Peralta V Philpost

8/23/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 223395, December 04, 2018 ]
RENATO V. PERALTA, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE POSTAL

CORPORATION (PHILPOST), REPRESENTED BY MA. JOSEFINA
MDELACRUZ IN HER CAPACITY AS POSTMASTER GENERAL AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
PHILPOST, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN CESAR N. SARINO,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is the Decision[2] dated July 24, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated March 8, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 103151.
The Antecedents
On May 10, 2014, respondent Philippine Postal Corporation (PhilPost) issued a stamp
commemorating Iglesia ni Cristo's (INC's) Centennial Celebration. The design of the
stamp showed a photo of INC founder, the late Felix Y. Manalo (Manalo) with the
designation on the left side containing the words "Felix Y. Manalo, 1886-1963 First
Executive Minister of Iglesia ni Cristo", with the Central Temple of the religious group at
the background. At the right side of Manalo's photo is the INC's centennial logo which
contained a torch enclosed by a two concentric circles containing the words "IGLESIA Nl
CRISTO CENTENNIAL 1914-2014".[4]
On June 16, 2014, petitioner Renato V. Peralta (petitioner) filed a complaint[5] for
injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 33 of Manila, assailing the
constitutionality of the printing, issuance and distribution of the INC commemorative
centennial stamps, allegedly paid for by respondent PhilPost using public funds.
In his complaint, petitioner alleged that the printing and issuance of the INC
commemorative stamp involved disbursement of public funds, and violated. Section
29(2) of Article VI[6] of the 1987 Constitution. He argued that respondents' act of
releasing the said stamps was unconstitutional because it was tantamount to
sponsorship of a religious activity; it violated the separation of the Church and the
State; and the non-establishment of religion clause. Thus, petitioner prayed that
respondents be restrained from issuing and distributing the INC commemorative
stamps.[7]
elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/64851 1/32
After service of summons to respondents PhilPost and its Board of Directors, and a
hearing on the petitioner's application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), the RTC
denied the same in its Order[8] dated June 23, 2014.
Respondents filed their Answer,[9] maintaining that no public funds were disbursed in
the printing of the INC commemorative stamps. They alleged that there was a
Memorandum of Agreement[10] (MOA) dated May 7, 2014 executed between PhilPost
and INC, where it was provided that the costs of printing will be borne by INC. They
claimed that the proceeds of the sale of the stamps will not redound to the sole benefit
of INC.[11] The printing, according to them, is part of PhilPost's philatelic products,
which will promote tourism in the country because it will attract people from all over
the world.[12] They maintained that any sectarian benefit to the INC is merely
incidental. As to petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief, respondents contended that
petitioner failed to demonstrate irreparable injury, and that he cannot seek to restrain
the printing and distribution of the stamps as these were already printed prior to the
filing of the complaint.
On July 25, 2014, the RTC issued an Order,[13] denying petitioner's application for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction and dismissing the action. It ruled that it was not a
taxpayer's suit and that it did not violate Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.[14]
Petitioner appealed the RTC's decision with the CA, but the same was denied in its July
24, 2015 decision. The CA ruled that although the action is considered as a taxpayer's
suit, the printing and issuance of the commemorative stamp did not violate the
Constitution.[15]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[16] of the CA's decision, but the
same was denied for lack of merit in the CA's March 8, 2016 Resolution.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner's arguments
Petitioner reiterates his argument that the CA failed to judiciously analyze the design of
the INC commemorative stamp as to conclude that the same is "more historical than
religious". He argues that the INC stamp, which commemorates the 100th year
founding of INC, particularly the INC Central Temple and centennial logo, is purely
religious. He explains that in Aglipay vs. Ruiz,[17] the stamp deleted the grapevine with
stalks of wheat in its design, and merely contained the Philippine map and the location
of the City of Manila, with inscription,"Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
February 3-7, 1937". For petitioner, what was emphasized in the stamp subject of the
case of Aglipay vs. Ruiz[18] was Manila, and not the Eucharistic Congress. Meanwhile, in
this case, the INC stamp purportedly emphasized the INC as a religious institution.
Petitioner likewise cited the MOA between INC and respondent PhilPost to emphasize
the religious purpose of printing the stamp.
PhilPost's comment
For respondents' part, they maintained the constitutionality of the stamps issued. First,
they claimed that the printing, issuance and distribution of the assailed INC
commemorative stamps can neither be restrained nor enjoined, because they have
become fait accompli.[19]
Respondents also questioned petitioner's standing as a taxpayer. They point out that
there is no illegal disbursement of public funds, as the cost of printing and issuance of
the assailed commemorative stamps was exclusively borne by INC for its consumption,
and no public funds were disbursed. The remaining pieces of stamps were used for sale
by PhilPost to its postal clients. It emphasized that the sales proceeds were not
intended to support the INC as a religious sect, but to promote the country as the
chosen venue of an international commemorative event, given INC's presence in other
countries. Respondents also pointed out that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer
a direct injury on account of the printing and issuance of the INC commemorative
stamps. Respondents also agreed with the findings of the CA that there is intrinsic
historical value in the design of the INC stamp, considering that INC is a Filipino
institution.[20]
Lastly, respondents contend that Section 29(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution does not apply, as it pertains to the Legislative Department. Respondents

