The Military Balance 1995
The Military Balance 1995
The Military Balance 1995
The Military Balance is updated each year to provide a timely, quantitative assessment of the
military forces and defence expenditures of over 160 countries. The current volume contains
data as of 1 June 1995 (although any significant developments that occurred in June and July
are also reported). This chapter explains how The Military Balance is structured and outlines
the general principles of compilation. The format for country entries remains the same as in the
1994-95 edition.
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The break-up of the Soviet Union has necessitated a re-evaluation of the way in which The
Military Balance divides the world into geographical sections. Russia is both a European and
an Asian state and is given a separate section in the book. The Military Balance assumes that
Russia has taken on all former USSR overseas deployments unless there is specific evidence to
the contrary. All the strategic nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union are shown in the
Russian section. Those forces still located in other former Soviet republics are listed again in the
relevant country entry. Information regarding European security arrangements, such as the
Western European Union, Partnership for Peace and the Stability Pact will be found in the
NATO section. The section on 'Non-NATO Europe' includes the Baltic states, Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldova and the three Transcaucasian republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia).
The latter have been included in Europe as signatories of the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) and Slovenia are listed as independent, while Serbia and Montenegro are
shown in a single entry as the follow-on states to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There are
two Asian sections. 'Central and Southern Asia' covers the five Central Asian republics of the
former Soviet Union (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan),
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The
remaining Asian countries are in the 'East Asia and Australasia' section (with China no longer
receiving individual-section status). The innovation, introduced last year, of grouping countries
in some regional sections into sub-sections has been discontinued. In all sections countries are
listed alphabetically throughout.
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
There are two parts to The Military Balance. The first comprises national entries grouped by
region; the Index on page 12 gives the page reference for each national entry. Regional
groupings are preceded by a short introduction describing the strategic issues facing the region,
and significant changes in the defence postures, economic status and military-aid arrangements
of the countries concerned. Inclusion of a country or state in no way implies legal recognition or
IISS approval of it.
The second part contains more general analysis and tables, and includes three descriptive
essays. The first examines developments in the field of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):
progress towards implementing the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I) Treaty; the
assistance being provided for the elimination of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons; the
nuclear test moratorium; targeting; the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
the possibility of a fissile-material production ban; progress towards a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT); North Korea and proliferation; and developments in the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The second essay
covers all other aspects of arms control including: the CFE Treaty two years after its entry into
force; the new United Nations (UN) Register of Conventional Weapons; and the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The third describes how the IISS estimates
5
and interprets data on defence expenditure. There is also a summary of the composition of all
UN and other peacekeeping forces, together with a short description of their missions. In the
1993-94 edition of The Military Balance, a 'Reader Reaction Questionnaire' was enclosed.
The main recommendations of readers who returned the questionnaire are set out in this edition.
A list of all the abbreviations and symbols used is printed on a card which can be detached
from the book for easier use. A loose wall-map is provided which covers the Middle East. The
main map, which shows the deployment of key offensive weapons including surface-to-surface
missiles, is surrounded by large-scale maps of potential flashpoints.
Abbreviations are used throughout because of space constraints and to avoid repetition. The
abbreviation may have both singular or plural meanings, for example, 'elm' = 'element' or
'elements'. The qualification 'some' means up to, while 'about' means the total could be higher
than given. In financial data, the $ sign refers to US dollars unless otherwise stated; the term
billion (bn) signifies 1,000 million (m). Footnotes particular to a country entry or table are
indicated by letters, while those which apply throughout the book are marked by symbols (i.e., *
for training aircraft counted by the IISS as combat capable, and t where serviceability of
equipment is in doubt).
NATIONAL ENTRIES
Information on each country is given in as standard a format as the available information
permits: economic and demographic data; military data, including manpower, length of
conscript service, outline organisation, number of formations and units; and an inventory of the
major equipment of each service, followed where applicable by a description of their deploy-
ment. Details of national forces stationed abroad and of foreign stationed forces are also given.
Other Forces
Many countries maintain paramilitary forces whose training, organisation, equipment and
control suggest they may be usable in support, or in lieu, of regular military forces. These are
listed, and their roles described, after the military forces of each country; their manpower is not
normally included in the Armed Forces totals at the start of each entry. Home Guard units are
6
counted as paramilitary. Where paramilitary groups are not on full-time active duty, the suffix
(R) is added after the title to indicate that they have reserve status. When internal opposition
forces are armed and appear to pose a significant threat to the security of a state, their details are
listed separately after national paramilitary forces.
Equipment
Quantities are shown by function and type and represent what are believed to be total holdings,
including active and reserve operational and training units and 'in store' stocks. Inventory totals
for missile systems (e.g., SSM, SAM, ATGW, etc.) relate to launchers and not to missiles.
Stocks of equipment held in reserve and not assigned to either active or reserve units are
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listed as 'in store'. However, aircraft in excess of unit establishment holdings, held to allow for
repair and modification or immediate replacement, are not shown 'in store'. This accounts for
apparent disparities between unit strengths and aircraft inventory strength.
Operational Deployments
The Military Balance does not normally list short-term operational deployments, particularly
where military operations are in progress. An exception to this rule is made in the case of
peacekeeping operations. The contribution or deployment of forces on operations are normally
covered in the text preceding each regional section.
GROUND FORCES
The national designation is normally used for army formations. The term 'regiment' can be
misleading. In some cases it is essentially a brigade of all arms; in others, a grouping of
battalions of a single arm; and lastly (the UK and French usage) a battalion-sized unit. The
sense intended is indicated. Where there is no standard organisation the intermediate levels of
command are shown as headquarters (HQs), followed by the total numbers of units which could
be allocated between them. Where a unit's title overstates its real capability, the title is in
inverted commas, and an estimate of the comparable NATO unit size is in parentheses: 'bde' (coy).
Equipment
The Military Balance uses the same definitions as those agreed to at the CFE negotiations.
These are:
Battle Tank (MBT): An armoured tracked combat vehicle weighing at least 16.5 metric tonnes
unladen, may be armed with a 360° traverse gun of at least 75mm calibre. Any new wheeled
combat vehicles entering service which meet these criteria will be considered battle tanks.
Armoured Combat Vehicles (ACV): a self-propelled vehicle with armoured protection and
cross-country capability. ACVs include the following:
Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC): A lightly armoured combat vehicle designed and
equipped to transport an infantry squad, armed with integral/organic weapons of less than
20mm calibre. Versions of APC converted for other uses (such as weapons platforms,
command posts, communications terminals) which do not allow infantry to be transported
are considered iook-alikes' and are not regarded as treaty-limited equipment (TLE), but are
subject to verification.
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV): An armoured combat vehicle designed and
equipped to transport an infantry squad, armed with an integral/organic cannon of at least
20mm calibre. There are also AIFV 'look-alikes'.
Heavy Armoured Combat Vehicle (HACV): An armoured combat vehicle weighing more
than six metric tonnes unladen, with an integral/organic direct-fire gun of at least 75mm
(which does not fall within the definitions of APC, AIFV or MBT). The Military Balance
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does not list HACV separately, but under their equipment type (light tank, recce or assault
gun), and where appropriate annotates them as HACV.
Artillery: Systems with calibres of 100mm and above, capable of engaging ground targets by
delivering primarily indirect fire, namely guns, howitzers, gun/howitzers, multiple-rocket
launchers (MRL) and mortars.
Weapons with bores of less than 14.5mm are not listed, nor, for major armies, are hand-held
ATK weapons.
and divisions differ widely from state to state. Where possible, the normal composition of
formations is given in parentheses. It should be noted that where divisions and brigades are
listed, only separate brigades are counted and not those included in divisions. The table which
showed the manpower and equipment strength of divisions has been discontinued as these are
being restructured in most countries following the end of the Cold War.
NAVAL FORCES
Categorisation is based partly on operational role, partly on weapon fit and partly on
displacement. Ship classes are identified by the name of the first ship of that class, except where
a class is recognised by another name (e.g., Krivak, Kotlin, etc.). Where the class is based on a
foreign design, the original class name is added in parentheses.
Each class of vessel is given an acronym designator based on the NATO system. All
designators are included in the list of abbreviations on the perforated card at the back of the book.
The term 'ship' refers to vessels of over both 1,000 tonnes full-load displacement and 60
metres overall length; vessels of lesser displacement, but of 16m or more overall length, are
termed 'craft'. Vessels of less than 16m overall length are not included.
The term 'commissioning' has different meanings in a number of navies. In The Military
Balance the term is used to mean that a ship has completed fitting out, initial sea trials, and has
a naval crew; operational training may not have been completed, but in all other respects the
ship is available for service. 'Decommissioning' means that a ship has been removed from
operational duty and the bulk of its naval crew transferred. De-storing and dismantling of
weapons may not have started. Where known, ships in long refit are shown as such.
Principal Surface Combatants: These include all surface ships with both 1,000 tonnes full-
load displacement and a weapons system other than for self-protection. They comprise aircraft
carriers (with a flight-deck extending beyond two-thirds of the vessel's length); cruisers (over
8,000 tonnes) and destroyers (less than 8,000 tonnes), both of which normally have an anti-air-
warfare role and may also have an anti-submarine capability; and frigates (less than 8,000
tonnes) which normally have an anti-submarine role.
Patrol and Coastal Combatants: These are ships and craft whose primary role relates to the
protection of the sea approaches and coastline of a state. Included are: corvettes (600-1,000
tonnes carrying weapons systems other than for self-protection); missile craft (with permanently
8
fitted missile-launcher ramps and control equipment); and torpedo craft (with an anti-surface-
ship capability). Ships and craft which fall outside these definitions are classified as 'patrol'.
Mine Warfare: This category covers surface vessels configured primarily for mine-laying or
mine countermeasures (which can be minehunters, mine-sweepers or dual-capable vessels).
A further classification divides both coastal and patrol combatants and mine-warfare vessels
into: offshore (over 600 tonnes); coastal (300-600 tonnes); and inshore (less than 300 tonnes).
Amphibious: Ships specifically procured and employed to disembark troops and their
equipment over unprepared beachheads or directly to support amphibious operations are listed.
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Vessels with an amphibious capability, but which are known not to be assigned to amphibious
duties, are not included. Amphibious craft are listed at the end of each entry.
Support and Miscellaneous: This category of essentially non-military vessels provides some
indication of the operational sustainability and outreach of the navy concerned.
Weapons Systems: Weapons are listed in the order in which they contribute to the ship's
primary operational role. After the word 'plus' are added significant weapons relating to the
ship's secondary role. Self-defence weapons are not listed. To merit inclusion, a SAM system
must have an anti-missile range of 10km or more, and guns must be of 70mm bore or greater.
Aircraft: The CFE definition of combat aircraft does not cover maritime aircraft. All armed
aircraft, including anti-submarine-warfare and some maritime-reconnaissance aircraft, are
included as combat aircraft in naval inventories.
Organisations: Naval groupings such as fleets and squadrons are often temporary and
changeable; organisation is only shown where it is meaningful.
AIR FORCES
The following remarks refer to aviation units forming an integral part of ground forces, naval
forces and (where applicable) marines, as well as to separate air forces.
The term 'combat aircraft' comprises aircraft normally equipped to deliver ordnance in air-to-
air or air-to-surface combat. The 'combat' totals include aircraft in operational conversion units
(OCU) whose main role is weapons training, and training aircraft of the same type as those in
front-line squadrons that are assumed to be available for operations at short notice. (Training
aircraft considered to be combat-capable are marked by an asterisk: *.) Where armed maritime
aircraft are held by air forces, these are not included in combat aircraft totals, whereas they are
in separate naval aviation listings. Air force operational groupings are shown where known.
Squadron aircraft strengths vary; attempts have been made to separate total holdings from
reported establishment strength.
The number of aircraft categories listed is kept to a minimum. 'Fighter' denotes aircraft with
the capability (weapons, avionics, performance) for aerial combat. Dual-capable aircraft are
shown as FGA, fighter and so on, according to the role in which they are deployed. Different
countries often use the same basic aircraft in different roles; the key to determining these roles
lies mainly in air-crew training. For bombers, 'long-range' means having an unrefuelled radius
of action of over 5,000km, 'medium-range' l,000-5,000km and 'short-range' less than
1,000km; light bombers are those with a payload of under 10,000kg (no greater than the
payload of many FGA).
The CFE Treaty lists three types of helicopters: attack (equipped to employ anti-armour, air-
to-ground or air-to-air guided weapons by means of an integrated fire control and aiming
system); combat support (which may or may not be armed with self-defence or area-suppres-
9
sion weapons, but do not have a control and guidance system); and unarmed transport helicop-
ters. The Military Balance uses the term 'attack' in the CFE sense, and the term 'assault' to
describe armed helicopters used to deliver infantry or other troops on the battlefield. Except in
the case of CFE signatories, The Military Balance continues to employ the term 'armed
helicopters' to cover those equipped to deliver ordnance, including ASW ordnance.
Defence Expenditure
Where possible, the data shown under individual country entries include both past (expendi-
ture) and planned (budgetary) figures denominated at current prices in both national currencies
and $ at average market or, as appropriate, official exchange rates. In the case of convertible
currencies, the use of average annual exchange rates can exceptionally give rise to a misleading
indication of real budget increases or declines when a currency revaluation or devaluation has
occurred. In these cases, defence budgets are converted at the average monthly exchange rate
applicable at the time of budget publication. Final defence outlays are, however, always
converted at annual rates. In the case of inconvertible currencies, a purchasing-power-parity
(PPP) $ exchange rate has been used in several clearly marked country entries where the use of
exchange rates is considered to be misleading. Available data for the two most recent years
(usually 1993 and 1994) and the latest defence budgetary data for the current financial year (as
at 30 June 1995) are generally cited. In some cases, substantial discrepancies can occur in the
official defence budget and actual military expenditure because of falsification by the
government concerned. In these instances the IISS provides its own estimates of real military
outlays based on NATO definitions of military expenditure, and these are clearly marked 'e'.
For NATO member-states, both national and NATO accounts of defence spending are
provided. NATO defines defence expenditure as all spending on national military forces,
including pensions, host-government expenses for other NATO forces stationed in the country,
allocated NATO common funding costs covering the three separate military, civilian staff and
infrastructure accounts, foreign military assistance, and expenditure on paramilitary forces
where these have a military role. NATO figures for the military expenditures of member-states
are often larger than the official defence budgets and outlays of the countries concerned.
Under individual country entries, data on foreign military assistance (FMA) refer to that
supplied by the US unless otherwise specified. US foreign military assistance covers: grants
and loans for equipment purchases (Foreign Military Financing — FMF); International Mili-
tary Education and Training (IMET) funds; voluntary peacekeeping operations; Emergency
Drawdown Authorities (EDA) funds to provide defence services in response to military
emergencies or to provide assistance for international narcotics control, disaster relief and
refugee containment; and the Excess Defence Articles fund for the sale or transfer of surplus
equipment. The terminology of US military aid will change in 1995, with FMF being termed
Military Assistance (MA) and IMET becoming Direct Training (DT). Individual details of US
support for narcotics (Narcs) interdiction and control are provided. Financial data on military
assistance supplied by nations other than the US are identified where these are available. FMA
grants have not been included in the defence expenditure of recipient countries.
Economic Performance
Each country entry includes the following economic performance indicators for the latest two
years available: nominal gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices denominated
10
in both the national currency and $ at average annual exchange rates, or exceptionally at a
weighted average exchange rate in cases where currency revaluation or devaluation has
occurred during the year; real GDP growth; annual inflation measured by the consumer price
index; and either one of two measures of debt. In the case of Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the measure used is gross public debt as a
proportion of GDP; and for all other countries, including those with former communist
economies in transition, it is gross public- and private-sector foreign debt denominated in $.
Average annual market exchange rates of the national currency with the $ or, where necessary,
official exchange rates, are provided. In a few cases where currency exchange-rate distortions
result in a misleading figure, PPP measures have been calculated. Otherwise, the UN System of
National Accounts has been used for the primary economic indicators. The GDP per capita
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indicator has been derived from PPP figures published by the World Bank. These estimates do
not therefore make use of official or market exchange rates, and often differ (in some cases
substantially) from calculations derived from these exchange rates. In general, the economic
data cited in The Military Balance are sourced from the publications of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) or other multilateral organisations, and readers should note that these
data are subject to year-on-year changes which are also reflected in the figures given. For that
small group of countries for which data from the IMF or other multilateral organisations are
unavailable, and for which no reliable official figures exist, the IISS calculates its best estimates
based on the available public sources.
Demography
Population aggregates are based on the most recent official census data. In the absence of
recent official census information, the source for demographic data is World Population
Projections published by the World Bank. Disaggregated demographic data for three age
groups (13-17, 18-22 and 23-32) of both sexes are provided as an indication of the numbers
potentially available for military service. Information on ethnic and religious minorities is
provided under the country entries for those cases where a related security problem exists, or
in the IISS view may potentially exist.
Sources
International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Government Financial Statistics Yearbook (IMF)
World Economic Outlook (IMF)
Economic Reviews on the Economy of the Former USSR (IMF)
OECD Economic Outlook (OECD)
World Tables (World Bank)
World Debt Tables (World Bank)
World Development Report (World Bank)
World Population Projections (World Bank)
Perm World Table (Mark 5.5) (National Bureau of Economic Research)
Human Development Report (UN)
Economic Survey of Europe (UN)
Economic Panorama of Latin America (UN)
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (Inter-American Development Bank)
Key Indicators (Asian Development Bank)
Asian Development Outlook (Asian Development Bank)
African Development Report (African Development Bank)
Les Etats d'Afrique, de Vocean Indien et des Caraibes (La Ministere de la Cooperation,
France)
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (US ACDA)
Military Expenditure Register (UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs)
The SIPRI Yearbook (SIPRI)
Russian Economic Monitor (PLANECON)
11
WARNING
The Military Balance is a quantitative assessment of the personnel strengths and equipment
holdings of the world's armed forces. It is in no way an assessment of their capabilities. It does
not attempt to evaluate the quality of units or equipment, nor the impact of geography,
doctrine, military technology, deployment, training, logistic support, morale, leadership, tacti-
cal or strategic initiative, terrain, weather, political will or support from alliance partners.
The Institute is in no position to evaluate and compare directly the performance of items of
equipment. Those who wish to do so can use the data provided to construct their own force
comparisons. As essays in many past editions of The Military Balance have made clear,
however, such comparisons are replete with difficulties, and their validity and utility must be
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suspect.
The Military Balance provides the actual numbers of nuclear and conventional forces and
weapons based on the most accurate data available, or, failing that, on the best estimate that
can be made with a reasonable degree of confidence — this is not the number that would be
assumed for verification purposes in arms-control agreements, although it is attempted to
provide this information as well.
The data presented each year in The Military Balance reflects judgements based on
information available to the Director and Staff of the Institute at the time the book is compiled.
Information may differ from previous editions for a variety of reasons, generally as a result of
substantive changes in national forces, but in some cases as a result of IISS reassessment of the
evidence supporting past entries. Inevitably, over the course of time it has become apparent
that some information presented in earlier versions was erroneous, or insufficiently supported
by reliable evidence. Hence, it is not always possible to construct valid time-series compari-
sons from information given in successive editions, although in the text which introduces each
regional section an attempt is made to distinguish between new acquisitions and revised
assessments.
CONCLUSION
The Institute owes no allegiance to any government, group of governments, or any political or
other organisation. Its assessments are its own, based on the material available to it from a wide
variety of sources. The cooperation of all governments has been sought and, in many cases,
received. Not all countries have been equally cooperative, and some of the figures have
necessarily been estimated. Pains are taken to ensure that these estimates are as professional and
free from bias as possible. The Institute owes a considerable debt to a number of its own
Members and consultants who have helped in compiling and checking material. The Director
and Staff of the Institute assume full responsibility for the facts and judgements contained in
this study. They welcome comments and suggestions on the data presented, since they seek to
make them as accurate as possible.
Readers may use items of information from The Military Balance as required, without
applying for permission from the Institute, on condition that the IISS and The Military Balance
are cited as the source in any published work. However, applications to reproduce major
portions of The Military Balance must be addressed to the Deputy Head of Journals, Oxford
University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK, prior to publication.
October 1995
JERUSALEM WEST BANK GOLAN
LEBANON
HEIGHTS
! Kuneilra
Armaments
limitation zones
UN-patrolled areas
SLA (IDF-backed)
controlled areas
showing disputed borders and other potential •§) -HarAvitalA 7~/'/. UN-controlled area
C of separation Palestinian refugee
camps
flashpoints and key equipment holdings including pre-1967 Land over 2000m
surface-to-surface missiles I S R A E L : Demilitarised Zones
above sea level L E B A N O
Land over 1000m
Palestinian towns Armaments Limits above sea level
Extended city limits
as decreed by Israel and villages 10km 10-20km
June 1967 Israeli settlements men 6,000
established before
May 1977 tanks
artillery
Israeli settlements
established since (up to 122mm)
May 1977 SAM
International border Towns
Israeli today
State/internal border (selected) Israeli pre-1967
Areas planned to
• Disputed border/cease-fire line be expropriated,
April 1995
I S R A E L Damascus
GOLAN I S R A E L
HEIGHTS
ISRAEL
Baghdad m
WEST
BANK KUWAIT
AND IRAQ
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Refugee camps
Israeli settlements
Bubiyan
Palestinian towns and villages Island
K^Warbah
Bubiyan
K U W A I T
lUl'fUIIUJIUUH OUU
KUWAIT ,.-_ Faylakah
iL
SINAI —-X Island
International border
sfeowins linitation of as demarcated by the UN)
Border (as shown by
EGYPT British mapping)
Bandar High-water line
Abbas Low-water line
The Tunbs
Zone C -V^ZoneD SAUDI ARABIA Abu Musa
BAHRAIN
Dubai AND QATAR
4 Battalions
4.000 Men
Abu Dhabi Char
No tanks
Border troops 180APCS Bahar
4.000 Men
Light weapons
1 Mech div only
22,000 Men
230 Tanks
480 APCs The
126 Artillery Gulf
126 AD arty S \l N A I
SAUDI
ARABIA Q A T A R
SUDAN
Armaments
Limitation Zones
Khartoum
ARABIAN
SEA
Oilfields
YEMEN-SAUDI STRAITS OF HORMUZ
Yemen Arab Republic claim (Philby)
18 October 1955 Saudi Arabia claim ARABIAN BORDER ERTREA
1935 Riyadh line
1935 Hamza line
S A U D I
1934 Treaty of Taif line/international border
A R A B I A YEMEN
1914 Violet line
Mam battle tanks
Artillery, MRL, mortars
(100mm and over) V Lesser Tunbr. e
Combat aircraft
DJIBOUTI Armed helicopters Ras al Khaymah
Surface-to-surface missiles
ETHIOPIA (with range of over 150km)
SOMALIA
3000 km
Scud-B
(same scale as map above)
M-11
© International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1995
13
UN Funding
The US has long sought to have its share of UN costs - 25% of all UN costs, and 31.7% of
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peacekeeping costs - reduced. On 16 February 1995, the House of Representatives passed the
National Security Revitalization Act which includes a measure requiring the Administration to
deduct from its annual UN peacekeeping assessment all costs incurred in direct or indirect
support of UN missions. These could amount to as much as the whole US share of UN
peacekeeping costs. The bill also prohibits placing US troops under foreign command and bars
the use of Department of Defense (DoD) funds for non-defence programmes. In another move, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved legislation calling for up to 50% of US contributions
to be withheld. Similar legislation is passing through the House of Representatives. Current
reports state that the US is roughly $1 billion in arrears to the UN. This arrears, together with
those of other countries behind in their payment, in turn means that the UN is often unable to
reimburse nations for their contribution to peacekeeping.
Gulf Security
The US Administration continues to bolster the security capability of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states. In October 1994, when Iraq moved two Republican Guard divisions south
towards the Kuwaiti border, the US promptly moved ground and extra air forces to the region.
Improvements to US force readiness, equipment prepositioning and transportation assets ensured
that this was completed in three day s; a similar deployment inl990would have taken three weeks.
The US now maintains an equipment stockpile for an armoured brigade in Kuwait, an agreement
has been reached to locate a second in Qatar, and the site for a third is under discussion with several
other Gulf states. The US Navy maintains a strong presence in the Persian Gulf, which can be
quickly reinforced by other naval forces in the region. In July, the US 5th Fleet was established
to take charge of naval operations in the Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. A number
of joint exercises have been held by US and GCC forces.
Bosnia-Herzegovina, providing protective air cover for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR),
and conducting air strikes at the UN's request against those threatening the safe areas) and
Operation Provide Promise (airlifting aid to Sarajevo), there are no US ground forces in Bosnia.
This has led to differences of opinion - not only between the US and its European allies, but more
significantly between the US Congress and the Administration - over the use of air-power and
the UN arms embargo imposed on all the former Yugoslavia. In November 1994, the US
withdrew its contribution to the naval operation enforcing the arms embargo on Bosnia when the
newly elected Republican majority in Congress ordered funds for the operation to be cut off as
the Bosnian Serbs would not accept the international peace plan. However, US naval ships
continue to take part in the economic blockade of Serbia and Montenegro, and to enforce the arms
embargo on other former Yugoslav republics. Since then, the Republican majority in Congress
has attempted to persuade the Administration to deliver arms to the Bosnian government and to
take a much stronger line with the Bosnian Serbs, including greatly increasing the use of air-power.
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On 8 June 1995, the House of Representatives added a clause to Bill HR1651, which is designed
to cut foreign aid by $ 1 bn, requiring the US to ignore the UN arms embargo on Bosnia. On 26 July,
the Senate passed by 62 votes to 29 a bill proposed by Senator Bob Dole requiring the President
to end the arms embargo either when requested to do so by the Bosnian government, or if the UN
withdrew from Bosnia. This would only be implemented 12 weeks after a Bosnian government
request for a UN withdrawal or when a withdrawal had been completed. The House of
Representatives passed a similar bill by 298 votes to 128. President Clinton vetoed both bills on
11 August 1995. It is still unclear under what circumstances US ground forces might be employed
in Bosnia (for example, to assist in the redeployment of UN troops and/or the withdrawal of
UNPROFOR) and Congress is opposed to any further commitment of ground forces.
Nuclear Developments
At their September 1994 summit in Washington, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President
Boris Yeltsin declared that they would work to ensure an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and achieve
global prohibition on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. They confirmed their
intention to seek early ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START II) Treaty and,
once ratified, the US and Russia would deactivate all delivery means reduced under the Treaty by
removing nuclear warheads or otherwise rendering them non-operational. They also pledged to
proceed with planning for START III negotiations. At the Budapest summit in December 1994,
the START I Treaty came into force following Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear
state (Belarus acceded in February 1993 and Kazakhstan in December 1993).
At their summit meeting in Moscow on 10 May 1995, Clinton and Yeltsin:
• pledged to cooperate in meeting threats of nuclear proliferation and to improve methods of
securing nuclear weapons and fuel against theft.
UNITED STATES 15
• agreed to ban the use in weapons, pending completion of a treaty agreed by all five nuclear-
armed nations on nuclear safety, of nuclear material taken from dismantled warheads, civil
programmes or newly produced material.
• promised regularly to exchange information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads and
fissile material and to arrange reciprocal monitoring of fissile material removed from
dismantled warheads.
They also reached basic agreement on a Statement of Principles to resolve their differences over
theatre missile defence (TMD), on the rapid ratification of START II in 1995, and to preserve
the NPT. When shown intelligence concerning Iran's nuclear-weapons ambitions, Yeltsin agreed
not to provide Iran with a centrifuge system to enrich nuclear material, but did not agree to halt
the sale of two light-water nuclear reactors to Iran. This matter was referred to US Vice-President
Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, whose Committee on Economic and
Technological Cooperation has been meeting at six-monthly intervals and which has successfully
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Strategic Forces
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), approved by President Clinton in September 1994, reviews
US nuclear doctrine, force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastrucr
ture, safety, security and arms control. Five basic themes emerged from the Review:
• nuclear weapons play a smaller role in US security than at any other time in the nuclear age;
• the US requires a much smaller nuclear arsenal than it currently has;
• the US must provide a hedge against the uncertainty of the future;
• the US does not have a national deterrent posture, but rather an international posture which
should be maintained;
• the US will continue to set the highest standards of stewardship.
The recommended force posture, confirmed in the annual Report to the President and the Congress,
while not altering the number of warheads the US plans to retain under START II, did identify ways
of reducing the delivery means necessary to carry them. The planned force will now comprise:
• 14 Trident SSBN (four fewer than previously planned), each carrying 24 D-5 SLBM each
with five warheads.
• 66 B-52 bombers (28 less than previously planned) armed with AGM-86B ALCM and AGM-
129 advanced cruise missiles (B-52H bombers count as 20 warheads under START II).
• 20 B-2 bombers armed with gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (counted as 16
warheads each).
• 450/500 Minuteman III ICBM each carrying a single warhead.
This force level is considered sufficient to:
• deter a hostile Russian government;
• maintain a reserve force capable of deterring other nuclear powers;
16 UNITED STATES
The US has continued to take nuclear weapons out of service. No Minuteman II ICBM are
operational, but because not all silos have yet been destroyed, a number of these remain START-
countable. A total of 41 ICBM launch silos at Whiteman and Ellsworth Air Force Bases had been
destroyed by December 1994. The number of deployed Minuteman III has increased by four to
533. Two moreO/i/o-class SSBN armed with Trident D-5 SLBM have been commissioned-one
in July 1994 and one in July 1995 - bringing the total number operational to 16. Three older SSBN
armed whhTridentC-4 SLBM have been decommissioned giving atotal of seven decommissioned
SSBN remaining START-countable. A further seven B-2 bombers have been completed and four
brought into squadron service. The B-l force, which is to have a purely conventional role, is still
START-countable as the rerolling of bombers is not permitted by START I; they will be removed
from accountability once STARTII comes into force. 195 B-52 bombers have now been eliminated
and only 148 B-52G bombers remain at the elimination site at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona.
forecast that PAC-3 will allow engagement of 'stealth' targets, produce a more lethal 'hit-to-
kill' intercept and will be a generally more reliable system.
• Navy Area Defence. Naval TMD will be based on the Aegis weapons system with which 38
cruisers and destroyers are already equipped. TMD will be provided by an improved Standard
missile (II Block IVA) with an upgraded aiming system and an infra-red seeker. An
unsuccessful test was carried out at the end of March 1995.
• Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). THAAD is designed to provide a far wider
defence capability in terms of both altitude (60 miles) and range. THAAD is an army-
developed system and its total cost, which could amount to $8.5bn, has been criticised by both
the Navy and the Air Force. The system would provide over 100 launchers with 1,400 missiles.
