1|Page

Apostol vs CA, G.R. No. 125375. June 17, 2004 price would be paid in installments. Thereafter, a deed of
absolute sale was executed in favor of the Apostols over an
SPOUSES ELPIDIO APOSTOL and AMELIA APOSTOL, unsegregated portion of the property, with an area of 29.68
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES square meters, for P7,350 and, later, a deed of confirmation
EMMANUEL CHUA and EDNA L. CHUA, respondents. of deed of absolute sale with waiver over the said property.

On June 7, 1993, the Spouses Paulo and Georgina Pascua On June 20, 1979, the Apostols executed an Affidavit of
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the Adverse Claim over the property, stating that they could not
improvements thereon in favor of the Spouses Emmanuel cause the registration of the said deeds because the owners
and Edna Chua for P1,000,000. On the basis of the said deed, duplicate of TCT No. 198936 was in the possession of
the Spouses Chua were issued Transfer Certificate of Title Teresita B. Jimenez, a former co-owner of the property. The
(TCT) No. 87610 over the property on June 8, 1993. The Apostols further alleged that Luz Pascua, in her letter to the
Spouses Elpidio and Amelia Apostol, who were present Register of Deeds dated August 6, 1979, confirmed that she
during the negotiations, verbally assured them that they failed to turn over the owners duplicate of TCT No. 198936
would vacate the property within ten (10) days from the because the same was in the possession of Jimenez, who, in
execution of the sale. They then acknowledged that their turn, gave it to Jose J. Burgos. Thereafter, on May 15, 1980,
stay in the property was only upon the tolerance of its Luz Pascua filed a Complaint against the Apostols in the RTC
former owners. Despite demands, however, the Apostols of Quezon City for rescission and damages docketed as Civil
refused to vacate the property. This led to the filing a Case No. 29895 but the same was dismissed on December
complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, 19, 1983 for lack of interest to prosecute. Paulo Pascua filed
Spouses Apostol, MeTC of Metro Manila by the Spouses a similar complaint against the Apostols in the RTC, docketed
Chua On September 3, 1993. as Civil Case No. 88-523, but the same was, likewise,
dismissed. Finally, the petitioners alleged that the Spouses
In their answer the Apostols alleged that Luz B. Pascua was Pascua’s possession of the property after the sale thereof to
the owner of the parcel of land and sold a portion of the the respondents was by mere tolerance.
property, to them on July 8, 1976 for P45,548 of which
P15,548 was paid. On the same day, the parties executed a In the meantime, the Apostols filed a complaint against the
memorandum agreement covering the property, in which Spouses Chua, the Spouses Pascua, and the Register of
the respondents agreed that the balance of the purchase Deeds in the RTC of Quezon City, for annulment of deed of
2|Page

sale and TCT No. 86338, and for reconveyance with damages. in physical and material possession of the subject premises
The petitioners alleged that they had been in possession of from the time they purchased the same from Luz B. Pascua
the property since 1973; their adverse claim over the on July 8, 1976. Defendants, therefore, are in possession of
property was annotated on June 20, 1979 as Entry No. PE the property in the concept of an owner, and under the law,
8812; Luz Pascua died on December 2, 1984 but Paulo a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the
Pascua did not inherit the property from her because the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he
same had already been sold to the respondents; Paulo cannot be obliged to show or prove it. Paulo Pascua had no
Pascua executed a falsified affidavit for self-adjudication over right to adjudicate the subject lot therefore the sale in favor
the property on the basis of which he was able to secure, on of the Chuas is invalid.
May 20, 1993, TCT No. 86338.
CA: reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the
MeTC: ruled in favor of the Spouses Pascua, and being the decision of the MeTC. The CA held that in ruling against the
registered owners of the property, the Chuas are entitled to petitioners, who were the registered owners of the property,
the possession thereof ordering the Apostols to vacate the the RTC thereby violated the prescription against the
premises, payment of P5,000.00 per month as compensation collateral attack of a torrens title.
for the use and occupancy of the property, P5,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of this suit.. Issues by the Apostols:
(a) their possession of the property since 1976 preceded the
RTC: reversed the decision of the MeTC and ordering the sale of the property to the Chuas
dismissal of the complaint. RTC said that even though Chuas (b) the Chuas were purchasers of the property in bad faith;
are registered owners and that they have the right to take (c) RTC did not collaterally attach the torrens title of the
possession thereof and eject Apostols from the premises, it Chuas because it only ruled that the land land was sold to
is the contention of the Apostols that they are the rightful them first and this may result to gross injustice.
owners of the land and have been in possession thereon
from the time they acquired the land from the real owner Chua’s said that these are only questions of facts. The
Luz B. Pascua. In ejectment cases, the only issue to be Apostols contend that the Chuas knew that the petitioners
determined by the Court is the fact of prior physical and were in actual possession of the property even before they
material possession over the subject property. In this case, purchased the same hence they were purchasers in bad
Apostols were able to establish the fact that they have been faith. They, the Apostols, purchased the property before the
3|Page

Chuas, they cannot be ejected therefrom. The sale in favor of

the Chuas is null and void consequently the TCT issued is also The Apostols claim that Chua’s title over the property is a
void. They, Apostols, may very well have become the owners nullity; hence, the complaint for unlawful detainer against
of the property by prescription under Article 1134 of the the petitioners should be dismissed for lack of merit. Such
New Civil Code. allegation does not help their present recourse. Under
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of
CA said that RTC erred in dismissing the action for unlawful title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
detainer on the sole ground that the private respondents are altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding
possessors in the concept of an owner and cannot be for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the
dispossessed of the same. The subject property is registered validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in
under the Torrens System in the names of the petitioners an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or
whose title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over
collaterally attacked, much less in an action for unlawful the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to
detainer. No title to registered land in derogation of the title determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
of the registered owner may be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. The presumption of ownership granted The following issues are now the subject of Civil Case No. Q-
by law to a possessor in the concept of an owner under 94-19352 before the RTC of Quezon City so the SC no longer
Article 541 is only prima facie and cannot prevail over a rendered a decision for these:
valid title registered under the Torrens System. (1) whether the respondents were buyers in bad faith;
(2) the validity of the deed of absolute sale over the property
SC: Upheld the decision of CA. It is an accepted rule that a executed by the Spouses Pascua in favor of the respondents;
person who has a torrens title over the property, such as the and
Chuas, is entitled to the possession thereof. The registered (3) the validity of the title issued to and in the names of the
owners are entitled to the possession of the property respondents. Hence, the Court shall no longer delve into
covered by the said title from the time such title was issued such issues.
in their favor. Moreover, the fact that the Chuas were never
in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no
moment, as prior physical possession is necessary only in
forcible entry cases.
4|Page

the RTC affirmed with modification the MTCs decision.

