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SECOND DIVISION

CELIA R. ATIENZA, G.R. No. 233413

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus- PERLAS-BERNABE,
CAGUIOA,
REYES, J. JR., and
LAZARO-JAVIER, JJ.

NOEL SACRAMENTO SALUTA,

Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

e

The Facts and the Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to

reverse and set aside the April 21, 2017 Decision 1 and the August 9, 2017
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 147356.
The questioned CA Decision affirmed with modification the April 27,
2016 Decision3 and the June 21, 2016 Resolution4 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 01-000121-16 which
1
Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao
and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring; rollo, pp. 28-39.
2
Id. at 41-42.
3
Id. at 70-92.
4
Id. at 96-98.

(
Decision 2 G.R. No. 233413

reversed and set aside the October 29, 2015 Decision 5 of the Labor
Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 04-04089-15, while the questioned CA
Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The instant case stemmed from the complaint for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for work
on holidays and rest day, illegal deduction, and issuance of a certificate of
employment filed by Noel Sacramento Saluta (respondent) against Celia
R. Atienza (petitioner) and CRY Corporation before the NLRC.
t

Respondent alleged that he was hired as a company driver by CRY

Corporation in May 2012. He was assigned to drive for the petitioner,
one of the company's top officials and received P9,000.00 monthly salary.

On December 11, 2014, while driving along North Luzon

Expressway, respondent hit the rear portion of the vehicle in front of him.
Thus, he was made to pay the amount of Pl5,000.00 to answer for the
damages caused to the said vehicle. The amount was first advanced by
the company, but will be deducted from his monthly salary. On the said
occasion, the authorities confiscated his driver's license and issued him a
Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP).

On December 23, 2014, respondent told the petit10ner that he

needed to absent himself from work because he had to claim his driver's
license since his TOP had already expired. According to him, petitioner
refused to excuse him from work because she had appointments lined up
that day. As it was illegal for him to drive without a license, he was
constrained to get his license the following day, December 24, 2014; thus,
he failed to report for work. However, before going on leave, he first
requested another company driver to drive for the petitioner. When
petitioner learned that he was not around, she immediately called him up
saying, "kung hindi ka makakapag-drive ngayon, mabuti pa maghiwalay
na tayo. " Upon hearing such words, respondent concluded that he had
been verbally terminated.

When respondent went to CRY Corporation at around 3:00 p.m. on

the same day, Rodolfo Reyes (Reyes), the General Manager of the
company, confirmed that he was already terminated from work. As it was
Christmas Eve, he requested that he be given his last salary, but this was
refused on the ground that he has yet to reimburse the company the
Pl5,000.00 it had advanced. 6

t
5
Id. at 178-19 I.
6
Id. at 267-268.

r
Decision 3 G.R. No. 233413

Thus, on April 7, 2015, respondent filed a complaint against CRV

Corporation and the petitioner for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for work on holidays and
rest day, illegal deduction, and issuance of a certificate of employment.

For her part, petitioner contended that respondent was not

dismissed from work, rather he abandoned his job when he refused to
report for work and took a leave of absence without permission.
Petitioner claimed that respondent was not an employee of CRV
Corporation, but was hired by the petitioner as her personal/family driver
with a monthly salary of P9,000.00 and free board and lodging. His duty
was simply to drive for her and her family to anywhere they wish to go.
His monthly salary was coursed through Reyes.

Sometime in December 2014, while driving her brother-in-law's

car, respondent was involved in a vehicular accident. Since respondent
readily admitted his fault, she agreed to lend him P15,000.00 so that he
could immediately pay for the damages he caused.

On the night of December 22, 2014, respondent asked for

permission if he could go to Pampanga as he needed to sign some papers.
She agreed on the condition that respondent would report for work the
following day. On December 23, 2014, respondent did not report for
work as instructed. Instead, he simply called petitioner to inform her that
he will be absent because he had to renew his expired driver's license.
That was the last time she had heard from the respondent. She
subsequently learned that on December 27, 2014, respondent asked Reyes
for his remaining salary oLP2,100.00 for the period covering December
16 to 22, 2014. Because respondent had not yet paid his P15,000.00 loan,
he was told that his salary could not be released. Nevertheless, Reyes
extended to him a personal loan in the amount of P4,000.00 which
respondent promised to pay. Respondent communicated with Reyes for
the last time on January 7, 2015 when the former told the latter that he
will no longer return to work. Thus, petitioner was surprised to learn that
on April 7, 2015, or more than three months from the time he failed to
report for work, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. 7

In a Decision8 dated October 29, 2015, the Labor Arbiter dismissed

respondent's complaint except insofar as his claim for illegal deduction
and request for the issuance of a certificate of employment are concerned.