Despite the lack of agreement on what constitutes TMD as opposed to anti-ballistic missiles
(ABM), the Clinton Administration notified Russia that THAAD testing would begin in early
1995. One successful test flight (without attempting to engage a target) was carried out in
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April 1995. THAAD could be already in service as early as the year 2000.
The third phase, known as Advanced Concepts Programs, will consider the following systems:
• Medium Extended Air Defense System (formerly Corps Surface-to-Air Missile).
• Navy Theater-wide Defense System.
• Boost Phase Interception (BPI).
Conventional Forces
Ground Forces
There have been few changes to the US Army order of battle. Two independent armoured and two
infantry (theater defense) brigades have been inactivated, and two mechanised divisions await
inactivation later this year. A reorganisation is under way which will give the remaining ten
divisions three active brigades each; the third brigade of divisions in Germany, Hawaii and South
Korea will be located in the US. There will no longer be reserve 'round-out' (or third) brigades,
but there will be 'round-up' (beyond the third) permanently affiliated to active divisions for
training and support. There have been no major changes in the Army National Guard (ARNG),
but the number of independent battalions has changed. In a number of states, independent
battalions have been grouped together and given honorific brigade designations. Army Reserve
(AR) units, which now only have a combat support or service support role, have been grouped into
ten Reserve Support Commands and three smaller Reserve Support Groups. There is no change
to the command arrangement for AR units in Europe, the Caribbean and the Pacific. In sum, the
Army will be reduced by two divisional HQ and three brigades. The division based in South Korea
has been redesignated a mechanised division.
Active Army manpower has been reduced by some 27,000, ARNG strength by 19,000 and that
of Standing Reservists (who receive annual training) by 18,000. There has been little equipment
procurement over the last 12 months. Purchases include 38 more Fuchs Chemical Defence
reconnaissance vehicles; 90 more Bradley fighting vehicles; 120 M-119 towed 105mm guns; and
160 more MLRS (now all 700MLRS are ATACMS-capable (135km-range missile system)). No
new main battle tanks have been acquired and over 2,200 older models (M-48, M-60) have been
disposed of. Disposal of M-110 203mm SP has also continued.
There has been a very large reduction in the number of heavy equipment positioned in Europe
as stockpiles were disposed of and the size of the force reduced. Table 1 shows the numbers of
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty Limited Equipment in Europe now, compared with
when the Treaty was signed in November 1990.
The Army is following the Marine Corps by establishing its own prepositioned afloat stockpiles
carrying both unit equipment packs and considerable logistic stocks. Elements were already
successfully employed in the rapid deployment to Kuwait in October 1994, and to the port of
Mombasa tosupport thehumanitarian operation in Rwanda. A brigade with prepositionedequipment
18 UNITED STATES
can be operational within six days, while airlifting an entire brigade would take up to 28 days and cost
over $300m more. Army strategic mobility will be greatly increased when the requirement for
additional roll-on roll-off shipping is met and the C-17 Globemaster production programme is
completed.
" Increased to 349 when the Treaty came into force in July 1992.
To meet its long-term needs, the US Army has begun a complete programme of redesign from
the front-line back to the arms industry called 'Force XX1'. Key elements include improving the
use of information technology and the handling of large quantities of automatically collected real-
time information. To this end the Army Digitization Office has been established to develop a
master plan. A major experiment ('Army Warfighting Experiment: Desert Hammer IY) held in
April 1994 validated the view that digitisation increases lethality and survivability and allows the
tempo of operations to be increased. As a result, the Army plans to digitise one brigade during 1996
and a division and a corps by 2000. The Army is also heavily dependent on space assets for
communications, intelligence and navigation. Two new weapons systems are considered essential
to modernisation. The first is the RAH-66 Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter designed
to operate round the clock in all conditions of weather and battlefield obscurants. The second is
the Advance Field Artillery System, a 155mm self-propelled howitzer employing liquid propel-
lant, automated ammunition handling and advanced fire control, all contributing major improve-
ments to operational capability. Directly linked to the system is the Future Armoured Resupply
Vehicle for the resupply of both fuel and ammunition.
Air Force
While active Air Force manpower strength has been reduced by some 34,000, that of the Air Force
Reserve (AFR) and Air National Guard (ANG) has been maintained. Reorganisation has
eliminated one numbered Air Force HQ and 14 aircraft wings, but only one active tactical fighter
squadron has been deactivated. Two transport squadrons are now equipped with C-17 A strategic
transport aircraft and nine more aircraft have entered squadron service, bringing the total
operational to 20 (it is planned to buy a total of 120). Five Air Force and two AFR transport
squadrons have been deactivated. The Air Force has deactivated four tanker squadrons, but the
ANG and AFR have formed three more tanker squadrons each. The AFR has deactivated three
FGA squadrons and the ANG three FGA, three reconnaissance and six air-defence fighter
squadrons. About 100 F-15 and nearly 600 F-16 have been taken from the Air Force inventory
and the DoD hopes to sell these to provide funds for other Air Force procurement.
Naval Forces
Four more improvedLos j4rtge/es-class SSGN have been commissioned in the last 12 months. Two
Los Ange/es-class SSN and five Sturgeon-class SSN have decommissioned. The first Seawolf-
class SSN was named on 24 June 1995, and is scheduled to commission in mid-1996. There has
been no change to the carrier fleet except that the USSEnterprise has completed its long refit. Two
cruisers, the last 7>Mxto/z-class and the last Belknap-c\siS,s, have been retired. Five more Arleigh
Burke-cl&ss destroyers have been commissioned and two Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates from
UNITED STATES 19
the Naval Reserve Fleet will decommission by the end of September 1995. After a Congressional
delay in 1994, the Newport-class of Landing Ship Tank has been disposed of, with seven sold
or leased to five other navies. A fourth Wasp-class Landing Ship Assault has been commissioned.
Naval manpower has been reduced by nearly 40,000, of which 6,000 have come from Naval
Aviation. Two naval air wings have been deactivated, as have nine carrier-borne aircraft
squadrons. The last two squadrons equipped with F/A-18 A have been re-equipped with F/A-18C/
N and numbers of F-14, A-4 and A-6 aircraft have been reduced. There are now two Marine Corps
aviation squadrons based on carriers. In February 1995, the Navy formed a new Destroyer
Squadron to command naval forces in the Persian Gulf in the absence of a carrier battle group.
The Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS-1), normally stationed on the US east coast, has
been deployed to the Mediterranean.
During the year, the Naval Reserve's contribution will be greatly increased when the aircraft-
carrier Kennedy (currently in long refit), USS Inchon (the first mine-control ship), four mine
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countermeasure ships and eleven coastal minehunters are transferred to the Reserve.
Defence Spending
Fiscal Year 1995
The US government's request for national defence for FY1995 was $263.7bn. By October 1994,
the beginning of the new fiscal year, Congress had approved a Budget Authority of $263.5bn,
leaving the Administration's request for an additional $300m for contingencies involving
peacekeeping operations (PKO) unresolved. Supplementary funds of $299m to cover DoD costs
in Rwanda and Cuba in FY1994 were also approved. Congress made little change to the total
requested by the Administration, but took the opportunity to reallocate funds, as is its custom. An
extra $125m was made available to the B-2 bomber programme to avoid the closure of the
production line, and the pay rise to military personnel was increased from 1.6% to 2.6%.
However, the Administration's future planning received considerable criticism from Con-
gress. In presenting the 1995-99 Future Years' Defense Program (FYDP) of $l,295bn, the
government acknowledged that its proposed defence budgets were projected to be about $20bn
below the level required by the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. In contrast, a study by the government's
spending watchdog, the General Accounting Office (GAO), estimated the shortfall at some
$150bn. The perceived funding inadequacies have also sparked off another debate over the
extent to which the government was creating 'hollow' armed forces. The two controversies
caused some quick recalculations. The DoD adjusted its estimate of the potential cost overrun
to $49bn and announced the cancellation of the TSSAM missile, together with delays to several
other programmes that would save some $8bn. In December 1994, the Administration an-
nounced that a further $25bn was to be added to the FYDP largely to improve the quality of life
of military personnel and fund their pay increase. By February 1995, the DoD was able to claim
that the shortfall had been eliminated entirely by a combination of new and lower-inflation
estimates ($12bn) and an increased net saving of $12bn from lower-priority programmes.
In February 1995, the Administration requested a further $2.6bn in supplementary funding for
FY1995, largely to reimburse the DoD for contingency costs arising from operations in Haiti and
the former Yugoslavia and the deployment of reinforcements to Kuwait. The cost of the Haiti
operation alone has amounted to $lbn since October 1994. Failing reimbursement, the Admin-
istration claimed that the funds would have to be taken from other areas of the DoD's Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) budget- something that would adversely affect readiness. The request
was partially offset by $703m in unspecified rescissions from the defence budget. With its new
Republican leadership, Congress reacted by approving a larger supplementary authorisation of
$3.1 bn, but at the same time offset the supplementary funding by cutting lower-priority funding
and the so-called 'non-defense programs'. This resulted in the O&M budget being reimbursed
$2.7bn for PKOs and $360m for the Kuwait deployment, while cuts include $300m from the
environmental clean-up programme (under the O&M heading), $300m from the Technology
20 UNITED STATES
Reinvestment Project and $225m from the military science and technology budget (these last two
from Research and Development (R&D)). The question of PKO contingency funds is a point of
contention between the government and Congress. Although Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD) 25 of May 1994 established a strict set of criteria for US PKO participation, and also
clarified the financing arrangements, Congress' usual stance has been that contingency opera-
tions should be absorbed by the DoD without recourse to supplementary funding and that deficit
pressures forcing Congress to mandate supplementary funding should be fully offset with
rescissions from other areas of defence spending. The increase in PKOs and the growing aversion
within Congress to their funding have sharpened the differences between the executive, the DoD
and the legislature over the issue of contingency funds.
Request
FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996
Military Personnel 76.0 71.4 70.6 68.7
Operations and Maintenance 89.2 88.3 94.4 91.9
Procurement 52.8 44.1 44.6 39.4
Research and Development 37.8 34.6 35.4 34.3
Military Construction 4.6 6.0 5.5 6.6
Family Housing 3.9 3.5 3.4 4.1
Other 3.0 3.4 -1.3 0.9
Total 267.3 251.3 252.6 245.9
Real year-on change (%) -5.8 -8.4 -1.9 -5.3
66 Comanche attack helicopters will be cut to $199m, providing for the construction of two
prototypes, but no production orders. The future of the Comanche programme thus remains
uncertain, although it has so far escaped the fate of outright cancellation which seemed possible
in late 1994. In 1996, orders will be placed for the first 18 upgrades of AH-64 Apache attack
helicopters toLongbow standard, together with orders for theHellfire Longbow missiles. Under
present plans, the last batch of 60 UH-60Blackhawk transport helicopters will also be ordered in
1996. The UH-60 has been in continuous production for the US Army since 1978. Other expensive
programmes involve upgrades for the M- \Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley infantry fighting
vehicle and the 155mm M-109 SP gun Paladin, and the purchase of nearly 20,000 SINCGARS
radio sets and 551 Javelin 'fire-and-forget' anti-tank weapons.
Table 3: Department of Defense and Coast Guard Budget Authority by Service, 1993-99
(current year $ billion)
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Request
{1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996
The US Navy would obtain the largest funding ($75.6bn) and retain the largest individual share
(31%) of the DoD budget. In the 1996 request, two more DDG-51 Aegis destroyers would be
funded ($2.6bn), while some $1.5bn would be put towards the third SSN-23 Seawolf attack
submarine and a further $ 1.2bn for the development of the successor New Attack Submarine.
The last batch of 12 F/A-18 C/D Hornet fighters would be purchased, and initial funds provided
for the first of the E/F variant, which would be ordered in 1997. After prolonged uncertainty, it
looks as if the US Navy will order the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft for the Marine Corps, as
purchasing orders covering long-lead items for four aircraft are included in the $810m funds for
the programme (Congress has long supported the Osprey programme against DoD advice).
Refuelling and overhaul funds for the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz amount to
$222m for 1996 and a further $317m for 1997. Trident D-5 SLBM procurement will be cut from
18 ($742m) to six ($518m). 164 Tomahawk SLCM have been requested at a cost of $ 162m with
a further $ 141 m iorTomahawk R&D. Four re-manufactured AV-8B II+//amerswill be ordered
for the Marine Corps at a cost of $ 170m, and production of the upgraded Group II variant of the
EC-2 AEW aircraft continues with a request for three ($214m).
The 1996 Air Force request amounts to $72.6bn - 30% of the DoD budget. In keeping with the
overall DoD philosophy for 1996, the funding priorities mostly support the readiness and quality
of life functions. The request for 8 C-17s ($2.5bn) consumes 39% of the entire Air Force
procurement budget, while the R&D budget continues to be dominated by the F-22 ($2.1bn or
17%). The Air Force now intends to buy 442 F-22s instead of its original target of 648, and orders
for the first four are expected in 1998. R&D funding of the Air Force/Navy Joint Advanced Strike
Technology (JAST) programme, consolidated with the ASTOVL Harrier replacement pro-
gramme in 1994, receives a total of $300m. The UK also joined this programme in April 1995.
Procurement of 2 more E-8 JSTARS, together with further R&D, accounts for $662m; B-1 bomber
22 UNITED STATES
upgrades call for $174m; and the purchase of 291 AMRAAM (air-to-air missiles) for $233m.
Most of the question marks in the Administration's 1996 budget request concern strategic
systems - BMD and the B-2 programme - and the so-called 'non-defense programs' funded by
the DoD. In 1996, BMD is set to receive some $2.9bn - down from the 1995 request for $3.3bn
but about the same as the actual budget authorisation. The shift towards procurement ($454m
from $271 m) continues in conjunction with the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organisa-
tion (BMDO) plans to spend nearly $1.4bn by the year 2000 on anti-missile defence systems.
Despite pressure from the new Republican-led Congress to elevate the importance of BMD for the
continental US, the BMDO's funding plans continue to attach less importance to US territorial
defence ($37 lm in 1996 rising to $400m in 1997). Current B-2 funding covers the purchase of
20 aircraft with production scheduled to end this year. Negotiations between the DoD and the
manufacturer on further purchases appear to have stalled over cost. The 1996 request includes
incremental procurement funds of $280m and further R&D funding for $624m. This year
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Congress added $125m for the B-2 production base, and there may be further changes to the
Administration's request, as indicated by the House of Representatives adding funding for two
additional B-2, though this may not survive the authorisation process.
Defence programmes with longer-term and wider security objectives are especially vulner-
able to cuts, as Congress seeks to address the perceived bias against procurement and defence-
specific R&D. Particular criticism within Congress has been directed at the former Soviet Union
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar) and the Technology Reinvestment
Project. The Clinton Administration has requested $6.2bn ($6.3bn in 1995) for the Department
of Energy' s nuclear-related Environmental Management Program, while $2.1 bn is allocated for
the DoD environmental clean-up (about $200m less than for 1995), $500m for the Technology
Reinvestment Project, and $400m of Nunn-Lugar funds for demilitarisation in the former Soviet
Union - both of the latter at the same levels as in 1995, although each has been the focus of
retroactive cuts by Congress.
US foreign military assistance (FMA) is funded under the International Security Assistance
budget rather than by the DoD. The Administration's 1996 request for FMA (inclusive of
economic aid promoting peace) is $6.6bn ($6.4bn in 1995), most of which goes to the Middle
East. The two major recipients remain Israel ($3.1bn) and Egypt ($2.1bn), with the appropria-
tions steady at 1995 levels. Jordan, which received $7m in 1995, will receive $30m. The budget
will also maintain aid to Turkey and Greece at the same 10:7 ratio as in previous years.
To conclude, although the US was slower in reducing its defence expenditure than was
typically the case among NATO member-states during the latter phases of the Cold War, the rate
of decline in US defence spending since 1990 has been relatively fast, the more so if the
extraordinary expenditure incurred as a result of the Gulf War in 1990-91 is discounted. The bare
statistics suffice to prove the point. In 1996, defence will account for a projected 3.5% of gross
domestic product (GDP), and this proportion will decline further to 2.9% in 2000. By comparison,
defence accounted for 5.4% of GDP in 1990 and 6.4% of GDP in 1985.
1988 292.0 290.4 283.8 281.9 7.9 4.5 29.3 1,064.1 155.2
1989 299.6 303.6 290.8 294.9 8.1 1.5 30.0 ,143.2 152.5
1990 303.3 299.3 293.0 289.8 9.0 8.7 29.0 ,252.7 221.4
1991 296.2 296.7 283.5 285.8 10.0 9.8 31.2 ,323.4 269.2
1992 287.7 286.1 274.8 274.7 10.6 7.5 33.9 ,380.9 290.4
1993 281.1 283.9 267.2 271.4 11.0 7.6 35.5 ,408.7 255.1
1994 263.3 278.8 251.4 265.8 11.9 6.6 37.4 ,460.9 203.2
1995 263.5 270.6 252.6 259.1 10.5 5.9 38.2 ,538.9 192.5
1996" 257.8 260.9 246.0 249.5 10.8 5.5 38.0 ,612.1 196.7
19971" 253.4 257.0 242.8 246.1 10.3 5.3 39.5 ,684.7 213.1
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19981* 259.6 254.5 249.7 244.2 9.7 5.2 39.7 ,745.2 196.4
R
= Request ' = Projection
Note: The National Defense Budget Function subsumes funding for the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy Atomic
Energy Defense Activities and some smaller support agencies. It does not include funding for International Security Assistance
(under International Affairs), Veterans Administration, US Coast Guard (Department of Transportation), nor the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Funding for civil projects administered by the DoD (such as Army Corps of
Engineers projects) is excluded from the National Defense Budget Function and DoD figures cited here.
5 (1 ANG (not yet op)) with 93 B-1B. MISCELLANEOUS DETECTION AND TRACKING
6 (1 AFR) with 93 B-52H (with AGM-86B ALCM). RADARS: US Army: Kwajalein Atoll (Pacific). USAF:
1 with 6 B-2A (plus 3 at production site). Ascension Island (Atlantic), Antigua (Caribbean),
FLIGHT TEST CENTRE: 9: 1 B-52, 2 B-1, 6 B-2A (not Kaena Point (HI), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MA).
START-countable). GROUND-BASED ELECTRO-OPTICAL DEEP SPACE
AWAITING CONVERSION/ELIMINATION: 148 B-52G SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (GEODSS): Socorro (NM),
(87 ALCM-capable). Taegu (S. Korea), Maui (Hawaii), Diego Garcia (Indian
Ocean).
STRATEGIC RECCE/INTELLIGENCE AIR DEFENCE:
COLLECTION (SATELLITES): RADARS:
IMAGERY: KH-11: 160-400 mile polar orbit, digital OVER-THE-HORIZON-BACKSCATTER RADAR (OTH-B):
imagery (perhaps 3 op). 1 in Maine (mothballed), 1 in Mountain Home AFB
KH-12(/ton): 1 launched 1989. AFP-731: optical- (mothballed). Range 500nm (minimum) to 3,000nm.
imaging satellite with sensors operating in several NORTH WARNING SYSTEM: to replace DEW line. 15
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wavebands. 203km orbit, at approx 60° inclination; to automated long-range (200nm) radar stations. 40 short-
replace KH-11. Lacrosse radar-imaging satellite. range (110-150km) stations.
OCEAN SURVEILLANCE (OSUS): 4 satellite clusters DEW LINE: system deactivated.
to detect ships by infra-red and radar. AC:ANG:90:6sqn:
NAVIGATIONAL SATELLITE TIMING AND RANGING 3 with 45 F-15A/B.
(NAVSTAR): 24 satellites, components of global 3 with40F-16A/B.
positioning system. Augmentation: ac on call from Navy, Marine Corps and
ELINT/COMINT: 2 Chalet (Vortex), 2 Magnum, 2 Air Force.
Jumpseat; 'Ferrets' (radar-monitoring satellites). AAM: Sidewinder, Sparrow, AMRAAM.
NUCLEAR DETONATION DETECTION SYSTEM: detects
and evaluates nuclear detonations. Sensors to be deployed
in NAVSTAR satellites. A R M Y : 524,900 (69,800 women).
3 Army HQ, 4 Corps HQ (1 AB).
3 armd div (3 bde HQ, 5 tk, 4 mech inf, 3 SP arty, 1
STRATEGIC DEFENCES:
MLRS, 1 ADbn; 1 avnbde)(incl 1 ARNGbdein 1 div).
US Space Command (HQ: Peterson AFB, CO).
5 mech div (3 bde HQ, 4 tk, 5 mech inf, 3 SP arty; 1
North American Aerospace Defense Command
MLRS, 1 AD bn; 1 avnbde) (incl 1ARNG bde in 3 div).
(NORAD), a combined US-Canadian org (HQ:
2 It inf div (3 bde HQ, 9 inf, 3 arty, 1 AD bn; 1 avn bde)
Peterson AFB, CO).
(incl 1 ARNG, 1 AR bde in 1 div).
US Strategic Command (HQ: Offutt AFB, NE). 1 air aslt div (3 bde HQ, 9 air aslt, 3 arty bn; avn bde (7
EARLY WARNING: hel bn: 3 ATK, 2 aslt, 1 comd, 1 med tpt)).
DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM (DSP): infra-red 1 AB div (3 bde HQ, 9 AB, 1 It tk, 3 arty, 1 AD, 1 cbt avn
surveillance and warning system. Approved bn).
constellation: 3 op satellites and 1 op on-orbit spare. 1 inf, 1 AB bn gp.
BALLISTIC-MISSILE EARLY-WARNING SYSTEM 7 avn bde (1 army, 4 corps, 2 trg).
(BMEWS): 3 stations: Clear (AK); Thule (Greenland); 2 armd cav regt.
Fylingdales Moor (UK). Primary mission to track ICBM 7 arty bde.
and SLBM. Also used to track satellites. 1 theatre AD comd.
SPACETRACK: USAF radars Pirinclik (Turkey), Eglin 9 Patriot SAM bn: 5 with 6 bty, 2 with 4 bty, 2 with 3 bty.
(FL), Cavalier AFS (ND), Clear, Thule and Fylingdales, 3 Avenger SAM bn.
Beale AFB (CA), Cape Cod (MA), Robins AFB (GA), READY RESERVE:
Eldorado AFS (TX); optical tracking systems in New ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG): 387,000 (31,000
Mexico, San Vito (Italy), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia women): capable after mob of manning 8 div (3 armd, 1
(Indian Ocean). mech, 3 inf (2 cadre), 1 It inf); 20 indep bde (5 armd, 6
USN SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM mech, 9 inf (3 It)) incl 5 'Roundout' (1 armd, 3 mech, 1 It
(NAVSPASUR): 3 transmitting, 6 receiving-site field inf) forRegular Army div; 1 armdcavregt; 1 infgp(Arctic
stations in south-east US. recce: 4 scout bn); 16 fd arty bde HQ. Indep bn: 4 tk, 2
PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR ATTACK mech, 63 arty, 16 avn, 21 AD (41 HAWK, 7 Chaparral,
CHARACTERISATION SYSTEM (PARCS): 1 north- 1 Patriot, 1 Avenger, 8 Stinger SP (div)), 53 engr.
facing phased-array system at Cavalier AFS (ND); ARMY RESERVE (AR): 654,000 (119,000 women): 9
2,800km range. trg div, 5 exercise div, 16 cbt spt/log bde. (Of these
PAVE PAWS: phased-array radars in Massachusetts, 242,000 Standing Reservists receive regular trg and
Georgia, Texas, California; 5,500km range. have mob assignment. The remainder receive no trg, but
UNITED STATES 25
5 'Aggressor' with F-5E/F, A-4, F-16N. 1 with 3 inf regt (lObn), 1 tk, 2 It armd recce (LAV-
13 trg with T-2C, T-34C, T-44, T-45A. 25), 1 aslt amph, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 arty regt (4 bn).
HEL: 1 with 3 inf regt (8 bn), 1 tk, 1 It armd recce (LAV-
ASW: 20 sqn: 25), 1 aslt amph, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 arty regt (4 bn).
10 with SH-60B (LAMPS Mk III). 1 with 2 inf regt (6 bn), 1 arty regt (2 bn), 1 cbt engr,
10 with SH-60F/HH-60H. 1 recce coy.
MCM: 2 sqn with MH-53E/CH-53E. 3 Force Service Support Groups.
MISC: 5 sqn with CH-46, 1 with CH-53E. 1 bn Marine Corps Security Force (Atlantic and Pacific).
TRG: 2 sqn with TH-57B/C. Marine Security Guard bn (1 HQ, 7 region coy).
RESERVES (MCR):
NAVY RESERVE: 1 div (3 inf (9 bn), 1 arty regt (5 bn); 2 tk, 1 It armd
FTR ATTACK: 2 sqn with F-18. inf (LAV-25), 1 aslt amph, 1 recce, 1 cbt engr bn).
FTR: 1 sqn with F-14. 1 Force Service Spt Gp.
AEW: 1 sqn with E-2C. EQPT:
Downloaded by [Monash University Library] at 08:48 07 March 2015
ECM: 1 sqn with EA-6B. MBT: 271 M-1A1 Abrams (plus 151 M-60A1 in store).
MPA: 9 sqn with P-3B/C. LAV: 423 LAV-25 (25mm gun), 240 LAV (variants,
FLEET LOG SPT: 1 wing with 11 sqn with C-9B/DC- excl ATGW).
9, 3 sqn with C-130T. AAV: 1,322 AAV-7A1 (all roles).
HEL: 1 wing with 3 ASW sqn with SH-2G and SH- TOWED ARTY: 155mm: 584 M-198.
3H, 2 HCS sqn with HH-60H. MOR: 81mm: 656.
EQPT (incl NR): 1634 cbt ac; 301 armed hel. ATGW: 1,300 TOW, 1,978 Dragon, 95 LAV-TOW.
AC: RL:84mm: 1,300 AT-4.
F-14: 361*. -A: 233 (ftr, incl 48 NR) plus 12 in store; - RCL: 83mm: 1,919.
Bplus:77(ftr);-D:5l(ftr).F/A-18:777*.-A:274(FGA,
incl 36 NR); -B: 33 (trg); -C: 344 (FGA); -D: 126 (trg). AVIATION: 35,260 (1,240 women); 3 active air
F-5E/F: 32* (trg). F-16:11*. -N: 9 (trg); TF-16N: 2 (trg). wings. Flying hours cbt aircrew: 231.
A-4: 74* (trg). TA-: 74; 4F/J: (trg) (plus 68; TA-F/J: 58 AIR WING (no standard org, but a notional wing is
in store). A-6: 245. E: 127* (FGA, incl 20 NR); EA-6B: shown below): ac: 166 fixed-wing; hel: 155:
118 (ECM, incl 4 NR plus 25 in store). E-2: 93. -C: 91 ac: 48 F/A-18A/C, 36 F/A-18D, 60 AV-8B, 10 EA-
(AEW, incl 10 NR) (plus 7 in store); TE-2C: 2 (trg). P- 6B, 12 KC-130; hel: 12 CH-53D, 32 CH-53E, 30
3: 285. -C: 252* (MR incl 72, NR); EP-3:12 (ELINT); AH-1W, 21 UH-1N, 60 CH-46E.
RP-3A/D: 5 (survey); U/VP-3A: 5 (VIP); TP-3A: 11 (trg) AC:
(plus 6 P-3 in store). S-3 141. -A: 1 (ASW) (plus 16 in FTR/ATTACK: 10 sqn with F-18A/C.
store); -B: 119 (ASW); ES-3A: 16 (ECM); -US-3A: 5 FGA: 7 sqn with AV-8B.
(tpt). C-130:22. -T: 12 (tpt NR); -LC-130F/R: 4 (Antarc- ECM: 4 sqn with 20 EA-6B.
tic); -TC-130G/Q: 2 (tpt/trg) EC-130Q: 4 (CMD) (1 TC- COMD: 6 sqn with 72 F/A-18D.
130G/Q and 3-F in store). CT-39:9 (misc). C-2A: 38 (tpt). TKR:3 sqn with KC-130F/R.
C-9B: 19 (tpt). DC-9: 10 (tpt). C-20: 7 (-D: 2 VIP, -G: 5 TRG: 3 sqn.
(t P t)).UC-12:85.-B:65;-F:l0;-M:l0.NU-1B:l(utl).U- HEL: 34 sqn:
6A:2(utl).T-2B/C: 111 (trg)(plus23instore).T-39D/N: 17 ARMED: 6 It attack/utl with 84 AH-1W and 63 UH-1N.
(trg). TA-7C: 3 (trg) (plus 2 in store). T-44: 57 (trg). T- TPT: 19 med sqn with 180 CH-46E and 32 CH-53D;
45:44 (trg).T-34C: 272 (plus 42 in store).TC-4C: 3 (trg). 6 hy sqn with 96 CH-53E.
HEL: TRG: 3 sqn.
HH-1N: 37 (utl) plus 6 in store.CH-53E: 11 (tpt). SH-60:235. SAM: 3+ bn:
-B: 158 (ASW); -F: 7 (ASW). HH-60H: 20 (cbt spt). SH-2F/ 1 bn (3 bty) with phase III I HAWK.
G: 26 (ASW) plus 23 in store. SH-3H: 40 (ASW/SAR). CH- 2+ bn (5 bty) with Stinger and Avenger.
46D: 28 (tpt, trg). UH/HH-46D: 47 (utl). TH-57:129. -B: 48 UAV: Pioneer.
(trg); -C: 81 (trg) (plus B-2, C-6 in store). VH-3A: 4 (VIP).
MSL: RESERVES: 5,300 (300 women) (MCR); 1 air wg.
AAM: AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM- AC:
54A/C Phoenix, AIM-9 Sidewinder. FTR/ATTACK: 5 sqn with 60 F-18 A.
ASM: AGM-45SAr/Jte, AGM-88A/MKM (anti-radiation); FGA: 1 sqn with 12 A-4M.
AGM-84 Harpoon, AGM-119 Penguin Mk-3. 1 Aggressor sqn with 12 F5-E, 1 F5-F.
TKR: 2 tkr/tpt sqn with 24 KC-130T.
HEL:
M A R I N E C O R P S : 171,900 (7,600 women). ARMED: 2 attack/utl sqn with 36 AH-1W, 18 UH-1N.
GROUND: 3 div: TPT: 6 sqn:
28 UNITED STATES
TPT: 40 sqn:
plus 1 in store. VH-60A: 8 (VIP tpt). VH-3D: 11 (VIP tpt).
15 strategic: 4 with C-5, 9 with C-141, 2 with C-17.
MSL:
10 tac airlift with C-130.
SAM: 60 phase III I HAWK launcher, 1,929 Stinger,
Units with C-135, VC-137, C-9, C-12, C-20, C-21.
