Acap v. CA
Acap v. CA
Acap v. CA
TEODORO ACAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDY DE LOS REYES,
respondents.
Property; Ownership; An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from
a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res—that right
or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law; While title is the juridical
justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.—
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a
juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or
title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights
are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is
the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
Same; Same; Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally
classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode and the derivative mode.—Under Article 712 of
the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two (2) classes, namely,
the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and
the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts,
such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).
Same; Same; Sales; Succession; “Contract of Sale” and “Declara-tion of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights,” Distinguished.—In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and
effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other
party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship
and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the
intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It
is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a
waiver of hereditary rights; A stranger to succession cannot conclusively claim ownership over a lot on the
sole basis of a waiver document which does not recite the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any
other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.—Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of
hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed
of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where
there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and
intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent,
being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the
subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or
a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
Same; Same; Land Titles; Adverse Claims; Words and Phrases; A notice of adverse claim is nothing
but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in
court at some future date.—A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private
respondent’s ownership over the tenanted lot. “A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim
adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some future
date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in court.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a person’s right or interest in a lot in question remains an adverse
claim, the same cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land.—It is to be noted that while
the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale
was executed between Cosme Pido’s heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido’s heirs
to
32
the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent’s right or interest therefore in the
tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land
and title the same in private respondent’s name.
PADILLA, J.:
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of2 the Court of Appeals, 2nd Division,
in CA-G.R. No. 36177, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental holding that private respondent Edy de los Reyes had
acquired ownership of Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
based on a document entitled “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights,” and ordering the
dispossession of petitioner as leasehold tenant of the land for failure to pay rentals.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was
evidenced by OCT No. R-12179. The lot has an area of 13,720 sq. meters. The title was issued
and is registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both
spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly
notarized document entitled “Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale” in favor of
Cosme Pido.
The evidence before the court a quo established that since 1960, petitioner Teodoro Acap
had been the tenant of a portion of
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1 Penned by Purisima, J., Chairman, with Isnani, J. and Ibay-Somera, J., concurring.
2 Penned by Executive Judge Jose Aguirre, Jr.
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VOL. 251, DECEMBER 7, 1995 33
Acap vs. Court of Appeals
the said land, covering an area of nine thousand five hundred (9,500) square meters. When
ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the
registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter,
upon Pido’s death, to his widow Laurenciana.
The controversy began when Pido died intestate and on 27 November 1981, his surviving
heirs executed a notarized document denominated as “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre,” wherein they declared, to quote its pertinent
portions, that:
“x x x Cosme Pido died in the Municipality of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, he died intestate and
without any known debts and obligations which the said parcel of land is (sic) held liable.
That Cosme Pido was survived by his/her legitimate heirs, namely: LAURENCIANA PIDO, wife, ELY,
ERVIN, ELMER, and ELECHOR all surnamed PIDO; children;
That invoking the provision of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the above-mentioned heirs do
hereby declare unto [sic] ourselves the only heirs of the late Cosme Pido and that we hereby adjudicate
unto ourselves 3 the above-mentioned parcel of land in equal shares. Now, therefore, We
LAURENCIANA, ELY, ELMER, ERVIN and ELECHOR all surnamed PIDO, do hereby waive, quitclaim
all our rights, interests and participation over the said parcel of land in favor of EDY DE LOS REYES, of
legal age, (f)ilipino, married4 to VIRGINIA DE LOS REYES, and resident of Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, Philippines. x x x” (Italics supplied)
The document was signed by all of Pido’s heirs. Private respondent Edy de los Reyes did not
sign said document.
It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido’s death, title to the property continued to be
registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship
with Waiver of Rights in his favor, private respondent Edy de los Reyes filed the same with
the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice
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3 The RTC decision used the name Luzviminda. The CA used the name Laudenciana.
4 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p. 14.
34
without his knowledge, R.A. 3844, as amended, grants him the right to redeem the same at a
reasonable price. Petitioner also bewailed private respondent’s ejectment action as a violation
of his right to security of tenure under P.D. 27.
On 20 August 1991, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, the
dispositive part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Edy de los
Reyes, and against the defendant, Teodoro Acap, ordering the following, to wit:
In arriving at the above-mentioned judgment, the trial court stated that the evidence had
established that the subject land was “sold” by the heirs of Cosme Pido to private respondent.