Enriquez then filed a Motion with the RTC on February 1,
Ayson vs Enriquez, G.R. No. 152438. June 17, 2004 2001 for issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.
Ayson interposed an appeal to the CA, assigning that the trial
LOLITA R. AYSON, petitioner, vs. MARINA ENRIQUEZ vda. DE court had no jurisdiction over the action. The Decision of the
CARPIO, respondent. RTC affirming the trial courts decision is accordingly
erroneous and consequently null and void.
Lolita Ayson was the owner of 3 parcels of land in Manibang,
Porac, Pampanga covered by TCTs. She has been in CA held that the continued possession of the property by
possession of the aforesaid properties being the owner Ayson had merely been tolerated. Possession became
thereof. On August 29, 1980, she mortgaged the said unlawful when she was divested of her ownership of the
properties to PNB, Angeles City Branch (Bank), and were premises. Holding that a summary action for ejectment was
subsequently foreclosed. After failing to redeem within the the proper remedy against her, the CA explained that the
prescribed period, Ayson’s TCTs were canceled and new ones parties were not precluded from ventilating their grievances
were issued in the name of PNB. in another action based on a separate and distinct cause
involving ownership of the land.
On April 14, 1999, PNB sold the property covered by TCT No.
220195-R to the Marina Enriquez and is now covered by TCT Issues:
No. 466519-R. On October 22, 1999, Ayson filed a Complaint
before RTC of Angeles City for the annulment of TCT No. 1. Whether the Decision of CA erred because it:
[466519-R] and the deed of sale between PNB and Enriquez a) digressed into matters not alleged in the Complaint,
as well as for reconveyance and damages. With said Civil and by which it breached the cardinal rule that jurisdiction of
Case still pending, Enqiquez, on January 3, 2000, sent the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
demand letters dated December 29, 1999 demanding b) not holding that the Complaint failed to aver facts
petitioner to vacate the premises covered by TCT No. constitutive of unlawful detainer.
466519-R. c) not holding that the action for the purported right to
possess was anchored on the elemental attribute of
On March 7, 2000, Enriquez filed a complaint with the MTC ownership and accordingly was of the nature of an accion
for ejectment with damages which was granted. On appeal, publiciana.
5|Page

d) not holding that the action suffered from a The origins of fair play were satisfied when she formally
jurisdictional defect with the manifest absence of proof of offered evidence, both documentary and testimonial, that
receipt of the demand letters. afforded Ayson the opportunity to refute and object to them.
2. Whether Ayson is estopped from assailing the trial courts
jurisdiction. Section 5 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court was thus rendered
applicable pro tanto. It provides:
HELD: Ayson objects to the MTCs jurisdiction. She argues SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation
that a complaint that fails to aver how entry was effected or of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are
to state the circumstances that brought about the owners tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they
alleged dispossession is not a valid action for ejectment, but shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
is actually a complaint for accion publiciana or accion the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
reivindicatoria. Thus RTC, not the MTC, that has jurisdiction necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
over the case. Enriquez unduly claimed the title to herself raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
and anchored her purported right to possess the property on any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does
her right of ownership thereof. not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
Enriquez counters that ejectment is the proper remedy, issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
because she is asking only for possession de facto. She posits pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege, presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law, substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
the property or is refusing to vacate it. Ayson is supposedly
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court The presentation of the evidence for and against imputations
after she voluntarily participated in the trial on the merits undoubtedly cured, clarified or expanded, as the case may
and lost. be, whatever defects in the pleadings or vagueness in the
issues there might have been in the amended complaint.
SC said that the complaint of Enriquez might have been
vague in certain respects and lacking in some details about It is settled that even if the complaint be defective, but the
her alleged dispossession, but these defects were not fatal. parties go to trial thereon, and the plaintiff, without
6|Page

objection, introduces sufficient evidence to constitute the One who has never been in possession of a property may
particular cause of action which it intended to allege in the acquire a better right to possess as where he acquires title to
original complaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces it through a sale between him and a mortgagee thereby
witnesses to meet the cause of action thus established, an divesting the mortgagor of ownership and the right to retain
issue is joined as fully and as effectively as if it had been possession thereof.
previously joined by the most perfect pleadings.
The continued occupation of the property by Ayson was
Trial on the merits was conducted without objection of merely tolerated and was bound by an implied promise that
Ayson. She did not challenge the statement of issues she would vacate the premises upon demand. Her failure to
proffered by Enriquez. Ayson simply presented, as her own, do so justified the action for ejectment filed in the MTC.
issues on the propriety of the ejectment case. She claimed Under these circumstances, the trial court acted within the
(1) that Enriquez was not in actual possession of the bounds of its jurisdiction and committed no reversible error
property; (2) that Enriquez’ acquisition of title over it was in taking cognizance of the case.
fraudulent; and (3) that no actual conciliation proceedings
had been held before the office of the barangay chairman. Ayson further assails the validity of the complaint on the
basis of the RTCs finding that it was not clear when she
The trial brought to light the true nature of the right of actually received the demand letter. She insists that there is
possession of respondent over the property, and the no factual or evidentiary basis to establish her receipt of the
circumstances surrounding her dispossession. The facts, as demand to vacate the premises. This contention must fail. It
collected from the evidence presented by both parties, is only in this late stage that petitioner is raising this point. It
unequivocally show that the instant case is one for unlawful was not raised before the MTC or the RTC. Hence, fair play,
detainer. Enriquez was able to present evidence showing justice and due process dictate that this Court cannot now,
that after the foreclosure of the property, Ayson failed to for the first time on appeal, pass upon this question. They
redeem it within the redemption period. Thus, she was must be raised seasonably in the proceedings before the
divested of her ownership and right to retain possession lower courts. Questions raised on appeal must be within the
thereof. Enqriquez acquired a better right to possess the issues framed by the parties; issues not raised before the TCs
property after acquiring title to it through a sale between her cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
and the mortgagee-bank.
7|Page

3. Espinas’ allegations
 They purchased the property and declared the
same for taxation purposes
DUMO V. ESPINAS  They were already declared the lawful owners of
the parcel of land in a civil casae
FACTS:  By virtue of said decision, defendants entered,
1. The present case arose from a complaint for forcible occupied and possessed said land in their right of
entry with prayer for the issuance of a temporary ownership, cleaned the same of illegally
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed by constructed structures which were done without
Sps Dumo (Petitioners) against respondents their knowledge and constent.

2. Sps Dumo’s allegations: 4. MTC:

 Sps Dumo are the owners-possessors of a parcel of  In favour of Sps Dumo.
land with all the improvements thereon  Ordered Espinas to vacate.
 Defendant Severa Espina (among the respondents)  Espinas to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages
filed for quieting of title and/or ownership and and Atty’s fees to Sps Dumo.
possession against plaintiffs. Although they were
able to obtain a favourable judgment, the Sheriff 5. RTC:
was not able to enforce the same  Reversed, set aside case filed by Sps Dumo and
 Disgruntled, all defendants, acting for the interest deleted award of damages.
of Severa, took it upon themselves, employing  Espinas enjoyed possession even before filing of
force, intimidation and threat to enter the said real the case until Sps Dumo erected a seawall and
property, armed with sticks, bolos, and other cyclone wire on the property without Severa
deadly weapons, successfully drove out the Espina’s consent.
plaintiffs. 6. CA:
 They totally tore down all the improvements  Reinstated the decision of MTC but with
standing thereon, consisting of, but not limited to modifications—deleting award of AME damages.
shed structures intended to rent to the public.
8|Page

ISSUE: WON deletion of award of damages in favour of Sps

Dumo was proper?

HELD: Yes, there is no basis for the award of damages.

1. Sps Dumo contends that since they did not raise the
issue of damages before RTC and CA, RTC and CA did
not have jurisdiction to rule on the matter
 UNTENABLE. Appellate court is clothed with ample
authority to review rulings even if they are not
assigned as error especially if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision.