235 Avenger.
TKR: 25 sqn:
AAM: Sparrow, Sidewinder.
21 with KC-135, 4 with KC-10A.
ASM: Maverick.
SAR: 9 sqn (incl STRATCOM msl spt), HH-3, HH-
60 hel, HC-130N/P.
C O A S T G U A R D 37,300 (includes 3,000 women). MEDICAL: 3 medical evacuation sqn with C-9A.
By law a branch of the Armed Forces; in peacetime WEATHER RECCE: WC-135.
operates under, and is funded by, the Department of TRIALS: weapons trg units with ac: A-10, F-4, F-15,
Transportation. Bdgt are not incl in the figures at p. 23: F-16, F-l 11, T-38, C-141; hel: UH-1.
Bdgt 1992: BA$3.6bn
1993: BA $3.7bn
RESERVES:
1994: request $3.8bn AIR NATIONAL GUARD (ANG): 115,580 (15,950
PATROL VESSELS: 137: women).
OFFSHORE: 51: BBR: 1 sqn with B-1B.
FTR: 6 AD sqn.
12 Hamilton high-endurance with HH-65A LAMPS
FGA: 36 sqn:
Dolphin hel, 2 x 3 ASTT, 4 with 1 x 76mm gun, 3
5 with A-10, OA-10.
with Harpoon SSM (4 in refit).
25 with F-16 (incl 3 AD).
13 Bear med-endurance with 1 x 76mm gun, HH-65 A hel.
6 with F-15A/B (incl 3 AD).
20 Reliance med-endurance with 1 x 3 inch gun, hel
RECCE: 1 sqn with RF-4C.
deck (excl 2 undergoing modernisation).
EW: 1 sqn with EC-130E.
2 Vindicator (USN Stalwart) med-endurance cutter.
TPT: 25 sqn:
4 other med-endurance cutters.
20 tac (1 trg) with C-130E/H.
INSHORE: 86:
3 strategic: 1 with C-5, 2 with C-141B.
49 Farallon, 37 Point Hope{.
TKR: 20 sqn with KC-135E/R.
SPT AND OTHER: 12: SPECIAL OPS: 1 sqn (AFSOC) with EC-130E.
2 icebreakers, 9 icebreaking tugs, 1 trg. SAR: 3 sqn with ac: HC-130; hel: HH-60.
AVN: ac: 41 HU-25, 30 HC-130H, 2 RG-8A; hel: 39 TRG: 7 sqn.
HH-60J, 94 HH-65A. AIR FORCE RESERVE (AFR): 78,700 (15,450 women).
21 wings, 60 sqn (39 with ac).
COAST GUARD RESERVE: 8,000.
BBR: 1 sqn with B-52H.
FGA: 10 sqn:
AIR FORCE: 408,700 (63,700 women). 7 with F-16 (3 F-16C/D; 4 F-16A/B).
Air Combat Comd (ACC): 5 air force (incl 1ICBM), 23 3 (incl 1 trg) with A-10.
ac wg. Air Mobility Comd (AMC): 2 air force, 10 ac wg. TPT: 18 sqn:
Flying hours: ftr 238, bbr 238. 6 strategic: 2 with C-5A, 4 with C-141B.
TAC: 52 tac ftr sqn (sqn may be 12 to 24 ac): I1 tac with 7 C-130H, 4 C-130E.
13 withF-15. 1 weather recce with WC-130E/H.
7 withF-15E. TKR: 6 sqn with KC-135E/R (2 KC-135R, 4 KC-135E).
21 withF-16C/D(incl3 AD). SPECIAL OPS: 1 sqn (AFSOC/AFR) with AC-130A
UNITED STATES 29
armed hel:F-4:122.-E: 20 (FGA);-G: 54;RF-4C:48 (plus Units only listed - manpower and eqpt shown in
280 in store (incl 64 RF-4C)).F-15:726.-A/B/C/D: 414 (ftr relevant single-service section.
incl 146 ANG); 108(OCU,test);-E:204(FGA);(plus55 ARMY: (15,000):
F-15A/B in store). F-16:1,253. -A: 166 (incl 137 ANG, 5 SF gp (each 3 bn).
14 AFR);-B:48 (incl 31 ANG, 1 AFR);-C: 903 (incl 310 1 Ranger inf regt (3 bn).
ANG, 70 AFR);-D: 136 (incl 23 ANG, 5 AFR); (plus 347
1 special ops avn regt (3 bn).
F- 16A/B in store). F-111E/F: 95 (FGA) (incl 23 OCU);
1 Psychological Ops gp (5 bn).
plus 3 in store.EF-111A:40 (ECM).F-117:52.41 (FGA),
1 Civil Affairs bn (5 coy).
10* (trg), plus 1 test.A-10A:213 (FGA,incl69 ANG.41
1 sigs, 1 spt bn.
AFR); plus 169 in store. OA-10A: 167* (FAC incl 47
RESERVES: (2,800 ARNG, 9,400 AR):
ANG, 27 AFR). EC-18B/D: 6 (Advanced Range
2 ARNG SF gp (6 bn).
Instrumentation). E-8A/C: 3 (JSTARS ac). WC-135B: 2
(weather recce). OC-135: 3 ('Open Skies' Treaty). AC- 12 AR Civil Affairs HQ (3 comd, 9 bde).
I S O ^ . -A: 6* (special ops, AFR); -H/U: 21 * (special ops, 2 AR Psychological Ops gp.
USAF). HC-130N/P: 58 (28 special ops; 30 SAR incl 11 24 AR Civil Affairs 'bn' (coy).
ANG, 12 AFR); EC-130E/H: 27 (special ops incl 6 SOF); NAVY: (4,000):
MC-130E/H: 38 (special ops); WC-130E/H: 12 (weather 2 Naval Special Warfare Command (incl 1 trg).
recce, AFR). OA-37B: 1 (test, plus 13 in store). 2 Naval Special Warfare gp.
TPT: 5 Naval Special Warfare units.
6 Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams.
C-5: 126. -A: 74 (strategic tpt; incl 13 ANG, 30 AFR); • 2 SEAL delivery veh teams.
B: 50, -C: 2.C-141B: 184(173 strategic tpt, 11 OCU, incl
3 Special Boat sqn.
16 ANG, 40 AFR); plus 18 in store. C-130:529.498 (tac
6 Dry deck shelters (DDS).
tpt, incl 188 ANG, 110 AFR); 31 (trg, incl 9 ANG); plus
RESERVES: (1,400):
31 in store. C-135A/B/C/E: 6. VC-137B/C: 7 (VIP tpt). C-
9A/C: 23. C-12: 75 (liaison). C-17A: 22 (2 test, 20 5 Naval Special Warfare gp det.
strategic tpt). C-20:13. -A: 3, -B: 6, -C: 3, -D: 1. C-21:79. 4 Naval Special Warfare unit det (incl 1 comd).
C-22B: 4 (ANG). C-23A: 3. VC-25A: 2 C-26A/B: 33 7 SEAL team det (incl 1 veh).
(ANG); VC-26C: 1. C-27A: 10 (tpt). T-43A: 2 (tpt ANG). 2 Special Boat unit.
TKR: 1 engr spt unit.
KC-135: 551 (293 USAF, 201 ANG, 57 AFR); plus 2 cbt spt special hel sqn.
21 in store. KC-10A: 59 tkr/tpt. AIR FORCE: (6,000): (AFRES 1,110) (ANG 825).
TRG: 1 air force HQ, 1 wing, 3 groups, 13 sqn:
T-3A: 91. T-37B: 487 (plus 69 in store). T-38:497 (plus 4 with MC-130, 2 with AC-130, 3 with HC-130,
l42instore).T-39:6.T-41D/C:3.T-43A: 12.TC-135S: 1. 3 with MH-53 hel, 1 with MH-60 hel.
TC-135W: 1. UV-18B: 2. Schweizer 2-37: 18.T-1A: 80, RESERVES: (1,110):
TG-7A: 9. 1 wing, 1 group, 2 sqn (AFSOC):
HEL: 1 with 6 AC-130A plus 4 HC-130 (AFR).
MH-53-J:41 Pave Low (special ops). MH-60G: 13(incl 10 1 with6EC-130E(ANG).
AFR). HH-1H:21. UH-1N:66.
MSL:
AAM: A\M-9P/UMSidewinder, AM-7E/FJMSparrow, DEPLOYMENT:
AIM 120, A/B AMRAAM. Commanders' NATO appointments also shown
ASM: AGM-69A SRAM; AGM-86B ALCM; AGM-65A/ (e.g., COMEUCOM is also SACEUR).
30 UNITED STATES
NAVY: 900, MPS-2 (5 ships with eqpt for 1 MEB). NAVY: 800.
Naval air station, spt facilities. CUBA:
US WEST COAST: NAVY: 1,900 (Guantdnamo).
MARINES: 1 MEF. MARINES: 650 (GuantSnamo).
AT SEA: ICELAND:
PACIFIC FLEET: (HQ Pearl Harbor). Main base: Pearl NAVY: 1,450. 1 MR sqn with 6 P-3, 1 UP-3.
Harbor.Other bases: Bangor (WA); San Diego and Long AIR FORCE: 1,000.4 F-15C/D, 1 KC-135,1 HC-130,
Beach (CA). 4 HH-60G.
Submarines: 7 Ohio SSBN, 5 SSGN, 27 SSN. MARINES: 80.
Surface Combatants: 6 CV/CVN, 29 CG/CGN, 2 DDG, PORTUGAL (AZORES):
15 DD, 12FFG,4FF. NAVY: 10. Limited facilities at Lajes.
Amph: 1 comd, 3 LHA, 3 LPH, 7 LPD, 6 LSD, 6 LST, AIR FORCE: 950. Periodic S AR detachments to spt space
2LKA. shuttle ops.
Surface Combatants divided between two fleets: UNITED KINGDOM:
3rd Fleet (HQ San Diego): covers Eastern and Central NAVY: 150. Comms and int facilities, Edzell, Thurso.
Pacific, Aleutians, Bering Sea, etc. Typically 4 CVBG, AT SEA:
4 URG. Amph gp. ATLANTIC FLEET: (HQ: Norfolk, VA). Other mainbases:
7th Fleet (HQ Yokosuka, Japan): covers Western Pacific, Groton (CT); Charleston (SC); King's Bay (GA);
Japan, Philippines, ANZUS responsibilities, Indian Mayport (FL).
Ocean. Typically 1 CVBG, 1 URG, amph ready gp (1 Submarines: 7 Ohio, 3 other SSBN, 16 SSGN, 35 SSN.
MEU embarked). Surface Combatants: 6 CV/CVN, 23 CG/CGN, 5 DDG,
CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM): comds 16 DD, 23 FFG, 4 FF. Amph: 1 LCC, 2 LHA, 4
all deployed forces in its region. LPH, 6 LPD, 5 LSD, 6 LST, 1 LKA.
HQ USCENTCOM: MacDill AFB, FL. Surface Forces divided into two fleets:
ARMY: 2,050. 2nd Fleet (HQ: Norfolk): covers Atlantic.
AT SEA: Typically 4-5 CVBG, amph gp, 4 URG.
5th Fleet. Average Composition of US Naval Forces 6th Fleet (HQ: Gaeta, Italy): Mediterranean. Under op
deployed in Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea: 1 comd of EUCOM (see entry for typical force levels).
CVBG (1 CV/CVN, 2 CG/CGN, 2 FFG, 1 AO/AOE/AE,
2 SSN). (Forces provided from Atlantic and Pacific.)
KUWAIT: CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
ARMY: prepositioned eqpt for 1 armd bde (2 tk, 1 (CONUS): major units/formations only listed.
mech bn, 1 arty bn). ARMY (USACOM): 113,800 provides general
QATAR: reserve of cbt-ready ground forces for other comd.
ARMY: prepositioned eqpt for 1 armd bde (forming). Active: 2 Army HQ, 3 Corps HQ (1 AB), 2 armd, 3
SAUDI ARABIA: mech, 1 It inf, 1 AB, 1 air aslt div; 2 armd, 6
AIR FORCE: units on rotational detachment, numbers arty bde; 2 armd cav regt, 8 AD bn (2 Avenger,
vary (incl: F-15, F-16, F-l 17, C-130, KC-135, U-2, E-3). 6 Patriot).
SOUTHERN COMMAND (USSOUTHCOM): Reserve: ARNG: 3 armd, 1 mech, 3 inf, 1 It inf div;
HQ USSOUTHCOM: Quarry Heights, Panama. 20 indep bde, 1 armd cav regt. AR: 1 It inf bde.
PANAMA:
ARMY: HQ US Army South, Fort Clayton, Panama: 6,300. U S STRATEGIC COMMAND(USSTRATCOM):
1 inf bde (1 inf bn), 1 avn bde. see entry on p. 23.
32 UNITED STATES
AIR COMBAT COMMAND (ACC): responsible C-130. HAITI (UNMIH): 2,400, plus 47 staff. IRAQ/
for provision of strategic AD units and of cbt-ready KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 15 Obs.ITALY (Deny Flight):
Air Force units for rapid deployment. USAF: 2,000: 8 F-15E, 12 F-16C, 8 OA-10,4 AC-130,
US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 3 EC-130, 10 KC-135, 6 EF-111A. USMC: 12 F/A-
(USSOCOM): HQ MacDill AFB, FL. Comd all active, 18D. USN: 1 CV/CVN, 18 F/A-18C, 6 EA-6B.
reserve and National Guard special ops forces of all ADRIATIC {Sharp Guard): 1 DDG, 2 FFG, 1 PCC.
services based in CONUS. See p. 29. MEDITERRANEAN: 1 CVBG, 1 amph ready gp
US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (with MEU embarked), P-3C ac. FYROM
(USTRANSCOM): responsible for providing all (UNPREDEP): 546; inf bn, incl 3 UH-60 hel.MIDDLE
EAST(UNTSO): 15 Obs. WESTERN SAHARA
common-user airlift, sealift and land transportation
(MINURSO): 30 Obs. SAUDI ARABIA {Southern
to deploy and maintain US forces on a global basis.
Watch): USAF units on rotation, numbers vary (incl F-
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (AMC): responsible
15, F-16, F-117, C-130, KC-135, E-3). TURKEY
for providing strategic, tac and special op airlift, aero- {Provide Comfort): Army (1,560); Air Force (1,400). 1
medical evacuation, SAR and weather recce. tac, 1 Air Base GP with 18 F-16,6 F-15C, 3 EF-111,5
Downloaded by [Monash University Library] at 08:48 07 March 2015
FORCES ABROAD:
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: PARAMILITARY:
BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 3. CROATIA (UNCRO): CIVIL AIR PATROL (CAP): 51,000 (17,500
345. EGYPT (MFO): 1,000; 1 inf bn. GEORGIA cadets); HQ, 8 geographical regions, 52 wings, 1,700
(UNOMIG): 3 Obs. GERMANY {Provide Promise): units, 530 CAP ac, plus 4,450 private ac.
33
NATO
In almost every NATO member-state, military manpower and defence spending have been reduced
in the last 12 months; by 1 January 1995, nearly all had reduced their holdings of Treaty Limited
Equipment (TLE) to below their Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty entitlement.
Documents (setting out the scope of cooperation activities sought) and 12 Partnership Pro-
grammes had been agreed with a further eight still under negotiation.
The most important PFP development has been Russia's successful involvement. Although
Russia signed the PFP in June 1994 and submitted a Presentation Document in July, Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev, contrary to expectation, did not sign Russia's Partnership Programme
in December. He objected to the NATO Council's Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and
Cooperation agreed upon the day before as well as to plans for NATO enlargement, particularly
the drafting of a timetable for enlargement.
On 31 May 1995 at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),
Kozyrev accepted both Russia's Partnership Programme and a document on what is described as
broader and more intense dialogue between NATO and Russia. The key recommendations were:
• Improving information sharing on European politico-security issues (including basic security
information, military doctrine and strategies, conflict prevention, resolution and crisis
management, conversion of defence industry and transparency of defence budgets).
• Increasing political consultation on matters such as weapons proliferation, nuclear safety and
specific crises in Europe.
• Cooperating in areas such as peacekeeping, ecological security, civil science and technological
policy and humanitarian matters. ~
On 17 July, the first meeting took place between NATO ambassadors and a high-level Russian
delegation headed by its Ambassador to NATO, Vitaly Churkin. He proposed sending military and
civil representatives to NATO Headquarters to facilitate direct contacts and creating a 'hot-line'
for communication between NATO HQ and Moscow. NATO asked the Russian government to do
more to change the image of NATO as an enemy military alliance held by the Russian people.
Three PFP exercises took place in 1994 and 11 are scheduled for 1995. A great many other
activities, such as conferences and workshops, visits, exchange appointments and attendance on
training courses, are taking place under the PFP mantle.
NATO Enlargement
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided in December 1994 to initiate an examination to
determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide the process and the implications of
membership. They directed the Council in Permanent Session to make an extensive study. The
Council was careful to assert that it would be premature to discuss the time-frame for enlargement
or which particular countries would be invited to join NATO. Nevertheless, many assumed that
the study would spell out the rules for eligibility for membership. (The criteria for membership
was discussed in the 4 May 1995 issue of the IISS publication Strategic Comments.) The US
appears to be the keenest NATO member on enlargement. It had been thought that Germany also
favoured early enlargement, but Chancellor Helmut Kohl warned against 'building new walls'
across Europe and unnecessarily antagonising Russia. He saw the question of enlargement as
34 NATO
going hand in hand with membership of the European Union (EU). The UK parliamentary Defence
Committee, in its report published on 1 August, also warned against too rapid enlargement and
recommended that it should be gradual and cautious. It firmly believed that there should be no
membership of the Western European Union (WEU) without NATO membership, nor any
differentiation between the Visegrad Four and Bulgaria and Romania.
Eurocorps
There have been no changes to the organisation or role of the Eurocorps in the last 12 months. It
held a major exercise from 7 to 17 November 1994 and eight command post and troop exercises
are planned for 1995. Eurocorps is expected to be declared operational on 1 October 1995.
Anglo-French Cooperation
The formation of the Combined Air Forces Group was announced at the Anglo-French summit
meeting on 18 November 1994. The Groups's main objective is to strengthen the capabilities of
the two air forces to undertake humanitarian and peace-support operations. The group will
comprise a planning cell of some ten officers co-located with HQ Allied Forces North-West Europe
at High Wy combe (UK). Unlike Eurocorps, the Group will have no permanently allocated air forces.
Nuclear Developments
TheUKhas decommissioned a second (of four) Polaris SLBM armed ballistic-missile submarine
(SSBN). The first Vanguard-class SSBN, armed with 16 Trident D-5 SLBM, started its first
operational patrol in December 1994. The second was accepted by the Navy in January 1995. It
was announced in April 1995 that all free-fall WE-177 nuclear bombs would be withdrawn by
1998 and not, as originally scheduled, in 2003. The nuclear sub-strategic role will then be taken
on by single-warhead Trident SLBM. The third Vanguard-class SSBN will be operational by
1998. It is understood that the US will deliver seven D-5 SLBM annually until 1999. The UK also
announced in April that it had ceased production of weapons-grade fissile material.
Shortly after his election in May 1995 as President of France, Jacques Chirac announced that
France would resume nuclear testing at the Mururoa Pacific test site in September 1995. A total
of eight tests were planned after which France would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). The reason for France's renewed testing has been given as the need to validate the new
TN-75 warhead for the M-45 SLBM (and M-5 SLBM) (one test), to verify whether nuclear
triggers are still exploding as predicted (two tests) and to calibrate data for simulation technology
(four tests). France is also developing a new air-delivered stand-off nuclear weapon, Air-Sol
Longue Portee (ASLP), also requiring a new type of warhead, to be tested presumably by
simulation. The French simulation plan, Preparation a la Limitation des Essais Nucleaires
(PALEN), is said to be based on the use of computers, such as the Cray T3D and Cray T3E
employing a technique known as 'massively parallel architecture' x-ray accelerators and
megajoule lasers. The total cost of the project could be some $3 billion. The testing announcement
has produced strong negative reactions, particularly from Pacific Rim countries. Less commented
on was France's subsequent announcement of a study on whether the intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) site on the plain of Albion, where France has 18 S-3D silo-based missiles, should
be closed. The M-5 SLBM design would have allowed it also to replace the S-3D should that have
been considered necessary. The two squadrons of Mirage bombers previously considered to be
strategic forces are now classified as 'pre-strategic' forces.
SAM launchers and 40 F-16 FGA aircraft. 25 Mirage 5 fighters have been sold to Chile with
delivery to be completed in November 1995. The Navy has acquired four more mine countermeasures
ships: two US Aggressive-class (van Haverbeke), and two more Aster (tripartite)-class.
The Canadian Army has disbanded its only parachute unit following revelations about its
conduct in Somalia, but a parachuting capability will be maintained in some infantry battalions.
The last squadron of CF-5 (F-5) fighters has been disbanded and the aircraft put in store. The Air
Force has acquired five KC-130 in flight refuelling tankers and nine C-146 Bell medium
helicopters to replace three older types. The Navy has commissioned a seventh Halifax-class
frigate and two more will be commissioned this autumn.
TheDanish Army has been reduced in strength by 5,500. Fifty-six M-l 13A2 APCs mounting
a 25mm gun have been acquired and 24 RF-35 reconnaissance aircraft have been eliminated. The
Navy has commissioned two Wyve/Men-class (Stanflex 300) fast patrol craft.
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The French Army has acquired 14 more MLRS and its first Leclerc tank regiment will be
operational by the end of 1995; 42 tanks out of 134 ordered have been delivered so far. Leclerc
tanks are also being manufactured for the UAE. The Navy has retired two frigates, one Tourville-
class and one Commandant Riviere-class, and has commissioned the first of three Flamant-class
coastal patrol craft. The Air Force has disbanded two fighter squadrons and eliminated some 80
combat aircraft. An air-launched cruise missile, Apache, is being developed. There will be three
versions of it, one with a400km range, one for airfield runway attack and one for hard target attack.
All of the German armed services have reduced their manpower; the Army by 14,000, the Air
Force by 7,600 and the Navy by 1,600. The Navy has commissioned one Brandenburg-class
guided-missile frigate. The Army has now disposed of all of its former East German Army
equipments, except for 45 Mi-24 attack helicopters. From 1996-2000, the German Army will
implement a reorganisation aimed at reducing manpower (by 24,400) and improving readiness.
The resulting organisation will be complex - all the more so since some decisions over manning,
status and command structure have not yet been taken. At the higher-corps level there is little
change and three Corps remain: I Corps is a truly joint German-Netherlands formation command-
ing both German and Dutch units in peacetime; II Corps, while German in peacetime, becomes a
US-German Corps in war (as does the US V Corps); IV Corps remains a national corps. At the
divisional level where Divisional HQs are also Military District HQs, one division, the 14th, will
lose its district responsibilities which will be taken on by 6th Division HQ in Kiel which will then
no longer have an operational role. 14th Division will come under NATO's LANDJUT command
in war. There are no other changes to divisional affiliations (to ARRC, Eurocorps or the V US
Corps). The Air-mobile Forces Command (KLK) established to command crisis-reaction forces
(KRK) carries the alternative title of 4th Division. In future there will be five categories of brigade.
KRK-roled brigades, which have three manoeuvre battalions, will be fully manned in peacetime
and by volunteers (conscript volunteers will be required to serve between 12 and 23 months). There
will be six such brigades: two tank, one airborne, one light infantry (located in former East
Germany), one air-mechanised (still forming, to include an attack helicopter unit) and the Franco-
German brigade. In future, new recruit intakes for these brigades will be trained in other units to
enhance readiness. The second tier of four brigades will also have three battalions each and be fully
manned in peacetime. They and all other brigades have a main defence force (HVK) role. To avoid
creating first- and second-class formations, it is likely that some battalions in these four brigades
(one tank, one armoured infantry, one airborne and one mountain) will be KRK-roled with a similar
number of battalions in KRK brigades HVK-roled. The third category comprises four mainly
active brigades of three battalions; these brigades will also hold and maintain the equipment for four
mobilisation brigades which would form the fifth category if mobilised. The fourth category of
brigade (eight tank and armoured infantry) will remain on their current organisation of two tank
and two armoured infantry battalions of which one of each type is manned in peacetime while the
other would be mobilised and manned by reserves. In all there will be 22 peacetime brigades
compared with the current 24. Finally, a Special Forces regiment is being formed by concentrating
NATO 37
the Long-Range Reconnaissance Companies and other elements of the airborne brigades together
under the HQ of 25 Airborne Brigade which will be disbanded.
The Greek Army has eliminated over 500 tanks (300 M-47,220 M-48) and acquired 80 more
Leopard tanks. It also acquired 120 more SP TOW. The Air Force has ordered 60AlphajetVGA
aircraft from Germany.
Italian Army manpower has been reduced by 15% to some 30,000 men. While 70 M-60 tanks
have been eliminated, a further 54 Leopard tanks have been acquired. There have also been small
increases in the numbers of artillery, including 4 more MLRS. Air Force manpower has been
reduced by 5,500.24 Tornado F-3 fighters are being leased from the UK, of which 12 will have
been delivered by December 1995. The Navy has commissioned one more Pelosi-class and retired
oneTofr-class submarine. One De Cristofaro-class frigate has been retired and the last of the class
will also be retired in late 1995. The three Lupo-class frigates, built originally for Iraq but never
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Upholder-class submarines and paid off omBroadsword-class and the last Leander-class frigate.
A tenth Norfolk-class (Type 23) frigate has been commissioned. In March, orders were placed for
22 utility EH-101 and eight Chinook transport helicopters for the Air Force. In July, the decision
on the Army' s new attack helicopter was finally taken and 67 AR-64Apache helicopters have been
ordered from the UK company, Westland. The UK has completed its feasibility studies into arming
nuclear-attack submarines with conventionally armedTomahawk cruise missiles and has formally
applied to the US government to purchase an unstated quantity to enter into service in 1998.
1994 while the third development aircraft, the first to be powered by the mv/EurojetEJ200 engine
designed specifically for Eurofighter, flew for the first time on 4 June 1995. The flight testing
programme is going well and the Eurofighter is on course to enter into service in 2000. There is
some concern over the apparent development budget over-spend.
Defence Procurement
The end of the Cold War has brought great pressure for NATO governments to cut defence
expenditures. Procurement, inclusive of research and development (R&D) and in-service support,
accounts for 30-40% of NATO defence spending, and has been the target for large cuts throughout
the Alliance. Governments have generally achieved their immediate aims either by delaying and
cancelling programmes, or by reducing the unit quantities ordered (which normally has the effect
of increasing unit costs). These changes have induced a wave of mergers and acquisitions in
national defence industries, with firms seeking to consolidate their defence business by further
concentration and specialisation. Governments have encouraged the consolidation of national
defence industries, but so far continue to protect them because of their strategic and wider economic
significance. But pressure to cut defence expenditures is certain to remain, so procurement reform
is increasingly essential. Although over-capacity is as much a feature of the US as of the European
defence industry, the urgency for reform is felt most keenly in Europe, partly because cuts in
demand threaten industrial efficiency, and because of the ongoing process of European integration.
The principal policy forum for European procurement issues is the Western European
Armaments Group (WEAG), formed as part of the WEU in 1992 to promote cooperation in
European defence procurement. The European Commission (EC) has no responsibility in matters
concerning defence procurement under Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome. But since the WEU has
a double function vis-d-vis both NATO and the EU, the EC also seeks to influence the policy debate
within the WEAG, and can also claim to represent the new EU members which currently belong
neither to NATO nor to the WEU.
Confronted by the need for reform in European defence procurement, three policy options have
emerged in the policy debate and these are subject to increasingly vigorous bargaining within the
WEAG in the run-up to the EU's Inter-Governmental Conference in 1996.
The first option, usually most identified with France and Germany, is to establish acentralised
European Armaments Agency that would be ultimately responsible for the coordination and
control of all European defence procurement and would exercise a preferential European
NATO 39
purchasing policy. Advocates argue that the wealth and continuing integration of Western Europe
means it now possesses the economic resources to reduce its dependence on the US. Furthermore,
a 'buy-European' policy is justified in so faras it mirrors the 'buy-American' prejudice of the US.
Concentration of R&D resources and larger-scale production made possible by European
preference would improve the efficiency and international competitiveness of European industry
vis-d-vis the US, and help to improve the balance of payments. Frustrated by the lack of aEuropean
consensus, France and Germany announced in mid-1993 that they intended to establish a joint
armaments agency, which might serve as the forerunner of a larger European organisation, and
which is planned to be in place by the end of 1995. In late 1994, the two countries formally invited
their European partners to join them.
Note: Except in the UK case, defence procurement budgets exclude expenditure on equipment in-service support and supplies of
other logistic materiel which form part of the O&M budget. If included in the procurement, these expenditures would add an
estimated 10-20% to the total, thus adding significantly to the overall market value.
Source: National governments.
The second option, promoted by the EC, is more radical than the first. Like the latter, it
involves the creation of a centralised European procurement agency and an internal defence
market. An essential difference is that competition would determine the structure of European
40 NATO
industry. It follows that, according to this view, there is no role for the traditional protectionist
policies of national governments to support indigenous industries and their insistence on the
principle of juste retour as a condition for joining European collaborative procurement programmes.
The third policy option, promoted by the UK, seeks to balance the strategic and economic
benefits of European collaboration - perceived as strengthening the European pillar of NATO -
with the need to sustain a strong and competitive transatlantic defence market incorporating both
the US and Canada in the wider interests of the Alliance which relies heavily on the US for the more
expensive military technologies. Advocates stress the need for rationalisation of EuropeanNATO
defence procurement by further efficiency improvements in the management of collaborative
programmes on a project-by-project basis, but oppose all-inclusive centralisation and protection-
ism. In line with this policy, both the UK and Italy indicated in early 1995 that they intended to
join the new Franco-German agency, suggesting that it assume management responsibility for the
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large Eurofighter and Horizon frigate programmes. Critics of the Franco-German and EC
proposals also point to the recurring failure of many European collaborative programmes to meet
performance, schedule and cost targets - citing government indecision and poor project manage-
ment as two primary factors - and claiming that more centralisation and anti-competitive policies
would not improve industrial performance. Furthermore, they argue that state control of defence
industries (particularly in France and Italy) often mitigates against efficient transnational
consolidation, and that there is a stronger case for a transatlantic defence industrial structure
incorporating efficiency-enhancing transnational mergers and acquisitions - giving European
defence industries continuing access to US equity capital and technology transfer. Finally, the
critics point to the likely costs of the two anti-competitive European policy options. If there is not
to be a net loss in defence industrial capacity arising from exclusion of the US, spending on defence
procurement (particularly R&D) will have to rise to perhaps double its present levels, for which
there is currently little political will. Any decline in defence industrial capacity will inevitably lead
to a reduced defence capability. At the same time, this would also drive another damaging wedge
between the European NATO partners and the US.
alikes' (55 in store, 14 for sale)). IN STORE: Mirage 5: 28 (-BA: 13; -BR: 12; -BD: 3).
