Report on the investigation of

the collision between

Wintertide and MSC Sabrina

off Texel Traffic Separation Scheme

13 June 2000

Marine Accident Investigation Branch

First Floor
Carlton House
Carlton Place
Southampton
United Kingdom
SO15 2DZ

Report No 7/2001
CONTENTS
Page

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

SY NOPSlS 1

PARTICULARS OF WlNTERTlDE AND MSC SABRINA AND ACCIDENT 2

SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 5

1.1 Background 5
1.2 Reconstruction of events 5
1.3 Bridge manning 5
1.4 Environmental conditions 8
1.5 Narrative 8
1.6 Radar 12
1.7 Navigation lights and fog signals 12
1.8 Conduct of navigation 13
1.9 Company and master's orders 13
1.10 Rule of the road 14
1.11 Manoeuvring characteristics 15
-
SECTION 2 ANALYSIS 17
2.1 Conduct of navigation and alterations of course 17
2.2 Use of radar 18
2.3 Safe speed 18
2.4 Decision not to call the master 19
2.5 Action following collision with Concordia 20
2.6 Management of lookouts and sound signals 20
2.7 Action taken to avoid a collision 21
SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 22
3.1 Findings 22
3.2 Cause 24
3.3 Contributory causes 24
SECTION 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS 26

Figure 1 Chart Extract showing planned tracks of both vessels

Figure 2 Diagram showing an approximation of actual tracks prior to the collision

Figure 3 Damage to Wintertide

Figure 4 Damage to MSC Sabrina

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AB - Able Seaman

ARPA - Automatic Radar and Plotting Aid

BA - British Admiralty

CPA - Closest Point of Approach

DR - Dead Reckoning

EP - Estimated Position

GPS - Global Positioning System

MAlB - Marine Accident Investigation Branch

oow - Officer of the Watch

TCPA - Time to Closest Point of Approach

TSS - Traffic Separation Scheme

UTC - Universal Co-ordinated Time

VHF - Very High Frequency

SYNOPSIS
At about 0209 (UTC) on 13 June 2000, the Panamanian-registered container ship
MSC Sabrina collided with the Netherlands-registered fishing vessel Concordia.
Fifteen minutes later, MSC Sabrina collided with the UK-registered refrigerated cargo
ship Wintertide at the junction of the Off Vlieland and Off Texel TSS off the
Netherlands. The MAlB was informed of both accidents that day, and an
investigation into the collision between Wintertide and MSC Sabrina was initiated.
The collision between MSC Sabrina and Concordia, neither of which were UK-
registered, has not been investigated.

Wintertide and MSC Sabrina were heading south-south-west in a traffic lane in

restricted visibility; MSC Sabrina was overtaking Wintertide with a speed advantage
of about 5 knots. Concordia was on passage from Den Helder to her fishing grounds
and was crossing the traffic lane from the south-east. The collision between
Wintertide and MSC Sabrina occurred after Wintertide altered course to follow her
planned track into the Off Texel TSS which put the vessels on a collision course.

Contributory causes included:

Wintertide’s OOW rigidly adhering to the planned navigation track;

The inaccurate radar plotting and monitoring of MSC Sabrina by Wintertide’s

oow;
MSC Sabrina’s OOW failing to maintain a proper radar lookout;

MSC Sabrina’s speed, which is considered to have been inappropriate, given the
prevailing visibility.

Additionally, neither master was called, nor were additional lookouts posted, when
the vessels entered restricted visibility.

There are several lessons to be learned from this incident regarding the actions of
the OOWs and their deviations from established procedures, company orders, and
regulations. The recommendations made aim to promote greater compliance with
standing instructions.

1
PARTICULARS OF WlNTERTlDEAND MSC SABRlNA AND
ACCIDENT
Vessel details Wintertide

Registered Owner Wissel V

Manager(s) Norbulk Shipping UK Ltd

Port of registry London

Flag UK

Type Reefer/Cargo

Built 1990 - Lervik in Sign, Norway

Classification society Det Norske Veritas

Construction Steel

Length overall 104.85m

Gross tonnage 5,084

Engine power 4043kW/Diesel

Service speed 16 knots

Other relevant info Bow thruster, single controllable pitch propeller

Accident details

Time and date 0223 UTC on 13 June 2000

Location of incident 10.5' N, 23.5' E (Off Texel TSS)

Persons on board 16

Injuries/fatalities 0

Damage Severely buckled bulwark and internal damage

to the starboard bow. Distorted deck fittings
and anchor fluke.