2. Furthermore, the rule is settled that in forcible entry

or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can
be recovered is the fair rental value of the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the
leased property. The reason for this is that of rightful
possession; hence, the damages which could be
recovered are those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property, AND NOT THE DAMAGES
WHICH HE MAY HAVE SUFFERED BUT WHICH HAVE NO
DIRECT RELATION TO HIS LOSS OF MATERIAL
POSSESSION.
9|Page

be maintained after a final determination on the

forcible entry cases has been made”
ISSUE:
Whether or not a complainant in a forcible entry case can file
an independent action for damages arising after the act of
Corporation v. Treyes dispossession had occurred even during the pendency of
their separate complaints for forcible entry.
FACTS: RULING: YES. Corporation may institute a separate and
 Corporation et al claimed to have occupied the subject independent complaint for damages even during pendency
public land lot for 25 years even before being granted of separate complaints for forcible entry, arising after the
Fishpond Leases. act of dispossession had occurred based on the separate
o However, Treyes allegedly forcibly and acts done after the dispossession such as the stealing of fish
unlawfully entered the properties and and ransacking of the church.
barricaded the entrance and harvested tons of  As per Dumo v. Espinas, it was settled that the only
fish in the ponds owned by Corporation el al. form of damages that may be recovered in an action
o Treyes even allegedly ransacked and destroyed for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the
the church built by Corporation in the properties reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
 Corporation et al then filed separate complaints for of the property
Forcible Entrey with temporary restraining order and o this is because the only issue to be resolved in a
preliminary injunction and damages PLUS complaint case for forcible entry is rightful possession and
for damages (the focus in this case) the only damages one could recover from such
 Treyes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for action for forcible entry is that which the
damages on three grounds: plaintiff could have had if he was still the
o Litis pendendtia possessor of the property
o Res judicata o the only damages you can get is what you lost
o Forum shopping when you loss material possession
 RTC dismissed the complaint for damages on the  Everything else should be claimed by ordinary action
ground of prematurity saying that “ damages may only
 This is different from the case of Dev’t Corporation v.
10 | P a g e

CA in which their claim for damages separate from

forcible entry with damages was dismissed on the
ground of litis pendentia (identity between two
pending actions with respect to rights asserted, reliefs
prayed for, is such that when judgment is done on
one, res judicata will result in the remaining action or
simply put, two cases are so similar that judgment of
one will render affect the other decision considerably)
o In Dev’t Corporation case, the separate action
for damages is based on the alleged forcible
takeover of the leased premises by the
petitioner in that case while the action for
forcible entry with damages was asking for
damages for the loss sustained by the plaintiff
o Basically, these are the damages asked for are
from THE SAME injury in the forcible entry case
(they are both fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property)

 In the present case though, the damages asked for in

the forcible entry case is based on the dispossession
while the action for damages is based on acts done
AFTER dispossession such as the carting away of fish
and the ransacking of the church.
11 | P a g e

right of pre-emption/prior purchase of the leased premises.

HELD: SC gave relevant precedents:
-injunction suits do not abate ejectment
-accion publiciana does not suspend an ejectment suit
-writ of possession does not bar execution of judgment
-action for quieting title does not bar an ejectment suit.
WILSON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION v. CA The reason for the above rulings of the precedence were
that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve
FACTS: physical or de facto possession, and on not a few occasions,
-Petitioner, Wilson Auto Supply is a lessee of a commercial that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay
building. disposition of the ejectment proceeding or that the issues
-After the expiration of the period in the lease agreement, presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
lessor executed an Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of Star defences in the ejectment action and there resolved.
Group Resources and Development. SC said that the cases cited by the petitioners were
-In the Deed of Sale, it was stated that the vendee shall deal exceptions such as in Vda. De Legazpi v. Avendano case, it
with the lessees and occupants of the property was based on strong reasons of equity not found in the
-Star Group, being the vendee then filed an action of present petition. In Vda. De Murga v. Chan, the essential
unlawful detainer against Wilson Auto Supply. requisite of an unequivocal demand to vacate and surrender
-Petitioner refused to concede invoking that the lessors the premises had not been fulfilled.
violated their leasehold rights because they were not SC stressed that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
accorded with: 1) rights of pre-emption; 2) buyer is not cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
required to honor lease; 3) lessees were denied option to pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
renew without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTC, MeTC and
-MTC issued restraining order enjoining proceedings in the MCTC have the competence to resolve “the issue of
unlawful detainer case. ownership....only to determine the issue of possession”
ISSUE: WON unlawful detainer suits in MTC against
petitioner, lessees, for the reason that their lease had
expired, should be abated by the action filed in RTC by
lessees based on the contention that they are entitled to a
12 | P a g e

 Dequina is actually the uncle of De Luna

 MTC ruled in favor of De Luna , RTC revered the
decision of the MTC, CA affirmed RTC decision
Issue: WON De Luna should have possession of the
property
RULING: YES
De Luna v. CA Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only
issue to be resolved therein is who is entitled to the physical
Facts: or material possession of the premises, or possession de
 De Luna filed a case for forcible entry, alleging that he facto, independent of any claim of ownership that either
is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land in San party may set forth in their pleadings.
Juan, Zambales since 1938  If petitioner can prove prior possession in himself, he
o However, on December 18 and 19 1971 Daclison may recover such possession from even the owner
et al (Daclison, Crispin, Doble and Dimaano) himself.
entered the land and began plowing it and even  Whatever may be the character of his prior
fenced the land with barbed wire and began possession, if he has in his favor priority time, he has
planting sugar cane the security that entitles him to stay on the property
o Now De Luna wants them out and pay him 45 until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
pesos monthly per hectare until he regains right by either accion publiciana or accion
possession of the land reindivicatoria.
 Defendants denied the allegations in the complaint. Dimaano may have claimed to possess the property by virtue
o Daclison, Crispin and Doble deny ever entering of a lease agreement by the alleged owner, but the RTC is
the and occupying the disputed property wrong to conclude that Dequina owns the subject property
o Dimaano for his part claimed that De Luna was  De Luna PROVED he had prior possession of the
NOT the owner of the property, it was owned by property and established by witnesses, notably by his
Dequina who had declared the property in his own tenants (possession by Dilag, his lessee, can be
name for taxation. proven since 1953 and since possession can be
 Dequina died then his son took over and exercised in the name of another, it positively
leased the property to Dimaano redounds to De Luna)
13 | P a g e

 Witnesses also state that De Luna has cultivated the area stated in the first deed of sale to An
land from 1938 to 1941 with his mother and leased o The lot, when delimited only by the boundaries,
the property to the witness is actually larger than 822.5
 On the other hand, Dimaano failed to prove Dequina  Now, when Semira entered the premises and started
Jr’’s PRIOR POSSESSION, much less ownership over the building a new rice-mill, An filed a case for forcible
lant entry against Semira because he forcibly entered on
 The mere fact that Dequina Sr, declared the property the premises of An to the east of Lot 4221
for taxation purposes does not constitute possession o An claimed that the lot is ONLY 822.5 Sq meters
Semira v. CA and Buenaventura An  Semira admits occupying the lot but denies the
 illegality of the occupation and claims ownership over
 An bought a parcel of land (4221) from Gutierrez with the land on the basis of the deed of sale to Semira by
an estimated area of 822.5 sq.m and with boundaries Ramirez
o North – Taysan-Lobo-Sto. Nino-Pinagbayanan  MTC ruled in favor of Semira, but RTC reversed the
and Sto. Nino-Dagatan Road MTC since An had prior possession to Semira since he
o East – Sto. Nino-Pinagbayanan Road and Juana was occupying the portion being disputed upon even
Gutierrez before Semira started building his new rice mill, CA
o South – Sto. Nino School Site affirmed
o West – Sto. Nino – Dagatan Road ISSUE: Who between the two has right possession to the
 An entered the premises following the boundaries, disputed portion of land? RULING: In this case at bench,
not the area given the issue of possession cannot be decided independently of
 An then acquired two other parcels of land to the east the question of ownership because it must be known who
 An then sold the subject lot to his nephew for LUMP is actually the owner of the disputed portion because both
SUM of 2500 pesos, latter then sold the subject lot to are parties are claiming that the portion in question belong
Semira to their own parcel of land (there is an overlap)
o However, when Ramirez sold the lot to Semira,  The dispute arose from the fact that Semira actually
the deed of sale stated 2200 sq. meters instead followed the boundaries and claimed 2200 sw. meters
of 822.5 because they’ve been referring to the while An said the area is only 822.5 Sq. meters as it
lot as delimited by the boundaries and not the was stated in the first deed of sale when he himself
got the area. The question is, which should be
14 | P a g e

followed, the area or the boundaries?