APC: 163 M-l 13 (plus 164 'look-alikes') (133/92 in MSL:
store), 198 Spartan (plus 112 'look-alikes') (25 in AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder.
store, 150 for sale). SAM: 24 Mistral.
TOTAL ARTY: 308:
TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 18 M-101 (10 in store).
SP ARTY: 198: 105mm: 20 M-108 (all for sale); FORCES ABROAD:
4
155mm: 41 M-109A3 (all for sale), 127 M-109A2 GERMANY: 4,250; 1 Force HQ, 1 mech inf bde.
(12 in store); 203mm: 10 M-l 10 (all for sale). UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
MOR: 107mm: 90 M-30 (incl 35 SP; 48 for sale); BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 94; 1 tpt coy plus 8 Obs.
120mm: 2 (for sale) plus 81mm: 285. CROATIA (UNCRO): 777; 1 inf bn, plus 6 Obs.
ATGW: 420 Milan (incl 222 YPR-765 (45 in store, 4 for INDIA/PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP): 1 Obs. FYROM
sale), 56 M-l 13 (13 in store)), 22 Striker (in store). (UNPREDEP): 1 Obs. MIDDLE EAST (UNTSO): 6
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AD GUNS: 35mm: 54 Gepard SP (all for sale). Obs. WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO): 1 Obs.
SAM: 118 Mistral.
AC: 10 BN-2A Islander.
HEL 80: FOREIGN FORCES:
ASLT: 46 A-109 (8 in store). NATO: HQ NATO Brussels; HQ SHAPE Mons.
SPT:32SA-318(16instore). WEU: Military Planning Cell.
UAV: 10 Epervier. US: some 1,500: Army 1,000; Navy 100; Air Force 400.
Army avn.
SYRIA/ISRAEL (UNDOF): 214; log unit.
RESERVES:
5 regt cbt gp (incl mot inf, arty bn).
PARAMILITARY: 1 arty comd, 1 arty, 1 AD, 2 engr bn.
The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is to merge with the 7 mil region (regt cbt gp or 1-2 inf bn).
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO-78 ships and EQPT:
vessels) by 1 April 1996. MBT: 411: 230 Leopard 1A5 (58 in store), 128
COAST GUARD: 5,200 (civilian-manned); some 83 Centurion (58 in store), 53 M-41DK-1.
vessels including: 1 cable ship, 1 hy, 5 med and 11 It AIFV: 56 M-113A2 (with 25mm gun).
icebreakers; 13 navaids and SAR vessels; 3 hovercraft; APC: 273 M-113 (581 incl variants).
plus ac: 1 DC-3; hel: 1 S-61, 5 Bell 206L, 16 BO-104. TOTAL ARTY: 553:
TOWED ARTY: 317:105mm: 184 M-101;155mm: 24
M-59, 97 M-l 14/39; 203mm: 12 M-115.
1 DENMARK |
SP ARTY: 155mm: 76 M-l09.
MOR: 120mm: 160 Brandt; plus 81mm: 422 (incl 55 SP).
ATGW: 140 TOW (incl 56 SP).
GDP 1993: kr 873.2bn ($134.67bn): RCL:84mm: 1,125 Carl Gustav; 106mm: 158M-40.
per capita $19,100 AD GUNS: 40mm: 36 L/60.
1994: kr 929.3bn ($146.09bn): SAM: Stinger.
per capita $19,900 SURV: Green Archer.
Growth 1993: 1.5% 1994: 4.4% ATTACK HEL: 12 AS-550C2.
Inflation 1993: 1.3% 1994: 2 . 0 % SPT HEL: 13 Hughes 500M/OH-6.
Publ debt 1993: 66.8% 1994: 68.7%
Def exp 1993: kr 16.67bn ($2.57bn)
Def bdgt 1994: kr 17.57bn ($2.76bn) N A V Y : 6,000 (incl 700 conscripts, 200 women).
1995: kr 17.09bn ($3.1 lbn) B A S E S : Kors0r, Frederikshavn.
NATO defn 1993: kr 17.39bn ($2.68bn) SS: 5:
1994: kr 17.43bn ($2.74bn)
3 Tumleren (mod No Kobben) SSC with Sw FFV
$1 = k r 1993: 6.48 1994: 6.36
1995: 5.50 Type 61 HWT.
2 Narhvalen, SSC with FFV Type 61 HWT.
kr = Danish kroner FF: 3 Niels Juel with 2 x 4 Harpoon SSM and 1 x 8
Sea Sparrow SAM, 1 x 76mm gun,
Population: 5,214,000 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 39:
13-17 18-22 23-32 MSL CRAFT: 10 Willemoes PFM with 2 x 4Harpoon,
Men 153,000 178,600 404,800 2 or 4 x 533mm TT, 1 x 76mm gun.
Women 147,400 172,600 390,200 PATROL CRAFT: 29:
OFFSHORE: 5:
1 Beskytteren, 4 Thetis PCO all with 1 Lynx hel.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: COASTAL: 15:
A C T I V E : 33,100 (8,300 conscripts, 900 women). 12 Flyveflsken (Stanflex 300) PFC.
3 Agdlek PCC.
Terms of service: 4-12 months (up to 24 months in
INSHORE: 9 Bars0.
certain ranks). MINE WARFARE: 9:
R E S E R V E S : 72,200: Army 56,200; Navy 5,000; MINELAYERS: 6:
Air Force 11,000. Home Guard (Hjemmevaernet) 4 Falster (400 mines), 2 Lindormen (50 mines).
44 NATO
MCM: 3:
2 Alssund (US MSC-128) MSC. FRANCE
1 Flyvefisken (SF3OO) MHC.
SPTANDMISC:8: GDP 1993: fr 7,082.8bn ($l,250.67bn):
2 AOT (small), 4 icebreakers (civilian-manned), 1 tpt, per capita $19,500
1 Royal Yacht. 1994: fr 7,308.3bn ($l,329.3bn):
HEL: 8 Lynx (up to 4 embarked). per capita $19,900
Growth 1993: -1.5% 1994: 2.7%
COASTAL DEFENCE: 1 coastal fortress; 150mm Inflation 1993: 2 . 1 % 1994: 1.7%
guns; 40mm AA guns. Coastal radar. 2 mobile coastal Publ debt 1993: 52.9% 1994: 56.8%
missile batteries: 2 x 8 Harpoon (not fully op until Defexp 1993: fr 193.8bn ($34.2bn)
1995). 1994: fr 199.3bn ($35.9bn)
Defbdgt" 1995: fr 202.3bn ($40.5bn)
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R E S E R V E S (Home Guard): 37 inshore patrol craft. NATO defn 1993: fr 241.2bn ($42.6bn)
1994: fr 243.7bn ($43.9bn)
$1 = fr 1993: 5.66 1994: 5.55
AIR FORCE:8,000(550conscripts,300women). 1995:4.99
Flying hours: 180. fr = franc
TAC AIR COMD:
FGA/FTR: 4 sqn with F-16A/B. * 1995 defbdgtreducedto fr 193.9bn in June following fr 8.4bn
cut in procurement.
TPT: 1 sqn with C-130H, Gulfstream III.
SAR: 1 sqn with S-61A hel. Population: 58,125,000
TRG: 1 flying school with SAAB T-17.
13-17 18-22 23-32
AIR DEFENCE GROUP: Men 1,938,800 2,080,200 4,408,800
AD: 2 SAM bn: 8 bty with 361 HAWK, 160 40mm L/ Women 1,850,600 1,984,800 4,276,400
60, 32 40mm/L70.
CONTROL/REPORTING GROUP: 5 radar
stations, one in the Faroe Islands. TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
EQPT: 66 cbt ac, no armed hel.
ACTIVE: some 409,000 (17,000 women, 189,200
AC: F-16A/B: 66 (FGA/ftr) (-A: 52; -B: 14). C-130H: 3
conscripts; 5,200 Central Staff, 8,600 (2,300 conscripts)
(tpt). Gulfstream III: 3 (tpt). SAAB T-17: 28.
Service de sante, 400 Service des essences not listed).
HEL:S-61:8(SAR).
Terms of service: 10 months (can be voluntarily extended
MSL:
to 12-24 months).
ASM: AGM-12 Bultpup.
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder. R E S E R V E S : earmarked formob: 337,000; Army
SAM: 36 I HAWK. 240,000, Navy 27,000, Air Force 70,000. Potential:
1,229,500; Army 915,000, Navy 135,000, Air Force
179,500.
FORCES ABROAD:
ICELAND: Navy: 30; 1 PC-3.
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES:
BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 285; elm Nordic bn incl 1 tk (17,000; some 1,700 Army; 5,000 Navy; 9,700 Air
sqn (10 Leopard MBT), HQ Coy plus 9 Obs and 5 civ Force; 600 Gendarmerie).
pol. Aircrew with NATO E-3A operations. Air Force NAVY: 80 SLBM in 5 SSBN.
personnel in tac air control parties (TACP).CROATIA SSBN: 5 mod Le Redoutable with 16 M-4/TN-70 or -71;
(UNCRO): 960; 1 inf bn, plus 3 Obs and 15 civ pol. plus SM-39£tocefUSGWand4x 533mm HWT(F17.2).
GEORGIA (UNOMIG): 6 Obs. INDIA/PAKISTAN AIR FORCE:
(UNMOGIP): 6 Obs. IRAQ/KUWAIT (UNIKOM): IRBM: 18 SSBS S-3D/TN-61 msl in 2 sqn.
44; spt tps, plus 6 Obs. FYROM (UNPREDEP): 45 BBR: 2 sqn with 15 Mirage IVP (ASMP: Air-Sol,
plus 3 Obs. MIDDLE EAST (UNTSO): 11 Obs. Moyenne-Portee nuclear ASM), plus 3 in store.
TAJIKISTAN (UNMOT): 4 Obs. TRG: 1 Mystere-Falcon 20P, 1 Alpha Jet.
TKR:2sqnwith 11 C-135FR.
FOREIGN FORCES: 'PRE-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES:
NATO: HQ Allied Forces Baltic Approaches
ARMY: 15 Hades SSM launchers (in store).
(BALTAP).
NAVY: 38 Super Etendard strike ac (ASMP); plus
NATO 45
(UNPROFOR): 3,826; 3 inf, 1 engr bn, 1 spt unit, 1 TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
ALAThel sqn (5 AS-332,4 SA-316); plus 5 Obs, 1 civ
A C T I V E : 339,900 (137,300 conscripts; 2,100
pol. CROATIA (UNCRO): 839; 1 log bn; plus 4 Ob-
active Reserve trg posts, all Services).
servers, 11 civ pol. EGYPT (MFO): 17; incl 1 DHC-6.
Terms of service: 12 months.
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Provide Promise): 1 C-
130.GEORGIA (UNOMIG): 5 Obs.HAITI (UNMIH): R E S E R V E S : 414,700(mentoage45,officers/NCO
2 Obs, plus 95 civ pol. IRAQ/KUWAIT (UNIKOM): to 60): Army 337,100, Navy 12,600, Air Force 65,000.
15 Obs. ITALY (Deny Flight): 7 Mirage 2000C, 4
Mirage Fl-CR, 6 Mirage, 2000KD, 5 Jaguar, 6 Super
A R M Y : 234,000 (112,800 conscripts).
Etendard, 1 C-135,1 E-3F, 1 N-262,1 C-135 (tkr), 1 E-
(Military District Command = MDC).
3F (AEW). LEBANON (UNIFIL): 264; elm 1 log bn;
Gendarmerie (11). FYROM: (UNPREDEP): 1 Obs. ARMY FORCES COMMAND:
MIDDLE EAST (UNTSO): 14 Obs. SAUDI ARABIA 1 air-mobile force (div) HQ with 3 AB bde.
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N A V Y : 28,500 (incl 4,500 Naval Air, 5,800 TRG: 1 sqn with Tornado.
conscripts and 330 women). MR/ELINT: 1 sqn with Atlantic.
Fleet Command organised into 7 type comds: Frigate; LIAISON: 1 sqn with Do-28/Do-228.
Patrol Boat; MCMV; Submarine; Support Flotillas; ASW: 1 sqn with Sea Lynx Mk 88 hel.
Naval Air; Naval Comms and Electronics. SAR: 1 sqn with Sea King Mk 41 hel.
B A S E S : Glucksburg (Maritime HQ) and five main TPT: 1 sqn with Mi-8.
bases: Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, Olpenitz, Eckernforde and EQPT: 54 cbt ac, 17 armed hel.
Warnemiinde. Other bases with limited support facili- AC: Tornado: 54. Atlantic: 16 (12 MR, 4 ELINT). Do-
ties: Baltic: Flensburg, Neustadt; North Sea: Emden. 28: 1 (environmental monitoring).Do-228: LM: 1
SS: 20: (environmental monitoring).
18 Type 206/206A SSC with Seeaal DM2 533mm HEL: SeaLynxM88: l7(ASW).SeaK/ngM/c41:22(SAR).
HWT (12 conversions to T-206A complete). MSL:
2 Type 205 SSC with DM3 HWT. ASM: Kormoran, Sea Skua.
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 13: AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder.
DDG: 3 Lutjens (mod US Adams) with 1 x 1 SM-1 MR
SAM/Harpoon SSM launcher, 2 x 127mm guns; plus
AIR F O R C E : 75,300 (18,700 conscripts).
1 x 8 ASROC (Mk 46 LWT), 2 x 3 ASTT.
FRIGATES: 10: Flying hours: 150.
FF: 8 Bremen with 2 Lynx hel (ASW7OTHT), 2 x 2 AIR FORCE COMMAND: 2 TAC cmds, 4 air div.
ASTT; plus 2 x 4 Harpoon. FGA: 4 wings with Tornado; 8 sqn.
FFG: 2 Brandenburg with 4 x MM-38 Exocet, 1 x FTR: 3 wg with F-4F (6 sqn); 1 wg with 1 sqn MiG-29.
VLS Mk-41 SAM, 2 x R A M , 21 Mk-49 SAM, 1 x RECCE: 1 wing with Tornado.
76mm gun, 4 x 324mm TT, 2 x Lynx hel. ECR: 1 wing with 2 sqn Tornado.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 36: SAM: 6 groups (each 6 sqn) Patriot; 6 groups (each 6
MSL CRAFT: 36: sqn) HAWK; 14 sqn Roland.
WAlbatros ( T y p e 1 4 3 ) P F M w i t h 2 x 2 Exocet, a n d RADAR: 2 tac Air Control regts.
2 x 533mm TT. 7 sites; 10 remote radar posts.
10 Gepard ( T - 1 4 3 A ) P F M w i t h 2 x 2 Exocet. TPT COMMAND (GAFTC):
16 Tiger ( T y p e 1 4 8 ) P F M w i t h 2 x 2 Exocet. TPT: 3 wings: 4 sqn with TransallC-160, incl 1 (OCU)with
MCM: 4 2 : C-160,4 sqn (incl 1 OCU) with Bell UH-1D, 1 special air
10 Hameln (T-343) comb ML/MCC. mission wing with Boeing 707-320C, Tu-154, Airbus A-
6 Lindau Troika MSC control and guidance, each 310, VFW-614, CL-601, L-410S (VIP); Mi-8S (VIP).
with 3 unmanned sweep craft. TRG: 1 sqn with UH-ID.
10 converted Lindau (T-331) MHC. FGA: OCU 1 det (Cottesmore, UK) with 18 Tornado.
10 Frankenthal (T-332) MHC. FTR: OCU (Holoman AFB, New Mexico) with 24 F-
5 Frauenlob MSI. 4E (17 F-4E leased from USAF).
1 MCM diver spt ship. TRG: NATO joint pilot trg (Sheppard AFB, Texas) with
AMPH: craft only: some 8 LCU/LCM. 35 T-37B.41T-38A; primary trg sqn with BeechBonanza.
SPT AND MISC: 42: EQPT: 488 cbt ac (25 trg (overseas)); no attack hel.
UNDER WAY SPT: 2 Spessart AO.
AC: F-4: 157: -F: 150 (FGA, ftr); -E: 7 (OCU, in US).
MAINTANDLOG:26: Tornado: 273 (192 FGA, 35* ECR, 28* OCU, 18* in tri-
6 Elbe spt, 4 small (2,000t) AOT, 4 Luneburg log national trg sqn (in UK)). MiG-29: 24: 20 (ftr), -UB: 4
*(trg). Alpha Jet 34* (trg); plus 72 in store. Transall C-
spt, 2 AE, 8 tugs, 2 icebreakers (civil).
50 NATO
160:85 (tpt, trg). Boeing 707:4 (VIP). A-310:3 (VIP, tpt). Airborne Early Warning Force: 18 E-3A Sentry
CL-601:7 (VIP). HFB-320:4 (in store). L-410-S: 4 (VIP). BELGIUM: 4,250; 1 Force HQ, 1 mech inf bde.
T-37B: 35. T-38A: 4 1 . Tu-154:2 (tpt). VFW-614: 3 (VIP). FRANCE: 15,000; 1 armd div (Eurocorps).
HEL: UH-1D: 104 (100 SAR, tpt, liaison; 4 VIP). Mi-8S: NETHERLANDS: 3,000; 1 It bde.
6 (VIP). UK: 28,600 Army: 23,600:1 corps HQ (multinational),
MSL: 1 armd div, 2 armd recce, 3 MLRS, 2 AD, 1 engr regt.
ASM: AGM-65 Maverick, AGM-88 HARM. Air Force Group HQ (5,000); 2 air bases, 6 ac sqn, 1 hel
AAM: AIM-9Sidewinder, AA-SAphid, AA-\0Alamo, sqn; ac: 52 Tornado GR1, 26 Harrier; hel: 5 Chinook,
AA-11 Archer. 5 Puma, 1 Gazelle.
I SAM: 216 HAWK launchers; 95 Roland launchers. US: 86,600; 1 army HQ, 1 corps HQ; 1 armd, 1 mech
288 Patriot launchers. div; Army 70,500, HQ USAFE; Air Force 16,200, HQ
FORMER GDR AIR FORCE (not being operated): 17th Air Force, 1 tac ftr wing with 4 sqn FGA/ftr, 1 cbt
sptwing, 1 air control wing, 1 tac airlift wing. 1 air base
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GREECE
FORCES ABROAD:
NAVY: 1 DD/FF with STANAVFORLANT.
GDP 1993: dr 17,760.4bn ($73.1 lbn):
1 DD/FF with STANAVFORMED.
per capita $8,200
1 MCMV with STANAVFORCHAN.
3 MPA in ELMAS/Sardinia. 1994: dr 18,362.6bn ($75.69bn):
AIR FORCE: US: 450 flying trg at Sheppard and per capita $8,300
Holman AFB; UK: OCU at RAF Cottesmore. Growth 1993: -0.5% 1994: 1.5%
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: Inflation 1993: 14.5% 1994: 10.9%
ADRIATIC {Sharp Guard): 1 DDG, 1 FFG with Publdebt 1993: 92.7% 1994: 87.9%
STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED, 3 Defexp 1993: dr 723.5bn ($3.16bn)
Atlantic MPA ac. GEORGIA (UNOMIG): 10 Obs. 1994: dr 740.2bn ($3.05bn)
IRAQ (UNSCOM): 44; ac: 2 C-160; hel: 3 CH-53. Defbdgt 1995: dr 772bn ($3.38bn)
RWANDA (UNAMIR): 8 civ pol. F O R M E R NATO defn 1993: dr 933bn ($4.07bn)
YUGOSLAVIA (Provide Promise): 1 C-160 1994: dr l,052bn ($4.34bn)
(Falconara, Italy). ITALY: 12 Tornado (8 ECR, 4 FMA 1994: $315.1m (FMF.IMET)
Recce) in direct support of Rapid Reaction Forces. 1995: $255.2m (FMF, IMET)
WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO): 5 civ pol. 1996: $315.0m (FMF, IMET)
$1 = dr 1993: 229 1994: 243
1995: 228
PARAMILITARY: dr = drachma
FEDERAL BORDER GUARD (Ministry of Population:" 10,455,000 (Muslim 1%)
Interior): 24,500; 5 comd (constitutionally has no cbt 13-17 18-22 23-32
status). Eqpt: 108 TM-170 APC; hel: 32 SA-318C, 13 Men 373,400 385,000 827,200
UH-1D, 8 Bell 212, 22 SA-330, 3 SA-332L. Women 349,400 365,800 782,000
COAST GUARD: 550; some 14 PCI, 1 inshore tug,
• e300,000 Albanian illegal immigrants and temporary
plus boats. workers lived in Greece in 1994.
FOREIGN FORCES:
NATO: HQ Allied Land Forces Central Europe TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
(LANDCENT). ACTIVE: 171,300(114,000conscripts,5,600 women).
HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Terms of service: Army up to 19 months, Navy up to
HQ Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT). 23 months, Air Force up to 21 months.
HQ Allied Land Forces Jutland and Schleswig- R E S E R V E S : some 291,000 (to age 50): Army
Holstein (LANDJUT). some 235,000 (Field Army 200,000, Territorial Army/
Allied Rapid Reaction Force Air Staff. National Guard 35,000); Navy about 24,000; Air
HQ Multi-National Division (Central) (MND(C)). Force about 32,000.
HQ Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF).
NATO 51
A R M Y : 125,000 (98,000 conscripts, 2,900 women). 205A, 17 AH-1P, 1 AB-212, 14 AB-206, 14 Bell
FIELD ARMY: (89,000); 3 Military Regions. 47G, 19 Hughes 300C.
1 Army, 4 corps HQ.
2 div HQ (1 armd, 1 mech).
N A V Y : 19,500 (1,600 conscripts, 1,600 women).
9 inf div (3 inf, 1 arty regt, 1 armd bn) 2 Cat A, 3 Cat
B, 4 Cat C. B A S E S : Salamis, Patras, Soudha Bay.
5 indep armd bde (each 2 armd, 1 mech inf, 1 SP arty SS: 8 Glavkos (Ge T-209/1100) with 533mm TT (1
bn) Cat A. with Harpoon LJSGW).
2 indep mech bde (2 mech, I armd, 1 SP arty bn), Cat A. PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 13:
2 inf bde. DD: 4 Kimon (US Adams) (US lease) with 1 x S M - 1 ;
1 marine bde (3 inf, 1 Jt arty bn, 1 armd sqn) Cat A. plus 1 x 8 ASROC, 2 x 3 ASTT, 2 x 127mm guns, 4
1 cdo, 1 raider regt. Harpoon SSM.
FF:9:
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4 recce bn.
2 army avn bn. 1 Hydra (MEKO 200) with 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2 x ^Harpoon
10 fd arty bn. SSM and 1 x 127mm gun (1 SH-60 hel, 1 DC).
1 indep avn coy. 5 Elli (Nl Kortenaer) with 2 AB-212 hel, 2 x 3
8 AD arty bn. ASTT; plus 2 x 4 Harpoon.
2 SAM bn with I HAWK. 3 Makedonia (ex-US Knox) (US lease) with 1 x 8
Units are manned at 3 different levels: Cat A 85% ASROC, 4 x ASTT; plus Harpoon (from ASROC
fully ready; Cat B 60% ready in 24 hours; Cat C launcher), 1 x 127mm gun.
20% ready in 48 hours. PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 42:
TERRITORIAL DEFENCE: (36,000). CORVETTES: 5 M i (ex-Ge Thetis) (ASW) with 1 x 4
Higher Mil Comd of Interior and Islands HQ. ASW RL, 4 x 533mm TT.
4 Mil Comd HQ (incl Athens). MSL CRAFT: 18:
1 inf div. 14 Laskos (Fr La Combattante II/III) PFM, 8 with 4
4 AD arty bn. x MM-38 Exocet, 6 with 6 Penguin 2 SSM, all
2 inf regt. with 2 x 533mm TT.
1 army avn bn. 2 /. Votis (Fr La Combattante IIA) PFM with 2 x 2
1 para regt. MM-38 Exocet.
8 fd arty bn. 2 Stamou, with 4 x SS-12 SSM.
R E S E R V E S (National Guard): 34,000; internal TORPEDO CRAFT: 10:
security role. 6 Hesperos (Ge Jaguar) PFT with 4 x 533mm TT.
EQPT: 4 No 'Nasty' PFT with 4 x 533mm TT.
MBT: 2,268: 89 M-47 (in store), 998 M-48 (102,45 A2, PATROL CRAFT: 9:
137 A3, 714 A5), 671 M-60 (359 Al, 312 A3), 154 COASTAL: 4:
AMX-30 (in store), 356 Leopard (170 1A4, 109 1A3). 2 Armatolos (Dk Osprey) PCC, 2 Pirpolitis PCC.
RECCE: 48 M-8. INSHORE: 5:
AIFV: 96 AMX-10P, 500 BMP-1. 2 Tolmi, 3 PCI.
APC: 2,072: 245 Leonidas, 365 M-59, 1,462 M-l 13. MINE WARFARE: 16:
TOTAL ARTY: 2,168: MINELAYERS: 2 Aktion (US LSM-1) (100-130 mines).
TOWED ARTY: 830: 105mm: 18 M-56, 461 M-l01; MCM: 14:
140mm: 2 5.5-in; 155mm: 268 M-l 14; 203mm: 81 9 Alkyon (US MSC-294) MSC.
M-115. 5 Atalanti (US Adjutant) MSC.
SP ARTY: 415: 105mm: 73 M-52; 155mm: 16 M- AMPH: 10:
44A1, 133 M-109A1/A2, 175mm: 12 M-107; 1 Samos LST with hel deck: capacity 300 tps, 16 tk.
203mm: 181 M-110A2. 1 Nafkratoussa (US Cabildo) LSD: capacity 200 tps,
MRL: 122mm: 150RM-70. 18 tk, 1 hel.
MOR: 107mm: 773 M-30 (incl 168 SP); plus 81mm: 690. 2 Inouse (US County) LST: capacity 400 tps, 18 tk.
ATGW: 290 Milan, 300 TOW (incl 156 SP). 4 Ikaria (US LST-5I0): capacity 200 tps, 16 tk.
RL:64mm: RPG-I8. 2 Ipopliarhos Grigoropoulos (US LSM-1) LSM,
RCL:90mm: 1,346 EM-67; 106mm: 1,313 M-40A1. capacity 50 tps, 4 tk.
Plus about 65 craft: 2 LCT, 8 LCU, 13 LCM, some42 LCVP.
AD GUNS: 20mm: 101 Rh-202 twin; 23mm: 300 ZU-
SPTANDMISC: 14:
23-2; 40mm: 227 M-l, 95 M-42A twin SP.
2 AOT, 4 AOT (small), \Axios (ex-GeLUneburg) log
SAM: 42 I HAWK, 12SA-8B. spt, 1 AE, 5 AGHS, 1 trg.
SURV: AN/TPQ-36 (arty, mor).
AC: 1 Aero Commander, 1 Super King Air, 47 U-17A.
NAVAL AIR: 16 armed hel.
HEL: 9 CH-47D (1 in store), 111 UH-1D/H/AB-
52 NATO
ASW: 1 hel div: 2 sqn with 9 AB-212 (ASW), 2 AB- (UNOMIG): 5 Obs. IRAQ/KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 7 Obs.
212 (EW), 2 SA-319 (ASW), 5 S-70B (ASW).
PARAMILITARY:
AIR F O R C E : 26,800 (14,400 conscripts, 1,100 GENDARMERIE: 26,500; MOWAG Roland, 15
women). UR-416 APC, 6 NH-300 hel.
TAC AIR FORCE: 8 cbt wings, 1 tpt wing. COAST GUARD AND CUSTOMS: 4,000; some
FGA: 7 sqn: 100 patrol craft, 2 CessnaC«/te.r, 2 TB-20Trinidad ac.
2 with A-7H.
1 with F-16.
3 with A-7E.
FOREIGN FORCES:
1 with F-4E. US: 550: Navy facilities at Soudha Bay; 2 air base gp.
FTR: 10 sqn:
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1 ITALY |
RESERVES: on mob: 1 armd, 1 mech, 1 mtn bde.
EQPT:
MBT: 1,319: 167 M-60A1 (in store), 910 Leopard,
GDP 1993: L l,55O,2OObn ($985.1bn): 242 Centauro B-l.
per capita $18,000 APC: 1,180 M-l 13,1,792 VCC1/-2,44 Fiat 6614,15
1994: L 1,641,lOObn ($l,017.8bn): LVTP-7.
per capita $18,400 TOTAL ARTY: 1,946:
Growth 1993: -1.2% 1994: 2.2% TOWED ARTY: 945:105mm: 347 Model 56 pack (233
Inflation 1993: 4.5% 1994: 4.0% in store); 155mm: 164 FH-70,423 M-l 14 (in store);
Publ debt 1993: 120.2% 1994: 122.6% 203mm: 11 M-l 15.
Def exp 1993: L25,965bn ($16.5bn) SP ARTY: 286:155mm: 260 M-109G/-L; 203mm: 26
Def bdgt 1994: L26,167bn ($16.2bn) M-110A2.
1995: L 26,500bn ($16.0bn) MRL: 227mm: 22 MLRS.
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NATO defn 1993: L 32,364bn ($20.6bn) MOR: 120mm: 693 (389 in store); plus 81mm: 1,205
1994: L34,179bn($21.2bn) (381 in store).
$1 = L 1993: 1,574 1994: 1,612 ATGW: 326 TOW (incl 270 SP), 804 Milan.
1995: 1,652 RL: 1,000 A PILAS.
L = lira RCL: 80mm: 720 Folgore.
AD GUNS: 25mm: 213 SIDAM SP; 40mm: 234.
Population: 57,867,000 SAM: 126 HAWK, 145 Stinger.
13-17 18-22 23-32 AC:33:30SM-1019, 3 Do-228.
Men 1,748,000 2,102,400 4,751,200 HEL: 27 A-109,28 A-129,91 AB-205A, 102 AB-206
Women 1,662,400 2,011,200 4,616,400 (obs), 14 AB-212, 23 AB-412, 34 CH-47C.
UAV: CL-89 (AN/USD-501), Mirach 20/-150.
