Feasting with "Kings" in an Ancient Democracy:

On the Slavic Society of the Early Middle Ages (Sixth to Seventh Century
A.D.)

Florin Curta

   One of the most persistent stereotypes about the early medieval history of
Eastern Europe holds that the Slavs, at the time of their migration, were a
"polyarchic tribal society with no elevated notion of sovereignty." No
Theodoric arose among the Slavs to gather their scattered communities into
a state and attempt a symbiosis with the Greco-Roman civilization of
Byzantium.1 My intention in this paper is to take a fresh look at the early
Slavic society in the light of written evidence. I will then focus on the
applicability of the modern concept of chiefdom to Slavic society and
compare Slavic leaders with "classical" examples of big-men and great-men,
on the basis of a theory of symbolic power. By emphasizing the mechanism
of the accumulation of power in the hands of the Slavic "kings," I will
consider the archaeological evidence and how feasting may have promoted
the growth of social inequality. I shall raise the question of whether current
historiographical models are appropriate for understanding early medieval
societies.

   The notion of the politically "primitive" Slavs of the early Middle Ages
derives from Procopius' frequently-cited description of the Sclavenes and
the Antes in the mid-500s:

For these nations, the Sclavenoi and Antae, are not ruled by one man,
but they have lived from of old under a democracy (en demokratia ek
palaiou bioteousi), and consequently everything which involves their
welfare, whether for good or for ill, is referred to the people (es
koinon agetai). (Wars VII 14.22)

   Some have argued that "democracy" is derisively applied here to what, in

Procopius' eyes, might have been the opposite of Byzantine
monarchy.2 Others called Procopius an unqualified witness, who could not
distinguish between acephalous societies and "primitive
democracies."3 Some others, particularly among Soviet historians, believed
Procopius to have described what is now known

page 20
by the Marxist concept of "military democracy."4 This concept, first
introduced in 1877 by Lewis Morgan, was often used for describing the
transitional stage from kin-based societies to state societies. According to
Morgan, military democracy only existed if there was an elected and
removable chief, a council of the elders, and a popular assembly.5 Frederick
Engels later gave the concept an economic and social meaning. To Engels,
"military democracy" concerned war and organization for war, since those
were now "regular functions of the life of the peoples who began to regard
the acquisition of wealth as one of the main purposes in life."6

   One of the key arguments for interpreting early Slavic society as a military
democracy is the chief's retinue of warriors.7 According to a sixth-century
source, the Avars attacked in 578 a Sclavene leader named Daurentius and
"the chiefs of his people" (hosoi en telei tou ethnous) (Menander the
Guardsman, fr. 21). Some argue that this particular passage points to a tribal
aristocracy, whose authority was presumably based on wealth
differentials.8 That Daurentius was a warrior leader is beyond any doubt,
but no evidence exists of the council of the elders, one of the institutions
both Morgan and Engels viewed as a necessary condition for the existence
of a military democracy. Nor can Menander the Guardsman's evidence be
used to postulate the existence of a political hierarchy, in which the power
of the military leader was checked by that of the "chiefs of his people."
When Procopius refers to "the people" or to public affairs, there is no
indication of chiefs (Wars 14.21-22). Where chiefs appear, there is no
indication of their separation from the agrarian substrate.

   In Engels's terms, military democracy was a form of social organization

typically associated with the dissolution of communal ownership and with
the emergence of private ownership and exploitation, based on tribute and
clientship.9 Chiefs set themselves apart from the agrarian substrate and
ruled through a retinue of warriors. The warrior chief or king controlled and
exploited the farming communities through tribute and taxation.10 Marxist
theorists, however, tend to use a restricted definition of economic interest,
one that does not acknowledge that the notion of "economic calculations"
should be extended to all the goods, material and symbolic, without
distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after
in a particular social formation.11 The current literature depicts chiefdoms
as institutions which depended on the interlocking of three major
components of power: control over economy, military force, and
ideology.12 It is precisely economic control that is absent from any
description of early Slavic society. There are, however, clear cases of
accumulation of "symbolic capital."13 This is particularly true in the
episode of a Sclavene chief narrated by Michael the Syrian (X 21). During
their raid into Greece, in the early 580s, the Sclavenes carried off on carts
the holy vessels and the great ciboria from devastated churches. In Corinth,
however, one of their leaders took the great ciborium and using it as a tent,
made it his dwelling. The Sclavene chief clearly seems to have grasped the
symbolic potential of the otherwise useless stone ciborium, shaped as it was
like a canopy over a throne.14 This further suggests that, at least in this case,
simple accumulation of "material capital" cannot account by itself for the

page 21
process of power concentration.