 It has been ruled that when a land is sold for LUMP
SUM, the BOUNDARIES determine the scope and
effects of the sale and NOT THE AREA
 Therefore, vendors are obligated to deliver ALL THE
LAND included WITHIN the BOUNDAIRIES
 Therefore, when An sold 4221 to his nephew, he
actually sold the ENTIRE LAND WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES and NOT THE AREA and sold more than
what he thought he sold
 IMPORTANT NOTE: the case was merely an action for
forcible entry and that the issue of ownership was
decided for the sole purpose of RESOLVING PRIORITY
POSSESSION. The SC had to know who owned the lot
to know who was actually possessing the lot
15 | P a g e

prior possession of the land.

o RTC reversed the MTC and affirmed by the CA
ISSUE: Who between the petitioner and private
respondents has prior physical possession of lots 1 and
2?

RULING: Reynante has had prior possession for 50 years

and should not be disturbed in his possession in the
forcible entry case.
In action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process
Reynante v. CA and Heirs of Carlos and actual title of the property is never determined.
 A party who can prove prior possession can recover
Facts: such possession even against the owner himself.
 Reynante was taken in as tenant of Carlos (the original Whatever may be the character of his prior
owner of the subject lot) over the fishpond. possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he
 Reynante has been living in the area for more than 50 has the security that entitles him to remain on the
years and has built two nipa huts and have been property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having
harvesting nipa palms ever since a better right by accion publiciana or accion
 After the death of Carlos, his heirs made a written reivindicatoria
agreement with Reynante wherein for the  On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior
consideration of 200k pesos, Reynante would turn physical possession, he has no right of action for
over the fishpond he was tenanting and his rights as forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the
caretaker owner of the property
o However, Reynante still continued to live there  in the case at bar, Reynante has been in possession for
 The Heirs then filed a complaint for forcible entry more than 50 years as it was admitted and proven.
against Reynante alleging that the latter by means of  Even if Reynante signed an agreement with the Heirs
strategy and stealth took over the possession of the saying that the former would surrender his rights over
lots the fishpond, what was to be surrendered was the
o MTC ruled in favor of Reynante since he was in fishpond and NOT the sasahan or the land on which he
16 | P a g e

constructed his hut where he now lives - SEC issued a writ of the preliminary injunction against
 Reynante built the hut on his own and was never part Batong and his group.
of the lease from Carlos - By virtue of the SEC injunction, Respondent with the aid
of PNP and DILG tried to dispossess petitioners if the
property tha they are residing (NOTE: as previous
clergymen they were given the privilege by LCP to occupy
the residential houses owned by the LCP)
-Petitioners refused to leave the premise. So, respondents
padlocked the maingate and stationed security guards to
prevent petitners and their families to from going in and
out of the property.
-A month after, Petitioners Del Rosario and Baes wrote
letters to the new LCP president Ladlad to reconsider and
BAES vs LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE PHILIPPINES to allow them to stay until such time they can find their
families new homes. -Eventually, all three petitioners left
Petitioners- Rev.Elmer Baes, Spouses Rev. Del Rosario, the premises and filed an action for forcible entry with
Sps. Rev.Ramon prayer for issuance of TRO and preliminary mandatory
Respondents- Lutheran Church in the Philippines (LCP), injunction against respondents.
Oscar Almazan, James Cerdenola, Luis Aoas, Edwino - MTC ruled that there was ni force, intimidation, threat,
Mercado, Antonio Reyes and CA. strategy and stealth so forcivle entry case dismissed.
-RTC reversed MTC decision ordering respondents to
FACTS: restore property to Petitioners
- In 1990, members of the LCP filed an action against its -Upon appeal, CA reversed RTC decision stating that while
President Thomas Batong and 6 other member of the respondent committed acts contrary to what's sanctioned
Board of Directors to the Securities Exchange Commission by laws, petitioners are not entitled to favorable
(SEC). As such, this resulted in the division of the LCP judgment in their forcible entry case as evidence show in
community into 2 factions: their letters that they were willing to vacate the premises.
*Batong/Saguilayan group- Petitioners are part of
*Ladlad/Almazan group- Respondents ISSUE:
17 | P a g e

Were petitioners removed from the premises by force,

intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth?

RULING:
- Yes, they were. MTC erred in finding that there was no
forcible entry reasoning that the petitioners expressed
willingness to vacate the premises.
- Said leistters do not negate the INITIAL use of force by
respondents which constituted forcible entry. It is
undisputed that respondents owned the property
occupied by petitioners, still their use of force in evicting
petitioners was not justified.
- Owner who has title over the property cannot take the
law into his own hands to regain possession of the said
property. He must go to court.
- Furthermore, respondents cannot justify their forcible
entry in the premises occupied by oetitioners by claiming
that petitioners have no valid right to the continued
possession of the property because they should have filed
the appropriate unlawful detainer case against them
instead of forcing them out of the premises.
DECISION:
- SC ordered respondent to vacate, surrender and restore
possession of questioned premises to Del Rosario and San
Ramon
-SC didn't grant Baes restoration of the subject premises
because they lost their cause of action to ask for
restitution having transferred to another property.
18 | P a g e

registrable owners over the lots as they had title over the
lots.
-Juan Veloso appealed the decision and so IAC reversed
lower courts decision adjudicating the entire lot to
respondent finding tha the contract was a contract of sale
of the land.

ISSUE: Was the contract that of a contract of sale or an

equitable mortgage?

RULING:
- Juan Veloso's contract with Josefa was that of an
equitable mortgage and not of sale.
BALATERO AND HEIRS OF BADELLES VS IAC AND JUAN - SC said that the price consideration to Veloso of P68 was
VELOSO unusually inadequate when the same parcel of land was
bought by Josefa herself from Tomasa for P111. If the
FACTS: contract was indeed of sale then why did Josefa sell it for
- property in dispute was originally owned by parents of a price almost half of what she laid for 12 years earlier?
Josefa and Alejo Iglupas. This fact shows that the contract was an equitable
- after death of parents, the lot was given to Alejo and his mortgage than a contract of sale.
wife Tomasa. - As such, Veloso was merely a holder and so even if he
-after Alejo died, Tomasa sold the lot t Josefa and her executed an affidavit to consolidate his right of ownership
husband Juan Badelles. over the land 4 years after executionof contract, it was of
-June 9, 1930- Josefa mortgaged the property to Juan no use because the constructive possession over the
Veloso in order to secure a loan. (Loan was paid in 1947) parcel of land did not ripen into ownership because the
- April 30, 1954- Josefa and her children sold a portion of contract was an equitable mortgage and not contract of
the lot to petitioner Florencio Balatero. sale.
- During the court proceeding for the lots in dispute, the
trial court finds Balatero and heors of Badelles as
19 | P a g e