4 Cassiopea with 1 AB-212 hel. EQPT: 369 cbt ac (plus 87 in store), no armed hel.
2 Storione (US Aggressive) ex-MSO. AC: Tornado: 82: GRA: 70 (66 FGA, 4* in tri-national
PATROL, COASTAL: 4 Bambu (ex-MSC) PCC sqn) plus 21 in store. F-3: 12. F-104: 112: -ASA: 99, plus
assigned MFO. 41 in store; TF104G: 13, plus 9 in store. AMX: 67: 65
MINE WARFARE: 13: (FGA); -T: 2* (trg). G-91: 58: -Y: 15; -T: 43; plus 7 in
MCM: 13: store. MB-339: 78 (13 tac, 60 (incl 50*) trg, 5 calibra-
lOLenciMHC. tion), plus 9 in store. Atlantic: 18 (MR). Boeing-707-320:
3 Castagno (US Adjutant) MHC. 2 (tkr/tpt). C-130H: 12 (tpt). G-222:45 (40 tpt, 4 calibra-
AMPH: 3 San Giorgio LPD: capacity 350 tps, 30 tion), -GE: 1 (ECM). DC9-32: 2 (VIP). Gulfstream III: 2
trucks, 2 SH-3D or CH-47 hel, 7 craft. (VIP).Fa/con50:4(VIP).P-166:l4(-M:8;-DL3:6Iiaison
Plus some 30 craft: about 3 LCU, 10 LCM and 20 LCVP. and trg). P-180: 5 (liaison); PD-808: 18 (ECM, calibra-
SPT AND MISC: 42: tion, VIP tpt); SF-260M: 39 (trg). SIAI-208: 36 (liaison).
2 Stromboli AO, 8 tugs, 9 coastal tugs, 6 water tkr, 4 HEL: HH-3F: 33 (SAR). SH-3D: 2 (liaison). AB-212: 36
trials, 2 trg, 3 AGOR, 6 tpt, 2 salvage. (SAR). AB-47G: 6 (trg). NH-500D: 53 (trg).
SPECIAL FORCES (Special Forces Comd - MSL:
COMSUBIN): ASM: AGM-88 HARM.
3 gp; 1 underwater ops; 1 school; 1 research. AAM: AIM-7ES/?am»v, AlM-9B/LSidewinder,Aspide.
SAM: 96 Nike Hercules, 7 bty Spada, ASPIDE.
MARINES (San Marco gp): (1,500).
1 bn gp.
1 trg gp. FORCES ABROAD:
1 log gp. GERMANY: 93; Air Force, NAEW Force.
EQPT: 30 VCC-1,10 LVTP-7 APC, 16 81 mm mor, 8 MALTA: 16; Air Force with 1 AB-212.
106mm RCL, 6 Milan ATGW. UK: 21; tri-national Tornado sqn with 4 ac.
US: 26 flying trg.
NAVAL AIR: (1,600); 7 cbt ac, 74 armed hel. UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
FGA: 5 AV-8B II, plus, 2* TAV-8B. ADRIATIC (Sharp Guard): 2 FFG. EGYPT (MFO):
ASW: 5 hel sqn with 30 SH-3D, 54 AB-212. 82; 3 PCC. INDIA/PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP): 7
ASM: Mane Mk 2. Obs. IRAQ (UNSCOM): 1 Obs. IRAQ/KUWAIT
(UNIKOM): 6 Obs. LEBANON (UNIFIL): 44; hel
unit.MIDDLEEAST(UNTSO):8Obs.WESTERN
A I R F O R C E : 67,800 (25,500 conscripts). SAHARA (MINURSO): 6 Obs.
FGA: 8 sqn:
4 with Tornado.
1 withG-91Y. PARAMILITARY:
3 with AMX. CARABINIERI (Ministry of Defence): 111,800:
CAS: 1 It attack sqn with MB-339. Territorial: 5 bde, 17 regt, 96 gp; Trg: 1 bde; Mobile def:
FTR: 8 sqn: 2 bde, 1 cav regt, 1 special ops gp, 13 mobile bn, 1 AB
7withF-104ASA. bn, avn and naval units.
1 with Tornado F-3. EQPT: 48 Fiat 6616 armd cars; 40 VCC2, 91 M-113
RECCE: 2 sqn with AMX. APC; 24 A-109,4 AB-205,40 AB-206,17 AB-412 hel.
MR: 2 sqn with Atlantic (Navy-assigned). PUBLIC SECURITY G U A R D (Ministry of
EW: 1 ECM/recce sqn with G-222VS, PD-808. Interior): 80,400:11 mobile units; 40 Fiat 6614 APC.ac:
CALIBRATION: 1 navigation-aid calibration sqn with 3 P-64B, 5 P-68; hel: 12 A-109, 20 AB-206,9 AB-212.
NATO 55
FINANCE GUARDS (Treasury Department): 64,100; Population: 406,000 (119,700 foreign citizens)
14 Zones, 20 Legions, 128gps;ac:5P-166-DL3;heI: 15 13-17 J8-22 23-32
A-109,66 Breda-Nardi NH-500M/MC/MD; 3 PCI, 65; Men 12,000 12,000 31,000
plus about 300 boats. Women 11,400 12,200 30,400
HARBOUR CONTROL (Capitanerie di Porto)
(subordinated to Navy in emergencies): some 12
PCI, 130+boats. TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
ACTIVE: 800.
FOREIGN FORCES:
NATO: HQ Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). ARMY: 800.
HQ 5 Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF). 1 It inf bn.
US: 12,700: Army (2,800); 1 AB bn gp; Navy (6,800);
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EQPT:
Air Force (3,200); 2 ftr sqn with 36 F-16C/D.
OPERATION DENY FLIGHT: France (7 Mirage APC: 5 Commando.
2000C, 4 Mirage Fl-CR, 4 Mirage F-1CT (on call), 6 MOR: 81mm: 6.
Mirage2000KD,6SuperEtendard, 5 Jaguar, 1 E-3F, 1 ATGW: TOW some 6 SP (Hummer).
C-135), NATO (8 E-3A), Netherlands (12 F-16), Spain Rl-.LAW.
(8 F/A -18,2 KC-130 (tkr), 1 CAS A 212 (sptac)), Turkey
(8 F-16), UK (6 Tornado F-3, 8 Harrier GR-7, 6 Sea
Harrier, 2 K-l Tristar (tkr), 3 E-3D Sentry), US (8 F- AIR F O R C E : (none, butfor legal purposes NATO's
15E, 12F/A-18D(USMC), 12F-16C(USAF), 12F/A- E-3A AEW ac have Luxembourg registration).
18C (USN), 8 OA-10 (US AF), 6 A-6E (USN), 3 EC-130, 1 sqn with 18 E-3A Sentry (NATO Standard), 2
4 AC-130,10 KC-135,6 EF-111A (USAF), 12 EA-6B/ Boeing 707 (trg).
E (USN). (Numbers as of 3 August 1995.)
Note: Germany provides 12 Tornado (8 ECR, 4 recce) in
direct support of Rapid Reaction Forces. PARAMILITARY:
OPERATION SHARP GUARD-.Omada 1 FFH.France GENDARMERIE: 560.
1 FF, Germany 1 DDG, 1 FFG, Greece 1 FFG, Italy 2
FFG, Netherlands 1 FF, 1 FFG, Portugal 1 FF, Spain 1
FF, 1 FFG, Turkey 1 FFG, UK 1 DDG, 1 FFG, USA 1 NETHERLANDS
DDG, 2 FFG, 1 PCC. Maritime aircraft from France
(Atlantic ac), Germany (Atlantic ac), Italy (Atlantic, 8
Tornado), Netherlands (P-3C ac), Portugal (P-3P ac), GDP 1993: gld 574.3bn ($309.2bn):
Spain (P-3B ac), UK (Nimrod ac), US (P-3C ac). (Num- per capita $18,000
bers as of 3 August 1995.) 1994: gld 600.3bn ($329.8bn):
per capita $18,300
UNHCR OPERATIONS: Canada(lC-130), Germany
Growth 1993: 0.4% 1994: 2.5%
(1 MD-16), UK (1 C-130), UN (1 IL), US (C-130).
Inflation 1993: 2.1% 1994: 2.8%
Publ debt 1993: 78.5% 1994: 79.0%
Def exp 1993: gld 14.09bn ($7.58bn)
| LUXEMBOURG Def bdgt 1994: gld 13.50bn ($7.42bn)
1995: gld 13.51bn ($8.56bn)
GDP 1993: fr 347.6bn ($10.1bn) NATO defn 1993: gld 14.1bn ($7.6bn)
per capita $20,900 1994: gld 12.9bn ($7.1bn)
1994: fr 355.3bn ($10.6bn) $1 = gld 1993: 1.86 1994: 1.82
per capita $21,200 1995: 1.58
Growth 1993: 1.7% 1994: 2.7% gld = guilder
Inflation 1993: 3.6% 1994: 2.2%
Publ debt 1993: 3.0% 1994: 3.1% Population: 15,446,000
Defexp 1993: fr 3.4bn ($98m) 13-17 J8-22 23-32
Defbdgt 1994: fr 3.7bn ($11 lm) Men 444,800 511,600 1,281,800
1995: Fr3.8bn($114m) Women 425,800 488,200 1,215,200
NATOdefn 1993: fr 3.7bn ($108m)
1994: fr4.1bn($124m)
$1 =fr 1993: 34.6 1994: 33.5 TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
1995: 31.6
A C T I V E : 74,400 (incl 3,600 Royal Military
fr = Luxembourg franc
56 NATO
Constabulary, 800 Inter-Service Organisation, 2,600 B A S E S : Netherlands: Den Helder (HQ); Vlissingen.
women, 27,700 conscripts). Overseas: Willemstad (Curacao), Oranjestad (Aruba).
Terms of service: 9 months. SS: 4 Zeeleeuw with Mk 48 HWT; plus Harpoon USGW.
R E S E R V E S : 130,600 (men to age 35, NCO to PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 18:
40, officers to 45): Army 111,600 (some - at the end DESTROYERS: 4 DDG (Nl desig = FFG):
of their conscription period - on short leave, imme- 2 Tromp with 1 SM-1 MR SAM; plus 2 x 4 Harpoon
diate recall); Navy some 9,000 (7,000 on immediate SSM, 1 x 2 120mm guns, 1 Lynx hel (ASW/
recall); Air Force 10,000 (immediate recall). OTHT), 2 x 3 ASTT (Mk 46 LWT).
2 Van Heemskerck with 1 SM-1 MR SAM; plus 2 x
4 Harpoon, 2 x 2 ASTT.
A R M Y : 43,200 (24,700 conscripts). FF: 14:
1 Corps HQ (Ge/Nl), 1 mech div HQ. 7 Karel Doorman FF with 2 x 4 Harpoon S S M , plus
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2 Operational Comds: COMNAVSONOR and bty NASAMS (Norwegian advanced SAM) (1995-
COMNAVNON with 7 regional Naval districts. 98), 4 bty NOAH to be converted to NASAMS).
B A S E S : Horten, Haakonsvern (Bergen), Ramsund, AAA: 10btyRB-70.
Olavsvern (Troms0). COASTGUARD: 1 sqnwith6L>7a:Mk86,2P-3NOnon.
SS: 12: EQPT: 80 cbt ac (incl 4 MR), no armed hel.
6 Via SS with Ge Seeal DM2A3 HWT. AC: F-5A/B: 15 (ftr/trg). F-16: 59; -A: 48 (FGA); -B: 11
6 Kobben S SC (with Swe T-612) HWT (to be replaced (FGA).P-3:6*.-C:4(MR);-N:2(CoastGuard).C-130H:
withTP-613for 1995-1997). 6 (tpt). Fa/con20C: 3 (EW/tpt Cal). DHC-6:3 (tpt). MFI-
FF: 4 Oslo with 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 6 Terne ASW RL; 15: 17 (trg).
plus 4 x Penguin 1 SSM, Sea Sparrow. HEL: Bell 412 SP: 18 (tpt). Sea King Mk 43B: 10 (SAR).
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 30: Lynx Mk 86: 6 (Coast Guard).
MSL CRAFT: 30: MSL:
ASM: Penguin Mk-3.
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to age 35).
PATROL, INSHORE: 13:
5 Argos, 8(.
A R M Y : 29,700 (15,000 conscripts). RIVERINE: 1 Rio Minho{.
3 Military Districts, 2 Military Comds. AMPH: craft only: 3 LCU, about 7 LCM.
1 composite bde (1 mech, 2 mot inf, 1 tk, 1 fd arty bn). SPT AND MISC: 14:
1 AB bde. 1 Berrio (UK Green Rover) AO, 9 AGHS, 2 trg, 1
2 armd cav regt. ocean trg, 1 div spt.
1 tk regt.
2 engr regt. MARINES: (2,100).
11 inf regt incl 3 garrison. 3 bn (2 It inf, 1 police), spt units.
2 fd, 1 AD, 1 coast arty regt.
EQPT: 4 V-200 Chaimite APC, 36 120mm mor.
1 MP regt.
EQPT:
MBT: 198: 24 M-47, 86 M-48A5, 88 M-60A3. AIR F O R C E : 7,300 (1,800 conscripts).
RECCE:295fl/aAn,40AML-60,15 V-150,21 EBR- 1 operational air command (COFA).
75, 8 ULTRAV M-l 1, 30 Ferret Mk 4. FGA: 5 sqn:
APC: 350: 249 M-l 13, 65 V-200 Chaimite, 2 EBR, 2 with A-7P.
22 YP408, 12 Condor. 1 with F-16A/B.
TOTAL ARTY: 318: 2 with Alpha Jets.
TOWED ARTY: 168: 105mm: 54 M-101, 24 M-56; SURVEY: 1 sqn with C-212.
140mm: 50 5.5-in; 155mm: 40 M-114A1. MR: 1 sqn with P-3P.
SP ARTY: 155mm: 6 M-109A2. TPT: 4 sqn:
MOR: 144: 107mm: 62 M-30 (incl 14 SP); 120mm: 1 with C-130.
82 Tampella; 81mm: some. 1 with C-212.
COASTAL ARTY: 27:150mm: 15; 152mm: 6; 234mm: 6. 1 with Falcon 20 and Falcon 50.
RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav. 1 with SA-316 hel.
ATGW.-51 TOW (inc\ 18M-113, 4M-901), 65 Milan SAR: 2 sqn:
(incl6ULTRAVM-ll). 1 with SA-330 hel; 1 with SA-330 hel and C-212.
RCL: 90mm: 112; 106mm: 128 M-40. LIAISON: 1 sqn with Reims-Cessna FTB-337G.
AD GUNS: 105, incl 20mm: M-163A1 Vulcan SP; TRG: 1 sqn with SOCATA TB-30 Epsilon.
40mm: L/60. EQPT: 97 cbt ac, plus 6 MR ac, no attack hel.
SAM: 12 Blowpipe, 5 Chaparral. AC:/>/pha Jef;40 (FGA trg),plus 10instore.A-7:37:-7P:
DEPLOYMENT: 31 (FGA); TA-7P: 6* (trg). F-16A/B: 20. P-3P: 6 (MR).
Azores and Madeira: 2,000; 3 garrison inf regt, 2 C-130H: 6 (SAR, tpt). C-212: 22: -A: 18 (12 tpt/SAR, 1
coast arty bn, 2 AA bty. Nav trg, 2 ECM trg, 3 fisheries protection); -B: 4 (sur-
vey). Cessna 337:12 (liaison). Falcon 20:1 (tpt, calibra-
tion). Falcon 50: 3 (tpt). Epsilon: 16 (trg).
N A V Y :e 12,500 (incl 2,100 Marines and 800 conscripts). HEL: SA-330: 10 (SAR/tpt). SA-316: 21 (trg, utl).
1 Naval area Comd, with 5 Subordinate one Comds
(Azores, Madeira, North Continental, Centre Continental
and South Continental). FORCES ABROAD:
B A S E S : Lisbon (Alfeite), Portimao (HQ Continental UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
Comd), Ponta Delgada (HQ Azores), Funchal (HQ ADRIATIC (Sharp Guard): 1 FF.
Madeira). ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 121 plus8Obs, 1 civpol.
60 NATO
BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 5 Obs, 4 civ pol. mech div (with 1 armd, 2 mech bde).
CROATIA (UNCRO): 7 Obs, 26 civ pol. 2 armd cav bde (1 cadre).
1 mtn bde.
3 It inf bde (cadre).
PARAMILITARY: 1 air-portable bde.
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN GUARD: 20,900; 1 AB bde.
Commando Mk III APC, 7 SA-313 hel. Spanish Legion:
PUBLIC SECURITY POLICE: 20,000. 1 bde (forming - to be 3 It inf, 1 arty, 1 engr bn, 1
BORDER SECURITY GUARD: 8,900. atk coy).
2 regt (each with 1 mech, 1 mot bn, 1 atk coy).
3 island garrison (Canary, Balearic Islands, Ceuta and
FOREIGN FORCES: Melilla).
NATO: HQ IBERLANT area at Lisbon (Oeiras). 1 arty bde; 1 AD regt.
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US: 1,155: Navy (55); Air (1,100) (incl Azores). 1 engr bde.
1 Army Avn bde (1 attack, 1 tpt hel bn, 4 utl units).
1 AD comd: 6 AD regt incl 1 HAWK SAM, 1 composite
1 SPAIN | AspideBSmm, 1 Roland bn.
1 Coast Arty Comd (6 mixed arty regt; 1 coast arty gp).
GDP 1993: pts 60,904bn ($478.4bn): 3 special ops bn.
per capita $13,400 Rapid Action Force (FAR) formed from 1 Spanish
1994: pts 64,673bn ($482.8bn): Legion, 1 AB and 1 air-portable bde (see above).
EQPT:
per capita $13,900
Growth 1993: -1.1% 1994: 2.0% MBT: 668: 210 AMX-30 (150 EM2, 60 ER1), 164 M-
Inflation 1993: 4.6% 1994: 4.8% 48 A5E, 294 M-60 (-A1:50; -A3: 244), some Leopard 2
Publ debt 1993: 59.4% 1994: 63.5% (being delivered).
Def exp 1993: pts 895.lbn ($7.03bn) RECCE: 340 BMR-VEC (100-90mm, 208-25mm,
1994: pts 829.3bn ($6.19bn) 32-20mm gun).
Def bdgt" 1994: pts 805.5bn ($6.01bn) APC: 2,092: 1,313 M-113 (incl variants), 679 BMR-
1995: pts 812.1bn ($6.59bn) 600, 100 BTR-70 (UNPROFOR).
TOTAL ARTY: 1,292:
NATO defn 1993: pts l,055bn ($8.29bn)
1994: pts 1,02lbn ($7.62bn) TOWED ARTY: 633: 105mm: 282 M-26, 170 M-56
FMA 1994: $0.05m (IMET) pack; 122mm: 73 122/46; 155mm: 84 M-114;
1995: $0.05m(IMET) 203mm: 24 M-115.
1996: $0.05m (IMET) SP ARTY: 180: 105mm: 48 M-108; 155mm: 96 M-
$1 = pts 1993: 127 1994: 134 109A1; 203mm: 36 M-110A2.
1995: 123 MRL: 140mm: 14 Teruel.
pts = peseta MOR: 120mm: 465 (incl 19 2SP); plus 81mm: 1,314
(incl 187 SP).
" 1995 def bdgt reduced from pts 866.5bn ($7.03bn) in Jan 1995. COASTAL ARTY: 7 1 : 6-in: 52; 305mm: 16; 381mm: 3.
ATGW: 442Milan, 2SHOT, somerO W(beingdelivered).
Population: 39,144,000 RCL: 106mm: 638.
AD GUNS: 20mm: 329 GAI-BO1; 35mm: 92 GDF-
13-17 18-22 23-32
002 twin; 40mm: 274 L/70.
Men 1,476,400 1,653,800 3,340,400
SAM: 24 I HAWK, 18 Roland, 13 Skyguard/Aspide,
Women 1,391,400 1,564,800 3,209,200
90 Mistral.
HEL: 176 (28 attack): 53 HU-10B, 70 HA/HR-15 (31
with 20mm guns, 28 with HOT, 9 trg), 6 HU-18, 11
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: HR-12B, 18 HT-21, 18 HT-17.
A C T I V E : 206,000 (126,000 conscripts (to be reduced), SURV: 2 AN/TPQ-36 (arty, mor).
some 200 women).
Terms of service: 9 months. DEPLOYMENT:
RESERVES: Army 420,000; Navy 10,000; Air CEUTA AND MELILLA: 10,000; 2 armd cav, 2
Force 8,000. Spanish Legion, 2 mot inf, 2 arty regt; 2 It AD bn, 2
engr, 1 coast arty gp.
BALEARIC ISLANDS: 2,500; 1 mot inf regt: 2
A R M Y : 144,700 (97,000 conscripts). mot inf bn,l mixed arty regt: 2 fd arty; 1 engr bn, 1
8 Regional Operational Commands incl 2 overseas: 1 special ops coy.
NATO 61
EQPT: 161 cbt ac, no armed hel. $1=TL 1993: 10,985 1994: 29,609
AC: EF-18 A/B: 69 (ftr, OCU). F-5B: 22 (FGA). Mirage: 1995: 42,306
62: F-1CF/-BE/-EE. RF-4C: 8* (recce). P-3:7:-A: 2 (MR); TL = Turkish lira
-B: 5 (MR). Boeing 707:3 (tkr/tpt).C-130:12: -H: 7 (tpt);
KC-130H: 5 (tkr). C-212: 76 (32 tpt, 9 SAR, 6 recce, 25 " Under a 1991 agreement also involving the US, Saudi Arabia,
trg, 2 EW, 2 trials). Cessna Citation: 2 (recce). C-101:81 Kuwait and the UAE, Turkey is to receive $3.5bn over 5 years
(trg). CL-215:21 (spt). Falcon 20:5 (3 VIP tpt, 2 EW); for its spt of the Coalition Forces in the Gulf War. The first tranche
of SI.2bn was released in Oct 1994.
Falcon 50:1 (VIP tpt); Falcon 900: 2 (VIP tpt). F-27: 3
(SAR). E-26: 39 (trg). CN-235:20 (18 tpt, 2 VIP tpt). E- Population: 61,284,000 (Kurds 17%)
20 (Baron): 5 trg; E-24 (Bonanza): 27 trg.
13-17 J8-22 23-32
HEL: SA-330: 5 (SAR), AS-332: 16 (10 SAR, 6 tpt),
Men 3,272,200 3,268,000 5,375,800
Hughes 300C: 15 (trg), S-76C: 8 (trg).
Women 3,099,400 3,051,800 5,159,000
MSL:
AAM: AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder.
ASM: Maverick, Harpoon, HARM. TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
ACTIVE: 507,800 (415,200 conscripts).
FORCES ABROAD: Terms of service: 18 months.
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: R E S E R V E S : 378,700 to age 41 (all): Army
ADRIATIC (Sharp Guard): 1 FF, 1 FFG, ac. 1 P-3B. 258,700; Navy 55,000; Air Force 65,000.
BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 1,438; 1 inf bn gp, 12 Obs.
CROATIA (UNCRO): 6 Obs. ITALY (Deny Flight)
280: 8 F/A-18, 2 KC-130 (tkr), 1 CASA-212 (spt ac). A R M Y : 400,000 (352,000 conscripts).
FYROM (UNPREDEP): 1 Obs. 4 army HQ: 9 corps HQ.
1 mech div (1 mech, 1 armd bde).
1 mech div HQ.
PARAMILITARY: 1 inf div.
GUARDIA CIVIL: 75,000 (2,200 conscripts); 9 re- 14 armd bde (each 2 armd, 2 mech inf, 2 arty bn).
gions, 19 inf tercios (regt) with 56 rural bn, 6 traffic 17 mech bde (each 2 armd, 2 mech inf, 1 arty bn.
security gp, 6 rural special ops gp, 1 special sy bn; 22 9 inf bde (each 4 inf, 1 arty bn).
BLR APC, 18 Bo-105, 5 BK-117 hel. 4 cdo bde (each 4 cdo bn).
GUARDIA CIVIL DEL MAR: (550); about 19 1 inf regt.
PCI and PCI(. 1 Presidential Guard regt.
5 border def regt.
26 border def bn.
FOREIGN FORCES: RESERVES:
US: 4,900: Navy (4,500); Air Force (400). 4 coastal def regt.
23 coastal def bn.
EQPT:
| TURKEY RECCE: some Akrep.
AIFV: 135 AIFV.
GDP 1993: TL l,937,742bn ($176.4bn): APC:3,576:286IAPC,2,815M-113/-A1/-A2,475AWC.
per capita $4,800 TOTAL ARTY: 4,341:
1994: TL 5,039,804bn ($170.2bn): TOWED ARTY: 1,618: 105mm: 640 M-101A1;
NATO 63
GDF-003; 40mm: 803 L60/70,40 T-1,262 M-42A1. I Mersin (US LSM) coastal (400 mines).
SAM: 108 Stinger, 789 Redeye. Note: Gelibolu FF, Bayraktar, Sarucabey and Cakabey
SURV: AN/TPQ-36 (arty, mor). LST have minelaying capability.
AC: 168: 3 Cessna 421, 34 Citabria, 4 B-200, 4 T- MCM:21:
42A, 98U-17B, 25T-41D. I1 Seymen (US Adjutant) MSC.
ATTACK HEL: 38 AH-1W/P. 6 Karamiirsel (Ge Vegesack) MSC.
SPT HEL: 221: 10S-70A, 12 AB-204B, 64 AB-205A.2 4 Foqa (US Cape) MSI.
AB-212, 28 H-300C, 3 OH-58B, 94 UH-1H, 8 R-22B. AMPH: 8:
UAV: CL-89 (AN/USD-501), GNAT 750. 1 Osman Gazi: capacity 980 tps, 17 tk, 4 LCVP.
2 Ertugal (US Terrebonne Parish): capacity 400
tps, 18 tk.
N A V Y : 51,000 (incl 3,100 Marines and 34,500
2 Bayraktar (US LST-512): capacity 200 tps, 16 tk.
conscripts). 2 Sarucabey: capacity 600 tps, 11 tk.
B A S E S : Ankara (Navy HQandCOMEDNOREAST), 1 Cakabey: capacity 400 tps, 9 tk.
GSlciik (HQ Fleet), Istanbul (HQ Northern area and Plus about 59 craft: 35 LCT, 2 LCU, 22 LCM.
Bosphorus), Izmir (HQ Southern area and Aegean), SPT AND MISC: 27:
Eregli (HQ Black Sea), Iskenderun, Aksaz Bay, Mersin 1 Akar AO, 5 spt tankers, 2 Ge Rhein plus 3 other
(HQ Mediterranean). depot ships, 3 salvage/rescue, 2 survey, 3 tpt, 5 tugs,
SS: 16: 2 repair, 1 div spt.
6 Atilay (Ge Type 209/1200) with SST-4 HWT.
7 Canakkale/Burakreis't (plus 2 non-op) (US Guppy) NAVAL AVIATION: 9 cbt ac, 14 armed hel.
with Mk 37 HWT. ASW: 1 sqn with ac: 9 S-2A/E/TS-2A Tracker (Air
2 Hizirreis (US Tang) with Mk 37 HWT. Force aircraft, Air Force and Navy crews);hel: 3 AB-
1 Preveze (Ge Type 209/1400). 204AS, 14* AB-212 ASW.
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 21:
DD: 5: MARINES: (3,100); 1 regt.
3 Yucetepe ( U S Gearing) ( A S W / A S U W ) with 2 x 3 HQ, 3 bn, 1 arty bn (18 guns), spt units.
A S T T (Mk 4 6 L W T ) ; 1 with 1 x 8 ASROC, 2 with
Harpoon S S M , all with 2 x 2 127mm guns.
2 A l c i t e p e ( U S Carpenter) with 1 x 8 A S R O C , 2 x 3 AIR F O R C E : 56,800 (28,700 conscripts).
ASTT, 1 x 2 127mm guns. 2 tac air forces, 1 tpt, 1 air trg comd, 1 air log comd.
FF: 16: Flying hours: 180.
4yavuz(GeM£*:O200)with 1 x AB-212 hel(ASW/ FGA: 13 sqn:
OTHT), 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2 x 4 Harpoon SSM, 1 3(1 OCU) with F-5A/B.
x 127mm gun. 4 (1 OCU) with F-4E.
1 Gemlik (Ge T-120 Koln) with 4 x 533mm ASTT, 2 6 (1 OCU) with F-16C/D.
x 4 ASW mor; plus 2 x 100mm gun. FTR: 5 sqn:
2 Berk with 2 x 3 ASTT, 2 Mk 11 Hedgehog. 2 with F-4E.
8 Muavenet (US Kno;t-class) with 1 x 8 ASROC, 3 withF-16C/D.
4 x ASTT; plus Harpoon (from ASROC launcher), RECCE: 2 sqn with RF-4E.
1 x 127mm gun. ASW: 1 sqn with S-2A/E Tracker (see Navy).
1 Barbados (MOD Ge MEKO 200) with 1 x AB-212 hel. TPT: 5 sqn:
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 44: 1 withC-130B/E.
MSL CRAFT: 17: 1 with C-160D.
64 NATO
2 with CN-235.
1 VIP tpt unit with Gulf stream, Citation and CN 235. UNITED KINGDOM
TKR:2KC-135R.
LIAISON: 10 base fleet with ac: T-33; hel: UH-1H. GDP 1993: £630.8bn ($947.5bn):
TRG: 4 sqn: per capita $17,300
1 with T-41; 1 with SF-260D, 1 with T-37; 1 trg 1994: £668.1bn ($l,023.3bn):
school with ac: T-38, CN-235; hel: UH-1H. per capita $17,900
SAM: 4 sqn with Nike Hercules; 2 sqn Rapier. Growth 1993: 2.2% 1994: 3.8%
EQPT: 447 cbt ac, no attack hel. Inflation 1993: 1.6% 1994: 2.5%
AC: F-16C/D: 146: -C: 122; -D: 24. F-5: 108: A/B: 64, Publ debt 1993: 47.4% 1994: 51.6%
NF-5A/B:44(FGA).F-4E:184:96FGA,48ftr;RF-4E: Def exp 1993: £23.42bn ($35.18bn)
40 (recce). S-2A/E Tracker. 9*. C-130: 13 (tpt). KC- 1994: £22.77bn ($34.88bn)
135R: 2, C-160D: 19 (tpt). Citation: 2 (VIP): CN-235: Def bdgt 1995: £21.72bn ($34.48bn)
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plus 1 trg sqn with Harrier T-4. ELINT: 1 ELINT with Nimrod R-l.
ASW: 5 hel sqn with Sea King HAS-5/6. TKR: 2 sqn:
ASW/ATK: 2 sqn with Lynx HAS-3 HMA8 (in indep 1 with VC-10 K-2/-3/-4.
fleets). 1 with Tristar K-1/KC-1/-2 (tkr/tpt).
AEW: 1 hel sqn with Sea King AEW-2. TPT: 5 sqn:
COMMANDO SPT: 3 hel sqn with Sea King HC-4. 1 strategic with VC-10 C-1/C-1K.