This is clear from the following disquisitions contained in the court’s six (6) page decision:
“There is no doubt that defendant is a registered tenant of Cosme Pido. However, when the latter died
their tenancy relations changed since ownership of said land was passed on to his heirs who, by
executing a Deed of Sale, which defendant admitted in his affidavit, likewise passed on their ownership
of Lot 1130 to herein plaintiff (private respondent). As owner hereof, plaintiff has the right to demand
6
payment of rental and the tenant is obligated to pay rentals due from the time demand is made. x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Certainly, the sale of the Pido family of Lot 1130 to herein plaintiff does not of itself extinguish the
relationship. There was only a
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5 Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo, p. 29.
6 Ibid.,p. 27.
36
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acap vs. Court of Appeals
change of the personality of the lessor in the person of herein plaintiff Edy de los Reyes who being the
purchaser or transferee, assumes 7
the rights and obligations of the former landowner to the tenant
Teodoro Acap, herein defendant.”
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, imputing error to the lower court when
it ruled that private respondent acquired ownership of Lot No. 1130 and that he, as tenant,
should pay rentals to private respondent and that failing to pay the same from 1983 to 1987,
his right to a certificate of land transfer under P.D. 27 was deemed forfeited.
The Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioner’s argument that the Declaration of Heirship
and Waiver of Rights (Exhibit “D”), the document relied upon by private respondent to prove
his ownership to the lot, was excluded by the lower court in its order dated 27 August 1990.
The order indeed noted that the document was not identified by Cosme Pido’s heirs and was
not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental. According to respondent court,
however, since the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights appears to have been duly
notarized, no further proof of its due execution was necessary. Like the trial court, respondent
court was also convinced that the said document stands as prima facieproof of appellee’s
(private respondent’s) ownership of the land in dispute.
With respect to its non-registration, respondent court noted that petitioner had actual
knowledge of the subject sale of the land in dispute to private respondent because as early as
1983, he (petitioner) already knew of private respondent’s claim over the said land but which
he thereafter denied, and that in 1982, he (petitioner) actually paid rent to private respondent.
Otherwise stated, respondent court considered this fact of rental payment in 1982 as estoppel
on petitioner’s part to thereafter refute private respondent’s claim of ownership over the said
land. Under these circumstances, respondent court ruled that indeed there was deliberate
refusal by petitioner to pay rent for a continued period of five years that merited forfeiture of
his otherwise preferred right to the issuance of a certificate of land transfer.
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7 Ibid.,p. 28.
37
In the present petition, petitioner impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals as not in
accord with the law and evidence when it rules that private respondent acquired ownership of
Lot No. 1130 through the aforementioned Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights.
Hence, the issues to be resolved presently are the following:
Petitioner argues that the Regional Trial Court, in its order dated 7 August 1990, explicitly
excluded the document marked as Exhibit “D” (Declaration of Heirship, etc.) as private
respondent’s evidence because it was not registered with the Registry of Deeds and was not
identified by anyone of the heirs of Cosme Pido. The Court of Appeals, however, held the same
to be admissible, it being a notarized document, hence, a prima facie proof of private
respondents’ ownership of the lot to which it refers.
Petitioner points out that the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is not one of the
recognized modes of acquiring ownership under Article 712 of the Civil Code. Neither can the
same be considered a deed of sale so as to transfer ownership of the land to private respondent
because no consideration is stated in the contract (assuming it is a contract or deed of sale).
Private respondent defends the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as in accord with
the evidence and the law. He posits that while it may indeed be true that the trial court
excluded his Exhibit “D” which is the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights as part of
his evidence, the trial court declared him nonetheless owner of the subject lot based on other
evidence adduced during the trial, namely, the notice of adverse claim (Exhibit “E”) duly
registered by him with the Registry of Deeds, which contains the questioned Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver
38
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8 Reyes, An Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. II, p. 20.
9 Article1458, Civil Code.
10 Paulmitos v. CA, G.R. No. 61584, Nov. 25, 1992, 215 SCRA 867, 868;Uberas v. CFI of Negros, G.R. No. 4248,
October 30, 1978, 86 SCRA 145, 147; Abrasia v. Carian, G.R. No. 9510, October 31, 1957.
