REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.917­944     OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(Criminal) Nos. 4948­4975/2019

Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S.Deswal 
and others …Appellants
versus

Virender Gandhi …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

Leave granted.

2. As common question of law and facts arise in this group of

appeals   and,   as   such,   all   these   appeals,   arise   out   of   the

impugned   common   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High

Court,   are   being   decided   and   disposed   of   together   by   this

common judgment and order.

3. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

common order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana

at   Chandigarh,   by   which   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the

respective   revision   applications   and   has   confirmed   the   order

Signature Not Verified

passed by the first appellate court – learned Additional Sessions
Digitally signed by
SANJAY KUMAR
Date: 2019.05.29
16:03:26 IST
Reason:

Judge,   Panchkula,   directing   the   appellants   herein   –   original

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appellants   –   original   accused  to  deposit   25%  of  the   amount  of

compensation, in view of the provisions of amended Act No. 20 of

2018   in   Section   148   of   the   Negotiable   Instruments   Act,   1881

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘N.I. Act’), the original appellants –

original accused have preferred the present appeals.

4. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as

under:

That criminal complaints were filed against the appellants

herein – original accused for the offence under Section 138 of the

N.I.   Act.     That  the   said   criminal  complaints  were filed prior  to

2.8.2018. That the learned trial Court vide judgment and order

dated 30.10.2018 convicted the appellants for the offence under

Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act   and   sentenced   them   to   undergo

imprisonment of two years and to pay cheque amount + 1% as

interest and litigation expenses as fine.

4.1 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   order   of

conviction   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court,   convicting   the

appellants – original accused for the offence under Section 138 of

the N.I. Act and the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court,

the appellants – original accused have preferred criminal appeals

before   the   first   appellate   Court   –   learned   Additional   Sessions

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Judge, Panchkula.  In the said appeals, the appellants – original

accused   submitted   application/s   under   Section   389   of   the   Cr.

P.C.   for   suspension   of   sentence   and   releasing   them   on   bail,

pending appeal/s.

4.2 That considering the provisions of amended Section 148 of

the   N.I.   Act,   which   has   been   amended   by   Amendment  Act   No.

20/2018,   which   came   into   force   w.e.f.   1.9.2018,   the   first

appellate Court, while suspending the sentence and allowing the

application/s   under   Section   389   of   the   Cr.P.C,   directed   the

appellants   to  deposit   25% of  the amount  of compensation/fine

awarded by the learned trial Court.

4.3 Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the learned first

appellate Court – learned Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula

directing the appellants – original accused – original appellants to

deposit 25% of the amount of compensation/fine awarded by the

learned   trial   Court,   pending   appeal   challenging   the   order   of

conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial Court, the

appellants approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at

Chandigarh by way of revision application/s.

4.4 It was the case on behalf of the appellants that Section 148

of   the   N.I.   Act,   as   amended   by   Act   No.   20/2018,   shall   not   be

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applicable with respect to criminal proceedings already initiated

prior to the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act.

4.5 The High Court by a detailed judgment and order has not

accepted the aforesaid contention and has dismissed the revision

application/s and has confirmed the order passed by the learned

first   appellate   Court   –   learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge,

Panchkula directing the appellants ­ original appellants­original

accused to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation awarded

by the learned trial Court considering Section 148 of the N.I. Act,

as amended.

4.6 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

common   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in

dismissing the revision application/s and confirming the order/s

passed   by   the   learned   first   appellate   Court   directing   the

appellants – original appellants – original accused to deposit 25%

of   the   amount   of   compensation   awarded   by   the   learned   trial

Court under Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as amended, the original

appellants – original accused have preferred the present appeals.

5. Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Advocate has appeared

on   behalf   of   the   appellants   –   original   appellants   –   original

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accused and Shri Alok Sangwan, learned Advocate has appeared

on behalf of the original complainant.

5.1 Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf   of   the   appellants   has   vehemently   submitted   that   in   the

present  case,  both,  the  High Court as well as the learned first

appellate Court have materially erred in directing the appellants

to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation as per Section 148

of the N.I. Act, as amended.

5.2 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Senior Advocate

appearing on behalf of the appellants that in the present case as

the criminal proceedings were initiated and the complaints were

filed against the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the

N.I. Act, prior to the amendment Act came into force, Section 148

of the N.I.Act, as amended shall not be applicable.  