SAR: 1 hel sqn with Sea King MK-4. 4 tac with Hercules C-1/-1K/-1P/-3P.
1 hel sqn with Sea King MK-5. LIAISON: 1 comms VIP sqn with ac: HS-125, BAe
TRG: 2 sqn: 1 ac with Jetstream; 1 hel with SA-341 146; hel: Wessex, SA-341 (Gazelle).
Gazelle HT-2. CALIBRATION: 2 sqn:
FLEET SPT: Hawk, Mystere-Falcon 20 (civil registration), 1 with Andover E-3; 1 target facility with Hawk.
1 Cessna Conquest (civil registration), 1 Beech Baron OCU: 7: Tornado GR-1, Tornado F-3, Jaguar GR-
(civil registration) (op under contract). 1A/T2A, Harrier GR-7/-T10, Hercules, SA-330/
TPT: Jetstream. CH-47. 1 wpn conversion unit with Tornado GR-1.
EQPT: 22 cbt ac, 110 armed hel. TRG: //awJtT-l/-lA/-lW, Jetstream T-l, Bulldog T-l,
AC: Sea Harrier: FRS-1/F-A2:18 plus 15 in store. T-4N: 4* Chipmunk T-10, HS-125 Dominie T-l, Tucano T-l.
(trg) plus 4 in store. Hawk: 12 (spt) (plus 3 in store). TAC HEL: 7 sqn:
Mystere-Falcon 20:13 (spt). Jetstream: 17: T-2:12 (trg) 1 with CH-47.
(plus 2 in store); T-3: 3 (trg). 1 with CH-47 and SA-330 (Puma).
HEL: Sea King: 98. HAS-6: *60, plus 10 in store; HC- 2 with Wessex HC-2.
4:29, plus 7 in store (cdo); AEW-2:9, plus 1 in store. 2 with SA-330 (Puma).
Lynx HAS-3: *50, plus 26 in store. Gazelle HT-2/-3:20 1 with CH-47 and Sea King HAR3.
(trg plus 4 in store). SAR: 2 hel sqn; 6 fit:
MSL: 1 with Wessex HC-2, 5 with Sea King HAR-3.
ASM: Sea Skua, Sea Eagle. TRG: Wessex, SA-341 Sea King.
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder. EQPT: 559 cbt ac, incl 26 MR (plus 58 in store), no
armed hel.
AC: Tornado: 315: GR-1:115; GR-1A: 26; GR-1B: 26; F-
MARINES: (7,300).
3:148; plus 21 GR-1 in store. Jaguar: 69: GR-1A/-B: 54;
1 cdo bde: 3 cdo; 1 cdo arty regt (Army) + 1 bty (TA);
T-2A/B: 15 (plus 16 in store). Harr/er;93: GR-7:70;GR-3:
2 cdo engr sqn (1 Army, 1 TA), 1 log regt (joint
2, GR-5: 6, T-4: 9, T-10: 6 (plus 11 GR-7 in store). Hawk:
service); 1 It hel sqn.
1 mtn and arctic warfare cadre. T-1/1-A-W: 106 (*56 (Tl -A) tac weapons unitSidewinder-
Special Boat Service (SF): HQ: 5 sqn. capable), 50 trg. Canberra: 9: T-4: 2, PR-7: 2, PR-9: 5.
2 aslt sqn. Nimrod: 28: R-1: 2 (ECM); MR-2: 26* (MR); plus 4 in
1 gp (Commachio). store. Sentry (E-3D): 7 (AEW). Tristar: 9: K-1:2 (tkr/tpt);
KC-1: 4 (tkr/cgo); C-2: 3 (tpt). VC-10: 25: C-1/C-1K: 13
EQPT:
(strategic tpt to be mod to tkr/tpt);K-2:5 (tkr); K-3:4 (tkr);
MOR: 81mm.
K-4:3. Hercules: 61: C-1:26; C-1K: 5 (tkr); C-3:29; W-2:
ATGW: Milan.
1. Andover: 4. HS-125: 27: T-1: 19 (trg); CC-2/-3: 8
SAM: Javelin, Blowpipe.
(liaison). Islander CC-MK2: 2 BAe-146: 3 (VIP tpt).
HEL: 9 SA-341 (Gazelle); plus 3 in store, 6 Lynx AHA.
Tucano: 82 (trg), plus 47 in store. Jetstream: 11 (trg).
AMPH: 16 RRC, 2 LCU, 4 LCVP, 4 LACV.
Bulldog: 115 (trg). Chipmunk: 56 (trg).
HEL: Wessex: 59. CH-47: 31. SA-330: 42. Sea King:
AIR F O R C E (RAF): 70,400 (incl 6,100 women). 19. SA-341 (Gazelle): 29.
NATO 67
ASM: Martel, AGM-84D-1 Harpoon, Sea Eagle. AD, 1 engr regt (declared to LANDCENT); RAF (No. 2
AAM: AIM-9G Sidewinder, Sky Flash. GP RAF): 5,000; 6 ac sqn, 4 Tornado, 2 Harrier, 1 hel
ARM: ALARM. sqn (SA-330 (Puma)IICW-Al (Chinook) tpt), RAF regt;
2 Rapier SAM sqn, 1 fd sqn (declared to AIRCENT).
ROYAL AIR FORCE REGIMENT: GIBRALTAR: 600: Army: 50; Gibraltar regt (400); Navy/
3 fd sqn (with 81 mm mortars), 5 SAM sqn with 52Rapier. Marines: 400; 2 PCI, Marine det, 2 twin&rocef launchers
RESERVES (Royal Auxiliary Air Force Regiment): 5 (coastal defence), base unit; RAF: 150; periodic ac det.
fd def sqn. HONG KONG: some 900. Army: 500; 1 Gurkha infbn, 1
Gurkha engr sqn, 3 small landing craft, 3 other vessels;
Navy/Marines: 180 (plus 2401ocally enlisted); 3Peacock
DEPLOYMENT: PCC (12 patrol boats in local service); RAF: 200; 1
ARMY: Wessex hel sqn (with 4 Wessex HC2). Reserves: Hong
Land Command. Kong regt (1,200).
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Reinforcements for ARRC (declared to LANDCENT). INDIAN OCEAN (Armilla Patrol): 2 DD/FF, 1 spt ship.
Active: 1 div, 1 air-mobile bde. Diego Garcia: 1 naval party, 1 Marine det.
Additional TA units incl 8 inf bn, 2 SAS, 3 AD regt. NEPAL: Army: 1,200 (Gurkha trg org).
Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) WEST INDIES (see also Belize): 1 DD/FF, 1 AO.
(AMF(L)): UK contribution: 1 infbn, 1 arty bty, 1 sigs MILITARY ADVISERS: 455 in 30 countries.
sqn.
HQ Northern Ireland (some 10,500, plus 5,300 Home UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
Service); 3 inf bde HQ, up to 12 major units in inf role ADKIATlC(SharpGuard): 1DDG, 1 FFG(resubordinated
(6 resident, 4 roulement inf bn), 1 engr, 1 avn regt, 6 from STANAVFORMED and STANAVFORLANT.
Home Service infbn. Also available for WEU tasking). 3-4 spt ships; UK
Remainder of Army regular and TA units for Home task group Adriatic: 1 CV V (6 Harriers for spt to Deny
Defence. Flight, 7 ASW Sea Kings for spt to Sharp Guard), 1
NAVY: DD/FF, 1 AO, 1 AR. RAF: 60: INimrod ac. ANGOLA
FLEET (CinC is also CINCEASTLANT and (UNAVEM III): 649: 1 log bn. BOSNIA (UNPRO-
COMNAVNORTHWEST): Regular Forces, with the FOR): 4,440; elm 1 air-mobile bde plus 1 armd inf, 1
exception of most Patrol and Coastal Combatants, Mine mech infbn gp, 1 engr regt, 2 armd recce sqn, 1 log bn
Warfare and Support Forces, are declared to EASTLANT. gp, 2 arty bty, 1 arty loc bty, 1 armd engr sqn, 13 Obs;
MARINES: 1 cdo bde (declared to SACLANT). 4 Royal Naval Sea King H-C4 hel. CROATIA
AIR FORCE: (UNCRO): 6 Obs. CYPRUS (UNFICYP): 364; 1 inf
STRIKE COMD: commands all combat air operations bn(-), 1 hel fit, engr spt (incl spt for UNIFIL).FORMER
other than for Cyprus, Falklands and Hong Kong: 5 YUGOSLAVIA (Provide Promise): RAF: 20; 1 C-130
Groups: No. 1 (Strike, Attack), No. 2 (Strike, Attack;
ac.GEORGIA(UNOMIG): lOObs.IRAQ/KUWAIT
based in Germany), No. 11 (Air Defence), No. 18
(UNIKOM): 15 Obs. ITALY (Deny Flight): 540; 6
(Maritime), No. 38 (Transport/AAR).
Tornado F3, 2 K-l Tristar (tkr), 2 E-3D Sentry; 8
LOG COMD: supply and maint spt of other comds.
Harrier GR-7,6 Sea Harrier. RWANDA (UNAMIR):
PERSONNEL AND TRG COMD: flying and ground trg.
1. SAUDI ARABIA (Southern Watch): 310; 6 Tor-
nado GR-IA, 1 VC-10 (tkr). TURKEY (Provide Com-
FORCES ABROAD: fort): RAF: 7330; 6 Tornado, 1 VC-10 tkr.
ANTARCTICA: 1 ice patrol ship (in seasonal summer).
ASCENSION ISLAND: RAF some 100.
BRUNEI: Army: some 900; 1 Gurkha infbn, 1 helflt(3hel). FOREIGN FORCES:
CANADA: Army: trg and liaison unit; RAF: 100; routine US: 11,500: Navy (2,000); Air (9,500): 1 Air Force HQ,
training deployment of Tornado GR1, Harrier, Jaguar. 66 cbt ac, 2 sqn with 48 F-15E, 1 sqn with 18 F-15C/D.
CYPRUS: 3,800. 1 Special Ops Gp, 3 sqn with 5 MH-53J, 4 HC-130, 4
Army: 2,400; 2 inf bn, 1 engr spt sqn, 1 hel fit. MC-130H, 1 air refuelling wg with 9 KC-135.
RAF: 1,400; 1 hel sqn (Wessex), routine trg deployment GERMANY/ITALY: tri-national Tornado trg sqn.
of Tornado ac, 1 sqn RAF regt field sqn. NATO: HQ Allied Forces North-west Europe
FALKLAND ISLANDS: 2,000. Army: 1 inf coy gp, 1 engr (AFNORTHWEST).
sqn (fd, plant); RN: 1 DD/FF, 1 PCO, 1 AO, 1 AR; RAF: HQ Allied Naval Forces North-west Europe (NAV
1OO. 1 Tornado F-3 fit, 2 Hercules C-1K, 2 Sea King NORTHWEST).
HAR-3, 2 CH-47 hel, 1 sqn RAF regt (Rapier SAM). HQ Allied Air Forces North-west Europe (AIR NORTH
GERMANY: 28,600: Army: 23,600: 1 corps HQ WEST).
(multinational), 1 armd div, 2 armd recce, 3 MLRS, 2 HQ Eastern Atlantic Area (EASTLANT).
68
Non-NATO Europe
Most international attention has focused on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia which intensified
during the year and risked further expansion following Croatia's successful recovery of Krajina
in August 1995. However, there was some improvement in the situation in the Caucasus and useful
negotiations took place between Russia and the Baltic states to stabilise the situation there.
Transcaucasus
The cease-fire agreed to in May 1994 has held firm, but Armenia and Azerbaijan are no closer to
a political settlement nor have they authorised the deployment of the peacekeeping force being set
up by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Plans for deploying the
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force to Nagorno-Karabakh are well advanced and a number of reconnaissance visits have taken
place. Both sides have exchanged all prisoners of war. Details of the planned OSCE mission are
given at page 306.
Moldova
In October 1994, the withdrawal by October 1997 of the Russian 14th Army was agreed. The
disposal of very large quantities of obsolete ammunition located in Dniestr remains a major
problem and environmental groups are opposing any destruction bar a small amount each day.
Former Yugoslavia
UN Forces
UNSC Resolutions 981-983 were adopted on 31 March 1995 which, in addition to extending the
UN force mandate in the former Yugoslavia to 30 November 1995, altered the name of the force
in Croatia to the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) and the
force in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to the United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). All three forces will continue to be controlled from the United
Nations Peace Force Headquarters (UNPF HQ) in Zagreb.
Croatia
On 2 December 1994, Croatia and the Krajina Serbs agreed on a number of economic issues,
including the Serb commitment to open the stretches of the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway that run
through Serb-controlled territory. On 1 May 1995, Croatia successfully attacked western Slavonia
and recovered UN Sector West, taken by the Serbs in 1991. On 22 July, Presidents Alija Izetbegovic
of Bosnia-HerzegovinaandFranjoTudjman of Croatiasigned an agreement on cooperation, including
in the military sphere. Within a week Croatian troops had begun an offensive from the Bosnian town
of Livno and quickly took the towns of Glamoc on the Split-Banja Luka road and Bosanska
Grahovo on the road leading to Bihac which controls the main route from Knin to Serb-held areas
in northern Bosnia and on to Serbia. Krajina Serb and Croatian government representatives met
UN negotiator Thorvald Stoltenberg in Geneva on 3 August. Early on 4 August the Croats mounted
a major offensive on Krajina preceded by heavy shelling of Knin, which resulted in the recapture
of the territory and the movement of at least 150,000 Serbian refugees into Bosnia and Serbia.
NON-NATO EUROPE 69
Bosnia-Herzegovina
In July 1994, the five-member Contact Group presented a new set of peace proposals and a map
showing the local control that would be granted to each faction. This allotted 51 % of territory to
the Bosnian-Croat Federation and 49% to the Bosnian Serbs. The plan and the map were
presented on a 'take it or leave it' basis. The Bosnian government accepted, but the Bosnian Serbs
did not, despite provisions for the Serbs to secede, following a referendum, after two years.
In late October 1994, the Bosnian Army Corps based in Bihac launched an offensive which
caught the Serbs by surprise and led to the capture of some 60 square miles south and east of Bihac.
At the same time, a joint Bosnian-Bosnian Croat attack was launched, recapturing the town of
Kupres, originally mainly Croat-inhabited. The Serbs did not wait long before reacting to this loss
and by mid-November had recovered virtually all lost territory and, aided by the Krajina Serbs,
were threatening the Bihac safe area. On 18 and 19 November aircraft from the Ubdina airfield
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in Krajina attacked Bihac. The UN Security Council authorised air attacks against targets in
Krajina and NATO attacked Udbina on 21 November. The next day NATO aircraft were attacked
by Serbian surface-to-air missiles which were, in their turn, attacked on 23 November. Since then
NATO has declined to mount air strikes or air drops of supplies to Bihac unless they are permitted
to take out Serb air defences beforehand. So far the UN has withheld this permission. After these
attacks, the Serbs held UN troops hostage at weapons-monitoring sites until mid-December.
i
On 18 December, former US President Jimmy Carter visited Sarajevo and Pale and brokered
a cease-fire which came into effect for four months on 24 December. The UN appealed for 6,500
more troops to assist in monitoring the cease-fire, but few were contributed.
Throughout the past 12 months, aid convoys have been routinely obstructed and those crossing
the Mount Igman track into Sarajevo have been fired upon. In addition, Sarajevo airport has been
closed to aid flights since 8 April 1995. The question of whether to lift the arms embargo has been
on the political agenda in Washington throughout this period. In November 1994, the US
Congress ordered that funds for the US contribution to maintain the arms embargo against Bosnia
be cut off. However, US naval ships still take part in Operation Sharp Guard, but only to enforce
the arms embargo on the other republics of the former Yugoslavia and to enforce the economic
blockade of Serbia and Montenegro. On 26 July, with a majority of 62 to 29, the US Senate passed
a bill, presented by Senator Bob Dole, for the US to end the arms embargo against Bosnia.
However, the bill stipulated that Bosnia-Herzegovina must request both the end of the embargo
and the withdrawal of UN troops from Bosnia, and that the UN must decide to withdraw before
the embargo was terminated. On 1 August, the US House of Representatives passed a similar bill
by 298 votes to 128. President Bill Clinton has vetoed the bill despite its more than two-thirds
majority, which would allow the veto to be overridden if none of the votes are changed. Serious
consideration has been given to a UN withdrawal for some time and a NATO plan has been
developed and approved to provide military support should the withdrawal be obstructed by
force. The US is committed to providing up to 25,000 troops for such an operation.
On 24 May, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander, General Rupert Smith,
issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to return all heavy weapons removed from UN-
monitored sites by noon on 25 May or face air-strikes. The Serbs failed to comply with the
ultimatum and NATO aircraft attacked an ammunition dump close to Pale on 25 and 26 May. The
Serbs reacted by taking over 300 UN troops hostage and used some as 'human shields' at likely
targets for further air attack. This massive hostage taking led France and the UK to announce that
they would immediately send reinforcements to render UNPROFOR less vulnerable. Perhaps
unwisely, the force was called the Rapid Reaction Force. The British first sent two batteries of
light artillery and a squadron of armoured engineers. The rest of the reinforcements took longer
to arrive as, first, the UN Security Council had to authorise the increase in forces and, second, the
British, who were sending large numbers of helicopters, needed to arrange to lease and prepare
ground for a helicopter base from the Croatian government. On 6 July 1995, while the Rapid
Reaction Force was still assembling, the Serbs launched an attack on the most exposed of the UN
70 NON-NATO EUROPE
'safe areas', Srebrenica, and captured the town on 11 July. Virtually straight after this, another
safe area, Zepa, came under attack and although much smaller than Srebrenica managed to hold
out until 22 July. On 21 July, the second London Conference was held. It had been preceded by
several days of talks between officials and two meetings of the French, British and US Chiefs
of Staff. The Conference concentrated on the remaining eastern Bosnian enclave, Gorazde, and
decided that any Serb move to attack this would be met by the immediate and substantial use of
air-power. On 23 July, a group of senior generals from France, the UK and the US delivered an
ultimatum to General Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian-Serb commander, at Belgrade airport.
On 23 July, Serbian artillery attacked a UN convoy on Mount Igman and a UN barracks in
Sarajevo, killing a French soldier on each occasion. Elements of the Rapid Reaction Force,
including the British artillery, were despatched to Mount Igman where they took up positions, not
to protect Sarajevo, but to return any fire directed at the UN or its convoys.
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Serbia
Considerable political faith has been placed in Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's ability to
pressurise the Bosnian Serbs into more reasonable behaviour. Some consider this faith misplaced.
Despite many meetings with the Contact Group and with the UN and European Union (EU)
negotiators Thorvald Stoltenberg and Carl Bildt. Milosevic has, so far, failed to recognise either
the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia.
Nuclear Developments
InUkraine, the VerkhovnaRada adopted the law on its accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in November 1994. On 5 December at Budapest, after receiving formal assurances
from Russia, the UK and the US, President Leonid Kuchma signed the instruments of ratification,
and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty came into force.
The process of removing nuclear weapons from Belarus and Ukraine, begun in early 1994, has
continued. All SS-25 road-mobile ICBM in Belarus were scheduled to have been transferred to
Russia by 25 July 1995, but on 6 July, when 18 SS-25 still remained, Belarus President Aleksandr
Lukashenka was said to have halted the process on the grounds that it was unnecessary as the two
states might shortly be unified. It now emerges that Lukashenka was misquoted; there is no
Belarussian intention to retain nuclear weapons. The original date for the completion of SS-25
withdrawal was Autumn 1996 but this was brought forward by the Russians. Ukraine has
returned over 400 nuclear warheads to Russia, but, by 13 July, had not received all of the fuel
for its nuclear power stations that had been agreed at the Moscow summit in January 1994. This
problem has now been settled. Forty SS-19 ICBM have been eliminated. Russia is negotiating
to buy the 19 Tu-160 Blackjack and 25 Tu-95 Bear H strategic bombers held by Ukraine.
Transcaucasus
The Armenian Army has formed seven more independent motor rifle regiments, one with a
training role. It has also formed a Spetsnaz (SF) regiment and four surface-to-air missile units.
NON-NATO EUROPE 71
Equipment holdings are virtually unchanged. Fresh information has allowed a revision of the
armed forces in Azerbaijan. Manpower is now some 21,000 stronger than previously listed, all in the
army. Two more motor rifle brigades have been formed. Equipment increases (over previous
assessments) include 50 tanks, 130 infantry fighting vehicles and 12 Mi-24 attack helicopters.
Most artillery types show a small decrease, presumably from battle casualties, but the overall total
is maintained by the addition of 32 more 120mm PM-38 mortars. Information is now available
on the ships acquired from the Black Sea Fleet by Georgia. They include twoGns/ia-class frigates,
one Turya torpedo craft and 12 patrol craft (9 Stenka PFC, 3 Muravey PHT).
and holdings are now within the CFE limit. Production of W-3W Sokol attack helicopter
continues, with fi veadded to the inventory by 1 January 1995; the production rate is one per month.
Romanian armed forces manpower has been reduced by some 8,000.550 tanks (mainly T-34), 350
other armoured vehicles (including 90 Su-76 assault guns) and nearly 800 artillery pieces were
eliminated during the last 12 months. But this still leaves 460 tanks and 860 pieces of artillery to
be destroyed by mid-November under the CFE Treaty. Romania is to build 96 AH- WCobra attack
helicopters under licence for delivery starting in 1999.SIovakia is to form a 12,000-strong national
guard, organised in two brigades and five regiments. The National Guard is to be the equivalent
of territorial defence troops, it will be manned by reservists. During the last 12 months Slovakia
has eliminated 270 tanks, 300 armoured combat vehicles and 180 pieces of artillery. The active
forces have been reorganised into two ground force corps and one air force and air-defence corps.
The Austrian armed forces have changed the terms of their conscript service. Conscripts now carry
out seven (as opposed to six) months recruit training followed by 30 (formerly 60) days of reservist
refresher training spread over ten (formerly 15) years. The Army has retired its 24 155mm M-114
guns and added 60 more RBS-565/7/ ATGW and 48 more 105mm SPKuerassier anti-tank guns.
Fresh information shows the armament of the ground air-defence troops as 80 Mistral SAM
launchers, 120 20mm and 74 35mm twin anti-aircraft guns with Skyguard radar. The Cypriot
Army took part in the annual student's parade marking Greece's independence day on 25 March
1995 and displayed a wide range of weapons including newly delivered Exocet coastal defence
missiles,/!spide (12 launchers delivered) andMistral (12 more delivered) SAM. It is reported that
a transfer of 50 AMX-30 tanks from Greece was blocked by France, the original supplier.
The Finnish Army' s organisation is now better understood. All brigades are manned by reservists,
but the ten Jaeger and one armoured brigade have a training role in peacetime. Fresh information
has allowed an understanding of the new organisation of the Swedish ground forces introduced in
1993-94. These are divided into divisions with differing numbers of brigades and defence districts
organised as regiments, normally only with infantry and some artillery. All are on a reserve basis.
The Army has taken delivery of 160Leopard 2 tanks, 30 Stridsfordon 90 infantry fighting vehicles
(50 more are due to be delivered in 1995), 360 MT-LB (formerly East German) APCs and six Hkp-
9 A (BO-105) anti-tank helicopters. Stridsfordon are currently developing a family of armoured
vehicles. So far only the infantry fighting vehicle and anti-aircraft version are in service.
Former Yugoslavia
Despite the UN arms embargo imposed on all republics of the former Yugoslav Federal
Republic, weapons are reaching all the warring parties in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but
obtaining accurate information is naturally difficult. Some indigenous production is also taking
place. Croatia held an exhibition of domestic arms production in May 1995 and a military parade
in June at which they displayed SAAB RBS 15 anti-ship missile and Russian SA-10 missile
canisters. How much these were staged for propaganda purposes is not known. The Croats claim
to be manufacturing tanks (a version of the M-84), artillery and MRL as well as many types of
small arms. The Croatian Army is undoubtedly far better organised, trained and armed than it was
two years ago. However, it and the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croatian forces still lack heavy
weaponry such as tanks, APCs and artillery when compared with Serb holdings. The Croatian Air
Force has managed to acquire a further eight MiG-21 aircraft and five Mi-24 attack helicopters
in the last 12 months. The Bosnian Serbs may have acquired some SA-10 SAM, but certainly not
as many as the 32 launchers which they boast as having.
Defence Spending
After remaining static in 1994, regional defence spending is set for a real increase of 15 % in 1995.
Non-NATO European Union countries and Switzerland continue to account for over half the
NON-NATO EUROPE 73
regional total, although their share is declining. Among theVisegrad Four, there are real increases
in the defence budgets of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Defence spending in
Ukraine and Belarus appears to be still in decline, due primarily to their continuing economic
difficulties. In the former Yugoslavia, Croatia and, despite sanctions, Serbia experienced real
growth for the first time since the federation collapsed, and in 1995 there are large real increases
in the official defence budgets of Croatia (up one-quarter) and Serbia (up one-third).
The three most recent EU members were all experiencing the effects of the global recession
when the 1994 referenda confirmed their entry. For this reason, more than the end of the Cold War,
underlying levels in the defence budgets of these traditionally neutral or non-aligned countries have
been stable or in gentle decline since 1992. Currency movements since 1992 have, however,
reduced the dollar value of Sweden's defence budget by nearly $lbn, but increased that of
Switzerland by over $lbn, although changes to these budgets when denominated in national
currencies have been moderate. Both countries are currently spending at least twice as much on
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defence as any other in the region. Finland's dollar-denominated defence budget also declined by
a quarter in 1993 owing to currency depreciation, but in 1995 it has nearly recovered to the 1992
level. The recent procurement budgets of these countries and those of other non-NATO EU
members (Austria and Ireland) are examined in an outline study in the NATO section of the
European defence procurement market.
In 1992,Poland was the first former communist country in Eastern Europe to register economic
growth following the dismemberment of COMECON. In 1994, the economies of the Czech
Republic, Hungary andSlovakia also started to grow again. This growth is reflected in their 1995
defence budgets. Poland's defence budget increases from $2.1bn to $2.6bn in current-year
dollars, Czech defence spending is set to grow from $931 m to $ 1,025m, andHungary'sdefence
budget increases from $556m to $641 m. Three of theVisegrad Four thus appear to be beginning
military reinvestment. In contrast, the continuing economic decline in Ukraine and Belarus is
constraining defence spending. Economic difficulties have forced all former Warsaw Pact
countries to prioritise manpower and operations and maintenance (O&M) spending (with the
notable exception of Ukraine where the emphasis has been on infrastructure) at the expense of
procurement and research and development (R&D).
As economic recovery and the restructuring of national defence industries gathers momentum,
defence planners in former communist countries are being confronted with difficult procurement
policy issues. With the effects of industrial dislocation arising from Soviet centralisation
increasingly behind them, countries face the choice of whether to renew defence industrial links
with Russia and other former Soviet republics; make a clean break from the past through
procurement from the US, Western Europe arid elsewhere; or steer a middle path by using both
traditional and new defence supply sources. Whateverthe decision, the expense of the most modern
weapon systems may predicate either direct purchase with offsets (or as debt repayment as in the
74 NON-NATO EUROPE
case of Russia's recent transactions with Slovakia and Hungary, and current proposals to
Bulgaria) or, where a defence industry exists, international collaboration through licensed
production and joint ventures. In some cases the national defence industries remain satisfactory
as independent sources of supply for many less costly weapons and equipment. The defence
industries of these former communist countries remain active in the international arms market. At
present, the most successful arms exporter is the Czech Republic, whose military exports
amounted to some $ 167m in 1993 and $ 194m in 1994 - much more than was spent on domestic
procurement. By comparison Poland, as the next largest arms exporter of this group, delivered
weapons and equipment worth an estimated $60m in 1993.
Table 2: Structure of Polish and Czech Defence Budgets in 1994 and 1995 ($m)
Poland Czech Republic
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In 1994 economic growth also resumed in the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. Estonia's defence budget in 1995 is $33m, up from $25m, and that of Latvia $65m,
about the same as last year. Military expenditures in the Baltic republics are probably larger than
the defence budgets indicate, since they do not reflect the costs of paramilitary border guards and
some procurement from foreign sources. These countries have also received military aid in the
form of equipment and services from a variety of sources including other Nordic countries, the
Czech Republic, the UK and the US. In 1995, US equipment (including communications and field
equipment, and uniforms) to support the Baltic Peacekeeping Force (B ALTB AT) was delivered
as part of a Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) commitment.
In the Caucasus, Armenia resumed economic growth in 1994, whereas the economies of
Georgia and Azerbaijan remained in decline. Audits of defence and security expenditure
conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are now available for 1992-93 which show
that these countries are gradually assuming financial responsibility for their own defence. The full
extent to which they make financial contributions to support residual Russian forces is, however,
unclear. Armenia has agreed to accept Russian military bases on its territory, and reportedly to
pay the cost of servicing these bases. The budgeted cost of the OSCE planning cell forNagorno-
Karabakh (Azerbaijan) was about $3m in 1994. For 1995, Georgia's central government
budget is dominated by defence (15.7%) and law enforcement (13.7% ) - giving a combined
security budget of $56m. The cost of UNOMIG in 1994 was about $ 1 lm. Russiaretains a military
presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Georgian government is at present linking the issue
of permanent Russian bases in Georgia to a favourable resolution of the Abkhazian conflict.
Russian border troops are also based in Georgia, and the government is reportedly making a
financial contribution for their upkeep.
In theformer Yugoslavia,the economies of Croatia andSerbia-Montenegro resumed growth
- in the latter case despite sanctions. The possible escalation of the civil war is signalled by large
increases in the defence budgets of Croatia (about 25% when measured in kunas but in dollar
terms from $978m to $ 1,784m because the kuna is linked to the German mark) and Serbia (from
$740m to $ 1,143m). In the case ofBosnia, details of military expenditures are not released by the
government nor by the Bosnian Serb leadership. The war effort of the Bosnian Muslims has so
far conspicuously lacked the indigenous economic and military resources available to the other
conflicting parties. Apart from being the weakest (other than the FYROM) of the republics of
NON-NATO EUROPE 75
the former Yugoslavia in economic terms, the Bosnian government had to rely at the outset of
the civil war on the weaponry, equipment and stores remaining after the departure of the
Yugoslav National Army. The country also contains part of the defence industry of the former
Yugoslavia, some of which is in Bosnian Muslim control and reported to be functioning. Reports
also suggest that the Bosnian government has received material amounts of foreign military
assistance, both in cash and in kind - according to reports mainly from Turkey, Iran and Saudi
Arabia - which has enabled it, along with other participants, to circumvent the UN arms
embargo. The main backer of the Bosnian Serb forces appears to remain Serbia itself, reportedly
payrolling the officers and providing regular support in military equipment and war materiel -
in apparent circumvention of agreements with the UN. Serbia has also been the main supplier
of the Croatian Serbs in Krajina. Serbian military expenditure is almost certainly much higher
than budgeted, and probably accounts for up to one-third of gross domestic product (GDP). The
cost of UNPROFOR operations in the former Yugoslavia - mainly Bosnia - was about $1,6bn
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in 1994, whilst the UN has estimated that some $500m in food aid was required for that year.