2.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that they do not
even have rights over the other parcels of land (but no
need to disturb ruling as it was not appealed for by the
Director of Lands). The original tracing cloth plan of the
land applied for was not submitted in evidence by the
heirs. Such omission is fatal to their application as the
submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character. While a blue print
of survey Plan Psu 215382 (lot 1) was presented before
the trial court, the same falls short of the mandatory
requirement of law.
The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona is a Spanish
title, a possessory information title issued on May 20,
Director of Lands vs Tesalona gr66130? 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481 hectares (but the
236 SCRA 336 – Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds – Land actual land area being applied for (lot 1) was 7000+ sq m.
Registration – Spanish titles But the heirs did not submit the original of the possessory
Isabel, Consuelo, and Serapia were sisters who filed a information title. What was submitted was an unclear,
petition to register 6 parcels of land under their name. illegible copy of a Spanish document purporting to be the
The land has an area of 10,481 sq m. The same was title evidencing the land grant of 1896. Moreover, proof
inherited by them from their parents who acquired the of loss or unavailability of the original document as
same from Spanish grant. The sisters showed possessory required by Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was
information. The lower court ruled in their favor but only not established thus, rendering admissibility of the said
awarded 4 parcels of land. Parcel no. 1 and 2 were not yet secondary evidence questionable and dubious. PD 982
decided upon as there was a separate case involving one was also in effect which mandated Spanish titles to be
Constancio dela Pena Tan. The heirs appealed to have lots registered but the heirs never registered the same
1 & 2 be included. (purpose of the law was to avoid falsified titles after the
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 & war).
20 | P a g e

thereon.

Epistacio and his wife Maria had 2 children: Catalina

and Pedro, Pedro died a bachelor while Catalina married
a certain surnamed Bartolome bore five children named
Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta.

In 1912, Epistacio left Laog and settled in Isabela and

entrusted his lot to Doroteo Bartolome who owned the
adjacent lot in the South. Maria on the other hand
remained in the lot before she followed her husband in
Isabela. In 1916, Epistacio died in Isabela. Five years later,
Maria, with her grandchildren: Calixto and Resurrection
(Petitioner) returned to Laoag and found out that their
house situated in the lot they owned was destroyed by
Resurrection Bartolome v IAC, heirs of Sps. Bernabe fire, thus, they boarded someone else’s house. Calixto
Bartolome and Ursula CID (GR 76792) built a bamboo fence around his grandfather’s lot while
Resurreccion returned to Isabela in 1926 when her
The lot in dispute is originally owned by Epitacio Bitara grandmother (Maria G.) died. In the same year Doroteo
and Maria Gonzales. The lot is located in Laoag, Ilocos went to Davao City and died there after 2 years.
Norte has 725 square meters with Lot No. 11165 under
tax declaration no. 5708, bounded by the propert of Thereafter, Director of Land instituted a cadastral
Pedro Manuel in the North, the road in the east, property proceeding over the lot (Cadastral No. 53). In 1933,
of Esteban in the West and property of Doroteo Ursula Cid (decendent of the Respondent), the widow of
Bartolome in the South. Bernabe (the son of Doroteo) files an answer in the
cadastral case claiming ownership over the lot alleging an
The tax declaration of the lot was superseded by Tax area of 1660 square meters through inheritance.
declaration no 37576 on April 23, 1914 already containing
an area of 772 square meters with improvements In 1934, Resurrection also filed an answer in the same
21 | P a g e

cadastral proceeding claiming ownership over the lot with Maria Gonzales (take note, grandmother ni siya ni
an area of 864 square meters (take note on the difference Resurrection og mao ni siya ang gi claim ni Resurrection)
in the area of lot claimed by Ursula). Resurrection alleged in 1917 for 772 sq. m. of lot for 103.75 pesos.
that the lot was inherited from her grandparents.
RTC
While no further proceedings was held thereon,
Resurrection entrusted the portion she claimed to MARIA In 1984, The RTC only entertained the answers filed by
BARTOLOME (daughter of Doroteo). Resurrection and Ursula, it rendered a decision in favor of
Resurrection. RTC ruled that the deed of sale executed by
In 1939, Ursula and her children migrated to Davao Maria Gonzales in favor of Ursula has no probative value
City leasing the lot she claimed to a certain Severino and is incomplete and undersigned. The possession of
Ramos. She instructed Maria B. to receive the rentals and Ursula over the proper was also interrupted and merely
to pay taxes to the property. Dominador (son of Ursula) tolerated during the pendency of the case. Thus, no
took over the task, but on 1950, Philippine United Trading ownership conferred upon Ursula.
Inc. rented the property until the company was burned
down in 1968. The rentals of the property were given to IAC
Dominador. Resurrection, who was at that time living in
Isabela received 50 pesos from Maria in consideration of IAC reversed the ruling of RTC. IAC ruled that the
the lease contract. document presented by Ursula was an ancient document
covered under Section 22, Rule 132 of the ROC. Further
In 1968, CFI of Ilocos sent a notice for the continuation ruled, that ownership over it was vested with the legal
of the hearing. A year later, Maria filed a motion to presumption that she possessed it with just title.
intervene alleging co-ownership with Ursula since she is
one of the child of Doroteo Bartolome (Daghan ni og Thus, this case reached the Supreme Court with the
children si Doroteo, si Maria B. lang ang ni represent). following ISSUES:
Ursula buttress the claim of Maria alleging that she and [a] WON the provisions of Rule 132 is applicable with
her husband purchased the lot. She presented 3 deed of respect to the deed of sale in question?
sales: [a] dated 1917, purchasing 374 sq. m. from Doming [b] WON acquisitive prescription runs during the
Augustin, [b] 1913, from Ignacia Manrique and [c] from pendency of the cadastral proceeding?
22 | P a g e

Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. – Where a

HELD private writing is more than 30 years old, is produced
from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
[a] WON the provisions of Rule 132 is applicable with genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
respect to the deed of sale in question? circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authority need be given.
NO, it was not applicable. In this case, it appeared that the document was
executed in 1917, it was more than 30 years when it was
The deed of sale presented consists of 3 pieces of paper. offered as an evidence in 1983. It was also presented in
The first page; is blank, apparently serves as a cover page. the court by the proper custodian (Dominador, the heir of
The second page; stated therein the consideration of the Ursula). However, the IAC failed to consider and discuss
sale in the amount of 103.75 pesos sold by Maria Paguyo THAT NO ALTERATION OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF
to Sps. Bernabe and Ursula. The third page; contains the SUSPICION ARE PRESENT.
warranty against eviction and the execution date of the
instrument. On its face, the document appeared without
alteration, but the MISSING PAGE, nonetheless affected
Dominador (the heir/son of Ursula) testified that when the authenticity of the document. The signature is a vital
he was 11 years old, he saw the FOUTH PAGE of the proof in the voluntary transmission of rights over the sale
document containing the signature of Maria Gonzales. It of the lot. IT’S INCOMPLETENESS IS FAR MORE WORSE
was also entrusted to him by his mother in 1947. THAN A DOCUMENT WITH AN ALTERED CONTENT (char
However, the 4th page was lost during the Japanese sad sa SC uy.)
Occupation. Dominador presented in the court a sworn
statement executed by Ursula in 1937 declaring that the Moreover, the genuineness of the document is also
sale was evidenced by a written document; that it was suspicious. The sale was executed in 1917. Ursula would
transferred in the name of her husband, that she was have had it in her possession in 1933 when she answered
paying taxes thereon and that they had been in the cadastral proceeding. But it turned out, she only
continuous possession of the lot for more than. 30 years. claimed that purchase was the mode of acquisition of the
lot after he sister in law (MARIA BARTOLOME) sought the
Rule 132 provides that; intervention in the proceeding allrging co-ownership.
23 | P a g e

