Tatad vs. Secretary of The Deparment of Energy.
Tatad vs. Secretary of The Deparment of Energy.
Tatad vs. Secretary of The Deparment of Energy.
STATCON
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
PRINCIPLES:
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled
"An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".
SC DECISION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are GRANTED. R.A. No. 8180 is
declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.
FACTS: Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than
those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market
without any government interference. There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex,
Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies
(Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the country.
In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government,
realizing that petroleum and its products are vital to national security and that their continued
supply at reasonable prices is essential to the general welfare, enacted the Oil Industry
Commission Act.
It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing,
exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing,
marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other refined petroleum products.
The OIC was vested with the power to fix the market prices of petroleum products, to
regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to regulate the operations and
trade practices of the industry.
In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need for a more
active role of Filipinos in the oil industry. Until the early seventies, the downstream oil industry
was controlled by multinational companies. All the oil refineries and marketing companies
were owned by foreigners whose economic interests did not always coincide with the interest of
the Filipino. Crude oil was transported to the country by foreign-controlled tankers. Crude
processing was done locally by foreign-owned refineries and petroleum products were marketed
through foreign-owned retail outlets.
CALIBUSO, JONA CARMELI B.
STATCON
On November 9, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly created the Philippine
National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to break the control by foreigners of our oil industry.
By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country — Caltex, Shell and the
government-owned PNOC.
In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating
the Energy Regulatory Board to regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting,
shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources "when
warranted and only when public necessity requires."
On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of
Energy to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects, and
activities of the government in relation to energy exploration, development, utilization,
distribution and conservation. The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the law was
toward privatization of government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and
energy industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants.10 The law also aimed to
encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the effectivity of
this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and
timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry."
ISSUE: 1. WON offending provisions in R.A. 8180 can be individually struck down without
invalidating the entire law.
RULING:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the
presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the
statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it
had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to
make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . .
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute
dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute
to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which
case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent,
conditional, or connected must fall with them.
R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any
reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such
parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This separability clause
notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its
essence that the entire law has to be struck down.