7
Id.at6-7.
8
Supra note 5.

t
V
Decision 4 G.R. No. 233413

The Labor Arbiter held that respondent failed to prove by substantial

evidence that he was an employee of CRV Corporation. Given the
admission of the petitioner that respondent was her personal driver and
considering that the employer-employee relationship between CRV
Corporation and the respondent had not been established, respondent was
deemed an employee of the petitioner. Being a personal driver, his
compensation for work and indemnity for dismissal were governed by
Articles 1689, 1697 and 1699 of the Civil Code. The monthly salary of
P9,000.00 being received by the respondent was reasonable and in
accordance with Article 1689 of the Civil Code. His claims for overtime
pay, holiday pay and premium for work done on holidays, as well as
premium for work done on rest day cannot be granted as the Labor Code
exempts from coverage househelpers and persons in the personal service
of another from such benefits. The Labor Arbiter further held that the
amount of Pl5,000.00 cannot be charged against the respondent as it had
not been proved that he was the one responsible for the vehicular accident
that transpired in December 2014. As for respondent's request to be
issued an employment certificate, the same must be granted as he was
entitled thereto pursuant to Article 1699 of the Civil Code. The Labor
Arbiter also dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of
showing that respondent was illegally terminated from the service, or that
he was prevented from returning to work. On the contrary, the Labor
Arbiter found the respondent to have left his employment without
justifiable reason. For such reason, he was deemed to have forfeited the
salary due him and unpaid pursuant to Article 1697 of the Civil Code.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the
Labor Arbiter in a Decision9 dated April 27, 2016. The NLRC held that
while it may be true that the respondent failed to present substantial
evidence to prove that he was under the employ of CRV Corporation as
one of its drivers, it is also true that petitioner did not dispute that
respondent was driving for her. By alleging that the respondent was her
personal driver, it becomes incumbent upon her to prove their employer-
employee relationship which she failed to do. The respective allegations
of the parties show that respondent was an employee of CRV Corporation.
Furthermore, the allegation put forward by petitioner that respondent
customarily reported for work to Reyes, the General Manager, and the act
of the latter of extending a personal loan to the former proved that
respondent was indeed under the employ of the company.

On whether respondent was illegally dismissed from work or had

abandoned his job, the NLRC held that both parties failed to adduce
9
Supra note 3.

I
Decision 5 G.R. No. 233413

evidence to support their respective contentions. Apart from his

uncorroborated statement that he was verbally terminated from work, no
other evidence was presented by the respondent. On the other hand,
petitioner relied on the information relayed to him by Reyes that
respondent will no longer be reporting back for work. Be that as it may,
considering that petitioner failed to disprove that she verbally terminated
respondent, coupled by the fact that when respondent was asking for his
December 2014 salary, the same was not released to him, it could
reasonably be inferred that respondent was indeed dismissed from work.
The NLRC rejected the defense of abandonment raised by the petitioner
for lack of proof indicating respondent's clear intention to sever his
employer-employee relationship with the company. For failure of the
petitioner to discharge the burden of proof that respondent's dismissal was
justified, there can be no other conclusion, but that the same was illegal.
Thus, it ordered CRV Corporation and the petitioner to pay respondent
full backwages from December 2014, separation pay equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service, wage differentials, holiday pay,
13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay from May 2012. His
claims for overtime pay, night shift differentials and premium pay for
holidays and rest day were denied for lack of evidence that the same had
been incurred and unpaid. Anent the complaint for illegal deduction, the
NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that the sum of PIS,000.00 cannot
be deducted from respondent's salary absent any showing that he was
responsible for the damage caused during the said vehicular accident.

Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, but it was

denied in a Resolution 10 dated June 21, 2016.

