LABOR LAW DIGESTS

1) GARCIA AND DUMAGO VS. PHIL. AIRLINES (GR No. 164856)

 
Facts: Petitioners-employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent PALwho dismissed them after they
were allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabuwithin its premises. The Labor Arbiter ruled for the petitioners and
orderedimmediately for their reinstatement. Prior to this decision, SEC had placed PAL underan Interim Rehabilitation
Receiver, and subsequently under a PermanentRehabilitation Receiver. PAL appealed and the Labor Tribunal ruled in
their favor.Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution for the reinstatement andissued a notice of
garnishment. The Labor Tribunal affirmed the writ and notice butsuspended and referred the action to the Rehabilitation
Receiver of PAL. On appeal,CA found for respondent PAL. 

Issue: Whether or not PAL being under corporate rehabilitation suspends any monetaryclaims to it. 

Ruling: YES. 
 
It is settled that upon appointment by the SEC of a rehabilitation receiver, all actionsfor claims before any court, tribunal or
board against the corporation shall
ipso jure
be
suspended. As stated early on, during the pendency of petitioners’ complaint before
the Labor Arbiter, the SEC placed respondent under an Interim RehabilitationReceiver. After the Labor Arbiter rendered
his decision, the SEC replaced the InterimRehabilitation Receiver with a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver. While
reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger tothe survival or even the life of the dismissed
employee and his family, it does notcontemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a
 judiciallymonitored
state of being resuscitated in order to survive.

Juanito Garcia v. PAL

CASE NO. 2 OF 50

JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO,

Petitioners,

Versus        

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,

Respondent.

 FACTS:

The case stemmed from the administrative charge filed by Philippine Airlines (PAL) against its employees-herein
petitioners after they were allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and
law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Center’s Toolroom Section on July 24, 1995.

After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline, prompting them to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages which was resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their favor, thus ordering PAL to,
inter alia, immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision.

Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution respecting the reinstatement decision and issued a Notice of
Garnishment. 

Respondent elevated the matter to the appellate court which issued the herein challenged Decision and Resolution
nullifying the NLRC Resolutions on two grounds, essentially espousing that:

(1) a subsequent finding of a valid dismissal removes the basis for implementing the reinstatement aspect of a labor
arbiter’s decision; and

(2) the impossibility to comply with the reinstatement order due to corporate rehabilitation provides a reasonable
justification for the failure to exercise the options under Article 223 of the Labor Code (the second ground).
HENCE, this Petition.

 RULING:

Amplification of the First Ground:

The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.

 It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either
re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the
payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employee’s salaries.

Amplification of the Second Ground

The Court sustains the appellate court’s finding that the peculiar predicament of a corporate rehabilitation rendered it
impossible for respondent to exercise its option under the circumstances.     

 The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not
executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission.  If the delay
is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the
reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY DENIED.  Insofar as the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution annulling
the NLRC Resolutions affirming the validity of the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment are concerned, the
Court finds no reversible error. 

SO ORDERED.

2) CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS. MERIS (470 SCRA 125, SEPTEMBER 16, 2005)

APRIL 6, 2015  | YUMMY

FACTS:

1. Capitol Medical Center hired Dr. Meris in 1974 as Chief of its Industrial Service Unit (ISU).

2. In 1992, however, or after about 18 years of service, Dr. Meris was notified that the ISU will be abolished and that his

services will be terminated. He, however, doubted the closure.

3. The ISU was not, in fact, abolished. It continued to operate with Dr. Clemente as head.

4. Dr. Meris believed it was a mere ploy for his ouster due to his refusal to retire. He sought reinstatement but was unheeded. 

5. Dr. Meris then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but the Labor Arbiter dismissed the same and was only granted his

hospital retirement plan.

6. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the retirement plan on the ground that Dr. Meris did not, in fact, retire. It ordered payment of

separation pay instead. 

7. The CA, however, ruled that Dr. Meris was illegally dismissed. Hence, present action by Capitol.

ISSUE: Was there illegal dismissal?

RULING: Yes.
1. Although employers have management prerogatives, including the right to close the operation of an establishment or

undertaking, they must comply with the legal requirements and not offend the protected rights of labor.

2. Requisites: (a) done in good faith to advance the company’s interest; and (b) not for the purpose of defeating or

circumventing the rights of employees under the law.

3. Capitol failed to prove its good faith in closing the ISU.

4. The “Analysis of Income and Expenses” which showed there were losses was doubtful since it was prepared by the internal

auditor who happened to be a relative of Dr. Clemente.

5. The accounting records, in fact, showed increasing revenues from 1989 to 1991.

3) J. Gonzales v NLRC and Ateneo de Davao. GR 125735 August 26, 1999  

Facts:

Sometime in 1991 petitioner was sent a letter dated April 11, 1991 informing her that she has been charged by two
parents for alleged use of corporal punishments on her students. Petitioner questions the fact that respondent only
confronted her about the complaint two years after. On March 31, 1993 petitioner demanded from Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J.,
that she be investigated and that she be formally be informed of the complaint against her. On June 9, 1993 petitioner had
been informed that an investigative committee had been formed and was furnished of the schedule of hearings, rules of
procedure, and sworn affidavits of the students who testified against her. Petitioner questioned the fact why she wasn’t
allowed to be accompanied or represented by a legal counsel, and that she could only be advised by one. Thus, petitioner
declined to take part in the investigation conducted by the said committee. Subsequently the said committee decided to
dismiss herein respondent. Herein respondent decided to lodge a complaint dfor illegal dismissal with the NLRC, wherein
after trial, Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez opined that such dismissal was illegal for failure to establish
substantial evidence as to the guilt of the accused. However, the NLRC sustained the dismissal of herein petitioner as
valid and legal.

Issue:

WoN the NLRC erred in holding that the said dismissal of the petitioner was valid and legal, and that such due
process was rightfully accorded to herein petitioner.

Held:

No,Ample opportunity must have been afforded to the petitioner to defend herself either by herself or through the
assistance of counsel. She must have also been afforded the right to confront the witnesses against her and to properly
know the nature of her offense. Petitioner was denied compliance to these requisites, which consequently resulted to her,
demanding to revise the rules of procedure laid down by the investigative committee

3) ROBERTO GONZALES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS,
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents, G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001. Second Division.De Leon, Jr., J.

