FULL CASES: RULE 112

G.R. No. L-18826      December 17, 1966

ANTONIO Y. MAYUGA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CESAR R. MARAVILLA, Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Odiongan and AQUILINO
GALLOMOSA, respondents-appellees.

On March 22, 1960, Aquilino Gallomosa, through then acting Provincial Fiscal Edmundo Ruado, filed before the Justice of
the Peace of Odiongan, Romblon, an information (Criminal Case No. 4720) against Antonio Mayuga, charging him of
Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence, alleging that he failed to remove an intestinal pack (rolled gauze) from the
surgical opening which he, as a medical practitioner, made in a cesarean operation on Gallomosa's wife, Avelina
Gallomosa, causing infection and leading to her death on December 8, 1956.

After conducting a preliminary examination, the Justice of the Peace, Cesar Maravilla, found that a prima facie  case
existed and ordered Mayuga's arrest.

Before the preliminary investigation, Mayuga, on August 30, 1960 moved to quash the information on the ground that the
accompanying annexes and oral testimonies made in the preliminary examination conducted by the Justice of the Peace
were all hearsay and insufficient to establish a prima facie  case.

When the Justice of the Peace after due hearing denied the motion to quash as well as subsequent motions for
reconsideration as being without merit, the accused on November 20, 1960 petitioned for certiorari before the Court of
First Instance of Romblon alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Justice of the Peace and seeking the
annulment of his orders and the dismissal of the information.

On January 21, 1961 the Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing the petition for lack of merit and directed the
Justice of the Peace to continue with the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 4720.

After denial on February 8, 1961 of motion for reconsideration the accused appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of
Appeals. The latter however certified the case to Us on questions of law: (1) Was the Court of First Instance in error in
upholding the actuations of the Justice of the Peace? (2) Was the outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari also an
error?

Appellant objects to the following, as insufficient basis for the existence of a  prima facie case:

1) Exhibit A — an allegedly unsigned, unauthenticated and unidentified true copy of a purported autopsy report
issued by Dr. Perpetua Penales on March 4, 1957. She was not presented for cross examination.

2) Exhibit B — a certificate stating that Avelina Gallomosa died on December 8, 1956 signed by the Municipal
Treasurer, whose signature was not identified.

3) Exhibit C — a partly accomplished, unsigned and unattested form of certificate of death of the Bureau of Health
later substituted by a photostatic copy marked as Exhibit C-1.

4) The testimonies of the deceased's husband Aquilino Gallomosa, Sancho Fargao, rural health nurse who
attended during the autopsy, and Dr. Godofredo Fatalla, incumbent Municipal Health Officer.

Appellant should bear in mind that a preliminary examination  such as was conducted by the Justice of the Peace has for
its purpose only the determination of whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
the accused guilty thereof,1 and if so, the issuance of a warrant of arrest. And it should not be forgotten that a preliminary
investigation has two stages:2 First, a preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of
the accused;3 and, second, the reading to the accused after his arrest of the complaint or information filed against him,
and his being informed of the substance of the evidence against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his
favor, if he desires.4 Probable cause, in regard to the first stage of preliminary investigation, depends on the discretion of
the judge or magistrate empowered to issue the warrant of arrest. It suffices that facts are presented to him to convince
him, not that a person has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause to believe that such person committed
the crime charged.5 The proceeding is generally ex partes6 unless the defendant desires to be present and while under
the old Rules the Justice of the Peace or investigating officer must take the testimony of the complainant and the latter's
witnesses under oath, only the testimony of the complainant shall be in writing and only an abstract or brief statement of
the substance of the testimony of the other is required. 7 Regarding preliminary investigation, it has thus been ruled that
"the occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof."8 Accordingly, it has been ruled that "a justice of the peace court is not prohibited by any law "from reaching the
conclusion that "probable cause" exists from the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone or any other person whose
statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge or magistrate." " 9

We note that aside from the above-enumerated documentary evidence alleged to be hearsay, there are testimonies of
witnesses and also the affidavits of the complaining witness Aquilino Gallomosa and of Dr. Perpetua Penales, attached to
the petition for certiorari as annexes A and B, respectively. These testimonies alone even excluding said documents
alleged to be hearsay evidence, under the rules then applicable and the jurisprudence, are sufficient to uphold the
conclusion of the Justice of the Peace in his finding that a prima facie  case existed. In fact We find that in looking into the
matters objected to as inadmissible and insufficient, the Justice of the Peace did more than that required to form his
conclusion, an act commendable of him in his efforts to clear his mind of doubts in forming his opinion which the Court of
First Instance correctly upheld.

Appellant further argues that under Section 6 of Rule 67, now Section 6 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari,
once sufficient in form and substance, should be answered and the Court of First Instance should have required the
Justice of the Peace to do so before dismissing the petition. Suffice it to observe that precisely in this case the petition is
deficient in substance. And as held in Arvisu vs. Vergara, 90 Phil. 621, 623-623: "On principle, dismissal [of a petition
for certiorari] would also be proper if before answer is filed, the attention of the court is called to the fact that from its own
allegations the petition appears to be without merit." 10

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed and respondent Justice of the Peace is directed to
proceed with the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 4720, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 147272             July 14, 2006

CONRADO B. NICART, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUZ B. TY, respondents.

In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for injunctive relief, Conrado B. Nicart, Jr.
seeks to annul and set aside the Order dated July 23, 1999 1 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, and its Resolutions
dated January 30, 20012 and February 15, 2001,3 all issued in its Criminal Case No. 24674.

The antecedent facts and proceedings:

This case started when Nilcar Mosende, et al., on the basis of the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA), filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (OMB-Visayas, hereinafter) a complaint against herein respondent Luz B.
Ty (Ty, hereinafter), then municipal treasurer of San Policarpo, Eastern Samar for, among other offenses,
misappropriation of over P4.1 Million of public funds. Answering, Ty denied the allegations in the complaint, docketed as
OMB-VIS-CRIM-96-1188, and pointed a finger of blame on petitioner Conrado Nicart, Jr., then Mayor of said municipality.

In a bid then to evade liability that might arise from the Mosende complaint, Ty, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT4 dated
November 6, 1966, charged petitioner with violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In her complaint, docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-96-1210, Ty stated that
she was influenced and induced by the petitioner to violate certain office rules and regulations. Going into specifics, she
alleged issuing, upon petitioner's instructions, several PNB checks in favor of third parties, which checks, however, ended
being encashed by petitioner's wife, Thelma. She also alleged being induced by the petitioner, his wife and an aide to
withdraw huge amounts from the municipal coffers to be charged to the account of petitioner. And according to Ty,
petitioner drew funds from her (Ty's) cash advances and used the same for purposes other than what they were
appropriated for, adding, in close, that petitioner purchased, in January 1994, a Nissan car using a PNB check issued in
her (Ty's) name.

For his part, petitioner tagged Ty's accusatory but false allegations as a case of buck-passing, and then proceeded to file
a counter-charge against Ty for malversation and violation of R.A. No. 3019.

Meanwhile, the Special Audit Division, COA-Regional Office-VIII, acting on the request of the OMB-Visayas to look into
the veracity of the allegations in Ty's affidavit-complaint and the legality of the transactions mentioned therein, submitted
on May 12, 1998 an audit report. 5 In it, the audit team concluded that cash advances in the total amount of P1,180,000.00
remain unaccounted and unliquidated and that both Ty and petitioner are responsible therefor.

Following the usual preliminary investigation, Graft Investigating Officer Thaddeus Boiser submitted a Resolution dated
March 31, 1998 on the consolidated OMB-VIS-CRIM Nos. 96-1188, 96-1210 and 97-0664, recommending the prosecution
of petitioner and Ty for Malversation of Public Funds (Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code). The Deputy Ombudsman for
Visayas endorsed the recommendation which then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved on June 9, 1998.

An information was accordingly filed with the Sandiganbayan against both petitioner and Ty, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 24674. The accusatory portion of the information 6 reads as follows:

That in or about the month of October 1996 and for sometime prior thereto, at the Municipality of San Policarpo,
Province of Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named
accused, public officers, being the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer of the [said] Municipality … and as
such, have in their possession and custody of public funds in the total amount of FOUR MILLION ONE
HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE AND 15/100 PESOS (P4,106,489.15), Philippine
Currency, for which they are accountable by reason of the duties of their office, taking advantage of their official
positions, conniving and confederating together … with intent to defraud and of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to their own personal use and
benefit said public funds in the amount of FOUR MILLION ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE AND 15/100 PESOS (P4,106,489.15) Philippine Currency, and despite demands made upon them
to account for said public funds, they have failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government,
particularly the Municipality of San Policarpo, Eastern, Samar.

The following events then transpired:

1. After posting the necessary bail bond, petitioner moved for a reinvestigation and the Sandiganbayan allowed
him to file the necessary motion.

2. Petitioner moved for and obtained a reinvestigation, but the Office of the Special Prosecutor denied the motion
in an Order of March 9, 1999.7

3. On June 30, 1999, petitioner interposed an Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings with Motion for Leave to File
Petition for Review with the [OMB], which motion, however, the Sandiganbayan denied in its first assailed Order
of July 23, 19998 on the ground that the motion partakes of "[a prohibited] second Motion for Reconsideration [and
that] the matters raised therein appear to be evidenciary in character which should be ventilated during the trial."
 4. On August 24, 1999, petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion, followed by his Reply to Comment [of the
Special Prosecutor] on the Urgent Omnibus Motion.

Pursuant to its assailed Resolution of January 30, 2001,9 the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's Urgent
Omnibus Motion and set a date for his arraignment.

5. A little over two weeks later , the Sandiganbayan, acting on the motion filed by the prosecution pursuant to Sec.
13 of R.A. 3019, issued another Resolution dated February 15, 2001,10 suspending petitioner (at that time
holding the Vice Mayoralty position) from office for ninety days from notice.

Hence, this petition.

In a Resolution of April 2, 2001, 11 the Court denied petitioner's motion for issuance of temporary restraining order to enjoin
the respondent Sandiganbayan from proceeding with his suspension from office pendente lite and from holding or taking
any further action in Criminal Case No. 24674. This was followed by another Resolution dated June 20, 2001, 12 denying a
reconsideration of the first, prompting the Sandiganbayan, per petitioner's own manifestation, to proceed with his
arraignment scheduled on April 17, 2001.13

Given the separate resolutions adverted to dated April 2 and June 20, 2001, the propriety of the preventive suspension of
petitioner effected through the assailed Resolution of February 15, 2001 has become a moot issue, it appearing that he
has already served his suspension. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justifiable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use and value. 14 In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. 15

This is not say, however, that the assailed suspension resolution of the Sandiganbayan, insofar as it imposed a 90-day
preventive suspension instead of the maximum 60 days prescribed by Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160),16 is flawed. Far from it. As may be noted, the anti-graft court ordered the petitioner's suspension on the
basis of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019,17 malversation of public funds being an offense involving fraud against government
funds and is clearly included among the crimes contemplated under said section. Be that as it may and given the
presumptive validity of the information in question, petitioner's urging for the Court to strike down the suspension order
cannot be granted. As the Court articulated in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan,18 citing what then Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa referred to therein as the "mass of jurisprudence":

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in the court in
which the criminal charge is filed;.

The provision of suspension pendent lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under the Act,
whether they be appointive or elective officials …. It applies to a … Municipal Mayor, a Governor, a Congressman
….

It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer accused before it. xxx

xxx       xxx       xxx

However, the preventive suspension may not be of indefinite period . . . . The Court has thus laid down the rule
that preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with [PD] No.
807, … now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. (Citations omitted; word in bracket added.)

Like the petitioner's challenge against the preventive suspension resolution of the Sandiganbayan, his assault against that
court's July 23, 199919 order must likewise be given a short shrift.

As may be recalled, the order adverted to denied, as earlier recited, petitioner's Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings with
Motion for Leave to Allow Accused to File Petition for Review with the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner sought
deferment to provide him time while he makes a bid to secure a review of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's denial of
his (petitioner's) motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner would now have this Court strike down the said July 23, 1999 order.
The Court will not do so, what with petitioner lacking even the good sense of venturing a reason for his plea.

At any rate, in no sense may the challenged order be stigmatized as capricious, oppressive or wanting in logic as to call
for its invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. As it were, the respondent court predicated its denial of the motion
to defer on, inter alia, the fact that the said motion "partakes of a second Motion for Reconsideration" suggesting – and
correctly so - that the filing thereof is contrary to the Office of the Ombudsman's one-motion rule expressed under the
following provision:

SEC. 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation; Grounds. - Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision
….
xxx       xxx       xxx
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the hearing officer shall resolve the
same within . . . .20
This brings us to the third and last issue. It relates to petitioner's  Urgent Omnibus Motion dated August 25, 1990, which
the Sandiganbayan denied in its assailed Resolution of January 30, 2001. 21 Parenthetically, the petitioner did not bother to
attach in his petition a copy of the urgent omnibus motion, thus leaving the Court in the dark as to the issues and
supporting arguments raised therein. On its face, however, the Resolution of January 30, 2001 only passed upon and
resolved, in the affirmative, the issue on the existence of a probable cause for malversation against the petitioner and
accordingly denied his plea to quash information.

The determination of a probable cause during a preliminary investigation pertains to the public prosecutor who inquires
into facts concerning the commission of a crime with the end in view of determining whether an information may be
prepared and filed against the accused. 22 This prefatory inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there is
well-founded ground to believe that a crime has been committed by the accused who is probably guilty thereof, 23 and ergo
should be held for trial.24 Such investigation should be distinguished from an inquiry to determine probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind, also called preliminary investigation proper, is executive in nature and is
part of the prosecutor's job. The second kind is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. 25

But while the institution of a criminal suit, be it thru complaint or information, rests upon the sound discretion of the
prosecutor, the trial court, once its jurisdiction over the case attaches, is not without competence, nay the duty, to
evaluate, in appropriate cases, the prosecution's determination of a probable cause, particularly when confronted with a
motion to quash on the ground that the prosecution had filed the information or denied a motion for reinvestigation with
grave abuse of discretion. While perhaps not on all fours, what the Court, through now Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, said in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals26 is very much apropos:

In Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, this Court overruled the grant of the motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting
fiscal … because, such grant was based upon consideration other than the judge's assessment of the matter.
Relying solely on the conclusion of the prosecution to the effect that there was no sufficient evidence against the
accused to sustain the allegation in the information, the trial judge did not perform his function of making an
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case.

Despite the pronouncement in Marcelo that a final resolution of the appeal to the Department of Justice is
necessary, both decisions followed the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul: Once a complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case … rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial judges are thus required to make
their own assessment of whether the secretary of justice committed grave abuse of discretion in granting or
denying the appeal, separately and independently of the prosecution's or the secretary's evaluation that such
evidence is insufficient or that no probable cause to hold the accused for trial exists. They should embody such
assessment in their written order disposing of the motion. (citations omitted)

In the case at bench, petitioner cannot plausibly impute grave abuse of discretion on respondent Sandiganbayan for
denying, pursuant to its January 30, 2001 resolution, his motion to quash information on the issue of existence of probable
cause. As it were, the anti-graft court complied with its judicial obligation of evaluating the evidence on account of which
the special prosecutor filed the information against the petitioner for malversation. And its assessment on the existence of
a probable cause appears correct and is, to be sure, incorporated in its assailed resolution of January 30, 2001, thus:

From the foregoing, accused Nicart's own evidence substantiates the charge of malversation filed against him,
although only to the extent of P475,000.00. Nicart's claim that if his wife's signature appears in the checks …, it is
because the checks were given to her by the store owner for encashment. This has to be proven by evidence.

Accused Nicart also claims that his signature in some of the checks involved in this case has been forged. xxx.
However, the NBI Questioned Document Report No. 1112-1197 … states that "the questioned and the standard
sample signatures of CONRADO B. NICART, JR. were written by one and the same person." The
audit/investigation also revealed that "cash advances totaling P1,180,000.00 remain unaccounted and
unliquidated" for which he and his co-accused Ty were found to be responsible …. The contention of the accused
that the Special Prosecutor "has nothing at all to support his decision" …, therefore, is not correct.

It may be, as petitioner claims, that the amount appearing as having been misappropriated in the Information exceeds
what the COA audit report yields and that both documents slightly differ as to when the acts or transactions complained of
occurred.

This variance as to amount and date of occurrence does not, to our mind, vitiate the validity of the Information in question.
For, the filing of an information follows and is dependent on a finding of a probable cause in a preliminary investigation.
But then an investigation, advisedly called preliminary, is not the stage for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence; it is, to stress, only an occasion for the presentation of such evidence as may engender a prima facie showing
that an offense has been committed and that the accused probably committed it. 27 The question of whether or not the
COA audit report is the only determinative documentary evidence to prove the offense charged is not a proper subject of
inquiry in this certiorari proceedings.

In all, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that grave abuse of discretion tainted the issuance of the assailed order and
resolutions. We are thus denying the instant recourse to clear the path for the Sandiganbayan to write finis, one way or
the other, to its Criminal Case No. 24674.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111616 February 4, 1994

MAYOR ARNULFO NATIVIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO N. FELIX, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 64, Tarlac, Tarlac and HON. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR OF TARLAC, respondents.

The threshold issue confronting us is whether or not the provincial prosecutor of Tarlac has authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the offense allegedly committed by herein petitioner who is a Municipal Mayor.

The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:

The Philippine National Police (PNP), responding to a letter dated July 19, 1993 written by Mrs. Lourdes Aquino, wife of
deceased Severino L. Aquino, requested the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate petitioner, the Municipal Mayor of
Ramos, Tarlac, for the death of Severino Aquino at the Ramos Police Station on the night of February 20, 1989. (I.S. 93-
1038). Consequently, a subpoena was issued requiring petitioner to submit a
counter-affidavit.

During the pendency of I.S. 93-1038, the PNP filed another complaint on July 26, 1993 with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Gerona-Ramos Tarlac (MCTC Criminal Case No. 4923). On the same day, the MCTC directed petitioner's arrest
with bail fixed at P250,000.00.1 On July 28, 1993, he forthwith posted bail with the RTC of Manila, Branch 27 which
thereafter issued an order recalling warrant.2

After conducting the requisite preliminary investigation, the MCTC, through a resolution dated July 29, 1993 opining that
there was probable cause to hold accused for murder, recommended bail at P250,000.00. 3 On the same date, the
Provincial Prosecutor approved the filing of an information for murder but with no bail recommended. 4 Consequently, an
information against petitioner and Sesinando "Boy" Llerina was filed before the sala of Judge Augusto Felix of Regional
Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 64 (Criminal Case No. 7717). Warrant of Arrest, dated July 30, 1993, was issued on
August 2, 1993.

Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withhold the issuance of the warrant of arrest and to dismiss the case. In
the alternative, petitioner asked that the case be remanded for further preliminary investigation proceedings. In an order
dated August 9, 1993, the trial court, observing that the Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court failed to conduct the
second stage of the preliminary investigation, recalled the warrant of arrest and remanded the case for further preliminary
investigation.5

Sensing an alleged partiality on the part of the provincial prosecutor, petitioner wrote the Secretary of Justice requesting
that his preliminary investigation be conducted in Manila. This request was denied subsequently on August 18, 1993.

On August 16, 1993, petitioner was ordered to file his counter-affidavit. On August 25, 1993, a resolution was issued by a
panel of prosecutors holding that probable cause exists. They also attached an amended information charging Jun
Cabaong, Sesinando "Boy" Llerina and Vicente Millado 6 as additional defendants. The same day, respondent judge
admitted the amended information and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest without bail on petitioner. 7

The next day, August 26, 1993, petitioner moved to remand his case for preliminary investigation 8 with motion to quash
warrant alleging that there was no preliminary investigation and contending that respondent judge had no jurisdiction over
the case because it was the Ombudsman and not the Provincial Prosecutor who had jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation. Petitioner vigorously contended that the proper court which had jurisdiction over the case was
the Sandiganbayan and not respondent judge.

On September 6, 1993, respondent judge denied petitioner's motion to remand and committed petitioner to the Tarlac
Penal Colony where petitioner is now detained.

Hence, this petition.

The issue is whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended
information filed by the provincial fiscal and in directing petitioner's arrest. Based on Section 15(1) of Republic Act
No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), petitioner contends that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who
has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for the alleged murder of Severino Aquino. Section
15 states:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases. (Emphasis ours)
Citing Deloso v.  Domingo9 where, in determining the power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation, we
relied principally on Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act of
1989. In the Deloso  case, we said that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official," 10 is broad enough to
encompass any crime committed by a public official. We continued: "The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act
or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we." On this aforequoted pronouncement is anchored petitioner's contentions.