ALBANIA
RECCE: 15BRDM-1.
APC: 103ChType-531.
4
TOWED ARTY: 122mm: 425 M-1931/37, M-30, 208
GDP I993e:leke 113bn ($l.lbn): Ch Type-60; 130mm: 100 Ch Type-59-1; 152mm:
per capita $2,800 90 Ch Type-66.
1994e:leke 164bn ($1.6bn): MRL: 107mm: 270 Ch Type-63.
per capita $3,000 MOR:82mm:259;120mm:550M-120;160mm:100
Growth 1993: 11.0% 1994: 7.4% M-160.
Inflation 1993: 85% 1994: 23% RCL:82mm:T-21.
Debt 1993: $755m 1994e:$770m ATKGUNS:45mm:M-1942;57mm:M-1943;85mm:
Defexp 1993: leke 3.84bn ($37.3m)
61 D-44, Ch Type-56; 100mm: 50 Type-86.
Def bdgt 1994e: leke 4.58bn ($44.0m)
AD GUNS: 23mm: 12 ZU-23-2/ZPU-1; 37mm: 100
1995e:!eke5.10bn($50.4m)
M-1939;57mm:82S-60;85mm:30KS-12;100mm:
FMA 1994: $0.2m (IMET)
1995: $0.2m(IMET) 56KS-19.
1996: $0.4m(IMET)
• Inf div strengths vary from 3,000 to 5,500.
$1 =leke 1993: 103 1994: 104
1995: 101
NAVY:2,500 (incl 350Coastal Defence and£ 1,000
Population: 3,535,000 (Muslim 70%, Greek Orthodox
conscripts).
20%, Roman Catholic 10%, Greek e3-8%)
B A S E S : Durrgs, Himare, Sarande, Sazan Island,
13^17 18-22 23-32
Shengjin Vlore, Orikjum.
Men 177,000 170,600 317,600
S S : | 2 Sov Whiskey with 533mm TT (plus 1 trg,
Women 162,600 156,600 296,000
unserviceable).
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS:t 37-43:
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: TORPEDO CRAFT: 24-30 Ch Huchuan PHT with 2 x
533mm TT.
ACTIVE: 73,000 (22,800 conscripts).
PATROL CRAFT: 13:
Terms of service: 12 months. 2 Sov Kronshdat PCO;
R E S E R V E S : 155,000 (to age 56): Army 150,000; 6 Ch Shanghai-ll.
Navy 2,500; Air Force 2,500. 5 Sov Po-2 PFI.
MCM:t 6:
A R M Y : 60,000 (incl Reserves, 20,000 conscripts). 2 Sov T-43 (in reserve), 4 Sov T-301 MSI (2 in reserve).
9 inf div." SPT: 15:
EQPT: 2 Sov Khobi harbour tkr, 2 Sov Shalanda AK, 1
MBT: 138T-34, 721 T-59. Sekstan, I Poluchat, 1 Nyryat, 1 Toplivo, 2 Tugur, 4
LT TK: 30 Type-62. Arcor 25, 1 Po-2.
76 NON-NATO EUROPE
TOTAL ARMED FORCES (Air Service AD: 80Mistral; 12020mm AA guns: 74 Twin35mm
forms part of the Army): AA guns with Skyguard radars; air surv Goldhawk
ACTIVE: some 55,750 (incl 30,000 active and short with Selenia MRS-403 3D radars.
term; e20-30,000 conscripts; some 66,000 reservists a
year undergo refresher trg, a proportion at a time).
Terms of sendee: 7 months recruit trg, 30 days reservist
FORCES ABROAD:
refresher trg during 10 years (or 8 months trg, no re- UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
fresher); 60-90 days additional for officers, NCO and CYPRUS (UNFICYP): 353; 1 inf bn. GEORGIA
specialists. (UNOMIG): 4 Obs. HAITI (UNMIH): 20 civ pol.
R E S E R V E S " . 119,000 ready (72 hrs) reserves; IRAQ/KUWAIT (UNIKOM):7Obs.MIDDLEEAST
960,000 with reserve trg, but no commitment. Officers, (UNTSO): 13 Obs. RWANDA (UNAMIR): 15 Obs.
NCO and specialists to age 65, remainder to age 50. SYRIA (UNDOF): 468; 1 inf bn. TAJIKISTAN
(UNMOT): 5 Obs.WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO):
4 Obs, plus 10 civ pol.
ARMY". 51,500 (22,000 conscripts).
3 Corps:
2 each with 1 engr bn, 1 recce, 1 arty regt, 3 Provincial
mil comd"; 10 inf regt (total). AZERBAIJAN |
1 with 3 mech inf bde (1 tk, 1 mech inf, 1 SP arty bn),
1 engr, 1 recce bn, 1 arty regt, 2 Provincial mil GDP 1993e:m 166bn ($3.8bn)
comd", 7 inf regt. per capita $2,200
1 Provincial mil comd" with 1 inf regt. 1994e:m l,674bn ($2.9bn)
EQPT: per capita $1,700
MBT: 169M-60A3. Growth 1993e:-23.3% 1994e:-21.9%
APC:465 Saurer4K4E/F(incl variants), somePandur Inflation 1993e: 1,129% 1994e: 1,664%
(being delivered). Debt 1993: $36m 1994: $152m
TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 108 IFH (M-2A1). Def exp 1992e: m 1.64bn ($321 m)
SP ARTY: 155mm: 138 M-109/-A2. 1993e:m 13.29bn ($305m)
FORTRESS ARTY: 155mm: 24 SFK M-2. Defbdgt 1994e:m 145bn ($132m)
MOR: 81mm: 701; 107mm: 100 M-2/M-30; 120mm: 1995e:m480bn ($109m)
244 M-43. $ = m" 1993: 93 1994: 1,100
ATGW: 179 RBS-56 Bill. 1995: 4,390
RCL: 2,199 incl 74mm: Miniman; 84mm: Carl Gustav. m = manat
106mm: 445 M-40A1.
ATK GUNS: • The manat was introduced in August 1992 as a parallel currency
SP: 105mm: 282 Kuerassier JPz SK. to the rouble and became sole legal tender in January 1994.
TOWED: 85mm: 206 M-52/-55.
STATIC: 90mm: 11 M-47 tk turrets; 105mm: some 228 Population: 7,640,000 (Russian 6%, Armenian 6%,
L7A1 (Centurion tk). Daghestan 3%)
AD GUNS: 20mm: 558;35mm: 74 GDF-002 twin towed.
MARINE WING (under School of Military Engineering): 13-17 18-22 23-32
2 river patrol craft(; 10 unarmed boats. Men 372,200 326,000 601,400
Women 347,600 316,800 671,200
"On mob Provincial mil comd convert to bde.
78 NON-NATO EUROPE
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: £8,000 volunteers from Armenia). Eqpt reported incl
ACTIVE: E86,700.
50+ MBT, 100+ AIFV/APC, 100 arty.
Terms of service: 17 months, but can be extended for
ground forces.
R E S E R V E S : some mob 560,000 with military
service within 15 years.
1 BELARUS |
GDP 1993E: rll,067bn ($28bn)
per capita $6,300
ARMY: 73,300. 1994E: r34,975bn ($22bn)
1 tk bde. per capita $5,300
14 MR bde (incl 2 trg, 2 with inf units only). Growth 1993E: -9.5% 1994e: -21.7%
1 air aslt bde. Inflation 1993e: 1,188% 1994e:2,220%
2 indep MRR. Debt 1993: $967m 1994: $l,009m
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1 with 1 mech, 1 SSM, 1 SAM bde, 1 arty, 1 MRLregt. * Incl Foreign Military Assistance but excl UNPROFOR. The
1 with no manned cbt units. cost of UNPROFOR in 1994 was $1.6bn.
EQPT:
MBT: 2,348: 381 T-55, 170 T-62, 1,797 T-72. Population: 4,383,000 (Muslim 44%, Serb 31%, Croat
LT TK: 8 PT-76. 17%)
AIFV: 2,024: 461 BMP-1, 1,278 BMP-2, 161 BRM, 13-17 18-22 23-32
124BMD-1. Men 187,800 171,600 357,400
APC: 1,014: 221 BTR-60,415BTR-70,189BTR-80, Women 177,200 160,600 339,800
117 BTR-D, 72 MT-LB.
TOTAL ARTY: 1,579:
TOWED: 440:122mm: 190 D-30; 152mm: 6 M-1943 TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
(D-l), 58 D-20, 136 2A65, 50 2A36. ACTIVE: some 92,000.
SP: 588: 122mm: 239 2S1; 152mm: 168 2S3, 120 RESERVES: some 100,000.
2S5; 152mm: 13 2S19; 203mm: 48 2S7.
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4
COMBINED GUN/MOR: 120mm: 54 2S9.
MRL: 419:122mm: 275 BM-21, 11 9P138; 130mm: A R M Y (BiH): 92,000 (incl e40,000 reserves).
1 BM-13; 220mm: 84 9P140; 300mm: 48 9A52. 1 'Army' HQ.
MOR: 120mm: 78 2S12. 6 'Corps' HQ.
ATGW: 480: hi-A Spigot, AT-5 Spandrel (some SP), 2 div HQ (reported).
AT-6 Spiral (some SP), AT-7 Saxhorn. Some 78 inf 'bde'. 9 mot 'bde'.
SSM: 60 Scud, 36 FROG/SS-21. Some 13 mtn 'bde'. 1 SF 'bde'.
SAM: 350: SA-8/-11/-12/-13. 1 recce bde. 5 territorial def'bde'.
SURV: GS-13 (arty), Long Trough ((SNAR-1) arty), 2 arty 'bde'. Some 2 AD regt.
Pork Trough ((SNAR-2/-6) arty), Small Fred/Small EQPT:
Yawn (veh, arty), Big Fred ((SNAR-10) veh, arty). MBT: e31 incl T-34, T-55.
APC: e35.
ARTY: elOO incl 130mm, 203mm.
AIR F O R C E : 25,700 (incl 12,000 AD); 1 air MRL: 2 incl 262mm: M-87 Orkan.
army, 349 cbt ac, 74 attack hel. Flying hours: 40. MOR: 200: 82mm; 120mm.
FGA: 42 Su-24, 99 Su-25. ATGW: 100 AT-3 Sagger, Ch Red Arrow (TF-8)
FTR: 45 MiG-23, 13 MiG-25, 83 MiG-29, 25 Su-27. reported.
RECCE: 42* Su-24. AD GUNS: 20mm, 30mm.
HEL: SAM: SA-7/-14.
ATTACK: 74 Mi-24. HEL: 5 Mi-8/-17.
CBT SPT: 9 Mi-24K, 10 Mi-24P, 148 Mi-8. AC: 3 UTVA-75.
TPT: ac: 29 11-76, 6 An-12, 7 An-24, 1 An-26, 1 Tu-
134; hel: 26 Mi-2, 14 Mi-26. DEPLOYMENT (manpower incl some reserves).
AWAITING ELIMINATION: 4 MiG-23, 32 MiG-25, 4 1 Corps: Sarajevo (incl Goradze, Srebrenica, Zepa and Mt
Su-17, 1 Yak-28. Igman): up to 21 inf, 8 mot, 7 mtn, 1 HVO, 2 arty bde.
2 Corps: Tuzla: up to 26 inf, 1 mot, 3 mtn, 2 HVO, 1 engr
bde.
AIR DEFENCE: 12,000. 3 Corps: Zenica: and up to 16 inf, 1 armd bde.
SAM: 200 SA-2/-3/-5/-10. 4 Corps: Mostar/Konjic: up to 5 inf, 1 mtn.
5 Corps: Bihac: up to 8 inf (1 HVO), 1 SF bde.
7 Corps: Travnik: 5 inf, 2 mtn bde.
PARAMILITARY: Abdic Faction (Bihac): 2 defected BiH bde, expanded to
BORDER G U A R D S (Ministry of Interior): 8,000. 6 bde.
S-60; 85mm: KS-12; 100mm: KS-19. AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-7 Apex, AA-8 Aphid.
SAM: 20 SA-3, 27 SA-4, 20 SA-6. SAM: SA-2/-3/-5/-10 (20 sites, some 110 launchers).
SURV: GS-13 (veh), Long Trough ((SNAR-1) arty),
Pork Trough ((SNAR-2/-6) arty), Small Fred/Small
Yawn (veh, arty), Big Fred ((SNAR-10) veh, arty). FORCES ABROAD:
UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 10 Obs plus 10 civ pol.
N A V Y : e3,000 (£2,000 conscripts).
B A S E S : Coastal: Varna (HQ), Atiya, Sozopol,
Balchik. Danube: Vidin (HQ). PARAMILITARY:
SS: 2 Pobeda (Sov /?omeo)-class with 533mm TTt. BORDER GUARDS (Ministry of Interior): 12,000;
FF: 1 Smell (Sov Koni) with 1 x 2 SA-N-4 SAM, 2 x 12 regt, some 50 craft incl about 12 Sov PO2 PCI(.
12 ASW RL; plus 2 x 2 76mm guns. SECURITY POLICE: 4,000.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 23: RAILWAY AND CONSTRUCTION TROOPS:
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18,000.
4
CORVETTES: 7:
4 Poti ASW with 2 x ASW RL, 4 x ASTT.
1 Tarantul II A S U W with 2 x 2 SS-N-2C Styx, 2 x 4
SA-N-5 Grail SAM; plus 1 x 76mm gun.
2 Pauk I with 1 SA-N-5 SAM, 2 x 5 ASW RL; plus
1 CROATIA |
4 x 406mm TT. GDP 1993e: $10.6bn
MSL CRAFT: 6 Osa PFM with 4 x SS-N-2A/B Styx SSM. per capita $5,000
PATROL, INSHORE: about 10 Zhuk PFI. 1994e:k84bn($11.0bn)
MINE WARFARE: 27: per capita $5,200
MINELAYERS: 10 Vydra. Growth 1993e: -3.2% 1994: 1.8%
MCM: 17: Inflation 1993e: 1,516% 1994e:98%
4 Sonya MSC. Debt 1993: $2.7bn 1994: $3.0bn
13 MSI: 4 Vanya, 4 Yevgenya, 5 Olya. Def exp 1993e:$975m
AMPH: 2 Sov Polnocny LSM, capacity 150 tps, 6 tk. 1994: k 8,040m ($1,117m)
SPTANDMISC:7: Def bdgt 1994: k 7,040m ($978m)
2 AOT, 2 AGHS, 1 AGI, 1 trg, 1 AT. 1995: k 8,900m ($ 1,784m)
FMA" 1995: $0.07m(IMET)
NAVAL AVIATION: 10 armed hel. 1996: $0.20m(IMET)
HEL: 1 SAR/ASWsqn with9Mi-14(ASW), 1 Ka-25. $1 = kuna 1994: 7.20 1995: 4.99
COASTAL ARTY: 2 regt, 20 bty. k = kuna*
GUNS: 100mm: el50; 130mm: 4 SM-4-1.
SSM: SS-C-lb Sepal, SSC-3 Styx. • The cost of UNPROFOR in 1994 was $ 1.6bn.
b
The kuna was introduced in May 1994 toreplacethe Croatian dinar.
NAVAL GUARD: 3 coy.
Population: 4,785,000 (Serb 12%, Muslim 1%, Slovene
1%) excl 386,000 refugees.
AIR FORCE: 21,600 (16,000 conscripts); 272 13-17 18-22 23-32
cbt ac, 44 attack hel. 2 air div, 1 mixed air corps. Men 169,800 166,600 335,800
FGA: 1 regt with 39 Su-25. Women 160,000 158,800 324,600
2 regt with 94 MiG-21.
1 regt with 36 MiG-23.
FTR: 4 regt with some 41 MiG-23, 20 MiG-21, 21 TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
MiG-29. ACTIVE: £105,000 (65,000 conscripts).
RECCE: 1 regt, 21 Su-22. Terms of service: 10 months.
TPT: 1 regt with 2 Tu-134, 3 An-24, 4 An-26, 5 L- R E S E R V E S : Army: 180,000; Home Def: 10,000.
410, 3 Yak-40 (VIP).
SURVEY: 1 An-30.
HEL: 2 regt with 14 Mi-2, 7 Mi-8, 25 Mi-17, 44 Mi- ARMY: £99,600 (£65,000 conscripts).
24 (attack). 6 op zone (OZ) (Zagreb, Bjelovar, Split, Osijek, Gospic,
TRG: 3 trg regt with 74 L-29, 35 L-39. Karlovac).
MSL: 29 inf 'bde'.
ASM: AS-7 Kerry. 6 mech bde.
82 NON-NATO EUROPE
1 arty/MRL bde.
1 Atk bde. AIR F O R C E : e300; 28 cbt ac, 5 armed hel.
1 AD bde. FGA/FTR: 21 MiG-21, 6 Galeb, 1 Orao.
1 SF bde (2 SF, 1 mtn, 1 amph, 1 AB bn). TPT: 2 An-2, 2 An-26, 5 UTVA.
1 engr bde HEL: 18 Mi-8, 5* Mi-24, 1 UH-1, MD-500.
RESERVES: 37 Home Def regt.
EQPT:
PARAMILITARY:
MBT: 176: 9 T-34, 140 T-55, 27 M-84.
LT TK: 5 PT-76. POLICE: 40,000 armed.
RECCE: 5 BRDM-2. HOS (military wing of Croatian Party of Rights
AIFV: 82 M-80. (HSP)): up to 5,000 reported (deployed in Bosnia).
APC: BTR-40/-50, 19 M-60 plus 22 'look-alikes',
el50 BIV (reported). OTHER FORCES:
TOTAL ARTY: some 949 incl:
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Inflation 1993: 4.9% 1994: 4.3% AD GUNS: 80:20mm: 36 M-55; 35mm: 24 GDF-005
Debt 1993: $926m 1994: $903m with Skyguard; 40mm: 20 M-l (in store).
Def exp" 1993: £C 245m ($492m) SAM: 24 SA-7, 30+ Mistral, 12 Aspide.
1994: £C 181m($368m) MARITIME: 1 Salamis PFI (plus 11 boats).
Def bdgt 1995: £C 194m ($4 llm) AC: 1 BN-2A Maritime Defender, 2 PC-9, 1 PA-22.
FMA* 1994: $15m (Econ aid) HEL: 3 Bell 206, 4 SA-342 Gazelle (with HOT), 1
1995: $15m (Econ aid) Bell 412, 2 Mi-2 (in store).
1996: $15m (Econ aid)
$1=£C 1993: 0.50 1994: 0.49
1995: 0.45 PARAMILITARY:
£C = Cypriot pound ARMED POLICE: 3,700; Shorland armd cars, 2
VAB/VTT APC, 1 Bell 412 SP hel.
• Official out-turn in 1993 was £C 166.3m ($333m). MARITIME POLICE: 320; 3 PFI: 2 Evagoras
* The 1994 cost of UNF1CYP was $44m.
and 1 Kinon PFI (plus boats).
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R E S E R V E S : some 200 local defence bn and coy. SPT AND MISC: 14:
EQPT: 4 Valas coastal tpt (can be used for minelaying).
MBT:70T-55M, 162T-72. Plus about 10 civilian-manned ships:
AIFV: 150BMP-1,110BMP-2(plus 17 'look-alikes'). 1 Aranda AGOR (Ministry of Trade control).
APC: 110 BTR-60, 310 XA-180 Sisu, 220 MT-LB 9 icebreakers (Board of Navigation control).
(plus 12 'look-alikes').
TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 252 H 61 -37; 122mm: 468 H
63 (D-30); 130mm: 166 K 54,152mm: 324 H 55 (D- AIR F O R C E : 2,900(1,300conscripts); 108cbtac,
20), H 88-40, H 88-37 (ML-20), H 38 (M-10); no armed hel, 3 AD areas: 3 ftr wings. Flying hours: 150.
155mm: 36 M-74 (K-83). FTR: 3 wings:
SP ARTY: 122mm: 72 PsH 74 (2S1); 152mm: 18 1 with 13 MiG-21bis, 10 Hawk Mk 51 and 51 A.
Telak 91 (2S5). 2 with 39 J-35, 20 Hawk Mk 51 and 51 A.
COASTAL ARTY: 100mm: D-10T (tank turrets); OCU: 4* MiG-21U/UM, 5* SAAB SK-35C.
122mm: M-60; 130mm: 170 M-54; (static). RECCE: some Hawk Mk 51 and MiG-21T (incl in ftr sqn).
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COASTAL SSM: 5 RBS-15. SURVEY: 3 Learjet 35A (survey, ECM trg, target-towing).
MRL: 122mm: Rak H 76 (BM-21), Rak H 89 (RM-70). TPT: 1 ac sqn with 3 F-27; 1 hel fleet with 2 Hughes
MOR: 81mm: 880; 120mm: 789: KRH 40, KRH 92. 500D, 7 Mi-8 (tpt/SAR).
ATGW: 100: incl 24 M-82 (AT-4 Spigot), 12 M-83 TRG: 17 Hawk* Mk 51, 28 L-70 Vinka.
(BGM-71D TOW 2), M-82M (AT-5 Spandrel). LIAISON: 15 Piper (9 Cherokee Arrow, 6 Chieftain),
RL: 112mm: APILAS. 10 L-90 Redigo.
RCL: 55mm: M-55; 66mm: 66 KES, 75 (M-72A3); AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-8 Aphid, AIM-9 Sidewinder,
95mm: 100SM-58-61. RB-27, RB-28 (Falcon).
AD GUNS: 23mm: 100+ ZU-23; 30mm; 35mm:
GDF-005, Marksman GDF-005 SP; 57mm: 12 S-60
towed, 12ZSU-57-2SP. FORCES ABROAD:
SAM: SAM-78 (SA-7), SAM-79 (SA-3), SAM-86 UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
(SA-16), 20 SAM-90 {Crotale NG). BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 7 Obs plus 2 civ pol.
CROATIA (UNCRO): 48; guard unit, incl 4 Obs plus
6 civ pol. CYPRUS (UNFICYP): 2.INDIA/PAKISTAN
N A V Y : 2,500 (1,000 conscripts). (UNMOGIP): 7 Obs. IRAQ/KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 6
B A S E S : Upinniemi (Helsinki), Turku. Obs. LEBANON (UNIFIL): 522; 1 inf bn. FYROM
4 functional sqn (msl, patrol, two mine warfare). (UNPREDEP): 428; 1 inf bn 1 Obs plus 1 civ pol.
Approx 50% of units kept fully manned; others are MIDDLE EAST (UNTSO): 17 Obs.
in short-notice storage, rotated regularly.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 21:
CORVETTES: 2 Turunmaa with 1 x 120mm gun, 2 x PARAMILITARY:
5 ASW RL. FRONTIER GUARD (Ministry of Interior): 3,500
MSL CRAFT: 10: (on mob 24,000); 4 frontier, 3 Coast Guard districts, 1
4/MrmfaPFMwith4x2MTO-85(SwRBS-15SF)SSM. air comd; 2 offshore, 3 coastal, 7 inshore patrol craft;
2 Tuima (Sov Osa-II) with 4 MTO-66 (Sov SS-N-2B) hel:3 AS-332,6AB-206L,4AB-412;ac: 1PA-NAVAJO.
SSM.
4 Rauma PFM with 2 x 1 and 2 x 1 MTO-85 (Sw RBS-
15SF) SSM. GEORGIA
PATROL CRAFT, INSHORE: 9:
2 Rihtniemi with 2 ASW RL.
2 Ruissalo with 2 ASW RL. GDP" 1993e:Gc 12,681bn ($2.3bn)
5 Nuoli PFI . per capita $2,300
MINE WARFARE: 14: 1994e:Gcn.k. ($1.5bn)
MINELAYERS: 8: per capita $1,600
2 Hameenmaa, 150-200 mines, plus 1 x 6 MATRA Growth 1993E: -39.2% 1994e: -35.0%
Mistral SAM. Inflation 1993e: 1,130% 1994e:7,380%
1 Pohjanmaa, 100-150 mines; plus 1 x 120mm gun Debt 1993: $420m . 1994: $654m
and 2 x 5 ASW RL Def exp 1992e: Gc 5.3bn ($ 111 m)
3 Pansio aux minelayer, 50 mines. 1993e:Gc521bn($94m)
2 Tuima (ex-PFM), 20 mines. Def bdgt 1994e: Gc n.k. ($47m)
MCM: 6 Kuha MSI (plus 7 Kiiski-c\ass minesweepers). 1995: Gc71,442bn($56m)
AMPH: craft only: 3 Kampela LCU tpt, 3 Kala LCU. FMA* 1994: $0.06m (IMET)
NON-NATO EUROPE 87
Growth
Inflation
per capita $6,100
1994: f4,310bn ($40.99bn):
per capita $6,500
1993: -2.3%
1993: 22.5%
1994: 2.6%
1994: 18.9%
i
Terms of service: conscription, 2 years. Debt 1993: $24.8bn 1994: $28.5bn
R E S E R V E S : possibly up to 250,000 with mil service Def exp 1993: f 66.5bn ($723.2m)
in last 15 years. Defbdgt 1994: f 58.5bn ($556.2m)
1995: f77.1bn($641.0m)
FMA 1994: $0.7m(IMET)
A R M Y : up to 20,000 planned, 6,000 probable. 1995: $0.7m(IMET)
2 Corps HQ. 1996: $1.0m(IMET)
Some 5 bde (incl border guard, plus trg centre). $1 = f 1993: 92 1994: 105
EQPT: 1995: 120
MBT: £40 T-55, e8 T-72. f = forint
AIFV/APC: 51 BMP-l.BTR.
TOWEDARTY:60incl:85mm:D-44;100mm:KS-19 Population: 10,206,000 (Romany 4%, German 3%,
(ground role); 122mm: D-30. Slovak 1%, Romanian 1%)
MRL: 122mm: BM-21. 13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 399,400 398,200 666,600
Women 374,800 371,000 625,800
N A V Y : 2,000.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 15.
FF: 2 Grisha I/V with 2 x SA-N-4 SAM, 4 x 533mm TT. TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
TORPEDO CRAFT: 1 Turya PFT with 4 x 533mm TT. A C T I V E : 70,500 (47,500 conscripts).
PATROL CRAFT: 12: Terms of service: 12 months.
9 Stenka PFC with 4 x 406mm TT, 1 x 76mm gun. R E S E R V E S : 173,000: Army 161,600; Air Force
3 Muravey PHT with 2 x 406mm TT. 11,400 (to age 50).
TPT: 1 HS-125-700B, 1 Super King Air 200, 1 1 inf bn, 1 peacekeeping coy (forming).
Gulfstream IV. 1 recce bn.
LIAISON: 1 sqn with 6* Cessna Reims F- 172H Rocket. 1 engr bn.
HEL: 3 sqn: RESERVES: Home Guard: 5 bde each of 5-7 bn.
1 Army spt with 8 SA-316B (Alouette III).
EQPT:
1 Navy spt with 2 SA-342L {Gazelle).
RECCE: 2 BRDM-2.
1 SAR with 5 SA-365FI (Dauphin).
APC: 13 M-42.
TOWED ARTY: 100mm: 25 M-53; 122mm: 20.
FORCES ABROAD: AD GUNS: 12.7mm.
UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 3 Obs, 1 civ pol. CROATIA
NAVY: 1,000 (incl 350 coastal defence).
(UNCRO):6Obsplus 11 civpol.CYPRUS(UNFICYP):
25 plus 15 civ pol. HAITI (UNMIH): 2. IRAQ/ BASES: Liepaja, Riga.
KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 7 Obs. LEBANON (UNIFIL): PATROL CRAFT: some 14, incl 2 Kondor-W, with
647; 1 bn; 4 AML-90 armd cars, \0Sisu APC,4 120mm 3 x twin 20mm gun, 3 Osa-l PFM, 1 Storm PCC
mor. MIDDLE EAST (UNTSO): 17 Obs. WESTERN (unarmed) plus approx 8 craft.
SAHARA (MINURSO): 9 Obs plus 14 civ pol.
COASTAL DEFENCE: 1 coastal def bn (350).
| LATVIA
AIR FORCE: 150.
GDP 1993e:L 1.59bn ($2.70bn) ac: 2 An-2, 1 L-410 ; hel: 5 Mi-2.
per capita $3,900
1994e: L 1.60bn ($2.85bn) PARAMILITARY:
per capita $4,200 BORDER GUARD: 4,300; 1 bde (9 bn).
Growth 1993e:-14.8% 1994e: 2.0% COAST GUARD: 3 patrol craft, 5 Sw Coast
Inflation 1993: 109% 1994: 36% Guard PCI( and 4 converted fishing boats.
Debt 1993: $231m 1994: $343m
Def exp 1993e: L 55m ($95m)
Def bdgt 1994e: L 36m ($64m) LITHUANIA
1995: L36m($65m)
FMA" 1994: $0.2m (IMET) GDP 1993e:L 13.3bn ($3.4bn)
1995: $0.2m(IMET) per capita: $3,200
1996: $0.4m(IMET) 1994e:L 16.0bn ($3.7bn)
$1 = lats» 1993: 0.59 1994: 0.56 per capita: $3,300
1995: 0.55
Growth 1993e:-16.5% 1994E:1.5%
L = lats
Inflation 1993e:410% 1994: 72%
Debt 1993: $291m 1994: $486m
"FMA received from Germany, Denmark and other Nordic
countries, 1992-94. Def exp 1993e:L5O5m($13Om)
* The lats was introduced in June 1993 ($1 = 0.68 lats) at Def bdgt 1994e: L 376m ($94m)
a floating exchange rate with convertible currencies. 1995e:L 468m ($116m)
90 NON-NATO EUROPE
$1 = L M 1993: 0.37
1995: 0.35 Women 187,200 165,600 299,000
LM = Maltese lira
GDP 1993e:L2.13bn($1.2bn):
per capita $3,800 AIR F O R C E : 1,300 (inci AD).
1994£:L3.63bn ($1.0bn): FTR: 1 regt with 27 MiG-29.
per capita $3,100 HEL: 1 sqn with 8 Mi-8.
Growth 1993e:-8.7% 1994e:-22.1% TPT: 1 An-24, 2 An-72, 1 Tu-134, 1 IL-18.