2
Vessel details MSC Sabrina

Registered Owner Partrederiet msc Sabrina - Copenhagen-

Panama

Manager Mediterranean Shipping Co SA

Port of registry Panama

Flag Panama

TYpe Full cellular container ship

Built 1989 - Korea

Classification society RlNA

Construction Steel

Length overall 242.6m

Gross tonnage 35,598

Engine power 20,853kW/Diesel

Service speed 21.5 knots

Other relevant info Bow thruster output 9OOkW, single controllable

pitch propeller

Accident details

Time and date 0223 UTC on 13 June 2000

Location of incident 10.5' N, 23.5' E (Off Texel TSS)

Persons on board 22

Injuries/fatalities 0

Damage Loss of watertight integrity above the waterline

on the port quarter in vicinity of the steering
compartment.

4
SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION
All times are UTC and all courses are gyro.

1.1 BACKGROUND

Wintertide, a refrigerated cargo ship, carried fertiliser from Europe to South

America, returning with fruit. She sailed from Koping, Sweden on 9 June
2000 with a cargo of 3,439.75 tonnes of ammonia nitrate. After bunkering in
Copenhagen on 10 - 11 June, she headed for Santa Marta, Colombia. She
entered the south-south-west bound lane of the Vlieland North TSS at 0015
on 13 June.

MSC Sabrina, a container ship, operated between Europe and North America
and Mexico on a 42-day cycle, She sailed from Bremerhaven, Germany on
the evening of 12 June with 1,710 containers weighing 32,779.9 tonnes for
Felixstowe; her required speed for the passage was 17.5 knots. She joined
the Vlieland TSS from the Terschelling-Germanbight TSS at 01 10 the
following day.

1.2 RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS

Discrepancies exist between the times recorded by the two vessels, even
taking account of the different time zones being kept (Wintertide UTC + 2 and
MSC Sabrina UTC + 1 hour 20 minutes). Wintertide logged the collision at
0223, while MSC Sabrina recorded its occurrence between 0210-0213.
Thames Coastguard intercepted a VHF radio call from MSC Sabrina to
Wintertide at 0223, immediately following the collision. Accordingly, it is
estimated the accident occurred between 0220 and 0223. Timings in this
report are considered to be accurate to within 3 minutes.

Information regarding the sequence of events on board MSC Sabrina before

the collision has been obtained from a number of sources. However, the
MAlB has been unable to interview MSC Sabrina's OOW, or view statements
he might have made to other parties.

Wintertide and MSC Sabrina's planned tracks are shown at Figure 1 and an
approximation of their actual tracks from 0200 until 0223 is shown at Figure
2. Positions are believed to be accurate to within 5 cables.

1.3 BRIDGE MANNING

Wintertide

The OOW was the chief officer, who joined the vessel on 8 June 2000. He
qualified as a watchkeeping officer in 1993, and served as chief officer on
smaller vessels between 1996-7. Wintertide was the third ship he had worked
on managed by Norbulk Shipping UK Ltd (he had served on her sister ship
Wiseda Frost for almost seven months), but it was his first as chief officer
since joining the company.

5
 Before taking over the watch at about 0200, he was reasonably rested and
felt alert. An AB lookout accompanied the chief officer on the bridge.

MSC Sabrina

The OOW was the second officer, who joined the vessel on 7 June 2000; his
previous experience is not known. According to the third officer, whom he
relieved at 2240, the second officer appeared normal, and did not seem tired.
He, too, was accompanied by an AB lookout.

1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

At the time of the collision the wind was south-westerly force 5, the sea state
was moderate, and the visibility was less than 2 cables. The predicted tidal
stream was north-north-easterly at 1 to 2 knots. The moon had set at 0158
and civil twilight was at 0225.

1.5 NARRATIVE

1.5.1 Pre-Collision Events

Wintertide

The chief officer arrived on Wintertide's bridge to relieve the second officer at
0152 on 13 June. Two radar displays were operating, one on each side of the
bridge, and both on the 6-mile range scale. There were two contacts of
interest: the first, later determined to be MSC Sabrina, was about 2.5 miles on
the starboard quarter and overtaking on a similar course. The second,
assumed to be Concordia, was less than 2 miles at 50" on the port bow, and
closing on a steady bearing. A third vessel, 4.5 miles ahead of Wintertide,
was also highlighted during the handover, but played no part in subsequent
events.

Fog patches had been encountered during the night and, at about 0200,
before handing over the watch, the second officer advised the chief officer
that visibility had reduced to about 0.5 mile, and switched on the forward fog
signal to automatic.

After taking the watch, the chief officer saw the radar contact on the port bow
was then at 0.6 mile. He checked visually, and sighted a masthead light and
side lights about 60" on the port bow and identified her as a fishing vessel not
engaged in fishing. Her range was checked by radar, and visibility confirmed
at 0.5 mile. At about 0205 the fishing vessel passed safely under Wintertide's
stern.

Shortly after, the chief officer set a course of 202" on the autopilot, followed
by a further adjustment 2 minutes later to 205". This was done to aim towards
a waypoint set in the GPS receiver indicating the position of the next planned
course alteration to 230". Following these course adjustments, the chief
officer assessed the radar contact on the starboard quarter to be steering
about 199" to at a speed of 19.5 knots. He estimated she would

8
overtake after the alteration to 230" but not precisely when, or at what
distance.

