A. F. UDUIGWOMEN, Ph.

©
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT
□irnen^b zi y^bsiv/cMpl .aiaw Ji
i';i; I must register my gratitude to my numerous
colleagues, friends, “brethren”, and students (past and
present) whose constructive criticisms, comments,
observations and moral support have made this edition
possible. Of note are Dr. G. O. Ozumba, Dr. Princewill
Alozie, Dr. (Mrs.) Grace Umoren, Dr. Andrew Efemini, and
particularly Dr. Oghenekaro Ogbinaka. The contribution of
the philosophical guru, Professor J. I. Omoregbe, to my
academic progress has not gone unnoticed. His counsel and
encouragement have been invaluable.
I commend my wife and children for their love and
understanding during those lonely hours I was try ing to put
my ideas together.
The authors whose books were consulted are too
numerous to mention here.
I remain grateful to my publishers AAU VITALIS
BOOKS CO. for a job well done.
Finally, 1 give God the glory for who He is and what
He is to me.
I
. 1O22W
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
:K lyicpifl J

:P Tjiquri.)
Foreword to Second Edition,
Preface to F irst Edition.......
Preface to Second Edition...
Preface to Third Edition.................................................. ......... viii
Preface to Fourth Edition...;.................................... ix
Acknowledgement........................... ................

V PARTONE:
PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
OF SCIENCE
nsaitrnqoO arlT
Chapter 1:
Philosophy and its Rivals,.......................................1
Chapter 2:
What is Science..........................................................................20
Chapter 3:
What is Philosophy of Science,,.,, .........................................26
Chapter 4:
On the Relationship between philosophy and Science..........31
J ■ 'i-
33143132 14L22M PART TWO ) HH3 W
HISTORY OF SCIENCE

, „ . aP er‘’ .o
Ancient and Medieval Science..,,...,................................ —48
o v „ .CVP'?r,6: , O
Science in the Renaissance Interlude and Modern Science
(15“-17“ Century AD).... ......... .................. . ..................... 72
Chapter 7:
Science
/. :
in the 18 ,h , 19 lh and 20lhCenturies1 '............
i • I . *’ .
..r. .............. 77
1 1 I I I I I I»I 1 J t i t « /
 Chapter 8:
History of Medicine........................ 87
Chapter 9:
History of Mathematics.......................................... 92
Chapter 10:
A Summary of the History of Western Science.................... 106

i PARTTHREEu ... •
PHILOSOPHY AND THE RISE OF MODERN SCIENCE

. Chapter 11:
Aristotelian Science.......... ....................................................... 116
Chapter 12:
The Copernican
Revolution............................... 121
Chapter 13:
The Scientific Method of Galileo, Descartes and Newton........ 128
Chapter 14:
Einstein's Theory of Relativity........................................ 136
Chapter 15:
Quantum Mechanics.......................................................... ....146

PART FOUR
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ’ISMS’ IN SCIENCE

Chapter 16:
Rationalism and Empiricism in Science................................ 154
Chapter 17:
Realism in Science..................................... 164
’ Chapter 18:
Idealism ih Science................................... 179
Chapter 19:
Materialism in Science........................................................... 187
 Chapter 20:
Pragmatism in Science............................................................ 194
Chapter 21:
Determinism in Science.......................................................... 204

PART FIVE
SOME PHILOSOPHIES/METHODS OF SCIENCE

Chapter 22:
Positive Methodology of Science........................................... 210
Chapter 23:
Inductivism and the Problem of Induction............................ 218
Chapter 24:
Critical Rationalist Methodology of Science (Karl Popper
and Imre Lakatos)..................................................................... 243
Chapter 25:
Historical and Revolutionary Science of Thomas Kuhn ....257
Chapter 26:
Marxist /Leninist Dialectical Methodology of Science............ 261
Chapter 27:
Feyerabend's Anarchic Conception of Science..................... 275

PART SIX
SOME ISSUES AND NOTIONS IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
Chapter 28:
Man: His Origin, Nature and Destiny, and Cosmic
Environment............... «....................................... .288
Chapter 29
The Notion of Scientific Explanation 307
Chapter 30
The Notion of Scientific Truth.......... .323
Chapter 31
The Notion of Scientific Progress.... 333
 Chapter 32:
Technology in Nigeria: Transfer and Appropriateness... ..........343

PART SEVEN
ENERGY RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT
ui ■' «-i I Z1A 8
HHO
Chapter 33:
Energy Resources........... «....,,........................................ 358
Chapter 34:
Environmental Pollution ..................................... 366
■l **
!*• ■

PART EIGHT
igqqc NUTRITION, DISEASE AND HEALTH
EK.......... ...................... ■
Chapter 35:
Nutrition.. •••••••
rl GJ J J ■........... ■• *.......... 37 6
Chapter 36:
Newer and Common Diseases..p.j,...... ............ 395
Chapter 37:
Preventive Health Practices........................... 413

Works Cited/ Further Readings

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Index
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 PART ONE

PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

<____________________________________________________ -
t
 CHAPTER ONE
PHILOSOPHY AND ITS RIVALS
In this chapter, I will first discuss briefly the question
-what is philosophy? Next, I will examine the connection
between philosophy and each of its rivals. In the concluding
part, I will assert and defend the view that commonsense is
the bedrock of knowledge, whether mythic, religious,
philosophic or scientific. I shall also try to debunk the
alleged superiority of science to other disciplines.

What is Philosophy?
It is difficult, if not impossible, to define philosophy
in a given way. To attempt to define philosophy is like
attempting to catch one’s shadow. Because of the
complexity of the phenomenon of philosophy, we can only
give ‘a definition of philosophy’ and not ‘the definition of
philosophy’. No wonder some sarcastic persons have
preferred to define it as everything and/or nothing. This is
not to say that serious efforts have not been made to define
the term. But the fact is that they are only efforts or
attempts. For this reason, instead of trying to define
philosophy in a given way, it is better to look at the different
conceptions of the term. Even at that, there are as many
conceptions as there are different schools of philosophy.
Let us, however, examine some of the many conceptions of
philosophy

a) Etymological Conception:
The oldest'and of course the broadest concept of
philosophy is derived from the etymological analysis of the

1
 term which means love of wisdom or the^ursuitofetemal
truths. This conception of philosophy is credited to the
Greek Mystic, Philosopher and Mathematician Pythagoras.
Wisdom in the context of this conception of philosophy
covers all areas (both theoretical and practical) where
intelligence can be exercised or displayed. Philosophy, in
this sense, is seen as a universal science, which proposes to
provide a true and reasonable explanation of the whole of
reality through its ultimate principles. This was the
meaning given to philosophy during the ancient, medieval
and modern period of Western philosophy. For instance,
during ancient period of Greek philosophy, Aristotle held
that philosophy and science meant the same tiling.
In more recent times, most philosophers are no
longer concerned with the formulation of complete systems
of thought about the whole reality. Rather, they are
interested in clarifying and analyzing the concepts, theories
and presuppositions of other disciplines. Consequently,
philosophy is now seen as a second-order discipline
concerned primarily with helping other disciplines to
resolve their conceptual and linguistic problems.
kX”
b] The Positivist Conception:
The positivists ably represented by BertrandRussell
andmembers of the Vienna Circle, conceive of philosophy
as a collective term for any knowledge claim that is yet to be
^empirically verified or confirmed. This conception has
, been criticized for its antf metaphysical stance.
.1
c] The Existentialist Conception:
According to the existentialist philosophers, the
concern of philosophy transcends normal human reason or
mere intellectual activity alone, the human will and the
fantasy also come into play.
2
d] The Linguistic Conception:
This is also called the analytic conception of
philosophy. Here analysis of the language of philosophy
and other disciplines is seen as the main business of
philosophy.

e] The Kantian Conception:

Phi 1 osoph y _s t udi e s.the nature, sources^, and
conditions necessary for the acquisition, scope and limits of
human knowledge. This conception is obviously
inadequate because it limits philosophy to the theory of
knowledge or epistemology.

f] The Valuational Conception:

Philosophy studies values, that is, it is concerned
withjwhat ought to be’, not ‘what is’. To put it in another
way, the philosopher is concerned with values and not facts,
though he might wish to know the meaning of the word
“fact” and the status of factual knowledge.

g] The Metaphysical Conception:

Philosophy is concerned with ultimate realities such
.as God, Mind, Soul, Spirit. Matter, and so on. It deals with
general or fundamental issues that defy scientific
verification such as, Does God exist? What is the
relationship between mind and body? What is the Soul?
Which is primary: Spirit or Matter?

h] The Logical Conception:

Philosophy is the science of correct reasoning.
Philosophy formulates principles or rules for separating
correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning.

3
i] The Scientific Conception:
Philosophy is concerned with the nature of arid
claims about scientific knowledge and the analysis of
scientific concepts to make their usage clear.
It nlust be mentioned that the various conceptions
outlined above are associated with the different objects of
philosophy and hence the different branches of philosophy.
We have also seen that philosophy goes after general as
opposed to specific questions. “Where the individual
disciplines stop their inquiry, philosophy questions further.
For instance, where the other disciplines formulate laws,
philosophy asks, what are laws? Where they claim
knowledge, philosophy asks, what is knowledge”
(Bochenski21).

Philosophy and Comnionsense

What is commonsense? The term ‘commonsense’
can be defined in the broad and narrow senses. In the broad
sense, commonsense knowledge is knowledge founded out
of superstitions, traditional teaching and ancient
metaphysics as well as personal impressions and opinions
developed in us by our fragmentary, partial experience. The
Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (vol. 2) defines commonsense
as “the general sense, feeling, or judgment of mankind” ...a
cluster of beliefs and persuasions, somehow “felt” to be
true by most people (156). Michael Dummett in his
“Comnionsense and Physics” defines it as a conception on
which most of those who belong to a particular culture,
over a particular period of time, habitually rely in their
everyday thinking (paraphrased) (17). In the narrow and
more philosophical sense of the term (which we shall be
mainly concerned with in this chapter), the commonsense

4
view of the world is the view that there is an external,
physical world^that pauses the perception we do have, and
that our perceptions of the external world more or less
resemble the qualities that are really present in the object.
For the commonsense person * . therefore, appearance is
reality; there is no other reality behind or other than what is
presented to us'by our senses. An object that appears to be
yellow is really yellow; the one that is perceived to be hot or
cold is really hot or cold. In short, the physical world exists
independent of the perceivers. If all perceivers were
eliminated, there would still be a physical world, though, of
course, there would be no sentient beings to perceive it.
This view is also called naive realism. G. E. Moore (1873 -
1925) is an advocate of the commonsense view of l* e
world. He stated his celebrated position in his influential
essay “A Defence of Coninionsense" (1925). To quote
Walsh who quoted Moore’s words from this essay:
There exists a living human body, which is my
body. The body was born at a certain time in
the past, and has existed continuously ever
since, though not without undergoing
changes,.. .ever since it was born, it has either
been in contact with or not far from the surface
of the earth; and at every moment since it was
bom, there have also existed many other
things, having shape and size in three
dimensions ...from which it has been at
various instances...Among the things
which...have formed part of its
environment...there have ...been large
numbers of other living bodies... which have
lived upon the earth.. .each has been the body
of a different human being, who has during the

5
 life time of that body, had many different
experiences (just as 1 had mine) (114).
G. E. Moore regards each of these propositions as a
truism. These statements as could be seen are all concrete
statements, that is, statements about particular bodies or
objects. What in essence Moore was trying to assert in a
general sense is that material objects are real and that beside
myself there are other sentient beings in the universe.
According to Walsh, “Moore wants to point out the
impossibility of simultaneously subscribing to a
philosophical thesis of idealism, that nothing exj^ts except
spirit, and persisting in the asseverations of everyday life.
Given that we are sometimes correct in the latter (and on
this point Moore says that none of us is in any real doubt),
the falsity of the former immediately follows” (Walsh 114).
Moore does not, however, think that • commonsense is
infallible. He seems to have treated universal or very
general acceptance as the identifying mark of a
commonsense belief and he mentions that things that
everybody once believed have turned out to be false. He is
also prepared to allow that there might be many false
propositions included within the vague boundaries of the
commonsense view of the world (Edwards 158).
Now, how is philosophy connected with
commonsense? Some people have argued that philosophy
is synonymous with commonsense. Their argument is that
every philosophy contains some cultural imprints or as
Bertrand Russell put it, philosophers are the outcome of
their milieu (7). I wish to argue, on the contrary, that the
whole activities and beliefs of men of different cultures do
not constitute philosophy simpliciter. It is common
knowledge that inherent in every culture are elements of
ignorance, emotion, superstition, prejudices and
assumption. But these do not really constitute philosophy.

6
It is “the attempt to ascertain the truth of these cultural
elements, which is not in any way designed to comfort the
ignorant or assuage the fears of superstition, and which is
not to be judged by emotional criteria that should be called
philosophy” (Jones 202).
I concede that philosophy might begin with and
analyze cultural beliefs. But I wish to argue that it extends
beyond them. It is too naive to hold that these cultural
beliefs are what make up philosophy. Cultural survivals and
manifestations conceived of as philosophy is
commonsensical and are thus considered by philosophers
as raw data. Philosophy in the academic or professional
sense goes beyond commonsense, though as .mentioned
above, it (sometimes) uses commonsense beliefs as raw
materials and as starting point of its procedures. /
Philosophy, in the end, is a critique of commonsense.
Commonsense postulates the existence of the external
world as a given (without critical reflection). But
philosophy critically reflects on what is given to determine
whether the knowledge claim about it is authentic or not.
For instance, the philosopher might criticize the
commonsense view that objects are really what they are as
presented to us by our senses. He can do this by alluding to
the fact that we sometimes perceive things the way they are
not (such as in illusory perceptions) and sometimes we
perceive things that are not (such as in hallucinations). He
may further ask, if our senses deceive „us sometimes, why
not always? He may continue this argument until he settles
down with the conclusion that the commonsense view leads
to solipsism - the view that my subjective experiences and I
are the only objects that exist.
Let me mention that the commonsense view is a
philosophical position in the debates regarding the
ontological status of the external world. Because of the

7
 unreflective nature of the position, attempts have been
made to refute it. Philosophical doctrines like
representationism (or critical realism), idealism and
phenomenalism (or sense - datum theory) are reactions
against the commonsense or naive realist position.
Closely connected with commonsense is intuition. It
must be admitted that the term ‘intuition’ is verbally
indefinable (Hospers 136). At any rate, it can be described
as a kind of experience or conviction that comes to one
suddenly like a lightening flash and instantly one is
convinced that what comes to one in the flash is true. To
know something by intuition is to know it a prior. If an
intuitious experience grows over a period of weeks or
months we will no longer call it intuition. However, like
commonsense, philosophy brings the acceptability of
intuition to question when it is made to underwrite a claim
to knowledge. Intuitious knowledge is sometimes
subsumed under commonsense because both claims to
. knowledge are held without critical reflection.
Consequently, some of the problems that face the
commonsense realist also face the intuitionist. For one
thing, intuitive knowledge is subjective knowledge. It is
common knowledge that different people’s intuitions
conflict and there is no direct way of ascertaining which of
the conflicting intuitions is right. Like is with the
commonsense position, the ultimate problem facing the
intuitionist is-solipsism.

Philosophy and Myth

What is myth? Myth relates to a primordial event
that took place at the beginning of time (Eliade 95). The
actors of the myth are in most cases not human beings, but
gods or culture heroes. It is assumed that man could not
know their acts except they were revealed to him. The
myth, therefore, is the recital of what the gods or semi­
divine beings did at the beginning of time. It tells how
something began to be or how it was accomplished. “It is
for this reason that myth is bound up with ontology; it
speaks only of realities, of what really happened, of what
was fully manifested” (Eliade 95). Once told or revealed^ it
becomes apodictic truth, that is, truth that is absolute.
Among the primitive societies, myths can only be recited
with reference to place or time or seasons that are
ritualistically important or important religious ceremonies.
In every case, the myth shows how a reality came into
existence, whether it be the total reality, the cosmos, or only
a fragment- an island, a species of plant, a human institution
(Eliade 95).
Now, how is myth related to philosophy? It should be
mentioned that myth is pre-philosophic. In fact, philosophy
begins where myth stops. The transition from mythology to
rational explanation of phenomena in Greek thought is a
good case in point. In the mythic trend of Greek thought,
objects and the world around were usually personified.
Consciousness, emotions, states and processes were
personified. Things like the earth, sky, river, sun, and night
were personified and deified. Mythic thought of^Greeks
was also based on human analogy. Change, for instance,
was depicted in form of generation and procreation. The
marriage between two elements was thought to bring about .
generation. But in the philosophic trends of Greek thought,
a rational attempt was made to understand the origin of

9
things, and the nature and destiny of man. I think
O’Connor was drawing a demarcating line between mythic
thought and philosophic thought when he said:
In the myths the great mystery is explained by
analogy with, and using the terminology of
biological processes, and the actors are
anthropomorphic monsters. In Milesian
cosmology these biological processes are
Jaced
^-re
* by manufacturing processes
/'(“separating off’ and “felting”) arid the gods
are replaced by a material. It is not “more
C ’ rational” to prefer manufacturing processes to
gods, unless you have good evidence in your
favour. But though they were not scientists,
they (the milesians) show a commonsense and
unmystical attitude, which is a part of the
scientific temper (3).
Apart from the above distinction, another distinction
between mythic thought and philosophic thought is that
whereas there is a blurring of classes in the former, the latter
begins with classification of things in the world. All this is
not to say that there is no continuity between mythic
thought and philosophic thought. There is not only
continuity, but a connection. Indeed, it is on record that the
mythic thoughts of Homer and Hesiod greatly influenced
th^presocratic philosophers in their speculations about the
world. Needless to say that in African metaphysics,
ontology is intimately bound up with myths. We proceed to
examine the connection between philosophy and religion.

10
Philosophy and Religion
Etymologically, there was a marriage between
philosophy and religion. Many great philosophers of
antiquity were greatly influenced by their religious beliefs.
For instance, the Pythagorean mathematical conception of
the universe was in no small way influenced by the Orphic
religious teachings on the problems of purification and
immortality of the soul. According to Stumpf, “Pythagoras
became interested in mathematics for what appear to be
religious reasons. His originality could be said to consist in
his conviction that the study of mathematics is the best
purifier of the soul” (9-10).
Apart from the Pythagoreans, the philosophical
speculations of Socrates, Plato and Plotinus were greatly
influenced by their religious convictions. It may also
interest us to know that in their attempt to explain the
confluence between philosophy and religion the medieval
thinkers (the ‘Fathers’ of the Church.) extolled religion
above philosophy. Their dictum was ‘I believe in order to
understand’, which meant for them that belief in God
preceded understanding' df phenomena. What this boils
down to is that faith precedes reason.
The influence of religion on philosophy seems not to
have been substantial during the modem period. The
analytic philosophers of the contemporary philosophy
would not entertain anything speculative. They treated
religious or metaphysical assertions as meaningless
because of their inability to stand the test of meaningfulness
or verifiability. In their attempt to destroy religion and
metaphysics, the analysts destroyed philosophy as well.
Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus that “whereof one
- , ’ ’• *
- ' ’ll
 cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” was no doubt a
destructive blow to traditional speculative philosophy.
Russell’s definition of philosophy as the no man’s land that
stands in between science and theology is a way of saying
that philosophy is neither factual (science) nor dogmatic
(theology). But this does not mean that today philosophy
has nothing to do with religion. In the various “philosophies
of’ which come under the subject of philosophy, we have
philosophy of religion, which is currently concerned with
tackling conceptual puzzles and difficulties that arise out of
religious beliefs and practices. For instance, to say that
Jesus Christ was God made flesh to redeem mankind from
sin is to trigger off a religious issue, which poses a
theoretical, conceptual puzzle. The philosopher might want
to know how God, generally thought of as a spiritual,
immaterial being could become flesh and bones. How does
this work for him after about 2000 years? Now, to solve this
puzzle, it is the philosopher again who comes to the rescue
" -in the form of a theologian. He might stiy that Jesus and God
are one and the same. Just as the same substance can have
different properties without itself changing in any essential
way, so the spiritual nature of God can take on material form
without undergoing substantial change. God the Father and
. Jesus are different manifestations of the same underlying
substance (Blocker & Hannaford 162). One of the greatest
proponents of this position is Baruch Spinoza (1632 -
1677).

Philosophy and Science

There was a time when philosophy included almost
every branch of knowledge including science. As a matter

12
of fact, there was no sharp distinction between pl^losophy
and science. For instance, ancient Greek thinkers, were both
philosophers and scientists, though their science is often
described as crude or primitive. Until recently, the various
sciences (especially physics) came under the name
“Natural philosophy”. In time, the various sciences broke
away from philosophy and became independent
disciplines. This is why today we have the various sciences
such as physics, Chemistry, biology, astronomy, and even
the social sciences, which of late became independent
sciences.
It is often said that various sciences broke away from
philosophy because they have been able to solve certain
problems which philosophy could not solve, and that when
problems are solved by sciences, there is no further need for
the philosopher. But I wish to maintain that this -js not
completely true. Even after science has solved certain
problems there remains the need to understand, interpret
and evaluate the body of facts accumulated by science.
Facts do not evaluate themselves, neither do they clearly
reveal to us what should or should not be done. It is the
philosopher who seeks to assimilate and understand these
facts and also seeks to put them into a larger and more
general context, which includes humanity’s quest for a
rational and fulfilling destiny (Stumpf 2). Today,
philosophy of science takes care of this function. Apart
from its role of clarifying and analyzing scientific concepts
and theories with the aim of making their scientific usage
clear, philosophy of science functions as a second order
discipline that attempts to answer the following questions;
What characteristics distinguish scientific inquiry from

13
other types of investigation? What procedures should
scientists follow in investigating nature? What conditions
must be fulfilled for a scientific explanation to be correct?
What is the cognitive status of scientific laws and
principles?
What 1 have tried to show above is that contrary to
the generally held view that there is no connection
whatsoever between philosophy and science, there is
indeed a deep connection between the two disciplines. In
fact, the activities of the philosopher and the scientist do
interpenetrate. For instance, it is the scientist who judges
one theory to be superior to another, but it is the philosopher
who evaluates the criteria of acceptability implied in the
judgment of the scientist. The observation of the close tie
between science and philosophy must have prompted John
Losee to say that:
The scientist who is ignorant of precedents in
the evaluation of theories is not likely to do an
adequate job of evaluation himself. And the
philosopher of science who is ignorant of
scientific practice is not likely to make
perceptive pronouncements on scientific
method (2).

Commonsense as the Basis of all Knowledge

1 have belaboured myself to show the connection
between philosophy and its rivals. My analysis does not
however show that philosophy is superior to these other
areas of study. But what it does show is that philosophy has
a role to play in all areas of knowledge. But let it be
mentioned that common sense (not philosophy) is the

14
bedrock of all fields of knowledge. Commonsense provides
the raw materials for all other areas of study mentioned in
this chapter. Myth, religion, philosophy and science all
draw upon commonsense in their quest for knowledge. The
alleged superiority of philosophy to commonsense does not
really hold. It can be rightly argued that philosophy does not
only begin with commonsense, it also ends with it. If
philosophers are continually testing and questioning
commonsense without ever having a consensus opinion on
the answers to the questions raised, does it not mean that
philosophy never really advance beyond the level of
commonsense? Are philosophical positions not merely the
subjective and biased claims of individual philosophers- a
situation leading to solipsism? Let it be stated categorically
that aside from disputes and disagreements among
individual philosophers, no single philosopher ever agrees
with himself. The individual philosopher keeps changing
his views with time. Even the alleged superiority of science
over myth, commonsense and philosophy, and in short all
other disciplines does not hold. I make bold to say that
science is founded on and nurtured by commonsense. Take
for instance the historical development of the theory of
atomism. This theory is by all accounts founded on
commonsense and myth. It has thrived on commonsense
speculation and bold guessing. In its original form as
propounded by Leucippus and Democritus, the term ‘atom’
meant ‘not cut’. It means ‘not cut’ because it was believed
that atoms were indivisible. The atoms were regarded as the
ultimate units of the world or the simplest particles of
matter. It was also believed that sense impressions and
appearances were produced by atoms, and that the changes

15
observable in the world were caused by real changes in the
positions and arrangements of atoms. Life itself was
thought to depend on the retention (through the process of
respiration) within the body of sufficient number of soul­
atoms. One peculiar characteristic of the Democritian
atoms is that they had size, shape and position, but no
weight. And because they had no weight, they moved
randomly irj-tlW void like dust particles. But following the
death of Democritus, the theory of atomism declined and
was overshadowed by the views of the Socratics. The
theory was however revived in the 4th century B. C. by
Epicurus who added weight to size, shape and position as
the basic attributes of atoms. After the death of Epicurus
nothing was heard about atomism until two centuries later
when Lucritus (the Roman poet) revived it. From this point
atomism disappeared not to resurface until 17th century
when Galileo revived it. In the 20th century, Einstein gave a
new conception of atom in his quantum theory, denying the
indestructibility of atoms. In short, atom is no longer
regarded as solid and indivisible but divisible into
electrons, protons, neutrons and so on. Another good
example is the overthrow of the geocentric view of the
world by the heliocentric view of the world. Ptolemy had
proposed the geocentric theory, which placed the earth at
the centre of the universe. The whole world was made to
take this view as a scientific truth. But later a man by name
Nicolaus Copernicus proposed the heliocentric theory,
which explained the solar system much more convincingly
than the Ptolemaic conception. Even over the years the
heliocentric theory of Copernicus has been seriously
modified.
I

16
 . These two examples suffice to show that scientific
truths and theories keep changing with time as
commonsense knowledge changes. This shows that the
generally held belief that the sciences are bodies of
established facts is mistaken. There is nothing either
permanent or unalterable in science, and science does nor
necessarily grow by adding new certainties. As Karl
Popper put it in his The Logic ofScientific Discovery:
The empirical basis of objective science has
nothing thus absolute about it. Science does
not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of
its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp;
but not down to any natural or “given” base,
and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not
because we have reached firm ground. We
simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles
are firm enough to carry the structure, at least
for the time being (111)
Popper calls science conjecture and refutation or
trial and error. Science, for him, is constantly engaged in
falsifying theories to death and formulating new ones.
Imagination and guesswork, he would argue, play
prominent-roles in science. All this boils down to the point
that science is not far from commonsense. Science is as
illusory and unreliable as commonsense. What on earth
made Paul Feyerabend to equate science with magic? Of
course, it is partly because of the problems discussed
above.
I do not share the view that physics falsifies
commonsense or naive realism. People who hold this view
make a distinction between ‘things as they appear to us’ and

17
‘things as they are in themselves’. While the naive realist is
concerned with things as they appear to us, the physicist is
concerned with things as they are in themselves. For
example, while the naive realist would assert that colour is
really in the table, the physicist would argue that colour is
not really in the table but is caused by the presence of light
and the emitting of electromagnetic radiation from the sun.
Now the whole idea of things as they are in
themselves or that there is a reality behind appearance is
indeed a metaphysical inquiry. Does this not mean that
physics is plagued with metaphysics while commonsense
is free from it? This problem led philosophers like Ramsey
to call commonsense or naive realism ‘the primary system’
and physical theory (physics) as ‘the secondary system’.
According to Michael Dummett,
The “primary system” embodies “the sum
total of... purely factual propositions; the
function of the secondary system is ‘purely
explanatory’, and the entities to which it refers,
in so far as they cannot be identified with those
figuring in the primary system, are simply
conceptual tools serving to arrange the
primary facts. This then is simply a version of
instrumentalism. The actual facts, the hard
facts; those that we really believe to obtain, are
those of the primary system; the statements of
scientific theory represent fictions, in which
we do not really believe (as Ramsey confessed
that he did not really believe in astronomy), but
which we devise as a vivid means of
encapsulating patterns and regularities
detectable amongst the primary facts (1).
 This is not to say that the commonsense view
presents a single, unchanging theory, unadulterated by the
smatterings of philosophical and scientific knowledge.
Indeed, the idea of a commonsense view of the world
uninfluenced or unaffected by either philosophic or
scientific knowledge is a myth. In actual fact, all are
profoundly affected, in their view of the world and of
ordinary things in it, by the smatterings of scientific
knowledge that they possess” (Dummett 18). But what 1 am
insisting on is that commonsense is tl^ebasis or foundation
of all knowledge. It provides the raw materials upon which
the various disciplines draw in their attempt to establish
knowledge claims.

19
 CHAPTER TWO
WHAT IS SCIENCE?
Different Conceptions of Science
in studying the philosophy of science, it seems
reasonable and logical to begin with a definition of science.
But this is not an easy task. There is no one standard
definition of the term. Consequently, instead of looking for
a standard definition of science, it is advisable to look at
different conceptions of science. Let us discuss some of
them.
Literally, and according to various dictionary
definitions, the term ‘science’ means knowledge arranged
in an organized or orderly manner, especially knowledge
derived from experience, observation and experimentation.
For this reason, it is often claimed that scientific knowledge
is proven knowledge. Science is based on what we can see,
touch, taste, hear and smell. Personal opinions, prejudices
or preferences, superstitions and speculative imaginings
have no place in science. From this conception, it is clear
that science is a discipline. It has shown that science is
systematic and comprehensive. It has characteristic
methods, addresses specific types of questions, advances
specific types of answers and carries with it a fund of results
(often changing) as well as characteristic set of
propositions (also sometimes changing) (Ratzsch 14).
It must, however, be mentioned that not all
disciplines are sciences. For instance, engineering is a
discipline, yet not a science in the strict sense of the word.
While engineering is an applied discipline, the sciences are
basically theoretical disciplines dealing essentially with
theoretical processes and principles. Whereas the former

20
 deals with the practicalities of ‘how to’, the latter are more
concerned with understanding. This, of course, is not to say
that its being theoretical distinguishes natural science from
other disciplines. Philosophy itself is theoretical in this
broad sense. But while philosophy is basically concerned
with abstract or immaterial phenomena and concerns, the
objects of science are material things and events. Yet the
material or natural is not the only concern of the sciences.
For instance, theology is also concerned with the natural
world, though in terms of God’s specific activity. However,
rather than seeking supernatural explanations of events in
the world, the science .seek to provide naturalistic or
mechanistic explanations of the events in their specTTTc~
domains.
Science has been broadly classified into two, namely,
-"Tealscience and formal science. While the former goes after
sensory realdies^or^empirical data^ the latter goes after
abstract structures or entities.TVfiile the former achieves its
fesultsllirou^?expenence?observation and testing of facts,
the latter achieves its result through logical reasoning.
Included within the purview of real science are the natural
sciences, the social sciences and the cultural sciences;
whereas formal science includes mathematics, structural
science and formal logic.
Three concepts, according to the first conception of
science still under consideration, namely, the empirical, the
objective and the rational are centraLto real science. In other
words, real science must possess empirical base, objectivity
and rationality. First, a genuine science must be in tune with
relevant facts or empirical data by senses or by empirical
processes. Secondly, the empirical base of science cannot
be an arbitrary one. This is where science differs from
'pseudo-science. While the empirical data of pseudo­
science are often preferentially selected, real science

21
exhibits some degree of objectivity in handling those data.
Thirdly, real science requires that there be some rational
connection between empirical data and explanatory theory?
How is the achievement of these criteria or norms ensured?
The answer is not far - fetched. The empirical base of
science is preserved mainly through testing; mathematics
constitutes one of the reliable ways of preserving
rationality within science; the communal or public nature
of science is one way in which objectivity is fostered in
science. From this conception of science, the following
working definition of science emerges: “..■Science is a
theoretical explanatory discipline which" objectively
addresses naturaTphenomena witfnn the general constraint^
That (1) its theories must be rationally connectable to~~
generally specifiable empirical phenomena and that (2) it
normally does not leave the natural realm for the concepts
employed in its explanations” (Ratzsch 15).
A second view of science has it that science is a study
of the mastery of man’s material environment. This implies
*
the application of scientific knowledge, principles, laws
and theories in solving man’s environmental problems. The
limitation of this definition stems from the fact that it tends
to identify science with the tangible result of its
applications. This conception of science obviously
confuses science with technology. Again, since it limits
science to the physical (the study of matter), it excludes the
non-physical from the realm of science. Such a conception
is grossly inadequate. Science is sometimes concerned with
the non-physical.
A third conception of science identifies science with
scientific methods. This conception recognizes
experimentation as the only authentic procedure of
observing the consequences of events and circumstance
over which man is incapable of' controlling or

22
 manipulating. A conception such as this makes no room for j
sciences like geology and astronomy (which are generally ;
considered as exact sciences). Apart from that, it tends to
undermine the strong theoretical and logical flavour
needed to hold together the results of observations and
experiments and give them force and which provides the
basis for the explanation of similar future observations.
Most philosophers conceive of .science as a
systematic process of searching for the truth about nature
.through logical inference from empirical observations and
.testing. This involves drawing a generalization from the
instances, which have been observed to occur several
times. In a general sense, observations are made using the
sense organs to collect impressions. Pre-requisite
conditions for observations include ability to imagine,
curiosity to investigate and motivation to search for
explanation (Okoroji 35). These enable the scientist to
piece together his observations in an orderly manner. As it
is practically impossible to make all observations
concerning a phenomenon, the scientist obviously and
actually jumps to conclusion without waiting for further
confirming instances. Past and repeated observations
generate a confidence on the future reoccurrence of the
phenomenon. A general statement is thus formulated
concerning the phenomenon and this is taken as a
hypothesis. This hypothesis is a tentative law considering

observations. As more and more confirming instances are~

found, the hypothesis gradually develops into a theory.
More confirmation will help to sustain the truth of the
theory, though it will not totally prove that the theory is
true. The ability to withstand crucial tests establishes the

23
 theory as scientific bearing upon reality and generally
. applicable within its domain of operation. As will be shown
in the chapter dealing with Inductivism and the Problem of-
Induction, this conception of science is replete with
insurmountable difficulties, chief among which is the
problem of‘inductive leap’, the leap from the known to the
unknown, from finite data of experience to an infinite
datum.
In conclusion, an integrative or synoptic definition of
science can be gleaned from the four conceptions discussed-
above. According to this eclectic definition, science is a-
process of searching for the truth about nature, and the
product that results from such a process. As a process­
science involves scientific methodology; as a product,
science involves scientific knowledge - facts, concepts,
. laws, theories, generalizations, and other forms oi
knowledge which guide practices and find applications as
technology, and as stored and written in textbooks and
taught to learners as science. It will be necessary to round
off this section with a few words on scientific methodology.

Scientific Methodology
The enterprise of science has been progressive. Ever
since it be^an to evolve into' its modem form especially
from the 16" century onward, most discoveries have tended
to follow a pattern or procedure that can roughly be called
‘scientific methodology’. This procedure involves various
elements such as observational procedures, patterns of
arguments, methods of representation and calculations, and
the evaluation of the grounds of their validity from the
points of view of^ormal logic, practical methodology and
metaphysics. The general procedure generally held to be
successful involves five major steps namely;

24 I
i
(a) Problem Formulation: Here efforts are made to ask
pertinent questions concerning the occurrence of a certain
phenomenon. For instance, how does a bat (generally
believed not to see in daytime) fly in the daytime without
having an accident?

(b) Design and Planning of Research: At this stage,

attempts are made to find solution to the problem raised in
step one above. The attempt to do this leads to the.
formulation of hypothesis.

(c) Collection of Data: This involves going to the field

to collect data, which are ultimately taken to the laboratory
for analysis.

(d) Analysis of Data: This involves testing the collected

data through actual experimentations.

(e) Conclusion: If the experiments confirm the

hypothesis, then the results are successful. The findings so
made can be presented as a seminar paper or published as a
textbook or in a learned journal. The findings serve as a
paradigm for future research work.
Individual scientists involved in scientific research
may not necessarily adhere strictly to the sequential order
presented above.

25
 CHAPTER THREE

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE?

Philosophy of science as a separate branch of

philosophy is a relatively new development. Before its
emergence as a distinct branch of philosophy, philosophy
of science was treated as part of epistemology or_the theory
ofknowledge. And so, in studying the scientific views of a
philosopher, the only way to go about it was to ‘fish’ out
such views from the epistemological works of that
philosopher.
Philosophy of science is said to have originated from
the great debate between proponents of two
epistemological systems in Europe, namely, rationalism
and empiricism. While rationalists such as Rene Descartes,
BarrichJSpinoza and GoltfriedWilhelm Von Leibniz held
that reason was the principal source of human knowledge,
empiricists such as John Locke, DavidHume and Bishop
George Berkeley held that sense experience was the
principal source of human knowledge. Immanuel Kant’s
attempt to resolve the conflict between the two
epistemological schools (rationalism and empiricism) led
him to develop his famous ‘critical philosophy’. Kant
maintained that the way to critical philosophy was to ask:
What and how much can understanding and reason know
apart from sense experience? To answer this question, Kant
said that though all knowledge begins with experiencejrz
posteriori knowledge), not all knowledge arises out of
experience, (a priori knowledge)7^To_saylhisTneans that

26
 though all our knowledge, consists of a series of
impressions derived from the senses, yet we obviously
possess a kind of knowledge, which does not arise from
experience even though it begins with experience. Thus,
for Kant, there are_two sources of knowledge, namely,
sensibility and understanding. Consequently, Kant
distinguished between phenomenal reality and noumenal.
reality. While the former refers to the world as we
experience it, the latter refers to intelligible, nonsensual
reality, or the thing-in-itself.
' ” WtuTFphenomenal reality is the object of scientific
investigation, noumenal reality is associated with
philosophy. Thus with Kant, there was a formal separation
between science and philosophy. But interestingly, Kant
maintained that, rather than being diametrically opposed to
one another, both realms (phenomena and noumenal)
complement one another. While the phenomenal realm
supplies us with knowledge of reality external to us, the
noumenal realm helps us to organize the raw materials
presented to us by our senses. This shows that while the
former increases our knowledge, the latter reminds us of
the limits of our knowledge. Consequently, the latter
(which is philosophy in general, and philosophy of science
in particular) helps us to tackle the problems that arise from
the former (sciencef Let us now examine the different
conceptions of philosophy of science.
(a) Philosophy of science consists in the formulation of
world-views that are consistent with findings in science or
based on scientific laws and theories. Although this
conception looks good, yet when the sledge-hammer of
criticism is applied against it, it will be found not to serve as
27
 a working definition in this work. The formulation of
world-views cannot be the function of philosophy of
science because it is inconsistent with the principal
functions of philosophy, which are reflection and analysis.
Again, to say that philosophy of science consists in the
formulation of world-views based on important scientific
theories or laws tends to project the philosopher of science
as one who has nothing to do except and until scientific
theories or laws are formulated. The interest of the
philosopher of science goes beyond pointing out the
implication of theories.
(b) Philosophy of science is concerned with uncovering the
presuppositions and predispositions of the scientist. This
conception is borne out of the fact that philosophy is a
presuppositionless and predispositionless discipline. The
philosopher of science does not presuppose or predispose
any knowledge claim, but, instead, he strives to unveil the
presuppositions and predispositions of other disciplines.
Science, for instance, presupposes that there are
regularities or uniformities in nature, which can be
discovered by the investigator. Scientists are predisposed to
accept deterministic laws or explanations rather than
teleological explanations. The task of the philosopher of
science is the uncovering of presuppositions or
predispositions such as these. But it must be argued that this
is an accurate picture of what.a sociologist does. Thus, this
conception"Tbnds to assimilate philosophy of science to
’ sociology. But philosophy of science does not proceed like
sociology and their methodologies are quite different from
one another.

28
(c) Philosophy of science is the clarification and analysis of
scientific theories and concepts with the aim of making
their scientific usage clear. Now, there are problems
associated with this conception of philosophy of science.
First, the position tends to portray the scientist as someone
who has no regard for meaning as he does for facts. And so.
he needs the philosopher of science to explain the meaning
of the concepts he uses to him. Another possibility is that
the scientist understands the concepts he uses but that he
does not consider it important to begin to waste time
analyzing a concept whose meaning is assumed to be
generally known. But it is a well-known fact that scientists
do inquire into the relations of a particular concept to other
concepts and to operations of measurement [Losee 35]
Our conclusion here must be that although analysis
of scientific concepts is part of the business of philosophy
of science, not all conceptual analysis carried out in science
qualifies as philosophy of science.
[d] Philosophy of science plays a second order role to
science by answering questions bordering on the meaning
of scientific concepts such as law, theory and explanation,
the nature of, and claims about, scientific knowledge, the
logic and procedures of scientific explanation, and the
cognitive status of scientific laws and principles.
It can be seen that although the fourth conception
incorporates some elements of the second and third
conceptions, it is, nevertheless, the best of the four
conceptions. The reason is that in it the traditional
distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, that is, between doing
science arid thinking about science is brought into focus.
Following this, science is to be seen as a discipline whose
subject-matter is the explanation of facts, while philosophy

29
of science is to be seen as a second-order discipline whose
subject matter is the analysis of not only the concepts and
theories of science but also the procedures and logic of
scientific explanation.
Regarding the nature and manner of scientific
inquiry, at least two positions, namely, empiricism and
realism, have emerged. While the empiricist standpoint has
it that scientific inquiry is carried out inductively through
observation and experimentation, the realist school holds
that since we cannot know everything through observation
and experimentation, the inductive method of scientific
inquiry is to be treated as inadequate. In trying to acquire
knowledge, the knower [the scientist] brings in his
organizing capacity, and this varies from scientist to
scientist by reason of circumstances of age, training and
prejudices [Losee 35],

30
 CHAPTER 4
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

Introduction
In this chapter, we will first clarify further the meaning of
philosophy and science before delving into the similarity and
difference between them.

What is Philosophy?
It is difficult, if not impossible, to give a precise
definition of philosophy. In fact, the issue of the definition of
philosophy is as controversial as controversy itself.
Consequently, there are basic differences of opinion regarding
what constitutes the subject matter of philosophy. However, the
broadest, and of course, the oldest conception of philosophy is
its etymological conception. Etymologically, the term
'philosophy' derives from the ancient Greek noun 'philosophia'
which literally translates to 'love of wisdom'. Wisdom here does
not connote mere knowledge, for it is possible to have
knowledge and yet be unwise. But wisdom simply refers to the
ability to put knowledge to good or practical use. True, a wise
man is one who knows what he has to do and actually plans and
manages to do it properly. This is true wisdom which philosophy
aims to impart. This deepest knowledge can only be acquired by
the unaided powers of reason, not by the senses, authority or
revelation.
Apart from the etymological conception, each school of
philosophy has its own view of what philosophy is and how it is
to be practiced. For the platonic tradition, the goal of philosophy
is the attainment of wisdom through a vision of the absolute
ideas: beauty, truth, piety,justice and so on. Human knowledge,

31
 for Plato, is only a stepping stone for the apprehension of these
absolute realities in and for themselves. On his part, Aristotle
questions the ontological bifurcation of philosophy into
practical and theoretical, claiming that the function of the
philosopher is the investigation of all fields through
observations and speculations which constitute knowledge in
these fields. For him, philosophy is a fundamental science, in
which man, using his powers of thought, attempts to discern the
nature of being, substance, unity, plurality, causality, change,
and other such theoretical notions which are basic to the other
sciences. In this investigation, the extent of his knowledge is
limited only by the powers of his own rational faculty
(Bronstein, et al 3). In arguing against the notion of philosophy
as a theoretical enterprise which can be engaged in and
understood without reference to daily practical living, the
pragmatists, ably represented by William James and John
Dewey, are of the view that philosophy is a practical venture,
whose main goal is the transformation of existing realities. This
view is somewhat akin to the Marxian view that, for a
philosophy to be significant, it must ensue in action directed
towards specific goals. Thus, for Marx, philosophy is an
instrument for attaining social and political goals. For Thomas
Aquinas, there is no formal separation between philosophy and
theology. He maintains that the proper way to philosophize is to
blend the study of philosophy with obedience to the Christian
k faith. The advantage of this, he probably reasoned, is to protect
philosophical research against the risk of error while still giving
room for freedom of investigation. Finally, analytic
philosophers are of the view that the main business of
philosophy is the analysis of language or the clarification of
meaning. Analytic philosophy takes the process of analysis to be
the central philosophical method and progress. It holds that the
surface form of a language may conceal hidden logical structure,
32
and may mislead us as to that structure. This could be revealed
by a process that would itself solve philosophical problems or
show them to be the offspring of the delusive surface forms of
ordinary language. The analysts believe that philosophical
analysis will provide a scientific, objective approach to
traditional problems. Just as a mathematician is able to define a
complex notion, reveals its identity in terms of a sequence of
31njp|pr operations, the philosopher-analyst will be able to
identify the nature of a complex concepts in terms of simple
constituent ideas and operations. Confidence in the method of *
analysis was booted by the early success of Frege and Russell in
reducing mathematics to logic, and by the insights gained from
the theory of definite descriptions. However, the programme of
philosophical analysis attained its peak with the early work of
the logical positivists, notably Carnap (Blackburn, 14-15).
Looking at the historical development of philosophy and
its division into various branches, it will be clearly seen that
early Greek philosophers seemed to have taken to themselves a
rather formidable task. Using contemporary categories, for
instance, Aristotle's works alone contain treatises on nature,
science, logic, political theory, moral philosophy (ethics),
epistemology and aesthetics. Over the centuries, however, the
philosophical enterprise has gone through much refinement
giving rise to various first-order disciplines such as physics,
chemistry, biology, mathematics, psychology, political science,
physiology, law, history and so forth. Philosophy now plays the
role of a second-order discipline whose chief concern is the
examination of the inquiries undertaken by these first-order
disciplines. As a result, we have established bodies of
knowledge in philosophy of science, philosophy of
mathematics, philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of
law, philosophy of history and so on. Thus, contrary to the fear of
some people that the series of breakaways from philosophy
33
might narrow down its field of attention, the fact is that the field
of philosophy is ever widening in horizon. Moreover, its
traditional branches: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic,
social and political philosophy, and aesthetics are as vibrant and
flourishing as they were in the early days of philosophy. That
does not however mean that contemporary philosophy is exactly
the same as ancient Greek philosophy. The fact is that there are
points of similarity and points of departure between them.
To conclude this section, it must be mentioned that virtually all
activities and professions raise philosophical issues. The
practice of law and medicine, science, psychology, theology,
electoral process, sports and even taxation all trigger off
philosophical questions. Woodhouse as cited in Velasquez (13)-
has put forward the following examples:
fnnd ) nFniRr^ /Iclrtnn srii
1. A neurologist while establishing correlations between
certain brain functions and the feeling of pain, begins to
wonder whether the 'mind' is distinct from the brain.

2. A nuclear physicist, having determined that matter is

mostly empty space containing colourless energy
transformations, begins to wonder to what extent the
solid, extended, coloured world we perceive corresponds
to what actually exists and which world is more 'real'.

3. A behavioural psychologist, having increasing success in

predicting human behavior, questions whether any
human action can be called 'free'.
‘H I >•! «'/.?-i’i'uI ? IHjijf’‘ji'iJ IO nOfifiniffWXd

4. Supreme Court Justices, when framing a law to

distinguish obscene and non-obscene art forms, are
drawn into questions about the nature and function of art.
o 1631 adfol viBilnoo ,audT .no oa bns /lolairflo vriooaoUria .wsl
5. A theologian in a losing battle with science over literal
34
 descriptions of the universe (or 'reality') is forced to
redefine the whole purpose and scope of traditional
theology.
f t 5_f 1
* -oiH• f'l !•!'••«• *j: • ••<!
** • i rl; I•’»' : ' I • - li H i**
;• *
•••
•-• 1 • f»-» 'nV
'■'1 : 11 Ls i -J Jh I , ; lU ; 1 • 1 J-.. , . MJ> f ! ip

6. An anthropologist, noting that all societies have some

conception of a moral code, begins to wonder just what
distinguishes a moral from a non-moral point of view.

7. A linguist, in examining the various ways language

shapes our view of the world, declares that there is no one
'true reality' because all views of reality are conditioned
and qualified by the language in which they are
expressed.

8. A perennial skeptic, accustomed to demanding and not

receiving absolute proof for every view encountered,
declares that it is impossible to know anything.

9. A country commissioner, while developing new zoning

ordinance, begins to wonder whether the effect of the
intent (or both) of zoning laws makes them
discriminatory.
□ftitnaioa aviJaoqaai ibd) njodn * /br.nTjiii gnome amk/i
10. An IRS (Internal Revenue Service) director, in
determining which (religious) organizations should be
exempted from tax, is forced to define what counts as a
'religion'or'religious group'.

11. A concerned mother, having decided to convert her

communist son, is forced to read the communist
manifesto and to do some thinking about Marxist and
capitalist ideologies.
ot eu ;itimmoa Ji Jsrlt ni noiznamib luamoloiaoa snoiJa j; ?::</lovni
The above examples given by Woodhouse clearly show
that philosophical questions and issues cut across virtually all
activities and all professions. Let it be quickly added that

35
 philosophical questions are continuously raised in everyday life
and conversations. It will not, therefore, be an overstatement to
conclude that philosophy is 'jack of all trades, master of all', the
'queen of all disciplines', the 'beautiful bride of all subjects', the
'synoptic visioner of all disciplines', the 'ultimate science', the
'gadfly of all subjects', the 'mother subject', the 'summit and
synthesis of all knowledge'. •

What is Science?
Science can be provisionally defined as “the process or group of
inter-related processes through which we have acquired our
modern, and ever changing knowledge of the natural world
which encompasses inanimate nature, life, human nature and
human society”(Richterl). Although this definition appears
narrow, it is however clear enough to indicate the approximate
boundaries of the subject matter of science and reasonably at
home with popular usage. Knowledge gotten through this
process may be regarded as 'scientific', with the understanding
that what is accepted as 'scientific' at one time may be termed
anachronistic at a later time. Those who creatively participate in
science are called 'scientists' while all 'scientists', as long as they
relate among themselves about their respective scientific
activities may be recognized as members of the scientific
community. A scientific community consists of members of a
scientific specialty who share the same goals, basic
assumptions, beliefs and norms. Although this conception of
science cautiously avoids commitments on some important
issues connected with the concept of science, it is obviously
broad enough to accommodate within its framework, a variety
of alternative conceptions of science. However, the conception
involves a strong sociological dimension in that it commits us to
a conception of science based on western standards, even though
science as we know, has existed to some extent in times and
cultures other than the western culture.
36
... x '■ ' • <\
t
 Thus, conceived, science does have historical roots in
several ancient cultures, especially the Greek culture. However,
it first emerged in its modem form in Western Europe in the 17"'
century. As Richter observed, the transition from pre-modern to
modern science involved several inter-related aspects. For him,
science came to be associated with a distinctive view of nature as
operating according to general laws which remain largely
hidden under ordinary observational circumstances but which
can be uncovered through systematically controlled observation
and experiments. Science became reasonably, clearly
differentiated from such related subjects as philosophy, religion,
magic and technology. In other words, the role of the scientist
became differentiated from other roles, as scientists came to
communicate with each other systematically in ways which *
make the beginning of what is now called the 'scientific
community'. After many centuries of irregular growth, science
came to attain a self-reinforcing capacity which has become
noticeable in the massive, sustained growth of science from the
17th -century to the present time (2).
Modern science is thus distinctively European in origin.
From its birthplace in Western Europe, it has gradually spread to
non-western lands. The dual status of modern science as western
in its cultural background and its universal relevance has made it
a powerful catalyst in the transformation of the western culture
to a position of global dominance. The complex and changing
patterns of modern science are today evident in its
differentiation into the 'sciences' or 'branches of science'. Today,
we have the various physical, biological and social disciplines
which come under the rubrics of science. Some disciplines such
as physics and astronomy which are as old as science itself, have
produced fantastic results, and served as paradigms for the less
developed sciences. At the extreme are disciplines such as
37
I
sociology, which though they are comparatively young, have
nevertheless recorded some modest achievements and have
tended to imitate other sciences rather than serve as models to
others. Such disciplines are marginal as exemplification of
science, even though not intrinsically less scientific or less
important than those which provide richer sources of materials
for illustrating the scientific process (Richter,4).
The aims of the empirical (physical) sciences are
description, explanation and prediction. While description is
basic and indispensable to science, explanation and prediction
are somewhat related activities which arise as the most desirable
fruits of scientific labours whenever inquiries transcend the
mere fact-gathering stage.
The aims of the empirical scientists are essentially the
same I the whole field. They all seek descriptions, explanations
and predictions which as much as possible are adequate and
accurate in the given context of research. There are certain
standards or criteria by which the quest for scientific knowledge
is regulated. It must be mentioned that these are ideals to be
approximated, but which may never’be fully attained. The most
important of these criteria are as stated below:

1. Inter-subjectivity or objectivity: This stresses the fact

that the scientific enterprise is social in nature. Scientific
truths are not accessible only to privileged individuals
such as visionaries and mystics. If it were so, the claims
c; *i ■- •j/Arrt o rt t <•
of science could not be adequately checked by anyone
else. Any person who is adequately equipped with
intelligence and the technical devices of observation and
experimentation will be able in principle to confirm or
refute the knowledge claims of science. What this shows
is that science is somehow free from personal and

*38
 cultural bias. The objectivity of science is therefore based
on the fact that pure or naked facts form the basis of
scientific discoveries and theories. The criterion of inter-
subjective testability thus delimits the scientific from the
non-scientific activities of man.

2. Precision, Specificity and Definiteness: This means that

science deals with specific or particular observable or
identifiable objects of this world, not some abstract
entities or beings in some ethereal world. The objects of
study of the sciences are the ones that can be perceived
with our senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch.
Furthermore, to say that the sciences are precise or
specific implies that they are capable of furnishing us
information about the world as it really is. This is partly
why the empirical sciences are sometimes called 'exact'
science. This criterion requires the concepts used in
formulating scientific knowledge claims be as definitely
delimited as possible. As Feigl observes:
zirfT .'j?nygnommo'j bsxincsio ?.e XMisijz baHc-s-1 - r I
On the level of quantitative classificatory
sciences this amounts to the attempt to reduce
all border-zone vagueness to a minimum. On
the level of quantitative science the exactitude
of the concepts is enormously enhanced
through the application of the techniques of
measurement. The measurational devices
usually also increase the degree of objectivity.
This is typically clear when they are
contrasted with purely impressionistic ways of
estimating magnitudes. Of course, there is no
point in sharpening precision to a higher

39
 degree than the problem in hand requires (you
need no razor to cut butter) (68)

3. Reliability: This criterion enables us to differentiate

between mere opinion and knowledge; while the former
is unsubstantiated, the latter is well substantiated. Truth­
claims generally regarded as superstitions and judgments
based on hasty generalization differ remarkably from
what we consider as scientific truth in the extremely low
degree of probability to which they are supported by
available evidence. For example, astrology and alchemy
are generally considered as false (though not factually
meaningless), because all available evidence speaks
overwhelmingly against. Modern techniques of
experimentation and statistical analysis aje the most
potent tools we have in the discernment between chance
and law and hence the best means of enhancing the
reliability of knowledge (Feigl, 68).

4. Coherence or Systematkity: It is in this sense that some

have regarded science as organized commonsense. This
implies that there is no as such between the way the
scientist proceeds and the way in which ordinary persons
arrive at certain conclusions in everyday life. In other
words, the common methods which the scientist employs
are the same as the ones employed by ordinary person
and these include induction and deduction (Aigbodioh,
26). Science seeks not a mere collection of miscellaneous
information, but a well connected account of the facts.
According to Feigl,

On the descriptive level this results, for

example, in systems of classification or
40
 division, in diagrams, statistical analysis, and
the like. On the explanatory levels of science,
sets of laws or theoretical assumptions are
utilized. Explanation in science consists in the
hypothetico-deductive procedure. The laws,
theories or hypothesis form the premises from
which we derived logically or Iogico-
mathematically, the observed or observable
facts. These facts often belonging to
heterogeneous domains thus become
integrated into a coherent, unifying structure
(69)

Although metaphysical and theological systems have

tried to follow this pattern of science, they have often fallen short
of criterion of testability or reliability in the sense already
highlighted in the points above.

5. Comprehensiveness: Scientific knowledge differs from

common-sense knowledge by its comprehensiveness or
scope of knowledge. Science acquires a reach which goes
far beyond the limits of our unaided senses. This is made
possible through bold and sweeping hypotheses and
especially through the ingenious devices by means of
which they are tested. With telescopes, microscopes,
spectroscopes, Geiger counters, lie detectors, and the
thousands of other contrivances of modern science we
manage to amplify our senses and thus open avenues of at
least indirect access to the worlds of very distant, the very
large, the extremely small, or the disguised and
concealed. The resulting increase in the completeness of
our knowledge is, of course, popularly the most
impressive feature of science (Feigl, 69). Let it be
41
 mentioned that the scope thus achieved by science is a
product of hard labour, and not a product of shame
completeness assumed by metaphysicians. The genuine
> scientists, unlike the idle metaphysician does not present
a finished account of the world, rather he keeps
subjecting his hypotheses to test with the hope of
revising, modifying or abandoning them if contrary
evidence renders them doubtful. This self-evaluative
posture of science is its most important characteristics.
That one live with an unfinished world-view is
undoubtedly a sign of intellectual humility and maturity.

It must be mentioned that the criteria adumbrated above

are the characteristics of pure (empirical) science. The applied
sciences (medicine, technologies, etc.) have their different aims,
chief among which are practical control, production, guidance,
therapy, and reform. This does not however rule out the fact of
interplay between pure science and applied sciences. Both are
indeed at the service of one another. Thus, we cannot deny the
obvious practical interpenetration and mutual fertilization of
both aspects of science.

Points of Similarity between Philosophy and Science

Philosophy is a science in the strictest sense of the term 'science'.
Like science, it is not spontaneous knowledge, belief or
historical knowledge; it is not even uncertain or conjectural
knowledge. Both philosophy and science are based on personal
understanding and not on the authority of another. Both deal
with certitude because they are capable of providing the reason
why a thing is what it is. Every science comprises the
explanatory reasons of a certain number of things which have a
common formal object. A science, since it provides the

42
explanation, is a synthetic view of its object. Since philosophy is
a discipline which subjects all things to critical examination to
give their raison d'etre, to that extent that it can be called a
science. Whereas the pure sciences are directed to groups of
objects more or less restricted, philosophy is interested in the
totality of reality. Philosophy is, thus, a general science, whose
formal object is common to all things and drawn by abstraction
from the very' depth of reality. It is the science of all things
through their simplest and most general reasons, or through their
most far-reaching causes (Uzoma, 23-24). The points of
similarity between philosophy and science can be summarized
as follows:
1. Philosophy and science are similar in their basic aim,
which is to understand the world and use this for man's
benefits. The difference between the two is just a matter
of degree. Philosophizing is a higher level of abstraction
than that of other branches of study. Mathematics ranks
higher than the empirical sciences on the level of mental
abstraction, while metaphysics ranks above both
mathematics and the physical sciences.
2. Both disciplines try to understand the world through
reflective thinking. In their approach to truth, they abhor
dogmatism, partiality and narrow mindedness. They are
interested in organized and systematized knowledge.
3. Both disciplines complement one another in that where
one stops, the other begins. When the particular sciences
have given partial explanation of reality, philosophy
takes over from there by organizing and systematizing
the piecemeal knowledge in a more complete and
integrated view of the world. In other words, science
provides the raw material (factual information) upon
43
 which philosophy is built. That is why the philosophy of
any age is a reflection of the science of that age. Science,
on its part, check-balances philosophy by helping it to get
rid of unscientific ideas. Indeed, the outstanding
contributions of science in contemporary times have
gone a long way in resolving philosophical puzzles
which were hitherto unresolved. We conclude with
Uzoma that “philosophy and science complement,
support and clarify each other on the condition that both
hold strongly to things and respect each other” (28).

Points of Difference between Philosophy and Science

Philosophy and science differ in some respects.
Basically, the types of questions which engage the attention of
philosophers are different from those which occupy the.minds of
scientists. While the philosopher is concerned with a priori
questions, the scientist is interested in empirical investigation of
phenomena. The physicist, for example, who is interested in
studying sub-atomic structures, will go about this by setting up
experiments in order to test his hypothesis about these
structures. The philosopher, on the other hand, has no need of
experiments in order to determine the validity of his knowledge
claims. He relies only on rational argument, reflection and
logical analysis. Although he may be interested in examining the
empirical data of the sciences, he needs to move beyond the
concrete world of experience if a question regarding the status of
knowledge is to be satisfactorily answered (Sharma and
Hyland,4). The points of difference between philosophy and
science can be briefly stated thus:
1. The particular sciences deal with limited fields, while
philosophy deals with the whole of experience. Science is
thus exclusive while philosophy is inclusive. Philosophy
44
 is inclusive because it attempts to include in its corpus
what is common to all field and human experience as a
whole. Philosophy is therefore more comprehensive than
science.
2. Whereas the particular sciences are more analytic and
descriptive in their approach, philosophy is more
synthetic or synoptic, dealing with nature or life as a
whole. Science is more interested in analyzing the whole
into parts, whereas philosophy attempts to give an
interpretative synthesis of things.
3. In pursing objectivity, science tends to ignore personal
factors and value judgments, whereas philosophy is
interested in all realms of experience.
4. Science aims at observing and controlling processes,
whereas philosophy aims at criticizing, evaluating and
coordinating ends.
5. Areas which are considered 'no go areas' by science are
interesting areas of study to the philosopher. Such areas
include religious commitment, the values, ends and
purposes of life, beauty in arts, and so on.
6. Whereas scieritific method is essentially experimental,
putting hypothesis or theory to test in terms specific
empirical consequences, the philosopher sees
experiments as impracticable in view of the general
nature of the problems he raises.
7. Whereas the scientist is interested in the particular good
for man, the philosopher is interested in the ultimate good
(the summum bonum).

It is important to mention again that the alleged

differences are differences of emphasis. As Uzoma observes, it
is interesting to know that many scientists are trained
philosophers, and many philosophers trained in scientific

45
methods have made immense contributions to the development
and growth of science (32).

Philosophy's Interest in Science

Philosophy's interest in Science includes the following:

1. Conceptual Analysis: This refers to the attempt to define

concepts or clarify problem areas in a way that would
make them amenable to scientific study.
2. Examination of Basic Assumptions concerning the
nature of reality which underlie science.
3. Synthesis, which is the attempt to fuse the various
findings of the various sciences into one consistent view
of reality, a weltaschauung (Aigbodioh, 13)
4. General issues, such as the relation of science to the
humanities, the epistemology status of theoretically
postulated entities, the validity of probable inference, the
nature of space and time, of causality and organic life, the
morality of induced abortion, in-vitro fertilization,
euthanasia, environmental management and sustenance,
the mass production of armaments and the limitations of
science as a genuine source ofknowledge.

(NOTE: This article appeared first in Philosophy & The Rise Of

Modern Science Edited By Prof. A.F. Uduigwomen, El-Johns
Publishers, Uyo; 2011)

46
 PART TWO

HISTORY OF SCIENCE
 CH APTER 5

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL SCIENCE

{6TH CENTURY B.C - 14TH CENTURY A.D}
Although science as it is today is a late product of the
development of human civilization, there has always been a
scientific tradition in every age of history. The only
problem with science before the emergence of modem
science is that it was subordinate either to the tradition of
philosophy or that of the crafts. Even in the Stone Age, man
had a form of science based on the skillful manipulation of
nature. Mason writes: No matter how far back in history we
go there were always some techniques, facts, and
conceptions, known to craftsmen or scholars, which were
scientific in character (11). Thu& we can discern two
primary sources as the historical roots of science, namely,
the technical tradition perpetuated by the artisans and the
spiritual tradition perpetuated by the priests and the scribes.
These two traditions continued for a long time until the
philosophers broke off from the priests and the scribes, and
craftsmen of one vocation broke off from those of another.
It was not until the early part of modem times that elements
from the two traditions metamorphosed into a new science.
With the appearance of the new science, “the development
of science then became autonomous, and, containing both
practical and theoretical elements. Science produced
results which had both technical and philosophical
implications” (Mason 12).
The cradle of science has often been linked with the
cradle of philosophy. Both arose as a result of civilization
and out of man’s curiosity to know. In fact, etymologically,
all knowledge, whether of science or magic, was integrated
in the guiding principles of philosophy. Consequently,
48
there was no clear-cut distinction between scientific
procedures and magical procedures. An ancient
philosopher had to grapple with numerous great questions,
which today are being studied by a host of scientists. Of
note is Aristotle whose knowledge of various disciplines
qualifies him as an encyclopedic. In short, ancient
philosophers were concerned with everything. In trying to
explain the origins of the world, they developed the science
of cosmogony - the science or theory of the origin, creation
and evolution of the universe. They also philosophized on
such scientific issues as the appearance of rainbow, the
phenomena of motion and change, the occurrences qf
eclipses, the generation of lightning, and so on.