The Deloso  case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo v. Domagas 11 and Sanchez
v.  Demetriou. 12 However, by way of amplification, we feel the need for tracing the history of the legislation relative to the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the
former.

In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the subject matter, has been in a state of flux.

These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, 13 — the first law on the Sandiganbayan;
(b) Pres. Decree No. 160614 which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129; 15 (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; 16 and (e) Pres. Decree
No. 1861.17

The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to reads as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and

employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional  or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed  prision correccional  or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court. (Emphasis provided)

A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense to fall under
the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must be in relation to his office and
the penalty prescribed be higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.

Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been met,  18 the first requirement
is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime
committed by public officers or employees must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1486, has been retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861
as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its power to investigate.

It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in  pari materia  to Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is
dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same
person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter. 19

It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but also to
harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.  20 Thus, in the application and
interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree
No. 1861 must be taken into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers
had in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or amendment,
the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres.
Decree No. 1861.

Now we cannot accept petitioner's specious argument that the alleged offense was committed in performance of the
mayor's responsibility to maintain peace and order on the pretext that the victim, a robbery and NPA suspect, was under
investigation at the time when he was allegedly killed at the police
station. 21 By no stretch of the imagination or logic, can we construe that the alleged act falls under any of the functions of
the municipal mayor as enumerated under Sec. 444 of the Local Government Code of 1991 or implied therefrom.  22 Thus,
petitioner cannot disregard the authority of the provincial prosecutor in conducting a preliminary investigation of his
alleged criminal acts.

Assuming arguendo that petitioner's act satisfied the requirement that the same must be in performance of official
functions, still it cannot be overlooked that the Ombudsman has only primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, not exclusive original jurisdiction as specified under Section 15 (1) of Rep. Act No. 6770 aforecited. As
we held in Aguinaldo v.  Domagas  23 and recently, Sanchez v.  Demetriou, 24 such authority of the Ombudsman "is not an
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged," in other words,
concurrent with similarly authorized agencies of the government. 25 Accordingly, the Ombudsman may take over the
investigation of such case at any stage from any investigative agency of the Government.

A careful scrutiny of Sec. 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 will reveal that the word "may" is used in regard to the
Ombudsman's assumption of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The word "may," being
generally permissive and since it operates to confer discretion, 26 it follows that the Ombudsman's investigatory powers
are but directory in nature.

Finally, petitioner contends that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he denied petitioner the
opportunity to file a counter-affidavit after the latter was subpoenaed. His thesis is that the filing of the amended
information was null and void because it violated his right to a preliminary investigation since it was filed before the lapse
of the ten-day period for filing a counter-affidavit under Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

We see no denial of due process against petitioner for he has been afforded every opportunity to present his counter-
affidavit. It appears from the records that the accused was duly notified to submit his counter-affidavit on August 19, 1993.
However, he did not personally appear and instead filed a manifestation with motion asking for a cancellation of the
August 19 hearing and requested an extension of fifteen (15) days. The fifteen-day period requested by him was denied
but he was given an additional period of five (5) days. The extended period elapsed without the accused submitting his
counter-affidavit. There being no counter-affidavit submitted as of August 25, 1993 by the petitioner, the prosecution filed
the corresponding amended information with the trial court. 27

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Case REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan,
JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 105965-70           August 9, 1999

GEORGE UY, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Special Prosecutor, respondents.

This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution 1 of the Sandiganbayan denying
petitioner's motion to quash the six (6) informations charging him with violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, and to permanently enjoin the respondents from proceeding with the criminal cases insofar as petitioner is
involved.

At times material hereto, petitioner was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy. He was designated by his immediate
supervisor, Captain Luisito F. Fernandez, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership, to act on the latter's behalf,
during his absence, on matters relating to the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch, O/NG. This included the authority to
sign disbursement vouchers relative to the procurement of equipment needed by the Philippine Navy.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 2, 1991, six (6) informations for estafa through falsification of official documents and one (1) information for
violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and nineteen
(19) co-accused, namely: (Ret.) Bgen. Mario S. Espina (then Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics,
Department of National Defense), (Ret.) Rear Admiral Simeon M. Alejandro (then Flag Officer in Command, Philippine
Navy), CDR Rodolfo Guanzon, CDR Erlindo A. Erolin, CAPT. Manual Ison (then Commander of the Naval Supply Center,
Philippine Navy), CAPT. Andres Andres, LCDR Gilmer B. Batestil, LCDR Jose Alberto I. Velasco, Jr., LTSG Edgar L.
Abogado, LT. Teddy O. Pan, LT. Ronald O. Sison, Reynaldo Paderna (Chief Accountant), Antonio Guda (Supply
Accountable Officer, Fort San Felipe, Cavite, Philippine Navy), Loida T. Del Rosario (Typist), Marissa Bantigue (owner of
MAR GEN Enterprise), Avelina Avila (owner of Avelina Avila General Merchandise), Jenis B. Bantigue (owner of JAB
GEN Merchandise), Maria M. Capule (owner of MM Capule Enterprise) and Andrea C. Antonio (owner of AC Antonio
Enterprise).

On September 20, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order 2 directing a comprehensive re-investigation of the cases
against all the twenty (20) accused.

After conducting the re-investigation, the Special Prosecutor issued an Order 3 dated November 14, 1991 recommending
that the informations for estafa through falsification of official documents be withdrawn and in lieu thereof, informations for
violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, be filed against eleven (11) accused, 4 which included the
petitioner.

In a Memorandum5 dated December 5, 1991, Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto reduced the number of those to be
charged under R.A. No. 3019, as amended, to five (5), 6 including petitioner.

Acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the five (5) remaining accused, the Special Prosecutor issued an
Order7 dated February 18, 1992 dropping two (2) more names 8 from the five (5) officers recommended for prosecution,
and recommending that six (6) separate informations for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, as amended, be filed
against the petitioner, LCMDR. Rodolfo Guanzon and LT. Teddy Pan. Except for the variance in the Purchase Order
numbers involved and the Payees,9 the six (6) amended informations10 filed by Special Prosecutor Officer III Roger C.
Berbano, Sr. recite identical allegations, viz:

That on or about November 1985, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, CDR. Rodolfo Guanzon, being then the
Procurement Officer, Philippine Navy, LCDR. George Uy, being then the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff
Comptrollership, Philippine Navy and Lt. Teddy O. Pan, being then the Naval Group Inspector, Philippine Navy, all
public officials, and committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, cause undue injury to the Government, and
in the exercise of their separate official functions, to wit: accused Guanzon initiated/prepared the Abstract of
Canvass and Recommendation of Awards, Certificate of Emergency Purchase and Reasonableness of Price,
signed the PO, DV, validated PO No. . . ., accused Uy signed the DV in behalf of the Assistant Chief of Naval
Comptrollership, accused Pan as N6 conducted the pre-audit and affixed his signature on the same P.O., the
Sales Invoice and Technical Inspection Report — which documents said accused had the duty to
check/verify/examined, thereby "acting or omitting to act" in a situation where there is a duty to act, in that only
100 seal rings were ordered at a unit price of P98.70, yet 1,000 pieces appear to have been sold with total price of
P98,700.00, hence there was gross error in multiplication as shown on the face of the aforesaid PO and other
supporting documents, resulting to an overpayment of P88,930.00 to . . ., thereby depriving the
Government/Philippine Navy of the use thereof until its remittance/return to the Government/Philippine Navy
by . . . in December, 1991.

On April 21, 1992, the petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash 11 the informations on the following
grounds:
1. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused.
 2. The officer who has filed the informations had no authority to do so.
3. The facts charged do not constitute an offense.
4. More than one (1) offense is charged.
On June 10, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued the now-assailed Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash for lack of
merit. It passed upon the grounds set forth by petitioner in this wise:

On the first issue raised by accused-movant, we are not inclined to rule that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
person of accused-movant or over the offenses charged herewith. As intimated by the prosecution, this Court has
several cases pending before it involving crimes committed by military officers in relation to their office. Unless
and until the Highest Tribunal rules otherwise, this Court has no judicious recourse but to entertain and try the
various criminal cases filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor involving military officers and men accused of
committing crimes "in relation to their office," and those involving violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Be that as it may, being prosecuted for violation of
R.A. 3019, as amended, accused-movant axiomatically is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

We cannot likewise sustain accused-movant's stance that the officer who has filed the informations in the cases at
bar had no authority to do so. Both the offense charged and the person of accused-movant being within the
exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, it stands to reason that the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the
instant criminal charges belong to, and are the exclusive prerogatives of, the Office of the Ombudsman, as
provided for in Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770.

Neither are we impressed with the asseveration that the acts charged in the amended informations at bar do not
constitute an offense. Such a claim cannot stand in the face of unequivocal rulings of the Supreme Court, thus:

The fundamental rule in considering a motion to quash on the ground that the averments of the
information are not sufficient to constitute the offense charged is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense, as defined in the law. (People
v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162).

As a general proposition, too, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in the information do
not constitute the offense charged, or of any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis
alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. (People v. Navarro, 75 Phil.
516).

The general rule is that in resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or information, the facts
alleged therein should be taken as they are. This is especially so if the motion to quash is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute offense, but he court may consider additional facts which
the fiscal admits to be true. (People v. Navarro, supra).

In consonance with the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements, the quashal of the informations at bar cannot be
sustained since they are sufficient in form and substance to charge indictable offenses. Parenthetically, some of
the arguments relied upon by accused-movant refer more to evidentiary matters, the determination of which are
not yet legally feasible at this juncture and should only be raised during the trial on the merits.

Finally, We find no merit in the argument that more than one offense is charged in the criminal informations at bar.
Precisely, the prosecution split the original information into six (6) distinct amended informations pertaining to six
(6) criminal violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended. Such is but proper under the premises
considering that the acts subject of the criminal cases at bar were allegedly committed on six (6) different
purchase orders and there is no showing that they were committed on similar dates or singular occasion.

In the instant petition, petitioner raises the following issues:

1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or the person of the
petitioner;

2) Whether or not the respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor have the authority to file the questioned
amended information;

3) Whether or not the act or omission charged constitutes an offense.

On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner and the Solicitor General submit that it is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan,
which has jurisdiction to try petitioner. Emphasizing the fundamental doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action, they claim that at the time the amended
informations were filed on July 2, 1991, the controlling law on the jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines is P.D. 1850, "Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police and further
defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (which took effect on
October 4, 1982), as amended by P. D. 1952 (which took effect in September of 1984), more particularly Section 1(b)
thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. — Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who
commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial
 pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of
War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime
or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of
War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper
civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of
Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused
military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the
active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by
law: Provided, further, that the President may, in the interest of Justice, order or direct, at any time before
arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the appropriate civil court.

As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers,
policemen, firemen, and jail guards. (emphasis ours).

Since petitioner is a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, he falls squarely under Article 2 of the Articles
of War (C.A. 408, as amended) mentioned in the aforecited Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850. Article 2 reads:

Art. 2: Persons subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these Articles and shall be
understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "person subject to military law;
whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the Philippine
Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees
undergoing military instruction; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or
for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to
obey the same; . . . .

Petitioner and the Solicitor General concede the subsequent passage of Republic Act No. 7055, "An Act Strengthening
Civilian Supremacy over the military by returning to the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain offenses involving
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, other persons subject to military law, and the members of the Philippine
National Police, repealing for the purpose certain presidential decrees" (which took effect on July 13, 1991) which
expressly repealed P.D. 1850. Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055 reads:

Sec. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, other special penal law, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not
civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or judicial persons, shall be tried by the
proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-
connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the
Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or
offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70,
Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty
prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.

They nonetheless argue that petitioner's case falls within the exception provided for in said Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055,
and, therefore, still cognizable by courts-martial, since the alleged commission of the offense for which petitioner is
charged with is "service-connected ."

We rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at the time of the filing of the informations, and as now
prescribed by law.

Republic Act No. 8249,12 the latest amendment to P. D. 160613 creating the Sandiganbayan (otherwise known as the
"Sandiganbayan Law"), provides the prevailing scope of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law read:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxx     xxx     xxx
(d.) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,  and all officers of higher rank;
xxx     xxx     xxx
It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the nature of the offense and the position occupied by the accused
are conditions sine qua non before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case.
In the instant case, while petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, which is an
offense covered by Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, his position as Lieutenant Commander (LCMDR.) of the
Philippine Navy is a rank lower than "naval captains and all officer of higher rank" as prescribed under sub-paragraph (d)
of Section 4. Under the Promotions System in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the hierarchy in the position/rank of
the officers of the Philippine Navy is as follows:
1. Admiral
2. Vice-Admiral
3. Rear Admiral
4. Commodore
5. Captain
6. Commander
7. Lieutenant Commander
8. Lieutenant Senior Grade
9. Lieutenant Junior Grade
10. Ensign
Thus, not falling within the "rank" requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the
regular courts pursuant to the provision of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which
states that "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.

Consequently, it is the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged. Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, the commission of any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act
shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than SIX YEARS AND ONE MONTH or FIFTEEN YEARS. The
indictment against petitioner cannot fall within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts because under Republic Act No. 7691 which amended certain provisions of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 by expanding the jurisdiction of said inferior courts, they "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof . . . ." This draws the case into the domain of the regional trial courts
which, under Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter."

It is not correct that under R. A. No. 7055, the courts-martial retain jurisdiction over petitioner's case since the offense for
which he is charged is "service-connected." The second paragraph of Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055 limits the nature of
"service-connected crimes or offenses" to those defined only in Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92 and 95 to 97 of Commonwealth
Act No. 408, as amended,14 to wit: Fraudulent enlistment, making Unlawful Enlistment, False Muster, False Returns,
Desertion, Advising or Aiding Another to Desert, Entertaining a Deserter, Absence Without Leave, Disrespect towards the
President, Vice-President and National Assembly, Disrespect towards Superior Officer, Mutiny or Sedition, Failure to
Suppress Mutiny of Sedition, Quarrels; Frays; Disorders, Breaking an Arrest or Escaping from Confinement, Refusal to
Receive and Keep Prisoners, Failure to make a Report of Prisoners Received, Releasing prisoners without proper
authority, Failure to Deliver offenders to Civil Authorities, Misbehavior Before the Enemy, Subordinates Compelling
Commander to Surrender, Improper Use of Countersign, Forcing a Safeguard, Neglect or Wrongful Appropriation of
Captured Property, Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property, Relieving, Corresponding with, or Aiding the Enemy,
Spies, Damage/Wrongful Disposition of Military Property, Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property, Drunk on
Duty, Misbehavior of Sentinel, Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions, Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions, Good
Order to be Maintained and Wrong Redressed, Provoking Speeches or Gestures, Dueling, Fraud against the Government
Affecting Matters and Equipment, Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman, and All Disorders and Neglects to the
Prejudice of Good Order and Military Discipline and All Conduct of a Nature of Bring Discredit Upon the Military Services.
None of these offenses relates to acts or omissions constituting a violation of Section 3 (e), R. A. No. 3019, as amended
which reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxx     xxx     xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s
against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.15

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 10, 1992 in Criminal Cases Nos. 16905-16910, is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the Sandiganbayan is ordered to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos.
16905-16910, and to inform this Court of the action taken hereon within fifteen (15) days from finality of this
decision.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October 16, 1985, petitioner seeks to annul
and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated August
9, 1985, August 12,1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing
with the trial or any other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, an entitled
"People of the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."

The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive
Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts,
filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then
Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.

Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had submitted his resignation as
Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint
with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices in the
conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint repeated the charges embodied in the
previous report filed by complainant before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).

On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding
investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted
his Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD have
violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable
under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the
motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On October
25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July 5, 1985, the
Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon, recommending
that the following informations be filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by
his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions
through manifest partiality and evident bad faith;

2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto
Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a
check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973;

3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and
Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978.

Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:

Re: Criminal Case No. 10499

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad with Violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:
 That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then the Secretary of the Department (now
Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive a check for
Pl25,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for printing services
rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum of January, 1973, wherein the accused in his
official capacity had to intervene under the law in the release of the funds for said project.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on May
16, 1980.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Re: Criminal Case No. 10500

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary
of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to
prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true detailed and sworn statement of his assets and
liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year (1973), as required of every public officer.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with the Office of the Tanodbayan on
June 20, 1980.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10501
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of
Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed as follows:

That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then
the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and
unlawfully give Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private corporation of which his
brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the President, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official functions, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer
of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of South East Asia Research Corporation (SEARCH),
allegedly a private corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973,
but whose organization and operating expenses came from the confidential funds of the Department of
Public Information as it was organized to undertake research, projects for the government, without
requiring an accounting of the funds advanced by the Department of Public Information and
reimbursement thereof by D' GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on May
16, 1980.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10502
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary
of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to
prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities,
as of December 31, 1976, including a statement of the amounts of his personal and family expenses and
the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1976), as required of every public
officer.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on
June 20, 1988.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10503
 The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare
and file with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities,
as of December 31, 1978, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts
of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year (1978), as required of every public officer.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on
June 20, 1980.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the informations on the follow
grounds:

1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations;

2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501;

3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for
the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;

4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases Nos. 10500, 10502 and
10503;

5. No prima facie  case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10199 for Violation of
Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;

6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10501 (for Violation of
Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.

On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion to quash, stating therein in
particular that there were only two grounds in said motion that needed refutation, namely:

1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and 10501, have already prescribed and
criminal liability is extinguished; and

2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 — For failure to file Statement of Assets
and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense.

On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, contended
that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since the above-
numbered cases were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were committed on July
16, 1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges were actually filed in Court only on July
9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten (10) year prescriptive period
has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period
of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.

Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is
separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the
former requires "any natural or juridical person having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more..." to submit a statement of
assets and liabilities "... regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL government employees and
officials to submit a statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are separate and
distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation does not impair
the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it render said informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added
that P.D. 911, the law which governs preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period of ten (10)
days from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation.

On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's "Consolidated Motion to
Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being one which
could be cured by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend said information to change
 the date of the alleged commission of the offense therein charged from January 31, 1974  to  September
30, 1974 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed an
amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500, changing the date of the commission of the offense to September 30,
1974.

On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Sandiganbayan
September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of his motion to quash.
On October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving due course the petition, resolved to require the respondents to comment
thereon and issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately and continuing until further orders of the Court,
enjoining the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial and other proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with said resolution, the respondents,
through ,Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their comment on January 6, 1986.

On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the supervening events, including
the change of administration that had transpired, and the provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insofar far as
the Public respondents were concerned, which requires the successor official to state whether or not he maintains the
action or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested that since "the
charges are not political offenses and they have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to pursue the
cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the petition; that in any event, petitioner is not precluded
from pursuing any other legal remedies under the law, such as the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the
Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he concurred with the position
taken by the new Tanodbayan.

Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion for re-evaluation with the Office
of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations be
quashed. The Court is not aware of what action, if any, has been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be that as
it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar as the duty
of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.

Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:

1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had deprived
petitioner of his constitutional light to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against
him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised by the petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non- existence of prima facie evidence to sustain
the filing of the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the questioned informations.

Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" and "speedy
disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding
informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to
loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner's contention,
saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for
the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of
"undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any
alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of
"indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other
constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully threshed out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:

That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of the proceedings before the
investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985 could have been due to
certain factors which do not appear on record and which both parties did not bother to explain or
elaborate upon in detail. It could even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to a painstaking an
gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In this respect, We are the
considered opinion that the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the resolution of a
complaint by the Tanodbayan  within ten (10) days from termination of the preliminary investigation is
merely "directory" in nature, in view of the nature and extent of the proceedings in said office.

The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in concise language in Rule
117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may be
entertained by the Court prior to arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the performance of
its official functions and subject to the charge that it has gravely abused its discretion. Such facts and
circumstances which could otherwise justify the dismissal of the case, such as failure on the part of the
prosecution to comply with due process or any other constitutionally-guaranteed rights may presented
 during the trial wherein evidence for and against the issue involved may be fully threshed out and
considered. Regrettably, the accused herein attempts to have the Court grant such a radical relief during
this stage of the proceedings which precludes a pre-cocious or summary evaluation of insufficient
evidence in support thereof.

This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the
right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury
its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial?

In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the accused from
undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or
other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated
in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely undisputed. The complainant,
Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command
(PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public
Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it
became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from
the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the
Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which
was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos — by referring the complaint to
the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to
the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition
by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan,
recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.

A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating
and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner
Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report.

We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office
directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was
politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the
impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes
alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear
or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence
to the established procedure may the public's perception of the of the prosecutor be enhanced.

Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be justified on the basis of the facts
on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary
investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely
"directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can
not be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be
treated as a dead letter.

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by
the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed
by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years
can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that
"the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first place,
such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of
the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such
"painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative,
while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years,
which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even
the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the absence
of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the
conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting
back time.

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the
foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.

Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same. The informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are
hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206438

CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Petitioner

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 210141-42
CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Petitioner
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate delay in the resolution and
termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is
not determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent
and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the accused must
invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a
waiver of right.

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 are Petitions for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction 1 assailing the Resolutions dated September 12, 2012 2 and January 15, 20133 of
the Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cesar Matas Cagang's (Cagang) Motion to Quash/Dismiss with
Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest in Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457.

G.R. Nos. 210141-42, on the other hand, refer to a Petition for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction 4 assailing the June 18, 2013 Order5 and September 10,
2013 Resolution6 of the Sandiganbayan. The assailed Resolutions denied Cagang's Motion to Quash Order of Arrest in
Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0456 and SB-11-CRM-0457.

Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan's denial to quash the Informations and Order of Arrest against Cagang despite
the Office of the Ombudsman's alleged inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.

On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging that Amelia May
Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and
corruption by diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as "dummies." The
complaint was docketed as CPL-M-03-0163 and referred to the Commission on Audit for audit investigation. A news
report of Sun Star Davao dated August 7, 2003 entitled "P61 M from Sarangani coffers unaccounted' was also docketed
as CPL-M-03-0729 for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation. 7

On December 31, 2002, the Commission on Audit submitted its audit report finding that the officials and employees of the
Provincial Government of Sarangani appear to have embezzled millions in public funds by sourcing out the funds from
grants, aid, and the Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin Chiongbian using dummy cooperatives and
people's organizations. 8 In particular, the Commission on Audit found that:

(1) There were releases of financial assistance intended for nongovernmental organizations/people's
organizations and local government units that were fraudulently and illegally made through inexistent local
development projects, resulting in a loss of ₱16,106,613.00;
 (2) Financial assistance was granted to cooperatives whose officials and members were government personnel or
relatives of officials of Sarangani, which resulted in the wastage and misuse of government funds amounting to
₱2,456,481.00;

(3)There were fraudulent encashment and payment of checks, and frequent travels of the employees of the Vice
Goven1or's Office, which resulted in the incurrence by the province of unnecessary fuel and oil expense
amounting to ₱83,212.34; and

(4) Inexistent Sagiptaniman projects were set up for farmers affected by calamities, which resulted in wastage and
misuse of government funds amounting to ₱4,000,000.00. 9

On September 30, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order terminating Case Nos. CPL-M-03-0163 and
CPL-M-03-0729. It concurred with the findings of the Commission on Audit and recommended that a criminal case for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 be filed against the public officers named by the Commission on Audit in its Summary of Persons that Could be Held
Liable on the Irregularities. The list involved 180 accused. 10 The case was docketed as OMB-M-C-0487-J.

After considering the number of accused involved, its limited resources, and the volumes of case records, the Office of the
Ombudsman first had to identify those accused who appeared to be the most responsible, with the intention to later on file
separate cases for the others.11

In a Joint Order dated October 29, 2003, the accused were directed to file their counter-affidavits and submit controverting
evidence. The complainants were also given time to file their replies to the counter-affidavits.

There was delay in the release of the order since the reproduction of the voluminous case record to be furnished to the
parties "was subjected to bidding and request of funds from the Central Office." 12 Only five (5) sets of reproductions were
released on November 20, 2003 while the rest were released only on January 15, 2004. 13

All imp leaded elective officials and some of the imp leaded appointive officials filed a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus,
Injunction with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with Branch 28, Regional Trial Court of
Alabel, Sarangani. The Regional Trial Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the Office of the
Ombudsman from enforcing its October 29, 2003 Joint Order. 14

In an Order dated December 19, 2003, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the Petition on the ground that the officials had
filed another similar Petition with this Court, which this Court had dismissed. 15 Thus, some of the accused filed their
counter-affidavits. 16

After what the Office of the Ombudsman referred to as "a considerable period of time," it issued another Order directing
the accused who had not yet filed their counter-affidavits to file them within seven (7) days or they will be deemed to have
waived their right to present evidence on their behalf. 17

In a 293-page Resolution18 dated August 11, 2004 in OMB-M-C- 0487-J, the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge
Governor Miguel D. Escobar, Vice Governor Felipe Constantino, Board Members, and several employees of the Office of
the Vice Governor of Sarangani and the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with Malversation through Falsification
of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. 19 Then Tanodbayan Simeon V. Marcelo
(Tanodbayan Marcelo) approved the Resolution, noting that it was modified by his Supplemental Order dated October 18,
2004.20

In the Supplemental Order dated October 18, 2004, Tanodbayan Marcelo ordered the conduct of further fact-finding
investigations on some of the other accused in the case. Thus, a preliminary investigation docketed as OMB-M-C-0480-K
was conducted on accused Hadji Moner Mangalen (Mangalen) and Umbra Macagcalat (Macagcalat). 21

In the meantime, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information dated July 12, 2005, charging Miguel Draculan
Escobar (Escobar), Margie Purisima Rudes (Rudes), Perla Cabilin Maglinte (Maglinte), Maria Deposo Camanay
(Camanay), and Cagang of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents. 22 The Information read:

That on July 17, 2002 or prior subsequent thereto in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Miguel Draculan Escobar, being the Governor of the Province of Sarangani, Margie Purisima Rudes,
Board Member, Perla Cabilin Maglinte, Provincial Administrator, Maria Deposo Camanay, Provincial Accountant, and
Cesar Matas Cagang, Provincial Treasurer, and all highranking and accountable public officials of the Provincial
Government of Sarangani by reason of their duties, conspiring and confederating with one another, while committing the
offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, convert and misappropriate the amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(₱375,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public funds under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by falsifying
or causing to be falsified Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-7-10376 and its suppo1iing documents, making it appear
that financial assistance has been sought by Amon Lacungam, the alleged President of Kalalong Fishermen's Group of
Brgy. Kalaong, Maitum, Sarangani, when in truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well that no financial assistance had
been requested by Amon Lacungan and his association, nor did said Amon Lacungan and his association receive the
aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of THREE
HUNDRED SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P375,000.00) through the encashment by the accused of
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Check No. 11521401 dated July 17, 2002, which amount they subsequently
misappropriated to their personal use and benefit, and despite demand, said accused failed to return the said amount to
the damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest in the aforesaid sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW.23

The Sandiganbayan docketed the case as Crim. Case No. 28331. Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang were arraigned on
December 6, 2005 where they pleaded not guilty. Rudes and Camanay remained at large. 24

On June 17, 2010, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision 25 in Crim. Case No. 28331 acquitting Escobar, Maglinte, and
Cagang for insufficiency of evidence. Maglinte, however, was ordered to return ₱100,000.00 with legal interest to the
Province of Sarangani. The cases against Rudes and Camanay were archived until the Sandiganbayan could acquire
jurisdiction over their persons. 26

In a Memorandum27 dated August 8, 2011 addressed to Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales (Ombudsman Carpio
Morales), Assistant Special Prosecutor III Pilarita T. Lapitan reported that on April 12, 2005, a Resolution 28 was issued in
OMB-M-C-0480-K finding probable cause to charge Mangalen and Macagcalat with Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. 29 Thus, it prayed for the approval of the attached
Informations:

It should be noted that in a Memorandum dated 10 December 2004 and relative to OMB-M-C-03-0487-J from which OMB-
M-C-04-0480-K originated, Assistant Special Prosecutor Maria Janina Hidalgo recommended to Ombudsman Marcelo
that the status of state witness be conferred upon Gadian. This recommendation was approved by Ombudsman Marcelo
on 20 December 2004. Hence, as may be noted[,] Gadian was no longer included as respondent and accused in the
Resolution dated 12 April 2005 and the attached Information.

Related cases that originated from OMB-M-C-03-0487-J for which no further preliminary investigation is necessary were
filed before the courts. One of these cases is now docketed as Criminal Case No. 28293 and pending before the
Sandiganbayan, First Division. It is noteworthy that in its Order dated 14 November 2006 the Sandiganbayan, First
Division granted the Motion to Dismiss of the counsel of Felipe Constantino after having submitted a duly certified true
copy of his client's Death Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office. Considering the fact therefore, there is a
necessity to drop Constantino as accused in this case and accordingly, revised the attached Information.

An Information for Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents is also submitted for your Honor's approval
considering that no such Information is attached to the records of this case.

VIEWED IN THE FOREGOING LIGHT, it is respectfully recommended that, in view of his death, Felipe Constantino no
longer be considered as accused in this case and that the attached Informations be approved. 30

Ombudsman Carpio Morales approved the recommendation on October 20, 2011. 31 Thus, on November 17, 2011,
Informations32 for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of Public Documents were filed against Cagang, Camanay, Amelia Carmela Constantino Zoleta (Zoleta),
Macagcalat, and Mangalen. The Informations read:

[For Violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019]

That on 20 September 2002, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Provincial Treasurer CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Provincial Accountant
MARIA DEPOSO CAMANAY, and Executive Assistant to Vice Governor Felipe Katu Constantino, AMELIA CARMELA
CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, and then Vice-Governor and now deceased Felipe Katu Constantino, all of the Provincial
Govermnent of Sarangani, committing the offense in relation to the performance of their duties and functions, taking
advantage of their respective official positions, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, conspiring and confederating with Barangay Captain UMBRA ADAM MACAGCALAT and HADJI MONER
MANGALEN, the alleged President and Treasurer, respectively of Kamanga Muslim-Christian Fishermen's Cooperative
("Cooperative"), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the disbursement of the amount of Three
Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱350,000.00) under SARO No. D-98000987 through Development Bank of the
Philippines Check No. 282398 dated 20 September 2002 and with HADJI MONER MANGELEN as payee thereof: by
falsifying Disbursement Voucher No. 401-200209-148 dated 20 September 2002 and its supporting documents to make it
appear that financial assistance was requested and given to the Cooperative, when in truth and in fact, neither was there
a request for financial assistance received by the said Cooperative after the check was encashed, as herein accused,
conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their
own personal use and benefit the said amount of ₱350,000.00 thereby causing undue injury to the government in the
aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.33

The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-11-0456 and SB-11-0457.

Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest while Macagcalat and
Mangalen separately filed their own Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest Cagang
argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the Informations. Citing  Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan34 and Roque v. Ombudsman, 35 he argued that the delay violated his constitutional rights to due process
and to speedy disposition of cases. 36 The Office of the Ombudsman, on the other hand, filed a Comment/Opposition
arguing that the accused have not yet submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and that there was no showing
that delay in the filing was intentional, capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons. 37

On September 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 38 denying the Motions to Quash/Dismiss. It found that
Cagang, Macagcalat, and Mangalen voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the motions.  39 It
also found that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information, considering that 40 different individuals
were involved with direct participation in more or less 81 different transactions. 40 It likewise
found Tatad and Roque inapplicable since the filing of the Informations was not politically motivated. 41 It pointed out that
the accused did not invoke their right to speedy disposition of cases before the Office of the Ombudsman but only did so
after the filing of the Informations. 42

Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration 43 but it was denied in a Resolution 44 dated January 15, 2013. Hence, Cagang
filed a Petition for Certiorari45 with this Comi, docketed as G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458. 46

In an Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest 47 dated June 13, 2013 filed before the Sandiganbayan, Cagang alleged that
an Order of Arrest was issued against him. 48 He moved for the quashal of the Order on the ground that he had a pending
Petition for Certiorari before this Court.49

In an Order50 dated June 28, 2013, the Sandiganbayan denied the Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on the ground
that it failed to comply with the three (3)-day notice rule and that no temporary restraining order was issued by this Court.

Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration 51 but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution 52 dated September
10, 2013. Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction,53 essentially seeking to restrain the implementation of the Order of Arrest against him.
This Petition was docketed as G.R. Nos. 210141-42.

On February 5, 2014, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 54 in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from continuing with the proceedings of the case and from implementing the warrant of arrest against
Cagang. This Court likewise consolidated G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 with G.R. Nos. 210141-42. 55 The Office of the
Special Prosecutor submitted its separate Comments56 to the Petitions on behalf of the People of the Philippines and the
Office of the Ombudsman. 57

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed his Motion to
Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy
disposition of cases. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,58 he argues that the Office of the Ombudsman lost its jurisdiction to
file the cases in view of its inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation almost seven (7) years after the
filing of the complaint. 59

Petitioner further avers that the dismissal of cases due to inordinate delay is not because the revival of the cases was
politically motivated, as in Tatad, but because it violates Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution 60 and Rule 112, Section
3(f)61 of the Rules of Court.62 He points out that the Sandiganbayan overlooked two (2) instances of delay by the Office of
the Ombudsman: the first was from the filing of the complaint on February 10, 2003 to the filing of the Informations on
November 17, 2011, and the second was from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation in 2005 to the filing of the
Informations on November 17, 2011. 63

Petitioner asserts that the alleged anomalous transactions in this case were already thoroughly investigated by the
Commission on Audit in its Audit Report; thus, the Office of the Ombudsman should not have taken more than seven (7)
years to study the evidence needed to establish probable cause. 64 He contends that "[w]hen the Constitution enjoins the
Office of the Ombudsman to 'act promptly' on any complaint against any public officer or employee, it has the concomitant
duty to speedily resolve the same."65

Petitioner likewise emphasizes that the Sandiganbayan should have granted his Motion to Quash Order of Arrest since
there was a pending Petition before this Court questioning the issuance of the Informations against him. He argues that
the case would become moot if the Order of Arrest is not quashed. 66

The Office of the Special Prosecutor, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner, along with his co-accused Camanay,
Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Magalen have remained at large and cannot be located by the police, and that they have not yet
surrendered or been arrested. 67 It argues that the parameters necessary to determine whether there was inordinate delay
have been repeatedly explained by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed Resolutions. It likewise points out that petitioner
should have invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases when the case was still pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman, not when the Information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan. It argues further that Tatad was
inapplicable since there were peculiar circumstances which prompted this Comi to dismiss the information due to
inordinate delay. 68

The Office of the Special Prosecutor argues that the Sandiganbayan already made a judicial dete1mination of the
existence of probable cause pursuant to its duty under Rule 112, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. 69 It points out that a
petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to question the denial of a motion to quash and that the appropriate remedy
should be to proceed to trial. 70

Procedurally, the issues before this Court are whether or not the pendency of a petition for  certiorari with this Court
suspends the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, and whether or not the denial of a motion to quash may be the
subject of a petition for certiorari. This Court is also tasked to resolve the sole substantive issue of whether or not the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Cesar Matas Cagang's Motion to
Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest and Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on the
ground of inordinate delay.

To give full resolution to this case, this Court must first briefly pass upon the procedural issues raised by the
parties.<1âwphi1/p>

Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the pendency of a petition for certiorari before this Court will not prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction. Under Rule 65, Section 771 of the Rules of Court:

Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting
the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation
of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case,
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent
from further proceeding with the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition
for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its
expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative
charge.

Since this Court did not issue injunctive relief when the Petition in G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 was filed, the
Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding with trial. It was only upon the filing of the Petition in G.R. Nos.
210141-42 that this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not appealable as it is merely interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the
subject of a petition for certiorari. The denial of the motion to quash can still be raised in the appeal of a judgment of
conviction. The adequate, plain, and speedy remedy is to proceed to trial and to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Thus, in Galzote v. Briones: 72

... In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the
trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower
court's decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an
error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter's ruling.

In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to inunediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a
special civil action for ce1iiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory
order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition
for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The
plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above. 73

Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash simply signals the commencement of the process leading to trial. The denial of
a motion to quash, therefore, is not necessarily prejudicial to the accused. During trial, and after arraignment, prosecution
proceeds with the presentation of its evidence for the examination of the accused and the reception by the court Thus, in
a way, the accused is then immediately given the opportunity to meet the charges on the merits. Therefore, if the case is
intrinsically without any grounds, the acquittal of the accused and all his suffering due to thecharges can be most speedily
acquired.

The rules and jurisprudence, thus, balance procedural niceties and the immediate procurement of substantive justice. In
our general interpretation, therefore, the accused is normally invited to meet the prosecution's evidence squarely during
trial rather than skirmish on procedural points.

A party may, however, question the denial in a petition for certiorari if the party can establish that the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion:

[A] direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that
must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more enlightened and
substantial justice;" the promotion of public welfare and public policy; cases that "have attracted nationwide attention,
making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;" or judgments on order attended by grave abuse
of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.

In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the
judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and
circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.74
Petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied his Motion to
Quash/Dismiss, insisting that the denial transgressed upon his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy
disposition of cases. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is consistent with this theory.

II

The Constitution guarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases. Under Article III, Section 16:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.1awp++i1

The right to speedy disposition of cases should not be confused with the right to a speedy trial, a right guaranteed under
Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution:

Section 14.

....

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed i1mocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a criminal prosecution. The right to speedy disposition of cases,
however, is invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or administrative cases before
them. As Abadia v. Court of Appeals75 noted:

The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to
protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies." This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the periods before,
during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy
trial. 76

Both rights, nonetheless, have the same rationale: to prevent delay in the administration of justice. In Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan:77

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays
in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.
Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is
not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative tem1 and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot
be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon circumstances.

It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.78

While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked
before quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in proceedings that are adversarial and may result in possible criminal
liability. The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and preliminary
investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal
prosecution. The Constitution itself mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to "act promptly" on complaints filed before it:

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants
of the action taken and the result thereof. 79

As if to underscore the importance of its mandate, this constitutional command is repeated in Republic Act No.
6770, 80 which provides:

Section 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the
people.

Neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 6770 provide for a specific period within which to measure promptness.
Neither do they provide for criteria within which to determine what could already be considered as delay in the disposition
of complaints. Thus, judicial interpretation became necessary to determine what could be considered "prompt" and what
length of time could amount to unreasonable or "inordinate delay."

The concept of inordinate delay was introduced in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,81 where this Court was constrained to apply
the "radical relief' of dismissing the criminal complaint against an accused due to the delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation.

In Tatad, a report was submitted to the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command sometime in October 1974, charging
Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad) with graft and corruption during his stint as Minister of Public Information. In October 1979,
Tatad submitted his resignation. It was only on December 29, 1979 that a criminal complaint was filed against him. Then
President Ferdinand Marcos accepted his resignation on January 26, 1980. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan 82 referred
the complaint to the Criminal Investigation Service, Presidential Security Command for factfinding. On June 16, 1980, the
Investigation Report was submitted finding Tatad liable for violation of Republic Act No. 3019.

Tatad moved for the dismissal of the case but this was denied on July 26, 1982. His motion for reconsideration was
denied on October 5, 1982. Affidavits and counter-affidavits were submitted on October 25, 1982. On July 5, 1985, the
Tanodbayan issued a resolution approving the filing of informations against Tatad. Tatad filed a motion to quash on July
22, 1985. The motion to quash was denied by the Sandiganbayan on August 9, 1985. The Sandiganbayan, however,
ordered the filing of an amended information to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense. In compliance,
the Tanodbayan submitted its amended information on August 10, 1985. Tatad filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by the Sandiganbayan on September 17, 1985. Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
this Court, questioning the filing of the cases with the Sandiganbayan.

On April 10, 1986, this Court required the pa1iies to move in the premises considering the change in administration
brought about by the EDSA Revolution and the overthrow of the Marcos regime. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan
manifested that as the charges were not political in nature, the State would still pursue the charges against Tatad.

In resolving the issue of whether Tatad's constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases were
violated, this Court took note that the finding of inordinate delay applies in a case-to-case basis:

In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief' and to spare the accused from
w1dergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or
other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated
in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 83

This Court found that there were peculiar circumstances which attended the preliminary investigation of the complaint, the
most blatant of which was that the 1974 report against Tatad was only acted upon by the Tanodbayan when Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos in 1979:

A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating
and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner
Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and report.

We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office
directly under the President in the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that
prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted,
wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective
of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor,
weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of
the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced. 84

Thus, the delay of three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation was found to have been inordinate
delay, which was violative of petitioner's constitutional rights:

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by
the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed
by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years
cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that
"the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place,
such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of
the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such
"painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative,
while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years,
which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. 85

Political motivation, however, is merely one of the circumstances to be factored in when determining whether the delay is
inordinate. The absence of political motivation will not prevent this Court from granting the same "radical relief." Thus,
in Angchangco v. Ombudsman, 86 this Court dismissed the criminal complaints even if the petition filed before this Court
was a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the complaints against him after more
than six (6) years of inaction:

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against petitioner for more than six
years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases
against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all
these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been
deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of
respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to
speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for. 87

As in Angchangco, this Court has applied the Tatad doctrine in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,88 Roque v.