5.3 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate

appearing on behalf of the appellants that the legal proceedings,

whether civil or criminal, are to be decided on the basis of the law

applicable   on   the   date   of   the   filing   of   the   suit   or   alleged

commission of offence by the trial Court or the appellate Court,

unless   the   law   is   amended   expressly   with   retrospective   effect,

subject  to   the   provisions   of   Article  20(1)  of  the   Constitution  of

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India.     In   support   of   his   above   submission,   learned   Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has heavily relied

upon   the   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Garikapatti

Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, reported in AIR 1957 SC 540;

and   Videocon   International   Limited   v.   Securities   and   Exchange

Board of India, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 33.

5.4 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate

appearing on behalf of the appellants that even otherwise in the

present case, the first appellate Court has interpreted the word

“may” as “shall” in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and proceeded on

the basis that it is mandatory for the appellate Court to direct

deposit of minimum of 25% of the fine or compensation awarded

by the trial Court for suspension of sentence.

5.5 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate

appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   the   first   appellate

Court heavily relied upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana

High Court in the case of M/s Ginni Garments and another v. M/s

Sethi Garments (CRR No. 9872 of 2018, decided on 04.04.2019),

in which it was held that the appellate Court continues to have

discretion as to the condition to be imposed or not to be imposed

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for suspension of sentence and it was further held that however

in case discretion is exercised to suspend the sentence subject to

payment of compensation/fine, such order must commensurate

with Section 148 of the N.I. Act.  It is submitted, however, in the

present case, the appellate Court did not exercise discretion and

proceeded on the assumption that it is mandatory to deposit 25%

of   the   fine   or   compensation   as   a   condition   for   suspension   of

sentence. It is submitted that therefore the High Court ought to

have remanded the matter back to the appellate Court to decide

on the question of suspension of sentence as per the decision in

the case of M/s Ginni Garments (supra).

5.6 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate

appearing on behalf of the appellants that a similar view is taken

by   the   Bombay   High   Court   in   the   case   of  Ajay   Vinodchandra

Shah v. The State of Maharashtra (Criminal Writ Petition No. 258

of 2019).   It is submitted that in the said decision, the Bombay

High Court has also observed and held that as per Section 148 of

the N.I. Act as amended, the appellate Court has the discretion to

direct deposit the sum pending appeal, but if at all such direction

is given, that sum shall not be less than 20% of the amount of

fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court.  It is submitted
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that in the present case, the appellate Court wrongly presumed

that   the   requirement   under   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   is   the

deposit of 25% of the fine or compensation.

5.7 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate

appearing on behalf of the appellants that in the present case the

learned trial Court imposed the fine under Section 138 of the N.I.

Act, equal to the amount of cheque plus 1%.  It is submitted that

as per Section 357(2) of the Cr.P.C., no such fine is payable till

the decision of the appeal.  It is submitted that therefore also the

first appellate Court ought not to have passed any order directing

the   appellants   to   deposit   25%   of   the   amount   of

fine/compensation,  pending  appeal/s.   In support of his above

submission, learned Senior Counsel has heavily relied upon the

decision of this Court in the case of  Dilip S. Dhanukar v. Kotak

Mahindra Bank, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 528.

5.8 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the

aforesaid decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeals and

quash   and   set   aside   the   impugned   order   passed   by   the   first

appellate   court,   confirmed   by   the   High   Court,   by   which   the

appellants   are   directed   to   deposit   25%   of   the   amount   of

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compensation   considering   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   as

amended.

6. While   opposing   the   present   appeals,   Shri   Alok   Sangwan,

learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original complainant

has   vehemently   submitted   that   the   order   passed   by   the   first

appellate   Court   directing   the   appellants   to   deposit   25%   of   the

amount   of   compensation/fine   pending   appeal   and   while

suspending  the   sentence   imposed by the learned trial Court is

absolutely   in   consonance     with   the   Statement   of   Objects   and

Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act.   It is

submitted   that   having   found   that   because   of   delay   tactics     of

unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing

of   appeals   and   obtaining   stay   on   proceedings,   the   object   and

purpose of N.I. Act was being frustrated and having found that

due to such delay tactics, injustice is caused to the payee of a

dishonoured   cheque   who   has   to   spend   considerable   time   and

resources in court proceedings to realize the value of the cheque,

the Parliament thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act,

which   confers   powers   on   the  first  appellate  court   to   direct  the

appellant   (the   convict  for  the offence under  Section  138 of the

N.I. Act) to deposit such sum which shall be minimum of 20% of

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the   fine   or   compensation   awarded   by   the   trial   court.     It   is

submitted   that   therefore   the   High   Court  has  rightly   refused  to

interfere with the order passed by the first appellate court, which

was just in consonance with the provisions of Section 148 of the

N.I. Act as amended.

6.1 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on

behalf of the original complainant that the submission on behalf

of the appellants – original accused that Section 148 of the N.I.

