FELICIANO VS COMMISSION ON AUDIT

A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of Leyte Metropolitan
Water District LMWD. Subsequently, Leyte Metropolitan Water District received a letter from COA
dated July 19 1999 requesting payment of auditing fees. As General Manager of LMWD, ENGR.
RANULFO C. FELICIANO sent a reply informing COAs Regional Director that the water district could
not pay the auditing fees. Petitioner cited as basis for his action Sections 6 and 20 of Presidential
Decree 198 ("PD 198") 2, as well as Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 ("RA 6758").

Petitioner also wrote COA for refund of all auditing fees LMWD previously paid to COA.

SECTIONS 6 and 20 of PD 198

SECTION 18 RA 6758

On 16 March 2000, petitioner received COA Resolution from Chairman Celso Gangans denying his
requests. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 31 March 2000, which COA denied on 30
January 2001.

On 13 March 2001, petitioner filed this instant petition. Attached to the petition were resolutions of the
Visayas Association of Water Districts (VAWD) and the Philippine Association of Water Districts
(PAWD) supporting the petition.

Whether a Local Water District ("LWD") created under PD 198, as amended, is a government-owned
or controlled corporation subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA

YES The Constitution and Section 26, Government Auditing Code of the Philippines mandate COA to
audit all government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations ("GOCCs")
with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC with an original charter. Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the
Constitution provides for COAs audit jurisdiction to any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters

Whether LWDs are Private or Government-Owned

and Controlled Corporations with Original Charters

Petitioner theorizes that what PD 198 created was the Local Waters Utilities Administration ("LWUA")
and not the LWDs. 

 Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations
except by a general law applicable to all citizens.

LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special charter.

Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through

special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can
create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled.

Since under the Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations may have special
charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they are government-owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs
are private corporations with a special charter is to admit that their existence is constitutionally infirm.

Unlike private corporations, which derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code,
LWDs derive their legal existence and power from PD 198. 
LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created under the Corporation Code. LWDs
are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code
states that "[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission articles of incorporation x x x." LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators
and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board directors
of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. 

ABBAS vs COMELEC

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in
Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No.
6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by DATU FIRDAUSI ABBAS et al (representing the
taxpayers of Mindanao) may generally be categorized into either of the following:

(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and

(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

The Tripoli Agreement, Agreement Between the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the
Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front, provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the
southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy."

In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras . Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted
and signed into law.

WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.

NO. it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is
so provided in the Constitution. Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it
would then constitute part of the law of the land.. But it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an
enactment of the Congress of the Philippines.

WON R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X. Petitioner contends that the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such
that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

NO. The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the
plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units. What is required by the
Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and
not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.

Under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be
included in the autonomous region.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court finds that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption.

DISOMANGCOP VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS

Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The law called for
the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte,
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General
Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. 6 In the ensuing plebiscite held on
19 November 1989, only four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on 12 October 1990,
Executive Order No. 426 (E.O. 426), entitled "Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the
Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under
the Autonomous Regional Government.

Nearly nine (9) years later, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary Gregorio R.
Vigilar issued Department Order. 119 which creates the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office

Almost two (2) years later, on 17 January 2001, then President Joseph E. Estrada approved and
signed into law R.A. 8999. The text of the law reads: AN ACT ESTABLISHING AN ENGINEERING
DISTRICT IN THE FIRST DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS

Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054), entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending Republic Act No. 6734,."
R.A. 9054 lapsed into law.

Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity as Officer-in-
Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of the
Department of Public Works and Highways, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DPWH-
ARMM) in Lanao del Sur.to annul and set aside D.O. 119; (2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary
from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public works projects intended for
Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative
regions of DPWH;

To support their petition, petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion
and that it violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged
Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have
already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.

WON R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional and were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

YES. Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the administrative and fiscal
management of public works and funds for public works to the ARG. Section 20, Article VI of R.A.
9054,
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public
Works and Highways. In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in
effect superseded E.O. 124. In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different
vintages, the later enactment prevails because it is the later legislative will.