alleged that the facts in the cases of Aglipay vs Ruiz and Manosca vs. Court of
Appeals[21] are different from the case at bar. In Aglipay, the funds originated from the
Insular Treasury - from funds not otherwise appropriated. Meanwhile, Manosca
pertained to an expropriation case, hence, entailed appropriation of public funds. In this
case, however, respondents emphasized that PhilPost is a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC), which operates on its own capital. Thus, when INC
sought the printing of the assailed stamps, from its own funds and for its primary use,
the prohibition was not violated. It alleged that the printing of the INC stamps was done
as a fund-raising activity, and not to endorse or benefit any religion.
Based from the aforesaid arguments of the parties, the issue of this case centers on the
constitutionality of the respondents' act in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorating the INC's centennial celebration.
The petition lacks merit.
Procedural Aspect -
It is doctrinal[22] that the power of judicial review is subject to the following limitations,
viz: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the constitutionality of the questioned act must be raised by the proper
party, i.e., the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
(the cause of the suit or action) of the case, i.e., the decision on the constitutional or
legal decision must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Of these four, the first and second conditions will be the focus of Our discussion.
Actual case or controversy -
Whether under the traditional or expanded setting, the Court's judicial review power,
pursuant to Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, is confined to actual cases or
controversies. We expounded on this requisite in SPARK, et. al. v. Quezon City, et. al.,
[23] thus:
An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights,

an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other
words, there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. According to recent
jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the
1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified by merely requiring a prima
facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case of controversy is the

requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as
a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of. [Citations omitted.]
Applying these principles, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case.
Here, it is evident that PhilPost - under the express orders of then President Benigno
Aquino III (President Aquino III), through Proclamation No. 815 printed, issued and
sold the INC commemorative stamps. PhilPost's act gave rise to petitioner's injunction
suit in which he made the following allegations: (1) the printing of the INC
commemorative stamps violated Sec. 29(2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution; and (2)
the purpose of the stamp as indicated in the MOA is "tantamount to sponsorship" of a
religious activity, violative of the non-establishment clause. These assertions are no
longer hypothetical in nature, but already amount to a legal claim susceptible for
adjudication.
Respondents claim that the Injunction suit filed by petitioner has become moot since
the acts sought to be enjoined - printing, issuance and distribution of the INC
commemorative stamps was fait accompli.[24] They anchored their claim on Our ruling
in Go v. Looyuko,[25] which essentially states that when the events sought to be
prevented by injunction have already happened, nothing more could be enjoined.
We clarify.
While this Court agrees that the issue on the remedy of injunction availed of by the
petitioner may no longer be viable to enjoin PhilPost's acts, considering that the act
sought to be enjoined already transpired, this does not necessarily mean that the
question on the constitutionality of the said acts would automatically be rendered
academic.
It is precisely PhilPost's issuance, printing and sale of the INC commemorative stamps
that created a justiciable controversy since the said acts allegedly violated Sec. 29(2),
Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. Had the petitioner filed the injunction suit prior to the
implementation of Proclamation No. 815, any resolution by this Court on the question of
PhilPost's printing of the INC commemorative stamps would merely be an advisory
opinion, veritably binding no one, for it falls beyond the realm of judicial review.
Nonetheless, even if the case has indeed been rendered moot, this Court can still pass
upon the main issue. As We have pronounced in the case of Prof David v. Pres.
Macapagal-Arroyo,[26]
[T]he moot-and-academic principle is not a magical formula that

automatically dissuades courts from resolving cases, because they will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if they find that: (a) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional
character, and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; or (d) a case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.[27]
This Court, in Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, et. al.,[28] enumerated several cases where the
exceptions to the moot-and-academic principle were applied; thus:
xxx in Constantino v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),[29] Constantino, a

public officer, and his co-accused, Lindong, a private citizen, filed separate
appeals from their conviction by the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
While Constantino died during the pendency of his appeal, the Court still
ruled on the merits thereof, considering the exceptional character of the
appeals of Constantino and Lindong in relation to each other; that is, the two
petitions were so intertwined that the absolution of the deceased
Constantino was determinative of the absolution of his co-accused Lindong.
[30]
In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,[31] the petition sought to declare as

null and void the concurrent appointments of Magdangal B. Elma as
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13,
Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. While
Elma ceased to hold the two offices during the pendency of the case, the
Court still ruled on the merits thereof, considering that the question of
whether the PCGG Chairman could concurrently hold the position of CPLC
was one capable of repetition.[32]
In David v. Arroyo,[33] seven petitions for certiorari and prohibition were

filed assailing the constitutionality of the declaration of a state of national
emergency by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the declaration of a
state of national emergency was already lifted during the pendency of the
suits, this Court still resolved the merits of the petitions, considering that the
issues involved a grave violation of the Constitution and affected the public
interest. The Court also affirmed its duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules, and recognized that the contested
actions were capable of repetition.[34]
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita,[35] the petition questioned the

constitutionality of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 's appointment of
acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments
while Congress was in session. While the President extended ad interim
appointments to her appointees immediately after the recess of Congress,
the Court still resolved the petition, noting that the question of the
constitutionality of the President's appointment of department secretaries in
acting capacities while Congress was in session was one capable of
repetition.[36]
In Atienza v. Villarosa,[37] the petitioners, as Governor and Vice Governor,

sought for clarification of the scope of the powers of the Governor and Vice-
Governor under the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code of
1991. While the terms of office of the petitioners expired during the
pendency of the petition, the Court still resolved the issues presented to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.[38]
In Gayo v. Verceles,[39] the petition assailing the dismissal of the petition for
quo warranto filed by Gayo to declare void the proclamation of Verceles as
Mayor of the Municipality of Tubao, La Union during the May 14, 2001
elections, became moot upon the expiration on June 30, 2004 of the
contested term of office of Verceles. Nonetheless, the Court resolved the
petition since the question involving the one-year residency requirement for
those running for public office was one capable of repetition.[40]
In Albaña v. Commission on Elections,[41] the petitioners therein assailed

the annulment by the Commission on Elections of their proclamation as
municipal officers in the May 14, 2001 elections. When a new set of
municipal officers was elected and proclaimed after the May 10, 2004
elections, the petition was mooted but the Court resolved the issues raised
in the petition in order to prevent a repetition thereof and to enhance free,
orderly, and peaceful elections.[42]
Additionally, in Arvin R. Balag v. Senate of the Philippines,[43] We likewise mentioned

the following cases:
xxx in Republic v. Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Inc.,