   An alternative to the "military democracy" model is the "segmentary

society."15 When historians speak of the "segmentary society" of the Slavs,
they usually refer to the late sixth- or early seventh-century military treatise
known as Strategikon, whose author claimed that Sclavenes were unable to
fight a battle standing in close order or present themselves on open and level
ground (XI 4.9 and 19).16 This lack of strategy, he argued, was a direct
consequence of their rudimentary political organization:

Owing to their lack of government (anarcha) and their ill feeling

toward one another (misallela onta) they are not acquainted with an
order of battle (oude taxin ginoskousin). (XI 4.12)17

   "Lack of government," it has been argued,18 refers to a segmentary

lineage system. The underlying idea of such a system is that the functions of
maintaining cohesion, social control, and some degree of "law and order,"
which normally depend on specialized agencies with sanctions at their
disposal, can be performed with tolerable efficiency, simply by the
"balancing" and "opposition" of constituent groups. Evans-Pritchard
described this as an "ordered anarchy."19 What is usually referred to as
"segmentary society," however, is one that is in some sense structured in
terms of descent, in terms of lineage.20 Lineages are social entities, which
emerge only in a social situation characterized by competition between
groups.21 Marshall Sahlins has argued that a segmentary lineage system
was a predatory organization characteristic of societies in migration, for, as
a social means of intrusion and competition in an already-occupied
ecological niche, it developed specifically within a tribal society struggling
with other tribes.22 Just as the African Tiv of more recent
times,23 Sclavenes reacted violently against any attempts to impose upon
them rulers from the outside. The author of the Strategikon knew that
Sclavenes and Antes were "both independent, absolutely refusing to be
enslaved or governed, least of all in their own land" (XI 4.1). He reports that
while Sclavenes may in fact unite to attack or repel an enemy at one time, at
another they will fragment into feuding factions, quarreling over land or
personal injuries. Once the defensive objectives which had impelled
confederation were accomplished, the confederation dissolves again into its
several segments, and the leaders who had emerged now return to social
oblivion or retain only local influence.
   Can we apply the model of a segmentary lineage system to the Sclavene
case? In other words, was the early Slavic society structured in terms of
descent? Inspired by Pierre Clastres's model of the "Society against the
State," some historians would infer a segmentary system from the presumed
absence of social mechanisms contributing to the consolidation of royal
authority.24 Lineage theory and segmentation are not, however, the same
thing. Although we do not know what mechanisms were responsible for the
descent structure of the early Slavic society, we may be in a better position
to identify elements of social segmentation.

   It has been observed that a segmentary structure of society involves a

segmentary structure of space, the minimal unit of which represents the
"primary

page 22
tribal segment," as the smallest multifamily group that collectively exploits
an area of tribal resources and forms a residential entity.25 How large was a
segment? The author of the Strategikon knew that for an invasion into
Sclavene territory to be successful, a fairly large force had to be dispatched
against each settlement. He recommends the use of one or two banda, i.e.
400 to 800 men, for storming a Sclavene village (XI 4.43).26 This may
indicate that the population of the village was slightly inferior in size to the
attacking Roman force, assuming that estimations of the Strategikon are
based only on the military potential of the enemy, that is, on the number of
warriors, not on the total number of inhabitants.

   Archaeological evidence supports this inference of small-sized segments.

Sixth- to seventh-century settlements excavated north of the Danube river,
in present-day Romania, Moldova, and south-west Ukraine, include only a
small number of features per occupation phase, ranging from ten to
fifteen.27 The most common type of residential structure in all these
settlements is the sunken-floored building of almost square plan with an
oven or hearth placed in one of the corners. Since the average area of a
sunken-floored hut is 20 square meters, it could hardly have sheltered more
than 5 persons, the size of a nuclear family. However, since lineage is an
"emic" category,28 there is no way settlement features per se could tell us
anything about social relations between the families who lived in them.

