Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.·Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to

expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. (Diaz vs. Mesias, Jr., 424 SCRA
747 [2004])
··o0o··

G.R. No. 172149. February 8, 2010.*

SESSION DELIGHTS ICE CREAM AND FAST FOODS,

petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth
Division), HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (Second Division) and ADONIS ARMENIO
M. FLORA, respondents.

Remedial Law; Judgments; Executions; Court frowns upon any

delay in the execution of final and executory decisions, as the
immediate enforcement of the partiesÊ rights, confirmed by a final
decision, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice.
·We state at the outset that, as a rule, we frown upon any delay in
the execution of final and executory decisions, as the immediate
enforcement of the partiesÊ rights, confirmed by a final decision, is a
major component of the ideal administration of justice. We admit,
however, that circumstances may transpire rendering delay
unavoidable. One such occasion is when the execution of the final
judgment is not in accord with what the final judgment decrees in
its dispositive portion. Just as the execution of a final judgment is a
matter of right for the winning litigant who should not be denied
the fruits of his or her victory, the right of the losing party to give,
perform, pay, and deliver only what has been decreed in the final
judgment should also be respected.
Same; Same; Same; That a judgment should be implemented
according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and well-
_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

11

established rule.·That a judgment should be implemented

according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and well-
established rule. Otherwise stated, it is the dispositive portion that
categorically states the rights and obligations of the parties to the
dispute as against each other. Thus, it is the dispositive portion
which the entities charged with the execution of a final judgment
that must be enforced to ensure the validity of the execution.
Same; Same; Same; Save for recognized exceptions, a final
judgement may no longer be altered, amended or modified even if the
alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless
of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, renders it.·A
companion to the above rule on the execution of a final judgment is
the principle of its immutability. Save for recognized exceptions, a
final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even
if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and
regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, renders
it. Any attempt on the part of the responsible entities charged with
the execution of a final judgment to insert, change or add matters
not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule
on immutability of judgments.
Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; Termination of Employment;
Separation Pay; Separation pay may be awarded to an illegally
dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement.·By jurisprudence
derived from this provision, separation pay may be awarded to an
illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement. Recourse to
the payment of separation pay is made when continued employment
is no longer possible, in cases where the dismissed employeeÊs
position is no longer available, or the continued relationship
between the employer and the employee is no longer viable due to
the strained relations between them, or when the dismissed
employee opted not to be reinstated, or payment of separation
benefits will be for the best interest of the parties involved.

Same; Same; Same; The re-computation of the consequences of

illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute
an alteration or amendments of the final decision being
implemented.·A re-computation (or an original computation, if no
previous compu-

12

tation has been made) is a part of the law·specifically, Article 279

of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this
provision·that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal
dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction,
as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The re-
computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution
of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of
the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling
stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this
dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments.
Same; Same; Same; In allowing separation pay, the final
decision effectively declares that the employment relationship ended
so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that
point.·Article 279 provides for the consequences of illegal
dismissal in no uncertain terms, qualified only by jurisprudence in
its interpretation of when separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is
allowed. When that happens, the finality of the illegal dismissal
decision becomes the reckoning point instead of the reinstatement
that the law decrees. In allowing separation pay, the final decision
effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that
separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point.
The decision also becomes a judgment for money from which
another consequence flows·the payment of interest in case of
delay. This was what the CA correctly decreed when it provided for
the payment of the legal interest of 12% from the finality of the
judgment, in accordance with our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Zachary O. Waytan for petitioner.
Basa, Adquilen & Balagtey Law Office for private
respondent.

13

BRION, J.:
We rule on the petition for review on certiorari assailing
the decision1 and resolution2 of the Court of Appeals3 (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 89326. These CA rulings dismissed the
petition for certiorari the petitioner·Session Delights Ice
Cream and Fast Foods (petitioner)·filed to challenge the
resolutions4 of the Second Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission5 (NLRC) that in turn affirmed the
order6 of the Labor Arbiter7 granting a re-computation of
the monetary awards in favor of the private respondent
Adonis Armenio M. Flora (private respondent).