Alleging grave abuse of discretion, petitioner elevated the case

before the CA by way of petition for certiorari. In a Decision 11 dated
April 21, 2017, the CA, like the NLRC, ruled that respondent failed to
prove by substantial evidence that he was a company driver of CRV
Corporation. However, in order to level the playing field in which the
employer was pitted against the employee, the CA deemed it necessary to
reexamine the evidence presented by the petitioner in support of her claim
that she was the real employer of the respondent. The CA was not
convinced that petitioner hired respondent in her personal capacity for the
former' s failure to present respondent's employment contract duly signed
by the petitioner and showing the date the respondent was hired, his work
description, salary and manner of its payment. The CA added that as a
top official of CRV Corporation, petitioner could have easily negated
respondent's allegation that he was employed by the company by

10
Supra note 4.
11
Supra note 1.

(
Decision 6 G.R. No. 233413

presenting the payrolls, complete list of personnel, salary vouchers and

SSS registration of the company, but she did not do so. Petitioner also
failed to explain why respondent was customarily reporting to and
receiving his salary through Reyes if he truly was her personal driver.
Petitioner also did not refute that respondent's salaries were paid through
Automated Teller Machines (ATM) just like the rest of the employees of
the company. That respondent was an employee of CRY Corporation was
further showed by the fact that the company wields the power of
dismissal. If respondent was indeed the employee of the petitioner, there
would be no reason for him to go to CRY Corporation's office to confirm
whether he was terminated or not after he was verbally dismissed by the
petitioner and ask for the release of his salary from the company.

The CA also held that petitioner failed to adduce evidence showing

that the respondent was not terminated for just or authorized cause and
after the observance of due process. On the contrary, the appellate court
found the failure of the respondent to report for work op December 24,
2014 in order for him to be able to claim his driver's license as his TOP
had already expired to be reasonable; thus, not enough reason for his
dismissal. The CA was likewise not convinced that the respondent
abandoned his job as no evidence was presented indicating respondent's
clear intention to sever his employment with the company. Thus, the
appellate court affinned the Decision of the NLRC with modification in
that it imposed a 6% interest per annum on all the monetary awards
granted to the respondent from the finality of judgment until fully paid.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a

12
Resolution dated August 9, 2017.

Undaunted, petitioner is now before this Court via the present

Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that the appellate court erred
in holding that the respondent was not her personal driver, but a company
driver under the employ of CRY Corporation; and that respondent was
entitled to full backwages, separation pay, wage differentials, holiday pay,
13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay for having been illegally
dismissed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner claimed that the CA erred in ruling that respondent was

employed as CRV Corporation's company driver and not her personal
driver despite respondent's failure to prove by substantial evidence the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between him and the
company. She asseverated that following the pronouncement of the High
Court in Lopez v. Bodega City, 13 it is the employee in illegal dismissal

12
Supra note 2.
13
558 Phil. 666, 674 (2007).

(
 e

Decision 7 G.R. No. 233413

cases, the respondent in this case, who bears the burden of proving the
existence of an employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence,
not her. Be that as it may, petitioner insisted that the following
circumstances show that respondent was hired by her in her personal
capacity, viz.: (a) respondent was not able to present any employment
contract or document showing that he was indeed a company driver of
CRV Corporation; (b) respondent received his salaries from the petitioner.
The Bank of the Philippine Islands Statements of Cash Deposits and
Withdrawals that respondent presented did not at all prove that CRV
Corporation was the one paying his salaries; and (c) respondent failed to
present any evidence to show how CRV Corporation exercised control
over the means and methods by which he performed his work. On the
other hand, petitioner had shown that she exercised the power of control
over the petitioner as she had the sole authority to give instructions to
respondent as to where and when he would drive for her and her family.

Furthermore, petitioner averred that it was error for the CA to have

ruled that respondent had been unlawfully terminated from work
considering that the fact of his dismissal had not even been established by
the respondent by substantial evidence. In this case, petitioner pointed out
that respondent never disputed that after he left his work on December 23,
2014, he did not make any attempt to return to work. His refusal to return
to work without any justifiable reason amounted to abandonment of work.
That respondent intended to put an end to his employment was clearly
demonstrated when he informed Reyes that he will no longer report for
work. Since it was respondent who decided to end his employment
without her prior knowledge, she should not be faulted and be held liable
for illegal dismissal.

Petitioner also asseverated that respondent was not entitled to full

backwages,and separation pay. Since he worked as a family driver who
left his work without justifiable reason, pursuant to Article 149 of the
Labor Code, he was deemed to have forfeited the unpaid salary due him.
He was also not entitled to separation pay because one who abandons and
resigns from his work is not qualified to receive the same. Furthermore,
petitioner contended that the CA erred in granting respondent's claim for
wage differentials, holiday pay, 13 th month pay and service incentive
leave pay because the Labor Code is clear that family drivers are not
entitled to the same. 14

For his part, respondent insisted that he was one of the company
drivers and regular employees of CRV Corporation since May 2012. As
one of the company drivers, his work was absolutely necessary and
desirable to the usual business of the company. He argued that the

14
Rollo, pp. 3-24.

I
Decision 8 G.R. No. 233413

petitioner only claimed that he was her personal driver sh that she could
circumvent the requirement of having to pay company drivers the
mandated minimum wage. He added that like the other regular employees
of the company, he received his salaries through the ATM.