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

R.A. 9054 states that "all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly."93 With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that
D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.

They implemented R.A. 8999 despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They maintained the DPWH
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus
officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.

Court, however, cannot uphold petitioners' argument that R.A. 8999 was signed into law under
suspicious circumstances to support the assertion that there was a capricious and whimsical exercise
of legislative authority. Once more, this Court cannot inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or
expediency of the acts of the legislative branch.

Let a writ of prohibition ISSUE commanding respondents to desist from implementing R.A. 8999 and
D.O. 119, and maintaining the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and the First
Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur comprising the City of Marawi and the
municipalities within the First District of Lanao del Sur.

IMBONG VS. OCHOA

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society came to strike down constitutional disobedience. the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-
intervention: including among others Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 5 filed by spouses Attys.
James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution

Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:

Petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH
Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify
the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.

The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a
product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).

(Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of
the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health )
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a
period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013

 PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

WON RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17
of the Local Government Code.
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the
powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code.
Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph
(c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-
funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure
projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under
the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the
implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases
supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU
is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act,
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of
health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals, 272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation.
Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these
services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability
of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law
amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the
local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally
applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. These provisions relied upon
by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government.

Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded
to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the
relationship between the national and the regional governments. 274 Except for the express and implied
limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent
and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.

PANDI VS CA

Dr. Jamila Macacua

Dr. Lampa Pandi
Dr. Mamasao Sani
Lanao Del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid Mutilan
Dr. Amer Saber
President Fidel V. Ramos

On August 9, 1993, Dr. Jarmila B. Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director4 and as Secretary5 of
the Department of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao issued a Memorandum
designating Dr. Lampa I.Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai
Pakpak General Hospital IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum, Macacua detailed
that Dr. Mamasao Sani), be transferred to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City.

However, On September 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office
Order No. 07 designating Dr. Amer A.Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del
Sur.

RTC: On August 12, 1993, Sani filed a complaint6 with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur,
Branch 10, Marawi City challenging the August 9, 1993 Memorandum transferring him to the DOH-
ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, alleging that he has a permanent appointment as provincial
health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
CA: On October 5, 1993, Saber filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with prayer
for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-
APGH, Lanao del Sur.

Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Pandi from further discharging the
functions and duties as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

On October 29, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 133 transferring the
powers and functions of the Department of Health in the region to the Regional Government of the
ARMM. Macacua however issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandi’s designation as Officer-in-Charge
of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, as well as Sani’s detail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM
in Cotabato City.

Pandi and Macacua cited as reason the enactment of the ARMM Local Government Code as well as
the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement between the DOH of the National Government and
the ARMM Regional Government

CA: The Court of Appeals held that Saber is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-
APGH, Lanao del Sur. The Court of Appeals ruled that Lanao del Sur Governor Mahid Mutilan has the
power and authority to appoint the provincial health officer under the Local Government Code of 1991.
CA maintained that the Organic Act of 1989 and the ARMM Local Code could not prevail over
the 1991 LGU Code.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL
GOVERNOR OF THE ARMM HAS ONLY A RECOMMENDATORY PREROGATIVE IN THE
APPOINTMENT OF PROVINCIAL HEALTH OFFICER UNDER SECTION 457 OF THE ARMM
LOCAL CODE;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
ORGANIC ACT OF 1989 IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE 1991 LGU CODE AND THAT THE FORMER
PREVAILS OVER THE LATTER;

Macacua, as Regional Director and Regional Secretary of Health, designated Pandi Officer-in-Charge
of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on August 9, 1993 and again on November 6, 1993. The
designation dated August 9, 1993 is void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yet
exercise supervision and control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, the
designation of Pandi on November 6, 1993 is valid since at that time Executive Order No. 133 had
already been issued vesting in the Regional Secretary of Health supervision and control over all
functions and activities of the Department of Health in the ARMM. The designation of Pandi, however,
while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is
made.

