LA NAVAL DRUG CORPORATION v. CA , GR No.

103200, 1994-08-31
Facts:
This case before us concerns the jurisdiction of courts, in relation to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
876, and, in... that respect, the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel. The law (R.A. 876), specifically Section 6
Petitioner's claim for damages predicated on alleged tortuous acts of respondents La Naval Drug corporation such
as their alleged interference and dilatory tactics, etc. in the implementation of the Arbitration Agreement in the
Contract of Lease, thereby compelling... among others the petitioner to go to Court for redress; and respondent La
Naval Drug Corporation's counterclaim for damages may be entertained by this Court in a hearing - not summary -
for the purpose, under the Rules of Court
From the petition below of respondent Yao, it appears that he is the present owner of a commercial building a
portion of which is leased to petitioner under a contract of lease executed on December 23, 1983 with the former
owner thereof, La Proveedora, Inc., which... contract expired on April 30, 1989. However, petitioner exercised its
option to lease the same building for another five years. But petitioner and respondent Yao disagreed on the rental
rate, and to resolve the controversy, the latter, thru written notices to the former,... expressed his intention to
submit their disagreement to arbitration, in accordance with Republic Act 876, otherwise known as the Arbitration
Law,... respondent Yao appointed Domingo Alamarez, Jr. as his arbitrator, while on June 5, 1989, petitioner chose
Atty. Casiano Sabile as its arbitrator. The confirmation of the appointment of Aurelio Tupang, as third arbitrator,
was held in abeyance... because petitioner instructed Atty. Sabile to defer the same until its Board of Directors
could convene and approve Tupang's appointment. Respondent Yao theorizes that this was petitioner's design to
delay the arbitration proceedings, in violation of the Arbitration Law, and the... governing stipulations of their
contract of lease.
the respondent court sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdiction and is not competent to act on...
respondent Yao's claim for damages, which poses an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action. But the respondent
court was not persuaded by petitioner's submission.
While the appellate court has agreed with petitioner that, under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 876, a court, acting
within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may in this case solely determine the issue of whether the litigants
should proceed or not to arbitration, it,... however, considered petitioner in estoppel from questioning the
competence of the court to additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings private respondent's claim
for damages, it (petitioner) having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the court a... quo.
Issues:
the court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
Ruling:
The lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a
defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so
wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so... seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. The
decisions promulgated heretofore by this Court would likewise seemingly apply estoppel to bar the defendant
from... pursuing that defense by alleging in his answer any other issue for dismissing the action.
"Voluntary appearance cures defects of summons, if any. Such defect, if any, was further cured when defendant
filed its answer to the complaint. A defendant can not be permitted to speculate upon the judgment of the court
by objecting to the court's jurisdiction over... its person if the judgment is adverse to it, and acceding to jurisdiction
over its person if and when the judgment sustains its defenses."
Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an
affirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion,
however, of... affirmative defenses shall not be construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
In the case at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable, given the nature of the controversy. The
arbitration law explicitly confines the court's authority only to pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is
no agreement in writing providing for... arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute ordains that the court shall issue
an order "summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof." If
the court, upon the other hand, finds that no such agreement exists, "the... proceeding shall be dismissed." The
proceedings are summary in nature.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the trial court in question are SET ASIDE. The
court a quo, in the instant proceedings, is ordered to DESIST from further hearing private respondent's claim, as...
well as petitioner's counterclaim, for damages. No costs.

Atwel v. Concepcion Progressive Association (G.R. No.  169370)

Facts:

Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive Association (CPA) and in its behalf bought a
parcel of land to be converted to a wet market, to generate income which were mostly rentals paid to CPA. When
he died, his son petitioner Manuel Melgazo succeeded him as President and other petitioners as officers and they
started to process the registering of CPA as a stock corporation. Meanwhile, the other elected officers and
members formed their own group and registered themselves in SEC as officers and members of respondent CPAI.
The petitioners were not listed either as members or officers and respondent CPAI objected when they made
collection of the rental payments. CPAI filed a case in SEC for mandatory injunction but with the passage of RA
8799, was transferred to a special commercial court. Petitioners contend that since they were not CPAI members
the case did not involve intra-corporate dispute to warrant the jurisdiction of the commercial court.

Issue:

Whether or not there is intra-corporate dispute to warrant the jurisdiction of the special commercial court.

Ruling: NO.

To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy to be heard and decided by the RTC, two
elements must concur:

(1) the status or relationship of the parties and

(2) the nature of the question that is subject of their controversy.

The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations: (a)
between any or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members or associates; (b) between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which
they are stockholders, members or associates and (c) between such corporation, partnership or association and
the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchises. On the other hand, the second element requires that the
dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation. If the nature of the
controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-
corporate controversy.