Science in Ancient Western World ✓

The development of science in the Western world is
often traced to ancient Greece, where actual philosophizing
and scienticising are said to have begun about the 6"'
century B.C. As a matter of historical fact, the ancient
Greeks were the first to have attempted to explain
phenomena in a scientific way. This science was
interwoven with philosophical speculation about the
cosmic process. One interesting thing about the early
Greek philosophers/scientists is that rather than explain the
natural in terms of the supernatural; they began to explain
the natural in terms of the natural. Samuel Enoch Stumpf
must have caught a vivid picture of the scientific
orientation of the early Greek philosophers when he said:
“To ask, as they [the early Greek philosophers] did,‘What
are things really like?’ and ‘How can we explain the
process Of change in things?’ indicates a substantial , -
departure from the poetry of Homer and Hesiod and a

49
movement toward what we should call the temperament of
science” (4).
Man, it has always been claimed, has been a
scientist since his appearance on this planet. This idea is
supported by the fact that man’s attempt at building,
construction, agriculture and health - care through the use
of herbs has scientific bearings. However, the conscious
study and attempted analytical application of science
started in ancient Greece some 3000 years ago. As E. M.
Rogers put it,
if science is more than an accumulation of
tacts; if it is not simply positive knowledge;
but systematized positive knowledge; if it is
not simply unguided analysis and haphazard
empiricism but synthesis; if it is not simply a
passive recording, but constructive activity;
then undoubtedly (ancient Greece) was its
cradle [23].
It is exactly the view of some people that ancient
Greece is the cradle of science that we have set out to
examine in this chapter. To achieve the goal, surviving
fragments of the postulations of some early Greek
philosophers will be subjected to analysis, using materials,
methods and facts of modern scientific theories.^ the end,
it would have been re-established and re-asserted that
ancient Greece’s contributions are a sine qua non to modem
scientific development?-
The age of mythology was the age that preceded the
age of actual philosophical cum scientific speculations. In
fact, the genius of the Greeks-started from their mythology
about gods.- During the age of mythology [which lasted
between the 8th and 5"' centuries B.C.], all happenings in the
natural world were attributed to the behaviour of gods. The
Homeric gods were believed to inhabit Mount Olympus
50
 •/
from where they came to intervene in human affairs when
occasions demanded it. These gods were however said to
be subject to the same fate as their human counterparts, jbkf
complete account will be given of the age of mythology
without making mention of the names of Homel and
Hesiod whose poems represented the spirit of the age. Sir
Dampier said of the Greek religion “it...was to interpret
nature and its processes in terms which could be
understood to make man feel at home in the world”[ 12],
But the consequence of attributing all occurrences
[whether good or bad] to the gods was that, instead of
looking into the scientific causes and explanations of such
occurrences, supernatural causes and explanations were
invoked and hence hindering real advance in human
knowledge. Hesiod summarized the spirit of the age when
he said, “There is no way to escape the will of Zeus”. This
submission to the will of the gods was the order of the day
and the consequence of this was recognized by scholars
such as Jones who said: “The myths not only failed to
inform; they actually inhibited scientific advance. As long
as the causes of events were attributed to the will of the
gods, a science of meteorology, for instance,, was
impossible”[9].
The above was the case in Greece until the 5"’ century
B.C. when the doors of philosophico-scientific
speculations were thrown open by Thales who lived in~
Miletus, a port city in Ionia on the coast of Asia Minor.. At
the time of Thales, Greece was divided into four main parts,
namely, Ionian Greeks, Dorian Greeks, Aeoloan Greeks
and Achen Greeks. The Ionian Greeks are the main focus of
this chapter. Lewes described the lonians “as... the first and
only people who disengaged speculation from theological
guidance... and it was he [Thales] who made the first
attempt to establish a physical beginning without the

51
 )

assistance of myths” [1-7], It is said by historians of

philosophy that this period, which started around 6000 B.C.
and lasted till 600 A.D. exploited all the philosophical
TrlTefhatives of~the Western world and also left many
philosophical traditions for posterity. The scientific
theories of atoms, the heliocentric view of the solar system
and organic evolution, which arc of paramount interest to
science today, were all speculated and philosophized upon
by the lonians [Reese 201], Nothing else can best vividly
describe the origin of the classical minds in Ionian Greece
than tjie words of Stumpf: .. -
Her wealth [Miletus] made possible the leisure v
without whiclx.Jt.be life of art and philosophy
could hardly develop and the broadmindedness
and inquisitiveness of her people created a
congenial atmosphere for the intellectual
activity that was to become philosophy [4]
As stated earlier, the early Greek philosophers
exploited many fields of human endeavour. Disciplines
such as Religion, Politics, Ethics, Logic, Law, Medicine,
Natural Science and so on, were treated under the purview
of the noble art of philosophy. As a result, there was nb
..clear-cut distinction between scientific procedures and
religious or metaphysical procedures. Indeed, the
separation of these other disciplines from their parent stock
[philosophy] was a gradual process. In what follows, we
examine the scientificity of the postulations of the early
Greek philosophers. Attention will be concentrated on a
few of the early schools of thought, namely, the Milesian
school, the Pythagorean school and the Atomist school. We
shall treat Thales as representing the Milesian school, he,
being the first in the trio which included Anaximander and
Anaximenes; in treating the Pythagorean school, both the
thoughts of its founder (Pythagoras] and those of the school

52
in general will be discussed together, in treating the
Atomist schoob_W£L&halJ-tFeat Democritusas representing
the school.

The Scientificity of the Early Greek philosophers

From the pre-socratic period of philosophy down to
the early part of the 17lh century A.D/ the process of
philosophy was basically deductive.J.n deductive method
of inquiry, we start with a general conception and
rationalize the particulars to fit in and Support the pattern
decided-hpon, ThTsTs the methodKarl Popper prefers to call ■
the hypotheticp-deductive method. Popper believes that
this method is the basic foundation of science. When we
consider the pre-socratic philosophers, we will find that
their conjectures, speculations and reasoning about the
universe were devoid of any physical means of arriving at
knowledge. That means that unlike modern science, there
were no tools, no apparatus and no laboratories to supply
the answers to the tantalizing questions they tried to
resolve. Nevertheless, the answers they did provide by
means of vigorous reasoning provided an intellectual
satisfaction and a sense of security which ignorance could
never have done.
At this juncture, we proceed to examine the thoughts
of the representatives of the three schools of thought
selected for analysis, namely, Milesian, Pythagorean and
Atomist.

The Milesian School: Thales of Miletus

Thales was born around 624 B.C. Many scientific
feats are credited to him. He is said to have accurately
predicted the eclipse of 585 B.C; he solved the problem of
crossing the wide Halys river by the use of a dam which
created two channels; he devised a means for measuring the
53
 height of pyramids; he constructed an instrument for
measuring the distance of a ship sighted at sea, and in the
field of astronomy and navigation, he discovered the
constellation__ LittLe - Bear which could be used for
^etermminglhe dLr£ction_of the north by sailors. However,
our main focus in this book is on Thales’ assertion that
water is the ultimate source of all things, or the essence of
all things. This aspect of Thales’ thought will be examined
in two perspectives, both of which are scientific. The firstis
that water is the ultimate source of all things and the second
is tfiatwater is the essence of all things.Let' snow examine
the first perspective.
~Xccdrdm’g'tO'‘Professor S. W. Peters of the Geology
Department, University of Calabar, in a paper entitled
“Evolution and History of Universe”, the earth was formed
probably 4.5 million years ago through the condensation of
the solar system. The initial atmosphere consisted of
hydrogen, helium, methane and ammonia gases. The
source of water and other constituents of the atmosphere
like nitrogen, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, sulphur
monoxide, chlorine, hydrogen sulphide, carbon monoxide,
etc., can be traced to volcanoes. The only exception is
oxygen.
On the origin of life, Professor Peters maintained that
geological experiments had proved that early life arose
from non-living matter and that the first organic
compounds occurred in the surface waters of the earth by
the action of solar and electrical energy on ammonia and
methane gases in the atmosphere. Having claimed earlier
that there^was no free oxygen in the atmosphere, and
knowing that, biologically, organic life cannot exist without
oxygen, water can again be seen as having played an
indispensable role in the origin and sustenance of organic
life in that free oxygen must have been derived chiefly by

54' ■
the break-up of water molecules into hydrogen and oxygen
(7). As the percentage of oxygen in the atmosphere
increased, organisms started to emerge from the seasrWhen
this oxygen was acted upon by the ultraviolet rays from the
sun it turned into Ozone gas, which in turn shielded off the
harmful ultraviolet rays.
The question we may ask at this juncture is, what is
the origin of water itself, considering the fact that
chemically, water is made up of two molecules of hydrogen
and one molecule of oxygen, and considering that it has
been stated that water was initially lacking in the
atmosphere? Here, we might guess that oxygen gas. might
have been given up in volcanic eruptions and this oxygen
cannot be denied being there in the sense that volcanic
eruption is a kind of combustion and combustion cannot
take place without oxygen. Carbon dioxide is,- as we are
told, the largest by-product of combustion. In the light of
the fact that hydrogen gas was present in the atmosphere, it
can be postulated that oxygen which came as a chemical
appendage of carbon dioxide under the very high pressure
of volcanic eruptions eventually combined with hydrogen
in the atmosphere in an exothermic reaction to form water
after the cooling of the environment [34]. Another way of
explaining this in simpler terms is that water vapour, which
is another way of describing water in the gaseous form,
must have been given up in volcanic eruptions. And it is a
well-known scientific fact that water vapour is not formed
unless water is heated up to a temperature of about 100"C
and above.
If the evolutionary theory above is debunked, then it
will mean the origin of water in the biosphere will be
attributed to no other source than God. And, of course, this
will form another standard argument in favour of the
limitations of modern science. If we agree that water is the
55
ultimate source of all things as the evolutionary theory
suggests, then the second perspective of Thales’
postulation [i.e. that water is the essence of all things] is
affirmed. That is to say that all things invariably have water
as their essence.
In conclusion, therefore, we can see that Thales view
that water is the source and essence of all things is not
absurd in any form, despite the absence of scientific steps in
his postulation. His was a product of the epoch in which he
lived and philosophized. In this sense, we take Thales as a
scientist who contributed in his own small way to the
development of science.

The Pythagorean School

Pythagoras of Samos, bom about 530 B.C, founded
the Pythagorean School. Pythagoras differed greatly from
the Milesians in that he blended philosophy, science and
mysticism into one cup of knowledge. Since it is difficult
to establish a divergence in the views of Pythagoras and
those of his followers, the name Pythagoras and the
compound form Pythagoreans will be treated in this work
as one and the same thing.
Like the Milesians, many scientific discoveries are
credited to the Pythagoreans. Pythagoras is credited with
deducing the proof for the geometncaTtheorem that the
square of the hypotenuse of a right- angled triangle is equal
to the sum of the squares on the other two sides. It is of
importance to note that the Pythagoreans experimented on
sound and came up with the theory that the lengths of string,
which gave a note and its octaves, are in simple proportions.
It is also generally agreed upon that the Pythagorean
astronomy pre-empted the Copernicus’ discovery of the
heliocentric universe in the 16"’ century A.D.

56
 Apart from the above-mentioned scientific strides by
the Pythagoreans, the most important aspect of their work is
to be found in their theory that number is at the base of all
things. In this theory, the world is taken as infinite and
things as units, which in turn form the numbers. Although
this theory has elements of mysticism surrounding it, this
mysticism does not in any way hamper the scientific
implications of their idea. According to Dampier, in
practical mathematics t^e discovery that number is the
basis of all things made arithmetic possible; in philosophy it
led to the belief thafliumber lies at the base of the real world
[16].
• How did this help arithmetic as stated in the
quotation above? The answer is simply that in arithmetic as
well as in mathematics, relations are employed. Two things
can only relate successfully when there is an intrinsic
quality common to them. Thus, X -2 conveys no relation of
idea just as ‘goats minus cats’ conveys no relation of idea.
It is only When we ascribe a numerical value, say 5, to X that
meaning will be conveyed. When we give the numerical
value 5 to X we can conveniently subtract 2 from 5 to arrive
at the number 3.
Science in its various probes and researche&has been
of considerable help in throwing more light on the
philosophical position that numbers lie at the base of the
real world. A few examples from the science of physics will
not be out of place. Let’s finft take the example of speed. In
the description of speed, the science of physics has been
able to lend support to the Pythagorean theory that numbers
lie at the base of the real world.
Speed is defined as distance traveled divided by time
taken. Speed could be measured in units of kilometers per
hour or minute, feet per second and centimeters per second
as the case may be [Whitely 23]. For example, if a car

57
 covers a distance of 60km in 30 minutes, the speed of the car
can be calculated as follows:
Speed = Distance travelled i.e. 60 = 2km/min.
Time taken 30
By reformulating the formula above we can get the
distance covered given the speed and time taken. For
example, if a car is moving at a speed of 2kms in a minute,
we can calculate the distance covered in 40 minutes as
follows:
Speed x Time =2x40= 80kms.
As in the case of speed, all phenomena of the real
world such as sound, light, energy, temperature, heat,
attractions, repulsions and so on, are quantifiable and can
also be given units of expressions in numbers. This is why it
is possible for science to make use of measuring
instruments like the rule, thermometer, hydrometer, and so
on. Numbers, again, can be seen as lying at the base of the
phenomenon of time. Time is no doubt an important aspect
of human consciousness. Man really depends on time for all
his successes and failures in life. Indeed, his attempts and
achievements are all products of time. However, time is
very relative because every phenomenon in the real world
has its own time clock. In view of this, if not for the use of
numbers to mark or identify time, man’s social endeavours
and other pursuits could have been a meaningless venture
(Aluko43).
Furthermore, number is very useful in the natural
- sciences for the purpose of predictions. In the field of
sociology, population growth is measured in numerical
terms. The rate of desert encroachment and the rise in the
volume of ocean waters are all presented in numerical
values. Number is therefore indispensable to life. There are

58
no suitable words to aptly describe the contributions of the
Pythagoreans than the words of Sir Dampier who said:
In our own day, Aston with his integral atomic
weights, Mosley with his atomic numbers,
Planck with his quantum theory, and Einstein
with his claim that physical fact such as
gravitation are exhibitions of local space-time
properties, are reviving ideas that, in older
crude forms, appear in Pythagorean
(
philosophy
* 18).

The Atomists: Democritus of Abdera

The particular things that make a plant a plant are the
roots, the stem, the branches and the leaves. Although each
of these taken alone does not constitute a plant, yet in the
absence of any of them a plant is not possible. But since
they are different things, each must have certain qualities
that assist it in composing a plant. This is the case with
matter. Matter as a whole is a composite thing, but the
elements that compose it may have natural distinctions and
qualities necessary to make matter, without these being
matter themselves. This is where the theory of atomism
comes in.
In an attempt to reconcile the ‘oneness’ of monism
and the ‘plurality’ of pluralism as shown in the above
analogy, Democritus reasoned that if a piece of matter were
to be divided continually, a point would eventually be
reached where no division is possible. This point of
indivisibility, he1 called ‘Atom’. The word ‘Atom’ is
derived from the Greek word ‘atome’, which means ‘un­
cut’, where ‘a’ like a negative prefix in English means ‘un’ '
and ‘tom’ means cut (Jones 77). Democritus believed that
the concept of the atom was the unifying principle behind
the illusion of the many. The Democritian atoms are
59
innumerable, uncuttable, unchangeable and perpetually in
motion. In between the atoms are empty spaces. The
question we may ask at this juncture is, how scientific is
Democritus’ concept of atom? To answer this question we
shall take some of the postulations credited to Democritus
and relate them to the thoughts of some of his successors
and also to generalized scientific facts.
Democritus maintained that matter is made up of
uncuttable parts called atoms. This postulation is logical,
since, according to him, if a piece of matter were to be
divided continually, a point would be reached where further
division is impossible. In this sense, logical possibility is
given to the existence of the atoms. In support of
Democritus, John Dalton in 1808 came up with the atomic
theory and corroborated Demorcritus’ assertion by saying
that, “matter is made up of small indivisible particles called
atoms’ [Holderness & Lambert 18]. Dalton’s atomic
theory came about 2,200 years after that of Democritus and
it was as a result of scientific experiments with crystals of
potassium permanganate in clear water and the diffusion of
liquid bromine water through the air [Aluko 45],
Democritus said that the atoms are uncaused and have been
in existence from eternity. This postulate seems to tally
with the geologist account of the formation of the earth
some 4.5 million years ago. The atoms in this case are
probably those materials of the solar system that came
together and reduced motions to form the rocks that first
made the earth. The cause of these solar atoms is not
known to scientists because of their infinite nature and
because of the finite scope of the human mind.
Another postulate of Democritus concerns the non­
annihilation of the atoms. When Democritus said that
atoms are never annihilated, what he meant is that, though
matter can be destroyed or changed, its constituents [the

60
atoms] remain. To explain this in the light of modern
science, the term ‘energy’ in physics is defined as that
which gives the ability to work, to make impact or to resist
impact. It has two forms, namely, potential energy and
kinetic energy. While the former is energy stored for work,
the latter is energy used for work. Again, while the former
is possessed by a body by virtue of its position and
mechanical condition, the latter is energy due to motion.
Although these two forms of energy make series of
transformations in a body, they are never lost. For
example, when water boils, the vapours produced are never
lost. Realizing the non-annihilation of atoms, scientists
experimented and came up with the law of conservation of
energy which states that during transformation of energy
from one form to another, the total amount of energy is
unchanged [Whitely 68]. This is also a basic law in the
physics of thermodynamics.
According to Democritus, atoms have many sizes
and shapes but identical substance. The implication of this
postulate is that differences in the properties of things can
be accounted for as differences in size, shape, position and
movement of the ultimate particles [atoms]. The assertion
is logical and in fact chemistry has proved that atoms differ
in sizes and shapes through Neil Bohr’s discovery that
electron shells surround atoms and these electron shells are
determined by the atomic numbers of the element in
question [Holderness & Lambert 73-74],
Furthermore, Democritus postulated that atoms
move in all directions through the void [infinite space]
striking against each other and producing lateral -
movements and vortices which bring similar atoms
together to form elements, which in turn start the formation
of innumerable worlds. These innumerable worlds grow,
decay and ultimately perish. Regarding this. Sir Dampier

61
 said: “Here we see a faint forecast of the nebula hypothesis,
and of the Darwinian theory of natural selection” (24). The
truth of the nebula hypothesis has been somewhat proved
and many instances of solar materials like stars and galaxies
coming together have been observed. Many of the
‘innumerable worlds’ are known to have a short life span
and many of them crash to the earth as meteorites when they
decay.
As we can see from the above, the philosophy of
atomism no doubt went beyond the bounds of its
predecessors. To be precise, it succeeded where its
predecessors~faffed: if combined logic with evidence to
dri ve Tome its point... As Bernal observed, Greekatomism
was the lineal and acknowledged ancestor of all modem
atomic theories in that Gassendi, the first of the modem
atomists, drew his ideas straight from Democritus and
Epicurus and Newton, a fervent atomist, inspired John
Dalton [184], It is nothing short of this fact and recognition
that modem science accorded the efforts of the Greek
atomists that made Sir Dampier to refer to the destructive
criticisms of Greek atomism by Plato and Aristotle as a
great misfortune.
Aside from philosophers discussed above, there are
other philosophers of early Greece whose scientific
achievements deserve mentioning. Anaximander—
^explained the cosmic origin of things in terms of the
unoriginated and indestructible primary substance called
~tTe ‘Apeiron’ or ‘indeterminate boundless’. For him, the
eternal motion of this substance brought the various
specific elements in the world into existence through the
process of‘separating off’. .Contrary toffhales’- View that
the earth was flat as a disk and floated on —water.
Anaximander theorized that the earth was cylindrical in
shape. Anaximenes [585-528 BXT] designated air as the

62
 primary substance of all things. He is credited with the leal
of being the first to’hit upon the highiyrespectable concepts
~oP rarefaction’ and^condensation
* as the specific forms of
motion, which lead to describable changes in air.
Heraclitus said that the material substance of the world is
fire?^ Empedocles^is credited with many scientific
hypotheses. For example, he was the first to pose the
problem of natural selection as the basis of biological
evolution and took a great interest in the study of the
structure of the human body. Particularly, he formulated a
consistent theory of the eye and the mechanism of visual
sensation. He maintained that the moon was formed as a
result of air condensation. His surmise that light spreads al
a certain speed is considered today as that of a no mean
thinker.
Plato is regarded as the earliestphilosopher who was
a propagandist for mathematics. His approach, to the
subject was basically theoretical. Aristotle who was a
student of PLato often comes after his master with a
difference? Whereas Plato’s approach to science was,
theoretical, the approach of Aristotle w as both theoretical
and practical.- All branches of science as we have them
today found expressions in the works of Aristotle. Among
his works on natural science are: Physics, Parts of Animals
and Meteorologica. It is said that through accurate
observations and disciplined theorizing, Aristotle created a
biological science and taxonomy much like those in use
today. In the field of physics, Aristotle theorized that a body
could only remain in motion if there is an abiding contact
between it and a mover operating continuously. His theory -
of causation or causality identified four major types of
causes, namely, the "formal cause”- what a thing is (e.g. a
chair);jmaterial cause- that out of which a thing is made (in
the case of a chair, wood); efficient cause- by which or

63
\Vhom a thing is made [in the case of the chair, a carpenter.],
final cause, that is, the end for which a thing is made [in the
case of achair, for sitting]._

Evaluation and Conclusion

The early Greek scientists are often called primitive
scientists because their scientific postulations were not
perfectly in order. Very often, they drew an analogy
between the real and the fantastic and sometimes
substituted the latter for the former. For example,
Democritus drew an analogy between the chaotic
movement of dust particles and his famous hypothesis on
the atomic structure of all objects.
Added to the argument of budding scientists that the
main undoing of the early science were its deductive nature
and the abstract level in which it operated, is the allegation
that philosophy at times produces a convincing belief that
may arrest the initiative of one and thus prevent one from
further objectively investigating the unknown and thereby
hindering the discovering of the actual truth. It is this latter
argument that we shall debunk in this section.
One of those allegations of abstractness was leveled
against the Pythagorean theory of numbers. The esoteric
nature of the Pythagorean School and lack of experimental
proofs are among the reasons for the doubt cast upon the
Pythagorean thought. But E. M. Rogers would wish to
differ from the critics of the Pythagoreans. For Rogers,
Pythagoras and his school attached to the study of numbers
mystical values that have appealed to thinking men for
long. He stated that among primitive men, superstition
gave lucky and unlucky numbers magic powers and to this
day reputable scientists discuss the structure of atoms and
universe in terms of magic numbers. The abstract or
magical use of numbers can be seen in the arrangement of

64
electrons in the atom (226k.Neil.BQhr in 1913 postulated a
theory of electron positioning in which he suggested the
existence of certain circular orbits or shells at definite
distances from the nucleus of the atom in which the electron
may rotate. These electron shellFare numbered 1.2.3,etc.
outwards from the nucleus. Perhaps a diagrammatic
example will be of help. < \

X= Electrons

In the diagram above, there are two electrons in shell

1, eight in shell 2, and one in shell 3. The diagram
represents the chemical element called ‘Sodium'. Bohr
claimed that he arrived at his theory of electron positioning
by calculating the theoretical frequencies for spectrums
emitted from an atom of hydrogen and later applied this to
other elements. In essence, using this method, by numbers
alone an element can be known. For example, numbers 2,6
represent oxygen and 2,5 represent nitrogen.
The above is a good example of the ‘mystical’
scientific use of numbers. Rogers’s writes: “There is in
fact, a corporate sanity among scientists that guide thinking
in wise channels without restricting fruitful
imagination”[226]

65
 Taking a cue from above, one readily sees that Bohr’s
theory was a fruitful imagination, which ultimately yielded
positive results, considering the role of Atomic Chemistry
in the field of Nuclear Engineering. It should be remarked
here that ‘fruitful imagination’ which was once the
exclusive reserve of philosophers, is the confluence of the
ancient and modern scientific thoughts. If, therefore,
‘fruitful imagination’ is taken to be the foundation for all
successful scientific enterprise, then we can assert that
philosophy is the cornerstone of modern scientific
development. In my opinion, fruitful imagination is what
philosophy bequeathed to science and which science in turn
uses to its best advantage.
With such a submission, it is argued that ancient
Greece is not only th$ cradle of modern science, it is the
source of the material! used in constructing the incubator in
which modern science was hatched in the 17th century A.D.
But there is a school x>f thought that ascribes this.feat to
ancient Egypt.
The ancient Greeks thought that their solutions to the
problems they sought to solve were logical and correct. But
it is a well-known fact that a vital task of contemporary
science has been to unravel the flaws in the solutions they
proffered. Indeed, without Greek science, some or most of
these problems would not have been solved at all.
z Finally, it is unfair to condemn the pre-Socratic
philosophers as idle speculators. We align with
-intellectuals like Jones who said that:
If we combine Pythagorean emphasis on
mathematics and measurement with the
Atomists’ view that reality consists in entities
varying only in shape, size and velocity, we
have the conception from which modem
physical theory began its great career [38]

66
Science in Africa
Although the African world is a heterogeneous
society, there exist certain common cultural and traditional
elements that identify Africa as an entity. These common
elements can be found in the beliefs and practices of the
people. Belief in one supreme deity and divinities, good
and evil spirits, and ancestors .is commonly held by
Africans. Craft and sculpture are some of the practices
commonly held by African peoples. Ancient Egypt had
these common elements that constitute the bedrock of
African science more than any other African culture.
Consequently, ancient Egypt is often used as a paradigm in
talking about African source of science.
Ancient Egypt is often regarded as the^cradle^of
civilization^ It is held that as far back as 1000 years before
the emergence of ancient Greek science, scientific
elements were to be found in one of the older civilizations
in Africa, Egypt in particular. Because there is no direct
historical record confirming this fact, Egyptian science has
been denied the debt modem science owed to it. Farrington
Benjamin writes:
The bridge connecting the Egyptians’ Science
and the beginning of Greek Science has been
practically broken down through the loss of the
historical tradition...it is undeniable that the
historian of science could not fail to
acknowledge the debt of modern science to the
Greeks. But ignorance reigned to that of
Egypt. On the other hand, the Greeks
acknowledged a heavy debt for the elements of
their mathematical knowledge to the
civilization of the Nile in Egypt (1).
Ancient Egyptian science, unlike ancient Greek

67
 Science, was more of technique than theory. This means
that the Egyptians were more versed in practical
[tcchno]ogy]Ahan in theoretical science. This does not,
however, mean that theEgyptians cannot be linked with the
source of the present science. It is common knowledge that
science and technology interpenetrate one another. In fact,
the connection between the two is very close and important.
The importance lies in the fact that both practical and
theoretical sciences seem to have been antecedented and
presupposed by technology. Based on this fact, the
techniques of ancient Egypt should be regarded as
constituting genuine knowledge. Apart from that,
techniques are fertile .|>eds or foundations upon which
science is raised. WitWieir techniques, ancient Egyptians
achieved a Jot in the fi^ds of agriculture, architecture and
medicine. As part ofpieir contribution to science, they
invented a practical system of geometry to fix property
.'lines, developed a c^fendar, studied the stars, invented
astronomy, named the constellations, discovered an
alphabet, introduced the art of writing, and learned some
physiology and surgery while embalming their dead
With these facts, it will be unfair to deny Eq [in
particular] and Africa [in general] a place in the history of
science.

Science in Eastern World

Ancient Babylonians were able to develop a
calendar, a system of measurement, and a system of
numbering. They also developed asirology^the art of
observing thg^differcnt positions of stars and planets in the
belief that they influence human ^affairs. The ancient
Chinese civilization came a little after Egyptian and
Babylonian civilization had developed. The Chinese were
-able to develop a system of writing and mathematics. They
68
made appreciable advances in the fields of chemistry,
medicine, and astronomy. But they did not influence
science in the western world.
The World Book Encyclopedia observes that a
scientific movement whose writings consisted of numerous
treatises, commentaries, manuals.and technical dictionary, •
originated in India and spread widely. When these writings
were translated, they gave rise to new movements in other
parts of the Eastern world. In the West, it influenced and
was in turn influenced by the traditions of western Asia and
Greece. It was not based on mere speculations, but on
rational principles. This is based on the fact that it sought to
provide natural explanations for observed phenomena. It
was also based on a theoretical logic against which, ideas
were tested. However, it did;not emphasize experiment as
such, except in the field of psychology where it recorded its i.
greatest progress because of’its celebrated techniques of
body and mind control. Apart from psychology, Indian
science also made some achievements in the fields of
astronomy and physiology. It alsotecorded some progress
in plant knowledge and later in chemistry. But it neglected
important areas of science such as physics, geography,
geometry, zoology and geology [Britannica, Vol.20,7].

Science in the Americas

Apart from the cultures and traditions mentioned
above, the Aztec, Inca and Maya Indians of America made
some contributions to science. The AzX&g- developed a
number system and a calendar. The Inca invented their own
number system. The Maya had both a number system and a
highly accurate calendar (World Book Encyclopedia 168).

Science in Medieval Europe

The contribution of the medieval th inkers to scien ce .
is infinitesimal. The medieval period is often called the
69
 dark ages because it was a period or intellectual darkness in
Europe. S. F. Mason regards it as “a somewhat barren
period in the history of European civilization”. With the
destruction of the political might of the Roman Empire in
A.D. 476 by the Barbarians, learning came almost to a
standstill, as virtually the whole body of ancient literature
was lost. Philosophy at this time was kept alive by Christian
Scholars. Their exaltation of faith over reason meant for
them that faith preceded reason or that theology super-
ordinated philosophy. Although there is not much to write
about natural philosophy (science) at this period, there were
fundamental innovations in the field of technology and the
craft tradition, which made life more comfortable
, materially for the majority of men of this period than in
classical antiquity. The victorious barbarians brought with
them numerous things, some of which are:
The wearing of trousers instead of the toga, the
use of butter instead of olive oil, improved
methods of felt making, the ski, and the
making of barrels and tubs. More important
were the introduction by the barbarians of the
cultivation of rye, oats, spelt, and hops, the use
of stirrup for riding horses, and, above, all, the
heavy wheeled plough that provided the means
for the development of the three-field system
on which the life of the medieval manor was
v based (Mason 103).
Apart from the invention of the horse-propelLed
plough, another innovation was the water wheel, which was
widely used during the dark agesTor grinding corn.
The positive consequences of the Various
innovations were: majority of men were spared crude

70
physical labour associated with men of classical antiquity;
food was produced above sustenance level. The wealth
accruing from the surpluses was invested in some notable
projects such as the building of great "cathedrals, the
crusades, and the founding of higher institutions of learning
between 11th and 13 th centuries.
In the area of the crafts, a lot of innovations were also
recorded/"O f note are the spinning wheel used in the textile
trade, waterpower that was applied to sawmills and for
draining mines. Perhaps the most important application of
waferpower was to the bellows of iron furnaces, giving a
blast, which elevated the smelting temperature and melted
the iron, so that it could be cast. Cast iron appeared first
during the thirteenth century in Europe, though blast
furnaces did not become common until the fifteenth
century (World Book Encyclopedia 107). .Other technical
innovations included printing (which made the printing of
the Bible in large numbers possible during Protestant
Reformation), gunpowder-making, canon-casting and later
the making of firearms, which improved military power.

71
 CHAPTER 6

SCIENCE IN THE RENAISSANCE

INTERLUDE AND MODERN SCIENCE
(15TH - 17TH CENTURY)
The period we call the renaissance interlude is the
period interlinking the medieval periodLand modem period.
At some points it departed from the medieval period and at
some points it pre-empted the modem period, hence
causing discontinuity with the past and ensuring continuity
with the past.
The renaissance period is so called because it was
not only a time when classical learning was revived (as a
result of the discovery of ancient Greek and Roman
literature), it was also a period of discovery and
emancipation. On every side new worlds were being
broken info. Christopher Columbus discovered a new
continent during this period, Griotto invented paintings,
and Dante’s literature facilitated the transition from
medieval symbolism to the exaltation’of nature. Leonardo
de Vinci, lhe universal genius looked behind beauty with
care to the mor& minute ingredients of plan’s anatomy, a
mode of curiosity that eventually led Harvey to discover the
circulation of the blood (Mason 215).
It was inevitable that the new intellectual mood of
the Renaissance period would lead to a totally new mode of
analyzing the structure of nature. According to Stumpf,
“Natural science was now to be bom in its modem form
with its stress upon observation and mathematics, an
approach employed, chiefly by Copernicus, Kepler and
Galileo. The Renaissance was, therefore, a time when
many individuals from many lands exhibited many new

72
 modes of freedom and expression, causing at some points
some discontinuity with the past while changing the
emphasis in areas in which continuity with the past was
preserved” (Mason 224). Renaissanne__thinkers_ pursued
questions principally about the physical world. Indeed,
“one of the significant aspects of the Renaissance was the
gradual emergence during this period of the methods of
modem science (Mason225).
The Renaissance produced scientists who achieved
the feat of devising a new method for discovering
knowledge. Unlike the medieval thinkers who took the
traditionaLtgxts as their final authority, the early modern
scientists shifted emphasis to observation and the
formation of hypotheses. Men now began to look for the
principles and laws governing heavenly bodies rather than
attempting to confirm biblical statements. Various
instruments were devised to test the exactness of then-
observations. With the use of instruments and through the
use of imaginative hypotheses, fresh knowledge began to
- unfold. Galileo discovered the moons around Jupiter, and
Leeuwenhoek (1633-1723) discovered spermatozoa,
protozoa, and bacteria. Whereas Copernicus (1463 - 1543)
formedli new hypothesis of the rotation of the earth around
the sun. Harvey (1578 -1657) discovered the circulation of
the blood. Gilbert (1540 - 1603) wrote a major work on the
magnet, and Boyle (1627 - 1691) the father of chemistry,
formulated hisLfarnoiis law concerning the relation of
temperature, volume and pressure of gases. Added to these
inventions and discoveries was the decisive advance made
in mathematics especially by _ Sir Isaac Newton and
Leibniz, wlio independently invented-differential and , ...
.integral ~calculus7 The method of observation and-
mathematical calculation now became the hallmarks of
modern science” (226).

73
 two
The new science had two important consequences on
philosophy. Firstly, the hypothesis that the processes of
nature can be explained and described in observable and
mathematical terms triggered off the philosophical
assumption that everything including the heavens, the
minutest particles and even human thought were subject to
the laws of motion or mechanical laws. Secondly, the
medieval assumption that the earth was the centre of the
universe and that man was the crown of creation was
shattered. Thus, the geocentric assumption, which found
great prominence in Ptolemaic astronomy, gave way to the
more refined heliocentric conception, which was initiated
by Nicolaus Copernicus. The new hypothesis of
Copernicus placed the sun at the center of the universe. The
earth attended by the moon now became one of the planets
that revolved around the sun. Scholars like Tycho Brahe
(1546 -1601), Johannes Kepler (1571 -1603), Galileo and
Isaac Newton supported this new theory (but with slight
modifications). With the emergence of the new science,
not much reference was made to the supernatural in
explaining the phenomena of nature. Rather, “the whole
drift of the new scientific method was toward a new
conception of man, of nature, and of the whole mechanism
of humarl knowledge ...and it was this new attitude of
science that had the most immediate effect upon ... Francis
Bacon and Thomas Hobbes” (Mason 231).
Bacon devised a new Method for assembling and
explaining facts. He believed^'that this method would
uncover the secrets of nature. He considered the mind as
having been distorted by passions and errors of traditional
learning, which he called idols, and distempers of learning,
respectively. These obscuring elements,'according to him,
prevent the mind from reflecting truth accurately.
Consequently, he advocated that to discover scientific

74

I
knowledge the mind must be cleansed of the obscuring
elements. This led him to advocate the method of induction
by simple enumeration. This is the method of deriving laws
from the observation of particulars (facts) and their series
and order (Mason 232). It appears that Bacon could not
offer tangible solutions to the limitations of this method.
The first limitation is that his assumption that a hypothesis •
simply suggests itself after enough facts have been
assembled is not in conformity with the modern scientist’s
conception of a hypothesis as a guide in the selection of
facts that are relevant to the experiment. The second
limitation of his method is that it undermines the
importance of mathematics for science. Thomas Hobbes
of England, Bacon’s friend and Countryman, overcame
these limitations.
JHobbes’ greatest achievement in science is the
addition of mathematical and deductive reasoning to
scientific philosophy. Hobbes fell in love with geometry
when he came across Euclid’s book titled Elements. He
later joined a small pool of thinkers of his day who believed
that geometry was the key to the study of nature. He sought
to recast the whole gamut of knowledge in line with this
single approach. To do this, Hobbes assumed that it
mattered little what the object of study was, that the method
of observation and deductive reasoning from axioms,
formed from observation, would yield exact knowledge.
He, therefore, set out an ambitious project, which was to
recast the study of physical nature, the nature of man, and
the nature of human society, using the same method
throughout (Mason 234).
Rene Descartes followed the tradition of Bacon and ,
Hobbes to urge that general principles must be the basis for
deduction. His great interest in mathematics led him to the
belief that mathematical reasoning provided the best

75
method for discovering true knowledge. He hoped to
generalize the use of the mathematical method for use in
understanding the operations of nature. For him, scientific
theories must be trimmed down to those susceptible of
mathematical development. It is his view that experiments
served to illustrate ideas from intuitively given principles;
they did not determine those principles (Onuobia 15). Both
Newton and Galileo were to agree with Descartes that
mathematical deductions should be based upon general
principles. Their point of difference lies in the fact that
while Descartes urged that the general principles in
question are intuitively given, both Newton and Galileo
urged that the principles are experimentally given.
 CHAPTER 7
SCIENCE IN THE 18TH,
19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES v

Science in the 18th Century

The 18th century was a century of many inventions

and discoveries in science. The field of chemistry got a
booster with the discovery of such chemical substances as
chlorine, oxygen, hydrogen and carbon dioxide. In 1777,
discovered the true natureoT
combustion. He demonstrated that burning is the result of
The rapid union of oxygen and the burning material. He is
said to have discovered the method of describing chemical
reactions by equations
Great strides were also recorded in the field of
biology. Carolus Linnaeus, a Swedish scientist, is credited
with development of the first successful method for naming
animals and plants. This method is still being used today,
though with some modifications. Albrecht Von Heller
organized all the findings of biologists about the nervous
system, the circulation of blood, respiration and
embryology into a systematic physiology (World Book
172). This century also witnessed the following discoveries
or inventions: sound by Joseph Sanveur (1653-1716);
current of electricity or ‘galvanism’ by Aloisio Galvani
(1737^1778); proof of the law of inverse squares by Charles
A. Coulomb (1736-1806); dectric Sparks and invention of
the leyden-jar. measurement of heat by Joseph Black '
(1728-1799); development of the~steam~engine by Thomas
Newcomer; Invention of the achromatic lens.

77
 Science in the 19th Century.
The 19th century witnessed great achievements in
Europe in the field of physics, chemistry, geology and
biology. jLjs often regarded as the golden age of modern
science. Many important advances were made, more so in
the formulating and discovering of the fundamentals of
Physical Science.
James P. Joule discovered that heat is a form of
energyT’The famous Law of Conservation of Energy is
credited to him. This law states that energy can only
undergo a change in form, but can neither be created nor
destroyed. In 1931, Michael Faraday discovered that a
.moving magnet is capable of inducing an electric current.
H. C. Maxwell described Faraday's work on electricity and
magnetism mathematically. He also showedlliaT light and
other energy waves are fundamentally the same. ~
Dmitri Mendeleev of Russia simplified and
systematized the description of chemical reactions. This is
shown in the periodic table of elements published by him in
1869. In this table, elements are grouped according to their
atomic weights and chemical properties, thus clarifying the
relations between the various elements. Other chemists of
the period explained the nature of organic compounds, and
devised new ways of explaining chemical reactions in
mathematical terms •
Charles Lyell, a British geologist, put forth a proof to
show that the development of the earth surface has been a
very slow and gradual process through millions of years.
Other geologists theorized that the earth reached its present
shape through violent changes known as cataclysms.
Charles R. Darwin, in 1858, put forward _an
evolutionary theory of the origin of plants and animals. He
theorized that plants and animals evolved through ages
through an orderly, gradual process of evolution. His

78
explanation of how this process might take place led him to
the idea of natural selection through competition and the
survival of the fittest. Gregor Mendel, an Austrian Monk,
laid the foundation of the science of genetics when he
discovered the basic laws of heredity in 1800’s. Louis
Pasteur founded modern microbiology with his studies of
fermentation and disease. In Leipzig, Germany, Wilhelm
Wundt founded the first laboratory of experimental
psychology in 1879 (World Book 171-172).

Science in the 20th Century

In the early part of the 20th century, revolutionary
advances were recorded in all fields of science. But the
most dynamic has been in the field of physics, especially in
the area of atomic research. Max Planck of Germany used
his famous quantum theory to explain certain properties of
heat. Albert Einstein extended this theory to light energy in
1905. Einstein published his farnous~theory of relativity
that same year. This theory was by all accounts a great
improvement on many of Newton’s concepts. Intensive
researches during the Second World War into the structure
of atom led to the development of atomic weapons. After
the war, scientists directed their effort towards perfecting
atomic energy as a source of power and producing more
deadly weapons. In chemistry, the substantial information
about the preparation of new compounds led to the
manufacturing of plastics, synthetic fibres, and drugs.
In the field of Earth Science, the need to fight energy
crisis and explore metals among rocks and earth’s
substratum led to the birth of a new science called
Geophysics. Geophysics is the science of exploration for
natural resources such as minerals, oil, salt, gas, coal, and
so on. The science of Geophysics has aided mankind in
understanding better such phenomena as continental drift,

70
plate tectonics, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, polar
wandering, and so on.
In healthcare delivery, the combined forces of such
world organizations as World Health Organization (WHO),
United Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF),
Public Opinion and Governments have resulted in
biological researches which have led to break-through
against such killer diseases as tuberculosis, malaria, polio,
whooping cough, and so on. Though no real cure has been
found for the killer disease Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), research war against the AIDS virus is
still raging fiercely. The discovery and development of
natural antibiotics (Penicillin) by Fleming (1881-1955) and
synthetic antibiotics by Ehrlich (1854-1915) has not only
made medical treatment effective, but has also contributed
to a better understanding of the processes underlying life. I
will not fail to mention the names of Marie Curie (1867-
1934), a notable female scientist, whose discovery of
radiotherapy has helped in the treatment of cancer, and
Christian Barnard who pioneered heart transplantation.
There have also been great advances in electronics,
communications and computers. In short, this age is now
known as the computer age.
In the field of aviation, following the initial flight
success of the Wright brothers, the initial entertaining role
of plane flight has risen to the exclusive role of military
fighting and civil transportation. The discovery in this
century of modern rocket system has contributed to both
space exploration and space research. The United States
of America and the former Soviet Union successfully
launched lunar and planetary probes and even the Sputniks.
Major Yuri Gagari of Russia became the first to
successfully orbit the earth in 1961 (Alozie 96-118). Today,
man can travel to and from the moon and there are artificial
satellites orbiting the earth.
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 CHAPTER 8
HISTORY OF MEDICINE
Lack of documentary records has been the bane in
the study of the history of medicine. Record
documentation dates back only to about 4000 B.C. when
human civilization reached a reasonable level. Today,
however, the history of medicine is a distinct and important
discipline in the field of medicine.
TheLaim of history ofmedfoingJ^J^-O^fold._Eirst,
since knowledge is a never-ending process, docunientation
of historical records in medicine will ensure continuity.. Jt
is said that today’s knowledge is a product of pre-existing
knowledge. Second, historical documentation will foster
research. By referring to past methods present day medical
practitioners have a lot to gain. A study of the difficulties
encountered in the past will undoubtedly spur up present
practitioners in identifying difficulties of the present and so
develop a critical sense, which is a prerequisite for medical
thinking. We shall now examine briefly the history of
modem medicine.
The history of medicine, as it were, is co-ever with
man. When man developed ailments, he was constrained
to seek empirical remedies for them. The history of
medicine has developed from primitive practices through
conjecturing and hypothesizing of the medieval period to
present day scientific reasoning.

Ancient Babylonia (4000 B.C.)

The ancient Babylonians possessed an extraordinary
knowledge of medicine considering the level of civilization
during that period. For instance, the Babylonians were_able_
to recognize rabies in dogs as early as 2000 B.C. Uroscopy,^
81
which is the practice of diagnosing diseases simply by
examining the patient’s urine was discovered dunngtHis~
period. This was based on the assumption that a patient’s
urine reflected his bodily functions.

Ancient Greece
It is said that the Greeks laid the foundations of
organized medical practice. “The priest-doctors of Eastern
civilization carried out numerous experiments whose
results reached Greece. These provided the basis for the
Greek schools of medicine which together gave rise to the
so-called Hippocratic medicine” (Korubo -Owiye 106)

Hippocratic Age (From 5 Century B.C.)

This marked a new age in the practice of medicine
because it was characterized by accurate observation and
description of diseases. The main-problem, how£ven-was
that accurate description of disease could not be matched
.with accurate treatment.
The Hippocratic writings were the earliest of the
Greek medical works, dating from the 4lh century B.C.
These writings were the product of a school rather than any
one man, though Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.) himself was
an outstanding figure. He was the first to describe the
method of systematic diagnostic investigation, based on
observation and reasoning. He is regarded as the founder of
medical ethics, and in fact he drafted the Hippocratic oath,
which is still sworn to by physicians today. Apart from
laying the foundation for the way in which treatment should
be conducted empirically and logically, he was the first to
document Uroscopy. No wonder that he won the title of
the father of medicine.

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Roman Period
It iS said that medical science was obliviated by the
fall of Greek political power and the rise of Roman Empire.
The Romans were so pre-occupied with warfare that they
had no time for medicine. The practice of medicine was
unbelievably left to educated slaves. It was not until the
reign of Julius Caesar that foreign doctors were granted
Roman citizenship. During the succeeding centuries Greek
physicians namely, Dioscoridees, Celsius and Galen
helped a great deal in coordinating and strengthening
medical knowledge in various fields.

The Arabic Periods (From 622 A.D.)

The Arabs generally rejected Uroscopy but
emphasized the use of herbs and incantations. Their main
contribution to medicine came from two of their notable
physicians, namely, Avicenna and Aerroes. It is also said
that Islamic medicine was a product of Greek culture,
which was passed from Asian scholars to Arabic scholars
who in turn translated all Greek literature to Arabic. In
addition to their contribution to medical ethics, the Arabs
established hospitals and had medical schools where
doctors were trained.

Pre-Renaissance and Renaissance Period (11th - 14th

Century)
During this period, the Salermita School in Italy
(11300 AD) was the centre of learning in the Christian
world. The church fathers stressed the need to care for the
sick, and this gave rise to the establishment of hospitals.
Medicinal herbs were cultivated, preserved and used for
treatment of disease. Johnnes Actuarius produced an
active medical practice based on Uroscopy in the 13th
century. The invention of the graduated flask of ‘Matula’
S3
generally used by doctors at that time is attributed to him.
Uroscopy was so exalted that it bred quacks. The bubonic
plague of the mid 1300’s was so devastating that many
hospitals were built and new sanitary measures were
introduced. Doctors received special public fees for their
services.
The renaissance period marked the beginning of
modern science and the attendant revival in clinical
medicine, that is, the recognition of the symptoms of
ailments based on accurate observation of the patient.
Consequently, Uroscopy nose-dived. In 1315 the first
official Anatomy dissection was carried out at Bologna
University.

16th-18thCentury.
The practice of Anatomy was revived at the
beginning of this period. Some of the important strides in
the field of medical science during this period included:
1. Leonardo de Vinci (1452- 1570) studied Anatomy by
the practice of dissection. In 1500, he likened
animal nutrition to the burning of a candle and
asserted that animals could not survive without
combustion.
2. The Italian physician Girolamo Fracastoro (1484-
1553) put forward a theory that diseases were seed -
like entities. As an avowed atomist, he suggested
that certain diseases were contagious because there
were atoms or seeds of disease, which reproduced
themselves and were transferred from one person to
another through contact or the air. In this way he
envisaged in a general but vague way the later germ
theory of disease.
3. Paracelsus (1493- 1541), a Swiss physician, tried to
bring into being a new science of medical-chemistry,

84
 or Iatrochemistry as it was called, by unifying
medicine with alchemy. He defined alchemy as a
science concerned with the transformation of the
raw materials of nature into the finished products
useful to humanity. He hypothesized that the human
body was essentially a chemical system composed
of the three principles of the alchemists, namely,
mercury, sulphur and salt. For him, illness could
arise when there is a lack of balance between the
principles. He postulated the doctrine that diseases
were highly specific in their action and hence each
disease needed a specific chemical cure. He was
totally opposed to the old cure-all remedies
containing numerous constituents, and proposed the
administration of single substances as medicaments.
Such a re-orientation stimulated the study of
particular diseases and helped in differentiating
between useful and harmful medicaments.
4. John Baptist van Helmont( 1580- 1644), a noble man
of Brussels, wrote a work titled On the Development
ofMedicine, which was published posthumously in
1648. He held that parts of a composite entity, such
as the organs of the human body had a life and being
of their own deriving from the vital force, which
controls that part. For him, disease was a foreign
guest, which entered the body, settled in a particular
organ and monopolized its vital processes. Thus, a
disease was to be treated by its specific remedy- a
simple inorganic or plant substance, not the old
complex cure-all medicaments. For him, ancient
physicians had confused diseases with their
symptoms, and in their attempt to effect a cure had
tried to remove the symptoms instead of the
occasional cause.

85
5 In 1595, Galileo invented the first instrument for
measuring temperature. In 1610, he effected a
transition from telescope to microscope by adapting
the optical instrument he used to study the skies to
observe small, close objects.
6 Marcello Malphighi (1628 - 1694) was a Professor
of Medicine in various Italian universities and then
physician to Pope Innocent XII. He attempted to
find a method of classifying all living creatures into a
vertical scale. His interest in Harvey’s theory of the
circulation of the blood and the attendant problem of
the role of respiration led him in 1660 to use the
microscope to see the capillaries which connected up
the veins with the arteries in the lungs of a frog.
Thereafter he went on to examine the respiratory
systems of other organisms. At the end of the
investigation, he placed plants at the bottom of the
scale because they were found to be filled with air
tubules, next were the insects because they had
numerous air passages; then fishes because they had
smaller, though complex, gill system; finally man
and the higher animals, which he placed at the top of
the scale because they had only a pair of lungs which
were small compared to the size of their other
organs.
7 In 1628, William Harvey gave the final definitive
description of the circulation of the blood. Before
him, the Spaniard Michele Servitus and the Italian
Andrea Gesalpino had made useful contributions to
it.
8 In 1665, Robert Hooke (1635-1703) discovered that
living tissue was made up of basic .microscopic units
called cells. He, together with Boyle, Richard
Lower, and John Mayow, tried to show that the

86
 change from dark red venous blood to bright red
, arterial blood in the lungs was a result of the uptake
of part of the air and that the air so absorbed played a
function in the body akin to that of chemical
combustion. The work of Boyle, Hooke, and Lower
was summarized and expanded by Mayow in his
Five Medico- Physical Treatises, published in 1674.
9 Antony Van Leeuwenhoek (1674- 1683) was a
Dutchman who perfected the microscope. With the
aid of the microscope, he was able to see the actual
circulation of the blood through the capillaries in the
tail of a tadpole and in the foot of a frog. With this
discovery the mechanics of the circulation of the
blood was finally settled and scientists were now
able to investigate what function the circulation of
the blood served. The industrial revolution in the
18th Century led to great scientific and medical
discoveries:
10 Earlier in this century, Giovanni Battista Morgagni
made great contribution to medicine. He is credited
with laying the foundation of pathology.
11. William Hunter (1752-1783) suggested that the seat
of disease was not at the organ level, but tissue level.
12. Reamure and Spallanzani hypothesized that
digestion was a chemical process. Spallanzani laid
the foundation of experimental physiology.
13. 1750 - 1875. The connection between dietary
deficiency and particular diseased states was
discovered. Consequently, the British Navy
introduced lemon juice into the rations of its officers
and men to control scurvy.
14. In 1762, Plenciz confirmed the already known idea
that infectious diseases were caused by living
agents.

87
15. Edward Jenner discovered smallpox vaccine in
1798. He showed that the much milder disease,
cowpox, provided human immunity against
smallpox, a discovery based on the observation that
dairymaids rarely caught small- pox. Consequently,
in the 1880’s, the practice of. inoculation was
generalized, finding a rational basis in the germ
theory of disease.
16. Pacin, an Italian, discovered the first microbe
associated with human disease - the cholera
organism called vibro comma.
17. Ini 863, Louis Pasteur (1822 - 1895) showed that a
micro-organism caused the fermentation (souring)
of wine, and he demonstrated that warming the wine
to 55°C could kill the microorganism. In the
following year he was asked by the French Ministry
of Agriculture to investigate the disease of
silkworms. Within a few months he succeeded in
isolating the micro-organisms responsible for two
kinds of diseases caused by silkworms, and showed
how the disease -free eggs, worms, and moths could
be recognized and isolated for use in breeding. A
decade later he investigated cattle anthrax and
chicken cholera, and finally in the 1880’s he studied
some of the diseases, which affected human beings.
He confirmed the scientific validity of the already
known preventive immunization. In 1885 he
successfully treated one Joseph Minter of rabies.
18. In 1876, Robert Koch (1843- 1910) discovered that
the micro-organisms responsible for cattle anthrax
could be grown outside the animal body in a culture
medium made up of meat broth jelly. By these
means, he was able to discover and isolate the
bacteria responsible for tuberculosis (TB) in 1882,

88
 and to isolate the cholera micro-organism in the
•following year.
19. In 1849, Berthhold demonstrated that testis
produced a blood-borne substance, which
conditioned sexual characteristics.
20. In 1861, Gregor Mendel (1822 - 1884) published his
principle of inheritance.
21. In 1864, Lord Joseph Lister (1827 - 1912)
introduced the practice of antiseptics in surgery.
22. From 1880-1890, Alexander Fleming and others
elucidated the essential facts of cell division and
emphasized the importance of equality of
chromosome distribution to daughter cells.
23. In 1859, Charles Darwin (1809 - 1882) brought out
his great work On The Origin of the Species by
Means of Natural Selection. Here he summed up
his position in the words that evolution “has been
effected chiefly through the natural selection of
numerous, successive, slight variations, aided in an
important manner by the inherited effects of the use
and disuse of parts, and in an unimportant manner,
that is, in relation to adaptive structures, whether
past or present, by the direct action of external
conditions, and by variations which seem to us in our
ignorance to arise spontaneously” (cited in Mason
419).
In 1871, Darwin published The Descent ofMan.

20th Century
The 20th century witnessed two World Wars, the
aftermath of which was great scientific and
medical discoveries:
24. In 1901, Wilhelm Roentgen received the Nobel Prize
for the discovery of X-rays. About the same time
89
 Mme Curie (1867 - 1934) and Pierre discovered a
radioactive element - Radium. These two great
discoveries revolutionized medical diagnosis and
treatment.
25. In 1908, Paul Ehrlich, a German, and Noguchi, a
Japanese, developed the first chemotherapeutic
agent, thus laying the foundation of modern
chemotherapy.
26. In 1921, Banting and Best discovered the insulin.
This was a great boost to the field of Endocrinology.
27. In 1929, an important breakthrough was recorded in
the treatment of infectious disease when Alexander
Fleming discovered Penicilin.
28. From 1926 - 1935, Vitamins were isolated and
chemically characterized. An important landmark
was recorded in the field of psychiatry when
Sigmund Freud proposed his theory of
psychoanalysis. The first effective vaccine against
polio was discovered. Albert Sabin is credited with
the discovery of the polio vaccine still in use today.

Black Africa and Nigeria

Lack of documentation is our major handicap in the
study of the history of medicine in Black Africa. This
loophole enabled foreign writers to claim that there is no
known active medical practice in Black Africa before the
coming of the whites. The truth is that there are indications
that there existed an active traditional medical practice in
many parts of Africa before the coming of Europeans.
Accounts of successful Caesarian section operation and
other medical ‘feats’ in many parts of Black Africa abound.
A look at the Nigerian case will confirm this.

90
 In Nigeria the practice of traditional medicine has a
very long history. Even today traditional medicine still
plays a significant part in the health care of a significant
proportion of both rural and urban population.
In the area of orthodox medicine, Korubo - Owiye
has identified as possible sources the Eastern Arabic
influence (which came across the Sahara to Western Sudan
and then to Northern Nigeria), Western influence (which
came through the trading missions of various Western
powers to the Niger Delta region and later through the
Portuguese), Slave trade (with slave ships normally
bringing-along, medical doctors), early explorers (with
some of the expeditions being led by doctors), and the
missionaries ( some of who established hospitals in the
costal area) (113-114).
In a more recent sense, the origin of public health
services in Nigeria can be traced to the British Army
Medical Services. After the Second World War medical
services were extended to civil servants. Further efforts’by
government and religious bodies led to the extension of
medical services to the local population.
The first known Nigerian doctors were trained in
mid 19" century first at Fourah Bay Institute in Sierra
Leone, and then in United Kingdom to qualify for practice.
On return to Nigeria, they first served in Army hospitals
before going into private practice. These included Dr. J. A.
B. Horton (1858)s Dr. Obadiah Johnson (1886), Dr. John
Randle (1888), Dr. S. A. Legh - Sodipe (1892), and Dr.
Oguntola Sapara (1895) (Korubo -Owiye 114).

91
 CHAPTER 9

HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS

What is Mathematics?
Mathematics can be roughly defined as the
deductive study of numbers, geometry and various abstract
constructs. Its main branches include foundations, algebra,
. analysis, geometry, and applied mathematics. Foundations
is concerned with the formulation and analysis of the
language, axioms and logical methods, which form the
basis of mathematics. Set theory, which was developed by
George Cantor, now constitutes the universal language of
mathematics. Algebra studies the solutions of one or
several algebraic equations, involving polynomial
functions of one or several variables. Arithmetic and
number theory are areas of algebra, which deal with special
properties of the integers. Geometry deals with the spatial
aspect of mathematics, that is, the properties of and
relationships between points, lines, planes, figures, solids
and surfaces. Topology is concerned with the structures of
geometric objects in a very general way. Applied
mathematics deals with a wide range of issues with
significant current use in the empirical sciences. It includes
mathematical statistics, mathematical physics, computer
science and probability theory.

History of Mathematics
Mathematics is a growing discipline, which has
varied with time. Although mathematics as we know it
today is an axiomatic - deductive discipline, it did not start
92
that way. It is said that mathematics starts with counting.
This does not mean that early counting was mathematics.
What it does mean is that it is only when some record of the
counting was kept that mathematics actually started.

Early Civilizations
The earliest records show that mathematics arose in
response to the practical needs of agriculture, business,
surveying, navigation, and industry in the 5*, 4*, 3- and 2
millennia B.C. in Egypt, Babylonia, and possibly in India
and China. In Egypt, for example, the annual flooding of
the Nile valley forced the ancient Egyptians to devise
formulas that would help in re-establishing land
boundaries. Also, the need to have mathematical formulas
for construction, calendar and commerce provided the
impetus for mathematical developments. Egyptian and
Babylonian mathematics was empirically based, and hence
devoid of logical demonstration.

Greece
Although the debt of Greek mathematics to Egyptian
and Babylonian mathematics is difficult to appraise, it is
nevertheless clear that the Greeks succeeded in
transforming the subject into something very different from
the set of empirical rules worked out by the Egyptians and
Babylonians.
Between 3rd and 2nd Century B.C., the classical
Greek philosophers Thales. Pythagoras. Plato, Aristotle,
Euclid, Archimedes, and Zeno of Elea profoundly altered
the nature of mathematics. They introduced such abstract
notions as ‘infinity’ and ‘irrational numbers’, and a
deductive system of proof.
93
 The ancient knowledge of geometry was passed on
to the Greeks who insisted that geometric statements
should be established by deductive reasoning as opposed to
trial and error. Thales, the originator of this was quite
familiar with the computations handed down from- the
Egyptians and Babylonians. His attempt to determine
which of the computations were correct led him to the
development of logical geometry. This orderly
development of theorems by proof was a novel invention.
The Pythagoreans continued this new mathematics
begun by Thales over the next two centuries. The
Pythagoreans, a school led by Pythagoras in the 6th century
B.C., were struck by the fact that phenomena that appear
different can exhibit identical mathematical properties.
They concluded that these properties could be expressed in
number or in numeral relationships. For them, the study of
music and mathematics can bring about the elevation of the
soul and union with God. Nonetheless, they were able to
develop a large body of mathematics, using the deductive
method.
Zeno of Elea made an important contribution to
mathematics. His paradoxes led to the atomic theory of
Democritus, •'he realization that the rational numbers are
no sufficient to measure all lengths was brought about by a
more precise formulation of concepts. Studies in the
geometric formulation of numbers led to a form of
integration.
The Platonists, led by Plato, expanded and
propagated the Pythagorean doctrine of the mathematical
design of nature in the 4th century B.C. Plato postulated
that there is an ideal world, a world of forms, that is
94
designed mathematically, and that the world of sense is an
imperfect representation of the ideal world. Though the
Aristotelians differed from the Platonists regarding the
relation of mathematics to the physical world, they still
propagated the doctrine of the mathematic design of nature.
At the end of the classical Greek period, the doctrine
of the mathematical design of nature had been fully
established and the quest for mathematical laws or truths
instituted. Of course, searching for mathematical truths
meant the abandonment of the Egyptian and Babylonian
emphasis on empirical and often approximate results.
What informed this development is that if mathematics is
truly a body of truths, then mathematical reasoning must be
tailored towards securing truths about physical
phenomena. The first principle was that mathematics
should be concerned with abstractions, that is, abstract
concepts (such as point, line, and whole number), in terms
of which other concepts such as triangle, square and circle
could then be defined. To reason with mathematical
concepts, the Greeks decided to start with axioms, that is,
self-evident truths, from which conclusions could be
arrived at through deductive reasoning.
How successful the search for mathematical truths
was is evidenced in the mathematical work of such men as
Euclid (about 300 B.C), Appollonius and Archimedes in
the 3rd Century B.C., and Ptolemy in the 2nd Century A.D.
These men belonged to the second great period of Greek
history called the Hellenistic or Alexandrian period (300
B.C-600A.D.).
Euclid’s work is a logical organization of a vast
account of the separate discoveries of many classical
95
Greeks. His major work Elements stipulates the laws of
space and of figures in space. This work consists of a large
body of known mathematics, including his own
discoveries, which he organized into the first formal system
of mathematics. This formal structure was shown by the
fact that the Elements began with an explicit statement of
assumptions known as axioms or postulates, as well as
definitions. The accompanying statements were then
shown to follow logically from these axioms and
definitions. The entire structure of Books I - IV, VII, and
IX of the treatise dealt primarily with what we now call
Euclidean geometry.
Euclidean geometry as conceived by its originator
was an idealization of physical geometry. The entities of
mathematical system are concepts abstracted from physical
experience but differing from physical .entities the same
way an idea differs from the object itself. However, there is
a correlation between the two. For example, the angle sum
oi a mathematical triangle was said to be 180°, and if one
measured the angles of physical triangles the angle sum
seemed to be 180°. The same held for a multitude of other
relations. Based on this agreement between theory and
practice, many writers have suggested that Euclid’s axioms
should be regarded as self-evident truths. Centuries later,
the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant surprisingly
declared that the human mind is essentially Euclidean and
can only conceive of space in Euclidean terms.
Euclid- based his geometry on five fundamental
postulates or assumptions, namely,

96
Postulate I: For every point P and for every point Q not
equal to P there exists a unique line that passes through P
and Q.

PostulateII: For every segment AB and for every

segment CD there exists a unique point E such that B is
between A and D and E and segment CD is congruent to
segment BE.

Postulate IIP. For every point O and every point A not

equal to O there exists a circle with centre O and radius OA.

Postulate IV: All right angles are congruent to each

Other.

Postulate V: If a straight line falling on two straight lines

makes the interior angles on the side less than two right
angles, the two straight lines, ifproduced indefinitely, meet
on that side on which the angles are less than two right
angles.
It is argued that Euclid’s fifth principle is too
burdensome. It is unlike the first four postulates, which are
derived from experience. Although the fifth postulate
comes from the study of parallel lines, it is not intuitive.
Since it is unintuitive, it should follow from other axioms
and be proved as a theorem.
The theory of conic sections found great expression
in pure mathematical study by Appollonius, a native of
Pergamum in Asia Minor who studied mathematics in
Alexandria. His classic work Conic Sections was partly
devoted to the study of the parabola, ellipse, and hyperbola.
97
Archimedes added several works, all of which dealt with
the calculation of complex areas and volumes by a method
known as the method of exhaustion. Today the method of
the calculus takes care of these problems.
The Greeks also made major contributions in the
fields of trigonometry, astronomy, mechanics, optics,
geography and hydrostatics. Hipparchus was the
originator of trigonometry, while Ptolemy gave a complete
and authoritative version of it. Ptolemy’s major work is the
Almagest (i.e. The Mathematical Composition). In
astronomy. Ptolemy’s theory of the universe offered the
first reasonably complete evidence of uniformity and
invariability of celestial phenomena. In mechanics,
Aristotle’s Physics reinforced the conviction that
mathematics is central to penetrating the design of nature.
In Optics (the branch of science concerned with the use of
vision to determine the sizes of objects), Euclid’s Optics
and Catoptrica (theory of mirrors) are the oldest
systematic treatments. In geography, Erastosthenes of
Cyrene made numerous calculations of distances between
significant places of the earth known to the Greeks. He also
made a now famous and quite accurate calculation of the
earth’s circumference. In hydrostatics, Archimedes’ work
On Floating Bodies is quite mathematical in approach and
in derivation of results. The work contains the famous
Archimedes principle, which states that a body immersed in
water is buoyed up by a force equal to the weight of the
water displaced by the body.