   It also remains unclear to what extent Byzantine sources provide reliable
empirical facts about actual behavior. It is logical to believe that the author
of the Strategikon had a better (perhaps first-hand) knowledge about
Sclavenes than did Procopius. But when he claims that Sclavenes were
always at odds with each other, he is repeating a well worn topos, used by
many before him, including Procopius.
   The model of the "segmentary society" also ignores historical process. It is
very unlikely that the Sclavene society remained "frozen" in its "primitive,"
segmentary stage after contact with the Empire. Despite claims to the
contrary,29 Byzantine sources make it clear that Sclavenes had their own
"kings." In fact, by its ideological definition of political action as the result
of segments in balanced opposition to one another rather than as the affairs
of particular individuals, the theory of segmentary lineage structures would
imply the emergence of men entrusted with considerable authority and
wielding great political power.30 As long as political leadership remains
personal and does not become institutionalized into an office, an ideological
assertion of egalitarianism can co-exist with considerable political
inequality.31 Any attempt to convert symbolic into material capital may
have resulted, in the case of the militantly egalitarian Sclavene "democracy,"
in periodic purges of would-be "tyrants," such as those clearly attested by
Pseudo-Caesarius. Pseudo-Caesarius, a Monophysite monk writing in the
560s, is the first author to refer to Sclavene chiefs, who, according to him,
were often killed at feast or on travel by their kinsmen.32 Pseudo-Caesarius
used this example to show that the Sclavenes were living by their own law
without the rule of anyone (anegemoneutoi), a remark which dovetails with
the evidence of other sources.33 That the purge of would-be tyrants took
place during feasts further

page 23
suggests that chiefs were coordinators of communal ceremonies.

   Ever since Elman Service defined them as "redistributional societies with

a permanent central agency of coordination," chiefdoms have been viewed
as the prevailing form of social organization in early medieval Europe,
existing first beyond the Roman frontiers and then persisting into the
migration period.34 It is reasonable to ask, therefore, whether all Sclavene
"kings" of the sixth and seventh century were truly chiefs. The terminology
employed by Greek sources is very complex and difficult to interpret. Later
sources constantly applied the term archon which designated a ruler with
full, regionally organized authority.35Hegemon is a term Menander the
Guardsman employed frequently in reference to Saracen, Utigur, Alan,
Frankish, Turkic, and Slavic leaders. This suggests that those whom he also
called hosoi en telei tou ethnous were not subordinates or in any way
inferior to Daurentius, the Sclavene chief attacked by Avars in 578 (see
above), but enjoyed a similar status and membership in what seems to have
been a tribal confederation. Other sources, such as Theophylact Simocatta,
the author of Book II of the Miracles of St Demetrius and the author of
the Strategikon employ the word rex borrowed from the late Roman
administrative jargon to refer to independent barbarian leaders.36 Such
leaders had significant power over their fellow tribesmen, a feature easily
recognizable in the case of Musocius, the Sclavene rex mentioned by
Theophylact Simocatta (VI 9.1). It is interesting to note that Menander the
Guardsman and the author of Book II of the Miracles of St
Demetrius referred to hegemones and archontes in plural, whereas rex was a
title bestowed upon individuals, who were often known by name (Musocius,
Perbundos). This suggests that there were many Sclavene leaders at any one
time, but not all of them wielded the same kind of power. Pseudo-Caesarius'
leaders who were killed at feasts or on travels, arguably by their fellow
tribesmen, were not on a level with "king" Musocius, explicitly said to have
had "subjects."

   This variety of leadership types may be best described, in anthropological

terms, as the coexistence of three different sorts of power. Anthropologists
distinguish chiefs, whose powers are largely ascribed and coincide with the
privileged control of wealth, from big-men, whose powers are largely
achieved and derived from the manipulation of wealth, and great-men,
whose powers may be largely ascribed or achieved, but are not based upon
the control of wealth.37 The distinction between chiefs and big-men goes
back to Marshall Sahlins, who depicted the typical Melanesian leader as a
"big-man," because he achieved his position in a context of egalitarian
ideology and competition, and his Polynesian counterpart as chief, because
he succeeded to a hereditary position in a context of social hierarchy.38

   Big men are leaders who organize feasts and festivals, daring warriors and
commanders in warfare, orators, or men of authority who arbitrate disputes
within the community. Some dominate by their physical strength,
particularly in contexts where leading warriors are politically important,
some by force of character.39 The concept of big-man has been applied
outside of Melanesia when achievement rather than ascribed leadership
status is under discussion.