In the case at bar, these elements are not present. The records reveal that petitioners were never officers nor
members of CPAI. CPAI itself admitted this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners were the only remaining members of
CPA which, obviously, was not the CPAI that was registered in the SEC.
Moreover, the issue in this case does not concern the regulation of CPAI (or even CPA). The determination as to
who is the true owner of the disputed property entitled to the income generated therefrom is civil in nature and
should be threshed out in a regular court. Cases of this nature are cognizable by the RTC under BP 129. Therefore,
the conflict among the parties here was outside the jurisdiction of the special commercial court.

GR No. 147406  July 14, 2008

Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes, petitioner
vs
People of the Philippines, respondent

Facts:
On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In his appeal
before the CA, the petitioner questioned for the first time the RTC’s jurisdiction.

CA, however, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the
jurisdiction of RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. CA
affirmed RTC’s decision.

[Sidenote: While not an issue, the SC clarified that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof. In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section
32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691. And so as the
imposable penalty for the crime charged is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
(imprisonment for 2 years 4 months and 1 day, to 6 years), jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on
MTC. Therefore, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.]

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. While both the appellate court and the Solicitor
General acknowledge the fact that RTC did not have jurisdiction, they nevertheless are of the position that the
principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC,
the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the
jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the
principle of laches will not be applicable.

Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC,
notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue during the trial and the alleged laches in
relation to the doctrine in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.

Held: YES. SC dismissed the case without prejudice.

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is the exception rather than the general rule. For it to be
invoked, laches should clearly be present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

SC clarified that in its past decisions concerning the same issue, it wavered on when to apply the exceptional
circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and
expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to
invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the
subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially
true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any
advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that
time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not
sustain the defense of estoppel by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not
sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that
he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case
of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the
judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain
in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94
is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

Guy v. Ignacio (G.R. No. 167824)

Facts:

Respondent Atty. Ignacio filed a complaint for blacklisting and deportation of herein petitioners-sisters, Geraldine
and Grace, before the Bureau of Immigration on the basis that they are Canadian citizens illegally working in the
Philippines. Acting on the complaint, the Special Prosecutor of the BI Commissioner issued a subpoena directing
petitioners to appear before the Commission and to bring pertinent documents relating to their current
immigration status, to which petitioners objected. Thus, the Board of Commissioners charged petitioners of
violating Philippine Immigration Laws. As a remedy, petitioners applied for TRO with RTC Manila, which the latter
granted enjoining respondents from further continuing with the deportation proceedings. However, on
respondents’ recourse to CA, the latter annulled the writ of injunction relying its decision on the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether the RTC Manila has jurisdiction to issue an injunction notwithstanding the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.

Ruling: YES.                                                    

It is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases
against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship. And a mere claim of citizenship
cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings. However, the
rule enunciated above admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned. In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, the Court ruled:

When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review
should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is,
therefore, not without exception. Judicial intervention, however, should be granted in cases where the claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words,
the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding.

The present case, as correctly pointed out by petitioners and wrongfully found by the CA, falls within the above-
cited exception considering that proof of their Philippine citizenship had been adduced, such as, the identification
numbers issued by the Bureau of Immigration confirming their Philippine citizenship, they have duly exercised and
enjoyed all the rights and privileges exclusively accorded to Filipino citizens, i.e., their Philippine passports issued
by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 202623,
November 27, 2013
Remedial law; Doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that
its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies,
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the
matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case,
the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the
case without prejudice. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some
question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
Exceptions to the rule on primary jurisdiction. There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its
application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the present case. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in
violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.
Administrative law; The Commission on Audit (COA) has primary jursidiction over money claims against the
government.  It is the COA and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioner’s money claim
against respondent local government unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties’ failure to argue the
issue nor active participation in the proceedings. Respondent’s collection suit being directed against a local
government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have
suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA.

SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, GR No. 173840, 2012-04-25

