in the years prior to World War I.) Service “A” of the First
Chief Directorate was responsible for “Active Measures,” ranging from building
clandestine ties to political leaders to the bribing of venal politicians, to the
placement of anti-American news stories in Third World journals. Service A effec-

tively used Russian Orthodox Church priests as agents of influence in the World
Council of Churches, according to a Soviet defector (Mitrokhin 1999, 486–507). The
KGB helped the Brezhnev regime build ties to West European governments, suc-
cessfully lobbying for diplomatic recognition and trade agreements (Mitrokhin and
Andrew 2005, 295–330). Perhaps the most infamous example of active measures was
a story placed in an Indian newspaper claiming the AIDS was created by the US
military to destroy people of color. The reason for the placement was to undercut
US prestige; the story is still widely believed in many countries Andrews and
Mitrokhin (2005, 339–40).
Intelligence historians will long debate about the effectiveness of Active
Measures as a form of Soviet and Russian “soft power.” Russian intelligence history
suggests that it will not be abandoned. The deputy chief of the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service (SVR) told an American audience in 1992 that Active Measures
was one of the most important tools of Russian foreign policy (Kirpichenko 1992).
4. Post-Soviet Services
At the time of the fall of the Soviet Union, the KGB had a staff estimated at approxi-
mately 500,000, 240,000 of whom were in the Chief Directorate of Border Guards.
The KGB was a worldwide intelligence services with residencies on every continent.
It had a working liaison relationship with Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, and
had a powerful paramilitary arm that operated within and outside the Soviet Union.
Yeltsin’s reforms were half-hearted and poorly monitored. The notorious Fifth
Directorate was disbanded; the KGB lost its relationship with Eastern European
services; and laws reduced its authority to control dissidents. The KGB was broken
up into five services; all, however, reported directly to office of the president.
Parliamentary and press oversight was limited. While the Communist Party archives
were opened, only a limited effort was made to open the KGB archives—even those
from the Lenin and Stalin eras—and no attempt was made to reveal the identity of
informers. In short, no effort was made in Russia such as the Gauk Commission in
Germany, which publicized the sordid history of the East German STASI, or Bishop
Desmond Tutu’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-Apartheid South
Africa. An American historian presciently wrote in 1996 of the “reforms”: “the defeat
of a coup attempt is not a revolution . . . The fact that the old apparatchiks, including
Yeltsin, are still at the helm is one of the major reasons why Russia has not reformed
its security services” (Knight 1996, 251).
The most important of the services, created from the KGB, are:
• The Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVR) was prior to 1991 the First
Chief Directorate.
• The Federal Security Service (FSB) included the Second (Domestic) and
Third (Military Counterintelligence) Chief Directorates, as well as KGB
provincial, district and city offices.
• The Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information
(FAPSI) included the Eighth (Government Communications) and
|Sixteenth (Signals Intercept) Chief Directorates.
• The Federal Technical and Export Control Service replaced the State
Technical Service (GTK), which had been responsible for technical
counterintelligence.
• The Federal Protective Service (FSO) and the President’s Main Directorate
of Special Programs (GUSP), formerly the Ninth and Fifteen Guards
Directorates, was made responsible for leadership protection and the
security of military and political installations.
Other smaller services have been created to coordinate work against organized
crime, narcotics, and to coordinate the fight against terrorism within the territory
of the former Soviet Union. All these services were directed and largely staffed by
former KGB officers.
The First Chief Directorate of the KGB, responsible for foreign intelligence col-
lection and covert action, went through a number of name changes before being
reborn as the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVR). The SVR leadership is
composed of a director and eight deputies, and maintains most of the same struc-
ture as the KGB’s First Chief Directorate with components responsible for analysis,
political intelligence, foreign counterintelligence, scientific intelligence collection,
and covert action. Like its Soviet predecessors, the SVR maintained officers under
legal cover as well as illegals.
While the SVR did close a number of residencies for financial reasons in the early
1990s, it continued to run several important penetrations of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigations. The most important of these agents
were Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, who betrayed a number of American agents
within the Russian services, at least ten of whom were executed. Ames, a veteran of
the CIA’s clandestine services, provided detailed information about CIA activities
within Russia. Hanssen, an FBI agent responsible for tracking Soviet intelligence
operations in the United States, also had access to US diplomatic and military secrets.
These SVR counterintelligence successes negated important American penetration
of the Russian intelligence services and military industrial complex.
Despite the relative impoverishment of the country in the early 1990s, SVR
chief Yevgeniy Primakov found the money to continue to run agents within the
United States. A former SVR officer, who defected in 2000, has written about SVR
operations in Canada and the United Nations in New York (Earley 2007, 225–54).
His book suggests that the Russian services continued to collect political and scien-
tific/technical intelligence, and to serve as a back-channel diplomatic conduit of
information and influence for the Yeltsin and Putin administrations. Specifically,
the defector claimed SVR agents of influence were able to influence senior Canadian
and US policymakers on political and economic questions.
The SVR did suffer a number of setbacks, however: several senior officers
defected; a retired archivist defected to the British with thousands of pages of reports
on operations against the United States and the United Kingdom; and intelligence
officers from the Baltic to Thailand were exposed and expelled by host governments.
In 2008, a spokesman for the British security service (MI5) stated that Russian intel-
ligence was the third greatest threat to the United Kingdom after Al Qaeda and Iran
(Soldatov 2008, www.agentura.ru.com, accessed 12 October 2008).
Thousands of KGB professionals left the service in the 1990s. Many migrated to
the new business community; others entered the burgeoning Russian criminal
world. Former KGB Deputy Chairman Fillip Bobkov became chief of security of a
major bank, for example. Former Chekists brought foreign language and real-world
experience to legal and illegal enterprises. A few, like an obscure lieutenant colonel
named Vladimir Putin, entered local government and took part in the privatization
of the Soviet economy.
The SVR’s responsibilities changed after 1991. They no longer enjoyed the
cooperation of the East European services, which had provided important scien-
tific and technical intelligence for the Soviet military and civilian economy.
Moreover, the breakup of the Soviet Union forced them to open residencies and
assign officers to what had been republics of the Soviet Union. In the Baltic States,
several SVR officers have been declared persona non grata and expelled for opera-
tional acts. In former Warsaw Pact states, SVR officers have been repeatedly and
publicly accused of fostering anti-American sentiment by sophisticated covert
action aimed at limiting the placement of anti-ballistic missile radar in the Czech
Republic and Poland.
The internal components of the KGB, which dealt with counterintelligence and
internal security, became the Federal Security Service (FSB). The largest internal-
security service in the world, save the Chinese’s, the FSB has also considerable
authority in the fight against terrorism, and against major criminal gangs. The FSB
has also been given authority over the Soviet signals intelligence service, the Federal
Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) and the Border
Guards. The FSB’s major components are responsible for domestic counterintelli-
gence; counterintelligence within the military; counterterrorism; and the struggle
against the mafias (“The Structure of the FSB Headquarters staff,” www.agentura.
ru, accessed 12 October 2008).
Since the collapse of the Soviet system, the FSB has boasted of successful
operations against western intelligence agencies, as well as agencies of former
republics such as Georgia. FSB technical and human counterintelligence opera-
tions remain sophisticated, and the British ambassador to London complained
publicly about the intense counterintelligence regime in Moscow in an interview
in September 2008. While Russian citizens are no longer shot for treason or espio-
nage, many have been sentenced to prison for cooperating with foreign services.
The FSB has also inherited the KGB’s responsibility for counterintelligence within
the military, and has successfully prosecuted several officers for leaking informa-
tion to Western environmental organizations (The Daily Mail [London], 28
September 2008).
Reports by Western and dissident Russian journalists such as Anna Politkovskaya

claim that the FSB has considerable extra-legal powers and has been used to arrest
and possibly murder politicians and journalists seen as opponents of the regime.
The FSB has also been blamed for staging terrorist acts to ignite the Second Chechen
War (Goldfarb and Litvinenko 2007, 109–50; Politkovskaya 2004). An issue raised by
Russian and Western journalists alike is whether elements of the FSB are acting
without political authority in creating acts of violence. Five FSB officers in 1999 said
in a press conference that they had been hired to murder Boris Berezovsky, one of
Russia’s richest men (Goldfarb and Litvinenko 2007, 45–85).
Russian military intelligence grew rapidly in the final years of the Soviet Union
into an intelligence empire. With its headquarters at Khodynka airfield in Moscow,
the military intelligence services continued its responsibilities from the Soviet period,
including daily intelligence briefings for the General Staff and the Ministry of
Defense, and running agents by both attaches and illegals. In the 1990s, several GRU
officers were expelled from Western countries for their intelligence activities. The
GRU after 1991 continued its mission as an all-source intelligence agency with the
ability to collect intelligence from military attaches, signal intercept sites, and recon-
naissance satellites. Agent operations apparently continue to be sophisticated, and
well-funded. The GRU have also played a political role in wars in the Caucasus, sup-
porting and arming pro-Moscow insurgents (Goldfarb and Litvinenko 2007, 18–99).
4. Putin and the Rise of the Siloviki

Vladimir Putin was Boris Yeltsin’s choice to succeed him as president. (The outgo-
ing president apparently selected his successors on the guarantee that neither he nor
his family would be prosecuted for corruption.) Putin, who served as a lieutenant
colonel in the KGB, had risen from a minor position in St Petersburg to FSB chief
and prime minister. Putin, who reportedly models his operational style on former
KGB chairman Andropov, gained tremendous popularity when he moved against
Chechen terrorists promising, to exterminate them, even if they hid in an outhouse.
Putin also quickly moved to bring into the National Security Council, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and other key ministries’ veterans of the KGB and other security
and military industries. These men, dubbed the siloviki, were supporters of a strong
state-centered economy, a powerful Russian state, an end to the mafia wars of the
1990s, and social order. A study by a Russian political scientist in 2006 found that
78 percent of the top thousand leaders of Putin’s Russia belonged to a former
security agency or had ties to it (Levine 2008, 17).
In many ways, Russia benefited from the eight years Putin served as president:
major mafia factions have been either beaten or forced to legalize their enterprises;
the economy has rebounded with oil money; and a middle class has emerged. For
the first time in Russian history, power was not figured in rockets or tanks but
Reports by Western and dissident Russian journalists such as Anna Politkovskaya

claim that the FSB has considerable extra-legal powers and has been used to arrest
and possibly murder politicians and journalists seen as opponents of the regime.
The FSB has also been blamed for staging terrorist acts to ignite the Second Chechen
War (Goldfarb and Litvinenko 2007, 109–50; Politkovskaya 2004). An issue raised by
Russian and Western journalists alike is whether elements of the FSB are acting
without political authority in creating acts of violence. Five FSB officers in 1999 said
in a press conference that they had been hired to murder Boris Berezovsky, one of
Russia’s richest men (Goldfarb and Litvinenko 2007, 45–85).
Russian military intelligence grew rapidly in the final years of the Soviet Union
into an intelligence empire. With its headquarters at Khodynka airfield in Moscow,
the military intelligence services continued its responsibilities from the Soviet period,
including daily intelligence briefings for the General Staff and the Ministry of
Defense, and running agents by both attaches and illegals. In the 1990s, several GRU
officers were expelled from Western countries for their intelligence activities. The
GRU after 1991 continued its mission as an all-source intelligence agency with the
ability to collect intelligence from military attaches, signal intercept sites, and recon-
naissance satellites. Agent operations apparently continue to be sophisticated, and
well-funded. The GRU have also played a political role in wars in the Caucasus, sup-
porting and arming pro-Moscow insurgents (Goldfarb and Litvinenko 2007, 18–99).
4. Putin and the Rise of the Siloviki

Vladimir Putin was Boris Yeltsin’s choice to succeed him as president. (The outgo-
ing president apparently selected his successors on the guarantee that neither he nor
his family would be prosecuted for corruption.) Putin, who served as a lieutenant
colonel in the KGB, had risen from a minor position in St Petersburg to FSB chief
and prime minister. Putin, who reportedly models his operational style on former
KGB chairman Andropov, gained tremendous popularity when he moved against
Chechen terrorists promising, to exterminate them, even if they hid in an outhouse.
Putin also quickly moved to bring into the National Security Council, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and other key ministries’ veterans of the KGB and other security
and military industries. These men, dubbed the siloviki, were supporters of a strong
state-centered economy, a powerful Russian state, an end to the mafia wars of the
1990s, and social order. A study by a Russian political scientist in 2006 found that
78 percent of the top thousand leaders of Putin’s Russia belonged to a former
security agency or had ties to it (Levine 2008, 17).
In many ways, Russia benefited from the eight years Putin served as president:
major mafia factions have been either beaten or forced to legalize their enterprises;
the economy has rebounded with oil money; and a middle class has emerged. For
the first time in Russian history, power was not figured in rockets or tanks but
through the strength of its economy. Putin and his colleagues are also credited with
defeating terrorists and separatist movements in the Caucasus and for reducing
street crime—the bane of the Yeltsin years. In foreign affairs, in the words of a
senior Kremlin envoy, “Russia has returned. It should be reckoned with” (Levine
2008, 33).
There has been of course a dramatic downside. The FSB, like the KGB in Stalin’s
time, has apparently hunted down enemies at home and abroad. Former oligarchs,
seen as enemies of the new Russia, were frightened into exile or sentenced to lengthy
prison terms. The assassination of a Chechen leader in Qatar in 2004, as well as the
murder with radioactive polonium of Aleksandr Litvinenko, an FSB defector in
London, and the fatal shooting of Anna Politkovskaya—both in 2006—are just
three incidents which can be traced back to the siloviki. (A former KGB officer, who
was identified as Litvinenko’s murder, ran successfully for the Russian parliament,
and an FSB officer was identified as a member of the gang that killed Politkovskaya.)
Putin and his successor Dmitry Medvedev have changed Russia: critics and sup-
porters alike opine that they have created a post-Soviet authoritarian Russian state
similar to that planned by tsarist prime minister Petr Stolypin or Communist Party
General secretary Yuri Andropov.
Counterterrorism tactics by the FSB have on two important occasions shown a
disregard for Russian and international law, as well as human lives. Politkovskaya
documented FSB tortures and assassination in Chechnya. In 2002, gas was used to
immobilize Chechen terrorists who had stormed Nord-Ost Theater in Moscow. All
41 terrorist were subsequently killed by the gas or shot, but 129 hostages inside the
theater also perished. In 2004 Chechen activists took 1300 teachers and students
hostage in a school in Beslan. In the subsequent paramilitary assault on the school
330 students and teachers died. In both cases, the FSB and other security services
acted before hostage negotiations with terrorists had been concluded. Foreign crit-
ics are concerned with the lack of professionalism as well as the disregard for inno-
cent hostages. While the FSB has inherited the mantle of the KGB with responsibility
for surveillance of the society, it lacks training, tactics, and cadres to deal with
sophisticated Islamic terrorist movements, and terrorist incidents.
Putin heralded the successes of living and deceased Soviet intelligence officers
and their agents. George Koval, a naturalized American citizen who served as a GRU
illegal and penetrated the Manhattan Project, received posthumous recognition in
2007. More ominous, counterintelligence officers, who played roles in the collectiv-
ization of agriculture which claimed millions of lives, have had stamps issued in
their name. Even Viktor Abakumov, Stalin’s minister of state security, has had his
death sentenced posthumously repealed. Putin has publicly placed flowers on a bust
of Andropov and toasted Stalin at public functions.
Has Russian intelligence history run full circle? The FSB has adopted a Russian
church and maintains an interesting website which provides access to hundreds of
valuable historical documents (www.fsb.ru). The SVR publicly discusses the fight
against terror and international crime. Both services are far more open to public
scrutiny than the Soviet KGB. Nevertheless, much remains the same:
• Services of the post-Soviet and Soviet era unabashedly served and now serve
political leaders.
• Operations against “enemies” at home and abroad are condoned, if not
sanctioned by the leadership.
• The intelligence and security services remain robust, well-financed, and
capable of suborning help from Russian citizens when necessary. As it was in
the tsarist and soviet people, informers and domestic surveillance remains a
staple of the security service’s responsibilities.
• The services have attracted competent people, who are capable of innovative
tactics. The creative use of the computer attacks that drove Georgian
communications off the air prior to the summer 2008 crisis demonstrates
the services’ ability to develop non-traditional allies and tactics.
• Most importantly, the services play a critical role in policy making in
Moscow, and are trusted by the political elite. Foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence services are involved in the warp and woof of
decision-making. Intelligence officers occupy critical positions in the foreign
ministry, the National Security Council, and key industries and businesses.
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chapter 47
THE GERMAN BUNDESNACH-

RICHTENDIENST (BND):
EVOLUTION AND
CURRENT POLICY ISSUES
wolfgang krieger
1. Introduction
Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND, is
marked by several peculiarities. The first one is its role as Germany’s single for-
eign and military espionage agency. Unlike most other western nations such as
Britain, France, or the United States, Germany has no separate military intelli-
gence service or services. Thus the BND integrates most functions of a military
intelligence service, excepting only the protection of the German armed forces
(Bundeswehr) from foreign espionage, which is organized in a separate institu-
tion, the MAD or Office for the Protection of the Armed Forces. After a consider-
able reshuffling of responsibilities in December 2007, the Bundeswehr retained
some units for tactical reconnaissance but had to close down its Center for
Military Information (ZNBw), which had provided the minister of defense with
a separate capacity for the analysis of a wide range of security-related intelli-
gence. Now the military depends entirely on the BND for all analysis and for
most of intelligence gathering. These changes have produced serious doubts
among the senior military since the BND operates under the chancellor’s office
the german bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) 791
but employs a considerable number of military personnel among its staff of

about six thousand.1
The second peculiarity is the absence within the BND of an acknowledged
capacity for covert operations. This has been the official position since the end of
the Cold War when the BND was finally put on a statutory basis.2 It is a point of
reference every time the activities of the BND come under fire either from the
press or in the parliamentary oversight committee of the Bundestag (federal par-
liament) or both. But what does this mean in practice? Does the BND no longer
provide secret funding for foreign political movements as it did, for example, in
Spain and Portugal before they became democracies in the mid-1970s? Does it
no longer engage in disinformation campaigns? Has it stopped its secret sup-
plies of arms and other “forbidden” items to foreign governments and rebel
movements?
There is little evidence either way. But since the Bundeswehr maintains an
acknowledged capacity for clandestine operations, the need for tactical and strate-
gic intelligence support is obvious. After the intelligence reforms of 2007 much of
this support must come from the BND. In recent years these “special forces” of 1,100
soldiers have operated in former Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere. They
were established in 1996, after the 1994 crisis in Rwanda, when German nationals
had to be rescued by Belgian special forces because Germany had no such
capability.
While it is true that the BND law of 1990 contains no language referring to a
capability for covert operations, it does not explicitly exclude them either. Indeed,
that law deals essentially with the parameters for information management within
the framework of data privacy rather than with the totality of the BND’s operational
mandate. The latter is determined by the head of the chancellor’s office, with the
rank of cabinet minister, who is in charge of executive tasking and oversight of all
three federal intelligence services. (The third one being the domestic service BfV
described below.)
A third peculiarity has resulted from the historical origins of the BND during
the early Cold War. In 1946, US military intelligence in Europe created a German
intelligence unit under American operational control and staffed it with former
Wehrmacht officers who had served in intelligence during the German war against
the Soviet Union (Krieger 2007; Critchfield 2003). It became known by the name of
1
The precise reasons for these changes have never been made public. From private
conversations with senior Bundeswehr officers one gets the impression that the military was
simply overruled by the stronger institutional battalions of the chancellor’s office.
2
The BND’s name itself suggests that it only deals with “Nachrichten,” which literally means
“news” and is usually applied to press reporting. One is reminded of its predecessor, the “Abwehr,”
which literally means “defense” (against foreign espionage) while in reality it was a full-fledged
foreign and military intelligence service with a considerable capacity for clandestine warfare and
sabotage. The lack of a German word for “intelligence” (in the sense of secret information and
operations) makes it easy to hide behind a screen of innocent terminology.
its leader, former Wehrmacht general Reinhard Gehlen, who in 1956 became the first
president of the BND. At the same time the majority of his staff was transferred to
the new BND.
How did this peculiar metamorphosis happen? At the end of the war Gehlen
had preserved a collection of files and materials which he put at the disposal of
US army intelligence. He identified a large number of his former collaborators,
held in POW camps all around western Germany, who were willing to work with
American intelligence. After considerable head-scratching they were given oper-
ational tasks. Gehlen’s radio specialists proved particularly useful during the
Berlin airlift because they could record and decipher Soviet tactical communica-
tions. Their work helped the western Allied powers track Soviet military activi-
ties throughout eastern Germany. Thus the Americans knew that Stalin was not
about to launch a surprise attack on them. Other parts of project RUSTY, as the
Gehlen organization was called, debriefed German POWs who returned from
Soviet POW camps. Building up and maintaining a ground-level network of
informers in the Soviet-occupied part of Germany was yet another task per-
formed by RUSTY.
When the CIA was founded and eventually became operational in Europe the
need for the Gehlen group became less obvious. The CIA hesitated until 1949 before
taking charge of it. It did so grudgingly at a moment when West German rearma-
ment was on the horizon and when the United States was keen to influence the
emerging German military structures in order to make sure that a new German
army would not position itself politically half way between Moscow and the West.
Thus the Gehlen organization became a large waiting room in which suitable ex-
Wehrmacht officers could be employed temporarily until the political battles over
German rearmament were terminated. As it turned out an agreed policy between
Britain, France, and the United States had to wait until 1954.3
By the time the BND was established in 1956, as part of West German rearma-
ment within the NATO framework, the Bonn government had already abandoned
its previous efforts to build up a military intelligence organization from scratch and
with people of its own choice. This choice was never explained to the German pub-
lic, though it met with considerable criticism from the parliamentary opposition
parties. It seems that at the time the numerous political battles over the armed forces
left no time and energy for the government to develop a coherent policy on foreign
and military intelligence. In this way Gehlen and his associates, who had been intel-
ligence mercenaries for the Americans over a period of ten years, gave the Americans
a unique intelligence asset of sorts deep inside the West German government. The
last head of the BND who had worked for the Americans was Eberhard Blum,
recruited in 1947. He retired in 1985.
3
The West German border police (Bundesgrenzschutz), founded in 1951, was another
“waiting room” for ex-Wehrmacht personnel.
2. Evolution
By the time Reinhard Gehlen was appointed as the first “president” of the BND, in
1956, he had made a considerable effort to involve himself and his organization
in the politics of the young Bonn republic. He understood perfectly well that his
special ties to the Americans, indeed his subordination to the CIA, would not make
him easily acceptable to a body of German politicians and government officials who
were tired of having American, British, and French diplomats and military brass
breathing down their necks.
Gehlen developed three avenues of influence into the German government
apparatus. First, he hired a great number of senior ex-Wehrmacht officers irrespec-
tive of their lack of expertise in intelligence work. In this way he helped them make
the transition from Allied POW camps to an eventual posting in the new German
army, which the three foreign ministers had decided on at their New York meeting
in September 1950, in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War. Though the gov-
ernment of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had followed up on that decision by
recruiting a small military staff to prepare for a German rearmament, that outfit
was far too small to accommodate the large numbers of volunteers and of senior
officers needed for an army of several hundred thousand soldiers. (Eventually, the
three powers agreed on a ceiling of 495,000.) Based on currently available evidence
it is not clear how hard Gehlen had to work in order to persuade his CIA overseers
to keep all those officers out of the civilian German labor market. We only know it
happened at a time when that market picked up sharply due to the economic boom
triggered by west European and above all by American rearmament during the
Korean War.
By the time the Bundeswehr’s officer corps began to be built up in 1955 Gehlen
had already established a network of loyalties inside it, which helped him achieve
his desired goal of heading a single foreign and military intelligence service. After
all, the first military chief of the Bundeswehr, General Adolf Heusinger, had been
Gehlen’s chief of intelligence analysis in 1948–50. One of Gehlen’s most trusted lieu-
tenants, Colonel (later General) Gerhard Wessel, left the organization to pursue a
career in the Bundeswehr, where he was instrumental in preventing the develop-
ment of a separate intelligence capacity. He would later return to the BND as
Gehlen’s successor from 1968 to 1978.
The second avenue of influence was to build up a relationship with a key mem-
ber of the chancellor’s office, Hans Globke, for whom he provided a wide variety of
information ranging from intelligence in the proper sense to “dirty linen” gathered
under the cover of intelligence and counterintelligence. This gave Adenauer the
opportunity to discredit political opponents at will and to keep his ministers and
high officials under wraps. In addition, Gehlen provided regular briefings on the
international security picture to the chancellor who received, however, additional
briefings directly from CIA officials. Adenauer, who had never served in the mili-
tary, was not easily impressed by military officers, above all not by Germans. It
appears that he did not entirely succumb to Gehlen’s charm offensive though he
welcomed his sinister help. Some years later he developed an outright hostility
toward Gehlen but failed to replace him.
Thirdly, Gehlen approached a number of members of the Bundestag (federal
parliament), including opposition members. By giving them individual briefings,
inviting them to the Pullach headquarters and providing saucy information about
various personalities in politics, journalism, and business, he developed a certain
degree of loyalty. This was above all needed during the weeks when the federal bud-
get was discussed in parliament. After all, even the most secret government activities
needed funding which had to be approved by parliament. The Bundestag estab-
lished a parliamentary oversight committee of sorts which consisted of the leaders
of the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag. It did not, however, have a clearly
defined mandate. Its rather infrequent meetings were initiated by the chancellor,
who also took the chair. A small number of parliamentarians involved themselves in
matters concerning the BND’s day-to-day workings, particularly in the selection of
senior staff. Many others, particularly parliamentarians from the political left, were
ill at ease with the BND, its legacy, and its chief. Given Gehlen’s background it was
to be expected that he would favor people with conservative political leanings over
liberals or social-democrats. Another issue of concern was the employment of for-
mer Nazis of various shades.
Gehlen had a rather peculiar way of selecting his staff. His preference was to
hire young men from professional military families, including his own. He literally
employed his own brothers, son, daughter, nieces and nephews, and of course his
in-laws. The same hiring pattern was followed with respect to the female staff, most
of them working as secretaries, translators, and other lower-grade office workers. In
terms of pro-active counterintelligence, this was perhaps wise since the descendents
of military families were usually imbued with a spirit of service to the German
nation and with the kind of “manners” fit for the gentlemanly age of foreign intel-
ligence. But it had its obvious drawbacks, too, since the sons of such well-known
families could not easily work and live under a false identity. Eventually, starting in
the 1960s, the BND began to recruit from a much wider social spectrum and with a
preference for people who had the scientific or engineering backgrounds needed for
mastering the new information technologies. Lawyers and journalists were also
favored. As in other government agencies, women remained a rare sight in manage-
rial and senior positions at least until the 1970s.
Scandals were frequent at the BND during the early years. They provided
opportunities for parliament to investigate the policies of Gehlen and his succes-
sors. Among the most serious was the Felfe/Clemens case. Those two former SS
officers began working for Gehlen in the early 1950s, presumably because of their
expertise in police and counterintelligence work, particularly work directed against
communists, which they had acquired during the Nazi era. Both, however, had pre-
viously signed up with the KGB and were employed to misdirect and to subvert
western intelligence. The Soviets helped Heinz Felfe build up an alleged network
of spies which produced masses of material, including what was believed to be a
complete organizational picture of the Soviet military administration in Karlshorst

(Berlin). Felfe was among Gehlen’s favourites. He moved up to the position of chief
of counterintelligence responsible for fighting Soviet penetration. By the time Felfe,
Hans Clements, and their collaborators within the BND were arrested in November
1961 they had delivered many thousands of documents and microfilms to Moscow
and had betrayed the identities of close to two hundred CIA and BND agents. They
had thoroughly misled not only the BND but also the CIA.
After Felfe, Clemens, and their associates were imprisoned there remained the
more general question of what to do about the other former SS people in the service
of the BND. How many were there? Why had they not been recognized as special
security risks?
These questions have not been fully answered even today. While many of those
people were removed from Gehlen’s payroll when his service became a German
federal office in 1956 or later, it seems that a considerable number of them were
retained on a freelance basis under the designation of “Y-Personal” (Waske 2009, 94).
Their total number may have been around one hundred.4
A year later, in 1962, the Spiegel crisis rocked the West German republic. At the
surface this crisis was about a press report allegedly containing defense secrets con-
cerning the inadequacies of the Bundeswehr’s training and armaments. This report
was published by Der Spiegel, a newsweekly highly skeptical of NATO defense and
nuclear policies. Some of the information in the article had been leaked by senior
officials in the German defense department who had an axe to grind with their
minister, Franz Josef Strauss. At the same time Der Spiegel was known to have good
relations with the BND. In fact, the article had been submitted in advance to the
BND to help with fact-checking and to ascertain that no “real” secrets were to be
disclosed.
Strauss and Chancellor Adenauer were upset that the BND, which was directly
subordinate to the chancellor’s office, should provide such assistance. They started
a legal investigation and had the editor and two of his senior journalists arrested for
suspicion of treason. This created a public outcry. The freedom of the press seemed
at stake, at least as far as the numerous political opponents of Adenauer and Strauss
were concerned (Schoenbaum 1968).
Underneath that public quarrel was another, concerning military intelligence.
Strauss had been dissatisfied with the services rendered by the BND and wished to
strengthen the Bundeswehr’s intelligence capacities. To Gehlen and his people such
plans had to be fought with all possible means, including disloyalty to the govern-
ment. Adenauer, who suspected an American intrigue against him and his defense
policy, scolded the US ambassador that “the US had burdened him with Gehlen.” In
the end, Strauss was fired and Gehlen remained in office though Adenauer from
4
See also Hachmeister’s (2008) book review and letters concerning James Critchfield’s book
(Partners at the Creation . . . ), in Foreign Affairs (November/December 2004); the figure of one
hundred former SS men is taken from the letter to the editor by ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck
who headed the BND in 1985–90.
that point refused to be briefed by him. His successor, Ludwig Erhard (1963–66),
took little interest in intelligence, leaving Gehlen to carry on without much guid-
ance from the government and with less control by the federal parliament (Waske
2009, 67–72).
By then the German press had discovered the BND as one of those Cold War
institutions that responded badly to the public demands for social and political
change. Those demands would ultimately explode in the student revolt of the 1960s.
Apart from the simmering issue of “old Nazis” there was a growing debate on the
BND’s “illegal” wire-tapping activities inside West Germany which, like Gehlen’s
“special files” on various political figures, were often targeted at “political trouble-
makers.” To be sure, the BND and the agencies responsible for domestic intelligence
were acting in something like a legal vacuum left by the incomplete agreement
between the Bonn government and the three western victor powers. The latter
reserved the right to carry out or to mandate such intrusions so long as there was no
German law regulating interceptions. Eventually this situation was brought under
control by legislation. In 1978 a special oversight committee for wire-tapping was
established. It reported to the federal parliament and had to grant individual per-
missions in each case (Krieger 2009).
When the social democrats led by Willy Brandt first participated in the federal
government in 1966 they began to focus not only on the BND’s spy-work against
them but also on its personnel management and on its operating procedures. An
investigation was launched, headed by three senior personalities, which produced a
long list of grave management failures as well as gross distortions of what the BND
had been producing in terms of intelligence output during the 1960s. The “Mercker”
report, submitted to the government in 1969, has not been fully released as of this
writing. In retrospect, the most senior civil servant in the chancellor’s office at the
time, Karl Carstens, called it one of the most gripping documents he had ever read.
(Carstens was federal president from 1979 to 1984.) One of the results of this inves-
tigation was a considerable strengthening of executive oversight and a number of
sweeping reforms under Gehlen’s successor Gerhard Wessel. The BND also revised
its hiring practices in order to attract young people with a more moderate view of
the Cold War ideologies. But finding suitable senior intelligence managers with a
Social Democratic Party book turned out to be a tricky problem, even after Brandt
became chancellor in 1969.
While it is relatively easy to trace the BND’s failures, particularly when moles
were uncovered and tried before law courts, there is little in the way of solid material
in the public domain to document the BND’s achievements. Only the massive col-
lection effort against Soviet armed forces stationed in eastern Germany can now be
traced in some detail from BND files released to the German federal archives. The
bulk of this material relates to the days before the Berlin wall was built in 1963. In
those days it was still possible for BND agents to meet personally with many of their
informants who were doing the donkey work of counting Soviet vehicles, recording
their markings, and estimating the military personnel in each Soviet military facil-
ity (Wagner and Uhl 2007).
From these and other sources it seems reasonable to assume that throughout the
Cold War eastern Germany was the BND’s main intelligence target, including of course
the Soviet forces in place and their relations with other Warsaw Pact armed forces. Its
expertise on Warsaw Pact conventional forces was superb and highly respected within
NATO. As an offshoot a highly profitable relationship was formed with Israel based on
the important fact that Israel was threatened by its Arab neighbors mostly with Soviet
and other Warsaw Pact weaponry. After each of the Middle Eastern wars Israel shared
with the Germans the captured Soviet equipment. Beyond comparing notes on the
latest in Soviet weaponry, Israel and West Germany jointly developed equipment for
their defense against those weapons systems (Shpiro 2004 and 2006). The BND also
supported Israel in other ways, for example with false flag operations such as those
carried out by Israeli agent Wolfgang Lotz in Nasser’s Egypt (Lotz, W 1972).
While it is known that the BND had extensive networks in the Middle East and in
Africa their purpose is much less clear. West Germany had no post-colonial ties in
those parts of the world that could be compared to Britain’s or France’s. Neither was
it in a position to distribute money and weapons on the scale of US intelligence, which
competed directly with Soviet and Chinese influence. The Germans did, however, play
an important role in supporting democratic forces in Spain and Portugal during the
Franco and Salazar dictatorships. This support paid off nicely after the fall of those
dictatorships in 1974/75 when many of the beneficiaries moved into leadership posi-
tions. By contrast it is far from clear to what extent the BND was able to influence the
struggle for democracy in eastern Europe, leading up to the 1989 “springtime of
nations.” Since it was barred from having permanent stations in the Warsaw Pact
countries it would appear such aid was likely to have been quite limited.
The end of the Cold War spelled much trouble for the BND. Among left-wing
politicians there was an urge to abolish it along with other cold war institutions.
Joschka Fischer’s Green Party even introduced an official motion to that effect in the
Bundestag, just two years before Fischer became foreign minister. Instead of being
closed down the BND was forced to reduce its staff. At the same time it was shaken
by the discovery of several moles deep inside its senior staff. There followed a frantic
mole-hunt which even targeted Volker Foertsch, one of the BND’s most senior fig-
ures, who was the current chief of counterintelligence. This son of a Wehrmacht
general had been recruited in 1957 and had climbed right to the top of the BND hier-
archy. As it turned out Foertsch was fully cleared of all charges, but took early retire-
ment, partly because his case had been leaked to the press. Among the real moles was
Gabriele Gast, uncovered in 1990, who had worked in the BND for seventeen years as
a Soviet specialist and had been on intimate terms with the East German Stasi’s for-
eign intelligence chief Markus Wolf who acted as her control.
If press leaks are any indication of the BND’s internal troubles, the 1990s were a
period of extreme frustration. The full extent of that crisis became apparent when the
oversight committee of the Bundestag ordered a special enquiry. It was led by a retired
federal judge who was given access to pertinent BND files. His report (“Schäfer-
Bericht”) uncovered a whole swamp of affairs inside the BND. It came to the conclu-
sion that a considerable part of the service was malfunctioning, largely because of
bureaucratic infighting. Moreover, it had used dubious methods to identify those on

the inside who might have passed confidential information to various journalists.
Certain journalists were even brought to spy on their colleagues. Others were put
under observation as if they had been suspected of major crimes while in actual prac-
tice they only did their job as guaranteed by freedom-of-the-press legislation.
To add insult to injury, the parliamentary oversight committee released that
classified report in May 2006 after deleting only the names of the victims but not
their circumstantial identification in the text. Thus even a lay-person could identify
them by consulting the Internet about “journalist X, the well-known author of such
and such a book,” with the book’s title freely supplied in the text. The Schäfer-
Bericht was put on the Bundestag’s website. It gained enormous popularity, not in
the least because it appeared to confirm what critics had always suspected about the
quality of the BND’s intelligence work.5 Indeed, the BND leadership never even
managed to identify the sources of those press leaks.
3. Current Issues
Even twenty years after the Berlin wall came down the BND is still in the process of
adapting to the twin developments that dominate German security policy today.
The first evolved as the German defense institutions changed from a large defensive
force, with an enormous army of tanks and artillery, to a much smaller, much more
mobile crisis intervention force suitable for the new world of multinational crisis
management, mostly far from Europe. The second is related to the focus on inter-
national terrorism, organized international crime, and WMD proliferation which
has largely replaced the intelligence work on Soviet armament and strategy during
the Cold War, hitherto the BND’s main line of business.
While international terrorism and WMD concerns had long been on the BND’s
agenda, the requirements for supporting an entirely new defense posture and policy
were difficult to meet. For over twenty years Germany’s armed forces (more pre-
cisely West Germany’s) had not been a national force directed by a national govern-
ment for national purposes but an element, albeit a very large one, of NATO-coalition
defense forces under SACEUR. Therefore the BND, in terms of its military intelli-
gence functions, did not have to provide any stand-alone strategic or tactical intel-
ligence. Its job was rather to contribute to NATO intelligence. Since the 1990s, when
German armed forces began to be deployed in various peace-making missions, the
lack of adequate intelligence support became apparent. German military units had
to beg other nations’ armies for intelligence. This was particularly embarrassing
during the 1999 Kosovo war (Goebel 2000).
5
The text can be found on the following website: http://www.bundestag.de/aktuell/
archiv/2006/pkg/index.html; see also “Die Schnüffler vom Dienst” in Der Spiegel (22 May 2006).
The Bundeswehr was understandably angry at this kind of intelligence failure.