ALL OF THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES NEGATES THE Neither Ursula can assert that acquisitive prescription
CONCLUSION OF THE APPELEATE COURT THAT THE was already in effect before the institution of the
DOCUMENT IS COVERED UNDER THE RULES IN ANCEINT cadastral proceeding because Bernabe (husband of
DOCUMENT. Ursula) declared the lot 11165 as his own only on 1925.
The cadastral proceeding started in 1933. It fell short of
The Supreme Court also discussed that even if rules of the 10 years actual, adverse and uninterrupted period of
ancient document would apply, it is still infirm. Under possession.
article 834 of the OLD CIVIL CODE, Maria Gonzales, as a
surviving spouse, shall be entitled to a portion IN OTHERS:
USUFRUCT equal to that corresponding by way of legitime
to each of the legitimate children or descendants who has Payment of taxes (as declared by Ursula during the
not received any betterment, until it had been pendency of the cadastral case) does not prove
determined by means of liquidation of the deceased ownership. It merely is an indicium of a claim of
spouse’s estate that a portion of the conjugal property ownership.
remained after all the debts and obligations had been
paid. Hence, in the absent of proof that the estate of WHEREFORE, IAC decision was reversed and set aside.
Epitacio (deceased spouse of Maria G.) had been settled, The eastern portion of Lot. 11165 with an area of 772 sq.
Maria G. has no right to sell not even the portion of the m. was adjudicated in favor to the heirs of Epitacio while
lot in dispute in this case. the remaining area is hereby adjudicated in favour to the
heirs of Doroteo.
[b] WON acquisitive prescription runs during the
pendency of the cadastral proceeding?

No, SC holds that the institution of the cadastral

proceeding, or atleast the publication of notice, has the
effect of suspending the running of prescriptive period.
IAC erred in ruling acquisitive prescription in favour of
Ursula.
24 | P a g e

Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government of the

Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance
with the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120).

The documents showed that the original vendee of the

subject lot assigned his sales certificate to petitioner's father,
who completed the required installment payments thereon
under Act No. 1120 and was consequently issued a patent.
The Director of Lands executed a final deed of sale in favor of
petitioner's father. However, the deed was not registered
with the Register of Deeds because of lack of technical
requirements as required by law.

Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found

out that the title of Lot No. 727 had been administratively
reconstituted from the owner's duplicate under a Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of United Service Country
Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. Upon order
of the court, the name of the registered owner in the said
TCT was changed to Cebu Country Club, Inc.
Alonso versus Cebu Country Club
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint for
declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title,
Facts: Petitioner Francisco Alonso, who died pendente lite cancellation of certificates of title and recovery of property
and substituted by his legal heirs, was the only son and sole against defendant Cebu Country Club, Inc. which the trial
heir of the late Tomas Alonso and Asuncion Medalle. court decided in favor of the defendant.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and lower court.
records showing that his father acquired Lot No. 727 of the
25 | P a g e

Issue: Who has the better right over the said lot? an absolute deed of sale and that his predecessor-in-
interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that neither Tomas Alonso notorious possession and occupation of the same. The
nor his son petitioner Francisco Alonso, or the latter's heirs, Republic filed in opposition to said motionassailing on the
are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute. The contrary while invoking that the land belongs to a public
petitioner was not able to secure a Torrens title, in fact the dominion and not subject for private appropriation. The land
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources declined their is subject to a request by the DENR for a Presidential
application. Proclamation to reserve the land for Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Site of the NHA.
Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been
able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. The Issue:
reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost Whether or not the appellee has the right to register the
duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. land title under his name.
It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, Ruling:
like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby. The court ruled that there is clear and convincing evidence
that the appellee has established possession over the land
for 30 years. His bona fide claim of ownership is evidenced
by the tax payment receipts, deed of sale, tax declaration,
improvements made on the land and developing it into a
Republic vs CA gr108926? ricefield. The issuance of Proclamation No. 679 that the land
is withdrawn from alienable portion of a public domain
Facts: pursuant to the slum improvement and resettlement project
The appellant Republic implores before the court to set aside of the NHA does not prohibit the registration of title by a
the decision of the CA declaring the ownership of a parcel of person who claims and able to prove ownership thereof.
land in favor of Democrito Plazas. Plazas filed a petition for Registration does not vest title but only serve merely as
registration and confirmation of his title over the land in evidence of such title. Paragraph 10 of LOI No. 555 provides
dispute contending that he is the owner thereof by virtue of that any privately owned land declared to be included in the
26 | P a g e

NHA project may be acquired by the State through

expropriation. Proclamation No. 679 does not provide a valid During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the
justification to deny an individual for a land title registration. following facts:

1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for

taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza prior to
1954 but isnow declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.

2) The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject

of instant case.

3) [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza

while the [respondent] is the only daughter of Sinforoso
Mendoza.

4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were]

brothers, now deceased.

5) During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15,

1979 there was already a dispute between Honorata M.
Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother of [petitioners].
Cequena vs Bolante
6) [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
On October 15, 1975, respondent Honorata Bolante and
Miguel Mendoza, brother of petitioners, had a dispute on Issue: The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful
the ownership of the land during the cadastral survey. owner and possessor of the land subject of the case.
Because of this dispute, herein petitioners filed a civil case
against respondent claiming ownership and possession of RTC: After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in
the parcel of land in question. favor of petitioners awarding the questioned
27 | P a g e

property to petitioners and ordered herein respondent to In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of
vacate the property subject of the case and deliver farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is
possession thereof to the heirs of Margarito Mendoza. settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere
Aggrieved by the decision, respondent filed an appeal to the occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility
Court of Appeals. toward the true owner,occupation and use, however long,
will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession.
CA: The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession
was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their
SC: The Supreme Court found the petition not meritorious. father and brother arguably acquired ownership through
The Court ruled that the appellate court was correct in not extraordinary prescription because of their adverse
giving credence to the affidavit presented by the petitioner possessionfor thirty-two years (1953-1985), 29 this supposed
for the reason that it cannot be admitted as an exception to ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must
the hearsay rule under the dead man's statute. Likewise, the be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document as the
petitioner failed to explain how the purported signature of Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
one of the respondents could have been affixed as she was ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof
an illiterate woman who had never had any formal schooling. of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes
had been paid. In the
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when absence of actual public and adverse possession, the
the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
possession, which was in the concept of owner —public, ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the
peaceful, and uninterrupted — had already ripened into whole parcel has no legal basis. Accordingly, the Court
ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's denied the petition and the assailed decision and resolution
demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. of the appellate court were affirmed.
Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation,
when coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.
28 | P a g e

recovery of possession, and damages with a prayer for a writ

of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents
Victor Caballero and his tenants, T eodoro Donela and Oliver
Donela.
Seriñas alleged in their complaint that they are the
absolute owners and have been in actual and constructive
possession of the land for 35 years. They averred that
sometime in March 1982, they discovered that
respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the said
land and offering it for sale or mortgage to third parties.
They also discovered that the respondents Donela were
occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of the land.
The petitioners claimed that their father, Dr . Seriña,
bought the land from Lucia Vda. de Marbella who
inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri. They presented a
Deed of Sale 6 dated August 23, 1947 showing that Dr .
Seriña bought 5 hectares of ricefield, bounded on the
North by Raymundo Seriña, on the East by Teofilo
Saburnido, on the South by Obdelio Caballero, on the West
by Obdullo Caballero from Lucia Vda. de Marbella.
In his answer, respondent Caballero alleged that he was the
lawful owner, and had been in actual physical possession of
the disputed land since time immemorial. He averred that
the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot originally owned by
SERIÑA vs. VICTOR CABALLERO his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero. They averred that
Eustaqio Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for tax
FACTS: purposes. This tax declaration indicated that the 119,490
On August 11, 1982, Dr . Jesus Seriña and his wife, square-meter parcel of land was located at Pontacon,
Enriqueta Seriña filed a Complaint for quieting of title, Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, bounded on North by
29 | P a g e