Facts:
As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II), an
electric cooperative providing electric service to all members-consumers in all municipalities within the Second
Congressional District of the Province... of Samar, individual petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005 on
January 22, 2005.
The said resolution disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD effective
February 2005 until the end of his term as director. The same resolution also disqualified him for one (1) term to
run as a candidate for director in the upcoming district... elections.
Convinced that his rights as a director of petitioner SAMELCO II had been curtailed by the subject board resolution,
private respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against petitioner SAMELCO II, impleading individual
petitioners as directors thereof, in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Calbiga, Samar. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. C-2005-1085 and was raffled to
Branch 33 of the said court x x x.
In his petition, private respondent prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 5, [Series] of 2005, contending that
it was issued without any legal and factual bases.
In their answer to the petition for prohibition, individual petitioners raised the affirmative defense of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Individual petitioners assert that, since the matter
involved an electric cooperative, SAMELCO II,... primary jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification
Administration (NEA).
Issues:
IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED LEGAL ERRORS IN LIMITING THE DOCTRINE TO "CERTAIN MATTERS IN CONTROVERSIES
INVOLVING SPECIALIZED DISPUTES" AND IN UPHOLDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
OVER THE URGENT PETITION FOR PROHIBITION FILED BY RESPONDENT SELUDO ON THE GROUND THAT THE
ISSUES RAISED THEREIN "DO NOT REQUIRE THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE OF THE NEA"
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN SUSTAINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT, COMMITTED AN
ERROR OF LAW BY HOLDING THAT "A PERUSAL OF THE LAW CREATING THE NEA DISCLOSES THAT THE NEA WAS
NOT GRANTED THE POWER TO HEAR AND DECIDE CASES INVOLVING THE VALIDITY OF BOARD
RESOLUTIONS UNSEATING ANY MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS" AND THAT "NEITHER WAS IT GRANTED
JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS."... who between the RTC and the
NEA has primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by
SAMELCO II.
Ruling:
Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of P.D. No. 1645, provides:
Section 5. Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. - In the exercise of its power of supervision and control over
electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue orders,
rules and regulations and motu... proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda and
other similar actions in all matters affecting said electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or
controlled entities.
In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 7 of P.D. No. 1645,
states:
Section 7. Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 24. Board of Directors. - (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its Board, subject to the
supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board
meetings and deliberations and to approve all... policies and resolutions.
A comparison of the original provisions of Sections 10 and 24 of P.D. No. 269 and the amendatory provisions under
Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645 would readily show that the intention of the framers of the amendatory law is to
broaden the powers of the NEA.
A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No. 269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the
authority of the NEA to exercise supervision and control over electric cooperatives. In administrative law,
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an... officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties.[5]  If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.[6] Control, on the... other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
A careful reading of the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1645 clearly show that, pursuant to its power of
supervision and control, the NEA is granted  the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as
well as to issue orders, rules and... regulations  with respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. Certainly,
the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically
removed respondent from his position as a member of the Board of Directors... and further disqualified him to run
as such in the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, comes within the
ambit of the powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645.
It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,... has been placed within the special competence of an administrative
agency.[9]  In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its... view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.  The
Court, in a long line of cases,[11] has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is
a pre-condition... that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him.  Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy... must be exhausted first before the court's power of
judicial review can be sought.[12] The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action.[13]
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may... be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain
exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal,... amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved... is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where
the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate
due process; (i) where the issue... of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j)
where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in
quo warranto proceedings.