India and Arabia

With the gradual conquest of Greece, Egypt and the

98
Middle East by Romans, and the final conquest of Egypt by
the upsurging Muslims in 640 AD, Greek civilization nose -
dived. Consequently, there was a decline in learning in the
West. The Indians, the Arabs and the Chinese continued
the development of mathematics. The Indians invented the
numeral system, which is still in use today in the civilized
world. Although the work in these countries did not match
the progress made by the Greeks, it did preserve Greek
mathematics to some extent. Moreover, after the conquest
of Egypt, most Greek scholars migrated to Constantinople
(now Istanbul), which had become the capital of the Eastern
Roman Empire at that time. This increased the body of
knowledge that eventually reached Europe about 800 years
later.
The Hindus and Arabs used whole numbers and
fractions, but they also used irrational numbers without
hesitation. They introduced new and correct rules for
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division of
irrational numbers.

The Renaissance
The most important concern in late medieval Europe
was the acquisition and study of Greek works. This was
made possible through the Arabic translations of those
Greek works proper which had been kept in safety in
Eastern Roman Empire. When the Turks conquered this
empire in 1453, many Greek scholars migrated westward,
bringing their books along. It was through these works that
the intellectual leaders who championed the revitalization
of Europe learned the doctrine of the mathematical design
of nature.
99
16th Century
The beginning of 16* century witnessed great strides
in mathematics in Europe. Pacioli, Cardan, Tartaglia and
Ferrari provided the algebraic solution of cubic and quartic
equations. Copernicus and Galileo revolutionized the
applications of mathematics to the study of the universe.
Added to the body of mathematical knowledge was
mathematical induction, the binomial theorem and
approximate results of finding new roots of low and high
degree equations - though proofs were not provided for
these results. The major contributors were Francois Vieta,
Thomas Harriot, Albert Girard, Pierre de Ferment, Rene
Descartes, and Isaac Newton.

17th Century
In the 17th century Napier, Briggs and others
developed decimal fractions and logarithms, and the study
of projectile geometry and probability was started. Napier,
Briggs, Blaise Pascal, Fermat, Galileo and Kepler made
useful contributions. Fermat and Pascal began the
mathematical study of probability. Under the influence of
earlier mathematicians, especially his former teacher
Barrow, Newton developed the calculus as a tool to extend
the frontiers of the study of nature. In short, the greatest
discoveries of the century were the invention of analytical
geometry by Descartes and of the calculus by Newton and,
independently, Leibniz. Leibniz’s influence on the various
members of the Bernoulli family was to ensure the growth
of the calculus in power, and variety of applications.
Newton’s theories of gravitation and light usher us into the
18th Century.
100
18th Century
* The history of mathematics in the 18th century is
characterized by development of the calculus and its
application to physical problems, both terrestrial and
celestial, with the Bernoulli family, Leonhard Euler, Joseph
Lagrange, and Pierre de Laplace playing leading roles.
Euler invented two new branches, namely, calculus of
variations and differential geometry. He effectively
expanded the new number theory begun by Fermat.
Toward the end of the ‘18th century Lagrange began a
rigorous theory of functions and of mechanics. A branch of
mathematical physics was launched in the 18th century
known as fluid dynamics. This is concerned with the study
of the flow of fluids and motion of bodies in fluids. Daniel
Bernoulli suggested that the theory might be used in
describing the flow of blood in human veins and arteries,
while Euler derived the equations for the motion of
compressible fluids.

19th Century
The most prominent figure in this century is Carl
Gauss, who made fundamental contributions to algebra,
arithmetic, geometry, number theory and analysis.
Another great addition to mathematical knowledge was the
invention of non-Euclidean geometry independently by
Nikolas Lobachevsky. Bolyai, and in another form, G.F.B.
Riemann, whose work was foundational to the
development of the general theory of relativity. Sir
William Rowan Hamilton, M. S. Lie, George Cantor, Julius
Dedekind, and Karl Weierstrass made great contributions
to number theory and abstract algebra. Weierstrass and
101
Augustine Cauchy introduced new rigours to the study of
calculus and of analysis. Cayley carried forward algebraic
geometry. Hamilton and Grassmann complemented his
work on matrices and linear algebra. At the end of the 19th
century Cantor invented set theory almost single-handedly.
He had discovered a contradiction while trying to assign a
cardinal number to the set of all sets and an ordinal to set of
all ordinal numbers. Cardinal number refers to the number
of elements in a set. For example, the cardinal number on
one hand is 5. Ordinal numbers refer to ordered rank. For
example, we can assign ordinal number 1 to the thumb, and
ordinal number 5 to the little finger. This innovation by
Cantor opened the eyes of mathematicians to the fact that
they had been using similar concepts not only in the newer
creations but also in the purportedly well-established older
mathematics. These contradictions were called paradoxes
(now antinomies) because it was thought that paradoxes
could be resolved. The English philosopher Bertrand
Russell formulated a more popular version of the nature of
paradoxes.

20th Century
There were two main trends in the twentieth century.
The first was towards increasing generalization and
abstraction, exemplified by investigations into the
foundations of mathematics by David Hibert, Bertrand
Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, and Kurt Godel. The
second is towards concrete applications to such areas as
social sciences, linguistics, and computer science, made
possible by the work of John Von Newmann, Nonbert
Wiener, and others.
102
 A major problem that plagued mathematicians in the
20th century is called the problem of completeness. Simply
put, completeness means that the axioms of any branch of
study are adequate to establish the correctness or falsity of
any meaningful assertion involving the concepts of that
' branch.
In the first decade of the century mathematical giants
split into different camps in their efforts to find solutions to
the problems plaguing mathematics. Four major schools of
thought emerged to tackle these problems. They include:
1. The logistic school, which was spearheaded
byRussell and his friend Whitehead.
This school founded mathematics on logic.
2. The intuitionist school, which was initiated by
the Dutchman 1. E. J. Brouwer. This school
reliedsolely on concepts and theorems
acceptable to human minds.
3. The formalist school, initiated by David
Hibert. This school built mathematics on
logical and mathematical axioms and
proposed a mathematical programme to
prove the consistency of mathematics.
4. The set theoretic school was founded by Ernst
Zermelo and modified by Abraham A.
Fraenkel. This school built mathematics on
axioms of sets so carefully chosen
that presumably the deduction of
contradictions is impossible.
The main bone of contention among members of
these four schools centred on the question of what
foundation was necessary to establish consistency. Other
103
minor issues centred on whether one should use the axiom
of choice or the continuum hypothesis, and the status of
what are called existence proofs.
As if to worsen the situation created by the
contentions and differing positions of the various schools of
mathematics, Kurt Godel of the University of Vienna
published a paper in 1931 which dealt a devastating blow to
mathematics. On the issue of consistency, Godel argued
that even the consistency of a mathematical system that
only embraces the arithmetic of whole numbers could not
be established by the logical principles adopted by the
various foundational schools. Godel’s ‘incompleteness’^
result states that, if any formal theory T adequate to
embrace the theory of whole numbers is consistent, then T
is incomplete. Thus, for Godel, the price of consistency is
incompleteness. Godel’s result also exposed the
inadequacy of all known axiomatic systems. Since
consistency cannot be proved, it means that
mathematicians are talking nonsense because a
contradiction can be found at any time. When this happens
and the contradiction cannot be resolved, then all
mathematics becomes pointless. Of course, one of two
contradictory propositions must be false. Does that not
mean that mathematicians have been labouring under a.
threat of doom?
Further attempts to resolve the problem of finding
proper foundation for mathematics have compounded
rather than solved the problem. Godel’s later work (1940)
and Paul Cohen’s work (1963), indicated that the axiom of
choice and the continuum hypothesis are independent of
other axioms of set theory. It follows that if one builds*
104
mathematics on set theory, there are several positions one
can take. Does that not mean that there are several
mathematics? As Morris Kline has rightly observed.
The developments on the foundations of
mathematics since 1900 are bewildering and
the present state of mathematics anomalous
and deplorable. The light of truth no longer
illuminates the road to follow. In the place of
the unique universally admired, and
universally accepted body of mathematics
whose proofs, though sometimes requiring
emendation, were regarded as the acme of
sound reasoning, we now have differing and
even conflicting approaches to mathematics.
What practical course can mathematicians
pursue? Beauty and intellectual challenge may
justify many creations; but to decide among
the many differing views about which
mathematics is sound for applications, only the
test of applicability is available. Ironically,
such a test means reverting to the empirical
nature of Egyptian and Babylonian
mathematics (502).
Thus, we are back to the starting point of mathematics!

105
 CHAP ! I R Id
A SUMMARY Ol HIE HISTORY OF
WESTERN SCIENCE
In this chapter. I present a summary of the trends and
developments in the history of Western Science. The
scientific postulations and achievements of distinguished
scientists of different periods are specifically highlighted.
The aim of this chapter is, therefore, mnemonic.

Ancient and Medieval Science (6th Century B.C.-14th

Century A. D)
600-500 B.C. Thales, Pythagoras, Euclid and others had
perfected geometry. Thales is credited with the
knowledge that amber, when rubbed will attract light
bodies, and that lead stone or magnet possesses the
power of attracting iron.

C. 400 B. C. Hinnocrates (regarded as the father ^of

Medicine) taught that diseases have~natural rather
than supernatural causes and that the human body
possessed the power to repair itself.

300’s B.C. Aristotle’s studies in logic and classification

contributed to the foundations of science.

371-286 B.C. Theophratus of Eresus wrote a book on

Winds and Weather Signs. Aratus of Soli also wrote
a book of progrostics, giving predictions of the
weather from observation of astronomical
phenomena, and various accounts of the effect of
weather on animals.

C. 300 B.C Euclid formulated basic postulates of

deductive geometry.
106
 2OO’s B.C. At a time when most Greek Scholars were
interested mainly in metaphysics, Archimedes
performed experiments and discovered basic
physical principles.

A.D. 100’s Galen laid the foundation for the study of

anatomy and physiology. Ptolemy developed the
geocentric theory- the theory that the earth is the
centre of the universe. He measured angles of
incidence and refraction and discovered they were
proportional, which is almost true in the case of small
angles.

1200’s Scholars who were mainly theologians saw no need

for direct observation of nature. Writings of
Aristotle, Galen and Ptolemy were considered
apodictic truth. However, some scholars were
interested in alchemy, a mixture of magic and
rudimentary chemistry. Roger Bacon criticized the
deductive method of obtaining knowledge and saw
the need for experiments, measurement and
mathematics.

'*5^1232-1370 Mechanical clocks appeared. The

construction of 39 clocks recorded.

j. 1276-1337 Griotto invented paintings.

Renaissance and Modern Science (15th -17th Centurv)

1400’s Many men developed interest in nature, but most
of them turned to Greek writings, rather than trying
to add new knowledge. Few' questioned the
authority of Aristotle and Ptolemy.
107
C. 1500 Leonardo da Vinci recognized the_importance_of
observation and experimentation in learning. He
used experiments to make many discoveries.

1543 Nicolaus Copernicus’ publication of two books

changed man’s ideas about his world and about the
world. He developed the heliocentric theory that the
sun is the centre of the universe and the earth and
other planets move around it.

1500’s Tycho Brahe made accurate observations about

The planets.

1590 The first compound microscope was created.

Galileo’s pupil Torricelli discovered the principle of
the barometer.

1640 -1608 Gilbert wrote a major work on the magnet.

1600’s Francis Bacon summarized the theory of the

experimental method, urging the use of the inductive
method of reasoning.

1600 Galileo emphasized the mathematical interpretation

of experiment in science. He discovered many
important physical laws. Galileo also discovered the
moons around Jupiter.

1608 Tippershey, a Dutchman, invented the telescope,

although Galileo was the firstto make dramatic use of it.

1602-1686 Guericke invented the air pump, which was so

important in creating a vacuum for the experiment
108
 that proved that all bodies regardless of their weight
or size fall at the same rate when there is no air
resistance.

1609 Johannes Kepler established astronomy as an exact

Science.

1628 William Harvey published his theory on the

circulation of blood.

1660’s Robert Boyle applied the scientific method to

chemistry. He formulated his famous- law
concerning the relation of temperature, volume and
pressure of gasses.

1687 Sir Isaac Newton published the PR1NCIPIA. which

' summarized basic laws of mechanics.:r’'
r'.i >* • '• • • . 'll1

- ,

1632-1723 Leeuwenhoek discovered spermatozoa,

’ 5: protozba and Bacteria. ‘ ”

18th Century Science

C. 1730 Carolus Linnaeus founded the method of
classification of plants and animals.

1774 Joseph Priestly discovered oxygen.

1776 Adam Smith published the first systematic

formulation of classical economics

1777 Antoine Lavoisier explained that when an object

109
 bums, it unites with oxygen. His research laid the
foundation for modern chemistry.

C.1781 William Herschel identified the planet Uranus

about 2880 kilometers from the earth.

1724 Stephen Hales, employing his mercurial gauge,

carried out a brilliant experiment on transpiration.

1767 Casper Friedrick Wolf discovered that all parts of

the plant except the stem are merely modified
leaves. Johann Wolfang confirmed this in 1790.

1731 -1802 Erasmus Darwin published two works ‘loves

of the Plants’ (1789) and ‘Zoonomia’ (1794). These
two works stressed the gradualistic theory of
evolution, which states that complex organisms
gradually evolved from simpler primordial forms.

1749 P. J. Macquer became the first to make a discussion

of affinity the focal point of interest in chemical
theory.

1756 Black discovered carbon dioxide.

1792 Rutherford discovered Nitrogen.

1708-1788 G. L. Leclerc - Comte de Buffon reached the

conclusion that the earth was 74,832 years old after
conducting series of experiments. He even went
further to divide this period into 7 geological
periods.
1726-1797 James Hutton proposed the volcanic theory,
which stated that rock strata were caused by volcanic
eruptions.

1770’s Hyder Ali, an Indian adventurer, became the first to

develop war rockets using hammered iron cylinders
as container for the gunpowder.

1783 Marquis de Jouffroy d’Abbans launched his

Steamboat in Lyon.

1796 Edward Jenner discovered a method of vaccination

against smallpox.

1803 Interest was revived in medical ethics and a code of

ethics was published.

Science in the 19th Century

1803 John Dalton announced his atomic theory.

1830 Charles Lyell founded modern geology.

August C omie started the study of sociology.
♦

1831 Michael Faraday induced an electric current with a

moving magnet.
1839 Maninas Schleiden and Theodor Schwann
theorized that all living things are composed of
cells.

1858 Charles Darwin advanced his theory of evolution of

plants and animals.
1860’s James Clerk Maxwell developed his
electromagnetic theory.

1866 Gregor Mendel published his discovery of the laws

of heredity.

1869 Dmitri Mendeleev developed the Period Table,

classifying elements by their atomic weights and
properties.

1876 Loius Pasteur found that micro-organisms cause

fermentation and disease.
- 4 ’. ‘J .1.

1879 Wilhelm Wundt founded the first laboratory of

experimental psychology.
t

1882 Robert Koch discover^ bapjt.eria that cause

tuberculosis,
I • : . VM ■

Wilhelm
1895 v- ii •
Roentgen discovered
R. ,IW." /p.x
X-rays.

1898 Marie and Pierre Curie isolated the element radium.

■ 1 •

1900 Max Planck advanced the quantum theory.

C.1900 Paul Ehrlich originated ‘chemotherapy’, the

treatment of disease with chemicals. Sigmund Freud
developed psychoanalysis.

1852 -1903 Bequerel, a French physicist, discovered what

is today known as radioactivity.
112
Science in the 20th Century
1905 Albert Einstein presented his Special Theory of
Relativity. In 1916, he presented His General Theory
of Relativity.

1911 Ernest Rutherford put forth a theory of Atomic

Structure. He recognized that the mass of the atom is
located in a nucleus.

1847-1922 Alexander Graham Bell designed and

developed the telephone.

1925 John Baird became the first to make possible live

television transmission.

1928 Alexander Fleming discovered Penicillin.

1932 Chadwick discovered the neutron

1938 Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann found lightweight

atoms after bombarding uranium with neutrons.

1942 Enrico Fermi and his associates achieved the first

successful nuclear chain reaction.

1945 The first atomic bomb was dropped at Hiroshima

and Nagasaki (Japan). Many lives were lost.

1953 Jonas Salk produced the first effective vabcine

against polio. It was released for use in 1955,

3
1957 Russia launched the first artificial satellite. Arthur
Kornberg grew DNA, the basic chemical of the gene
in a test tube.

1958 U.S.A, sent up its first artificial satellite.

1961 Major Yuri Gagari of Russia and Alan B. Shepard,

Jr., of the United States became the first men to fly in
space.

1969 Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., landed

on the moon and brought moon rocks and dust back
to earth for scientific study.

*1 am greatly indebted to the authors of the following works

whose material was profusely used. Some of the materials
were li fted verbatim. I dully acknowledge them. Indeed, the
chapter is just a footnote to them.
Alozie, P. I. (ed.) History and Philosphy of
Science, (Calabar: Dec-ford Publishers, 1994).
Mason, S. P. 4 History ofthe Science, (N.Y: Collier Books,
1962).
Onuobia; O. N. (ed.) History and Philosophy of Science,
(Aba: Maiden Educational Publishers Ltd., 1992).
Stumpf, S. E. Philosophy: History and Problems,
(N.Y: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1971).
The World Book Encyclopedia, (Chicago: Field
Enterprises Educational Corp, 1976), vol. 17.

114
----------------- —_ ,

PART THREE:

PHILOSOPHY AND THE RISE OF

MODERN SCIENCE
L______________ .________________________________________________ A
 CHAPTER 11

ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

Biographical Sketch
Aristotle [384-322 B.C.], was bom in the small town
of Stagira on the northeast coast of Thrace. His father was
the personal physician to the Macedonian King. His great
interest in science, especially biology was nurtured in his
early childhood. At seventeen years, he enrolled at Plato’s
Academy in Athens, where he stayed as a pupil and
member in the next twenty years. While there, he was
greatly influenced by Plato’s thought and personality. At
the Academy, he wrote many dialogues in a platonic style.
He eventually left the Academy to found his own
institution, the Lyceum, in order to formulate his own
philosophical ideas. At the Lyceum, he and his pupils
studied philosophy, mathematics, and the empirical
sciences, especially biology. He wrote books on a variety
of subjects including logic, Metaphysics, physics, ethics,
biology, politics, psychology, rhetoric and aesthetics. He is
reputed to be the first to develop logic as a science or as an
academic discipline. He became the teacher of Alexander
the Great in 343/342 B.C. As a teacher to a future leader,
his interests included politics. When Alexander ascended
the throne, his work as a tutor came to an end. He then left
for Athens in 335/334 B.C. where he embarked upon the
most productive period of his life. When Alexander died in
, 323 B.C., the subsequent wave of anti-Macedonian feeling
that arose forced him to flee Athens [because of his close
connections with Macedonia], lest, according to him, the
116
Athenians should sin twice against philosophy, the killing
of Socrates being the first. He left the lyceum and went to
Chaicis where he reportedly died in 322 B.C. of a long­
standing digestive ailment.

Aristotelian Science
The early work of Aristotle, which focused on the
nature of the heavens, was speculative in method, while his
later works, which focused on biology, were based more
closely on observation.
In the field of astronomy, Aristotle held that the
spheres, which bore the heavenly bodies round their
courses were indeed physical bodies as opposed to
geometrical constructions, as supposed by Eudoxus. Each
sphere passed on its motions to the one immediately below
it so that the outermost sphere carrying the fixed stars, by
rotating daily on its axis, caused the diurnal rotation of all
the spheres and the heavenly bodies attached to them with
it. In order that the motions peculiar to one heavenly body
should not be passed on to the body immediately below it,
Aristotle introduced a number of what he called ‘unrolling
spheres’ between each set of spheres carrying a planet. The
similarities among the spheres included that they had the
same axes of rotation, they had the same speeds; they were
of the same number as the spheres which moved the planet
above them. The difference among them, however, is that
they moved in an opposite direction so that they were able
to neutralize all the motions peculiar to that planet, only the
diurnal rotation being passed on. For him. there were about
twenty-two ‘unrolling spheres’ that were geometrically
redundant [Mason 41],
Aristotle believed that the outermost sphere of the
fixed stars was moved by what he called the ‘Unmover

117
Mover’, which, according to him, is stationed at the,
periphery of the universe from where it controlled the entire
universe. He probably thought that each of the other
spheres had a lesser ‘Prime Mover’, which was responsible
for its motion. He likened the relation between a sphere
and its mover to that of a body to a soul. For him, the
movers of a planet worked contrary to the Prime Mover and
this made them to have their own west/east motions
contrary to the diurnal rotation. The planet Saturn, which is
the outermost planet, had the longest period of rotation
because of the difficulty it had in trying to overcome the
‘Primum Mobile’. The moon had the shortest period of
rotation because it was the innermost body. This informed
Aristotle’s arrangement of the heavenly bodies in order -
outwards from the earth in accordance with their periods of
revolution-Moon, Sun, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter and
Saturn.
In the field of physics, one of the main concerns of
Aristotle was the question of how things came to be in the
physical world. He began with the notion of Prime Matter,
by which he supposedly meant the substratum of things that
was capable of becoming other things or assuming new
forms. For him, the processes of nature involved the
continuous transformation of matter from one form to
another. He believed that nature made things from what he
called ‘simple bodies’, namely, air, water, fire and earth.
All things were reducible to these basic elements. When
these elements combined with one another, they gave rise
to new substances. The genesis of these new forms was a
product of nature itself, since inherent in these bodies was a
principle of motion and rest. For this reason, “fire tends to
rise to become air. water to fall and become earth, the solid
to become liquid, and the wet to become dry. In any case, to
118
say that things change is to say that these basic simple
bodies are constantly being transformed into things through
their internal principle of motion and by the motion of
things” [Stumpf 100-101],
Denying the existence of empty space, which the
atomists believed to exist, Aristotle argued that it was
inconceivable that a vacuum could exist, as space must be
filled with matter to transmit physical effects by direct
contacts in this way. For instance, when a stone is thrown it
is maintained in motion by the air which streams behind it to
prevent the formation of vacuum. Following this, the
atomists must be wrong to have supposed that the world
consists of atoms in the void, for space is a continuum of
matter.
Aristotle is said to have a richer view of causality
than Plato. He indicated four main types of causes namely:
1. Material cause: This refers to the primary matter out of
which objects are made.
2. Formal causes: These refer to the designs, forms and
patterns, which are impressed upon the primary matter.
3. Efficient causes: These refer to the agents who provide
the mechanisms whereby such designs are realized.
4. Final Causes: These are the purposes for which objects
are designed.
For Aristotle, what confers life upon certain kinds of
bodies is the soul.. The soul accounts for the transition
from inorganic to organic forms. All bodies are a
combination of the primary elements, but while some have
life, others do not. He uses ‘life’ here as a correlate of decay
to mean nutrition and growth. Matter as such is not a
principle of life because material substance can only be
potentially alive, but form is actuality. A body that is
potentially alive derives its life from what is actually alive,
namely, form. The soul, then, is the form of an organized
119
body. However, soul and body are not two separate entities
but are rather matter [body] and form [soul] of a single
unity. From this, it follows that the soul cannot be separated
from the body. Without the body, the soul cannot exist in
the same way that there cannot be vision without an eye.
By way of conclusion, it should be mentioned that
Aristotle marks a turning point in the history of Greek
Science, for he was the first to embark upon extensive
empirical inquiries.

120
 CHAPTER 12

THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION

Nicolas Copernicus (1473-1543) was the son of a

prosperous merchant and municipal official of the old
Hansa town of Thorn on the Vistula. His father died when
he was only ten years old and his uncle, Lucas Watzelrode,
who became Bishop of Ermland in 1489, adopted him.
During the years 1496-1506 he studied in Italy, returning to
Frauenburg to take up a canonry when his uncle died in
1512. During his thirty years stay at Frauenburg, his
activities touched many areas, among which were.'
medicine, politics, finance, and ecclesiastical affairs, but he
seemed to be more interested in the new system of the
world which he probably thought about while in Italy. This
new system placed the sun at the center of the universe,
with the earth revolving daily on its axis and orbiting
annually round the sun, while the fixed stars remained at
rest.
Copernicus wrote a small work titled . the
Commentariolus, in which he gave account of his theory,
which circulated in handwritten copies among his friends
from about 1530. The theory became well known and
attracted George Rheticus (1514-1576). a mathematician
of Wittenberg, who studied with Copernicus for two years
and published the first printed account of the Coperriican
theory in 1540. Finally, Copernicus published his main
work titled Revolution of the Heavenly Spheres in 1543
(Mason 127-128).

121
The Copernican System
One of the early achievements of modem science
was in the science of observational astronomy. The
common cosmological view of men in ancient times was a
geocentric one. It was believed that the inhabited earth was
at rest at the centre of the universe, with other planets
(including the sun) revolving round it. This belief was
derived from familiar facts of common experience, ideas
from the Bible, and early Greek philosophy and science,
especially those of Aristotle and Ptolemy.
In his work The Garden ofEpicurus,, Anatole
France captures the mind-set of the medieval man
thus:
We have some trouble in picturing the mind of
man of olden times who firmly believed that the
earth was the centre of the world and that all the
stars turned round it. He felt under his feet the
souls of the damned writhing in flames, and
perhaps he had seen with his own eyes and
smelled with his own nostrils the sulphurous
fumes of Hell escaping from some fissures in the
rocks. Lifting his head he contemplated the
twelve spheres of the moon, of Mercury, of
Venus, which Dante visited on Good Friday of the
year 1300, then those of the Sun, of Mars, of
Jupiter, and of Saturn, then the incorruptible
firmament from which the stars were hung like
lamps. Beyond his mind’s eye discerned the
Ninth Heaven to which saints were rapt, the
premium Mobile or Crystalline, and finally the
Empyrean, abode of the Blessed, toward which,
he firmly hoped, after his death two angels robed
in white would bear away, as it were a little child,
his soul washed in baptism and perfumed with the
122
 oil of the last sacraments. In those days God has
no other children than men, and all his creation
was ordered in a fashion at once childlike and
poetic, like an immense cathedral. Thus
imagined, the universe was so simple that it was
represented in its entirety with its true shape and ,
motions in certain great painted clocks run by
machinery (cited in Onigbinde 106).
. . It was a great shock when Copernicus challenged and
upturned this familiar view of the world by his new science
of astronomy. Copernicus is regarded as “the first great
modem astronomer and founder of a new system of the
celestial orbs” (Burtt 35). It should be mentioned that
though Copernicus was primarily an astronomer, his
scientific discoveries brought about an intellectual
upheaval that has come to be regarded as the Copernican
revolution.
Copernicus employed mathematical arguments to
substantiate his theory. For him, a scientific theory consists
of a group of ideas deduced from certain assumptions
(hypotheses). A true assumption must meet two conditions,
namely, it must account for the observed motions of the
heavenly bodies, and it must not contradict the Pythagorean
preconceptions that the heavenly bodies have circular and
uniform motions. It is in view of the failure of the PtolemaicA
system to meet the latter condition that Copernicus?
dismissed it as grossly insufficient to please the mind.
Ptolemy had assumed that the heavenly bodies move in
circles with angular speeds whicji were uniform relative not
to the centres of their circles, but only to points outside such
centre. Another important objection Copernicus raised ,
against ancient astronomers is that they failed to explain
what was observed in the heavens and unnecessarily
complicated their systems of the universe. He argued that in
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their quest to postulate a scheme that make the earth to be at
rest at the centre of the universe, the ancient astronomers
added three motions of the earth to each of the heavenly
bodies, thereby unnecessarily complicating the Greek
schemes. Copernicus eliminated these by assuming that the
earth rotates on its axis daily and revolves round the sun in
an annual orbit. Thus, Copernican system threw the facts of
astronomy into a simpler and more harmonious
mathematical order. It was simpler because in place of
eighty or so epicycles of the Ptolemaic system, Copernicus
was able to ‘save the phenomena’ with only thirty-four, all
those which had been required by lbs assumption thatrthe
earth remained at rest being now eliminated. It was more
harmonious because the major part of the planetary
phenomena could now fairly well be represented by a series
of concentric circles around the sun, our moon being the
only irregular intruder (Burtt 38)
Whereas in the old system the motions of the
heavenly bodies were east-west, and their rotations in the
opposite direction, in the Copernican system all the planets
(including the earth) moved in the same direction with
speeds that decreased with distance from the sun, while the
sun and the fixed stars are at rest at the center and the
periphery of the universe respectively. With this, it became
clear why the planets appeared to approach and recede from
the earth. According to Mason, “By an ingenious
combination of epicycles, Copernicus accounted for the
fact that the apparent diameter of the moon does not vary
widely, whilst the epicycles assumed by Ptolemy required
that the apparent diameter of the moon should vary by a
factor of four” (131). Mason also observes that though
astronomical computations were made simpler by the
Copernican scheme due to the smaller number of circles
involved, the prediction of planet places was not more

124
accurate than with the Ptolemaic scheme, as both involved
error of about one per cent.

Objections to the Copernican System

The objections that have been raised against the
Copernican system include the following:
1. Copernicus has been accused of being conservative.
For example, he continued to stick to the ancient dogma of
assigning epicycles in accounting for planetary motions.
This technique, which was borrowed from ancient Greek
thought required that the heavenly bodies be circular in
shape, since only the circle exhibited the perfect shape
appropriate to their motions. This presupposition was not
finally overthrown until Johann Kepler formulated his
three laws of planetary motions. The first law states that
each planet describes an ellipse with the sun in one focus;
the second is that the line drawn from the sun to the planet
sweeps out equal areas in equal times; and the third is that
the times the planets require to complete their orbits are
proportional to the cubes of their respective mean distances
from the sun (Mason 136).
Another example of Copernicus’ conservatism can
be seen in his dogmatic adherence to the notion that his
heliocentric theory in which a single body (the sun)
occupied the centre of the universe, while all other bodies
including the sphere of fixed stars revolve round this
centre. This view was later abandoned when it was
discovered that the sun is just one of the innumerable
quantity of stars and that there is nothing like a single
sphere of fixed stars.
2. Another serious objection is that, if the earth rotated
as theorized by Copernicus, then the air would tend to be
left behind, resulting in a permanent east wind. Copernicus
answered this objection in two ways. Firstly, he contended
125
that, since earth and air both contain earthly particles, both
of them are forced to rotate together. Secondly, he stated
that the air rotates without resistance, since it is contiguous
to the ever-rotating earth.
3. It is objected that, going by the Copernican scheme, a
stone thrown upwards into the air would be left behind by
the rotation of the earth, and fall westward of its point of
projection. To this, he replied that, since the objects which
are depressed by their weight are mainly earthen, there is no
doubt that the parts retain the same nature as their whole,
and thus rotate with the earth (Mason 131).
4. Finally, it is objected that, if the earth rotated, then
the impact of the centrifugal force would make it to fly to
pieces. To this, Copernicus replied that if the earth did not
rotate, then the much vaster sphere of fixed stars must rotate
at a very great speed,, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to
fragmentation due to the influence of centrifugal force. He
also suggested that centrifugal force was only found in
unnatural, artificial motions, not in natural motions, such as
those of the earth and the heavenly bodies.

Conclusion
In spite of the criticisms leveled against the
Copernican system, its achievements cannot be dismissed
with a wave of the hand. With Copernicus, a new set of
cosmic values emerged. The universe was no longer
governed by a prime mover at the periphery of the universe
but by the sun at the centre of the universe.
As Onigbinde observes, the Copernican revolution
clearly illustrates two basic features.that must characterize
any major revolution in science. The first is that it must be
able to reorient the ways in which scientists think about a
domain of natural phenomena and propose new lines of

126
research. For example, the astronomical theory of
Copernicus set new tasks for other astronomers such as
Tycho Brahe (1546 - 1601),. who undertook extensive
observational studies on the positions of the planets; Kepler
(1571 - 1630), who embarked upon a series of theoretical
researches in his quest for a more adequate planetary
theory; and Isaac'Newton (1642 - 1727), who initiated a
series of investigations in trying to systematize and unify
the laws of the whole field of terrestrial and celestial
physics. For Onigbinde, a second result of the Copernican
revolution consists in its philosophical implications.
Specifically, it forced a basic rethinking of man’s
conception of the world and his place in if. Of course,' it was
only the first of many scientific revolutions, which had
similar broad impacts. Other examples include the
biological theory of evolution developed in the 19th
century, Einstein’s theory of relativity and quantum
mechanics developed in the early part of the 20th century,
and the results are now beginning to emerge from the
science of molecular biology in genetic research (108
-109)..

i
127
 CHAPTER 13
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF GALILEO,
DESCARTES AND NEWTON
Galileo Galilei
Galileo Galilei (1564 -1642) was born at Pisa, Italy
where he studied and taught for a brief period at the
university there. He moved to the university of Padua in
1592, where for eighteen years he embarked upon the more
important of his researches on mechanics. In 1610 he
moved to Florence where he carried out his investigation in
astronomy with the telescope. In 1632 he published his first
influential work titled Dialogues Concerning the Two
Chief World Systems: Ptolemaic and Copernican^ In
1638, he published his second great work titled Discourses
on Two New Sciences. Both works, which were written in
form of dialogues, were aimed principally at discrediting
Aristotelian cosmology and mechanics. His work on
mechanics was inspired by the problems experienced in
engineering, while his studies on the gravitational fall of
bodies was stimulated by the problem of the flight of
projectiles (Mason 153).
Galileo’s main interest was in the role of
mathematics in scientific methods, particularly the
problem of the degrees to which physical objects
correspond to geometrical figures. His mathematical
theory of motion, which was a substantial improvement of
Bacon’s method of inquiry, grew out of his use of
mathematical facts to empirical facts about motion. His
inductive method was a huge success because through it he
was able to discover the laws of change. Bacon’s method
was concerned with ‘forms’ as its objects, while Galileo’s

128
method was concerned with establishing the mathematical
relationships that control the simplest, most fundamental
phenomenon of motion. In addition to his method of
induction (i.e. analysis), Galileo introduced the method of
mathematical deduction (i.e. synthesis), which proved very
fruitful in ascertaining the movement of astral bodies,
which were not amenable to observation in an experimental
laboratory. By means of a rational principle, which he
formulated, Galileo was able to place the laws of nature1 in a
universal form. He successfully applied the principle of
Plato and Democritus to resolve the age-long problem of
‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’. Thus, “the world is indebted to
Galileo for correcting the vagaries of Empiricism by means
of mathematical calculations, replacing the steri.lt
Pythagorean number philosophy of the Humanistic period
with an empirically valid mathematical theory” (Sahakian
130). •? :
Another area of interest for Galileo had to do with the
fall of bodies under gravitational force. After dismissing as
wrong Aristotle’s view that heavy bodies fall faster than
light ones, he proposed a theory of inertia which urged that
the unimpeded motion of a body is a uniform speed in a
straight line. From this position of Galileo, there arose the
problem of explaining heavenly bodies in mechanical
terms. The problem narrowed down to two questions,
which agitated the minds of the men of that period. They
included:
1. What is the law governing centripetal force, which is
necessary in order to bend linear motions into
circular or elliptical ones?
2. How do we demonstrate that gravity is capable of
providing the centripetal force, which makes planets
move in close orbits?
129
 Of course, this required the derivation of law
responsible for variation of gravitational force with the
distance of gravitational bodies (Onuobia 15 - 16). Here,
credit must go to Newton who discovered this law.
Before discussing Newton’s scientific method, one
more area in which Galileo made important contribution to
science needs to be adumbrated, and that is, his support for
the Copernican heliocentric theory of the universe.
Contrary to the view of the Catholic Church at that
s time that the Copernican system was a mere instrument for
calculation, Galileo insisted that the Copernican system
, was more than that. He agreed with Copernicus that the sun
was at rest at the centre of the universe and all other
heavenly bodies including the earth revolved round it.
From the centre of the universe the stationary sun
illuminated the parts of the planetary bodies, which were
turned towards it.
Despite the attempt by the church to make Galileo to
recant his claims, he insisted that Copernicus was correct
because he himself had viewed Jupiter and its moon with
the telescope and they constituted a miniature model of
what Copernicus said about the solar system, that is, that the
universe housed planets, which were like moons to the sun.
Galileo also claimed to have viewed through the telescope
that the inner planets appeared to be like moon when
viewed from the earth, as Copernicus had predicted. All
, attempts by Galileo to make the church representatives to
see for themselves through the telescope were defied
because they believed that the scientific equipment was
meant to enable you see what it was designed for, and not
any objective reality. The church opposed the Copernican
130

U
 system because it contradicted what it stood for, that is,
that the sun and other planets revolved round a stationary
earth at the centre of the universe. As Galileo insisted on
fostering the new system, he was called before the-
inquisition, which tried him, found him guilty and
compelled him to abjure, curse, and defest the aforesaid -
errors.

Rene Descartes
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is French most eminent
; philosopher and the father of modem philosophy. He was '
- bom in La Haye, Touraine. He was trained in Scholastic
philosophy under the tutelage of the Jesuits in La Fleche.
Here he also studied Mathematics, in which he
distinguished himself by founding analytical georifetry.
' From 1629 to 1649 he lived in the Netherlands, where he,
wrote his important works, namely, Discourse on Method
■ (1637), Meditations of the First Philosophy (1641),
' Principles ofPhilosophy (1644), The Passions ofthe Soul
" (written during 1646-1649, and published posthumously in.
- 1650), and The World (written during 1630-1632, and
published posthumously in 1664).
Z Despite being a Roman Catholic, Descartes’ books
were placed upon the index by the Roman Catholic Church.
Oxford University prohibited the teaching of his
philosophy (Sahakian 133).
Descartes’ main vision was to find a single all-
encompassing science of Mathematical Physics that would
make the entire physical universe intelligible. In using
mathematics as the paradigm of knowledge, Descartes
followed the legacy of Plato. But unlike Plato whtf
131 1.1
believed that mathematics can yield the knowledge of
forms without the admixture of anything material or
sensible, Descartes proposed that it is mathematical
physics and not ‘pure’ mathematics that can yield both
rational, demonstrative knowledge and knowledge of the
material sensible. Descartes was a creative mathematician
who is credited with the discovery of the fundamental
principles and techniques of analytic geometry. He it was
who succeeded in merging geometry, and arithmetic and
algebra into a single discipline. As a result of his effort in
this direction, it became possible to write algebraic
equations for geometric curves and other spatial figures.
In the field of physics, Descartes held that the ideal
mathematical language for describing physical phenomena
is analytic geometry. His assumption is that it is possible to
bring the whole sphere of physical phenomena under the
purview of the science of mechanics, that is, the aspect of
physics that is concerned with the motion of bodies. His
views about physics and motion included the following
theses:
1. All of physical nature is a plenum. This implies that
there is no empty space in the universe.
2. The so-called indivisible particles of matter (atoms)
do not exist.
3. All motions of bodies can be explained in terms of
whirlpools of material particles (vortices) that vary
in size and speed.
4. Extension is the essential attribute of matter. This is
his most fundamental claim (Onigbinde 112-113).

132
 In summary, the achievements of Descartes include:
1. Contribution to the development of mathematical
techniques.
2. Invention of coordinate geoi ; etry.
3. Extension of geometry to measurable quantities - a
process that remains clumsy because algebra is more
suited to the task.
4. Development of the view that motion and extension
is the key to understanding reality.
5. The view that all space is filled with matter and
therefore there is no void.
6. The view that motion is relative.
7. The view that God governs reality as a whole using
the rules of mechanics (Onuobia 15).
Descartes’ hypothesis that all of physical nature is a
single, mathematically unified intelligible mechanism, all
of whose motions and phenomena can be explained in
terms of a single set of principle was a task too enormous
for him to implement. As a result of this, Descartes’
proposals were shelved in favour of a more superior and
convincing principle of Newtonian mechanics.

Isaac Newton
Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) is credited with the
feat of successfully carrying out Descartes’ proposal of a
mechanization of physics. In his influential work The
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, he tried
to show that his three laws of motion and gravitational law
have made it possible to deduce, and hence explain, the
whole range of physical phenomena observed over the

133
centuries. In particular, he showed that the concepts of
mass and force were crucial to the explanation of the
acceleration of bodies. For him, his language of calculus
was the precise mathematical tool needed for the
formulation of laws of motion of bodies. Thus, the
Newtonian synthesis was able to accomplish what
Cartesian system could not - a universe made intelligible to
a science of mathematical physics (Onigbinde 144).
Newton’s mechanics was based on the common
belief that conceptual truths, laws and theories of natural
sciences are derived from observation or sense experience
by the method of induction rather than sheer imagination.
Newton himself stated that the truth of his theory could be
determined from certain observational statements, similar
to those from which the theory was logically derived.
Thus, for him, the inductive method of scientific inquiry is
indispensable to the natural sciences, and is preferable to
the deductive method because it enables the Scientist to
move from effects to causes. This is so, more so that, the
conclusion of a deductive argument cannot extend our
knowledge beyond the information already provided by the
premises, whereas the conclusion of inductive argument
does. In fact, the premises of an inductive inference
provide weighty evidence, which renders the truth of the
conclusion probable.
Newton first found the law of centripetal force of the
universe, and then the connector between the decrease of
gravitational force between two bodies with the square of
the distance separating them. He agreed with Descartes
that the starting point for mathematical demonstration in
natural philosophy should be the observed effects and laws

134
of mechanical motion. He also shared Galileo’s view-that -
mathematical deductions should be based upon
experimentally given principles. But he differed in that he'
was able to see- the "difference between experimental
principles and intuitive principles. In so doing, he differed
from Descartes who suggested that scientific
demonstrations should be based on intuitively given ideas.
Newton believed that intuitively given ideas had the status
of hypotheses only. Speculative and experimental
philosophizing belonged to separate chambers in
Newtonian system (Onuobia 16).
Newton was criticized by some of his
contemporaries, and their work helped to strengthen the
Cartesian system in Europe for many years. They
attempted mechanical explanations of gravity, either by
invoking the action and pressure of subtle matter
permeating the entire universe, or looking back to the idea
of magnetism. The English generally supported Descartes,
while the French supported Newton. The consequence
was a controversy, which continued well into the 18th
century. According to Butterfield,
Both Descartes and Newton were in the first rank
of geometers; but the ultimate victory of Newton
has a particular significance for us in that it
vindicated the alliance of geometry with the
experimental method against the elaborate
deductive system of Descartes. The clean and
comparatively empty Newtonian skies
ultimately carried the day against a Cartesian
universe packed with matter and agitated with
whirlpools, for the existence of which scientific
observations provided no evidence (170).
135
 CHAPTER 14

EINSTEIN’S THEORY OF RELATIVITY

Biographical Sketch
Albert Einstein was bom in Ulm, Germany in 1879,
He graduated from the School of Engineering in Zurich in
1901. In 1905 his first paper on the theory of relativity
earned him a Ph.D from the University of Zurich.
In 1919 he gained world fame when the British Royal
Society (BRS) announced that his theory of relativity had
overthrown the Newtonian theory. He was awarded the
Nobel Prize for his work in theoretical physics in 1921.
Because of the growing anti-Semitism in Europe, he was
forced to migrate to the United States in 1933 where he
taught at the famous Princeton University until his death in
1955.
Einstein was a liberalist, pacifist and Zionist. His
life-long quest for a unified theory of all the basic forces of
nature was futile. He published a number of
groundbreaking papers, among which are:
1. “A new Determination of Molecular Dimensions “
(1905)
2. “On a Heuristic Viewpoint concerning the
Production and Transformation of Light,” in which
he postulated that light is made up of Quanta (later
called photons), that in addition to wave-like
behaviour, demonstrate certain properties unique to
particles.
3. “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”, in
which he postulated that both time and motion are
136
 relative to the observer.
4. “Does the Inertia of a Body Depend Upon Its Energy
Content,” in which he postulated his famous
formula: E=MC‘ (Energy= Mass multiplied by the
speed of light squared).
5. “The Foundation of the General Theory of
Relativity”’(1916) in which he argued that gravity is
not a force but a curved field in the space-time
continuum created by the presence of mass (Geisler,
Baker Encyclopedia 213-214).

Background to the Theory of Relativity

The idea that time, space, motion and indeed reality
is relative emerged in physics through the works of a Jew
known as Albert Einstein (1879 1955)% Before him, the*
clockwork universe of Galileo and Newton portrayed these'
concepts in absolute terms. Infact, the works of Galileo and
Newton, which were based on absolute laws and
certainties, cause and effect, order, etc., formed the
psychological foundation for the enlightenment.
In the first of three papers, all written in 1905,
Einstein examined the phenomenon discovered by Max
Planck, according to which electromagnetic energy seemed
to be emitted from radiating objects in discrete quantities.
His second paper proposed what is today called the Special
Theory of Relativity. He based his new theory on a
reinterpretation of the classical principle of relativity,
namely, that the laws of physics had to have the same form
in any frame of reference. As a second fundamental
hypothesis, Einstein assumed that the speed of light
remained constant in all frames of reference, as required by
Maxwell’s theory.
137
 Later in 1905 Einstein showed how mass and energy
were equivalent. He was not the first to propose all the
components of Special Theory of Relativity. Whitehead
has noted that ... his contribution is unifying important
parts of classical mechanics and Maxwell’s
electrodynamics” (106).
In his subsequent work, he was able to make
preliminary predictions about how a ray of light from a
distant star passing near the Sun would appear to be bent
slightly in the direction of the sun. This was highly
significant, as it would lead to the first experimental
evidence in favour of Einstein’s theory. In what follows, I
present a summary of the basic tenets of relativity and show
why it marked a complete breakaway from the past, that is,
why it changed everything in physics.

A Summary of Relativity
Building upon the works of Galileo and Newton, the
19th century scientists were convinced that space
everywhere was filled by a medium called the ether. They
reasoned that light rays and radio signals were waves in this
ether the same way as sound is pressure waves in air. The
interest of the physicists of this era yas how to measure the
elastic properties of the ether with the hope that when this
was done, every other thing would fall into place. Yet a
series of experiments failed to find or unravel the exact
nature of the ether.
In 1905, Albert Einstein, in a paper, pointed out that
because we could not detect whether or not we were
moving through the ether, the whole notion of ether was
redundant. Instead, Einstein started from the postulate that
138
the laws of science should appear the same to all freely
moving observers. In particular, observers should all
measure the same speed for light, no matter how they were
moving. This dealt the first blow on Newtonian physics
which held that there was a universal quantity called ‘time’
that all clocks measure. Instead, every one would have his
personal time. The clock of two people would agree if they
were at rest with respect to each other but not if they are
moving. Einstein’s postulate that the laws of nature should
appear the same to all freely moving observers was the
foundation of the theory of relativity, so called because it
implies that only relative motion is important. This
overthrew two of the absolutes of nineteenth century
science: Absolute rest as represented by the ether and
absolute or universal time that all clocks would measure.
A very important consequence of relativity, according to
Einstein, is the connection between the mass of an object
and its energy (Relativity: Special and General theory
211). The equivalence of mass and energy is summed up
in his famous equation E= MC3 (energy equals mass
multiplied by the speed of light squared)
Among the consequences of this law is that if the
nucleus of a Uranium atom fission (split) into two nuclei
with slightly less total mass, a tremendous amount of
energy is released. It should be noted or remembered that
this led to the Manhattan project and the atomic bomb that
exploded in Hiroshima Nagasaki, Japan in 1945.
Although the theory of relativity fitted well with the
laws that govern electricity and magnetism, it was not
compatible with Newton’s law of gravity. This law states
that if we change the distribution of matter in one region of
139
 space, the change in the gravitational field would be felt
■rnstantaheously everywhere else in the universe. This
means that we could send signals faster than light (which is
forbidden by relativity), and it also required the absolute or
universal time that relativity had abolished in favour of
personal or relativistic time. Einstein realized that there is a
close relationship between acceleration and a gravitational
field: “Some one in a close box cannot tell whether he is
sitting at rest in the earth’s gravitational field or being
accelerated by a rocket in free space” (Hawkings 33).
J The equivalence between acceleration and gravity
did not seem to work for a round earfh, however, people on
the other side of the world have to be accelerating in the
opposite direction but staying at a constant distance from
us. Einstein realized that the equivalence of gravity and
acceleration would work if there were some give and take
1 in the geometry of reality. What if ‘space-time’, an entity
invented by him to incorporate the three familiar
dimensions of space with a fourth dimension “time” was
curved, and not flat, as had been assumed? His idea was
that mass and energy would warp space-time in some
manner yet to be determined. Objects likp apples or planets
would try to move in straight lines through space-time, but
their path would appear to be bent by. a gravitational field
because space-time is curved. In 1915, Einstein published
his General Theory of Relativity, which borders on the
relation of the curvature of space-time to the mass in it. The
new theory of curved space-time was called the General
Theory of Relativity to distinguish it from the original
theory without gravity, which was now known as Special

140
Relativity.
These theories were confirmed in 1919, when a
British expedition to West Africa observed a slight shift in
the position of stars near the sun during an eclipse. Their
light, as Einstein had predicted, was bent as it passed the
sun. It was direct evidence that space and time are warped,
the greatest change in the perception of the universe since
Euclid wrote his Element about 300 B.C. Genera!
relativity also predicted that time comes to a stop inside
black holes regions of space-time that are so warped that
light cannot escape them. But both the beginning and end of
time are places where equations of general relativity fall
apart. Thus, the theory cannot predict what should emerge
from the big bang. Scholars such as J. H. Jauncey, see this as
an indication of God’s freedom to start the universe off any
way God wanted (Science Returns To God 20)
The basic tenets of relativity could be listed as
follows:
1. A moving clock runs slower than a stationary one
from the perspective of a stationary observer.
2. A moving object appears to shrink in the direction of
motion, as seen by a stationary observer.
3. According to relativity, gravity is not a force. It is a
warping of space-time (which happen to be an
amalgam of time and space) that happens in the
presence of mass. The warping is analogous to the
bending of a rubber sheet when weight is placed on ■
it.
4. Without external clues, it’s impossible to tell if one is
being pulled downward by gravity or accelerating

141
 upward.
Confirmation of the Theory of Relativity
Arthur Eddingtion, an authority on the subject of
relativity was very much concerned with the astronomical
consequences of Einstein’s theory of relativity and the
possibility of confirming it by astronomical observations.
Paul Dirac has adumbrated Eddington’s three confirmatory
tests, (the fourth being a recent one) as follows:
1. The Motion of Mercury:
Through astronomical observations, Eddington
discovered that the perihelion of Mercury (i.e. the point in
the planet’s trajectory nearest to the sun) was advancing
about 43 seconds of arc more than it should be according to
the Newtonian theory, a fact that had worried astronomers
for a long time. Einstein’s theory predicted exactly this
effect and Eddington’s tests confirmed this prediction.

2. The Deflection of Light Passing Close by the Sun:

Einstein’s theory of gravitation requires that light
passing close by the sun shall be deflected. The
Newtonian theory requires only half the amount of the
Einstein’s theory. So, by observing stars on the far side of
the sun, whose light has passed close to the sun to reach us,
we can test Einstein’s theory. This is possible at a time of
total eclipse, when the moon wipes out the sunlight. The
total eclipse in 1919 was an opportunity for Eddington to
test Einstein’s theory. The two expeditions he arranged
(one of which he personally led) obtained amazing results,
which confirmed Einstein’s theory. Although some people
were not satisfied at that time because of the difficulties in
making the confirmatory observations, subsequent total
142
eclipses have confirmed this effect and produced results
which tally with Einstein’s theory with a greater or lesser
accuracy.
Today, with the discovering of radio star, it is
possible to check this effect without waiting unending for
the occurrence of a total eclipse. All we need to do is to
observe whether radio waves passing close by the sun are
deflected when a radio star in behind the sun. Critics have
argued that using radio waves instead of light waves will
bring added complication because radio waves are
deflected by the sun’s corona. This is easily' countered by
arguing that this deflection varies for different
wavelengths. By observing two wavelengths, it is possible
to separate the effect arising from the corona from the
Einstein effect. The result is a confirmation of Einstein’s
theory with much greater accuracy than can be attained
with lightwaves.

3. The Red Shift Effect:

This has to do with the prediction that light waves
emitted from a source in a gravitational field will be
deflected towards longer wavelengths, that is, towards the
red end of the spectrum.. The only place to locate this effect
is in a light that comes from the surface of the sun. Although-
it is pretty difficult to observe the Einstein effect there
because of the Doppler effect arising from the motion of the
matter in the sun’s atmosphere (which is quite large and not
very much understood), nevertheless, rough estimates of
the agreement of the effects of this motion with Einstein’s
theory can be obtained.
With the discovering of white dwarf star, a better
143
way of testing for this effect has emerged. The white dwarf
stars present matter in a highly condensed state. The
gravitational potential at the surface of a white dwarf star is
very much greater than it is at the sun’s surface and
correspondingly greater in the Einstein effect. If it is
possible to determine the mass and size of a white dwarf
star, a very good check of Einstein’s theory can be obtained.
Happily, laboratory observations now present us with
greater accuracy than do astronomical observations.

4. The time taken by light to pass close by the sun:

This is a recent test added to the classical ones above.
The time taken by light to pass close by the sun can be
observed by projecting radar waves to a planet on the far
side of the sun, and then observing the time it takes for the
waves to reflect back to earth. Einstein’s theory requires a
delay. With the use of radar waves the retardation is
affected by the corona of the sun.. Again, two different
wavelengths are needed to separate the corona effect from
the Einstein effect. Irwin Shapiro made these observations,
which have largely confirmed Einstein’s theory (in Brown,
Fauvel and Finnegan 90-93)
In sum, these four tests have gone a long way in
showing how successful Einstein’s theory is. It is even
more baffling to realize that Einstein’s theory is not a
product of observation or experimentation, but of
imaginative ability or creative ingenuity.

Conclusion
Einstein’s theory of relativity not only upended
physics, it shook the underpinnings of society. Indirectly,
144
relativity paved the way for a new relativism in ethics, arts
and politics. After the publication of the theory of
relativity, there was less faith in absolutes, not only of time
and space but also of truth and morality. But relativism,
that is, the idea that moral or ethical truth exists in the point
of view of the beholder, owed nothing to Einstein.
Finally, relativity is significant because it
demonstrates that imagination is capable of coming to
terms with experience. By gazing into existence Einstein
concluded that time and space could be warped, and that
mass and energy are interchangeable. D. P. Gribanov sums
up the significance of Einstein’s theory of relativity in the
following words:
The theory of relativity is one of the most
fundamental theories of nature that still, at the
present time, calls for further philosophical
substantiation. Its mathematical and physical
aspects do not give rise to substantial
disagreement among researchers. It has a
leading position by right among the
achievements of the advanced physical
thought of the twentieth century. It has had
broad application in many 1 experimental
programmes (7).
As Paul Dirac puts it, Einstein alone changed the
course of scientific history. His theory of relativity came in
with a terrific impact. It presented the world with a new
style of thinking, a new philosophy (in Brown, Fauvel and
Finnegan 89)

145
 CHAPTER 15
QUANTUM MECHANICS
The term ‘quantum’ was originally used in Latin in
an interrogative sense to refer to ‘how much’ or ‘how
many’. Before the 20th century it was occasionally used in
English to denote a definite amount of something.
Obviously, it was in this sense that Planck im 1-900
• spoke of the elementary quantum of electricity ‘e’, which
meant ‘the electric charge of a positive univalent of ion or
an electron'. It was from this he derived his famous law of
thermal (or ‘black body’) radiation that now carries his
name. The model he employed was a collection of many
linearly oscillating monochromatic resonators encased in a
cavity with reflecting walls, and he assumed that the energy
of the resonators oscillating with a particular frequency “v”
was an integral multiple of the quantity. '

Ev = hv
Where ‘h’ is a constant of nature with a dimension of
action (energy x time), later known as ‘Planck’s constant’.
We are not too sure this was a general hypothesis or a
peculiarity of his fictitious model. Planck himself did not
call “h” an elementary quantum of action nor did he refer to
Pv as one of energy. It was while Einstein was trying to
build on Planck’s work a few years later that he (Einstein)
guessed that all electromagnetic radiation consisted of
energy quanta localized at points in space, which moved
undivided, and could only be absorbed as general wholes
satisfying the condition contained in the equation above.
Subsequently, the term ‘quantum’ was used more often as a
noun to refer to the minimum amount in which some

146
physical quantity is found in nature by multiples of which it
increases or decreases. It was also used as an epithet for
hypotheses, theories, and the like, that imply the reality of
such Quanta, and particularly the ‘quantization’ of energy
in accordance with the equation above. Thus, we can speak
of Quantum Physics (QP) in. this general sense, and
Quantum Mechanics (QM) as the theory developed in the
late 1920’s from the comBmation of Heisenberg's ‘matrix
mecHanics’ of 1925 and SchxodjngerTs~rw'ave ffiechanics’
of 1926. --------------- -----
Quantum mechanics represents a new way of
understanding the basic purpose and concepts of physics,
which has become a subject of endless, philosophical
controversy. This is surprisingly so in spite of its
impeccable experimental success. It should be stated that
the equations of quantum mechanics are not Lorentz
invariant and hence can hold well only in situations where
relative speeds are small, but most authors believe that the
philosophical problems inherent in Lorentz invariant
quantum theories developed at its outset. These problems
have generated the current interest in philosophy of
physics, especially since the philosophical problems
associated with the theory of relativity have been tackled
(Torrenti 307-308) (

Summary of what Quantum Mechanics is all about

The foundation stone of quantum mechanics was
laid in 1900 when Max Planck (1858 — 1947) discovered
that the radiation from a body that was glowing red hot
could be explained if light came only in packets of a certain
size called quanta. It was as if radiation were packaged.
Radiation, which in physics refers to the release of
energy from a source, also applies to different kinds
particles such as1 protons, electrons, positrons, photons,
radio waves, electromagnetic waves, X-rays, ultraviolet
147
 rays, and so on. All bodies, human (including animal) or
incorporeal, hot or cold experience the radiation of
electromagnetic waves. Radiation of these waves from hot
bodies can be seen with the naked eyes, while radiation
from cold bodies can only be detected with the aid of
specialized instruments.
Planck sought to offer an acceptable solution to the
problem of ‘black body’ radiation. Simply defined, a
‘black body’ is a body that absorbs and emits wavelength
and temperature. Planck reasoned that if ‘black body’
radiation were given out discontinuously in Quanta, in such
a way that the energy of a quantum was proportional to the
frequency of the radiation, the emission of the longer
wavelengths towards the red end of the spectrum, would be
favoured at low temperatures as the energy of the Quanta
would be small, while at higher temperatures more energy
would be available, favouring the emission of the larger
Quanta of the shorter wavelengths. In this way Planck was
able to account for the fact that a maximum amount of
energy was emitted at a certain wavelength, and this
maximum shifted to the shorter wavelengths, with an
increase in temperature (Mason 550-551).
In one of his groundbreaking papers written in 1905,
Einstein showed that Planck’s quantum hypothesis could
explain what is called photoelectric effects, the way certain
metals give off electrons from the atoms in the metal when
light falls on them. These electrically charged particles
(electrons) cause the flow of electric current. This is the
basis of modern electrical appliances (e.g. automatic
elevator (lifts) doors, burglar alarm, etc), television
cameras, and communication equipment. On the basis of
the photoelectric effect, Einstein was able to conjecture the
nature of light and physical reality.
Thus, contrary to the wave theory of light (which
identified current of light with an electromagnetic wave)
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popularized by notable physicists of the time including
Planck and Thomas Young, Einstein held that light is made
up of particles. The photoelectric effect was years later
confirmed independently by Arthur H. Compton and Peter
Debye in 1923, and by Loius De Broglie in 1925. Broglie
stated that matter and radiation both have particles and
wave properties. This was confirmed experimentally
shortly after when it was discovered that electrons, protons,
and alpha particles had wave properties, giving diffraction
patterns like light and X-rays.
Erwin Schrodinger, Werner Heisenberg, Paul Dirac,
Niels Bohr and others worked on the Planckean hypothesis
to develop a new picture of reality, which became known as
Quantum Mechanics. No longer did tiny particles have a
definite position and speed. On the contrary, the more
accurately you determine the particles position, the less
accurately you could determine its speed and vice versa.
Schrodinger who was well acquainted with Broglie’s
hypothesis came up with his own hypothesis known as
‘wave-particle duality’ of matter and radiation. He saw
electrons as patterns of standing waves ‘quantized’ as
particles in a discontinuous manner. On the basis of this,
he developed an equation, which the shape of electron
wave had to obey if the electron was part of the hydrogen
atom. He was able to show that electrons are also waves by
applying his equation to deduce the light spectrum of
hydrogen atom. Thus, he was able to demonstrate that the
motion of particles and waves is relative.
On his part, Heisenberg came up with the uncertainty
relation where we cannot at the same time establish the
position and momentum of a particle in motion. He
I 149
perceived atoms in terms of energy transmitted and the
energy so transmitted in terms of an array of mathematical
numbers or matrices. By means of these arrays of
mathematical numbers he was able to calculate atomic
processes. However, the doubt still remains till date
whether all reality can be reduced to mathematics and
whether all mathematics can be reduced to formal logic
(Alozie, POP 109).
In 1928, Dirac derived a relativistic quantum
mechanics by means of which he predicted the existence of
a particle with a positive charge, namely, the positron,
which was later discovered. He had suggested that this
would refer to the proton, but it fitted the positron far better.
Instead of constituting a refutation, the position was an
added confirmation of quantum mechanics.
The uncertainty principle of Heisenberg is
equivalent to Bohr’s principle of indeterminacy. Bohr used
the term ‘complementary’ quantum theory in the sense that
“any given application of classical concepts precludes the
simultaneous use of other classical concepts which in a
different connection are equally necessary for the
elucidation of the phenomena” (Bohr 10). In simple terms,
the principle of ‘complementarity’ encourages us to admit
contradictory positions in quantum theory. For Bohr,
though the wave theory of light excludes the particle theory,
both are necessary or complement each other. Heisenberg
explained this further by positing that,
By the term ‘complementarity’, Bohr
intended to characterize, the fact that very
different, possibly even contradictory
150
 pictures, which are complementary in the
sense that both pictures are necessary if the
quantum character of the phenomena shall be
made visible, can sometimes describe the
same phenomena. The contradiction
disappears when the limitations in the
concepts are taken properly into account (6).
It has to be so if quantum theory must make sense at
all, for the schisms in the theory are numerous.
Complementarity is used to weave together the diverse
aspects of the theory. The McGraw-Hills Encyclopedia of
Physics explained it thus:
Nature has complementary aspects; an
experiment, which illustrates one of these
aspects necessarily simultaneously, obscures
the complementary aspects. To put it
differently, each experiment or sequence of
experiment yields only a limited amount of
information about the system under
investigation; as this information is gained,
other equally interesting information (which
could have been obtained from another
sequence of experiments) is lost. Of course,
the experimenter does forget the results of
previous experiments, but at any instant, only
a limited amount of information is useable for
predicting the further course of the system
(902).

151
 The validity of quantum theory becomes obvious
when we realize that on extremely fine'scale, space-time,
and thus reality itself becomes grainy and discontinuous.
At this level, the laws of cause and effect break down and
particles can jump from point A to point B without going
through space in between. In such a world, you can only
calculate what will probably happen next - which is just
what quantum theory is designed to do. Instead of knowing
something by simply observing it, quantum theory is
saying that something is not just there until you observe it.
Unlike classical physics, which conceived reality as a three
coordinates or dimensional phenomenon, quantum
mechanics regards space and time as separate entities.
To conclude, in the words of Alozie, despite the
difficulties and controversies over the interpretation of
quantum theory, a lot of new grounds have been broken,
using the theory as the basis. For him, the new fields,
which have emerged as a result of the theory, include,
among others, electrical conductivity, quantum theory of
solids, quantum chemistry and molecular biology. He
concludes that the scientific enterprise appears to be
advancing and giving birth to new technologies, despite
some difficulties with popular logic, metaphysics,
epistemology and axiology (POP 115). And in the words
of Karl Popper, although quantum mechanics was at first a
theory of the motion of the (negative) electron in the
positive field of the nucleus, nevertheless, this formalism
has changed very considerably, as it is more and more
widely applied (Quantum Theory 13).
.152
-----------------------------------------i------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ,

PART FOUR:

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL
‘ISMS’ IN SCIENCE
 CHAPTER 16

RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM

IN SCIENCE

Before we delve into the role of rationalism and

empiricism in science, it is germane to address first of all
the question - what is rationalism and what is empiricism?