The GPS waypoint alarm sounded at 0215 and the chief officer ordered the
AB lookout to change to manual steering and alter course to 230". When
steady on the new course, steering was changed back to autopilot and
checked by the AB.

At 0216, the vessel on the starboard quarter was at 1 mile and assessed to
be passing astern with a CPA of 0.45 mile to port; at 0219 she was at 0.6 mile
with an assessed CPA of 0.25 mile to port. At this point the chief officer
reduced the radar range scale to 3 miles, then to 1.5 miles soon after. He
then looked over the starboard quarter, but could not see the vessel. The
radar was checked again and, although now in the clutter, the echo was still
discernible and at a range of 0.4 mile. The vessel was still not visible.

By 0221, the chief officer could no longer see the radar echo close astern, so
he moved to the port bridge wing to search astern using binoculars. He
believed the vessel would pass astern and on to Wintertide's port quarter. He
also informed the lookout, who had remained inside the bridge since shortly
after coming on watch, that he was unable to see the vessel close astern.

Moments later, as the chief officer re-entered the bridge, he saw the loom of a
forward masthead light, and the dark silhouette of a fast moving ship passing
very close on Wintertide's starboard side. The chief officer immediately
switched to manual steering, and applied 20" of port rudder. He then gave
the helm to the AB lookout, before moving the propeller pitch to 'Dead Slow
Ahead. The other vessel passed to starboard at a converging angle of about
and, as Wintertide began to swing to port, the other vessel struck
Wintertide's starboard bow with her port quarter. The collision occurred at
0223, and the chief officer immediately sounded the general alarm.

The master, who was asleep in his cabin when the ships collided, was woken
by the impact. From his window he saw a large ship passing ahead at an
angle of 10" to 15". He went directly to the bridge, but by the time he arrived,
the other vessel was no longer visible.

Prior to the collision, other than regular position broadcasts by tug Almgra, the
OOW did not hear any other vessels using the VHF radio.

MSC Sabrina

MSC Sabrina entered the south-south-west lane of the Off Vlieland TSS at
01 10. The second officer was aware, both visually and by radar, of a vessel
proceeding in the same direction about 5 miles on the starboard bow. By
0200 the vessel was at 2 miles on the port bow; she was no longer visible and
had a CPA of 8 cables to port. Soon after, the second officer observed a
second radar contact on the port bow, range unknown, on a course of 290" to
300" at 11 knots with a CPA of zero in 8 to 10 minutes. Until 0209 course
was adjusted between and to follow the planned track.

9
 At 0209, the second officer saw a bright white light and the green side light of
a fishing vessel close on the port side. The fishing vessel was seen to slow
down but still collided with MSC Sabrina's port side aft in the vicinity of the
accommodation ladder. At about the same time the OOW manoeuvred the
ship 12" to port and then 26" to starboard before returning to the base course
of 206". The vessel appears to have been swinging throughout this
manoeuvre, touching but not steadying on either or The
manoeuvre lasted about 7 minutes, but it is not known whether it began
before or after the collision. After the collision, the second officer attempted to
call the fishing vessel on VHF radio, but received no reply. It is not known
what VHF radio channels were used, or what language the second officer was
speaking. Speed was maintained at 17.5 knots.

At 0210, the master was woken by a telephone call from the second officer,
advising him there was a strong wind, and also that a group of fishing vessels
was in the vicinity, and asking him to go to the bridge. After dressing, the
master arrived on the bridge 5 to 6 minutes later, and was advised by the
second officer that a small vessel had passed very close by, or even collided
with, MSC Sabrina's pot? side amidships.

The master checked the Furuno radar and observed the closest contact was 3
to 4 cables just forward of the port beam; its CPA was zero and its true radar
vector was converging about towards MSC Sabrina's course. The master
ordered the second officer to put the helm hard to starboard. It is not known
whether the second officer switched to manual steering before carrying out
this instruction. A few seconds later the master saw the bows of a ship and a
masthead light emerge from the fog at a range of about 1 to 1.5 cables and
assessed that the vessels were still on converging courses. Soon after, MSC
Sabrina's port quarter struck the other vessel's starboard bow. No sound
signals from Wintertide were heard on board MSC Sabrina at any time.

Concordia

The fishing vessel Concordia, on passage from Den Helder to her fishing
grounds, was crossing the Off Vlieland TSS steering 310" at 11 knots. Soon
after altering course to starboard to pass under Wintertide's stern at about
0205, she sighted MSC Sabrina immediately ahead. Concordia came to full
astern but still collided with MSC Sabrina. It is not known what VHF radio
channels Concordia was monitoring, or if she heard the calls MSC Sabrina
made on VHF radio.