CITY OF TAGUIG v. CITY OF MAKATI, GR No. 208393, 2016-06-15

Facts:
The Complaint (Territorial Dispute Case) was denominated as one for "Judicial Confirmation of the Territory and
Boundary Limits of Tagig [sic] and Declaration of the Unconstitutionality and Nullity of Certain Provisions of
Presidential Proclamations 2475 and 518, with Prayer for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order."
In this Complaint, Taguig asserted that the areas... comprising the Enlisted Men's Barangays, or EMBOs, as well as
the area referred to as Inner Fort in Fort Bonifacio, were within its territory and jurisdiction.
the Regional Trial Court, through Judge Briccio C. Ygaña (Judge Ygaña), ruled in favor of Taguig.
On July 28, 2001, Makati filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment[15] under Rule 47 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
It assailed the Regional
Trial Court's July 8, 2011 Decision as having been rendered without jurisdiction and in violation of due process.[17] It
claimed that the July 8, 2011 Decision was rendered by Judge Ygaña after he had retired, and was merely antedated
(i.e., to make it... appear that it was rendered before he retired).[18] It prayed that this Decision be annulled and set
aside.[19]
Also following the Regional Trial Court's July 8, 2011 Decision, Makati filed before the same court its Motion for
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the July 8, 2011 Decision.
Court of Appeals denied Taguig's Motion to Dismiss.
In the Resolution dated December 18, 2012,[64] the Court of Appeals granted Taguig's Motion for Reconsideration
and dismissed Makati's Petition for Annulment of Judgment: (1) for being functus officio and/or moot; (2) for being
premature; and (3) for... forum shopping.
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that in filing a Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for Annulment of
Judgment, Makati effectively split a single cause of action and thereby engaged in forum shopping.[69]
Construing the Court of Appeals' silence (in its July 25, 2013 Resolution) on the issue of forum shopping as a "denial
of the relief sought[,]"[81] petitioner City of Taguig comes to this Court through the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prays that the assailed Court of Appeals' April 30, 2013 and July 25,
2013 Resolutions be modified by including a declaration that respondent City of Makati is guilty of willful and
deliberate forum shopping and that appropriate... sanctions be imposed.[82]
Issues:
whether respondent City of Makati engaged in forum shopping in simultaneously pursuing: first, a Petition for
Annulment of the July 8, 2011 Regional Trial Court Decision; and second, a Motion for Reconsideration (later Appeal)
of the same July
8, 2011 Decision.
Ruling:
Respondent City of Makati pursued two (2) simultaneous remedies: a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule
47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 120495); and a Motion for Reconsideration
(later, an Appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
98377).
Alaban v. Court of Appeals[102] discussed the nature, purpose, and availability of petitions for annulment of
judgment:
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that
there will be a renewal of... litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of... jurisdiction or denial of due process. A
person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected...
thereby.[103] (Emphasis supplied)
No stretch of legal imagination can justify as final and executory the Order assailed in the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed by respondent City of Makati. It was still subject to appeal. Respondent City of Makati's having availed
itself of this remedy is, in fact, the... entire impetus for this Decision.
Besides, a Rule 47 petition was not even opportune. It was not as though respondent City of Makati was left with no
other remedy but a Rule 47 petition. Lack of jurisdiction could have just as easily been raised as an error in its Appeal
or in its Motion for Reconsideration.
It is as much a cause for pursuing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal as it is for pursuing a petition for
annulment of judgment.
Principles:
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals[87] recounted that forum shopping originated as a concept in
private international law:
To begin with, forum-shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident litigants are
given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to
secure procedural advantages,... to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a
more friendly venue. To combat these less than honorable excuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was
developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its... jurisdiction where it is not the
most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
In this light, Black's Law Dictionary says that forum-shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in
a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict." Hence,
according to Words and
Phrases, "a litigant is open to the charge of 'forum shopping' whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to
factual circumstances surrounding his suit, and litigants should be encouraged to attempt to settle their differences
without imposing undue expense and... vexatious situations on the courts."[88] (Emphasis in the original)
Jurisprudence has recognized that forum shopping can be committed in several ways:
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and the same... prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for
dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with diiferent prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also... either litis pendentia or res judicata).[94]
(Emphasis in the original)
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether
the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another; otherwise... stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.[97]

CASE DIGEST
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

versus

MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND “BONGBONG” R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA.
ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and
PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO,
Respondents.

G. R. No. 171701

February 8, 2012

FACTS:
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino created the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) that was primarily tasked to investigate and recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and associates.

On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint
for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by
his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong
Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.  

Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive participation and collaboration of another persons, viz. Nemesio
G. Co and Yeungs (Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda Cojuangco for the
estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Prime Holdings, in the alleged illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses in relation to
the ₱200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten wealth allegation.

Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter objected on the ground that
the documents were unauthenticated and mere photocopies.

On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the documentary exhibits formally offered by the
prosecution; however, their evidentiary value was left to the determination of the Court.

Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma.
Araneta III;Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO filed their respective Demurrers to
Evidence.

On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers to evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos.
The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of Gregorio Maria AranetaIII are accordingly lifted.

With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court noted that
their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never established; neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint their
involvement therein. The court held that all presented evidence are hearsay, for being merely photocopies and that the originals
were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out
that petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to
show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had
allegedly acquired illegally, her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel and to prove how the Marcoses
used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the bus company PANTRANCO.

Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed to
demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that they were dummies of the Marcoses.
Again, the court held that the documentary evidence relevant to this allegation was INADMISSIBLE for being mere photocopies,
and that the affiants had not been presented as witnesses.

ISSUE:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRERS TO EVIDENCE FILED BY RESPONDENTS MA.
IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR.; RESPONDENT-SPOUSES
GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA AND RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG
CHUN FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO

RULING:

It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations; the operative act on how and in what manner must be clearly shown through
preponderance of evidence.

The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative; therefore,
to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner’s allegations. Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation of
best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. Furthermore, petitioner did not even
attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court such
documents as secondary evidence absent the affiant’s testimony.

The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Under
Section 3 (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,’
the original thereof need not be presented. However, all except one of the exhibits are not necessarily public documents. The
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a public document but what the
plaintiff presented was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even signed by the
stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide that when the original document is in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof may prove its
contents.

In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the
original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the original. None of the abovementioned requirements were complied by the plaintiff.Exhibits ‘P’, ‘Q’, ‘R’,
‘S’, and ‘T’ were all photocopies. ‘P’, ‘R’, and ‘T’ were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court. Exhibit ‘S’ is a
letter, which is clearly a private document. It is emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still
be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify them.
Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule rendered the offered documentary evidence futile and worthless in
alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.Hence, Sandiganbayan is
correct in granting the respondents respective Demurers to evidence.