Ombudsman,89 Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan,90 Lopez, Jr. v. Ombudsman,91 Licaros v. Sandiganbayan,92 People v. SPO4
Anonas,93 Enriquez v. Ombudsman,94 People v. Sandiganbayan, First Division,95 lnocentes v. People,96 Almeda v.
Ombudsman,97 People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,98 Torres v. Sandiganbayan,99 and Remulla v. Sandiganbayan. 100

This Court, however, emphasized that "[a] mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient"  101 to rule
that there was inordinate delay. Thus, it qualified the application of the Tatad doctrine in cases where certain
circumstances do not merit the application of the "radical relief' sought.

Despite the promulgation of Tatad, however, this Court struggled to apply a standard test within which to determine the
presence of inordinate delay. Martin v. Ver, 102 decided in 1983, attempted to introduce in this jurisdiction the "balancing
test" in the American case of Barker v. Wingo, thus:

[T]he right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed to
accused persons and cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a
precise time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted or considered waived ...

[A] claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length of the delay,
reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or nonassertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from
the delay, in determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied . . . 103

The Barker balancing test provides that courts must consider the following factors when determining the existence of
inordinate delay: first, the length of delay; second, the reason for delay; third, the defendant's assertion or non-asse1iion
of his or her right; and fourth, the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay.

For a period of time, this balancing test appeared to be the best way to determine the existence of inordinate delay. Thus,
this Court applied both the Tatad doctrine and the Barker balancing test in the 1991 case of Gonzales v.
Sandiganbayan: 104

It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which
the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for
the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay,
are considered. 105

The combination of both Tatad and the balancing test was so effective that it was again applied in Alvizo v.
Sandiganbayan, 106 where this Court took note that:

[D]elays per se are understandably attendant to all prosecutions and are constitutionally permissible, with the monition
that the attendant delay must not be oppressive. Withal, it must not be lost sight of that the concept of speedy disposition
of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination
of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of delay,
the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to asse1i such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay. 107
Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is deemed to have commenced. In Dansal v.
Fernandez, 108 this Co mi recognized that the right to speedy disposition of cases does not only include the period from
which a case is submitted for resolution. Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before trial. Thus, the
right may be invoked as early as the preliminary investigation or inquest.

In criminal prosecutions, the investigating prosecutor is given a specific period within which to resolve the preliminary
investigation under Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. 109 Courts are likewise mandated to resolve cases within a
specific time frame. Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-
four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months
for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon
the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may
have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for
determination, without further delay.

Under Republic Act No. 8493, or The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the entire trial period must not exceed 180 days, except
as otherwise provided for by this Court. 110 The law likewise provides for a time limit of 30 days from the filing of the
information to conduct the arraignment, and 30 days after arraignment for trial to commence. 111 In order to implement the
law, this Court issued Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98112 reiterating the periods for the conduct of trial. It also provided
for an extended time limit from arraignment to the conduct of trial:

Section 7. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections 2 and 6 for the first twelve-
calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by
said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one
hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.

The Circular likewise provides for ce1iain types of delay which may be excluded in the running of the periods:

Section 9. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:

(1) delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused;

(2) delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused;

(3) delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;

(4) delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings: Provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;

(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from
other courts;

(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and

(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding
concerning the accused is actually under advisement.

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown
or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An essential witness shall be considered unavailable
whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for
the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would
commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not
acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio or on motion of either the accused
or his counsel or the prosecution, if the court granted such continuance on the basis of his findings set forth in the order
that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy
trial.

These provisions have since been incorporated in Rule 119, Sections 1, 113 2,114 3,115 and 6116 of the Rules of Court.

Several laws have also been enacted providing the time periods for disposition of cases.

In Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act No. 8551, resolution of complaints against members of the
Philippine National Police must be done within ninety (90) days from the arraignment of the accused:

Section 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. - Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in
form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not exceeding ninety
(90) days from arraignment: provided, however, that if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is harassing the
complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the
charge is punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: provided, further, that the preventive
suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault,
negligence or petitions of the respondent: provided, finally, that such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the
court in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial
and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused."

Republic Act No. 9165,117 Section 90 provides that trial for drug-related offenses should be finished not later than 60 days
from the filing of the information:
Section 90. Jurisdiction. –
....
Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of
the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission
of the case for resolution.

Republic Act No. 9372, 118 Section 48 mandates continuous trial on a daily basis for cases of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism:

Section 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the judge shall set the continuous
trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial.

Republic Act No. 9516119 amends Presidential Decree No. 1866 120 to provide for continuous trial for cases involving illegal
or unlawful possession, manufacture, dealing, acquisition, and disposition of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives:

Section 4-B. Continuous Trial. - In cases involving violations of this Decree, the judge shall set the case for continuous
trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial. Such case shall
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Implementing rules and regulations have also provided for the speedy disposition of cases. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases 121 provide that trial shall commence within three (3)
days from arraignment:

Section 21. Speedy Trial of Child Abuse Cases. -The trial of child abuse cases shall take precedence over all other cases
before the courts, except election and habeas corpus cases. The trial in said cases shall commence within three (3) days
from the date the accused is arraigned and no postponement of the initial hearing shall be granted except on account of
the illness of the accused or other grounds beyond his control.

The Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9208, 122 as amended by Republic Act No. I
0364, 123 mandates the speedy disposition of trafficking cases:

Section 76. Speedy Disposition of [Trafficking in Persons] Cases. - Where practicable and unless special circumstance
require; otherwise, cases involving violation of R.A. No. 9208 shall be heard contiguously: with hearing dates spaced not
more than two weeks apart. Unnecessary delay should be avoided, strictly taking into consideration the Speedy Trial Act
and SC Circular No. 38-98 dated 11 August 1998.

Laws and their implementing rules and regulations, however, do not generally bind courts unless this Court adopts them
in procedural rules. 124 In any case, this Court has already made several issuances setting periods for the conduct of trial.

Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure m Environmental Cases 125 provide that trial must not exceed three (3)
months from the issuance of the pre-trial order:
Section 1. Continuous trial. - The court shall endeavor to conduct continuous trial which shall not exceed three (3) months
from the date of the issuance of the pre-trial order.

Rule 14, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property Rights Cases 126 limits the period of presenting
evidence to 60 days per party:

Section 2. Conduct of trial. - The court shall conduct hearings expeditiously so as to ensure speedy trial. Each party shall
have a maximum period of sixty (60) days to present his evidence-in-chief on the trial dates agreed upon during the pre-
trial.

Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 25-2007127 provides that trial in cases involving the killings of political activists
and members of the media must be conducted within 60 days from its commencement:

The cases referred to herein shall undergo mandatory continuous trial and shall be terminated within sixty (60) days from
commencement of trial. Judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from submission for decision unless a
shorter period is provided by law or otherwise directed by this Court.

The Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right of the Accused to Bail and to Speedy
Trial 128 provide for strict time limits that must be observed:

Section 8. Observance of time limits. - It shall be the duty of the trial court, the public or private prosecutor, and the
defense counsel to ensure, subject to the excluded delays specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998, compliance with the following time limits in the prosecution of the case against a detained accused:

(a) The case of the accused shall be raffled and referred to the trial court to which it is assigned within three days from the
filing of the information;

(b) The court shall arraign the accused within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle;

(c) The court shall hold the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days after arraignment or within ten (10) days if the
accused is under preventive detention; provided, however, that where the direct testimonies of the witnesses are to be
presented through judicial affidavits, the court shall give the prosecution not more than twenty (20) days from arraignment
within which to prepare and submit their judicial affidavits in time for the pre-trial conference;

(d) After the pre-trial conference, the court shall set the trial of the case in the pre-trial order not later than thirty (30) days
from the tem1ination of the pre-trial conference; and

(e) The court shall terminate the regular trial within one hundred eighty (180) days, or the trial by judicial affidavits within
sixty (60) days, reckoned from the date trial begins, minus the excluded delays or postponements specified in Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.

A dilemma arises as to whether the period includes proceedings in quasi-judicial agencies before a formal complaint is
actually filed. The Office of the Ombudsman, for example, has no set periods within which to conduct its fact-finding
investigations. They are only mandated to act promptly. Thus, in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 129 this Court
stated that a fact-finding investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not be deemed separate from
preliminary investigation for the purposes of determining whether there was a violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases:

The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part of the preliminary investigation
because the former was only preparatory in relation to the latter; and that the period spent in the former should not be
factored in the computation of the period devoted to the preliminary investigation.

The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.

The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before
all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting
distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if
the respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their cases had been violated. 130 (Emphasis supplied)

People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division 131 must be re-examined.

When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the Ombudsman conducts a motu proprio fact-finding investigation,
the proceedings are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to attend these investigations, this period cannot be
counted since these are merely preparatory to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman
will not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge the accused.

This period for case build-up cannot likewise be used by the Office of the Ombudsman as unbridled license to delay
proceedings. If its investigation takes too long, it can result in the extinction of criminal liability through the prescription of
the offense.
Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against the accused, the period of
investigation will not be counted in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.
Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have
commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 132 the ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in the period for
determination of inordinate delay is abandoned.

With respect to fact-finding at the level of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman must provide for reasonable periods based
upon its experience with specific types of cases, compounded with the number of accused and the complexity of the
evidence required. He or she must likewise make clear when cases are deemed submitted for decision. The Ombudsman
has the power to provide for these rules and it is recommended that he or she amend these rules at the soonest possible
time.

These time limits must be strictly complied with. If it has been alleged that there was delay within the stated time periods,
the burden of proof is on the defense to show that there has been a violation of their right to speedy trial or their right to
speedy disposition of cases. The defense must be able to prove first, that the case took much longer than was reasonably
necessary to resolve, and second, that efforts were exerted to protect their constitutional rights. 133

What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by "mere mathematical reckoning." 134 It
requires consideration of a number of factors, including the time required to investigate the complaint, to file the
information, to conduct an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the submission of the case for
decision. 135 Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be taken into
account.

The complexity of the issues presented by the case must be considered in determining whether the period necessary for
its resolution is reasonable. In Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan 136 this Court found that "the long delay in resolving the
preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the records." 137 In Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 138 this Court
considered "the complexity of the cases (not iun-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties' lawyers" 139 to
determine whether the delay is justifiable. When the case is simple and the evidence is straightforward, it is possible that
delay may occur even within the given periods. Defense, however, still has the burden to prove that the case could have
been resolved even before the lapse of the period before the delay could be considered inordinate.

The defense must also prove that it exerted meaningful efforts to protect accused's constitutional rights. In  Alvizo v.
Sandiganbayan, 140 the failure of the accused to timely invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases may work to his or
her disadvantage, since this could indicate his or her acquiescence to the delay:

Petitioner was definitely not unaware of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him by the indication of this
Court as a complementary sanction in its resolution of his administrative case. He appears, however, to have been
insensitive to the implications and contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of
the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to have been without his
objection hence impliedly with his acquiescence. 141

In Dela Pena v. Sanqiganbayan, 142 this Court equated this acquiescence as one that could amount to laches, which
results in the waiver of their rights:

[I]t is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was set for an-arraignment, that petitioners
raised the issue of the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. As stated by them in their Motion to
Quash/Dismiss, "[o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing." Also, in their petition, they averred: "Aside from the
motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits, petitioners in the present case did not file nor send any letter-queries
addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which conducted the preliminary investigation." They slept on
their right - a situation amounting to lac11es. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those four
years, they showed signs of asse1ting their right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some overt acts,
like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not waiving that right. Their silence may, therefore be
interpreted as a waiver of such right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner therein was "insensitive to the implications
and contingencies" of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him "by not taking any step whatsoever to
accelerate the disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to
have been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with his acquiescence." 143

This concept of acquiescence, however, is premised on the presumption that the accused was fully aware that the
preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated despite a considerable length of time. Thus,
in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 144 this Court stated that Alvizo would not apply if the accused were unaware that the
investigation was still ongoing:

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely
unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that
petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a
preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally,
had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed. 145

Similarly, in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:146

Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were unaware that the
investigation against them was still on-going. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information
against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB
on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already
been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. ..

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is
consistent with due process. 147

Justice Caguioa submits that this Court should depart from Dela Pena. He explains that the third factor of
the Barker balancing test, i.e., waiver by the accused, was applied within the context of the Sixth Amendment 148 of the
American Constitution in that it presupposes that the accused has already been subjected to criminal prosecution. He
submits that as the right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked even before criminal prosecution has
commenced, waiver by the accused should be inapplicable.

The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked by a respondent to any type of proceeding once delay has
already become prejudicial to the respondent. The invocation of the constitutional right does not require a threat to the
right to liberty. Loss of employment or compensation may already be considered as sufficient to invoke the right. Thus,
waiver of the right does not necessarily require that the respondent has already been subjected to the rigors of criminal
prosecution. The failure of the respondent to invoke the right even when or she has already suffered or will suffer the
consequences of delay constitutes a valid waiver of that right.

While the Barker balancing test has American roots, a catena of cases has already been decided by this Court, starting
from Tatad, which have taken into account the Philippine experience.

The reality is that institutional delay 149 a reality that the court must address. The prosecution is staffed by overworked and
underpaid gove1nment lawyers with mounting caseloads. The courts' dockets are congested. This Court has already
launched programs to remedy this situation, such as the Judicial Affidavit Rule, 150 Guidelines for Decongesting Holding
Jails by Enforcing the Right of the Accused to Bail and to Speedy Trial, 151 and the Revised Guidelines for Continuous
Trial. 152 These programs, however, are mere stepping stones. The complete eradication of institutional delay requires
these sustained actions.

Institutional delay, in the proper context, should not be taken against the State. Most cases handled by the Office of the
Ombudsman involve individuals who have the resources and who engage private counsel with the means and resources
to fully dedicate themselves to their client's case. More often than not, the accused only invoke the right to speedy
disposition of cases when the Ombudsman has already rendered an unfavorable decision. The prosecution should not be
prejudiced by private counsels' failure to protect the interests of their clients or the accused's lack of interest in the
prosecution of their case.

For the court to appreciate a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases, delay must not be attributable to the
defense. 153 Certain unreasonable actions by the accused will be taken against them. This includes delaying tactics like
failing to appear despite summons, filing needless motions against interlocutory actions, or requesting unnecessary
postponements that will prevent courts or tribunals to properly adjudicate the case. When proven, this may constitute a
waiver of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy disposition of cases.

If it has been alleged that there was delay beyond the given time periods, the burden of proof  shifts. The prosecution will
now have the burden to prove that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy disposition of
cases. Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan154 states that "vexatious, capnc1us, and oppressive delays," "unjustified
postponements of the trial," or "when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his [or her] case tried" 155 are instances that may be considered as violations of the right to speedy
disposition of cases. The prosecution must be able to prove that it followed established procedure in prosecuting the
case.156 It must also prove that any delay incurred was justified, such as the complexity of the cases involved or the vast
amount of evidence that must be presented.

The prosecution must likewise prove that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the
delay. Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan157 defined prejudice to the accused as:

Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,
namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit
the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses
are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial
resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy. 158

In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan: 159

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring
dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be
weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. 160

The consequences of delay, however, do not only affect the accused. The prosecution of the case will also be made
difficult the longer the period of time passes. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan: 161

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The
passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules
do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exe1iion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate
that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v.
United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that
the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that
there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice. 162

The consequences of the prosecution's failure to discharge this burden are severe. Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of
Court requires that the case against the accused be dismissed if there has been a violation of the right to speedy trial:

Section 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. - If the accused is not brought to trial within
the time limit required by Section 1 (g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the information may
be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the
burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the
exclusion of time under section 3 of this Rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this section.

Tatad, as qualified by Angchangco, likewise mandates the dismissal of the case if there is a violation of the right to
speedy disposition of cases. The immediate dismissal of cases is also warranted if it is proven that there was malicious
prosecution, if the cases were politically motivated, or other similar instances. Once these circumstances have been
proven, there is no need for the defense to discharge its burden to prove that the delay was inordinate.

To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates the accused's right
to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. The
burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or procedural rules. If the
delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that
the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay.

The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical reckoning but through the
examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the
point of view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a
given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and
that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must
also be examined on a case-to-case basis.

III

This Court proceeds to determine whether respondent committed inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of the
preliminary investigation against petitioner.

There is no showing that this case was attended by malice. There is no evidence that it was politically motivated. Neither
party alleges this fact. Thus, this Court must analyze the existence and cause of delay.

The criminal complaint against petitioner was filed on February 10, 2003. On August 11, 2004, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner. This Resolution, however, was modified by
the Resolution dated October 18, 2004, which ordered the conduct of further fact-finding investigation against some of
the other respondents in the case. This further fact-finding was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12,
2005. On August 8, 2011, or six (6) years after the recommendation to file informations against petitioner was approved
by Tanodbayan Marcelo, Assistant Special Prosecutor II Pilarita T. Lapitan submitted the informations for Ombudsman
Carpio Morales' review. Informations against petitioner were filed on November 17, 2011.

Six (6) years is beyond the reasonable period of fact-finding of ninety (90) days. The burden of proving the justification of
the delay, therefore, is on the prosecution, or in this case, respondent.

Respondent alleged that the delay in the filing of the informations was justified since it was still determining whether
accused Mary Ann Gadian (Gadian) could be utilized as a state witness and it still had to verify accused Felipe
Constantino's death. The recommendation, however, to utilize Gadian as a state witness was approved by Tanodbayan
Marcelo on December 20, 2004. 163 Felipe Constantino's death was verified by the Sandiganbayan in its November 14,
2006 Order. 164 There is, thus, delay from November 14, 2006 to August 8, 2011.
This Court finds, however, that despite the pendency of the case since 2003, petitioner only invoked his right to speedy
disposition of cases when the informations were filed on November 1 7, 2011. Unlike
in Duterte and Coscolluela, petitioner was aware that the preliminary investigation was not yet terminated.

Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights during this period, choosing instead
to wait until the information was filed against him with the Sandiganbayan.

Furthermore, the case before the Sandiganbayan involves the alleged malversation of millions in public money. The
Sandiganbayan has yet to determine the guilt or innocence of petitioner. In the Decision dated June 17, 2010 of the
Sandiganbayan acquitting petitioner in Crim. Case No.28331:

We wish to iterate our observation gathered from the evidence on record that the subject transaction is highly suspect.
There is a seeming acceptance of the use of questionable supporting documents to secure the release of public funds in
the province, and the apparent undue haste in the processing and eventual withdrawal of such funds. However, obvious
as the irregularities may be, which can only lead to distrust in the ability of public officials to safeguard public funds, we
are limited to a review only of the evidence presented vis-a-vis the charges brought forth before this Court. Thus, We
cannot make any pronouncement in regard to such seeming irregularities. 165

The records of the case show that the transactions investigated are complex and numerous. As respondent points out,
there were over a hundred individuals investigated, and eventually, 40 of them were determined to have been involved in
81 different anomalous transactions. 166 Even granting that the Commission on Audit's Audit Report exhaustively
investigated each transaction, "the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit; it must rely on its
own independent judgment in the determination of probable cause." 167 Delays in the investigation and review would have
been inevitable in the hands of a competent and independent Ombudsman.

The dismissal of the complaints, while favorable to petitioner, would undoubtedly be prejudicial to the State. "[T]he State
should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or
nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman." 168 The State is as much entitled to due process as the accused. In People
v. Leviste: 169

[I]t must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity
to present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in question, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased
the workload of the justice system as a whole and caused uncalled-for delays in the final resolution of this and other
cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the respondent court, instead of easing the burden of the accused, merely
prolonged the litigation and ironically enough, unnecessarily delayed the case - in the process, causing the very evil it
apparently sought to avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice. 170

This Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of cases considering that there was a
waiver of the delay of a complex case. Definitely, granting the present Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due process rights of the State.

IV

This Court now clarifies the mode of analysis in situations where the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to
speedy trial is invoked.

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is
the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy
disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is
that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation.
This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with
due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the
prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included
in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time
periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, 171 and the time periods that will be promulgated by
the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay
occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically
motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove  first, that it followed the prescribed
procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case;  second, that the complexity of the
issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as
a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from
the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such
as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious
intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is
properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of
the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy
trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the
relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the
accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are
deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order dated February 5, 2014 is LIFTED. The
Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to resolve Case No. SB-11-CRM-0456 and Case No. SB-11- CRM-0457 with due and
deliberate dispatch.

