Moral Skepticism: Moral Skepticism Class Metaethical Modal Moral Knowledge Is Impossible Moral Realism
Moral Skepticism: Moral Skepticism Class Metaethical Modal Moral Knowledge Is Impossible Moral Realism
Moral Skepticism: Moral Skepticism Class Metaethical Modal Moral Knowledge Is Impossible Moral Realism
Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism) is a class of metaethical theories in which all members
entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal
claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Moral skepticism is particularly against moral realism
which holds the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.
Some proponents of moral skepticism include Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus, David
Hume, Max Stirner, Friedrich Nietzsche, and J.L. Mackie.
Non-cognitivism.[17]
All of these three theories share the same conclusions, which are as follows:
(a) we are never justified in believing that moral claims (claims of the form "state of
affairs x is good," "action y is morally obligatory," etc.) are true and, even more so
(b) we never know that any moral claim is true.
Moral error theory holds that we do not know that any moral claim is true because
Pyrrhonian moral skepticism holds that the reason we are unjustified in believing any
moral claim is that it is irrational for us to believe either that any moral claim is true or
that any moral claim is false. Thus, in addition to being agnostic on whether (i) is true,
Pyrrhonian moral skepticism denies (ii).
Dogmatic moral skepticism, on the other hand, affirms (ii) and cites (ii)'s truth as the
reason we are unjustified in believing any moral claim.
Noncognitivism holds that we can never know that any moral claim is true because moral claims
are incapable of being true or false (they are not truth-apt). Instead, moral claims are imperatives
(e.g. "Don't steal babies!"), expressions of emotion (e.g. "stealing babies: Boo!"), or expressions
of "pro-attitudes" ("I do not believe that babies should be stolen.")
Normative ethics
Main article: Normative ethics
Normative ethics is the study of ethical action. It is the branch of ethics that investigates the set
of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, morally speaking. Normative
ethics is distinct from meta-ethics because normative ethics examines standards for the rightness
and wrongness of actions, while meta-ethics studies the meaning of moral language and the
metaphysics of moral facts.[14] Normative ethics is also distinct from descriptive ethics, as the
latter is an empirical investigation of people's moral beliefs. To put it another way, descriptive
ethics would be concerned with determining what proportion of people believe that killing is
always wrong, while normative ethics is concerned with whether it is correct to hold such a
belief. Hence, normative ethics is sometimes called prescriptive, rather than descriptive.
However, on certain versions of the meta-ethical view called moral realism, moral facts are both
descriptive and prescriptive at the same time.[18]
Traditionally, normative ethics (also known as moral theory) was the study of what makes
actions right and wrong. These theories offered an overarching moral principle one could appeal
to in resolving difficult moral decisions.
At the turn of the 20th century, moral theories became more complex and were no longer
concerned solely with rightness and wrongness, but were interested in many different kinds of
moral status. During the middle of the century, the study of normative ethics declined as meta-
ethics grew in prominence. This focus on meta-ethics was in part caused by an intense linguistic
focus in analytic philosophy and by the popularity of logical positivism.
Virtue ethics