Rustico Dablio, on the East by J. Seriña and T. Saburnido, on alleged that the property is located in "Mantadiao, Opol,
the South by Victor Obsioma, and on the West by Victorino Misamis Oriental," while the Deed of Sale shows that the
Caballero. property purchased is located in "Puntakon, Igpit, Cagayan
RTC - in favor of Caballero (the boundaries of the land stated Or. Misamis." We agree with the CA that there was no
in complaint did not coincide with what was stated in the showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of
Deed of Sale and that it was not clearly shown that the land Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled. Absent any specific
bought by Dr. Serina was the same land owned by Victor statement therein to that effect, it cannot be presumed that
Caballero) Tax Declaration No. 4029 in the name of Dr. Seriña cancelled
CA - affirmed decision of RTC Tax Declaration No. 2442. Moreover, the land covered by
ISSUE/s: Tax Declaration No. 2442 is different from that covered
The issues in this petition are, therefore, the following: (1) by Tax Declaration No. 4029.
whether the petitioners were able to establish the The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
identity of the land being claimed by them; and (2) the petitioners did not prove the identity of the land being
whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in claimed. The petitioners did not present evidence to prove
favor of the petitioners. that the land registered in the name of Eustaquio Caballero
SC: was sold to Lucia Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-
The CA was correct in concluding that the petitioners failed interest from whom they purchased the land subject of their
to establish that the parcel of land in the possession of the complaint. The failure to establish the identity of the land is
respondents is the same as that subject of their complaint. obviously fatal to the petitioners' case. In Beo vs. Court of
The CA noted that the land subject of the complaint has Appeals,
boundaries different from the land in possession of the Corollarily, the rule is likewise well-settled that in
respondents. In fact, the land described in the complaint order that an action for recovery of possession may
appears to be different from the land described in the Deed prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the
of Sale which the petitioners invoke as the basis of their action fully proves not only his ownership but also the
ownership. identity of the property claimed, by describing the
The complaint 24 of the petitioners states that the location, area and boundaries thereof. As the appellate
property they are claiming has an area of 2.5 hectares. court succinctly stated, he who claims to have a
On the other hand, the Deed of Sale provides that the better right to the property must clearly show that the
subject property has an area of 5 hectares. The complaint land possessed by the other party is the very land
30 | P a g e

that belongs to him. purposes does not prove ownership.

On the second issue, the CA ruled that inasmuch as the
petitioners failed to establish that the parcel of land in
possession of the respondents is the same as the subject of
their complaint, their claim of acquisitive prescription is
clearly untenable.
We agree with the respondents. Since the property has not
been clearly identified by the petitioners, their claim of
acquisitive prescription cannot be considered. Insufficient
identification of the portion of land claimed in absolute
ownership cannot ripen into ownership. Possession as a
means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive,
is not a mere fiction. Assuming, however, that the disputed
land has been clearly identified, acquisitive prescription will
still not lie in favor of the petitioners because they were not
able to prove that they have been in possession of the
property for the requisite number of years. Prescription
requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse
possession of the property in the concept of an owner for
ten years, in case the possession is in good faith and with just
title.
The petitioners' argument that the payment of taxes on the
property since May 31, 1948 constitutes proof of their
possession of the subject land for thirty-five years is
untenable. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere
prima facie proof of ownership of the property for which
taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
31 | P a g e