There followed an institutional battle over who could and should provide the newly
required military intelligence. While the details of this battle have been carefully
hidden from public view it is obvious that the BND won. At the end of 2007 the
Bundeswehr’s office for military intelligence (ZNBw) was closed down. Of its 650
full-time posts, 270 were transferred to the BND. This decision was taken against
the advice of many senior military leaders who had wished to enhance the existing
ZNBw structure, making it into a fully functioning military intelligence service
along the lines of the British model. Their proposal was turned down by the politi-
cal leadership. The Bundeswehr only retained its strategic intelligence command
(KSA), headquartered near Bonn in 2002. It comprises all mobile technical intelli-
gence gathering and electronic warfare units. It is also responsible for satellite imag-
ery derived from the five German SAR-Lupe mini-satellites. The KSA now has about
7,000 full-time posts, of which 10 percent are filled with civilians. This figure includes
several hundred specialists inherited from the former ZNBw. The German navy has
some additional capacities for intelligence gathering while on overseas mission. The
related personnel are integrated with small naval infantry or marine units, another
novelty of the sweeping military reforms.
One of the most surprising aspects of this bureaucratic saga is that all this hap-
pened under the “red-green” government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his
foreign minister Joschka Fischer. In 1998, soon after he came into office, Schröder
appointed a new head of the BND. His somewhat surprising choice was a typical
conservative German mandarin, August Hanning, who had loyally served Schröder’s
right-of-center predecessor Helmut Kohl. Schröder even took the most unusual
step of travelling to the BND headquarters on the outskirts of Munich (“Pullach”)
in order to introduce the new boss to his staff. Hanning immediately announced the
creation of a liaison staff of two hundred people in Berlin, the new seat of the
German government and federal parliament as of 1999. In Bonn the BND liaison
staff had been considerably smaller. A year later, Hanning announced that the entire
analysis staff of one thousand people would be transferred to Berlin. All this hap-
pened well before 9/11 and the many changes it entailed for the intelligence
community.
While several of Hanning’s predecessors had tried without success to move the
BND to the seat of the government, the Schröder government was now willing to
accept it, albeit without stating its reasoning in public. Being so far from the seat of
government shaped not only the BND but also its relations with the governments in
Bonn. While one could well understand why Chancellor Adenauer had preferred to
keep Gehlen’s motley crew at arm’s length, headquartered in Pullach some four
hundred miles to the southeast of Bonn, that remoteness became increasingly
absurd as the German federal bureaucracy matured. It made it nearly impossible for
the BND to interact with the defense and foreign ministries at the working level. Yet
every government, including Kohl’s after German unification, refused to consider
such a move. As to the reasons, one can only speculate. Perhaps Kohl did not wish
to give the BND any special importance at a time when German unification had
raised the specter of a more “assertive” Germany. Bringing the BND closer to the
seat of political power might have been seen as a signal for a more independent
German foreign and security policy.
While Kohl wished to be seen as a “good European,” Schröder was quite willing
to pursue a more assertive foreign policy. His refusal in 2002 to join the war coali-
tion against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was the prime example of this new orientation,
and incidentally helped him win the 2002 German federal elections. It is therefore
no mere coincidence that the decision for the complete transfer of the BND to
Berlin was made in this context.
During a meeting of the cabinet committee for national security in April 2003,
Hanning raised the issue of moving the BND headquarters to Berlin. After a brief
debate the chancellor and his most senior ministers approved this proposal (Gujer
2006). This decision was made exactly at the moment when the American-British
coalition forces had overcome Iraqi military resistance and looked like they had
achieved their goals brilliantly. At that point it seemed likely that the two main vic-
tor powers would put the heat on their skeptical friends, such as Germany, and force
them to shoulder “their share” of the post-Saddam clean-up—though without get-
ting their hands on the most lucrative international contracts for rebuilding Iraq’s
infrastructure and oil industry. In that situation the Berlin government would either
be submissive as Chancellor Kohl had been during the previous Iraq war, to which
the Germans (along with the Japanese) had been forced to make a massive financial
contribution. Or else, Berlin would pursue its assertive course of a more “national”
foreign policy, contributing to world security only at times and in places of its own
choosing. The obvious consequence of the latter course was to speed up the reforms
of the German military and intelligence capabilities.
Admittedly, there is a danger of reading too much into this issue. Schröder
and Hanning may simply have used a moment of intense uncertainty, when
Germany’s public attention was focused uncomfortably on the events in Iraq, to
do what they had long intended to do. Moreover, Schröder’s “opposition” to the
Iraq war was much softer than it appeared. Throughout that war American armed
forces were making full use of their bases, including their support and command
structure on German territory, without the slightest complaint from Berlin. Some
years later it was revealed that the BND actively supported US war operations, in
part through two BND agents on the ground in Bagdad (and sheltered in the
French embassy).
This clandestine support later became the focus of a parliamentary inquiry in
which Chancellor Angela Merkel’s foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, was
the chief target because he had been responsible for executive oversight of all federal
intelligence activities during the Schröder government. In December 2008 his pre-
decessor, Joschka Fischer, stepped out of retirement to testify before a parliamen-
tary committee: “I gave the green light in early 2003.” True or not, that statement
does not entirely clear Steinmeier of the charges brought against him. Both he and
Fischer resolutely denied that those BND agents did anything to support American
war-fighting. By contrast, U.S. General James Marks, who had been working in
military intelligence in Iraq at the time, strongly emphasized their “extreme useful-
ness” to American war-fighting.6
Apart from the usual political game in which the political opposition goes after
a government minister, the political far-left saw an opportunity to damage
Steinmeier, who hoped to succeed chancellor Merkel after the September 2009 fed-
eral elections. At the same time those same parliamentarians wished to hurt the
BND as an institution. The idea of having 3,000 BND staff or more inside the city
of Berlin (of an expected total of 6,500) clearly made them uncomfortable.
Meanwhile, work goes forward at a huge construction site just 700 yards north of
the chancellery in Berlin where the BND hopes to reside by 2012.
The complete reorientation of the Bundeswehr has not only assigned an
enhanced role to the BND. It has also made the Berlin-Potsdam area (once again!)
into the new hub of German security policy. While the nominal seat of the ministry
of defense remains located in Bonn, a new command center for overseas operations
has been established near Potsdam. The ministry’s Berlin headquarter is housed in
the historic “Bendler Block,” built in 1911–1914 as the seat of the imperial German
navy (On 20 July 1944 it was the site where some of the leaders of the attempted
assassination of Hitler were shot, among them Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg.)
Numerous other military institutions have been moved to that region as well. In
2004 the joint center for defense against terrorism (GTAZ) was set up in Berlin-
Treptow. It brings together some 220 representatives from all German intelligence
services, including those of the 16 Länder (states) and their criminal-police offices,
and the military and federal security agencies. In this way, a completely new security
infrastructure has been built up in and around Berlin which deals both with the new
overseas military engagements and the new concern with anti-terrorism, WMD pro-
liferation, and international organized crime. Needless to say that the German intel-
ligence services, including the BND, have a large stake in these new institutions.
Against this background it is easy to see why the BND’s relocation to Berlin has
been essential to its institutional survival. Never again would it be sidestepped in
big-time national-security decision making as it had been in 1990, during the nego-
tiations for German unification. That “tense non-relationship between Bonn and
Pullach,” as its former chief Hans-Georg Wieck has described it, would have to come
to an end (Wentker 2008, 344). Neither would it rely on the erstwhile mantra that
“modern communication makes it unnecessary to be physically close to the center
of political decision-making” as argued by numerous opponents both within and
outside the BND. “Pullach” is now history, even if the actual removal of all staff will
take a few more years.
Aside from this external adaptation to a new security environment, the BND
had to undergo an internal reshuffling of people and resources. The biggest reform
was undertaken in 2008. It essentially did away with the organizational separation
of intelligence gathering and intelligence analysis, hitherto organized on each side
6
For details, see Der Spiegel, online international ed. (16 December 2008) “The Germans
Were Invaluable to Us.”
in geographical and functional offices. The new scheme is essentially arranged by

functions, leaving only two geographical departments. Intelligence support for cur-
rent Bundeswehr missions now has a separate division, as do terrorism and prolif-
eration. There are several divisions for dealing with intelligence-related technologies,
including signals intelligence, which is organized in separate services in Britain, in
the United States, and elsewhere, but not so in Germany. To underline the long-
term nature of this restructuring, the BND chief now has a deputy director for
institutional reforms. To emphasize the new responsibilities in operational military
intelligence the second deputy director is a major-general from the Bundeswehr
while the third deputy director is a career diplomat. Previously the typical arrange-
ment had been a military man as chief of intelligence gathering and a diplomat at
the head of the analysis branch.
The combination of a physical relocation of headquarters and a fundamental
organizational reform has produced much ill-will inside the BND. The current
BND leadership has lived through a number of crises which have found their expres-
sions in the press and in the parliamentary oversight committee of the Bundestag,
both usually acting in tandem. Relations with the oversight staff inside the chancel-
lor’s office are tense. Few senior politicians are willing to defend the BND against
public criticism. Chancellor Merkel keeps a great distance, leaving her chief-of-staff
and minister for special duties, Thomas de Mazière, to handle those matters. (His
father had been one of the founding generals of the Bundeswehr.)
The still-inconclusive debates on the BND’s role during the 2003 Iraq war, men-
tioned above, are only one of several issues related to German-American relations
in security matters. Another concerns the “extraordinary rendition” flights that the
CIA routed through Germany (among many other countries) in order to subject
suspected terrorists to intense questioning. In a June 2006 report the Council of
Europe estimated that one hundred people had been kidnapped by CIA officers on
EU territory. In a February 2007 report the number of rendition flights is put at
1,245.7 So far no answer has been given by the German government to the many
allegations made in this context, which obviously touch on the role of the BND.
Another “intelligence crisis” concerns the young Turkish-German Murat
Kurnaz who was captured by the Americans in Pakistan shortly after the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks, and eventually kept at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. In August
2006 he was released without being charged. (He features in the 2008 John le Carré
novel A Most Wanted Man.) Why had the German authorities not tried to get Kurnaz
freed much earlier even though intelligence contacts had indicated that he turned
out to be “small fry”? What had been the role of German intelligence and police
authorities?
To many in Germany, particularly (but by no means only!) those on the politi-
cal left, the Kurnaz case represents the submissive policies of Germany vis-à-vis the
United States when it comes to security and intelligence issues. But there is also a
7
Supporting documentation is found in http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/
AdoptedText/ta06/ERES1507.htm.
deep concern with civil liberties in which the intelligence services, along with the
police, figure prominently.
Like most countries, Germany responded to the 9/11 events with a wide range
of new legislation granting all sorts of new special privileges to the security and
intelligence community. They range from electronic surveillance, particularly
related to Internet access and private use, to new police and judicial regulations
concerning people suspected of planning terrorist acts or of supporting any type of
associated organization. In this context the BND was given authority not only to
acquire such information but especially to make such information available to law-
enforcement agencies. Hitherto, such access had been very tightly regulated, based
on the assumption that police work and intelligence should be kept very far apart.
Now the new anti-terrorism policies call for a close cooperation between all govern-
ment and law-enforcing agencies.
A similar change of doctrine occurred on the issue of separating domestic from
foreign intelligence. In Germany, domestic intelligence is handled by a large num-
ber of agencies. At the federal level, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) or
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is the largest and best-known.
Headquartered in Cologne it has a staff of some 2,500. It acts in close cooperation
with the 16 related agencies run by the 16 Länder which, taken together, have an
estimated staff of 3,200, bringing the total staff employed in German domestic intel-
ligence to about 5,700 (for a total population of 82 million).8 Its main mission, apart
from general counterintelligence work, is to track political extremism, both from
the Left and the Right, as well as other organizations hostile to the principles and
liberties laid down in the German constitution. Their major findings are summa-
rized in published annual reports issued by all seventeen agencies and in various
special reports. Their agents have no police powers (such as search and arrest). But
they use clandestine methods and infiltrate spies into their target organizations or
groups. Due to the activities of Palestinian terrorist groups as far back as the 1960s
and 1970s—think of the attacks during the Munich Olympics in 1972—they have a
long experience with terrorism from the Islamic world. Thus jihadist terrorism
since the 1990s was no surprise to them.
To round off the picture of German intelligence we need to mention the
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) or Federal Criminal Police Office, headquartered in
Wiesbaden (near Frankfurt/Main), and with a staff of 5,200, including 2,600 police
officers. While it remains essentially a law-enforcement agency, comparable to the
American FBI, combating major crime, including international organized crime, its
mandate for fighting international terrorism was significantly enlarged in recent
years. In 2004 the Schröder government even tried to transfer most of the BKA to
Berlin in order to enhance the emerging new anti-terrorism center. However, the
project raised a storm of political protest and had to be abandoned. According to
the German constitution, police work essentially remains a prerogative of the
Länder (states) while the federal government is restricted to auxiliary functions.
8
This is my own estimate, based on rather incomplete published figures.
The Länder did not wish to see their constitutional position weakened, under
the pretext of enhancing the institutional structures for combating international ter-
rorism. They already feel uneasy about the expansion of the Bundespolizei (Bpol) or
federal police, which had originally been established in 1951 as a border-control force,
armed like light infantry units, and was subsequently transformed into a police force
ready to deal with large-scale domestic threats to public order. Its total force of 39,000
police officers dwarfs the forces of any single Land (state). In 2005 its name was for-
mally changed from “border police” to “federal police”—a clear message that the
German federal government has enlarged its law-enforcement mandate.
Another aborted project was made public in May 2008. The ambition was to
create a new intelligence organization for electronic surveillance, somewhat along
the lines of the British GCHQ or the much larger American NSA (Der Spiegel, 19
May 2008, 30). It would have marked yet another post-9/11 step to give the German
federal government more intelligence power and to tear down the walls between
foreign and domestic intelligence. Even though the very powerful interior minister
Wolfgang Schäuble proposed Cologne rather than Berlin as the site of such a
“German NSA,” his plan met with massive opposition from many sides. Apart from
the ongoing battle between the federal level of government and the Länder, there is
also a widely held belief among the German public that the security legislation and
institutional changes made in the wake of 9/11 already pose a fundamental threat to
civil liberties and must not be allowed to progress any further. At the same time,
however, there is a deep fear that German intelligence agencies might be unable to
bring the new post-9/11 threats under control. It seems therefore likely that Schäuble
or his successor after the 2009 German federal elections will eventually revive the
idea of a “German NSA.” If not, the massive technological infrastructure needed
will be allocated to several independent agencies, which would result in an ineffi-
cient use of an enormously expensive investment.
4. Conclusion
No crystal ball is needed to forecast that intelligence institutions at the level of the
European Union are unlikely to replace national institutions any time soon (or
ever). The chief concern among professionals is to improve cooperation at the
working levels and to bring the new east European EU members up to the level of
performance of their very much richer west European neighbors. Standardization
or at least interoperability of hardware and software is another major concern.9
The main challenge to Germany’s new security and intelligence architecture
is likely to come from two directions. The most troubling is the tense and nearly
9
This consensus emerged from a conference of German intelligence experts held by the
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Berlin on 8 April 2008. The proceedings will be published in 2009.
hopeless situation in some of the crisis zones where German soldiers are now
deployed, particularly the southern ex-Yugoslav republics and Afghanistan. By con-
trast, jihadist terrorism is a better understood field where past experience and cur-
rent expertise are applied successfully, even though success is not always certain.
Unless a miracle happens, the Balkan operations and even more so the situation in
Afghanistan are likely to bring a rude shock to the German public, torn as it is
between the idealism of humanitarian intervention and crisis resolution on the one
hand and “playing at little Switzerland” on the other. At fault are not Germany’s new
security institutions, her new Bundeswehr and a reformed (and relocated) BND,
but the frame of mind that got the Germans into those difficulties. In the view of
this author no amount of institutional reform will fill the gap in realistic strategic
thinking which has developed inside the liberal democracies, formerly called “the
West,” since the enthusiastic days of 1989 and 1990.
REFERENCES
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and Intelligence Establishments. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (daily).
Goebel, P., ed. 2000. Von Kambodscha bis Kosovo: Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr seit Ende
des Kalten Krieges. Bonn: Report-Verlag.
Gujer, E. 2006. Kampf an neuen Fronten: Wie sich der BND dem Terrorismus stellt. Frankfurt
am Main: Campus-Verlag.
Hachmeister, L. 2008. Weiße Flecken in der Geschichte des Bundesnachrichtendienstes.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (May 13): 50.
Krieger, W. 2007. US Patronage of German Postwar Intelligence. In Handbook of Intelligence
Studies, ed. L. K. Johnson. London: Routledge.
———. 2009. Oversight of Intelligence: A Comparative Approach. In National Intelligence
Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects, ed. G. F. Treverton and W. Agrell.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lotz, W. 1972. The Champagne Spy: Israel’s Master Spy Tells His Story. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Schoenbaum, D. 1968. The Spiegel Affair. Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday.
Shpiro, S. 2004. Know Your Enemy: West German–Israeli Intelligence Evaluation of Soviet
Weapons Systems. Journal of Intelligence History 4, no. 1:14–29.
Shpiro, S. 2006. Cold War Radar Intelligence: Operation “Cerberus.” Journal of Intelligence
History 6, no. 2:53–64.
Der Spiegel (weekly).
Wagner, A., and M. Uhl. 2007. BND contra Sowjetarmee: Westdeutsche Militärspionage in
der DDR. Berlin: Links-Verlag.
Waske, S. 2009. Mehr Liaison als Kontrolle: Die Kontrolle des BND durch Parlament und
Regierung, 1955–1978. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
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chapter 48
ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE:
ORGANIZATION, FAILURES,
AND SUCCESSES
ephraim kahana
The State of Israel was established only in 1948, but in its fifty-seven years of exis-
tence its intelligence community has won the image of a “superman.” Most espio-
nage movies somehow contrive to mention the Israeli Mossad, which has probably
become the most ubiquitous Hebrew word everywhere after shalom. Countless
books have been written on the Israeli intelligence community, especially the
Mossad.
Much of the literature about the Mossad may be considered pure fiction, but
the fact is that many observers regard Israel’s intelligence community as among the
most professional and effective in the world and as a leading intelligence agency in
Israel’s success in the conflict with the Arab states. Its missions encompass not only
the main task of ascertaining the plans and strengths of the Arab military forces
opposing Israel but also the work of combating Arab terrorism in Israel and abroad
against Israeli and Jewish targets, collecting sensitive technical data, and conducting
political-liaison and propaganda operations.
The Israeli intelligence community is composed of four separate components,
each with distinct objectives. The Mossad is responsible for intelligence gathering
and operations in foreign countries. The Israeli Security Agency controls internal
security and, after 1967, intelligence within the occupied territories. Military
Intelligence is responsible for collecting military, geographic, and economic intelli-
gence, particularly in the Arab world and along Israel’s borders. The Center for
Political Research in the Foreign Ministry prepares analysis for government
policymakers based on raw intelligence as well as on longer analytical papers.
israeli intelligence 807
The Mossad, and likewise elite units of the Israel Defense Forces, have achieved
many notable successes. Most of them remain secret and unknown. The known
ones are still impressive and are covered in the dictionary. They includes the capture
of the high-ranking Nazi Adolf Eichmann, the theft of a Soviet MiG-21 fighter air-
craft, the rescue of Israelis taken hostage by terrorists in far-off Uganda, and the
conveyance to Israel, their homeland, of Jewish communities in oppressive coun-
tries, such as Iraq, Iran, the Maghreb states, and Ethiopia. All these were accom-
plished despite the Mossad’s being a tiny organization in terms of manpower and
budget compared with its counterparts in the West. However, in addition to many
impressive successes, the Israeli intelligence made huge mistakes and failures. Most
of the important successes and failures will be discussed in this paper.
1. The Early Days: The Intelligence

of the Haganah Jewish Underground
Militias in Palestine
Until 1939, no single body existed to coordinate the Jewish intelligence actions in
Palestine, which was then under the British Mandate. Rather, four different organi-
zations were operating throughout the country, and no regular or formal connec-
tion existed between these bodies. First was an underground militia that would
eventually become the first official Information Service. known by the Hebrew
acronym SHAI (Sherut Yediot). Besides the SHAI, other underground militias also
performed intelligence tasks (Danin 1984, 32–35). The Palmah (the Hebrew acro-
nym of the elite striking unit of the Haganah) had the Arab Platoon, which was
composed of Arabic-speaking and Arab-looking Jews who conducted work similar
to that of the SHAI’s Arab Department. There was also Rekhesh (Acquisitions), a
secret organization with a mission to secretly obtain weaponry by whatever means
available. Finally, the Mossad Le’Aliyah Beth organized and brought illegal immi-
grants to Palestine.
The next stage in the development of an intelligence system came in 1939, with
the publication of the British White Paper on Palestine, which intensified the con-
frontation between the Jewish settlements and their British rulers over the future
status of Palestine. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the commanders of the
Jewish militia, the Haganah, had found the decentralized intelligence arrangement
to be somewhat advantageous. With the advent of the war, the first attempt was
made by the Haganah to unify the four intelligence organizations. The prime mover
in this effort was Shaul Avigur, who, together with Moshe Sharett and the national
Haganah command, was instrumental in creating the official Information Service,
Sheruth Yedioth, known by its Hebrew acronym SHAI (Dekel 1959). It was divided
into departments, and the essential function of counterespionage was integrated
into its ranks. In the Jewish settlement in Palestine prior to the establishment of the
State of Israel, two political departments existed, with one in the SHAI and the
other in the Jewish Agency. The SHAI’s departmental system remained in effect
with hardly any changes until the body was disbanded soon after the State of Israel
was established in May 1948.
Despite the fact that most of its members were lacking in formal intelligence
experience, it appears that the SHAI was well organized and was able to penetrate
most areas necessary for obtaining intelligence. The SHAI had the benefit of a con-
siderable number of Arabic-speaking Jews, most of whom had been born in Arab
countries and could pass as Arabs. Some were sent back to their countries of birth
as Israeli agents, and some infiltrated Palestinian Arab villages and towns inside the
borders of the British Mandate, all for purposes of collecting information. The
SHAI did engage in some successful operations, such as the “Night of the Bridges,”
in which the plans of the bridges between Palestine and its neighbors were obtained
in preparation for blowing them up on the night of June 17, 1946. However, in the
end, the SHAI lacked the central direction and systematic thinking essential for an
intelligence organization, as all of its departments were more politically rather than
militarily oriented (Black and Morris 1991, 17–29, 44–61).
The SHAI was ill prepared for its real mission during the crucial years of 1947
and early 1948 in the struggle for the creation of the independent State of Israel,
when most SHAI resources, in terms of manpower, money, and effort, were devoted
to the Internal Department for collecting information on dissident Jews. After the
United Nations voted for the partition of Palestine on November 29, 1947, the SHAI,
like the intelligence units of the other underground militias, lost many of its con-
tacts with Palestinians and other Arabs. From that time until the eve of Israel’s War
of Independence in May 1948, the SHAI failed to evaluate the military strength of
the Arab states. The young state knew very little about enemy plans, and Israeli
forces were surprised by the numbers and strength of the Arab armies. A heavy price
was paid for this assessment error. The SHAI managed to learn the planned routes
of the Arab invasions of the fledgling Jewish state only a week before they were
launched. Many in the Jewish leadership did not believe that the British would really
leave or that the regular Arab armies would attack, but they were mistaken on both
counts. Arab informers could no longer be contacted once the fighting broke out,
due to communication difficulties as well as to unwillingness on the part of many
to continue working against their own people.
The SHAI was formally disbanded on June 30, 1948, a month and a half after the
declaration of Israeli statehood. Despite its ineffectiveness in many spheres, the
SHAI’s apparatus and personnel provided the infrastructure on which the new
state’s military intelligence and security services were founded (Kahana 2006,
119–23). Thus, Israel’s intelligence community was built on the foundations laid by
the SHAI during the few years of its existence. After the Information Service was
disbanded on June 30, 1948, three Israeli intelligence organizations were formed: the
Military Intelligence (MI), the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), and the Political
Department in the Foreign Ministry (Black 1987, 151–56).
The MI was established as a department in the General Staff of the Israel

Defense Forces (IDF) and was known by its Hebrew name, Mahleket Modi’in. In
December 1953, it was renamed as the Directorate of Military Intelligence, known in
Hebrew as Agaf Modi’in (AMAN). The MI serves as the professional authority for
the Israeli Air Force’s Air Intelligence Squadron, the Israeli Navy’s Naval Intelligence
Squadron, and the intelligence units at the headquarters of the various field corps
and the regional commands. The organization collects information on the Arab
armies and is responsible for state-level intelligence assessments of war and peace
and for providing warnings of war and terrorist acts. When it was established, the
MI was also engaged in counterespionage (espionage obstruction); however, this
function has since been transferred to the ISA (Clements 1996, 51–59).
The MI is structured as two main units, the Collection Department and the
Research Division. The Collection Department is responsible for signals intelligence
(SIGINT) and for imagery intelligence (IMINT). SIGINT collects intelligence infor-
mation by plugging into the telephone systems of Arab countries to eavesdrop and
record land-line conversations. The Collection Department also collects informa-
tion from open sources (OSINT) by scanning the print and electronic media,
including the Internet, for unwittingly exposed military matter. The Research
Division is the largest part of the MI and is organized into subunits according to
geographical and functional targets. This division receives and analyzes informa-
tion assembled by the entire Israeli intelligence community, including the MI itself,
the ISA, and the Mossad, which is the most well-known Israeli intelligence agency
(Kahana 2006, 182–84).
The MI is also responsible for assigning military attachés to Israeli embassies
overseas. A special task is press censorship and information security (previously
known as field security) to prevent leaking of secret matters. There is a unit for liai-
son with foreign intelligence communities and another engaged in computer hard-
ware and software to assist in intelligence collection. Another unit was charged with
conducting propaganda in Arab countries. The unit responsible for intelligence
missions in Arab countries, including intelligence collection and sabotage, was dis-
mantled and moved to the Mossad in 1963 (Kahana 2006, 182–84).
The Israeli Security Agency is also known as the General Security Service, which
translates to Sheruth Bitahon in Hebrew, or Shin Bet, the Hebrew initials. The ISA
was established with the declaration of Israeli independence in the Israel Defense
Forces. At that time, all its personnel were IDF officers and soldiers. In 1950, respon-
sibility for ISA activity was moved from the IDF to the Israeli Defense Ministry, and
soon after it was moved again to the Office of the Prime Minister.
Upon establishment, the ISA was divided into units, which later became sec-
tions. The first section was concerned with preventing subversion by the Israeli
extreme right. In practice, this referred to political espionage, which entailed the
collection of information about the adversaries of the then-ruling party, Mapai. The
importance of that section declined with the rising perception of Israel as a demo-
cratic state, and political espionage was terminated. The ISA was then transformed
from an organization close to the ruling party to a state body without political
affiliation. Other sections of the ISA were charged with counterespionage, in par-
ticular the section for Arab affairs. Besides monitoring and tracing the political
mood of the Arabs in Israel, this section was also responsible for the obstruction of
espionage by Arab states and for the prevention of hostile sabotage activity (Doron
and Shapira 1990, 371–82).
Another ISA unit was concerned with new immigrants, specifically with obtain-
ing information on the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc by means of ques-
tioning new immigrants from Eastern Europe in order to detect any spies who
might attempt to enter Israel in the guise of new immigrants. The information
obtained in this way greatly assisted in establishing intelligence relations with the
United States during the time that it was locked in the Cold War with the Soviet
Union. Other sections were responsible for the security of installations of the
defense system, including technical services for eavesdropping equipment, micro-
cameras, recording devices, invisible ink, and so forth (Gillon 2000, 28–31).
Today the ISA is responsible for security against any party who seeks to under-
mine Israel by terrorist activity or violent revolution. It is also charged with provid-
ing the IDF with intelligence for counterespionage and for supporting counterterror
operations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. After the Six Days’ War, the ISA was
assigned to monitor the activities of Palestinian terrorist organizations in the
Occupied Territories. This has become the organization’s most important role,
though it was initially ill prepared for the mission with a workforce of six hundred
agents. After a few years, however, it rose to the challenge, and its agents have become
known as “intelligence fighters.” Collecting intelligence in these areas has become an
even more critical function of the ISA since the Palestinian uprising known as al-
Aqsa Intifada, which erupted in the fall of 2000 after the collapse of the Camp David
Summit. The ISA produces intelligence enabling the IDF to stop suicide bombers
before they reach their destinations through preventive arrests and the deployment
of roadblocks (Gutman 1995, 38–57).
In addition, the ISA cooperates with the Israel Air Force (IAF) to pinpoint and
kill terror masterminds and terrorist leaders by precise air strikes, known as “tar-
geted killings.” The targets are field commanders and senior leaders of Palestinian
militant factions that Israel considers to be terrorist groups, mainly those of Hamas
but also of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and al-Fatah, as
well as the Iranian-Lebanese group Hizballah. The ISA task is to provide intelli-
gence on when and where the target will be vulnerable to the strike without endan-
gering civilians. By relying mainly on human intelligence (HUMINT) from the
local population for collecting information about planned terror attacks or the
location of terror leaders, the organization has enjoyed overwhelming success with
informants in its targeted killings. As a result, the Palestinian terrorist groups have
started lynching suspected collaborators or killing them on the street without trial
(Indinopulos 1997, 91–96).
The ISA also obtains information by interrogating suspects. Until the 1980s, the
ISA used controversial methods, including beatings, to extract information.
However, after complaints of excessive use of violence in interrogations of Palestinian
Another intelligence agency, the Bureau of Scientific Liaison (Lishka Le’Kishrei