The Facts

The private respondent filed against the petitioner a

complaint for illegal dismissal, entitled „Adonis Armenio
M. Flora, Complainant versus Session Delights Ice Cream
& Fast Foods, et. al., Private respondents,‰ docketed as
NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR 09-0507-00.
The labor arbiter decided the complaint on February 8,
2001, finding that the petitioner illegally dismissed the
private respondent. The decision awarded the private
respon-

_______________

1 Dated December 19, 2005; Rollo, pp. 23-32.

2 Dated March 30, 2006; Id., at p. 33.
3  Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member
of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos and Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon.
4 Dated October 25, 2004 and January 31, 2005; Rollo, pp. 62-69 and
80-81.
5 Docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR 09-0507-00/NLRC CA No.
028029-0199, and penned by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino,
and concurred in by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay and
Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan.
6 Dated March 25, 2004; Rollo, pp. 70-79.
7 Docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR 09-0507-00 and penned by
Labor Arbiter Monroe C. Tabingan.

14

dent backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,

indemnity, and attorneyÊs fees, under a computation that
the decision itself outlined in its dispositive portion. The
dispositive portion reads:
 „WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring private
respondent guilty of illegal dismissal. Accordingly, private respondent
SESSION DELIGHTS is ordered to pay complainant the following:
a) Backwages:
P170.00 x 154 days P 26,180.00
Proportional 13th month pay
P 26,180/12    2,181.65 28,361.65
b) Separation Pay:
P 170.00 x 314/12 x 1  4,448.35
c) Indemnity of P5,000.00 for failure to observe due process
d) AttorneyÊs fees which is 10% of the total award in the amount of
P3,781.00.
SO ORDERED.‰8

On the petitionerÊs appeal, the NLRC affirmed the labor

arbiterÊs decision in its resolutions dated May 31, 2002 and
September 30, 2002.9 The dispositive portion of the NLRCÊs
resolution of May 31, 2002 states:

„WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review

is hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal, DISMISSED, for lack of
merit.‰10

The petitioner continued to seek relief, this time by

filing a petition for certiorari before the CA, which petition
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74653.

_______________

8  Rollo, p. 89.
9  Docketed as NLRC CA No. 028029-0199; Id., at pp. 90-103.
10 Annex „E-10,‰ Id., at p. 100.

15

On July 4, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition and

affirmed with modification the NLRC decision by deleting
the awards for a proportionate 13th month pay and for
indemnity.11 The CA decision became final per Entry of
Judgment dated July 29, 2003.12 The dispositive portion of
this CA decision states:

„WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is AFFIRMED with modification that the award of
proportional 13th month pay as well as the award of indemnity of P
5,000.00 for failure to observe due process are DELETED.‰

In January 2004, and in the course of the execution of

the above final judgment pursuant to Section 3, Rule VIII13
of the then NLRC Rules of Procedure, the Finance Analyst
of the Labor ArbiterÊs Office held a pre-execution
conference with the contending parties in attendance. The
Finance Analyst submitted an updated computation of the
monetary awards due the private respondent in the total
amount of P235,986.00.14 This updated computation
included additional backwages and separation pay due the
private respondent

_______________

11 Id., at pp. 105-113.

12 Id., at p. 114.
13 SEC. 3. Computation.·The Labor Arbiter of origin, in cases
involving monetary awards and at all events, as far as practicable, shall
embody in any such decision or order the detailed and full amount
awarded.
In case of an employee who is unjustly dismissed, his full backwages,
shall include allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement.
In situations not covered by Section 16, Rule V, but where further
computation of the judgment amount is necessary, no execution shall
issue until after the computation shall have been approved by the Labor
Arbiter the parties shall have been duly notified and heard thereon.
14 Rollo, p. 115.