Rationalism
Rationalism is the philosophical school that stresses
the primacy of reason over any other faculty in the
acquisition of knowledge. It holds that reason is the
primary means of determining truth and of justifying
knowledge. Rationalists subscribe to the view that ideas
originate from the mind. Rationalists stress the primacy of
mind over senses, the a priori over the a posteriori.
Rationalists are mostly foundationalists who hold that there
are first principles of knowledge, the absence of which no
knowledge is possible. They affirm that reason arbitrates
truth, and truth is objective.
Aristotle is often regarded as the father of Western
rationalism. Although he holds that knowledge begins in
the senses, his emphasis on reason and logic qualified him
for this honour.
It is said that modem rationalism begins with a
reaction against scholastic Aristotelianism, a reaction that
elevates mathematics as a model of human knowledge.
Following this, it is held that our knowledge of ourselves, of
God and the world ought to be organized into a deductive
system, in which all truths are derived from a relatively
154
 small number of axioms and definitions, whose truth is
assured by their self-evidence. Only if our starting points
are absolutely certain, and we proceed by careful, certainty­
preserving, deductive steps from them, can we achieve
certain knowledge. Following this picture of knowledge,
experience is to be counted as essentially irrelevant because
it cannot provide the certainty we requires (Curley, 411).
This is the central thesis of rationalism to which Rene
Descartes (1596-1650), Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677),
and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) subscribed. These
three philosophers are regarded as the chief modem
rationalists. With his thesis T think, therefore, I am’,
Descartes, often regarded as the father of modern Western
rationalism, raised a new insight into the qualities of the
human mind and established a new foundation for
knowledge (Oyeshile and Ugwuanyi 69). Spinoza is
regarded as a pantheist philosopher who believes that
reason is independent and that God and nature are one.
Leibniz subscribes to theism. In short, most worldviews
have some forms of rationalism because as an
epistemology, rationalism is a means of discerning truth.
Most worldviews have at least one prominent proponent of
rationalism who uses rationalism to determine and defend
truth as he sees it.
Although there are many versions of rationalism,
there are certain central premises shared commonly by
virtually all rationalists. They include the following
factors:

1. All rationalists are foundationalists who believe in

the existence of foundational principles of
155
 knowledge, namely, non-contradiption, identity and
excluded - middle. These are sometimes regarded as
the laws of thought. Other principles of knowledge
subscribed to by rationalists are the principles of
sufficient reason and causality.
2. Rationalists are objectivists who believe that there is
an objective reality knowable only by human reason.
This distinguishes them from mystics, existentialists
and other classes of subjectivists. For a rationalist
(e.g. Hegel), ‘the real is rational, and the rational is
real’. In other words, it is by reason alone that the
real can be ascertained.
3. Rationalists are exclusivists who believe that
mutually exclusive opposites cannot both be true.
For example, if theism is true, then atheism is false.
Both opposite claims to truth cannot both be true. Of
course, this is the law of non- contradiction.
4. All rationalists subscribe to apriorism as opposed to
a posteriorism. They hold that there is an a priori
element in knowledge. A priori knowledge is
knowledge that is independent of sense experience.
Even rationalists who are also empiricists believe
that there is nothing known through experience that
was not first known through reason.
In spite of the various factors shared commonly by
all rationalists, there are recognizable differences among
them. The first area of difference is the role of the senses.
While some rationalists deny the role of the senses in the
knowing process (e.g. Spinoza), others combine senses and
reason (Aquinas and Leibniz). The former are more
deductive in their approach to learning truth, while the
156
latter are more inductive and inferential (Geisler, Baker
Encyclopedia 663). The scope or limits of reason is another
crucial area of difference among rationalists. While some
rationalists believe that reason is the sole determinant of
truth, others opine that reason can discover some truths
(e.g. the existence of God), but not all truths (e.g. the
Trinity). The truth about Trinity cannot be known by
reason but by special revelation.

Empiricism
Empiricism is an epistemological movement which
holds that nothing around us can be known to be real unless
its existence is revealed in or inferable from information we
gain directly in sense experience or in introspection of our
subjective states or later recall; and genuine, intelligible
differences in our claims about this world must express
these knowable differences in experience. Because of their
constraints on knowledge and meaning, empiricists tend to
be skeptical about necessary truths that are independent of
mind and language, and of putative external abstract
entities (e.g. universals). In particular, they are skeptical of
faculties of intellectual, non-sensuous intuition through
which such things are allegedly known. Like any
philosophical movement, empiricism is often challenged to
show how its claims about the structure of knowledge and
meaning can themselves be intelligible and known within
the constraints it accepts (Hunter 115).
For the traditional empiricists, only what is
immediately presented to us in consciousness is non-
inferentially knowable. In present sense- experience, this
consists of the occurrence of particular sensible qualities
157
 such as shape, size, texture, flavors, colour, odour, and the
1 ike, while from past experience, it consists of those we can
immediately recall, though less vividly. Thus, for the
empiricists, the five modes of sensation of seeing, feeling,
hearing, tasting and smelling are reliable sources of
knowledge. The data that come through these senses in
form of impressions on the mind feed the mind with ideas,
which are the objects of knowledge. John Locke, the
British philosopher, is often regarded as the father of
modern Western empiricism. Other notable modem
/ empiricists include Bishop George Berkeley and David
Hume. Since then it has continued to attract influential
advocates and sympathizers such as Mill, James, Russell,
Lewis, Ayer, Carnap and Quine. Locke’s ambition was to
explore the origin, sources, and scope or limits of
knowledge. His extreme empiricism made him to treat
knowledge and sensation as though they are synonyms.
On his part, Hume argues that all knowledge is based
on sense experience. He divides what we know into two,
' namely, matters of fact and relation of ideas, which is the
realm of logic and mathematics. The truths of logic and
mathematics are known a priori. They are by definition,
necessary. They are not part of this world. On the contrary,
matters of fact belong to the realm of sense- experience.
They are contingent truths. They are a posteriori, and
hence can be known only by direct experience. They
provide genuine knowledge of the world and can be used to
ascertain what is claimed on the basis of experience.
Contrary to the commonsense belief that we have ideas,
eoncepts and sense-experience, Hume contends that these
ideas or concepts either are relations of ideas, or are capable

158
of being analysed into having sensation or reflecting on
them. According to him, impressions are the actual content
of the mind in the moment of perception. For him, ideas are
less vivid copies of impressions, which can be combined
into complex ideas by means of imagination. In the final
analysis, empiricism holds that there is nothing in the mind
which was not first in the sense.
It is said that empiricism provides both an acceptable
answer to the skeptic and a unified source of all knowledge.
This has developed in two ways. The search for certainty
has resulted in the analysis of experience into irreducible,
infallible units of experience known as sense-data. These
are the raw materials or basics of our experience about
which we cannot be mistaken. This approach highlights the
reality of the external world and of the self. A
contemporary analytic movement in philosophy - logical
positivism - has converted empiricism into a search for
meaning based on ostensive definition, which sees
knowledge as like learning a language, in which we give a
name and point out an object, so that no other understanding
is possible. Verifiability has been the other criterion of
meaning, in which a statement is meaningful only if it can
be verified by sense-experience. This has been modified by
Karl Popper and his followers to become a ‘principle of
falsifiability’, which bases knowledge on the failure to
disprove, falsify or refute. However, empiricism is still
based on verification by sense-experience, using the
methods of empirical and inductive sciences as a solution to
skepticism. It has created doubt about the truth and validity
of religious statements and doctrines, based on a narrow
view of experience being reducible to sense-experience
alone (Cook 223).
159
 To conclude this section, it must be mentioned that
attempts have been made to reconcile rationalism and
empiricism. It is argued that both movements share in a
common debate over the origin of human knowledge, both
employ rational and scientific approaches, and both aim at
achieving certainty. Furthermore, both are responses to the
skeptical challenge to knowledge. The skeptic doubts the
possibility of knowledge, but the rationalists and
empiricists attempt to cure that doubt. Immanuel leant offers
a bridge between reason and sense-experience with his
emphasis on synthetic a priori categories of understanding
which make knowledge possible. For Kant, knowledge of
these categories is not based on experience, yet it is a
condition of the comprehensibility of experience.
Objections have, however, been raised against kant’s
synthetic a prior claims. G.E. Moore and Ludwig
Wittgenstein have downplayed the issues of doubt and
analyzed knowledge in terms of meaning through linguistic
usage. For them, ordinary language and commonsense
have little problem with philosophical doubt and offer a-
simple solution to it. The logical positivists, as indicated
above, have converted empiricism to verificationism and
falsificationism as means for determining the truth claims
and knowledge, often using data as the ultimate source of
certainty. A.J. Ayer offers an analysis of knowledge in
terms of its being justified true belief. For him, the key
issues in epistemology seem to border on the role of
justification and its nature, ways of setting aside, or coping
with, doubt, and whether the skeptic’s position makes any
sense, the nature of the known, an adequate theory of truth,
and the relationship between objectively and to what extent
160
subjectivity intrudes or is seen to be problematic (Cook
225).

Rationalism and Empiricism in Science

It is customary to associate rationalism with the
method of intuition and empiricism with the empirical
scientific method. But neither the rationalists nor the
empiricists fully accept these identifications. However,
what we can justly say is that if the intuitive method is to be
associated with one or the other, the higher bidder will be
rationalism. There is no doubt that the method of intuition
has played a more significant role in rationalism than it
does in empiricism. But how do we relate these points of
view to science?
Historically, rationalism has been closely linked to
mathematics, while empiricism has been closely associated
with natural science. Empiricists may anchor their
position on the fact that natural science scrupulously
appeals to observation and experimentation in testing its
theories, while rationalists may stress the important role of
theories in guiding experience and as factors without which
experience would be empty and meaningless. Rationalists
have particularly urged that the meteoric rise in modern
science was due largely to the imaginative ingenuity and
intellectual originality of such great minds as Galileo,
Stevinus. Harvey and Kepler. By their theories, these men
transcended the realm of what is immediately known. It is
said that Galileo at times pointed to the ’natural light of
reason’ as his guide (Randall and Buehler 81 -82).
Following this, it is clear that a synthesis of emphasis
within rationalism and empiricism is possible. To begin
161
with, it is neat to suggest that neither extreme rationalism
nor extreme empiricism is correct in its interpretation of
natural science, though certain emphasis with both systems
may be regarded as correct. It must be conceded that the
success of modem science is due partly to theoretical
originality and the application of mathematics, on the one
hand, and partly due to the faithful submission of theories to
the test of experimental observation, on the other. Thus,
neither theory nor experiment is significant alone; they are
interdependent. According to Randall and Buehler (82),
the great merit of science is that it has made this
interdependence fruitful. For them, by its theories, science
has interpreted and organized facts, and by appealing to
facts it has verified its theories. The greater the number of
facts it examines, the greater becomes the necessity of
perfecting and modifying theories. But these modified
theories explain to us better the facts, which are their
support. The more illuminating our theories, the more
significant do the facts become. The more exact our
experimentation, the more correct do the theories become.
In concluding this chapter, it must be stated that
reason and experience play complementary roles in
scientific knowledge. Each has value and something to
contribute to scientific knowledge, though each may be
superior to the other in certain areas. Montague is quoted as
saying that the empiricists “acquire the food of science,”
while rationalists “digest and assimilate it” (in Titus and
Smith 246). Leighton is quoted as stating that “the
materials of knowledge come to us in experience, but the
materials thus given are organized by the activity of reason
into the texture of our science” (Titus & Smith 246). For
162
John Dewey, knowledge is experience that is organized by
the self or mind. This sometimes called the genetic
approach to knowledge. For Titus and Smith, knowledge is
not something that comes in neat packages, which can be
easily traced to separate sources. It is rather the result of
growth in which a living organism with interests and drives
is in constant contact and interact with a changing
environment. Out of this relationship awareness arises.
An organism becomes aware of various specific things,
relations, events, and persons; acquaintance, language,
meaning, and thinking emerge (246).

163
 CHAPTER 17
REALISM IN SCIENCE
Introduction
According to W.E. Hocking, “realism as a general
temper of mind is a disposition to keep ourselves and our
preferences out of our judgment of things, letting the
objects speak for themselves....” (Cited in Titus and Smith
225).
With its assumption of an external world existing
quite independent of the human mind, realism was widely
accepted among Western philosophers until it was first
seriously questioned about the 17"' century. Most of us
think we exist in the midst of a world of objects that are
independent of us. Thus it is our belief that though our
mind interacts with the external world, nevertheless, this
interaction does not in any way affect the basic nature or
structure of the world. The world predates the mind and
will continue to exist after the mind has ceased to be aware
ofit.
The aim of this chapter is explore the place of realism
in the field of science. But before this can be judiciously
done, it will be germane to discuss the meaning, history and
types of realism.

Meaning and Tenets of Realism

For a clearer understanding of the meaning of
realism, it will be necessary to distinguish the term from
two other related terms - real and reality. The term ‘real’
refers to the ‘actual’ or the existing. In other words, it refers

164
 to events or things that exist in their own right, as opposed
to events or things that are fictitious or imaginary. In a
nutshell, real refers to what is. Reality is the state or
quality of being real or actually existent, as opposed to
being a mere appearance. In popular usage, realism refers
to devotion to fact, to what is the case, in contrast with what
is desired, wished or hoped (Titus & Smith 442). Any view
can qualify for the name ‘realist’ if it emphasizes the
existence of some kind of thing or object (e.g. material
objects, propositions, universals), as opposed to a view,
which dispenses with the things in question in favour of
words (nominalism), ideas (idealism, conceptualism), or
logical constructions (phenomenalism) (A.R.. Lacey 180).
In philosophy, the term 'realism' is used in a more technical
sense.
In its strictly philosophical sense, realism refers to
the position that the objects of our senses are real in their
own right, and that they exist independent of their being
known to, perceived by, or related to the mind. In other
words, realism is the doctrine that there is a real world of
things behind and corresponding to the objects of our
perception (Sharma & Hyland 52; Titus & Smith 442;
Ozumba91).
Realism holds that there is a world really ‘out there’
that we just have to come to terms with, but not to attempt to
interpret it with the special hope of unveiling its secrets.
For the realist, we cannot mn away from the fact that there
is a marked distinction between things and ideas. Even
commonsense reveals to us that an idea is an idea or a
thought of something in our mind, which represents the
thing, it is an idea of. In that case, the idea is merely how the
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 thing appears to us, while the thing is the reality. Therefore,
if our idea is to be true, it must adapt itselfto things. An idea
is false or useless if it fails to correspond with the thing of
which it is the idea.
A notable realist A. N. Whitehead is said to have set
forth some good reasons for believing that the things we
* experience are different from our knowledge of them. In
defending his objectivist position, he makes three
«, affirmations. First, we are within a world of colours,
sounds and other sense objects, a world that is neither
within us, nor is dependent on our sense perception.
Second, historical evidence abounds that long before living
beings surfaced on the earth, important happenings were
taking place therein. Third, one’s activity seems to
transcend the self and to find and to seek ends in the known
world. Things pave way for our awareness. A common
world of thought seems to imply and require a common
world of sense (Titus & Smith 443). Many notable
philosophers, especially of idealist and -pragmatic
orientations have argued that the object as it is and the
object as it is experienced or known are entirely different
things. For them, since we can never know an object except
it is experienced or known by us, the object being
experienced or known invariably forms an integral part of
the object known. The realist sees this line of reasoning as
fallacious because, according to him, we cannot know a
thing except we have experience of it. In other words, only
known things are known.
Realism has a tendency toward other trends or
philosophies. We can point to at least three tendencies in
modern realism. First, there is an apparent tendency

166
toward materialism - “a view that everything is to be
accounted for in terms of material causes” (Popkin & Stroll
121). For example, mechanistic or naturalistic materialism
is both realism and materialism.
Mechanistic/naturalistic materialism holds that
nature and the physical world are one and the same. And by
the physical world is meant the collection of facts, events,
and the .things that have space, time and motion as their
sufficient . and fundamental defining characteristics.
Nature is the sum of all events and things that are
quantitatively measurable (Randall & Buehler 195;DagIish
75 - 78). Second, there is a tendency toward idealism, the
view that the most importantelement in the nature of reality
is the mind or spirit or idea (Popkin & Stroll 120); or to put
it in the Hegelian way, the doctrine that thoughts within
one’s brain are not more or less abstract pictures of actual
things and processes, but, conversely, things and their
evolution are only the realized pictures of the ‘Idea’,
existing somewhere from eternity before the world was
(Engels 35). Third, many realists have a tendency toward
pluralism - the view that reality consists of many kinds of
entities of which mind and matter may only be two.
Because this is the dominant view today, this type of
realism occupies much of our attention in this chapter.
There are three basic tenets of realism. A. J. Knight
has stated these tenets to include the following:
1.. Ultimate reality is not in the realm of the mind but
matter. The universe is composed of matter in motion, so it
is the physical world in. which man lives that constitutes
reality. The vast cosmos rolls on despite man and his
knowledge. This position constitutes the philosophic base
of much of modem science
167
2. Truth is through observation. Realism resorts to the
correspondence theory for validating its conception
of truth. It holds that truth is that which conforms to
the actual situation as perceived by the observer.
3. Values emanate from nature. The realist believes
that values are obtained by the observation of nature.
Through the study of the natural order, one comes to
know the laws that provide the basis for ethical and
aesthetic judgment. Values that come from this
source are permanent, since they are grounded in a
universe that is stable, even though, from the human
viewpoint, it is being more fully understood all the
time (Philosophy & Education 103-154).

A Brief History of Realism

Realism is largely a reaction against the abstract
nature and other worldliness of idealism. As mentioned
before, while realism gives primacy to matter, idealism
gives primacy to the spirit, mind or idea. The basic
difference between both systems of philosophy is best
illustrated by the example of a mighty stone that lies
beneath the sea. The idealist would maintain that such a
stone exists only if there is some mind (including the mind
of the supreme being) or if we can have knowledge of it.
On the contrary, the realist would argue that whether or not
there are perceiving beings, the stone continues to exist.
Like naturalism, realism has its roots in early Greek
philosophy. Aristotle is regarded as the father of realism.
He it was who first brought that notion that nature is the
ideal starting point for philosophers. Unlike his master
Plato who subscribed to idealism, Aristotle held that every
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object is made up of matter and form. Form may be
equated with Plato’s conception or idea or universal, while
matter can be seen in terms of the material constituents of
any particular sensory object. For Aristotle, form can exist
without matter, whereas matter cannot exist without form.
The aim of Aristotle in departing from the position of his
master is to show that we can understand universal ideas
only through the study of particular things. No wonder it is
said that Aristotle laid the foundation of modern physical
and social sciences.
During the medieval period (middle ages), the bone
of contention was between the classical (Platonic) realists
and the nominalists. The classical realists held that
universals have an independent existence from the
particular objects that appear to the senses, while the
nominalists insisted that universals are mere names or
symbols representing nothing and having no existence
apart from the particular things that make up the class. On
his part, Thomas Aquinas tried to forge a blend of
Aristotelian metaphysics and Christian theology. He
maintained that though the universe is made of matter and
form, matter is united or organized by forms, which have
been fixed or created by God.
In the modern period, realism received its
prominence largely through Bacon’s inductive
methodology and Locke’s view that the human mind at
birth is like a tabula raza (clean slate or sheet) that receives
impressions from the environment. Thus Locke rejected
the notion of the existence of 'innate ideas’ which
condition our perception of the world. Comenius held that
the idea of man’s mind is like a mirror, which projects the
impressions of the external world, while Descartes
169
maintained that the reality of the physical world could be
experienced by the senses.
Kant also held the view that the external world is a
real phenomenon while the mind or the knower of this
phenomenon is a mere witness of the representation of the
external objects.
At the beginning of the 20,h century, realism was
largely a reaction against the various trends that tended to
magnify human powers in knowledge and reality. In
America, the pragmatist William James rose to challenge
the dominant types of idealism (See William James 17 -
37). In England, in 1903, G. E. Moore published an
important essay entitled 'Refutation of Idealism There
were similar protests in Germany. In 1912, six renowned
American philosophers of like mind formed a group that
co-published a book entitled ‘ The New Realisin’. The new
realists claimed that they were returning to the
commonsense doctrine that there is a real, objective world,
w hich men can know directly by sense perception. In 1920,
seven men published a volume entitled Essays in Critical
Realism. These men agreed with the new realists that the
existence of objects is independent of knowledge, but
criticize them for making the relationship between the
object and the knower so direct or immediate. For them,
the outer object is not present in consciousness, only the
sense data (i.e. mental images) do. The sense data are a
reflection of both the nature of the external object and the
perceiving mind.
What the above discussion has clearly shown is that
realism is a blanket term covering a variety of movements,
trends and philosophies.
170
Types of Realism
There are various types of realism. A number of
them are highlighted as follows:
There is naive or commonsense realism. This holds
that there is a physical world that causes us to have the
perceptions that we have, and our perceptions are more or
less exact copies or pictures of the qualities that are really
present in those objects. The physical world exists and is in
no way dependent on our perception for its existence
(Halverson 83 - 84).
There is scholastic realism, which in opposition to
nominalism during the medieval times, held that universals
have real existence and substance independently of being
thought. During the period in question, Thomas Aquinas
held a view, which has come to be regarded as theistic
realism. This is the doctrine that God created the world but
is not identical with the world. God is an original substance
and nature is a separate substance. Created things or
substances are however real and possess genuine powers.
There is naturalist realism, according to which, the
external world exists independently of the mind and is
governed by natural laws. The human mind has a
biological origin and it is an instrument for adjusting to
external forces in the world. Man is to utilize the
intelligence bestowed on him in his struggle against
external nature.
The position of John Locke is called representative
realism. According to this position, our ideas merely
represent the primary qualities (quantitatively measurable
qualities - the bulk, figure, number, situation or motion or
rest) of the external world, which are themselves real
(Locke, Essay 23-24).
 We have transcendental realism, the view that
space, time and their attributes are real, and that our
perception of them is governed by direct intuitive cognition
(Everyman’s Encyclopedia, Vol. 10, p.238).
Herbert Spencer calls his philosophy-/rans/iigrMra/
realism. This holds that some objective existence,
manifested under some conditions, separate from and
independent of subjective existence, is the final necessity of
thought, and yet that perceptions and objects in
consciousness are not the reality, and do not resemble, but
only symbolize it (Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology 421 - 422). He differentiates this from what he
calls hypothetical realism, the view that the existence of
the real is an inference, not a fact.
Lewis calls his version reasoned realism. By this,
he means that the reality of an object (a not - self) is given in
feeling and is indissolubly woven into consciousness.
McGilvary calls his philosophy perspective realism
(199 - 208). This regards every experience as the real
objective world appearing in the perspective of an
experiencing organism. Like Austin, he did not believe
that the phenomena of illusion and perceptual relativity
show that we perceive sense data and not physical objects,
but his analysis requires us to revise our ordinary
conception of the perceived qualities of such objects and to
regard them as primarily relational. There is what can be
roughly called artistic realism. This refers to a mode of
artistic treatment, which represents its objects as they are in
reality, as opposed to idealism. The distinctive features of
artistic or aesthetic treatment are summed up as follows:
1. In contrast with idealism, which emphasizes the
type, it stresses individuality.
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2. It brings out the strong, harsh and even the ugly side
of reality or life, in contrast with idealism, which
seeks the harmonious.
3. It seeks to reproduce all aspects of reality and all
details without discrimination or modification, in
contrast with idealism, which selects and modifies
according to the artist’s aesthetic interest (Northrop
424).
We have socialist realism. This is a Marxist
approach, which emerged at the beginning of the 20"'
century as a result of the harsh conditions occasioned by the
advent of capitalism and its Concomitant class struggle. Its
main features include the idea of the working man and
fighter, service to the people, identification with the
working people’s struggle, commitment to the communist
ideology, historical optimism, etc. (Uduigwomen 70).
There is Legal realism. This holds that law consists
of the pronouncement of the court. For the Legal realists,
judges are the lawmakers. Legal decisions are not
compelled but are a matter of choice on the part of the
judge.
We also have the new realism and critical realism.
These have already been highlighted in the preceding
section of this chapter.
Finally, we have scientific realism, which is the core
of this chapter. To which we now turn.

Realism in Science (Scientific Realism)

Anyone who is familiar with recent advances in the
natural sciences, especially the science of physics will not
be comfortable with the position of commonsense realist
173
regarding the nature of reality. John Locke’s rough - and -
ready description of the world in terms of primary and
secondary qualities no longer enjoys much credence today.
A good deal has taken place in science since the time of
Locke. Contrary to the Lockean conception of material
objects in terms of little nuggets of matter, each retaining
the so-called primary qualities, modern science has made
us to know that the physical world is composed of few basic
elements which are reducible to molecules, to atoms, to
protons, neutrons, electrons and numerous other even
smaller particles. This therefore calls for the need to
explore the complexities of modem physics in order to see
the great departure from the commonsense view of reality.
Scientific realism holds that the knowledge, beliefs
and theories we already hold play a fundamental role in
determining what we perceive. According to Wilfrid
Sellars, as quoted by M. C. Von Fraassen, to have a good
reason for holding a theory is, all things being equal, to have
a good reason for holding that the entities postulated by the
theory exist. Von Fraassen also quoted Brian Ellis as
stating that the theoretical statements of science are, or
purport to be, true generalized descriptions of reality. Von
Fraassen, himself who claims to be giving us the correct
statement of scientific realism states that Science aims to
give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the
world is like, and that acceptance of a scientific theory
involves the belief that it is true (Von Fraassen 7). P. N.
Churchland gives what he calls the principal tenet of
scientific realism as, “excellence of theory is the measure of
ontology” (43).

174
 According to scientific realism, reality is beyond
what we see and there are degrees of perception of reality
that are akin to the scientific enterprise. It holds that the
real may be the posited, the scientifically perceptible, the
scientifically, real (Ozumba 91). Scientific realism thrives
on the view that there are certain objects or entities that are
not amenable to perception with the naked eyes but with
scientific instruments such as microscopes, telescopes,
stethoscopes, thermometers, and so on. Consequently,
what may be real to the naive realist and critical realist may
not be real to the scientist who depends on instruments,
theories and standards set by the scientific community. A
few examples or illustrations will help to buttress this point.
Let us take the table right in front of one, for
example. Naive realist would claim that the table is what it
appears to be - a solid block of matter that occupies some
particular position, say a fixed three - dimensional space.
' But modern science states that what we call a table is a
series of events that occur in a four-dimensional region of
space - time. None of the atomic particles involved in the
events can be called solid, coloured, hard, warm, etc. The
atomic events take place without my being aware of them,
just as radio waves continually pass me without my being
aware of their presence.
Now, consider the example of the colour of my table,
naive realist tells us that if the colour of my table is brown, it
is really brown. However, physics tells us otherwise.
What really happens when I say am perceiving the colour of
table as brown is that electromagnetic radiations of various
frequencies are being constantly released from the sun
which stream through my window and strike on the surface
175
of my table, and some of these, by means of my brain and
optic nerve cause me to perceive the table as brown. This
equally holds for all sensible qualities.
Thus, scientific realism holds that it is the particular
modifications of sensory faculty that causes us to perceive
what are called commonsense qualities. If all sentient
beings were annihilated, such qualities would accordingly
disappear. What would, however, be left would be the
atomic and sub-atomic events that make up the physical
world and cause us to have the particular perceptions we do
have. To that extent, the physical world has a real existence
of its own ?md is in no way dependent on a perceiver for its
existence (Halverson 97 - 98). To this end, scientists
formulate theories based on their own perception of the
world. Perception here goes beyond our being aware of the
observable. It includes all ideas, conjectures, organized
imaginations and all possibilities, which strike our minds.
This informs why scientific realism debunks the
theory/observation distinction or demarcation proposed by
the logical positivists. The reason for this is that it is
difficult to ascertain where a theory ends and where
observation begins. What is unobservable today may
become observable in future. It will therefore be senseless
to establish in a priori fashion the language that will
constitute sentences about observables. For a realist like
Paul Feyerabend, the proper method is “anything goes”
(f eyerabend 296), and what should concern the scientist
should be the formulation of theories in form of bold
conjectures (hypotheses) and attempting to rise above them
through bolder and more intelligible conjectures (Karl
Popper 231).
176
 Now, what is the status of theoretical entities in
relation to the position of scientific realism? Theoretical
entities, simply put, are existents beyond the physical.
Their existence may only be attested to with the help of
scientific apparatus. They are names, concepts or
expressions, which help scientists.to properly define and
explain what they are doing. Scientists have at least three
levels of observation, namely, ordinary, instrumental and
theoretical. Theories, as generalizations based on
hypotheses, do not constitute wholly the observable. They
have in their constitution certain entities which represent
reality, but which are only acceptable to members of the
scientific community upon an observable definition that
will enable people to verify them. These unobseryabj,e
entities (theoretical entities) constitute the ‘not- given’
aspects of the theory which are made meaningful by being
consistent with the ‘given’ (observable, concrete). To
make these unobservable meaningful, the scientist employs
correspondence rules, making sure that they yield to inter-
subjective verification. Take for example, Newtonian
mechanics. In our context, Newtonian mechanics is to be
regarded as a calculating device that enables the observable
positions and velocities of billiard balls at some instant of
time to be deduced from their observable positions and
speeds at some different times. The forces involved in
these and similar calculations (the impulsive forces due to
impact, frictional forces, etc.) are really not entities that
exist, rather they are inventions of the physicist. Similarly,
the atoms and molecules involved in the kinetic theory of
gases are convenient theoretical fictions (Chalmers 148).
In this case, theoretical entities are to be justified by their
177
 usefulness in connecting one set of observation of a
physical system involving gases (the height of the mercury
in a manometer, the reading of a thermometer, etc.) with
another similar set (Ogar 103).

Conclusion
The focal question addressed generally by realism is
- Is the physical world in any degree dependent on a
perceiver for its existence? The meeting point of all the
trends or versions of realism highlighted in this chapter is
their unanimous ‘No’ answer. They are all agreed that the
physical world existed long before the emergence of
sentient life on earth and will continue to exist long after all
such life has disappeared from the scene. Commonsense
(naive) realism, in particular holds that our unaided senses
reveal to us the shapes, ^izes, colours, sounds, solidities, etc
that are really ‘out there’.
Modem physics reveals to us that by the use of
magnifying instruments (e.g. microscopes, telescopes,
amplifiers, etc) we can transcend the limits of our unaided
senses to perceive certain features of the world that are
indiscernible to the senses. It is the opinion of this author
that the account of the physicist does not in any way
contradict that of the commonsense, rather it augments,
supplements or complements it. It will therefore be
arbitrary to claim that the position of the commonsense is
invalid while the observations of the physicist are valid.

i
f.

178
 CHAPTER 18

IDEALISM IN SCIENCE

What is Idealism?
Idealism is the philosophical school that stresses the
central role of the ideal or the spiritual in man’s
interpretation of his experiences. It holds that reality exists
mainly as spirit or mind, and that abstraction and law are
more central to our knowledge than sense experience. We
can know that a thing exists only through mind or ideas.
Idealism is thus opposed to materialism, the view
that matter is real and mind is its byproduct. Idealism
denies the materialist view that the world is a great machine
to be interpreted as matter, mechanism or energy alone.
Idealism is also opposed to realism, the doctrine that in
human knowledge objects are perceived or known as they
really are. For idealism, nothing is known or understood
outside or independently of the mind.
The essential features or tenets of idealism are as
follows:
1. Truth is the whole, or the Absolute.
2. To be is to be perceived, meaning that the being of an
object depends in its being perceived by the human
mind.
3. Reality reveals its ultimate nature more faithfully in
its highest qualities (mental) than its lowest
(material).
4. The ego is both subjective and objective (Sharma &
Hyland 45).
Idealism lays great stress on supernatural or
transcendental ideas. As a world-view, it holds that the
basic reality consists of mind, ideas, thoughts, or selves.

179
 For the idealist, the world has a meaning beyond its surface
appearance. In short, the world can be understood and
interpreted not exclusively by the methods of the natural or
physical sciences, but by studying the laws of thought and
consciousness. Since the universe is purposive and
a^eapingful, there is an inner harmony between man
(microcosm) ;and the external world (macrocosm). Thus,
what is highest in spirit is ipso facto deepest in nature. Man
is not an alienor a creature of chance, since the universe is
id some sense a logical arid a spiritual system that is
reflected in man’s search forthegood life. Theselfisnotan
fshlat^'q oV'ilni^al entitv. but a genuine part of the world
rnEHKdDl LLoimoinva snfljfuff? .dhe.ujsi ?.i_
1 hls prt<css al "s hl8h lcvcls manifests itself as
Persons. Man, as. a part of the
cosmos, expresses its structure inWown life (TiW&
Smith 42.3(7t 424).bav ieoiaq orn yfu'jjdo ogbolwonM nnmuri
bo< ) - .Idealism .stresses organic wholeness !as ,a central
principle. It holds that the world process exhibits organic
unity. As a result of this unity, it will be difficult to separate
the parts from the whole without causing damage to the
equally important excludednspects.rlThisjinner! unity can
be seeni inlthe unfolding series of levels through vegetable
liferand lower animals to mail, mind! and spirit^ Idealists
subscribe to the coherence theory of truth, which holds that
a statement or judgment is true if it coheres/agrees with
.other statementSior j udgments that are acceptedias true.
Historically, the origin of idealism; can.he traced to
early Greek philosophy. Specifically,; it began with
Socrates when he dialogued with Pythagoras,aPatmenides
and,other early Greek thinkers. (Socrates’ disciple, Plato,
held that there arc two worlds, namely, the world of forms
or ideas, w hich are real and lasting, and the world of objects
or senses which are transitory and imperfect. In hiS'1
immortal work The Republic, Plato holds that the sensible
world is a shadowy world, a pale reflection of the world of
forms, and that in order to grasp pure idea, we seed td's^fl
aside sense experience and rely on pure intellect. No
wonder Plato is not only regarded as the father of WesWh
idealism but also an idealist par excellence.
St. Augustine reflected on idealistic tradition dtn‘iiig •
the 4"' century. However, the beginning of mbd^rn
idealistic revival came after the renaissance. Through liik
principle of‘cognito ego sum’ (1 think, therefore, 1 dm’), ■
the French thinker, Rene Descartes, held that the self Was 1
the basic reality and the existence of God was necessary.
Benedict Spinoza, the pantheistic idealist, reflected that
there existed eternally a substance in the world, wlficli Iid4
identified as God. For Leibniz, the cosmos is mad^’iip of
simple, indivisible entities, which he calls monads. These
monads, for him, are points of mental force. . /iryjjdu?.
Bishop George Berkeley continued and developed
the idealistic tradition. He is fondly remembered lor his. .
idealistic statement: ‘esse estpercipi’, which means,?To bg i
is to be perceived’. In the late 18"' century, Kant, the
founder of objective idealism, postulated a formalistic or
transcendental introspection of the main idealistic'themes.
He believes that the self or transcendental ego coridtrucTs
knowledge out of sense impressions upon wliiih lire laid
universal concepts, which he calls categories. In the early'i
19th century, Hegel was inspired by this Kantian pdsition to J
postulate the idea that the world consisted of man-made,
objects with corresponding structures, examples; ptjwhich/
are language and practical art (e.g. medicine)^ which -
constituted mental achievements. In his celebrated
response to the question of why there is a world of nature at
all, Hegel answered: *for the sake of mind’. The German
181
 idealist, Arthor Schopenhauer, held that the world was
merely a conception of man’s will. His idealistic thought
greatly influenced the English, French and American
philosophers who came after him.
From the foregoing historical analysis, it is clear that
though idealist philosophy has taken many and varied
forms, the underlying assumption in all is that mind, or
spirit, or self is the basiQ world-stuff, and that true reality is
of a mental character. In order to fully understand the
various forms of idealism underlying this common
principle, a brief discussion of the various strands of
idealism, which have been proposed over the centuries, is
necessary.

Types of Idealism
1 Subjective idealism:
Also called mentalism or phenomenalism,
subjective idealism conceives reality in terms of the
experiences of the individual mind. It holds that all that
existxare minds or spirits and their ideas or perceptions.
Things such as buildings, trees, rivers, human beings exist
only in a mind that perceives them. Both Berkeley and
Leibniz were subjective idealists. Preferring to call his
philosophy immaterialism, Berkeley adopted a position
that reduced reality to spirit and the ideas entertained by
spirits. He explained the apparent objectivity of world
outside self in terms of ideas in God’s mind. For Leibniz,
monads or souls were the true atoms of nature and nothing
exited in the world apart from minds.
2. Objective Idealism.
_ 1 This is the view that the universe is one all-
embracing order, an organic whole, whose basic nature is

182
mind. For the objective idealist, the mind discovers what
there is in the order of the universe.
Plato is the father of objective idealism in the
Western world. For him, behind the empirical world of
change, the phenomenal world that we feel and see, the
world of individual thkgs, there is a supersensible world of
forms, eternal essences, ideas, universals, or concepts. The
former is concrete, temporal and perishable, while the
latter is permanent and eternal. Forms or ideas are the
original, transcendent patterns and perceptions, while
individual things are mere copies, imitations, or shadows
of these forms. While affirming that reality is immaterial,
Plato held that there is nothing real except mind and its
experiences. The unchanging forms or ideas, which are
real, are known only through reason.,
Hegel was an objective idealist. (His version is
sometimes called evolutionary idealism . /or logical
idealism. Hegel held that thought is the essence of the
universe and that nature is the whole of mind objectified.
Nature is Absolute Reason or Spirit expressing itself in
outward form. For him, when we say that the total world
order embraces all of the inorganic, organic and spiritual
levels of existence in a single all-inclusive order, we are
speaking in terms of the Absolute Spirit or God.
3. Personafldealism, or Personalism
This view arose as a result of the protest against
mechanistic materialism and monistic idealism.
According to this version, reality does not consist of
abstract thought or a particular thought process, but a
person, a self, or a thinker. In other words, reality consists
of the nature of conscious personality. The personalists
find support for their position in the recent developments in
modern science, especially the formulation of the theory of
relativity with its emphasis on the perspective of the
183
 observer. For them, because reality is a system of personal
self, it is pluralistic. Thus, personalists stress the reality and
worth of individual people, moral values, and human
freedom. They believe that though nature is an objective
order, it does not exist in and of itself. People rise above
nature when they interpret it. Science transcends its
material through its theories, and the world of meaning and
values transcends the world of nature as final explanation.
The chief proponents of this point of view include Rudolf
Hermann Lotze (1817 - 1881), Borden P. Bowne (1847 -
1910), Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884- 1953), and Peter
Bertocci (1910 -) (Titus & Smith431).
4. Scientific Idealism:
Hermann Cohen who applied Kant's critical methods
to humanistic and scientific studies founded this School. It
got a boost under the leadership of Ernest Cassirer who is
noted for his definition of man as that who creates culture
through a unique capacity for symbolic representation.
This brand of idealism is said to play a significant role in
shaping Russian culture and society.
5. Theistic Idealism
According to this school, there is a ‘world ground’ in
which all phenomena find their unity. This "world ground’,
which is both mechanical and teleological, is the
transcendental synthesis of evolutionary world process. T.
H. Green and F. H. Bradley are exponents of this view.
They employed the classical proofs and recent advances in
the natural and behavioural sciences to support their
arguments for the existence of God. In particular, they
restated the cosmological proof as a continuing relation of
the cosmos to a world ground that is essentially spiritual.

Idealism in Science
Idealism holds that the universe is a purposive
184
universe whose real nature is spiritual. While accepting
the interpretations of modern empirical sciences, idealists
however argue that they are limited by the ; methods
employed and the fields investigated. The sciences tend to
eliminate all mental aspects of the world and construct a <•
world that is devoid of mind. The idealists are willing to
allow the physical scientists tell us what matter is, provided
in trying to do that they do not reduce everything in the
world to that category. They are willing to allow the
biologists tell us what life is and its processes, provided
they guard against the temptation to reduce all other levels
to the biological.
For the idealists, the world of. nature that men
perceive is undoubtedly a world of appearances whose real
nature is different from what it appears to be. But in man’s
attempt to explain the various transformations that take
place in matter, he has pushed his analysis from molecules
to atoms, and from atoms to protons and electrons. For
idealists, what the scientists call molecules, atoms, protons,
electrons and neutrons are nothing but mental constructs
arrived at through a reasoning process or logical analysis.
Evidently, the fundamental character of matter is not that of
its outward appearance, and when we try to determine just
what this fundamental character is, we came back to energy
of some kind. If we try to stop at this point in pur
interpretation, the idealist might suggest that psychical
energy is that which is most real to us. Even though we
may start with so-called physical things, when we push our
investigation far enough, we are forced into what appears
to be a mental world. In any event, we are forced to the
conclusion that there are mental forces within and behind •
the world of nature (Titus & Smith 433).
For the idealist, the mind is not just a stranger
appearing suddenly and accidentally in the universe. The

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fact that men’s minds work and understand the same way
show that they are fundamentally the same, and governed
by the laws of logic and intelligibility. Again, the fact that
man is progressively coming to understand and interpret
nature shows that the mind is at work in nature. Thus
“order, intelligibility, meaning, and law seem to be at the
basis of both mind and nature” (Titus & Smith 433).
Finally, unlike modern empirical sciences, which do
not accommodate religion, idealism accepts the scientific
account and indeed mak(e§ room for religion. It holds that
moral and religious values are part and parcel of the world
of nature. It gives men the assurance that mind and values
are structurally part of the world. Thus, men can feel at
home and live confidently in the world.

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 CHAPTER 19
MATERIALISM IN SCIENCE
Materialism is the philosophical doctrine that all is
matter or reducible to matter. There are .basically two
versions of materialism, namely, hard or rigid materialism
and soft materialism. Hard materialism holds'that mind
does not really exist, only matter, while soft materialism
holds that though mind exists, its existence depends on
matter the same way a shadow of a person depends on the
person.
Strict materialism, which is also called materialistic
naturalism, holds that nature and the physical world are one
and the same. And by the physical world is meant “the
collection of facts, events, and things that have space, time,
and motion as their sufficient and fundamental defining
characteristics. Nature is the sum of all events and things
that are quantitatively measurable” (Randall & Buehler
195). Thus, in defining nature, materialism holds that what
is natural or real is material or physical in character,
irrespective of the way it may appear to us.
In trying to interpret the world, a philosopher is
confronted with its diversity. There are gigantic celestial
bodies and planets, including the habitable earth, and there
are also minute, invisible particles in our world - molecules,
atoms and elementary particles. A vast number of animate
beings and inanimate beings such as mountains, the land
and vast expanses of water bodies surround us. Man builds
houses and lives in them, uses buses, trains, ships and
aircrafts to move from place to place, which he has
designed with his hands. But he also sees objects around
him, which have been there before he surface4 on the earth.
The important question is - Is there a unity in the midst of
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 diversity? Or, is the universe a cosmos or chaos? Better
still, are there universal laws, which bind the world into a
single whole?
At first, the idea about the existence of universal laws
in the world was just a matter of conjecture. The early
materialists of ancient Greece made some crude attempts to
discover these laws. Thales, the father of Greek
philosophy, hypothesized that water is the primary
foundation of the world; Anaximenes claimed it is air;
Anaximander claimed it is a combination of the basic
elements (water, air, fire and earth), which he called the
Aperion or ‘indeterminate boundless’; Heraclitus held that
the world is a unity because it reposes on a single base - fire,
which kindles in measure and extinguishes in measure. It
was Leucippus and Democritus who first formulated the
principles of materialism in the late 4th and early 5th century
B.C. Both philosophers theorized that the single primary
base of things were tiny, moving particles called atoms.
Thus, all things could be reduced by scientific analysis into
their material constituents. For them, all that exist in reality
are atoms and void (i.e. empty space). Every other thing is
just the product of a subjective, human way of viewing
things. In the late 4'h and early 3rd century B.C. Epicurus
restated the atomic principles of Democritus, while in the 1st
century the Roman poet Lucretius restated the materialist
thesis that what we call mind and soul are ultimately
material. In the seventeenth century AD the English
materialist Thomas Hobbes stated that every part of the
universe is body, and that which is not body is no part of the
universe. For him, all that exists is body, and all that occurs
-is motion. Based on the scientific mood of the 19th century,
and the pronouncements of materialists in past centuries,
Ludwig Buchner summed up the main thesis of materialism
thus:

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 Thinking can and must be regarded as a special
mode of general natural motion, which is as
characteristic of the substance of the central
nervous elements as the motion of contraction
is of the muscle - substance, or the motion of
light is of the universal ether.... The words
mind, spirit, thought, sensibility, volition, life,
designate no entities and no things real, but
only properties, capacities, actions of living
substance, or results of entities, which are
v based upon the material form of existence
(Randall & Buehler 197)
Although there are variations in the views of
materialists, all materialists share some common beliefs.
These include the following:
1. Everything is made of matter (energy) or is reducible
to it.
2. Matter is eternal. In other words, matter has no
beginning and no end.
3. There is neither a Creator nor a Maker of the world.
The world is self - explanatory or self - expressive.
4. Humans are mortal. There is no soul separate from
the body. In fact, what we call soul or mind is just a
chemical reaction in the brain. When matter
disintegrates at the death of the body, the soul or
mind is also destroyed.
5. Humans are not unique. Human beings differ from
the lower animals not in kind but only in degree.
Although each of these tenets is.subject to standard
criticisms, we will not go into that here.

Materialism in Science
In order to fully grasp the impact of materialism on
science, it will be necessary to restate the main thesis of
189
i
materialism, and that is, that all realities can be reduced to
material properties undergoing change of motion in space.
This implies first, that the objects of all the sciences -
biology, physics, chemistry, psychology, sociology,
economics, and others - are only causally connected
material phenomena so that all sciences can be subsumed
under the parent - discipline of mechanics. Second, what
we call mind and its activities are simply brain or nervous
processes. Third, What we call values, ideals or purposes
are simply subjective human tags for different physical
situations in which physical organisms find themselves.
Thus, all phenomena, whether physical, physiological or
social are simply disguised forms of a basic physical reality
and its causally changing relations (Randall & Buehler
202).
In contrast to the crude speculative atomism of the
early Greek materialists, modem materialists were inspired
by the general discoveries and theories of modem physical
science to show that a materialist account of all we know is
possible. Using as their premises the physics of Descartes,
the atomism of Descartes’ contemporary Gassendi and
subsequently the theories of Newton, the materialists tried
to explain all events in the universe in terms of
mathematically describable motions of extended, solid
features of the universe.
The initial appeal to the materialist theory came as a
result of the growing disenchantment about skepticism of
previous metaphysical theories and the rapid growth of the
physical sciences, especially physics and astronomy. The
emergence of the social sciences in the 18th century, the
advances in modem chemistry of the 19th century, and the
tremendous progress in biology and psychology in more
recent times have given greater authority to the materialist
190

i
in his belief that even if the task has not been fully achieved,
there is hope that it will soon be possible to explain all
events in physical terms and laws. Since Descartes’ day
materialists have tried to make good their assertion that all
living processes like digestion, growth, reproduction can be
accounted for in purely mechanical terms, and that mental
events can be given a similar explanation (Popkin Stroll
124).
In the field of biology, the bone of contention has
been between the mechanists and the vitalists. The
mechanists believe that since it is now possible to show that
the various processes of animals and plants can be
accounted for in physical and chemical terms, nothing stops
us from believing that it will soon be possible to do so with
all questions of biology. On the contrary, the vitalists
contend that it is the case that either we are constrained to
jettison materialist concepts and introduce certain other
concepts (e.g. life-force), which are irreducible to physical
and chemical notions, or that this will occur. For them, in
the absence of such non-materialists ideas, the attempt to
account for the information we already have about the'
behaviour of living things will be a practical impossibility.
In the field of psychology, the bone of contention is
between those who believe that a materialist science of
human behaviour is possible and those who believe that it is
not possible. Here, the value of each case will depend on
the direction to which the pendulum of future experimental
research will swing.
In the field of physics, as scientific theories move
further away from the simple Newtonian theory that holds
that science is capable of providing accurate accounts of the-
intimate secrets of nature to “a more empirical conception
of science as a hypothetical model of what the world may be
like, that suffices for predicting the future course of
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experience, a materialism based on the development in
scientific research has become less attractive. Those who
base their theories about the fundamental character of the
world upon an interpretation of our scientific knowledge
have tended to adopt a positivistic or pragmatic, or less
materialistic form of naturalist theory, than the classical
forms of materialism” (Popkin and Stroll 125)

The Justification of the Materialist Hypothesis

Randall and Buehler (202 - 204) have listed the
advantages, claimed for the materialist hypothesis to
include the following:
1. v It introduces unity and continuity into our world­
perspective. It discountenances the appeal to mysterious
principles of explanation in accounting for a supposed
relation between the material and the non-material.
2. It introduces simplicity and economy into our
interpretation. If it is possible to employ one basic principle
of explanation instead of two or more, the former is
undoubtedly more desirable. Thus, the assumption that all
things have a single characteristic of being material is most
intelligible.
3. It is most faithful to our experience. We know that
all mental phenomena can be changed when physical
conditions change. Ideas, emotions, meanings are
impossible without bodily functioning; no mental event
has ever existed except in a body. It is possible to have a
l'ving brain without thought, but it is not possible to have
thought without a brain. In the same vein, social
phenomena are impossible without physical conditions.
4. It is most faithful to the conclusions of science,
physico-chemical changes are the most basic of all
changes. They are possible without social, biological and
psychological changes, but the latter are impossible
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without the former. Science ignores values because
different values are relative to different men, but all men
alike are at bottom complex physical organizations
crovemed by the same causal sequences that govern the rest
of nature. In the science of psychology, behaviourism has
shown that only the physiological interpretation of human
behaviour has made science of human behaviour possible.
Only mechanism explains why science can predict. This is
possible only if we assume that a fixed and limited number x
of principles governing the universe exist (see also Titus
and Smith 404-405)

193
 CHAPTER 20
PRAGMATISM IN SCIENCE
Although pragmatism is a contemporary movement
in philosophy, its roots can be traced to the early Greek
philosophers. The Ionian thinkers such as Thales,
Heraclitus, Parmenides and Democritus brought empirical
considerations to bear on man’s speculation about the
world. The sophist, Protagoras, defined knowledge in
terms of sense perception and reflected that man is the
measure of all things. During the modern period, this mode
of thought was re-emphasized in the empiricist philosophy
of Bacon, Locke, Hume and Berkeley. Bacon in particular
introduced inductive logic to the scientific method. In the
19"' century, Auguste Comte introduced positivistic
•thinking, tracing the evolution of human thought from its
theological and metaphysical stages to its positive stage
characterized by the systematic methodology of science.
Modem pragmatism developed in the 19,h century as
a protest against the barren and useless metaphysics of that
time. Pragmatism originated in the United States of
America and received its principal formulations in the
hands of American philosophers such as Charles S. Peirce,
William James, John Dewey and Mead. Peirce is regarded
as the father of modern pragmatism because he directly or
indirectly influenced the others.

What is Pragmatism?
Pragmatism is essentially a method of solving
intellectual problems. It holds that theorizing should have

194
practical results and truth could be of tremendous utility in
solving intellectual problems of all kinds and in fostering
social progress. James emphasized the case-value of ideas
and theories, that is, their usefulness’in solving problems
and overcoming difficulties. For him, ideas, theories and
thinking are instruments employed in the practical business
of solving the problems we experience in our daily life.. For
Peirce, the meaning of an idea consists in putting the-idea
into practice in the objective world of activities and,
whatever its consequences prove to be. Contrary to the
traditional philosophical view that truth is a property
independent of human experience, Peirce and James
asserted that an idea is true if it works. Both of them agreed
that once an idea is tested in the world of affairs? it’s
meaning could be depended upon. Unlike Peirce and
James, who believed that once ideas are tested they have a
degree of permanence, Dewey regarded truth as relativistic.
Dewey held that the universe is in a state of perpetual flux,
so that there is no ultimate truth or reality. For him, reality
is born out of man’s experience of the world and, hence,
when there is a change in his experience of the world,
reality also changes.

Impact of Science on Pragmatism

There is no doubt that pragmatism was greatly
influenced by the methods of science. This influence can
be seen from four perspectives, namely, the pragmatic
conception of truth, Peirce’s experimentalism, James’
practicalism and Dewey’s instrumentalism. We shall
examine these forms briefly.

195
1. The Pragmatic Conception of Truth
The pragmatists shared in the general apathy of
Americans towards theoretical activity that has no cash­
value. By cash-value they meant the use to which ideas
could be put. Whether a theory is believed to be true or false
is irrelevant, what is important is whether it affects one’s
actions. Theories are mere instruments of solving
problems in practical living, and their success is appraised
in terms of performing this function. Thus, a theory is true
if and only if it works, it is useful, it satisfies us, or it solves
one’s problems. In testing a theory, a scientist designs an
experiment that determines whether the theory works under
specified conditions. The theory can only be true if the
experiment is successful. Truth is what works in practice
now. Ideas remain true as long as they work, and false as
long as they fail to work (Nenty 9). According to Peirce,
truth is the consequence of the experimental method, which
is agreed upon by the scientific community. For James,
truth is determined by consequences. A statement is true if
it meets the criterion of practical test. For Dewey, truth is
‘warranted assertibility’. Truth is what happens to an idea
when it is warranted or verified.
2. Peirce’s Experimentalism
Peirce’s pragmatism consciously uses the method of
science as its model in formulating the rule of significance
for terms in general. For Peirce, to define terms
experimentally is to employ a means by which meanings
can be communicated without ambiguity. For instance, if
one claims that he does not understand the meaning of a
word, all we need to do is to explain the experimental
conditions which define the word. When this is done, we
196
have established a standard of agreement and of universal
understandability. Peirce believed that by this way, the
pragmatic rule helps us to achieve clarity. We can thus
begin to appreciate the merit of pragmatism if we can
imagine a situation where such words as ‘atomism’,
‘right’, and ‘equality’ are so clarified that it will be very
easy for us to identify the state of affairs they denote.
According to Peirce, all meaningful statements must
conform to the standard of scientific verifiability. For a
statement to satisfy this standard means that it can be
investigated by the scientific method. We may say, then,
that a factual statement is genuine or significant, if it is
possible to investigate its truth or falsity, that is, if it is
possible to collect or adduce evidence for it. Some
statements are directly verifiable, while others are
indirectly verifiable.
Pierce’s pragmatism is to show that the meaning of a
statement is in the sum of its verifiable consequences.
Following this, it is possible to have two statements
containing different words yet having the same meaning.
The reason is simply that they both have the same factual
consequences. Again, the only way to distinguish the
meaning of two opinions, which appear to be verbally
similar, is to show their consequences and observe closely
the different facts implicitly referred to by each of them.
The main aim of Peirce’s pragmatism was basically to
show us the way out of intellectual verbalism by providing
objective criteria of distinction.
For Peirce, when we say that a statement is
scientifically or experimentally verifiable, we can give this
expression a narrow or a broad meaning. It must be stated
197
that Peirce rejected a narrow or sensationalistic conception
set up as standard for the broad canons of science. The
logical positivists, for instance, expressed distrust for
indirect verification and restricted ‘experience’ to sense­
experience. But, again, we must guard against the
temptation of narrowing down Peirce’s pragmatism in such
a way as to think that he used the terms ‘experiment’ and
‘experience’ to refer to physical experiment or physical
experience alone. Such narrow interpretation is bound to
render unverifiable any theory that is speculative in nature.
Peirce’s idea of experiment gives room for verification of
such theories. For Randall and Buehler,
The complexity and difficulty of the process is
immeasurably greater but is of essentially the
same kind. In a given science, say psychology,
the facts verifying psychological theories
' would be specific instances of behaviour by
the individual organism. In a general theory of
civilization, on the other hand, the verifying
facts would include not merely these but
psychologically accepted theories as well, or a
combination of facts and hypotheses of
psychology and physics and biology, and in
general the entire set of scientific results. The
kind of facts serving as evidence for
speculative philosophic theories is thus of a far
broader and more complex character than that
serving as evidence within a given science.
Yet the process of verification may be called
“scientific”, for while we are no longer
concerned with verification in a special
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 science, we can employ the scientific method.
The pragmatic standard of Peirce thus requires
that all hypotheses purporting to be about fact
be verifiable, but avoid a narrow conception of
verifiability (131).
Peirce’s experimentalism exhibits a marked
difference from Kantianism and positivism both of which
rejected as unintelligible the unknowable supersensible
reality. Unlike these two philosophies,- Peirce’s
experimentalism introduced the factor of meaning in the
analysis of knowledge, and a more exact conception of
experience and scientific method. As opposed to
positivism, which lumped together all speculative theories
and regarded them as metaphysical, experimentalism
discriminated speculative theories as verifiable or
unverifiable. Again, it differs from positivism “in its more
liberal interpretation of science and its avoidance of
legislation on scientific method; and its substitution of a
specific criterion of the intelligibility of theories as
opposed to the vague positivist criterion of their
“usefulness” or “fruitfulness” (Randall and Buehler 132).
3. James’ Practicalism
Although James initially set out to elaborate on the
pragmatism of Peirce, he (James) ended up formulating
something quite different. For James, pragmatism is a
manifestation of the empiricist attitude, which can be
interpreted in the following way. The pragmatist
Turns away from abstraction and insufficiency,
from verbal solutions, from bad a priori
reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems,
and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns
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 towards concreteness and adequacy, towards
facts, towards action and towards power. That
makes the empiricist temper regnant and the
rationalist temper sincerely given up. It
means the open air and possibilities of nature,
as against dogma, artificiality, and the
presence of finality in truth” (cited in Randall
and Buehler 133).
For James, truth is what happens to an idea. After
examining the traditional theories of truth and finding that
they virtually took the opposite view, namely, that truth is a
fixed or a static relation, James took exception by arguing
that truth must be the cash-value of an idea. Something is
true if it can provide guides for practical behaviour. An
idea is made true by events. An idea is true if it has
satisfactory consequences. Truth is relative and it grows.
Ideas, doctrines and theories are not just answers to riddles
but instruments to help meet life situations. The only
satisfactory criterion of truth of a theory is that, it suits
human purpose and it brings about beneficial results. Thus,
lor James the key words in the pragmatic conception of
truth are workability, satisfactions, results and
consequences.
The essential point of difference between James’
practicalism and Peirce’s experimentalism is that the term
‘practical’ as used-by James has a looser and more popular
meaning than it has for Peirce. The general pragmatic view
that a statement is significant if it has practical
consequences may mean two things, namely, (I) that it has
consequences capable of empirical or experimental
investigation, and (ii) that belief in the statement can serve
200
as a guide to human behaviour. Whereas the first meaning
refers to the standard of Peirce, the second refers to that
James.
For Peirce, the terms we employ should be defined
by means of a scientific procedure with which they are
associated, while James urged that what really matters is
that the terms should be capable of influencing our
behaviour. On Peirce’s principle, to speak cf “purpose” or
“design” in the universe, or of “God”, is to speak of nothing '
significant unless these terms are capable of being
experimentally defined in accordance with scientific
standards. For James, however, it will appear that such
terms need not be thus defined in order to be
“pragmatically” significant” (Randall and Buehler 134).
Thus, for James, when we are faced with a speculative
problem, say that of rationalism versus empiricism, the
difference in meaning of these two epistemological
theories is not determined by their experimental
consequences but by the different effects they have on
human conduct and experience.
4. Dewey’s Instrumentalism
For Dewey and many of his followers, the term
‘instrumentalism’ is preferred to pragmatism, though both
are used interchangeably. Dewey tells us that men have. •
applied two methods in escaping danger and obtaining ’.
security. One is to appease the powers around them
through rites, rituals, sacrifices and prayers, while the other
is to design tools to control the forces of nature to man’s ,
benefit. The latter is the way of science, technology and the
arts, and this is the one approved by Dewey. The purpose of
philosophy, according to Dewey, is to better man’s life here
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and now. Thus, philosophy’s interest has shifted from
traditional metaphysical problems, to the methods and
techniques for scientific and social progress. The method
is that of experimental inquiry guided by empirical research
in the sphere of values.
The key word in instrumentalism is experience.
Experience, on this view, is the whole process of interaction
of living organism with its social and physical
environment. The present world is the world of
experience. We should strive to understand it and then try
to construct a society in which man can freely express his
freedom and intelligence.
Dewey believed that man lives in an unfinished
world. This can best be understood by examining the three
aspects of Dewey’s instrumentalism. The first is the notion
of lemporalism, which holds that since there is real
movement and progress in time, men should no longer hold
a spectator view of reality. Our knowledge is not just a
mirror of the world but also a means of reshaping it. The
second is the notion of futurism. This urges us to look to the
future and not the past because the future promises to be
novel. The third is meliorism - the view that human efforts
can transform the world and make it a better and safer place
to live in.
Finally, an important aspect of Dewey’s philosophy
is the instrumental theory of ideas. For him, thinking is a
biological process because it has to do with the adjustments
between an organism and its environment. All thinking is
part of the protective equipment of the human race in its
struggle for existence. Thinking arises out of problematic
situations and man’s reasoning in response to these
202
situations follows a certain pattern. The pattern takes the
following steps:
1. A problem or difficulty to be overcome presents
itself.
2. The perplexity caused by the problem stimulates
thought, leading to the proposal of solutions to the
problem.
3. These solutions are tested in practice.
4. Finally, one solution sticks out as the most effective
and hence is approved,for future use. _
This shows that all learning is an adaptation of the
organism to its environment by means of problem solving.
Dewey thus “insisted on the direction of thinking and
theorizing towards the solution of practical and social
problems, and went on to link his^philosophy with the
democratic ideal in which individual members of society
cooperate to realize the full potentialities of each, thus
bringing about mutual progress and general social advance
(Sharma and Hyland 59).
 CHAPTER 21

DETERMINISM IN SCIENCE
What is Determinism?
Determinism is the general philosophical thesis that
everything that happens is determined. In other words,
A everything that happens is caused and nothing happens by
chance. Laws of nature govern all events. These laws are
*
not the type passed by a legislature; rather they are
statements of conditions under which certain events or
effects inevitably occur. Likewise there are conditions that-*
determine the conditions of that effect, conditions that
determine those conditions, and so on backwards ad
infinitum (Geisler & Feinberg 195).
There have been many versions of determinism in
the history of philosophy, some of which overlap
considerably. J. I. Omoregbe has identified five versions or
theories of determinism in the following order.
1. Metaphysical Determinism
'This is the view that the whole universe is an
interrelated whole or system in which everything is
connected with another thing. A version of this is
pantheistic determinism, the view that God, man and the
universe are ultimately one and the same thing, and that all
actions and events are self-manifestations of God.

2. Psychological Determinism s
This is the view that all our actions are determined by
certain instinctive drives or impulses (mostly sexual in
nature), some of which were previously inhibited but
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eventually found outlets in various ways and manifest
through our actions.
3 Theological Determinism
This is the view that God determined in advance the
way every man will live and all that he will do in life? He
has determined or predestined in advance those to go to
heaven and those to go to hell.
4. Fatalism
This is the view that what happens is inevitable,
regardless of what we do or do not do.
5. Economic Determinism
This is a Marxist theory, which holds that human
activities in any society are determined by the economic
situation of the society (39 - 42)
Taylor adds three more versions to the ones given by
Omoregbe. They are: ethical determinism, logical
determinism and physical determinism (359-371). '
6. Ethical Determinism
' This is the view that all man’s actions are determined
by the ‘Summum bonunT or ‘highest good ’.
7. Logical Determinism
This is the view that a given event must either occur
or not occur. Whichever happens, the prediction that it
would happen will turn out to be correct, whether or not we
knew it. Therefore, since one statement about the apparent
future alternatives is already true, nothing we can do will
alter matters (Lacey 71).
8. Physical Determinism
This is the view that eternal and inviolable laws of
nature determine all events and human actions. Since this
last version is the most scientific of all the versions, and
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since our topic is centred on determinism in Science, we
shall devote the remaining part of this discussion to it. We
shall consider in turn its history, tenets, problems and the
resolution of the problem.
The theory of physical determinism was inspired by
development of the natural sciences, particularly in the
15th, 17th and 18th centuries. It was discovered that the
motions of the heavenly bodies did not only follow a
regular pattern but also obeyed certain laws, which could
be expressed with mathematical accuracy. Gradually, the
old approach to the study of nature, which was basically
speculative and profusely Aristotelian, began to give way
to observation, experimentation and the search for kaws.
Philosophers were compelled to revise the content of the
deterministic theories, which they were accustomed to.
They more or less ceased to think of human actions and
events as determined by moral considerations (ethical
determinism) or by an eternal and immutable God
(theological determinism) and began to think of them as
determined by eternal and inviolable laws of nature
(physical determinism). Much earlier the atomists
(Leucippus and Democritus), the Epicureans and Stoics
had somewhat held this view, though their approach was
highly philosophical and speculative.
A central presupposition of the emerging science
was the idea of universal causation - the belief that every
event has an antecedent cause and that there are no
uncaused events. Furthermore, it w as assumed that events
occur in orderly patterns, which makes the formulation of
causal or natural laws possible. On the basis of these laws
and knowledge of the actual causes at work in a situation, it
206
is possible to predict with great exactness what will occur.
Concerning events about which such prediction cannot be
made presently, there is in principle no reason why we
could not. Our lack of knowledge about both the laws and
the present causes are our only hindrances. As we learn
more about the causes of such events and develop methods
to detect when these causes are at work, then we will be able
to predict both the time and severity of their occurrence.
These theories about universal causation and total
predictability have been traditionally called ‘determinism’
(Geisler & Feinberg 194)
The question that follows is: if physical determinism
oruniversal causation is the case, it would inevitably follow
that man’s behaviour is causally determined and
predictable, since man is also an object in the real world.
How, then, do we account for freedom and moral
responsibility? Physical determinism seems to be in
conflict with free will.
There have been philosophers who have argued that
there is no real conflict between physical determinism and
free - will. Thomas Hobbes belongs to this group of
philosophers. Hobbes opined that physical determinism is
consistent with free - will or human liberty. He defined
liberty as simply the absence of external constraints or
impediments and, hence as something which even
inanimate objects can possess. It is Hobbes’ own
contention that any unobstructed moving body can be
considered free. For instance, water naturally flows
downward and freely, though it is not free to ascend or flow
across the riverbed.
 As can be seen, Hobbes’ theory represents a
substantial departure from some of his predecessors. For
instance, unlike the Epicureans who assumed that
behaviour that is physically determined is unfree, Hobbes
claimed that although all human behaviour is physically
determined and necessitated, man is still to be held
responsible for his actions. For Hobbes, a voluntary act is
simply one that is caused by an act of will. It is rendered no
less voluntary to assert that acts of will are caused.
Generations of philosophers while debunking
Hobbes’ materialism have however toed his line in this
conception. A good example is Arthur Schopenhauer.
Schopenhauer affirms Hobbes’ position, giving the same
reason Hobbes gave. In the 20th century, the logical
positivists Moritz Schlick and A. J. Ayer (and in fact many
others) have argued in line with Hobbes that freedom is not
contradicted by causation but by constraint. These ideas
are significant because they provide a means of reconciling
the apparent conflict between determinism and free - will.
Specifically, they have been able to show that there is really
no problem of free will.