Furthermore, respondent claimed that he did not resign nor

abandon his job, but was illegally dismissed therefrom. His vigorous
pursuit of the present illegal dismissal case is a manifestation that he had
no intention of relinquishing his employment. At any rate, he asseverated
that it is the employer who had the burden of proving that the dismissal
was justified. If the petitioner insisted that he resigned from his work, it is
incumbent upon her to prove that he did so willingly. Unfortunately,
petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. Since respondent was
not afforded due process as he was not given any notice to explain or a
notice of termination, there can be no other conclusion but that he was
indeed illegally terminated from work. Having been illegally dismissed
from work, the CA rightfully granted him his money claims. On top of
full backwages, separation pay, wage differentials, holiday pay, 13th
month pay and service incentive leave pay, he must also be awarded
damages and attorney's fees even if the same were not included in his
complaint as the same had been seasonably raised in his position paper. 15

The Court's Ruling

Respondent is the personal/family

driver of the petitioner

Settled is the tenet that allegations in the complaint must be duly

proven by competent evidence and the burden of proof is on the party
making the allegation. 16 In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi
rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a
valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an
employer-employee relationship must first be established. Thus, in filing
a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, based on the
premise that he was an employee of CRY Corporation, it is incumbent
upon the respondent to prove the employer-employee relationship by
substantial evidence. 17 Stated otherwise, the burden of proof rests upon
the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. Since it is the
respondent who is claiming to be an employee of CRY Corporation, it is,
thus, incumbent upon him to proffer evidence to prove the existence of
employer-employee relationship between them. He needs to show by
substantial evidence that he was indeed an employee of the company
against which he claims illegal dismissal. Corollary, the burden to prove
the elements of an employer-employee relationship, viz.: (1) the selection
15
Id. at 266-272.
16
Marsman & Company, Inc. v. Sta. Rita, G.R. No. 194765, April 23, 20 I 8.
17
Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., 760 Phil. 779, 789 (2015); Lopez v. Bodega City,
supra note 13.

r
Decision 9 G.R. No. 233413

and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power
of dismissal; and (4) the power of control, lies upon the respondent. 18

It must be pointed out that the issue of whether or not an employer-

employee relationship exists in a given case is essentially a question of
fact. As a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with
greater force in labor cases. Only errors of law are generally reviewed by
this Court., However, this rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions
like in labor cases where the Court may look into factual issues when the
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are
conflicting. 19 In this case, the findings of the Labor Arbiter differed from
those of the NLRC and the CA necessitating this Court to review and to
reevaluate the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and
reexamine the questioned findings. 20

To ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship,

jurisprudence has invariably adhered to the four-fold test, to wit: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3)
the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's
conduct, or the so-called "control test." 21 Although no particular form of
evidence is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, and any competent and relevant evidence to prove the
relationship may be admitted, a finding that the relationship exists must
nonetheless rest on substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. 22 In this case, a scrutiny of the records will bear out that the
respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he was a company driver
of CRV Corporation.

Apart from his staunch insistence that he was a company driver of

CRV Corporation, respondent did not proffer any competent evidence,
documentary or otherwise, as would prove his claimed employment with
the company. In the case at bench, the respondent did not present his
employment contract, company identification card, company pay slip or
such other document showing his inclusion in the company payroll that
would show that his services had been engaged by CRV Corporation. His
contention that he received his salaries through the ATM like the other
employees of the company, even if true, does not sufficiently show that
his salaries were paid by the company as its employee. Respondent also
failed to present any proof showing how the company wielded the power
of dismissal and control over him. Evidence is wanting that the company
monitored the respondent in his work. It had not been shown that

18
Valencia v.,Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G .R. No. 206390, January 30, 2017, 8 I 6 SCRA
144, 156.
19
South East International Rattan, Inc. v. Coming, 729 Phil. 298,305 (2014).
20
Javier v. Fly Ace Corp., 682 Phil. 359, 371 (2012).
21
Alba v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 227734, August 9, 2017, 837 SCRA 52, 61.
22
South Cotabato Communications Corp. v. Sto. Tomas, 787 Phil. 494, 505 (2016).