Nature of the Case:

This case is a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), dated June 26, 1997 and August 12, 1997, respectively, reversing the Decision dated October 15, 1996 of the
Labor Arbiter who found and declared that petitioner Roberto Gonzales was illegally dismissed by private respondent Pepsi Cola
Products, Philippines, Inc. (PCCPI) and ordered his reinstatement with payment of full backwages.

Facts:

Petitioner Roberto Gonzales was an employee of private respondent Pepsi Cola Products, Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) since July
25, 1989. In 1990 he was promoted to the position of Route Manager and tasked with the supervision and coordination of the activities
of salesmen servicing the area under his jurisdiction. His service with the respondent company was abruptly interrupted on October 6,
1993 when the private respondent terminated his services after he was implicated in an irregularity when he instigated the issuance by
his subordinate salesman of an official receipt for his post-dated check whereby he could have evaded payment to private respondent
of his debt as a concurrent dealer of Pepsi Cola products.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Gonzales was dismissed illegally. He found and declared that the petitioner was denied due
process when no written notice of the charges was received by petitioner prior to notice of termination. The Labor Arbiter opined that
the imputation against the petitioner was committed by the latter not as an employee but as a concessionaire, and that PCPPI has
suffered no damage as a consequence of the acts of petitioner, thus, concluding that there was no justifiable reason for the termination
of the employment of the petitioner.

The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that the separation or termination from employment of the
petitioner by the private respondent due to loss of trust and confidence is a just and valid cause for dismissal under Article 282(c) of
the Labor Code.

Issue:

Whether the NLRC erred in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal.

Arguments:

For the Petitioner:

Petitioner contends that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in reversing the factual findings and
conclusions of the Labor Arbiter.

On October 15, 1996, the Labor Arbiter found and declared that petitioner was denied due process when no written notice of
the charges against him was received by petitioner prior to his receipt of the notice of termination. There was no justifiable reason for
the termination of the employment of petitioner, the Labor Arbiter concluding that the imputation against petitioner was committed by
the latter not as an employee but as a concessionaire of private respondent PCPPI, and that there is no showing that private respondent
PCPPI suffered damage as a consequence thereof.

For the Respondent:

The evidence on record shows that contrary to the finding of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner was given ample opportunity to
present his side and to defend himself against the charges. In a letter dated April 14, 1993, petitioner was directed by private
respondent PCPPI to report to the Security Office on April 16, 1993 for administrative investigation.

While the letter does not show on its face that the petitioner acknowledged receipt thereof, it is undisputed that petitioner
freely, voluntarily and actively participated in the administrative investigation on the charges filed against him, as evidenced by his
signature affixed on each page of the minutes of the hearings conducted on April 16, 1993 and June 25, 1993.

In a letter dated September 30, 1993, petitioner was notified of his termination from employment on the ground of loss of
confidence and having violated the company rules and regulations, to wit:

“Group III – Frauds and Acts of Dishonesty

4. Engaging in fictitious transactions, fake invoicing, deals padding and other sale malpractices
8. Breach of trust and confidence.”

Ruling:

The dismissal of the petitioner is valid and that public respondent NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in reversing
the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal.

Under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, an employer can terminate the employment of the employee concerned for “fraud or
willful breach by an employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative.” Loss of confidence, as a
just cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust
and confidence. In the present case, petitioner is not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He is a Route Manager, a managerial level
position as settled in the case of United Pepsi–Cola Supervising Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma. The test of managerial status has been
defined as an authority to act in the interest of the employer, which authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires
independent judgment. As managerial employee, petitioner is tasked to perform key and sensitive functions, and thus he is bound by
more exacting work ethics.

Private respondent PCPPI has sufficiently shown that petitioner has become unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded
of his position. Petitioner betrayed his employer’s trust and confidence when he instigated the issuance by his subordinate salesman of
an official receipt for his post-dated check on December 22, 1992 whereby he (petitioner) could have evaded payment to private
respondent PCPPI of his debt amounting to P116,182.00. These acts committed by petitioner adversely reflected on his integrity. As
Route Manager he disregarded the private respondent company’s rules and regulation prohibiting the issuance of official receipt for
post-dated check payment unless the same is done by the Sales Office Manager.

The fact the private respondent PCPPI ultimately suffered no monetary damage as petitioner subsequently settled his account
is of no moment. This was not the reason for the termination of his employment in the respondent company but the anomalous scheme
he engineered to cover up his past due account, which constitutes a clear betrayal of trust and confidence.

The Court has ruled that the petitioner is indeed unfit to continue working for private respondent PCPPI, and that public
respondent NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in dismissing the
complaint for illegal dismissal.

The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of public respondent National
Labor Relation Commission dated June 26, 1997 and August 12, 1997, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

4) PAL v. NLRC G.R. No. 85985 August 13, 1993

Facts:

PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated amon g the employees and was
immediately implemented, and some employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary measures
embodied therein. The Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before t he
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). PALEA contended that PAL, by its unilateral implementation
of the Code, was guilty of unfair labor practice, spec ifically Paragraphs E and G of Article 249 and Article 253
of the Labor Code. PA LEA alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated in limited numbers; that being
penal in nature the Code must conform with the requirements of sufficient publication, and that the Code was
arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to th e rights of the employees. It prayed that implementation of the Code
be held in abeyance; that PAL should d iscuss the substance of the Code with PALEA; that employees
dismissed under the Code be reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing; and that PAL be declared
guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay damages PAL asserted its prerogative as an employer to
prescibe rules and regulations re gardingemployess' conduct in carrying out their duties and functions, and
alleging that by implementing the Code, it had not violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or any
provision of the Labor Code. Assailing the complaint as unsupported by evidence, PAL maintained that Article
253 of the Labor Code cited by PALEA reffered to the requirements for negotiating a CBA which was
inapplicable as indeed the current CBA had been negotiated.

Issue: W/N the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer
and the employees.