Conclusion
Like Hobbes and his supporters, I strongly believe
and hold that determinism and freedom are compatible.
My reason is that before an action is done there are always
some conditions sufficient to cause or determine that
action, and yet that action can be free. In other words, there
are always contingently sufficient antecedent conditions
before a person decides to act in one-way and not another.
 PART FIVE

SOME PHILOSOPHIES/
METHODS OF SCIENCE
 CHAPTER 22
POSITIVIST METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE

Simply put, the word ‘positivism’ is a general

attitude of mind to the facts of human existence (Stumpf
343). Negatively, it rejects the assumption that nature is
teleological (that is, has some ultimate purpose or end) and
repudiates any attempt to explore the so-called ‘essence’ or
secrete causes of things. Positively, its spirit is expressed in
the attempt to study facts by observing the constant
relations between things and formulating the laws of
science simply as the laws of constant relations between
phenomena (Stumpf 343). It was this spirit that prompted
Galileo to seek to understand the movements and relations
of stars without probing into their physical constitution. It
was in this same spirit that Newton sought to describe the
phenomena of the physical without probing into the
intricate issue of the essential nature of things. Of course, it
was in the spirit of positivism that Fourier discovered the
mathematical laws of the diffusion of heat, without asking
questions bordering on the essential nature of heat, and
Cuvier formulated some laws about the structure of living
things without delving into the intricate question of the
nature of life.
Positivism is characterized by the following claims:
(a) Science is the only authentic and valid
knowledge.
(b) Facts are the only possible objects of
knowledge.
(c) The method of philosophy is not different
from that of science.
210
 (d) The main business of philosophy is to identify
general principles common to all science and
use those principles as guides to human
conduct and as the basis of social organization
(Essiet24).
Three main types of positivism can be identified.
They are social positivism, evolutionary positivism and
critical positivism.

Social Positivism:
Prominent among the many social positivists is
Auguste Comte, a French philosopher who is said to have
been the first to coin the word ‘positivism’ to designate his
own system of philosophy. But the fact is that Comte’s
adoption of positivism was due largely to the scientific or
positivistic spirit or attitude of the age, already discussed
above. The attitude was derived from the belief that
adequate knowledge of the world could only be achieved
through the scientific method of carrying out empirical
investigation of reality and subjecting theories derived
from such investigation to empirical verification. D. P.
Johnson in his Sociological theory: Classical Founders
and Contemporary Perspectives writes:
Although Comte coined the term “positivism”,
the ideas that this word conveys were not
original with him. The positivist beliefs that
society was part of nature and that empirical
methods of investigation could be used to
discover its laws were widespread in Comte’s
intellectual climate” (77).
Following this method, metaphysical knowledge
211
was regarded as invalid. The scientific mood of the age
must have influenced Comte to suggest the initial rigor of
positivism when he stated that any proposition that is not
reducible to a simple enunciation of facts, particular or
general, does not make any sense. Comte writes:
All investigation into the nature of beings,
and their first and final causes, must always
be absolute; whereas the study of the laws of
phenomena must be relative, since ii supposes
a continuous progress of speculation subject
to gradual improvement of observation,
without the precise reality beiiig ever fully
disclosed; so that the relative character of
scientific conceptions is inseparable from the
true idea of natural laws... (452).
This was the attitude Comte brought to the study of
social life and religion. In the end, he created a new science
of society (which he called sociology) by which the whole
activities of man could be explained, using scientific
principles. His assumption was that if science had
succeeded in dealing with physical reality, the knowledge
derived from science and dogmas associated with the
theological and metaphysical stages of development,
political order needed to work out a science of society,
which he (Comte) did not find available and which he,
therefore set out to create, calling it ‘sociology’. For him,
sociology is the queen of all sciences; the summit of
knowledge, for it makes use of all previous information and
coordinates it for the sake of a peaceful and orderly society.
It was the aim of Comte to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the underlying philosophical and
(212
methodological unity between the so-called natural science
and social science (Stumpf344 - 345).
In siim, all social positivists (Auguste Comte,
Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill) agreed
that positivism must be the basis of ethics, religion,
politics, public education, and in short, the perfect social
reform to which progress based on science must lead. For
them, social positivism would seek to use the methods and
findings of science to promote a more just social
organization (Essiet 25).

Evolutionary Positivism:
Prominent among the founders of this movement are
Herbert Spencer, Ernest Haeckel (the German
philosopher), Cesare Lambroso (the founder of the
positivist school of penal law), and Wilhelm Wundt (the
founder of the first laboratory of experimental
psychology). Evolutionary positivism has left as a legacy
to contemporary philosophy the idea of a universal,
unilinear, continuous, necessary, and necessarily
progressive evolution. This idea of a universal evolution is
central to the philosophies of Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James, John Dewey, George Santayana, Samuel
Alexander and Alfred North Whitehead (Essiet 26 - 27). A
mention must be made of Charles Darwin who is one of the
immediate forefathers of the doctrine of biological
evolution.
From the foregoing, it can be seen that evolutionary
positivism resembles social positivism in a certain respect
and is different from it in a certain respect. Both are centred
on man and are inspired by faith in progress based on
213
science. However, they are dissimilar because while
evolutionary positivism is based on nature, which is the
concern of physics and biology, social positivism is based
on society or history.

Critical Positivism:
This version of positivism is also known as empirio-
criticism. It emerged during the last decade of the 19lh
century through the works of Ernest Mach and Richard A.
Avenarius. Both scholars admitted that there is no real
difference between the realms of the physical and psychical
because a thing is both a set of sensations and the thought of
it. Although a thing is a set of sensations, it is the thought of
the thing that enables us to talk of it as being ‘perceived’ or
‘represented’. Avenarius and Mach believed that science
(and knowledge in general) is an instrument for
confronting and reacting to the infinite mass of sensations
and its end is the progressive adaptations of the human
organism to its environment. Following this, scientific law
is to be seen as a description, not a prescription. Scientific
laws have only logical necessity, not physical necessity.
This necessity lies in the world of conceptions and is
merely unconsciously transferred to the world of
perceptions (Essiet 25).

Logical Positivism:
The movement called ‘logical positivism’ is the
immediate offspring of critical positivism. A. E. Blumberg
and H. Feigl to designate a set of philosophical ideas
postulated by members of the movement who styled
themselves the “Vienna Circle” coined the term ‘logical
214
positivism’ in 1931. Logical positivism “is also referred to
as ‘logical empiricism’, ‘consistent empiricism’ and
scientific empiricism. It is often, but misleadingly,
extended to include the ‘analytical’ or ‘ordinary language’
philosophies developed at Cambridge and Oxford” (Essiet
25).
Members of the group included Moritz Schlick,
Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Philipp Frank and Friedrich
Waismann, Edgar Zilsei, Bela Von. Juhos, Felix Kaufmann,
Herbert Feigl, Victor Kraft, Karl Menger, and Kurt Godel.
They were either scientists, or mathematicians or
philosophers. Because many of them had scientific
orientation, their approach was rigorously empirical or
scientific. It was their view that the success and growth of
science was- due largely to the restriction of the scientific
endeavour to the sphere of experience or matters of fact.
In their discussion of the issue of how laws and
theories are formulated, the logical positivists adopted the
verification principle, according to which, a proposition is
meaningful, if it can be verified directly or is capable of
being verified in future experience. This principle was to
serve a dual purpose. Firstly, it was to serve as a criterion of
demarcation between science and non-science or pseudo­
science. Secondly, it was to enhance the unity of science
and in the process rid science of all metaphysical notions.
In pursuance of these goals, the positivists ended up
debunking metaphysical, epistemological ethical
assertions as meaningless. According to them, these
assertions do not live up to the condition of empirical
verifiability; only claims of empirical sciences do.
The logical positivists identified hypotheses and
215
propositions, as two dimensions of verificationism. A
hypothesis is a proposed law connecting various
observations or many different immediate experiences. A
hypothesis is potentially testable or verifiable, and when it
is eventually verified it becomes a law. Each record of an
observation is a proposition. A hypothesis consists of
many propositions, which are many verifications of it.
Hypotheses are confirmed only by an appeal to the
verifying propositions. This method of basing general
statements or laws on accumulated verifying propositions
is known as induction and is seen by the logical positivists
as the hallmark of science.

Conclusion
The meeting point of all the different strands of
positivism examined above is the belief that enquiry should
be confined to the sphere of what can be firmly established
and, that is, what is immediately given to the senses.
Following this, metaphysics and theology are to be counted
as meaningless and nonsensical; much of ethics and
aesthetics is, as much as possible, assimilated to sciences
like psychology, while what is left of them is usually
categorized as emotive, evaluative or prescriptive. They
sometimes give room for verifiability in principle, not in
practice. But all positivists face the same internal
difficulties, some of which are: the possibility of translating
a person’s internal experience into a statement about a
physical object and vice-versa without falling into the trap
of solipsism; the problem of whether to accept either
physicalism (the view that every statement including
psychological ones can be translated into physicalist
216
statements) or the physicalist language, or reject both; the
problem as to whether laws which are the basis of scientific
prediction can be considered as meaningful in view of the
fact that my present experience or experiment cannot
authoritatively and conclusively tell us anything about the
future; the question as to why sense -experience should be
the criterion of meaning; and the fact that in their own way
positivists can be and are metaphysicians too - they can and
do investigate and try to find answers to genuinely
ontological questions.

217
 CHAPTER 23

INDUCTIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF

INDUCTION
Fact, Law and Theory
Before a description of inductivism is carried out, it
is necessary to first answer the following questions: What is
a fact, a law, a theory? How, if at all, are they related?
Fact
The word ‘fact’ is normally used to denote actual
state-of -affairs. According to the correspondence theory
of truth, fact is that which corresponds to a proposition. It is
often said that fact is what makes a proposition true. In
other words, fact is synonymous with ‘true proposition’.
On the basis of this, a proposition can only be said to be true
if it describes a state-of-affairs, that is, a fact.

Law
In the empirical sciences, the word Taw’ is used in
terms of Taw of nature’. Laws of nature or scientific laws
are generalizations. They are descriptive and not
prescriptive. In other words, they describe how nature
works and do not prescribe anything. For instance,
Kepler’s law« of planetary motion only describe how
planets actually do move, they do not prescribe how planets
should move, and the penalties they would suffer if they
fail. Laws in this sense describe certain uniformities in
nature. These uniformities exist whether or not human
beings are there to describe them. This is the reason it is
sometimes said that Taws are discovered, not made’. But
218
this is not to say that the formulation of these uniformities is
not the work of men. Indeed, it is the work of men.
A statement expressing a scientific law differs from a
singular empirical statement (i.e. a statement expressing a
fact) in the sense that while the truth of the latter can be
tested by an observation of the world, the truth of the former
cannot be tested by an observation of the world. A scientific
law is a true universal empirical proposition. That means
that it applies to all members of a given class without
exception. For example, the proposition ‘All iron rusts
when exposed to oxygen’ is a true universal empirical
proposition. But the proposition ‘This piece of iron rusts’ is
simply a statement of fact.

Theory
A theory may be defined as a unified system of laws
or hypotheses, with explanatory force. Scientific theories
are normally constructed to explain laws of nature.
Although it is sometimes difficult to make a clear-cut
distinction between a law and a theory, it is clear that while
it is the case that scientific law is discovered, it is the case
that scientific theories are constructed or devised. One
important feature of a scientific theory is that it normally
contains a term that denotes an unobservable entity. For
example, the proposition ‘There are protons and electrons',
is a theory. The reason we call this proposition a theory is
that evidence about the existence of protons and electrons is
unavoidably inconclusive. Indeed, in all of empirical
sciences, the belief in the ‘smallest particles of matter’ is
the most thoroughly worked out theory.

219
 Having distinguished between the fact, law and
theory, we shall now attempt to provide an answer to the
question: How, if at all, are fact, law and theory related?
The principal task of science is to discover facts.
But science does not go about the business of collecting
facts haphazardly. The scientist searches for more general
truths of which isolated facts are mere instances. Not only
are the isolate facts instances of these more general truths,
they also constitute the evidence for these truths. Isolated
particular facts are discoverable by direct observation of
the world. For example, the proposition ‘A particular
released object falls’ and the proposition ‘This piece of iron
rusts’ are matters of fact open to direct observation. But the
scientist does not only record such phenomena, he
formulates general laws, which state the pattern of such
occurrences. But he does not just stop there. Just as he is
challenged by particular facts to discover their lawful
connections, so also he is challenged by a plurality of
general laws to try to discover a still more general principle
of which the several laws are special cases. The attempt to
seek to unify and explain the systematic relationship
between laws leads the scientist to devise theories.
From the foregoing, we can see that while particular
facts lead the scientist to discover scientific laws, the need
to unify and explain scientific laws leads the scientist to
construct or devise theories. Thus, while scientific laws
unify and explain facts, theories are devised to unify and
explain both laws and facts.

220
 Inductivism
How are scientific laws arrived at? According to
some scientists, science is principally concerned with
establishing general laws. These general laws are derived
rigorously from a great number of particular observations
or facts of experience. For instance, if we represent the
various facts that have been established as r, s, t, u, and let T,
stand for the theory (or general law) derived from them, the
supposed relationship between the facts and the theory ma>
be put schematically thus:
r is a fact
s is a fact
t is a fact
u is a fact
Therefore, T is a valid theory.
The above gives us a true picture of what scientific
knowledge is and what scientists do. Specifically, it shows
that science is not based on speculative imaginations, but
on what we can observe (i.e what we can see, touch, hear,
etc). Thus, it shows that “Scientific Knowledge is reliable
knowledge because it is objectively proven knowledge”
(Chalmers 1). This conception of how scientific laws or
theories are arrived at is called inductivism. This popular
conception of science first gained currency during the great
scientific revolution of the 17th century, which was brought
about by the pioneering works of scientists such as Galileo
and Newton. Francis Bacon was obviously adumbrating
the scientific attitude of many of his contemporaries when
he said that in order to understand nature we must consult
the “textbook” of nature and the treatises of ancient
philosophers such as Aristotle. Encouraged by the

221
 successes of Galileo’s experiments, Bacon and his
colleagues dismissed as mistaken the view of the medieval
natural philosophers that the Holy Bible and Aristotle’s
writings constituted the chief sources of scientific
knowledge, and argued that the source of reliable
knowledge is experience. J. J. Davis seemed to have lent
weight to this as he is quoted by Chalmers to have said that
“Science is a structure built on facts”[ 1 ]
Naive inductivism is an attempt to formalize the
picture of science given above. According to naive
inductivism, under normal conditions the scientific
observer unprejudicially records what he observes by
means of his senses. The statements he arrived at as a result
of his observation are called observation statements or
singular statements. A singular statement is a statement
that refers to a particular occurrence at a particular place at
a particular point in time. A good example is ‘That stick,
half immersed in water, appears bent’.
Apart from singular statements, which can be said to
be particular, there are also general statements. General
statements are statements that make claims about the
behaviour or properties of some aspects of the universe.
Unlike singular statements which refer to particular
occurrences or state-of -affairs, general statements report
about all events of a particular kind at all places and at all
times. Consider the example, ‘All planets move in ellipses
around the sun’. This statement is a general statement
because it claims that all planets, irrespective of where they
are situated, will always move around the sun. Because of
their generality, general statements constitute the laws and
theories, which constitute scientific knowledge and are
also called universal statements.
222
 Having drawn a distinction between singular
statements (i.e. statements of observation or experience)
and general statements (i.e. universal statements), it
becomes pertinent to ask: What makes it possible for the
inductivist to infer a general statement from singular
statements? In other words, what makes it possible for the
inductivist to generalize from a finite number of
observation statements to a universal law or theory?
The inductivist might answer this question by saying
that provided the number of observations are repeated
under a wide variety of conditions, and provided no
accepted observation statement conflicts with the derived
universal law or theory, it is legitimate to infer a universal
law or theory from a limited list of statements. Referring to
heated metals, we can legitimately draw the universal law
that ‘All metals expand when heated’.
It is quite obvious that when we are asked why we
believe that the sun will rise tomorrow or in the future, we
will naturally answer, “Because it has always risen in the
past.” But if we are further challenged as to why we firmly
believe that it will rise tomorrow or in the future, we may
appeal to the laws of motion to buttress our claim. We
know that the earth is a body that rotates freely and that it
can only cease to rotate if it is interfered with by another
body. But we know that nothing will interfere with the
rotation of the earth between now and tomorrow. And so
we feel we are justified in saying that the sun will rise
tomorrow because sunrise is a fulfillment of the laws of
motion and experience or the past teaches us that the laws of
motion will continue to operate as they have operated until
now.
223
 This kind of reasoning discussed so far is called
inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning involves moving
from a limited number of observation statements to the
justification of a universal statement and the process is
called induction. Science, for the naive inductivist, is
based on the principle of induction. Chalmers states the
principle of induction as: “If a large number of As have
been observed under a wide variety of conditions, and if all
these observed A’s without exception possessed the
property B, then all A’s have the property B” [5]. The naive
inductivist thinks of scientific knowledge as a building
resting on the secure basis provided by observation, a
position hotly criticized by Popper. To quote Chalmers in
some details:
As the number of facts established by
observation and experiments grows, and as the
facts become more refined and esoteric due to
improvements in our observational and
experimental skills, so more and more laws
and theories of ever more generality and scope
are constructed by careful inductive reasoning.
The growth of science is continuous, ever
onward and upward as the fund of
observational data is increased [5]
Inductive and Deductive Reasoning
Inductive reasoning is often contrasted with
deductive reasoning. In short, while induction is regarded
as the hallmark of science, deduction is regarded as the
hallmark of Logic. Both modes of reasoning proceed by
means of rigorous arguments. Thus, we sometimes speak of
inductive arguments and deductive arguments.
224
 In inductive arguments, if the premises are known to
be true, then it is probable that the conclusion will be true.
Here we see that inductive reasoning does not hold that if
the premises of an argument are true, then its conclusion
must be true. It is as a result of this that inductive
arguments are not judged as valid or invalid, sound or
unsound. Of course, they can be appraised to the degree of
probability, which the premises provided for the
conclusion.
A deductive argument, on the other hand, is one in
which it is claimed that if the premises are true, it follows
that the conclusion must be true. For this reason, deductive
arguments are judged as valid or invalid, sound or unsound.
In a valid deductive argument, the premises and the
conclusion are so logically connected that it will be
impossible for the former to be tine and the latter false.
This does not however mean that we cannot have a valid
deductive argument, which has false premises. Indeed, we
can have a perfectly valid deductive argument with false
premises. A sound deductive argument is one which has
true premises and hence a true conclusion.
In inductive reasoning, we move from particular
assertions to general assertions and we know that the
inference of a general proposition from particular
assertions is never conclusive. On the other hand, in
deductive reasoning, we move from assertions about a
whole class of things to assertions about some of them. For
example, from assertions about all planets, we can move to
assertions about the planet earth. Briefly, we can say that
whereas we move from ‘some’ to ‘all’ in inductive
reasoning, we move from “all” to “some” in deductive
reasoning.
225
 Advocates of the principle of induction hold the view
that a distinctive feature of scientific method is the use of
inductive reasoning. They claim that the inductive method
of scientific inquiry is superior to the deductive method
because it is integrally connected with the discovery of
scientific laws and theories. They buttress their claim by
saying that whereas the inductive method enables us to
make a leap from the finite data of observation to a law
covering all that are (i.e. known present) and all that will or
could be (i.e. predicted future), deductive method can never
advance to knowledge of the hitherto unobserved. Max
Black seemed to be in support of this when he said: “The so-
called ‘inductive leap’ (from ‘some’ to ‘any’ and ‘all’)
seems indispensable in science no less than in ordinary life”
(cited in Chalmers 5).

Two Versions of Inductive Reasoning

Two versions of inductive reasoning, namely, simple
(primitive) form of induction and sophisticated form of
induction can be distinguished. The distinction between
the simple form of induction and the sophisticated form of
induction is the distinction between induction in the narrow
sense and induction in the wide or general sense.
According to A.R. Lacey, an argument is. inductive in
the narrow or strict sense (called simple or enumerative
induction), if it claims to draw its conclusion from its
premises directly in a single step (94). That is to say that
from the knowledge of a sample of a case, we draw a
conclusion about a case not included in that sample, and
hence anticipate what will happen next time. For example,
if my friend’s dog always barks whenever it senses my
226
presence in my friend’s house, we will conclusively expect
that it will bark at me the next time it sees me there. Let’s
consider a weightier example. When I apply a lit match to a
piece of paper and it catches fire, we conclude that any
similar piece of paper will catch fire in a similar situation.
The sophisticated form of induction, on the other
hand, refers to “any rational process where from premises
about some things of a certain kind a conclusion is drawn
about some or all of the remaining things of that kind”. In
other words, the sophisticated form of induction involves a
transition from any information about a given set of objects
or situations to a conclusion about some wider, more
inclusive set. For example, if all observed ravens have been
found to be black, we conclude ‘All ravens are black’.
This conclusion invariably implies that all subsequent
ravens to be observed will be black.
It should be mentioned that there is not much
difference between the simple and the sophisticated forms
of induction. In fact the only point of difference is that the
sophisticated form is broader than the simple form. I ndecd.
it can be argued (as Max Black did) that it is on the
correctness of the simple form of induction that the
sophisticated form depends.

The Problem of Induction

The search for uniformities in nature, and hence
natural laws, has been central to scientific investigation
since Archimedes. But Francis Bacon was the first to
systematically describe the way scientific investigation is
to be pursued. Bacon was dissatisfied with “the
powerlessness of deduction to do more than render explicit
/ 227
the logical consequences of generalization derived from
some external sources” (Edwards 94). He thought, “if
recourse to intellectual intuition or to self-knowledge is
repudiated as a source of factual knowledge, nothing better
seems to remain than reliance upon the empiricist principle
that all knowledge concerning matters of fact ultimately
derives from experience”(Edwards 94). Bacon maintained
that the aim of the scientist is to move further and further
away from ignorance. To achieve this the scientist begins
by carrying out experiments. Depending on the outcome of
his experiments, he may record his findings or cause them
to be published. In the course of time, he and other workers
in the scientific community, to put it in the language of
Thomas Kuhn, would have accumulated a lot of similar,
shared and reliable data. As these grow, to put it in the
language of Bryan Magee, general features begin to evolve
and the individual scientist begins to formulate a general
hypothesis. After this has been done, he begins to look for
confirming or supporting instances of the hypothesis. If a
good number of such confinning or supporting instances
are found, then he has discovered a scientific law, which
will help mankind in discovering more of the secrets of
nature. Thus, according to Bryan Magee, the existing stock
of scientific knowledge is added to, and ignorance is pushed
back.
According to Magee, “The method of basing general
statements on accumulated observations of specific
instances is known as induction, and is seen as the hallmark
of science” (11 - 12). Magee says that it is the use of the
inductive method criterion that serves to draw a line of
demarcation between science and non-science, between
228
scientific method and non-scientific methods. He says
further that since scientific statements are based on
observation of facts, they alone provide sure and certain
knowledge. He concludes that since science is a body of
certain knowledge, the growth of science consists in the
endless addition of new certainties to the already existing
ones.
Good as the foregoing account of induction may
seem, a problem however arises when we try to ask whether
induction can be justified. That induction is fallible is
obvious, even to commonsense. Critics might wish to ask
how we can be sure that the position of the inductivist is
stronger than that of the gambler who has had a sequence of
throws. Can we possibly know that the law of gravitation
will continue to hold true? The answer to this question is
Yes and No. Yes, because it may turn out to hold true in
future, but No, because it is possible that tomorrow’s
observations may go in a direction contrary to the way the
present evidence points. After all. much uniformity that
has occurred in the past does not occur today. This is why
some philosophers have found it hard to understand how
the so-called inductive leap (i.e. the leap from ‘some’ to -
‘all’), which seems to involve a plain logical fallacy
(perhaps the fallacy of faulty or hasty generalization), can
be justified. It is the problem of justifying inductive-leap
that we call ‘the problem of induction’. R. Harre and E.H.
Madden, in their book Causal Powers, defined the problem
of induction as “the problem of the -legitimacy of
generalizing any results obtained in particular empirical
investigations” (70). According to Vernon Pratt, the
problem can be put by asking, “How we can be justified in
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thinking that our findings about some individuals can be
generalized to apply to all”? (84). In attempting to answer
this question, three lines of approaches are open to the
inductivist. Firstly, he can appeal to inductive logic;
secondly, he can appeal to experience; and thirdly he can
retreat to probability. Let us examine these three
approaches One by one.
A valid argument is one in which if the premises are
true, it will be impossible for the conclusion to be false. In
fact this is the characteristic of all valid arguments. But it
should be mentioned that while deductive arguments have
that character, inductive arguments do not. Inductive
arguments are not appraised as valid. This is chiefly
because it is possible for an inductive argument to have a
false conclusion and true premises without being involved
in a contradiction. For example, suppose I have observed a
large number of crows under a wide variety of
circumstances and have found them all to be black and on
the basis of that I conclude that ‘All crows are black’. Now,
although this is a legitimate inductive inference, there is no
logical guarantee that the next crow I will observe will be
black. Thus, while there is no logical contradiction in
claiming that each observed crow is black, there are no
logical grounds justifying the sweeping claim that ‘All
crows are black’. Perhaps Russell’s story of the inductivist
turkey may fit in here. The story goes as follows: The
inductivist turkey was among other turkeys in the turkey
farm. When he was first taken to the farm he discovered
that he was fed at 9.00a.m. He did not immediately
conclude that he was being fed everyday at 9.00 a.m., but
waited until he had made this observation under varied
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 circumstances. Every day he added an observation
statement to his list. When he felt that his inductivist
conscience was fully satisfied, he confidently made an
inductive inference as follows: ‘I am always fed at 9.00.
a.m’. Alas, this conclusion was proved to be false when, on
the eve of Christmas, his throat was chopped off instead of
being fed. *
Having shown that induction cannot be justified on
logical grounds, it behooves the inductivist to show how
induction can be justified by recourse to experience.
Presumably, the inductivist can attempt to do this by
recounting the successful predictions and explanations,
which were made possible by inductively derived scientific
laws and theories. For example, the successful prediction
of the occurrence of eclipses has been made possible by the
law of planetary motion, which is inductively derived from
the observations of planetary positions, etc. But this way of
justifying induction is untenable because it employs the
very kind of inductive argument whose validity is, in turn,
in need of justification. The form of the justificatory
argument can be written as follows:
The principle of induction worked
successfully on occasion X,. The principle of
induction worked successfully on Occasion
X2. The principle of induction always works
(Chalmers 14).
In this example, singular statements expressing past
successes of the principle of induction serve as premises of .
the argument. A universal statement (the conclusion)/
inferred from the singular statements asserts the validity of
the principle of induction. Now, any attempt to use this
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argument to justify induction is bound to be unsuccessful,
for it would mean justifying induction by means of
induction, which is circular.
Having shown the first two lines of approach to fail,
what is left for the inductivist is to retreat to probability.
Some advocates of the theory of induction have argued that
the problem of induction can be solved by making a
reference to probability as part of the statement expressing
the conclusion of a properly stated inductive argument.
They insist, for instance, that instead of inferring the
conclusion ‘All A’s are B’ from the premise ‘All examined
A’s are B’, the conclusion should read ‘It is more probable
than not that all A’s are B’. As Chalmers puts it, the
probabilistic version will read something like the
following: If a large number of A’s have been observed
under a wide variety of conditions, and if all these observed
A’s without exception have possessed the property B, then
all A’s probably possess the property B (17). Obviously this
reformulated version of induction faces the very problems
that the previous attempts to justify induction face, hence it
does not overcome the problem of induction. For one thing,
it is like the original principle in being a universal
statement. For another, any attempt to justify it by an
appeal to logic or by recourse to experience, is bound to’fail.
Thus, the probabilistic version cannot solve the problem of
induction. In the words of Max Black:
Those who insist that the conclusion's of
inductive arguments should be probability
statements are faced with the same dilemma
that bedevils all previous attempts to justify
induction: either the argument is left in its
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 original form, and then it seems to be invalid;
of else it is replaced by some valid deductive
argument (either by strengthening the
premises or by weakening the conclusion),
and then it is not an inductive argument at all
(161).
It should be mentioned here that the age-old problem
of induction is more than the general problem of
justification discussed above. It entails as well the inter­
twined problems of differential appraisal and analysis.
The problem of differential appraisal is also called the
comparative problem. Under this problem, the following
question is often asked: Why is it that one inductive
conclusion or inference is (sometimes) preferable to
another as being more reliable or better grounded? The
analytical problem or the problem of analysis asks the
‘What’ question of the problem of induction. For instance,
it asks: What makes some inductive arguments rationally
acceptable than others? What criteria determine that one
rule of inductive inference is superior to another?
In practice, the three problems presented above (that
is, the problems ofjustification, differential appraisal and
analysis') cannot be pursued separately. Specifically, the
“how” and “why” of inductive argument cannot be
profitably isolated from one another. Nonetheless, finding
that the general problem ofjustification is insurmountable,
most recent investigators of the problem of induction have
concentrated their attention on the problems of‘differential
appraisal’ and ‘analysis’. They do this in the hope of
formulating precise canons or rules of inductive inference.
Granted that the problem of induction is difficult to
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surmount, there are, however, a number of responses to the
problem. One of such responses can be called the skeptical
response. We can accept that science depends on the
principle of induction and that we cannot justify this
principle by appealing to logic or experience, and conclude
that science is not rationally justifiable. This is the kind of
position held by David Hume.
A second response involves denying that science
depends on induction. It says the problem of induction is
solved if it can establish that science is not based on
induction. This is the kind of position held by
falsificationists, most notably Karl Popper. In the
remaining part of this chapter, we examine Hume’s
discussion of the problem of induction and Popper’s
response to Hume.

Hume’s Discussion of the Problem of Induction

David Hume was the first philosopher to give a
serious thought to the problem of induction. Indeed, no
modem discussion of the problem of induction will be
complete without reference to Hume. Although it is
claimed that Hume never used the word ‘induction’ in any
of his works, his analysis of causation has obvious
ramifications in the philosophical problem of induction.
His analysis of causation arises from his view that all
reasoning concerning matters of fact is grounded in the
connection between cause and effect.
Hume approaches the idea of causation with
suspicion. He asks the question: When we say A causes B,
what relations exist between A and B? For Hume,
experience supplies us with the answer in our ideas of: [a]
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 Contiguity - i.e. A and B are always close together, (b)
Priority in time — i.e. A, which is the cause, always
precedes B, which is the effect; and (c) Constant
conjunction - i.e. we always see A accompanied by B. To
these notions of spatial contiguity, temporal succession and
joint occurrence, which such later writers as J.H. Mill also
associated with the notion of cause and effect, Hume adds
the notion of ‘necessary connexion’. His argument is that
before one event can be properly recognized as the cause of
the other, something more than contiguity, succession, and
accompaniment is needed. In predicting the effect of a
given event, our memory goes beyond contiguity,
succession and accompaniment to furnish us with a belief
that these things will be repeated under repeated
circumstances. Hume challenges his readers to find out
whether the observation of a simple case of a causal action
can give answer to the required necessary connexion that is
supposed to exist between the cause and the effect. He
argues that no number of true, singular observation
statements will entitle us to draw an unrestrictedly general
statement. In An Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, (edited by Charles W. Hendel), Hume
writes:
Even after one instance or experiment where
we have observed a particular event to follow
upon another, we are not entitled to form a
general rule or foretell what will happen in like
cases, it being justly esteemed an
unpardonable temerity to judge the whole
course of nature from one single experiment,
however accurate or certain (85).
 For instance, if I observe that event A is
accompanied by event B on one occasion, it does not follow
that A will be accompanied by event B on subsequent
occasions. If it happens often enough, I may come to
expect that the next time Event A occurs; Event B will
follow. Hume says this is a fact of psychology and not
logic. No matter how numerous the number of observed
instances may be, they do not logically entail the general
statements (laws or theories) inferred from them.
Hume recognizes the fact that the whole of science
assumes that the future will always resemble the past in
those aspects in which the laws of nature are said to operate,
but maintains that this assumption is unjustifiable.
Observation, he argues, cannot establish this, since the
future is unobservable. Neither can logic do this because
the fact that all past futures have resembled past pasts does
not entai I that future futures will resemble future pasts.
The conclusion Hume comes to is that although there
is no way of validating inductive' procedures, our
psychological constitution makes us think in terms of them.
As he puts it in The Inquiry,
Because of the repeated observation of the
association of events, we expect the
association to continue by means of an
operation of the soul, when we are so situated,
as unavoidable as to fall the passion of love,
when we receive benefits, or hatred, when we
meet with injuries (60).
Hume says that the idea of necessary connexion
results from the habit or custom of expecting effects.
Necessity, for him, is not in the object but in the mind. He
236
concludes that all probable reasoning is nothing but a
speci'es of sensation. This would mean that although
scientific laws work in practice, they have no rationally
secure foundation - either in logic or in experience, since
every scientific law, being unrestrictedly general, goes
beyond both.

Evaluation of Hume’s Discussion of the Problem of

Induction
There is no doubt that Hume created more problems
than he solved in attempting to solve the problem of
induction. Because of his inability to solve the problem of
induction, which he had set forth to achieve, some of his
critics have dubbed the problem of induction ‘Hume’s
problem’. Indeed, many philosophers since the time of
Hume have been baffled by this problem. Bryan Magee
refers to C.D Broad who describes the Humean problem as
the skeleton in the cupboard of philosophy. Bertrand
Russell more forcefully presented Hume’s conclusion in
some of his writings, particularly in his The Problem of
Philosophy. Popper refers to Russell as having said of
Hume that:
Hume’s philosophy represents the bankruptcy
of eighteenth century reasonableness and. it is
therefore important to discover whether there
is any answer to Hume within a philosophy
that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not, there
is no intellectual difference between sanity
and insanity. The lunatic who believes that he
is poached egg is to be condemned solely on
the ground that he is in a minority (5).
Russell himself says that Hume has been able to
demonstrate that pure empiricism is not a sufficient basis
for science. He maintains further that from Hume’s
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arguments, it becomes incontrovertible that induction,
being an independent logical principle is incapable of
being inferred either from experience, or from other logical
principles and that in the absence of this principle science
will definitely not be possible.
That the scientific enterprise rests upon foundations
whose validity is doubtful, as Hume wants us to believe, is
quite embarrassing. According to Bryan Magee, this view
of Hume’s has turned many empiricist philosophers into
skeptics, irrationalists, mystics and religionists. For
Magee, all have felt bound to say that since scientific laws
are improvable, they are not certain. He says further that
even if there are millions of confirming instances, they are
probable to the degree it is possible to conceive. Magee
observes that many philosophers of science as well as
scientists are aware of this fact but do not bother
themselves about an insoluble logical problem. He says
that rather than give up science, they go about doing more
science and getting more good results. For Magee, they
rest content that science delivers the goods, it works, it
produces good results. He says that those of them who are
more philosophically minded have been deeply disturbed
by this unsolved problem because of their feeling that since
induction is centralto science, science will continue to float
in mid air unless and until the problem of induction is
resolved. Karl Popper belongs to this latter group of
philosophers. In fact, his all-important achievement has
been his attempt to solve the Humean problem. In what
follows, we examine how Popper evaluated the Humean
problem.

Popper’s Evaluation of the Humean Problem

Before Popper proposed his solution to the problem
of induction, he first evaluated Hume’s position. His aim
238
 was to expose the problems created by Hume in his attempt
to solve the problem of induction. In his book Objective
Knowledge, Popper identifies what he calls “Hume’s Two
Problems of Induction”. The two problems are, Hume’s
logical problem and Hume’s psychological problem.
Hume’s logical problem is: Are we justified in reasoning
from repeatedly observed instances to other instances
(conclusions), which we have not observed? Hume’s
answer to this question is No, no matter the number of
repetitions. On the other hand, Hume’s psychological
•problem is: Why is it that reasonable people believe and
expect that those instances, which they have observed, will
conform to those which they have no experience of?
Hume’s answer to this question is, because we are
conditioned by repetitions and the mechanism of
association of ideas
Popper agrees with Hume on the answer to the
logical problem but disagrees with him on that of the
psychological problem. In his Conjectures and
” Refutations, Popper writes:
I. approached the problem of induction
through Hume. Hume, 1 felt was perfectly
right in pointing out that induction cannot be
validly justified ... I find Hume’s refutation of
inductive inference as clear and conclusive.
But I felt completely dissatisfied with his
psychological explanation of induction in
terms of custom and habit (42).
Popper says that Hume’s psychological explanation
of induction is philosophically unsatisfactory because it is
intended as a psychological theory rather than a •
philosophical one. Specifically, it tries to give a causal
explanation of the fact that we believe in laws or
regularities by asserting that this fact is due to, or constantly

239
conjoined with, custom and habit. Popper observes that
this psychological fact can itself be described as a custom,
or habit and it will not be surprising to hear that this custom,
or habit must be explained as due to or conjoined with, a
custom or habit, though a different one. For Popper, it is
only when we realize that Hume used the words ‘custom’
and ‘habit’ to theorize about, rather than describe, the origin
of regular behaviour ascribed to frequent repetition that the
need to reformulate Hume’s psychological theory in a more
reformed way becomes obvious. We may thus reformulate
this theory by saying, to use the language of Popper, that
“like other habits, our habit of believing in laws is the
product of frequent repetition”(43).
Popper argues that even if Hume’s theory is
reformulated in such a revolutionary way, it is nevertheless
mistaken about the origin of habits and most importantly,
the character of those experiences we may describe as
believing in laws or expecting regularities. Popper says
that as a rule, habits do not originate in repetition. Habits
begin before repetition can play its part. For instance, the
habit of eating at certain hours begins before repetition
plays any part. Popper says that Kant was right to say that
our intellect imposes its laws upon nature, though he (Kant)
did not take cognizance of the fact that our intellect does fail
us in most cases in the attempt. Popper writes that: “The
regularities we try to impose are psychologically a priori,
but there is not the slightest reason to assume that they are a
priori valid, as Kant did” (Popper 22).
The need to try to impose regularities upon nature is
obviously inborn. We generally expect that our world
conform to our expectations. This, according to Popper,
would lead us to conclude that expectations may arise
before or without repetition. For Popper, repetition
presupposes similarity, and similarity presupposes a point

240
of view or a theory or an expectation. On the basis of this
claim, Popper dismissed Hume’s inductive theory of our
reformulation of beliefs as false. Popper concludes: “The
idea of induction by repetition must be due to an error - a
kind of optical illusion. In brief there is no such thing as
induction by repetition” (Popper 6-7)
Popper’s argument against Hume’s principle of
induction by repetition can be couched in the following
way: The cases that Hume had in mind can never be cases of
perfect sameness; at best they are cases of similarity. For
logical reasons, we can therefore say that there are
repetitions from a certain point of view, such as: “a system
of expectations, anticipations, assumptions, or interests -
before there can be any repetition; which point of view,
consequently cannot be merely the result of repetition”
(Popper 23). Hume, having dismissed induction as
logically invalid 'and rationally unjustifiable proposed a
non-inductive procedure for science without giving serious J
thought to it. Having pushed aside the logical principle of
induction, Hume struck a secret deal with commonsense by
cleverly introducing induction by repetition in the guise of
a psychological theory. Popper tries to turn the table upon-
this theory of Hume by saying that repetition - for us can be
best explained as the result of our propensity to expect
regularities and not vice-versa. He says that we do not wait
passively for repetition to impose regularities upon the
world. For him. without waiting for premises, we jump to
conclusions, though these may be discarded later if
falsified by observation.
Here we see that Popper is trying to stress the priority
of theories to observations. This runs contrary to the
traditional belief that observation precedes theory. For
241
Popper, scientific theories are not the product of
observations, they are bold conjectures to be tested by
observations with the aim of obtaining a decisive
refutation; hence science is conjectures and refutations^
Thus, for Popper, there is nothing like scientific certainty.
He summed up his devastating critique of science in his The
Open Society and Its Enemies when he wrote: “Thus the
belief in scientific certainty and in the authority of science
is just wishful thinking. Science is fallible, because science
is human” (375).
In the foregoing, we have limited our examination of
Popper’s critique of inductivism to his evaluation of
Hume’s discussion of induction. In the next chapter, we
examine Popper’s critical rationalist methodology of
science.

242
 CHAPTER 24
CRITICAL RATIONALIST
METHODOLOGY
OF SCIENCE
(KARL POPPER & IMRE LAKATOS)
In this chapter, we explore the critical rationalist
methodology of science. Our analysis will be confined to
Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos.

What is Critical Rationalism?

The wor^‘critical’ simply means faultfinding, or
forming and giving a judgment or opinion on somebody’s
work. On the other hand, the word ‘rationalism’ denotes
the practice of treating reason as the ultimate authority in all
subjects of study (including science). Literally, therefore,
the term ‘critical rationalism’ means the attempt to find
fault with, or form and give a judgment or opinion on
somebody’s work by making it to undergo the test of
reasoning.
Critical rationalism as a method of science is
associated with the Popperian School. It arose out of the
debate over the issueoEdemarcating science from non­
science or pseudo-science. Generally, critical rationalism
provides criteria for distinguishing critical and rational
thinking, behaviour and actions from uncritical and
irrational thinking, behaviour and actions. Thus, it
provides concrete suggestions, which help to correct
irrationality and remove ambiguities from our thought
pattern and procedures for acquiring knowledge.

243
 The standards of rationality put forth by the
Popperian school are simply standards of criticism. Paul
feyerabend has summarized these standards as follows:
rational discussion consists in the attempt to criticize, and
not in the attempt to pfove or make probable. Every step
that protects a view from criticism, that makes it safe or
‘well-founded’, is a step away frOitbtetionality. Every step
that makes it more vulnerable is welcome. In addition, it is
recommended that w£ abandon ideas which have been
found wanting and forbid to retain them in the face of strong
and successful criticism. We are to develop our ideas so
that they can be criticized or attacked felentlessly. We
should not try to protect them, but exhibittneir weak points.
Finally, we are to eliminate them when sucll weak points
have become noticeable (173).
What prompted Popper to adopt the critical
rationalist method of science? In a nutshell, the turning
point in Popper’s career was the introduction to the new
physics by Einstein. In 1919, Popper attended a lecture by
Einstein in Vienna, where, according to him, he was dazed
by Einstein’s introduction to the new physics. As if to
buttress his faith in Einstein, Einstein’s eclipse predictions
were tested in May of the same year and were found to be
successful. These tests ushered in a new theory of
gravitation and. of course, a new cosmology. What made
Einstein's new physics peculiar was that it was a real
improvement on Newton’s, in fact, a better approximation
to the truth. Popper was so impressed by this development
that he now considered Einstein as the most dominant
influence on his thinking. Einstein’s, new discoveries
explained all of Newton’s and even went beyond Newton’s.
244
As Popper claimed, what impressed him most was
Einstein’s declaration that he would regard his general
theory of rel^ivity as untenable if it failed crucial tests.
Popper saw in this a critical attitude totally different from
the dogmatic attitude of Marx, Freud and Adler. He came
to realize that Marx’s theory of history, Freud’s
psychoanalysis and Adler’s individual psychology failed to
make precisely formulated predictions that could be
subjected to direct (or indirect] empirical test.
Under the influence of Einstein, Popper came to the
conclusion that falsifiability or refutability is the criterion
of the scientific status of a theory. In other words, it is the
demarcating line between what is and what is not science.
Thus, the hallmark of the scientific status of a theory is that
empirical findings, which would refute it, are logically
possible. Any such theory is said to be empirically
‘falsifiable’ in the sense that actual occurrence of findings
contrary to it would be the warrant of its falsity (Logic of
S.D. 112).
Popper based his method on the hypothetico-
deductive method (the method of trial and error, or
conjecture and refutation, as he later called it), claiming
that enumerative induction was impossible.

Popper’s Falsifiability Criterion

We have highlighted the standards of rationality put
forward by the critical rationalists in the foregoing
discussion. Now, when this procedure is applied to the -
realm of the natural sciences, it will be seen that criticism is
connected with testing a hypothesis or theory against basic
statements through observation and experimentation. Basic
245
statements have the form of singular existential statements.
They are statements asserting that an observable event is
taking place in a particular place at a particular time. Basic
statements are, therefore, potential falsifiers of a theory and
in fact they constitute the content of a theory. Theories of
increased content are preferable to those of decreased
content because they ar* more vulnerable to falsification.
A good scientific law or theory must make definite claims
about the world, for it is only when this obtains that it will
be possible to show that the world does not in fact behave
the way the law or theory claims. Let us consider the
following laws to buttress this point:
(a) The planet earth moves in an ellipse around the sun.
(b) All planets move in ellipses around the sun.
In these examples, it is obvious that law (b) makes
more claims about the universe than law (a). In short law
(b) contains all about (a) and even goes beyond it.
Consequently, any falsification of (b) will result in the
falsification of (a), but not vice-versa. Law (b) is,
therefore, more falsifiable than law (a) and hence
preferable to (a). To say this is to say that it is a better law
because it claims more.
Following this view, ad hoc hypotheses and theories
that fail crucial tests as a result of contradicting basic
statements must be abdicated. It shows that science
progresses by proposing highly falsifiable hypotheses or
theories and deliberately attempting to falsify them. Let us
hear from Karl Popper, regarded as the most notable
falsificationist:
I can therefore gladly admit that
falsificationists like myself must prefer an
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 attempt to solve an interesting problem by a
bold conjecture, even (and especially) if it
soon turns out to be false, to any recital of a
sequence of irrelevant truisms. We prefer this
because we believe that this is the way in
which we can learn from our mistakes and that
in finding that our conjecture was false we
shall have learnt much about the truth and
shall have got nearer to the truth (Conjectures
231).
From this quotation from Popper, we are told that we
learn from our mistakes and that science thrives through
trial and error. Because of the logical impossibility of
deriving laws and theories from singular observation
statements, and the logical possibility of the deduction of
their falsity from same, falsificationism becomes the
hallmark of science. A science that proceeds in this fashion
takes the following orders: first, a problem is proffered.
Second, attempt is made to solve the problem. Solving the
problem would require putting forth a theory which, though
is relevant and falsifiable, but is, nevertheless, yet to be
falsified. Third, the theory is tested or criticized through
observation and crucial experiments. If the theory is
successfully criticized or falsified, it is jettisoned and a new
problem emerges. To solve this new problem, there is need
for a new theory that reproduces the successful
consequences of the older theory, avoids or denies its
anomalies and makes additional predictions not made
before (Feyerabend 173 - 174). And so, science may
continue on the unending route of modus tollens,
conjectures and refutations, or trial and error in its quest to
247
unveil the secrets of nature. A.F. Chalmers writes:
The greater the number of conjectured
theories that are confronted by the realities of
the world, and the more speculative those
conjectures are, the greater will be the chances
of major advances in science. There is no
danger in the proliferation of speculative
theories because any that is inadequate as
descriptions of the world can be ruthlessly
eliminated as the result of observation or other
tests (44).
There are at least two advantages that go with the
demand that theories be highly falsifiable in order to be
admitted in science. Firstly, such a demand enhances the
clarity of theories. A theory that is so vaguely stated so that
it is not clear as to what it is claiming will be shown to be
inconsistent when subjected to critical tests by experiment
and observation. Secondly, such a demand will ensure the
stating of theories in a precise manner. To quote Chalmers
again,
The more precisely a theory is formulated the
more falsifiable it becomes. If we accept that
the more falsifiable a theory is the better
(provided it has not been falsified), then we
must also accept that the more precise the
claims of a theory are the better (45).

Popper’s Concept of Verisimilitude (Truth-likeness)

It is interesting to know that Popper believes that
science does not necessarily seek to unveil the truth. He
does not assert that the unending formulation and testing of
248
hypotheses or theories will ultimately generate truth or
certainty. Through the fact of the refutation of our earlier
theories, science enables us to know that the world as we
perceive it to be is not the world as it is. For Popper,
although, we may aim at the target (i.e. truth) with the arrow
of modus tollens, nevertheless, we may never know when
we have hit the target. Rather than devise a theory of
realism founded on a doctrine of truth, Popper had devised
a concept called ‘verisimilitude’ by which the ‘truth­
likeness’ of hypotheses or theories could be determined.
Following this,
If we have an empirical statement, then the
class of true statements that it entails is called
its ‘truth content’ and the set of false
statements it entails is called its ‘falsity
content’. The ‘verisimilitude’ is defined as
‘truth content’ minus ‘falsity content’. The
‘verisimilitude’ of two theories which offer
competing explanations of the same
phenomena may thus be supposedly
compared if one of them explains or accounts
for that which the other explains and also
some additional phenomena; and the first
theory has stood up to tests in the extra domain
where the second theory is unsuccessful, or
which it does not cover (Oldroyd 311).
Popper’s Concept of Corroboration
This concept is important because it is on it that some
of Popper’s critics capitalize to criticize him.
Corroboration is simply defined as the degree to which a
theory is falsifiable. Given some initial conditions, we can
249
proceed to deduce statements from scientific theories.
Agreed tests are the determinants of the truth of these
statements. If the statements withstand the tests, then the
theory is corroborated. And when a theory is
corroborated, we feel more justified to adhere to it than
before. On the other hand, if statements are falsified,
theories themselves are falsified, and once theories are
falsified they must be mercilessly abandoned. Thus,
Popper seems to conceive of scientific change in the light
of the indications of hypothetico-deductive methodology,
which is often called the falsificationist methodology.
Falsificationism is anti-inductivistic in that ft completely
rejects the claim of the inductivist (especially positivistic
inductivist) that theories are verified, confirmed or
established as true or probable on the basis of
observational evidence.

Criticism
In spite of the fact that Popper’s views have
contributed in no small way to revolutionize twentieth
century science and philosophy of science, it must be said
that his whole programme of critical rationalism is to be
accounted as not too successful because of the standard
criticisms it is open to.
Below are outlined some of the standard criticisms
which the Popperian system is open to
1. By postulating his single criterion of falsifiability, he
has committed the fallacy of oversimplification; he
has oversimplified the forms that scientific theories
take and the methods used in testing them.
2. By his concept of corroboration, he has cleverly
250

-
 introduced induction through the back door. There
seems to be a resemblance between his model and the
inductivist model which he had set forth to debunk.
Thus, his claim that he has succeeded in
circumventing the problem of induction is a false
claim.
3. As shown by Tichy, it is not possible to satisfactorily
compare the verisimilitudes of two theories. This
puts a question mark against Popper’s notion of
verisimilitude.
4. Popper’s view that a theory is all conjecture is not
completely correct. The fact is that a theory is not all
conjecture because some parts of it may have
become very well established. Conjecture may only
come in at what one may call the experimental and
growing points of science.
5. Popper is ensnared by his own view that all
knowledge is provisional. If all knowledge is
provisional, then it is arguable that Popper’s own
critical rationalist methodology is ‘ipso-facto’
provisional.
6. History seems to falsify the falsificationist principle.
History abounds with examples of scientific
theories, which were not rejected even though
anomalies were found in them right from the start.
In the face of the objections to which the Popperian
system is exposed, there have been attempts by some .
of Popper’s former friends and colleagues to either
develop or modify Popper’s position. Of note is
Imre Lakatos whose attempt to improve on the
Popperian system we shall now examine.
251
Imre Lakatos (1922-1974)
He was a Hungarian by birth. In his early years, he
belonged to an anti-Nazi resistance movement. Later in
life, he moved to the London School of Economics, where
he came under Popper’s influence. He eventually occupied
a chair in this school. His most widely read and influential
paper is entitled “The Methodology ofScientific Research
Programme". Lakatos was no doubt greatly influenced by
Popper. In his The Rationality of Science, W.H. Newton-
Smith,described Lakatos as “TheRevisionaryPopperian”
(77 - 79). Lakatos himself declares that:
Popper’s ideas represent the most important
development in the philosophy of twentieth
century; an achievement in the tradition and on
the level of Hume, Kant and Whewell.
Personally my debt to him is immeasurable,
more than anyone else, he changed my life. I
was nearly forty when I got into the magnetic
field of his intellect ...”(139).
JJke Popper, Lakatos is a rationalist in that he
believes that the central problem in the philosophy of
science is that of stating the universal conditions under
which a theory can be regarded as scientific and when to
decide whether the acceptance of a theory is rational or
irrational. Although Lakatos’ model is not as simplistic as
Popper’s, it is indeed a remarkable improvement.
Lakatos ’ main obj ection to Popper is that Popper tends
to represent the scientific endeavour as a kind of two-
comered fight between a theory and the world in the sense that:
1. A test is or must be made a two-cornered fight
between theory and experiment so that in the final
confrontation only these two face each other; and
252
2. The only interesting outcome of such confrontation
is (conclusive) falsification: the only genuine
discoveries are refutations of scientific hypotheses.
However, history of science suggests that (i) tests are
at least three-cornered fight between rival theories
and experiments; and (ii) some of the most
interesting experiments result prima facie, in
confirmation rather than falsification (Lakatos 31)
In proposing his alternative view to that of Popper,
Lakatos maintains that we should regard the
scientific endeavour as a kind of three-cornered fight
between rival theories with the world acting as the
referee. Consequently, he suggests that we should
only regard theory T as having been falsified if and
only if another theory T1 has been proposed with the
following characteristics:
(1) T1 has excess empirical content than T: that
is, it predicts novel facts, that is, facts
improbable in the light of, or even forbidden
by T; (2) t explains the previous success of T,
that is, all the unrefuted content of T, and (3)
some of the excess content of T‘ is
corroborated (Lakatos 32).
In criticizing Popper, Lakatos argues that theories
have not been abandoned simply because they resulted in
predictions which were not fulfilled. Indeed, to jettison a
theory just because it generates anomalies is to undermine
the scientific enterprise. Lakatos further argues that in a’
two-cornered fight, victory would normally go to the
world. He contends that there has never been a scientific
theory, no matter how successful, that has not generated
253

* /
 some anomalies right from its cradle to its demise. For
* him, the generation of anomalies is not sufficient a
condition to warrant our rejection of a theory. For, to have a
theory with anomalies is far better than not to have a theory
at all. So, Lakatos does not subscribe to Popper’s view that
' a theory is to be immediately abandoned once it has
generated some anomalies. It is his view that:
An assessment of ’the relative merits of
competing theories should be delayed until
proponents of the theories have had time to
explore modifications in their theories which
might make them better able to cope with
anomalies (Newton-Smith 79).
This line of reasoning led Lakatos to surmise that the
unit of appraisal in science must not be a single theory but
many related theories arranged in such a sequence that each
one is generated by modifying the one preceding it.
Lakatos calls such a sequence Scientific Research
Programme. In proposing this programme, Lakatos thinks
that:
The appraisal of large units like research
programmes is in one sense much more liberal
and in another much more strict than Popper’s
appraisal of theories. This new appraisal is
more tolerant in the sense that it allows a
research programme to outgrow infantile
diseases, such as inconsistent foundations and
occasional ad hoc moves (Lakatos ! 49).
In an attempt to answer the question as to which
theories actually constitute a particular research
programme, Lakatos individuates research programme by
254
specifying its three main components: the ‘hard-core’, the
‘negative heuristic’ and the ‘positive heuristic’. The hard­
core is made up of theoretical assumptions, which any
theory that is part of the programme must share from. The
positive heuristic consists, pf rough guidelines, which
indicate how the research programme might be developed.
It gives guidance as to wljat is to be done in the face of
anomalies. The negative heuristic consists of a
methodological principle, which stipulates that, the basic
assumptions underlying the research programme, its hard­
core, must not be rejected or modified when confronted
with anomalies. Its protection from falsification is ensured
by a “protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses, initial
conditions, and so on.
Lakatos avers that the aphievement of Scientific
Research Programmes can be evaluated in terms of
progressive and stagnating probleip-shifts. According to
him, a research programme is progressive if its theoretical
growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is, as long as it
keeps predicting new facts with some measure of success.
On the other hand, a research programme is stagnating pr
degenerating if its theoretical growth lags behind its
empirical growth. For Lakatos, it is only when a research
programme progressively explains more than its rival that
the said rival ought to be shelved.

Conclusion
In closing this chapter, it is pertinent to pinpoint the
salient similarities and differences between Popper and
Lakatos. Both of them agree that the goal of science is to

' 255
• I
increase verisimilitude (i.e. truth-content) and
corroboration. Whereas Popper stresses that the unit of
appraisal is a single theory, Lakatos is of the view that the
unit of appraisal is a sequence of related theories each of
which is generated by modifying its predecessor. Whereas
Popper stresses the need for crucial experiments between
rival theories, Lakatos does not stress the need for crucial
experiment between rival programmes. Whereas Popper
urges that a theory should be mercilessly abandoned if an
observation contradicts it, Lakatos urges that a theory
should not be immediately dropped in the face of
contradiction by an observation, but its “protective belt”
should be strengthened or modified. Lakatos, however,
enjoins us to drop a theory if and only if the research
programme of which it is a part is no longer generating
novel predictions, which are corroborated. Finally, it has
been widely claimed that the Lakatosian model is much
richer than the Popperian model. To quote Newton-Smith:
Lakatos’ conception of the scientific enterprise
is much richer than that of Popper. For
Lakatos’ notion of a heuristic, in spite of its
problem, does direct our attention to important
aspects of scientific practices not adequately
stressed by Popper (99).

256
 CHAPTER 25
HISTORICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY
SCIENCE OF THOMAS KUHN r .

Thomas Kuhn is more of a historian of Science than a

philosopher. He is one of Karl Popper’s rigorous critics
and Popper himself stands against some of what Kuhn
stands for. The great debate in 1965 between Popperians
and Kuhnians exposed the divergence between the views
of both men. As a historian of science, Kuhn came to
realize that: inductivism and falsificationism did not tally
with historical evidence. His preoccupation was,
therefore, to develop a theory of science that would be in
line with historical situations. >The character of scientific
progress and the sociological characteristics of scientific
communities are the key features in the Kuhnian model.
Kuhn’s most influential book is titled The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions. In this book, Kuhn challenged
the view that the history of science is characterized by the
study of cumulative discovery. Contrary to this view, Kuhn
argued that the history of science is the study of
discontinuous and incommensurable paradigms. Unlike
Popper who believes that the unit of appraisal in science is a
single theory, Kuhn opines that the unit of appraisal is a
paradigm. Although the notion of paradigm is one that is
very difficult to fathom, we can discern two senses in which
Kuhn uses it. Firstly, there is paradigm as ‘example^.
This has to do with the accepted ways or patterns of solving
a problem, which then serves as a model or example for
future research workers. Secondly, there is paradigm as -
257
 disciplinary matrix’. Disciplinary matrix refers to the
common possession of members of a professional
discipline, composed of ordered elements of some sorts,
each requiring further specification. It can also be defined
as the commitments, beliefs, values, techniques, and so on,
shared by members of a given scientific community. A
scientific community is made up of practitioners of a
scientific specialty.
In his book referred to above, Kuhn presents a
picture of science as pre-paradigm science - normal
science crisis - revolution - new normal science - new
crisis, and so on, ‘ad infinitum’. During pre-paradigm
period of science, there are many schools of thought
competing for general acceptance. In this period, facts are
withered almost randomly without any reference to a
iieoretical structure. As one theoretical system gradually
ives genera] acceptance, a paradigm is established.
I his is then followed by a period of normal science.
During normal science, rather than attempt to falsify
i henries, scientists engage in puzzle-solving activity. Their
faith in the underlying theory is such that anomalies are not
treated as falsifying instances of the theory but as puzzles to
be solved. The failure to solve a puzzle is not attributed to
the inadequacy of the paradigm, but the inadequacy of
experiment or the incapability of the scientist. Kuhn
rejects all forms of falsificationism, arguing that all
paradigms normally contain anomalies. The anomalous
results, which may occur during normal science, are
suppressed or dealt with by the use of ad-hoc hypotheses.
Nevertheless, a time may come when the number of
■ uumalics becomes so large that the ad-hoc hypotheses can
258
no longer contain them. And so, most members of the
scientific community will begin to lose faith in the
paradigm. This is a period of crisis. The loss of confidence
by most members of the community may result in the
articulation of several other alternative theoretical
structures or paradigms. When one of these structures
achieves general acceptance, there occurs what Kuhn calls
‘paradigm shift’. This constitutes a scientific revolution -
the very subject of Kuhn’s book. Kuhn likens the process
whereby scientists abandon one paradigm and adopt
another to what psychologists call a ‘Gestalt switch’. The
implication of this is that a scientist cannot hold two
competing paradigms at the same time because two
scientists working on two different paradigms will find
their thoughts mutually incomprehensible (in detail), for
they will mean different things by the same words. What
this boils down to is that different paradigms are
incommensurable (Oldroyd 323).