(
Decision 10 G.R. No. 233413

respondent was required by the company to clock in to enable it to check

his work hours and keep track of his absences. On the other hand, the
records showed that petitioner had a say on how he performed his work.
It is the petitioner who decides when she needed the services of the
respondent. As a matter of fact, the respondent had to secure permission
from the petitioner before he can take a leave of absence from work. That
petitioner also enjoyed the power of dismissal is beyond question given
that respondent himself believed that the petitioner verbally terminated
him. 23 Because the respondent failed to establish his employment with
CRY Corporation, the Court must necessarily agree with the Labor
Arbiter that respondent was the personal/family driver of the petitioner.

Both the NLRC and the CA made it the petitioner's obligation to

prove that respondent was under her employ and not a company driver of
CRY Corporation. The Court does not agree. It must be emphasized that
the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on the respondent to
establish or substantiate his claim by the requisite quantum of evidence
given that it is axiomatic that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits
provided by law should establish his or her right thereto. 24 Unfortunately,
respondent failed to hurdle the required burden of proof as would give
ground for this Court to agree with him.

Respondent was not dismissed

from employment

It is axiomatic that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the

burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.
However, there are cases wherein the facts and the evidence do not
establish prima facie that the employee was dismissed from employment.
Before the employer is obliged to prove that the dismissal was legal, the
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his
dismissal from service. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no
25
question as to the legality or illegality thereof.

Here, respondent alleged that when he failed to report for work on

December 24, 2014, he was verbally terminated by the petitioner.
Respondent claimed that Reyes confirmed his terminatiorf. On the other
hand, petitioner contended that the respondent just stopped reporting for
work after he left his work on December 23, 2014.

Respondent's bare claim of having been dismissed from

employment by the petitioner, unsubstantiated by impartial and
independent evidence, is insufficient to establish such fact of dismissal.
Bare and unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute substantial
23
Supra note 6.
24
Javier v. Fly Ace Corp., supra note 20, at 372.
25
Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. v. Tanguin, G.R. No. 221096, June 28, 2017, 828 SCRA 397,407; Doctor
v. NII Enterprises, G.R. No. 194001, November 22, 2017, 846 SCRA 53, 66-67.

(
Decision 11 G.R. No. 233413

evidence and have no probative value. 26 It must be emphasized that aside

from the allegation that he was verbally terminated from his work,
respondent failed to present any competent evidence showing that he was
prevented from returning to his work. Reyes did not issue any statement
to corroborate the claimed termination of the respondent. That he was
refused to be given his salary covering the period from December 15,
2014 to December 22, 2014 did not at all prove the fact of his termination.
It must be taken into account that salaries of employees may not be
released for myriad of reasons. Termination may only be one of them.
The Court reiterates the basic rule of evidence that each party must prove
his affirmative allegation, that mere allegation is not evidence. The Court
must also stress that the evidence presented to show the employee's
termination from employment must be clear, positive, and convincing.
Absent any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioner had
dismissed the respondent, the latter's claim of illegal dismissal cannot be
sustained - as the same would be self-serving, conjectural, and of no
. value. 27
pro b ative

Respondent did not abandon

his work

Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be inferred

or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts. 28 In Protective Maximum
Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes, 29 this Court held:

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee

to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause
for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of
abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to
sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be
deduced that the [employee] has no more intention to work. The intent to
discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and unjustified.

The burden of proving abandonment is upon the employer who, whether

pleading the same as a ground for dismissing an employee or as a mere
defense, additionally has the legal duty to observe due process. 30

The Court finds that there is no abandonment in this case. Aside

from his absence from work, petitioner failed to present any proof of
respondent's overt conduct which clearly manifested his desire to end his
employment. Settled is the rule that mere absence or failure to report for

26
LNS International Manpower Services v. Padua, Jr., 628 Phil. 223, 224 (2010).
27
Doctor v. NII Enterprises, supra note 25, at 67-68.
28
Tegimenta Chemical Phils. v. Oco, 705 Phil. 57, 67 (2013).
29
Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes, 753 Phil. 482,507 (2015).
3
° Functional, Inc. v. Granfil, 676 Phil. 279, 288-289 (2011 ).

(
Decision 12 G.R. No. 233413

work is not tantamount to abandonment ofwork. 31 This is especially so in

light of his having filed a case for illegal dismissal which is inconsistent
with abandonment of employment. An employee who takes steps to
protest his dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned his work.
The filing of such complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to
work, thus, negating any suggestion of abandonment. 32

The Civil Code shall govern the

rights offamily drivers

Article 141, Chapter III, Book III on Employment of Househelpers

of the Labor Code provides that family drivers are covered in the term
domestic or household service. It states:

ART. 141. Coverage. -This Chapter shall apply to all persons

rendering services in household for compensation.