16

computed from March 1, 2001 to September 17, 2003. The

computation also included the proportionate amount of the
private respondentÊs 13th month pay. On March 25, 2004,
the labor arbiter approved the updated computation which
ran, as follows:

COMPUTATION
Total computation as per NLRC CAR
decision dated February 8, 2001 (sic) 41,591.00
1. Additional backwages: (March 1, 2001-Sept. 17, 2003)
March 1, 2001-April 30, 2002:
  P178.00 x 52 days = 9,256.00
May 1, 2001-June 30, 2002:
   P185.00 x 365 days = 67,525.00
July 1, 2002- Sept. 17, 2003:
  P190.00 x 382 days = 72,580.00 149,361.00
Proportional 13th month pay:
  P149,361.00/12 =   12,446.75
161,807.75
2. Additional separation pay:
  P190.00 x 314/12 x 3 years = 14,915.00
3. Additional attorneyÊs fee:
  P176,722.75 x 10% = 17,672.25 194,395.00
TOTAL 253,986.00

The petitioner objected to the re-computation and

appealed the labor arbiterÊs order to the NLRC. The
petitioner claimed that the updated computation was
inconsistent with the dispositive portion of the labor
arbiterÊs February 8, 2001 decision, as modified by the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74653. The NLRC disagreed with the
petitioner and affirmed the labor arbiterÊs decision in a
resolution dated October 25, 2004. The NLRC also denied
the petitionerÊs motion for reconsideration in its resolution
dated January 31, 2005.
The petitioner sought recourse with the CA through a
petition for certiorari on the ground that the NLRC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

17

The CA Rulings
The CA partially granted the petition in its decision of
December 19, 2005 (now challenged before us) by deleting
the awarded proportionate 13th month pay. The CA ruled:

„WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Labor Arbiter is DIRECTED to compute only the following (a)
private respondentÊs backwages from the time his salary was
withheld up to July 29, 2003, the finality of the Decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 74653; (b) private respondentÊs separation pay from July 31,
2000 up to July 29, 2003; and (c) attorneyÊs fees equivalent to 10%
of the total monetary claims from (a) and (b). The total monetary
award shall earn legal interest from July 29, 2003 until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.‰15

The CA explained in this ruling that employees illegally

dismissed are entitled to reinstatement, full backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent, computed from the time actual
compensation was withheld from them, up to the time of
actual reinstatement. If reinstatement is no longer feasible,
the backwages shall be computed from the time of their
illegal dismissal up to the finality of the decision. The CA
reasoned that a re-computation of the monetary awards
was necessary to determine the correct amount due the
private respondent from the time his salary was withheld
from him until July 29, 2003 (the date of finality of the July
4, 2003 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 74653) since the
separation pay, which was awarded in lieu of
reinstatement, had not been paid by the petitioner. The
attorneyÊs fees likewise have to be re-computed in light of
the deletion of the proportionate 13th month pay and
indemnity awards.

_______________

15 Id., at p. 31.

18

The petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration

which the CA denied in its resolution of March 30, 2006,
now similarly assailed before us.

The Issue

The lone issue the petitioner raised is whether a final

and executory decision (the labor arbiterÊs decision
of February 8, 2001, as affirmed with modification by
the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 74653) may be
enforced beyond the terms decreed in its dispositive
portion.
In the pleadings submitted to the Court, the petitioner
insists on a literal reading and application of the labor
arbiterÊs February 8, 2001 decision, as modified by the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74653. The petitioner argues that since
the modified labor arbiterÊs February 8, 2001 decision did
not provide in its dispositive portion for a computation of
the monetary award up to the finality of the judgment in
the case, the CA should have enforced the decision
according to its express and literal terms. In other words,
the CA cannot now allow the execution of the labor
arbiterÊs original decision (which the CA affirmed with
finality but with modification) beyond the express terms of
its dispositive portion; thus, the amounts that accrued
during the pendency of the petitionerÊs recourses with the
NLRC and the CA cannot be read into and implemented as
part of the final and executory judgment.
The petitioner, as an alternative argument, argues that
even assuming that the body of the CA decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 74653 intended a computation of the monetary
award up to the finality of the decision, the dispositive
portion remains to be the directive that should be enforced,
as it is the part of the decision that governs, settles, and
declares the rights and obligations of the parties.
The private respondent, for his part, counters that the
computation of the monetary award until the finality of the
CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 74653 is in accord with
Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended.