Criticism •
Many standard criticisms have been leveled against
Kuhn’s conception of science. The first criticism is against
his notion of paradigm. It has been argued that the notion of
a paradigm is ambiguous. Dudley Shapere describes
Kuhn’s paradigm as a blanket term. Masterman claims he
could point out about twenty-one ways in which Kuhn uses
the term ‘paradigm’ all of which is incompatible with, one
another. The second criticism is against his
incommensurability thesis. The thesis seems to suggest
that science is not concerned with discovering ‘the truth’.
Going by the Kuhnian model, what counts as the truth is
' 259
what a scientific community allows, rathef than the
relationship between a theory and the world. ^Orpe critics
have, gone as far as accusing Kuhn of suggesting that
science is an irrational enterprise, governed by shared
commitments, rather^uian struggles with nature in an
attempt to discover tKe^uth (Oldroyd 323). Thirdly,
Kuhn’s notion of ‘normal science’ has been found to be
distasteful. On the one hand, the notion of‘normal science’
does not tally with lji§torical evidence. On the other hand,
the notion runs contrary to critical discussing and the
testing of hypotheses and theories to death, ldrrl Popper
fias made'this second observation. It must befmentkrtied ,
that Kuhn has' made successful respons^s^o some xVf~
criticisms of this kind in his ‘postscript’ to the sgsofra
edition of The Structure ofScientific in a
paper entitled “Second Thought on Paradigms
To conclude this discussion, it must be .■
that although Kufftw^t^^cw that there is a^ftrong social
component to scientifu^knowledge lpfe ;been widely
accepted (Oldroyd 324), navMhfcJess, hZhas not succeeded
in formulating a more convijsyng approach to replace the
Popperian approach. In attempt to solve some of the
problems created by Pepper, he Zpded up creating more
problems, the most obvious bei$gs>the problem of ‘normal
science’. It is, therefore, a thing of relief to hear that Paul
Feyerabend made an iirgeiydus attempt to solve not only the
Popperian problem, but also the Lakatosian and Kuhnian
problems. Feyerabend’s position will be examined in
chapter twenty-six

260
 CHAPTER 26

MARXIST/LENJNIST DIALECTICAL
ME1JIODOLOGY OF SCIENCE

In taiiking about the Marxist/Leninist methodology

of science it will be germane to state the meaning of
dialectical methodology.
Dialectical methodology is the triadic interpretation
of things and processes. This methodology has been
conferred various terms by different thinkers. Hegel ,
designated it as thesis-antithesis-synthesis, or universal- '«
particular-individual. Marx himself flirted with the term
(although not to a great effect) in some of his works-
especially in the large mass of his unpublished notes
towards an early version of Capital that is known as
‘Grundrisse’.
Another important way of designating the stages of
dialectical methodology is to call the first stage affirmation
(a), the second stage contradiction or negation (-■a), and the
third stage the negation of the negation (—•—■a or a).
Having clarified the notion of dialectical
methodology it will be necessary to examine briefly the
influences on Marx in formulating this methodology. Here
we examine the influence of Hegel and Feuerbach on Marx.
Like most intellectual figures of his time, Marx was
greatly influenced by Hegel’s dialectics, which proceeds
from thesis to antithesis and to a synthesis, which combines
both of them. Hegel’s dialectics is an effort to conceive and
explicate the concrete movement of thought in and as
being, in and as its object (Mure 31 - 32). Hegel argued
261
* that the general trend of all development was not a descent
but a progress. For him, it was the spirit that struggled to
realize itself in the dialectical progress of the state. He
maintained that the world of flux is in a state of emergent;
each new stage contains (but supercedes) the preceding
ones from which it originates and approaches nearer and
nearer to perfection. Hegel called the end of all
development; ‘The Idea’, ‘The Absolute’, ‘The Highest
Good’, or ‘The Scientifically Contemplated Universe’. As
a young man, Hegel had thought that the Ideal had been
achieved with Emperor Napoleon of France. However, he
later abandoned this illusion and discovered the Ideal in the
Prussian state.
There is no doubt that Hegelianism took a permanent
hold on Marx even though he later came to differ from
Hegel’s point of view. Marx dismissed the idealist
conception of the world as unreasonable. He believed that
Hegel had completely reversed the true state of facts, for as
science shows, matter preceded spirit, not vice versa.
Whereas Hegel believed that ideas generate the conflict in
the world, Marx believed that the conflict is in the world
itself, and that ideas spring from the conflict instead of
generating it. In his own words, he found “Hegelianism
standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if
you would discover the rational Kernel within the mystical
shell” (Marx, Capital, vol. 1,29). Marx’s friend, Engels, in
Anti-Duhring dismissed Hegelianism as wrong in details.
To quote him, “Hegelian system, in itself, was a colossal
miscarriage, but it was also the last of its kind” (35). In
caricaturing Hegelian system, Bertrand Russell has this to
say: “one is tempted to suppose that spirit is trying to
262
 understand Hegel, and at each stage rashly objectifies what
it has been observing” (750).
It must be mentioned that although Mau rejected
Hegel’s notion of the priority of spirit over matter, he did
not reject Hegel’s dialectical method. The point is that
Marx had to modify Hegelianism in order “to bring the
process of realization of the historical Absolute into a
material, hence supposedly sounder frame” (Wesson 11).
In the language of L.B. Boudin, Marx upholds that:
The development of society, including men’s
ideas of human society and institution, are the
result of the development of the material
conditions under which men live, that these
conditions are the only ones which have an
independent existence and development; that
the changes of material conditions cause the
institutions- of human society to be changed
and suit them (23). •
It should be noted that Marx was led to
modifyHegelianism when he encountered Feuerbach’s
materialism. Unlike Hegel who argued that the Universal,
the Idea, Spirit is the true reality, Federbach believed that
the true reality is the individual, singular, nature. On this
basis he argued that the universal or idea or spirit, which
Hegel took to be the true reality, is just the correlative of
nature. Feuerbach maintained that “spirit is merely a
bifurcation and disuniting of the individual within himself,
not a real entity, but only a pale reflection of Nature”
(Wetter II).
Although Marx attacked some aspects of
Feuerbachian system in his “Thesis on Feuerbach'.
263
 nevertheless, the major source of Feuerbach’s influence on
Marx is found in his materialist doctrine. Feuerbach’s
radical move was to see the dialectic as dialectic of
consciousness and sensibility grounded in the very
conditions of material human existence. For Feuerbach,
material conditions connote both the physical requirements
for human life, w4iich are food, shelter and clothing, and
social requirements, which are other human beings.
From the foregoing, we see that Feuerbach had
inverted Hegel’s idealism substituting for it the primacy of
\material conditions. The resulting materialism impressed
Marx so much that it provided him with one of the most
decisive and characteristic elements in his own philosophy.
As would be expected, Marx now acknowledged that
Feuerbach was the pivotal figure in his philosophy. Most
importantly, Feuerbach shifted from spirit to man as the
focal point of historical development. Where Hegel said
that it was spirit progressively realizing itself in history,
Feuerbach said it was really man who was struggling to
realize himself. Marx thought that if the actual condition of
man was as Feuerbach opined the world would be changed
in order to facilitate man’s self - realization. This
prompted him to say that “Hitherto the philosophers have
only interpreted the world differently; the point is,
however, to change it” (Bridgwater & Kutz 568). Marx
now rooted his thought in both Hegel’s dialectics of history
and Feuerbach’s materialism. He was to embark upon a
programme of forging the ideas of both thinkers into a full-
scale instrument of social analysis. A combination of
Hegelian dialectics and Feuerbachian materialism resulted
in ‘Dialectical Materialism’ and the application of the
264
principles of dialectical materialism into the phenomenadf
social life, society and history resulted in ‘Historical
Materialism’. > > .
Dialectical materialism is the philosophical (arid
scientific) theory propounded by Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels and adopted as the official philosophy in the former
Soviet Union. Theoretically, it is meant to provide a.
general world-view as well as specific method. Its basic
tenets are that the universe is composed solely of matter and
that change takes place because of conflict of opposites, k
holds that,Because everything contains different elements,
which are in opposition, automatically, self-movement
occurs; the conflict of opposing forces leads to growth,
change and development, according to definite laws (Marx
& Engels 179).
These laws, which are, (i) the law of transformation
of quantity to quality; (ii) the law of mutual
interpenetration of opposites; and (iii) the law of the.
negation of the negation, are apprehended as the laws
governing nature and human.mind.
Marx and Engels believed that these laws or
principles not only govern nature and human mind, but also
social life of society and history. It is obvious that without
such a historical approach to social phenomena, the
existence and development of a science of history will be
impossible. This shows that historical materialism cannot
be divorced from dialectical materialism. In the words of
Professor K. Wiredu, a renowned Ghanaian contemporary
philosopher, one cannot be a real scientific socialist
without believing in both dialectical and historical
materialism. For him, it seems to be supposed that
265
scientific socialism presupposes historical materialism,
which in turn presupposes dialectical materialism.
Marx maintained that the only way to understand
history realistically, and so be able to avoid errors in
practical programme of revolutionary activity, is to give a
proper assessment of the material order of the society, on
the one hand, and the order of the human thought, on the
other. For this reason, Marx drew a sharp dichotomy
between the Base (or substructure) and the Superstructure
(or the order of the human thought). For him, the
substructure contains the impetus of history, whereas the
superstructure consists of men’s ideas and is simply a
reflection of the configuration of the Base.
It is common knowledge that,-in any given society,
social life is full of contradictions and conflicts, and that
history reveals a struggle within a society or a nation, and
between societies and nations. These contradictions or
conflicts may take the form of an alternation of periods of
revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and
rapid progress. Marx provides guidance for discovering
the laws governing this seeming chaos. He maintained that
the conflicting strivings stem from the difference in the
position and mode of life of the classes into which each
society is divided. Marx writes in the Communist
Manifesto: “the history of all hitherto existing society is
the history of class struggle”(80). According to him, each
person belongs to a certain socio-economic group within
the society. Such a group is called a ‘class’. The system of
classes that a given society has is determined by economic
means and conditions of production. This is why each
period of economic development has a corresponding class
266
 system. There was the era of stone tools, which is
associated with primitive communism. Here there were no
classes and hence no exploitation. But when metal tools
were first used, society was divided into master and slaves. '
Under the master - slave epoch the slave was exploited. He5
neither shared in the ownership nor in the fruits of
production. The struggle between the owners of the means
of production and the exploited slaves divided the society
into ‘privileged’ and ‘exploited’, or ‘haves’ and ‘have
nots’. From the struggle between these opposing classes a
synthesis was formed, and the feudalist society came into
being. Under the feudal system, the feudal lords owned the
means of production. Although under this system, the serf
rises above the level of the former slave because he has
some shares in the ownership of tools, he still works for the
feudal lord. Because of this, Marx claims, the serf feels
exploited and struggles against his exploiter. Feudalism,
then, breaks down into its opposing forces - the lords and
serfs. From this struggle a synthesis is formed and modern
capitalism is bom. Under the capitalist system, workers are
free when compared with the slaves and serfs but do not
own the means of production, and in order to survive they
must sell their labour to the capitalist.
Marx believed that the transition from the slave to
feudal and from feudal to capitalist relations of production
is the result of the dialectic process of the Base. He thought ,
that though in all periods there was conflict and struggle
between different classes, the class struggle would be
particularly violent in the capitalist system. Marx claimed
that capitalism had broken down into its opposites - the
employers, on the one hand, and the employees, on the
267
other. He wrote in the Communist Manifesto that:
The modern bourgeois society has not done away
with class antagonisms. It has but established
new classes, new conditions of oppression, and
new forms of struggle in the place of the old ones.
Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie,
possesses, however, this distinctive feature; it has
simplified the class antagonism. Society as a
whole is more and more splitting up into two
great' classes directly facing each other:
bourgeoisie and proletariat (80).
Marx believed that modern capitalism contains a
final conflict or contradiction that needs to be resolved. It
was his opinion that the presence of surplus value is the
cause of this discrepancy. Under capitalism, the products
of labour can be sold more than it costs the capitalist to hire
the labour force. The capitalist reaps the difference (i.e. the
surplus value). Marx did not blame the capitalist for this
arrangement but attribated to him the organization of the
workers into a self-conscious and powerful group. He
argued that for scientific reasons he must say that the class
antagonism caused by the contradiction of surplus value
would force the dialectical movement to the next stage.
This is socialism as Marx called it. In the words of Dr.
Edwin I. Madunagu, “Socialist revolutions are a result of
capitalist contradictions” (20 -21).
The steps of the dialectic process can easily be
perceived in this picture: capitalism presents a thesis and
that is that one has to work in order to earn a profit. The
thesis leads to a state in which very few persons own the
means of production while every other person is subject to
268
the privileged few. The thesis will produce a conflict when
the relatively large class of workers feels that they are being
exploited. This stage of the dialectic is the antithesis.
Finally, a revolution breaks out and the few owners of the
means of production are overthrown. The result of the
conflict is a socialist society. Marx asserted that the first
step the proletariat would take on assuming g power would
be to destroy the bureaucratic government and replace it
with the dictatorship of the proletariat'-for which his model
was the revolutionary commune of Paris (1871). Maj'x >
believed that with time socialism itself would be replaced
by communism. This would be because the socialist.’
system would turn out to be an instrument of coercion. He,
however, believed that the use of coercive power would not
last long, for the state would eventually turn round to use
this power to benefit few people in the society. This,
according to Marx, would eventually usher in communism
and the state with its coercive power would wither away.
Marx believed that the full realization of human
nature would be attained in communism. When people no
longer divide themselves into classes, and the power of
production has been harnessed to provide for the needs and
wants of all, government is no longer needed. To quote T.
R. Machan,
Human beings will have changed into a mature
new species and nature will contain all that
members of this new species required for a
peaceful, cooperative, flourishing life. In
effect, humanity will have reached perfection
(27).

I
269
 A community of such members will not have need
for any form of government. It is a society without rulers.
We can discern an anarchistic model of thought here! Let’s
try to answer the often-asked question: How scientific is
Marx’s scientific socialism?
No doubt the question of the scientific character of
the Marxist theory of society and history is a controversial
one. It is, however, not the preoccupation of this chapter to
go into the controversies that have been generated by the
question. Suffice it to say that if it is the main business of
science (and I think it is) to transform the world for the good
of man, then we can say that Marx’s primary aim was to
change the human situation in the world in accord with
what history told him that situation was to be. Of course,
Marx’s theory was based on the political, economic, social
and religious factors, which he observed to be
characteristic of the 19* century industrial Europe in which
he lived. His second aim was to accomplish this
transformation of society on the basis of a scientific method
for the construction of a new society where man could
become what history had destined him to be. Or as Quentin
Lauer remarked in his article entitled “The Marxist
Conception ofScience',
Marx himself intended a historical process,
which was neither teleological nor rigidly
deterministic and yet susceptible of the kind of
scientific knowledge, which would enable him
not only to criticize the aberrations of society
but also to remedy them (393).
Science, for Marx, then, is “critical knowledge of
historical movement” (Lauer 389).
270
 Before we consider objections to Marx’s dialectical
materialism, it will be pertinent to say a few things about
Lenin since Leninism is often linked with Marxism, and
more so that in the caption of this chapter the words
‘Marxist’ and ‘Leninist’ are lumped together.

V. I. Lenin (1870-1924)
V. I. Lenin was a theoretical Marxist and a Russian
political leader who was the chief architect of the
philosophy of dialectical materialism after Marx and
Engels. His chief philosophical work Materialism and
Empirio-Criticism (1909) was directed against a group of
Russian critics of Marx. These critics wanted to supplant
Marxism with the phenomenalistic positivism of Avenarius
and Mach. Castigating their position as a form of
subjectivist idealism, Lenin argued that rather than being a
construct of sensations, matter is ontologically primary to
and exists independent of consciousness. Showing a high
regard for Hegelian dialectics, Lenin considered dialectics
as the heart of Marxism. He defined dialectics as the study
of contradiction in the very essence of objects. Like Marx,
Lenin was concerned with issues regarding historical
materialism. In particular, he was interested in the
economic and political aspects of the revolutionary
transition from capitalism to communism. In his work
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916).
Lenin maintained that capitalism had reached its highest
stage but that because of uneven development of capitalism
in different countries of the world, socialism would not
triumph at the same time all over the world, as Marx
envisaged. In another work titled State and Revolution
(1918), Lenin elaborated some of the points not fully

271
stressed by Marx. In particular he developed the Marxist
theory of the state as a tool of class domination. He
advocated the destruction of the bourgeois state machinery
and the establishment, in its place, of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. He also made a distinction between a lower
stage of communism in which the state is still needed and
hence reward will be commensurate with work, and a
higher stage in which the state is withered away completely
and hence reward will be based on need. Like Marx, Lenin
is so revered by the Soviets that “contemporary Soviet
philosophers consider Lenin a philosophical luminary of
the first magnitude and commonly call their over-all
intellectual outlook “Marxism-Leninism” (Edwards 435).

Criticism
The main objection to Marx’s dialectical
methodology of science stems from his claim that the
socialism he is offering to us is advanced on a scientific
viewpoint. Marx believes that socialism is proved
scientifically, made evident by a careful observation of
nature. He buttresses this point by saying that socialism is
the result of the laws of reality, especially the laws of human
history and progress. The theory holds basically that
everything, in reality, undergoes change in a revolutionary
fashion, in accordance with the dialectics of nature. From
the start, whatever exists generates its opposite (or
negation). When this clashes with its opposite, a brand new
item emerges, which then produces its own opposite. The
process continues throughout nature until a point of total
harmony is reached. Marx believes that the point of
harmony in the operation of the dialectics in society is

272
socialism, which will finally culminate in communism.
Thus, Marx’s dialectical process proceeds along an upward
-moving continuum.
Now, it can be objected that Marx’s socialism is not
scientific enough and hence his view that socialism is
scientific is untenable. There is no rational justification for
any attempt to establish broad general laws of history or
human society. This may serve as a useful guide to know
the past but it certainly cannot provide any valid basis for
predicting the future, as Marx tried to do. Marx sees
historical process as an inevitable process, which will
ultimately lead to the establishment of a classless society.
The validity of this kind of interpretation of history and the
claim that the process will terminate along the line is
doubtful. T.R. Machan has rightly observed that:
The dialectical principle, whereby everything
develops its opposite and then, through their
clash, resolves into a new kind of thing, is
difficult to confirm. The process simply does
not appear to occur with sufficient regularity
to qualify as a scientifically supportable law
of nature and human development (270).
This quotation aptly shows that it is very difficult to
find any strict regularity in social phenomena. No one
doubts the fact that physics and chemistry are reputable
kinds of understanding, but intelligent thinkers have argued
that the employment of the method of the natural sciences
in the analysis of social life and society is misguided and
that any theories that may be formulated do not correspond
to social and political reality. For one thing, social
phenomenon is too complex for analysis and

273
quantification. If this is the case, which actually cannot be
denied, then the whole strand of‘scientificity’, which Marx
boldly claimed to be inbuilt in the dialectic process is a false
proclamation.
It can also be argued that dialectical materialism is a
metaphysical notion. The Hegelian element in it makes it
so. Although Marx’s partner, Friedrich Engels, tried to
show that all aspects of nature exhibit the operation of the
dialectical principle, he did not quite succeed in the task.
This is understandable when we realize that principle was
borrowed from Hegel who did not view it as a scientific law
of nature. It could be recalled that Hegel viewed this
principle as a fundamental feature of reality, established by
metaphysical inquiry. But Marx rejected Hegel’s
metaphysics for a scientific analysis. And without the
metaphysics of Hegel it is difficult to imagine how the
dialectical idea can be defended; without the dialectical
principle the very basis of communist theory is
substantially lost. According to Bertrand Russell, “all the
elements in Marx’s philosophy which are derived from
Hegel are unscientific in the sense that there is no reason
whatever to suppose them true” (754).
What all this boils down to is that Marx’s dialectical
materialism is plagued by metaphysics. If this sounds well,
then communism amounts to nothing more than a figment
of imagination. It becomes an image to which reality
cannot conform. Communist society, becomes utopia,
which people try to desperately impose upon the people of
the world. Stalinism in the former Soviet Union, which was
filled with complete tyranny and massive brutality, was the
inevitable outcome of trying to make communism realistic
(McBride 159).
274
 CHAPTER 27

FEYERABEND’S ANARCHIC
CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE

One of the most challenging and thought-provoking

accounts of science in contemporary times is the one that
has been colourfully presented and defined by Paul
Feyerabend, and no assessment of the nature, and status of
science will be complete without a reference to his position
(Chalmers 135). In this chapter we examine briefly the
main features of Feyerabend’s anarchistic conception of
science as presented in his book Against Method.
Anarchy means absence of government or control,
disorder, confusion. Anarchism is the political theory that
government and laws are undesirable. Paul Feyerabend is a
methodological anarchist because he believes that the
whole notion of a methodology of science is an illusion. He
acknowledges the fact that anarchism may not be a
palatable political philosophy, but he thinks that it is an
excellent panacea for philosophy of science. In pursuance
of this stance, Feyerabend says he would prefer to be called
a ‘dadaist’ rather than an anarchist since he does not have
the seriousness of purpose, which an avowed anarchist has.
A ‘dadaist’ is one who should not be taken seriously. His
claim to be a ‘dadaist’ notwithstanding, let us look ai his
position in Against Method.
Feyerabend begins Against Method by declaring that
he is engaged in an anarchistic enterprise, in the words of
David Oldroyd, Feyerabend wants to argue - contrary to
Popper and Popperians (or even Lakatos, no doubt) - that
275
there is no privileged method of scientific inquiry which, if
followed, will lead to the successful acquisition of
knowledge (324). Feyerabend claims that none of the
methodologies of science has lived up to expectation.
Specifically, he argues that none of them is compatible with
the history of physics. He avers that all methodologies of
science have not provided adequate rules for the guidance
of scientific activities. According to him, all scientific
methodologies have their limitations and the only rule that
really holds is “anything goes”. For him, given the fact that
the future of science with regards to development is
unpredictable and given the fact of the complexity of any
realistic situation in science, it will be implausible to ask a
rational scientist to adopt this theory because it receives
most inductive support from accepted facts (inductivism)
and reject that theory because it is incompatible with basic
statements or generally accepted facts (falsificationism).
For Feyerabend, rules such as these are not compatible with
the progressive phases of science To quote Feyerabend at
some length:
The idea that science can, and should be run
according to fixed and universal rules, is both
unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic,
for it takes too simple a view of the talents of
man and of the circumstances, which
encourage, or cause, their development. And
it is pernicious, for the attempt to enforce the
rules is bound to increase our professional
qualifications at the expense of our humanity.
In addition, the idea is detrimental to science,
for it neglects the complex physical and

276
 historical conditions, which influence
scientific change.
... Case studies such as those reported in the
preceding chapters ... speak against the
universal validity of any rule. All
methodologies have their limitations and the
only ‘rule’ that survives is ‘anything goes’
(296).
Feyerabend’s criticism against Method is directed
against the positivists’ inductivistic methodology, the
conventionalists and transcendental idealists, Karl
Popper’s falsificationist methodology, Imre Lakatos’
methodology of Scientific Research Programme and
Thomas Kuhn’s methodology of Science. In criticizing
inductivism, Feyerabend considers as no longer popular the
view that science works by collecting facts and inferring
theories from them. It is his contention that theories never
follow from facts in the strict logical sense. He asks, for
instance, to what extent is the theory of relativity supported
by facts?
Feyerabend’s sledge-hammer is also directed against
the conventionalists or transcendental idealists who
maintain that theories shape and order facts and can
therefore be retained no matter what happens. They can be
retained so far as it is the function of the mind to
consciously or unconsciously carry out the ordering
process. But Feyerabend argues that the conventionalists *
commit a category - mistake because they assume for the
mind what is actually the case about the world, that is, it
works in a regular manner. Feyerabend maintains that this
difficulty has been overcome by Mill in his immortal essay
277
“On Liberty” and by some followers of Darwin who
extended Darwinism to the realm of ideas in the 19th
century. According to these thinkers, theories cannot be
justified and their excellence cannot be shown without
reference to other theories. In essence, what this means is
that the success of a theory is best explained by reference to
a more comprehensive theory or by comparing it with other
theories. But, argues Feyerabend, such a comparison does
not show the intrinsic excellence of the theory chosen, since
the theory chosen may still be unclear, cumbersome and full
of contradictions. The fact is simply that the theory chosen
may be the best of all lousy theories available at the time.
Feyerabend also used the sledge - hammer of
criticism on Popper’s falsificationist methodology. His
main objection to the Popperian system is that its standards
of comparison are rigid and fixed and as such eliminate
competitors once and for all. Theories that are not
falsifiable or have been falsified are inadmissible in
science. Only theories that are falsifiable or have
withstood crucial experimental tests are acceptable. In
reaction to this view of Popper’s, Feyerabend maintains
that many revolutionary theories are unfalsifiable. He
admits that falsifiable versions exist, but he is quick to
point out that such versions are scarcely in agreement with
accepted basic statements. Moreover, he argues that many
theories contain contradictions, formal flaws, ad-hoc
adjustments, and so on. He, therefore, argues that if the
Popperian standards were applied strictly, they “would
wipe out science as we know it and would never have
permitted it to start” (Feyerabend 176) in the first place.
Feyerabend further argues that “the principles” take
278
falsifications seriously; increase content; avoid ad hoc
hypotheses; ‘be honest’ ... give an inadequate account of
the past development of science and are liable to hinder
science in the future. They give an inadequate account of
science because science is much more ‘slopy’ and
‘irrational’ than its methodological image. And they are
liable to hinder it, because the attempt to make science
more ‘rational’ and more precise is bound to wipe it out...
The difference between science and methodology which is
such an obvious fact of history, therefore, indicates a
weakness of the latter ...”(179). For all these reasons,
Feyerabend concludes that the Popperian standards cannot
aid the growth of science but its destruction.
Feyerabend’s searchlight of criticism is also pointed
at Kuhn’s ideas about science. He maintains that although
Kuhn’s ideas are interesting, they are too vague to result in
anything but lots of hot air. He finds particularly distasteful
Kuhn’s idea of normal science. He argues that Kuhn’s idea
of normal science is not in consonance with the history of
science.
Before criticizing Lakatos’ methodology of science,
Feyerabend confesses that Lakatos is immeasurably
superior to Kuhn. The first reason being that in place of
theories, Lakatos considers research programmes which
are sequences of researches or theories conducted by
investigators, in which certain methodological rules are
adhered to. The sequences of researches or theories are
connected by what he called ‘heuristics’ (which means
methods of modification). While some of the
methodological rules tell us what paths of research to avoid
(negative heuristics), others tell us what paths to pursue

279
(positive heuristics). What count is not the many faults,
which a theory in the sequence may contain, but the
tendency displayed by the entire sequence. The second
reason, according to Feyerabend, for the superiority of
Lakatos to Kuhn is that he (Lakatos) tends to bind history
and methodology into a single enterprise. By this,
historical developments and achievements are to be judged
over a period of time, rather than the situation at a particular
time. A research programme may be progressive or
degenerating. A research programme is progressive if it
keeps predicting novel facts, otherwise it is degenerating.
Feyerabend points out that a decisive feature of Lakatos’
methodology of Science is that it does not stipulate
methodological rules that tell the scientist to either retain or
reject a research programme. Feyerabend writes:
Scientists may stick to a degenerating
programme, they may even succeed in
making the programme overtake its rivals and
they therefore proceed rationally with
whatever they are doing (provided they
continue calling degenerating programmes
degenerating and progressive programmes
progressive). This means that Lakatos offers
words, which sound like the elements of a
methodology; he does not offer a
methodology. There is no method according
to the most advanced and sophisticated
methodology in existence today (How to
Defend S.A.S. 161).
By implication, what Feyerabend is saying is that
Lakatos does not offer a methodology and as such he is a
fellow anarchist.
280
 Having dismissed all scientific methodologies as
inadequate, Feyerabend goes on to discuss the relationship
between science and other forms of knowledge. He
observes that many methodologies of science present
science as though it is the paradigm of rationality. In
criticizing Lakatos’ methodology of science, in particular,
he points out that, “Having finished his “reconstruction” of
modem science, he (Lakatos) turns it against other fields as
if it had already been established that modem science is
superior to magic or to Aristotelian science, and that it has
no illusory results. However, there is no shred of an
argument of this kind. “Rational reconstructions” take
“basic scientific wisdom” for granted; they do not show
that it is better than the “basic wisdom” of witches and
warlocks (Feyerabend, A. M. 205).
Feyerabend maintains that science is one of the
many ideologies that should be treated as fairytales. It is
his view that all ideologies must not be taken seriously but
should be treated as fairytales because of the many wicked
lies they contain. He complains that proponents of the
‘superiority’ of science do not take time to investigate other
forms of knowledge. Feyerabend is not prepared to accept
this attitude. For him, ifjustice is to be done in comparing
science with other forms of knowledge, a thorough
investigation of the nature, methods and aims of science
must be carried out simultaneously with those of other
forms of knowledge. This, according to him, can be done
by studying “historical records - textbooks, original
papers, records of meetings, and private papers, letters and
the like”(A.M.. 253). Feyerabend claims that his
preoccupation is to defend (or rather free) society and its
281
inhabitants from the strangling hold of science. Thus,
Feyerabend defends what he calls humanitarian attitude,
according to which, individual humans should be free and
allowed to possess liberty so they can lead a full and
rewarding life. From this humanitarian viewpoint,
“Feyerabend’s anarchistic view of science gains support
because, within science; it increases the freedom of
individuals by encouraging the removal of all
methodological constraints, whilst in a broader context it
encourages a freedom for individuals to choose between
science and other forms of knowledge”(ChaImers 142).
Feyerabend believes that the institutionalization of science
is totally against the humanitarian attitude he seeks to
defend. In schools, science is taught as a compulsory
subject, and whereas an American is free to belong to any
religion of his choice, he is not free to demand that his
children be allowed to study magic, astrology, or legends at
school. Whereas there is a formal separation between state
and church, there is no formal separation between state and
science. State and science work closely together. The state
spends immense sums on the improvement of scientific
ideas.
Feyerabend’s recommendation for the
demythologization of science is the formal separation
between state and science as there is now a formal
separation between state and church. He writes: "... as
accepting and rejecting of ideologies should be left to the
individual, it follows that the separation of state and church
must be complemented by the separation of state and
science, that most recent, most aggressive, and most
dogmatie religious institution. Such a separation may be
282
our only chance to achieve a humanity we are capable of,
but have never fully realized”(A.M. 295).
Feyerabend concludes his anarchistic programme by
saying that science, myths, dogmas of theology and
metaphysics are some of the many ways of constructing a
world-view. He maintains that a fruitful exchange between
science and such ‘non-scientific’ world-views will be in
even greater need of anarchism than is science itself. Thus,
to him, anarchism is not only possible, it is necessary both
for the internal growth of science^nd for the development
of our culture as a whole (A. M. 180). Indeed, the
realization that science is not perfect calls for an anarchistic
epistemology. He writes: “The realization that science is
not sacrosanct, and that the debate between science and
myth has ceased without having been won by either side,
further strengths the case for anarchism” (A. M. 171).
How far Feyerabend’s argument is correct will be seen after
some objections have been raised against it.

Criticism
The following standard objections can be leveled
against Feyerabend’s argument against method.
1. If methodologies of science are to be understood in
terms of providing ruies to guide scientists in their choices
and decisions, then it will seem that Feyerabend’s
anarchistic stand against all methodologies of science is
correct. However, if the strategy of separating the problem
of theory change from that of theory choice is adopted, then
problems concerning rules for guiding theory choice does
not constitute problems for an account of theory change
(Chalmers 136).

283
 In his book “What is this thing called Science!, A.
F. Chalmers points out that an objectivist account of theory
change in physics is immune from Feyerabend’s critique of
method. For him, the account is based on the assumption
that in any society where physics is actually practised, there
are bound to be scientists or groups of scientists with the
appropriate physical and mental resources who will use the
available experimental or theoretical techniques to develop
science. If this sociological assumption is fulfilled,
Chalmers argues (ceteris paribus), then we can presume
that,
If an objective opportunity for development
of a programme is present, then sooner or later
some scientists or group of scientists will take
advantage of it. The net effect will be that a
programme that offers more objective
opportunities for development than its rival
will tend to forge ahead of its rival as those
opportunities are taken advantage of. This
will be the case even if the majority of
scientists happen to choose to work on the
programme with small degree of fertility. In
the latter case, the minority choosing to work
on the programme offering many
opportunities will soon meet with success
whilst the majority, those representing the
majority view, will struggle in vain to take
advantage of non-existent opportunities (128
-129).
What this position of Chalmers shows is that, with
this sociological requirement satisfied, a programme with a

284
 higher degree of fertility than its rival will tend to oust its
rival.’ He is, however, quick to point out that it is possible
for a programme with a high degree of fertility to come to
naught, especially as there is no absolute guarantee that
opportunities will bear fruit when pursued. He cites as his
example the vortex theory of William Thomson, whose aim
was to explain the properties of atoms and molecules by
representing them as vortices in perfectly elastic, non-
viscous ether. This theory met with abysmal failure and
was soon overtaken by other programmes that met with
success. For Chalmers, therefore, an objectivist account of
theory change will need to take account both of the relative
"degrees of fertility of rival programmes and their success in
pfiactice (129 — 130). Chalmers thinks that if his account of
thebry change is ..correct, “the process of theory change
transcends the conscious intentions, choices and decisions
of physicists. In particular, it is not determined by the
methodological decisions of the physicists”! 131)
2. Feyerabend’s comparison of science with myth,
' " voodoo, witchcraft, astrology and the like is ‘unholy’. The
first reason for saying this is that these ‘non-scientific’
subjects do not have well defined objectives and the
methods for achieving those objectives, as does science.
The second reason is that these ‘non-scientific subjects do
not constitute a pressing problem to our contemporary
society as do science and technology. So, the question of a
free choice between science and witchcraft or astrology or
voodoo is irrelevant.
3. In a society where ‘anything goes’, that is, where
everyone is free to follow his own inclinations and do his
own thing in his own way, the principle that will be at work

285
 is “everything stays”. Politically, this can lead to
authoritarianism, as those in power will do everything
possible to remain in power.
4. Considering the errors in Feyerabend’s position, we
may (despite the merits of his position) agree with him that
he is not to be taken seriously. We have already mentioned
that Feyerabend presents himself not only as an anarchist
but as a ‘dadaist’ and as an exponent of irrationalism. If we
are to go strictly by the usual twenty first - century norm of
critical analysis and rigorous application of the canons of
logic, a position that favours irrationalism is not to be taken
too seriously.

I.

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 PART SIX

SOME ISSUES AND NOTIONS IN

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
 CHAPTER 2§

MAN: HIS ORIGIN, NATURE

AND DESTINY, AND COSMIC
ENVIRONMENT

The Origin of Man

The question ‘what is the origin of man?’ is a
controversial question which has a long history. In answer
to this question, two contending views or theories have
emerged, namely, the scientific (biological) view and the
biblical or theological view. While the scientific view
states that man gradually evolved from a single^called
organism over 6 billion years ago, the theological view
attributes the origin of man to the creative act of a
sup_e_rhuman being, an uncreated prime mover- Both
schools of thought have their adherents and admirers. The
biblical view was more popular than the scientific view for
a very long time. With the growth of science, it has been
hotly challenged by the scientific view. Today, the
scientific view has gained currency mostly among scholars.
This is not to say that the debate is over or has ebbed. Both
points of view have continued to attract more and more
admirers.
My aim in this chapter is not to attempt to strike a
compromise between the two, for that will be unholy.
Rather, I want to assert the superiority of the biblical theory.
But before that is done, it will be germane to explain or
discuss the two theories.
288
1. Evolutionism:
The ordinary dictionary definition of evolution is
that it is development or growth. But this is not what
scientists mean by it. According to Herbert Spencer.
“Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant
dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from
an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent
heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion
undergoes a parallel transformation” (quoted in C.F.Baker,
1971). What Spencer means is that the process in nature is
always from the simple to the complex, and from the
complex to the more complex. He says this is true of plants,
animals and humans too. The process was from non-living
matter to pfants^animals and then humans. Fuller and
bing to this when they wrote:
The concept of organic evolution ... holds
that the first living organisms on the earth
were very simple in structure, that all plants
and animals which have appeared on the earth
are descendants of the simple, primordial
organisms, and that during the main course of
evolutionary change, there has occurred an
ever increasing structural complexity and
diversification (Quoted in Baker, 1971).
Historically, the ancient Greek philosophers were
the first to hold views, which can be roughly classified, as
evolutionary. The doctrine acquired a scientific basis and
became fundamental to the biological sciences when
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C harles_ Darwin published his “Origin of Species" (1866f
followed \yy “The Descent ofMan" (1871). Darwin had a
theological training at Edinburgh. Ironically, his theory
has become one of the most powerful weapons of atheism
and anti-Christianity.
Darwin’s thesis was that of natural selection. He
observed the competition in nature, the struggle for
existence and from that he inferred the doctrine of the
survival of the fittest. He reasoned that the weak and
diseased forms of life die off and become extinct, causing
all living things to evolve into stronger, more virulent
forms. In the “Descent of Man", Darwin maintained that
man must have evolved from a single - celled organism
through a very long process of evolution. Following his
view, living things were classified into two kingdoms,
namely, the plant and animal kingdoms. Man belonged to
the kingdom~o? animals and the order of primates
comprising the apes, monkeys, lemurs, tarsiers, etc.
In brief, evolution is the gradual development of
higher forms of life from a lower stage of living matter. The
theory seeks to explain the universe from “primitive
nebulosity” to a modem world. The theory is, however,
replete with insurmountable difficulties. According to
Douglas (1976):
(a) It fails to account for the origin of the first atom or the
primordial stuff.
(b) It cannot explain how the original matter changed
from a homogenous to a moving one.
(c) It cannot explain how life emanated from the non­
living original stuff.

290
(d) It does not explain the transition from the plant world
• to animal and then to human.
(e) It does not show how the present universe is a
cosmos and not chaos.
(f) It fails to account for why evolution has ceased?
Why is there no continuity of evolution? How does a
goat produce a goat and no an evoluted specimen?
Why have monkeys and apes ceased to
evolve to man?
All these show that there is a serious missing link in
the evolutionary theory. Modern attempts to supply this
missing link have led to the birth of another kind of
evolution called theistic evolution. This is different from
organic evolution discussed above. While organic
evolution is naturalistic or atheistic, theistic evolution finds
a place for God’s intervention. While the former holds that
evolution is a chance process, the latter posits that evolution
is guided by God’s design. Let us elaborate theistic
evolution further.
According to theistic evolution, God created the
prime matter and endowed it with certain laws and powers
of development, which would result in all the living forms,
which He purposed to inhabit the earth. Instead of creating
a seed for every kind of life, as the Bible teaches, theistic
evolution claims that God created a seed capable of
producing every kind of life. On the origin of man, theistic
evolutionists are of the view that God used evolution to
produce an animal with all the bodily features of man and

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that when that stage was reached, God breathed into this
animal body the Divine Spirit thus giving to it the Divine
image and making man more than mere animal. Many of
those who hold this view today are mostly liberal
theologians.
To me, theistic evolution is as ridiculous as organic
evolution. Both are contrary to fact. Does this not show
that evolution is a mere fabric of hypothesis, a pure fiction
or a figment of imagination? Does it not show the collapse
of evolution under the very weight of its own inherent
difficulties and absurdities? Should we not therefore
believe the word of God and accept the simple but true story
of creation revealed in Genesis chapters 1 & 2? Personally,
I take my stand with God and the Bible against this
erroneous and heretical theory called evolution. Before we
consider the more authentic view (i.e. the biblical view), let
me adumbrate some other theories that are opposed to
Biblical creation.
2. Materialism:
This is the doctrine that holds that nothing exists
except matter. It postulates the eternity of matter. It
holds further that at one time in the universe all
matter existed as a huge cloud of atomic particles.
This super-heated cloud of atomic particles
experienced a big bang about 10 billion years ago,
throwing matter in all directions, which upon
cooling formed into planets, stars and galaxies. Kant
and Laplace supported this theory.
3. Dualism:This doctrine posits the eternity of God and
matter.
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4. Emanationism:
This is the view that the universe has been produced
by successive emanations from the substance of
God. It is supposed that the emanations from God’s
substance, being separated from Him by greater and
greater distances produced a world of spirit, the
intensity of which varied inversely with its distance
from the source until at length it vanished in matter.
5. Creation from Eternity:
The view that creation is from eternity cannot be
correct. Creation is an act, which brings something
into being, but since eternity had no beginning, an
eternal creation could have had no beginning.
6. Life from Outer Space:
This is the view that life on earth may have
originated from bacteria carried to earth by a
meteorite from outer space. Because there is no
shred of evidence supporting this idle speculation, it
has fallen into disrepute.
All these so-called scientific theories cannot account
for the origin of the earth and man. They all point to
the pre-existence of matter. The earth was made
from some kind of primordial stuff, either by a
divinity or by the blind forces of nature.
7. Creation:
The only authentic source book of the creation of the
world is the Bible. The Bible is unique in its doctrine
of creation. The beauty, brevity, logic and simplicity
of the story of creation, particularly when contrasted
with existing human accounts of creation, is worthy
of admiration. The Biblical doctrine of creation is
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 the substructure upon which subsequent revelations
concerning God’s nature and His relationship to the
Bible and man are laid. The importance of the
doctrine, according to Baker (1971), can be judged
from the following points:
(a) The amount of space given to the doctrine in
the Bible is to a large degree indicative of the
importance of the subject. Read Genesis 1 &
2; Isaiah 40-42; John 1:1-3; Romans 1:19-20;
Colossians 1:15-17; Hebrews 1:2,etc.
(b) The doctrine is important to the proper
worship of God (Romans 1:19-23; Rev. 4:11).
(c) The doctrine is important because it reveals
the transcendence of God (Eph. 4:6; Rom. 9:5;
Deut 4:39; Psalm 57:5). It reveals the
sovereignty of God (Rom 9:21).
(d) It is the basis of the unity of the human race
and cosmopolitanism (Acts 17:24,26).
(c) It is the basis of universal sinfulness of
humanity (Rom 5:12-21; 1 Corinthians 15:21,
22,45-50).
(f) It reveals the unity of the marriage
relationship and the headship of the husband
(Gen 2:18-24; Matt 19:3-9; 1 Corinthians
11:3,8,9).
(g) It adequately answers the age-old question:
where did man come from?
(h) It affirms the trustworthiness of scriptures.

The creation:
(a) There was a beginning before which God existed.

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 The beginning could not have been the beginning of
God, but the beginning of the heavens and the earth.
(b) God created the heavens and the earth in the
beginning. The material from which man was
created had been created by God from the beginning
(Gen. 2:7).
(c) Before the creation of the heavens and the earth there
must have been a condition before the beginning
when the heavens and the earth did not exist. This
provides a strong basis for the doctrine of creation ex
nihilo (out of nothing).
(d) After God created The heavens and the earth, the
earth was without form and void, and darkness was
upon the face of the deep (Gen. 1:2). But Isaiah has
shown that “He created it not in vain” (Isaiah 45:18).
(e) It is. quite-ev-ident that the work of the six days called
the “days of creation” was mainly that of making the
earth a suitable place for vegetable, animal, and
human life and the creation of such life upon it. Each
of the six days is the literal 24-hour day (Baker,
1971)

Purpose of Creation Story in Genesis:

Thq. purpose is not to proffer an answer to all of
man's questions. It is not to make us astronomers and
astrologers. It is to reveal God as a powerful Creator and to
lead us into worship of God Himself (Rev. 4:11).

Facts Supporting the Biblical Account:

(a) Of all sacred books, it is only the Bible that
proclaims that there is but one God, who created all
things by a Spoken Word.
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(b) We can sense order and design in the vision of the
land and water, air and atmosphere. If the ocean
level were to rise beyond its present level, large
portions of land would be submerged. The air is
perfectly balanced with oxygen and nitrogen (ratio
21:-79). There is no physical or chemical law
maintaining this balance; it is kept by God’s power.
(c) The lavishness of creation: hundreds of varieties of
birds, flowers, animals, herbs, fruits, fish, trees, etc.
Evolution could not provide this.
(d) The history of the primitive man reveals the savagery
and natural brutality of man as mentioned in Genesis
as a result of the fall. Thomas Hobbes said that life in
the original state of man (the state of nature) was
nasty, brutish and short. This is a mark of degenerate
mankind. Brutality is the result of the fall (Douglas,
1976).
(e) Man was the only creature created in the image and
likeness of God. This refers to moral or spiritual
likeness, not physical likeness. Man has God
consciousness which animals and other creatures
have not.
(f) Biologists have confirmed that the scripture is
correct in its account of creation. They assert that
sixteen or more basic elements of which man’s body
is composed came from the dust. If I may add, the
breath of life came from God. They have also
discovered that there is a missing rib in males, thus
confirming the Biblical story that the woman was
formed from the rib taken from man.
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(g) Had man been created before the creation of the
■firmament (the expanse above the earth), he would
not have survived. God created the firmament by
modifying the temperature and separating the
vaporous waters beneath (the seas or oceans) (Gen.
1:6, 7). Geographers tell us that the surface of the
earth consists of two- thirds water and one- third
land. Scientists tell us that this is a perfect balance
essential to provide moisture for life upon the land as
well as to sustain life and keep a healthy climate.
(h) Man is the only creature endowed with free will, that
is, the capacity to reason or to know good and evil.
Freedom is not only a gift from God, but a heavy
burden laid on man, a heavenly responsibility
entrusted to him, for he is held responsible for the
way he uses his freedom.

The New Creation:

God is still in the business of creation. He said
“Behold I create all things anew”. The type of creation God
does now is spiritual. The process by which man is created
anew is called regeneration. Regeneration is a spiritual
quickening, a new birth, a new creation. From creation
everything has been brought forth after his kind: sinners
beget sinners. We cannot alter the old nature, or reform or
re-invigorate it but we need a new birth, the impartation of a
different “kind” - God’s holy nature |11 Corinthians 5:17:
Eph. 2:1]; a change from death to life; this is not
reformation; it is spiritual regeneration (Gal 6:15; Ezek.

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36:25-27; Eph. 4:23,24). The author of regeneration is
God; the channel is Christ; the executive or executor is the
Holy Spirit; the medium is through receiving Christ by
believing the word of God. Results of regeneration are: the
heart is changed; sin is hated; Christ is loved; the life is
changed; new and holy desires spring up like a well of
living water. The new creation contains all you need to
make life meaningful and worth living.

The Nature and Destiny of Man

Man is a multi-dimensional being, a complex
phenomenon. He is distinct from all other creatures in
intelligence, physique, beauty, religiosity, sociality, and so
on. He is the only being on earth capable of immortality
(Gen. 1:26), a moral being bearing God’s likeness (Gen.
1:27) and an intellectual being capable of reasoning and
rulership (Gen. 1:28-30). Man has been variously
described as a biological being, a psychological being, a
religious being, a social and political being, and a cultural
being.
There are various philosophical doctrines regarding
the nature of man. Some of them are highlighted below.
1. Humanism:
According to this position, man is more than matter,
more than a complex physical organism. Man is not merely
a material entity, as the materialists argue. For the
humanist, mind, soul and consciousness are real entities in
the world. Apart from that, man is subject to moral
imperatives other than those he prescribes for himself.

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--------------------------------- —-------------------------------------------

Man is answerable to man, not to God. The future of man is

to some extent open and undetermined. What man will
become in future is primarily dependent upon what he
chooses to be, not on what he has been programmed to
become. It is common to hear humanists say, ‘1 am the
master of my fate’ or ‘I am the captain of my soul’.

2 Naturalism or Nihilism:
This is the doctrine that man is simply a highly
developed organism that has evolved out of earlier and
simpler forms of life as a result of natural processes
working upon the matter of which the universe is
composed. For the Nihilist, man is an accidental product of
a blind process in a universe that neither knows him nor
cares about his existence. Man is thrown into existence and
it behooves him to try to make the best of it. What is certain
about his existence of which he is particularly aware is that
existence will terminate one day. While still living, he
must decide on how to live his life, .what to live for, what to
work for, how to occupy the few or many days left for him
on earth.

3. Ethical Theism:
This is the ethical doctrine that man is the steward of
the universe endowed by his Creator with an immortal
spiritual soul and destined for immortal life. After his
stewardship on earth, man must appear before his Maker to
give account of his stewardship and to be judged
accordingly to his deeds.

299
4. Transcendentalism:
This is the view that there is a dimension of depth in
everything that exists. Every finite thing points beyond
itself to that which is infinite. Man is a physical entity
illuminated by the spirit or consciousness. But deep within
man, at level that external observers cannot fathom, man is
a bearer of hopes, fears, dreams and aspirations.

5. Existentialism:
This is the view that man carves his own destiny
through his actions and behaviour. Man is free to choose
what he wants to be, but he is also responsible for what he
does. Man’s anxiety is precipitated by the fear of death.
Life makes sense only because of the certainty of death.
Man's activities, plans, decisions and actions are affected
by the inevitability of death.

Man’s Cosmic Environment:

The word ‘environment’ simply means that which
surrounds or is surrounded. To understand the
environment properly a study of each of the global realms is
imperative. These realms are:
1 Atmosphere:
This is the gaseous realm. It subdivides into two
layers with different temperatures. The lower layer is
called troposphere, while the upper layer is called
stratosphere. The temperature decreases as one moves
from the lower layer to the upper layer. The Ozone (<9,)
layer is very close to the stratosphere. The Ozone layer
protects the earth and the troposphere from direct contact of
ultraviolet radiation in the sun’s rays. Without the Ozone
300
layer, all surface bacteria, plant and animal tissue would be
exterminated by ultraviolet radiations from the sun.

2 The Hydrosphere:
This is the liquid water realm. It simply refers to
land or ground water and surface water. Water resource is
stored in three states, namely, liquid, solid, and gaseous.
Liquid water is commonly found around. Solid water is
ice, while gaseous water is vapour.

3 The Lithosphere:
This is the solid mineral realm. This is made up of
crustal rocks and materials, which in turn constitute the
continental blocks. Earthquakes normally have their roots
from these rocks and materials. In recording the shock
waves produced by earthquakes, seismographs are used.
4 The Biosphere:
This is the life layer of the earth interfaced between
the other layers!*

The Solar System

The solar system is made up of the sun and eight
planets; the ninth Pluto has lost its status as a planet
[International Astronomical Society Report, 2006]. Planets
are believed to have evolved from the condensation of
gases and other lesser bodies. All planets are believed to
revolve around the sun, a discovery made by Nicolaus
Copernicus in 1543. The eight planets include: Mercury,
Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune.
The listing is on the basis of their distances away from the
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sun. Mercury is 36 million miles away from the sun, Venus
- twice that distance, Earth - 93 million miles, Jupiter -
about 485 million miles, etc. The planets (except Pluto]
are classified into two, namely, the ‘terrestrial planets’ and
the ‘celestial planets’. The terrestrial planets are Mercury,
Mars, Earth and Venus, while the celestial planets include
Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune. The celestial planets
are also referred to as the giant planets.
In August 2006, the International Astronomical
Union [IAU] redefined the term ‘planet’. According to the
IAU resolution passed August 24, 2006, there are three
main conditions for an object to be called a planet, namely,
1. The object must be in orbit around the sun with a
diameter greater than 2000 Km.
2. The obj ect must be massive enough to be a sphere by
its own gravitational force. More specifically, its
own gravity should pull it into a shape of hydrostatic
equilibrium.
3. It must have cleared the neighbourhood around its
orbit.
Pluto fails to meet the third condition. The IAU
further resolved that Pluto be classified in the
simultaneously created dwarf planet category.
As a result of the IAU resolution, planets and other
bodies in our solar system except satellites, are defined into
three distinct categories in the following way:
1. A planet is a celestial body that [a] Is in orbit around
the sun, [b] Has sufficient mass for its self gravity to
overcome rigid body forces so that it assumes a
hydrostatic equilibrium [nearly round] shape and
 [c] Has cleared the neighbourhood around
its orbit. f
2. A dwarf planet is a celestial body that [a] Is in orbit
around the sun, [b] Has sufficient mass for its self
gravity to overcome rigid body forces so that it
assumes a hydrostatic equilibrium [nearly round]
shape, [c] Has not cleared the neighbourhood around
its orbit and [d] Is not a satellite.
3. All other objects except satellites orbiting the sun
shall be referred to collectively as smaller solar
system bodies.
Since that definition classifies Pluto not as a planet
but as a dwarf planet, the official number of planets has
fallen from the traditional nine to eight. Pluto, Ceres and
Eris are classified as dwarf planets. Pluto is also classified
as the prototype of a family of trans-Neptunian objects
[Internet:http// en.Wikipedia.org/ Wiki / Pluto].
The closer a planet is to the sun, the hotter it is, while
the farther a planet is away from the sun, the colder it is.
Because the earth is neither hot nor cold, it is the only planet
inhabited by living beings, though it is believed by some
astronomers that some species of plant could survive in
Mars under controlled conditions.
There are about 33 natural satellites (moons)
scattered over the planets. The terrestrial planets have one
each, while the celestial planets have 29. The light of the
moon is reflected from the sun. There are innumerable
luminous objects in our galaxy. These objects are called '
stars. They exist in clusters and are held together by the
force of gravity. Their distances from the earth are so far

303
that they are measured in light years - the space displayed
by an object at the speed of light in one year. Aside from the
planets, there are small bodies lying between Jupiter and
Mars, which perpetually move randomly, colliding with
one another. They are called asteroids. Their fragments
occasionally hit our earth as meteorites.
Contrary to the earlier widely held view that the earth
was flat, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
the shape of the earth is spherical. The earth moves in two
different ways. First, it rotates on its axis from west to east
in every 24 hours, resulting in day and night. Second, it
revolves round the sun in an orbit once in every 365% days,
resulting in the seasons and the year.

The Earth’s Crust

The earth’s crust consists of various types of rocks
differing from each other in structure, colour, texture,
permeability, mode of occurrence and degree of resistance
to denudation. Broadly, there are three types of rocks,
namely, igneous, sedimentary and metamorphic.
The cooling and solidification of molten rocks
(magma) from beneath the earth’s crust forms igneous
rocks. Igneous rocks may be subdivided on the basis of
mineral composition. In terms of origin, the two main
classes of igneous rocks are plutonic rocks and volcanic
rocks.
Sedimentary rocks are formed from sediments
accumulated over long periods, usually beneath water.
Unlike igneous rocks which are crystalline and do not
contain fossils, sedimentary rocks are non-crystalline and
often contain fossils of animals, plants and other micro­

304
ft is however a model of explanation in the social sciences
where, Marxist and Freudian theories, among others, are
held to be tenable explanatory hypotheses (Aigbodioh 78-79).
2. Functional or Teleological Explanation:
This has to do with a statement of purpose or
intended goal, which underlies the actions of men, the
activities of animals, God or some supernatural powers.
In many contexts of inquiry, especially in biology
and human affairs, functional explanation takes the form of
showing one or more functions (or even dysfunctions) that
a unit performs in achieving certain traits of a system to
which the unit belongs, or of stating the instrumental role an
action plays in bringing about some goal. A characteristic
of this mode of explanation is that it often employs such
typical locutions as ‘in order that’, ‘for the sake of’, and the
like. Another characteristic is that there is an explicit
reference to some still future state or event, in terms of
which the existence of a thing or the occurrence of an act is
made intelligible (Nagel 337).
In what has been said so far, two subsidiary cases of a
functional explanation are discernible. Number one is that
a functional explanation may be sought for in a particular
state, thing or act that occurs at a particular time. Number
two is that a functional explanation may be ascribed to a
feature that is common to all systems of a certain kind, at
whatever time those systems may exist. Thus, the
annulment of the marriage between Prince Charles of
England and Lady Diana may be explained by indicating
that it was done to allow Prince Charles to many another
Lady (i.e. Ms Bowles) who had won his affection. The
presence of lungs in the human body may be explained by
indicating that they operate in a stated manner so as to
maintain a certain chemical process and thereby assuring
that bodily existence continues into the future.

309
3. Genetic Explanation:
This mode of explanation sometimes sets out the
sequence of major events through which some earlier
system has metamorphosed into a later one. For instance,
historical analysis frequently is undertaken to explain why
a given discipline lias certain features, by describing how
the discipline grew out of some earlier one. . A good
example here is philosophy, which is generally regarded as
the mother-subject or parent-stock of other disciplines.
Such mode of explanation is often given for both
animate and inanimate objects, for traits of an individual
and characteristics of a group. The explanatory premises of
such explanation usually contain a large number of singular
statements about past events in the system under review.
Two more points about the explanatory premises of
genetic explanation need to be pointed out. The first is that,
it is not every past event in the career of the system that is
mentioned. The second is that the events mentioned are the
ones selected on the assumption that they are causally
relevant to the development of the system. Thus, the
premises will include, in addition to singular statements,
general assumptions about the causal dependencies of
various kinds of events. These assumptions may either be
fairly precise developmental laws for which independent
inductive evidence has been found, or only vague
generalizations, perhaps statistical in content, containing
no reference to some of the highly specific features of the
subject matter under inquiry. However, in none of the cases
do the explanatory premises in familiar examples of genetic
explanation state the sufficient conditions for the
occurrence of the event stated in the ‘explanandum’ (i.e.
event or fact that needs explanation), though the premises
often do state some of the conditions which, under
circumstances generally taken for granted, are. necessary
310
for the latter. The safest conclusion, therefore, is that
genetic explanation is by and large probabilistic (Nagel 338
-339).,
4. Reductive Model of Explanation:
This model of explanation involves “the reduction of
a strange, unusual puzzling or a complex event (process or
phenomenon) to terms which describe familiar (or
commonplace) occurrence” (Aigbodioh 78). In other
words, what earlier appeared strange is reduced to what we
are very familiar with. This not only dispels our fears or
douses our curiosity, but also makes the former intelligible.
For example, in a real life situation, when we seek to know
why some persons manifest a bizarre form of behaviour, we
may be told that they behave the way they do because of
certain feelings aroused in them by certain events. Such
explanation will render what initially looked like a strange
behaviour to be accepted as a normal thing. Again, the
unusual phenomenon of seeing balloons rising up instead
of falling like other objects when dropped (in accordance to
the gravitational law) can be explained by saying that the
weight of the gas in the balloon is less than the weight of the
normal atmospheric air around, and hence the balloon is
forced to rise in the same way that light objects rise and
float in water, while heavy objects (e.g. lead or stone) sink.
When explained this way, the phenomenon, which earlier
appeared surprising, has been rendered familiar and
intelligible. Thus, we have shown that the same principle,
which renders the familiar intelligible, is embedded in the
unfamiliar event. Some philosophers of science including
Campbell and Bridgman subscribe to this model of
explanation.
Objections have been raised against this model of
explanation. Chief among them is that, although some
events are amenable to this pattern of explanation, it is
possible to point out a number of unfamiliar events or
occurrences, which cannot be reduced, to familiar ones
through explanation. It is also argued that what is familiar
to one person may not be so to another, what is familiar in
one place may not be so in another, and what is familiar at a
particular point in time may not be so at another point in
time. That is simply to say that the concept of familiarity is
relative.
5. Deductive Model of Explanation:
The deductive model of explanation is one that
enjoys a position of near-orthodoxy amidst competing
accounts. Both as an object of attack and defense, and both
as an object of interest among scientists and philosophers,
the so-called ‘hypothetico deductive’ or deductive-
nomological theory of explanation enjoys a position of
dominance in the field. As the name implies, the theory
holds that “explanations require the adducing of general
laws, with the status of empirical hypotheses about the
natural order, from which, in conjunction with statements
of initial conditions, we can deductively infer statements
about empirical consequences” (Ryan 46).
The elements of this theory have a long history.
Traces of it run from Aristotle of early Greek philosophy
through the medieval period down to the modern period.
However, it was not until the 19"’ century before it assumed
almost canonical status, defended at that time by such great
philosophers as Laplace, Whewell and Mill, and in our day
by Popper, Hempel and Nagel.
The deductive model is commonly found in the
natural sciences, though not exclusively limited to those
disciplines. It has a formal structure akin to a deductive
argument, in which the explanation is a logically necessary
consequence of the explanatory premises. Accordingly, in
this kind of explanation, the premises state the sufficient
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organisms. In terms of origin and composition,
sedimentary rocks are classified into three categories,
namely, those that are mechanically formed, those that are
organically formed and t^ose that are chemically formed.
Metamorphic rocks refer to changed rocks. All
rocks whether igneous or sedimentary may become
metamorphic when subjected to great heat and pressure as a
result of earth’s movements. '■

Theory of Continental Drift and Plate Tectonics

Alfred Wegener, a German meteorologist,,
formulated the theory of continental drift. According' to
this theory, there existed some 150 million years ago a
single continent on earth which Wegener named ‘Pangaea’
or ‘Gondawanaland’. There occurred a ‘big bang’, which
caused this supercontinent to rupture into several
fragments, which then began to drift away. As the
American fragment drifted from Africa and Eurasia, a
narrow basin, which was to become the Atlantic Ocean
basin, appeared. Some other fragments also drifted apart,
opening up the Indian Ocean.
Wegener’s theory later fell into disrepute as it was
considered by Geophysicists not to have tallied with any
known laws of physics. This gave rise to a new theory
called Plate tectonics.
According to Plate tectonics, the continental
fragments are like rafts floating on a denser and plastic
substratum. The continents are merely lithospheric plates
separated by belts of higher oceanic floor called the mid-
oceanic bridges. From the oceanic bridges, magma is
added to some sections designed as ‘seafloor of spreading’.
305

/.
Unmistakable evidence abounds, showing that the crust is
spreading • apart along the rift at the rate of one to two inches
per year It must, however, be pointed out that there is no
strong evidence supporting the theory of Plate tectonics.
More research needs to be done to either confirm it or
falsify it. ,

The Theory of Isostacy:

The theory was formulated to counter the earlier held
view that different landforms are characterized by different
densities. The theory of Isostacy, also called the theory of
‘equal standing’, states that every protuberance above the
earth surface (eg mountain) has a corresponding root which .
ensures that equal mass exists beneath equal surface area.
This balance explains why mountains standing side by side
with valley do not cave in one day because of the force of
gravity.

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 CHAPTER 29 IGTIT
THE NOTION OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION

Although it is generally agreed that the main goal of

science is to explain phenomena and events in the world,
nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the nature and
forms of explanation so as to unravel the specific sense in
which the sciences can be said to function as modSlsAor
paradigms of explanation. This forms the main thrust of
this chapter,
What' is explanation? Basically, there are two senses
in which the term ‘explanation’ is used, namely, the loose or
general sense and the technical sense. In the loose- sense,
the word ‘explanation’ is derived from the verb ‘to
explain’. In this sense, the term embraces many human
activities. Generally, in our daily life, when we ask
questions of why, what, when, how, etc, we are simply
seeking explanation in one way or the other.
Apart from these contexts, we often ask people to
explain themselves or their points more clearly by restating,
clarifying or simplifying their earlier assertions in a way
that we can understand fully what they have said. In the
more technical sense, when we speak of explanation, we are
referring to the way scientists and philosophers of science
conceive of explanation. In this sense, there are six specific
kinds of explanation. They include the following:
1. Explanation with Reasons:
This mode of explanation consists of providing
explanatory . reasons for holding certain beliefs. For

307
 example, various reasons have been given in response to
the question - why do people worship God? The Marxists
believe that religion is the opium of the masses. The reason
given for this belief is simply exploitation or oppression of
the masses in the capitalist system. The masses that are
suffering under the oppressive capitalistsystem invent the
idea of God who will come and deliver them from the hands
of their exploiters. Thus, religion is the product of
exploitation, the sigh or cry of the oppressed in the
capitalist system. This explains why the bulk of those who
practice religion are the poor, the oppressed, the suffering
masses, the Marxists argue. The Freudians' or
Psychoanalysts give a psychological explanation as to why
people worship God. For them, religion is childhood
neurosis brought into adult life. Realizing his
powerlessness in the face of the odds of life such as poverty,
disease, death, etc, man spontaneously seeks the help of a
father, and finding none he invents one (i.e. God) for
himself. Thus, for the Freudians, religion is the obsessive
neurosis of humanity.
Apart from these two examples that appeal to some
general principles undergirding certain beliefs, there are
other reasons often offered which do not appeal to
principles. In the case of why people worship God, it could
be asserted that people worship God because of their family
background, others because of personal conviction after
listening to preachers, and yet others because of problems
in life. The believer may be conscious of the reasons
..undergirding his belief or he may not. Where he is not
conscious of the reasons, the reasons are said to be latent
and can only be discovered by investigating the primitive
factors, which underlie the belief in question. On the
whole, this mode of explanation is generally not supposed
to provide an ideal form or model of scientific explanation.
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(though sometimes necessary) condition for the truth of the
‘explanandum’. We can illustrate this by citing an
example. Suppose you wake up one morning to discover to
your dismay that the rear windscreen of your car is
damaged. You naturally would like having an explanation
as to what caused it. Suppose on enquiry you discovered
that your son mistakenly broke it while hauling stone at
lizards. At this point you claim you have got the
explanation; you can piece together the conditions - your
son pursuing lizards, the use of a big stone - and from these
you can infer the result, the shattering of the rear
windscreen of your scar. Thus, you have succeeded in
producing an argument whos.e premises have to do with the
causal antecedents, while the conclusion states the present ’
sad results.
Some people might argue that what is presented here
is not a deductive argument as such but a sequence. If we
take the event of the car windscreen being destroyed as our
conclusion [C], and the antecedent events as our premises
(A and B), what we have is not a deductive argument but a
sequence: Event A - lizards are being pursued by my son;
Event B - a big stone is thrown which accidentally hits the
windscreen; So Event C - the rear windscreen is damaged.
Thus, we have a sequence A, B, so C, which does not look
like a valid deductive argument.
In response to the objection above, the deductivist
might argue that in a case such as the one under
consideration, the general law that governs the explanation
is usually taken for granted, but once it is made explicit the
result is a valid argument. The singular statement ‘My
son’s throwing a stone caused the car windscreen to be
destroyed’ obviously rests on a causal law of a general kind,
which states the effects or impacts of hard objects on sonef
ones. The generalization that hard objects will cause
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damage to softer ones on impact, whether stated or not, is
logically necessary to the explanation. If stone were not to
be a hard object, but a soft one, we could not cite the impact
of the stone on the windscreen of the car as the causal
explanation, since it would no longer enjoy the backing of
the generalization, which renders it relevant.
When an event is explained causally by pointing to
its causal antecedents or what Popper refers to as ‘initial
conditions’ of the events, this makes sense simply because
we appeal to a general law which states that these causal
antecedents are sufficient to bring about the event. Thus, “a
fully spelled out explanation takes the form of adducing a
general law or laws, some set of initial conditions, and
deducing from these the statement describing the event to
be explained. The logical relationship is thus: Laws (L,....
Ln), Conditions (C,.... Cn), so Event(s) (E,.... En); and as in
any valid deductive argument the explanans must entail the
explanandum” (Ryan 49), corresponding to what some
scholars, for example Nagel, prefer to call explicans and
explicandum. The explanandum (as indicated earlier)
refers to the statement, which describes the event to be
explained, whereas the explanans refers to the entire set of
statements, which are adduced for the purpose of
explaining the phenomenon.
From these distinctions, the general characteristics
of true deductive explanation can be summarized as
follows:
1. The explanandum must be a logical consequence of
the explanans.
2. The explanans must contain some covering (or
general) laws from which the explanandum is truly
derived. .
3. The explanans must contain some empirical facts if
the phenomenon? described by the explanandum is
3T4
 to be inferable from it.
4. All statements of the entire explanans must be true,
otherwise the inference from them to the
explanandum would be unsound (Hempel as cited
by Aigbodioh 87 - 88).
These four items are considered by some scholars as
the necessary requirements for true scientific explanation.
Hempel’s deductive-nomological explanation can be
represented in the following schema:

C„ C,..... C. (Statements of antecedent

Conditions)
L„ L„..... L, (General Laws)

describing the particular facts appealed to, while L„ L,,...,

Lr represent general laws. The two sets of statements
combined constitute the explanans, while the conclusion is
a statement describing the explanandum events. What is
required for the argument to be valid is that the explanans
must entail the explanandum.
It must be noted that the deductive nomological ,
theory*pf explanation has a predictive function. As
Aigbodioh has rightly observed,

315
 By showing that the antecedent conditions and
the general laws described by the two sub-sets
of statements in the explanans, are responsible
for the occurrence of the phenomenon
described in the explanandum, or simply that
the explanandum follows from (or is inferable
from] the explanans, the deductive model
implies that we could have predicted the
occurrence of the explanandum if, at an earlier
period, we had known about the logico-
empirical connections which the explanans
■ has to the explanandum. Hence, now that we
know of those possible connections, we can
predict that if similar antecedent conditions
described in the explanans should prevail in
the near future, then a phenomenon of the sort
described in the explanandum would occur,
given that the general laws cited in explanans
still hold (89).
In spite of the privileged status accorded the
deductive model of explanation, it is not immune to
criticism. The first objection is that, it cannot satisfactorily
answer the question of whether laws can be characterized
simply as presumptively true universal statements, or
whether in o$er to serve as a premise in a satisfactory
explanation a universal statement must in addition have a
distinctive type of relational structure. Secondly, while it is
trfiq that highly integrated and comprehensive systems of
explanation are achieved in science through the use of so-
called ‘theoretical assumptions’, it is still necessary to
inquire more closely what are the traits that differentiate
316
I.
theories from other laws, what features in them account for
their power to explain a wide variety of facts in a systematic
manner, and what cognitive status is to be assigned to them
(Nagel 335).
6 Inductive-nomological Explanation:
Although it is a moot question whether this model
constitutes a distinctive type, evidence abounds that ii is
sometimes used in the sciences. It is a known fact that
many explanations in practically every discipline in science
do not follow the deductive pattern adumbrated above, as
their explanatory premises (explanans) .do not npriTially
entail the explanandum. Since their premises are logically
insufficient to secure the truth of the explanandum. the
latter can be said to be' probabilistic. Probabilistic
explanations result from a situation where the explanatory
premises contain a statistical assumption about some class
of elements, while the explanandum is a singular statement
about a given individual member of that class. An
illustration will help to clarify this: Consider the example:,-
Why did Dimka plot the death of General Murtala
Mohammed? Here we have an individual fact in need of
explanation. To be able to explain this we may need to
appeal to general psychological principles about why our
big people in politics behave the way they do, especially
when they harbour hatred for one another. That is to say that
we can point to a general principle that during successive .
military regimes in Nigeria, the relative frequency was high
that individuals belonging to the upper strata of society and '
possessed by great hatred of tyranny would plot to
eliminate men who were in position to secure tyrannical

317
power [Explanans (1)]. Dimka was such a Nigerian and
Murtala Mohammed was such a potential tyrant
[Explanans (2)]. So, though it does not follow that Dimka
plotted to kill Murtala Mohammed, it is highly probable he
did so (Explanandum).
In this explanation, it is obvious that the explanans
do not imply the explanandum. Rather it is only made more
or less probable to be the case because of the presence of the
statistical law-like statement in the explanans (1) coupled
with the historical antecedent expressed in explanans (2).
A few objections have been raised against the
inductive model. The first is that the inductive model is just
the reverse of the deductive model, and hence does not
constitute a distinct type. It is suggested that all that we
need to do is to replace the statistical assumptions in the
premises of probabilistic explanations by a strictly
universal statement. The inductivist might counter this
objection by arguing that though there is some merit in it, as
a matter of fact it is extremely difficult in many subject
matters to assert with even moderate plausibility strictly
universal laws that are not trivial and hence otiose. For him,
often the best that can be established with some warrant is
statistical regularity. Accordingly, probabilistic
explanations cannot be ignored, on pain of excluding from
Jhe discussion of the logic of explanation important
areas of investigation (Nagel 336).
Secondly, it is objected that, it is still an unsettled
question whether an explanation must contain a statistical
assumption in order to be a probabilistic one, or whether
non-statistical premises may not make an explanandum
probable in some non-statistical sense of the term. Nor are
students of the subject generally agreed on how the relation
between premises and explanandum is to be analyzed, even
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in those probabilistic explanations in which the premises
are statistical and the explanandum are statements about
some individual (Nagel 337).