Mada—LAKAM), was created in 1957. The first name of the LAKAM was the Office
of Special Assignments. Its mission was to collect scientific and technical intelli-
gence from open and covert sources. LAKAM’s best known success was obtaining
the blueprint of the French Mirage-III fighter aircraft from the Swiss engineer Alfred
Frauenknecht in 1968. Thereafter its successes were minor. LAKAM set up U.S.
offices in Boston, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, and its database con-
tained the names of American Jewish scientists. The organization was long under
surveillance by the FBI. From the time of LAKAM’S inception, the Mossad was not
pleased with this new, amateur intelligence organization. LAKAM agents were not
professional intelligence officers. When Jonathan Jay Pollard was exposed as an
agent operating espionage missions for Israel under the supervision of LAKAM, the
affair generated a great scandal. In its wake, LAKAM was obliged to disband. The
scientific and technological information formerly collected by LAKAM is now col-
lected by a secret unit of the Israeli Foreign Ministry (Melman and Raviv 1989,
42–45).
Yet another Israeli intelligence agency created in the 1950s was Nativ. Formerly
called Bilu, this intelligence organization was established in March 1951 after the
dismantling of the Mossad Le’Aliyah Beth, which was active in illegal immigration
to Palestine during the period of the British Mandate. Nativ was responsible for the
connection with Jews in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and for immigration
to Israel from those countries. Over the years, Nativ became an inseparable part of
the Israeli intelligence community, establishing research and intelligence-gathering
units and carrying out clandestine operations, such as sending agents under diplo-
matic cover to Israeli consulates in countries behind the iron curtain. Nativ also ran
secret operations to establish contact with Jews and to provide them with informa-
tional materials about Israel, prayer books, Hebrew dictionaries, and the like. To
this end, it recruited Jews who were citizens of countries other than Israel and mem-
bers of youth movements abroad. As a cover for its operations, Nativ operatives
were planted on vessels of the Israeli merchant fleet that visited the Soviet Union
(Levanon 1995).
In 1961, Nativ expanded its operations and set up a unit called Bar, which
received funding from organizations in the United States including the CIA. The
benefit to the United States from supporting Nativ was access to intelligence about
the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc countries, which the Israelis obtained
from questioning new immigrants in order to detect any spies that might attempt
to enter Israel in the guise of new immigrants. The unit was charged with spear-
heading a movement among Jewish organizations and leaders throughout the
world to apply pressure on the Soviet Union to allow Jews to immigrate to Israel.
The slogan of this worldwide propaganda and information campaign was “Let My
People Go.” The Kremlin considered Nativ a hostile espionage organization incit-
ing the Jewish population to emigrate, and every effort was made to repress it,
including placing the Nativ operatives under surveillance by the KGB (Kahana
2006, 200).
For about thirty years, Nativ secretly organized the emigration of Jews from
Romania through an agreement with the regime of Dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.
Nativ’s clandestine operations to bring immigrants from the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe largely terminated with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of
the Soviet Union. After the renewal of diplomatic relations between Israel and the
Eastern bloc countries at the end of the 1980s, and still more with the disintegration
of the USSR, Jews were increasingly able to emigrate freely from those countries.
Occasionally, the old methods of using clandestine operations still had to be
employed. In September 1992, Nativ organized two airlift operations to take Jews
out of Georgia and out of Tajikistan, which were under attack by members of
extremist Muslim rebel groups. In July 2000, the size of Nativ was substantially
reduced, its unit for research and intelligence was dismantled, and some of its func-
tions were transferred to other governmental bodies.
An extremely secret unit in the Israeli Defense Ministry, known by its Hebrew
acronym MALMAB, was created in the 1960s as part of LAKAM. The exact date that
MALMAB was established is unknown. MALMAB is apparently responsible for
physical security of the Defense Ministry and its research facilities, including the
nuclear reactor at Dimona. MALMAB is also charged with preventing leaks from
the Israeli security institutions, including the Mossad and the ISA. MALMAB,
together with Security Support (SIBAT) in the Ministry of Defense, closely super-
vises Israeli arms manufacturers in order to reduce any potential damage that could
be caused by too widely disseminating Israeli weapons technology around the
world. Yet, for all its power, MALMAB is not an autonomous intelligence organiza-
tion, and in contrast to the Mossad or the ISA, it does not engage in any information
collecting (Ettinger 1992).
The Mossad, Israel’s most well-known intelligence agency, was established on
December 13, 1949, as the Institution for Coordination at the recommendation of
Reuven Shiloah, adviser to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Shiloah proposed
establishing the Mossad as a central institution for organizing and coordinating the
existing intelligence and security services: the Military Intelligence (MI), the Israeli
Security Agency (ISA), and the Political Department in the Foreign Ministry. The
Mossad began life under the wing of the Foreign Ministry. For all practical pur-
poses, it was the Political Department, though it soon underwent a reorganization
process. The Political Department was dismantled in February 1951, and its intelli-
gence-collecting and operational activities in foreign countries were assigned to the
Mossad (Kahana 2006, 77–79).
In March 1951, the Mossad was made a part of the Prime Minister’s Office,
reporting directly to the prime minister. The immediate result was that senior oper-
ations officers of the Political Department collectively submitted their resignations
in what became known as the Spies’ Revolt. The revolt did not last long, and the day
it broke, April 1, 1951, is considered as the Mossad’s official birth date. That day, the
operations branch of the Political Department was replaced in the Mossad by
the Foreign Intelligence Authority, and operational activities in Arab countries were
assigned to MI. Over the years, the Mossad has undergone reorganization from time
to time and has been assigned additional tasks previously fulfilled by Israel’s other
intelligence agencies. For example, the mission of handling Israeli spies abroad,
which was previously under the purview of the MI, was reassigned to the Mossad in
1963. In that same year, the Mossad was given the Hebrew name Mossad Le’Modi’in
Ule’Tafkidim Meyuhadim—Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations (Eshed
1997).
The Mossad is a civilian organization. Its employees do not have military ranks,
though most of them have served in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and many even
served in MI. It is organized into several main units, with headquarters in Tel Aviv.
Tsomet is the largest branch and has responsibility for collecting intelligence infor-
mation, mainly by its case officers who activate spies and operatives in target coun-
tries. The Intelligence Branch is responsible for collecting information on prisoners
of war and those missing in action, nonconventional weapons, hostile sabotage
activities, psychological warfare, propaganda and deception operations. Nevioth
collects intelligence for the Mossad via break-ins, street surveillance, listening
devices, and other covert methods. The special operations division, known as
Metsada, conducts sabotage and paramilitary projects. A top classified subdepart-
ment known as Kidon conducts assassinations, as approved by Committee X, which
is chaired by the prime minister. The political action and liaison department, known
as Tevel, conducts political activities and liaison work with friendly foreign intelli-
gence services and with nations with which Israel does not have normal diplomatic
relations. Tsafririm is a unique department concerned with the security of the
Jewish people around the globe, which has successfully carried out secret opera-
tions to bring Jews from other countries, such as Ethiopia, to Israel. The Mossad is
also one of the leading intelligence agencies in the world in the field of high-tech
electronics. It has developed a powerful computer database, known as PROMIS,
which can store and retrieve enormous quantities of information. This technology
is even sold by the Mossad to intelligence communities of foreign countries (Kahana
2006, 79).
2. Assessment Failures
The Israeli intelligence community has enjoyed many successes in its assessments
throughout its history, probably outnumbering the failures, but by the nature of
this activity most of them are not known or widely publicized. As for the failures,
many of them were significant and costly, particularly when they involved failure to
provide an alert of a war or terrorist attack.
MI’s responsibility was to provide early warning against an impending attack
initiated by neighboring countries. However, in the years preceding the Six Days’
War, MI’s single-minded evaluation was that Nasser would not initiate a crisis as
long as his army was bogged down in Yemen. A few months before the start of the
crisis leading to the war, MI analysts estimated that the Egyptians would not be able
to risk a war in the next five years. This proved to be wrong as Nasser mobilized
Egyptian troops in the Sinai Desert in May 1967 (Kahana 2006, 16–19).
In 1973, MI analysts failed to accurately assess when Egypt and Syria would
strike Israel. This failure became known as the Yom Kippur War or the 1973
October War, as it started on October 6, 1973, when Egyptian and Syrian forces
launched a surprise joint attack on Israel. Egyptian forces timed the attack to
occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when only a skeletal Israeli
force would be deployed and response would be slower. The Egyptian forces
surprised the Israeli forces by attacking across the Suez Canal, allowing them to
gain a significant foothold in the Sinai Desert. At the same time, the Syrian
forces penetrated the Golan Heights and came within ten kilometers of securing
a key bridge that would have left northern Israel vulnerable to attack. These
offensive campaigns caught the Israelis off guard and achieved strategic as well
as tactical surprise before the IDF could fully mobilize (Kahana 2002). The con-
flict raged for almost three weeks before the United Nations intervened, impos-
ing a cease-fire on October 24, 1973, prior to any clear-cut military resolution on
the battlefield.
Despite Israel’s sophisticated and renowned intelligence-gathering apparatus,
the Arab forces achieved total surprise on the Suez front and near-complete surprise
on the Golan front. Their deception operation was a shrewd combination of politi-
cal and military maneuvering, directly contributing to their initial successes. The
success of the Arab deception plan was due in large part to incorrect analysis rather
than failure in intelligence gathering by the Israelis. The elaborate deception plan
convinced senior Israeli intelligence officers that Egypt and Syria would not attack
and were only conducting routine defensive training exercises.
Israeli intelligence gathered many indications in the spring of 1973 that war was
probable, including brigade-size movements up to the canal and extensive modifi-
cations and improvements to defensive works and roads on the West Bank. Over the
next four months, the Arabs stepped up their deception operation with monthly
movements of men, equipment, and supplies up to the borders in combat forma-
tions as large as divisions. Their exercises portraying the intent to cross the canal
were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them. In September alone,
the Egyptian formations moved up to the canal six times and then withdrew (Kahana
2002, 7–12).
Thus, preparations for defensive operations continued as normal and were
heavily emphasized in military radio traffic. False reports of faulty missile systems
and submarine repairs were exchanged on open radio in order to deceive the Israeli
signals intelligence operatives into believing that they were operationally unready.
Egypt also made public announcements that naval forces had performed poorly
during exercises and would undergo further training in laying mines. In fact, the
mines laid during this subsequent exercise were real and actually used as part of the
blockade. A flood of reports on Egypt’s economic instability and its inability to
afford another war were also made public, stressing the importance of a political
solution to regaining the Sinai. Articles were planted in newspapers quoting Sadat
and Assad, alternating between strong condemnation and conciliatory speeches to
keep the Israelis off balance (Handel 1975).
Despite the deception operations, tactical observers reported with increas-
ing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant, with elite
commando units detected along the front. Their reports caused concern, but no
action. Coordination between Egypt and Syria was well established, and
extremely tight operations security ensured that not more than a dozen people
on either side were aware of the exact plans. Most troops and officers were
informed no more than two hours before the attack was launched. The Arab
deception plan was so successful that as late as the morning of October 5, 1973,
the risk of attack was assessed by the Israelis to be low. Not until the morning of
October 6, 1973, the day of the attack, did Israeli GHQ inform its reserve com-
manders that war was imminent and give orders to begin mobilization. Even
after Israeli troops were belatedly placed on high alert, Prime Minister Meir
made the decision not to preemptively attack the Arab forces. As a result of their
deception efforts, the Arab forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli
forces in the early stages of the war. Although the Arab forces won an initial
advantage, the Israelis managed to recover, fighting in two separate theaters of
operation. The Israelis eventually scored a tactical victory against the Syrians
and the Egyptians, but the victory came at a very high cost in the loss of men
and equipment (Kam 1988).
Assessment failures were made in relation to other players in the region as well.
At the end of the 1980s, the MI failed to identify the buildup of Iraq’s nuclear capac-
ity, and in 1990 it gave no early warning of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
1990. Israeli intelligence calculated that Iraq would require a few years after its war
with Iran to rebuild and reorganize its army before it could launch another war in
the region. At the request of the United States, Israel decided to refrain from
responding to Iraq’s Scud missile attacks on its civilian population. Therefore, no
one in the Israeli intelligence community predicted a crisis between Israel and the
United States about the Israeli settlements in the West Bank following the Desert
Storm Operation (Asher 2003).
In the 1990s, the MI’s apocalyptic and unequivocal evaluation of the danger
inherent in an Israeli pullout from the security zone of Lebanon prevented a with-
drawal. In retrospect, there was clearly no foundation for such a grim assessment,
and the price of IDF forces remaining in the security zone was extremely costly in
terms of human life. Israeli intelligence overestimated Hizbullah’s military reac-
tion to Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and recommended that Israel
retain a military presence in southern Lebanon to defend Israeli civilians living in
northern towns. Moreover, the Israeli intelligence community did not predict the
Palestinian uprisings in the occupied territories, known as the Intifada, the first of
which started in December 1987 and the second of which started in 1996 in
response to the opening of the Jerusalem Tunnels leading to the Wailing Wall
(Kahana 2006, 9).
3. Covert-Action Successes
Since its establishment, the Mossad’s best-known successful operations have been
the obtaining of Khrushchev’s speech in 1956; Eichmann’s capture in 1960; the
Wrath-of-God Operation after the massacre in the 1972 Munich Olympic Games;
the kidnapping in 1986 of Mordechai Vanunu, the Israeli technician at an Israeli
nuclear reactor, Dimona who revealed its secrets to the Sunday Times; providing the
intelligence background for the Osirak nuclear-reactor bombing by Israel in 1981
(Opera Operation); bringing Ethiopian Jews to Israel in the secret Moses Operation
(Mitsva Moshe) and the Solomon Operation (Mitsva Shlomo); and furnishing
intelligence for IDF operations outside of Israel, such as the Yehonathan Operation
in 1976 and the assassination of Abu Jihad in Tunisia in 1988 (Cohen 2003 and Safran
1987).
Among the Mossad’s most renowned undercover intelligence successes was the
location and capture of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, architect of the
Final Solution of the so-called Jewish problem in Europe. In the fall of 1957, Walter
Eytan, an Israeli diplomat, received a phone call from Fritz Bauer, public prosecutor
of the province of Hesse in West Germany. Bauer told Eytan that Eichmann was
alive and living in Argentina, probably under an assumed name. No other clue was
provided at that time. The investigation proceeded slowly and delicately so as not to
reveal that any search for Eichmann was in progress. In late 1959, it was discovered
that after the war Eichmann had changed his name to Ricardo Klement. However,
his sons apparently still used their family name openly at times. Mossad agents fol-
lowed Nicholas’s trail, which led to a house in Buenos Aires that was kept under
constant surveillance and photographed from every angle to learn Eichmann’s hab-
its (Aharoni and Dietl 1997).
A highly experienced Mossad team of over thirty members in Tel Aviv and
Argentina prepared a plan for abducting Eichmann and flying him out of Argentina
with forged documents. Every detail was worked out and nothing was left to chance.
In May 1960, Argentina was celebrating its 150th year of independence. A large con-
tingent of Mossad employees was sent to Argentina as if visiting for the country’s
anniversary celebrations. To ensure that there were no problems with documents,
airline connections, visas, health certificates, or character references for the unit’s
members, a small-scale travel agency was set up by the Mossad in an unidentified
European city to avoid any connection with Israel. The Israeli agents began to fly in
from all over the globe, and no two came from the same city. They rented safe
houses and constantly changed cars to mislead anyone who might be watching them
or who could get suspicious.
On May 11, 1960, the Mossad operatives were ready to go into action after shad-
owing Eichmann’s every move for some time. They knew that he arrived home from
work by bus at about 7:40 p.m., and they were in place waiting. Two Mossad agents
pretended to tinker with their car engine until Eichmann arrived, when they grabbed
him and forced him into the car. It was correctly assessed that Eichmann’s family
would not go public about his disappearance because it would almost certainly
expose his true identity. Eichmann was kept for a week in a room in a safe house. He
was moved out of the safe house to an El Al flight, dressed in a crew uniform along
with the team of Mossad agents. At five minutes past midnight on May 21, 1961, the
airplane carrying Eichmann took off for Tel Aviv. After a lengthy trial, Adolf
Eichmann was found guilty of crimes against humanity and was executed on May
31, 1962.
4. Covert-Action Failures
The Mossad’s best-known mishaps have been the Lillehammer Affair; the killing in
1973 of Ahmed Bouchiki, an innocent Moroccan waiter mistakenly identified as the
leader of the Black September terrorist organization, Ali Hassan Salameh; and the
failed assassination of Sheikh Khaled Mash’al, a leader of the Palestinian militant
group Hamas, by poison injection in 1997 on Jordanian soil (Bar-Zohar and Haber
2002).
One of the infamous MI intelligence failures was the Bad Business, also known
as the Lavon Affair after the Israeli defense minister Pinhas Lavon, who was in
office in 1954. As the largest of Israel’s neighboring Arab countries, Egypt was
always of primary interest to Israeli intelligence. Thus, MI decided to set up a
network of sleeper agents in Egypt, who would be assigned to carry out secret
missions as deemed necessary. Accordingly, an Israeli intelligence officer, Major
Avraham Dar, was secretly dispatched to Egypt in May 1951 under the assumed
name John Darling and the cover of a British businessman representing an elec-
tronics company. His mission was to recruit Egyptian Jews for an espionage net-
work, and he succeeded in setting up two cells of the network, one in Alexandria
and the other in Cairo. Several recruits were brought secretly through Europe to
Israel for training in surveillance and other techniques. Despite remaining ama-
teurs, the members of the espionage network were sent back to Egypt where they
“slept” for three years.
At the end of 1951, Avraham (Avri) Elad, a former major in the IDF, was recruited
and disguised as a German named Paul Frank. After residing for a while in West
Germany to construct his cover story, Elad arrived in Egypt in December 1953 as a
wealthy businessman. He soon blended into the expanding colony of expatriate
Germans in Egypt, some of whom had fled Germany because of their Nazi past.
Elad’s task was to take over as Israeli commander of the “sleeping” Jewish espionage
network (Harel 1980).
The need for the network to spring into action would soon arrive. After the
revolution in Egypt in 1952, the United States was exerting pressure on Britain to
withdraw from the Suez Canal zone in order to keep Egypt in the pro-Western
camp. However, since the Israeli government regarded the presence of British forces
in the Canal zone as a check against possible aggression under Gamal Abdel Nasser,
there was great concern in Israel about the forthcoming British evacuation.
Nonetheless, by the end of June 1954, the British evacuation of the Canal zone
appeared imminent. The Israeli defense minister Pinhas Lavon asked Binyamin
Gibli, the director of the MI, to use all their means in Egypt to prevent the evacua-
tion. Gibli proposed an idea to prevent or delay the British withdrawal by staging a
series of sabotage acts directed primarily against Western embassies and other insti-
tutions. His assumption was that the British government would interpret such acts
as being perpetrated by the Egyptians and might reconsider or even cancel the evac-
uation plan. Gibli instructed Elad to carry out covert sabotage in Egypt according to
his plan.
In July 1954, members of the espionage network planted a series of small fire-
bombs in several public locations, including cinemas and railway stations, as well as
in U.S. cultural and information centers in Alexandria and in Cairo. These events
were reported by the local and the international press. When one member of the
network, Philip Nathanson, entered the Rio Cinema in Alexandria, the bomb went
off prematurely in his pocket. Nathanson was arrested, and in a matter of just a few
days, the Egyptian security police arrested and interrogated the rest of the network’s
members. They also arrested Max Binnet, who was an Israeli spy not directly con-
nected to the group.
Members of the MI’s inner circle were forced to accept responsibility for recruit-
ing Egyptian Jews for the espionage network. Gibli admitted that the MI had
recruited and trained them for their duties, though he maintained that the order to
activate them for the sabotage mission in Egypt was given to him by Minister of
Defense Pinhas Lavon. The trial began on December 11, 1954. The verdicts and sen-
tences, delivered in January 1955, spanned a broad range. Two members of the net-
work were acquitted, two were sentenced to seven-year prison terms, two were
sentenced to fifteen years, two were sentenced to life in prison, and two were sen-
tenced to death and executed. Philip Nathanson was one of those sentenced to life
imprisonment. The Israeli handlers of the network, John Darling (Avraham Dar)
and Paul Frank (Avri Elad), were not apprehended but were tried in absentia and
sentenced to death as well. Max Binnet, the Israeli spy arrested with the network but
not directly involved in its operations, committed suicide in jail on December 21,
1954.
For many years, Israel denied any connection to the bombings in Egypt. As
the scandal was published in the foreign press, Israeli inner circles began to
demand the establishment of a commission of inquiry to determine who was
responsible for the “Bad Business,” that is, who gave the order to activate the
Jewish network for its works of sabotage in Egypt. Although Lavon maintained
that he had been framed, he was forced to resign. David Ben-Gurion returned
from his private life to replace Lavon as minister of defense. In 1960, new evidence
became known from a secret trial of Avri Elad in 1958 that he betrayed the Jewish
network in Egypt. Lavon then requested that Ben-Gurion exonerate him, but
Ben-Gurion refused. Over the years, several commissions have formed in Israel to
investigate the Bad Business, but all have failed to reach any clear-cut conclusions
as to who gave the order and who was responsible for the fiasco. It seems that the
answer will never be known for sure.
In the aftermath of the Sinai Campaign in October 1956, negotiations took
place for the release of over 5,500 Egyptian prisoners of war (POWs) held by Israel
after its conquest of the Sinai Peninsula. The Israeli government did not even ask
for the release of the members of the Jewish espionage network from prison. Its
policy was still to deny any Israeli connection to the sabotage in Egypt in 1954.
However, after fourteen years in Egyptian jails, the two network members who
had received fifteen-year prison terms and the two who had received life impris-
onment were released from prison as part of the agreement for the return of 5,237
Egyptians POWs captured in the 1967 Six Days’ War. This time, the inclusion of
the Jewish-spy-network prisoners in the POWs exchange was settled only at the
insistence of the director of the Mossad, Meir Amit. Minister of Defense Moshe
Dayan granted him a thirty-day period in which to conclude the deal, and Amit
succeeded. The four members of the espionage network were released separately
from the Israeli POWs, but their presence in Israel remained an official secret
until 1971.
The most important result of the Bad Business was that the Israeli government
adopted a rule of never activating Jews in the Diaspora for espionage or any other
covert action against their own country’s government. On March 30, 2005, the three
last surviving members of the Jewish espionage network in Egypt were accorded
recognition by Israel’s president Moshe Katsav and the chief of the General Staff
Lieutenant-General Moshe Ya’alon for their service to the state and for their years of
suffering.
On September 25, 1997, Mossad agents tried to assassinate the chief of the
Jordanian Branch of the Hamas. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the
Mossad to carryout the assassination on Jordanian soil. Two Mossad agents carry-
ing Canadian passports entered Jordan, where Mashal was living. As Mashal walked
into his office, one of the agents came up from behind and held a device to Mashal’s
left ear that transmitted a lethal nerve toxin. After a chase by one of Mashal’s body-
guards, Jordanian authorities arrested the two Mossad agents. Immediately after the
incident, Jordan’s King Hussein demanded that Benjamin Netanyahu turn over the
antidote for the nerve toxin. At first Netanyahu refused, but as the incident grew in
political significance, American President Bill Clinton intervened and forced
Netanyahu to turn over the antidote. Jordanian authorities later released the two
Mossad agents in exchange for the release of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder and
spiritual leader of Hamas (Cowell, 1997).
Despite such failures, Israeli intelligence still rates among the highest in the
world, taking into account the technological advances in all areas of its intelligence
activity and its quality of intelligence personnel. This is evidenced by the very high
bar that has to be crossed by candidates wishing to enter the ranks of the Israeli
intelligence community.
5. Future Challenges
In the present day and age, Israeli intelligence still has to be alert to the moods in
enemy states, principally Syria and Iran with its nuclear weapons program. Another
challenge is acquiring intelligence not only on Arab terrorism generated outside
Israel, but on terrorism originating within its borders as well, focusing on subver-
sive individuals among Israeli Arabs and Jews. Yet, in addition to warning against
terrorist acts, the Israeli intelligence community is at the same time committed to
assessing opportunities for peace and finding openings for dialogue with its
Palestinian neighbors.
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chapter 49
INTELLIGENCE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY: THE
AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE
david martin jones
1. Introduction
From the foundation of a modern security service in 1949, to the expansion of the
concept of security after 2001 and the announcement of the war on terror, the the-
ory and practice of intelligence and national security has vexed and troubled
Australians. Across this half century, the maintenance of national security raised
questions concerning its necessity as well as the most effective means of sustaining
it. Indeed, the extent of sabotage and subversion and the constitutional oversight of
those agencies charged with detecting and deterring it have constituted an enduring
problem for Australian democratic self-understanding.
The pursuit of national security exposed a paradox at the core of modern
Australian democracy, namely, that the practice of political freedom entails the pro-
scription of those dedicated to undermining it. The fact, as the seventh report of the
Royal Commission on Security and Intelligence observed, that successive Australian
governments demonstrated “a lack of real conviction” concerning “the need for
security and intelligence organizations,” combined with “public apathy on the part
of most Australians and hostility to them from a minority” that “resulted not in less
spying, but simply in less efficient spying” further exacerbated this paradox
(Templeton 1977, 9).
Over time, the Australian political experience, nevertheless, disclosed three
plausible resolutions of this paradox that reflect the federation’s dominant political
traditions. Thus, the conservative understanding of Australian politics, represented

by Liberal Country and Liberal National Party Coalition governments after 1949,
accepted that the price of freedom is eternal vigilance and recognized the necessity
for security intelligence. By contrast, those on the left of the Labor Party together
with those who now inhabit the wilder shores of international idealism, consider it
antithetical to the democratic rule of law and the promotion of a transformative
politics of inclusivity, world peace and global justice. Finally, a third approach, artic-
ulated by the new Labor government of Kevin Rudd (2007–) accepts the need for
security traditionally defined, but stretches the concept of national security to
embrace contemporary elite enthusiasms like global warming and human security.
In other words, the development of an Australian view of national security in
the geopolitical aftermath of World War II has left an ambivalent legacy that con-
tinues to affect the character and conduct of Australian intelligence. Let us first
examine the context in which the understanding of Australian national security
evolved to address the unique threat environment the island continent inhabits,
before evaluating Australia’s security agencies and the threats they currently con-
front today.
2. The Evolution of the Australian

Intelligence Community
The anxiety of influence exerts a peculiar hold over the Australian perception of
national security. More precisely, the strategic interests of the United Kingdom and
the United States have profoundly influenced the structure and philosophy of the
Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) from its inception.
At the behest of the British Counter Espionage Service the Australian
Commonwealth established its first Special Intelligence Bureau in 1916. In the inter-
war period, the Commonwealth Investigation Branch of the Commonwealth Police
(CIB) assumed responsibility for political surveillance. Fear of communist subver-
sion after 1917 and Soviet espionage, after 1945, meant that the Communist Party of
Australia (CPA) formed in 1920 and aligned to Moscow from 1922 constituted an
enduring focus of surveillance. The government proscribed the party between
1940–42 and tried to again in 1950. In the 1920s the CIB also paid desultory attention
to the problem of Japanese espionage. Yet, as Jacqueline Templeton observed in her
history of The Australian Intelligence and Security Services 1900–1950, the collection
of secret intelligence lacked both a clear “policy and defined objectives.” Moreover,
even when “certain requirements were laid down at a national level, there was no
firm central control over the operation of the services at a local level” (1977, 6). The
problem of central control versus local autonomy within a federal system represents
a further enduring tension in Australian security organization.
intelligence and national security: the australian experience 825
The somewhat complaisant interwar approach to security changed dramati-

cally between 1939 and 45. After the fall of Singapore in 1942, a hostile Japanese mili-
tary imperialism directly threatened Australia. The war concentrated Australian
minds on questions of espionage and intelligence. The government reformed the
CIB into the Commonwealth Security Service (CSS) with a director general account-
able to the office of the Commonwealth attorney-general situated in Melbourne.
Despite the presence of military and naval intelligence officers in the CSS higher
echelons, suspicion defined its relationship with Australian, air force, naval, and
military intelligence units. The fact that a new Allied Intelligence Bureau coordi-
nated the armed forces units further complicated the practice of collecting and
sharing intelligence. The appointment, in March 1942, of General Douglas
MacArthur to supreme command of all allied forces in the South West Pacific Area
(SWPA) did little to alleviate the problem (see Ball and Horner 1998, 29–47).
Bureaucratic infighting notwithstanding, allied cooperation in the arcane field
of signals intelligence profoundly affected the subsequent orientation of Australian
national security. It also influenced the outcome of the war. Breaking the German,
Japanese, and, after 1944, Soviet wireless transmission codes gave the allies a strate-
gic advantage in both the European and Pacific theatres of World War II and in their
relations with the Soviet Union after 1944. The Australian Special Wireless Group
participated in code breaking through the allied Central Bureau located in
Melbourne.
Reading the Russian codes in 1944 also revealed a hitherto unsuspected
Australian espionage cell located in Canberra. This discovery, and the secrecy sur-
rounding it, dramatically changed and politicized the Cold War Australian practice
of national security.
2.1 From Operation Venona to the Petrov Case:

The Shaping of an Australian Security Culture
In December 1944, the Australian Army Commander, General Blamey, composed a
letter to the acting minister for the army complaining of security leaks. As Ball and
Horner explain, “the evidence of soviet espionage in Australia rested on the most
astounding allied cryptoanalytic achievement . . . the decryption of large portions of
Soviet intelligence and radio communications for selected periods from 1940 to
1948” (1998, 177). Operation Venona, inter alia, uncovered an Australian espionage
ring, the KLOD group, that had penetrated the Department of External Affairs.
Between 1943–49, the group provided allied documents to the Soviet State Security
Service.
The failure of the Chifley Labor government to address this security breach
with sufficient urgency between 1944–49 deleteriously affected its relations with key
allies. As the Cold War intensified after 1947, and as allied documents continued to
leak from Canberra, Australia’s place in the UKUSA sigint cooperation agreement
(1947–48), that established the “four eyes” intelligence community of the United
Kingdom, United States of America, Canada, and Australia, was placed in jeopardy.
In June 1948, the US chiefs of staff excluded Australia from access to American
sigint.
It was in the light of this disturbing development, that Chifley agreed in 1949 to
the creation of an Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) to crack
“the case” of Canberra espionage. The decision caused a rupture in the Australian
Labor Party with Chifley’s Deputy and Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt
opposed to the organization’s creation. Evatt and his departmental secretary, John
Burton, expressed skepticism about the leaks and questioned the need for intelli-
gence in a postwar world which the Labor left believed should embrace a practice of
open diplomacy.
Doubts about the case haunted the Labor Party and its view of security intelli-
gence for two decades and, as we shall see, in the context of the contemporary role of
intelligence, continues to color the perception of ASIO and the Australian Federal
Police’s (AFP) approach to counter terrorism. Indeed, the question of whether a spy
ring actually existed or whether the Liberal-Country Party Coalition, which governed
Australia continuously from 1949–72, manipulated the case for its own political pur-
pose, distorted much subsequent Australian academic and media debate about the
Australian intelligence services. It was only the publication of Ball and Horner’s
Breaking the Codes (1998), based on Venona decrypts first made publicly available in
1995, that established conclusively the evidence justifying ASIO’s foundation.
Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley issued the Directive for the Establishment
and Maintenance of a Security Service in March 1949. As its first director, Justice
Geoffrey Read, observed, the new security service was established by “administra-
tive fiat” (McKnight 1994, 19). Subsequently, his successor, Liberal Prime Minister
Robert Menzies, promulgated a more specific directive, the Charter of the Australian
Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) and appointed Colonel Charles Spry to
replace Reed. It was only in 1956 that parliament passed the ASIO Act governing the
organization.
The new organization existed for two reasons: to demonstrate to its allies that
Australia took national security seriously and to crack the case (Ball and Horner
1998, 295). Britain’s MI5 presided over its design. ASIO’s organizational structure
reflected this, which like MI5, involved three core activities: B1 (counter subversion)
B2 (counterespionage) and C (protective security).
Spry, who directed ASIO until 1970, ran the organization along military lines.
The focus of activity was counterespionage and surveillance directed internally at
Soviet and CPA influence in Australia. This first phase of Australian intelligence
gathering and counterespionage operations culminated in the defection of the
Soviet agent Vladimir Petrov and his wife Evdokia in 1954. The Petrovs confirmed
the presence of an espionage network and boosted the reputation of ASIO. The
subsequent Royal Commission on Espionage (1955) served both the electoral purpose
of Menzies and the wider cause of anti-communism. It also polarized the Labor
Party and undermined any possibility of a bipartisan approach to security. “After
Petrov,” David McKnight averred, “Labor relentlessly attacked ASIO and ASIO
increasingly saw Evatt and the left of the ALP as threats to security” (1994, 87).
It was in this histrionic environment, moreover, that the other branches of

Australia’s security apparatus assumed their present shape. Whereas successive
Australian governments have acknowledged the existence of ASIO, the development
of an external espionage agency under the auspices of the Department of External
Affairs (after 1972, the Department of Foreign Affairs) occurred in a far more clan-
destine fashion. In 1952, the Menzies government secretly approved the formation
of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) to gather information abroad
about threats to Australian security. It was predictably modeled upon, and retained
close ties with, the UK Secret Intelligence Service, M-I6. After 1952 ASIS played a
role in Southeast Asian counterinsurgency.
An analogous secrecy enveloped the evolution of intelligence-gathering services
linked to the Australian armed forces and subsequently housed within the Department
of Defense. Thus, the first incarnation of the Defense Signals Directorate (DSD), the
Defense Signals Bureau, dates from 1947, and emerged from Australian wartime par-
ticipation in the allied Central Bureau. The British Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) oversaw its foundation. Australia’s participation in the 1948
UK/USA security agreement shaped the Bureau’s early development. Renamed DSD
in 1978, the organization functioned under the umbrella of the United Kingdom,
United States, Canada, and New Zealand’s signals-intelligence (sigint) agreement.
Closely related to the electronic information gathering activities of DSD, the
Defense Imagery and Geospatial Organization (DIGO) brought together the
Australian Imagery Organization, the Directorate of Strategic Military Geographic
Information, and the Defense Topographic Agency into a single data-gathering
body. Like DSD, it forms an integral part of the Department of Defense and relies
upon the US investment in satellite imagery and other technical means of collec-
tion. Alongside this intelligence gathering function, the Department of Defense also
developed an intelligence collation and assessment capacity through the Joint
Intelligence Bureau that united a number of wartime service intelligence director-
ates. In 1969, the Defense department established a Joint Intelligence Organization
to provide and integrate intelligence assessments prepared by analysts from all three
uniformed services. The JIO, which became the Defense Intelligence Organization
(DIO) in 1990, was firmly incorporated within the Defense Department and the
Australian Defense Force (ADF) structures. From the outset, however, the JIO con-
tinued the suspicion that characterized the wartime relationship between military
and civilian security branches (Ball and MacDonald 2000, 148). Intramural tension,
as well as the broader purpose of intelligence security, resurfaced dramatically with
the re-election of a Labor government in December 1972.
2.2 Murphy’s Raid and the Shifting Perception

of National Security
The changing temperature of the Cold War after 1972, especially in its Southeast
Asian manifestation, together with the election of Gough Whitlam’s Labor govern-
ment in 1972, caused a radical reassessment of the AIC. It also gave vivid expression
to Labor’s historic mistrust of ASIO. From Labor’s perspective, ASIO, DSD, and
ASIS appeared overly dependent on allied direction, lacked political accountability
and failed to secure the national interest.
Two events dramatically illustrated the tension between the new government
and the AIC: the Pine Gap Controversy and the “Murphy raid” on ASIO. To demon-
strate Australia’s autonomy from its allies Whitlam announced the government’s
recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and informed the US that it
must renegotiate its access to the secret Pine Gap facility that monitored two rhyo-
lite geostationary satellites collecting a wide range of foreign signals. Subsequently,
Attorney-General Lionel Murphy’s decision to “raid” the ASIO office in Canberra
and the headquarters in Melbourne in March 1973, on the ostensible grounds that
the organization had concealed documents relating to Croatian terrorist activity in
Australia, further exacerbated allied concerns.
Murphy’s raid did, however, highlight ASIO’s preoccupation with communist
and communist-front activity to the exclusion of other threats, most notably terror-
ist groups using Australia as a base. In particular, ASIO seemingly tolerated the
Croatian Republican Brotherhood (Hrvatsko Revolucionaro Bratstvo—HRB)
responsible for coordinating an insurgency against the Yugoslav government and
bombing the Yugoslav consulate in Sydney in 1967. Labor’s demand for account-
ability confronted the AIC’s institutional rigidity and forced the resignations of
both Peter Barbour and Bill Robertson, directors of ASIO and ASIS respectively, in
1975. The resignations did little to allay allied concern about the politics of Australian
security intelligence. CIA counterintelligence director James Angleton considered
Whitlam’s policies jeopardized “the jewels of counter intelligence” (McKnight 1994,
292–93).
The return of Malcolm Fraser’s Liberal Coalition in December 1975 alleviated
the intelligence crisis and restored traditional ties. Fraser’s administration, however,
allowed the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (RCIS) established by
Whitlam in 1974 to proceed. The government charged Justice Robert Hope with
inquiring into the scale and scope of operations and intelligence gathering, the
coordination and distribution of product, and relations with law enforcement agen-
cies. Hope disclosed his findings in eight reports to government between 1976–77.
Hope’s third report revealed an AIC that was “fragmented, (and) poorly coor-
dinated.” The agencies lacked “proper guidance, direction and control.” More dis-
turbingly, Hope considered they “do not have good . . . relations with the system of
government they should serve” (Hope 1976, 34). Hope further identified an unhealthy
competition between the Departments of Defense and Foreign Affairs and Trade
over the control of the intelligence collection and assessment processes. His fourth
report, on ASIO, described a dysfunctional organization beset by a lack of leader-
ship and a management structure both “capricious and hierarchical” (1976, 36).
Hope concluded the need for greater political scrutiny together with a coordinated
national approach to intelligence gathering to overcome departmental rivalries.
As a consequence of the RCIS, the Liberal government, by an act of Parliament,
established a new Office of National Assessments (ONA) in 1977. The ONA
henceforth assembled and correlated information relating to international matters

of political, strategic, or economic significance to Australia. It addressed the need
for an independent and “centrally located assessment function . . . placed in a loca-
tion in the centre of government” (Flood 2004, 98; McLennan 1995, 75). A distinc-
tively Australian organization, in contrast with the allied influence exercised over
the other security agencies, the ONA performs an oversight role. The ONA Act
required the organization to review “activities connected with international intelli-
gence,” and bring to the government’s attention “any inadequacies in the nature,
extent or . . . coordination of those activities” (Flood 2004, 56). ONA has a small staff
of analysts and reports directly to the prime minister, immune from the influence
of the policy departments. Nevertheless, as a “bureaucratic interloper” it struggled
to establish itself in the security apparatus. The JIO in particular considered the
ONA “a challenge” (McLennan 1995, 75).
Following Hope’s criticisms, the government also created the Office of the
Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) and established the National
Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) in 1977. The NSC subsequently stood at the
apex of a pyramid of accountability measures for the various intelligence agencies.
Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley maintain that “the reforms adopted after the
Hope royal commissions improved coordination and oversight (and) lines of
accountability through individual ministers and Cabinet were made clearer”
(Gyngell and Wesley 2004, 145).
From this perspective, the story of Australian intelligence is one of growing
oversight, transparency, and parliamentary accountability. Thus, Gyngell and Wesley
aver that, “the period from the first Hope Royal Commission Report in 1977 through
his second report 1984 to the Gordon Samuels and Michael Codd Commission of
Inquiry into ASIS in 1995 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001, was a story of the
gradual integration of the intelligence agencies into the Australian foreign policy
process, a growing movement to accountability and greater . . . transparency” (2004,
145). Through a brief examination of Australia’s strategic environment, the legal
framework governing intelligence gathering, its organization, and growth especially
post-2001, we shall evaluate whether this is the case.
3. Security and Australia’s Strategic