[44] the controversy therein was whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
jurisdiction over an injunction complaint filed against the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration (POEA) regarding the cancellation of the
respondent's license. The respondent then argued that the case was already
moot and academic because it had continuously renewed its license with the
POEA. The Court ruled that although the case was moot and academic, it
could still pass upon the main issue for the guidance of both bar and bench,
and because the said issue was capable of repetition.
xxx in Regulus Development, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,[45] the issue therein was
moot and academic due to the redemption of the subject property by the
respondent. However, the Court ruled that it may still entertain the
jurisdictional issue of whether the RTC had equity jurisdiction in ordering the
levy of the respondent's property since it posed a situation capable of
repetition yet evading judicial review.
Based on these precedents, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the
bench and the bar, and in the present petition, the parties involved, on the application
of the constitutional provisions allegedly violated vis-a-vis the printing and issuance of
the INC commemorative stamps. There is no question that the issues being raised
affect the public interest, involving as they do, the alleged misuse of public funds and
the non-establishment clause which is one of the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of religion. This petition calls for a clarification of constitutional principles. Perforce,
there is a need to adjudicate the instant case.
Legal Standing -
In Mamba, et. al. v. Lara, et. al.,[46] this Court explained the legal standing of a
taxpayer in this wise:
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a
taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves
the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. He must also
prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. xxx. [Citations
omitted.][47]
Here, petitioner made an allegation of PhilPost's misuse of public funds in the printing
of 1,200,000 INC commemorative stamps. Petitioner pointed out that out of the
1,200,000 commemorative stamps printed, only 50,000 pieces were shouldered by the
INC based on its MOA with PhilPost. Petitioner, thus, concluded that the production of
the additional 1,150,000 stamps were made possible only with the use of public funds
and property. On this basis, petitioner indeed, is invested with personality to institute
the complaint for injunction with the RTC. As correctly observed by the CA:
[Petitioner] Peralta contends that as the stamps covered by the MOA and
paid for by the INC pertain only to 50,000 pieces, public funds and property
were used by [respondent] Philpost in the printing and distribution of the
remaining 1,150,000 stamps. For purposes of determining capacity to sue as
a taxpayer, it is sufficient that [Petitioner] Peralta made allegations of such
nature.[48]
Substantive Aspect -
The non-establishment of religion clause is not equivalent to indifference to

religion
At the outset, this Court notes that the petition has argued, in length, about how the
appellate court apparently erred in failing to find the design of the stamp
unconstitutional. Citing Aglipay vs. Ruiz, petitioner insists that the religious nature of
the INC stamp makes the same unconstitutional, since it violates the prohibition against
the State from establishing a religion.
It is at once apparent that petitioner has summarily equated religion to

unconstitutionality. Certainly, examination of jurisprudence, both here and in the United
States, as well as the context over which this stamp has been issued, inevitably leads
this Court to agree with the CA, and uphold the issuance of the INC commemorative
stamp.
True, fundamental to the resolution of this case is the policy of the State on the
inviolability of the principle of separation of the church and the state. Justice Isagani
Cruz explained the rationale of this principle in this wise:
The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences
make good neighbors." The idea is to delineate the boundaries between the
two institutions and, thus, avoid encroachments by one against the other
because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive
jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the entities to "render therefore
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's."[49]
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides for the following provisions, giving life to the
policy of separation of the Church and the State; thus:
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES
xxxx
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
xxxx
ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
xxxx
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.
xxxx
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
xxxx
Section 29.
(1) xxx
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or

employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
xxxx
The Constitutional "wall" between the Church and the State, has been jurisprudentially
recognized to stem from the country's unfortunate collective experience when the two
institutions are commingled into one entity, exercising both power and influence,
oftentimes to the detriment of the populace.
However, as apparent from the Constitution, the "wall" between the Church and the
State exists along with the recognition of freedom of religion. In fact, review of
jurisprudence would reveal that this Court has carefully weighed this principles as to
allow the broadest exercise of religious freedom without infringing the non-
establishment clause.
In upholding the issuance of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress

commemorative stamp, this Court in Aglipay v. Ruiz[50] recognized how religion is
integrated in the Filipino way of life:
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the
Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is
alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which provides as follows:
"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,

or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, secretarian institution, or system
of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium."
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of

separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the
historical background ofthis principle in our country, it is sufficient to say
that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that
the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise
when the estate (sic) will use the church, and the church the state, as a
weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos
Constitution recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the
early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty
of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898,
reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission,
reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August
29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of the Philippines as the
supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that
in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of
the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to
support and defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and
respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent
limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is
guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious
toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its

influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so
far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence
is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence
under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested
their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who
guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to
religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt
from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14,
subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4,
Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm.
Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces
or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3,
Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII,
Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday
and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays
are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea
that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows
divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against
religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the
state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).[51] (Emphasis ours)
In Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals,[52] this Court upheld the MTRCB's regulatory
authority over religious programs but ultimately upheld the contents of the INC's
television program which attacked other religions, viz:
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all
"television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the
power to "approve, delete xxx and/or prohibit the xxx exhibition and/or
television broadcast of xxx television programs xxx." The law also directs the
Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to
determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime."
Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include
religious programs like its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene Section 5, Article III of the
Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free

exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed."
We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a

constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has
been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws,
past and present We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good." We have also laboriously defined in our
jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to
religious profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice
Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist:
Religious Profession and Worship
The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold

aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's
beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within
the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where
the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases

concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about
life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all;
embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God
or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny
the immortality of his soul - in fact, cherish any religious
conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs
may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the
majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may
not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for
his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. Men
may believe what they cannot prove. Every one has a right to his
beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot
prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or

omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may
be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the
Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the
rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of

religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent
in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can
be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And
this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere
religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the
reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious

freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave
religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity
to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.[53]
In Estrada vs. Escritor,[54] this Court encapsulated its policy towards these kinds of
disputes as "benevolent neutrality":
By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion, the Filipinos

manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach in
interpreting the religion clauses, an approach that looks further than the
secular purposes of government action and examines the effect of these
actions on religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the
religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of
religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that
government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals,
however, government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability
which inadvertently burden religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives
room for accommodation of these religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches in the wall of
separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the integral purpose
of the religion clauses. The case at bar involves this first type of
accommodation where an exemption is sought from a law of general
applicability that inadvertently burdens religious exercise.
Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent

neutrality, benevolent neutrality does not mean that the Court ought to
grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it
does mean that the Court will not look with hostility or act
indifferently towards religious beliefs and practices and that it will
strive to accommodate them when it can within flexible
constitutional limits; it does mean that the Court will not simply dismiss a
claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question
offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection
afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in the absence
of legislation granting exemption from a law of general applicability, the
Court can carve out an exception when the religion clauses justify it. While
the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate the difficult
questions of judgment in determining the degree of burden on religious
practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the means
adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a doctrine on
the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed.
We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the
benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits as
discussed above, but more importantly, because our constitutional
history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent
neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off
in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this
approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty "not only for a
minority, however small-not only for a majority, however large-but for each
of us" to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.[55]
(Emphasis ours)
Verily, where the Court has been asked to determine whether there has been an undue
enchroachment of this Constitutionally forged "wall", this Court has adopted a stance of
"benevolent neutrality". Rightfully so, for this incorporates the Constitutional principle
of separation of the Church and the State while recognizing the people's right to
express their belief or non belief of a Supreme Being. This Court, applying the view of
benevolent neutrality, declared that there was no violation of the non-establishment of
religion clause in the recent case of Re: Letter Of Tony Q. Valenciano.[56]
Even in the U. S., whose jurisprudence are of persuasive weight in this jurisdiction, it
can be gleaned that the religious nature of certain governmental acts does not
automatically result in striking them as unconstitutional for violation of the non-
establishment clause, particularly if the act involves constitutionally protected form of
exercise of religious freedom.
The "Lemon test", which has been extensively applied by the U. S. Supreme Court in
issues involving the determination of non-establishment of religion clause originated
from the case of Lemon vs. Kurtzman.[57] In that case, the Court used a three-pronged
test to adjudge whether the assailed governmental act violated the First Amendment,
as follows:
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and,
3. The statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion."
In that case, the Court ruled that the state laws of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
providing financial aid and resources to teachers of parochial private schools, who will
teach non-secular subjects to public schools is unconstitutional. This was because the
effect of the law was to require the individual states to have continuous monitoring and
surveillance of teacher beneficiaries, in order to ensure that they would not espouse
Catholic teachings in their classes. Such scenario, according to the Supreme Court,
constitutes as an excessive entanglement of government in matters of religion. In that
case, however, the U. S. High Court admitted that drawing the line between allowable
and prohibited State acts delving on religion is not a matter of drawing conclusions
from well-defined formula, to wit:
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state;
total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship
between government and religious organizations is inevitable. Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,343 U.S. 312 (1952); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S.
398, 374 U.S. 422 (1963) (HARLAN, J., dissenting). Fire inspections, building
and zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school
attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible contacts.
Indeed, under the statutory exemption before us in Walz, the State had a
continuing burden to ascertain that the exempt property was, in fact, being
used for religious worship. Judicial caveats against entanglement must
recognize that the line of separation, far from being a "wall," is a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship.
This is not to suggest, however, that we are to engage in a legalistic minuet

in which precise rules and forms must govern. A true minuet is a matter
of pure form and style, the observance of which is itself the
substantive end. Here we examine the form of the relationship for the light
that it casts on the substance. (Emphasis ours)
Meanwhile, in upholding the use of a creche or Nativity scene in its annual Christmas
display by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the U. S. Supreme Court, in Lynch vs.
Donnelly,[58] explained that the separation of the Church and the State should not be
viewed to mean absolute detachment of each other. The Court stated that:
This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is "to prevent, as far as possible,
the intrusion of either [the church or the state] into the precincts of the
other."
xxxx
In every Establishment Clause case, we must reconcile the inescapable

tension between the objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion
of either the church or the state upon the other, and the reality that,
as the Court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not
possible.
The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses as erecting a "wall"
between church and state, see, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 330 U.S. 18 (1947). The concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful
figure of speech probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. The
metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment Clause forbids an
established church or anything approaching it But the metaphor itself is not
a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that
in fact exists between church and state.
No significant segment of our society, and no institution within it can

exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other
parts, much less from government. "It has never been thought either
possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation. . . ." Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 413 U.S.
760 (1973). Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of church
and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance,
of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. See, e.g., Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 343 U.S. 314, 343 U.S. 315 (1952); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 333 U.S., 211 (1948).
Anything less would require the "callous indifference" we have said was
never intended by the Establishment Clause." xxx (Emphasis Ours)
The U. S. Supreme Court then went on to state how its history and tradition has
allowed a healthy interaction between the State and religion, so long as the State does
not commit acts that are solely motivated by religious considerations.
Another important lesson in Lynch was the Court's consideration of the context within
which the government has issued a legislation or pursued an act. In that case, the
Court found that the inclusion of the creche in the annual Christmas display was merely
a recognition of the historical origins of the Christmas holiday.
Having in mind the above-stated rulings pertinent to the principle of non-establishment