Formalists and Contextualist Theories of Explanation

Regarding the nature of scientific explanation, there
is a ranging debate in contemporary philosophy of science.
This debate centres on the question of how scientific
theories and their explanatory and predictive powers are to
be construed. The question is - are there universalizable
formal structures or logical forms into which scientific
theories can be analyzed, or are the essential elements of a
theory context-dependent?
The formalists are of the view that every scientific
theory is analyzable into definite logical structure and the
role of the philosopher of science is that of an applied
logician who formulates and exhibits the logical structures
or models of scientific theories and explanation. For the
formalists, theories are complex deductive systems, which
are put to explanatory and predictive uses. This school has
its representatives - Carl Hempel, Ernest Nagel, Wesley
Salmon and Mary Hesse.
On the other hand, the contextualists, inspired by
Wittgenstein’s view that language is a form of life, hold that
explanations are always given in a context, so that we very
often offer some piece of information as the explanation of
some phenomenon not really because we think that in itself
this piece of information is strikingly important, but
because we think that in the context of what the inquirer can
be expected to know, this information is the particular one
that is lacking. The assumption is that since explanation is
sought because of our ignorance, then whatever can fill the
gaps in our knowledge invariably becomes an explanation.
In this sense almost any information can serve as the
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explanation, in the same way any piece of a jigsaw puzzle
can be the piece, depending on what has been completed
already (Ryan 47). This means that the translation of
ordinary language (including scientific theories), into
symbolic notations (which the formalists think is possible)
distorts its meaning and deprives it of its function as a
system of communication. For Wittgenstein, to fully
understand the meaning of ordinary language and scientific
theories, the motives, desires, intentions and aspirations of
the speaker and scientist (respectively) must be taken into
consideration. These elements constitute, for the
contextualists, the non-logical aspects of theories, which
are value-laden. Thus, according to the contextualists,
All sorts of considerations - including the
values and metaphysical beliefs of the
scientific community-could be relevant to the
understanding of scientific theories and the
role they play in scientific explanations and
predictions. There are no logical models into
which theories or explanations may be
analyzed, as the formalists want us to believe
(Aigbodioh84). •
Apart from Wittgenstein, other notable
contextualists include Thomas Kuhn, N.K. Hanson,
Michael Scrivenand Stephen Toulmin.

Does Science Really Explain?

Because of the structural differences among the
various types of explanation examined above, the natural
question to ask is-Does Science really explain?
It is argued by some that no science is able to provide
satisfactory answers to the question of why any event
occurs, or why things are related in certain ways. Such
320
question can only be answered if it is possible to show that
the events, which occur, must occur and that the relations,
which hold between things, must hold between them.
However, experience has shown that the methods of the
empirical sciences are incapable of detecting any absolute
or logical necessity in the phenomena, which they
investigate. Even if the laws and theories of science are
true, they are nothing more than logically contingent truths
about the sequential orders of phenomena. Consequently,
the sciences can only answer questions as to how events
happen and how things are related. The conclusion is that
the sciences are only descriptive, not explanatory. E. W.
Hobson has raised this kind of objection. To quote him at
some length,
The very common idea that it is the functions
of Natural Science to explain physical
phenomena cannot be accepted cs true unless
the word ‘explain’ is used in a very limited
sense. The notions of efficient causation, and
of logical necessity, not being applicable to the
world of physical phenomena, the function of
Natural Science is to describe conceptuallyThe
sequences of events which are to be observed
in Nature; but Natural Science cannot account
for the existence of such sequences, and
therefore cannot explain the phenomena in the
physical world, in the strictest sense in which
the term ‘explanation’ can be used. Thus
Natural Science describes, so far as it can, how,
or in accordance with what rules phenomena
happen, but it is wholly incompetent to answer
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 the question why they happen (cited in Nagel
339).
Against the view of critics that scientific laws and
theories are mere formulations of relations of
concomitance and sequence between phenomena, some
pro-explanation scholars have argued that such objection
hinges in some measure on a verbal issue. They contend
that the fundamental flaw of the argument is that it merely
assumes that there is only one correct sense in which ‘why’
question can be raised, that is, the sense in which the proper
answer to it is a proof of the inherent necessity of a
proposition. However, this assumption is mistaken
because there are in fact well-established uses for the words
‘why’ and ‘explanation’ such that it is both possible and
appropriate to designate an answer to a ‘why’ question as an
explanation, even when the answer fails to provide reasons
for regarding the explanandum as intrinsically necessary.
Indeed, “even writers who officially reject the view that the
sciences can ever explain anything sometimes lapse into
language which describes certain scientific discoveries as
’explanations’ ...”. For example, Mach describes Galileo’s
analysis of equilibrium on an inclined plane in terms of the
principle of the lever, as an explanation of the former”
(Nagel 340).
To balance up the foregoing arguments, we can
safely conclude that although science has limitations in that
it cannot explain all the ‘why’ questions, nevertheless, to
the extent that it can explain some and even make
predictions on their basis, and to that extent, science is
beneficial.

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 CHAPTER 30

THE NOTION OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH

If science is ultimately bound up with truth, it will be

germane to first try to define truth before explaining how it
is determined in science.

What is Scientific Truth?

Literally, the word truth refers to what is verifiable
by everyone or that on which everybody has reached an
agreement. Truth is therefore universal. It is objective and
public, not subjective or private.
Science is a systematic process of searching for the
truth about nature in its various forms. Scientific truth
sometimes starts with a subjective speculation. This is then
subjected to logical, theoretical and empirical tests. If the
tests confirm or validate it, it is retained as a tentative truth.
It is tentative because future observations or tests may
invalidate it. For instance, contrary to the earlier widely
held view that the earth was flat, the idea that the earth was
not flat remained a mere conjecture, speculation or
hypothesis for many years. In a bid to confirm or refute it, it
went through prolonged logical and theoretical arguments.
Later, some empirical tests were conducted to confirm or
refute it. The last of the empirical tests, which was sailing
around the world, came to confirm the speculation that the
earth was not flat (Nenty 9). The same was the case with
the heliocentric theory of the universe (i.e. the theory that it
is the sun and not the earth that is the centre of the universe
and all other planets revolve around it). Once a hypothesis
is confirmed, the new truth adds to the stock of know ledge
and thus contributes to progress in science.
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 The aim of science therefore is to discover the truth.
It does not invent truth and it cannot invent truth.
Having clarified the notion of scientific truth, the
next thing to do is to try to answer the question: How is truth
determined in science? In answer to this question, we shall
be considering four tests of truth.
1. Correspondence Test
The first and oldest test of truth in both philosophy
and science is the correspondence test. Although the
correspondence theory of truth has a long history, it y/as
Bertrand Russell who first popularized it in this century
through his writings. According to this theory, truth is
simply correspondence of a belief or proposition with a
fact, a state of affairs or reality. Reality is what actually
exists, while truth is our estimation of reality or what we
agree exists. Hence what we hold to be true reflects reality
or that which actually exists. Chief among the advocates of
this theory are Aristotle, G. E. Moore and Alfred Taski.
According to Aristotle, it is by the facts of the case, by their
being or not being so, that a statement can be called true or
false. For G. E. Moore, when a belief is true, that which is
believed is a fact and when a belief is false, that which is
believed is not a fact. Taski, on his part, considers truth as a
property of sentences and involves a relationship between a
sentence and reality. For instance, the sentence ‘it is
raining’ is true if and only if it is indeed raining out there.
My objection to this theory is that there cannot be a
strict correspondence between a belief or proposition and a
fact. A picture cannot be the same as the thing it pictures.
Beliefs and propositions are communicated in words.
Words are only symbols or signs and no symbol can ever be
the same as the thing it symbolizes (Stumpf 36).
2. Coherence Test:
The coherence test of truth is one of the two

324
traditional tests of truth (the other being the correspondence
test). Rationalist metaphysicians such as Spinoza, Leibniz,
Hegel and F. H. Bradley held the coherence theory of truth.
It enjoyed, though briefly, some support among the
scientifically minded logical positivists such as Otto
Neurath and Carl Hempel.
According to the coherence theory of truth, a
statement or theory is true if and only if it agrees or is
logically consistent with other statements or theories of the
system. Each statement or theory of the system is related to
every other statement or theory by implication. Various
arguments have been given in support of this theory. First it
is commonly used in evaluating the truth content of
statements or ideas we are confronted with. Very often, we
reject the claims of others when we find them to be
inconsistent with our experience. For instance, if a person
told us that he saw a witch flying across his room, we would
not accept such a story because it does not agree with the
rest of our experience. The same holds for scientific
investigation. For instance, if someone told us that he
dropped a ball which instead of falling to the ground
remained suspended in the mid air, we would reject his
claim because it is not consistent with what science tells
about the law of gravitation and with our common
experience of what is possible. The coherence test also
holds in the systems of pure mathematics. The test for the
truth of any new proposition is its coherence with other
propositions of the system and ultimately with the axioms
of the system. This test is not merely a practical one, it is a
logical one. A statement is coherent with other
propositions of the system when it is logically deducible •
from them.
A few objections can be raised against the coherence
test for truth. First, it is possible to have a statement or

325
/
theory, which is consistent with one system but inconsistent
with another. If this is permitted in science, it is going to
create serious difficulties. Second, a statement may be
coherent with a system of judgment, yet not applicable to
the real world. For instance, in mathematics, we can show
that 2 + 2 = 4 is deduced from a given set of statements or
rules. Of course, no one will question the non-applicability
of a mathematical statement to the real world. But
empirical statements of science and everyday experience
purport to tell us about the world, and thus require some
stronger meaning to be true. What all this shows is that
coherence test only guarantees that a statement may ,
possibly have application to the real world; it does not
demonstrate that any statement actually has application to
the world (Ozumba 127). Finally, it is logically possible to
have two coherent systems, which are mutually
incompatible so that both cannot be true without sacrificing
the law of non-contradiction. If the coherence theory is
true, then there is no way to decide between the two
systems. We do not reject empirical statements because
they fail to cohere, but because they are inconsistent with
what we believe to be true. Thus the coherence of a new
statement or judgment is simply a practical test, not a
determination of truth.
3. Pragmatic Test:
Pragmatism was a dominant force in American
philosophy during the first half of the twentieth century.
The central figures in pragmatism are Charles Sanders
Peirce (1839 - 1914), William James (1842 - 1910), and
John Dewey (1859 - 1952). The pragmatists shared in the
general apathy of the Americans towards theoretical
activity, which has no cash-value. By cash-value, they
meant the use to which ideas can be put. Whether a theory is
believed to be true or false is unimportant, what matters is
whether it affects one’s actions. Theories are mere
instruments of solving one’s problems and their success is
evaluated in terms of performing this function. Thus a
theory is true if and only if it works or is useful or it satisfies
us. In testing a theory, the scientist designs an experiment,
which determines whether the theory works under specified
conditions. The theory can only be true if the experiment is
successful. Truth is what works in practice now. Ideas
remain true as long as they work, and false as long as they
fail to work (Nenty 9).
According to Peirce, truth is the consequence of the
experimental method, which is agreed upon by the
scientific community. For William James, truth is
determined by consequences. A statement is true if it
satisfies the criterion of practical interest. For Dewey, truth
is ‘warranted assertibility’. Truth is what happens to an
idea when it is verified or warranted.
A few objections have been raised against the
pragmatic theory of truth. The first objection stems from
the view that a statement or theory is true if its empirical
consequence meets our expectations. The que'stion one
may ask is - whose expectation? Is it the individual or
society? This introduces subjectivity into the process of
testing objective truth. Individual or societal interests or
values thus become the standard for determining truth. A
corollary objection to the first objection is that the attempt
to verify truth has to await its consequences. This tends to
confuse the truth with the good. The truth is not necessarily
the good or socially desirable. This is the realm of
philosophy (Ozumba 245).
4 Performative Test:
The Chief proponent of the performative theory of
truth is P.F. Strawson. Strawson challenged the age-long
327
view that terms like ‘true’ and ‘false’ were descriptive
expressions. Strawson argued rather that the term ‘true’ is
a performative expression. In using a performative
definition one is not just making a statement but performing
an act. To prefix a statement with ‘It is true that...’ we are
simply expressing our agreement with, acceptance or
endorsement of the statement. Thus, if I say ‘it is true that
the sermon is timely’, is simply to say that ‘I agree that the
sermon is timely’.
Like any other theory of truth, the performative
theory is not exempt from criticism. The main criticism
against it is that it does not distinguish among performative
expressions. Even if we concede that ‘true’ is sometimes
used as a performative, it differs from such other
performatives as I accept ...; I insist ...; I admit ...; etc.
Apart from that, we need to distinguish a performative such
as ‘yes’ from ‘it is true that... ’. While the former indicates
what philosophers call ‘bare assent’, the latter indicates a
considered opinion, as in, ‘I have studied the evidence and
concluded that...’.

Some Schools of Thought regarding the Notion of Truth

in Science
Over the years many schools of thought have
emerged in an attempt to explain the nature of scientific
truth and how this truth is attained. Some of these schools
of thought will be briefly discussed here.
1. Verificationism:
This position is associated with the logical
positivists of the Vienna Circle fame. Verificationism is a
standard of clarity, which the logical positivists formulated
to achieve their objective of clarity of language. According
to the principle of verification or verifiability, a statement is
true or meaningful if it can be verified in my present
328
experience or capable of being verified in future
experience. Logical positivists classified statements into
two, namely, formal statements and empirical statements.
The former are analytical statements whose truth depends
wholly on the meanings of the terms used. Statements of
formal logic and pure mathematics fall within this category.
The empirical statements are synthetic statements whose
truth depends on some extra-linguistic facts. All-synthetic
statements belong to science, since their truth can be
established by empirical investigation.
The main problem with verificationism is that it fails
to take cognizance of the fact that the experiences of one
person cannot be the same as those of another. Each
person’s experience is different and all their experiences
are not the same as the real world. What this boils down to
is that verification statements will mean different things to
different people. Thus we are back to the relativism (or
better still, solipsism) of Protagoras, which holds that
everything is true, that truth is relative to persons and
circumstances.
2 Falsificationism and Relative Verisimilitude:
Falsificationism as a method of science is associated
with Karl R. Popper. Contrary to the logical positivists
who adopted the inductive method of science, Popper
adopted a position that showed that scientific theories
cannot be verified by any possible accumulation of
observational evidence, but falsified by it. Consequently,
theories are, for Popper, genuine conjectures, highly
informative guesses about the world which though not
verifiable, but nevertheless can be submitted to several
critical tests. They are serious attempt to discover the truth,
even though we do not know, arid may perhaps never know,
whether it is true or not.
329
 What this implies is that the essential element of
scientific activity is critical attitude, the readiness to expose
every assertion to risk, to possible refutation or rejection. It
is in this sense that Popper regards scientific progress as the
product of the interplay between conjecture and refutation,
trial and error. This method implies that science searches
for disconfirming instances and that there is no scientific
postulation that should be held sacrosanct. On the relation
of falsificationism to the pursuit of truth, which is one of the
chief aims of science, Popper opined that science proceeds
as though it is aimed at the truth, but in actual practice it
does not aim at truth but at what he called verisimilitude.
Verisimilitude means truthlikeness or approximation to the
truth. For Popper, science is not a system of certain or well-
established statements. In short it is not knowledge
* (episteme), an,d it can never claim to have attained truth, or
even a substitute for it such as probability. We do not know,
we can only guess, guided by the unscientific, the
metaphysical faith in law, in regularities. He stated further
that, instead of discussing the ‘probability’ or certainty of a
theory, we should try to assess how far it has been able to
prove its fitness to survive by standing up to tests. In brief,
we should try to assess how far it has been corroborated.
The idea of corroboration as postulated by Popper
implies a process whereby a theory is made to rely on its
past success to improve its chances of success in future.
There is no other aspect of Popper’s position that has
attracted criticism as his notion of corroboration. This
notion bears striking resemblance with the notion of
confirmation. If this is the case, Popper has cleverly
introduced the inductive method of science (which he set
forth to refute) through the back door.
330
3. Individualism and Objectivism:
According to Individualism, knowledge or truth can
be understood only in terms of beliefs held by individuals.
What the individual is acquainted with or the interpretation
his subjective mind is capable of giving concerning a state
of affairs is what constitutes truth. Like verificationism.
individualism inevitably leads to solipsism.
Objectivism holds that truth exists in natuic
independent of our subjective minds or what v\c
individually hold or believe to be truth. Reality is what
exists in nature and truth is simply our reflection or
estimation of this pre-existing reality, which everybody
tends to agree with. The world is a totality of pre-existing
entities, independent real and their relations. The job of /
science is to discover these objective truths through
objective procedure.
Marxism holds an objectivist approach in the
question of truth. Consistent,' scientific-dialectical
materialism specifies the concept of truth by stating that ii is
objective. V. I. Lenin interpreted Objective truth as
knowledge whose content does not depend on an individual
or on humanity (122). Marxism holds that the concept of
objective truth contains in itself knowledge about the
objective world. That is to say that our ideas and thinking
provide us with correct or true knowledge. But objective
truth is achieved in the process of cognition based on man’s
practical activities. Therefore, it is unjustifiable to say that
truth is something, which exists outside man’s mind,
outside his consciousness. The connection between truth
and people’s activities expresses its dynamic nature. The '
achievement of truth is a painstaking process, because it is
not formulated in one step, but only gradually. Any truth is
therefore limited and relative. Relative truth is just a step
forward in the realization of absolute truth. Absolute truth
331
is therefore the aggregate of relative truths. Truth is
therefore absolute or objective.

Conclusion
All said and done, it can be concluded that science
aims at searching for truth about nature. This it does in a
systematic manner. An area of study can only be called
science if and only if it applies the scientific procedure to
create knowledge about nature. Knowledge is simply
validated truth about one form of nature or another, and
science is the only authentic method of creating empirical
knowledge. The natural sciences have judiciously
employed this method to unravel a lot of truth about
physical phenomena. This has added a lot to our stock of
knowledge of physical nature and has also found numerous
applications in the applied science as well as in technology.
The various theories of truth discussed are agreed that the
job of science is merely to uncover truth (not to invent it),
though they do not share in common the means or method
of attaining this truth.

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 CHAPTER 31

THE NOTION OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

Introduction
Science has no doubt left us in doubt as to the
authenticity of its claim to rationality and progress, file
reason is, as Thomas Kuhn suggested, every benefit
derived from our knowledge is often followed by attendant
losses. Consequently, we are left in a skeptical position as
to whether or not science is progressing. It is, therefore, the
preoccupation of this chapter to critically discuss the notion
of progress in science. Before this critical discussion is
done, it will be necessary to first explain what constitutes
progress in science. And to do this will require us to first
say a few things about the aim of science. This will be done
with the understanding that if we know the aim of science,
we shall be in a better position to judge if science is
achieving its aim or not.
Aim of Science
The basic aim of science is explanation and hence the
prediction of natural phenomena for the betterment of the
living condition of man. The notion of the explanatory aim
of science is as old as the period of ancient Greek
philosophy and science. Since ancient times, it has always
been in the nature of man to ask questions bordering on the
ultimate nature of the universe. Different answers have
been proffered to these questions. Thus. Thales of Miletus
(an Ionian city in Asia Minor) saw the world as floating on
water like a ship. Other Greek philosophers such ■ ■
Anaximenes, Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Democritus
explained the constitution of the universe in terms of air, the
‘Apeiron’ or ‘Infinite’, fire and atoms respectively.
333
 Over the years, the mode of explanation in science
has become more systematized, and this has enabled
science to achieve a lot today in the realm of invention and
discovery.
Science aims at finding satisfactory explanations of a
phenomenon that strikes us as being in need of explanation.
Explanation is a set of statements by which we describe the
event or state of affairs to be explained. In his work entitled
“Explanation in Science and in History’'', Carl G. H-empel
gave a brilliant discussion on scientific explanation on the
basis of a model, which has come to be variously called
‘deductive-nomological model’, the ‘deductive model’, the
‘hypothetico-deductive model’, or the ‘covering law
model’. According to this model, the occurrence of an event
is explained when a statement describing that event
(explanandum) is deduced from general laws and
statements of antecedent conditions. In other words, a
general law is explained when it is deduced from more
comprehensive laws. When we say an explanation is
nomological, what we mean is that the event to be explained
presupposes general laws. Hempel’s deductive-
nomological explanation can be represented in the
following schema:

Explanans

E *■ Explanandum

In the above schema, C„ C3........ CR represents statements

describing the particular facts involved, while L„ L,, ...,

334
Lr stands for general laws. These two sets of statements put
together form the/explanans’. The letter ‘E’, which is the
conclusion, is a statement describing the ‘explanandum’
event. As in any valid deductive argument the ‘explanans’
must entail or imply the explanandum’.
What the above shows is that the' 'explanatory
function of science has to do with establishing general laws
and the behaviour of the empirical events or objects with
which science is concerned and thereby, our knowledge of
the separately known events and to make predictions of
events which are yet unknown (Braithwaite 2).

Discovery and Inventions

This is an aspect of scientific progress whose
importance cannot be overemphasized. In fact, the
mention of scientific progress immediately invokes in
one’s mind the picture of achievement through creativity in
science.
When one looks at the history of science one will
discover that the widely held view that modern science is
the cradle of discovery and inventions is not completely
correct. The fact is that documentary evidence abounds to
show that many of the discoveries and inventions credited
to modern science had already been discovered and
invented at one time or another. What marked the
difference was the intellectual significance attached to
these things during the modern period. The example of the
invention of machines will suffice. The developmental
stages of the theory of machines are divided into three,
namely, simple machine stage, heat engine stage and
computer stage. When we speak of simple machines we
are referring to the lever, the wedge, the wheel, and the axle
and screw. Hero of Alexandria, a Greek writer and
■inventor, is said to have invented these simple machines in
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 the first century A. D. He is said to have recognized that
these simple machines were devices that could be used to
move heavy weights whose main attribute was a high
velocity ratio (Braithwaite 2). He is also said to have
recognized the relation between “Mechanical Advantage”
and “Velocity Ratio" and is credited with recognizing the
need for a precise technical definition of “work” in terms of
force and distance (Ravetz 13). Although Hero is widely
acclaimed as the inventor of these machines, the principles
of these machines were already in use in places like Egypt,
China, Greece and so on, centuries before him. Today, the
principles of these machines have been so modernized that
they can be applied to all sorts of mechanism no matter how
complicated. In particular, the principle of the wheel and
axle played a great role in the production of motor vehicles
and other mechanical devices.
The principles of the simple machines continued
until sometime in the 18lh century when the theory of heat
engines emerged. Regarding this theory, such big names as
Joules and Faraday dominate. But it must be mentioned
that Sadi Carnet’s memoir On the Motive Power of Fire,
which was written at the turn of the 19'1' century, today
constitutes one of the theoretical underpinnings of the
internal combustion engine and is the basis for an approach
to the second law of thermodynamics though it did not gain
recognition until the 1840s (Koestler 660). The theory of
computers, no matter how complicated it is today, would
not have been possible without the ideas put forward by
people like Charles Babbage in the 18,h century. But even
before his time, computer-principle machines of different
sorts had been invented. The importance of the computer
only came to light in the 1930’s. Today, the computer plays
a significant role in many human activities and institutions.
Discovery and invention in science takes the form of
conjecture and refutation or trial and error, as Popper would
336
call it. Secondly, it can take the form of spontaneous
insight, as the psychologist would call it. George Polya has
put-forward some ideas of rules of discovery as follows:
The first rule is to have brains and good luck. The second is
to sit tight and wait till you get a bright idea (Merton 5). If
these rules are closely looked at, it will be seen that they
merely depict the two types of discovery mentioned above,
namely, ‘trial and error’ and ‘spontaneous’ insight.
The third form that discovery and invention
normally takes is rigorous search by way of explorations.
The impact.of discoveries and inventions through this
means cannot be overstressed in terms of progress brought
to science. For example, the invention of the telescope by
Galileo went a long way to solve most of the astronomical
problems of his day. No doubt the invention of the
microscope, stethoscope, electricity and X-ray, to mention
a few, have facilitated inquiry into the constitution or
composition of nature and hence has led to further progress
in science. It is not an exaggeration to remark that there are
more discoveries, and inventions than scientists today
throughout the world.

Research and Industry.

Research and Industry constitute another important
medium of scientific progress. Today, research has
become the backbone of scientific progress. The main aim
of research is to make new discoveries and inventions in
addition to the already existing ones. Apart from the place
of personal research in scientific progress, research is
sometimes carried out as a communal activity, hence the
existence of scientific community today which involves a
number of scientists coming together to work for the
progress of science. The scientific community only
recognizes research works that contribute to the solutions
of important scientific problems.

337
 The aim of scientific research has been stated by
Robert Merton to involve the achievement of a set of
conditions. Merton avers that science gs a social institution
has four norms or rules which, when put together, constitute
the ethos ofmodern science. They are:

(a) Organized Skepticism: This condition requires that

for any piece of knowledge to be recognized or accepted as
a body of knowledge it must be properly scrutinized
irrespective of its source.
(b) Universalism: This condition requires that there
shall be no discrimination with respect to a person’s sex,
age, race, creed, or status or any other aspect of his
personality before taking a decision as to whether to accept
or reject the scientific information at his disposal.
(c) Communism: This requires that a particular
scientific knowledge that has been made public be made
accessible to all other scientists for future research work.
(d) Disinterestedness: This requires that the aim of the
scientist should be to extend knowledge and not to seek
after material or monetary gain. Even if material gain is his
motive, his research must not reveal this motive (5).
For Merton, these norms or rules are compatible with
the aim of science.
In the area of industry, judging from the way the
industrial sector has developed today, it is not a misnomer
to say that today’s science is ‘industrialized’ science.
Industries have now become the medium through which the
results of scientific research are brought to large-scale
innovations. Historically, the industrial revolution of the
19th century acted as a catalyst to the development of
science and technology. By the middle of the 19lh century, a
new pattern of scientific discoveries began to emerge;
totally new mechanical devices and industrial processes
were created. Today, new industries of the 20lh century such
as plastics, telecommunication, pharmaceutical and
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motorized transport have created the material base for our
present affluence (Ravetz 13).
a
Scientific Revolutions
This is no doubt a very vital aspect of scientific
progress that must not be overlooked. Going by Popper’s
falsificationist methodology of science and Kuhn’s notion
of ‘paradigm shift’ already discussed, one can say that
science has always progressed through revolutions. For
instance, modern or renaissance science witnessed a great
revolution when it drastically went beyond scholasticism, a
medieval school that has as its main aim the rationalization
of sense experience with revealed religion and held the
geocentric theory of the universe formulated by Ptolemy.
Rather than lay stress on reading traditional texts, the early
modem scientists shifted emphasis to observation and
formulation of hypothesis. Various instruments were
invented to test the exactness of their observations. “With
the use of instruments and through the use of imaginative
hypotheses, fresh knowledge began to unfold” (Stumpf
225). The Copernican revolution of this period saw nature
as devoid of spiritual or human properties and which had to
be investigated through the media of sense-experience and
reason. Much has been said about the notion of scientific
revolution in the chapters dealing with Karl Popper’s and
Thomas Kuhn’s methodologies of science.
Attitudes
Scientific progress has no doubt been influenced by
change in man’s attitude. The main aspect of man that has
greatly influenced scientific progress is his critical attitude.
Right from the earliest times of science, scientific progress
has always taken place in an atmosphere which allows for
scrutiny and criticism. This critical attitude is clearly
noticeable in the works of the Pre-Socratics. Many of the
339
 doctrines propagated by each of them were a sort of critique
to another’s. It is interesting to say that this critical attitude
stil! holds very strongly till date. For a fuller understanding
of this point, see my explanation of‘critical rationalism’.
Evaluation
My aim in this concluding section is to critically
’ examine the extent to which science has been valuable to
man. To address this issue, I will attempt to answer the
following questions:
(a) To what extent has scientific progress solved
the problems facing man?
(b) To what extent has scientific progress been
useful and detrimental to man?
(c) How commensurate are the merits and
demerits of scientific progress?
Let me take them one by one.
Aim of science
The aim of science has already been explained as
success in explanation to better the lots of man. It should be
said that science has not only succeeded in predicting
phenomena, it has been able to tackle a lot of man’s
problems. A few examples will suffice to justify this
assertion. With adequate explanations regarding earth’s
movement, mankind can now boast of a good astronomical
and meteorological knowledge of the world, thus making
possible ’the forecasting of weather for aviation and farm
production. Around the middle of the 18"’ century,
Benjamin Franklin gave a good explanation of the
occurrence of thunder and lightning and a painstaking
investigation of electrical phenomena. With his
explanation, he was able to save people from having their
houses burnt down by lightening. They discovered
lightening rods, which are still being used today. Very
heavy ships are used for transportation, exploration,
fishing, and warfare today as a result of Archimedes’
340
explanation of why and how objects float. Clerk Maxwell
provided the theoretical basis, which led to the invention
and use of wireless telegraphy. Heinrich Hertz is
remembered for his famous experiment, which greatly
improved the telephone or telegraph. In the area of the use
of the computer, we are indebted to George Boole, an
English Logician and Mathematician, for his development
of symbolic logic especially the binary logic operators (n, v,
etc.). His formalism showing the way of mechanizing logic
and operating on 0 and 1 (the binary numeral), is the basis
for what is now called the Boolean algebra and binary
switching upon which modern computing is based
(Meisner 1). The list is inexhaustible.
What all this shows is that explanation is the bedrock
of scientific progress.

Merits and Demerits of Science

That science has been very beneficial to man is a fact
that is indubitable. Among other achievements, it has to a
large extent liberated man from dogma and superstition in
the study of nature and man. It seems that the numerous
achievements of science have so blindfolded many people
that they cannot realize the detrimental aspect of science.
This is the reason that science is often conceived as having
the power to transform anything to the benefit of man. But
with the memory of the two world wars, this view about
science seems to have been abandoned. Rapid advances in
war technology have posed a very serious threat to the
existence of man on the planet earth. Since the merits and
demerits of science and technology are discussed in some
detail in the next chapter, I deem it unnecessary to discuss
the merits and demerits of scientific progress here. But
suffice it to say that although many of the inventions and
products of scientific progress have their advantages, they,
341
nevertheless, have their disadvantages and catastrophic
effects. To Ravetz, the deepest problems in the
understanding of science of our period are the social and
ethical problems consequent upon the industrialization of
science (15).

Conclusion
Now, how commensurate are the merits and demerits
of scientific progress? The balance sheet of the brief
discussion of the merits and demerits of science carried out
above is that science is a gift of mixed blessing. Like wild
fire, its rapid social changes bring with them
maladjustments and misery (Johnson 359). Science has
particularly destroyed our cherished traditional, moral and
religious values and replaced them with technological
development, which does not consider human factor but
machine factor as the important thing. This can be
understood from the fact that empiricism, a philosophical
school upon which science is built, holds that only
empirical and logical statements are meaningful. This
school considers metaphysical statements, ethical
statements and all value judgments as meaningless and
nonsensical. But it must be mentioned that science does not
represent the whole of experience, it represents just an
aspect of it. To see life holistically, we need science plus
ethics, religion, philosophy, art and other disciplines. Since
development is a multi-dimensional process involving man
in all spheres of life, a combination of all will not only help
mankind to regain its lost sense of humamvalues of morality
and traditional culture caused by the deification of science,
it will also go a long way in putting society on the pftth of
balanced development.

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 CHAPTER 32
TECHNOLOGY IN NIGERIA :
TRANSFER AND APPROPRIATENESS
Issues to be addressed here are the merits and
demerits of technological development, the absurdity of
technology transfer, and the need for appropriate
technology. But before these issues are discussed, it will be
pertinent to first clarify the meaning of the term
‘technology’

What is Technology?
Technology is a term describing the use of both
primitive and highly advanced tools and methods of work.
Ever since man appeared on the planet earth, he has had to
work to satisfy the basic necessities of life, which are food,
clothing and shelter, and his desire for leisure and com foi l.
Through the ages, man has invented numerous tools,
machines, materials and techniques to make his work easier
and faster. He has also discovered waterpower, electricity
and other sources of power that have helped to increase the
rate at which he could work. Technology thus involves
man’s use of tools, machines, materials, techniques and
sources of power to make his work easier and more
productive (World Book E. 58). Although many people
call the age we are the age of technology, it is clear from the
definition of technology given above that man has always
had a form of technology or lived in a technological age 01
some sort because he has always had to work in order m
satisfy his various life’s needs. However, when people
speak of technology today, they tend to refer to industrial
technology. Industrial technology began about 200 years
ago with the development of power - driven machines, the
growth of factories, and the mass production of goods. As
industrial technology advances, it affects more and more all
aspects of man’s life (World BookE. 58).

The Merits and Demerits of Technological

Dev elopment
Science can be regarded as the mother of technology.
Science provides information to technology, and
technology in turn provides science with ingenious
precision instruments. These instruments extend the scope
of human sources of knowledge and thus provide
knowledge beyond human limitations.
The development of science and technology in this
century has led men into many inventions and discoveries.
For centuries men were content with the use of railways,
carriages and cars. Another chapter opened when
steamships and airplanes were invented. Thus, through
technology, man conquered the land, the water and the
airspace. But there was one dimension left unconquered by
man: outer space. In fact outer space, planets, stars and
galaxies were only known through magnifying lenses.
Thus, man operated on mere conjecture as far as knowledge
of these things was concerned. Consequently, there was no
scientific certainty, only hypothesis. But today man has
penetrated outer space. “Engineers,' technicians and
scientists will be able to remain in space for extended
periods of time with substantial operational and mission
flexibility and return to earth with the products of their
efforts ...Three decades have passed since man penetrated
outer space” (Fugua 1).
The global technological development has several
characteristic features. One very important element in each
of the great technological breakthroughs is that each can be

344
used to further the progress of man and its destruction. No
doubt technological development has brought many good
things to man. Specifically, it has improved his living
standards and consumption habits.
Merits:
It is true that science and technology have reached a
pyramidal stage of development in this century. In the field
of engineering, for example, the automobile has been
invented as a means for easier, comfortable and faster
movement from one place to another. Airplanes, ships,
motor vehicles and other machineries like tractors testify of
increased knowledge in the field of engineering research.
Apart from that, methods and instruments of diagnosing
diseases and promotion of hygiene and sanitation have
helped to reduce mortality rate and improved living
conditions. In the field of agriculture, large acres of land
have been cultivated with the aid of tractors; expanses of
land formerly overtaken by water have been reclaimed; and
through the method of irrigation arid lands have been made
fertile. Mechanization in agriculture has no doubt boosted
food production. Israel now boasts of the largest quantity
of food production as a result of development in
agricultural technology. In the field of electronic
technology, the invention of the computer is a remarkable
achievement. The use of computers in business, education,
administration and economic activities has helped to
reduce the exertion of human energy as more activities can
be earned out faster and in a very short time. Yemi
Osinbajo writes:
There can be no doubt that computers have
assumed a new and phenomenal role in
virtually all aspects of human activity.
Probably no other technological device has
had such a pervasive effect on the human life.
345
 Even in Nigeria where the revolution is in its
foundations, the intensity and spread of private
and commercial use in the past few years have
certainly exceeded all projections. By its very
nature, computer use means a radical change in
the speed and quality of transactions in which
it is engaged and assumes less direct human
intervention (11).
Apart from the use of the computer, the invention of
audiovisual sets like radio and television has added more
comfort to human life. According to Ralph A. Uttaro, “As
a result of the outstanding technological advances of the
20th century, earth has become and will continue to become
an ever-smaller planet. For centuries, man communicated
by word of mouth or by written word. In modem times,
marvels such as radio and television have become
commonplace, and now the vast majority of world’s
information is disseminated electronically. This trend is
not likely to abate” (1).
In sum, the benefits of technology are increased
production of food, goods and services, reduced and easier
labour and improved living standards.
Demerits:
It must be mentioned that in spite of the laudable
contributions and lofty accomplishments of technology, it
has nevertheless, succeeded in introducing several
anomalies and. in some cases, reduced or even eradicated
the value attached to human life. In our age, socio­
political life has been greatly altered by technological
changes such as the invention of nuclear warheads. Those
who support the continued manufacture, testing and
stockpiling of nuclear warheads claim that the only way to
maintain peace is by war. The dictum is: ‘if you want peace,
be prepared for war’. In other words, peace is the result of
346
war. Humanity is greatly threatened and terrorized by
stockpiles of nuclear warheads. Men now live in dread of
the hour, as no one knows when a conflict may arise
between nations that may lead to the use of nuclear bombs
assumed to possess the capacity of wiping out humanity in a
twinkle of an eye. The nations that have succeeded in
acquiring this deadly weapon have become like children
who, by some paradox of nature, have been bestowed with
great power. They must therefore be petted, flattered and
coerced, lest they destroy the whole of humanity at any
venture.
The mass drift of people from rural areas to the
highly industrialized urban cities in quest of jobs in
factories has produced significant changes in many aspects
of social life. Also, the pollution of air, water and land by
industrial wastes is another problem, which the highly
industrialized society has to grapple with. W. Friedmann
vividly portrayed this situation when he wrote:

It has become apparent with dramatic

suddenness that, at the present, more or less
uncontrolled, rate of industrial and urban
development, the major rivers and lakes of the
country will become - and many of them
already are, incapable of sustaining marine life
and unusable for humans. By-products of
gasoline operated motorcars and the
generation of electricity, notably carbon and
sulphur compounds, are poisoning the air. At
the same time, the enormous increase in the
production of carbon dioxide is affecting
photosynthesis and the temperature of the
earth (through its effect on the atmosphere and
347
 the radiation of sun rays). Mercury and other
industrial by-products are making fish unfit for
human consumption. Non-organic materials
such as discarded motor cars and metal waste,
plastic containers for beverages and other
consumer products, glass bottles, mountains of
paper and the like are potential threat to life
(521-522).
While many of the problems mentioned above are
national, others are international. In fact oceans and air
have no physical boundaries, only legal ones. Supersonic
air transport and nuclear radiation have global effects. The
growing exploitation of the ocean bed, especially through
offshore oil drilling, increasingly affects ... the freedom of
the seas and creates worldwide problems of water pollution
and destruction of marine life (Friedmann 522). There is no
doubt that many of the things said about the hazardous
effects of technology are true of Nigeria. The Nigerian
environment, especially the water environment has been
greatly degraded. This has had telling effect on human and
marine life. Towards the hinterland of the country the
increasing use being made of pesticides, herbicides and
fertilizers may soon begin to have harmful effects on the
environment.
The accelerated growth of technology in Nigeria was
assisted by the discovery of oil in large quantities towards
the end of the sixties (Akanle 1 - 2). With the new-found
wealth Nigeria embarked upon gigantic economic and
industrial ventures. Also the living standards and
consumption habits of the people improved considerably.
The irony of the whole thing is that while all these things
were taking place, adequate planning of measures to
combat the after-effects was not carriecLout.
In sum, apart from the threat to human race posed by
348
the invention of nuclear weapons and the problem of
environmental pollution, other side effects of technology
that deserve mentioning are depletion of natural resources,
unemployment and the creation of boring, unsatisfying
jobs.

‘Technology Transfer’
Technology transfer, simply put, is the buying or
importation of technology by a particular country or state
without due regard to the question of whether or not it suits
the environment of the buying country or state.
There are problems associated with ‘transferred
technology’. The first is that, although it may be possible
for Nigeria to buy technology from the technologically
advanced countries of the West, the very act of buying
means that the buying nation is not independent. No
country will be willing to sell technology to another if she
feels that that will be detrimental to her industry back home.
Apart from that, the Western world depends very much on
the so-called Third World for the marketing of their
manufactured products.
Another problem about ‘transferred technology’ is
that there is really nothing like transferred technology.
What we have is transfer of equipment, or machinery.
Pitiably, we do not have a single idea of how some of the
equipment is made. This is due to the problem of lack of
trained scientists and technologists. Consequently, when
there is a breakdown due to climatic and other conditions,
foreign expertise and spare parts have to be brought in.
This leads to further drain of our nation’s foreign currency
earnings.
It must be mentioned that technology is better
acquired than bought. The acquisition can be done by
either copying or stealing it from industrialized countries
and then adapting or modifying it to suit our environment,
or by developing our own. Since no one nation is self-
sufficient, a synthesis of both modes of acquisition will
constitute a solid substructure or foundation upon which a
strong edifice of technological development will
eventually be erected. Professor G. O. Ezekwe, one time
Minister of Science and Technology was obviously lending
support to this view when he said:
Technology transfer does not work and will not
succeed in entrenching technological
capability in Nigeria. Technological
competence is only reliably achieved by a
people’s own effort. No country has achieved
real economic progress by total dependence on
other countries for its technology needs.
However, isolation from the rest of the world
would retard our progress in technology
acquisition. We must reach out to the world’s
wealth of knowledge and practice. We must
pursue the solution of our problems of
industrial manufacture and economic progress
with dedication, conviction and patriotism ...
(in Newswatch. Feb. 12,1990.14).,
Other African countries look up to Nigeria as their
pace-setter in technological revolution because of her being
in possession of the largest pool of scientific and
technological manpower in black Africa today. Nigeria
faces the danger of a grave future if she cannot put herself
on the path of self-reliance in technological development.
It is saddening that very few Nigerians are seriously
committed to issues of indigenous technology. This is,
indeed, unfortunate, considering the fact that most of the
economic problems being faced by the country today are
350
due largely to the stark technological illiteracy of a
substantial proportion of the Nigerian populace. The
Nigerian Government must, through the appropriate
agencies, create a certain level of scientific and
technological awareness or consciousness for the citizenry,
for this is the very first step towards real scientific and
technological development. Of course, the best medium
for inculcating scientific consciousness is the educational
system.
If we must have real scientific and technological
development, what we need is scientific consciousness and
not just scientific knowledge. While the former denotes
knowledge about science, the latter denotes knowledge of
science. To quote Andrew Efemini,

Anyone with scientific consciousness

understands the place of Science in man’s
struggle to improve his living condition on
earth. He does not see science as something
that should be pursued for its own sake but as
something that should be pursued for man’s
benefit... Once our educational system is able
to produce people who have scientific and
technological consciousness, it would have
produced those who would be committed to
the pursuit of scientific and technological
development because they would be fully
aware of the consequences of their refusal to
do so (18).
The Nigerian government must de-emphasize the
issue of ‘technology transfer’ because of its dangerous
consequence of exposing the nation’s economy to
continued domination by foreign governments and
multinational companies to our detriment. The country’s
351
lawmakers must have a thorough assessment of the present
state of the nation’s technology with a view to putting the
country on the path of fast attainment of technological
capability. A country that cannot produce basic tools on a
large scale, talkless of mechanizing their work processes,
cannot produce enough food, cannot have functional
transportation and information transmission, cannot
provide social services, cannot even guarantee and exploit
the land it calls its own for the betterment of its people. In
short, social and economic development on a national scale
is next to impossible outside the context of the use of
machines in massive number. (Ezekwe 13).

Appropriate Technology
Another term for ‘appropriate technology’ is
‘alternative technology’, ‘intermediate technology’ or
‘small-scale technology’. The essence of appropriate
technology is that “technology and industry should be
designed for the benefit of both the community at large and
the local community. This means that industry works for
the people rather than the opposite. The approach used is to
identify needs and find the most appropriate means of
solving them, taking account of all features involved, such
as the effect on the local population, employment needs,
pollution, etc (Andrews 1). Often, appropriate technology
is more practicable, using local skills and techniques in
small factories, rather than large-scale production in big
factories. This does not, however, mean that advanced
scientific skills and techniques should not be used. As a
matter of fact, a great deal of research is necessary before
appropriate technology can be efficiently and successfully
executed (Andrews 2).
Like any other form of technology, appropriat e
technology has political undertones. It must be conceded
352
that the dominant economic system in most countries of the
world today is capitalism. Since appropriate technology is
not in terms with capitalism, the bourgeoisie will mount
serious campaign against it. David Andrews writes:
In most countries of the world, the dominant
economic system is capitalism. In order that
capitalism can work effectively, the control has
to be in the hands of a small proportion of
society, which it is when industry is large. If
the industry is developed as a large number of
small units, each individual has more say in
what happens, which means that power is
removed from the large-scale industrialists.
Therefore, there will be great pressure against
developing appropriate technology (2).
What Andrews is saying is that, since appropriate
technology is a venture that will lead to the control of the
industry by a large number Qf people, it will break the
monopoly of the capitalists. In order that this will not
happen, the capitalists will endeavour to nip the project in
the bud by mounting great pressures, against its
development. But there are advantages to be derived from
appropriate technology. Let us briefly consider some of
them.
The first advantage of appropriate technology is that
it removes monotony and boredom associated with large
scale industries where many people are made to work on a
production line, do the same work daily with little or no
control over the line of operation. Since the main reason for
doing such a job is to eke a living, it is not uncommon to see
workers engage in strikes, work-to-rule and industrial
action, to back up their demands for better remuneration.
Appropriate technology will no doubt overcome this
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problem because the workers jn a small scale industry are
few, have much to do, have more say, and so can determine
their remuneration and the success of the venture.
The second advantage of appropriate technology is
that it reduces some of the hoards associated with large-
scale industrial ventures to a manageable level. A good case
in point is the problem of environmental pollution. Large-
scale industries produce industrial wastes, which very often
find their way into the environment. The result is
widespread pollution which poses a threat to both human
and plant lives. With small-scale industries, this problem is
drastically reduced, and can easily be curtailed.
The third important advantage of appropriate
technology is that it solves the problem of depopulation of
rural areas, since it is particularly applicable to rural
problems. Because of the problem of rural unemployment
caused by absence of industries in our rural areas, our
youths (most of whom are school leavers) troop in
thousands yearly to urban centres in search of the Golden
Fleece. Appropriate technology will, to a large extent, solve
this problem since it will ensure even development.
Corollary to the point above is the fact that, although
appropriate technology is applicable everywhere, it is
nevertheless, easier to execute in developing countries of
the world collectively called the Third World. Happily, the
advantage that the Third World countries already have over
the industrialized countries {United States of America,
Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan and Russia] is that
there is little industry already there, so that small-scale
industry can start more easily. The Third World can,
therefore, attempt to avoid some of the mistakes of the First
World [Andrews 2],
Finally, when fully developed, appropriate
technology will enable a country like Nigeria to break all
ties of neo-colonialism. The consequence of this will be
that Nigeria will be able to compete with the West on equal
terms.

Possible Areas of Developing Appropriate Technology

Although we can cite many examples of areas where
technology can be developed on small scale, 1 will limit
myself to two vital areas, namely, solar power and building.
David Andrews observes that energy is a limited resource,
and with the present rate of consumption of energy, it will
not take long to finish all the fossil fuels, such as oil and
coal, and even uranium needed for nuclear power.
According to him, “Solar power has the advantage that it
will not run out while the sun still shines, and it is therefore
a renewable and inexhaustible source of energy. It is
especially applicable on the small scale, and can be
obtained where it is needed” [Andrews 3]. He cites the
example of the United States, where according to him, it is
common to see small solar panels used for heating water for
domestic uses on the roofs of private houses. He, however,
identifies the problem of the use of solar power as that of
the “efficiency of converting solar power into other, more
useful forms of energy” [Andrews 5]. Scientists need to
carry out research on this problem.
Another area of possible application of appropriate
technology is the area of building. Here in Nigeria, like
many other countries of the world, modern techniques and
materials are used in buildings. These techniques which
were developed in one area of the world are being applied
everywhere without regard for local conditions, social and
climatic. Apart from the fact that building materials are not
locally available as such and are very expensive, foreign
currency is needed to get them. In Nigeria, the traditional
building is made from mud and thatching, using locally
355
available materials. Although these materials have the
disadvantage of lack of durability and destruction by fire or
storms, among others, they do have advantages over
concrete buildings, particularly thermal insulation.
Traditional houses are much more cooler than concrete
houses and do not need so much mechanical cooling. If
appropriate technology is applied, scientists will seek to
find buildings, which combine the good properties of both.
The result will be a cheap, durable, cool house adapted to its
environment.

Conclusion
In concluding this chapter, 1 would like to remark
that appropriate technology should be of benefit to people
everywhere, but it has particular applications in the Third
World. However, if it is to be at all successful, it requires the
cooperation of all sorts of people, such as economists,
sociologists, scientists, geographers, engineers, etc, so that
the total problem and its solution can be properly
investigated.

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f------

PART SEVEN

ENERGY RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENT

<_______ j
 CHAPTER 33

ENERGY RESOURCES
Introduction
Ever since man appeared on planet earth, he has
always sought for some forms of energy to modify his
environment. The quest has led him to exploit and develop
various sources of energy. What then is energy?
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines
energy variously as the ability to put effort and enthusiasm
into an activity, one’s work; a person’s physical and mental
powers available for work or other activities; the ability of
matter or radiation to do work because of its motion, its
mass, or its electric charge, etc.; fuel and other resources of
power used for operating machinery, etc. (381). In the same
vein, Ekine defines energy as “a measure of the ability or
capacity to do work” (128). Inyang Abia equally defined
energy as “the power by which material body or radiation
uses to do any form of work” (127).
The implication of all this is that energy is
indispensable to everything (living and other forms) that
needs to perform any form of work. Food, assimilated into
their systems, is what helps animals to work. Machines are
able to work because of the source of energy in them (e.g.
electricity or fuel).
There are two characteristics of energy. The first is
that energy can be transferred. For example, heat energy
can become fire, solar energy can give rise to light and heat
energy, and chemical energy stored up in plants. When
animals eat such plants, the energy is transferred to them,
and when human beings or other animals eat such animals,

358
the energy is transferred to them. Secondly, energy can be
converted but can never be destroyed. This is referred to as
the law of conservation. For example, when an animal dies,
its energy is returned to the earth.
There are basically two types of energy in the motion
of bodies. They are kinetic energy and potential energy.
Kinetic energy is the energy a body has while in
motion. Good examples here are a running person, a flying
aircraft or bird, wind and a moving car. On the other hand,
potential energy can simply be defined as stored energy.
Good examples here include compressed gas in a cylinder,
a fruit on the branch of a tree, water in the overhead tank or
on top of a waterfall, runnfrig water, wind, and fossilized
plants that come in form of petroleum, lignite, etc. Thus all
around us abound different forms of energy. The major
ones, as identified by Ekine, include the following.
1. Chemical energy, which is derived from
chemical substances due to the reactions taking
place in them or induced by them.
2. Electrical energy, which is derived from the
motion of charged particles and that of electrons
due to some driving force.
3. Heat energy, ■ which is derived from
thermodynamic processes in a system, which
cause changes ih the internal energy of the
system.
4. Light energy, which is derived from the
interaction of magnetic and electrical fields, <
which oscillate and propagate with a certain
range of frequency and velocity.
5. Magnetic energy, which is derived from the
atomic structure of the material.
359
 6. Mechanical energy, which generally involves
motion (e.g. Kinetic and potential energies).
7. Nuclear energy, which is conserved in the nucleus
of the atom.
All these forms of energy are mutually
interconvertible (130).

Sources of Energy
Broadly speaking, there are two sources of energy,
namely, renewable (replenishable) and non-renewable. We
shall briefly consider them.
1. Renewable Sources of Energy:
Renewable sources of energy are the permanent or
infinite sources of energy. They are called primary sources
because they give rise to other sources. Examples of
renewable sources would include the sun, wand or tide,
water, wood, nuclear fusion and synthetic fuels. Let us
briefly consider each of these.
(a) Solar Energy:
The sun is the primary and most enduring source of
energy available to man. It is considered the ultimate source
of energy because all life forms derive their energy needs
from it. Huge amount of energy released from the sun is as a
result of the nuclear fusion of hydrogen into helium within
the interior of the sun. Of this huge amount only a very
insignificant fraction gets to the earth. Unfortunately, the
interior of the sun cannot be accessed for direct
experimentation. All we can know about it is based on
theoretica]considerations.~ai’ KliCv'. auUu! h
The second law of thermodynamics states that heat
always flows from hotter to cooler regions. Heat transfer
occurs by three basic modes, and these include conduction,
convection and radiation. Conduction involves the transfer
of heat through matter. In this case, energy and not mass is
360
little ones with the release of neutrons and some amount of
thermal energy. But since spontaneous natural fission is a
rare process, the usual way of producing fission is to excite
the nucleus by bombarding the neutrons. For example,
when a neutron bombards Uranium-238, it undergoes
fission reaction and breaks up releasing more neutrons and
a large quantity of thermal energy. With the release of more
neutrons, it is possible to arrange the process to occur in
rapid succession bringing about a chain reaction. This
chain is controlled to provide a large amount of useful
energy in nuclear reactors. However, in an uncontrolled
state the number of fission increases exponentially as the
number of neutrons produced, which results in a divergent•
chain reaction as in the atomic bombs (136 - 137).
Although Nigeria has shown some level of interest in the
acquisition of nuclear fission technology, it has not been
able to acquire it partly because of non-availability of raw
materials and partly because of the very high cost of
procurement and maintenance. Above all, Nigeria is
signatory to Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and so
cannot have it.

365
 CHAPTER 34
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
Introduction
The word ‘environment’ simply refers to the totality
of what surrounds us and this includes the land, air, water
and all the physical structure around us. Man depends on
the abundant resources of the earth for his survival. In his
quest to satisfy his needs and to harness the environment to
meet these needs, man has altered his natural environment
thereby causing untold damage to the biosphere - the life
support system. The biosphere comprises the lithosphere
(land), atmosphere (air), and hydrosphere (water).
Pollution has to do with the release into the land, air,
water or biota of physical and chemical agents capable of
adversely affecting man and other living organisms. The
release of pollutants may be direct or indirect. Carbon
fumes, rock dusts, oil fumes, raw material dusts,
smokestacks and municipal sewage outfalls come under
the category of direct pollution. Also to be placed under
this category are the less detectable mechanisms such as the
release of toxic substances into food by contaminating
micro-organisms and moulds in the ordinary process of
food spoilage. Under the category of indirect pollution
come the more difficult to detect forms. For example,
potentially harmful substances may be concentrated at
locations very far away from the original source of release.
For example, “DDT, polychlorinated biphenyls, heavy
metals, and other chemicals that are poorly metabolized
and excreted by animals tend to be concentrated in
biological food chains” (Okpokwasili 154).
Environmental pollution refers to the unfavourable
alteration of our surroundings partly due to man’s actions
366
and partly due to abundance of organisms and changes in
radiation levels, chemical composition and energy
patterns. These changes may affect man through various
mechanisms and routes. Man has become increasingly
aware of the enormous damage that pollution can cause to
human life, animals and plants. Indeed, the need to arrest
this predicament is becoming one of the most important
global challenges of the 21st century.
Our main concern in this chapter is to highlight the
various types of environmental pollution and proffer
solution to the endemic problem.

Types of Pollution
Air Pollution
When the air we breathe is contaminated by human
activities, the result is air pollution. Air becomes polluted
when it is mixed with poisonous gases and particles of
liquid and solid nature, and when the atmosphere is
overloaded with these harmful substances. The
appropriate body responsible for atmospheric quality
determines the degree to which such substances being
released into the air can be considered harmful to public
welfare. However, according to Okpokwasili, air is

made up of tour molecules, nitrogen (approximately

78.09%), oxygen (20,94%), argon (0.95%), carbon dioxide
Mg and about a dozen other constituents found in
trace quantities usually expressed in parts per million. For
him, the typical urban air will usually contain some of these
trace materials including carbon monoxide, sulphur
dioxide, and methane, in very large amounts. There will
also be measurable levels of mercury, cadmium, zinc, lead,
chlorine compounds, carbon, silica, various hydrocarbons,
asbestos, and a conflagration of compounds generated by
chemical industries. Since industrial technology is directly
367
responsible for their release they are sometimes referred to
as primary pollutants. The secondary pollutants are other
compounds, which are formed from a combination of man­
made emissions and oxygen, nitrogen and water vapour in
the air. Ozone (C?3) is one of the more common secondary
pollutants (155- 156).
The sources of gaseous pollutants are tegion.
Gaseous pollutants are either as a result of emissions from
industries such as cement factories, power plants,
petroleum refineries, breweries, tyre manufacturing, iron
and steel mills, glass manufacturing, fertilizer
manufacturing, aluminum processing, or exhaust from
heavy generating sets, old motor vehicles, incinerators, and
so on. Fumes, dusts and gases have been implicated as
being responsible for serious respiratory problems like
bronchitis, asthma, and lung cancer. In short, both
particulate and gaseous pollutants can cause serious
damage to the human respiratory system. Apart from that,
air pollution can cause acute diseases such as common cold
and pneumonia. Again, secondary pollutants cause eye
irritation and other toxic effects.
Apart from human beings and plants, air pollution
can have serious effects on materials, namely, decay and
corrosion of metals; weakening, disintegration and
discolouring of clothing; discolouring or defacing of
paintings; dissolution of carbonate stones in urban
buildings; weakening and discolouring of books in
libraries, and cracking of rubber when exposed to
atmospheric ozone.
Another serious problem associated with air
pollution is the current belief that the atmosphere is heating
up as a result of increasing amounts of carbon dioxide and
other gases bringing about global climatic changes. The
most significant of these changes are global warming,

368
transferred. In convection, mass is transported through
matter in form of liquids, not solids. In radiation, heat
transfer is simply a product of electromagnetic waves.
Here, matter is not required. Since the sun energy that
reaches the surface of the earth is mainly heat, all the three
modes are very useful in the exploitation of heat energy.
Solar energy, according to Ekine, can be converted to
various forms of energy for immediate use or conserved for
future use. For example, green plants can through the
process of photosynthesis convert solar energy to chemical
energy and stored in the plants. Solar heat collectors are
now used in heating homes, driving industrial machinery,
and preservation of agricultural products. Also available
today are solar air-conditioners,, and solar refrigerators
used for long-term preservation of food, drugs and
vaccines.
Furthermore, it is now possible to convert solar
energy directly to electrical energy using Silicon or other
solid-state solar cells. These cells now provide power for
navigation, machinery, domestic and industrial lighting
and spacecrafts (132).
(b) Wind and Tidal Energy:
Wind and tidal energy results from the movements
of ocean waters and atmospheric air mass. These
movements are caused by the rotation of the earth and the
activities of the sun. For example, the kinetic energy in
winds can be converted to the mechanical energy for
generation of electricity and ship sailing. Tidal energy is
very useful in transporting heavy logs.
(c) Water Energy (Hydropower): This uses the
kinetic energy of massive water to generate electricity.
(d) Wood and Biomass Energy:
Wood has ever been a major source of heat and light
energy for domestic and industrial uses. Biomass, which is
made up of animal, forest, agricultural, and municipal
361
wastes, is an important source of heat energy in certain parts
of the world; India, for example.
(e) Nuclear Fusion:
Nuclear fusion, which is the combination of
massive amount of hydrogen and a little amount of helium,
plus a neutron and some amount of energy, can be gotten in
large quantity from the rivers and oceans of the world.
Because of its cost and the high level technology required to
obtain it, nuclear fusion is presently within the reach of only
a few wealthy countries.
(f) Synthetic Fuels:
Also known as Synfuels, their major sources are
alcohol, coal and shale. Only the first is actually a
renewable source of energy. Like nuclear fusion, the huge
capital and high technology involved have made synthetic
fuels the exclusive reserve of a few privileged countries of
the world. South Africa has developed synthetic fuel
industry, producing gasoline, aviation gas oil,
petrochemical intermediates etc. from coal.
2. Non-Renewable Sources of Energy
Non-renewable sources of energy are so called
because they are exhaustible and unreplenishable. They
are called secondary sources because they are derived
largely from the primary sources. They have a finite
recoverable quantity and take millions of years to recover.
Good examples here include fossil fuels, geothermal
energy and nuclear fission. We shall briefly consider these
in turn.
(a) Fossil Fuels:
These are mineralized remains, which have been
converted into hydrocarbons due to high temperature, and
they occur in form of sediments or sedimentary rocks.
Good examples here are coal, petroleum and natural gas.
Coal is an example of fossil fuel in solid form. It is
formed from mineralized remains of plant debris buried in
362
swampy areas. Prolonged heating and compression leads
to the gradual transformation of the original materials into
coal. The classification of coal as peat, lignite, bituminous
and anthracite is based on its percentage of carbon or
volatile content. Carbons bum with hot smokeless and
steady flame, while volatiles produce long smoky flame.
Peat contains much water and volatiles but little carbon.
Because of its high carbon dioxide output, peat burning is a
major source of environmental pollution. Also called
brown coal, lignite has much water but low percentage of
carbon. Lignite bums easily, and in some countries it is a
major source of thermal power. Regarded as the most
common form of coal, bituminous coal is black, shinny
coal, which bums with smoky flame. Its carbon content is
low. Today its importance has declined because of decline
in the use of steam engine and availability of petroleum as
an alternative and cheaper source of fuel. Anthracite is
hard coal with high carbon content. It produces, hot and
smokeless flame and least ash. It has various commercial
uses.
Fossil fuels can also occur in liquid form as
petroleum. Petroleum is formed from decayed marine
micro-organisms and is found in marine sedimentary rocks.
As the micro-organisms die, they are converted to some
organic substances and subsequently to petroleum
hydrocarbons under high temperature and pressure over a
long period of time. Crude oil, which is a product of the
hydrocarbons, is converted to various products by means of
fractional distillation. Petroleum is produced in large
quantity in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Nigeria’s
estimated oil reserve is about 28 billion barrels. Because of
its low sulphur content, Nigeria’s Bonny Light crude oil is
one of the finest and high grades crude in the world. There
are low-performing refineries in Port Harcourt, Warri and
363
Kaduna. Because of their low and erratic performance,
Nigeria still imports refined petroleum products from other
countries. An irony indeed!! With the present rate of
global fuel consumption, it is feared that the present world
oil reserves would be used up in about 60 years.
Finally, fossil fuels can occur in gaseous form.
Natural gas is a mixture of hydrocarbons or flammable
gases. Although it may occur on its own without a close
association with crude oil, it is sometimes found on top of
crude oil or dissolved within it. They are the major cause of
blowouts during oil exploration and mostly flared up in oil
fields. In Nigeria, natural gas is a major source of energy.
Usually cleaner, cheaper and more environmentally
friendly, natural gas is very useful for domestic and
industrial purposes. In Nigeria, there are three forms of
processed natural gas, and these include Compressed
Natural Gas (CNG), Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). Nigeria presently has an
abundant reserve of natural gas, which can last for many
years. However, with the steady rise in the awareness of its
uses, the consumption rate is gradually rising. Today some
parts of the Niger Delta region are able to generate
electricity through gas turbine.
(b) Geothermal Energy:
This is derived from migrating or trapped hot water
in thick sedimentary rocks under very high temperature and
pressure. Heat is produced in these rocks as a result of the
activity of radioactive elements. Water, which circulates
through cracks in these rocks, is known to have a high
temperature. The over-heated ground water or hot springs
can be tapped for electricity generation.
(c) Nuclear Fission:
According to Ekine, nuclear fission is the
spontaneous or induced disintegration of heavy nuclei into
364
otherwise known as ‘the green house effect’, and the
depletion of the ‘protective’ ozone layer.
Water pollution
Like air, water is an indispensable natural resource.
Though found almost everywhere, fresh water is hard to
come by. Water is almost synonymous with life. Water is
needed for almost everything - for the survival of human,
plant and aquatic life, for drinking and domestic uses; for
agriculture, processing, manufacturing, transportation, and
so forth.
Water pollution is one of the greatest environmental
problems in the world today. Water pollution is simply
defined as the contamination of water used for drinking and
other purposes. When substances such as toxic wastes,
human and animal wastes, domestic and industrial wastes,
organic chemicals, oil spillage, pesticides and micro­
organisms (viruses and bacteria) find their way into water,
they cause pollution. Water pollution is responsible for
water-related diseases such as guinea worm, dysentery,
typhoid, cholera, bilharzias and infectious hepatitis.
When chemical pollutants are released into water,
they constitute health hazards to human and aquatic life. '
These materials are either dispersed in immense bodies of
water or buried in rivers or streams. The sediment may
continue to leak toxic compounds without disturbance,
thereby posing a health hazards for years. Water containing
excessive salts may be unsafe for drinking, industrial and
irrigation purposes. Water infested with pathogenic
organisms such as bacteria, viruses, worms, protozoa and
fungi is not safe for human use. The presence of these
organisms in water may be Traced to either contamination
by human wastes (e.g. faeces), or swimming in water
bodies by people carrying infections. Water-borne diseases
still constitute major killers in the developing world.
369
 Agricultural Pollution
Agricultural pollution results generally from
agricultural activities. Agricultural wastes in form of crop
and animal refuse and excess fertilizers and pesticides
carried by surface drainage to water bodies pose serious
environmental dangers. Chemical fertilizers are now
required in large quantities to ensure high crop yields, but
they also pose a great danger to the environment. Problems
arise when excess fertilizers find their way through various
routes to water bodies. Today, man resorts to use of
poisonous chemicals (pesticides) to tackle fungi, insects
and other pests, which compete seriously with him over
who should reap the benefits from crops. The use of
manual means in earlier times to remove weeds and drive
away pests has since been displaced by the use of
pesticides. It is now that the eyes of man are beginning to
open to the fact that the continued indiscriminate use of
these chemicals is disastrous. It has been discovered that
chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides have the capacity to
remain in the biosphere in appreciable quantities for nearly
a century. Some of these pesticides that are carried to lakes
and streams may be incorporated into algae and plankton
and eaten by small fish and aquatic insects. These poisons
at the end of the food chain may end up in the bodies of
predatory animals, birds of prey and large fish.
Under this section we may also include the perennial
solid waste pollution. The disposal and management of
solid wastes has remained a perennial problem in Nigeria
and other developing countries. In many Nigerian cities,
residential buildings, markets, abattoirs, offices, schools
and hospitals are an eye-saw to behold. Past and present
370
efforts by the three-tiers of government to arrest the low
levels of sanitation have only yielded negligible results.
Noise pollution
According to Okpokwasili, sound caused by the
vibration of molecule waves travels in pressure waves'.- •
emanating from the source of disturbance much like the
ripples in a pond. For him, these pressure waves can be
described in two measures, namely, the frequency of the
waves and the amplitude or magnitude of the pressure, d
Frequency, he maintains, determines the pitch of the sound
(how high or low it is) and amplitude is a measure of its
loudness. He says further that the universal measure of
loudness is referred to as decibel (dB). Zero decibel is the
threshold of hearing, while 85 dB is usually considered loud
enough to result in the damage of the ear if the noise is
prolonged. The pin threshold is 140dB(178).
Although we generally detest complete silence, the
same sound that is generally needed can become unwanted
or unpleasant sound (noise). Sound has both positive and
negative characteristics. Positively, the sounds we like are
considered as melodious, soul - lifting, inspiring, soothing,
pleasant, and interesting. Negatively, the sounds we hate
are described as loud, unpleasant, irritating, disturbing,
annoying, and so on. For example, we enjoy the sound of
good music and laughter, but detest the sound of crying or
the squeal of tyres. Menkiti has identified the
characteristics of noise to include the following:
1. Localization: When the source of sound is not
steady,- it tends to invoke in us a feeling of fear aqd
insecurity., u
2. Echoes: Reverberating sounds cause us to repeat
ourselves unduly when we are talking. They hinder
us from having a relaxed conversion. This irritates.
3. Irregularity and Intermittence: Irregular and
371
 V

intermittent sounds are regarded as noisy because

they are disconcerting. We tend to adjust easily to
any sound better when we can predict when and how
it will occur.
4. Meaninglessness: Sounds that carry no information
and are unfamiliar are more disturbing than the ones
that convey information or are familiar (171).
The causes of noise include mainly three factors and
they are; technological advancement, which has left a trail
of noise pollution and its attendant problems; socio­
economic change, which h^s brought about the rural-urban
drift and the acquisition of noise-producing items; and
population explosion, which has brought about increase of
noise emission from, overcrowding and the use of more
noisy resources. Menkiti has identified the types of noise
as dwelling place noise, construction site noise, motor
vehicle noise, and aircraft noise. He grouped the effects of
noise into two n\ain areas, namely, physiological effects
and psychological effects (172 - 175). The most
immediate and acute health effect of noise pollution is
damage to some parts of the auditory system resulting in
impairment of hearing. Noise pollution has been
discovered to be a major source of cardiovascular ailments.
It alters the rhythm of heartbeat, resulting in headache,
palpitation and irritability. It is also a major factor in stress-
related conditions such as high-blood pressure, heart
failure, peptic ulcer, nervous breakdown and even insanity.
Children who grow up in noisy environment find it difficult
to focus their auditory senses on one sound, such as the
voice of a teacher. Every time an aircraft passes the teacher
must pause and try to re-establish attention ( Okpokwasili
178).
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 Oil Pollution
Oil pollution seems to accompany all aspects of
crude oil exploitation, production and processing, creating
numerous small sources of spillage. Petroleum exploitation
is accompanied by contamination of the environment bv
hydrocarbons and heavy metals associated with crude oil
Despite the efficiency of the mechanical devices employed
by oil producing companies to separate liquid from oil.
effluent discharged into aquatic or terrestrial ecosystem is
always mixed with a thin film of oil. In oil terminals and
flow stations, oil pollution may be as a result of pipeline
leaks, pump and valve leaks due to vibration, over-pressure
failures or overflow of process equipment components in
tanks and API units. Pollution may also be due to waste pits
and flare basins, and washing down of volatile pollutants
arising from gas flaring. Marine accidents may also result
in oil spillage. Oil spillage resulting form oil tanker damage
is a common experience in Nigeria. Blowouts in oil wells
are another large source of oil pollution. Blowouts, that is,
the loss of control over oil flow at high pressures,
sometimes result in large amounts of oil being spilled
thereby polluting the marine environment (Akpan-Idiok
240; Okpokwasili 173).
In Nigeria, the oil-producing Niger-Delta region has
suffered unimaginable environmental degradation and
pollution. Arable and grazing lands have been lost to oil
spillages. Much of the land has been rendered barren as a
result of the contamination of soils by hydrocarbons
leading to destruction of vegetation and aerobic micro­
organisms. Fishery stock and other aquatic life have been
destroyed. Flora and fauna have become rare commodities.
Leisure is expensive to attain. Human and animal life are
endangered.
i Gas flaring is a source of potential danger to the oil-
i producing areas of the Niger-Delta. Gas flared at close
,i 1 373
iJ
distances to the host communities usually raises the heat
levels in those areas, leading to constant sweating and
dehydration. The inhabitants are sometimes forced to
discard their tops and go about bare-bodied, to mitigate the
impact of the unbearable heat. Acid rain resulting from gas
flaring is a common sight. Acid rain leaves the land and
landscape withered and patched. Although the aim of gas
flaring is to burn off excess methane and other gases that
contribute to elevated pressures near the oil wells, yet gas­
flaring practice is quite wasteful because the gas could be
converted to huge revenue if properly exploited as in the
liquefied natural gas project at Bonny, Rivers State. Apart
from that, large qualities of gas released into the atmosphere
during oil production contribute to air pollution
(Okpokwasili 180-181).
Conclusion
As individuals, we are all involved directly or
indirectly in environmental issues. As contributors to the
problem of environmental pollution, we should equally be
part of the solution to the problem. AU of us as stakeholders
must be involved in protecting the environment. A change
of attitude towards the environment by all and sundry is the
solution to the problem. This could be done through public
enlightenment campaigns, effective examination of our
lifestyle and consumption patterns, imposition of pollution
controls on individuals and corporate bodies by
government or control agencies, effective population
control, and effective sanitation exercises. As we all begin
to show interest in environment issues and management, we
will be bequeathing a healthy environment for generations
to come.