Application of the law to the designation of Saber

Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated Saber as Officer-in-Charge of the
IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on September 15, 1993. On this date the provincial health officer of
Lanao del Sur was still a national government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial
health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province.
The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial health officer. The
Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any
province within the region. Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no
power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the
designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void.

The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only after the
effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25,
1994 and approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code but
after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed the provincial health
officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the provincial health officer to any province
within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even designate the Officer-in-
Charge of the provincial health office.

The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as Provincial Governor
Mutilan’s authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which provides
that "[T]he appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and municipal
governments," is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers. It is
simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In
short, the appointment of local health officers, being essential for public services, is a mandatory
obligation on the part of those vested by law with the power to appoint them. Moreover, as explained
earlier, the 1991 LGU Code did not amend the Organic Act of 1989.

Application of the law to the appointment and transfer of Sani

Sani was appointed provincial health officer by then Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon on
January 1, 1988. He was appointed as "Provincial Health Officer (R-05 5th Step), Office of the
Regional Health Director, Regional Health Office No. XII, Cotabato City." Sani was  appointed
provincial health officer in Region XII since at that time Executive Order No. 119, the charter of the
Department of Health, expressly stated that provincial health officers were to be appointed to a region.
The Secretary of Health, upon recommendation of the Regional Director, could assign provincial
health officers to any province within the region. In Miclat vs. Ganaden,23 this Court held that:

"While the doctrine x x x to the effect that the transfers of officers against their will amount to a
removal, the same is predicated upon the theory that said officers are appointed to particular
stations and as such cannot be transferred without their consent. x x x.
 The case before us, however, does not involve any appointment to any particular station. It
merely concerns an assignment to a station made in the interest of the service. x x x."

Consequently, Sani cannot claim any security of tenure as provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur
because he was never appointed to that office.

Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and ARMM Secretary of Health, detailed Sani to the
DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City on August 9, 1993. As of that date, the powers and
functions of the Department of Health were not yet transferred to the Regional Government, and the
Secretary of Health of the National Government still exercised the power to assign the provincial
health officers in the ARMM. Consequently, the August 9, 1993 directive of Macacua detailing or
assigning Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato City is void.

However, on November 6, 1993, Macacua issued another Memorandum reiterating Sani’s detail or
assignment to the Regional Office in Cotabato City. This second Memorandum was issued after the
issuance of Executive Order No. 133 which expressly transferred "supervision and control over all
functions and activities of the Regional Department of Health" to "the Head of the Regional
Department of Health." In Gen. Renato de Villa vs. City of Bacolod,24 this Court ruled that the power of
administrative control encompasses the power to transfer personnel who under the law may be
reassigned to other stations. The second detail or assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in
Cotabato, issued on November 6, 1993, is within the authority of Macacua as Regional Secretary of
Health. Thus, the second detail of Sani is valid.

Application of the law to the designation of Pandi

As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to
exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM. The Regional
Secretary, by virtue of Executive Order No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and functions of
the Secretary of Health of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the
ARMM. The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority
to designate, in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant.
Macacua, therefore, had the authority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the
provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health
officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the
authority to make such a designation.

Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the first an official of the
provincial government even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and draws his salary
from regional funds. The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to "exercise
general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial
government." Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and control over
the provincial health officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor. From then
on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officer-in-
Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer

BADUA VS. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION

The petitioners, spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua, allegedly own a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba,
Villaviciosa, Abra. In July 1989, they were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of the
Cordillera Bodong Administration in Case No. O, entitled "David Quema vs. Leonor Badua.

The factual background of the case, as recited in the undated "decision" (Annex A, translation is
Annex A-1) is as follows:
 In 1966, David Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa,
Abra, evidenced by Tax Declarations Nos. 4997 and 4998 mortgaged said parcels of land for
P6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land twenty-two (22) years later, on
August 14, 1988, long after the mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the
redemption price of P10,000 to the mortgagee's heir, Jessie Macaraeg.

On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold to her by Dra. Erotida Valera
when she was still alive. However, Rosa could not produce the deed of sale because it is
allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor Benesa.