Ruling:

Petitioner's assertion that it needed the implementation of a new Code of Discip line considering the nature of
its business cannot be overemphasized. In fact, its being a local monopoly in the business demands the most
stringent of measures to attain safe travel for its patrons. Nonetheless, whatever disciplinary measu res are
adopted cannot be properly implemented in the absence of full cooperatio n of the employees. Such cooperation
cannot be attained if the employees are res tive on account, of their being left out in the determination of
cardinal and fundamental matters affecting their employment.

PAL vs NLRC

G.R. No. 87698 September 24, 1991

Topic: Law interpretation,Factual Consideration

Facts: A criminal case was filed charging Oscar Ireneo (Employee), among others, of Estafa thru Falsification. After the
criminal proceeding, Ireneo filed a case with the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement and back wages. The Labor Arbiter ruled
in favor of Ireneo, ordering PAL to life the suspension. The basis for this was a PAL circular dated June 15, 1966 to the
effect that "(a)n employee charged with any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under preventive
suspension until the final adjudication of his case"

Issue: Was the decision of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC valid?

Ruling: No. There should be care and solicitude in the protection and vindication of the rights of workingmen cannot be
gainsaid; but that care and solicitude can not justify disregard of relevant facts or eschewal of rationality in the
construction of the text of applicable rules in order to arrive at a disposition in favor of an employee who is perceived as
otherwise deserving of sympathy and commiseration.

The letter to Oscar Irineo of then PAL President Benigno P. Toda, Jr. dated August 23, 1967, based evidently on the
investigation and report of the fact finding panel, leaves no doubt that Irineo's employment was being ended; the language
is plain and categorical. It reads pertinently as follows:  

To: Oscar Ireneo

Comptroller's Department
For being involved in the irregular refund of tickets in the international service to the damage and
prejudice of the company, you are dismissed from the service effective immediately.
The acts committed being criminal, resulting in the swindling of the company, the Legal Department is
directed to file immediately the corresponding criminal cases against you.

To say, as both the Arbiter and the respondent Commission do, that that declaration, "you are dismissed from the service
effective immediately," should be construed merely as a suspension, not a dismissal, from employment, is illogical if not
downright ludicrous. They attempt to justify this conclusion by adverting to a PAL circular dated June 15, 1966 to the
effect that "(a)n employee charged with any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under preventive
suspension until the final adjudication of his case," and construe this as a complete foreclosure or prohibition of any
alternative or concurrent action on PAL's part, such as the imposition of administrative sanctions or penalties; in other
words, any disciplinary action against an erring employee was absolutely dependent on the outcome of the criminal action
against the latter, no disciplinary measure of any nature being permissible against the employee "until the final
adjudication" of his criminal case. It is a construction that has nothing to support it, is contrary to common sense, and one
certainly not justified by the recorded facts.

5) FAIR SHIPPING V. MEDEL (G.R. NO. 177907; AUGUST 29, 2012)

CASE DIGEST: FAIR SHIPPING CORP., and/or KOHYU MARINE CO., LTD. v. JOSELITO T. MEDEL

FACTS: On November 23, 1998, Medel was hired by Fair Shipping Corporation (Fair Shipping), for and in behalf of its
foreign principal Kohyu Marine Co., Ltd. (Kohyu) Medel was employed as an Able Seaman of the vessel M/V Optima.

On board M/V Optima, Medel figured in an unfortunate accident. During the conduct of emergency drills aboard the
vessel, one of Medel’s co-workers lost control of the manual handle of a lifeboat, causing the same to turn uncontrollably;
and it struck Medel in the forehead. He was given first aid treatment and immediately brought to the hospital.

Medel was repatriated to the Philippines on March 13, 1999 and was admitted to the Metropolitan Hospital on the said
date. Dr. Robert D. Lim, the company-designated physician examined Medel. Medel’s accident rendered him incapable of
performing his usual or customary work for more than 120 days.

Thus, Medel filed a complaint against Fair Shipping and Kohyu to recover his disability benefits. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
ruled in favor of Medel. However, the NLRC reversed the LA. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and ruled that
Medel is entitled to recover permanent total disability benefits.

Hence, this appeal. Fair Shipping and Kohyu argue that the 1996 POEA SEC does not state that the mere lapse of 120 days
automatically makes a seafarer permanently and totally disabled.

ISSUE: Is Medel entitled to recover permanent total disability benefits?

HELD: The application of the provisions of the Labor Code to the contracts of seafarers had long been settled by this
Court. In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, we emphatically declared that: “the standard employment
contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to secure the best terms
and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith and to promote and protect
the well-being of Filipino workers overseas. Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that “all rights and
obligations of the parties to the Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory.” The Labor Code
defines permanent total disability under Article 192(c)(1), which states: “the following disabilities shall be deemed total
and permanent-temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules.”

This concept of permanent total disability is further explained in Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book
IV of the Labor Code (Amended Rules on Employees Compensation) as follows: “a disability is total and permanent if as a
result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding
120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.”

In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., the Court discussed how the above-mentioned provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing rules should be read in conjunction with the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000
POEA SEC, which states: “upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.”

Unmistakably, from the time Medel signed off from the vessel on March 13, 1999 up to the time his fitness to work was
declared on February 11, 2000, more than eleven (11) months, or approximately 335 days, have lapsed. During this period,
Medel was totally unable to pursue his occupation as a seafarer. DENIED.

6)  BREW MASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. V NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU)

DAVIDE, JR; April 17, 1997

NATURE

A special civil action for certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC)
which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter by directing the reinstatement of private respondentAntonio D.
Estrada, the complainant, without loss of seniority rights and benefits.