"Domestic or household service" shall mean service in the

employer's home which is usually necessary or desirable for the
maintenance and enjoyment thereof and includes ministering to the
personal comfort and convenience of the members of the ;mployer's
household, including services of family drivers. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, under the Labor Code, the rules for indemnity in case a
family driver is terminated from the service shall be governed by Article
149 thereof which provides:

ART. 149. Jndemnityfor unjust termination of services. -If the

period of household service is fixed, neither the employer nor the
househelper may terminate the contract before the expiration of the
term, except for a just cause. If the househelper is unjustly dismissed,
he or she shall be paid the compensation already earned plus that for
fifteen (15) days by way of indemnity.

If the househelper leaves without justifiable reason, he or she

shall forfeit any unpaid salary due him or her not exceeding fifteen (15)
days.

However, Section 44 of Republic Act No. 10361, otherwise known

as the "Domestic Workers Act" or "Batas Kasambahay" (Kasambahay
Law), expressly repealed Chapter III (Employment of Househelpers) of
the Labor Code, which includes Articles 141 and 149 mentioned above.

31
L. C. Ordonez Construction v. Nicdao, 528 Phil. 1124, 1135 (2006) and Shie Jie Corp. v. National
Federation of Labor, 502 Phil. 143, 151 (2005), citing Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459
Phil. 506, 516 (2003).
32
lntec Cebu, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 788 Phil. 31, 41 (2016).

(
Decision 13 G.R. No. 233413

The J(asambahay Law, on the other hand, made no mention of

family drivers in the enumeration of those workers who are covered by
the law. This is unlike Article 141 of the Labor Code. Section 4( d) of the
Kasambahay Law states:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term:

xxxx

(d) Domestic worker or "Kasambahay" refers to any person

engaged in domestic work within an employment relationship such as,
but not limited to, the following: general househelp, nursemaid or
"yaya", cook, gardener, or laundry person, but shall exclude any person
who performs domestic work only occasionally or sporadically and not
on an occupational basis.

The term shall not include children who are under foster family
arrangement, and are provided access to education and given an
allowance incidental to education, i.e.[,] "baon", transportation, school
projects and school activities.

Thus, Section 4(d) of the Kasambahay Law pertaining to who are

included in the enumeration of domestic or household help cannot also be
interpreted to include family drivers because the latter category of worker
is clearly not included. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others - this is expressed in the familiar maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 33 Moreover, Section 2 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Kasambahay Law provides:

SEC. 2. Coverage. - This xx x [IRR] shall apply to all parties

to an employment contract for the services of the following
Kasambahay, whether on a live-in or live-out arrangement, such as but
not limited to:

(a) General househelp;

(b) Yaya;
(c) Cook;
(d) Gardener;
(e) Laundry person; or
(f) Any person who regularly performs domestic work in one
e household on an occupational basis.

The following are not covered:

(a) Service providers;
(b) Family drivers;
(c) Children under foster family arrangement; and
(d) Any other person who performs work occasionally or
sporadically and not on an occupational basis. (Emphasis
supplied)

33
De La Salle-Araneta University v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 190809, February 13, 2017, 817 SCRA
317,340.

(
Decision 14 G.R. No. 233413

The aforecited administrative rule clarified the status of family drivers as

among those not covered by the definition of domestic or household help
as contemplated in Section 4( d) of the Kasambahay Law. Such provision
should be respected by the courts, as the interpretation of an
administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement the
statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction
of the courts. 34 Moreover, the statutory validity I of the same
administrative rule was never challenged. This Court has ruled time and
again that the constitutionality or validity of laws, orders, or such other
rules with the force of law cannot be attacked collaterally. There is a legal
presumption of validity of these laws and rules. Unless a law or rule is
annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity
stands. 35 And while it is true that constitutional provisions on social
justice demand that doubts be resolved in favor of labor, it is only
applicable when there is doubt. Social justice principles cannot be used to
expand the coverage of the law to subjects not intended by the Congress
to be included.

Due to the express repeal of the Labor Code provisions pertaining

to househelpers, which includes family drivers, by the Kasambahay Law;
and the non-applicability of the Kasambahay Law to family drivers, there
is a need to revert back to the Civil Code provisions, particularly Articles
1689, 1697 and 1699, Section 1, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV thereof.
The Articles provide:

SEC. 1 -Household Service.