As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he filed a case before the
Barangay Council, but it failed to settle the dispute, A certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his
complaint in the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe.

Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. In September 1989, his wife, Rosa, was arrested
by the Cordillera People's Liberation Army and detained for two days.

On April 2, 1990, the Baduas filed this petition "for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs" (which may be
treated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition) praying that:

1. a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop the respondents from enforcing the
decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration during the pendency of this case;

2. the respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power and hearing cases; and

3. the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and Cordillera People's
Liberation Army be clarified.

Petitioners allege that the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration is null and void because:

1. petitioners were denied due process or formal hearing; and

2. the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial power nor jurisdiction over the
petitioners nor over the private respondent as neither of them are members of the Maeng
Tribe.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court on April 5, 1990 required the respondents to comment, but,
unable to serve said resolution on the respondents, the court requested the Philippine Constabulary
Commander of the Cordillera Region to do it.

Respondents through counsel, Atty. Demetrio V. Pre, filed their comment on October 26, 1990. They
alleged that: the Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting the interior
mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra. The tribe is a part of the Cordillera Bodong Association or
Administration whose military arm is the Cordillera People's Liberation Army. The tribal court, or
council of elders, is composed of prominent and respected residents in the locality. It decides and
settles all kinds of disputes more speedily than the regular courts, without the intervention of lawyers.

Respondents further allege that the proceedings and decisions of the tribal courts are respected and
obeyed by the parties, the municipal and barangay officials, and the people in the locality, ostracism
being the penalty for disobedience of, or non-compliance with, the decisions of the council of elders in
the areas where tribal courts operate.

Respondents contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the tribal courts because they
are not a part of the judicial system.

Respondents concede that if the petitioners "want to test the wisdom of the decision of the council of
elders," the petitioners should file the necessary suit, not in the Supreme Court, but in the trial courts
where evidence can be presented. Respondents pray that the decision of the tribal court be
maintained and the petition for certiorari and prohibition be dismissed.

After deliberating on the petition and the comment thereon of the respondents, which the Court
decided to treat as the latter's answer, the Court finds the petition to be meritorious, hence, resolved
to grant the same.

In Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al. vs. The Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990, the Court en banc, found that in the plebiscite
that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766, the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and city * of the Cordillera region, except
Ifugao province, hence, the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be.

Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an
autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160,
and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is
declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.

As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created
under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous
cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera
People's Liberation Army as a regional police force or a regional command of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally exist.

Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court
was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal
Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural
community.

Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court
and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They
do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in
the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together
the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.

An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably
repudiated, has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be
enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits
the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it
(Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as
provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular courts today.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. The decision
rendered on February 18, 1989 by the Maeng Tribal Court in Case No. 0, entitled "David Quema vs.
the Leonor Badua," is hereby annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The respondents Cordillera Bodong
Administration, Cordillera People's Liberation Army, Manuel Tao-il, Amogao-en Kissip, Dalalo Illiques,
Juanita Gayyed, Pedro Cabanto, Vicente Dayem and David Quema, are hereby ordered to cease and
desist from implementing said decision, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action by the
parties in the proper competent courts of the land as provided by law. Costs against the respondents.

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION VS. COA

In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15,
1987, which created the (Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that
it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.

In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on
ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the
New People's Army. (NPA).

After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of
national reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA
heeded this call of the President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and some
members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13, 1986 and
signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as
President of Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil government of the CPLA a ceasefire
agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).

The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not undertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political
negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until the demands of the Cordillera
people shall have been substantially granted.

On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in
pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and
signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs 2
and 3 of which state:

Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could
perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.

Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in
drafting the Executive Order.

Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people.

On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as
E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].

Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under
Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) ,
which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province
and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth
in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
[sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and
services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with
the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in
identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It
shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the
region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating
body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR
and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional
government is established and organized [sec. 17].
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act
recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory
nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:

SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as well as all
offices and agencies created under Execute Order No. 220 shall cease to exist
immediately upon the ratification of this Organic Act.