The period for the determination of whether inordinate delay was committed shall commence from the filing of a formal
complaint and the conduct of the preliminary investigation. The periods for the resolution of the preliminary investigation
shall be that provided in the Rules of Court, Supreme Court Circulars, and the periods to be established by the Office of
the Ombudsman. Failure of the defendant to file the appropriate motion after the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods shall be considered a waiver of his or her right to speedy disposition of cases.

The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division 172 that factfinding investigations are included in the period for
determination of inordinate delay is ABANDONED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-53373

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial
Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET
AL., respondents.

The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the
motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for
estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario
L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the
arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court
of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained
Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court.  5 In a comment that
was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to
compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition
for review. 7

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed
the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order
of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. 10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge
denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:

ORDER

For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence,
as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other
things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the
payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it
but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of
due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit
and therefore hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.

SO ORDERED. 11

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ
of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-
08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of
arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision
filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be
reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the
arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and
effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16

In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the
respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment
filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private
respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition
be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the
Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.

Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief
reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to
dismiss the information.

It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the
fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to
prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty
of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime
committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an
investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case that
would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally
initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction.  24 Neither
has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this
would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal
of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The
fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the
defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the
judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those
of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of
prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is
necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval
of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the
Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the
Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed
in Court. 31

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the
Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a  prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as
above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the
fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured.
After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial  discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should
be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court,  35 The only qualification is that the
action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of
law. 36a

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by
the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion
may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the
Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly
be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be
expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary,
it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court
to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should
not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution
although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and
control. 38

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining
a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,

vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where the  cause celebre is a
star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary.

In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de
Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave
misconduct.1

After an answer2 and a reply3 were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in its Resolution dated
February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals
for investigation, report and recommendation.

On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid Criminal Case No.
142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be
found guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal
or suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, commencing from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent facts in his
aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his disposition of this case may be duly
appreciated:
 Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while respondent
former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission (PACC) headed by
Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.

Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special Proceeding No.
90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares presumptively dead, after an
absence of sixteen (16) years.

Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge
Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement.
They met sometime in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro
Manila, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a
close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After the wedding, they received their guests at a
German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8,
Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the
phone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant
confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a
call at the wrong number". What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a
point when respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae,
yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have it burned." Such unbearable
utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon.
Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized,
contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what
happened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996.

Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the complainant learned
from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the
marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the
disheartening news, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6,
1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").

On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the complainant
executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").

Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered by
complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that the
respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This, the
respondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant
lamented. Also presented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"); Order
declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim
Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").

Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on January 7, 1994
was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage
Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against
her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that
when his marriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Peña,
his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become
final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as required by the Rules, the service
of summons upon Librada Peña having been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published.
To this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of Justice
Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding respect and dignity. 4 He himself asserts that at the time of his
marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Peña, had not yet
attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez,
in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been
annulled.

Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if
the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it
does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is
not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice
of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all the
necessary legal requisites.5

On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice Purisima which we
quote with approval:
 That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a Marriage Contract with
complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by
respondent himself, he could not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).

That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and the evidence. To
be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e.,
legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and a female; consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer; authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and complied with.

The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a "sham" marriage is too
incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered into subject marriage in an effort
to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of
respondent in saying "I do" with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were
present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the
civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage.

Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the criminal case of Bigamy
against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-
67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete
finality due to non publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone,
only made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and
respondent void.

Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Pena had
been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage,
and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant
as his wife by a second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Peña was subsisting and unannulled.

But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not respondent can be
adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue pending determination in
Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that
what respondent contracted with complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the
ineluctible conclusion is — that what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of
the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge against herein
complainant in the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded,
respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality
charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted
by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and
therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could
have testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio
Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis.

In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of marriage and the
family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery thereof and perform a sham marriage
with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and
mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7,
1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross
misconduct, nay sacrilege.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued
membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 6 Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly
immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers. 7

However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive conduct during some episodes
of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the
undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that
disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended,
would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit
the same or a similar offense hereafter.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 94054-57             February 19, 1991

VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 94266-69             February 19, 1991

JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON A. BAGALIHOG, MAYOR NESTOR C. LIM and
MAYOR ANTONIO KHO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. ALFANE, respondents.

May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely on the certification
or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?

On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic
Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security
escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.

An investigation of the incident then followed.

Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the
PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos.
9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio
Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the
airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that:

. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary
examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie
Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor
Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-
57)

x x x           x x x          x x x

In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of P200,000.00 as bail for
the provisional liberty of each of the accused.

Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of bail which was granted by the court
and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of P150,000.00 each. Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest of the
accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.

On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261) pages were transmitted to
the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case.

On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a  prima facie case against the
petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be
charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims
and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H", Comment of
Fiscal Alfane, p. 186, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57) A motion to reconsider the Resolution filed by petitioners Vicente Lim,
Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim was denied.

On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of
murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.

On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue.
(Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-90)

On December 14, 1989, we issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from the Regional Trial Court
of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice, to wit:

Acting on the petition for change of venue of the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 5811, 5812, 5813, and 5814 from the
Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to any of the Regional Trial Courts at Quezon City or Makati, the Court
Resolved to (a) GRANT the aforesaid petition for transfer of venue in order to avoid miscarriage of justice (Article
VIII, Section 5(4) of the Philippine Constitution); (b) DIRECT the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Masbate,
Masbate to transmit the records of the aforesaid cases to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Makati, for
raffling among the other branches of the court; and (c) ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate to
desist from further taking cognizance of the said cases until such time that the petition is finally resolved.

The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.

Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in
substance prayed for the following:

1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation
conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its
personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination
of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless
the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.

2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a matter of right; and

3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable cause, to be allowed to file a
motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail. (p. 17, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)

In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a  prima
facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary
investigation. The motions and manifestations were opposed by the prosecution.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and
issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:
 In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate,
Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that
all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who
properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two
competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each
information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face,  this Court finds it just and
proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information which reads: (pp. 19-20, Rollo, G.R Nos. 94054-
57; Emphasis supplied)

x x x           x x x          x x x

The petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the July 5, 1990 Order.

In a Resolution dated July 17, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94054-57, we issued ". . . a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly
authorized representatives or agents to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrant of arrest without
bail issued against the petitioners in his Order dated July 5, 1990 in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811-14.

In another Resolution dated July 31, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94266-69, we resolved:

x x x           x x x          x x x

. . . To ISSUE writs of (1) PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION, ordering and directing the respondent
judge to recall/set aside and/or annul the legal effects of the warrants of arrest without bail issued against and
served upon herein petitioners Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr. and Nonilon Bagalihog and release
them from confinement at PC-CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City; and (2) TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the
respondent judge or his duly authorized representatives or agents, to CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing or
implementing the warrants of arrest without bail issued against petitioners Mayors Nestor C. Lim and Antonio T.
Kho.

The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without
bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva (126 SCRA 463 [1983]), we ruled that a judge may rely
upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest.
However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the
"search and seizure" provision of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge,
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce . . .

We ruled:

. . . The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the
part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.

Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or
by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or
order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v. Abbas (98
Phil. 739). And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15,
16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as
a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the information filed in his sala, respondent found the
informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show,
after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest
in the case where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.

The case of Soliven v. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393 [19881) was decided after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. We
stated:

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
 Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts.

The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990), reiterated the above
interpretation of "personal" determination by the Judge:

We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2,
Constitution)

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the
determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By
itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether
the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and
the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for
the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the Prosecutor.

The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [19891):

Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to conduct
preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47
Phil. 443, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from them
by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11,
1984) which deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges. We had occasion to point tills out in
Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely:
(1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function . . . (but) part of the
prosecution's job, a function of the executive," (2) that whenever "there are enough his or prosecutors to
conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to
them," and the fact "that a certain power is granted does not necessary mean that it should be
indiscriminately exercised.

The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October 1, 1988,
(The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today of October 29, 1988) did not
restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with
the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations.

This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to make a
preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the
 issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power –– indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a
power –– has been and remains vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935,
the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to revoke. The
distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary
investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or
information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether
there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction
accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges
the authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be judicial in nature.

We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of
a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in
nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly
called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. . . .

Finally in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990) there is a statement that
the judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the
certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
We, however, also reiterated that ". . . the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted
to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest." (Section 2, Article
III, Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of
either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution
because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength of the
certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.

It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some Judges are still bound by the inertia
of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and are sadly confused or hesitant. Prosecutors are also
interested in a clear cut ruling. We will, therefore, restate the rule in greater detail and hopefully clearer terms.

There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where there is no duplication of
work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly
urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the
Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest
warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial functions.

At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires ". . . probable cause to
be  personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or person.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in
Masbate, he or she has not  personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent
Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was
no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired
in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a
probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However,
there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before
the Judge.

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each
case.1âwphi1 We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The
Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution.
It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.

It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent Judge documents of
recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. Although, the general
rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial (Tan
Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298 [1972])
the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of
the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in
view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General recognized the significance of the
recantations of some witnesses when he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:
 It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition are affidavits of recantation
subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano and an affidavit executed by one, Camilo Sanano,
father of the complainant's witnesses, Renato and Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these
earlier written statements of these witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate found the existence of
a prima facie case against petitioners and accordingly recommended the filing of a Criminal Information.
Evidently, the same written statements were also the very basis of the "Fiscal's Certification", since the attached
affidavits of recantation were not yet then available. Since the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is now
assailed and put in issue and, since the petitioners have not yet been arraigned, it would be to the broader
interest of justice and fair play if a reinvestigation of this case be had to secure the petitioners against hasty
prosecution and to protect them from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive trials (Salonga v. Paño G.R. No.
59524, February 18,1985). (Rollo of G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)

We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence
earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is
subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him,
he issues a warrant of arrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and
issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination
of the existence of a probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix
of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made
PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 106632 October 9, 1997

DORIS TERESA HO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) and the
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), respondents.

G.R. No. 106678 October 9, 1997

ROLANDO S. NARCISO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) and the
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), respondents.

May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the report and recommendation of the investigating
prosecutor, without personally determining probable cause by independently examining sufficient evidence submitted by
the parties during the preliminary investigation?

The Case

This is the main question raised in these two consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
challenging the Sandiganbayan's August 25, 1992 Resolution 1 which answered the said query in the affirmative.
 The Facts

Both petitions have the same factual backdrop. On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented
by its chief prosecutor and investigator, Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint 2 against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678, respectively),
Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odoño. The complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g)
of Republic Act 3019 3 prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the
government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will
profit thereby. After due notice, all respondents therein filed their respective counter-affidavits with supporting documents.
On January 8, 1992, Graft Investigation Officer Titus P. Labrador (hereafter, "GIO Labrador") submitted his
resolution 4 with the following recommendations:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that an information for violation of
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 as amended be filed against respondent Rolando S. Narciso before the
Sandiganbayan.

It is likewise recommending that the case against the other respondents be DISMISSED for insufficiency
of evidence.

However, after a review of the above resolution, Special Prosecution Officer Leonardo P. Tamayo (hereafter "SPO
Tamayo") recommended that
both Rolando Narciso and Doris Teresa Ho be charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The resolution of GIO
Labrador, as modified by the memorandum 5 of SPO Tamayo, was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on
May 5, 1992. Thus, herein petitioners were charged accordingly before the Sandiganbayan in an information 6 filed on
May 18, 1992. Attached to the information were the resolution of GIO Labrador and the memorandum of SPO Tamayo.
The said information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
ROLANDO NARCISO and DORIS TERESA HO, President of National Marine Corporation, of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about April 4, 1989, and for sometime prior and/or subsequent thereto, in the
City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused ROLANDO NARCISO, a public officer, being then the Vice-President of
the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned or controlled corporation
organized and operating under the Philippine laws, and DORIS TERESA HO, a private
individual and then the President of National Marine Corporation (NMC), a private
corporation organized and operating under our Corporation law, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, with
evident bad faith and through manifest partiality, cause undue injury to the National Steel
Corporation (NSC), by entering without legal justification into a negotiated contract of
affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of
P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila, despite their full knowledge that the rate they
have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping
Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of
P109.56 and P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding held on June 30,
1988, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation, in the total
sum of One Million One Hundred Sixteen Thousand Fifty Two Pesos and Seventy Five
Centavos (P1,116,052.75), Philippine Currency, to the pecuniary damage and prejudice
of the NSC in the aforestated sum. The said offense was committed by Rolando S.
Narciso in the performance of his official functions as Vice-President of the National Steel
Corporation.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Acting on the foregoing information, the Sandiganbayan issued the now questioned warrant of arrest against Petitioners
Ho and Narciso. Petitioner Ho initially questioned the issuance thereof in an "Urgent Motion to Recall Warrant of
Arrest/Motion for Reconsideration" which was adopted by Petitioner Narciso. They alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in
determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the
resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied said motion in the
challenged Resolution. It ratiocinated in this wise.

Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the information in
this case in the determination of whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of
arrest but also on the basis predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the
resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest,
or the reconsideration sought for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly
shows that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties
during preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the entire record of the preliminary
investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence submitted by the complainant and the
accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in futility.
Thus, these petitions.

The Issue

Petitioner Ho raises this sole issue:

May a judge determine probable cause and issue [a] warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the resolution
of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who
conducted the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such as
complainant's affidavit, respondent's counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted at
the preliminary investigation? 7

In his separate petition, Rolando S. Narciso adopts the foregoing and raised no other distinct issue.

Petitioners Ho and Narciso similarly contend that a judge, in personally determining the existence of probable cause, must
have before him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information filed by the investigating
prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest warrant. Such evidence should not be "merely
described in a prosecutor's resolution." Citing People vs. Inting, 8 petitioners insist that the judge "must have before him
'the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents which are
material in assisting the judge to make his determination.'"

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are meritorious.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 2 [Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (Emphasis supplied.)

In explaining the object and import of the aforequoted constitutional mandate, particularly the power and the authority of
judges to issue warrants of arrest, the Court elucidated in Soliven vs. Makasiar  9:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examined the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.  10 [emphasis
supplied]

We should stress that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause "personally." The word
"personally" does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous Constitutions. This emphasis shows the
present Constitution's intent to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under the
previous Charters.

While affirming Soliven, People vs. Inting  11 elaborated on what "determination of probable cause" entails, differentiating
the judge's object or goal from that of the prosecutor's.

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to
make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor
presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are
conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the
objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused
 is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial — is the function of the Prosecutor. 12

And clarifying the statement in People vs. Delgado 13 — that the "trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to
file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest" — this Court underscored in Lim Sr. vs. Felix  14 that
"[r]eliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of either the
COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because
the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation." We added, "The warrant issues not on the strength of the
certification standing along but because of the records which sustain it." Summing up, the Court said:

We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for
the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's
examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification
and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for [the] complainant and [the] witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so
require. 15 [emphasis supplied]

The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim Sr. were iterated in Allado vs. Diokno 16 where we explained again what
probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested. 17 Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, "must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof." 18 At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in
detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such
evidence in determining probable cause. 19 In Webb vs. De Leon, 20 we stressed that the judge merely determines the
probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply
personally reviews the prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.

In the recent case of Roberts Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 21 this Court's application of the dictum laid down in Soliven —
affirmed and fortified in Inting, Lim Sr., Allado and Webb — should lay to rest the issue raised in the instant petitions.
In Robets Jr., this Court, through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., set aside the order of the respondent judge
directing inter alia the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused, reasoning that said judge did not personally
determine the existence of probable cause, since he had "only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution
as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause."

In like manner, herein Respondent Sandiganbayan had only the information filed by the Office of the Ombudsman, the
thirteen-page resolution of the investigating officer and the three-page memorandum of the prosecution officer, when it
issued the warrant of arrest against the petitioners. The latter two documents/reports even had dissimilar
recommendations — the first indicting only Petitioner Narciso, the second including Petitioner Ho. This alone should have
prompted the public respondent to verify, in the records and other documents submitted by the parties during the
preliminary investigation, whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the Ombudsman's action charging both
petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of Anti-Graft law. But in its initial justification of the issuance of the warrant, the
Sandiganbayan simply said:

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:

xxx xxx xxx

But in this particular case we believe there is prima facie case based on our examination of the resolution
because we believe, we think the Ombudsman will not approve a resolution just like that, without
evidence to back it up. 22

In attempting to further justify its challenged action, the public respondent explained in its assailed Resolution.

In the instant case, there are attached to the information, two (2) Memorandum/Resolution ( sic)
emanating from the Offices of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor (Pp. 4-6, 7-19, respectively,
Record) which clearly and indubitably established,  firstly, the conduct of a due and proper preliminary
investigation, secondly, the approval by proper officials clothed with statutory authority; and thirdly, the
determination and ascertainment of probable caused based on the documentary evidence submitted by
the complainant (Anti-Graft League of the Philippines), foremost among which is the Contract of
Affreightment entered into between National Steel Corporation (NSC), and National Marine Corporation
(NMC) and the COA-NSC audit report, together with the counter-affidavits of accused Rolando Narciso
and NMC officials, among whom is accused-movant. Outlined in detail in the aforesaid Resolution of Titus
 P. Labrador, Graft Investigation Officer II, which was reviewed by Attys. Romeo I. Tan and Arturo Mojica,
Director, Community Coordination Bureau and Assistant Ombudsman, PACPO, [respectively,] are the
facts leading to the questioned transaction between NSC and NMC, together with an evaluation of the
propriety and legality of the bidding process involved therein and which revealed that there were
supposed non-compliance with proper bidding procedures. GIO Labrador's findings and
recommendations, extensively set out in his thirteen-page resolution, is complemented by the three-page
Memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer II Leonardo P. Tamayo, both of which meticulously delved
into the merits and demerits of the evidence presented by the complainant and accused-respondents and
which resulted in their respective recommendation which led the Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez to
approve the recommendations of Deputy Special

Prosecutor Jose de G. Ferrer and Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto for the filling of the information
in the case at bar.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the information in
this case in the determination of whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of
arrest but also on the basis predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the
resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest,
or the reconsideration sought for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly
shows that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties
during the preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the entire record of the preliminary
investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence submitted by the complainant and the
accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in futility. 23

In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be upheld. Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish
to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor
is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on
the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused,  i.e. whether there is a
necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. 24 Thus, even if both should
base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct
objectives.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable
cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report
will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However,
the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report,
upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest
order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is
lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the
judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution
finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his
personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest. 25

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the

case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. 26 We do not intend to unduly burden
trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering
the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as
the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any)
upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as
to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation,
as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution we repeat, commands the judge to  personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of
arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the
report of the investigating officer.

True, in Webb vs. De Leon, we found that "the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ
Panel Report satisfied both judges that there [was] probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners." This
statement may have been wrongly construed by the public respondent to mean that the narration or description of
portions of the evidence in the prosecutor's report may serve as sufficient basis to make its own independent judgment.
What it should bear in mind, however, is that, aside from the 26-page report of the DOJ panel, the sworn statements of
three witnesses and counter-affidavits of the petitioners in Webb were also submitted to the trial court, and the latter is
presumed to have reviewed these documents as well, prior to its issuance of the warrants of arrest.

In the instant case, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the graft investigation officer
and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the
Ombudsman would not have approved their recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documents
from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the People from which to sustain its own
conclusion that probable cause exists. Clearly and ineluctably, Respondent Court's findings of "the conduct of a due and
proper preliminary investigation" and "the approval by the proper officials clothed with statutory authority" are not
equivalent to the independent and  personal responsibility required by the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. At least
some of the documentary evidence mentioned (Contract of Affreightment between National Steel Corporation and
National Marine Corporation, the COA-NSC audit report, and counter-affidavits of Rolando Narciso and NMC officials),
upon which the investigating officials of the Ombudsman reportedly ascertained the existence of probable cause, should
have been physically present before the public respondent for its examination, to enable it to determine on its own
whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding of probable cause. But is stubbornly stood pat on its position
that it had essentially complied with its responsibility. Indisputably, however, the procedure it undertook contravenes the
Constitution and settled jurisprudence. Respondent Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in  ipso
facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and
without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and
recommendation.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED and the assailed Resolution is SET ASIDE. The warrant issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) on May 20, 1992 in Case No. 17674 for the arrest of Petitioners Doris Teresa Ho and
Rolando Narciso is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 153524-25            January 31, 2005

RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO
in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO,
SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A.
BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL, respondents.

Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the Ombudsman in its finding of lack of
probable cause made during preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of
discretion on their part.

Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the public respondents herein – officers of the
Office of the Ombudsman – gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private respondents herein, members of the
Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.

From the respective pleadings2 of the parties, the following facts appear to be indubitable:

1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14 May 2001 Elections 3 ),
petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition;

2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a crime which carries with it the
penalty of prision correccional  in its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);

3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal.
revolver with ammunition;

4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at the
Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to have a standing warrant of
arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;

5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners were brought to the
residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a "Joint-Affidavit" against
them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the
petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-
Affidavit" was filed and docketed;

6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was released upon the order
of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back
and continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Soria’s detention up to the
time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;

7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an
Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;

8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bista’s arrest for alleged illegal
possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner
Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code
in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N,
respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;

9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and
No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.

10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit
for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents.

11. After considering the parties’ respective submissions, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered the first assailed
Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code for lack of merit; and

12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in
the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next
preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground
and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request,
to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by
correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was
arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours
without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the proper judicial authorities.

The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36 periods. With respect specifically to
the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing
Article 1254 as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the periods prescribed within which
public officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception.
Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any attempts at interpretation.5 Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v. Orozco,
Jr.,6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to bolster their position that Sundays, holidays
and election days are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in Article 125, 9 hence, the arresting officers
delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.

In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of
the information in court against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The information was filed at 4:30
p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the
prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with violation
of Article 125.10 Public respondents countered that the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the filing of the
informations with the proper judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12

From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public respondents did not abuse their
discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against private respondents.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.1awphi1.nét The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.13

No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public respondents. Their disposition of petitioners’
complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it
was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:

As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based on applicable laws
and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed
by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (Medina
vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial
Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on
May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could
be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of. 14

Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,15 that —

. . . The arresting officer’s duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or
thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not released. From the time of petitioner’s arrest at 12:00 o’clock
p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for murder actually was in court, over
75 hours have elapsed.

But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was declared an official holiday; and
November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal
to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the
clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to
locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers and employees could very well compound the fiscal’s difficulties.
These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he
was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.

And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila16 --

. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other
circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in
time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.

As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has already been filed in Court, public
respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not prosper
because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the
time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P.
Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release.
Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous
detention.

The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed
with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes "G" and "I",
Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and
MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes "J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of detained
person to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The complaints against
him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed
above. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like
issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739). 17

The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,18 wherein we ordained that –

. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied
considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release
when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has
been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such
filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.

All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to defer to the Office of the
Ombudsman’s determination that the facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.l^vvphi1.net

As we have underscored in numerous decisions --

We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent
any compelling reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that
the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside
pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits
of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may
not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds
the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much
the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint
Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128147 May 12, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ESTANISLAW JABERTO y TELOY and MELVIN TIMTIM, accused, ESTANISLAW JABERTO y TELOY, appellant.

The following well-entrenched doctrines are used by this Court in rejecting this appeal: (1) the trail court's assessment of
the credibility of a witness is generally binding on appellate courts; (2) discrepancies between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness do not necessarily discredit him; and (3) treachery is present if the attack on an unarmed and
unsuspecting victim is swift and unexpected.

The Case
Estanislaw Jaberto appeals the August 26, 1996 Decision 1 in Criminal Case No. CBU-40141, promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, which convicted him of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

In an Information dated December 27, 1995, Prosecutor Valentin B. Suan charged Estanislaw Jaberto and Melvin Timtim
with murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of December, 1995, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a kitchen knife, with deliberate
intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there attack, assault and
stab one PRIMITIVO DAGOC Y NESTAL with said kitchen knife on the vital part of his body and inflicting
upon him physical injuries which caused the death of said Primitive Dagoc y Nestal. 2

At his arraignment, Appellant Jaberto, duly assisted by Atty. George P. Bragat, pleaded not guilty. 3 The other accused,
Melvin Timtim, and has remained at large. 4 Thus, trial proceeded against Appellant Jaberto alone. Thereafter, the court a
quo  rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Estanislaw
Jaberto guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal [in] the felony of murder; he is accordingly sentenced
to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay unto the legal heirs of the deceased victim
Primitivo Dagoc the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of death indemnity. The costs of this instance shall
be taxed against the said accused. 5

In view of the penalty imposed, appellant filed his appeal directly with this Court. 6

The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
In the Appelle's Brief, 7 the Office of the Solicitor General 8 presented the following narration of the facts.
On December 24, 1995, at around 10:30 in the evening, Mardonio Pelonio and Franklin Dagoc were at
one side of Lincoln Street, Cebu City, talking to each other (TSN, February 21, 1996, p. 3). On the other
side of the street was Franklin's father, Primitivo Dagoc, who was then sitting on a stall, leaning on the
door of their store, and napping (Ibid., pp. 3-4 & 8). While Primitivo Dagoc was in this restive state,
Estanislaw Jaberto and Melvin Timtim sneaked up on the sleeping Primitivo, and Estanislaw Jaberto
suddenly stabbed him on the right chest (Ibid., pp. 4, 9 & 10). This was witnessed by Franklin Dagoc, who
was then talking to Mardonio Pelonio at the other side of the street, which was well lighted ( Ibid., pp. 4 &
7).

When Primitivo Dagoc growled that he was stabbed, Estanislaw Jaberto and Melvin Timtim ran away
(Ibid., p. 4). Mardonio Pelonio and Franklin Dagoc pursued them (Ibid). While they were being pursued,
Estanislaw Jaberto and Melvin Timtim took separate ways; Jaberto ran towards Magallanes, while Timtim
toward Carbon [S]treet (TSN, January 22, 1996, p. 6). Mariano Pelonio and Franklin Dagoc decided to
pursue the person who did the stabbing: Estanislaw Jaberto (Ibid). While pursuing Estanislaw Jaberto,
Mardonio Pelonio and Franklin Dagoc noticed that there were barangay tanods on board a patrol car
(TSN, February 21, 1996, pp. 4-5). They shouted for assistance (Ibid, p. 5).

Eventually, the barangay tanods caught Estanislaw Jaberto and recovered from him a knife. They brought
him to the police authorities (Ibid).

The police authorities brought Estanislaw Jaberto to the Office of the City Prosecutor for investigation.
There, Estanislaw Jaberto admitted owning the knife and stabbing the victim (Ibid, p. 11).

The victim died due to the stab wound on his chest (Ibid, p. 15). 9

Evidence for the Defense

The trial court summarized the evidence presented by the defense in this wise: 10

Testifying in his defense, accused Estanislaw Jaberto, 21 years old, married, jobless and a resident of
Pansolan, Balogo, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental[,] declared that he came to Cebu a week before
December 24, 1995, to look for a job; that he stayed in Talisay, Cebu[,] at the house of his wife's cousin;
that on December 24, 1995, at about 8:00 o'clock p.m., Melvin Timtim, his wife's cousin, came to fetch
him and brought him to Cebu City; that they roamed around Cebu City until 10:30 o'clock p.m. when they
were at a place unfamiliar to him; that Melvin Timtim stabbed a man sitting outside a house by the road;
that he stood at some distance from where Melvin Timtim stabbed that person; that he did not see what
was used by Melvin Timtim when he stabbed the man whom he himself had not seen before; that when
Melvin Timtim ran away he followed suit because there were persons chasing him; that he was caught
after the chase because he did not know where to go; that he was mauled and was brought to the
Waterfront Police Station; that at the said police station, a man who claimed to be the brother of the
victim, struck him; that he was investigated at the station but he was not assisted by a lawyer and the
investigation was not in writing; that he was forced to admit owning the knife (Exh. "A"), and stabbing the
victim in this case because he was manhandled; that he owned the black wallet which fell from his pocket
when he was beaten up; and the wallet contained some kind of certification from the [b]arangay [c]aptain
 of Mabunga, Negros Oriental; and that during his detention, Melvin Timtim[,] his co-accused, did not
contact him by letter or otherwise.

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses to be clear, convincing and consistent, the trial court concluded
that appellant did indeed stab and kill the unsuspecting and defenselves victim, Primitivo Dagoc, who was then napping
outside his store. The trial court likewise rejected appellant's "plea of passive presence" 11 for being self-serving and bereft
of corroboration from any disinterested or impartial party. Moreover, appellant and co-accused Melvin Timtim's flight
immediately after the stabbing incident belied their innocence.

Assignment of Errors
Appellant interposes the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court.
I
The Honorable Trial Court erred in sweepingly declaring that the testimonies of "state witnesses Mardonio
Pelonio and Franklin Dagoc whose vivid accounts of the incident were clear, consistent and forthright and
credible," considering that evidence is abundant on record that Mardonio Pelonio's account of the incident
in his testimony in court vis-a-vis his joint affidavit with Franklin Dagoc, was never vivid, nor was it clear,
consistent, forthright and credible, but, on the other hand, filled with inconsistencies and evasiveness,
th[u]s creating serious doubts as [to] the culpability of Jaberto. The same [situation] can be said of
Franklin Dagoc, aside from the clear bias of his testimony.
II
The Honorable Trial Court whose decision is assailed in this appeal, clearly erred in pronouncing that
Estanislaw Jaberto y Teloy employed "treachery" in relation to the crime for which he stands charged
together with Melvin Timtim who until now has not been shown to have been brought to the bar of justice
nor to have been pursued by the authorities. 12

In the main, appellant assails (1) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and (2) the appreciation of treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. In addition, he carps at alleged irregularities in the preliminary stages of the case.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is devoid of merit.
Preliminary Issue:
Irregularities Before Trial

Preliminary, appellant alleges irregularities in his detention and during the proceedings before the prosecutor's
office. 13 He alleges that he was detained beginning on December 24, 1995, but that the Information against him was filed
only on December 27, 1995. Moreover, he claims that he was not given a chance to file a counter-affidavit before the
Office of the Prosecutor. These contentions are utterly devoid of merit.

While this Court cautions public officers to be vigilant in safeguarding the custodial rights of detained persons and to
observe and follow the regular procedures in investigating and prosecuting such cases, the alleged irregularities during
the preliminary stages of the investigation are immaterial to the disposition of this case. These matters do not pertain to
the guilt or the innocence of the accused or to material points regarding the crime itself. Equally important, the alleged
irregularities were waived when appellant went to trial without raising his objections thereto. 14

First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses
Appellant assails the credibility of Prosecution Eyewitnesses Mardonio Pelonio and Franklin Dagoc, citing discrepancies
between their joint affidavit 15 and their testimonies.

Appellant's contention is clearly erroneous. The alleged inconsistencies between the joint affidavit and the testimonies of the
two prosecution witnesses do not destroy their credibility and truthfulness. "The general rule has always been that
discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit him" 16 because "affidavits, being taken ex parte are almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate . . . ." 17

Thus, the joint affidavit stating that Primitivo Dagoc was sitting when he was stabbed 18 was merely less precise than the
testimony of Pelonio that the victim was sleeping in a sitting position. 19 Similarly, we find no material inconsistency
between the statement in the affidavit that the witnesses saw Jaberto take a "kitchen knife" 20 from his waist, and Pelonio's
testimony that he saw the appellant draw from his waist "something" 21 which he used to stab the victim. More important,
the alleged inconsistencies pertain to insignificant matters which do not detract from the testimonies of the prosecution
eyewitnesses that they saw appellant stab the victim. 22 A witness is not expected to remember perfectly all the minute
details of an occurrence. 23

In this light, the trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Pelonio pointing to appellant as the culprit who stabbed
Primitivo Dagoc.
Court: By the way, what time did the stabbing take place?
A: About 10:30, December 24, 1995.
Court: Is that scene of the incident lighted?
A: Very bright because of mercury lights.
Court: In other words, you actually saw the person who stabbed the victim?
 A: Yes, sir.
Court: Look around you if he is here.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Court: Will you please point to him.
A: The one to his right, no. 25, Estanislaw Jaberto. 24Pelonio's testimony was
corroborated by Franklin Dagoc, who also positively identified appellant as the
perpetrator. 25
Q By the way, is the accused inside the court room now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to him?
(The witness has pointed to the accused, one of the persons seated at the bench
previously identified as Estanislao Jaberto).
PROS. SOLIMA: DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Q Is he the same accused . . . whom you saw [stab] your father?
A Yes, sir.
COURT: At the time you saw this accused [stab] your father, how far were you from the
accused?
A More or less 10 meters.
COURT: Was that area lighted?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT: What kind of light?
A Mercury light, your Honor.

The trial court, which had the opportunity to hear directly the testimony of the two prosecution witnesses, gave credence
to their assertion that they saw appellant stab the victim. Time and again, this Court has ruled that "the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. Findings of the trial court on such matters are
binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. 26

It should be noted that Franklin Dagoc was the son of the deceased. Thus, his natural reaction was to pinpoint the real
perpetrator and not to let the guilty go free. Furthermore, appellant did not allege, much less prove, that Franklin Dagoc
and Mardonio Pelonio had any ill motive to testify falsely against him. Appellant's defense is further belied by the fact he
fled from the scene of the crime immediately after the stabbing, but was caught by those who pursued him and his co-
accused Melvin Timtim.

Second Issue: Treachery
Citing People v. Hubilla, 27 appellant argues that treachery could not qualify the killing to murder because the attack was
not sudden. Appellant contends that, based on the testimony of Franklin Dagoc, the attacker was merely walking casually
when he approached the victim.

Contrary to the claim of the appellant, the trail court correctly appreciated treachery, the essence of which "is the swift and
unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation" 28 on the part of the latter. In the present case,
it is clear that treachery was employed, because the attackers stealthily approached the sleeping and unaware victim and
then swiftly stabbed him. Thus, "the means, method and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate." 29

Crime and Punishment

As the prosecution has not proven any generic aggravating circumstance (other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery), the trial court correctly imposed on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, not death. Likewise, we affirm
the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, consonant with prevailing jurisprudence. 30

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellant.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,

vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON ANADILLA, RAFAEL
ANADILLA and JOSE ANADILLA, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order * of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10th Judicial
District, Branch I, dated 20 March 1974, dismissing motu proprio Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled "People of the
Philippines, Complainant versus Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, Accused," as well as of the order
dated 22 April 1974 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration of said earlier order.

The facts are not disputed.

On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against
accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12
March 1974. The hearing set on 11 March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused,
respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested by the police authorities. On the same date, the court  a
quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974.

On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads:

Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this
case and there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose
Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March
11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect.

The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled.

In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said
accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order.

SO ORDERED. 1

The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was executed by the offended party on 20 March 1974
and subscribed and sworn to before the branch Clerk of Court Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged, among others, that:

That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled, People vs. Ariston Anadilla, et al., for
Attempted Homicide, which case is pending before the first branch of this Court; that he is no longer
interested in the further prosecution of this case and that he has already forgiven the accused for their
acts; that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted and that without their testimonies, the guilt
of the accused cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that in view of these circumstances, he
requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of the said case. 2

The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the court  a quo in an order dated 22
April 1974. 3 This petition was thereupon filed before this Court.

The issue in this petition is whether the courta a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance
executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.

The issue presented is not novel. In Crespo v. Mogul, 4 promulgated on 30 June 1987, the Court had occasion to state the
rule in regard to the respective powers of the prosecuting fiscal and the court, after the complaint or information has been
filed in court. In said case, the issue raised was whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed
by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial of the case on the merits.

In the Crespo case, an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant Fiscal before the Circuit Criminal
Court of Lucena City. Arraignment of the accused and trial of the case were, however, deferred because of a pending
appeal by the accused/respondent to the Secretary of Justice. Reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, the Undersecretary of Justice directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against
the accused. Upon such instructions, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The
Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. On a certiorari recourse to the Court of Appeals, the petition was
dismissed. Review of the Court of Appeals decision was then sought by the accused with this Court, raising the issue
previously stated herein, Resolving, the Court held:

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of
the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie
case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in
the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at
such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
 recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that
the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court or not [sic], once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may
feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The
only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." (Emphasis
supplied).  5

In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten (10) years had elapsed from
the date of filing of the information. It was not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit of
desistance manifested that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their testimony, the guilt of
the accused could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case, obviously believed that despite
such manifestation of the complainant, he (fiscal) could prove the prosecution's case.

To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the
sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court), still,
any move on the part of the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without objection of the
accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of the
prosecution of the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed. It is only after hearing
the prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 106695 August 4, 1994

EDWARD T. MARCELO, DIONILO D. MARFIL, CELIA C. CABURNAY, and DANIEL T. PASCUAL, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, in his capacity as
The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, and THE QUEZON CITY
PROSECUTOR, respondents.
The issue in this case is whether a pre-arraignment dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, which relied on the
reversal by the Review Committee of the Office of the City Prosecutor of the investigating prosecutor's resolution to file
the information, bars the filing of a new information for the same offense after the Secretary of Justice reversed the
resolution of the review committee.

This case was originally assigned to the Third Division but was referred to the Court en banc in view of the novelty and
importance of the issue.

The procedural antecedents of this case, as disclosed by the original records of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285  1 and
Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, which we required to be transmitted to this Court, as well as that of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681, are herein set forth.

In a complaint-affidavit sworn to on 18 March 1991 and filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, Jose T.
Marcelo charged the petitioners with falsification of public documents committed by forging the signature of Jose P.
Marcelo, Sr. in six voting trust agreements (VTA's). 2 Submitted in support of the affidavit-complaint were the findings of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and of the PC/PNP Crime Laboratory that the signature on the VTA's purporting
to be that of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. and the specimen or standard signature of the latter were not written by one and the
same person. The VTA's 3 were purportedly executed in Quezon City and acknowledged before petitioner Dionilo Marfil, a
notary public.

After conducting a preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Domingo Israel found "more than sufficient
evidence" of the forgery of the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr., as "found and concluded by two (2) national police
agencies, the NBI and PCCL," and recommended the filing of the case in court. 4

On 30 May 1991, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, and raffled to Branch 96 5 thereof (hereinafter Bersamin court).

On 6 June 1991, the petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City a Motion for Review seeking the
deferment of the filing of the information — or if one had been filed, the suspension of the criminal proceedings — and the
reversal of the Israel resolution. 6

On 10 June 1991, warrants for the arrest of the petitioners were issued, 7 and all of them except Edward Marcelo posted
bail.8 Marcelo surrendered to the court and posted bail on 29 July 1991. 9

On 13 June 1991, the petitioners, in a Manifestation and Motion, informed the Bersamin court of the filing of their Motion
for Review and prayed that further proceedings in the case be suspended until the resolution of the Motion for Review. 10

On 14 June 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico Bringas, the prosecutor assigned to the case, filed a motion to defer
the arraignment until the resolution of the Motion for Review, 11 which the Bersamin court granted in its Order of 10 July
1991. The Bersamin court, however, reset the arraignment to 28 August 1991.

Then, on 27 August 1991, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to defer the arraignment on 28 August 1991 until the
resolution of their Motion for Review. 12 Acting thereon, and over the vigorous opposition of the private prosecutor, Judge
Bersamin issued an order on 28 August 1991 13 resetting the arraignment to 8 October 1991 and directing the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City "to conclude the pending review of the resolution of the filing Prosecutor Domingo Israel and to
render a report of the results of the review on or before" 8 October 1991.