of religion clause, We proceed to scrutinize the INC commemorative stamp.
The printing of the INC commemorative stamp did not amount to a violation of
the non-establishment of religion clause
There is no quibbling that as to the 50,000 stamps ordered, printed and issued to INC,
the same did not violate the Constitutional prohibitions separating State matters from
religion. Per paragraphs 5 and 6 of the MOA between PhilPost and INC provided that:
xxxx
5. Upon signing of this Agreement, INC shall pay m cash or by manager's

check an amount equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the value of the
stamps, first day covers and other philatelic products ordered to be
purchased by INC, the fifty percent (50%) balance shall be paid upon
approval of the final stamp design/s by the PPC Stamps Committee.
6. Unless the total cost of the stamps and other related products ordered
by the INC is paid, PPC shall have the authority to hold the printing of
the stamps and other philatelic products. Only upon payment of the full
amount of the purchased stamps that the same shall be printed,
delivered to INC, circulated and/or sold to collectors and the mailing
public.
xxxx[59]
It is plain, that the costs for the printing and issuance of the aforesaid 50,000 stamps
were all paid for by INC. Any perceived use of government property, machines or
otherwise, is de minimis and certainly do not amount to a sponsorship of a specific
religion.
Also, We see no violation of the Constitutional prohibition on establishment of religion,

insofar as the remaining 1,150,000 pieces of stamps printed and distributed by
PhilPost.
First, there is no law mandating anyone to avail of the INC commemorative stamps, nor
is there any law purporting to require anyone to adopt the INC's teachings. Arguably,
while then President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 815, s. 2014, authorizing the
issuance of the INC commemorative stamp, the same did not contain any legal
mandate endorsing or requiring people to conform to the INC's teachings.
The secular purpose behind the printing of the INC commemorative stamp is obvious
from the MOA between INC and Philpost:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
xxxx
INC has requested PPC to issue, circulate and sell commemorative stamps
and other philatelic products to promote the Centennial of the Iglesia Ni
Cristo, and in honor of its First Executive Minister, Bro. Felix Y. Manalo;
(Emphasis ours)
xxxx[60]
The centennial celebration of the Iglesia ni Cristo, though arguably involves a religious
institution, has a secular aspect. In the old case of Garces, et al. vs. Hon. Estenzo, etc.,
et al.,[61] the Court made a similar pronouncement as to a controversy involving the
purchase of a barangay council of a statue of San Vicente Ferrer:
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration

of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer,
and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One
of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the
patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a

patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the
worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image)
cannot be branded as illegal.
As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair.

Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The
fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden

image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic
church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the
image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any
family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.
[62] (Emphasis ours)
The printing of the INC commemorative stamp is no different. It is simply an

acknowledgment of INC's existence for a hundred years. It does not necessarily equate
to the State sponsoring the INC.
As to the use of the government's machinery in printing and distribution of the 1.2
million stamps, this Court does not find that the same amounted to sponsorship of INC
as a religion considering that the same is no different from other stamps issued by
PhilPost acknowledging persons and events of significance to the country, such as those
printed celebrating National Artists, past Philippine Presidents, and events of
organizations, religious or not. We note that PhilPost has also issued stamps for the
Catholic Church such as those featuring Heritage Churches,[63] 15th International
Eucharistic Congress,[64] and Pope Francis.[65] In the past, the Bureau of Posts also
printed stamps celebrating 300 years of Islam in the 1980s. Likewise, our review of the
records does not disclose that PhilPost has exclusively or primarily used its resources to
benefit INC, to the prejudice of other religions. Finally, other than this single
transaction with INC, this Court did not find PhilPost to have been unneccesarily
involved in INC's affairs.
Based on the foregoing, this Court is not convinced that PhilPost has actually used its
resources to endorse, nor encourage Filipinos to join INC or observe the latter's
doctrines. On the contrary, this Court agrees with respondents that the printing of the
INC commemorative stamp was endeavored merely as part of PhilPost's ordinary
business.
In the same vein, We do not find that there was illegal disbursement of funds under
Section 29(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. The application of this prohibition
towards government acts was already clarified by the Court in Re: Letter of Tony Q.
Valenciano, Holding Of Religious Rituals At The Hall Of Justice Building In Quezon City:
[66]
Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public

money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium."
The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose."
"Appropriate" means "to prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or
to designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct use, or for the

payment of a particular demand."
Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is

ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of
words in which it is found with or with which it is associated. This is because
a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words
or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the
latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.
Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that
what is prohibited is the use of public money or property for the sole
purpose of benefiting or supporting any church. The prohibition
contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for
the furtherance of a particular church.
It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not
inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the
religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary
use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general."
Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even as it is
available for a civic parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred
to a religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage.
In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of

appropriation of public money or property, not as to whether a particular act
involves a direct or a mere incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have placed it before "use, benefit or
support" to describe the same. Even the exception to the same provision
bolsters this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation wherein
public funds are paid to a priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher, or dignitary because they rendered service in the armed forces, or
to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. That a
priest belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from
the money he received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of
public funds is merely to compensate the priest for services rendered and for
which other persons, who will perform the same services will also be
compensated in the same manner.
Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a

whole. As such, the foregoing interpretation finds support in the
Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is
proscribed is the passage of any law which tends to establish a religion, not
merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.[67]
Indeed, what is prohibited is the State using its resources to solely benefit one religion.
As stated above, the records do not show that the State has been using the resources
and manpower of PhilPost for INC's sole advantage. On the contrary, the stamps
printed and issued by PhilPost, as seen through its website, feature various entities and
organizations, other than religious sects.
The design of the INC commemorative stamp is merely an acknowledgment of