19

The CourtÊs Ruling

We resolve to dismiss the petition and,

accordingly, affirm the CA decision.
We state at the outset that, as a rule, we frown upon any
delay in the execution of final and executory decisions, as
the immediate enforcement of the partiesÊ rights, confirmed
by a final decision, is a major component of the ideal
administration of justice. We admit, however, that
circumstances may transpire rendering delay unavoidable.
One such occasion is when the execution of the final
judgment is not in accord with what the final judgment
decrees in its dispositive portion. Just as the execution of a
final judgment is a matter of right for the winning litigant
who should not be denied the fruits of his or her victory, the
right of the losing party to give, perform, pay, and deliver
only what has been decreed in the final judgment should
also be respected.
That a judgment should be implemented according to
the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and well-
established rule.16 Otherwise stated, it is the dispositive
portion that categorically states the rights and obligations
of the parties to the dispute as against each other.17 Thus,
it is the dispositive portion which the entities charged with
the execution of a final judgment that must be enforced to
ensure the validity of the execution.18
A companion to the above rule on the execution of a final
judgment is the principle of its immutability. Save for
recognized exceptions,19 a final judgment may no longer be
altered,

_______________

16 Suyat v. Gonzales-Tesoro, G.R. No. 162277, December 7, 2005, 476

SCRA 615, 624.
17 Equitable Bank Corp. v. Sadac, G.R. No. 164772, June 8, 2006, 490
SCRA 380, 417.
18 Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations Commission, 457 Phil. 868,
883; 411 SCRA 69; 79-80 (2003).
19 They are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the making of so-
called nun pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any

20

amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or

modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what
court, be it the highest Court of the land, renders it.20 Any
attempt on the part of the responsible entities charged with
the execution of a final judgment to insert, change or add
matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion
violates the rule on immutability of judgments.
In the present case, with the CAÊs deletion of the
proportionate 13th month pay and indemnity awards in the
labor arbiterÊs February 8, 2001 decision, only the awards
of backwages, separation pay, and attorneyÊs fees remain.
These are the awards subject to execution.
Award of backwages and separation pay
A distinct feature of the judgment under execution is
that the February 8, 2001 labor arbiter decision already
provided for the computation of the payable separation pay
and backwages due, and did not literally order the
computation of the monetary awards up to the time of the
finality of the judgment. The private respondent, too, did
not contest the decision through an appeal. The petitionerÊs
argument to confine the awards to what the labor arbiter
stated in the dispositive part of his decision is largely based
on these established features of the judgment.
We reject the petitionerÊs view as a narrow and
misplaced interpretation of an illegal dismissal decision,
particularly of the terms of the labor arbiterÊs decision.
While the private respondent failed to appeal the
February 8, 2001 decision of the labor arbiter, the failure,
at the most, had the effect of making the awards granted to
him final so

_______________

party; and (3) where the judgment is void. Equitable Banking Corp. v.
Sadac, supra note 15, pp. 416-417.

20 Id.

21

that he could no longer seek any other affirmative relief, or

pray for any award additional to what the labor arbiter had
given. Other than these, the illegal dismissal case
remained open for adjudication based on the appeal made
for the higher tribunalsÊ consideration. In other words, the
higher tribunals, on appropriate recourses made, may
reverse the judgment and declare that no illegal dismissal
took place, or affirm the illegal dismissal already decreed
with or without modifying the monetary consequences
flowing from the dismissal.
As the case developed and is presented to us, the issue
before us is not the correctness of the awards, nor the
finality of the CAÊs judgment, nor the petitionerÊs failure to
appeal. The issue before us is the propriety of the
computation of the awards made, and, whether this
violated the principle of immutability of final
judgments.
In concrete terms, the question is whether a re-
computation in the course of execution of the labor arbiterÊs
original computation of the awards made, pegged as of the
time the decision was rendered and confirmed with
modification by a final CA decision, is legally proper. The
question is posed, given that the petitioner did not
immediately pay the awards stated in the original labor
arbiterÊs decision; it delayed payment because it continued
with the litigation until final judgment at the CA level.
A source of misunderstanding in implementing the final
decision in this case proceeds from the way the original
labor arbiter framed his decision. The decision consists
essentially of two parts.
The first is that part of the decision that cannot now be
disputed because it has been confirmed with finality. This
is the finding of the illegality of the dismissal and the
awards of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
backwages, attorneyÊs fees, and legal interests.
The second part is the computation of the awards made.
On its face, the computation the labor arbiter made shows
that it