FACTS

- Private respondent NAFLU, a co-complainant in the labor case, is a labor union of which complainant is amember.-
Complainant was first employed by Brew Master on 16 September 1991 as route helper with the latest daily wageof
P119.00.- From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a period of 1 month, complainant went on absent without
permission(AWOP).- On 20 May 1993, Brew master sent him a Memo: “Please explain in writing within 24 hours of your
receipt of thismemo why no disciplinary action should be taken against you for the following offense: You were absent
sinceApril 19, 1993 up to May 19, 1993.”- In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:“Sadahilanponaako
ay hindinakapagpaalamsainyodahilinuwikoangmgaanakkosa Samar dahilangasawakoaylumayas at walang mag-
aalagasamgaanakko. Kaya namanhindiakonaka long distance or telegramadahilwalaakongpera at ibinilikonggamot ay
puroutang pa.”- Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, the company issued a Notice of Termination: “...we regret to
inform youthat we do not consider it valid. You are aware of the company Rules and Regulations that absence without
permission for 6 consecutive working days is considered abandonment of work...”- Complainants contend that individual
complainant’s dismissal was done without just cause; that it was notsufficiently established that individual complainant’s
absence from April 19, 1993 to June 16, 1993 are unjustified;that the penalty of dismissal for such violation is too severe;
that in imposing such penalty, respondent should havetaken into consideration complainant’s length of service and as a
first offender, a penalty less punitive will sufficesuch as suspension for a definite period.- Upon the other hand,
respondent contends that individual complainant was dismissed for cause allowed by thecompany Rules and
Regulations and the Labor Code; that the act of complainant in absenting from work for 1month without official leave is
deleterious to the business of respondent; that it will result to stoppage of productionwhich will not only destructive to
respondent’s interests but also to the interest of its employees in general; that thedismissal of complainant from the
service is legal.- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing the principle of managerial control,
whichrecognizes the employer’s prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to govern the conduct of
hisemployees. He relied on

Shoemart, Inc. vs. NLRC

: “...that individual complainant has indeed abandoned his work...therefore, under the law and jurisprudence which
upholds the right of an employer to discharge an employee whoincurs frequent, prolonged and unexplained absences as
being grossly remiss in his duties to the employer and istherefore, dismissed for cause. An employee is deemed to have
abandoned his position or to have resigned from thesame, whenever he has been absent therefrom without previous
permission of the employer for three consecutivedays or more. “- the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's decision and
held that complainant’s dismissal was invalid for thefollowingreasons:Complainant-appellant’s prolonged absences,
although unauthorized, may not amount to gross neglect or abandonment of work to warrant outright termination of
employment. Dismissal is too severe a penalty...Relianceon the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoemart is quite
misplaced because of the obvious dissimilarities--complainant in the Shoemart Case was “an inveterate absentee who
does not deserve reinstatement” compared toherein complainant-appellant who is a first offender

ISSUE

WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter

HELD

NO

Ratio

a) Petitioner’s finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is misplaced. Abandonment as a just andvalid ground
for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment.Two elements must
then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason;and (2) a clear intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship. b) Verily, relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual.
They are impressed with public interestand labor contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.While the
employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees,these rules
and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable.

Reasoning

- complainant’s absence was precipitated by a grave family problem as his wife unexpectedly deserted him
andabandoned the family. Considering that he had a full-time job, there was no one to whom he could entrust
thechildren and he was thus compelled to bring them to the province. He was then under emotional,
psychological,spiritual and physical stress and strain. The reason for his absence is, under these circumstances, justified.
Whilehis failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an omission which must be corrected and chastised, he
didnot merit the severest penalty of dismissal from the service.- the elements of abandonment are not present here.
First, as held above, complainant's absence was justified under the circumstances. As to the second requisite,
complainant immediately complied with the memo requiring him toexplain his absence, and upon knowledge of his
termination, immediately sued for illegal dismissal. These plainlyrefuted any claim that he was no longer interested in
returning to work.- our Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights not only under a
generalstatement of a state policy, but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts
ona higher plane and with greater safeguards.- While we do not decide here the validity of petitioner's Rules and
Regulations on continuous, unauthorizedabsences, what is plain is that it was wielded with undue haste resulting in a
deprivation of due process, thus notallowing for a determination of just cause or abandonment. In this light, petitioner's
dismissal was illegal. This isnot to say that his absence should go unpunished, as impliedly noted by the NLRC in declining
to award back wages.

Disposition

petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED

BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. v. NAFLU

 
FACTS:  Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor union. He did not report for work
for 1 month due to a grave family problem as his wife deserted him and nobody was there to look after his
children. He was required to explain. Finding his reasons to be unjustified, the petitioner terminated him,
since according to company rules, absence for 6 consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.
 
ISSUE:  Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company rules?
 
HELD:  No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the
conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable. No less
than the Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights not only under a
general statement of a state policy but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing
labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between labor and capital
are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts must, perforce,
yield to the common good.

7) Mabeza vs. NLRC Case Digest

Norma Mabeza vs. NLRC, Peter Ng/Hotel Supreme 

271 SCRA 670

Facts: Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that on the first week of May 1991, she and her co-employees at the Hotel
Supreme in Baguio City were asked by the hotel's management to sign an instrument attesting to the latter's compliance
with minimum wage and other labor standard provisions of law. Petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City
Prosecutor's Office to swear to the veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. The affidavit was
nevertheless submitted on the same day to the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment in Baguio
City. 

The affidavit was drawn by management for the sole purpose of refuting findings of the Labor Inspector of DOLE
apparently adverse to the private respondent. After she refused to proceed to the City Prosecutor's Office, petitioner
states that she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her
belongings from the hotel premises. According to her, respondent strongly chided her for refusing to proceed to the City
Prosecutor's Office to attest to the affidavit. She thereafter reluctantly filed a leave of absence from her job which was
denied by management. When she attempted to return to work on May 1991, the hotel's cashier informed her that she
should not report to work and, instead, continue with her unofficial leave of absence. 

Consequently, three days after her attempt to return to work, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission — CAR Baguio City. In addition to her complaint for illegal
dismissal, she alleged underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay,
night differential and other benefits. 

Responding to the allegations for illegal dismissal, private respondent Peter Ng alleged before Labor Arbiter that petitioner
surreptitiously left her job without notice to the management and that she actually abandoned her work. He maintained
that there was no basis for the money claims for underpayment and other benefits as these were paid in the form of
facilities to petitioner and the hotel's other employees. 

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. On April 1994, respondent NLRC promulgated its assailed Resolution affirming the
Labor Arbiter's decision. 

Issue: Whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his
employee's right to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment constitutes unfair labor
practice. 