374
 PART EIGHT

NUTRITION, DISEASE
AND HEALTH
 CHAPTER 35
NUTRITION
BY
FRIDAY UBOH, Ph. D
Department of Biochemistry, College of Medical
Sciences, University of Calabar

What is Nutrition?
Nutrition can be defined as the science which deals
with foods a living organism requires, how it utilizes them
and how it deals with waste products of its activities. Put
differently, nutrition is the study of the food an organism
eats and the use of this food in the body. As an academic
discipline, it is the science of food nutrients and substances
therein, their actions, interaction, and balance in relation to
health and disease, and the process by which the organism
ingests, absorbs, transports, utilizes and excretes food
substances.
Unlike medicine, whose purpose is to help a sick
person get well or, in case of a chronic illness, to keep him
alive, the purpose of nutrition is to maintain health and to
prevent illness. Nutrition, therefore, is an aspect of
preventive medicine.

FOOD
Food is defined as any liquid or solid substance
which when taken into the digestive tract serves one or
more ofthe following functions: provides energy or heat;
supplies materials to be used for growth, repair and
replacement of worn - out tissues, sustenance of metabolic
processes and reproduction; regulates body processes; and
provides protection against disease.
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 By convention, only substances that enter the body
through the alimentary canal are regarded as food.
Consequently, a 5% dextrose solution administered
intravenously, though a liquid and supplies energy, may not
be regarded as food; whereas, alcohol, a ‘non-nourishing’
substance can be regarded as food, because it is not just a
liquid, but is taken orally and at least provides some amount
of heat (7 kcal/g) on metabolism in die body.
Food is complex in composition - a mixture of
chemical constituents both organic and inorganic, which
belongs to two major categories: Nutrients and Anutrients
(Non-nutrients).
• ■ r;
Food Nutrients:
Nutrients are the active principles or the ultimate
nourishing chemical substances in food. They constitute
the functional units/entities in food, which actually perform
the above-listed functions of food (in its definition).
Traditionally, there are six main nutrients present in notrqal
diet, namely: carbohydrates, lipids, proteins, mineral
elements, vitamins and water.

Carbohydrates
Carbohydrates are compounds composed mainly of
the elements, carbon, hydrogen and oxygen. They
constitute the major proportion of a typical African diet.
Sources include roots and tubers (cassava, yam,, cocoyam,
potatoes-sweet and Irish), cereal grains (rice, corn, wheat,
millet, sorghum), legumes (beans, pigeon-pea, soybean,
banbara, groundnuts, African yam bean, etc), and starchy ■
fruits (plantain and banana). *
Carbohydrates provide a primary and mqjor source
of fuel for the body and body processes, on average 4kcal/g,
In daily diet, carbohydrates provide between 45“ 55% of

377 ,
the total calorie/energy needed. Hence the tag name
‘energy-giving’ foods.
Total carbohydrates in foods are made up of the
available (dietary carbohydrates) and unavailable (dietary
fiber) carbohydrates. The former denotes digestible
carbohydrate portion, which yields energy, while the latter
tends to resist digestion by the animal’s conventional
digestive enzymes and may rather play mechanical roles in
the diet.
Based on complexity, carbohydrates can be
classified into simple sugars, oligosaccharides and
polysaccharides.
1. Simple Sugars: These are made up of the
monosaccharides (‘mono’, meaning one and ‘saccharide’,
sweet) and disaccharides. Monosaccharides include^
glucose, galactose and fructose (fruit sugar]. The
disaccharides are - sucrose (cane or table sugar), maltose
(malt sugar) and lactose (milk sugar).
Simple sugars can be absorbed unchanged, or with
only mild digestion, then converted to glucose, the
principal monosaccharide of choice, by the body to form
the well known blood glucose. Blood glucose level is a
vital concept throughout the entire life of mammals, needed
exclusively by the brain, nerves and red blood cells for
energy supply. A slight decrease in the amount of glucose
available to the brain is enough to cause ‘slowed’ thinking,
dizziness, confusion and eventually seizures (coma), if
prolonged.
Although excess of simple sugars (hence glucose)
can be converted into storage forms - glycogen and fats, in
normal individuals, their consumption should be done in
moderation. Persistent high-sugar diets pose the risk of
obesity, dental caries, high glycemic index (potential for
diabetes and atherosclerosis) and the like. Nutritionists
suggest that simple sugars added to foods should provide
378
no more than about 10% of total energy intake daily, that is,
maximum of about 50g (10 teaspoons) per day, based on a
2000kcal diet.
Natural honey, composed of sucrose, fructose and
glucose has of recent gained preference to synthetic sugars
as a food sweetener.
2. OIigosaccharides:This group’ of carbohydrates
contains three to about ten single sugar units (‘oligo’ means
‘scant’ or few). Classical examples of oligosaccharides of
nutritional importance include, raffinose (a triose) and
stachyose [a tetrose], which are found in beans and other
legumes. They are both indigestible by the intestinal
enzymes, but may be fermented by micro-organisms in the
large intestine to produce gases and short chain fatty acids
(SCFAs), responsible for the flatulence effect felt by some
individuals after consuming legume meals. Because
raffinose and stachyose are highly concentrated in the seed
coats, less of the flatulence effect is experienced on
consumption of ‘moi-moi’ whose processing removes the
covering.
A commercial enzyme preparation from mold called
Beano, which can digest these oligosaccharides, is used to
prevent these side effects, if taken before the meal.
Nevertheless, some individuals are allergic to Beano, so
should avoid its u^age.
3. Polysaccharides: Polysaccharides are the most
abundant carbohydrates in man’s diet. They are polymers
containing several units from 12 up to as much as 3000
monosaccharides. While some are digestible, others are
resistant to digestion (indigestible).
Digestible polysaccharides are comprised mainly of
starch (of plant origin) and glycogen (animal starch), built
exclusively from a single monomer, glucose. On digestion
or hydrolysis these polysaccharides yield glucose only.
379
 The indigestible polysaccharides come under
various nomenclatures - unavailable carbohydrates, non-
starchy polysaccharides (NSP), dietary fiber and/or non­
toxic anutrients. They have their origin from cell wall
material (intrinsic or associated) and some storage
polysaccharides. Examples include, cellulose,
hemicellulose, pectins, gums, pentosans and mucilage.
Lignin is also present but chemically it is a complex alcohol
derivative rather than a polysaccharide.
Dietary fiber is non-nourishing but performs a great
deal of vital functions in human diet, namely:
(a) Helps to form softer bulky stool, hence a mild
laxative.
(b) Protects against colon and rectal cancers.
(c) Decreases blood cholesterol levels and by so
doing the risk of developing gallstone is
reduced.
(d) Slows glucose absorption from the small
intestine, an effect helpful in the management
of diabetes.
(e) Helps in weight control and reduces the risk of
developing obesity.
(f) Decreases the risk of developing coronary
heart disease and heart attack.
Some food sources rich in dietary fiber include,
whole wheat bread, vegetables, bran, cereals, starchy roots,
mature leguminous seeds, nuts and fruits.

PmMns/Amino Acids
The term protein is derived from the Greek word
‘protos* which means ‘to come first’. Proteins are highly
complex nitrogenous organic compounds occurring
^naturally in all living matter. They are polymers whose
building blocks or monomers are called amino acids. The
380
elements contained in proteins-'are - carbon, hydrogen,
oxygen and nitrogen, and to a smaller extent, sulphur
and'/or phosphorous.
Aside from water, proteins form the major pail of
lean body tissue, totaling about 17% of body weight. Our
body is largely made up of proteins: skin, muscles, internal
organs, nails, hair, brain and the base of our bones. Hence
they aje referred to as ‘the stuff of life’.
proteins can be obtained from plant, animal and
mierobial sources. Plant sources include dottonseed,
wheat, legumes, maize and soybeans. On the other hand,
animal proteins are obtained from meat, fish, milk, egg
white and yolk, horn, hair and cartilage, while microbial
sources are yeast, fungi and algae.
In the body, proteins are known tcTperform the
following functions: “
[a] Supply energy to the body (4kcal/g) like
carbohydrates and lipids
[b] Provide the materials for growth, repair and
maintenance of body cells and tissues.
[c] Regulate the chemical processes within the cell
through enzymes and hormones, which are protein
in nature.
[d] Transport of materials in the body e.g. albumin and
hemoglobin.
[e] Help the body combat infection (antibodies are
proteins).
[f] Provide structural support for the body e.g. muscles,
collagen, elastin, etc.
[g] Aid in movement (actin and myosin of muscles).
[h] Formation of most of the blood clotting factors.
[i] Control the distribution of substances in* the body
(osmotic balance) by blood protein (predominantly,
albumin).
381
[j] pH buffering mechanism by ionized intracellular
proteins.
Amino Acids
Amino acids are building blocks of proteins and
constitute digestion products of proteins. They form the
raw materials for tissue synthesis. Classically, twenty (20)
amino acids have been identified. Of the twenty, the body
has the machinery to synthesize some, while others cannot
be synthesized by the body in sufficient quantity and so
must be taken in diets. The former constitutes the so-called
non-essential (dispensable) amino acids and the latter,
essential (indispensable) amino acids (see table 1 for
details).
A particular protein may differ greatly in proportions
of essential and non-essential amino acids. A protein that
provides all the essential amino acids in their correct
proportion is regarded as a first class protein. Animal
proteins (except gelatin) are first-class, high quality or
complete proteins because they contain ample amounts of
all eight (8) essential amino acids. On the other hand, plant
proteins (except soybeans) are second-class, lower quality
or incomplete proteins due to limited presence of the
essential amino acids in their structures. For instance,
cereal proteins rich in sulphur amino acids are limiting in
lysine; legumes and beef proteins, with abundant lysine, do
not contain sufficient amounts of sulphur containing amino
acids (cystine, methionine and cysteine]; and maize protein
shows limitations in tryptophan content. It is obvious,
therefore, that excessive reliance on one source of protein
could result in insufficient dietary supply of some of the
essential amino acids.
Diet complementation or supplementation is the key
to adequate protein intake and a good nutrition practice.

382
The capacity of a protein to make good one another’s
deficiencies is known as supplementary value or
complementation and the protein a complementary protein.
A combination of legumes and cereals in a meal [e.g. rice
and beans] is encouraged. Plant proteins can also be
improved by the addition of some quantity of animal
proteins/foods; for example, gruel meal and milk or gruel
meal and crayfish.
Note however, that the word ‘essential’ as used in
this classificatfea is a misnomer. That some amino acids
are essential does not mean that others are unnecessary.
They also take part in protein building in the body, only that
the body can make up for their inadequacies.

Table 1: Amino Acids: Essential and non-essential

Non-essential Essential in Essential in Human

Human adult infant, Pregnant &
Lactating Women

Alanine Leucine Leucine

Arginine Isoleucine Isoleucine
Asparagine Tryptophan Tryptophan
Aspartic acid Lysine Lysine*
Cysteine Phenylalanine Phenylalanine
Cystine Threonine Threonine
Glutamic acid Methionine Methionine
Proline Valine Valine
Serine *Histidine
Tyrosine *Arginine

383
 * Arginine and * histidine are commonly called
'Growth Promoting factors’ since they are not synthesized
in sufficient amounts during growth. They become
essential in growing children, pregnancy and lactating
mothers
Proteins Needs
The contribution made by proteins to the energy
value of a balanced diet should be 10 - 15% of the total
energy. Adults need about 1 g of protein per kilogram body
weight daily. A 65kg man therefore requires 65 grams of
proteins in his diet daily. In sharp contrast to the traditional
belief of African societies, infants require more proteins in
their diets than adults; about 1.5 to 1,85g per kilogram body
weight, i.e. between 13.5 to 16.5 grams in the diet of a 9kg
infant. Pregnant and lactating women in addition to the
normal adult requirement need an extra 6 to 17.5 grams for
the first 6 months of pregnancy, and 3g. during the last 6
months of lactation. Their diets should also be rich in or
enriched with histidine and arginine needed for growth at
the early stage of life.
A ready supply of amino acids from those already
present in body cells and in blood exist in adults i.e. protein
turnover. Adults, therefore, need only about 11% of their
total protein requirement to be supplied in diets. For the
human infant, about 30% of the dietary protein must be
provided as essential amino acids. Consequently, diets for
infants and pre-school children must be carefully planned
to make sure enough protein is present to yield high-quality
protein intake. As a necessity too, these supplied proteins
should have a high digestibility value (from 0.8 and above).
Protein deficit in the diet accounts for retarded
growth in children and weight loss in the adult. Delayed
wound healing and decreased resistance to infection is
observed. Hemoglobin synthesis may be impaired with
consequent anemia. Marked deficiency decreases plasma
384
albumin levels, hence edema.}, fibrosis and cirrhosis of the
liver, and lots more.
It is worth noting that no ‘warehouse’ exists in
humans for breakdown products of proteins, unlike
carbohydrates. Excess or high-protein intake may unduly
burden the liver and kidneys by forcing them to deaminate
and excrete the resulting excess nitrogen as urea^ If
prolonged, this situation may wear and tear these organs
and is potentially risky for individuals with marginal liver
and kidney problems overtly or covertly. Infants are at
increased risk than adults. Their kidneys have difficulty­
excreting large amounts of urea and minerals; therefore,
their diets should be limited in proteins. Regular cow milk
[formulations] must not be used for feeding young infants,
since it is too high in protein and other nutrients.
Excess of animal protein in diet is also known to
increase calcium loss in urine, hence increased risk of
osteoporosis - a form of bone disease. Africans are said to
have an increased protection from osteoporosis due to their
protein source [plants].
If too little protein in diet can be as harmful as too
much, where then lies the answer/solution? Moderation!

LIPIDS
Lipids are a diverse and heterogeneous group of\
chemical compounds having little in common with each
other except that they are generally insoluble in water but
readily soluble in organic [non-polar] solvents, such as
chloroform, ether and benzene. Like carbohydrates and
proteins, lipids are made up of the elements: carbon,
hydrogen and a fewer atoms of oxygen. Some also contain
phosphorus and nitrogen.
Lipids provide the major source of energy, yielding
on average 9kcal of energy per gram when completely
‘burnt’. Also, they are the forms for energy storage in the
body [mostly in the adipose tissue beneath the skin].
385
X1 •
 Generally speaking, lipids perform the follow mg
functions:
[a] Provide energy for the body [9kcal/g].
[b] Serve as carriers of the fat-soluble vitamins: A, D, E
and K, and some provitamins e.g. provitamin A
[carotene].
[c] Serve as energy reserve for the body.
[d] Add flavour to a wide variety of foods.
[e] Are important lubricants to bread and cereal
products, e.g. bread and butter, yam and oil, etc.
[f] They comprise a large component of membrane of
cells and membranous organelles, e.g. nucleus,
mitochondria, lysosome, etc.
[g] Insulate and protect [cushion] vital internal organs
[kidney, heart, liver, etc.] from injury.
[h] Serve as precursors of some hormones and vitamins,
e.g. sex hormones and vitamin D [primed by
cholesterol].
Examples of lipids include, fats, oils, waxes,
phospholipids and steroids. Fats and oils are of utmost
interest in food and nutrition. Roughly speaking, while fats
are lipids that are solid at room temperature, oils are liquid
lipids at room temperature [25°c], Basically, fats and oils
are triglycerides or triglycerols whose structures are built
from glycerol [a 3-carbon alcohol] and fatty acids. These
fatty acids are the functional units of fats and oils and to a
large extent determine their properties.

Fatty Acids:
These are long chains of carbon atoms linked
together and flanked by hydrogen. Depending on the
carbon chain length, fatty acids can be short-chain [5 or few
carbon atoms], medium-chain [6-10 carbon atoms] or long-
chain [12 carbon-atoms and above]. The short-chain fatty
386
• \ ' -
acids are found mainly in milk fat, medium-chain fatty
acids in animal and most vegetable fats, while the long-
chain fatty acids are found in fish oils.
Fatty acids can be classified into - saturated
and unsaturated [i.e. mono- and polyunsaturated]. These
terms respectively refer to absence or presence of double
bond[s] in the carbon-carbon linkages of the fatty acid
chain. The degree of unsaturation and chain length of fatty
acids present in any fat are important in determining its
physical properties. For instance, fats consisting
predominantly of saturated or long-chain fatty acids [or
both] are solid at room temperature [e.g. animal fat],
whereas those with high proportions of unsaturated or
short-chain fatty acids [or both] are usually liquid [e.g.
whale oil, olive oil, soybean oil, etc].
Like amino acids of proteins, fatty acids can be
essential or non-essential. Unsaturated fatty acids [e.g.
linoleic acid and ?-linolenic acid] are of special interest as
they cannot be produced in the body and are, therefore,
known as essential fatty acids. For purposes of good
health, these must be supplemented in diet, unlike saturated
fatty acids [e.g. Palmitic acid and stearic acid], which can
be produced by the body.
Essential fatty acids form part of vital body
structures, perform important roles in immune system
function and vision. Also, they are used in forming *!ell
membranes and in the production of hormone-like
compounds called embolden, important in inflammatory
response. Alpha linolenic acid, in particular, is known to
lower the risk of heart disease and circulatory problems.
The Eskimos are believed to have lower prevalence of heart •
disease than other populations, not because fats are absent
from their diets, but because fats in their diets contain
predominantly unsaturated fatty acids.

387
 Deficiency of essential fatty acids and/or excess
saturated fatty acids in diets has been found to be
responsible, for disturbances of fat transport causing their
raised concentration in the blood. A raised concentration
of saturated fats in blood has an attendant risk of developing
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, hypertension, and the like.
- Oils are better sources of dietary lipids than solid fats.
Cholesterol (Steroids] .
Cholesterol is a derived lipid, a major constituent of
cell membranes and bile acids, and a precursor of sex
hormones [steroids] and vitamin D. It is present in
reasonable concentrations in most foods [meat, cream, egg
yolk, etc] and can also be synthesized by the body. Its level
in blood is an important diagnostic index.
Cholesterol is highly implicated in the onset of
degenerative diseases, such as, heart attack, hypertension
[eventually, stroke], arteriosclerosis, obesity and diabetes.
A diet rich in saturated fatty acids increases cholesterol
levels in blood. Foods with abundance of cholesterol
should be taken in moderation. FAO/WHO recommends
dietary cholesterol intake not exceeding 300mg per day
[NOTE: two eggs a day exceed this limit]. Fifteen percent,
20% and 30’40% of energy from fat have been
recommended by the same agencies for adults, women of
reproductive age and 6-24 months infants, respectively.

Sources of Fats and Oils

Plants and animals are both sources of fats and oils.
These sources can be visible and invisible.
[i] Visible fats - Palm oil, butter, lard, margarine,
vegetable oils, etc.
[ii) Invisible fat - Soybeans, groundnuts, cashew nuts,
avocados, cakes, cookies, local pears, fried foods,
cream, milk, cheese, ice cream, etc.
388
 In sharp contrast to the case in proteins, fats of plant
origin are nutritionally preferred to those of animal sources.
Plant fats contain largely unsaturated fatty acids, and where
saturated fatty acids occur, they are mostly of short-chain.
On the other hand, animal lipids [fats] comprise more of
saturated and/or long-chain fatty acids, Animal fats also
contain high cholesterol levels [e.g. approximately 2 ICimg
in an egg]. Consequently, plant fats are first-class dietary
fats, whereas fats of animal origin are second-class and
hence should be taken in moderation.
Fish flesh and oils are good sources of unsaturated
fatty acids. Serving fish twice a week and a teaspoon of
plant oil a day is nutritionally encouraged. Note that high
temperature has an adverse effect on unsaturated fatty
acids. It ‘destroys’ the inert quality of unsaturation, and
converts them to the saturated [‘bad’] fatty acids. This
effect can also be caused by prolonged exposure of the fats
to air. It is nutritionally sound, therefore, to limit intake of
fried foods and avoid undue or prolonged preservation of
oils.

Vitamins
Vitamins are essential carbon-containing substances
needed in small amounts in the diet for the normal function,
growth, and maintenance of body tissues. Although
vitamins themselves provide no energy to the body, they are
needed to unlock the energy stored in proteins,
carbohydrates and lipids. Hence their role in metabolism is
regulatory in nature.
There are about 13 vitamins in all, which are divided
into two groups: [a] Fat soluble - A, D, E and K. and [b]
Water-soluble - C and the B vitamins [about 9, i.e. the sb-

389
 called B-complex]. The fat-soluble vitamins are not
soluble in aqueous medium of the body, hence not readily
excreted. A significant reserve exists in the body, which
often times can accumulate to toxic amounts. Conversely,
the water-soluble vitamins are readily lost in an aqueous
medium. Cooking alone renders them non-available, if the
sauce is discarded.
Generally, vitamins are indispensable in human
diets, so must be supplemented. If vitamin intake is
insufficient to meet needs, a deficiency occurs
accompanied by a measurable decline in health. Table 2
shows the deficiency diseases associated with the various
vitamins as well as their physiologic and biochemical
functions and dietary sources.
Certain food practices such as, excess heating,
excess alcohol intake, parboiling of vegetables, etc. are
known to render insufficient some vitamins in the diet.
Anti-vitamins, a typical example of anutrients, in some
food items poses similar problems. An anti-vitamin is
defined as any organic substance whose biological effects
are identical to those caused by the lack of a given vitamin
and whose action is reversible, that is, it can be neutralized
by the administration of a given vitamin. Examples
include:
[i] Thiaminase, an enzyme present in raw fish, aquatic
animals and mushroom, is known to render vitamin B,
[thiamine] inactive hence unavailable in the diet.
[ii] Ascorbic oxidase, an enzyme in cabbage,
cucumbers, pumpkin, apples, lettuce, carrots, potatoes,
tomatoes, bananas, etc, limits the availability of vitamin C
[ascorbate] in diets.
[iii] Avidin, present in raw egg white, chelates biotin in
diet and renders it unavailable. Habitual taking of raw eggs
will lead to nutritional trouble.
390
 Table 2: Vitamins, Functions, Sources and Deficiency Diseases

i
391

00
O
3
 Minerals
Minerals refer to elements other than carbon,
hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen. Normally, they form salts,
which remain after the body had been cremated and
converted into ash. Structurally, minerals are inorganic
and contribute about 4% of the total weight in man. Like
vitamins, minerals are basically regulators of metabolic
processes and do not contribute to energy yield in
themselves.
Essentially, minerals perform the following
functions in the body:
[i] Are important in water balance [osmolarity] of body
fluids.
[ii] Take part - in muscle contraction, e.£. Ca2'; buffer
systems of the body [e.g. K', Na, etc]; waste
removal; and transfer of respiratory gases.
[iii] Are components of most enzymes, hence regulate
metabolic reactions.
[iv] Form the structural framework of the body, for
example, calcium and phosphorus in bones.
Depending on the amount needed" per day, minerals
required in diet are grouped into two: Major and
Trace minerals.
A. Major (Macro) Minerals: These minerals are
required in amounts of about lOOmg [1/50 of a
teaspoon] or more per day. These include
calcium, sodium, phosphorus, potassium,
chlorine), magnesium and sulphur, etc.
B. Trace (Micro) Minerals: Are minerals required in
small amounts of less than lOOmg per day,
including iron, manganese, copper, zinc, cobalt,
iodine, selenium, fluorine and molybdenum.
Almost all foods - plants and animals, except sugar,
contain some amounts of one or more minerals. Fruits,
vegetables, cereals, legumes and animal foods are,
392
however, better sources. Because of their simple structure,
minerals are not easily destroyed during cooking but they
can be lost if they leak into the water used for cooking and
then are discarded. Processing can also well diminish the
mineral content of foods.
Accumulation of any of these minerals in the tissue
may be toxic. This may arise from an overwhelmed
controlling mechanism, and/or entry into tissue by an
alternative route, e.g. iron toxicity through frequent blood
transfusion.
Some minerals are toxic even in trace concentration
and so foods known to contain these should be avoided with
passion. They include, cadmium, lead, and mercury.

Water
Water is the largest component of the human body,
making up to 50 to 70% of the body’s total weight (about 40
litres). The body requires water to survive. A typical adult
can survive for about 8 weeks without food; but can survive
only a few days without water intake. This is so because
water reservoir does not exist in the body unlike some
nutrients. The study of life itself is a ‘wet science’.
In the body, water belongs to either intracellular
(within the cells) or extra-cellular (water which bathes the
cells) fluids, and both serve specific and vital purposes.
Some functions of water in the body include:
[a] Serves as a solvent for many chemical compounds.
[b] Provides a medium in which many biochemical
reactions occur.
[c] Actively participates as a reactant or becomes a
product in some reactions e.g. Krebs’s cycle
reactions.
[d] It is the transport medium of the body, e.g. waste
removal in urine.
393
[e] It contributes to temperature regulation.
[f] Serves as lubricant in joints and between internal
organs.
[g] Aids in mastication and softening of food.
[h] Is the base for saliva, bile, and amniotic fluid (fetal
shock absorber).
[i] Helps in pH regulation through electrolyte
compartmentalization.
Source of Body Water:
Liquid- Water, tea, coffee, soups, milk, juice, fruits, etc.
Solid foods- cooked.
Metabolic water - amount formed by the metabolism of
different food variety. About 0.06g/g; 1.07g/g and 5.41g/g
for carbohydrates, fats and proteins, respectively. Donkeys
and horses make long journey on the desert without water,
pot because of supply from reservoir (hump), but from the
breakdown of fat reserves.

Water Needs
Adults need roughly 1 ml of water per kcal of energy
expended and about 2.4 litres per day or 40ml per kg body
weight. A 65kg man would require 2600ml (2.61itres) per
day. This requirement, however, varies with environment
and activity. More water might be required in an arid
environment than a humid one. Likewise an active person
•Mil need more water than a sedentary individual.
Daily intake is necessary to compensate for water
loss in urine, sweat, expired air and faeces. Too much
water, whatever amount the kidneys are unable to excrete,
constitutes a hazard - water toxicity or water intoxication.
This usually results in headache, nausea, blurred vision,
cramps, convulsions and ultimately death.
394
 CHAPTER 36

NEWER AND COMMON DISEASES

BY
FRIDAY UBOH, PhD and A. F. UDUIGWOMEN

Introduction:
A disease is any condition that affects the normal functioning of
one or more systems in an organism. In other words, it may be
described as any condition that impairs normal body function(s).
It is medically considered to a clinical condition associated with
specific symptoms and signs. In a generalized term, disease is
often used more broadly to refer to any condition that causes
pain, dysfunction, distress, social problems, or death to humans,
or other animals. Under this broader description, injuries,
disabilities, disorders, syndromes, infections, abnormal
behaviors, may be regarded as diseases. Diseases generally
affect people physically, mentally, emotionally, etc. Mental
disease is a broad, generic nomenclature for a category of
illnesses that may include affective or emotional instability, and
cognitive dysfunction or impairment. Specific diseases that are
usually considered as mental illnesses include major depression,
generalized anxiety disorder, schizophrenia, attention deficits,
etc. Mental illness can be of biological (e.g., -anatomical,
chemical, or genetic) or psychological (e.g., trauma or conflict)
origin. It can impair the affected person's performance at work $r
school, as well as affect interpersonal relationships.
Diseases may be caused by several factors originating ;
from external or exogenous source (such as microbial-related or
infectious diseases), or internal dysfunctions (such as
autoimmune diseases). Other lion-infectious diseases include
cancer, most heart diseases, genetic diseases (such as sickle cell

395
anemia, albinism, etc.). Apart from infection, various
environmental challenges that result in physical trauma, pain,
physical inactivity, hormonal activation from stress or menstrual
cycle, as well as exposure to chemicals, toxins, mold, allergens,
drugs, radiation or airborne particulate matter, extreme
temperature, may also be considered as exogenously caused
diseases.
Some diseases are known to be contagious, while others
are not. Most contagious diseases (such as influenza) are
commonly believed to be infectious. The micro-organisms that
cause these diseases are known1 as pathogens and include
varieties of bacteria, viruses, protozoa and fungi. Generally,
these contagious, infectious diseases can be transmitted via
several routes. Among the commonest routes include-hand-to-
mouth, contact with infectious material on surfaces, bites of
insects or other carriers of the disease, blood-to-blood contacts,
and ingestion of contaminated foods, water or other drinks. Also,
some infectious diseases can be transmitted via sexual
intercourse, and these types of diseases are referred to as
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Examples of sexually
transmitted diseases include gonorrhea, syphilis, HIV/AIDS,
ebola, etc. Among these sexually transmitted infectious
(microbial -related infection) diseases, HIV/AIDS and ebola
may be considered newer infectious diseases in Nigeria.

A. Nutrition-Related Diseases
Nutrition-related diseases are generally manifestation(s) of
abnormalities of molecules,-chemical reactions and processes.
When the abnormality can be traced to nutrition, it is referred to
as nutritional disorder, and can result from malnutrition, nutrient
toxicity and defect in absorption of nutrients or defects in
biochemical process within the cell. Malnutrition appears to be
the most important public health problem due mainly to
misconceptions as to its meaning to different sets of people.
396
»
In a strict sense, malnutrition could be any of the following:
• Starvation-an almost zero intake of food.
• Under-nutrition- pathological condition(s) resulting
from consumption of inadequate amounts of food over an
extended period of time.
• Over-nutrition - consumption of excessive amounts of
foods over an extended period of time [e.g. accumulation
of fat-soluble vitamins],
• Imbalance - a disproportion in intake and utilization of
nutrient(s) in the staple diet [e.g. obesity],
• Specific nutrient deficiency- a pathologic condition that
results from relative or complete absence of an individual
nutrient in the staple diet [e.g. beriberi due to thiamine
deficiency].

Diet-related diseases or nutritional disorders, especially

the chronic types are said to be the main causes of premature
deaths in adults. Some of these nutrition-related diseases include
protein energy malnutrition, obesity, diabetes and hypertension.

Protein Energy Malnutrition

Protein energy malnutrition can be defined as a range of
pathological conditions arising from a deficiency of protein and
calorie (energy). It occurs most frequently and severely in
children, usually under 5 years of age in developing areas of
Asia, Africa and South America. It is seldom observed in
adolescents and adults. The disease mostly afflicts lactating
women, especially during periods of war, famine or other
emergencies. It constitutes the most widespread form of
malnutrition in the world.
Two extreme forms of protein energy malnutrition of
clinical importance are: marasmus and kwashiorkor.
Marasmus is a clinical form of protein energy malnutrition
resulting from severe caloric deficiency, mostly in children. It is
397: :
an equivalent of starvation in adults. The disease is characterized
by severe wasting [subcutaneous and muscle tissue], which
culminates in highly emaciated appearance of a wizened old
man. There is no edema; the patient is fairly alert and has keen
appetite.
Kwashiorkor involves protein deficiency [both in
quantity and quality] where calorie intake may be adequate. It is
characterized by edema and swollen belly due to enlargement of
the liver caused by fat accumulation. Tissue wasting is
concealed by the edema, giving a bloated appearance,
desquamation and ulceration. Depigmentation of hair with easy
pluck-ability are observable features.
A third form of protein energy malnutrition known as
marasmic kwashiorkor also occurs. This results from deficiency
both in calorie and protein, and would usually lead to nutritional
dwarfism.
Protein energy malnutrition of all types can be resolved
with appropriate intake of the deficient nutrient(s) - protein,
calorie or both. Nutrition education, environmental sanitation,
birth control, adequate breastfeeding, supplementary feeding
and improved weaning practices can, to a large extent, prevent
protein energy malnutrition

Obesity:
Obesity may be defined as the presence of large amounts of fat in
the subcutaneous tissues of the body. Mean values of body fat in
the total body weight for normal young men are about 12%, and
for young women about 26%. A man whose body fat amounts to
over 20% of his total body weight may be considered obese, and
for women a figure of over 40% represents obesity.

Etiology ofobesity: The etiology of obesity is multifactorial:

a) When calorie intake exceeds calorie expenditure [i.e.
over consumption or under expenditure of energy or
frequently a combination of both].
398
b) Over indulgence in sweet foods like cakes and
chocolates or starchy foods like bread and biscuits as well
as excessive or high intake of fatty foods.

Riskfactors ofobesity: The risk factors of obesity include:

• Age and sex- women are more prone.
• Cultural factor- considering obesity as a mark of social
prestige or a beauty marker.
• Eating habit- continuous nibbling of foods especially by­
stay-at-home mothers.
• Physical activity- obesity is common with those who live
sedentary life style than active individuals;
• Genetic factors- obesity is known to run in some families;
genes are responsible.

Health and social implications: Obesity has many health

and social implications: obesity predisposes individuals to
diabetes, cancer, cardiovascular diseases, dental caries, etc. If
may also lead to barrenness in females, and hypertension in
pregnant women. Life expectancy decreases by up to 25% in
some cases. The social implications include wearing of
unfashionable clothes, shyness and job preferences.

Prevention and Treatment: These entail caloric restriction,

regular exercise, use of drugs [e.g. appetite de-stimulatory
drugs] and medical supervision. |

Diabetes mellitus:
This is a condition in which excessive amounts of some
substances are excreted or 'siphoned' from the body. It is due
primarily to a lack of or functional deficiency in glucose
-regulatory hormone, insulin, leading to excessive and
chronically high levels of glucose in the blood, that is,
hyperglycemia.
399

'&
 Hyperglycemia is responsible for the clinical features
characteristic ofthe diabetic:
• Glycosuria - excessive excretion of sugar in urine, the
cardinal diagnostic sign of diabetic mellitus.
• Polyuria- excretion of large quantity of urine.
• Polydipsia- intense appetite both for food and water.
• Polyphagia - constant and excessive eating.

Diabetes mellitus may be classified into two varieties

based on the cause, namely type I and type II.
Type I [formerly, Insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus] is
caused by severe or absolute lack of insulin whose function it is
to promote glucose entry into cells. Insulin shortage is caused by
complete destruction or drastic reduction of Beta-cell mass of
the pancrtjas, which ordinarily synthesizes and secretes the
hormone. Its onset is usually from childhood, less than 25 years;
\ hence it was also called 'juvenile onset diabetes mellitus'.
Type II [formerly, Non-Insulin-dependent diabetes
mellitus] is the most prevalent [90% of all the known cases].
Insulin is available usually, but the body does not respond, to it
[glucose intolerance]. The cells have too few specific 'keys' on
their membrane whose job it is to recognize and unlock the
biochemical 'locks' to the doors through which insulin enters the
cejls. This type usually appears after the age of 40, hence the
former name, maturity onset diabetes mellitus.
Other rare types of diabetes, according to the recent
WHO (World Health Organization) classification, are
gestational diabetes mellitus and 'other specific types'.

Complications of the advanced stage of diabetes may include:

• damage to the eye (retinopathy and glaucoma),
• damage to the kidney (nephropathy),
• damage to nervous system (neuropathy),
400
 • premature cardiovascular diseases (hypertension),
• Increased risk of infection.

Healthy diet with ample fibre, low in refined sugar, high in

complex carbohydrates and moderate proteins are preventive
measures. Others include regular exercise, weight reduction and
refraining from habits like smoking and alcohol abuse. Note that
refined sugar is a risk factor, not a direct primer of diabetes
mellitus.

Hypertension:
Hypertension is defined as a condition in which blood
pressure remains persistently elevated. Precisely, it is sustained
systolic pressure [when the heart actively pumps blood]
exceeding 140mmHg and diastolic pressure [when the heart is
relaxed] exceeding 90mmHg [i.e. 140/90mmHg].
Hypertension has been described as a 'silent disorder'
because it usually does not cause any symptom before overt
manifestation.
The disorder is of two main types:
• Primary or essential or idiopathic hypertension,
• Secondary hypertension

Essential hypertension accounts for majority of the cases

[about 95% of the cases] and have no clear-cut cause. Secondary
hypertension due to kidney disease, sleep-disordered breathing
(sleep apnea) and other causes leads to the remainder 5% of the
cases.
Some conditions predispose individuals to hypertension
and strongly correlate to hypertension. These are:
• Ageing -blood pressure usually increases with age.
• Atherosclerosis- hardening of arteries due to gradual
accumulation of plaques on the intima.
401
 • Defects in rennin-angiotensin-aldosterone system.
• Obesity- overweight people have 6times greater risk of
having hypertension than lean people.
• Inactivity - another lifestyle factor, second to obesity, is
associated with hypertension.
• Excessive alcohol intake - accounts for about 10% of all
cases.
• Lead in bones has an increased risk (though yet to be
fully established).
• Excessive $alt intake - tend to increase blood pressure
particularly in Africans and older people.
• Excess of other minerals - calcium, potassium,
magnesium, etc.
• Smoking and elevated lipoprotein in the blood.

To prevent and/or treat hypertension, diet and lifestyle

changes are necessary. Salt intake should be moderate [not more
than 2400mg per day has been suggested]. Note: almost all
natural foods contain already the amount of salt needed to
support health. Seasoning with salt is merely to enhance taste.
Abstinence from smoking and excessive alcohol is indicative of
a reduced risk of hypertension. Checking blood pressure
regularly also suffices as a good health practice. Drug therapy is
only the last resort; after diet and lifestyle attempts have failed.

Cancer:
■ Essentially, cancer is a condition in which cell division is
abnormal and uncontrollable. A spontaneous new tissue growth
that serves no physiological function is called a tumor. Most
cancers take this form, although not all tumors are cancers.
Cancer cells are characterized by three properties: diminished or
unrestrained growth, invasion of local tissues, and spread or
metastasis to other parts of the body.
402
 Currently, cancer is the second-leading cause of death for
American adults. It is not a single disease but exists in at least
100 different forms; hence we talk of breast cancer, skin cancer,
cancer of the lungs, etc. About 35% of cancers are related to
diets. Some of the risk factors related to diet are: high fat diet;
low fibre intake; low consumption of fruits and vegetables; high
intake of meat and protein products; excess alcohol
consumption and smoking; Benzof?] pyrene and nitrosamines
in smoked foods; mycotoxins produced by micro-organisms
that may contaminate foods.
Control and avoidance of these risk factors and practices
would well prevent cancers or at least delay their onsets

B. Microbial Infection - Related Diseases

HIV/AIDS:
Of all the illnesses that have ever plagued humanity,
HIV/AIDS has been the most devastating. To worsen the whole
matter, no known cure has so far been found for HI V/A1DS. Like
polio, chickenpox, measles, common cold, rabipf and hepatitis
A, B and C, AIDS is caused by a virus. The Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) that causes AIDS is so small
that it can only be seen with a very powerful microscope. It takes
just a few of these viruses to enter a person's body to be infected
and later develop the condition called AIDS. HIV belongs to a
group of viruses known as retroviruses. There are two sub-types
of HIV namely: HIV-I and HIV-2. In Nigeria, HIV-1 accounts
for 97.5% of HI V infection, while HIV-2 accounts for 0.4%. The
rest of the infected people have both viruses. One who is infected
with any type of HIV will almost certainly develop AIDS and die
within 2-10 years. As an acronym, the letters HIV stand for the
following:
403
H- Human, the virus is found in humans, not in animals or
insects.
I- Immunodeficiency, the virus attacks the immune system
of the infected person and reduces it.
V- Virus, being the smallest of all micro-organisms, viruses
can only be seen with a powerful electron microscope.

The acronym A-l-D-S stands for the fol lowing words:

A- Acquired, it is a disease that one acquires or get from
someone else who already has the virus.
I - Immune, the virus attacks a person's immune [protective
or defensive] system.
D- Deficiency, there is a deficient response or resistance to
all diseases by the immune system.
S- Syndrome, the affected person manifests some signs or
symptoms.

Many people do not know that there is a difference

between HIV and AIDS. The truth is that HIV is the cause of
AIDS. AIDS is a group of symptoms that shows forth toward the
end of the life of a person infected with HIV.
Most sexually transmitted diseases are followed by
symptoms after a few days of infection, but this not the case with
HIV infection. This is why most people infected with the HIV
virus are not aware of it until when they start to get sick with
AIDS -related illnesses. The doctor prescribes blood test on
noticing these illnesses, which will show HIV positive if the
person has actually been infected.
There are basically four stages leading to AIDS. The first
is called the window stage. Apart from slight fever, which some
people manifest at the initial stage of infection, most people do
not notice any illness around the time of infection. The HIV test .
may show negative during the first six (6) months after
infection. The Second stage is called asymptomatic (symptom-
404
free) period. This period can last for 2-10 years. No wonder the
slogan “AIDS no dey show for face”. During this period, the
HIV virus can be transmitted to others. The third stage is called
the symptomatic period. During this period, the infected person
may start to manifest such symptoms as fever, dysentery,
tiredness, cough, skin rashes, yeast infections and enlargement
of lymph glands. The person may start visiting the hospital or
clinic often and taking treatment for malaria, typhoid, diarrhea,
rashes, and tuberculosis (TB). The fourth and last stage is called
full- blown AIDS period. The person is now an AIDS patient
who is ill continuously and has a short time to live. According to
Garland (7-15), the three major signs of full-blown AIDS
include:
• Persistent fever lasting for up to one month.
• Excessive weight loss.
• Persistent diarrhea.

Other minor signs include:

• Thrush [yeast infection of mouth and throat]
• Persistent skin rashes.
• Persistent cough
• Herpes [cold sores in the mouth and/or genital area].
• Shingles [painful rashes]
• Swollen lymph nodes
• Neurological signs
• Night sweats and loss of appetite.

HIV/AIDS is said to be contracted through direct contact

with the body fluids of an AIDS patient or carrier. Thus, it can be
contracted through sexual intercourse, from mother to child
during delivery or through breastfeeding. It can also be caught
through indirect means such as the use of unsterilized or sharp
objects formerly used on an infected person or through blood
transfusion.
405

1
 At the moment, there is no known cure or vaccine for
AIDS. However, some drugs known as antiretroviral drugs have
been developed to fight HIV virus directly. Some of the common
antiretroviral drugs include: Lamivudine, Combivir, Nevirapine
and Zidovudine (AZT). These drugs do not cure but help to keep
the virus under control for a long time. These drugs are very
expensive. Here we commend the efforts of National Action
Committee on AIDS (NACA) and their counterparts in the
various states [State Action Committee on AIDS (SACA)] in
setting up antiretroviral centers where those who are lucky to be
registered can obtain these drugs and get treatment at a very
minimal cost. The only cure for HIV/AIDS epidemic is
abstinence from premarital and extramarital sex. A condom does
not give full-proof protection from HIV/AIDS.

EBOLA

Definition of Ebola Disease: Ebola disease may simply be

defined as an infectious disease that is caused by ebola virus. It is
a rare deadly disease of humans and other related primates. The
disease is also referred to as Ebola haemorrhagic fever, or
simply as ebola. The ebola disease is said to be deadly because it
has a very high death risk, and may kill between 25 to 90 percent
of the infected persons.

History of Ebola Disease: Ebola disease outbreak was firs’t

identified in Sudan and Zaire in 1976. History shows that the
first outbreak of Ebola, which occurred in Nzara village in
Sudan (i.e., Ebola-Sudan), and that over 284 people were
infected. And the second Ebola virus emergence occurred few
months later in Yambuku (a village near the Ebola River) in
Zaire (i.e., Ebola-Zaire; EBOZ), now known as the Democratic
Republic of Congo. The emergence of the outbreak near the
Eboia River made it to be named “Ebola” after the Ebola River
in Zaire. While the first emergence had a mortality rate of about
53 percent, the second emergence recorded the highest mortality
rate (about 88 percent) of any of the Ebola viruses, with 318
people being infected. The Zaire outbreak was caused by the
Ebola virus, formerly referred to as Zaire ebolavirus, which is a
different member of the Ebolavirus genus from the one that
caused Sudan outbreak.
The third strain of Ebola, Ebola Reston (EBOR), was first
identified in 1989 when infected monkeys were imported into
Reston, Virginia, from Mindanao in the Philippines.
Fortunately, the few people who were infected with EBOR
(seroconverted) did not develop Ebola hemorrhagic fever
(EHF). The last known strain of Ebola, Ebola Cote d'Ivoire
(EBO-CI) was discovered in 1994 when a female ethologist
performing a necropsy on a dead chimpanzee from the Tai
Forest, Cote d'Ivoire, accidentally infected herself during the
necropsy. According to history, about 24 intermittent Ebola
virus disease outbreaks have occurred between 1976 and 2013,
with about 1,716 persons affected mostly in sub-Saharan Africa.
The largest recent epidemic outbreak occurred in West Africa
(mostly in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and to a lesser extent,
Nigeria) between 2013 and 2015. Particularly, the Ebola virus
was identified in Nigeria in 2014. And it is on history that as of 5"'
day of May, 2015, about 26,661 cases with 11,022 deaths have
been reported.
A village School headmaster, Mabalo Lokela, was the
first person to be infected with the ebola disease. Mabalo Lokela
began to manifest symptoms on the 26th August 1976, on his
return from a trip to Northern Zaire near the Central African
Republic border, after visiting the Ebola River between the 12th
and 22th August. Having being treated for malaria as was
suspected) with quinine (an antimalarial drug) and admitted at
407
I
\ ambuku Mission hospital on 5th September, he died on the 8"'
of September, 14 days after he began to display the symptoms.
Soon after the death of Lokela, others who had direct contact
with him also died, and this threw the people in the village of
Yambuku into anxiety and fear. The incidence also made the
country's Minister of Health together with Zaire President
Mobutu Sese Seko to declare the entire region, including
Yambuku and the country's capital, Kinshasa, a quarantine zone.

Mode of Transmission of Ebola Disease: Ebola disease is not

contagious like other common virus-caused diseases, such as
colds, influenza and measles. However, it is commonly
transmitted by contact with skin or body fluids (including blood,
saliva, semen, sweat, etc) of an infected human, or such animals
as monkey, chimpanzee and fruit bat. The virus is also often
contacted by persons who care for patients suffering from ebola
disease, or bury those who died from ebola disease without
adequate protective measures. Contact with contaminated
needles, clipper, and manicure and pedicure appliances.
However, semen and breast milk of infected persons may still
harbour traces of ebola virus for several weeks after recovery.
Generally, a person who has ebola virus but has not manifested
the symptoms cannot spread the virus. The incubation period
(i.e., the period between exposure to the virus and the
development of symptoms) of ebola virus is between 2 to 21
days, although it may take between 4 to 10 days in some cases.
• J.
Signs and Symptoms of Ebola Disease: The signs and
symptoms usually begin with conditions that resemble those of
sudden influenza, 2 to 21 days after contacting the virus. The
common symptoms that are manifested early include fever (with
body temperature above 38.3°C), headaches, sore throat, loss of
appetite, tiredness and weakness, muscular pain, and joint pain.
408
These are usually followed by vomiting and diarrhea. Fluid loss
may results in low blood pressure; liver and kidney dysfunction
may also develop, a stage at which both internal and external
bleeding may begin to occur, as the infection progresses. The
latter typically begins between 6 to 16 days after the appearance
of symptoms. In some cases, the skin develops maculopapular
rash, a condition where a flat red area of the skin is covered with
small bumps, between 5 to 7 days after the appearance of the
early symptoms.
Generally, decreased blood clotting capability, bleeding
from the mucous membranes or needle injection sites are
common in about 40 to 50 percent of all the infected persons.
The foregoing may cause coughing or vomiting of blood, or
defecation of blood in stools. Basically, bleeding into the skin
may produce purpura, or hematomas, particularly around the
needle injection sites. Bleeding may also occur through the ear,
eye and nose. For individuals that survive, recovery may begin
between 7 to 14 days after the appearance of the first symptoms,
whereas if death occurs, it typically follows 6 to 16 days from the
first symptoms. However, those who survive often experience
regular muscular and joint pain, inflammation of the liver,
hearing defect, general weakness and decreased appetite.
Bleeding particularly often presents the most critical outcome of
ebola disease cases, and most deaths result from blood loss.

Control and Prevention of Ebola Disease: Control and

prevention of the outbreak of ebola disease generally require
coordinated medical services, some level of communit}
enlightenment and personal precautionary measures. The
required medical services include:
• Rapid detection of cases of disease.
• Contact tracking of those who have contact with the
infected person(s).
409
 • Prompt access to laboratory services.
• Proper healthcare for the infected persons.
• Proper disposal of the dead through cremation or burial.
• Handling of body fluids and tissues from infected
persons with special caution.

Personal precautionary or preventive measures to

prevent the spread of ebola disease from infected animals to
humans, and from the infected to normal persons, may include
the following:
• Handling potentially infected bush meat only with
protective clothing.
• Cooking of bush meat thoroughly before eating.
• Wearing of protective clothing when coming around
ebola disease patients.
• Washing of hands thoroughly with a good sanitizer at
regular intervals, particularly after several handshakes,
or touching the bare skin of other persons.
• Avoiding body contact with the body fluids of other
persons.
The response of the Federal Government ofNigeriato the
ebola epidemic of 2014 in West Africa include:
• Establishment of quarantine centers: visitors to the
country are quarantined for 21 days.
• Closure of air, land and sea borders with neighboring
countries.
• Surveillance: reported cases were kept under intensive
monitoring. Previous contacts were isolated and
quarantined.
• Public enlightenment campaigns on TV, radio and print
news media- this created a high level of awareness
among the populace.
410
The Lagos State and Rivers State Governments (the two most
affected states) went further to establish special healthcare
centers for ebola patients and had healthcare workers in their
service trained in the management of ebola victims. Personal
protective gears were also procured for these workers. Nigeria
was able to contain the spread of the ebola virus through these
measures.

Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs)

Apart from HIV/AIDS, there are other known sexually
transmitted diseases. They include: gonorrhea, syphilis,
Chlamydia, trichomonas, herpes, genital warts, and hepatitis B
infection. Some of these can be transmitted through non-sexual
ways. The following signs have been identified by Garland as
possible signs that a person suffering from a sexually
transmitted disease may show:

• Bumps, sores or warts near the genitals or mouth,

• Itching or pain near the genitals,
• S wel Iing, ulcers or redness near the genitals,
• A stinging or burning feeling when passing urine,
• Fever, chills aches and pains with yellowing of the skin
(may be hepatitis).
• An unusual discharge or smell from the person or vagina,
• Vaginal bleeding other than from a menstrual period,
• Deep vaginal pain during sex,
• Pain anywhere between the hips and genitals in women.

A condom does not guarantee full-proof protection from STDs.

However, many STDs can be completely treated with
antibiotics. Others such as hepatitis B, herpes and genital warts
are not amenable to complete treatment and bring about serious
damage despite treatment. It is suggested that a person who has
411
been treated for a sexually transmitted should encourage his/her
partner to undergo the same treatment whether or not the
symptoms are there. Lack of treatment or delayed treatment for a
sexually transmitted disease may result in infertility or serious
damage to the reproductive organs. Like HIV/AIDS, the best
known cure for STDs is sexual purity.

412
 CHAPTER 3 7

PREVENTIVE HEALTH PRACTICES

What is Health?
The World Health Organization [WHO] defines
health as a state of “complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absencev of disease and
infirmity”. This broad definition rests only on the
understanding that a balance in biochemical reactions of
the body, only, can guarantee the attainment of such a state.
To say one is healthy, reactions in the body [both intra-and
extra-cellular] must proceed at rates commensurate with
maximal physiology of survival. The continuous
manipulation of these reactions to achieve a better living is
what would for centuries keep life scientists not only busy,
but indispensable.
Like any other reaction, biochemical reactions
require an optimal supply of “reactants”, if the animal must
maintain good health. Optimal supply, because too little or
too much often culminates in pathologic state [disease].
The ‘reactants’ including amino acids, fatty acids,
vitamins, minerals and water can only be obtained in diets.
As a science that defines the optimal amount in diets
necessary to maintain health and forestall the development
of disease, nutrition is, therefore, a form of preventive
medicine. Note, understanding nutrition depends to a large
extent on knowledge of biochemistry. The two cannot be
studied in isolation.
Community Health
Also called preventive health/medicine, public
health, Social health, etc, community health has to do with
413
prevention rather than cure of disease. It is the principle of
manipulation of the environment in order to improve the
health of the people. To ensure health for all, every
community needs some health-related services. Ideally,
every community is entitled to facilities for adequate
nutrition, environment health, social health, control of
communicable diseases, health services from the
conception of the individual to the death, health education,
hospitals, veterinary services, means of transportation and
communication, treatment of minor ailments, and so on.
These services are all available in the developed world. In
Nigeria, however, not all are available presently. Even
where they are available, there is the problem of proper
maintenance.
The culture and traditional practice of a community
play an important role in the etiology of disease. For
example, the incident of cancer of the breast is rare in
cultures where women breast-feed their babies. In many
African communities, body resistance to certain diseases is
very low because of food taboos, which deny them of eating
certain foods that are rich in protein. Apart from that, the
traditional methods of handling the umbilical cords after
delivery and of male and female circumcision often lead to
infections, particularly tetanus. Also, occupational
hazards bring about certain health problems. Communal
eating, drinking and sharing-of items together are catalysts
for the spread of communicable diseases. Finally, our
cherished traditional social security systems such as the
extended family system, communal fanning, communal
burial, communal financial contributions [‘Osusu’], and so
on have suffered very serious setbacks as a result of
increased education and urbanization
414
 In every country there are public health laws, which
are aimed at promoting community health. There are
officers vested with special powers to enforce compliance.
These laws cover such health-related issues of
environmental health, registration of births and deaths, sale
of drugs and food, quarantine and prevention of disease,
registration of schools, and so on. Again, our main
problem is with the enforcement of these laws.
Primary Health Care
In a layman’s language, primary health care is health
care at the grassroots. In other words, it is bringing health
care to where people live and work at an affordable rate. It
includes preventive and curative services; and public
enlightenment. The basic aim of primary health care is to
bring health services nearer to the people in order to
improve their general health and living conditions.
Presently in Nigeria, there exist three levels of health
services. They include
[i] The Primary Health Service, which is closest to the
people and is constitutionally the responsibility of
local government.
[ii] Secondary Health Service, which involves general
or district hospitals under the supervision of the state
government.
[iii] Tertiary Health Service, which is the highest and
most sophisticated, and involves specialist and
teaching hospitals under the supervision of federal
government through the Federal Ministry of Health
[Korubo-Owiye 123-‘24].
The components of primary health care include:
415
1 A Health Centre: This is supposed to be located very
close to the people, well-staffed, closely supervised,
and provide all health services required.
2. General Private Clinics: Because these are privately
owned, the quest for profit maximization makes
them unaffordable to the poor.
3 General Out-Patient Hospitals or Clinics: Although
these hre "available to the costly,
lackadaisical attitude of health personnel, lack of
basic equipment and shortage of essential drugs are
key factors in their ineffectiveness.
4. Traditional Healers: In Nigeria, traditional medical
practice exists side-by-side the orthodox medical
practice. Although traditional medical practice is
often criticized for its lack of uniform standards,
archaic methods and poor sanitary conditions, it is a
known fact that traditional medicine has been very
successful even in some areas where orthodox
medicine has not fared well [e.g. mental health and
orthopedics]. The success of traditional medical
practice is evident in the fact that a large proportion
of our rural and urban population still patronizes
them. Government should create an enabling
environment that will enhance fruitful cooperation
between traditional practitioners and orthodox
practitioners so that the people can benefit more from
both methods.

416
 WORKS CITED/FURTHER READING

Adelgks, B.O & Leong, G.C: Certificate Human and Physical

Geography, W.A Edition. Ibadan: University Press
Limited, 1980.

Aigbodioh, J.A. Philosophy of Science: Issues and Problems.

Ibadan: Hope Publications, 1997.

Akanle, O. “A Legal Perspective on Water Resources and

Environmental Development Policy in Nigeria” In:
Nigerian Law Journal, Vol. 12 No. 1,1984.

Akpan-Idiok, A. “Petroleum Wealth and its Revenue Sharing

in Nigeria” In Nigeria: Citizenship Education. Aba:
Vitalis Books, 1998.

Alozie, P.I.(ed.) History and Philosophy of Science, Calabar:

Dec-Ford Publishers, 1994.

............. -Philosophy of Physics. Calabar: University of

Calabar Press, 2003

Aluko, A.O. The Contributions of the Early Greek

Philosophers to the Development of Modern Science.
Unpublished BAThesis. University of Calabar, 1987.

Anijah -Obi, F. “ Environmental Crisis: An Overview” In:

Technology, Science and Environment: A Current
Overview edited by Alozie, P. Aba : Vitalis Books,
1996.

417
 l ABOUT THE AUTHOR
A native of Eme-Ora in Owan

B
West Local Government Area of
Edo State, Nigeria, Dr. Andrew F.
Uduigwomen graduated from the
Department of Philosophy,
University of Calabar, in 1984.
with a First Class Degree in
Philosophy. This was foilowea oy
a Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy of Science
(1988) and a ^Ph.D Degree in Philosophy of Law
(1992). He is a distinguished Academic, a reputable
public speaker and a minister of a fast growing
churcn. He has taught History and Philosophy of
Science for a number of years.

Dr. Uduigwomen is a copious writer. ,.He has

published quite a numoer of books, chapters in
bocks and well-researched articles in teamed
international journals. He is married to Ekanem and
they are blessed with fourch lldren.

Dr. Uduigwomen is oresently a Professor in the

Department of Phiiosopny, University of Calabar,
Caiabar, and the Editor of SOPHIA: An African
Journal of Philosophy. <

Cover: The “Electric Speaking Telephone” patented

- by Alexander Granam Bell in 1875.