All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera
Regional Assembly shall automatically be transferred to the Cordillera Autonomous
Government.

WON by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior
to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-
empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National
Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant
of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an
organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall then
appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees from multi-
sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the
autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into law.
Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18].
Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.

Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers,
as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address
the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed
and the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken
by the President are obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly petitioner Yaranon who views
E.O. No. 220 as capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) of Balweg, as
unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the measures taken by the President,
We can only inquire into whether or not the measures violate the Constitution. But as we have
seen earlier, they do not.

2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner
Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras" [Petition,
G.R. No. 79956, p. 25].

The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region
composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not
establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for
administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation
of programs and services.

The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure,
nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an
"umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted
Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. The
President then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft organic act which
became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which
was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be
conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution.

In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and we find
that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be created,
showing the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have shown that petitioners' fear that
E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was
totally unfounded.

Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed.

whether or not it is a territorial and political subdivision. 

1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not
have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it
vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue
and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of
revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.

The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is
nothing new.  The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of
1âwphi1

the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later increased
to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the
Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the
regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws,
policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional
areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to
coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to
coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as
may be provided by law. [See Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].

We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created
under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the
participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government but also
the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing
about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose

2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and
the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of
the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than
anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the
regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X,
sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental
organizations within the region for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a
more sophisticated version of the regional development council.

WON petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X,
sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority.

On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not
just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an
autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department
and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction
in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the
stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of
transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or
administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Provinces
Cities
Section 12 Article X 1987 Constitution

Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent of the province.

Section 25 LGC

SECTION 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. – (a) Consistent with the basic policy
on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to
ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. The President
shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent
component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and
through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.

(b) National agencies and o៛�ces with project implementation functions shall coordinate with one
another and with the local government units concerned in the discharge of these functions. They
shall ensure the participation of local government units both in the planning and implementation of
said national projects.
(c) The President may, upon request of the local government unit concerned, direct the appropriate
national agency to provide ퟷ � nancial, technical, or other forms of assistance to the local
government unit. Such assistance shall be extended at no extra cost to the local government unit
concerned. (d) National agencies and o ៛�ces including government-owned or -controlled
corporations with ퟷ�eld units or branches in a province, city, or municipality shall furnish the local
chief executive concerned, for his information and guidance, monthly reports including duly certi ퟷ
�ed budgetary allocations and expenditures

Section 25 LGC

SECTION 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities. – The province, through
the governor, shall ensure that every component city and municipality within its territorial
jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities shall be independent of the province.

Rama vs. Moises GR 197146

Umali vs. Comelec GR 203974

Section 1 Article 10 1987 Constitution

Local Government Units

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

SECTION 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this
Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
Government.

SECTION 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region
with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees
from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose

, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

SECTION 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts
for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide
for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.

SECTION 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and
security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government.

An autonomous administrative division (also referred to as an autonomous

area, entity, unit, region, subdivision, or territory) is a subdivision or dependent territory of
a sovereign state that has a degree of autonomy — self-governance — from an external
authority. Autonomous areas are distinct from the constituent units of a federation (e.g. a state,
or province) in that they possess unique powers for their given circumstances. Typically, it is
either geographically distinct from the rest of the state or populated by a national
minority. Decentralization of self-governing powers and functions to such divisions is a way for a
national government to try to increase democratic participation or administrative efficiency or to
defuse internal conflicts.

https://www.slideshare.net/jobitonio/philippine-local-government-system

LOCAL GOVT CODE

A plebiscite in 13 provinces and 9 cities in Mindanao and Palawan was schedules November 19,
1989 in the implementation of RA 6734 Än act providing for Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao””
Facts: Datu Abbas challenges the constitutionality of RA6734. R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be
categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary
to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such
region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that “[t]here is
hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting
favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.”
Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute,
such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.

Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.
The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region.
It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite
contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be
an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A.
No. 6734, shall compromise it.
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the
proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of
the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.”
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the
organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units
put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the
plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the
Constitution.