ART. 1689. Household service shall always be reasonably

compensated. Any stipulation that household service is without
compensation shall be void. Such compensation shall be in addition to
the [househelper's] lodging, food, and medical attendance.

xxxx

ART. 1697. If the period for household service is fixed neither

the head of the family nor the [househelper] may terminate the contract
before the expiration of the term, except for a just cause. If the
[househelper] is unjustly dismissed, he shall be paid the compensation
already earned plus that for fifteen days by way of indemnity. If the
[househelper] leaves without justifiable reason, he shall forfeit any
salary due him and unpaid, for not exceeding fifteen days.
xxxx
ART. 1699. Upon the extinguishment of the service relation, the
[househelper] may demand from the head of the family a written
statement on the nature and duration of the service and the efficiency
and conduct of the [househelper]. ~

34
Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. Bicolandia Drug Corporation, 528 Phil. 609, 6 I 7 (2006).
35
Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, 583 Phil. 706, 735 (2008).
Decision 15 G.R. No. 233413

The reason for reverting back to the Civil Code provisions on

household service is because, as discussed earlier, Section 44 of the
Kasambahay Law expressly repealed Articles 141 to 152 of the Labor
Code which deals with the rights of family drivers. Obviously, an
expressly repealed statute is not anymore binding for it has no more force
and effect.

On the other hand, Article 302 of the Labor Code, its repealing
clause, which provides:

ART. 302. Repealing clause. - All labor laws not adopted as

part of this Code either directly or by reference are hereby repealed. All
provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations
inconsistent herewith are likewise repealed.

did not repeal the said Civil Code prov1s1ons since they are not
inconsistentt with the Labor Code. Besides, repeals by implication are not
favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full
knowledge of all laws existing on the subject, the congruent application of
which the courts must generally presume. 36

Since what were expressly repealed by the Kasambahay Law were

only Articles 141 to 152, Chapter III of the Labor Code on Employment
of Househelpers; and the Labor Code did not repeal the Civil Code
provisions concerning household service which impliedly includes family
drivers as they minister to the needs of a household, the said Civil Code
provisions stand. To rule otherwise would leave family drivers without
even a modicum of protection. Certainly, that could not have been the
intent of the lawmakers.

Pursuant to Article 1697 of the Civil Code, respondent shall be paid

the compensation he had already earned plus that for 15 days by way of
indemnity if he was unjustly dismissed. However, if respondent left his
employment without justifiable reason, he shall forfeit any salary due him
and unpaid for not exceeding 15 days. Given that there is neither
dismissal nor abandonment in this case, none of the party is entitled to
claim any indemnity from the other. Verily, in a case where the
employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment
nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted
to the employer; each party must bear his own loss. 37 Otherwise stated,
the respondent's act of not reporting to work after a verbal
miscommunication cannot justify the payment of any form of
remuneration.

36
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, 635 Phil. 447,459 (2010).
37
MZR Industries v. Colambot, 716 Phil. 617,628 (2013); Borja v. Minoza, G.R. No. 218384, July 3,
2017, 828 SCRA 647,662.

(
 "
Decision 16 G.R. No. 233413

Petitioner is not liable for wage differentials,

holiday pay, 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay

As found by the Labor Arbiter, the P9,000.00 salary respondent

receives a month is reasonable and in accordance with Article 1689 of the
Civil Code. Hence, petitioner may not be made to pay the respondent
wage differentials.

Petitioner is not also liable to the respondent for the payment of

holiday pay, 13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay because
persons in the personal service of another, such as family drivers, are
exempted from the coverage of such benefits pursuant to Articles 82, 38
39 40
94 and 95 of the Labor Code, and Section 3(d)4 1 of the implementing
rules of Presidential Decree No. 851.

The reversal of the judgment rendered by the

appellate court will not inure to the benefit
of CR V Corporation

It is not lost on this Court that only the petitioner appealed the CA
Decision which found the respondent to have been illegally dismissed and
38
Art. 82. Coverage. -The provisions of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees,
field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support,
domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers whp are paid by results as
determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
As used herein, "managerial employees" refer to those whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision
thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff.
"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties
away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours
of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
39
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. - (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10)
workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be
paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; and
(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday, Good
Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of
November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of December and the day designated by law for holding a
general election.
40
Art. 95. Right to service incentive leave. - (a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year
of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
(b) This provision shall not apply to those who are already enjoying the benefit herein
provided, those enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five days and those employed in
establishments regularly employing less than ten employees or in establishments exempted from
granting this benefit by the Secretary of Labor and Employment after considering the viability or
financial condition of such establishment.
(c) The grant of benefit in excess of that provided herein shall not be made a subject of
arbitration or any court or administrative action.
41
Sec. 3. Employers covered. - The Decree shall apply to all employers except to:
X X X X
(d) Employers of household helpers and persons in the personal service of another in relation
to such workers[.] (Underscoring supplied)