1.5.2 Post-Collision Events

Wintertide

After exchanging identities and details of damage with MSC Sabrina via VHF
radio, Wintertide, resumed passage at a reduced speed until visibility
improved. She arrived at Falmouth on 14 June for repairs to her damaged
bow.

10
 MSC Sabrina

Immediately after the collision MSC Sabrina reduced speed, started sounding
fog signals, and closed all watertight doors. She then exchanged details with
Wintertide, and informed the Netherlands Coastguard before proceeding to
Felixstowe for repairs.

Concordia

The vessel suffered minor damage, but was able to continue passage to her
fishing grounds.

1.6 RADAR

Wintertide

Two Krupps Atlas 7600 radar displays, capable of providing true and relative
motion information, were fitted. The plotting of radar echoes was semi-
automatic; it was not an ARPA. Plotting was achieved by the operator
manually updating the position of an echo with a tracker ball. Contact data
such as course, speed, CPA and TCPA were calculated within the radar set
using the last two manually injected positions, and could be displayed if
selected by the operator. The operating manual for the radar advised that the
time between two plot positions should be at least forty-five seconds to obtain
accurate information.

The radars were also fitted with a ‘trial manoeuvre’ facility, enabling an
operator to simulate a course change and determine the revised CPA of a
contact of interest prior to an actual alteration. The chief officer did not use
this facility before the alteration to

MSC Sabrina

The radar most frequently used by the OOW was a Furuno ARPA radar. Two
JVC radars, one of which was also an ARPA, were also available. When the
master arrived on the bridge just prior to the collision, the second officer had
been using the Furuno radar configured to display ‘ship’s head up’ in relative
motion with vectors showing true courses.

1.7 NAVIGATION LIGHTS AND FOG SIGNALS

Both vessels were displaying navigation lights appropriate for their length.
wintertide had two air-driven whistles, one forward and one aft; both were
controlled from the bridge and could be sounded manually or automatically.
The OOW switched on the forward sound signal in automatic at about 0200.
MSC Sabrina had a whistle available, but did not switch it on until after the
collision.

12
1.8 CONDUCT OF NAVIGATION

General

Both OOWs periodically transferred GPS positional information to the chart,

but neither maintained an EP or DR position. The planned tracks for both
vessels were drawn on the chart in use.

Wintertide

Chart BA 1408, which was not the largest scale chart available for the area,
was the chart in use on board Wintertide. The intersection of the 200" and
230" tracks at the junction of Off Vlieland and Off Texel TSS was input into
the GPS as a waypoint with a 1.75 cable guard zone around it. This was the
distance the chief officer had allowed for the ship to travel, from putting the
helm over to steadying on the new course. When the ship closed to 1.75
cables of the waypoint, the GPS alarm sounded, indicating that the ship was
at the course alteration.

MSC Sabrina

Chart BA 2953, the largest scale chart available for the area, was the chart in
use on board MSC Sabrina. It is not known if the second officer utilised the
waypoint or alarm facilities of the GPS receiver.

1.9 COMPANY AND MASTER'S ORDERS

Wintertide

The following is an extract from the Vessel Operations Manual issued by

Norbulk Shipping UK Ltd:

When restricted visibility is encountered or expected, the first responsibility of

the Officer of the Watch is to comply with the relevant rules of the applicable
regulations for preventing collisions at sea.. In addition, he is to pay
particular regard to the sounding of fog signals, proceeding at a safe speed
and having the engines ready for immediate manoeuvre. He is also to:

Inform the master

Post a look-out and helmsman and in congested waters revert to manual

steering immediately

The Officer of the Watch is also to have the manoeuvring capabilities,

particularly the 'stopping distance' of his own vessel clearly in mind.

On the evening of 12 June the relevant extracts of night orders written by the
master were as follows:

Entering Vlieland TSS. Pay attention to the crossing vessels. Do not

overtake the vessel at a distance less than 1 mile. Many fishing vessels can

13
 be in this area. Call the captain in case of any doubt.. ... In case of poor
visibility call captain immediately.

The chief officer had signed a copy of the company orders and the master’s
order book to indicate that he had read and understood the contents.

MSC Sabrina

Company orders issued to MSC Sabrina were very similar, but also directed
the OOW in restricted visibility to put engineers on stand-by and to appreciate
that other ships might have different handling characteristics.

Additionally, they directed the OOW to call the master:

when another vessel is about to approach within a mile or whose manoeuvres

do not conform with the Rule of the Road, or are liable to endanger the ship.

when visibility is reduced to less than 3 miles or when heavy traffic is passing
at a distance of less than half a mile.

On the evening of 12 June the relevant extracts of night orders written by the
master were as follows:

. . .Avoid approach too close to other vessels or fishing boat, Advise me in

case of anomaly or doubt.