   More recently, Maurice Godelier has proposed that the big-men system
be-

page 24
gins with great men. "Great men" become prominent through a variety of
practices, but the most common type is that of the man who advances alone
toward the enemy lines, along with a handful of followers, and who engages
in single combat with any warrior prepared to match his skill and strength.
A "great man" thus gains prestige, a name for himself, and admiration, but
not wealth. In times of war his authority is unquestioned, while in peacetime
his function disappears, but his prestige remains.40

   Ardagastus, as described by Theophylact Simocatta, fits the model of a

great man well. He had a remarkable physical size and strength, which
helped him escape from being captured by Romans in 593 (VI 7.3). He had
a "territory" of his own, which Priscus' troops devastated in that same year
(VI 7.5). It is interesting to note that the inhabitants of this chora are never
referred to as his subjects, only as "Sclavene hordes" or his "followers" (VI
7.1 and 9.6; cf. VI 9.1). Ardagastus may have been a warrior leader,
organizing raids into the Roman provinces. Warriors from afar may have
come to his "territory" and joined him in his plundering expeditions.41 No
mention is made of a village and, if we are to believe Theophylact
Simocatta, Ardagastus was on the point of launching a new raid across the
Danube, when Priscus' attack took him by surprise. That Ardagastus was a
real threat for the Romans, is indicated by the fact that Priscus directed his
first operations beyond the Danube against his chora. His power was
undoubtedly achieved, with his remarkable physical strength at the basis of
this political prominence. He had already begun to build a name for himself,
when Priscus' expedition north of the Danube frontier put an end to his
career. Though he may have survived the Roman aggression, Ardagastus
fell back into social oblivion, for nothing further is reported about him in the
otherwise well documented events of the following decade.

   Can we bestow the title of great men upon other Sclavene leaders? The
case of Peiragastus is much more difficult to decide than that of Ardagastus.
Peiragastus is briefly mentioned by Theophylact in relation to Peter's
campaign north of the Danube, in 594. Theophylact calls him "the tribal
leader of that barbarian horde" (VII 4.13) and then "their brigadier (touton
taxiarchos)"(VII 5.4). He may have been a simple commander in warfare,
not a true chief. Mention is made of forces under his command, but unlike
Ardagastus, Peiragastus had no "territory." Immediately after his death in
battle, Sclavenes "turned to flight" and Romans were concerned with
pursuing them, not with ravaging neighboring villages which may have
existed in the area. Peiragastus and his "horde" had come from afar in what
might have been an expedition against Peter's troops. It is very unlikely,
therefore, that he was anything other than a warrior leader.

   The association between Pseudo-Caesarius' leaders and feasting suggests

they were big-men. The piling up of debts and the prospect of future gains
for all supporters are held to be the critical aspects for understanding how
competitive feasting fosters the emergence of wealth-accumulators.42 Big-
men also play a key role in "making" groups. Their oratorical interventions
during meetings, together with private persuasion, transform actions that
would otherwise be construed as merely personal into collective ones as
well. This seems to have been

page 25
the case of Menander the Guardsman's Daurentius and of Fredegar's Samo,
both of whom are described as speaking in the name of their respective
groups, boldly proclaiming their independence and thus "creating" their new
identity.43 Unlike Daurentius, Samo's utilitas won him both the admiration
of the Wends and his election as their "king." The Wendish rex proved his
skills as commander in war, his prudence and courage always bringing
victory to the Wends. Samo forged alliances with several Wendish families,
marrying no less than twelve Wendish women, who, according to Fredegar,
"bore him twenty-two sons and fifteen daughters" (IV 48). He was involved
in long-distance trade and his economic and political influence produced
strong alliances, particularly after the debacle of the Frankish army
at castrum Wogatisburc (IV 68).44

   More than twenty years earlier, another rex, Musocius, had "subjects"

whom he could send to reconnoitre or to give assistance to refugees from
neighboring territories. Musocius' chiefdom was more limited in territory
than Samo's. Theophylact's account of Priscus' campaign of 593 shows
clearly that, in order to shatter his chiefdom, Roman troops simply needed to
capture Musocius and to devastate his village.

   Big-man leadership, with its emphasis on competitive feasting is also

visible in the archaeological evidence, particularly in settlement patterns.
Ever since Gordon R. Willey introduced the concept, settlement pattern
analysis has been viewed as a useful interpretative tool in detecting in
archaeological cultures the reflections of various institutions of social
interaction and control.45 Decisions as to how to organize the use of space
within residences and settlements may indeed have been influenced by the
group's socioeconomic organization. This influence, however, would be
mediated by the kind of activities performed on a site at a given time. This
shows up in excavation as an activity area, defined as an archaeologically
consistent, spatially clustered, association of artifacts in a precisely dated
archaeological horizon.46

   At Seliste (Moldova), two groups of buildings with sunken foundations

were located on either side of a central place.47 The eastern group produced
all of the needles, most of the amphora sherds, and all of the clay pans found
on site. By contrast, all arrow heads, awls, and dress accessories (beads and
bow fibula) were found in the western group. Furthermore, three of the five
buildings in the east had no heating facility, which suggests they were used
not as dwellings, but as workshops. The almost exclusive association of clay
pans and amphora sherds with the eastern sector also indicates that certain
activities were performed there involving the consumption of special
foods.48

