643 Phil. 675 2.

ORDERING respondent to pay complainant the total amount of

P178,978.48 representing payment for separation pay, back wages and
13th month pay, plus 10% thereof as attorney's fees in the amount
THIRD DIVISION of P17,897.85, or in the total amount of

[ G.R. No. 186557, August 25, 2010 ] ONE HUNDRED NINETY SIX THOUSAND EIGHTH HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX
PESOS & 33/100 (P196,876.33) the same to be deposited with the Cashier
NEGROS METAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ARMELO J. of this Office, within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of this Decision.
LAMAYO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION On petitioner's appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by

Resolution[7] of March 30, 2006, set aside the ruling of, and remanded the case to, the
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Labor Arbiter for disposition based on the company's grievance procedure. It held that
based on a letter of the company union president Arturo Ronquillo (Ronquillo),
Armelo J. Lamayo (respondent) began working for Negros Metal Corporation (petitioner respondent invoked the CBA provision on grievance procedure. Respondent's Motion
or the company) in September 1999 as a machinist.
for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC by Resolution[8] of June 27, 2006. He
thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Sometime in May 2002, while respondent was at the company's foundry grinding some
tools he was using, William Uy, Sr. (Uy), company manager, called his attention why he
was using the grinder there to which he replied that since the machine there was By Decision[9] of March 25, 2008, the appellate court set aside the NLRC Resolutions
bigger, he would finish his work faster. and reinstated the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It held that the Labor Arbiter had
jurisdiction to hear the complaint; that as respondent's dismissal did not proceed from
Respondent's explanation was found unsatisfactory, hence, he was, via memorandum, the parties' interpretation of or implementation of the CBA, it is not covered by the
grievance machinery procedure; that the laws and rules governing illegal dismissal are
charged of loitering and warned.[1] Taking the warning as a three-day suspension as
not to be found in the parties' CBA but in the labor statutes, hence, the Labor Arbiter
penalized under company rules, respondent reported for work after three days, only to
had jurisdiction; and that although the option to go through the grievance machinery
be meted with another 10-day suspension[2] ─ from May 30 to June 10, 2002, for
was stated in Ronquillo's letter[10] to petitioner, respondent denied having made that
allegedly failing to sign the memorandum suspending him earlier.
option as he had ceased to be a member of the union, as evidenced by a March 20,

After serving the second suspension, respondent reported for work on June 11, 2002 2001 Certification[11] of the union's past president Alex Sanio that he had resigned
but was informed by Uy that his services had been terminated and that he should draft effective March 18, 2001. The appellate court went on to hold that, at that point, it was
too late to direct the parties to go through the grievance machinery.
his resignation letter, drawing respondent to file on June 17, 2002 a complaint[3] for
illegal dismissal.
In holding that respondent was illegally dismissed, the appellate court noted that he
was not allowed to go back to work after serving two suspensions, without affording
In lieu of a position paper, petitioner submitted a Manifestation[4] contending that the him the requisite notice and hearing; and that respondent's failure to seek
complaint should be dismissed because the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it reinstatement did not negate his claim for illegal dismissal, there being nothing wrong
since, under their Collective Bargaining Agreement[5] (CBA), such matters must first be in opting for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
brought before the company's grievance machinery.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution[12] of January
By Decision[6] of December 29, 2004, the Labor Arbiter, brushing aside petitioner's 21, 2009, it interposed the present petition for review on certiorari, maintaining that
position, held that respondent was illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion of the the grievance machinery procedure should have been followed first before respondent's
said Decision reads: complaint for illegal dismissal could be given due course.

The petition fails.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. DECLARING that complainant was illegally dismissed by respondents; Articles 217, 261, and 262 of the Labor Code outline the jurisdiction of labor arbiters
and voluntary arbitrators as follows:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) Except Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective
as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without
extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes,
grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
1. Unfair labor practice cases; Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately
dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary
2. Termination disputes; Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and ART. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary
conditions of employment; Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the
parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. (emphasis and
from the employer-employee relations; underscoring supplied)

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and Under Art. 217, it is clear that a labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over termination disputes. On the other hand, under Article 261, a voluntary
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and arbitrator has original and exclusive jurisdiction over grievances arising from the
maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee interpretation or enforcement of company policies.
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless As a general rule then, termination disputes should be brought before a labor arbiter,
of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. except when the parties, under Art. 262, unmistakably express that they agree to
submit the same to voluntary arbitration.[13]
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters. In the present case, the CBA provision on grievance machinery being invoked by
petitioner does not expressly state that termination disputes are included in the ambit
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective of what may be brought before the company's grievance machinery. Thus, the
bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or pertinent provision in the parties' CBA reads:
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor
Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. (emphasis and Article IV
underscoring supplied) GRIEVANCE MACHINERY

xxxx Section 1. The parties hereto agree on principle that all disputes between
labor and management may be settled through friendly negotiations that the
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary parties have the same interest in the continuity of work until all points in
Arbitrators. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary dispute shall have been discussed and settled. x x x For this purpose, a
Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and grievance is defined as any disagreement between the UNION and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or the EMPLOYER or between a worker or group of workers on one
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those hand and the EMPLOYER on the one hand as to the application and
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company interpretation of any of the provisions of this contract. Other matters
personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. subject of collective bargaining or regulated by existing labor laws shall not
Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those be considered as grievances. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor
practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining
 by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Francisco P. Acosta.
Even assuming, however, that the suspension of an employee may be considered as a
"disagreement" which bears on the "application and interpretation of any of the [10] NLRC records, p. 111.
provisions" of the CBA, respondent could not have bound himself to bring the matter of
his suspension to grievance procedure or voluntary arbitration in light of the [11] Id. at 16.
documented fact that he had resigned from the union more than a year before his
suspension, not to mention the fact that he denied having a hand in the preparation of [12] Rollo, pp. 36-37. Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and concurred
the union president Ronquillo's letter invoking the grievance procedure. In fine, the
in by Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Francisco P. Acosta.
labor tribunal had original and exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's complaint for
illegal dismissal.
[13] Vide San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108001, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA

On the merits, as did the appellate court, the Court sustains the Labor Arbiter's ruling 133.
that respondent was illegally dismissed absent a showing that he was accorded due
process when he was summarily terminated. The Court is not a trier of facts. It is not
tasked to review the evidence on record, documentary and testimonial, and reassess
the probative weight thereof, especially in view of the well-entrenched rule that findings
of fact of administrative officials, such as labor arbiters, who have acquired expertise
Source: Supreme Court E-Library
on account of their specialized jurisdiction are accorded by the courts not only respect This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System (E-LibCMS)
but, most often, with finality, particularly when affirmed on appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Sereno, JJ., concur.

[1] NLRC records, p. 107.

[2] Id. at 109

[3] Id. at 1-3.

[4] Id. at 11-12.

[5] Id. at 121-134.

[6] Id. at 58-65. Penned by Labor Arbiter Phibun Pura.

[7] Id. at 257-262. Penned by Commissioner Aurelio D. Menzon and concurred in by

Commissioner Oscar S. Uy and Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles.

[8] CA rollo, pp. 102-103. Penned by Commissioner Aurelio D. Menzon and concurred in

by Commissioner Oscar S. Uy and Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles.

[9] Id. at 190-198- Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and concurred in