The second officer signed the page of the master’s order book indicating that
he had read and understood its contents; it is not known whether he had read
or understood the company orders.

1.10 RULE OF THE ROAD

The following are extracts from the International Regulations for the
Prevention of Collisions at Sea (Collision Regulations):

Rule 5, concerning keeping a lookout, states:

Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing
as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances
and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and risk of
collision.

Rule 6, concerning the conduct of vessels in any condition of visibility, states:

Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take
proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance
appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions.

In determining a safe speed the following factors shall be among those taken
into account:

14
 By all vessels:

the state of visibility;

the manoeuvrability of the vessel with special reference to stopping distance

and turning ability in the prevailing conditions;..,.

Rule 19, concerning the conduct of vessels in restricted visibility, states:

“(b). Every vessel shall proceed at a safe speed adapted to the prevailing
circumstances and conditions of restricted visibility....

(d). A vessel which detects by radar alone the presence of another vessel
shall determine if a close quarters situation is developing and/or risk of
collision exists. If so, she shall take avoiding action in ample time, provided
that when such an action consists of an alteration of course, so far as
possible the following shall be avoided:

an alteration of course towards a vessel abeam or abaft the beam.”

Rule 35, concerning sound signals in restricted visibility, states:

“In or near an area of restricted visibility, whether by day or night, the signals
prescribed in this Rule shall be used as follows:

(a) A power-driven vessel making way through the water shall sound at
intervals of not more than 2 minutes one prolonged blast.. ..”

1.1 1 MANOEUVRING CHARACTERISTICS

Wintertide

Full Speed (16 Slow Speed (8

knots) knots)

Advance 0.18 miles 0.1 8 miles

Transfer 0.12 miles 0.12 miles

Time Taken 1.O minute 1 minute 30

seconds

15
Stopping Distance - Normal Loaded Condition

Time Distance Starboard

2.5 minutes 0.4 miles

knots)

Half Ahead (12.5 2.4 minutes 0.2 miles 70"

knots)

1.7 minutes 0.1 mile

knots)

Full Speed (22.8 Half Speed (10.1

knots) knots)

Advance- 0.42 miles 0.3 miles

Transfer 0.23 miles 0.14 miles

Time Taken 1.5 minutes 1.7 minutes

Stopping Distance - Full Load Condition

TimeTaken Distance

From Full Speed 11 minutes 10 2.6 miles

(22.8 knots) seconds

5 minutes 10 0.39 miles

(10.1 knots) seconds

16
SECTION 2 ANALYSIS
2.1 CONDUCT OF NAVIGATION AND ALTERATIONS OF COURSE

Wintertide

The alteration to 230" was made to follow the planned navigational track and,
although prompted by the activation of the GPS waypoint alarm, was not
essential for the safe navigation of the ship. The OOW could have continued
on for about another 4 miles before entering the traffic separation zone.
With an overtaking vessel 1 mile on the starboard quarter in visibility of
between 2 and 5 cables, the alteration to 230" was imprudent. Rule 13 of the
Collision Regulations regarding overtaking is only applicable to vessels in
sight each other. As the vessels could not see each other, it is considered
that Rule 19 governing the conduct of vessels in restricted visibility is
pertinent. The danger of altering towards a vessel abaft the beam in restricted
visibility is acknowledged in Rule 19, and, on this occasion, the alteration put
the vessels on a collision course.

The alteration indicates reluctance by the chief officer to deviate from the
planned track, regardless of the shipping and environmental conditions. The
options of reducing speed or standing on the 205" course were also feasible.

A possible explanation for the OOWs action is a reliance on GPS. A passage

plan put into a GPS receiver as waypoints is straightforward to follow, with
relevant information such as bearing, distance and estimated time of arrival at
the next waypoint displayed if required. As a result, the necessity to maintain
a predicted EP or DR to determine the time of the next alteration of course is
diminished. By not maintaining a predicted EP or DR on the chart, it is
possible, in this case, the chief officer denied himself the opportunity to
appraise himself of the navigable water and other options available. The use
of chart BA 1408, a small scale chart, may also have influenced the chief
officer's spatial awareness, by visually condensing the width of the traffic
lanes and influencing his perception of the safe water available.

MSC Sabrina

From entering the Off Vlieland TSS until 0209, the second officer adjusted
course between 206" and 21 to follow the planned track towards the Off
Texel TSS. There is no evidence to suggest he made any alteration to
influence the CPA with Wintertide.The CPA of 8 cables to port was a function
of the planned tracks and passage speeds of the two vessels, rather than the
result of a conscious decision made by the second officer. The master's night
orders gave no specific distance at which to pass other vessels. Directing the
OOW to avoid passing "too close" relied on the subjective assessment of the
OOW. In this case, it is considered that 8 cables was a reasonable distance
to pass another vessel in a traffic lane, providing the movements of the vessel
being overtaken were closely monitored.