Ruling: The Court ruled that there was unfair labor practice. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an
instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with
the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme constitutes unfair labor
practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers to seek better terms and conditions of employment
through concerted action. For refusing to cooperate with the private respondent's scheme, petitioner was obviously held
up as an example to all of the hotel's employees, that they could only cause trouble to management at great personal
inconvenience. Implicit in the act of petitioner's termination and the subsequent filing of charges against her was the
warning that they would not only be deprived of their means of livelihood, but also possibly, their personal liberty. 
Granting that meals and lodging were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted
without the employer complying first with certain legal requirements. Without satisfying these requirements, the employer
simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages. First, proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily
furnished by the trade. Second, the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the
employee. Finally, facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value. These requirements were not met in the instant
case. 

More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water consumed by the petitioner were not facilities but
supplements. A benefit or privilege granted to an employee for the convenience of the employer is not a facility. The
criterion in making a distinction between the two not so much lies in the kind (food, lodging) but the purpose. Considering
that hotel workers are required to work different shifts and are expected to be available at various odd hours, their ready
availability is a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such as the private respondent's hotel.

8) G.R.
No. 128845 INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF
EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING 333 SCRA 13
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING

333 SCRA 13

G.R. No. 128845

June 1, 2000

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and  a salary rate 25% more than local hires based on “significant
economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference
in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. 

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the
grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity.

RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the
long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill,
effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal
work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or
why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the
salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.

9) TIRAZONA v. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO-SERVICE INC. (PET, Inc.)

January 20, 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J. | When to/not to tilt the scales of justice as a measure of equity and compassionate
social justice

Digester: Arreza, Jose Augusto

SUMMARY:Petitioner Tirazona was dismissed from service by Respondent PET, Inc. for her willful breach of trust
reposed upon her by her employer. The NLRC, CA, and SC all found her dismissal as justified. In her 2nd Motion for
Reconsideration, she prayed for the invalidation of her dismissal and for the award of separation pay for just causes on the
basis of equity. The SC denied her petition for lack of merit.

DOCTRINE:Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is
validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.

FACTS:

 Because of her improper handling of a situation involving a rank-and-file employee, officers/directors of

respondent PET, Inc. called the attention of petitioner Ma. WenelitaTirazona, the Administrative Manager
of respondent company. Claiming she was denied due process, she demanded Php 2M indemnity from PET
and its officers/directors. She also admitted to reading a confidential letter addressed to PET
officers/directors containing the legal opinion of the counsel of PET regarding her case. Because of all this,
she was validly terminated on the ground that she willfully breached the trust and confidence reposed in her
by her employed. The SC denied her original petition.
 Apr. 29, 2008: Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that her dismissal be declared illegal and that
she be awarded separation pay and retirement benefits out of humanitarian considerations. But the SC
denied MR.
 Aug. 21, 2008: Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration for the
reconsideration of the SC resolution raising essentially the same arguments and prayers.

RULING: Motion for leave to file a second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

W/N her dismissal was justified – YES

W/N she may be awarded separation pay out of humanitarian considerations – NO

 First of all, a 2nd MR is prohibited, except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons [Sec. 2, Rule 52, ROC].
Here, no extraordinary persuasive reasons are present to allow the 2nd MR.
 Next, as re petitioner’s dismissal, the general rule is that an employee who has been dismissed for any of the
just causes enumerated under Art. 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to separation pay. Only unjustly
dismissed employees are entitled to retirement benefits and other privileges including reinstatement and
backwages.
 An exception, however, is that separation pay or other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee
dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity. This shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character.
 Given the above, petitioner is not entitled to the award of separation pay for violating the trust and
confidence reposed in her by her employer when she arrogantly demanded from respondent the exorbitant
amount of Php 2M in damages with a threat of a lawsuit if the money was not paid within five days. She
also continually refused to cooperate with PET’s investigation of her case.
 Lastly, petitioner tried to persuade the Court to consider in her favor the length of her service to PET, but in
the end, failed. She claimed that she was employed by PET for 26 years. However, it was later on found out
that she had only been there for 2 years and 9 months.
 The cases she cited to support her case were misleading as the circumstances were totally different from
hers.

10) REYNALDO HAYAN MOYA VS FIRST SOLID RUBBER INDUSTRIES INC.

GR NO. 184011, SEPTEMBER 18, 2013

FACTS:

Reynaldo Moya was hired by respondent First Solid, a business engaged in manufacturing of tires and rubbers,
as a machine operator. He was promoted as head of the Tire Curing Department of the company. He reported an
incident about under curing of tires within his department which led to the damage of five tires. The incident was
investigated by the company which he was later required to explain. Upon explanation he stated that the damage was
caused by machine failure and the incident was without any fault of the operator. His employment was then terminated
by the company. As a result, he filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal against First Solid Rubber
Industries, Inc. And its President Edward Lee Sumulong. The company insisted on its right to validly dismiss an employee
in good faith if it has a reasonable ground to believe that its employee is responsible of misconduct, and the nature of
his participation therein renders him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.

ISSUE:

Does the termination from employment of Moya was valid on the ground of loss of trust and confidence?

LAW APPLICABLE:

ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;

XXX

RULING: Yes. The termination from employment of Moya was valid.

Moya was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He was holding a supervisory rank being an Officer-in-Charge
of the Tire Curing Department. The position, naturally one of trust, required of him abiding honesty as compared to
ordinary rank-and-file employees. When he made a false report attributing the damage of five tires to machine failure,
he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by the company.

It is a general principle of labor law to discourage interference with an employer’s judgment in the conduct of
his business. As already noted, even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it also recognizes
employer’s exercise of management prerogatives. As long as the company’s exercise of judgment is in good faith to
advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or
valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.
CASE HISTORY:

LA – Dismissal was valid. However, LA ruled that dismissal was too harsh as a penalty.

NLRC – Affirmed

CA – Deleted the award on separation pay.

OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. The law is clear in providing for the valid grounds of termination
of employment of the employer. Article 282 of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an
employment if there is a serious misconduct or wilful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
or representative in connection with his work. Moya, was holding a supervisory rank being an OIC of the Tire Curing
Department. When he made the false report regarding the incident, it was indeed a loss of trust and confidence of the
employer. As to the award of the separation pay of Moya, I agree with the Supreme Court in holding that he is not
entitled for such separation pay. Although the State upholds the principle of social justice, it cannot be used as a defense
by the party at fault which is Moya as the principle is not intended to condone the wrongdoing of the employee.