r
Decision 17 G.R. No. 233413

ordered both the CRV Corporation and the petitioner liable to the
respondent for the payment of backwages, separation pay, wage
differentials, holiday pay, 13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay.
Considering that CRV Corporation did not appeal the decision of the
appellate court, the same stands insofar as the corporation is concerned.

At this juncture, this Court takes this opportune time to emphasize

that a reversal of a judgment on appeal is binding on the parties to the suit,
but shall not benefit the parties against whom the judgment was rendered
in the court a quo, but who did not join in the appeal, unless their rights
and liabilities and those of the parties appealing are so interwoven and
dependent as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates
as a reversal as to all. 42

It is basic that under the general doctrine of separate juridical

personality, stockholders of a corporation enjoy the principle of limited
liability: the corporate debt is not the debt of the stockholder. 43 This is
because a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from those
· 44
w h o represent 1t.

Here, it was not disputed that CRV Corporation had been

impleaded, duly notified of the suit, and properly served with legal
processes, but it never participated in the case by sending an authorized
representative or filing a single pleading. The Securities and Exchange
Commission i-Report45 dated May 14, 2015 which showed that the
company status of CRV Corporation as revoked can hardly mean that the
NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over it inasmuch as the i-Report did not
indicate when the CRV Corporation ceased to exist. Besides, the
complaint pad already been filed on April 7, 2015. Moreover, under
Section 122 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 68 or "The Corporation Code of
the Philippines," a corporation whose registration had been revoked has
three years from dissolution to continue to be a body corporate for
purposes of winding up its affairs which includes prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it.

Although a reversal of the judgment as to one would operate as a

reversal as to all where the rights and liabilities of those who did not
appeal and those of the party appealing are so interwoven and dependent
on each other as to be inseparable,46 CRV Corporation and petitioner have

42
Municipality of Orion v. Concha, 50 Phil. 679,684 (1927) and Government of the Republic of the
Philippines v. Tizon, 127 Phil. 607, 611-612 (1967).
43
Bustos v. Milli ans Shoe, Inc., 809 Phil. 226, 234 (2017).
44
Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. Morning Star Travel & Tours, Inc., 763 Phil. 428, 437
(2015).
45
Rollo,p.153.
46
Citytrust Banking Corporation v. Court ofAppeals, 253 Phil. 743, 748 (1989).

r
Decision 18 G.R. No. 233413

no commonality of interest because each bears the injury of an adverse

judgment. CRY Corporation will not be harmed had petitioner been held
liable to pay the respondent his unpaid wages. Conversely, petitioner did
not suffer any monetary injury when CRY Corporation was made liable to
pay the respondent his unpaid wages.

Even if petitioner is allegedly one of CRY Corporation's top

officials, such hypothetical fact does not translate, or even imply that she
will be financially injured by an adverse money-claim judgment against
the latter. Much like stockholders, corporate officers and employees only
have an inchoate right (only to the extent of their valid collectibles in the
form of salaries and benefits) to the assets of the corporation which, in
tum, is the real owner of the assets by virtue of its separate juridical
. 47 ~
persona11ty.

Moreover, no evidence was offered by both parties that petitioner

8
was equipped with a board resolution (even if belatedly submitted)4 or, at
least, authorized by corporate by-laws49 to represent CRY Corporation in
the instant suit. Therefore, petitioner's appeal cannot benefit CRY
Corporation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.

The April 21, 2017 Decision and the August 9, 2017 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 147356 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the October 29, 2015 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC
NCR Case No. 04-04089-15 is AFFIRMED only insofar as petitioner
Celia R. Atienza is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

/2:C~~
v:s~ociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
47
See Marcos-Araneta v. Court ofAppeals, 585 Phil. 38, 59 (2008).
48
See Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. Court ofAppeals, 458 Phil. 36 (2003).
49
See Cebu Mactan Members Center, Inc. v. Tsukahara, 610 Phil. 586,592 (2009).

~
 Decision 19 G.R. No. 233413

JAQ ./J..k✓
ESTELA M~ i-ERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

A✓~O-.JAVIER
•

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division .