22

was time-bound as can be seen from the figures used in the

computation. This part, being merely a computation of
what the first part of the decision established and declared,
can, by its nature, be re-computed. This is the part, too,
that the petitioner now posits should no longer be re-
computed because the computation is already in the labor
arbiterÊs decision that the CA had affirmed. The public and
private respondents, on the other hand, posit that a re-
computation is necessary because the relief in an illegal
dismissal decision goes all the way up to reinstatement if
reinstatement is to be made, or up to the finality of the
decision, if separation pay is to be given in lieu
reinstatement.
That the labor arbiterÊs decision, at the same time that
it found that an illegal dismissal had taken place, also
made a computation of the award, is understandable in
light of Section 3, Rule VIII of the then NLRC Rules of
Procedure which requires that a computation be made.
This Section in part states:

[T]he Labor Arbiter of origin, in cases involving monetary awards

and at all events, as far as practicable, shall embody in any such
decision or order the detailed and full amount awarded.

Clearly implied from this original computation is its

currency up to the finality of the labor arbiterÊs decision. As
we noted above, this implication is apparent from the terms
of the computation itself, and no question would have
arisen had the parties terminated the case and
implemented the decision at that point.
However, the petitioner disagreed with the labor
arbiterÊs findings on all counts·i.e., on the finding of
illegality as well as on all the consequent awards made.
Hence, the petitioner appealed the case to the NLRC
which, in turn, affirmed the labor arbiterÊs decision. By
law,21 the NLRC decision is final, reviewable only by the
CA on jurisdictional grounds.

_______________

21 Article 223, Labor Code, as amended.

23

The petitioner appropriately sought to nullify the NLRC

decision on jurisdictional grounds through a timely filed
Rule 65 petition for certiorari. The CA decision, finding
that NLRC exceeded its authority in affirming the payment
of 13th month pay and indemnity, lapsed to finality and
was subsequently returned to the labor arbiter of origin for
execution.
It was at this point that the present case arose. Focusing
on the core illegal dismissal portion of the original labor
arbiterÊs decision, the implementing labor arbiter ordered
the award re-computed; he apparently read the figures
originally ordered to be paid to be the computation due had
the case been terminated and implemented at the labor
arbiterÊs level. Thus, the labor arbiter re-computed the
award to include the separation pay and the backwages
due up to the finality of the CA decision that fully
terminated the case on the merits. Unfortunately, the labor
arbiterÊs approved computation went beyond the finality of
the CA decision (July 29, 2003) and included as well the
payment for awards the final CA decision had deleted·
specifically, the proportionate 13th month pay and the
indemnity awards. Hence, the CA issued the decision now
questioned in the present petition.
We see no error in the CA decision confirming that a re-
computation is necessary as it essentially considered the
labor arbiterÊs original decision in accordance with its basic
component parts as we discussed above. To reiterate, the
first part contains the finding of illegality and its monetary
consequences; the second part is the computation of the
awards or monetary consequences of the illegal dismissal,
computed as of the time of the labor arbiterÊs original
decision.
To illustrate these points, had the case involved a pure
money claim for a specific sum (e.g. salary for a specific
period) or a specific benefit (e.g. 13th month pay for a
specific year) made by a former employee, the labor
arbiterÊs computation would admittedly have continuing
currency because the sum is specific and any variation may
only be on the interests

24

that may run from the finality of the decision ordering the
payment of the specific sum.
In contrast with a ruling on a specific pure money claim,
is a claim that relates to status (as in this case, where the
claim is the legality of the termination of the employment
relationship). In this type of cases, the decision or ruling is
essentially declaratory of the status and of the rights,
obligations and monetary consequences that flow from the
declared status (in this case, the payment of separation pay
and backwages and attorneyÊs fees when illegal dismissal is
found). When this type of decision is executed, what is
primarily implemented is the declaratory finding on the
status and the rights and obligations of the parties therein;
the arising monetary consequences from the declaration
only follow as component of the partiesÊ rights and
obligations.
In the present case, the CA confirmed that indeed an
illegal dismissal had taken place, so that separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement and backwages should be paid. How
much that separation pay would be, would ideally be stated
in the final CA decision; if not, the matter is for handling
and computation by the labor arbiter of origin as the labor
official charged with the implementation of decisions before
the NLRC.22
As the CA correctly pointed out, the basis for the
computation of separation pay and backwages is Article
279 of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:

„x x x An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be

entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.‰

_______________

22 Section 3, Rule VIII of the old NLRC Rules of Procedure now

Sections 2 and 4, Rule XI of the 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
 25

By jurisprudence derived from this provision, separation

pay may be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee in
lieu of reinstatement.23 Recourse to the payment of
separation pay is made when continued employment is no
longer possible, in cases where the dismissed employeeÊs
position is no longer available, or the continued
relationship between the employer and the employee is no
longer viable due to the strained relations between them,
or when the dismissed employee opted not to be reinstated,
or payment of separation benefits will be for the best
interest of the parties involved.24
This reading of Article 279, of course, does not appear to
be disputed in the present case as the petitioner admits
that separation pay in lieu of reinstatement shall be paid,
computed up to the finality of the judgment finding that
illegal dismissal had taken place. What the petitioner
simply disputes is the re-computation of the award when
the final CA decision did not order any re-computation
while the NLRC decision that the CA affirmed and the
labor arbiter decision the NLRC in turn affirmed, already
made a computation that·on the basis of immutability of
judgment and the rule on execution of the dispositive
portion of the decision·should not now be disturbed.
Consistent with what we discussed above, we hold that
under the terms of the decision under execution, no
essential change is made by a re-computation as this step
is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of
the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. A re-
computation (or an original computation, if no previous
computation has been made) is a part of the law·
specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the
established jurisprudence on this provision·that is read
into the decision. By the nature of an illegal

_______________

23 Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena, G.R. No. 173076, October 10, 2007,
533 SCRA 518, 541.
24 Velasco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 161694, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 686,
699.

26
dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full
satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor
Code. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal
dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute
an alteration or amendment of the final decision being
implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the
computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is
affected and this is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments.
We fully appreciate the petitionerÊs efforts in trying to
clarify how the standing jurisprudence on the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and the
accompanying payment of backwages ought to be read and
reconciled. Its attempt, however, is out of place and, rather
than clarify, may only confuse the implementation of
Article 279; the core issue in this case is not the payment of
separation pay and backwages but their re-computation in
light of an original labor arbiter ruling that already
contained a dated computation of the monetary
consequences of illegal dismissal.
That the amount the petitioner shall now pay has
greatly increased is a consequence that it cannot avoid as it
is the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses
against the labor arbiterÊs decision. Article 279 provides for
the consequences of illegal dismissal in no uncertain terms,
qualified only by jurisprudence in its interpretation of
when separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed.
When that happens, the finality of the illegal dismissal
decision becomes the reckoning point instead of the
reinstatement that the law decrees. In allowing separation
pay, the final decision effectively declares that the
employment relationship ended so that separation pay and
backwages are to be computed up to that point. The
decision also becomes a judgment for money from which
another consequence flows·the payment of interest in case
of delay. This was what the CA correctly decreed when it
provided for the payment of the legal interest of 12% from
the

27

finality of the judgment, in accordance with our ruling in

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby
AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
 December 19, 2005 and its resolution dated March 30, 2006
in CA-G.R. SP No. 89326.
For greater certainty, the petitioner is ORDERED to
PAY the private respondent:
(a) backwages computed from August 28, 2000 (the
date the employer illegally dismissed the private
respondent) up to July 29, 2003, the date of finality of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74653;
(b) separation pay computed from July 31, 2000 (the
private respondentÊs first day of employment) up to July 29,
2003 at the rate of one month pay per year of service;
(c) ten percent (10%) attorneyÊs fees based on the total
amount of the awards under (a) and (b) above; and
(d) legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of
the total monetary awards computed from July 29, 2003,
until their full satisfaction.
The labor arbiter is hereby ORDERED to make another
re-computation according to the above directives.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Bersamin,** Abad and Perez, JJ.,

concur.

Judgment and resolution affirmed.

_______________

25 Supra note 34.

**  Designated additional Member of the Second Division vice
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, per raffle dated January 18,
2010.

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