Believing that no resolution on the Motion for Review would be released before 8 October 1991 and considering that
petitioner Marcelo was abroad, the petitioners filed on 3 October 1991 a motion for the cancellation of the arraignment on
8 October 1991 and for its resetting to "early November 1991." 14

There is no showing that this motion was acted upon. The records of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 were thereafter
destroyed by a fire on 16 October 1991 but were subsequently reconstituted on 9 December 1991. 15

On 15 November 1991, the Review Committee handed down a resolution, 16 approved by Acting City Prosecutor Lydia
Navarro on 29 November 1991, recommending the reversal of the Israel resolution and the withdrawal of the information
in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285. Then on 5 December 1991, the petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion informing
the Bersamin court of the reversal and praying for the dismissal of the case. 17 This was followed on 10 December 1991
by the motion of Assistant City Prosecutor Conrado M. Jamolin which prayed for the withdrawal of the information in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 because of the resolution of the review committee. 18 The private prosecutor opposed this
motion. 19

In the meantime too, specifically on 10 December 1991, the private complainant filed with the Secretary of Justice
an appeal from the 15 November 1991 resolution of the Review Committee. 20

On 13 December 1991, Judge Bersamin, agreeing with the findings and conclusions of the Review Committee, issued an
order, 21 the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion to Dismiss of the accused and the Motion to Withdraw Information of
the public prosecutor are hereby granted and this case is hereby dismissed without costs.
On 27 January 1992, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre R. Bello III handed down a resolution granting the complainant's
appeal, reversing the 15 November 1991 Resolution of the Review Committee, and ordering the filing of
a new information. 22

The new information, 23 signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ralph Lee, was filed on 5 February 1992 pursuant to the
resolution of Secretary Bello, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, and then raffled to Branch 101 presided over
by Judge Pedro Santiago (hereinafter Santiago court) of the RTC of Quezon City. The petitioners posted
bail. 24 Thereafter, the following incidents took place in the said case:

1. On 3 March 1992, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. Q-91-21285 was already final and that the appeal subsequently taken by the private prosecutor to and the
resolution thereon by the Secretary of Justice are null and void and cannot be a valid basis for any authority to file the new
information or for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. 25

2. On 20 March 1992, Judge Santiago issued an order denying the motion to quash on the principal ground that it was not
based on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 26

3. On 1 April 1992, the petitioners filed a motion to reconsider the 20 March 1992 Order alleging therein that their motion
to quash was based on the ground that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so and had acted
pursuant to an order of the Secretary of Justice which is void for having been given without or in excess of jurisdiction
under the doctrine laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul 27 that the Secretary of Justice cannot interfere with the trial court's
disposition of a criminal case after it had taken cognizance thereof. 28

4. On 2 April 1992, Judge Santiago denied the motion to reconsider and reset the arraignment to 7 April 1992. 29

Thus, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals on 3 April 1992 a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the
order of the Santiago court denying the motion to quash, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27681. They alleged
therein that the "respondent Judge evaded his positive legal duty when he disregarded the consistent rulings of the
Honorable Supreme Court that once an information has already been filed in court, the court acquires complete
jurisdiction over the case and the Secretary of Justice may no longer interfere with the court's disposition of the case." 30

In its decision of 11 June 1992, 31 the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition. It found it to be "devoid of merit"
because

certiorari  and prohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a motion to
quash. The defendant should instead, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the
special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision
is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 32

In the meantime, however, the Santiago court, not having been enjoined by the Court of Appeals, continued with the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104. On 7 April 1992, it arraigned petitioners Caburnay, Pascual, and Marfil,
entered a plea of not guilty for them, and reset the arraignment of petitioner Edward T. Marcelo, who was then abroad, to
28 April 1992. 33 On the latter date, Marcelo was arraigned and a plea of not guilty was entered for him. 34 Subsequently,
the court received the testimonies of the following witnesses for the prosecution: Jose Marcelo, Jr., who testified on direct
examination and cross-examination on 9 June 1992, 16 June 1992, and 14 July 1992; Emmanuel Guzman, who testified
on 23 July 1992, 10 August 1992, and 20 August 1992; Aida Gaetos, who testified on 10 August 1992; and Francisco
Cruz, Lita Wells, Evelyn M. Eugenio, and Helier Penaranda, who testified on 13 August 1992.

On 31 August 1992, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' motion to reconsider the decision of 11 June 1992. 35

Hence, the instant petition which reiterates the grounds and the arguments raised before the Court of Appeals.

The petition is without merit.

The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners' special civil action for certiorari not necessarily for the reason it
relied upon, i.e., "certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a motion to quash," but
because the Santiago court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to quash. It is settled that if a court, in denying the motion to quash (or a motion to dismiss), acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari or prohibition lies. 36

The denial by the Santiago court of the motion to quash suffers from no fatal infirmity. The petitioners' contention that the
prosecutor did not have the authority to file the information because he acted upon an order of the Secretary of Justice
which is void in the light of Crespo vs. Mogul 37 is untenable. In the Crespo case, this Court ruled:

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
 arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor[e] to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the court. 38

Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case,
the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed
resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.

Insofar as this case is concerned, the procedure on appeals from the resolution of the investigating prosecutor (which was
duly approved by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City) as well as that from the resolution of the Review
Committee was governed by Department Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990, of the Department of Justice. This was
superseded by Department Order No. 223, dated 30 June 1993. Pursuant to Section 1 of Department Circular No. 7, only
resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor, the Regional State Prosecutor, and the Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing
a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice, except as otherwise provided in Section 4 thereof.
Under the latter, a resolution of the aforesaid prosecutors finding probable cause may be appealed only upon a showing
of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion; however, even with such showing, the appeal shall not be entertained if the
appellant had already been arraigned, and if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal
shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.

In this case, the petitioners did not at once appeal to the Secretary of Justice from the resolution of Assistant Prosecutor
Israel. Instead, they initially filed the Motion for Review.

From the foregoing antecedents, it is clear that the Bersamin court knew and took cognizance of the Motion for Review,
deferred the arraignment of the accused until the resolution of the said motion, and even directed the Office of the City
Prosecutor "to conclude the pending review . . . and to render a report of the results of the review on or before" 8 October
1991. In thus recognizing and allowing the Motion for Review, the Bersamin court deferred to the authority of the
prosecution arm of the government to resolve with finality the issue of whether or not the information should have been
filed. The Review Committee's resolution was of course not final because under Department Circular No. 7 both the
offended party and the petitioners could still appeal therefrom to the Secretary of Justice under Section 1 and Section 4
thereof. The Bersamin court knew or was expected to know, since it had to take judicial notice of Department Circular No.
7, that the resolution of the Review Committee was not final. The offended party had, in fact, appealed from the said
resolution to the Secretary of Justice on 10 December 1991.

Consequently, the 5 December 1991 Manifestation and Motion of the petitioners praying for the dismissal of the case and
the 10 December 1991 motion of Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin asking for the withdrawal of the information were
prematurely filed, because as to the first, the period of the offended party to appeal from the resolution to the Secretary of
Justice had not yet lapsed or even begun, there being no showing of the date the offended party received a copy thereof;
and, as to the second, an appeal had in fact been filed on 10 December 1991. Prudence, if not wisdom or at the very least
respect for the authority of the prosecution agency to which the Bersamin court deferred, dictated against a favorable
action on the Review Committee's resolution until the denial of the appeal or the affirmance of the resolution by the
Secretary of Justice. The Bersamin court acted then with precipitate or undue haste in issuing the 13 December 1991
Order granting the petitioners' motion to dismiss and Prosecutor Jamolin's motion to withdraw the information in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-21285.

Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said
motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon
only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice.

It may be observed that the granting of both motions is a serious contradiction in that upon withdrawal of the information,
which is the logical consequence of the grant of the motion to withdraw, there no longer remained any case to dismiss. In
fine, the withdrawal of the information rendered moot the motion to dismiss.

The withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91- 21285, or even the dismissal of the said case as decreed by
the Bersamin court, did not bar the filing of a new information as directed by the Secretary of Justice in his Resolution of
27 January 1992. No jeopardy had attached as a result of the earlier termination of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285
because the petitioners therein had not been arraigned and had, in fact, asked for its dismissal for a cause other than that
which would constitute double jeopardy. On the contrary, the filing of the new information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-
28104 straightened the course of criminal justice which had earlier gone awry due to the precipitate action of the
Bersamin court. Nor may it be said that the prosecutor who filed the information had no authority to do so.

The Santiago court, therefore, correctly denied the petitioners' motion to quash in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104 and the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681.
It must also be noted that the petitioners had already been arraigned in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104 and had
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the reception of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and even
terminating the cross-examination of some of them.

Before we end, a few words are in order by way of comment on the emphasis placed by our brother, Mr. Justice Jose A.
R. Melo, in his dissenting opinion, on the filing with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal in July 1988 by Mrs. Lilia S.
Wells, first cousin of Edward Marcelo and Jose Marcelo, Jr., of a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
involving the same VTA's against petitioners Marcelo and Marfil, the dismissal thereof on 29 March 1989 by the Rizal
Provincial Prosecutor for insufficiency of evidence, 39 and the resolution of the Department of Justice of 27 August 1989
dismissing the petition for review of the dismissal. The clear suggestion is that the filing of the second criminal complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City is persecutive and should not be countenanced by this Court.

Our reading of the petitioners' Position Paper in the criminal complaint filed against them by Jose Marcelo, Jr. with the City
Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City (I.S. No. 91-3069) 40, the motion for review, the motion to quash the information in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681, and the petition in this case does not disclose any
claim by the petitioners that they are the victims of a vexatious or persecutive action. In the first mentioned pleading, they
simply stated that the "sole issue in this case [is] whether or not, on the basis of the evidence submitted by the parties,
there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Use
thereof have been committed and that Respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial." 41 The first
complaint was filed by Mrs. Wells alone who was unable to present the findings of the questioned documents examiner of
the NBI and of the PC/PNP Crime Laboratory on the alleged forgery of the signatures of Jose Marcelo, Sr. on the
questioned VTA's. The latter and the specimen or standard signature of Jose Marcelo, Sr. were submitted to these
agencies only in January and February 1991, respectively. 42 The second complaint was filed by Jose Marcelo, Jr. who,
by then, had already obtained the findings of the said agencies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27681
is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 121180 July 5, 1996

GERARDO A. MOSQUERA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, City of
Makati, Metro Manila, HON. FELICIDAD Y. NAVARRO-QUIAMBAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, City of Makati, Metro Manila, and MARK F. JALANDONI, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of orders dated June 9, 1995 and July 19, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Branch 64) sustaining an order of the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 65) for the reinstatement of the information
for less serious physical injuries against petitioner Gerard S. Mosquera, which the MeTC had previously allowed to be
withdrawn by the prosecution. The reinstatement of the case was made on motion of the offended party.

The prosecution in the MeTC arose out of a physical encounter between petitioner and private respondent Mark E.
Jalandoni within the premises of the Ateneo Law School on June 21, 1993. Petitioner is a graduate of the law school and
a member of a fraternity in that school. On the other hand, private respondent was then a third-year student enrolled in the
lawschool. There is considerable dispute how the fight took place. Petitioner's version was that he had gone to the law
school and happened to meet respondent Jalandoni. Because Jalandoni had a previous altercation with another member
of petitioner's fraternity, petitioner tried to talk to Jalandoni, but the latter reacted belligerently and the two had a fight. On
the other hand, Jalandoni claimed that petitioner and members of petitioner's fraternity simply attacked him upon seeing
him, for a remark which they claimed he (Jalandoni) had made, which caused a female student to cry. The female student
was a friend of one of the fraternity members.

Be that as it may, as a result of the scuffle, a criminal complaint for frustrated homicide was filed by private respondent
against petitioner and five others, namely, Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronald B. Almeida, Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr., Walter S.
Ong, and Jayme A. Sy, Jr., before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.

After the usual preliminary investigation, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Herminio T. Ubana, Sr. recommended
the filing of an information for less serious physical injuries against petitioner, Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronald B. Almeida
and Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr. and the dismissal of the charges against Walter S. Ong and Jayme Sy, Jr. The
recommendation was approved by Rizal Provincial Prosecutor Mauro M. Castro on January 10, 1994.

Accordingly, an information for less serious physical injuries was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila on January 17, 1994 against petitioner and Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronaldo B. Almeida and Alfredo B. Lagamon,
Jr. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 147366, was assigned to Branch 65 of the MeTC and tried in accordance
with the Rule on Summary Procedure. The arraignment was set on July 29, 1994, at 8:30 A.M., but petitioner filed a
motion before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause
against him. As his motion was denied by the Provincial Prosecutor, petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice
which, on July 20, 1994, directed the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw the information.

Accordingly, Second Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista filed a motion to withdraw the information in Criminal
Case No. 147366. Private respondent in turn moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the Department of Justice but
his motion was denied.

In its order dated October 13, 1994, 1 the MeTC, presided over by respondent Judge Felicidad Y. Navarro-Quiambao,
granted the motion of the prosecution and considered the information against petitioner withdrawn. The MeTC stated in its
order:

Considering the time limit given by the Court to said counsel in the order dated August 15, 1994 within
which to pursue the motion for reconsideration [of DOJ Resolution No. 525, Series of 1994] and without
said counsel having informed this Court of the outcome of the same, 2 it can safely be concluded that
private counsel had lost interest to further prosecute the case. Moreover, Atty. Valdez acting as private
counsel in the prosecution of the instant criminal case is under the direct control and supervision of the
Trial Fiscal, who by virtue of the Department of Justice resolution was impliedly ordered to desist from
prosecuting the case for lack of probable cause. In view thereof, the Court is of the opinion that the
motion of the Trial Fiscal should be accorded weight and significance, as it was premised on the findings
that the filing of the information in question has no legal basis.

On motion of private respondent, however, the MeTC reconsidered its order . In its order dated December 29, 1994, the
MeTC said:3

After carefully weighing the arguments of the parties in support of their respective claims, the Court
believes that the weight of the evidence and the jurisprudence on the matter which is now presented for
resolution heavily leaned in favor of complainant's contention. As held in the cases recently decided by
the Hon. Supreme Court, once a case is filed in Court, the latter acquires complete jurisdiction over the
same without regard to technicalities and personal beliefs.

That while there is merit in the accused Gerard A. Mosquera's claim that the institution of a criminal action
depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal who may or may not file the complaint' or information,
when in his opinion the evidence is insufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the same is true only when the case is not in court yet because after the case is already forwarded,
raffled and assigned to a particular branch the Public Prosecutor loses control over the case.

It required the parties to appear before it on January 20, 1995, at 9:00 A.M.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied. 4 In its order, dated April 24, 1995, the MeTC also set the
arraignment of petitioner and Meneses, Jr. on May 19, 1995.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The case, docketed as
Special Civil Case No. 95-718, was assigned to Branch 65, presided over by respondent Judge Delia H. Panganiban.

Initially the RTC issued a temporary restraining order but, on June 9, 1995, 5 it denied petitioner's application for
preliminary injunction. The RTC upheld the reinstatement of the information against petitioner and the other accused. With
its denial of injunction the RTC considered the petition for certiorari and prohibition as having been rendered moot and
academic. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in its order of July 19, 1995.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari and for an order:

a. Reversing the Orders dated 09 June 1995 and 19 July 1995 (cf. Annexes "A" and "B") issued by
respondent Judge Panganiban;

b. Setting aside, as null and void, the Orders dated 29 December 1994 and 24 April 1995 (cf. Annexes
"R" and "T") issued by respondent Judge Quiambao;

c. Making the preliminary injunction final;

d. Prohibiting respondent Judge Quiambao from trying and hearing Criminal Case No. 147366; and

e. Declaring the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 147366 as final and executory in accordance with the
Order dated 13 October 1994 issued by respondent Judge Quiambao.

Petitioner's contention is that, because the direction and control of criminal prosecutions are vested in the public
prosecutor, the motion for reconsideration of the order of October 13, 1994, which the private prosecutor filed without the
conformity by the public prosecutor, was a nullity and did not prevent the order of dismissal from becoming final.
Consequently, the MeTC gravely abused its discretion in afterward reinstating the information.

Undoubtedly private respondent, as complainant, has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution. The right
of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has always been recognized,
the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double
jeopardy.6 recently had occasion to reiterate this rule in Martinez v. Court of Appeals,7 where, through the Chief Justice,
we held:

Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final
judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party," except when the accused is placed thereby
in double jeopardy.

In People v. Guido, [57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean
not only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment
rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have the right
to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from
the offense. The right of the offended party to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari from an
[interlocutory] order rendered in a criminal case was likewise recognized in the cases of  Paredes
v. Gopengco [29 SCRA 688 (1969)] and People v. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)] which held that
"offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file
the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the
underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object. . . .

Petitioner cites the following statement in Cabral v. Puno8 in support of his contention that private respondent has no
personality to file the motion in question:

While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the
period for appeal [from the order of dismissal of the information]. He did not have the legal personality to
appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the
private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration
or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal.

The case of Cabral, however, differs materially from this case. In Cabral, the offended party had lost his right to intervene
because prior to the filing of the criminal case, he had instituted a civil action arising from the same act subject of the
criminal case. On the other hand, in the case at bar, the right of private respondent to intervene in the criminal prosecution
is well nigh beyond question as he had neither instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do so. 9

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that private respondent has the legal personality to file the motion for reconsideration
in the trial court.

Beyond the personality of the private respondent to seek a reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the MeTC, the
central issue in this case is whether in ordering the reinstatement of the information, the MeTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
The MeTC invoked its authority under Crespo v. Mogul 10 to approve the withdrawal of informations after they have been
filed in court, thus:

[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instruction of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.

Petitioner argues that by its order of October 13, 1994, the MeTC already exercised its authority under the Mogul doctrine
to grant or deny the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information and was thereafter precluded from changing its
mind in absence of a motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor.

This argument is untenable. The court could have denied the public prosecutor's 'motion for the withdrawal of the
information against petitioner, and there would have been no question of its power to do so. If it could do that, so could it
reconsider what it had ordered. Every court has the power and indeed the duty to review and amend or reverse its
findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to any error or defect therein.  11 In this case, the motion for
reconsideration was timely filed by the private prosecutor who, as already discussed, has the legal personality to do so.

Indeed, the MeTC must have realized that it had surrendered its exclusive prerogative regarding the withdrawal of
informations by accepting public prosecutor's say-so that the prosecution had no basis to prosecute petitioner. 12 Its order
of October 13, 1994 was based mainly on its notion that the motion of the Trial Fiscal should be accorded weight and
significance as it was premised on the findings [of the Department of Justice] that the filing of the information in question
has no legal basis."

This certainly was not the exercise of discretion. As we said in Martinez, "whether to approve or disapprove the stand
taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this [under the  Mogul  ruling] . . . What was
imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and
proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency." 13

Unfortunately, just as in allowing the withdrawal of the information by the public prosecutor, the MeTC did not make an
independent evaluation of the evidence, neither did it do so in granting the private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration.
In its order dated December 29, 1994, the MeTC simply stated that it was reinstating the case against petitioner because
[a]fter carefully weighing the arguments of the parties in support of their respective claims, the Court believes that the
weight of the evidence and the jurisprudence on the matter which is now presented for resolution heavily leaned in favor
of complainant's contention" and that after a case has already been" forwarded, raffled, and assigned to a particular
branch, the Public Prosecutor loses control over the case." The order contains no evaluation of the parties' evidence for
the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause to proceed against petitioner. The statement that the
"weight of evidence . . . lean[s] heavily in favor of complainant's [Jalandoni's] contention" is nothing but the statement of a
conclusion.

Nor could the MeTC rest its judgment solely on its authority under the Mogul doctrine to have the last word on whether an
in formation should be withdrawn. The question in this case is not so much whether the MeTC has the authority to grant or
not to grant the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information it does but whether in the exercise of that discretion
or authority it acted justly and fairly. In this case, the MeTC did not have good reason stated in its order for the
reinstatement of the information against petitioner, just as it did not have good reason for granting the withdrawal of the
information.

The matter should therefore be remanded to the MeTC so that it can make an independent evaluation of the evidence of
the prosecution and on that basis decide whether to grant or not to grant the withdrawal of the information against
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the orders dated June 9, 1995 and July 19, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED and the
orders of October 13, 1994 and December 29, 1994 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 65 are SET ASIDE
and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati is ORDERED within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision to RESOLVE the
public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 147366, stating in its order clearly the reason
or reasons for its resolution, after due consideration of the evidence of the parties.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113216 September 5, 1997

RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon
City, respondents.

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution
of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such
motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to
evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A
trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such
recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction
over the criminal action.

This principle is explained in this Decision resolving a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals,2 promulgated on September 14, 1993 in CA-G.R SP No. 30832 which in effect affirmed an order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City denying the prosecution's withdrawal of a criminal information against petitioner.

The Antecedent Facts

From the pleadings submitted in this case, the undisputed facts are as follows:

Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma,
petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counter-
affidavit to the complaint.

Finding "sufficient legal and factual basis," the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for
libel against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. 3 The Information filed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Augustine A. Vestil reads:4

That on or about the 27th day of June 1991, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
acting with malice, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously send a letter addressed to Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Director of Philippine Heart Center, East Avenue, this city, and furnished the same
to other officers of the said hospital, said letter containing slanderous and defamatory remarks against
DR. JUAN F. TORRES, JR., which states in part, to wit:

27 June 1991

Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral Director

Subject: Return of all professional fees due Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, Nuclear Medicine
Specialist/Consultant, Philippine Heart Center, from January 31, 1989 to January 31,
1991.