11) 4. FUENTES, ET AL VS NLRC

FACTS:

Petitioners were regular employees of private respondent Agusan Plantations, Inc., which was engaged in the operation
of a palm tree plantation in Trento, Agusandel Sur, since September 1982. Claiming that it was suffering business losses
which resulted in the decision of the head office in Singapore to undertake retrenchment measures, private respondent
sent notices of termination to petitioners and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).On 31 October 1990
petitioners filed with the DOLE office in Cagayan de Oro City a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement, backwages and damages against private respondent Agusan Plantation, Inc., and/or Chang Chee Kong.

Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 27 May 1992 in favor of petitioners ordering private respondents to pay the former
separation pay equivalent to fifteen (15) days pay for every year of service plus salary differentials and attorney's fees.

On appeal by respondents to the National Labor Relations Commission, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed
on 27 November 1992.

ISSUE:

NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioners were legally
terminated from their employment

RULINGS:

Under Art. 283 therefore retrenchment may be valid only when the following requisites are met: (a) it is to prevent
losses; (b) written notices were served on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least
one (1) month before the effective date of retrenchment; and, (c) separation pay is paid to the affected workers.

There is no question that an employer may reduce its work force to prevent losses. However, these losses must be
serious, actual and real.[3] Otherwise, this ground for termination of employment would be susceptible to abuse by
scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees.[4]

Indeed, private respondents failed to prove their claim of business losses. What they submitted to the Labor Arbiter
were mere self-serving documents and allegations. Private respondents never adduced evidence which would show
clearly the extent of losses they suffered as a result of lack of capital funding, which failure is fatal to their cause.We
agree with the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that the termination of the services of petitioners was illegal as there was
no valid retrenchment. Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of the Labor
Arbiter and ruling that there was substantial compliance with the law. This Court firmly holds that measures should be
strictly implemented to ensure that such constitutional mandate on protection to labor is not rendered meaningless by
an erroneous interpretation of applicable laws.

12) Capilivs NLRC

FACTS

Herein respondents are licensed drivers of public utility jeepneys and for the use of it for twelve hours they would pay
rent or so-called "boundary" per day. Upon assumption of ownership of said jeepneys by herein petitioners Capili, they
and the other drivers similarly situated were required to sign individually contracts of lease of the jeepneys to formalize
their lessor-lessee relationship. However, having gathered the impression that the signing of the contracts of lease was a
condition precedent before they could continue driving for petitioners, all the drivers stopped plying their assigned
routes. A complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter praying not for reinstatement but for separation pay.
Petitioners opposed the claim of private respondents before the Labor Arbiter alleging that the latter voluntarily
abandoned their respective jobs without any valid cause. The Labor Arbiter ruled that it was just a m i s u n d e r s t a n d
i n g a n d m i s a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the situation by both parties and, therefore and directed to reinstate the drivers to
their former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, but without back wages. Upon appeal before
the NLRC, the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the case arose due to simple misunderstanding was upheld but ordered
the payment of their separation pay. The Capilis contended that since there was a clear finding of abandonment by the
Labor Arbiter consisting in the failure of private respondents to report for work without justifiable reason, the award of
separation pay could not be warranted.

ISSUE:

Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in awarding separation pay to private respondents

DECISION.

The NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in awarding separation pay to private respondents. In the instant case
there was no dismissal at all. Respondent NLRC affirmed the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter that there was only a
misunderstanding between petitioners and private respondents which caused the latter to stop reporting for work. The
award of separation pay cannot be justified solely because of the existence of "strained relations" between the
employer and the employee. It must be given to the employee only as an alternative to reinstatement emanating from
illegal dismissal. When there is no illegal dismissal, even if the relations are strained, separation pay has no legal basis.
Besides, the doctrine on "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately since every labor dispute almost
invariably results in "strained relations;" otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is
engendered between the parties as a result of their disagreement.

13) G.R. No. 191281 : December 5, 2012

BEST WEAR GARMENTS and/or WARREN PARDILLA, Petitioners, v. ADELAIDA B. DE LEMOS and
CECILE M. OCUBILLO, Respondents.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Respondents Adelaida De Lemos and Cecile Ocubillo were employees of Best Wear Garments (Best Wear) owned by
Warren Pardilla. In 2004, De Lemos and Ocubillo filed a case for illegal dismissal. Both alleged that they were arbitrarily
transferred to other areas of operation of Pardilla’s garments company, which they said amounted to constructive
dismissal as it resulted in less earnings for them. They also claimed that the reason for their transfer is their refusal to
render overtime work until 7:00 p.m.

Best wear countered that De Lemos and Ocubillo are piece-rate workers and hence they are not paid according to the
number of hours worked. Best Wear also averred that the two were not illegally terminated; rather, they were the ones
who resigned.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that De Lemos and Ocubillo were constructively dismissed from employment. On appeal, the
NLRC found no basis for the charge of constructive dismissal. Aggrieved, De Lemos and Ocubillo appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The CA reinstated the LA’s decision. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that De Lemos and Ocubillo were constructively dismissed?

HELD: De Lemos and Ocubillo were not constructively dismissed.

LABOR LAW: transfer; management prerogative; piece-rate workers

The right of employees to security of tenure does not give them vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving
management of its prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer them. Thus, an employer may transfer or assign
employees from one office or area of operation to another, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary,
benefits, and other privileges, and the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of
punishment or demotion without sufficient cause.

Being piece-rate workers assigned to individual sewing machines, their earnings depended on the quality and quantity of
finished products. That their work output might have been affected by the change in their specific work assignments does
not necessarily imply that any resulting reduction in pay is tantamount to constructive dismissal. Workers under piece-
rate employment have no fixed salaries and their compensation is computed on the basis of accomplished tasks. The
constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy management. While the
Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed
that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights which are entitled
to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Thus, where management prerogative to transfer employees
is validly exercised, as in this case, courts will decline to interfere.

Petition is GRANTED.