the historical and cultural contribution of INC to the Philippine society
Adopting the stance of benevolent neutrality, this Court deems the design of the INC
commemorative stamp constitutionally permissible. As correctly held by the CA, there is
an intrinsic historical value in the fact that Felix Y Manalo is a Filipino and that the INC
is a Filipino institution. It explained, thus:
xxx Both matters, "culture" and "national development," are secular in

character. Further, it cannot be denied that the part of the late Felix Y.
Manalo's cultural and historical contribution is his founding of the INC. This
circumstance, however, does not immediately put it in a religious light if it is
only the historical fact of establishment which is being mentioned, i.e.,
adding nothing more and without regard to its doctrine and teachings.
After arguing that the INC does not contribute to national development
because it does not pay taxes, (petitioner) Peralta now wants this Court to
enumerate INC's contributions to national development. This matter has
already been determined by the President of the Philippines, Congress, and
the National Historical Commission. It is not for this Court to question the
wisdom of these executive and legislative issuances nor supplant the same.
The task of this Court is to resolve whether the printing of the stamps is
constitutional in light of these executive and legislative determinations.
To reiterate, in the same manner that public property is allowed to be used

temporarily by different religions like roads or parks, the philatelic services
and products offered by (respondent) PhilPost for valuable consideration, can
be availed of not only by the INC but by other people or organizations as
well. For the above-stated reasons, this Court maintains its finding that the
printing and issuance of the INC Centennial stamps did not contravene
Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Besides, (petitioner's)
cause of action, which is injunction, necessarily fails as there is nothing more
to restrain or enjoin.[68]
Thus, this Court sees no religious overtones surrounding the commemorative stamps,
as insisted upon by the petitioner.
In the case of Aglipay,[69] the issuance and sale of postage stamps commemorating the
Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress was assailed on the ground that it
violated the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or
property for the benefit of any church. In ruling that there was no such violation, the
Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, held that:
xxx It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question
may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character,
the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church,
was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that
the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because
of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide
Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U.S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed.,
168.).[Emphasis Supplied.]
Indeed, the design depicted in the INC commemorative stamp is merely a recognition
of the continuous existence of a group that is strictly Filipino. As compared to major
religious groups established in the country, Felix Y. Manalo, and the INC, are not plain
religious symbols, but also a representation of a group that is distinctly unique to the
Philippines. To the mind of this Court, the use of the facade of the Church and the
image of Felix Y. Manalo is nothing more than an acknowledgment of a historical
milestone. It does not endorse, establish or disparage other religious groups and even
non-believers, especially considering the fact that PhilPost also print stamps with
symbols which can arguably be connected to religion. In the case of Manosca vs. Court
of Appeals,[70] this Court has already recognized Manalo's contribution to the Filipino
society:
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the
expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public
use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some
religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what
should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The
purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the
Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater
benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most
others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of public use. (Emphasis ours)
To debunk petitioner's claim that Section 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution[71] was
violated, We agree with PhilPost's view that:
xxx the printing and issuance of the assailed commemorative stamps were
not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were neither for the
benefit of INC, nor money derived from their sale inured to its benefit. xxx
the stamps delivered to INC were not free of charge and whatever income
derived from the sale to INC and of the excess to the postal clients were not
given to INC, but went to the coffers of PhilPost.[72]
All told, therefore, the Court finds no reason or basis to grant the petition. In refusing
to declare unconstitutional the INC's commemorative stamp, this Court is merely
applying jurisprudentially sanctioned policy of benevolent neutrality. To end, it bears to
emphasize that the Constitution establishes separation of the Church and the State,
and not separation of religion and state.[73]
WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the July 24, 2015 Decision, as well
as the March 8, 2016 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 103151.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Caguioa, A.

Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Carandang, J., on leave.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on December 4, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on January 31, 2019 at 9:10 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
EDGAR O.
ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-14.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Socorro B. Inting. CA rollo, pp. 79-94.
[3] Id. at 135-140.
[4] Rollo, p. 7; CA rollo, p. 80.
[5] Records, pp. 1-10.
[6] Section 29. xxx
xxxx
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,

directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination.
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
xxxx
[7] Records, pp. 4-7.
[8] Id. at 53-60.
[9] Id. at 105-112.
[10] Id. at 88-90.
[11] Id. at 109.
[12] Id. at 110-111.
[13] Penned by Presiding Judge Reynaldo G. Ros. CA rollo, pp. 30-31.
[14] As mentioned in the Petition of Renato V. Peralta Rollo, p. 3.
[15] Id.
[16] CA rollo, pp. 101-112.
[17] 64 Phil. 201, 209 (1937).
[18] Id.
[19] Rollo, p. 32.
[20] Id. at 32-35.
[21] 322 Phil. 442 (1996).
[22] See Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), et al. v. The Secretary of
Budget and Management, et al., 686 Phil. 357, 369 (2012); Advocates For Truth in
Lending, Inc., et al. v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, et al., 701 Phil. 483, 494
(2013); and Joya v. Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 296-A Phil.
595, 602 (1993).
[23] G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017.
[24] Meaning, an accomplished or consummated act.
[25] 563 Phil. 36, 68 (2007).
[26] 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
[27] Id. at 754.
[28] 582 Phil. 494 (2008).
[29] 559 Phil. 622 (2007).
[30] Mattel v. Francisco, supra note 28, id. at 502.
[31] 523 Phil. 550 (2006).
[33] 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
[34] Mattel v. Francisco, supra note 28, id. at 502-503.
[35] 509 Phil. 567 (2005).
[36] Mattel v. Francisco, supra note 28 at 503.
[37] 497 Phil. 689 (2005).
[39] 492 Phil. 592 (2005).
[41] 478 Phil. 941 (2004).
[43] G. R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018.
[44] 768 Phil. 334 (2015).
[45] 779 Phil. 75 (2016).
[46] 623 Phil. 63 (2009).
[47] Id. at 76.
[48] CA rollo, p. 84.
[49] Cruz, Philippine Political Law (2002), p. 68.
[50] Supra note 17.
[51] Id. at 205-207.
[52] 328 Phil. 893 (1996).
[53] Id. at 923-925.
[54] 455 Phil. 411 (2003).
[55] Id. at 573-575.
[56] A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, 819 SCRA 313.
[57] 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
[58] 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
[59] Records, p. 89.
[60] Id. at 88.
[61] 192 Phil. 36 (1981 ).
[62] Id. at 43-44.
[63] See https://www.phlpost.gov.ph/stamp-releases.php?id=3839. Visited September
14, 2018.
[64] https://www.phlpost.gov.ph/stamp-releases.php?id=3739.Visited September 14,