Respondents: Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr., Chief, Nuclear Medicine Section

Dr. Orestes P. Monzon, Staff Consultant

Dear Dr. Cabral,

This is to demand the return of all professional fees due me as a consultant in Nuclear
Medicine, this Center, since January 31, 1989 until my resignation effective January 31,
1991, amounting to at least P100,000.00 for the year 1990 alone. Records in the Nuclear
Medicine Section will show that from January 1989 to January 1991, a total of 2,308
patients were seen. Of these, I had officially supervised, processed, and interpreted
approximately a total of 1,551 cases as against approximately 684 and 73 cases done by
Dr. Monzon and Dr. Torres respectively.

Until my resignation I had received a monthly share of professional fees averaging

P1,116.90/month supposedly representing 20% of the total monthly professional fees.
The rest were divided equally between Dr. Monzon and Dr. Torres. There was never any
agreement between us three consultants that this should be the arrangement and I am
certain that this was not with your approval. The burden of unfairness would have been
lesser if there was an equal distribution of labor and the schedule of duties were strictly
followed. As it was, the schedule of duties submitted monthly to the office of the Asst.
Director for Medical Services was simply a dummy to comply with administrative
requirements rather than a guideline for strict compliance. Both consultants have
complete daily time records even if they did not come regularly. Dr. Torres came for an
hour every week, Dr. Monzon came sporadically during the week while I was left with
everything from training the residents and supervising the Techs to processing and
 interpreting the results on a regular basis. I had a part time appointment just like Dr.
Monzon and Dr. Torres.

In the interest of fairness and to set a precedent for the protection of future PHC Nuclear
Medicine Alumni I am calling your attention to the unfair and inhuman conditions I went
through as a Consultant in that Section. I trust that your sense of professionalism will put
a stop to this corruption.

I suggest that a committee be formed to make an audit of the distribution of professional

fees in this Section. At this point, let me stress that since professional fees vary according
to the type of procedure done and since there was no equity of labor between us I am not
settling for an equal percentage share. I demand that I be indemnified of all professional
fees due me on a case to case basis.

Let me make clear my intention of pursuing this matter legally should there be no
favorable action in my behalf. Let me state at this point 6 that the actions of Dr. Torres
and Dr. Monzon are both unprofessional and unbecoming and are clearly violating the
code of ethics of the medical profession and the Philippine Civil Service Rules and
Regulations related to graft and corruption.

Thank you.

and other words of similar import, when in truth and in fact, as the accused very well knew, the same are
entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose said DR. JUAN F.
TORRES, JR. to public ridicule, thereby casting dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of the
said offended party, to his damage and prejudice.

A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the Department of
Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911.

The Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City prosecutor to move for deferment
of further proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the case. 5 Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated
September 7, 1992 was filed by Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo.6 On September 9, 1992, the trial court
granted the motion and deferred petitioner's arraignment until the final termination of the petition for review. 7

Without the consent or approval of the trial prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the
Order dated September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for Arraignment/Trial. 8

On January 8, 1993, the trial court issued an Order setting aside its earlier Order of September 9, 1992 and scheduling
petitioner's arraignment on January 18, 1993 at two o'clock in the afternoon. 9

In a resolution dated January 27, 1993, then Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon reversed the Quezon City investigating
prosecutor. Pertinent portions of Drilon's ruling read: 10

From the circumstances obtaining, the subject letter was written to bring to the attention of the Director of
the Philippine Heart Center for Asia and other responsible authorities the unjust and unfair treatment that
Dr. Ledesma was getting from complainants. Since complainants and respondent are government
employees, and the subject letter is a complaint to higher authorities of the PHCA on a subject matter in
which respondent has an interest and in reference to which she has a duty to question the same is
definitely privileged (US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 131). Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 455, the
Supreme Court, citing Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, ruled that "A communication made in good faith
upon any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or concerning
which he has a duty is privileged. . . although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which, without
the privilege, would be libelous and actionable.

The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of the PHCA, is a direct evidence of respondent's
righteous disposition of following the rule of law and is a clear indication that her purpose was to seek
relief from the proper higher authority who is the Director of PHCA.

The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and administrative complaints which respondent
filed against complainants. They are mere manifestations of her earnest desire to pursue proper relief for
the alleged injustice she got from complainants. If she was motivated by malice and ill-will in sending the
subject communication to the Director of the PHCA, she would not have sent the second letter and filed
the administrative and civil cases against complainants.

Moreover, it is unbelievable that it took complainants one year to realize that the questioned letter
subjected them to public and malicious imputation of a vice or omission. It is beyond the ordinary course
of human conduct for complainants to start feeling the effects of the alleged libelous letter — that of
experiencing sleepless nights, wounded feelings, serious anxiety, moral shock and besmirched reputation
— one year after they read the communication in question.
 The claim that the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 is applicable to the instant case is
unfounded. In the first place, the instant cases are not being reinvestigated. It is the resolutions of the
investigating prosecutor that are under review. Further, the record shows that the court has issued an
order suspending the proceedings pending the resolutions of the petitions for review by this Office. In the
issuance of its order, the court recognizes that the Secretary of Justice has the power and authority to
review the resolutions of prosecutors who are under his control and supervision.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed resolutions are hereby reversed. You are directed to withdraw the
Informations which you filed in Court. Inform this Office of the action taken within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.

In obedience to the above directive, Quezon City Trial Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed a Motion to Withdraw Information
dated February 17, 1993, 11 attaching thereto the resolution of Secretary Drilon. The trial judge denied this motion in his
Order dated February 22, 1993, as follows: 12

The motion of the trial prosecutor to withdraw the information in the above-entitled case is denied.
Instead, the trial prosecutor of this court is hereby directed to prosecute the case following the guidelines
and doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 13 was denied by the trial judge in the Order dated March 5, 1993, as follows: 14

Finding no cogent reason to justify the reconsideration of the ruling of this Court dated February 22, 1993,
the Motion for Reconsideration dated March 1, 1993 filed by the accused through counsel is hereby
denied.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court. In a Resolution dated March 31,
1993, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9,
paragraph 1 of B.P. 129. 15

Respondent Court dismissed the petition "for lack of merit," holding that it had no jurisdiction to overturn the doctrine laid
down in Crespo vs. Mogul — once a complaint or information has been filed in court, any disposition of the case, i.e.,
dismissal, conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. 16

Hence, this recourse to this Court.

The Issues

For unexplained reasons, petitioner failed to make an assignment of errors against the appellate court. Her counsel
merely repeated the alleged errors of the trial court: 17

I. The Orders, dated February 22, 1993 and March 5, 1993, of respondent Judge Asuncion relied solely
on the "Crespo vs. Mogul" (151 SCRA 462) decision. It is respectfully submitted that said case is not
applicable because:

1. It infringes on the constitutional separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of
the government;

2. It constitutes or it may lead to misuse or misapplication of "judicial power" as defined in the

Constitution;

3. It goes against the constitutional proscription that rules of procedure should not diminish substantive
rights;

4. It goes against the principle of non-delegation of powers;

5. It sets aside or disregards substantive and procedural rules;

6. It deprives a person of his constitutional right to procedural due process;

7. Its application may constitute or lead to denial of equal protection of laws;

8. It deprives the secretary of justice or the president of the power to control or review the acts of a
subordinate official;

9. It will lead to, encourage, abet or promote abuse or even corruption among the ranks of investigating
fiscals;

10. It does not subserve the purposes of a preliminary investigation because —

 (10.a) It subjects a person to the burdens of an unnecessary trial, specially in cases where the
investigating fiscal recommends no bail for the accused;

(10.b) It subjects the government, both the executive and the judiciary, to unnecessary time and
expenses attendant to an unnecessary trial;

(10.c) It contributes to the clogging of judicial dockets; and

11. It has no statutory or procedural basis or precedent.

II. On the assumption that "Crespo vs. Mogul" is applicable, it is submitted that —

1. Respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
when he denied the Motion to Withdraw Information since he had already deferred to, if not recognized,
the authority of the Secretary of Justice; and

2. The facts in "Crespo vs. Mogul" are different from the instant case. Hence, respondent Judge Asuncion
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when he relied solely on said case
in denying the Motion to Withdraw Information.

In sum, the main issue in this petition is: Did Respondent Court commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court's
denial of the prosecution's Motion to Withdraw Information?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit. We answer the above question in the affirmative.

Preliminary Matter

Before discussing the substance of this case, the Court will preliminarily address a procedural matter. Prior to the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on July 1, 1997, Section 2 of Rule 45, which governed appeals from the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, provided:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of . . . the assignment of
errors made in the court below . . . .

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 requires a concise statement of the errors committed by the Court of
Appeals, not of the trial court. For failure to follow this Rule, the petition could have been dismissed by this Court  motu
proprio, considering that under Section 4 of the same Rule, "review is not a matter of right but of sound discretion."

We take this occasion to stress the need for precision and clarity in the assignment of errors. Review under this rule is
unlike an appeal in a criminal case where the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed and
where the whole case is opened for review. Under Rule 45, only the issues raised therein by the petitioner will be passed
upon by the Court, such that an erroneous specification of the issues may cause the dismissal of the petition. We stressed
this in Circular No. 2-90, entitled "Guidelines to be Observed in Appeals to the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme
Court," as follows:

4. Erroneous Appeals. . . . .

e) Duty of counsel. — It is therefore incumbent upon every attorney who would seek review of a judgment
or order promulgated against his client to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign,
whether these be of fact or of law; then upon such basis to ascertain carefully which Court has appellate
jurisdiction; and finally, to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that
any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his client's cause.

FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE.

Be that as it may, the Court — noting the importance of the substantial matters raised — decided to overlook petitioner's
lapse and granted due course to the petition per Resolution dated July 15, 1996, with a warning that henceforth petitions
which fail to specify an assignment of errors of the proper lower court may be denied due course motu proprio by this
Court.

Determination of Probable Cause

Is an Executive Function

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is judicially recognized as an executive function
and is made by the prosecutor. The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free a respondent from the
inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the
reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent
officer designated by law for that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden
of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or
groundless charges. 18

Such investigation is not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but
only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. 19 By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result
thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy attaches.

In declaring this function to be lodged in the prosecutor, the Court distinguished the determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a search warrant from a preliminary investigation proper, in this wise: 20

. . . Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from a preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. . . . The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper — whether . . . there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether . . .
he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is the function of the
prosecutor.

We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for

the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutor's job. The second kind of preliminary
investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with
the judge.

Sound policy supports this distinction. Otherwise, judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. The
Separate Opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals stressed that the
determination of the existence of probable cause properly pertains to the public prosecutor in the "established scheme of
things," and that the proceedings therein are "essentially preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and
authoritative judgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or a crime." 21

In Crespo vs. Mogul, 22 the Court emphasized the cardinal principle that the public prosecutor controls and directs the
prosecution of criminal offenses thus:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow
that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution
by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who,
according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed
within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an
investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a  prima
facie case.

In the same case, the Court added that where there is a clash of views between a judge who did not investigate and a
fiscal who conducted a reinvestigation, those of the prosecutor should normally prevail: 23

. . . . The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is
not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally
initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for
conviction. Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a
certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal
prosecutions. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has
authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case
and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is
innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. In a clash of views between
the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or
the defendant, those of the fiscal's should normally prevail. . . . . .

Appeal as an Exercise of the Justice

Secretary's Power of Control Over Prosecutors

Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus
affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of
justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices.
The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the
Code:

(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units; . . . . .

Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:

Sec. 3. . . . .

The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the
State Prosecutors shall . . . perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of
Justice in the interest of public service.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power,
authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same
shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act
directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of
bureau, office, division or service.

"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as
follows: 24

In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial
steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities,
and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.

Appeal to the Secretary of Justice Is Not

Foreclosed by the Ruling in Crespo

In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 25 the Court clarified that Crespo 26 did not foreclose the power or authority of the
secretary of justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Court recognized in Crespo that the
action of the investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to the approval of the provincial or
city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Thereafter, it may be appealed to the secretary of justice.

The justice secretary's power of review may still be availed of despite the filing of an information in court. In his discretion,
the secretary may affirm, modify or reverse resolutions of his subordinates pursuant to Republic Act No. 5180, as
amended, 27 specifically in Section 1 (d):

(d) . . . Provided, finally, That where the resolution of the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief State
Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by the Secretary of Justice, the latter may, where he finds that
no  prima facie case exists, authorize and direct the investigating fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or
state prosecutor to cause or move for the dismissal of the case, or, where he finds a prima facie case, to
cause the filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn statements or
evidence submitted without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation.

Pursuant thereto, the Department of Justice promulgated Circular No. 7 dated January 25, 1990 governing appeals in
preliminary investigation. Appeals under Section 2 are limited to resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint. However,
Section 4 provides an exception: appeals from resolutions finding probable cause upon a showing of manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion are allowed, provided the accused has not been arraigned. In the present case, petitioner's
appeal to the secretary of justice was given due course on August 26, 1992 pursuant to this Circular.

On June 30, 1993, Circular No. 7 was superseded by Department Order. No. 223; however, the scope of appealable
cases remained unchanged:

Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal
to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
 Appeals from the resolutions of provincial/city prosecutors where the penalty prescribed for the offense
charged does not exceed  prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, shall be made to the
Regional State Prosecutors who shall resolve the appeals with finality, pursuant to Department Order No.
318 dated August 28, 1991 as amended by D.O. No. 34 dated February 4, 1992, D.O. No. 223 dated
August 11, 1992 and D.O. No. 45 dated February 2, 1993. Such appeals shall also be governed by these
rules.

Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief
State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except
upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been
arraigned. If the appellant (is) arraigned during the pendency of the
appeal, . . . appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the
filing of the information in court.

Apart from the foregoing statutory and administrative issuances, the power of review of the secretary of justice is
recognized also by Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal.— . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city
fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint
or information.

This appeal rests upon the sound discretion of the secretary of justice arising from his power of supervision and control
over the prosecuting arm of the government, not on a substantial right on the part of the accused as claimed by petitioner.

Appeal Did Not Divest the

Trial Court of Jurisdiction

Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an information has been filed, trial courts should
defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment or suspension,
however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction,
once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to
dismiss the case.

Judicial Review of the Resolution

of the Secretary of Justice

Judicial power is defined under the 1987 Constitution as the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable. Such power includes the determination of whether there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. 28 Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of Congress or of the President. It may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has
been made in grave abuse of discretion.

Judicial review of the acts of other departments is not an assertion of superiority over them or a derogation of their
functions. In the words of Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Elertoral Commission: 29

. . . [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument sources and guarantees to them. This is
in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of the judicial
review under the Constitution. . . . .

It is not the purpose of this Court to decrease or limit the discretion of the secretary of justice to review the decisions of the
government prosecutors under him. In Crespo, the secretary was merely advised to restrict such review to exceptionally
meritorious cases. Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which recognizes such power, does not, however, allow the
trial court to automatically dismiss the case or grant the withdrawal of the information upon the resolution of the secretary
of justice. This is precisely the import of Crespo, Marcelo, Martinez vs. Court of Appeals 30 and the recent case
of Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, which all required the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case,
because granting the motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case
itself.
 The Marcelo and Martinez
Cases Are Consistent

In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 31 this Court ruled that, although it is more prudent to wait for a final resolution of a motion
for review or reinvestigation from the secretary of justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw an
information, a trial court nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the
awaited action of the secretary. The trial court has the option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused, and whether after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the secretary who reviewed the records of the investigation; provided that such grant or denial is made from its own
assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion.

In Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 32 this Court overruled the grant of the motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal
upon the recommendation of the secretary of justice because, such grant was based upon considerations other than the
judge's own assessment of the matter. Relying solely on the conclusion of the prosecution to the effect that there was no
sufficient evidence against the accused to sustain the allegation in the information, the trial judge did not perform his
function of making an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case.

Despite the pronouncement in Marcelo that a final resolution of the appeal to the Department of Justice is necessary, both
decisions followed the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul: Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial judges are thus required to
make their own assessment of whether the secretary of justice committed grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying
the appeal, separately and independently of the prosecution's or the secretary's evaluation that such evidence is
insufficient or that no probable cause to hold the accused for trial exists. They should embody such assessment in their
written order disposing of the motion.

The above-mentioned cases depict two extreme cases in complying with this rule. In Marcelo, the dismissal of the criminal
action upon the favorable recommendation of the Review Committee, Office of the City Prosecutor, was precipitate in
view of the pendency of private complainant's appeal to the secretary of justice. In effect, the secretary's opinion was
totally disregarded by the trial court. In contrast, in Martinez the dismissal of the criminal action was an "erroneous
exercise of judicial discretion" as the trial court relied hook, line and sinker on the resolution of the secretary, without
making its own independent determination of the merits of the said resolution.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the

Resolution of the Secretary of Justice

In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice
secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of
justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration — all of which were
submitted to the court — the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the
information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our
repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial
judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner
criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for
disregarding the secretary's recommendation.

Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have discovered that there was, in fact, sufficient ground to grant
the motion to withdraw the information. The documents before the trial court judge clearly showed that there was no
probable cause to warrant a criminal prosecution for libel.

Under the "established scheme of things" in criminal prosecutions, this Court would normally remand the case to the trial
judge for his or her independent assessment of the motion to withdraw the information. However, in order not to delay the
disposition of this case and to afford the parties complete relief, we have decided to make directly the independent
assessment the trial court should have done. The petitioner has attached as annexes to the present petition for review the
information, which contains a complete and faithful reproduction of the subject letter, the resolution of the secretary of
justice, the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order of February 22, 1993, and even the private
complainant's opposition to said motion. The records below have been reproduced and submitted to this Court for its
appreciation. Thus, a remand to the trial court serves no purpose and will only clog the dockets.

We thus proceed to examine the substance of the resolution of the secretary of justice. The secretary reversed the finding
of probable cause on the grounds that (1) the subject letter was privileged in nature and (2) the complaint was merely a
countercharge.

In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur:

(a) it must be defamatory;

(b) it must be malicious;

(c) it must be given publicity; and

(d) the victim must be identifiable.

 At the preliminary investigation stage, these requisites must show prima facie a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the accused probably committed it. A cursory reading of the information immediately
demonstrates a failure on the part of the complainant to establish the foregoing elements of libel.

Every defamatory imputation, even if true, is presumed malicious, if no good intention or justifiable motive for making it is
shown. There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. 33 In this case,
however, petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and
payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart
Center. It is a qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it

be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and

x x x           x x x          x x x

The rule on privileged communication is that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the
communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contains incriminatory matter which, without the privilege, would be libelous and
actionable. Petitioner's letter was a private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her part. Her
intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to present her grievance to her superior.
The privileged nature of her letter overcomes the presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive exists;
and in the absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to allege the existence of malice.

Thus, we agree with the ruling of the secretary of justice: 34

. . . (T)he subject letter was written to bring to the attention of the Director of the Philippine Heart Center
for Asia and other responsible authorities the unjust and unfair treatment that Dr. Ledesma was getting
from government employees, and the subject letter is a complaint . . . on a subject matter in which
respondent has an interest and in reference to which she has a duty to question the same is definitely
privileged (US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 131). Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court,
citing Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, ruled that "a communication made in good faith upon any subject
matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is
privileged although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which, without the privilege, would be
libelous and actionable.

The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of the PHCA, is a direct evidence of respondent's
righteous disposition of following the rule of law and is a clear indication that her purpose was to seek
relief from the proper higher authority . . . .

The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and administrative complaints which respondent
filed against complainants. They are mere manifestations of her earnest desire to pursue proper relief for
the alleged injustice she got from complainants. If she was motivated by malice and ill-will in sending the
subject communication to the Director of the PHCA, she would not have sent the second letter and filed
the administrative and civil cases against complainants.

In Alonzo, the settled rule is that, when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a
communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of
the communication, such communication does not amount to publication within the meaning of the law on
defamation. 35 Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other
than the person to whom it has been written. 36 The reason for such rule is that "a communication of the defamatory
matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not
the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him."  37 In this case, petitioner submitted the
letter to the director of said hospital; she did not disseminate the letter and its contents to third persons. Hence, there was
no "publicity" and the matter is clearly covered by paragraph 1 of Article 354 of the Penal Code.

Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July 27, 1992 or one year after June 27, 1991,
the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more than a countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage
against petitioner's administrative action against him.

Ineluctably, Judge Asuncion's denial of the motion to withdraw the information and the reconsideration thereof was not
only precipitate but manifestly erroneous. This is further compounded by the fact that he did not explain his grounds for
his denial inasmuch as he did not make an independent assessment of the motion or the arguments in the resolution of
the secretary of justice. All in all, such rash action did not do justice to the sound ruling in  Crespo vs. Mogul upon which,
ironically, he supposedly rested his action, or to the directive in Marcelo and Martinez where this Court required trial
courts to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Motion to Withdraw the Information
dated February 17, 1993 filed before the trial court is GRANTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.