Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary
Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary
Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary
79538, 1990-10-18
Facts:
October 12, 1965, Felipe Ysmael entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA
No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources wherein it issued an exclusive
license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of
public forest land.
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum
order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling
the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires it immediately sent a
letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos, alleging that it was not given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations.
Barely one year thereafter, one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No.
87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under TLA No. 356
which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by
Filipinas loggers. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos.
Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order
dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a
contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be
withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands. The Ministry imposed the ban
because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forests.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In
a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office
of the President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having
been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14,
1987.
Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance
of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13,
1987, it filed a supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private
respondents submitted their respective comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply
thereto. In a resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their
predecessors in the past regime.
Ruling:
The refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders
does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an
established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the
affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The
rule of res iudicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent
authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)] dated March 17, 1986 and April 2,
1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of
Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the
revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e.
Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative
actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly
appointed Minister of the MNR, requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these
were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned.
Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present
case because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.
The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the
length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the
institution of the proceeding to annul the same"
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto
has either abandoned it of declined to assert it.
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and
1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the
opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at
the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount
to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.