2018.
[65] https://www.phlpost.gov.ph/stamp-releases.php?page=30.Visited September 14,
2018.
[66] Supra note 56.
[67] Id. at 356-358.
[68] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[69] Supra note 17, id. at 209-210.
[70] Supra note 21, id. at 453.
[71] Section 29. I. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law. 2. No public money or property shall be appropriated,

applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. 3. All money collected on any tax
levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government.
[72] Rollo, p. 38.
[73] See Protestants and Other Americans United For Separation Of Church And State
vs. Lawrence F. O'BRIEN, Postmaster General of the United States, 272 F. Supp. 712
(1967)
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I dissent.
Enshrined as a major principle is the inviolabilty of separation of church and State.

Thus, in Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution:
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PRINCIPLES
....
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
This inviolability is without qualification. The provision requires fealty to a strict reading.
It should mean that the use of State resources to incidentally support a religion must
be inevitable and unavoidable.
An image[1] of the assailed centennial stamp is reproduced below:
(See image p. 2)
According to petitioner Peralta, the issuance of the Iglesia ni Cristo stamps is "purely
religious"[2] mainly because their design "commemorates the 100th year founding of
[Felix Y. Manalo] of [Iglesia Ni Cristo], his leadership as First Executive Minister and
with the [Iglesia Ni Cristo] Central Temple and Central Logo[.]"[3] As such, their
issuance and distribution are allegedly violative of the non-establishment clause and of
Article VI, Section 29(2) of the Constitution prohibiting the employment of public
money or property for the benefit of any religion.
The non-establishment clause is found in Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, thus:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.
Based on this provision, the State has two (2) fundamental duties: to respect the free
exercise of any religious faith; and to not establish, endorse, or favor any religion.[4] In
my dissent in Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano,[5] I stated:
There is no duration, degree of convenience, or extent of following that

justifies any express or implied endorsement of any religious message or
practice. There is also no type of endorsement allowed by the provision. It is
sufficient that the State, through its agents, favors expressly or impliedly a
religious practice.[6]
The non-establishment clause recognizes the cultural power of the State. In my dissent
in Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, I explained that:
Congealed in this provision is the concept that the Constitution

acknowledges the cultural power of the State. Government's resources, its
reach, and ubiquity easily affect public consciousness. For example, actions
of public officials are regular subjects of media in all its forms. The
statements and actions of public officials easily pervade public deliberation.
They also constitute frames for public debate on either personality or policy.
The rituals and symbolisms of government not only educate the public but
also etch civic and constitutional values into mainstream culture. The flag for
instance, reminds us of our colorful history. Flag ceremonies instill
passionate loyalty to the republic and the values for which it stands. Halls of
Justice consist of buildings to remind the public that their cases are given
equal importance. The arrangement of bench and bar within our courtrooms
exhibits the majesty of the law by allowing the judicial occupants to tower
over the advocates to a cause. This arrangement instills the civic value that
no one's cause will be above the law: that no matter one's creed or belief, all
will be equal.
Any unnecessary endorsement, policy, or program that privileges, favors,

endorses, or supports a religious practice or belief per se therefore would be
constitutionally impermissible. It communicates a policy that contrary beliefs
are not so privileged, not so favored, not so endorsed and unsupported by
the Constitutional order. It implies that those whose creeds or whose faiths
are different may not be as part of the political community as the other
citizens who understand the rituals that are supported. It is to install
discrimination against minority faiths or even against those who do not have
any faith whatsoever.[7]
Relatedly, Article VI, Section 29(2) of the Constitution prohibits the appropriation or
employment of public money or property for the use, benefit, or support of any religion:
Section 29.
....
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or

employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
The text of Article VI, Section 29(2) allows for no qualification. As I had previously
remarked in my dissent in Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano:
Section 29 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is straightforward and needs no

statutory construction. The religious use of public property is proscribed in
its totality. This proscription applies to any religion. This is especially so if
the accommodation for the use of public property is principally, primarily,
and exclusively only for a religious purpose.[8] (Emphasis in the original)
It is true that this Court has recognized one instance when governmental action may be
inextricably linked with an event that is religious in character. In the old case of Aglipay
v. Ruiz,[9] this Court allowed the "incidental endorsement" of a religion so long as the
challenged act has a secular purpose.
Gregorio Aglipay, then Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought to
enjoin the issuance and sale of commemorative stamps of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress of the Roman Catholic Church. He contended that the design and
the very issuance of the stamps violated the separation of church and State as well as
the constitutional prohibition on the appropriation of public money for the benefit of any
religion. The design of the stamp assailed in Aglipay contained a map of the Philippines
and the location of the City of Manila, with the inscription "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937."[10]
This Court dismissed the Petition, allowing the sale and distribution of the stamps. In so
ruling, the Court observed that the primary purpose for the issuance of the stamps was
secular. The stamps were designed in such a way that Manila was emphasized as the
seat of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Thus, while the event was "religious
in character,"[11] the distribution of the stamps was nevertheless allowed because the
main purpose for their sale and issuance was "to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourists to this country."[12] Through Justice Laurel, this Court said:
In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in