Act would not be made applicable retrospectively and shall not be

applicable to the appeals arising out of the criminal proceedings

which   were   initiated   much   prior   to   the   amendment   in   Section

148 of the N.I. Act is concerned, it is vehemently submitted that

the aforesaid submission has no substance.  It is submitted that

first of all amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act is procedural

in nature and therefore there is no question of applying the same

retrospectively.   It is submitted that as such no vested right of

the appeal of the appellants has been taken away or affected by

amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act.  It is submitted that in

the present case, admittedly, the appeals were preferred after the

amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act came into force and

therefore   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act,   as   amended,   is   rightly

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invoked/applied   by   the   learned   first   appellate   Court.     It   is

submitted that therefore the amendment so brought in the Act by

insertion of Section 148     of the N.I. Act is purely procedural in

nature and not substantive and does not affect the vested rights

of   the   appellants,   as   such,   the   same   can   have   a   retrospective

effect and can be applied in the present case also.

6.2 Now so far as the reliance placed on Section 357(2) of the

Cr.P.C.   and   the   submission   of   the   learned   Senior   Advocate

appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   in   view   of   Section

357(2) of the Cr.P.C., fine during the pendency of the appeal is

not recoverable is concerned, it is vehemently submitted that in

the present case in Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, it is

specifically   stated   that   “Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973…..”.   It is submitted that

therefore   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   as   amended   shall   be

applicable and it is always open for the appellate court to direct

deposit  of   such  sum,   but  not  less than  20%  of the  amount  of

compensation/fine imposed by the learned trial court.

6.3 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the

present appeals.

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7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties

at length.

7.1 The short question which is posed for consideration before

this   Court   is,   whether   the   first   appellate   court   is   justified   in

directing   the   appellants   –   original   accused   who   have   been

convicted   for   the   offence   under   Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act   to

deposit 25% of the amount of compensation/fine imposed by the

learned   trial   Court,   pending   appeals   challenging   the   order   of

conviction   and   sentence   and   while   suspending   the   sentence

under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C., considering Section 148 of the

N.I. Act as amended? 

7.2 While   considering   the   aforesaid   issue/question,   the

Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section

148 of the N.I. Act, as amended by way of Amendment Act No.

20/2018   and   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   as   amended,   are

required to be referred to and considered, which read as under:

“The   Negotiable   Instruments   Act,   1881   (the   Act)

was enacted to define and amend the law relating
to   Promissory   Notes,   Bills   of   Exchange   and
Cheques.   The   said   Act   has   been   amended   from
time   to   time   so   as   to   provide,   inter   alia,   speedy
disposal   of   cases   relating   to   the   offence   of
dishonour   of   cheques.   However,   the   Central
Government   has   been   receiving   several
representations   from   the   public   including   trading

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community   relating   to   pendency   of   cheque
dishonour cases. This is because of delay tactics of
unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due
to   easy   filing   of   appeals   and   obtaining   stay   on
proceedings. As a result of this, injustice is caused
to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to
spend   considerable   time   and   resources   in   court
proceedings   to   realize   the   value   of   the   cheque.
Such   delays   compromise   the   sanctity   of   cheque
transactions. 

2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a view
to   address   the   issue   of   undue   delay   in   final
resolution   of   cheque   dishonour   cases   so   as   to
provide   relief   to   payees   of   dishonoured   cheques
and   to   discourage   frivolous   and   unnecessary
litigation  which  would  save  time  and money. The
proposed   amendments   will   strengthen   the
credibility of cheques and help trade and commerce
in   general   by   allowing   lending   institutions,
including banks, to continue to extend financing to
the productive sectors of the economy. 

3.   It   is,   therefore,   proposed   to   introduce   the

Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Bill, 2017 to
provide, inter alia, for the following, namely:— 

(i)        to insert a new section 143A in the said Act
to provide that the Court trying an offence under
section 138, may order the drawer of the cheque to
pay interim compensation to the complainant, in a
summary   trial   or   a   summons   case,   where   he
pleads   not   guilty   to   the   accusation   made   in   the
complaint; and in any other case, upon framing of
charge. The interim compensation so payable shall
be such sum not exceeding twenty per cent of the
amount of the cheque; and 

(ii) to insert a new section 148 in the said Act
so as to provide  that in an appeal by the drawer
against conviction under Section 138, the Appellate

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Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum
which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the
fine or compensation awarded by the trial court. 

4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.”