Environment
Australians have traditionally regarded themselves as amputated from their
European roots by the tyranny of distance. This has led the conservative, Liberal-
National Coalition and, somewhat reluctantly, the Australian Labor Party, that have
alternated in government since federation, to emphasize close ties and a special
relationship with the United Kingdom and, after the fall of Singapore in 1942, the
United States.
The need to retain close ties with politically and culturally similar, great, and
powerful friends, while treating the immediate geographic region with a degree of
suspicion, has influenced both public threat perceptions and, for a middle power,
Australia’s notably outward-looking foreign policy. Indeed, the prevailing myth of
being the “odd man in,” as former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans somewhat apoc-
ryphally put it, in its region, has framed Australia’s threat perception, its determina-
tion to protect its borders, and its often uncertain relationship with geographically
close, but culturally different, neighbors (Higgott and Nossal 1997, 169).
There exists, therefore, a broad consensus that Australia should actively engage
with the world. The difference has always been over how this might be achieved—
through alliance, through regional ties, or through multilateral institutions. After
1945, foreign policy oscillated from continental defense and internationalism in the
era of Chifley-Evatt (1945–49); to forward defense and the special relationship with
the United States under Menzies, Harold Holt, and William McMahon (1950–72); to
an independent foreign policy premised on the defense of Australia and much closer
engagement with Asia first intimated by Whitlam (1972–75) and pursued with
increasing vigor by Bob Hawke and Paul Keating (1983–96); only to be succeeded by
the Howard Doctrine during John Howard’s Coalition government (1996–2007),
which returned foreign-policy thinking to a more skeptical view of the region and
renewed the emphasis on a forward-defense posture and the special relationship
with the United States in its global war on terror. The new Kevin Rudd Labor gov-
ernment (2007–) has reaffirmed the special relationship whilst proposing a more
nuanced regional multilateralism (Rudd 2008, 5–8).
Australia, therefore, is externally oriented. This extrovert strategic personality
informs Australia’s perception of its security dilemma, namely: does it engage
autonomously with its region and by extension the world, or does it depend on
culturally similar great powers beyond the region for its external policy determina-
tion and security assessment?
Given this external orientation during the Cold War, Australian threat percep-
tion reflected the prevailing US view that international communism required con-
tainment. During the longue durée of Prime Minister Robert Menzies, the
government adopted a forward-defensive posture, and Australian troops partici-
pated in the United Nations force in Korea (1951) and supported the US engagement
in Vietnam after 1966. Australia also enthusiastically signed up to the ANZUS
(Australia, New Zealand, United States) Treaty in 1951, and the South-East Asian
Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954.
During the first phase of the Cold War (1950–72) the Liberal-Country Coalition
and the security apparatus that evolved under its aegis, perceived the security threat
as communism both in its immediate region and within Australia. In this Cold War
environment, moreover, the threat of communism ineluctably elided into a general
anxiety about the Southeast Asian region.
The perception of a regional threat emanating from Asia aroused fear not only
of communism, but mutated, over time, into a generalized concern about a variety
of unstable regimes in the vicinity of the island continent, whether in the South
Pacific like Papua New Guinea, Fiji, or the Solomon Islands, or from non-aligned but
unpredictable neighbors like Indonesia. Indeed, the potential of either instability in,
or regional assertiveness by, the culturally distinct, majority-Muslim, Republic of
Indonesia, has proved a further source of enduring Australian anxiety, especially
after Indonesia achieved independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1949. Significantly,
President Sukarno’s attempt to disrupt the British retreat from its colonial interests
in Southeast Asia by promoting a greater Indonesia incorporating much of Western
Malaysia between 1963–66 saw Australia militarily involved with the United Kingdom,
Malaysia, and Singapore in konfrontasi with the new Republic. Despite good rela-
tions with the successor Suharto’s New Order regime and the anti-communist
Association South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) after 1967, the potential threat from
the near north constituted an enduring preoccupation of DFAT, ASIS, ONA, and
DIO. Indonesia was also the focus of DSD monitoring particularly when Indonesia
invaded East Timor in 1975 and again during Indonesian-army-orchestrated vio-
lence that followed the referendum on East Timor’s independence in 1999 (Ball and
MacDonald 2000, 92–100; Ball 2001, 35–62).
3.1 Security and the Framework of Political

and Legal Oversight
Nevertheless, Gough Whitlam’s Labor government (1972–75) and subsequently the
Hawke-Keating era (1983–96) sought to redefine both the concept of security and the
prevailing view of the region. As successive Labor governments developed a more-
independent foreign-policy stance in the wake of US withdrawal from Vietnam, they
also sought to restructure the character of Australian intelligence both at home and
abroad. Critics in the 1970s saw the Australia-US intelligence relationship constrain-
ing Australia’s autonomy. More mundanely, the RCIS (1977) led to a new emphasis
on greater ministerial accountability either to the minister of defense, minister of
foreign affairs, or, in the case of ASIO, the office of the attorney-general.
The RCIS, nevertheless, confirmed the need for Australia’s own intelligence
and security perspective. It recommended ASIO expand its brief to include ter-
rorism (a phenomenon it previously neglected), sabotage, and “active measures”
to combat hostile foreign agents in Australia. After 1979, ASIO produced a classi-
fied annual report for the attorney-general on counterespionage operations.
Following the Hilton Hotel bombing during a Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting in Sydney in 1978, Hope again reviewed domestic protective
security arrangements.1 This second review resulted in a new ASIO Act (1979)
1
In February 1978, a bomb exploded in a garbage bin outside the Sydney Hilton Hotel
during a Commonwealth heads of government meeting, killing three people. Subsequently, the
Liberal government of Malcolm Fraser commissioned Hope to review protective security
arrangements for the Commonwealth and Commonwealth/State cooperation on protective
security. The Protective Security Review appeared in 1979. After the expulsion of the first secretary
of the Soviet embassy from Canberra in 1983, Hope was called upon yet again to head a royal
commission reviewing the activities of Australia’s Security and Intelligence Agencies (RCASIA).
Hope completed the RCASIA report in December 1984.
designating ASIO the principal agency responsible for providing national threat
assessments in the field of politically motivated violence. It also resulted in the
federal and state police forces assuming some counterterrorism functions under
the aegis of the attorney-general and coordinated through the Protective Services
Agency and annual meetings of a Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/
State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV), which became the
National Counter-Terrorism Committee in 2005. In 1978, ASIO’s headquarters
moved from Melbourne to Canberra, where it shared a building with the newly
formed ONA.
Along with this expansion of the security role went a growing public aware-
ness of the security services. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser officially recognized
the existence of ASIS and DSD in 1977. Meanwhile a further Royal Commission
into the Australian Intelligence Service Agencies (RCASIA), also chaired by Hope,
in 1984 led to an amendment of the ASIO Act (1986), further redefining ASIO’s
security responsibilities. Significantly, references to terrorism and subversion were
withdrawn from the act and replaced with “politically motivated violence,” and
“attacks on Australia’s defence system and promoting communal violence.” ASIO
also acquired the ancillary function of collecting foreign intelligence relevant to
external interference in Australian affairs and providing protective-security advice
to the Commonwealth government. The 1986 amendment saw ASIO establishing
a media liaison officer. The government also established a separate office of the
inspector general of intelligence and security (IGIS) to provide independent
assurance to Parliament that the security agencies conducted their activities
within the law. The governor-general appoints the IGIS for a fixed term of three
years. The 1984 Royal Commission further recommended a Parliamentary joint
committee on ASIO to scrutinize its activities. The committee began its oversight
role in 1988.
This machinery of legislative accountability was, in time, extended across the
AIC. Increased public scrutiny particularly affected ASIS, which suffered a series of
public relations setbacks in the 1980s. A royal commission of inquiry into ASIS fol-
lowed an ill-conceived paramilitary training exercise in 1987 and the public disclo-
sures of disaffected agents in 1994. The 1995 commission, chaired by Justice Samuels
and Michael Codd, recommended that ASIS be “brought under legislative cover to
affirm its existence and provide authority for its activities” (Samuels and Codd 1995,
17). Samuels and Codd believed that “it is appropriate that in a parliamentary
democracy, the existence of an agency such as ASIS should be endorsed by the
Parliament and the scope and limits of its functions defined by legislation” (cited in
Gyngell and Wesley 2004, 140).
Yet, it was only in 2001 that the Intelligence Services Act established a compre-
hensive legislative framework for the oversight of the AIC. This legislation, as Philip
Flood’s Report into the Australian Intelligence Agencies observed, “clarifies the func-
tions of agencies and indicates publicly what the agencies may and may not do . . . the
legislation renders legal activities that would otherwise not be so” (Flood 2004, 15).
As a consequence of the 2001 act, the remit of the Parliamentary Committee on
ASIO was extended to embrace ASIS and DSD. Flood maintained it represented “a
major step forward in the accountability of agencies” (Flood 2004, 15). This not-
withstanding, the Committee’s “terms of reference extend only to the budget and
administration of the agencies, not policy and operational activities and its cover-
age is of ASIO, ASIS and DSD only—not DIGO, ONA and DIO” (Flood 2004, 55).
In December 2005, the Committee took the new title of the Joint Committee on
Intelligence and Security without altering its function or oversight responsibilities.
In addition to oversight by individual ministers, since 2001 the National Security
Committee of Cabinet (NSC), which includes the prime minister, deputy prime
minister, treasurer, attorney-general, and the ministers of defense and foreign affairs
and trade, oversees all agencies.
4. Threat Perception after the Cold War

and its Impact on the AIC
By the 1990s the size and scope of the intelligence agencies, and their Cold War
orientation, reopened debate about their relevance. In early 1992, the Keating Labor
government commissioned a review of the “overall impact of changes in interna-
tional circumstances on the roles and priorities of the Australian intelligence agen-
cies” (McLennan 1995, 87). Although the government still recognized the need for
individual agencies, the Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security (SCIS)
also recognized that the communist threat had palpably diminished. This led to
staff reductions and a cut in budget to the intelligence agencies, most notably
ASIO. The new Howard coalition government further downsized the agencies in
1997.
Thus, the period from 1992–2001 saw the AIC shifting focus and addressing a
new post–Cold War environment that lacked obvious military threat with reduced
resources. The AIC also operated in an increasingly complex regional context.
In this uncertain world, agencies increasingly provided intelligence on issues like
transnational crime, drug and people smuggling, and terrorism—activities outside
the conventional Cold War remit of intelligence agencies and traditionally viewed
as lower-level policing activities.
The ASIO Act was again amended in 1999 to take account of this changed con-
dition. The act enabled ASIO agents to access electronic data, use tracking devices,
and open mail under warrant. The act also allowed ASIO to charge non-Common-
wealth agencies for security assessment advice, and, in the context of the 2000
Sydney Olympics, provide security advice to state and territory governments.
Meanwhile ASIS’s function continued to emphasize foreign intelligence gather-
ing and counterintelligence activities. By the 1990s it had established liaison rela-
tions with a number of states in East and Southeast Asia, notably Japan, Singapore,
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, in addition to its traditional partners in the

United States, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand.
Nevertheless, despite a growing awareness of new security threats, the AIC
failed to notice Jemmah Islamiyah’s evolution as a regional franchise of al-Qaeda
and was unprepared for the attack on Bali in October 2002 that killed eighty-eight
Australians. Indeed, prior to 2001, the AIC considered political or religiously moti-
vated violence and its transnational mutation largely a nuisance activity akin to
piracy or people smuggling, requiring a police response rather than a strategic intel-
ligence solution.
The 1996 ASIO annual report to the Federal Parliament affords an interesting
insight into Australia’s security thinking prior to 9/11. Assessing the international
scene and its implications for Australia, ASIO recognized the end of the Cold War
had loosened the structural constraints on minority groups, which in turn had led
to an increase in violent conflict amongst sub-state actors. An eclectic mix of reli-
gious, ethnic, and cultural grievances, the report contended, drove such groups to
violence.
ASIO’s assessment also identified a “particularly disturbing trend . . . towards
large-scale terrorist acts designed to kill as many innocents as possible and a grow-
ing disregard for their own lives as perpetrators” (ASIO 1996, 3). This assessment,
however, referred not to an incipient jihadism, but to Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical-
weapons attack in Tokyo a year earlier. The report also observed that Australia’s
geostrategic isolation was no longer a barrier to the transnational security threats
facing other parts of the globe.
These judgments were not without insight. In the fiscal climate of the late 1990s,
however, there was little appetite to fund the necessary changes to intelligence-
collection priorities and policing powers. Indeed, in the course of the 1990s, as
mujahideen were training in al-Qaeda camps across Afghanistan, the Middle East
and Southeast Asia, funding for Australian intelligence and security agencies
remained stagnant or in decline. By 1997–98, ASIO staffing levels had fallen to 488
full-time staff, down from more than 700 a decade earlier (Brew 2002, 2).
Neither did international terrorism trouble the wider Australian foreign- and
security-policy community. The publication of the Foreign and Trade Policy White
Paper, In the National Interest, in 1997, identified a growing number of potential
non-traditional threats to Australia’s security interests including pandemics, drug
trafficking, and transnational crime. However, regional terrorism failed to rate a
mention. Prior to 9/11, the ONA, the peak intelligence agency, employed no analyst
dedicated to terrorism.
The inattention to the emerging terror threat, even after 9/11, represents a seri-
ous intelligence failure. In this, Australia was far from alone in misreading the
emerging organizational and operational capabilities of the al-Qaeda network and
its regional affiliates. The problem, moreover, was not just one of misdiagnosis.
Intelligence collection ultimately reflects the policy priorities government sets.
Throughout much of 2001, the Australian government identified people smuggling
from Indonesia as the principal security threat.
4.1 9/11, Bali, and 7/7 Change the Security Paradigm

After the al-Qaeda attacks on Washington and New York in 2001, the AIC and the
government changed its attitude to the threat posed by religiously motivated vio-
lence. However, it was the regional manifestation of this asymmetric style of warfare
in Bali in 2002 that prompted a more radical reassessment of Australia’s internal
and external security.
The Bali bombings challenged a number of assumptions about the foundations
of Australian defense force planning including: the centrality of state-based warfare;
the critical importance of defending the air-sea gap to Australia’s northwest; and the
emphasis on a superior defense-technology edge to defeat potential adversaries in
the region. Ultimately, Bali crossed an important psychological threshold in the
Australian perception of national security. After Bali, the wider community and the
media accepted the proposition that terrorism had shifted from a nuisance criminal
behavior to the primary focus of the AIC.
After the joint Australia-Indonesia police and intelligence work to find and
arrest the Bali bombers, it appeared that Australia needed an overarching national-
security strategy to counter terrorism. It was assumed that a national strategy would
more clearly define the terrorist threat to Australia, identify the key long-term trends
in terrorist activity, and offer some concrete policy and intelligence responses.
However, it was only in 2004, following a series of further attacks against
Australian interests in Southeast Asia, that DFAT produced a white paper on trans-
national terrorism. It advocated a three-pronged strategy to deal with transnational
terrorism: build effective operational-level cooperation; help other countries
develop and strengthen their capabilities to fight terrorism; and build political will
among governments to combat terrorism (DFAT 2004, 77).
After Bali, transnational terrorism became the defining issue in Australia’s
domestic and foreign relations. It also profoundly affected the practice of intelligence
collection. Since September 2001, Australian diplomacy has attempted to secure
greater cooperation across the full range of political, military, and development-
assistance sectors with Southeast Asia. Australia has negotiated twelve separate bilat-
eral memoranda of understanding on counterterrorism co-operation with Asian
and Pacific countries, co-hosted four ministerial regional summits, and provided
more than $100 million (Aus) in aid projects to assist regional counterterrorism
efforts since 2001. The internal and external terror threat to Australian interests,
exacerbated by Australia’s participation in the Iraq War in 2003, remains. Both ASIO’s
2007 and 2008 reports to Parliament identify the “threat of terrorism” and “violent
jihadist” activity as the organization’s chief concern (ASIO 2007, 3; ASIO 2008, 3).
The intersection of localized grievances and separatist movements in Southeast
Asia combined with globalized Islamist ideology poses a complex array of challenges.
The direct challenge to Australia has two separate, but overlapping, dimensions. The
first is the immediacy of the threat. As the 2005 annual report from ASIO notes, there
has been at least one aborted, disrupted, or actual terrorist attack against Australians
or Australian interests in Southeast Asia every year since 2000 (ASIO 2005, 15).
The second challenge arises from the enhanced levels of regional cooperation
required to confront this polymorphous threat. Australian diplomacy continues to
regard Southeast Asia as a difficult environment for foreign-, intelligence-, and
defense-policy coordination over an issue as sensitive as Islamic terrorism. Relations
with several Southeast Asian states remain fragile. The Australia-Indonesia relation-
ship, although artificially buoyed by effective police and intelligence cooperation
after 2002, is a particularly uneasy one.
Australia has therefore pursued bilateral agreements with individual countries
in the region. Together, they constitute a web of relationships between Australian
police and intelligence agencies and their counterparts in Asia to facilitate greater
intelligence cooperation and information sharing. Such bilateralism yields Australian
policymakers two obvious benefits: it removes the lowest-common-denominator
politics of multilateral negotiations; and it permits individual agencies in Australia
(such as ASIO, ASIS, or the federal police) to build effective long-term relationships
with counterparts in other countries.
4.2 Law, Intelligence, and Terrorism

After 2001, Western counterterrorism efforts disrupted, but did not destroy, the
structure and organization of jihadist networks. Terrorist cells became protean and
leaderless, making their penetration by intelligence agencies more difficult. Suicide
attacks employing “clean skins” reduced the chances of detection. As the London
bombings in July 2005 demonstrated, home-grown radicals can quickly become
agents of global jihad.
Moreover, the use of the Internet by Islamic terrorist groups places a high pre-
mium on assessing this type of open-source information. However, the allied intel-
ligence community has so far failed to respond effectively to this virtual battleground.
In Australia, responsibility for open-source collection on the Internet and other
media shifted from DFAT to ONA, following the recommendations of the 2004
Flood Inquiry. Although ONA has increased the pool of analysts working on open-
source collection, it cannot track even a small percentage of the estimated 4,800
terrorist websites used by Islamic extremists.
Notwithstanding evident intelligence failings post-2001, the government has
nevertheless invested heavily in the AIC as the principal tool to combat transna-
tional and home-grown terrorism. Since 2001 the government has provided $600
million (Aus) in new funding to the six national intelligence agencies. ASIO, the
agency responsible for counterterrorism, funding grew from $69 million (Aus) in
2001 to $441 million (Aus) by 2008—an increase of 539 percent. This investment
represents a significant long-term commitment to placing intelligence security at
the forefront of the government response to the new risk environment. Yet some-
what problematically, as a 2008 Australian Strategic Policy Institute report observed,
“there is no systematic way to examine public expenditures on counter-terrorism”
(Ergas et al. 2008, 3).
At the same time, as the intelligence agencies enjoyed a boom in resourcing, the
Howard government controversially amended the law governing terrorism to facili-
tate its preemption. As Jenny Hocking observed, “organizationally the events of
September 11 also set in train a steady expansion in the domestic counterterrorism
institutional machinery, an expansion heightened by the bombings in Bali” (2004,
195). The government’s proposals were essentially twofold: the expansion of ASIO’s
powers by yet another amendment to the ASIO Act, and new laws to combat the
specific crime of terrorism (Hocking 2004, 195). The Security Legislation Amendment
(Terrorism) Act 2002 introduced specified offences of terrorism into Australian fed-
eral criminal law. A terrorist act meant “an action or threat of action . . . done with
the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause and with the
intention of coercing or influencing by intimidation, the government of the
Commonwealth or State or Territory . . . or intimidating the public” (Hocking 2004,
202) The Act further identified a range of ancillary offences, as well as a series of
offences relating to connections with proscribed organizations. Under the terms of
the new legislation, moreover, the attorney-general, and not the judiciary, decides
whether an organization “planning assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist
act” should be proscribed.
Together with a legal definition of terror and its ancillary prescriptions and
penalties the government proposed to alter the ASIO Act to enhance “the powers of
ASIO to investigate terrorism offences,” which entailed the power to detain indi-
viduals and to conduct coercive interrogations under strict control orders. Reporting
on the ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on ASIO, ASIS, and DSD considered it “one of the most controversial
pieces of legislation considered by Parliament in recent times,” that would “under-
mine key legal rights.”
The proposed anti-terror measures evoked a chorus of academic, media, and
legal disapproval. For civil libertarians moving ASIO into “the arena of preemptive
security policing” represented an “unprecedented” assault on the rule of law
(Hocking 2003, 364). Equally significantly, the 2002 legislation reversed an earlier
approach to political violence that refused political credibility to groups or indi-
viduals having recourse to violence in the name of an ideological abstraction. The
1984 ASIO Act treated politically motivated violence as an offence at common law.
The concept of terrorism, constitutional lawyers averred, was notoriously impre-
cise. They referred those who cared to listen to Justice Sir Victor Windeyer’s
Olympian judgment in 1979, that “the best safeguard against new terrors . . . may lie
in the rigorous enforcement of criminal law rather than in making new laws about
terrorism” (Hocking 2004, 200).
Criticism of the legislation focused upon the manner in which it eroded demo-
cratic rights like freedom of association and habeas corpus. Critics observed that the
executive proscription of political, religious, and ideological organizations evoked
memories of the Menzies government’s attempts to proscribe the Communist Party
after 1950 and marginalize the Labor Party. Jenny Hocking considered the anti-
terror laws “carried profound implications for freedom of political association and
political expression. The new crime of membership of a terrorist organiza-

tion . . . institutionalizes. . . . guilt by association” (216). Following extensive review,
parliament passed amended legislation in 2003 that gave additional powers to ASIO,
but included safeguards to ensure they fell under parliamentary oversight.
Despite academic and media criticism of the legislation, the threat the security
agencies faced was one not easily curtailed without expanding ASIO’s power to act
pre-emptively against groups prepared to undertake suicide attacks. Indeed, ASIO
employed the new legislation successfully to foil attacks on Australian targets. In
June 2006, Faheem Khalid Lodhi received a twenty-year sentence for preparing to
commit a terrorist act in Sydney. More dramatically, in November 2005, ASIO in
conjunction with federal, Victorian, and New South Wales police arrested eighteen
Muslim men in Sydney and Melbourne planning attacks on the Melbourne Cricket
Ground (MCG) and the Crown Casino. The subsequent trial of twelve of those
arrested in Operation Pendennis resulted in six convictions under the new laws in
September 2008.
Nevertheless, the legislation and its application remain politically contentious.
In March 2006, “Jihad” Jack Thomas was sentenced to five years in prison for receiv-
ing funds from a terrorist organization. Yet on appeal the case was dismissed. In
2007, the ASIO and AFP case against medical student Izhar ul Haque collapsed.
Most devastating of all for the new counterterror laws was the AFP’s detention and
arrest of Dr. Mohamed Haneef for his alleged role in the failed attacks on a London
night club and Glasgow airport in July 2007. The subsequent dropping of all charges
against Haneef embarrassed both the director of public prosecutions and the AFP.
It also prompted a judicial inquiry into the handling of the case chaired by Judge
John Clarke. Evidence to the inquiry revealed that the AFP detained and charged
Haneef despite ASIO’s repeated advice that he had no involvement in the failed UK
attacks and represented no security risk (Maley 2008, 8). Clarke’s report found seri-
ous weaknesses in the application anti-terrorism laws, and a “silo” mentality operat-
ing in both ASIO and the AFP. He recommended parliament implement oversight
of the AFP and reform to the counterterror legislation (Shanahan 2008, 1). Arrest
and detention on the grounds of preemption will, it seems, continue to divide pub-
lic opinion about the utility of the counterterror legislation and the political and
security role of the AFP.
Meanwhile, the intelligence community has also lost credibility since 2003 for
both “sexing up” evidence concerning Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of
mass destruction and uncritically following UK and US intelligence assessments
that persuaded the Howard government to join the Coalition of the willing in 2003.
The resignation of ONA analyst Andrew Wilkie on the eve of the Iraq war in protest
at the “unbalanced” use of intelligence highlighted what appeared to be a govern-
ment propensity to use information selectively to justify policy decisions (Wilkie
2004).
In an atmosphere of growing skepticism about the legitimate use of secret intel-
ligence, and on the recommendation of a parliamentary inquiry into the quality
and effectiveness of Australian intelligence, the government appointed Philip Flood
to assess the Australian intelligence agencies in 2004. Flood’s report depicted an

overworked, under-resourced intelligence community lacking strategic direction.
Flood nevertheless found that ONA and DIO Iraq assessments had not been politi-
cally managed.
Nevertheless, Flood identified a number of weaknesses in the AIC. In particular,
he revealed a culture that uncritically accepted preconceptions governing both
assumptions and sources (Flood 2004, 174). Flood recommended a renewed focus
on analytic technique and improved command of foreign languages. Flood also
reinforced the need to maintain a distinction between the detached activity of intel-
ligence collection and the demands of policy making.
Flood also recommended broadening ONA’s charter to embrace a new Foreign
Intelligence Co-ordination Committee chaired by ONA and including ASIO and
the AFP. Subsequently, the government introduced the National Threat Assessment
Center (NTAC), an all-agency coordination body for filtering intelligence data as a
“refinement” to existing bureaucratic structures. The NTAC, however, fails to
address the structural problem posed by information silos within and between
agencies (Brew 2003, 1). Indeed, the call for “better coordination” and integration
became the preferred rhetorical response to the complex problem of understanding
and addressing the evolving nature of asymmetric threats. Indeed, despite cosmetic
adjustments, the outcome of the Flood inquiry saw a better resourced and larger
AIC, but one that still resembled and acted in a remarkably similar way to that
which existed before 2001.
In 2007, the new Labor government of Kevin Rudd came to power promising a
radical review of national security. To this end, Rudd commissioned Ric Smith, a
former Defense Department bureaucrat, to conduct a Homeland and Border
Security Review in February 2008. However, the review delivered little that was
innovatory. Incorporating the review findings in the First National Security Statement
in December 2008, Kevin Rudd accepted Smith’s recommendation that Australia
avoid the US model of a Department of Homeland Security. Somewhat predictably,
Rudd opted instead for “a new level of leadership, direction and coordination” of
“the existing community of relatively small, separate agencies” (Rudd 2008, 8).
Rather than contemplating radical reform to the cold war structure of security
intelligence, Rudd instead created a new office of the national security adviser within
the prime minister’s department, but separate from ONA, to provide strategic direc-
tion and support a “whole-of-government national security policy” (Rudd 2008, 8).
To facilitate this “integrated approach,” Rudd also announced a new crisis coordina-
tion center and intimated the possibility of a new national-security college to incul-
cate security executives in the whole-of-government approach.
Ultimately, the national-security statement merely summated prevailing ortho-
doxies about improving coordination. Where the review did innovate, moreover, it
was by expanding the definition of security to embrace new Labor ideology. Thus
the statement proposes climate change as “a most fundamental national security
challenge for the long term future” (Rudd 2008, 4). The government’s current
predilection for stretching the already-contested concept of national security to
embrace current elite enthusiasms can only further confuse the already-far-from-
detached pursuit of strategic intelligence.
5. Conclusion
Australia has traditionally sought security through alliance, and this has left its
imprint upon the structure and philosophy of national security and the intelligence
required to sustain it. It has also been the focus of a sometimes acerbic debate about
what Australian security should entail and the powers granted to agencies to sustain
it. Political disagreement about both the external and internal nature of threats and
a constantly changing risk environment exacerbate this security intelligence
dilemma and distort the assessment and intelligence collection process.
A number of enduring dilemmas emerge from the history of the essentially
contested and increasingly politicized concept of Australian national security.
Firstly, the Australian debate about its security increasingly required legal account-
ability and parliamentary oversight of all security agencies as the sine qua non of
policing a political democracy. A series of commissions since 1977 have established
a structure of political and legal accountability.
The problem, however, is that to be effective intelligence requires confidential-
ity, “not just to protect sensitive intelligence sources, but also to protect fearless
analysis.” As former ONA analyst A. D. McLennan observed, “it would be hard for
minister to walk away from complicating intelligence judgments, were they public
knowledge” (McLennan 1995, 81). In an era of asymmetric violence and intense
media scrutiny, maintaining confidentiality and detachment has become increas-
ingly difficult. Moreover, the evolution of new polymorphous threats like contem-
porary jihadism renders particularly vivid the irresoluble constitutional dilemma
concerning the relationship between the prudential pursuit of security and the safe-
guarding of democratic rights and abstract notions of justice. This dilemma will
continue to preoccupy those engaged with assessing Australian intelligence and
national security.
Secondly, the evolution of the AIC also demonstrates the uncertain and shifting
international environment in which agencies operate. From the formation of ASIO
to the creation of the new national security adviser, the various Australian agencies
represent partial responses to very different security dilemmas. As a result there
exists a tendency toward overlapping jurisdictions and institutional sclerosis where
agencies immured in a structure designed for Cold War contingencies fail to adapt
to new exigencies. This is evident in the Australian response to regional terrorism.
Nor does the Howard and Rudd governments’ preoccupation with piecemeal reform
and improving coordination and cooperation across the AIC necessarily address
the silo mentality that goes with the territory of bureaucratically entrenched practice
over time.
Somewhat differently, the tendency for the media to shape debate on security
means that the often-histrionic debate over terror precludes attention to the recur-
rent threat of espionage and subversion, ironically the threats that ASIO, ASIS, DIO,
and DSD were founded to combat. Currently, Chinese espionage activity in Australia
exceeds that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but public awareness of this
threat to national security is minimal.
Finally, having elevated intelligence to the forefront of allied counterterrorism
efforts, there is an expectation among the public that new funding, integrated
approaches, strategic frameworks, and risk-based analysis will prevent the next 9/11.
Such expectations are of course unrealistic. Intelligence remains an imprecise activ-
ity, liable to political distortion. The history of Australian security intelligence bears
eloquent testimony to this imprecision.
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GLOSSARY
ABM anti-ballistic missile

ADCI/A assistant director of Central Intelligence/Administration
ADCI/A&P assistant director of Central Intelligence/Analysis and Production
ADCI/C assistant director of Central Intelligence/Collection
AEF American Expeditionary Force
AFIO Association of Former Intelligence Officers
AG Attorney General
AIC Australian Intelligence Community
ANZUS Australia-New Zealand-United States
ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organization
A-12 U.S. spy plane
AWAC airborne warning and control system (U.S. spy plane)
BCCI Bank of Credit and Commerce International

BDA battle damage assessment
Bfv Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (German internal
security service: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz)
BMD ballistic missile defense
BND German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst)
BNL Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
BW biological weapons
CA covert action
CAS Covert Action Staff
CAT Convention against Torture
CB chemical-biological
CBSA Canadian Border Services Agency
CBW chemical-biological warfare
CE counterespionage
CEO chief executive officer
C4I command, control, computer, communications, and intelligence
CFR Council on Foreign Relations
CHAOS crptyonym (code name) for CIA domestic spying operation
CHEKA Soviet internal security agency under Stalin
CI counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (the “Agency”)
CIC Counterintelligence Center
CIG Central Intelligence Group
CINC commander-in-chief (regional military commander)
844 glossary
CIO Central Imagery Office

CIPA Classified Information Procedures Act
CISC Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada
CMS Community Management Staff
CNA Computer Network Attack
CNC Crime and Narcotics Center (DCI)
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COI Office of Coordinator of Information
COINTELPRO FBI Counterintelligence Program
comint communications intelligence
CORONA codename for the first U.S. spy satellite system
C/O case officer (CIA)
COed “case officered”
COMINT communications intelligence
COS chief of station, the top CIA officer in the field
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSIS Canadian Security and Intelligence Service
CTC Counterterrorism Center (CIA)
CW chemical weapons
DA Directorate of Administration
DAS Deputy Assistant Secretary
DBA dominant battlefield awareness
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DCIA Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
DDA Deputy Director for Administration
DDCI Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DD/CIA Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
DD/CIA/CM Deputy Director of Central Intelligence/Community Management
DDI Deputy Director for Intelligence
DDO Deputy Director for Operations
DDS&T Deputy Director for Science and Technology
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DEC DCI’s Environmental Center
DGSE French military foreign intelligence service
DHS Department of Homeland Security; also, Defense Humint Service
(U.S.)
DI Directorate of Intelligence (CIA)
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAC Defense Intelligence Agency Center
DIA/Humint Defense Humint Service
DIS Defence Intelligence Staff (British)
DMA Defense Mapping Agency
DND Department of National Defence (Canada)
DO Directorate of Operations (CIA), also known as the Clandestine
Services
DoD Department of Defense
glossary 845
DoE Department of Energy

DoS Department of State
DoT Department of Transportation
DMI Director of Military Intelligence (proposed)
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DRKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (U.N.)
DS&T Directorate for Science and Technology (CIA)
Elint electronic intelligence

Enigma codename for a machine used to break Germany’s communications
codes in the Second World War
E.O. executive order
EOP Executive Office of the President
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EU European Union
FARRA Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act

FAS Federation of American Scientists
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service (today the Open Source Center,
U.S.)
FIA Future Imagery Architecture (satellite surveillance plan, U.S.)
FIAS Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
fisint foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FSB Federal Security Service (Russia, after the Cold War)
FY Fiscal Year
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GC Geneva Convention
GC&CS Government Code and Cypher School (British)
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (British)
GEO Geosynchronous Orbit
geoint geospatial intelligence
gIBIS graphical Issues Based Information Systems
GID General Intelligence Division (FBI)
GRU Soviet Military Intelligence
GSR Ground Surveillance Radar
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
HEO Highly Elliptical Orbit

HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
humint human intelligence (espionage assets)
IBIS Issues Based Information System
IC intelligence community
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
846 glossary
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICS Intelligence Community Staff
ICC International Criminal Court
IC-21 Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (report title)
IG Inspector General
IG-CSIS Inspector General of CSIS (Canada)
IJN Imperial Japanese Navy
IM Intelligence Memorandum
imint imagery intelligence (photography; geoint)
INFOSEL information security (NSA)
Int-Q-Tel a CIA venture capital fund
ints intelligence collection methods (as in “sigint”)
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State)
INSAC Integrated National Security Assessment Center (Canada)
IOB Intelligence Oversight Board
IRB Immigration Refugee Board (Canada)
IRPA Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Canada)
IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (U.S.)
ISA Intelligence Support Activity
ISC Intelligence Services Commissioner (British)
IT information technology
I&W indicators and warning
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee (U.K.)
JICLE Joint Intelligence Enforcement Working Group (U.S.)
JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Cell (U.N.)
JMIP joint military intelligence program
JROC Joint Reconnaissance Operations Center
JSOC Joint Special Operations Command
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems
KGB Soviet Secret Police and Foreign Intelligence: Committee for State
Security
KH Keyhole (satellite)
KP kitchen police (U.S. Army slang)
LEO Low Earth Orbit
MAGIC Allied code-breaking operations against the Japanese in World War II,
also known as PURPLE
masint measurement and signatures intelligence
MI military intelligence
MIA missing in action
MIB Military Information Branch (U.N.)
MIP Military Intelligence Program
MIRV multiple, independently targeted, re-entry vehicle
glossary 847
MI5 British Security Service

MI6 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS—United Kingdom)
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MOA Memorandum of Agreement
MON Memorandum of Notification
Mossad Israeli intelligence agency
MRBM medium-range ballistic missiles
MRC major regional conflict
MX Missile Experimental (a component of U.S. nuclear deterrence)
NAC National Assessment Center (proposed)

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAO National Applications Office (Department of Homeland Security)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCPC National Counterproliferation Center (for the DNI)
NCS National Clandestine Service
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center (for the DNI)
NFAC National Foreign Assessment Center
NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program (now NIP)
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO non-governmental organization
NIA National Imagery Agency (proposed)
NIC National Intelligence Council
NID National Intelligence Director (variation of DNI)
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NIO National Intelligence Officer
NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIP National Intelligence Program
NIPF National Intelligence Priorities Framework
NKVD the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Soviet Union)
NOC nonofficial cover
NPC Nonproliferation Center
NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSDD National Security Decision Directive
NTM National Technical Means
NZ New Zealand
OBE overtaken by events
OC official cover
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OGPU State Political Directorate (Soviet Union)
OKW Axis crytanalysis agency
OLC Office of Legal Council (Justice Department)
OMB Office of Management and Budget
848 glossary
ONE Office of National Estimates

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
ONUC U.N. Operation in Congo
OPC Office of Policy Coordination (CIA)
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
osint open-source intelligence
OSP Office of Special Planning (DoD)
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PAC Political Action Committee

PBCFIA President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
PDB President’s Daily Brief
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PFIAB President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (as of 2008, PIAB)
phoint photographic intelligence (also, photoint; imint; geoint)
PIAB President’s Intelligence Advisory Board
PKI peacekeeping intelligence
PM ops paramilitary operations
PNG persona non grata
POW prisoner of war
PRB Publication Review Board (CIA)
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSC Public Safety Canada
radint radar intelligence

RAF Royal Air Force
RAND a Washington and California think tank
R&D research and development
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (British)
RMA revolution in military affairs
RN Royal Navy (British)
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

SAIS School of Advanced International Studies (Johns Hopkins)
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAP Special Access Program
SCEs Service Cryptologic Elements (U.S.)
SDO support to diplomatic operations
secdef Secretary of Defense
SF Special Forces (Green Berets—U.S. Army)
SHAMROCK cryptonym for NSA domestic spying operations
sigint signals intelligence
SIRC Security Intelligence Review Committee (Canada)
SIS Secret Intelligence Services (British), also known as MI6
glossary 849
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

SMO support to military operations
SMUN Soviet Mission to the UN
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOCOM Special Operations Command
SOE Special Operations Executive (British)
SOF Special Operations Forces (U.S.)
SOG Special Operations Group (CIA)
SOVA Office of Soviet Analysis (CIA)
SR-21 U.S. spy plane
SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SVR Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (the new KGB)
TCA Technical Collection Agency (proposed)

techint technical intelligence
telint telemetry intelligence
TIARA tactical intelligence and related activities
TOR terms of reference (for NIE drafting)
TSP Terrorism Surveillance Program (U.S.)
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle (drone)

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
UK United Kingdom
UKUSA United Kingdom, United States, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand
intelligence sharing
Ultra communications intelligence obtained by the United States and Britain
during the Second World War
U-2 CIA spy plane
UN United Nations
UNAMIR UN Mission for Rwanda
UNCOK UN Commission on Korea
UNEF UN Emergency Force
UNSEC UN Secretariat
UNTAG UN Mission in Namibia
USAF U.S. Air Force
USC U.S. Code (a statutory identification system)
USCS U.S. Cryptologic System
USIB U.S. Intelligence Board
USN U.S. Navy
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USSS U.S. Sigint System
USTR U.S. Trade Representative
VENONA Codename for U.S. Army Signal Corps and NSA sigint intercepts against
Soviets (1943–1980)
850 glossary
VX a deadly nerve agent used in chemical weapons
WIPACC Weapons Intelligence, Proliferation, and Arms Control Center

WMDs weapons of mass destruction
INDEX
A-12 aircraft, 73, 82 administrator-custodians, 491

AAF. See Army Air Forces AEF. See American Expeditionary Force
Aamodt, Michael G., 531 Afghanistan
Abakumov, Viktor, 777, 781, 787 Canada and, 675–76
Able Archer command-post exercise (1983), 151 mujahideen in, 25, 144, 363, 449, 834
ABM. See antiballistic missile system Northern Alliance of, 90, 144, 212–13, 223
Abou-Elmaati, Amed, 676 Al Qaeda in, 24–25, 144
Abu Ghraib, 268–69, 297 Reagan and, 23–25, 615
Abwehr Ultra, 511, 791n2 UK and, 709–10
academic study, of national security, 138–41 UN and, 275
access codes, 26 US in, 242, 245–47
accountability, 627–753 USSR and, 23–25, 359, 363, 782
in Australia, 682–85 Africa Command (AFRICOM), 581, 584
in Canada, 673–98 AFRICOM. See Africa Command
DCI and, 721–22 Aftergood, Steven, 234
dimensions of, 719–21 aggressive bureaucratic competition, 365
document, 26 Agrell, Wilhelm, 345n3
ethics and, 735–53 AIC. See Australian Intelligence Community
future of, 732–33 aircraft
GAO and, 401n9 A-12, 73, 82
GCHQ and, 643–45, 701, 713 JSTARS, 428
goals of, 729–32 Predator, 17, 583, 591
Intelligence Accountability Act, 499 for reconnaissance, 6, 17, 25, 73, 82, 216
intelligence and, 27–28, 52–53, 213–15, 497–99, SR-71, 82, 220
719–34 U-2, CIA and, 73, 83, 115, 148, 176, 178
Johnson, L. K., and, 676, 716 U-2, Eisenhower and, 127, 442
politicization and, 728–29, 762 U-2,IMINT and, 127, 129, 220, 237, 261,
politics of, 719–34 442, 449
“process accountability,” 728–29 UAVs, 17–18, 424–25, 428, 432, 455
reforms and, 761–70 Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and
RIPA and, 645n15, 648, 695, 701, 704 Reconnaissance Agency, 243
secrecy and, 657–72, 703–4 airport security, 19–20
SIS and, 644–45, 701, 708 Albania, 127, 144, 260
state secrets privilege and, 657–72 Aldrich, Richard, 140, 144
totalitarian regimes and, 736 alert systems, 66–67
in UK, 699–718 Alexander, Keith B., 248–49
Acheson, Dean, 115, 487 Allen, George, 722
Ackerman, Ken, 507 Allen, Lew, 185
Ackoff, Russell, 346 Allen, Richard, 182
Re-Defining the Future, 346n4 Allende Gossens, Salvador, 489n4, 617–18, 721
Acquis Communautaire, 770 Allhoff, Fritz, 744
Acton, Lord, 27 Allison, Graham, 473
Adams, John, 330 all-source fusion, 22, 139, 190, 394
Adams, John Quincy, 330 Almalki, Abdullah, 676
Adams, Sam, 129–30 Alwan, Rafid Ahmed (“Curve Ball”), 18
adaptive realism, 49 American Expeditionary Force (AEF), 109, 216
Addington, David S., 252 American Historical Association, 418
Adelman, Howard, 312 American Historical Review (journal), 79
Adenauer, Konrad, 793–95, 799 American intelligence culture, 361–66, 433
852 index
Amery, John, 522, 527 anti-war movement, 27, 118, 130

Ames, Aldrich Hazen ANZUS. See Australia-New Zealand-United States
CI and, 27, 81, 96, 185, 528–29, 533 Applebaum, Anne, 776
KGB and, 541–44, 549, 784 Arab-Americans, 271–72
reforms and, 100, 192, 721 Arar, Maher, 53, 312–13n3, 329, 676, 743
USSR and, 133, 263–65, 267, 269, 273–74, 364, Arar Commission, 673, 677
724 Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo, 24, 615
Amit, Meir, 820 Argell, Wilhelm, “When Everything is
Amnesty International, 321 Intelligence, Nothing is Intelligence,” 722
analysis Argentina, 761, 764–66, 768–69
analytical culture and, 457 Arguelles, José Augustin, 331–33, 335t
analytic integrity officers, 419 Aristotle, 741
Analyzing Intelligence (George, R., and Arkin, William, 574
Bruce, J.), 405 Armed Services, mission of, 112–14
assessments of, 400–401 Armstrong, Anne, 175, 182, 184
Bay of Pigs Invasion and, 359 Army Air Forces (AAF), 111
Betts and, 384, 453 Army Intelligence and Security Command
competitive, 375–86 (INSCOM), 243
of cost, 413n7, 758n2 Army Knowledge Online, 415
counterterrorism and, 401 Arnold, Henry, 562
covert actions and, 393, 448–49 Ashcroft, John, 251
crisis of, 359–74 ASIO. See Australian Security Intelligence
DNI and, 412 Organization
ethics and, 417–20 ASIS. See Australian Secret Intelligence Service
future of, 409–13 Aspin, Les, 13, 133, 185
of intelligence, 65–66, 82, 122, 279–82, 343–57, Aspin-Brown Commission, 7n3, 134, 185, 630n5
375–86 al-Assad, Hafez, 816
in intelligence cycle, 20, 393, 409–13 assassinations
intelligence estimates and, 444 Church Committee and, 727
Kent and, 370, 372, 398, 730 CIA and, 23, 25, 285
methodologies of, 378–81, 389–403, 417 as covert actions, 143, 599
NIC and, 385–86, 457–58, 466 Eisenhower and, 28, 126–28
of OSINT, 230–31, 235 Ford, G., and, 180
performance measures for, 400–401 Hitler and, 272–73
policymaking and, 395–402, 443–47 Israel and, 744
The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis SIS and, 144
(Heuer), 405 assessments
research and development for, 415–17 of analysis, 400–401
secrecy and, 390, 393, 399, 418 of failures, 77, 87, 89, 97, 359–61
Studies in Intelligence and, 404 of intelligence, 87–103, 396
theory of, 375–86, 389–403 measures of success and, 499–500
training in, 404–5, 448 of risk, 45–46, 66, 214–15, 219, 391, 553, 581–84,
uncertainty and, 404–21 613–14
analytic integrity officers, 419 of threat, 45–46, 375–76, 453, 455, 460
Analyzing Intelligence (George, R., and assets, 15, 222, 393
Bruce, J.), 405 asset validation, 544–48
“Anarchist Fighters,” 507 associations and hypotheses, 354f, 355
anarchists, 507–8 “asymmetric threat,” of terrorism, 455
Anderson, George W., 179–80 atomic energy, 108–9, 148
Andrew, Christopher, 73–75, 79, 140, 144 Atomic Spy Ring, 527, 555–66
For the President’s Eyes Only, 609n2 Atom Spy, 555–66
Andropov, Yuri, 777, 786–87 Atta, Mohammed, 267
Angleton, James, 96, 828 Attlee, Clement, 562
Angola, 279, 287, 610n6 Augustine (saint), 741
Annan, Kofi, 282 AUMF. See Authorization to Use Military Force
antiballistic missile system (ABM), 132 Aum Shinrikyo movement, 834
Anti-Terrorism Act, 674–75, 687 Australia
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act accountability in, 682–85
(2001), 645n16, 652 AIC and, 824, 835
index 853
ANZUS and, 612 Bay of Pigs Invasion

ASIO and, 681, 826–28, 831–35, 837, 841 analysis and, 359
ASIS and, 683–84, 827–29, 831–33, 837, 841 CIA and, 24, 28, 73, 77, 122, 128, 365, 370,
The Australian Intelligence and Security Services 449–50, 570
1900-1950 (Templeton), 824 Cuba and, 24, 28, 73, 77, 122, 128, 172, 177, 359,
Australian Security Intelligence Organization 365
Act (1979), 645n17 Kennedy, J. F., and, 475, 614n9, 721
Australian Special Wireless Group, 825–26 PFIAB and, 172, 177
codebreaking in, 825–26 Bazarov, Boris, 509
intelligence in, 438, 463, 823–42 Bean, Hamilton, 239
national security of, 823–42 Beaumarchais, Pierre Augustin Caron de, 609
strategic intelligence in, 829–33, 836 Beck, Ulrich, 46, 49
terrorism in, 834–40 Beckett, Margaret, 646, 710, 712, 714
UKUSA and, 825 Begin, Menahem, 811
in Vietnam War, 830 Belgium, 207, 217
Australia-New Zealand-United States belief perseverance, 366
(ANZUS), 612 Bell, Griffin, 513–14
The Australian Intelligence and Security Services Bell, Stewart, Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures
1900-1950 (Templeton), 824 and Exports Terrorism Around the
Australian Intelligence Community (AIC), World, 312
824, 835 Bell, William, 529
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Bellah, Robert, 520
683–84, 827–29, 831–33, 837, 841 Ben-Gurion, David, 813, 819
Australian Security Intelligence Organization Ben-Menashe, Ari, Profits of War, 747
(ASIO), 681, 826–28, 831–35, 837, 841 Beobachtungs-Dienst, 163–64
Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act Berezovsky, Boris, 786
(1979), 645n17 Berger, Samuel, 184
Australian Special Wireless Group, 825–26 Beria, Lavrentiy, 777, 781
authoritarian regimes, 47, 51, 759 Berki, Robert N., 47
authority, substantive, 605 Berlin Tunnel, 77, 126–27
Authorization to Use Military Force Berlin Wall, 34, 486, 496, 796, 798
(AUMF), 337 Best, Robert, 523
autonomy, 48–49 best practices, 62, 76, 79
Avant, Deborah D., 50 measures of success and, 499–500
avian influenza, weaponization of, 382 Betrayal and Deceit: The Politics of Canadian
Aviation Week (journal), 237 Immigration (Campbell), 312
Avigur, Shaul, 807 Betts, Richard, 375
analysis and, 384, 453
cognitive pathologies and, 458–59
Baginski, Maureen A., 248 Bevin, Ernest, 144
Bagosora, Théoneste, 290 BfV. See Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
Baird, Zoe, 185 biases, 390
Baker, Norman, 651 motivated, 369–72, 398, 460
Baker, William O., 176 policymaking and, 369–72
Bali bombings, 712, 834–35 of politicization, 242, 360, 363, 373, 398, 444,
Ball, D., 825 458–63, 472–74
Breaking the Codes, 825 scientific, 399
Baltic states, 776, 785 unmotivated, 366–69, 391, 456–58
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 197 “bidding back,” 303–6
banking system, 38 Biddle, Charles J., 658
Bank of Credit and Commerce Bill of Rights, 745
International, 197 Bin Laden, Osama
el-Banna, Jamil, 709 Clinton and, 21–22
Bar-Joseph, Uri, 345n3, 372 OSINT and, 233, 236
Barlow, Richard M., 667 Al Qaeda and, 243
Bartko, George “Dennis,” 249 Binnet, Max, 819
Battle of Fallujah (2004), 247 Biological and Chemical Weapons
Battle of Midway (1942), 65, 111, 166 Conventions, 203
Bauer, William, 312, 324 biological weapons, 192, 446, 707
854 index
Bissell, Richard, 127–28 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 182, 495

BKA. See Bundeskriminalamt budgets
Black, William, Jr., 305 cuts, by Clinton, 298
blackmail, 269, 530, 735, 766 for intelligence, 447–48, 499
black operations v. white operations, 575–77 Office of Management and Budget, 117
“black sites,” of CIA, 51 Bulgaria, 763
Black Tom munitions terminal, 507 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), 791, 803
Blackwater USA, 299 Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), 803
Blair, Dennis C., 432, 750n3 Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), 790–805,
Blair, Tony, 476, 707, 709, 711 791n2
Blamey, Thomas, 825 Bundestag, 791, 794, 797
Bletchley Park, 160, 164–65, 557 Bundeswehr, 790–91, 791n1, 793, 799, 801–2
Blix, Hans, 457, 461 Bundy, McGeorge, 25, 72n2, 488
blogosphere, 234–35, 415 bureaucracy
Bloomingdale, Alfred, 182 aggressive bureaucratic competition and, 365
blow-back, 598–99 of CIA, 10f, 11f
Blum, Eberhard, 792 of government, 397–98, 437–38
BND. See Bundesnachrichtendienst of intelligence community, 7–11, 8f
Board of National Estimates, 115 retaliation by, 749
Bobkov, Fillip, 785 structures of, 108, 463–67
Boland Amendments, 748 Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR),
“Bomber Gap,” 118, 127, 179, 370 7, 368
Bond, James, 54, 530, 532 Burgess, Guy, 81, 218
Booz Allen Hamilton, 299, 301, 304 Burkert, Walter, 519
Boraz, S., 757n1 Burma, 38
border issues, US-Canadian, 310–27, 674–75 Bush, George H. W.
Boren, David, 184 CIA and, 119, 133, 181, 371, 450, 486,
Borman, Frank, 182 490n7, 493
Born, Hans, 745 covert actions and, 610n6
Bosnia, 94, 221, 276, 428 as president, 176, 183–85
Botha, Pik, 286, 288 Skull and Bones Society and, 490n6
Bouchiki, Ahmed, 747, 818 Bush, George W.
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 281 CIA and, 238
Bowman, M. E. (“Spike”), 516 civil liberties and, 253, 262
Brady v. Maryland 1963, 198–99 DNI and, 731
Brahimi Report, 282 domestic spying and, 118, 186, 242–43, 250,
brain drain, 303–6 349
brainstorming, 381 FISC and, 726
Brandt, Willy, 219, 796 GWOT and, 92, 296, 336, 462
Brauner, Phyllis, 664 national security and, 35, 172, 239, 250, 445,
Brauner, William H., 663 630n6
Brazil, 761, 763–65, 768–69 9/11 attacks and, 212
Breaking the Codes (Ball and Horner), 825 NSA and, 244
Breaking the Phalanx (MacGregor), 417 PFIAB and, 172, 175–76, 185–86
Brezhnev, Leonid, 777, 783 politicization and, 119, 371, 731
British Intelligence and Security Services, 39, Al Qaeda and, 475, 579–80
124–25 state secrets privilege and, 657, 669
British Mandate, in Israel, 807, 812 WMDs and, 91–92, 134, 457–58
Brooks, David, 399 Butler, Robin, 458
Brown, Gordon, 647, 705, 711–15 Butler Committee, 461–62
Brown, Harold, 133 Butler Report, 714
Brown, Wilson M., III, 664–65 Byers, Wheaton, 179
Brown Commission, 386 By Way of Deception (Ostrovski), 747
Bruce, David K. E., 175
Bruce, James, Analyzing Intelligence, 405
Brugioni, Dino, 178 Cairncross, Frances, 407
Brundrett, Frederick, 148 Cambodia, 721
Bruneau, Thomas, 757n1 Cambridge Five, 263, 527
Bruner, Jerome, 399 camouflage, 26, 394n5
index 855
Campbell, Charles, Betrayal and Deceit: The case officers, 550–51

Politics of Canadian Immigration, 312 Casey, William
Campbell-Savours, Dale, 716n4, 717 CIA and, 76, 182, 371, 488, 490, 490n7
Canada, 167–68 congressional oversight and, 499
accountability in, 673–98 covert actions and, 131
Afghanistan and, 675–76 politicization and, 721
Betrayal and Deceit: The Politics of Canadian Reagan and, 618–19
Immigration (Campbell), 312 Castro, Fidel
Canada’s Immigration Policy (Collacott), 312 Carter, Jimmy, and, 442
Canadian Car and Foundry Plant, 507 CIA and, 24–25, 128, 130, 230, 365
Canadian Council of Refugees, 322n12 Eisenhower and, 615
CATSA and, 673, 694, 694n8 Helms and, 724
CBSA and, 314–18, 675 Kennedy, J. F., and, 177, 450, 615, 622n17
CIC and, 314, 690 CAT. See Convention Against Torture
Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports CATSA. See Canadian Air Transportation
Terrorism Around the World (Bell), 312 Safety Act
CSEC and, 674–75, 690 Cavanaugh, Thomas Patrick, 529
CSIS and, 673, 677n1, 685–87, 690 CBSA. See Canadian Border Services Agency
Department of Justice Canada and, 318n6 CCMR. See Center for Civil-Military Relations
FINTRAC and, 690 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 813
immigration in, 310–27 censorship, 26, 51
intelligence in, 314–16 Center for Army Lessons Learned, 417
9/11 attacks and, 674 Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), 758,
oversight in, 678–81 758n3
parliamentary oversight in, 688–89 Center for Military Information (ZNBw), 790,
PSC and, 674 799
refugees in, 319–22 Center for Naval Analyses, 386
scandals in, 685–86 Center for the Study of Intelligence, 82, 391
US-Canadian border law enforcement, Centers for Disease Control, 411
310–27, 674–75 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Who Gets In: What’s Wrong with Canada’s assassinations and, 23, 25, 285
Immigration Program, and How to Fix It Bay of Pigs Invasion and, 24, 28, 73, 77, 122,
(Stoffman), 312 128, 365, 370, 449–50, 570
Canada’s Immigration Policy (Collacott), 312 “black sites” of, 51
Canadian Air Transportation Safety Act bureaucracy of, 10f, 11f
(CATSA), 673, 694, 694n8 Bush, George H. W., and, 119, 133, 181, 371, 450,
Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), 486, 490n7, 493
314–18, 675 Bush, George W., and, 238
Canadian Car and Foundry Plant, 507 Carter, Jimmy, and, 131–32, 448, 450
Canadian Council of Refugees, 322n12 Casey and, 76, 182, 371, 488, 490, 490n7
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Castro and, 24–25, 128, 130, 230, 365
(CSIS), 673, 677n1, 685–87, 690 Central Intelligence Agency Act (1949), 486
Cannon, Clarence, 498 Central Intelligence Bulletin, 496
capital-intensive economics, 363 Central Intelligence Group and, 486
Caplan, Elinor, 320, 321n8 Chile and, 130, 489n4
Capone, Al, 355 Church Committee and, 173, 236, 722, 726
Carlton, Eric, 519 CI and, 77, 82, 96, 100, 133, 195, 267
Carns, Michael, 498 Colby and, 14–15, 76n6, 488, 490n7, 491, 498
Carstens, Karl, 796 Cold War and, 8–9, 73, 77, 96, 123
Carter, Jimmy congressional oversight of, 77, 119–20, 125,
Brzezinski and, 182, 495 130–31, 573–74, 677n1
Castro and, 442 Contra faction and, 3–4, 24, 131–32
CIA and, 131–32, 448, 450 covert actions and, 82, 118, 122, 125, 127, 142,
FBI and, 513 259–60, 365, 422, 494n11, 569, 577–78
Iran and, 16 culture of, 361–66
PFIAB and, 175–76, 181–82, 187 DCI and, 8, 630
Turner and, 9, 25, 181, 426 democratization of, 123
Carter, John J., Covert Operations as a Tool for Deutch and, 304, 500
Presidential Foreign Policy in History, 609n2 DO of, 9, 11f, 82
856 index
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (continued) U-2 aircraft and, 73, 83, 115, 148, 176, 178
drug experiments by, 236 USSR and, 115
Dulles, A., and, 72n2, 76n6, 126, 128–29, 215, war protesters and, 27, 118, 130, 668
365, 488–89, 490n7, 498, 749 WMDs and, 123, 134
Eisenhower and, 488n3, 495, 500, 587–88 Woolsey and, 15n11, 18, 146, 487, 490n7, 491
FBI rivalry with, 126, 134 Central Intelligence Agency Act (1949), 486
founding of, 112–13, 123 Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIA), 496
Gates and, 76n6, 94, 151, 371, 397, 441, 490n7, Central Intelligence Group, 486
498, 498n15, 725, 729 centralization, 49, 637
Germany and, 792–93, 795 CFE. See Conventional Forces in Europe
Goss and, 238, 298, 304 chain of custody issues, 193, 198
Guatemala and, 24, 128, 185 Challenger shuttle, 352
Hayden, M., and, 82, 88, 92, 304, 306, 490n7, Chandler, Douglas, 523
491n8, 580, 587–88, 604, 624, 633, 724 Chechnya, 776, 786–87
Helms and, 721 checks and balances, 669–72
history of, 70–86, 112, 122–37, 485–89 CHEKA. See Extraordinary Commission for
History Staff of, 71, 73–75, 76n5, 76n6 Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage
HUMINT and, 362–64 Chekists, 775–76, 785
inspector general of, 680, 723, 731–32 chemical warfare, 17, 192, 446, 707
interrogation techniques of, 19, 731 Cheney, Richard, 46, 244, 250, 252–53, 462
Iran and, 367–68, 570 Cheney Doctrine, 46, 52
Iran-Contra scandal and, 3–4, 24, 131–32 Cherkashin, Viktor, 263, 265, 267, 269
IRTPA and, 134, 264 Cherne, Leo, 173–75, 182–83
Japan and, 363 Chernenko, Konstantin, 232
Kennedy, J. F., and, 83, 128–29, 495 Chesney, Robert, 670
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA Chicago Tribune, 125
(Weiner), 74n4, 135, 304, 745 chief of station (COS), 9
McCone and, 82, 129–30, 425–26, 488, Chifley, Ben, 825–26, 830
490n7, 492 Chilcot, John, 655
mission of, 125, 133–34, 190, 260, 384 Chile
National Security Act and, 8, 78, 125, 190–91, CIA and, 130, 489n4
218, 273, 485n1, 487, 489, 589, 630 covert actions in, 116, 614n9, 617–19
NATO and, 489n4 intelligence in, 759, 761, 764
9/11 attacks and, 123 Chi Mek, 516
Nixon and, 496, 614n9, 730 Chin, Larry Wu-Tai, 271, 529
North Korea and, 100, 135, 248, 362–64 China. See People’s Republic of China
NRO and, 115 Chinese embassy bombing, in Belgrade, 97n4,
ODNI and, 80n9, 107 428
Open Source Center of, 229–30, 240 Chinese-Taiwan dispute, 381
organizational framework of, 10f, 11f Chomeau, John, 727
Pahlavi and, 367–68 Church, Frank, 118, 130, 135, 180, 680n4
performance measures for, 92, 94, 96–98 Church Committee
PFIAB and, 175 assassinations and, 727
President’s Commission on CIA CIA and, 173, 236, 722, 726
Activities, 680n4 covert actions and, 23n13, 173, 499
Al Qaeda and, 212–13 domestic spying and, 118
Reagan and, 131–32 FBI and, 722
recruitment and, 466 Helms and, 721, 724
reform of, 49, 117, 306–7, 630n2 NSA and, 722
renditions and, 135 Churchill, Winston, 143, 217, 394, 611
rise and fall of, 122–37 CI. See counterintelligence
Schlesinger and, 183, 488, 490, 490n7, 492–93 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency
Strategic Intent 2007-2011, 730 CIC. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada
Studies in Intelligence, 4, 73–74, 74n4, 80, 237, CIPA. See Classified Information Procedures Act
404, 758 cipher systems, 81, 109, 156, 161, 164–65
Tenet and, 261, 371, 448, 462, 488, 490n7, 491 Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), 314,
treason cases in, 4 690
Truman and, 22, 73, 83, 115, 259, 486 civilian intelligence, 189–98, 209, 788
Turner and, 94, 488–89, 488n3, 492–93 civil liberties
index 857
Bush, George W., and, 253, 262 Colby, William E.

FBI and, 125, 516–17 CIA and, 14–15, 76n6, 488, 490n7, 491, 498
intelligence community and, 43, 108, 197, CI and, 540
208, 803 congressional oversight and, 725
in UK, 711 Honorable Men, 745
civil-military relations (CMR), 757 Iran and, 25
civil rights movement, 27, 118 Kissinger and, 450
Civil War, extradition and, 331–33 Rumsfeld and, 450
Clancy, Tom, 404 Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports
clandestine operations, 3, 59, 202, 551 Terrorism Around the World (Bell), 312
v. covert actions, 570 Cold War
NCS and, 9, 11, 82, 448, 539 CIA and, 8–9, 73, 77, 96, 123
Clapper, James R., Jr., 633–34 CI and, 539
Clarke, Carter, 564 communism and, 113, 116–18, 122, 124
classified documents, 234–35, 476 computers and, 167–70
CIPA and, 192–93, 199–200, 206, 514 cooperation during, 219–20
controlled, 239 covert actions and, 587–89, 609
histories, 78 FBI and, 512–13
Studies in Intelligence as, 4 Germany in, 127, 145, 790–98
US v. Reynolds and, 658, 664 intelligence during, 28, 33–35, 43, 112–16,
Classified Information Procedures Act (1980) 259–60
(CIPA), 192–93, 199–200, 206, 514 intelligence estimates and, 149
Clausewitz, Carl von, 376, 453, 632 Journal of Cold War Studies, 79
Clegg, Hugh G., 124 Nixon and, 116–18, 496
Clemens, Hans, 794–95 Penkovsky and, 18, 395
Clemente, Jonathan, 737 politicization and, 132
Clifford, Clark, 175, 178–79 SIGINT in, 167–70
climate change, 37–38 SIS and, 140–41, 143–44, 147–48, 362
Clinton, Bill, 496 UK and, 138–54
bin Laden and, 21–22 US and, 219–20, 512–13
budget cuts by, 298 USSR and, 18, 132–33, 146–50, 168, 441,
covert actions and, 448 781–82
former Yugoslavia and, 428 Woolsey and, 13
Gates and, 488n3 collaboration
Netanyahu and, 820 in developing democracies, 767
PFIAB and, 174, 176, 184–85 interagency, 50–51, 350–51, 396–400, 418
Presidential Decision Directive 35 of, 92 international, 212–25
Woolsey and, 9, 488n3 risk assessment and, 214–15, 219
club mentality, 362, 367 in US, 50–51, 350–51, 390n1, 396–400, 418,
CMR. See civil-military relations 616–17, 617n11
CNA. See Computer Network Attack Collacott, Martin, Canada’s Immigration
Coast Guard Intelligence Service, 7, 7n4, 196, Policy, 312
223 collection phase, in intelligence cycle, 15–17,
Cockroft, John, 560 393–95
codebreaking Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff
by Australian Special Wireless Group, 825–26 (CRES), 92
Japan and, 160, 165–66 collective intelligence, 16, 63–65
terminology of, 81 collectivization, in USSR, 267
by UK, 111, 156, 159–67, 557 Collins, Susan, 631
by US, 19, 72, 111, 156, 159–60, 393 Colombia, 764, 766–67, 769
by USSR, 159–62 Combined Bombing Offensive, 111
codemakers, 156, 163–65 COMINT. See communications intelligence
cognitive pathologies, 51, 453. See also biases commando operations, 111
Betts and, 458–59 Committee of Secret Foreign
cognitive dissonance, 457 Correspondence, 258
cognitive limits, 456–58 Commonwealth Security Service (CSS), 825
mirror-imaging, 362, 458 communications intelligence (COMINT), 243
self-deception, 526 Communications Security Establishment Canada
COI. See Office of Coordinator of Information (CSEC), 674–75, 690
858 index
communism Constitutional issues

Cold War and, 113, 116–18, 122, 124 Communism and, 113, 118
Constitutional issues and, 113, 118 covert actions and, 590, 598, 601
in Europe, 507, 527 due process, 189–90, 193, 333
McCarthy and, 721 ethics and, 745
in the western hemisphere, 615 fifth amendment, 200
Communist Party fourth amendment, 253
in Germany, 558–59, 563 in Germany, 803–4
glasnost and, 778 sixth amendment, 200
Khrushchev and, 777 wartime powers and, 251, 726
in PRC, 529 containment, 259
in US, 118, 507, 509 Continental Army, 258, 609
in USSR, 152, 232, 775 Continental Congress, 215, 258, 608
compartmentalization, 88, 365, 552–53, 737 contingency analysis, 379
competition, and politicization, 459–60 contractor employees, 296, 532
competitive analysis, 375–86 Contra faction
after intelligence failures, 376–77 CIA and, 3–4, 24, 131–32
obstacles to, 382–85 Iran-Contra scandal and, 449–50, 570, 583, 595,
techniques/methodologies of, 378–81, 622, 680, 724
389–403, 417 Control Intelligence Staff, 390n1
“complexities” controlled operations, 545–47, 550
The Complexity of Terrorism: Social and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), 239
Behavioral Understanding (Hayden, Convention Against Torture (CAT), 334, 337
N.), 348n9 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), 149
in homeland security, 343–58, 344t, 351t Coolidge, Calvin, 508
in law enforcement, 353–55 Cooper, Yvette, 706–7
sensemaking of, 352–57 cooperation
of terrorism, 347–49 in Cold War, 219–20
The Complexity of Terrorism: Social and in global era, 212–25
Behavioral Understanding (Hayden, N.), in intelligence community, 50–51, 356–66, 389,
348n9 390n1, 396–400, 418
Comprehensive Communications Act, 507 IRTPA and, 8n5, 50, 213, 223, 411–12
Computer Network Attack (CNA), 170 NGA and, 223–24, 410, 423, 427
computers SIGINT and, 222, 423
Cold War and, 167–70 core collectors, 550n22
in warfare, 452–53 COS. See chief of station
The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (DOD), 220 cost
Congo, 275–77, 279 analysis of, 413n7, 758n2
UN Operation in the Congo, 284–86 of failures, 48, 52–53
congressional oversight counterespionage, 26, 540–44
Casey and, 499 counterfeiting, 23
CIA and, 77, 119–20, 125, 130–31, 573–74, counterinsurgency, 417, 581
677n1 counterintelligence (CI), 6
Colby and, 725 Ames and, 27, 81, 96, 185, 528–29, 533
covert actions and, 589, 592–97, 620–21 Atomic Spy Ring and, 527, 555–66
funding and, 95, 112, 300, 430, 447–48, 620–21, case studies of, 546–47
620–21n16 challenges of, 537–54
Hayden, M., and, 593n5 CIA and, 77, 82, 96, 100, 133, 195, 267
of SOF, 569 Colby and, 540
theory of, 53, 765 Cold War and, 539
Congressional Research Service, 173, 239 Counterintelligence Enhancement Act
Congress of Vienna, 408 (2002), 196
Conklin, Jeff, 350 counterintelligence states, 47, 759
Connally, John B., 180 countersubversion as, 538
Conolly, Richard L., 176 counterterrorism and, 552
Conquest, Robert, The Great Terror, 776 definitions for, 537–40
Conrad, Clyde, 541–42, 541n11 DHS and, 538
consequentialist theory, 741, 751 FBI and, 505–17
index 859
in Germany, 794–95 failures of, 622