question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued
and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it
appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated
on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and
selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists
to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines
and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications [to] the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3,
petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually
designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church
chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the
location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is
not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines,
as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of
the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of
a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government.
We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its
activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be

frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.
[13] (Citations omitted)
Identifying the secular purpose in an image and projecting its dominance are not
enough. This mode of analysis invites courts to use their subjectivities in deciding how
to look at an image. In a country with a dominant religion, this spells disaster for those
whose faiths are not in the majority. It will also further marginalize those whose
spiritual beliefs are not theistic, e.g. Buddhists, or those who are agnostic or atheistic.
Iglesia ni Cristo's ability to fund the printing of the centennial stamps attests to its
cultural dominance. It also reveals that it has the resources to mark its own anniversary
through means other than the use of government facilities. Therefore, the
government's issuance of stamps in its favor has no other purpose other than to favor
its dominant religious teachings disguised through its anniversary.
Our reading of the non-establishment clause should not be as superficial. Dominant

religions may command their faithful to vote as a block for certain political candidates.
In doing so, they can slowly erode the separation of church and State, sacrificing
genuine sovereignty among our people. Therefore, the sponsorship of any faith through
a commemorative stamp unwittingly furthers proselytization.
Aglipay and the proposed decision record the pliability of our State to major religious
denominations. In the guise of looking for the dominant secular purpose or benevolent
neutrality,[14] current doctrine may only be favoring these religions.
Furthermore, it is not clear as to who decides that a particular religion is officially part
of government history. In lieu of subjectivity, we must return to the Constitution in
Article II, Section 6: the separation of church and State shall be inviolable. Should there
be a link between governmental action and religion, the burden is on the government to
show that the link is inevitable and unavoidable.
Our Bill of Rights protects those who do not count themselves as part of the dominant
religious faiths. Their beliefs, though fervent, may not translate to huge resources
allowing them to influence politics and the use of the State's resources. Yet, it is for
them that the assurance of separation of church and state has been made.
Reifying faith in Aglipay does the exact opposite. Unfortunately, I dissent on these
findings.
II
The Philippine Postal Corporation, in its Comment, maintains that "religion and politics
are inextricably linked[.]"[15] As basis, it again cites Aglipay, decided during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, where the Filipino people in the preamble implored
the aid of Divine Providence. The present Constitution, according to the preamble, was
ordained and promulgated with the aid of Almighty God.[16]
In my view, the preamble should not be a basis to raise the possibility of faiths which
are not theistic. The epilogue of my dissent in Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano remains
relevant here. The faiths which anchor our Constitution are diverse. It should not be the
monopoly of any sect. The diversity mandated by our Constitution deepens our
potentials as sovereigns. Therefore, to favor a belief system in a divine being, in any
shape, form, or manner, is to undermine the very foundations of our legal order.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The printing and issuance of the Iglesia ni Cristo commemorative stamps should be
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
[1]
<https://www.phlpost.gov.ph/images/stamps/phlpost_stamp_2014515_1813785396.jpg>
Last accessed on December 3, 2018.
[2] Rollo, p. 7.
[3] Id.
[4] See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Re: Letter ofTony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-
4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?

file=/jurisprudence/2017/march2017/10-4-19-SC_leonen.pdf> 10 [Per J. Mendoza, En
Banc].
[5] A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2017/march2017/10-4-19-SC.pdf> [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[6] Id. at 15.
[7] Id. at 14.
[8] Id. at 18.
[9] 64 Phil. 201 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
[10] Id. at 209.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 209-210.
[14] See Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
[15] Rollo, p. 29.
[16] The Preamble of the Constitution provides:
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and
secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace,
do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
Source: Supreme Court E-Library

This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System (E-LibCMS)

Peralta V Philpost

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Peralta V Philpost

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Peralta V Philpost

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

8/23/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

[ G.R. No. 223395, December 04, 2018 ]

RENATO V. PERALTA, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE POSTAL

Hence, the instant petition.

The Court's Ruling

Lastly, respondents contend that Section 29(2), Article VI of the 1987

Constitution does not apply, as it pertains to the Legislative Department. Respondents

The petition lacks merit.

Actual case or controversy -

An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights,

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case of controversy is the

[T]he moot-and-academic principle is not a magical formula that

xxx in Constantino v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),[29] Constantino, a

In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma,[31] the petition sought to declare as

In David v. Arroyo,[33] seven petitions for certiorari and prohibition were

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita,[35] the petition questioned the

In Atienza v. Villarosa,[37] the petitioners, as Governor and Vice Governor,

In Albaña v. Commission on Elections,[41] the petitioners therein assailed

Additionally, in Arvin R. Balag v. Senate of the Philippines,[43] We likewise mentioned

xxx in Republic v. Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Inc.,

jurisdiction over an injunction complaint filed against the Philippine Overseas

The non-establishment of religion clause is not equivalent to indifference to

It is at once apparent that petitioner has summarily equated religion to

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or

In upholding the issuance of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not

inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free

We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a

Religious Profession and Worship

The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold

(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases

(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or

rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious

By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion, the Filipinos

Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent

1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose;

This is not to suggest, however, that we are to engage in a legalistic minuet

In every Establishment Clause case, we must reconcile the inescapable

No significant segment of our society, and no institution within it can

Having in mind the above-stated rulings pertinent to the principle of non-establishment

5. Upon signing of this Agreement, INC shall pay m cash or by manager's

Also, We see no violation of the Constitutional prohibition on establishment of religion,

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a

As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden

The printing of the INC commemorative stamp is no different. It is simply an

Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public

to designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct use, or for the

Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is