claim of fruits derived from the land and then placethe

parties in their previous positions before the agreement.
FACTS:
 Daniel Aquino is a registered owner of a land which he
mortgaged to the DevelopmentBank of the Philippines (DBP).
As the property was in danger of being
foreclosed,respondents sold to petitioners a portion of the
land with the agreement that petitionerswould assume the
remaining mortgage obligation of respondents with the DBP
and thebalance shall be paid to respondents. Petitioners
were allowed by respondents to takepossession of the land.
Subsequently, petitioners applied for a re-structuring of the
mortgageloan win the DBP for a period of ten years.
Petitioners then went to DBP to pay for theamortization but
they found out that respondents had paid the bank and the
latter told theformer that they would return whatever the
petitioners paid for the land and threatened towithdraw the
title from the bank. Petitioners filed with the trial court for
SpecificPerformance with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages and three days later, respondentswithdrew the
amount which they had paid to the bank. During the
pendency of the case,petitioners were able to fully settle the
loan with the DBP. The trial court rendered a decision
assailed by herein petitioners on the ground, amongothers,
Ramel vs Aquino gr133208? thatthe offsetting the claim of improvements by petitioners
and the claim of thefruits derived from the land by
DOCTRINES: respondents is erroneous citing Articles 546 and 547 of
 Absent any direct proof on the value of improvements and theCivil Code. Petitioners argue that as possessors in good
the fruits, it is just tooffset the claim of improvements to the faith and in the concept of an owner,they are entitled to the
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fruits received before possession was legally interrupted and The City of Dagupan (City) filed a complaint against NAWASA
theymust be reimbursed for their expenses or for the (now MWSS) for recovery of ownership and possession of
increase in the value the subject propertymay have acquired Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA invoked RA 1383
by reason thereof. which vested upon it the ownership, possession and control
ISSUE: Whether or notthere is legal ground to order the of all waterworks systems throughout Philippines and as one
offsetting of the claim of improvements by petitioners to the of its counterclaims, asked for reimbursement of its
claim of fruits derived from the land by respondents necessary and useful expenses in making improvements.
RULING: YES. The records show that both parties failed to Trial court ruled in favor of City and found NAWASA to be
prove their claims through anyreceipt or document. Despite possessor in bad faith and not entitled to reimbursement.
the lack of proof, the trial court ordered that NAWASA appealed to CA and argued that City must be liable
whateverimprovements spent on the land shall be offset for amortization of the balance of the loan NAWASA secured
from the fruits derived therefrom. Theplaintiffs claimed that for the improvement of Dagupan Waterworks System. CA
they were able to improve the land after possession was affirmed lower court’s decision and ruled that:
given tothem. No receipts were shown to guide the court as “..expenses were made in utter bad faith for they were made
to how much were the costs of theimprovements. Likewise after the complaint was filed and after numerous SC
the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were able to decisions declaring unconstitutional the taking by NAWASA
cultivate theland and harvest palay although their of the patrimonial waterworks systems of cities,
testimonies to this effect are based on theirpresumptions municipalities and provinces w/o just compensation.
and calculations not on actual harvest such that the court Under Art 456 of NCC, it is clear that a builder or possessor in
also cannot makedetermination of the real fruits derived bad faith is not entitled to indemnity for any useful
from the land. This being so, the court shall justoffset the improvement on the premises”
claim of improvements to the claim of fruits derived from MWSS, successor-in-interest of NAWASA appealed to SC
the land and then placethe parties in their previous positions raising as sole issue of WON it has the right to remove all the
before the agreement. Whatever improvements spenton the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to Dagupan
land shall be compensated from the fruits derived Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA
therefrom. was found to be possessor in bad faith. It argues that Art.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) 546, 547 and 549 do not definitely settle the question of
vs. CA and City of Dagupan (CITY) whether a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove
useful improvements. It invoked cases of Mindanao
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Academy v. Yap and Carbonell v. CA. action for annulment, thus rendering him a builder in bad
Basically, the main issue is: Does a possessor in bad faith faith who is denied by law any right of reimbursement. What
have the right to remove useful improvements? Court allowed Yap to remove were the equipment, books,
SC: NO! furniture and fixtures brought in by him, because they were
Article 449 of CC provides that “he who builds, plants or outside the scope of the judgment and may be retained by
sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, him.
planted or sown without right to indemnity." As a builder in
bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it In Carbonell v CA, both the trial court and CA found that
had made without right to indemnity respondents Infantes were possessors in good faith. On
appeal, Court reversed decision and declared Carbonell to
Moreover, under Art 546, only a possessor in good faith shall have superior right to the land. On issue of WON the Infantes
be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention were possessor in good faith, 4 members ruled that they
until reimbursed; and under Art 547, only a possessor in were not, but as a matter of equity, allowed them to remove
good faith may remove useful improvements if it can be the useful improvements. Inasmuch as only four Members
done w/o damage to the principal thing and if the person concurred in ruling that respondents Infantes were
who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of possessors in bad faith and two Members ruled that they
reimbursing the useful expenses. were possessors in good faith, said decision does not
establish a precedent. Moreover, the equitable consideration
The right given a possessor in bad faith to remove present in said case are not present in the case at bar.
improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury
or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury (In that case, Justice Teehankee (now Chief Justice)
thereby and lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them concurred on the same premise as the dissenting opinion of
by paying the value they have at the time he enters into Justice Muñoz Palma that both the conflicting buyers of the
possession. real property in question, namely petitioner Carbonell as the
first buyer and respondents Infantes as the second buyer,
Mindanao Academy v. Yap does not support stand of MWSS. may be deemed purchasers in good faith at the respective
In that case, Court ruled that if the defendant constructed a dates of their purchase. Justice Muñoz Palma dissented on
new building, as he alleges, he cannot recover its value the ground that since both purchasers were undoubtedly in
because the construction was done after the filing of the good faith, respondents Infantes' prior registration of the
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sale in good faith entitled them to the ownership of the SABIDO vs IAC
land.)
Spouses Dasal and Pecunio filed a case for queiting of title
against herein respondents Spouses Sabido and Rances for
the subject Lots B and C.
The Lower Court ruled in favor of Spouses Dasal. The sheriff
then executed the Writ of Execution as ordered by then
Presiding Judge Sunga. During the execution of the writ, the
sheriff learned that a certain Dominador Sta. Ana was
occupying a portion of lot B together with two other persons
(tenants of Sta. Ana).
Third party Sta. Ana was given an opportunity to present
evidences to prove his ownership upon Lot B which
according to him he purchased in good faith. Subsequently, it
was proved that the lot he claims was different from that of
the subject Lot B.
Furthermore, it was established that Sta. Ana has a
relationship with the Spouses Dasal which should alerted him
that the subject lot was under litigation and that he was also
present during the ocular inspection made in which he fails
to invoke his right upon the issuance of the decision of the
ownnership of the subject Lot B which estabilshed bad faith
on his part.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Spouses Sabido. However,
part of the decision of the Appellate Court grants Sta.Ana an
option to either remove his improvements or make an offer
to the lawful owners to pay for the price of the lot where his
improvements were introduced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in granting
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Sta. Ana the right to exercise the option. Edu vs Gomez grL-33397?
RULING: Yes, the Appellate Court erred in granting such right
to Sta. Ana. FACTS:
The right to exercise the option is only given to a builder in The 1968 model Volkswagen, bantam car, allegedly owned
good faith (previous discussions). The only option for a by Lt. Walter A. Bala under whose name it was
possessor in bad faith is only granted with regards to originally registered, was reported to the Office of the
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure. Provided, Commission on Land Transportation as stolen on June 29,
two conditions must be satisfied. (1) removal will not cause 1970 from the residence of Lt. Bala. Upon receipt of such
damage to the principal thing (2) the lawful owner does not information the agents of Anti-Carnapping Unit
prefer to retain them by paying the reasonable price. (ANCAR) of the Philippine Constabulary, on detail with the
In the case, Sta. Ana being a possessor in bad faith has no Land Transportation Commission recognized subject
option but to vacate the lot. car on 2 February 1971 in the possession of LUCILA ABELLO
and immediately seized and impounded the car as
stolen property.
Romeo F. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation,
seized the car pursuant to Section 60 of Republic Act
4136 which empowers him to seize the motor vehicle for
delinquent registration aside from his implicit power
deducible from Sec. 4(5), Sec. 5 and 31 of said Code, "to seize
motor vehicles fraudulently or otherwise not properly
registered.”
Lucia Abello filed a complaint for replevin with damages in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. CFI ruled in facor
of ABELLO. CFI found that the car was acquired by ABELLO by
purchase from its registered owner Marcelino
Guansing for P9,000 and that she has been in possession
thereof since then until when the car was seized from her
by ANCAR who acted in belief that the car was stolen from
Lt. Bala.
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ISSUE: of Republic Act 4136 that the Commissioner's right to

Whether or not the seizure of the car by the officials are seize and impound subject property is only good for the
valid. proper enforcement of lien upon motor vehicles. The Land
RULING:NO. Transportation Commission may issue a warrant of
There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer constructive or actual distraint against motor vehicle for
or the purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-registration or
property is entitled to be respected and protected in his delinquent registration of vehicles.
possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a
competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the
true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be
compelled to surrender possession nor to be required to
institute an action for the recovery of the chattel, whether or
not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing of an
information charging that the chattel was illegally
obtained through estafa from its true owner by the
transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant
disturbing
the possession of the chattel against the will of the
possessor.
Finally, the claim of petitioners that the Commission has the
right to seize and impound the car under Section 60 of
Republic Act 4136 which reads:
Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. Any balance of fees for
registration, re-registration or
delinquent registration of a motor vehicle, remaining unpaid
and all fines imposed upon any
vehicle owner, shall constitute a first lien upon the motor
vehicle concerned.
is untenable. it is clear from the provision of said Section 60
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EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP. vs. SANTOS

Facts: A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz

placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company
for 406 books, payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the
corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered,
for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase
price. On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to
private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the
seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second
order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first check,
made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had
claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no
such person in its employ. Further verification revealed that
Cruz had no more account or deposit with the Philippine
Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment
check. EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and
arrested Cruz. Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas
de la Peña.

Issue: WON the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of

the books because the check issued by the impostor in
payment therefor was dishonored.

Held: Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer
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until full payment of the purchase price only if there is a — in dealing with the impostor. Although it had never
stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he
ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted his
the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity
the purchase price has not yet been paid. Non-payment only although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to
creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated
contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms
checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery,
the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer thereby vesting ownership in the buyer. Surely, the private
who can in turn transfer it to another. respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz
good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was
lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the
may recover it from the person in possession of the same. books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy
been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a them.
public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is
reimbursing the price paid therefor. clear that its remedy is not against the private respondents
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently caused all
acquired ownership over the books which he could then this trouble.
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between
him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books. It bears repeating that in
the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first
that the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to
purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured
her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By
contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too trusting
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