   Though on a comparatively smaller scale, the site at Bucharest-Soldat

Ghivan Street shows an organization very similar to that of
Seliste.49 Settlement features, all of them with clay ovens, were placed
around a large area devoid of any structures. A large building on the
northern side produced all of the tools and weapons found on site, while a
neighboring structure supplied the only fragments of clay pans. No such
artifacts turned up on the southern side. The bow fibula and the potsherd
with an incised cross found in building 12, and the handmade lamp from
neighboring building 15, stand in sharp contrast with the artifact distribu-

page 26
tion to the north. At Dulceanca II (south Romania),50 a site with sunken-
foundation buildings arranged in a circle around two ovens, sherds of clay
pans and amphoras cluster in the south, while tools occur mostly in the
northern sector. At Poian (Transylvania, Romania),51 the distribution of
dress-accessories (combs, a bow fibula, and a brooch with bent stem) is
distinct from from that of tools and querns. A group of three buildings in the
southern sector produced most of the items of the first category.

   The site at Davideni (Romania)52 was divided into two groups of sunken-

hut buildings, presumably separated by a creek (Figures 1-2). The larger
group to the north includes the biggest structures found on site, but also one
of the smallest buildings, which was located in the middle of a central, open
area. Though too small to accommodate a family, this structure had two
heating facilities, a stone oven and an open hearth, and produced no tools
and no dress accessories, only sherds of clay pans. Most other buildings
surrounding the central area were equipped with two heating facilities and
produced large numbers of clay pans. Most tools found on site, as well as a
bow fibula and a double-layered comb were found in this area. There is only
one structure with two heating facilities in the smaller group of buildings, to
the south. This sector, however, produced three open-air ovens. Judging
from the intrasite distribution of artifacts, the central area on the northern
side of the settlement may have been a locus of industrial activities, such as
smelting and, possibly, production of dress accessories. It was also an area
of special activities involving consumption of special foods, since clay pans
were more frequently associated with features equipped with two or three
ovens which were located in this region. At Davideni, the distribution of
clay

page 27
pans, however, sharply differs from that of faunal remains, which are more
evenly distributed. Clay pans (Figure 3) may therefore signal the existence
of an area of communal activities involving, among other things, the
production and consumption of flat loaves of bread.

   This analysis of the intrasite distribution of artifacts on sixth- and seventh-

century Romanian sites thus reveals a systematic organization and use of
space. The most important characteristics of this organization are the
presence of a central, open area, and the polarization of the artifact
distribution. The central area may have been an arena for ceremonies
involving the processing and consumption of special, cereal-based foods. As
the center of intervillage social, political, or economic events, this area may
have acquired a special public character as the symbol for the community as
a whole. As suggested by the exclusive presence of such markers of social
status as bow fibulae, the central area was, however, not only a locus of
communal activity, but also an arena of social competition, a "beyond-the-
households context" for the display of symbols of leadership.53

   The end of the sixth century was a period of increasing competition among
Sclavene leaders. The author of the Strategikon knew that there were many
Sclavene "kings," "always at odds with each other" (XI 4.30), a useful
political detail for any Roman general who may have found himself in a
position to make war against any of them. What were the stakes of this
competition, we can only guess. The archaeological evidence, however,
suggests that shortly before and after 600 A.D. symbols of personal identity
came into higher demand. At this time bow fibulae found in Romania
(Figure 4), Crimea, and Mazuria display the greatest number of links in their
ornamental patterns. Long-distance connec-

page 28
tions signalized by those links, as well as the display of different patterns on
various groups of bow fibulae point to social competition.54 If, as
suggested, the intrasite distribution of artifacts on sixth- and seventh-century
sites can be associated with competitive feasting, which was a typical
feature for big-man leadership, we may be able to visualize some aspects of
this competition. War, however, was the overwhelming concern of those
whom the author of the Strategikon viewed as unable to fight in ordered
battle, but who, nevertheless, were extremely skillful at ambushing Roman
troops. That Slavic society was geared up for warfare is evident from the
significant number of weapons, especially arrow- and spear-heads, which
have been found on sixth- to seventh-century sites in Romania, Moldova,
and Ukraine. This further suggests that the evidence of destruction by fire
occasionally found on those sites is the result of inter-group conflicts. After
all, as the author of the Strategikon observed, in the Slavic "democracy,"
"nobody is willing to yield to another" (XI 4.14).