39
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of
hereditary
11
rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the
parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is
an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence
and intention
12
to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the
succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot
conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on 13
the sole basis14 of the waiver document
which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative
mode of acquiring ownership. Quite surprisingly, both the trial court and public respondent
Court of Appeals concluded that a “sale” transpired between Cosme Pido’s heirs and private
respondent and that petitioner acquired actual knowledge of said sale when he was summoned
by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to discuss private respondent’s claim over the lot in
question. This conclusion has no basis both in fact and in law.
On record, Exhibit “D,” which is the “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights”
was excluded by the trial court in its order dated 27 August 1990 because the document was
neither registered with the Registry of Deeds nor identified by the heirs of Cosme Pido. There
is no showing that private respondent had the same document attached to or made part of the
record. What the trial court admitted was Annex “E,” a notice of adverse claim filed with the
Registry of Deeds which contained the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of rights and was
annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of Title to the land in question.
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11 See Aguirre v. Atienza, G.R. No. L-10665, Aug. 30, 1958; Mari v. Bonilla, G.R. No. 852, March 19, 1949; Robles v.
CA, G.R. No. L-47494, 83 SCRA 181, 182, May 15, 1978.
12 See Borromeo Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-41171, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 171.
13 See note 10—supra.
14 Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., No. 16544, March 20, 1921.
40
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private respondent’s
ownership over the tenanted lot. “A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim
adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some
future date, and is15
no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already
pending in court.”
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no
evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido’s heirs and private
respondent transferring the rights of Pido’s heirs to the land in favor of private respondent.
Private respondent’s right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim
which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private
respondent’s name.
Consequently, while the transaction between Pido’s heirs and private respondent may be
binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to the land cannot be
perfunctorily forfeited on a mere allegation of private respondent’s ownership without the
corresponding proof thereof.
Petitioner had been a registered tenant in the subject land since 1960 and religiously paid
lease rentals thereon. In his mind, he continued to be the registered tenant of Cosme Pido and
his family (after Pido’s death), even if in 1982, private respondent allegedly informed
petitioner that he had become the new owner of the land.
Under the circumstances, petitioner may have, in good faith, assumed such statement of
private respondent to be true and may have in fact delivered 10 cavans of palay as annual
rental for 1982 to private respondent. But in 1983, it is clear that petitioner had misgivings
over private respondent’s claim of ownership over the said land because in the October 1983
MAR conference, his wife Laurenciana categorically denied all of private respondent’s
allegations. In fact, petitioner even secured a certificate from the MAR dated 9 May 1988 to
the effect that he
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15 Somes v. Government of the Philippines, No. 42754, October 30, 1935, 62 Phil. 432.
41
continued to be the registered tenant of Cosme Pido and not of private respondent. The reason
is that private respondent never registered the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights
with the Registry of Deeds or with the MAR. Instead, he (private respondent) sought to do
indirectly what could not be done directly, i.e., file a notice of adverse claim on the said lot to
establish ownership thereover.
It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that there was no unjustified or deliberate refusal by
petitioner to pay the lease rentals or amortizations to the landowner/agricultural lessor which,
in this case,
16
private respondent failed to establish in his favor by clear and convincing
evidence.
Consequently, the sanction of forfeiture of his preferred right to be issued a Certificate of
Land Transfer under P.D. 27 and to the possession of his farmholdings should not be applied
against petitioners, since private respondent has not established a cause of action for recovery
of possession against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 1 May 1994 which affirmed the decision of the RTC of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental dated 20 August 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE. The private
respondent’s complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner Acap is
hereby DISMISSED for failure to properly state a cause of action, without prejudice to private
respondent taking the proper legal steps to establish the legal mode by which he claims to
have acquired ownership of the land in question.
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted. Judgment set aside, complaint for recovery of possession dismissed.
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16 See Laureto v. CA, G.R. No. 95838, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 397;Cuno v. CA, G.R. L-62985, April 2, 1984, 128
SCRA 567.
42
Notes.—The right to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death
and do not vest in his heirs until such time. (Locsin vs. Court of Appeals,206 SCRA 383 [1992])
In proceeding with the actual partition of the properties mentioned in the deed of
extrajudicial partition, the parties are duty bound to abide by the mutual waiver of rights
agreed upon in the document. (Divina vs. Court of Appeals,220 SCRA 597 [1993])