14) G.R. No. 164856 January 20, 2009

JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:
An administrative charge was filed by PAL against its employees-herein petitioners after they were allegedly caught in
the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical
Center’s Toolroom Section. After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline,
prompting them to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages which was resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their
favor, thus ordering PAL to immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision. Prior to the promulgation
of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, the SEC placed PAL which was suffering from severe financial losses. From the Labor
Arbiter’s decision, PAL appealed to the NLRC which reversed said decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioners’
complaint for lack of merit. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied and Entry of Judgment was issued.
Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution respecting the reinstatement aspect of his decision, and he
issued a Notice of Garnishment. PAL thereupon moved to quash the Writ and to lift the Notice while petitioners moved
to release the garnished amount. In a related move, PAL filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the NLRC which
affirmed the validity of the Writ and the Notice issued by the Labor Arbiter but suspended and referred the action to the
Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action. PAL elevated the matter to the appellate court which reversed the NLRC’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not a subsequent finding of a valid dismissal removes the basis for implementing the reinstatement
aspect of a labor arbiter’s decision? and
(2) whether or not the impossibility to comply with the reinstatement order due to corporate rehabilitation provides a
reasonable justification for the failure to exercise the options under Article 223 of the Labor Code?

HELD:
Since petitioners’ claim against PAL is a money claim for their wages during the pendency of PAL’s appeal to the NLRC,
this should have been suspended pending the rehabilitation proceedings. It was then suspended while ongoing
rehabilitation. In view of the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings, the Court now proceeds to resolve the
remaining issue for consideration.
As to the first issue, the court held that a subsequent finding of a valid dismissal removes the basis for implementing the
reinstatement aspect of a labor arbiter’s decision.
Based on jurisprudential trend applying par 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code which provides that “In any event, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided
herein.” The view as maintained in a number of cases is that “Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.” On the other hand, if the employee has been
reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required
to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the
period. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even
pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative
intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To
require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement
award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223. The reason is simple.

As to the second issue, the Court held that the peculiar predicament of a corporate rehabilitation rendered it impossible
for respondent to exercise its option under the circumstances. The spirit of the rule on reinstatement pending appeal
animates the proceedings once the Labor Arbiter issues the decision containing an order of reinstatement.
Reinstatement pending appeal necessitates its immediate execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to
serve its noble purpose. At the same time, any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution,
should not be countenanced. After the labor arbiter’s decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be
barred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal
was without fault on the part of the employer. The new NLRC Rules of Procedure, now require the employer to submit a
report of compliance within 10 calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, disobedience to which clearly
denotes a refusal to reinstate. It is apparent that there was inaction on the part of respondent to reinstate them, but
whether such omission was justified depends on the onset of the exigency of corporate rehabilitation. It is settled that
upon appointment by the SEC of a rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims before any court, tribunal or board
against the corporation shall ipso jure be suspended. Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the
implementation of the order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory. This injunction or suspension of claims by
legislative fiat partakes of the nature of a restraining order that constitutes a legal justification for respondent’s
noncompliance with the reinstatement order. Respondent’s failure to exercise the alternative options of actual
reinstatement and payroll reinstatement was thus justified. Such being the case, respondent’s obligation to pay the
salaries pending appeal, as the normal effect of the non-exercise of the options, did not attach.

15) JAMER v. NLRC

FACTS:  Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who were dismissed for having accumulated
shortages. Petitioners admitted this in their affidavits. The labor arbiter ruled them having been illegally
dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling.
 
ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?
 
HELD:  Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the management the irregularities constitute "fraud
or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized representative"--one of
the just causes of valid termination of employment. The employer cannot be compelled to retain
employees who were guilty of malfeasance as their continued employment will be prejudicial to the
former's best interest. The law, in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression
nor self-destruction of the employer.

16) G.R. No. 168120 : January 25, 2012

MANSION PRINTING CENTER and CLEMENT CHENG, Petitioners, v. DIOSDADO BITARA, JR.,
Respondent.

PEREZ,J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners engaged the services of respondent as a helper (kargador). Respondent was later promoted as the companys
sole driver tasked to pick-up raw materials for the printing business, collect account receivables and deliver the products
to the clients within the delivery schedules.

Petitioners aver that the timely delivery of the products to the clients is one of the foremost considerations material to the
operation of the business.It being so, they closely monitored the attendance of respondent. They noted his habitual
tardiness and absenteeism.

Thus, petitioners issued a Memorandumrequiring respondent to submit a written explanation why no administrative
sanction should be imposed on him for his habitual tardiness.

Despite respondents undertaking to report on time, however, he continued to disregard attendance policies.

Consequently, Davis Cheng, General Manager of the company and son of petitioner Cheng, issued another
Memorandum(Notice to Explain) requiring respondent to explain why his services should not be terminated. He
personally handed the Notice to Explain to respondent but the latter, after reading the directive, refused to acknowledge
receipt thereof.He did not submit any explanation and, thereafter, never reported for work.

Davis Cheng personally served another Memorandum(Notice of Termination) upon him informing him that the company
found him grossly negligent of his duties, for which reason, his services were terminated.

On even date, respondent met with the management requesting for reconsideration of his termination from the service.
However, after hearing his position, the management decided to implement the Memorandum. Nevertheless, the
management, out of generosity, offered respondent financial assistance in the amount ofP6,110.00 equivalent to his one
month salary. Respondent demanded that he be given the amount equivalent to two (2) months salary but the
management declined as it believed it would, in effect, reward respondent for being negligent of his duties.

Respondent filed a complaintfor illegal dismissal against the petitioners before the Labor Arbiter.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, the findings of the Labor Arbiter wasAFFIRMEDentoto.

Before the Court of Appeals, respondent sought the annulment of the Commissions Resolution on the ground that they
were rendered with grave abuse of discretion and/or without or in excess of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals found for the respondent and reversed the findings of the Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is illegally dismissed?

HELD: NLRC's decision is reinstated.

LABOR LAW
In order to validly dismiss an employee, the employer is required to observe both substantive and procedural aspects the
termination of employment must be based on a just or authorized cause of dismissal and the dismissal must be effected
after due notice and hearing.

We, therefore, agree with the Labor Arbiters findings, to wit:

The imputed absence and tardiness of the complainant are documented. He faltered on his attendance 38 times of the 66
working days. His last absences on 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16 March 2000 were undertaken without even notice/permission
from management. These attendance delinquencies may be characterized as habitual and are sufficient justifications to
terminate the complainants employment.