‘‘148.  Power   to   Appellate   Court   to   order

payment   pending   appeal   against   conviction....
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (2   of   1974),   in   an
appeal   by   the   drawer   against   conviction   under
section   138,   the   Appellate   Court   may   order   the
appellant   to   deposit   such   sum   which   shall   be   a
minimum   of   twenty   per   cent   of   the   fine   or
compensation awarded by the trial Court: 

Provided   that   the  amount   payable  under  this

sub­section   shall   be   in   addition   to   any   interim
compensation paid by the appellant under section
143A. 

(2)   The   amount   referred   to   in   sub­section   (1)

shall be deposited within sixty days from the date
of   the   order,   or   within   such   further   period   not
exceeding   thirty   days   as   may   be   directed   by   the
Court   on   sufficient   cause   being   shown   by   the
appellant. 

(3) The Appellate Court may direct the release
of   the   amount   deposited   by   the   appellant   to   the
complainant   at   any   time   during   the   pendency   of
the appeal: 

Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the
Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the
appellant the amount so released, with interest at
the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of
India,   prevalent   at   the   beginning   of   the   relevant
financial   year,   within   sixty   days  from   the   date  of
the   order,   or   within   such   further   period   not

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 exceeding   thirty   days   as   may   be   directed   by   the
Court   on   sufficient   cause   being   shown   by   the
complainant.’’

8. It is the case on behalf of the appellants that as the criminal

complaints against the appellants under Section 138 of the N.I.

Act were lodged/filed before the amendment Act No. 20/2018 by

which   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   came   to   be   amended   and

therefore amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act shall not be made

applicable.   However, it is required to be noted that at the time

when the appeals against the conviction of the appellants for the

offence   under   Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act   were   preferred,

Amendment Act No. 20/2018 amending Section 148 of the N.I.

Act came into force w.e.f. 1.9.2018.  Even, at the time when the

appellants   submitted   application/s   under   Section   389   of   the

Cr.P.C. to suspend the sentence pending appeals challenging the

conviction   and   sentence,   amended   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act

came   into   force   and   was   brought   on   statute   w.e.f.   1.9.2018.

Therefore, considering the object and purpose of amendment in

Section 148 of the N.I. Act and while suspending the sentence in

exercise   of  powers  under   Section 389 of the Cr.P.C., when the

first appellate court directed the appellants to deposit 25% of the

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amount   of   fine/compensation   as   imposed   by   the   learned   trial

Court, the same can be said to be absolutely in consonance with

the Statement of Objects and Reasons of amendment in Section

148 of the N.I. Act.

8.1 Having observed and found that because of the delay tactics

of   unscrupulous   drawers   of   dishonoured   cheques   due   to   easy

filing   of   appeals   and   obtaining   stay   on   proceedings,   the   object

and purpose of the enactment of Section 138 of the N.I. Act was

being   frustrated,   the   Parliament   has   thought   it   fit   to   amend

Section 148 of the N.I. Act, by which the first appellate Court, in

an appeal challenging the order of conviction under Section 138

of the N.I. Act, is conferred with the power to direct the convicted

accused   –   appellant   to   deposit   such   sum   which   shall   be   a

minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial

Court.     By   the   amendment   in   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act,   it

cannot be said that any vested right of appeal of the accused –

appellant   has   been   taken   away   and/or   affected.     Therefore,

submission   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   amendment   in

Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   shall   not   be   made   applicable

retrospectively   and   more   particularly   with   respect   to

cases/complaints filed prior to 1.9.2018 shall not be applicable

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has no substance and cannot be accepted, as by amendment in

Section  148  of the  N.I. Act, no substantive right of appeal has

been taken away and/or affected.  Therefore the decisions of this

Court in the cases of  Garikapatti Veeraya (supra) and Videocon

International   Limited   (supra),  relied   upon   by   the   learned   senior

counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   shall   not   be

applicable   to   the   facts   of   the   case   on   hand.     Therefore,

considering   the   Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   of   the

amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act stated hereinabove, on

purposive   interpretation   of   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act   as

amended, we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the N.I. Act as

amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the

order   of   conviction   and   sentence   for   the   offence   under   Section

138 of the N.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints

for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior to

amendment Act No. 20/2018 i.e., prior to 01.09.2018. If such a

purposive interpretation is not adopted,  in that case, the object

and purpose of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act would

be frustrated.   Therefore, as such, no error has been committed

by   the   learned   first   appellate   court   directing   the   appellants   to

deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by

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the learned trial Court considering Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as

amended.