Hanssen and, 96, 100, 265–67, 551 Gates and, 588n1
IMINT and, 15, 25, 81, 393 Geneva Conventions and, 582, 582n2
The International Journal of Intelligence and in Guatemala, 442, 570, 615
Counterintelligence (journal), 4, 79, 239, 404, GWOT and, 572–73
758 Iran-Contra scandal and, 3–4, 24
KGB and, 265, 267–68, 537, 539–50, 759 by Israel, 817–20
law enforcement and, 553–54 Johnson, L. K., and, 610n5, 619n15
NSC and, 554 Kennedy, J. F., and, 448
offensive v. defensive, 394n5 Kissinger and, 619
Office of Intelligence and law and, 570–74, 587–607
Counterintelligence, 7, 17 law enforcement and, 196
OSINT and, 236–37 National Security Act and, 590–95
reform of, 509–10 NSC and, 589, 589n2
risk assessment and, 553 Pentagon-style, 569–86
security and, 25–27, 192 policymakers and, 613–19
SIGINT and, 111, 148–49, 544–45 presidents and, 589, 591–92, 601, 609n2, 613,
training in, 509–10 617–21
in WWII, 399, 549–50 Reagan and, 610n6, 611
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act risk assessment and, 581–84, 613–14
(2002), 196 SOF and, 569, 575–84, 576t
counternarcotics enforcement, 197 strengths and weakness of, 608–25
countersubversion, 538 TECHINT and, 588
counterterrorism Turner and, 25
analysis and, 401 in UK, 142–45
CI and, 552 Covert Operations as a Tool for Presidential
covert actions and, 604 Foreign Policy in History (Carter,
Gates and, 580 John J.), 609n2
homeland security and, 60–62 Covey, Stephen M. R., 520
NCTC and, 196, 297, 464–65, 580 Cradock, Percy, 139, 141, 145, 150–52
Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation The Craft of Intelligence (Dulles, A.), 273, 487
Group, 462 CRES. See Collection Requirements and
SOF and, 576t Evaluation Staff
in USSR, 787 crimes
courts, and intelligence, 651 cybercrime, 203, 552–53
covert actions, 23–25, 72 against humanity, 207–8
analysis and, 393, 448–49 organized, 354–55, 736, 762
assassinations as, 143, 599 political, 202
Bush, George H. W., and, 610n6 criminal statutes, 201–7
Casey and, 131 crippies, 167
in Chile, 116, 614n9, 617–19 crisis, of analysis, 359–74
Church Committee and, 23n13, 173, 499 Critchfield, James, Partners at the
CIA and, 82, 118, 122, 125, 127, 142, 259–60, 365, Creation, 795n4
422, 494n11, 569, 577–78 critical thinking, 389–92, 396–400, 453–67
v. clandestine, 570 Croatian Republican Brotherhood, 828
Clinton and, 448 cross-border raids, 591
Cold War and, 587–89, 609 Crown Prosecution Service, 641
Congress and, 589, 592–97, 620–21 Crutchfield, James P., 347n5
Constitutional issues and, 590, 598, 601 cryptanalysis, 81, 113, 156, 160, 393
counterterrorism and, 604 cryptography, 155–56, 161–68, 408
Covert Operations as a Tool for Presidential Cryptologia (journal), 4
Foreign Policy in History (Carter, cryptologic linguists, 249, 394
John J.), 609n2 cryptology, 111, 155–56, 159–70, 512
Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations CSEC. See Communications Security
in the United States 1939-1941 Establishment Canada
(Mahl), 611n7 CSIS. See Canadian Security Intelligence
Eisenhower and, 128, 448, 728 Service
executive process and, 597–98, 601 CSS. See Commonwealth Security Service
860 index
Cuba Iran and, 131, 368

Bay of Pigs Invasion and, 24, 28, 73, 77, 122, mission of, 422–23
128, 172, 177, 359, 365 PFIAB and, 175, 177
Kennedy, J. F., and, 28, 261, 365, 473 Defense Intelligence Enterprise, 633n12
Missile Crisis in, 18, 115, 129, 148, 177–78, 261, Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS) (UK), 140,
359, 410, 450, 473, 630 641–42
Roosevelt, K., and, 615n10 Defense Mapping Agency, 425
US relations with, 14 Defense Signals Directorate (DSD), 683–84, 827,
CUI. See Controlled Unclassified Information 837, 841
cultural insensitivity, 361–62, 364 defensive counterintelligence, 394n5, 401
culture DeFreitas, John, III, 248
of American intelligence, 361–66, 433 Deleon, Linda, 732
analytical, 457 Deletant, Dennis, 760
of CIA, 361–66 Delta Force, 577
Cunningham, Randy “Duke,” 305 democracies
Currie, Lauchlin, 263, 512 in developing world, 757–73
cybercrime, 203, 552–53 in Eastern Europe, 761–63
Cyprus, 291 intelligence in, 52, 72, 85, 408, 418–20, 449–50,
Czechoslovakia, 115, 141, 178, 763 498, 719
Czech Republic, 785 OSS and, 72–73
Secrecy and Democracy (Turner), 237
democratic civilian control, 757n1, 765–68
Dalai Lama, 751 democratization
Dallaire, Roméo, 288–90 of CIA, 123
“dangle” operations, 545, 545n18, 550 of intelligence community, 51–52, 757–58,
d’Aquina, Iva Toguri (“Tokyo Rose”), 523 765–68, 771
Dar, Avraham, 818–19 politicization and, 51
Darden, Colgate, 175 “third wave” of, 759–61
Darfur, 260, 277 deniability, plausible, 588–89, 727
data mining, 65, 234 “denial and deception,” 383, 399
Daugherty, Harry, 508 denied area, 545, 545n19
David, Ruth, 412n6 Denmark, 355
Davis, Jack, 379 Denning, T., 699–700
Davis, Legrome D., 665 deontological theory, 741
Dayan, Moshe, 811, 820 Department of Defense (DOD), 197
DCAF. See Geneva Center for the Democratic The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 220
Control of Armed Forces DNI and, 423–24
DCI. See Director of Central Intelligence intelligence in, 422–34
DCIA. See Director of the Central Intelligence NSA and, 423, 427
Agency ODNI and, 432–33
DEA. See Drug Enforcement Administration satellites and, 424, 427, 430–32
Deane, Silas, 608 TECHINT and, 424–25
Dearlove, Richard, 144–45 Department of Energy (DOE), 185
decentralization, 49, 350 Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
deception, 383, 394n5, 399, 736 See also homeland security
decision-making CI and, 538
decision advantage and, 389–403 founding of, 7, 223, 464–65, 632, 722
requirements, 351t law enforcement and, 195–97
speed in, 454–55 OSINT and, 231
defense, and intelligence, 422–34, 629–39 private sector and, 301
defense attachés, 423 Department of Justice Canada, 318n6
Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel Dershowitz, Alan, 743–44
System, 634 Descazes, Rosario, 265
Defense Human Resources Activity design considerations, 351t
(DHRA), 525 Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations
Defense Imagery and Geospatial Organization in the United States 1939-1941
(DIGO), 683, 827, 833 (Mahl), 611n7
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) de-Stalinization, 777
founding of, 7, 114, 128–29, 218, 223 Detainee Treatment Act, 270
index 861
détente, 116–18 disruptive technologies, 108–9

Deutch, John dissemination
CIA and, 304, 500 compartmentalization and, 552–53
as DCI, 442–43, 490n7, 492, 724 Gates and, 21
developing democracies intelligence cycle and, 436–501
collaboration in, 767 of PDB, 21, 88, 496
intelligence in, 757–73 policymakers and, 437–51
professionalism in, 763, 766, 768 politicization and, 472–84
devil’s advocacy, 379, 382, 384–85 SIS and, 453, 464
DGSE. See Direction Générale de la Sécurité DNI. See Director of National Intelligence
Extérieure DO. See Directorate of Operations
DHRA. See Defense Human Resources Activity document accountability, 26
DHS. See Department of Homeland Security DOD. See Department of Defense
DI. See Directorate of Intelligence DOE. See Department of Energy
DIA. See Defense Intelligence Agency Doerrenberg, Dirk, 539n6
Diana (princess of Wales), 144 Dole, Bob, 281
DIGO. See Defense Imagery and Geospatial domestic spying
Organization Bush, George W., and, 118, 186, 242–43,
Dilks, David, 140 250, 349
Dillinger, John, 509 Church Committee and, 118
Diplomatic History (journal), 79 FBI and, 510–13
diplomatic immunity, 202 Hoover and, 27–28, 118
Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure “dominant battlespace awareness,” 453
(DGSE), 611–12 Dominican Republic, 489n4
Directorate of Intelligence (DI), 92, 382, 467 Donald, D., 50
Directorate of Operations (DO), 9, 11f, 82 Donohue, Laura, 47
Directorate of Science and Technology Donovan, William J. (“Wild Bill”), 111, 124–25,
(DS&T), 11, 177, 302 217, 259, 272
Directorate of Support (DS), 11 Doolittle, James H., 176–77, 728
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 485–501 Doolittle Committee, 587
accountability and, 721–22 Dorgan, Byron, 311n2
CIA and, 8, 630 double agents, 394, 399, 510, 551
Deutch as, 442–43, 490n7, 492, 724 misuse of term, 81, 545n18
Goss as, 173, 186, 489, 490n7, 492 The Double-Cross System (Masterman), 551
Helms as, 76, 76n6, 371, 392n3, 488, 490n7, Dover, Robert, 50
498 downsizing, 630, 630n5, 762
influence of, 115, 488–89, 499 Drucker, Peter, 412
mission of, 112–13, 125, 219, 486 drug cartels, 539, 767
SIGINT and, 115 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 7, 82,
Smith, W., and, 488–90, 490n7, 492, 630 196, 223, 243
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) drug experiments, by CIA, 236
analysis and, 412 DS. See Directorate of Support
Bush, George W., 731 DSD. See Defense Signals Directorate
DOD and, 423–24 DS&T. See Directorate of Science and
founding of, 8f, 8n5, 229, 465, 631, 722, 731 Technology
IRTPA and, 196, 423, 429–30, 465–66, 631 due process of law, 189, 209, 333
McConnell as, 302–4, 382, 432, 632–33, 635–36, Dujmovic, Nicholas, “Extraordinary Fidelity:
750n3 Two CIA Prisoners in China,
mission of, 213–14, 223 1952–1973,” 74n4
Negroponte as, 186, 214, 302, 432, 532, 632 Dulles, Allen W.
9/11 attacks and, 429–30 CIA and, 72n2, 76n6, 126, 128–29, 215, 365,
reforms and, 465 488–89, 490n7, 498, 749
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency The Craft of Intelligence, 273, 487
(DCIA), 485–86, 485n1 Eisenhower and, 425, 449
IRTPA and, 495n12 OSS and, 272–73
DIS. See Defense Intelligence Staff Dulles, John Foster, 449, 487–88, 498
discovery rules, 198 Dunlap, Jack, 178
disgruntlement, 530–33 Duquesne, Frederick, 510
disinformation, 235–36, 546, 548–50, 791 Dzershinsky, Feliks, 775
862 index
early warning, and OSINT, 231–32 “Ethics Phobia in the U.S. Intelligence
Eastern Europe Community” (Goldman), 750
democracies and, 761–63 Ethiopia, 580, 814
Israel and, 810 ethnocentricity, 361–62
Russian Federation and, 783 Europe
Stalin and, 147 communism in, 507, 527
eavesdropping program Eastern, 147, 761–63, 783, 810
McConnell and, 251 European Union, 39, 354, 761–62, 767, 770, 804
NSA program of, 250–54 European Convention on Human Rights
Echelon program, 456 (ECHR), 648–49, 655, 685
ECHR. See European Convention on Human European Court of Human Rights (E Ct HR),
Rights 649–52
Economic Espionage Act (1996), 524 Evans, Don, 186
economic treason, 524 Evans, Garth, 830
E Ct HR. See European Court of Human Rights Evans, Jonathan, 46
Egypt, 267, 370, 582, 746, 815–16 Evatt, H. V., 826, 830
Ehrlichman, John, 496 event prediction, 61–62, 65–67
Eichmann, Adolf, 807, 817–18 Every Spy a Prince (Raviv and Melman), 747
Eisenhower, Dwight D. evidence, 654–55, 667, 670
assassinations and, 28, 126–28 evil, organizational, 737
Castro and, 615 “evil empire,” USSR as, 371, 515
CIA and, 488n3, 495, 500, 587–88 executive privilege, 173, 181
covert actions and, 128, 448, 728 executive process, and covert actions, 597–98, 601
Dulles, A., and, 425, 449 expanded targets, of treason, 523–24
military-industrial complex and, 115, extradition treaties
126, 307 in Civil War, 331–33
Pahlavi and, 614–15 in France, 329, 333
PFIAB and, 172, 174–77, 187 Pahlavi and, 329
Powers and, 442 Supreme Court rulings on, 334
U-2s and, 127, 442 in US, 191, 202, 328–33
Elad, Avraham, 818–19 Extraordinary Commission for Combating
electronic intelligence (ELINT), 155, 190, 243 Counterrevolution and Sabotage
ELINT. See electronic intelligence (CHEKA), 775, 778
Ellison, Graham, 50 “Extraordinary Fidelity: Two CIA Prisoners in
embassy attacks, by Al Qaeda, 34 China, 1952-1973” (Dujmovic), 74n4
Encounter (journal), 127 extraordinary rendition, 19, 201, 328–40, 582, 802
encryption, 408 Eytan, Walter, 817
Encyclopedia Britannica, 81
Enigma machines, 155, 161–62, 164, 168, 217
Entente, 158–59 facilitative power, 47
Erhard, Ludwig, 796 failures
Erickson, Richard, 679 assessments of, 77, 87, 89, 97, 359–61
Ervin, Sam, 414n8 competitive analysis after, 376–77
espionage, 3, 25, 109, 143, 192 cost of, 48, 52–53
Espionage Act (1917), 109, 522–23, 533 of covert actions, 622
Espionage Cases 1974-2004 (PERSEREC), 525 of policymaking, 438, 449, 613–16, 621–23
estimates. See intelligence estimates of surveillance, 452–53
ethics Fairless, Benjamin, 176
accountability and, 735–53 Falklands War (1982), 141, 679
analysis and, 417–20 Fall, Albert B., 508
Constitutional issues and, 745 Falun Gong, 35
“Ethics Phobia in the U.S. Intelligence “Family Jewels” expose, 82, 450
Community” (Goldman), 750 FAS. See Federation of American Scientists
intelligence and, 51–52 fascism, 116, 259, 527
literature on, 745–48 FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation
policymakers and, 739 FBIS. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service
professional codes of, 737–38 FDA. See Food and Drug Administration
test cases of, 739–40 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 7, 96,
torture and, 737, 743–45 109n1
index 863
Carter, Jimmy, and, 513 assassinations and, 180

Church Committee and, 722 “Family Jewels” expose and, 450
CI and, 505–17 HUMINT and, 180–81
CIA rivalry with, 126, 134 PFIAB and, 176, 180–82, 184
civil liberties and, 125, 516–17 politicization and, 119
Cold War and, 512–13 President’s Commission on CIA Activities
domestic spying and, 510–13 and, 680n4
FISC and, 731 Ford, Harold, 729
Fuchs and, 556–57, 562 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act
Hanssen and, 27, 269, 273–74 (1998), 334
history of, 505–17 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 461
Hoover and, 112–13, 124–25, 259, 489, 507–9 Foreign Assistance Act (1961), 590n4
KGB and, 512–16 Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Latin America and, 111, 511 (FBIS), 229–30, 233–34, 271, 411
mission of, 112–13, 125, 191, 516 foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
PFIAB and, 175 (FISINT), 243
reform of, 49, 508–10, 513–14 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978)
Roosevelt, F., and, 509 (FISA)
Wilson, W., and, 506 amendments to, 209
Federal Communications Commission, 507 Hayden, M., and, 252
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 200 surveillance and, 193–94, 203, 514, 680
Federal Security Service (FSB), 784–87 violations of, 250–52
Federal Tort Claims Act, 658–59 wiretap and, 193–94
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
239, 758 (FISC), 250–52, 514
Fedochuk, Vitaliy, 781 Bush, George W., and, 726
Fedorenko, Sergey, 527 FBI and, 731
Feith, Douglas, 371, 462 surveillance, 194, 680
Felfe, Heinz, 794–95 foreign intervention, 108, 204
FIA. See Future Imagery Architecture foreign language deficiency, 362, 367–68
fiduciary relationships, 413–15 For Official Use Only (FOUO), 239
Figes, Orlando, The Whisperers, 776 Forschungsamt, 160–61
financial crisis (2008), 242–43 For the President’s Eyes Only (Andrew), 609n2
financial topics, 7 forward-looking infrared (FLIR) cameras, 279
Financial Transactions and Report Analysis FOUO. See For Official Use Only
Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), 690 fragmentation, of national security intelli-
Fingar, Thomas, 382, 389 gence, 49–50, 61
Finletter, Thomas K., 660–61, 664–65 France, 158–62, 168, 215–17
FINTRAC. See Financial Transactions and Report extradition treaties and, 329, 333
Analysis Centre of Canada NATO and, 489n4
1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta Francis, Diane, Immigration: The Economic
(Delta Force), 577 Case, 311–12
FISA. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Franklin, Benjamin, 215, 745
(1978) Franks, Tommy, 428
Fischer, Benjamin, 781 Franks Report, 141, 146
Fischer, Joschka, 797, 799–800 Fraser, Malcolm, 681, 828, 831n1, 832
FISINT. See foreign instrumentation signals Frauenknecht, Alfred, 812
intelligence Freedman, Lawrence, 380
Fleming, Ian, 217 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 237, 669
From Russia, With Love, 268 Freeh, Louis, 266, 516
FLIR. See forward-looking infrared free market ideology, 363–64
Flood, Philip, 683, 832–33, 838–39 Fremont, John, 332
Flood Commission, 684, 832–33, 836, 839 Freud, Sigmund, 439
Floyd, “Pretty Boy,” 509 Friedman, Stephen, 185–86
Foertsch, Volker, 797 From Russia, With Love (Fleming), 268
FOIA. See Freedom of Information Act FSB. See Federal Security Service (FSB)
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 71 Fuchs, Klaus, 512, 523, 555–66
force protection, 538 Fukuyama, Francis, 520
Ford, Gerald Fuld, Leonard, 231n3
864 index
Fuller, Graham, 729 gIBIS. See graphical Issues Based Information

funding, by congress, 95, 300, 430, 447–48, System
620–21, 620–21n16 Gibli, Binyamin, 819
Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), 302–3 GID. See General Intelligence Division
Giglio v. US 1972, 198–99
Gill, Peter, 679, 716, 764
Gadahn, Adam, 528 Intelligence in an Insecure World, 44n1
Galileo project, 414, 414n9 Gillars, Mildred, (“Axis Sally”), 523
gang activity, 61–62, 769 glasnost, 778
Gang of Eight, 573, 575, 593 Glass Ceiling Study, 133
GAO. See General Accountability Office “global brain,” 63
Gast, Gabriele, 797 global era intelligence, 212–25
Gates, Robert globalization, 60, 67, 312, 527–28, 533
CIA and, 76n6, 94, 151, 371, 397, 441, 490n7, global positioning systems (GPS), 169, 222
498, 498n15, 725, 729 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
Clinton and, 488n3 Bush, George W., and, 92, 296, 336, 462
counterterrorism and, 580 covert actions and, 572–73
covert actions and, 588n1 intelligence and, 95, 270, 406
dissemination and, 21 McConnell and, 580
as Secretary of Defense, 633, 635–37 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
Gauk Commission, 783 Terrorism and, 579
Gayler, Noel, 19 NSA and, 242, 254
Gaza Strip, 810 terrorism and, 92, 95, 242
GC&CS. See Government Code & Cypher UK and, 648–49
School Globke, Hans, 793
GCHQ. See Government Communications Godfrey, John, 217
Headquarters Gold, Harry, 565
Gehlen, Reinhard, 792–96 golden age, of TECHINT, 410, 410n4
Gehlen group, 792, 799 Goldman, Jan, 745
General Accountability Office (GAO), 401n9 “Ethics Phobia in the U.S. Intelligence
General Intelligence Division (GID), 507–8 Community,” 750
Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Goldsmith, Jack L., 251, 253
Armed Forces (DCAF), 758, 758n3 Goldwater-Nichols Act, 634n13
Geneva Conventions Gonzales, Alberto R., 251–52
covert actions and, 582, 582n2 Goodman, Melvin, 729
Guantanamo Detention Center and, 726 Goodman, Michael, 141, 148, 371
Al Qaeda and, 337, 582, 582n3 The Good Shepherd (film), 72n3
torture and, 200–201, 285, 334, 336 Google Earth, 234, 236
genocide, 207–8, 288–90 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 183, 367, 778
GEOINT. See geospatial intelligence Gordievsky, Oleg, 148, 151, 527, 775
George, Alexander, 380 Gore Commission, 722
George, Roger, 378 Goss, Porter
Analyzing Intelligence, 405 CIA and, 238, 298, 304
geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), 15, 169, 425 as DCI, 173, 186, 489, 490n7, 492
Germany Rodriguez and, 731
BND in, 790–805, 791n2 governance
CIA and, 792–93, 795 centralized, 108–9
CI in, 794–95 democratic civilian control, 757n1, 765–68
in Cold War, 127, 145, 790–98 The Governance of Britain (Wilson, H.), 700,
Communist Party in, 558–59, 563 700n1, 711–12, 715
Constitutional issues in, 803–4 and intelligence, 47–48
Israel and, 797 politicization of, 483–84
NATO and, 792, 797–98 The Governance of Britain (Wilson, H.), 700,
parliamentary oversight in, 791 700n1, 711–12, 715
unification of, 799–801 governmental structures, 108, 463–67
wiretap in, 796 Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS)
in WWI, 506–7 (UK), 159–62, 557, 641n1
in WWII, 110–13, 158–61, 190, 216–17, 522–23 Government Communications Headquarters
Ghaddafi, Muammar, 144 (GCHQ) (UK)
index 865
accountability and, 643–45, 701, 713 Hale Foundation, 173

DSD and, 827 Hall, Theodore Alvin, 512, 564–65
Fuchs and, 562 Hamas, 18, 35, 818, 820
mission of, 641–43, 643n9 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 200, 336–38
SIGINT and, 641–43 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 336
statutory charter of, 640–41 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 276, 284
GPS. See global positioning systems Handel, Michael I., 372
Graham, Bob, 296 Hanning, August, 799–800
graphical Issues Based Information System Hanssen, Robert
(gIBIS), 350 Cherkashin and, 263
Gravier, Charles, 608–9 CI and, 96, 100, 265–67, 551
graymail, 192, 514 FBI and, 27, 269, 273–74
Great Depression, 125 KGB and, 541–42, 784
Greater Toronto Enforcement Center Hanyok, Robert, J., 117n4
(GTEC), 317 Harding, Warren, 508
Great Terror, 776, 780 Harkabi, Yehoshafat, 372
The Great Terror (Conquest), 776 Harman, Harriet, 648n26
Green Berets, 577, 580 Harman, Jane, 631
Greenglass, David, 512 Harmon, Reginald C., 660, 664–65
Grenada, 90, 183 Harper, Stephen, 313n3
grey intelligence, 231 Hastedt, Glenn, 49
Grieve, Dominic, 714 Hawke, Bob, 830–31
group-think, 51, 146, 367, 378, 414, 749 Hayden, Michael
GRU (Soviet Intelligence), 541, 541n12, 551, 780, CIA and, 82, 88, 92, 304, 306, 490n7, 491n8,
782, 786 580, 587–88, 604, 624, 633, 724
Gryllakis, Nikolaos, 542n13 congressional oversight and, 593n5
GTEC. See Greater Toronto Enforcement Center FISA and, 252
Guadalcanal, 166 OSINT and, 240
Guantanamo Detention Center Hayden, Nancy, The Complexity of Terrorism:
Geneva Conventions and, 726 Social and Behavioral Understanding,
Kurnaz and, 802 348n9
legal status of, 200, 709 Helgerson, John, 724
Mohamed, B., and, 709–10 Helms, Richard
private sector intelligence and, 300 Castro and, 724
terrorist suspects and, 134–35, 709–10 Church Committee and, 721, 724
torture and, 200, 269, 731 CIA and, 721
Guatemala as DCI, 76, 76n6, 371, 392n3, 488, 490n7, 498
CIA and, 24, 128, 185 NIEs and, 437
covert actions and, 442, 570, 615 Nixon and, 392n3, 426, 496
intelligence in, 766 Hennessy, P., 45–46
guerrilla warfare, 111, 231 Herbig, Katherine, 527–28, 531
Guideon’s Spies (Thomas), 747 Herman, Michael, 142–43, 145–47, 149, 408, 750
Guillaume, Gunter, 219 Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 139
Guiora, Amos, 744 Hermann, Robert, 185
Gulag Archipelago (Solzhenitsyn), 776 “The Hero” (Pushkin), 23
Gulf of Tonkin incident, 480–81 Herring, Patricia Reynolds, 663–64
GWOT. See Global War on Terrorism Hersh, Seymour, 573, 575, 579
Gyngell, Allan, 829 Heuer, Richard, 378
The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 405
heuristics, judgmental, 366–67, 479–83
habeus corpus, 200 Heusinger, Adolf, 793
Habyarimana, Juvénal, 288–89 Hewitt, Patricia, 648n26
Hachmeister, Lutz, 795n4 Hezbollah, 35, 810, 816
Hadley, Stephen, 635–36 Hibbert, Reginald, 139, 145
Haganah, 807 high treason v. petit treason, 520–21
Haines, Gerald, 76 hijacking, 192
Haiti, 277, 291–93 Hillenkoetter, Roscoe, 490n7, 491
Haldeman, H. R., 496 Hince, Lawrence, 124
Hale, Nathan, 258–59 Hiss, Alger, 263, 512
866 index
Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence Israel and, 810

(Kahana), 747 NATO and, 769–70
historiography North Korea and, 18, 362
of intelligence, 140–42 OSS and, 111
Johnson, L. K., and, 79 policymaking and, 442, 545
of Russian Federation, 774–75 recruitment and, 257–74, 425, 551, 613
history v. TECHINT, 17–19
of CIA, 70–86, 112, 122–37, 485–89 UN and, 275–76, 279
classified documents as, 78 human rights, 52, 409, 764
Covert Operations as a Tool for Presidential Human Rights Act (1998), 648–53
Foreign Policy in History (Carter, Human Rights Project, “Torture by Proxy,” 334
John J.), 609n2 Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 288
Diplomatic History (journal), 79 human security v. national security, 49
of FBI, 505–17 Hume, David, 456
History Staff, of CIA, 71, 73–77, 76n5, 76n6 HUMINT. See human intelligence
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA Hungary, 127, 763
(Weiner), 74n4, 135, 304, 745 Hunter, Duncan, 631
of NRO, 80n9, 82, 426, 532 Huntington, Samuel, 520
of PDB, 78 Hussein (king of Jordan), 363, 618n13, 820
of spying, 258–61 Hussein, Saddam
Hitler, Adolph, 110, 149, 272–73, 394, 399, 801 capture of, 266, 371
Hocking, Jenny, 837 Iraq and, 382, 428, 453, 480, 550, 800
Hoekstra, Peter, 724, 731 Kuwait and, 229
Hoffman, Bruce, 743 WMDs and, 28, 238, 379, 462, 482, 707, 838
Hollerith data systems, 161, 164–65 Hutu people, 288–90
Hollis, Roger, 560 hypotheses and associations, 354f, 355
Holmes v. Jennison, 330
homeland security
“complexities” in, 343–58, 344t, 351t IBIS. See Issues Based Information System
counterterrorism and, 60–62 ICBM. See Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
DHS and, 7, 195–97, 223, 231, 301, 464–65, 538, ICC. See International Criminal Court
632, 722 ICCPR. See International Covenant of Civil and
intelligence for, 50, 60–62, 297, 417 Political Rights
homosexuals, 133 ideologies, and treason, 527–28
Hong Kong, 146 IDF. See Israel Defense Forces
Honorable Men (Colby), 745 IEDs. See improvised explosive devices
Hoover, J. Edgar IG. See Office of the Inspector General
domestic spying and, 27–28, 118 IJN. See Imperial Japanese Navy
FBI and, 112–13, 124–25, 259, 489, 507–9 imagery intelligence (IMINT)
MI5 and, 564–65 CI and, 15, 25, 81, 393
Hoover Commissions, 722, 725 NGA and, 19, 234
Hope, Robert, 681, 828–29, 831n1, 832 NSA and, 81–82
Hopkinson, Francis, 658 reconnaissance and, 216, 240, 408
Horner, D., 825 U-2s and, 127, 129, 220, 237, 261, 442, 449
Breaking the Codes, 825 UN and, 276
Houghton, Harry, 533 IMINT. See imagery intelligence
Howard, Edward Lee, 183, 274, 540, 540n9, 543 Immerman, Richard, 24n14, 419n11
Howard, John, 830, 837–38, 840 immigration
Howells, Kim, 646, 714 in Canada, 310–27
Hoxha, Enver, 144 Immigration: The Economic Case
Huettenhain, Erich, 164 (Francis), 311–12
Hughes, Charles Evans, 333 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
Hughes-Ryan amendment, 118, 499, 589n3, (IRPA), 311, 316, 321, 337
590n4, 724 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
Hull, John E., 176 (IRPA), 311, 316, 321, 337
human intelligence (HUMINT) Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), 166–67
assets for, 15, 222, 393 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 247
CIA and, 362–64 in camera inspection, 662
Ford, G., and, 180–81 India, 98, 324–25, 359, 362
index 867
indications-and-warning methodologies, 65–67 in Iraq, 363–64, 376–77

Indonesia, 615, 762, 831, 834–35 in Israel, 89, 220, 806–22
industrial warfare, 407 law enforcement and, 189–211, 429
information explosion, 408–9, 416 limits of, 452–71
information-gathering spectrum, for UN, 280t monitoring of, 64, 90–91, 97–98, 99t
information-processing models, 349–51 9/11 attacks and, 4, 34–36, 43–44, 60, 89, 93,
information revolution, 59–60, 63, 120, 407–9, 229, 238, 298–99, 417, 428–29, 448, 769
749 operational, 157, 365, 550–51
Information Security (INFOSEC), 243 OSINT and, 16, 64–65, 222, 229–41
INFOSEC. See Information Security outsourcing of, 50–51, 298–300, 306
“inherent enemies,” 453–54 oversight of, 52–53, 497–99
Inman, Bobby Ray, 304 Pearl Harbor attack and, 89, 91, 93, 112, 124–25,
In-Q-Tel, 299 359, 417
INR. See Bureau of Intelligence and Research peer review of, 723
INSCOM. See Army Intelligence and Security performance measures for, 88–100, 396
Command of PKI, 275–96
insider administrators, 492 to please, 366, 370, 417
inspector general of CIA, 680, 723, 731–32 policymaking and, 91, 95, 119, 122, 355–57, 366,
Institute for Defense Analyses, 386 390, 437–51, 453, 476–79
institutional checks and balances, reforms PRC and, 513, 516, 524, 539
of, 669–72 presidents and, 495–97, 725
institutional orthodoxies, 459–60 in private sector, 50, 53, 296–309
intelligence. See also intelligence community; public use of, 474–76
intelligence cycle; intelligence estimates; on Al Qaeda, 46, 66, 257, 266, 377, 834–35
military intelligence RCMP and, 314, 510, 673, 694n8
accountability and, 27–28, 52–53, 213–15, in Russian Federation, 774–89
497–99, 719–39 Stalin and, 391, 489n4, 779
analysis of, 65–66, 82, 122, 279–82, 343–57, structures of, 49–50
375–86 surveillance and, 45, 53
assessments of, 87–103, 396 theories of, 43–58, 138–40
in Australia, 438, 463, 823–42 theories of intelligence performance, 87–92
budgets for, 447–48, 499 totalitarian regimes and, 72, 108, 408, 410–11,
in Canada, 314–16 759
in Chile, 759, 761, 764 at transnational levels, 49–50, 53
civilian, 189–98, 209, 788 transparency in, 758, 761–70
in Cold War, 28, 33–35, 43, 112–16, 259–60 in UK, 39, 46, 73–74, 124–25, 138–54, 197, 392,
collective, 16, 63–65 640–56
COMINT and, 243 in US, rise of, 107–21
courts and, 651 in USSR, 82, 113, 190, 218, 259–60, 509, 775–78,
The Craft of Intelligence (Dulles, A.), 273, 487 780–82
culture of, 361–66, 433 on Vietnam War, 114, 116–17, 407, 427
defense and, 422–34, 629–39 war and, 781–82
in democracies, 52, 72, 85, 408, 418–20, 449–50, “When Everything is Intelligence, Nothing is
498, 719 Intelligence” (Argell), 722
in developing democracies, 757–73 wisdom and, 736–38
in DOD, 422–34 in WWI, 109–10, 124, 216–17, 506–7
ethics and, 51–52 Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
failures of, 48, 52–53, 77, 87, 89, 97, 359–61, (Lowenthal), 405, 745
376–77, 438, 449, 452–53, 613–16, 621–23 Intelligence Accountability Act, 499
FISINT and, 243 Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome:
in global era, 212–25 Trust in the Gods but Verify
governance and, 47–48 (Sheldon), 608n1
grey, 231 Intelligence and National Security (journal), 4, 79,
in Guatemala, 766 404, 758
GWOT and, 95, 270, 406 Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)
historiography of, 140–42 (UK), 53, 645–47, 647n25, 701–10, 703t
for homeland security, 50, 60–62, 297, 417 Intelligence Assessments Staff (UK), 642
Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy Intelligence Authorization Acts, 570–71, 596, 598,
(Lowenthal), 405, 745 610n5, 618
868 index
intelligence community interdependence, of nations, 36, 38, 49