17
2.2 USE OF RADAR

Wintertide

The chief officer on Wintertide assumed that MSC Sabrina would overtake
Wintertide after the alteration of course, but did not know when or at what
distance. Had he been using his display effectively and plotted MSC Sabrina
correctly, this information would have been available from the TCPA and CPA
readouts. It is not known whether the chief officer knew how to use the 'trial
manoeuvre' facility, but of this, before altering course to would
have warned the chief officer of the resultant change in CPA.

The radar display in use was not an ARPA. The accuracy of the information
displayed, such as course, speed, and CPA, relies on a reasonable time
interval between manually injected plots, a reliance on the vessel being
plotted maintaining a steady course and speed, and the accuracy of the plot
by the operator. After altering course to the chief officer plotted MSC
Sabrina at 0216 and again at 0219, a reasonable interval, during which MSC
Sabrina's range reduced from 1 mile to 6 cables and her CPA was assessed
to have reduced from 4.5 to 2.5 cables to port. MSC Sabrina maintained a
course of 206" at 17.5 knots during this period and, providing the chief
officer's plotting of the contact was accurate, so too should have been the
contact data displayed. However, as the two plots were conducted with the
radar on the six-mile range scale, even the smallest movement away from the
target echo, while initiating either plot, would have resulted in significant
errors. It is, therefore, possible that radar information regarding MSC
Sabrina's CPA shortly before the collision was inaccurate, and the chief officer
incorrectly assumed that she would pass under the stern to the port quarter.

MSC Sabrina

The second officer on MSC Sabrina was aware that his vessel was overtaking
Wintertide and would pass with a CPA of about 8 cables, but it is unknown if
she had estimated when or where she would pass. Nor is it known how
closely the second officer routinely monitored his radar display. It is possible
that, between 0209 and 0216, he was distracted by: the collision with
Concordia; manoeuvring the ship; attempting to call Concordia on VHF radio;
and calling the master to the bridge. He was busy, and it is likely that he
failed to notice Wintertide had altered course to 230" thus putting the two
vessels on a collision course. It was only when the master looked at the radar
and saw Wintertide at 3 to 4 cables just forward of the port beam with a CPA
of zero, that the problem became evident.

2.3 SAFE SPEED

General

Rule 6 of the Collision Regulations states the need for all vessels to proceed
at a safe speed. Among the factors listed, to be taken into account when
determining safe speed, are the state of visibility and the manoeuvrability of

18
 the vessel with special reference to stopping distance and turning ability in the
prevailing conditions. The requirement to proceed at a safe speed in
restricted visibility is endorsed in the company orders of both vessels, yet
neither vessel reduced speed on entering fog, even though visibility reduced
to less than 2 cables.

Wintertide

Wintertide was making good about 12.6 knots. Examination of her

manoeuvring data shows that at this speed in a normal loaded condition she
could complete a 90" turn with an advance of 0.18 miles and be stopped
within about 0.2 miles. At 0200, when the OOW assessed visibility at 5
cables, the ship could easily have been stopped or turned within the distance
of visibility. Immediately before the collision, although it was evident that
visibility had reduced further when the OOW could not see MSC Sabrina at 4
cables, it would have been inappropriate to reduce speed with another vessel
so close astern.

MSC Sabrina

MSC Sabrina was making good about 17.5 knots. Although the manoeuvring
data available requires interpolation between full and half speed in a fully
loaded condition, it shows that at this speed, her advance for a 90" turn is in
excess of 3 cables, and that the distance required to stop is greater than 1
mile. Both distances were beyond the prevailing visibility at the time of the
collision.

2.4 DECISION NOT TO CALL THE MASTER

General

Had the masters been informed of the restricted visibility, it is impossible to

determine what actions they would have taken. By not informing them,
however, the OOWs denied themselves the benefit of their respective
master's watchkeeping experience and judgment.

Wintertide

The OOW on Wintertidewas directed in the company orders, and the

master's night orders for 12 June, to inform the master when entering
restricted visibility. Visibility reduced to about 5 cables before the second
officer handed over the watch, and had reduced to less than 2 cables at the
time of the collision, but neither the second officer nor chief officer called the
master. The reasons for this have not been determined, but might have been
due to: a belief that the fog patches would soon clear; the lack of a specific
range of visibility at which the master should be called in either company or
master's orders; personal reasons, such as confidence in their own ability or
avoiding loss of face, or; they were wary of disturbing the master in the middle
of the night.

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 MSC Sabrina

The second officer on MSC Sabrina called the master at, or about the time of,
the collision with Concordia. He did not call him when visibility reduced to 3
miles, or when Concordia approached within a mile of the ship as required by
company orders. His reasons for not calling the master earlier are not known.
Since he was new to the ship he might not have read and understood the
company orders and, therefore, might not have been aware of the
circumstances in which this should be done. The OOW might also have been
reluctant to call the master in the middle of the night.