9. Now so far  as  the  submission on behalf of the appellants

that  even  considering  the  language used in Section 148 of  the

N.I.   Act   as   amended,   the   appellate   Court   “may”   order   the

appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20%

of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court and the

word   used   is   not   “shall”   and   therefore   the   discretion   is   vested

with the first appellate court to direct the appellant – accused to

deposit   such   sum   and   the   appellate   court  has   construed  it   as

mandatory, which according to the learned Senior Advocate for

the appellants would be contrary to the provisions of Section 148

of   the   N.I.   Act   as   amended   is   concerned,   considering   the

amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act as a whole to be read with

the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Section

148 of the N.I. Act, though it is true that in amended Section 148

of   the   N.I.   Act,   the   word   used   is   “may”,   it   is   generally   to   be

construed as a “rule” or “shall” and not to direct to deposit by the

appellate court is an exception for which special reasons are to

be   assigned.   Therefore   amended   Section   148   of   the   N.I.   Act

confers   power   upon   the   Appellate   Court   to   pass   an   order

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pending   appeal   to   direct   the   Appellant­Accused   to   deposit   the

sum   which   shall   not   be   less   than   20%   of   the   fine   or

compensation   either   on   an   application   filed   by   the   original

complainant   or   even   on   the   application   filed   by   the   Appellant­

Accused   under   Section   389   of   the   Cr.P.C.   to   suspend   the

sentence.   The aforesaid is required to be construed considering

the fact that as per the amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, a

minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial

court is directed to be deposited and that such amount is to be

deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of the order, or

within   such   further   period   not   exceeding   30   days   as   may   be

directed by the appellate court for sufficient cause shown by the

appellant.   Therefore, if amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act is

purposively   interpreted   in   such   a   manner   it   would   serve   the

Objects and Reasons of not only amendment in Section 148 of

the   N.I.   Act,   but   also   Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act.     Negotiable

Instruments Act has been amended from time to time so as to

provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence

of   the   dishonoured   of   cheques.  So  as to  see  that  due to  delay

tactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured cheques

due   to   easy   filing   of   the   appeals   and   obtaining   stay   in   the

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proceedings,   an   injustice   was   caused   to   the   payee   of   a

dishonoured   cheque   who   has   to   spend   considerable   time   and

resources   in   the   court   proceedings   to   realise   the   value   of   the

cheque  and  having observed that such delay has compromised

the   sanctity   of   the   cheque   transactions,   the   Parliament   has

thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act.   Therefore,

such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the

Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I.

Act and also Sec 138 of the N.I. Act.

10. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants,

relying upon Section 357(2) of the Cr.P.C. that once the appeal

against the order of conviction is preferred, fine is not recoverable

pending appeal and therefore such an order of deposit of 25% of

the   fine   ought   not   to   have   been   passed   and   in   support   of   the

above reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case

of Dilip S. Dhanukar (supra)  is concerned, the aforesaid has no

substance.  The opening word of amended Section 148 of the N.I.

Act is that “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of

Criminal Procedure…..”. Therefore irrespective of the provisions

of Section 357(2) of the Cr.P.C., pending appeal before the first

appellate court, challenging the order of conviction and sentence

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under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the appellate court is conferred

with   the   power   to   direct   the   appellant   to   deposit   such   sum

pending appeal which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or

compensation awarded by the trial Court. 

In view of the above and for the reasons stated herein above,

impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court does

not call for any interference.

11. At this stage, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf

of   the   appellants   has   requested   to   grant   the   appellants   some

more time (three months’ time) to deposit the amount as per the

order passed by the first appellate court, confirmed by the High

Court.     The   said   prayer   is   opposed   by   the   learned   Advocate

appearing on behalf of the original complainant.  It is submitted

that as per amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, the appellants –

accused   have   to   deposit   the   amount   of   compensation/fine   as

directed by the appellate court within a period of 60 days which

can be further extended by a further period of 30 days as may be

directed   by   the   Court   on   sufficient   cause   being   shown   by   the

appellants.  However, in the facts and circumstances of the case

and   considering   the   fact   that   the   appellants   were     bonafidely

litigating before this Court challenging the order passed by the

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first appellate court, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of

the   Constitution   of   India   and   in   the   peculiar   facts   and

circumstances of the case and the amount to be deposited is a

huge amount, we grant further four weeks’ time from today to the

appellants to deposit the amount as directed by the first appellate

court, confirmed by the High Court and further confirmed by this

Court.

12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we

see no reason to interfere with the impugned common judgment

and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   dismissing   the   revision

application/s, confirming the order passed by the first appellate

court directing the appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of

fine/compensation pending appeals.

The   instant   appeals   are   accordingly   dismissed   with   the

aforesaid observations and appellants are now directed to deposit

the amount directed by the first appellate court within extended

period of four weeks from today.

…………………………………….J.
[M.R. SHAH]

NEW DELHI; ……………………………………J.
MAY 29, 2019. [A.S. BOPANNA]

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