Gaudioso Erezo V Aguedo
Gaudioso Erezo V Aguedo
Gaudioso Erezo V Aguedo
SYLLABUS
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
"The defendant does not deny that at the time of the fatal accident the cargo
truck driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia was registered in his name. He,
however, claims that the vehicle belonged to the Port Brokerage, of which he
was the broker at the time of the accident. He explained, and his explanation
was corroborated by Policarpio Franco, the manager of the corporation, that
the trucks of the corporation were registered in his name as a convenient
arrangement so as to enable the corporation to pay the registration fee with
his backpay as a pre-war government employee. Franco, however, admitted
that the arrangement was not known to the Motor Vehicles Office."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Against the judgment, the defendant has prosecuted this appeal claiming
that at the time of the accident the relation of employer and employee
between the driver and defendant-appellant was not established, it having
been proved at the trial that the owner of the truck was the Port Brokerage,
of which defendant-appellant was merely a broker. We find no merit or
justice in the above contention. In previous decisions, We already have held
that the registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is liable to
the public for the injuries or damages suffered by passengers or third
persons caused by the operation of said vehicle, even though the same had
been transferred to a third person. (Montoya v. Ignacio, 94 Phil., 182, 50
Off. Gaz., 108; Roque v. Malibay Transit Inc., 1 G. R. No. L-8561, November
18, 1955; Vda. de Medina v. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506, 52 Off. Gaz., [10],
4606.) The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with
vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to
assume or presume that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof,
for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions that they may
have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated
if the public should be required to prove who the actual owner is. How would
the public or third persons know against whom to enforce their rights in case
of subsequent transfers of the vehicles? We do not imply by this doctrine,
however, that the registered owner may not recover whatever amount he
had paid by virtue of his liability to third persons from the person to whom
he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the vehicle.
Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for a public service, should primarily be responsible to the public or to
third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven
on the highways or streets. The members of the Court are in agreement that
the defendant-appellant should be held liable to plaintiff-appellee for the
injuries occasioned to the latter because of the negligence of the driver,
even if the defendant- appellant was no longer the owner of the vehicle at
the time of the damage because he had previously sold it to another. What
is the legal basis for his (defendant-appellant’s) liability?
There is a presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is the defendant-
appellant as he is the registered owner in the Motor Vehicles Office. Should
he not be allowed to prove the truth, that he had sold it to another and thus
shift the responsibility for the injury to the real and actual owner? The
defendant holds the affirmative of this proposition; the trial court held the
negative.
The Revised Motor Vehicles Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides that
no vehicle may be used or operated upon any public highway unless the
same is properly registered. It has been stated that the system of licensing
and the requirement that each machine must carry a registration number,
conspicuously displayed, is one of the precautions taken to reduce the
danger of injury to pedestrians and other travellers from the careless
management of automobiles, and to furnish a means of ascertaining the
identity of persons violating the laws and ordinances, regulating the speed
and operation of machines upon the highways (2 R. C. L. 1176). Not only
are vehicles to be registered and that no motor vehicles are to be used or
operated without being properly registered for the current year, but that
dealers in motor vehicles shall furnish the Motor Vehicles Office a report
showing the name and address of each purchaser of motor vehicle during
the previous month and the manufacturer’s serial number and motor
number. (Section 5 [c], Act No. 3992, as amended.)
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by
which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases,
because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any
essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla v.
Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of
the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as
amended). The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is
caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be
fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous
where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or
drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor
vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination
of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.
With the above policy in mind, the question that defendant- appellant poses
is: should not the registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the
actual and real owner is, and in accordance with such proof escape or evade
responsibility and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle?
We hold with the trial court that the law does not allow him to do so; the
law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the
responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or
consequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evade
responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would
be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said
responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who
possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or
injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually
without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury
or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in
the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that
the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered
owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.
If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered
owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of the
person injured, that is, to prove that a third person or another has become
the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the
injured person.
The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and
would seem to conflict with truth and justice. We do not think it is so. A
registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the
recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him
to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee
of the vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving
him of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply
with the registration that the law demands and requires.