2.5 ACTION FOLLOWING COLLISION WITH CONCORDlA

MSC Sabrina’s second officer was aware that a fishing vessel had collided
with his ship. He attempted to call the vessel via VHF radio but did not get a
response, and therefore did not know whether the other vessel was damaged
or in difficulty or had injured people on board. The details or extent of the
damage to MSC Sabrina were also unknown. In this situation the second
officer should have reduced speed and remained in a position to render
assistance if required. He should have also sounded the general alarm,
determined the extent of the damage sustained, and informed the coastguard.
He took none of these actions. Other than trying to establish radio contact,
MSC Sabrina did not make any preparations to assist Concordia.

2.6 MANAGEMENT OF LOOKOUTS AND SOUND SIGNALS

Company orders for both Wintertide and MSC Sabrina state that on entering
restricted visibility a helmsman and lookout should be posted. Both officers of
the watch were accompanied only by a lookout; the additional ratings were
not on duty. With only two people on the bridge it is difficult to maintain a
comprehensive visual, radar, and aural lookout, as required by Rule 5 of the
Collision Regulations, as well as being ready for immediate manoeuvring.
Also, to be effective, an aural lookout should ideally be kept outside a bridge
where sounds can be more easily distinguished. Neither of the OOWs
directed their lookout to conduct an aural watch specifically from the bridge
wing. Additionally, at no time was Wintertide’s lookout specifically instructed
to keep a lookout astern.

Prior to the collision, Wintertide was making sound signals as required by

Rule 35 of the Collision Regulations and her company orders; MSC Sabrina
was not. As the wind was from the south-west, it is possible that, had MSC
Sabrina maintained a proper aural lookout, Wintertide’s sound signals might
have been heard, alerting her presence to the bridge team. It is also feasible
that, had MSC Sabrina been making sound signals, they might have been
heard by Wintertide’s OOW when he moved to the port bridge wing
immediately before the collision, and might have prompted his taking avoiding
action.

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2.7 ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID A COLLISION

Wintertide

On sighting MSC Sabrina moving down the starboard side, Wintertide’s chief
officer reacted quickly and applied 20” of port helm in hand steering and put
the propeller pitch to ‘Dead Slow Ahead’. This had the effect of reducing
speed, and moving the ship’s head to port, away from MSC Sabrina, thus
reducing the severity of the impact. However, the ship’s head might have
moved to port quicker, and impact might have been reduced further, had
maximum helm been applied, at that time. The decision to put the propeller
pitch to ‘Dead Slow Ahead’ was prudent. Had the propeller pitch been put to
Stop, the steering might have been less effective, and the paddlewheel effect
caused by any astern movement on the engines would have caused the bows
to pay off to starboard, towards MSC Sabrina.

MSC Sabrina

The master‘s application of starboard helm on board MSC Sabrina as soon as

he realised that a collision with Wintertide was imminent, resulted in the bow
paying off to starboard. The severity of the impact was probably reduced by
this action. Before applying starboard helm, however, he did not order the
second officer to change to hand steering, and it cannot be established
exactly how, or what amount of helm, was applied. It is therefore not possible
to determine if more helm could have been applied which might have reduced
the impact even further. The master’s decision not to reduce speed at this
stage was prudent, given the relative positions and courses of the two .
vessels; any reduction of speed might have caused the impact to occur closer
to the amidships sections of both vessels, possibly causing greater damage.
However, a speed of 17.5 knots was too fast to enable sufficient action to
avoid a collision to be taken when the risk of collision became apparent.

General

With helmsmen on the helm as required by company orders, the response by

both vessels might have been quicker.

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SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS
3.1 FINDINGS

3.1 General

1. MSC Sabrina and Wintertide collided at 0223 on 13 June 2000 at the junction
of the Off Vlieland and Off Texel TSS. [1.5]

2. Visibility reduced from 5 miles at 01 10, to about 5 cables at 0200, and to less
than 2 cables at the time of the collision. [1.5]

3. Bridge manning in both vessels was not in accordance with the respective
company orders when operating in restricted visibility. [1.5, 1.9]

3.1.2 Wintertide

1. The master had not been informed by the OOW when reduced visibility was
encountered, as required by company and master's orders. [1.5,1.9]

2. Company and master's orders did not specify a range of visibility at which the
master was to be called. [1.9]

3. The OOW was aware of MSC Sabrina overtaking on the starboard quarter but
he did not calculate when or where she would pass. [1.5]

4. The chief officer did not utilise the 'trial manoeuvre' facility on his radar display
prior to altering course. [1.6]

5. The OOW altered course to to follow the planned track when prompted
by a GPS alarm. [1.5,1.8]

6. The OOW's reliance on GPS and lack of referral to the chart may have
contributed to a reluctance to deviate from the planned track. [1.8,2.1]