AIC and, 824, 835 intermediate-range ballistic missiles
bureaucracy of, 7–11, 8f (IRBMs), 150, 261
civil liberties and, 43, 108, 197, 208, 803 International Assessment Staff, 675
cooperation in, 50–51, 365–66, 389, 390n1, international collaboration, 212–25
396–400, 418 International Covenant of Civil and Political
democratization of, 51–52, 757–58, 765–68, Rights (ICCPR), 334, 337
771 International Criminal Court (ICC), 207
“Ethics Phobia in the U.S. Intelligence internationalism, 39
Community” (Goldman), 750 The International Journal of Intelligence and
NRO and, 218, 223, 245, 427 Counterintelligence (journal), 4, 79, 239,
professionalism in, 736–38, 760 404, 758
in US, 8f, 107–21 international law, 202, 204, 207–8, 269, 601–2
Intelligence Community Briefs, 99n5 international research, 758–59
Intelligence Community Staff, 230, 426 International Review Agencies Conference, 53
intelligence cycle, 6, 11–21, 12f, 59 International Security Assistance Force
analysis in, 20, 393, 409–13 (ISAF), 222–23
collection, 15–17, 393–95 Internet
dissemination, 436–501 access to, 63, 419
HUMINT v. TECHINT and, 17–19 NSA and, 424
planning, 12–15 OSINT and, 64–65, 222, 411
processing in, 19–20, 48–49 terrorists and, 455, 836
of UN, 278–82 internment, wartime, 558
intelligence estimates, 90–92, 396 interpersonal skills, 396–400
analysis and, 444 interrogation techniques. See also torture
Board of National Estimates, 115 of CIA, 19, 731
during Cold War, 149 coercive, 52
Johnson, L. B., and, 370 Tenet and, 731
NIEs, 64, 91, 98–99, 99n5, 181, 372, 381–82, 437, interventions, secret, 142–45. See also covert
444, 446–47 actions
nonfailure rates of, 98–99, 99t INTS (intelligence activities), 15–19, 155–71, 409
Office of National Estimates, 138, 372 intuition, 396–400
policymaking and, 21, 380 Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 648n29, 651
Reagan and, 371 IOB. See Intelligence Oversight Board
semi-annual reviews of, 723 Iran. See also Iran-Contra scandal
Truman and, 112 Carter, Jimmy and, 16
Intelligence Executive Order 12333, 223, 635–37 CIA and, 367–68, 570
Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 192 Colby and, 25
Intelligence in an Insecure World (Gill and DIA and, 131, 368
Phythian), 44n1 Islamist movement in, 77, 131, 182, 359, 362
Intelligence Oversight Act (1980), 589n3 Israel and, 368–69
Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), 180–81 nuclear materials of, 35, 100, 135, 411
Intelligence Power in Peace and War Pahlavi and, 16, 24–25, 127–28, 131, 362
(Herman), 139 Roosevelt, K., and, 24n14
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Iran-Contra scandal
Act (2004) (IRTPA) Boland Amendments and, 748
CIA and, 134, 264 CIA and, 3–4, 24, 131–32
cooperation and, 8n5, 50, 213, 223, 411–12 Contra faction and, 449–50, 570, 583, 595, 622,
DCIA and, 495n12 680, 724
DNI and, 196, 423, 429–30, 465–66, 631 covert actions and, 3–4, 24
OSINT and, 229, 233 Israel and, 747
reforms and, 419 Reagan and, 3–4, 131–32, 206, 450, 492,
terrorism and, 8n5, 50, 134, 196 618–19
Intelligence Services Act (1994), 641, 645n17, Iraq
702 Hussein, S., and, 382, 428, 453, 480, 550, 800
intellipedia, 415 intelligence in, 363–64, 376–77
interceptions, 240, 510–11, 649–50, 654–55, 674 Kuwait and, 220, 816
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), 127, US invasion of, 45, 186, 222, 242, 245–47, 277,
149–50 296, 462
index 869
WMDs in, 4, 18, 20, 28, 49, 51, 64, 100, 257, 359, Jenkins, Brian Michael, 348, 743
366, 377, 438, 444, 653, 712, 730 Jervis, Robert, 368, 379, 457
IRBMs. See intermediate-range ballistic missiles Jews, in USSR, 777, 780
Ireland, 37, 51, 145 JFK (film), 84
Irish Quick Reaction Force (QRF), 201 JIC. See Joint Intelligence Committee
IRPA. See Immigration and Refugee Protection JICLE. See Joint Intelligence-Law Enforcement
Act Working Group
IRTPA. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism jihad, 263
Prevention Act (2004) Jihad, Abu, 817
ISA. See Israeli Security Agency JIO. See Joint Intelligence Organization
ISAF. See International Security Assistance Force JMACs. See Joint Mission Analysis Cells
ISC. See Intelligence and Security Committee John Paul II (pope), 183
Islamist movements, 263–64, 528 Johnson, Loch K.
in Iran, 77, 131, 182, 359, 362 accountability and, 676, 716
in Israel, 810 covert actions and, 610n5, 619n15
Munich Olympic Games and, 747, 803, 817 historiography and, 79
terrorism and, 261, 266, 456 Strategic Intelligence, 142
Israel Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret
assassinations and, 744 World, 610n5
British Mandate in, 807, 812 Johnson, Lyndon B., 22, 116, 118, 128–30, 495
covert actions by, 817–20 intelligence estimates and, 370
Eastern Europe and, 810 McCone and, 443
Germany and, 797 PFIAB and, 175, 178–79
Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence PRC and, 178
(Kahana), 747 Vietnam War and, 370, 473, 476
HUMINT and, 810 Johnston, Rob, 467
IDF and, 809–10, 814 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 112, 115, 487
intelligence in, 89, 220, 806–22 joint-duty assignments, 634
Iran and, 368–69 Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), 140
Iran-Contra scandal and, 747 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 139–41,
ISA and, 808–11, 813 145–52, 457–58, 461–62, 641–42, 714
Islamist movements in, 810 Joint Intelligence-Law Enforcement Working
KGB and, 812 Group (JICLE), 197
MI in, 808–9, 811, 813–16, 818–19 Joint Intelligence Operations Center, 223
Pollard and, 270–71, 529, 543, 543n16, 812 Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO), 145–46
SIGINT in, 809 Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMACs), 280, 292
US and, 94 Joint Special Operations Command
Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 809–10, 814 (JSOC), 577–81
Israeli Security Agency (ISA), 808–11, 813 Joint Task Force on Intelligence and Law
Issues Based Information System (IBIS), 350 Enforcement, 197
Italy, 129, 338 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), 653
Jones, Brian, 707
Jones, Reginald V., 140, 372, 728
Jackson, Robert, 511 Jordan, 266–67, 363, 618n13, 746
James, Daniel, 533 Journal of Cold War Studies, 79
Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 764 Joyce, William (“Lord Haw Haw”), 522–23, 527
Janis, Irving R., 378 JSOC. See Joint Special Operations Command
Japan JSTARS aircraft, 428
CIA and, 363 JTAC. See Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
codebreaking and, 160, 165–66 judgmental heuristics, 366–67, 479–83
IJN and, 166–67 judicial finality, 663
WWII and, 89, 91, 93, 113, 124–25, 522–23, 611, judicial independence, 666–69
825 judicial oversight, in UK, 648
Jay Treaty, 330 Just-War Theory, 728, 735, 741–42
Al Jazeera, 233
Jedburgh teams, 216–17
Jefferson, Thomas, 329 Kahana, Ephraim, Historical Dictionary of Israeli
Jemmah Islamiyah, 834 Intelligence, 747
Jencks Act, 198–99 Kahle, Hans, 559, 563
870 index
Kalugin, Oleg Danilovich, 537n3 Kimmel, Husband E., 729

Kam, Ephraim, 345n3 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 113
Kamil, Hussein, 380 King, Tom, 646, 702–3, 714
Kant, Immanuel, 741 King Lear (Shakespeare), 518–19
Karadzic, Radovan, 92 Kipling, Rudyard, 259, 273
Katangese Gendarmerie, 279, 284–85 Kirkpatrick, William H., 658–60, 662, 664
Katsav, Moshe, 820 Kissinger, Henry, 130, 132, 179, 220, 488
Keating, Paul, 830–31 Allende and, 617
Keegan, John, 454 Colby and, 450
Kelly, “Machine Gun,” 509 covert actions and, 619
Kennan, George, 259 Nixon and, 132, 220, 495–96
Kennedy, John F., 25, 147 Kita, Yoshito, 747
Bay of Pigs Invasion and, 475, 614n9, 721 KJs. See key judgments
Castro and, 177, 450, 615, 622n17 Knight, Amy, 774
CIA and, 83, 128–29, 495 Knott, Stephen F., 609n2
covert actions and, 448 knowledge/power relationship, 45–47,
Cuba and, 28, 261, 365, 473 437–51
McCone and, 478–79, 497 Knox, Frank, 729
PFIAB and, 175, 177–78 Kohl, Helmut, 799–800
Kennedy, Joseph P., 175–76 Kolbe, Fritz, 272–73
Kennedy, Robert, 450 Korea, 114
Kent, Sherman North Korea, 18, 93n2, 100, 135, 248, 362–64
analysis and, 370, 372, 398, 730 Republic of Korea, 93n2, 148, 276
strategic intelligence and, 139, 141–42 UN Commission on Korea, 283–84
Strategic Intelligence for American World Korean War, 424, 449, 793
Policy, 138, 145 Truman and, 424, 449
Kenya, 207 Kosovo, 221, 702, 798
Ker-Frisbie doctrine, 201, 333, 335t Koval, George, 787
Kerr, Richard, 495 Kremer, Simon, 559
Kerry, John, 445 Kriegsmarine, 164
key assumptions checks, 379 Kryuchkov, Vladimir, 778
key judgments (KJs), 444, 447 Kuala Lumpur, 20
Keynes, John Maynard, 263 Kuklinski, Ryszard, 83
KGB Ku Klux Klan, 27
Ames and, 541–44, 549, 784 Kulik, Grigory, 779
breakup of, 783–84 Kurnaz, Murat, 802
CI and, 265, 267–68, 537, 539–50, 759 Kuwait, 276, 359, 377, 379
Directorate K of, 537n3, 539 Hussein, S., and, 229
FBI and, 512–16 Iraq and, 220, 816
First Chief Directorate of, 537, 537n2, 784
Fuchs and, 559
glasnost and, 778 Lackawanna Muslims, 271
Gordievsky and, 148, 151, 527, 775 Laird, Melvin, 304
Hanssen and, 541–42, 784 Lake, Anthony, 184, 498
Israel and, 812 Lalas, Steven, 542
Khrushchev and, 777 Land, Edwin, 180
Philby and, 144 Landau Commission, 811
Khan, Mohammad Siddique, 708–9 Langer, William, 177, 372
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 359, 367–68 language deficiency, 362, 367–68
Khrushchev, Nikita, 129, 147, 261 Lansdale, Edward, 127–28, 130
Communist Party and, 777 Laquer, Walter, 348
KGB and, 777 Latin America, 43, 52, 168, 745–46
Mossad and, 817 FBI and, 111, 511
Penkovsky and, 261 Lauth, Jeff, 249
Kibbe, Jennifer D., 571–72 Lavon, Pinhas, 818–19
kidnapping, 52, 338 law
Killian, James R., Jr., 176–78 covert actions and, 570–74, 587–607
Kimball, Wilmoore, 145 establishing, 764
index 871
international, 202, 204, 207–8, 269, 601–2 low-probability scenarios, 381

in UK, 640–56 loyalty testing, 27
law enforcement LTTE. See Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
CI and, 553–54 Luftwaffe, 164
complexities in, 353–55 Lumumba, Patrice, 25, 285
constraints on, 61–62 Lycurgus, 519
covert actions and, 196
DHS and, 195–97
intelligence and, 189–211, 429 MacArthur, Douglas, 167, 825
JICLE and, 197 MacEachin, Douglas, 384
Joint Task Force on Intelligence and Law MacGregor, Douglas, Breaking the Phalanx,
Enforcement, 197 417
SIGINT and, 202–3, 208 MacGuffin, John, 400n7
terrorism and, 203–4, 206 machine cryptography, 156, 161–67
at US-Canadian border, 310–27, 674–75 Enigma machines, 155, 161–62, 164, 168
leadership typology, 490–94 MacLean, Donald, 81, 218
Lebanon, 277 Madrid train bombing, 261
le Carré, John, A Most Wanted Man, 802 MAGIC material, 161, 217, 365
Lee, Charles, 329 Mahl, Thomas, Desperate Deception: British
Lee, Wen Ho, 185 Covert Operations in the United States
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA 1939-1941, 611n7
(Weiner), 74n4, 135, 304, 745 Major, John, 141, 701
legal limitations, 494–95, 598–600 Malaya, 143
legal practice, 603–4 Malaysia, 831, 834
legal regime, of US, 590–98 manager-reformers, 492–93
legal templates, 600–604 Manhattan Project, 512, 523, 555–56, 559–60,
Legare, Hugh, 330 564, 787
legislative charters, 640–43, 765 Mann Act, 506
Lenin, Vladimir I., 272, 507 Mansfield, Mike, 176, 725
Levi, Edward, 118, 513 The Man Who Never Was (film), 549n21
Levin, Carl, 631 Mao Tse Tung, 146
Lewis, Anthony, 24 mapping associations and hypotheses, 354f,
Liberal National Party Coalition, 824 355
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 323–24 Marks, James, 800
Libya, 135, 207 Marrin, Stephen, 737
Liddell, Guy, 511 Marshall, George C., 487, 511
Lie, Trygve, 283 Martin, Paul, 675
Lieberman, Joseph, 631 MASINT. See measurement and signatures
limits intelligence
cognitive, 456–58 el-Masri, Khaled, 743
of intelligence, 452–71 Massoud, Ahmed Shah, 144
legal, 494–95, 598–600 Masterman, John C., The Double-Cross
on structures, 463–67 System, 551
of time and space, 454–56 Matei, Cristiana, 747
Lincoln, Abraham, 331–32 Maxwell-Fyfe Directive, 641–42, 649, 699
Lincoln, Franklin, 180 May, Alan Nunn, 559–60
Lindh, John Walker, 281 May, Ernest, 99, 383
linguists, cryptologic, 249, 394 Mazière, Thomas de, 802
Lisbon Summit (1952), 147 McCain, John, 631n7
Litvinenko, Aleksandr, 787 McCain Amendment, 270
Lloyd George, David, 370 McCarthy, Joseph, 721
Loader, I., 48 McClellan, George B., 391
Loether, Judith, 663 McCone, John
logistics, 376 CIA and, 82, 129–30, 425–26, 488, 490n7,
Lotz, Wolfgang, 808 492
Lovett, Robert A., 176 Johnson, L. B., and, 443
Lowenthal, Mark, 384, 389 Kennedy, J. F., and, 478–79, 497
Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 405, 745 politicization and, 479
872 index
McConnell, J. M. “Mike” MIP. See Military Intelligence Program

as DNI, 302–4, 382, 432, 632–33, 635–36, Miranda warnings, 193, 200
750n3 Mirokhin, Vasili, 775
eavesdropping program and, 251 mirror-imaging, 362, 458
GWOT and, 580 Mislock, Raymond, 515
KJs and, 444 “Missile Gap,” 127, 179, 370
“Overhauling Intelligence,” 630n3 missions
processing and, 19 of Armed Services, 112–14
“responsibility to provide” and, 412–13, 413n7, of CIA, 125, 133–34, 190, 260, 384
553 of DCI, 112–13, 125, 219, 486
Vision, 214 of DIA, 422–23
McDonald, David, 685 of DNI, 213–14, 223
McDonald Commission, 686, 695 of FBI, 112–13, 125, 191, 516
McFarlane, Robert, 182 of GCHQ, 641–43, 643n9
McGrory, Mary, 73 of national security intelligence, 23–27, 112–13
McKinley, Andrew, 715 of NGA, 7, 425
McKnight, David, 826 of NRO, 7, 424
McLellan, Anne, 675 of NSA, 115, 218, 243, 424
McNamara, Barbara, 304 organizational mission statements, 88
McNamara, Robert, 114, 426, 488 of SOF, 576t
McQuivey, James, 530 Mitrokhin affair, 702, 710
measurement and signatures intelligence Mitterrand, François, 611–12
(MASINT), 17, 82, 393 Mohamed, Ali, 528
media coverage, 37 Mohamed, Binyam, 709–10
Medina, Carmen, 391, 400 Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh, 269
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), 150 Moldava, 768
Medvedev, Dmitry, 787 monitoring
Meir, Golda, 816 of intelligence, 64, 90–91, 97–98, 99t
Melman, Yossi, Every Spy a Prince, 747 technologies for, 290–92
Membership Action Plan, of NATO, 770 Moorer, Tom, 182
Memorandum of Notification (MON), 594 Moore’s Law, 416
Menzies, Robert, 830, 837 Morgan, Thomas B., 130
Merkel, Angela, 800–802 Morgenstein, Jonathan, 581
methodological nationalism, 49 Morrison, John, 707, 712
Mexico, 259, 371, 392, 395 Mossad, 747, 748n2, 749, 806–22
Meyer, J. T., 571, 571n1 Khrushchev and, 817
Meyerosse, Dale, 553 Le’Aliyah Beth of, 807, 812
MI. See Military Intelligence Mossadeq, Mohammad, 24, 143, 363, 614–15
MI5. See Security Service A Most Wanted Man (le Carré), 802
MI6. See Secret Intelligence Service motivated biases, 369–72, 398, 460
Mikhoels, Solomon, 779 motivations, for treason, 260–74, 524–33, 526f
Miliband, David, 716 Moynihan, Daniel P., 133, 721
military-industrial complex, 115, 126, 307 MRBMs. See medium-range ballistic missiles
military intelligence mujahideen fighters, 25, 144, 363, 449, 834
analysts in, 88 Mukasey, Michael, 731
MI and, 808–9, 811, 813–16, 818–19 Mulgan, Richard, 732
Military Intelligence Program, 447 Mumbai terrorist attacks, 36, 274
in US, 110–14, 129, 139n1, 375–86 Munguia, Ricardo, 246
in USSR, 779–82 Munich (film), 748n2
Military Intelligence (MI) (Israel), 808–9, 811, Munich Olympic Games, terrorist attacks at, 747,
813–16, 818–19 803, 817
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), 447 Murphy, Franklin, 179–80
Mill, John Stuart, 741 Murphy, Lionel, 828
Miller, Richard, 530, 530n6, 533 Murphy, Paul, 646
Milosevic, Slobodan, 145 Murphy Commission, 722
mindsets, 378, 553 Murphy’s Raid, 827–28
Minihan, Ken, 297 Murray, William, 519
ministerial oversight, 644–45, 678–79 Murrett, Robert B., 224
MINUSTAH. See United Nations mysteries, 343–45, 344t
index 873
Namibia, 286–88 academic study of, 138–41

Napoleonic period, 407 of Australia, 823–42
narcotics trafficking, 204, 231, 609 Bush, George W., and, 35, 172, 239, 250, 445,
Nardone v. US, 204 630n6
Nasr, Hassan Mustafa Osama, 743 v. human security, 49
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 797, 814–15, 819 public anxiety and, 33–39
Nathanson, Philip, 819 National Security Act (1947)
National Archives and Records CIA and, 8, 78, 125, 190–91, 218, 273, 485n1, 487,
Administration, 174 489, 589, 630
National Clandestine Service (NCS), 9, 11, 82, covert actions and, 590–95
448, 539 mandate of, 23, 196, 202, 393, 425
National Counterintelligence Executive Truman and, 112–13
(NCIX), 196, 553 National Security Agency (NSA)
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 196, Bush, George W., and, 244
297, 464–65, 580 Church Committee and, 722
National Defense University (NDU), 237 DOD and, 423, 427
National Foreign Intelligence Program eavesdropping program of, 250–54
(NFIP), 426 GWOT and, 242, 254
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) IMINT and, 81–82
cooperation and, 223–24, 410, 423, 427 Internet and, 424
IMINT and, 19, 234 mission of, 115, 218, 243, 424
mission of, 7, 425 9/11 attacks and, 244–45
NIMA and, 82 Obama administration and, 242–56
National Imagery and Mapping Agency PFIAB and, 175
(NIMA), 81–82, 425 Reagan and, 244
National Intelligence Council (NIC) reconnaissance and, 7, 17, 19, 28, 80n9
analysis and, 385–86, 457–58, 466 SIGINT and, 92, 167, 243–47, 249–50, 424
NIEs and, 91, 381–82 Smith, W., and, 115
threat warnings and, 60–61, 91 Truman and, 424, 731
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) National Security Council (NSC)
Helms and, 437 CI and, 554
NIC and, 91, 381–82 covert actions and, 589, 589n2
NSC and, 99n5 NIEs and, 99n5
PFIAB and, 181 as policymakers, 14, 112, 218, 386, 494n11,
for 2000-2007, 98–99, 99n5 630
for 2002, 64, 91, 372, 444, 446–47 national security intelligence, 4–6
National Intelligence Officer for Warning, 91 fragmentation of, 49–50, 61
National Intelligence Program (NIP), 447, 631, as information, 21–23
631n8 mission of, 23–27, 112–13
National Intelligence Program Evaluation organization of, 7–11, 8f
(NIPE), 426 process of, 12–21
The National Intelligence Strategy of the United National Students Association, 130
States of America (Negroponte), 214 Naval Network Warfare Command, 243
nationalism, methodological, 49 Naval OPINTEL, 114
National Military Strategic Plan for the War on NCIX. See National Counterintelligence
Terrorism, 579 Executive
National Photographic Interpretation Center NCS. See National Clandestine Service
(NPIC), 115, 177–78, 425 NCTC. See National Counterterrorism Center
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) NDU. See National Defense University
CIA and, 115 Nedze, Lucien, 680n4
history of, 80n9, 82, 426, 532 “need to know” v. “responsibility to pro-
intelligence community and, 218, 223, 245, vide,” 412–13, 413n7, 467, 553
427 Negroponte, John
mission of, 7, 424 as DNI, 186, 214, 302, 432, 532, 632
SIGINT and, 302, 423 The National Intelligence Strategy of the United
national security. See also National Security Act States of America, 214
(1947); National Security Agency; National Neither Confirm Nor Deny response, 651
Security Council; national security Nelson, John, 331
intelligence nerve gas, 17
874 index
Netanyahu, Benjamin, 820 nonfailure rates, of intelligence estimates, 98–99,

Netherlands, 217 99t
neutrality, 391 non-state actors, 221, 539
New Deal, 263 Normandy Invasion (1944), 111–12, 165, 217,
New Orleans, 38 549
Newsweek International, 19 North Atlantic Council, 222
Newton Committee, 654 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
“New World Order,” 406 Alliance, 207, 222
New York City Bar Association, 334 CIA and, 489n4
The New Yorker, 4 France and, 489n4
New York (City) Police Department, 107 Germany and, 792, 797–98
New York Times, 4, 16, 72, 250 HUMINT and, 769–70
New Zealand, 611–13, 681–82, 685 Membership Action Plan of, 770
NFIP. See National Foreign Intelligence Program membership in, 219, 761–63, 767
NGA. See National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency UN and, 293
NIC. See National Intelligence Council Northern Alliance, of Afghanistan, 90, 144,
Nicaragua. See also Iran-Contra scandal 212–13, 223
mining of harbor of, 23, 721 North Korea
Reagan and, 23–24 CIA and, 100, 135, 248, 362–64
Sandinistas and, 131–32, 622 HUMINT and, 18, 362
Nicholson, Harold, 531, 533 invasion of Republic of Korea and, 93n2
NIEs. See National Intelligence Estimates Norton-Taylor, Richard, 704
Niger, 238 Norway, 163–64, 167
Nigeria, 220 Norwood, Melita, 710, 779
NIMA. See National Imagery and Mapping Nowinski, Ed., 302
Agency NPIC. See National Photographic Interpretation
Nimrody, Yaacov, 369 Center
9/11 attacks NRO. See National Reconnaissance Office
Bush, George W., and, 212 NSA. See National Security Agency
Canada and, 674 NSC. See National Security Council
CIA and, 123 nuclear materials
Commission Report on, 50, 53, 257, 272, 377, in India, 362
382, 429, 432, 466, 529, 553, 630–31, 725–27 of Iran, 35, 100, 135, 411
DNI and, 429–30 Libya and, 135
intelligence and, 4, 34–36, 43–44, 60, 89, 93, Manhattan Project and, 512, 523
229, 238, 298–99, 417, 428–29, 448, 769 tracking of, 7
NSA and, 244–45 USSR and, 126–27, 148–50, 260, 555–56
planning of, 66 weaponization of, 444, 455
SOF and, 569 Nujoma, Sam, 286–87
UK and, 652–53 Nureddin, Muayyaed, 676
ninja warriors, 746–47
NIP. See National Intelligence Program
NIPE. See National Intelligence Program Obama, Barack, 35, 242, 251, 432
Evaluation Obama administration, and NSA, 242–56
Nixon, Richard M. OBE. See overtaken by events
Allende and, 617–18 Obey, David, 573
Cambodia and, 721 objectivity, 472–74
CIA and, 496, 614n9, 730 O’Connor, Dennis, 53, 313n3, 676
Cold War and, 116–18, 496 O’Connor, Sandra Day, 336
Helms and, 392n3, 426, 496 O’Connor Commission, 673, 693–95
Kissinger and, 132, 220, 495–96 ODNI. See Office of the Director of National
PFIAB and, 176, 179–80, 182 Intelligence
PRC and, 179 OFCO. See Offensive Counterintelligence
Schlesinger and, 497 Operations
Watergate scandal and, 130, 179, 450, 667 offensive counterintelligence, 394n5
NKVD (Soviet intelligence), 161, 168, 775–76, Offensive Counterintelligence Operations
779–80 (OFCO), 549
Nolan, James E., 515 Office for Research and Collection of
non-democratic regimes, 759–61 Information (ORCI), 280–81
index 875
Office of Coordinator of Information PDB and, 232

(COI), 124 in private sector, 231
Office of Foreign Missions (OFM), 515 operating environments, 351t
Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, operational intelligence, 157, 365, 550–51
7, 17 Operation Barbarossa, 163, 780
Office of Management and Budget, 117 Operation Desert Shield, 220
Office of National Estimates, 138, 372 Operation Desert Storm, 220, 427–28, 549–50
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 506 Operation Mountain Lion, 246
Office of Open Source Intelligence, 233 Operation Phoenix, 130
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 401n8 OPM. See Office of Personnel Management
Office of Research Reports, 126 opportunities to exploit, 90–91, 99t
Office of Special Planning (OSP), 371 ORCI. See Office for Research and Collection of
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Information
democracy and, 72–73 ordinary renditions, 328
Dulles, A., and, 272–73 O’Reilly, Conor, 50
founding of, 81 organizational evil, 737
HUMINT and, 111 organizational mission statements, 88
Truman and, 124 organized crime, 354–55, 736, 762
USSR and, 781 Orlov, Alexander, 547
WWII and, 111, 124, 217, 259, 370, 372, 556 OSC. See Open Source Center
Office of the Director of National Intelligence OSINT. See open-sources intelligence
(ODNI) OSP. See Office of Special Planning
CIA and, 80n9, 107 OSS. See Office of Strategic Services
creation of, 8n5, 49 Ostrovski, Victor, By Way of Deception, 747
DOD and, 432–33 Oswald, Lee Harvey, 527
OSINT and, 230, 239 Ottaway, Richard, 713–14
private sector intelligence and, 297, 299, 304 outsider administrators, 492–93
Office of the Inspector General (IG), 680, 723, outsourcing, of intelligence, 50–51, 298–300, 306
731–32 Overend, William, 530n6
Office of the National Executive for “Overhauling Intelligence” (McConnell), 630n3
Counterintelligence (ONCIX), 524–25 oversight. See also congressional oversight
Official Secrets Act (1889), 522–23, 525, 533, 564, in Canada, 678–81
681 of intelligence, 52–53, 497–99
OFM. See Office of Foreign Missions Intelligence Oversight Act (1980), 589n3
Ogorodnikov, Svetlana, 530 IOB and, 180–81
OGPU. See State Political Directorate judicial, in UK, 648
Okhrana (tsarist intelligence), 775, 778, 782 ministerial, 644–45, 678–79
Olson, Eric, 580 parliamentary, 645–47, 688–89, 765, 791
Olympic Games in PRC, 2008, 35 for private sector intelligence, 306–7
On Active Service in Peace and War of RCMP, 676, 685–86, 689–92
(Stimson), 72n2 in UK, 699–702
ONCIX. See Office of the National Executive for overtaken by events (OBE), 21
Counterintelligence Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 276n1
One Day of Ivan Denisovich (Solzhenitsyn), 777
ONI. See Office of Naval Intelligence
open-minded personnel, 372 Padilla, Jose, 271
Open Source Center, of CIA (OSC), 229–30, 240 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza
open-sources intelligence (OSINT), 229–41 CIA and, 367–68
analysis of, 230–31, 235 Eisenhower and, 614–15
Bin Laden and, 233, 236 extradition treaties and, 329
CI and, 236–37 Iran and, 16, 24–25, 127–28, 131, 362
collective intelligence and, 16, 63–65 Pakistan, 36, 233, 266–67, 359, 579–80, 583
DHS and, 231 Paladin, 208
early warning and, 231–32 Palestine, White Paper on, 807
Hayden, M., and, 240 Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 810
intelligence and, 16, 64–65, 222, 229–41 Pallitto, Robert, 669
Internet and, 64–65, 222, 411 Palmer, A. Mitchell, 507–8
IRTPA and, 229, 233 Palya, Albert, 663
ODNI and, 230, 239 Palya, Elizabeth, 664
876 index
Panama, 610n6 persona non grata, 202, 514

Pan-American Games, 769 Personnel Security Research Center
pandemic illness, 37 (PERSEREC), 525–26, 525n3
paramilitary initiatives, 23–24, 143, 449, 609 Espionage Cases 1974-2004, 525
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS Recent Espionage Cases, 525
and DSD (PJCAAD), 683–84 Pers Z, 160
parliamentary oversight Peru, 763–64
in Canada, 688–89 Petraeus, David H., 247
in Germany, 791 petrodollars, 7
in UK, 645–47, 765 Petrov, Vladimir, 826
Partners at the Creation (Critchfield), 795n4 Pfaff, Tony, 728
party associations, of presidents, 497 PFIAB. See President’s Foreign Intelligence
Paterno, Joe, 520 Advisory Board
Patriot Act, 262, 311, 337, 429 Philby, Kim
Patterson, Geoffrey, 565 KGB and, 144
PDB. See President’s Daily Brief USSR and, 81, 113n2, 168, 218, 260, 557, 562
peace-dividend, 34, 406, 630 Philippines, 127
peacekeeping intelligence (PKI), 275–96 Phythian, Mark, 49
Pearl Harbor attack Intelligence in an Insecure World, 44n1
intelligence and, 89, 91, 93, 112, 124–25, 359, 417 PIAB. See President’s Intelligence Advisory Board
investigations into, 722 Pike, Otis, 180, 680n4
Roberts Commission and, 729–30 Pike, Thomas, 150
Wohlstetter and, 358n3, 359, 409, 727 Pike Committee Report, 489n4, 499, 722, 726
WWII and, 116, 218, 259, 510 PIL. See primary inspection line
Peeke, Charles MacLean, 266, 270 Pillar, Paul, 26, 371
peer review, of intelligence, 723 PJCAAD. See Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Peierls, Rudolf, 557–58 ASIO, ASIS and DSD
penetration, 48 PKI. See peacekeeping intelligence
Penkovsky, Oleg plausibility, 353
Cold War and, 18, 395 plausible deniability, 588–89, 727
Khrushchev and, 261 Poland, 51, 132, 135, 161–62, 763, 785
as US agent, 81, 148–49, 266–67, 270, 527, Polaris submarines, 149
547–48, 547n20 policy coherence, 616–19
Pentagon Papers, 130 Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, 462
Pentagon-style covert action, 569–86 policymakers
People’s Republic of China (PRC) covert actions and, 613–19
Chin and, 271, 529 dissemination to, 437–51
Chinese-Taiwan dispute, 381 ethics and, 739
Communist Party in, 529 NSC as, 14, 112, 218, 386, 494n11, 630
embassy bombing, in Belgrade, 97n4, 428 policymaking
intelligence and, 513, 516, 524, 539 analysis and, 395–402, 443–47
Johnson, L. B., and, 178 biases and, 369–72
Nixon and, 179 failures of, 438, 449, 613–16, 621–23
Olympic Games of 2008 in, 35 HUMINT and, 442, 545
Stalin and, 146 Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
perestroyka, 778 (Lowenthal), 405, 745
Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 280, 287 intelligence and, 91, 95, 119, 122, 355–57, 366,
perfidy, 582 390, 437–51, 453, 476–79
performance measures intelligence estimates and, 21, 380
for analysis, 400–401 politicization and, 474–76
for CIA, 92, 94, 96–98 requirements of, 440–41, 473
for intelligence, 88–100, 396 torture and, 743–45
theories of intelligence performance, 87–92 Policy Sciences (journal), 345
Perry, William, 304 Politburo, 261
PERSEREC. See Personnel Security Research political crimes, 202
Center political spin, 22
Persian Gulf War (1991), 184, 220–21, 406, 427 political will, 707–10
The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War politicization (political bias), 472–84
(DOD), 220 accountability and, 728–29, 762
index 877
biases of, 242, 360, 363, 373, 398, 444, 458–63, Primakov, Yevgeniy, 784
472–74 primary inspection line (PIL), 318
Bush, George W., and, 119, 371, 731 privacy issues, 52, 108, 208, 649–51
Casey and, 721 private sector
Cold War and, 132 DHS and, 301
competition and, 459–60 disadvantages of, 300–303
democratization and, 51 Guantanamo Detention Center and, 300
dissemination and, 472–84 intelligence in, 50, 53, 296–309
Ford, G., and, 119 ODNI and, 297, 299, 304
of governance, 483–84 OSINT and, 231
McCone and, 479 oversight for, 306–7
policymaking and, 474–76 Truman and, 300
top-down model of, 459 process accountability, 728–29
Vietnam war and, 118, 370 processing
WMDs and, 51, 444–45 information-processing models, 349–51
politics, of accountability, 719–34 in intelligence cycle, 19–20, 48–49
Politkovskaya, Anna, 786–87 McConnell and, 19
Pollard, Jonathan, 270–71, 529, 543, 543n16, 812 professional codes of ethics, 737–38
Polyakov, Alexander, 527 professionalism
polygraph tests, 26–27, 238, 543n15 in developing democracies, 763, 766, 768
Popov, Pyotr, 267 in intelligence community, 736–38, 760
Portugal, 329–30, 791 Profits of War (Ben-Menashe), 747
Poseidon submarines, 149 Profumo scandal, 699–700
Posner, Richard, 516 Program on National Security Reform, 352n12
Post, Louis, 507–8 Proscribed Organisations Appeals
postmodernism, 44n2 Commission, 654n42
Powell, Colin, 220, 382, 401, 462, 475 prosecution, 204–6
power Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 37,
knowledge/power relationship, 45–47, 437–51 45–46
sovereign v. facilitative, 47 proxy wars, 588
Powers, Francis Gary, 442 prudential searches, 199
Powles, Guy, 681 PSC. See Public Safety Canada
Prados, John, 621n16 The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis
Prague Summit (2002), 222 (Heuer), 405
PRB. See Publications Review Board public anxiety, and national security, 33–39
“precision” air raids, 111 Publications Review Board (PRB), 237–38
Predator aircraft, 17, 583, 591 public health, 61–62
prediction, of events, 61–62, 65–67, 379 public relations, 364
pre-existing beliefs, 366 Public Safety Canada (PSC), 674
Presidential Decision Directive 35, of Clinton, 92 public use, of intelligence, 474–76
presidents Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), 71
covert actions and, 589, 591–92, 601, 609n2, Pushkin, Alexander, “The Hero”, 23
613, 617–21 Putin, Vladimir, 400, 776, 784–85, 786–88
intelligence and, 495–97, 725 Stalin and, 787
party associations of, 497 Putnam, Robert, 520
PDB and, 21, 78, 84, 88, 232, 445, 496 puzzles, mysteries and complexities, 344t
President’s Commission on CIA Activities,
680n4
President’s Daily Brief (PDB) Al Qaeda
dissemination of, 21, 88, 496 in Afghanistan, 24–25, 144
history of, 78 Bin Laden and, 243
OSINT and, 232 Bush, George W., and, 475, 579–80
Tenet and, 84, 445 CIA and, 212–13
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board embassy attacks by, 34
(PFIAB), 172–88 Geneva Conventions and, 337, 582, 582n3
President’s Intelligence Advisory Board intelligence on, 46, 66, 257, 266, 377, 834–35
(PIAB), 172 Tenet and, 724
President’s Intelligence Checklist, 496 terrorist attacks by, 6, 13, 18–21, 37, 93, 98, 134,
Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), 654n42 208, 261, 423
878 index
QDR. See Quadrennial Defense Review of MI5, 653–54, 713