On this score,Valiao v. Court of Appealsis instructive:

xxx It bears stressing that petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated incidents but manifested a pattern of
habituality. xxx The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be
considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by him should not
be taken singly and separately but in their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into
tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate and independent of each other.

InValiao,wedefinedgrossnegligenceas want of care in the performance of ones dutiesandhabitualneglectas repeated failure

to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.51 These are not overly technical terms,
which, in the first place, are expressly sanctioned by the Labor Code of the Philippines, to wit:

ART. 282.Termination by employer.- An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) xxx
(b)Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
xxx
Clearly, even in the absence of a written company rule defining gross and habitual neglect of duties, respondents
omissions qualify as such warranting his dismissal from the service.

We cannot simply tolerate injustice to employers if only to protect the welfare of undeserving employees. As aptly put by
then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing:

Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in the workplace, and it is within the
managements prerogative xxx to terminate his employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it
must also protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the
companys exercise of those rights and prerogative is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.

Procedural due process entails compliance with the two-notice rule in dismissing an employee, to wit: (1) the employer
must inform the employee of the specific acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) after the employee
has been given the opportunity to be heard, the employer must inform him of the decision to terminate his employment.

REMANDED

17)
GANDARA MILL SUPPLY v. NLRC

FACTS:  Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife delivered their first
child. He did not however notify his employer, causing a disruption in the business of the latter. When the
respondent returned to work he was surprised upon knowing that someone has been hired to take his
place.
 
ISSUE:  Was there a case of illegal dismissal?
 
HELD:  Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged absence without
leave may constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems from the non-observance of due
process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where dismissal was not preceded by the twin
requirement of notice and hearing, the illegality of the dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and
therefore illegal.

SHORTCUTS:

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER (CMC) v. MERIS,

 
FACTS:  Petitioner closed its industrial service unit due to alleged loss and extinct demand resulting to the
termination of the employment of the respondent. The latter filed an illegal dismissal case but the same
was denied by the labor arbiter, and subsequently by the NLRC contending that the same is part of the
management prerogative.
 
ISSUE:  Has employer the right to close its business even without basis resulting to the displacement of
the worker?
 
HELD:  No. Employers are also accorded with rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and
independence and reasonable return of capital. This mass of privileges is called management prerogatives.
Although they may be broad and unlimited in scope, the State has the right to determine whether an
employer's privilege is exercised in a manner that complies with the legal requirements and does not
offend the protected rights of labor.
 
 
BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. v. NAFLU
 
FACTS:  Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor union. He did not report for work
for 1 month due to a grave family problem as his wife deserted him and nobody was there to look after his
children. He was required to explain. Finding his reasons to be unjustified, the petitioner terminated him,
since according to company rules, absence for 6 consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.
 
ISSUE:  Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company rules?
 
HELD:  No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the
conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable. No less
than the Constitution looks with compassion on the workingman and protects his rights not only under a
general statement of a state policy but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing
labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between labor and capital
are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts must, perforce,
yield to the common good.
 
 
JAMER v. NLRC

FACTS:  Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who were dismissed for having accumulated
shortages. Petitioners admitted this in their affidavits. The labor arbiter ruled them having been illegally
dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling.
 
ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?
 
HELD:  Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the management the irregularities constitute "fraud
or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized representative"--one of
the just causes of valid termination of employment. The employer cannot be compelled to retain
employees who were guilty of malfeasance as their continued employment will be prejudicial to the
former's best interest. The law, in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression
nor self-destruction of the employer.
 
 
GANDARA MILL SUPPLY v. NLRC

FACTS:  Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife delivered their first
child. He did not however notify his employer, causing a disruption in the business of the latter. When the
respondent returned to work he was surprised upon knowing that someone has been hired to take his
place.
 
ISSUE:  Was there a case of illegal dismissal?
 
HELD:  Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged absence without
leave may constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems from the non-observance of due
process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where dismissal was not preceded by the twin
requirement of notice and hearing, the illegality of the dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and
therefore illegal.
 
 
GARCIA v. PAL, GR 164856, Jan. 20, 2009

FACTS: PAL filed an administrative case against Garcia and Dumago after they were allegedly caught
sniffing shabu at the PAL Tool Room. After due notice, they were dismissed for transgressing the PAL Code
of Discipline. The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of
petitioners with an immediate reinstatement. A writ was issued to such effect pending appeal with the
NLRC.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners collect wages on the period of appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s order up to the
final decision of the higher court?

HELD: Yes. The State forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force.
In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently
overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal. Therefore, the petitioners can collect wages from
the period of the execution of the decision of the labor arbiter to the time of the final decision of the
higher court.

TIRAZONA v. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO-SERVICE (PET) INC

FACTS: The petitioner, a managerial employee who was holding a position of trust and confidence, was
admonished by the latter of her improper handling of a situation involving a rank-and-file employee. She
admitted having read a supposed confidential letter for the PET directors containing a  legal opinion of the
respondent's counsel regarding the status of her employment. As a consequence, she was terminated for
willful breach of trust reposed upon by her employer. She claimed having been denied of due process.
 
ISSUE: Was her dismissal justified?
 
HELD: Yes. The petitioner has given the respondent more than enough reasons to distrust her. The
arrogance and hostility she has shown towards the company her stubborn uncompromising stance in
almost all  instances justify the company's termination of her employment.

MABEZA v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997

FACTS: The petitioner and her co-employees were asked by their employer to sign an instrument attesting
to the latter’s compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provision, and that they have no
complaints against the management. The petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City’s
Prosecutor’s Office to confirm the veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management.
That same day she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and
to remove her belongings in the hotel’s premises. She then filed a leave of absence which was denied by
her employer. She attempted to return to work but the hotel’s cashier told her that she should not report
to work and instead continue with her unofficial leave of absence. The management defended upon a
ground of loss of confidence.
 
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the petitioner valid?
 
HELD:  No. The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is
alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or
coercion, against his employee’s right to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of
employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the
employer observed labor standard provisions of the law when he might not have, together with the act of
terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employers’ scheme constitutes unfair labor
practice.