7. The OOW did not have to alter course to at 0215; there was sufficient
sea room to stand on for a further 4 miles before the ship would have entered
the traffic separation zone. [1.5,1.8,2.1]

8. The chart in use, BA 1408, was not the largest scale chart available for the
area and may have distorted the OOWs perception of the width of the traffic
lane and safe water available. [1.8,2.1]

9. The alteration to put Wintertide on a collision course with MSC

Sabrina.[2.1 ]

10. The alteration to 230°, although made for navigational reasons, was
imprudent and against the spirit of Rule 19 of the Collision
Regulations.[1.5,1.10,2.1]

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1 1. The plotting of MSC Sabrina by the OOW on the 6-mile range scale, following
the alteration of course to was inaccurate: the resulting CPA information
was also inaccurate. [1.5,2.2]

12. After the course alteration, the OOW assumed MSC Sabrina would pass
under Wintertide's stern until she became visual on the starboard side.
[1.5,2.2]
13. At 12.6 knots the ship could be stopped or turned through 90" within 2 cables.
[1.11]
14. A continuous aural lookout was not maintained from the bridge wing. [1.5,2.6]
15. Avoiding action was delayed while the OOW moved from the port bridge wing
to the helm and changed to hand steering. [1.5,2.7]

16. Avoiding action was too late to prevent a collision, but may have prevented
greater damage. [1.5,2.7]

17. The master did not arrive on the bridge until after the collision. [1.5,2.4]

3.1.3 MSC Sabrina

1. The master had not been informed when visibility reduced to less than 3 miles
or when Concordia came within a mile as required by company orders.
[1.5,1.9,2.4]
2. The master's night orders did not specify a minimum range at which to
approach other vessels. [1.9]

3. Sound signals required by Rule 35 were not started until after the collision
with Wintertide. [1.7,1.10,2.6]

4. An aural lookout was not maintained. [1.3,2.6]

5. The collision with Concordia occurred about 14 minutes before the collision
with Wintertide. [1.5]

6. After the collision with Concordia,the OOW attempted to contact the fishing
vessel via VHF radio but made no preparations to assist. [1.5,2.5]

7. The master was called to the bridge about the same time as the collision with
Concordia. [1.5]

8. The ship was manoeuvred to port then to starboard between 0209 and 021 6
and was then steady on until immediately prior to the collision. [1.5]

9. Speed was maintained at '17.5 knots following the collision with Concordia.
[15]

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10. At 17.5 knots the ship required 3 to 4 cables to turn through and required
about 1.3 miles to stop; the vessel could not be stopped within the distance of
visibility [1.11,2.3]

11. The OOW was distracted by the collision with Concordia and failed to notice
Wintertide had altered course to 230°, putting the two vessels on a collision
course. [1.5,2.2]

12. The master's decision not to reduce speed immediately prior to the collision
was prudent. [2.7]

13. Avoiding action was too late to prevent a collision but may have reduced the
damage sustained to both vessels. [1.5,2.7]

14. It is not known if hand steering was selected prior to taking avoiding action.
[1.5,2.7]

3.2 CAUSE

Wintertide and MSC Sabrina closed on converging courses and the actions
taken by both vessels were insufficient to prevent a collision. [2.2,2.7]

3.3 CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES

1. General

a. Neither master was made aware of the reduced visibility as required by

company orders. [2.4]

b. Neither bridge was manned as required by company orders.[2.6]

2. Wintertide

a. The alteration to 230" was made to follow the planned track and without due
consideration for MSC Sabrina overtaking on the starboard quarter. [2.1]

b. Following the alteration, the plotting of MSC Sabrina by radar on a six-mile

range scale was inaccurate. The resulting information led the OOW to
incorrectly assume MSC Sabrina would pass under the stern. [2.2]

C. The lookout was not instructed specifically to keep a lookout astern [2.6]

3. MSC Sabrina

a. A proper radar lookout was not maintained; the OOW was distracted by the
collision with Concordia and did not detect that Wintertide had altered course
and was on a steady bearing. [2.2]

b. A speed of 17.5 knots was not a safe speed in the prevailing visibility. It was
too fast to enable sufficient avoiding action to be taken, when the risk of
collision became apparent [2.3, 2.7]

24
c. Had MSC Sabrina been making sound signals, they might have been heard
by Wintertide’s OOW, and might have prompted avoiding action to be taken
sooner [2.6]

d. An aural lookout, which may have alerted the bridge team to Wintertide’s
close proximity sooner, was not maintained. [2.6]

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SECTION 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS
Norbulk Shipping UK Ltd and Mediterranean Shipping Co SA are respectively
recommended to:

1. Take measures to ensure that all personnel on board their vessels are fully
conversant with the contents of standing orders.

2. Take measures to monitor more closely that standing orders on board their
vessels are being complied with.

Marine Accident Investigation Branch

March 2001

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