QRF. See Irish Quick Reaction Force Program on National Security Reform,
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 578 352n12
Quirk, Richard J., III, 248 Rumsfeld and, 633
in UK, 711–15
USSR and, 783–86
Raborn, William, 490n7.491 Refugee Convention (RC), 337
radio communications, 108, 246, 453 refugees
Radio Free Europe, 116, 127 in Canada, 319–22
Radio Moscow, 232 Canadian Council of Refugees, 322n12
radio station seizures, 232 IRPA and, 311, 316, 321, 337
Ramparts (journal), 130 Refugee Convention (RC), 337
Ranelagh, John, 79 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 320
rational-choice theory, 378–79 Regan, Brian Patrick, 532
Raviv, Dan, Every Spy a Prince, 747 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA)
al-Rawi, Bisher, 709 accountability and, 645n15, 648, 695, 701, 704
RC. See Refugee Convention ECHR and, 648, 685
RCIS. See Royal Commission on Intelligence and surveillance and, 650
Security Reilly, Sidney, 778
RCMP. See Royal Canadian Mounted Police renditions
Reagan, Ronald, 75 CIA and, 135
Afghanistan and, 23–25, 615 extraordinary, 19, 201, 328–40, 582, 802
Casey and, 618–19 ordinary, 328
CIA and, 131–32 varieties of, 335–37, 335t, 591, 602
covert actions and, 610n6, 611 Republic of Korea, 93n2, 148, 276
intelligence estimates and, 371 research agendas, 3
Iran-Contra scandal and, 3–4, 131–32, 206, 450, “responsibility to provide,” 413, 413n7, 553
492, 618–19 Ressam, Ahmed, 310
Nicaragua and, 23–24 restorer administrators, 493
NSA and, 244 retaliation, bureaucratic, 749
PFIAB and, 176, 182–84 retraining, 464, 763
USSR and, 151, 473, 515 revolution in military affairs (RMA), 406
realism, adaptive, 49 Reynolds, Robert E., 663
Recent Espionage Cases (PERSEREC), 525 Reynolds, US v., 657–72
reconnaissance. See also National Reconnaissance Rimington, Stella, 531
Office RIPA. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
aircraft for, 6, 17, 25, 73, 82, 216 rise of intelligence system in US, 107–21
Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and risk assessments
Reconnaissance Agency, 243 CI and, 553
IMINT and, 216, 240, 408 collaboration and, 214–15, 219
NSA and, 7, 17, 19, 28, 80n9 covert actions and, 581–84, 613–14
recruitment indications-and-warning methodology
CIA and, 466 and, 66
of HUMINT, 257–74, 425, 551, 613 v. threat assessment, 45–46
Red Army, 408, 775 Rittell, Horst, 345–46
red cell exercises, 379–80, 384 RMA. See revolution in military affairs
Red Cross, 201 RN. See Royal Navy
Re-Defining the Future (Ackoff), 346n4 Robbins, Jonathan, 330
Red Orchestra, 781 Robert, Pat, 305
reforms, 101 Roberts Commission, 729–30
accountability and, 761–70 Robertson, John, 561
Ames and, 100, 192, 721 Robertson, Ken, 139
of CI, 509–10 Robson, Kim, 234–35
of CIA, 49, 117, 306–7, 360n2 Rockefeller, Nelson, 179, 680n4
DNI and, 465 Rockefeller Commission, 722
of FBI, 49, 508–10, 513–14 Rodriguez, Jose, 731
of institutional checks and balances, 669–72 Rogers, Henry Wade, 333
IRTPA and, 419 Roman Empire, 608n1
manager-reformers and, 492–93 Romania, 51, 222, 747, 759, 763–70, 813
index 879
Roosevelt, Franklin D. satellites

Donovan and, 124, 217 DOD and, 424, 427, 430–32
FBI and, 509 surveillance, 6, 15, 115, 453
Kolbe and, 273 Saudi Arabia, 385, 579, 746
Roberts Commission and, 729 SAVAK, 442, 579
Truman and, 112 Savinkov, Boris, 778
wiretap and, 511 scandals, 3, 52, 141. See also specific scandals
WWII and, 110, 259, 611 in Canada, 685–86
Roosevelt, Kermit (“Kim”) UKUSA and, 679–80
Cuba and, 615n10 scenario building, 381
Iran and, 24n14 Schäble, Wolfgang, 804
Rose, Charlie, 88 Schäfer-Bericht, 798
Rosenberg, Ethel, 523 Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop, 222
Rosenberg, Julius, 512, 523, 564–65 Schlesinger, James
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) CIA and, 183, 488, 490, 490n7, 492–93
intelligence and, 314, 510, 673, 694n8 Nixon and, 497
oversight of, 676, 685–86, 689–92 Watergate scandal and, 117
Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security Schlesinger Commission Report, 725, 730
(RCIS), 681, 823, 828, 831–32 Schmidt, Helmut, 347
Royal Navy (RN), 158–59, 164, 217 Schröder, Gerhard, 799–800, 803
Rudd, Kevin, 824, 839–40 Schwarzkopf, Norman, 220
Rudgers, David F., 124 scientific bias, 399
Rudman, Warren, 174, 185 Scowcroft, Brent, 184–86
Rudolph, Anne, 727 search warrants, 193–95, 198
Rumsfeld, Donald, 180, 244, 348 SEATO. See South-East Asian Treaty Organization
Colby and, 450 Sebold, William, 510
Feith and, 462 secrecy
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 200, 336–38 accountability and, 657–72, 703–4
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 336 analysis and, 390, 393, 399, 418
reforms and, 633 PFIAB and, 173–74
SOCOM and, 578–79 Secrecy and Democracy (Turner), 237
Rumsfeld Commission, 377 secret agencies, 3, 417
Rusk, Dean, 13, 16, 20, 488 Secretary’s Morning Summary, 401
Russian Federation, 14, 762, 769 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6)
Eastern Europe and, 783 accountability and, 644–45, 701, 708
FSB and, 784–87 assassinations and, 144
historiography of, 774–75 Cold War and, 140–41, 143–44, 147–48, 362
intelligence in, 774–89 dissemination and, 453, 464
SVR and, 537n2, 552, 783–85, 787 statutory charter of, 640–41
Rwanda, 13, 207, 276, 791 WWII and, 557
UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, 279, secret interventions. See covert actions
288–90 Secret Service Bureau (UK), 641n1
Ryerson, Edward L., 176 security. See also homeland security; national
security; National Security Agency
airport security, 19–20
SACEUR, 798 CI and, 25–27, 192
Sadat, Anwar, 816 clearances, 749
Salameh, Ali Hassan, 818 national v. human, 49
sales promotion, 364 paradox of, 47
SALT. See strategic arms limitations treaties Security Service Act (1989), 641, 642n8, 684, 699
Salufism, 264 Security Intelligence Review Committee
Sample, Timothy, 299 (SIRC), 685–86, 695
Sanders, Ronald, 306 Security Service (MI5) (UK), 197, 264, 516
Sandinista faction, 131–32, 622 Andrew and, 73–75
SAPs. See special access programs Evans, J., and, 46
sarin, 17 Fuchs and, 555–66
Sarjeant, Marcus, 523 Hoover and, 564–65
SARS outbreak, 37 reform of, 653–54, 713
Satar, Haji, 246 statutory charter of, 640–41
880 index
Security Service Act (1989), 641, 642n8, 684, 699 Skelley, Douglas B., 49
self-censorship, 51 Skull and Bones Society, 83, 490n6
self-deception, 526 Slovenia, 763
SEMA. See Swedish Emergency Management Smith, Jacqui, 710, 713, 715n3
Agency Smith, Michael, 583
“sensemaking,” of complexities, 352–57 Smith, Walter Bedell
Serpell, Michael, 559 as DCI, 488–90, 490n7, 492, 630
7/7 bombings, 708–13, 716, 769 NSA and, 115
Seward, William H., 332 Snider, L. Britt, 723
sexual entrapment, 268–69 SNIEs. See Special National Intelligence Estimates
sexual harassment, 373 “social mess,” 346
SF. See Special Forces SOCOM. See Special Operations Command
SHAI. See Sherut Yediot SOE. See Special Operations Executive
Shakespeare, William, 505 SOF. See Special Operations Executive
King Lear, 518–19 Soldiering for Peace (Von Horn), 284n3
Sharansky, Anatoly, 514 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 776–77
Sharett, Moshe, 807 Gulag Archipelago, 776
sharia legal code, 263 One Day of Ivan Denisovich, 777
Shayler, David, 144 Somalia, 579–80
Sheldon, Rose Mary, Intelligence Activities in Sorenson, Theodore, 498
Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods but Sorge, Richard, 780
Verify, 608n1 Souers, Sidney, 486, 490n7, 491
Sheruth Bitahom (Shin Bet), 809 South Africa, 286–87, 764–65, 767–68, 783
Sherut Yediot (SHAI), 807–8, 811 South-East Asian Treaty Organization
Shiloah, Reuven, 813 (SEATO), 830
Shorrock, Tim, 50 South Korea. See Republic of Korea
Spies for Hire, 307 South West Africa People’s Organization
Short, Walter C., 729 (SWAPO), 286–88
Shpiro, Shlomo, 747, 763 sovereign power, 47
SIAC. See Special Immigration Appeals Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist
Commission Republics
Sierra Leone, 207, 277, 702, 712 space
SIGINT. See signals intelligence architecture, 431
signals intelligence (SIGINT), 15, 18, 25 limitations, 454–56
CI and, 111, 148–49, 544–45 Spain, 215, 329, 331, 489n4, 761, 768–69, 791
in Cold War, 167–70 speaking truth to power, 51, 397, 418–19, 738
cooperation and, 222, 423 special access programs (SAPs), 574–75
DCI and, 115 Special Forces (SF), 213, 577, 739
GCHQ and, 641–43 Special Immigration Appeals Commission
in Israel, 809 (SIAC), 651–52, 652n38, 654–55
law enforcement and, 202–3, 208 Special Intelligence Services, 511
NRO and, 302, 423 Special National Intelligence Estimates
NSA and, 92, 167, 243–47, 249–50, 424 (SNIEs), 149, 151, 178
UN and, 276 Special Operations Command
in war, 155–67, 245–47, 393, 455–56 (SOCOM), 578–79
in WWI, 157–59, 163 Special Operations Executive (SOE), 124, 143,
signal-to-noise ratio, 409 217
Silberman-Robb Commission, 257 Special Operations Forces (SOF), 569, 575–84,
Sillitoe, Percy, 562, 565 576t
Siloviki, 786–88 Specter, Arlen, 631n7
Simm, Herman, 529 Der Spiegel (journal), 795, 798n5, 801n6
Simon, Jonathan, 47 Spielberg, Steven, 748n2
Sims, Jennifer, 47, 49, 234, 638n17 Spies for Hire (Shorrock), 307
SIRC. See Security Intelligence Review Spycatcher (Wright), 700
Committee spy handlers, 258n1, 262, 269
SIS. See Secret Intelligence Service; Special spying, history of, 258–61
Intelligence Services spy runners, 258, 262, 266, 272, 551
situational awareness, 5, 402 SR-71 aircraft, 82, 220
Skardon, William, 556, 562–65 Sri Lanka, 320, 322–24
index 881
staffing ratios, 416 Strauss, Franz Josef, 795

Stafford, David, 122n1 strengths and weakness, of covert
Stalin, Josef actions, 608–25
de-Stalinization and, 777 Strong, Kenneth, 140, 149
Eastern Europe and, 147 structures
intelligence and, 391, 489n4, 779 of bureaucracy, 108, 463–67
PRC and, 146 governmental, 108, 463–67
Putin and, 787 of intelligence, 49–50
totalitarian regimes and, 776–78 limits on, 463–67
Truman and, 781 Studies in Intelligence (CIA), 73–74, 74n4, 80,
WWII and, 89, 511, 780–81 237
START. See Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty analysis and, 404
STASI, 783, 797 as classified document, 4
State Political Directorate (OGPU), 548, 775 international research and, 758
state secrets privilege substantive authority, 605
accountability and, 657–72 subversion, 110, 113, 143–44, 231, 609
Bush, George W., and, 657, 669 success, assessments of, 499–500
Tenet and, 667 Sudoplatov, Pavel, 779
statutory gateways, 53 Suez Canal Zone, 818–19
Stauffenberg, Claus von, 801 suicide bombers, 209, 261, 348, 738, 836
Steele, Robert D., 239–40 Sukarno, Ahmed, 615, 831
Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 800–801 Sullivan, John, 352n13
Stennis, John, 725 Sun Tzu, 148, 152, 737, 746
Stephenson, William, 217, 510 Supreme Court rulings, 191, 200
stereotypic beliefs, 366–67 extradition and, 334
Stevens, Ted, 631 on intercepted electronic
Stevenson, Adlai, 261, 475 communications, 510–11
Stimson, Henry, 728–29 US v. Reynolds and, 657, 661–63, 666
On Active Service in Peace and War, 72, 72n2 Surinam, 610n6
stinger missiles, 24–25 surveillance
Stoffman, Daniel, Who Gets In: What’s Wrong Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and
with Canada’s Immigration Program, and Reconnaissance Agency, 243
How to Fix It, 312 failures of, 452–53
Stone, Harlan Fiske, 508 FISA and, 193–94, 203, 514, 680
Stone, Oliver, 84 FISC and, 194, 680
Story, Joseph, 663 intelligence and, 45, 53
Stowe, Michael, 663 privacy and, 649–51
strategic arms limitations treaties (SALT), 132, RIPA and, 650
149, 489n4 satellites for, 6, 15, 115, 453
Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), 149, Terrorist Surveillance Program, 250, 569,
183 596n6
Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”), wiretap, 191, 193–94, 243, 250–54, 511, 727,
132–33 796
strategic intelligence Suskind, Ron, 46
in Australia, 829–33, 836 Sutch, William, 681
Kent and, 139, 141–42 Sutton, Willie, 411
Strategic Intelligence (Johnson, L. K.), 142 SVR (Russian Foreign Intelligence
Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret Service), 537n2, 552, 783–85, 787
World (Johnson, L. K., and Wirtz), 610n5 SWAPO. See South West Africa People’s
Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy Organization
(Kent), 138, 145 Swedish Emergency Management Agency
in UK, 138–54 (SEMA), 343
US, 3, 88–89, 94, 98, 110–13, 427, 487 Swenson, Russell, 745
Strategic Intelligence (Johnson, L. K.), 142 Syria, 313n3, 329, 579, 596, 746, 815–16
Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World
(Johnson, L. K., and Wirtz), 610n5
Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy T-72 tanks, 406
(Kent), 138, 145 Taiwan-PRC dispute, 381
Strategic Intent 2007-2011 (CIA), 730 Tajikistan, 813
882 index
Taliban regime, 25, 35, 212–13, 245–46, 260, 615 by Al Qaeda, 6, 13, 18–21, 37, 93, 98, 134, 208,
Tamil people, 320, 322–24 261, 423
Taney, Roger, 329 terrorists
Tanweer, Shazad, 708 Internet use by, 455, 836
TASS agency, 265 suspects, and torture, 19, 269, 334–38
Taylor, Ann, 646, 705 suspects at Guantanamo Detention
Taylor, Maxwell, 177, 179–80, 721 Center, 134–35, 709–10
team A/team B exercises, 119, 371, 379–80 Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), 250, 596,
Teapot Dome scandal, 508 596n6
TECHINT. See technical intelligence Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), 464
technical intelligence (TECHINT), 17–19, 129, Tet offensive (1968), 93n2, 129, 178
364 Thailand, 785, 834
covert actions and, 588 Thatcher, Margaret, 146, 700
DOD and, 424–25 theories
golden age of, 410, 410n4 of analysis, 375–86, 389–403
v. HUMINT, 17–19 of congressional oversight, 53, 765
in USSR, 782 consequentialist theory, 741, 751
technologies deontological theory, 741
Directorate of Science and Technology of intelligence, 43–58, 138–40
(DS&T), 11, 177, 302 of intelligence performance, 87–92
disruptive, 108–9 Just-War Theory, 728, 735, 741–42
for monitoring, 290–92 rational-choice theory, 378–79
technological disadvantage of USSR, 94 utilitarian theory, 741
Teller, Edward, 180 virtue theory, 741, 751
Telman, Jeremy, 671 “think” pieces, 401
Templeton, Jacqueline, The Australian Intelligence “third wave” of democratization, 759–61
and Security Services 1900-1950, 824 Third World, 116
Tenet, George J. Thomas, Gordon, Guideon’s Spies, 747
CIA and, 261, 371, 448, 462, 488, 490n7, 491 Thompson, Llewelyn, 261
interrogation techniques and, 731 threat assessments, 375–76, 453, 460
memoirs of, 84, 238 “asymmetric threat” and, 455
PDB and, 84, 445 v. risk assessment, 45–46
Powell and, 475 TTIC and, 464
Al Qaeda and, 724 threat warnings, 89–90, 98, 99t
state secrets and, 667 NIC and, 60–61, 91
WMDs and, 100, 134 Three Days of the Condor (film), 72n3
terrorism Three Mile Island, 352
Anti-Terrorism Act, 674–75, 687 time and space limitations, 454–56
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act Tomlinson, Richard, 144
(2001), 645n16, 652 top-down model, of politicization, 459
“asymmetric threat” of, 455 Toronto Immigration Holding Center, 319
in Australia, 834–40 torture
Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports CAT and, 334, 337
Terrorism Around the World (Bell), 312 ethics and, 737, 743–45
complexities of, 347–49 extraordinary rendition and, 19, 201, 328–40
The Complexity of Terrorism: Social and Geneva conventions and, 200–201, 285,
Behavioral Understanding (Hayden, 334, 336
N.), 348n9 at Guantanamo Detention Center, 200,
GWOT and, 92, 95, 242 269, 731
IRTPA and, 8n5, 50, 134, 196 policymaking and, 743–45
Islamist movements and, 261, 266, 456 terrorist suspects and, 19, 269, 334–38
JTAC and, 653 “Torture by Proxy” (Human Rights
law enforcement and, 203–4, 206 Project), 334, 336
National Military Strategic Plan for the War on US and, 52, 134, 203, 242, 297
Terrorism, 579 “Torture by Proxy” (Human Rights Project), 334,
Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), 654n42 336
terrorist attacks totalitarian regimes
in Mumbai, 36, 274 accountability and, 736
at Munich Olympic Games, 747, 803, 817 intelligence and, 72, 108, 408, 410–11, 759
index 883
Stalin and, 776–78 UK. See United Kingdom

US and, 108 Ukraine, 144, 267
tradecraft, 59–69, 510, 550–51, 557, 638, 737 UKUSA
training Australia and, 825
in analysis, 404–5, 448 scandals and, 679–80
in CI, 509–10 UK and US intelligence relationship, 50, 168,
retraining, 464, 763 216–18, 456
transnational levels, of intelligence, 49–50, 53 Ultra, 139, 146, 155, 158, 162–69, 217
transparency, in intelligence, 758, 761–70 UN. See United Nations
treason UNAMIR. See United Nations
CIA and, 4 uncertainty
definitions of, 520–23 analysis in uncertain environment, 404–21
economic, 524 limits of intelligence and, 452–71
expanded targets of, 523–24 UNCOK. See United Nations
high v. petit, 520–21 unconventional warfare, 576t
ideologies and, 527–28 UNHCR. See United Nations
motivations for, 260–74, 524–33, 526f Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 200,
origin of concept, 518–19 509, 599
polygraph tests and, 27 unintended consequences, 24, 44–45, 616,
Treasury Department Office of Intelligence 736, 741
Support, 7 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
trench warfare, 109 Afghanistan and, 23–25, 359, 363, 782
Treverton, Gregory, 382 Ames and, 133, 263–65, 267, 269, 273–74,
tribal loyalties, 50 364, 724
Trotsky, Leon, 779 CIA and, 115
Troy, Thomas F., 124 codebreaking by, 159–62
Trudeau, Pierre, 685 Cold War and, 18, 132–33, 146–50, 168, 441,
Truman, Harry S 781–82
CIA and, 22, 73, 83, 115, 259, 486 collapse of, 13, 34, 84, 98, 132–33, 220, 359, 406,
intelligence estimates and, 112 448, 539, 785
Korean War and, 424, 449 collectivization in, 267
National Security Act and, 112–13 Communist Party in, 152, 232, 775
NSA and, 424, 731 counterterrorism in, 787
OSS and, 124 as “evil empire,” 371, 515
private sector intelligence and, 300 intelligence in, 82, 113, 190, 218, 259–60, 509,
Roosevelt, F., and, 112 775–78, 780–82
Stalin and, 781 invasion of Czechoslovakia, 115
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 783 Jews in, 777, 780
TSP. See Terrorist Surveillance Program military intelligence in, 779–82
TTIC. See Terrorist Threat Integration Center nuclear materials of, 126–27, 148–50, 260,
Tucker, Nancy, 419n11 555–56
Turkey, 129 OSS and, 781
Turner, Stansfield Philby and, 81, 113n2, 168, 218, 260, 557, 562
Carter, Jimmy and, 9, 25, 181, 426 Reagan and, 151, 473, 515
CIA and, 94, 488–89, 488n3, 492–93 reforms in, 783–86
covert actions and, 25 TECHINT in, 782
Secrecy and Democracy, 237 technological disadvantage of, 94
Tutsi people, 288–90 UK, relations with, 142–44
Tutu, Desmond, 783 US, relations with, 116, 119, 122, 129, 132–33,
183
WWI and, 782
U-1 intelligence system, 124 WWII and, 89, 511, 780–81
U-2 aircraft United Arab Emirates, 380
CIA and, 73, 83, 115, 148, 176, 178 United Fruit Company, 24, 128
Eisenhower and, 127, 442 United Kingdom (UK), 24, 36
IMINT and, 127, 129, 220, 237, 261, 442, 449 accountability in, 699–718
UAVs. See unmanned aerial vehicles Afghanistan and, 709–10
UCMJ. See Uniform Code of Military Justice civil liberties in, 711
UFOs, 83 codebreaking by, 111, 156, 159–67, 557
884 index
United Kingdom (UK) (continued) torture and, 52, 134, 203, 242, 297
Cold War and, 138–54 totalitarian regimes and, 108
covert actions and, 142–45 UKUSA and, 50, 168, 216–18, 456
GWOT and, 648–49 unilateral action of, 36
intelligence in, 39, 46, 73–74, 124–25, 138–54, US-Canadian border law enforcement, 310–27,
197, 392, 640–56 674–75
judicial oversight in, 648 USSR, relations with, 116, 119, 122, 129, 132–33,
law in, 640–56 183
9/11 attacks and, 652–53 WWII and, 158–59
oversight in, 699–702 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 17–18, 424–25,
parliamentary oversight in, 645–47, 765 428, 432, 455
reforms in, 711–15 unmotivated biases, 366–69, 391, 456–58
strategic intelligence in, 138–54 UNPROFOR. See United Nations
UKUSA and, 50, 168, 216–18, 456 UNTAG. See United Nations
USSR, relations with, 142–44 UNUC. See United Nations
in WWI, 259 uranium, yellow cake, 6
WWII and, 111, 146, 158–67 Uribe, Alvaro, 767
United Nations (UN), 207 US Cryptologic System (USCS), 243, 245
Afghanistan and, 275 USCS. See US Cryptologic System
Assistance Mission in Rwanda USS Pueblo, 178
(UNAMIR), 279, 288–90 USSR. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Commission on Korea (UNCOK), 283–84 US v. Reynolds, 657–72
High Commissioner for Refugees US v. Truong, 193–94
(UNHCR), 320 utilitarian theory, 741
HUMINT and, 275–76, 279
IMINT and, 276
information-gathering spectrum for, 280t values, 605, 736–39
intelligence cycle of, 278–82 Vandenberg, Hoyt, 488, 490n7, 492
NATO and, 293 Vanunu, Mordechai, 817
Operation in the Congo (UNUC), 284–86 Varma, Virendra, 742
peacekeeping intelligence by, 275–96 VENONA, 512, 556–57, 560–61, 775, 825–26
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 293 Verrier, Anthony, 141
Security Council of, 277, 282, 289–90, 382 Vickland, Eric, 581
SIGINT and, 276 Viet Cong, 116, 178, 365
Stabilization Mission in Haiti Order of Battle of, 371
(MINUSTAH), 291–92 Vietnam, 13, 18, 22, 482. See also Vietnam War
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Vietnam War
Namibia, 286–88 Australia in, 830
United States (US) Gulf of Tonkin incident and, 480–81
Afghanistan and, 242, 245–47 intelligence on, 114, 116–17, 407, 427
codebreaking by, 19, 72, 111, 156, 159–60, 393 Johnson, L. B., and, 370, 473, 476
Cold War and, 219–20, 512–13 peace accords for, 489n5
collaboration in, 50–51, 350–51, 390n1, politicization and, 118, 370
396–400, 418, 616–17, 617n11 virtue theory, 741, 751
Communist Party in, 118, 507, 509 Vision (McConnell), 214
Cuban relations with, 14 Visitor Information Transmission (VIT),
extradition treaties in, 191, 202, 328–33 316
intelligence community in, 8f, 107–21 VIT. See Visitor Information Transmission
invasion of Iraq by, 45, 186, 222, 242, 245–47, Von Horn, Carl, 284
277, 296, 462 Soldiering for Peace, 284n3
Israel and, 94
legal regime of, 590–98
military intelligence in, 110–14, 129, 139n1, Wahhabism, 264
375–86 Wald, Patricia M., 671
Penkovsky and, 81, 148–49, 266–67, 270, 527, Waldegrave Initiative, 141
547–48, 547n20 Walker, John A., 515, 541–43, 541n10
rise of intelligence system in, 107–21 Walker, N., 48
strategic intelligence of, 3, 88–89, 94, 98, Walker spy ring, 267
110–13, 427, 487 Waltzer, Kenneth, 748n2
index 885
war. See also specific wars Weiner, Tim, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the
On Active Service in Peace and War CIA, 74n4, 135, 304, 745
(Stimson), 72n2 Weisband, William, 113n2, 168
chemical warfare, 17, 192, 446, 707 Wesley, Michael, 829
computers in, 452–53 Wessel, Gerhard, 793, 796
Constitution and, 251, 726 West, Rebecca, 519–20, 526, 533
“dominant battlespace awareness” in, 453 West Bank, 810
guerrilla warfare, 111, 231 Westerfield, H. Bradford, 237
industrial warfare, 407 western hemisphere, communism in, 615
intelligence and, 781–82 Westmoreland, William C., 129
Intelligence Power in Peace and War Wheelon, Albert, 302
(Herman), 139 “When Everything is Intelligence, Nothing is
internment in wartime, 558 Intelligence” (Argell), 722
Just-War Theory, 728, 735, 741–42 The Whisperers (Figes), 776
lessons of, 110–13 whistleblowers, 740, 742, 748–49
Profits of War (Ben-Menashe), 747 Whitaker, Reg, 311
protesters of, and CIA, 27, 118, 130, 668 White, Dick, 144
SIGINT in, 155–67, 245–47, 393, 455–56 White, Harry Dexter, 263, 512
trench warfare, 109 white operations v. black operations, 575–77
unconventional warfare, 576t White Paper on Palestine, 807
Warner, John, 498, 631 Whitlam, Gough, 681, 827–28, 831
Warner, Michael, 46–47, 54, 759 Who Gets In: What’s Wrong with Canada’s
Warner, Terry, 526 Immigration Program, and How to Fix It
warnings (Stoffman), 312
early warning, and OSINT, 231–32 “wicked” problems, 345–47, 351
indications-and-warning Wieck, Hans-Georg, 795n4, 801
methodologies, 65–67 Wigmore, John Henry, 666
Miranda warnings, 193, 200 wiki environments, 415
National Intelligence Officer for Warning, 91 Wikipedia, 234
threat warnings, 60–61, 89–91, 98, 99t will, political, 707–10
warrantless wiretap program, 243, 250–54, 727 Williams, K., 760
Washington, George, 109, 123–24, 215, 258, 609 Wills, Aidan, 745
water-boarding, 269, 731 Wilson, Harold, The Governance of Britain, 700,
Watergate scandal 700n1, 711–12, 715
Ervin and, 414n8 Wilson, Joe, 238
Nixon and, 130, 179, 450, 667 Wilson, Valerie Plame, 238
Schlesinger and, 117 Wilson, William, 507
tapes on, 667 Wilson, Woodrow, 72, 159, 259
Watts, Larry, 760 FBI and, 506
Waxman, Henry, 301–2 Windeyer, Victor, 837
weaponization Winks, Robin, 80, 140
of avian influenza, 382 wiretap surveillance, 191
of nuclear materials, 444, 455 FISA and, 193–94
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Germany, 796
Bush, George W., 91–92, 134, 457–58 Roosevelt, F., and, 511
CIA and, 123, 134 warrantless, 243, 250–54, 727
Hussein, S., and, 28, 238, 379, 462, 482, 707, 838 Wirtz, James, 139–40
in Iraq, 4, 18, 20, 28, 49, 51, 64, 100, 257, 359, Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret
366, 377, 438, 444, 653, 712, 730 World, 610n5
politicization and, 51, 444–45 wisdom, and intelligence, 736–38
Tenet and, 100, 134 WMDs. See weapons of mass destruction
WMD Commission Report, 377, 382–83, 386, Wohlstetter, Roberta, 358n3, 359, 409, 727
429, 629n1 Wolf, Markus, 779, 797
Weaver, William, 669 Wolfowitz, Paul, 462, 553
Webber, Melvin, 345–46 Woolsey, R. James
Webster, Daniel, 330 CIA and, 15n11, 18, 146, 487, 490n7, 491
Webster, William H., 76n6, 490n7, 493, 516, 723 Clinton and, 9, 488n3
Wehrmacht, 791–93 Cold War and, 13
Weick, Karl, 352n10, 356 World Council of Churches, 783
886 index
World War I (WWI) WWI. See World War I

Germany in, 506–7 WWII. See World War II
intelligence in, 109–10, 124, 216–17, 506–7
SIGINT in, 157–59, 163
UK in, 259 Ya’alon, Moshe, 820
USSR and, 782 Yassin, Ahmed, 820
World War II (WWII) Yates, Athol, 747
CI in, 399, 549–50 yellow cake uranium, 6
Germany and, 110–13, 158–61, 190, 216–17, Yellow Fruit Scandal, 583
522–23 Yeltsin, Boris, 778, 783, 786–87
Japan and, 89, 91, 93, 113, 124–25, 522–23, 611, Yemen, 579, 583, 814
825 Yom Kippur War, 370, 815
OSS and, 111, 124, 217, 259, 370, 372, 556 Yoo, John C., 251
in Pacific, 166–68 Yugoslavia, 84, 207, 428, 828
Pearl Harbor attack and, 116, 218, 259, 510 Yurchenko, Vitaliy Sergeyevich, 183, 543,
Roosevelt, F., and, 110, 259, 611 543n14
SIS and, 557
Stalin and, 89, 511, 780–81
UK and, 111, 146, 158–67 Zahner, Richard P., 248
US and, 158–59 Zegart, Amy, 48–49, 460
USSR and, 89, 511, 780–81 Zimmerman telegram, 159, 395
worst case scenarios, 742–43 Zinoviev Letter, 370
Wright, Peter, Spycatcher, 700 ZNBw. See Center for Military Information

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the oxford handbook of

Copyright © 2010 by Oxford University Press, Inc.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Oxford handbook of national security intelligence / edited by

Printed in the United States of America

About the Contributors, xi

1. National Security Intelligence, 3

2. National Security and Public Anxiety: Our Changing Perceptions, 33

Part II Theory and Method

4. The Sources and Methods of Intelligence Studies, 59

5. Getting Intelligence History Right: Reﬂections and Recommendations

6. Assessing Intelligence Performance, 87

Part III The Evolution of Modern Intelligence

7. The Rise of the U.S. Intelligence System, 1917–1977, 107

8. The Rise and Fall of the CIA, 122

9. British Strategic Intelligence and the Cold War, 138

10. Signals Intelligence in War and Power Politics, 1914–2010, 155

11. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 172

12. Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 189

13. The Evolution of International Collaboration in the Global

Part IV Intelligence Collection and Processing

14. The Dilemma of Open Sources Intelligence: Is OSINT Really

15. The Troubled Inheritance: The National Security Agency

16. Human Source Intelligence, 257

17. United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence, 275

18. Privatized Spying: The Emerging Intelligence Industry, 296

19. Guarding the Border: Intelligence and Law Enforcement in

20. Extraordinary Rendition, 328

Part V Intelligence Analysis and Production

21. Addressing “Complexities” in Homeland Security, 343

22. The Intelligence Analysis Crisis, 359

23. Competitive Analysis: Techniques for Better Gauging Enemy Political

24. Decision Advantage and the Nature of Intelligence Analysis, 389

25. Intelligence Analysis in an Uncertain Environment, 404

26. The Dilemma of Defense Intelligence, 422

Part VI Intelligence Dissemination

27. The Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship, 437

28. On Uncertainty and the Limits of Intelligence, 452

29. The Perils of Politicization, 472

30. Leadership in an Intelligence Organization: The Directors

Part VII Counterintelligence

31. The Future of FBI Counterintelligence through the Lens

32. Treason: “’Tis Worse than Murder”, 518

33. The Challenges of Counterintelligence, 537

Part VIII Covert Action

35. Covert Action, Pentagon Style, 569

37. Covert Action: Strengths and Weaknesses, 608

Part IX Intelligence Accountability

38. The Role of Defense in Shaping U.S. Intelligence Reform, 629

39. Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom, 640

40. Rethinking the State Secrets Privilege, 657

42. “A Very British Institution”: The Intelligence and Security Committee

43. The Politics of Intelligence Accountability, 719

44. Ethics and Professional Intelligence, 735