Inflation 1993e:837% 1994e:lll% SAM: 1 bde with 25 SA-3/-5.
Debt 1993: $289m 1994: $390m
Def exp 1993e: L 58m ($32m)
Def bdgt 1994: L 29m ($7m) PARAMILITARY:
1995: L60m($13m) INTERNAL TROOPS (Ministry of Interior): 2,500.
92 NON-NATO EUROPE
OPON (riot police) (Ministry of Interior): 900. arty, 1 engr bde, 1 SSM, 1 SA-6 regt.
1 (Silesia) with 3 mech, 1 armd cav div, 2 arty, 2
engr, 1 SA-4 bde, 2 SSM, 1 SA-6 regt.
OPPOSITION: 1 (Warsaw) with 3 mech div, 1 arty, 1 engr bde.
DNIESTR: 5,000; incl Republican Guard (Dniestr 1 (Krakow) with 1 air cavalry div HQ, 1 armd, 1
bn), Delta bn, el,000 Cossacks. mech, 1 air aslt, 1 'podhale rifle' bde, 1 mech,
1 arty, 1 tpt hel regt.
Div tps: 9 SA-6/-8 regt.
FOREIGN FORCES: R E S E R V E S : 1 mech div.
RUSSIA (14th Army): £9,200.1 ArmyHQ, 1 MRD, EQPT:
1 tk bn, 1 arty regt, 1 A A bde (120 MBT, 180 ACV,
MBT: 1,752: 1,035 T-55, 717 T-72.
130 arty/MRL/mors) (in Dniestr).
RECCE: 464 BRDM-2.
PEACEKEEPING: 6 AB bn (Russia), 3 inf bn
AIFV: 1,406 BMP-1, 37 BRM-1.
(Moldova), 3 bn (Dniestr).
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2 regt, 2 sqn.
FTR: 1 regt, 35 MiG-21 BIS/U. 1994e:lei 43,256bn ($26.13bn):
1 special naval regt with 14 TS-11, 7 An-2. per capita $3,000
1 ASW/SAR sqn with 5 Mi-2, 11 Mi-14 (ASW), 3 Growth 1993: 1.3% 1994: 3.4%
Mi-14 (SAR). Inflation 1993: 256% 1994: 137%
1 SAR/liaison sqn: 3 An-28RM, 6 W-3 Sokol. Debt 1993: $4.46bn 1994: $4.37bn
Def exp 1993: lei 421bn ($554m)
COASTAL DEFENCE: (3,100,inclin Army total). Def bdgt 1994: lei l,260.3bn ($761.5m)
6 arty bn with M-1937 152mm. 1995: lei l,772.7bn($927.5m)
3 SSM bn with SS-C-2B. FMA 1994: $0.3m (IMET)
1995: $0.5m (IMET)
1996: $0.7m (IMET)
AIR F O R C E : 72,600 (incl AD tps, 40,300 $1 = lei 1993: 760 1994: 1,655
conscripts); 412 cbt ac (plus 20 in store), 30 attack hel. 1995: 1,911
Flying hours: 60.
FTR: 3 AD Corps: 7 regt with 216 MiG-21,37 MiG-23, Population: 22,805,000 (Hungarian 9%)
12MiG-29. 13-17 18-22 23-32
FGA: 2 air div, 4 regts with 16 Su-20, 103 Su-22. Men 928,400 947,200 1,733,600
RECCE: 28* MiG-21 R/U. Women 892,800 909,800 1,673,800
TPT:2regtwith 10 An-2,1 An-12,10An-26,10Yak-40,
1 Tu-154, 211-14.
HEL: armed, 30 Mi-24,40 Mi-2URP, 10 W-3W; aslt: 68 TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Mi-2, 5 Mi-8.
A C T I V E : e217,400 (incl el04,700 conscripts,
TPT: 106 Mi-2, 5 Mi-8, 7 W-3 Sokol.
TRG: 191TS-11 Iskra, 5 PZL1-22 Iryda, 24 PZL-130 Orlik. 9,700 MoD staff and 5,900 centrally controlled units).
IN STORE: 20 MiG-21. Terms of service: Army, AirForce: 12 months; Navy:
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-8 Aphid. 18 months.
ASM: AS-7 Kerry. R E S E R V E S : 427,000: Army 400,000; Navy
SAM: 4 bde; 1 indep regt with 50 sites with about 232 6,000; Air Force 21,000.
SA-2/-3/-5.
A R M Y : 128,800 (e84,700 conscripts).
FORCES ABROAD: 4 Army Areas:
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: 6 Corps HQ:
ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 7 Obs. BOSNIA 1 with 1 tk, 2 mech, 1 inf, 1 mtn, 1 arty, 1 ATK bde, 1
(UNPROFOR):120bs,3civpol.CROATIA(UNCRO): mixed AAA regt, 1 recce, 1 SSM, 2 airport gd, 2 engr
1,063; 1 inf bn, incl 16 Obs, 25 civ pol. FORMER bn.
YUGOSLAVIA: 2 Obs. GEORGIA (UNOMIG): 5 1 with 2 mech, 1 mtn, I arty bde, 1 recce, 1 engr bn.
Obs. IRAQ/KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 6 Obs. KOREA 1 with 1 tk, 2 mech, 1 mtn, 1 ATK bde, 1 AAA regt, 1
(NNSC):staff.LEBANON(UNIFIL):558; 1 infbn.mil recce bn.
hospital. FYROM (UNPREDEP): 2 Obs plus 1 civ pol. 1 with 2 mech, 1 mot inf, 1 mot inf, 1 mtn, 1 ATK bde,
RWANDA (UNAMIR): 2 Obs. SYRIA (UNDOF): 1 recce, 1 airport gd, 1 SSM, 1 engr bn.
354; 1 inf bn. TAJIKISTAN (UNMOT): 2 Obs. 1 with 2 tk, 1 inf, 1 ATK bde, 1 recce, 1 engr bn.
WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO): 2 Obs. 1 with 3 mech, 1 mot inf, 1 mtn, 1 arty, 1 ATK bde, 1 arty
regt, 1 recce, 1 engr bn.
94 NON-NATO EUROPE
Army tps: 1 tk, 1 mech, 1 mtn, 1 arty, 1 ATK, 3 AAA bde, 4 Ch Shanghai PFI, 4 Ch Huchuan.
1 mech, 1 arty, 4 AAA, 4 SAM, 3 engr regt. RIVERINE: 24:
MoD tps: 3 AB (Air Force), 1 gd bde, 2 recce bn. some 6 Brutar with 1 x 100mm gun, 1 x 122mm RL,
Land Force tps: 2 Scud, 1 arty, 1 engr bde; 2 engr regt. 18(.
EQPT: MINE WARFARE: 39:
MBT: 1,843: 146 T-34, 822 T-55, 30 T-72, 620 TR- MINELAYERS: 2 Cosar, capacity 100 mines.
85, 225 TR-580. MCM: 37:
ASLT GUN: 160: 94 SU-76, 66 SU-100. 4 Musca MSC.
RECCE: 139 BRDM-2, 8 TAB-80. 8 T.301 MSI (plus some 9 non-op).
AIFV: 178 MLI-84. 25 VD141 MSI(.
APC:2,032:168TAB-77,414TABC-79,l,365TAB- SPTANDMISC: 10:
71, 85 MLVM, plus 976 'look-alikes'. 2 Constanta log spt with 1 Alouette hel, 3 spt tkr, 2
TOTAL ARTY: 2,341: AGOR, 1 trg, 2 tugs.
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TOWED: 1,174: 100mm: 132 Skoda (various models); HEL: 3 1AR-316, 4 Mi-14 PL.
105mm: 72 Schneider; 122mm: 334 M-1938 (M-30),
12 M-1931/37 (A-19); 130mm: 98 Gun 82; 150mm: 6 NAVAL INFANTRY (Marines): (8,000).
Ceh (Model 1937);152mm:81 D-20,101 Gun-How 85, 2 mech, 1 mot inf, 1 arty regt, 1 airport gd, 1 ATK,
55 Model 1938, 283 Model 81. 1 recce bn.
SP: 48: 122mm: 6 2S1, 42 Model 89. 1 indep inf bn.
MRL: 311: 122mm: 38 APR-21, 273 APR-40. EQPT:
MOR: 808: 120mm: 332 M-38, 476 Model 1982. MBT: 168 TR-580.
SSM: launchers: 13 Scud, 12 FROG. ASLT GUN: 12 SU-76.
ATGW: 534: AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2). APC: 90TAB-71,33 TABC-79 plus 79 'look-alikes'.
ATK GUNS: 1,450: 57mm: M-1943; 85mm: D-44;
TOTAL ARTY: 126:
100mm: 829 Gun 77, 75 Gun 75.
TOWED: 122mm: 36 M-1938 (M-30); 152mm: 36
AD GUNS: 1,118:30mm; 37mm; 57mm; 85mm; 100mm.
Model 81.
SAM: 62 SA-6/-7.
MRL: 122mm: 18 APR-40.
SURV: GS-13 (arty), 1 L219/200 PARK-1 (arty), MOR: 120mm: 24 Model 1982, 12 M-38.
Long Trough ((SNAR-1) arty),Pork Trough ((SNAR-
2/-6) veh, arty), Small Fred/Small Yawn ((veh, arty), COASTAL DEFENCE (1,000): HQ Constanta
Big Fred ((SNAR-10) veh, arty). 4 sectors.
4 coastal arty bty with 32 130mm.
10 A A arty bty: 3 with 18 30mm; 5 with 30 37mm;
N A V Y : e 19,000 (incl 8,000 Naval Infantry ande 10,000
2 with 12 57mm.
conscripts). 1 maritime div, 1 patrol boat bde, 1 river
bde, 1 maritime/river bde.
B A S E S : Coastal: Mangalia, Constanta; AIR FORCE: 54,000 (incl 8,000 AB, 10,000
Danube: Braila, Giurgiu, Tulcea. conscripts); 402 cbt ac, 17 attack hel.
SS: 1 Sov Kilo SS with 533mm TT. Air Force comd: 1 Air div, 1 AD div, 3 para bde. Flying
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 6: hours: 40.
DD: 1 Marasesti (tx-Muntenia) DDG with 4 x 2 SS- FGA: 3 regt with 10 MiG-17,75IAR-93,25 MiG-15,
N-2C Styx SSM, plus SA-N-5 Grail SAM, 2 IAR- 45 MiG-21.
316 hel, 2 x 3 533mm TT, RBU 6000. FTR: 4 regt with 120 MiG-21, 38 MiG-23,18 MiG-29.
FF:5: OCU: 46* MiG-21.
4 7e/a/with2x ASWRL,4x ASTT, 1 imp Tetal with RECCE: 2 sqn:
2 x ASW RL, 4 x ASTT, plus 1 SA-316 hel. 1 with 12 11-28 (recce/ECM), 1 with 11* MiG-21.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 77: TPT: 1 regt with 8 An-24,14 An-26,211-18,2 Boeing
CORVETTES: 3 Tarantul I with 2 x 2 SS-N-2C Styx, 707, 2Rombac 1-11.
1 x 4 SA-N-5 Grail SAM; plus 1 x 76mm gun. SURVEY: 3 An-30.
MSL CRAFT: 6 Sov Osa-\ PFM with 4 x SS-N-2A Styx. HEL: 5 regt plus 4 sqn with:
TORPEDO CRAFT: 32: ATTACK: 17IAR316CBT.
12 Epitrop PFT with 4 x 533mm TT. SPT: 81 IAR-316, 69 IAR-330, 2 Mi-17, 7 Mi-8.
20 Ch Huchuan PHT with 2 x 533mm TT. UTL: 4 AS-365N.
PATROL CRAFT: 36: TRG: ac: 45 L-29, 32 L-39, 2 MiG-15, 14* IAR-99.
OFFSHORE: 4 Democratia (GDR M-40) PCO. AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-7 Apex.
INSHORE: 8: AD: 1 div: 20 SAM sites with 120 SA-2.
NON-NATO EUROPE 95
RECCE: 38 BRDM-2.
4
SECURITY GUARDS (Ministry of Interior): AIFV:517M-80.
46,800. APC: 112M-60P, BOV-VP.
TOTAL ARTY: 1,499:
TOWED: 786: 105mm: 174 M-56; 122mm: 168 M-
Federal Republic of 1931/37,M-1938,132D-30;130mm: 180M-46;152mm:
Yugoslavia: 48: M-1937, D-20, M-84; 155mm: 84: M-59, M-65.
SP: 105mm: M-7; 122mm: 75 2S1.
SERBIA/MONTENEGRO MRL: 72: 128mm: 48 M-63, 24 M-77.
MOR: 82mm: 1,700; 120mm: 566.
GDP 1993e:$12.3bn: ATGW: 135 AT-3Sagger, incl SP(BOV-1, BRDM-1/2).
per capita $4,000 RCL: 57mm: 1,550; 82mm: 1,000 M-60PB SP;
1994e:$13.0bn: 105mm: 650 M-65.
per capita $4,200 ATK GUNS: 76mm: 60; 90mm: 74 M-36B2 (incl SP);
Growth 1993e:-30.0% 1994e:5.5% 100mm: 130 T-12.
Inflation: 1993: hyper-inflation 1994e: 500% AD GUNS: 20mm: 475 M-55/-75, 65 BOV-3 SP
Debt 1993e:$6.2bn 1994e:$6.5bn triple; 30mm: 350 M-53, M-53/-59, 8 BOV-30 SP;
Defexp 1993e:n.k. ($2,800m) 57mm: 54 ZSU-57-2 SP.
Def bdgt 1994: sd 1,000m ($741 m) SAM: 175: SA-6/-7/-9.
1995: sd 1,61 lm ($1,143m)
$1 =sd" 1994: 1.62 1995: 1.41 N A V Y : e6,000 (incl 4,500 conscripts).
sd = super dinar B A S E : Kotor, Tivat, Bar. (Most former Yugoslav
bases are now in Croatian hands.)
"The super dinar was introduced in January 1994 when it was
fixed at parity with the DM. Unofficial rates in mid-1995 were SS:4:
$=3sd. 2 Sava SS with 533mm TT (poss only 1 op).
2 Hero) SS with 533mm TT.
Population: Serbia and Montenegro 10,821,000. Serbia (Plus 5 Una SSI for SF ops.)
10,040,000 (Serb 66%, Albanian 17%, Hungarian 4%, FF:4:
Muslim 2%). Montenegro 782,000 (Montenegrin 62%, 2 Kotor with 4 x SS-N-2C Styx SSM, 1 x 2 SA-N-4
Muslim 15%, Serb 9%, Albanian 7%). e2,032,000 Serbs SAM, 2 x 1 2 ASW RL, 2 x 3 ASTT.
were living in the other Yugoslav republics before the 2 Split (Sov Koni) with 4 SS-N-2C, 1 x 2 SA-N-4
civil war began. S A M , Styx SSM, 2 x 1 2 ASW R L .
13-17 18-22 23-32 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 41:
Men 427,400 425,800 834,400 MSL CRAFT: 10:
Women 403,200 402,800 791,800 5 Rade Koncar PFM with 2 x SS-N-2B Styx (some t).
5 Mitar Acev (Sov Osa-l) PFM with 4 x SS-N-2A.
TORPEDO CRAFT: 4 Topcider (Sov Shersheri) with 4
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: x 533mm TT.
A C T I V E : 126,500 (e60,000 conscripts). PATROL CRAFT: 27:
Terms of service: 12-15 months. INSHORE: 6 Mima.
RESERVES: some 400,000. RIVERINE: about 21< (some in reserve).
MINE WARFARE: 5:
96 NON-NATO EUROPE
MARINES: (900).
2 marine bde (2 regt each of 2 bn). ARMY: 33,000.
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2 Corps HQ.
I
1 mech inf div.
AIR F O R C E : 29,000 (3,000 conscripts); 282 cbt EQPT:
ac, 110 armed hel. MBT: 912 T-72M, T-54/-55.
4 air bde, 2 hel regt. RECCE: 129 BRDM, 90 OT-65.
FGA: some 80 Jastreb, Super Galeb, Orao 2. AIFV: 476: BVP-1, BMP-2, BPZV, BRM-1K.
FTR: 7 sqn with 87 MiG-21F/PF/M/bis, 10 MiG- APC: 567: OT-90, 476 OT-64A/C.
21U, 16 MiG-29 (-A: 14; -UB: 2). TOTAL ARTY: 808:
RECCE: 2 sqn with some 29* Orao, MiG-21. TOWED: 297: 100mm: M-53; 122mm: M-1931/37
ARMED HEL: some 110 Mi-8 (aslt); Gazela. (A-19), M-1938, D-30.
ASW: 1 hel sqn with 4 Mi-14, 4 Ka-25, 2 Ka-27. SP: 189: 122mm 2S1; 152mm: Dana (M-77).
TPT: 2 An-12, 15 An-26, 4 CL-215 (SAR, fire- MRL: 243:122mm: RM-70; 130mm: RM-130 (M-51).
fighting), 2 Falcon 50 (VIP), 2Learjet 25, 6 Yak-40. MOR: 79: 120mm; 240mm: 2S4.
LIAISON: ac: 46 UTVA-66; hel: 14 Partizan, SSM: 9 FROG-1, SS-21, Scud, SS-23.
TRG: ac: 60 *Super Galeb/Jastreb, 100 UTVA; hel: ATGW: AT-3 Sagger, AT-5 Spandrel.
20 Gazela. ADGUNS:286:30mm:M-53/-59,Sfro/>SP;57mm:S-60.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-8 Aphid, AA-10 Alamo, AA- SAM: 437: SA-7, SA-9/-13.
11 Archer. SURV: GS-13 (veh), Long Trough (SNAR-1), Pork
ASM: AGM-65 Maverick, AS-7 Kerry. Trough ((SNAR-2/-6) arty), Small Fred/Small Yawn
AD: 8 SAM bn, 8 sites with 24 SA-2, 16 SA-3. (veh, arty), Big Fred (SNAR-10) veh, arty).
15 regt AD arty.
AIR F O R C E : 14,000; 111 cbt ac (plus 30 in
1 SLOVAKIA |
store), 19 attack hel.
FGA: 34, incl Su-22, Su-25.
FTR: 50 MiG-21, 15 MiG-29.
GDP 1993: Ks 340.2 bn ($11.97bn): RECCE: 8 MiG-21 RF.
per capita $5,500 TPT: 16, incl An-12, An-24/-26, Tu-134, Tu-154, L410M.
1994: Ks398.3bn($12.85bn): TRG: some 15 L-29, 25 L-39, 4* MiG-21 U/MF.
per capita $5,800 ATTACK HEL: 19 Mi-24.
Growth 1993: -4.1% 1994: 4.8% ASLT TPT: 26, incl Mi-8, Mi-17.
Inflation 1993: 23.1% 1994: 11.7% IN STORE: about 30 incl MiG-21, Su-7.
Debt 1993: $3.33bn 1994: $4.28bn
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-7 Apex, AA-8 Aphid.
Def exp 1993: Ks 8.2bn ($273.3m)
AD: SA-2, SA-6.
1994: Ks 9.6bn ($309m)
Def bdgt 1994: Ks 10.4bn ($335.5m)
1995: Ks 12.9bn ($403.1m) FORCES ABROAD:
FMA 1994: $0.3m(IMET) UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
1995: $0.4m(IMET) ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 5 Obs. CROATIA
1996: $0.5m(IMET)
(UNCRO): 589; 1 engr bn.
$ = Ks 1993: 30.8 1994: 32.1
1995: 29.4
Ks = Slovak koruna PARAMILITARY:
NON-NATO EUROPE 97
Population: 8,785,000
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
13-17 18-22 23-32
A C T I V E : 8,400 (5,500 conscripts).
Men 258,200 283,200 631,000
Terms of service: 1 months.
Women 243,400 269,200 596,000
R E S E R V E S : 70,000 (incl 47,000 first-line reserves).
6 div with total of 2 armd, 4 mech, 6 inf, 4 arctic bde, 3 Arko MSC.
7 arty regt. 10 MSI, 5 MSI(.
22 def districts (4 mech, 18 inf). AMPH: craft only: 12LCM.
EQPT: SPTANDMISC: 12:
MBT: 288 Centurion, 260 Strv-103B, 160 Strv-121 1 AGI, 1 sub rescue/salvage ship, 1 survey, 6 ice-
(Leopard 2). breakers, 2 tugs, 1 SES PCI (trials).
LTTK:210Ikv-91.
A1FV: 405 Pbv-302 plus 200 'look-alikes', 30 Strf-9040. COASTAL DEFENCE:
APC: 360 Pbv 401A (MT-LB). 2 coast arty bde: 4 naval bde, 12 mobile, 53 static units,
TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 455 Type-40; 155mm: 153 incl 2 amph defence bn, arty, barrier bn, minelayer sqn.
FH-77A/B, Type F 182. EQPT:
SP ARTY: 155mm: 26 BK-1A. GUNS: 40mm, incl L/70 AA; 75mm, 120mm incl
MOR: 81mm: 1,000; 120mm: 510. CD-SOKarin (mobile); 75mm, 120mmErsta (static).
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ATGW: 57 TOW (Pvrbv 551 SP), RB-55, RB-56B//Z. MOR: 81mm, 120mm: 70.
RL: 84mm: AT-4. SSM: RBS-17 Hellfire, RBS-08A, RBS-15KA, RB-52.
RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav; 90mm: PV-1110. MINELAYERS: 9 inshore, 16 inshore(.
AD GUNS: 4 0 m m : 600. PATROL CRAFT: 18 PCI.
SAM: RBS-70 (incl Lvrbv SP), RB-77 (I HAWK), AMPH: 10 LCM, 80 LCU, about 60 LCA.
RBS-90.
SURV: Green Archer (mor). NAVAL AIR: (320); 1 cbt ac, 10 armed hel.
HEL: 26 Hkp-9A ATK, 16 Hkp-3 tpt, 25 Hkp-5B trg, ASW: 1 C-212ac.
19Hkp-6Autl. HEL: 3 sqn with 10 Hkp-4B/C (ASW), 10 Hkp-6 liaison.
N A V Y : £9,000 (incl Coastal Defence, 320 Naval AIR F O R C E : 11,500(5,500 conscripts); 393 cbt
Air and £4,100 conscripts). ac (plus 51 in store), no armed hel.
B A S E S : Musko,Karlskrona,Harnosand,G6teborg 3 Air Comd.
(spt only). FGA: 4 sqn with 74 SAAB AJ-37 (plus 13 in store); incl
SS: 13: 1 (OCU) with 15 SAAB SK-37 (plus 15 in store).
4 Vdstergotland with TP-617 HWT and TP-613 and FTR: 8 sqn:
TP-43. 1 with 40 SAAB J-35 (plus 23 in store), 10 SAAB
1 modernised Niicken (AIP) with TP-613 and TP-42. SK-35C.
2 Niicken. 7 with 135 SAAB JA-37.
5 Sjoormen, with TP-613 and TP-42. RECCE: 2 sqn with *50 SAAB SH/SF-37.
1 Spiggen II (ASW target) submarine. ECM: 2 Caravelle, 13 SAAB J-32E.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 41: TPT: 1 sqn with 8 C-130E/H, 3 King Air 200, 2 Metro
MSL CRAFT: 34 PFM: III (VIP), 13 SK-60D/E, 1 SAAB 340B.
4 Goteborg with 4 x 2 RBS-15 SSM; plus 4 x 400mm TRG: 25 SAAB J-32B/D/E (-E ECM trg: 13; -D
TT, 4 x ASW mor. target-towing: 5; -B: 7), 69 *SK-69B/C (also have It
2 Stockholm with 4 x 2 RBS-15 SSM (or up to 4 attack/recce role), 71 SK-61.
additional 533 TT); plus 2 x 533mm, 4 x 400mm SAR: 11 Hkp-10 (Super Puma), 6 Hkp-3 (Bell 204).
TT, 4 x ASW mor. AAM: RB-24 (AIM-9B/3 Sidewinder), RB-27 (Improved
16 Hugin with 6 RB-12 (No Penguin) SSM; plus 4 Falcon), RB-28 (Falcon), RB-71 (Skyflash), RB-74
ASW mor. AIM 9L (Sidewinder).
12 Norrkoping with 4 x 2 RBS-15 SSM or up to 6 x ASM: RB-04E, RB-05A, RB-15F, RB-75 (Maverick).
533mm TT. AD: semi-automatic control and surv system, Stril
PATROL CRAFT: 7: 60, coordinates all AD components.
1 PCI, 6 PCI{.
MINE WARFARE: 29:
MINELAYERS: 3:
FORCES ABROAD:
1 Carlskrona (200 mines), trg. UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
2 Alvsborg (200 mines). ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 20 Obs. BOSNIA
(Mines can be laid by all SS classes.) (UNPROFOR): 1,121; 1 armd inf bn, 6 Obs plus 5 civ
MCM: 26: pol. CROATIA (UNCRO): 137;HQcoy, 11 Obs, 30 civ
1 Uto MCMV spt. pol. GEORGIA (UNOMIG): 7 Obs. INDIA/
7 Landsort MHC. PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP): 8 Obs. IRAQ/KUWAIT
NON-NATO EUROPE 99
(UNIKOM):6Obs.KOREA(NNSC):6Staff.FYROM 1 mtn corps with 3 mtn div (2 mtn inf, 1 arty regt),
(UNPREDEP): 38 plus 1 Obs. MIDDLE EAST 3 fortress bde, 2 mtn inf, 2 fortress, 1 engr regt, 1
(UNTSO): 17 Obs. territorial div (6 regt), 2 territorial bde.
EQPT:
MBT: 117 Pz-61,186 Pz-68,186 Pz-68/88,380 Pz-87
PARAMILITARY: (Leopard 2).
C O A S T GUARD: (600); 1 Gotland PCO and 1 AIFV: 192M-63/73,315M-63/89(all M-l 13 with20mm).
KBV-171 PCC (fishery protection), some 65 PCI; APC: 836 M-63/73 (M-113) incl variants, somePiranha.
Air Arm: 3 C-212 MR, 1 Cessna 337G, 1 402C ac. TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 216 Model-35, 341 Model-46.
CIVIL DEFENCE: shelters for 6,300,000. All SPARTY:155mm:558PzHb-66/-74/-79/-88(M-109U).
between age 16-25 liable for civil defence duty. MOR: 81mm: 2,750 M-33, M-72; 120mm: 402 M-
VOLUNTARY AUXILIARY ORGANISA- 87, 132M-64(M-113).
TIONS: some 35,000 volunteers. ATGW: 2,700 Dragon, 303 TOW-2 SP (MOWAG)
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Piranha.
RL: 83mm: 20,000 M-80.
ATK GUNS: 90mm: 850 Model-50/-57.
I SWITZERLAND AD GUNS: 20mm: 1,700.
SAM: 56 B/L-84 (Rapier), Stinger.
GDP 1993: fr 343.Obn ($232.13bn): SURV: Green Archer (mor).
per capita $22,300 UAV: Scout.
1994: fr 356.2bn ($260.44bn): HEL: 60 Alouette III.
per capita $23,100 MARINE: 11 Aquarius patrol boats.
Growth 1993: -0'.9% 1994: 2.1%
Inflation 1993: 3. 3% 1994: 0.8% AIR C O R P S : 32,500 on mob (incl mil airfield guard
Publ Debt 1993: 2().2% 1994: 21.8% units); 153 cbt ac, no armed hel.
Def exp 1993: fr 5.8bn ($3.9bn) The Air Corps is an integral part of the Army, struc-
1994: fr 5.9bn ($4.3bn)
tured in 1 Air Force bde, 1 AD bde, 1 Air-base bde
Def bdgt 1995: fr 6.02bn ($5.16bn)
and 1 Comd-and-Control bde. Flying hours: 150-
1996e:fr 6.00bn ($5.13bn)
200. Reserves 50-70.
$1 =fr 1993: 1. 48 1994: 1.37
1995: 1. 17 FTR: 9 sqn:
fr = Swiss franc 7 with 90 Tiger II/F-5E, 12 Tiger II/F-5F.
2 with 29 Mirage HIS, 4 -III DS.
Population : 7,071,000 RECCE: 1 sqn with 18* Mirage IIIRS.
13-17 18-22 23-32 TPT: 1 sqn with 17 PC-6, 2 Learjet 36, 3 Do-27.
Men 202,600 219,000 543,600 HEL: 3 sqn with 15 AS-332 M-i (Super Puma), 12
Women 194,000 211,400 534,800 SA-316)A/o«e«eIII).
TRG: 19 Hawk Mk 66, 38 PC-7, 12 PC-9.
ASM: AGM-65A/B Maverick.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES (Air Corps AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder, AIM-26 Falcon.
AIR DEFENCE:
forms part of the Army):
1 SAM regt with 2 bn (each with 3 bty, Bloodhound).
A C T I V E : about 3,400 regular, plus recruits (2 intakes 1 AD bde: 1 SAM regt (3 bn, each with 2 or 3 bty:
(1 of 11,000, 1 of 17,000) each for 15 weeks only). Rapier); 7 AD regt (each with 2 bn of 3 bty; 35mm
Terms of service: 15 weeks compulsory recruit trg at guns, Skyguard fire control).
age 19-20, followed by 10 refresher trg courses of 3
weeks over a 22-year period between ages 20-42.
Some 313,100 attended trg in 1994. FORCES ABROAD:
R E S E R V E S (all services): 396,300. UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 6 Obs. GEORGIA
(UNOMIG): 5 Obs.KOREA (NNSC): 6 Staff. MIDDLE
A R M Y : 363,800 on mob. EAST (UNTSO): 8 Obs. FYROM (UNPREDEP): 1
Armed Forces Comd (All units Reserve status). Obs plus 6 civ pol. TAJIKISTAN (UNMOT): 3 Obs.
Comd tps: 2armd bde, 2 inf, 1 arty, 1 airport, 2 engr regt.
3 fd Corps each 2 div (3 inf, 1 arty regt), 1 territorial div
(5/6 regt), 1 armd bde, 1 arty, 1 engr, 1 cyclist, 1 PARAMILITARY:
fortress regt. CIVIL DEFENCE: 480,000 (300,000 trained).
100 NON-NATO EUROPE
Western Op Comd:
UKRAINE Comd tps: 1 arty div (2 arty, I MRL, 1 ATK bde),
1 SSM bde, 1 TD (trg), 1 engr regt.
GDP" I993e:krb 153,490bn ($51bn) 3 Corps:
per capita $4,300 1 with 2 MRD (1 res), 2 mech (1 res), 1 SSM, 1
1994e:krb 355,000bn ($39bn) arty, 1 SAM, 1 engr bde, 1 MRL, 1 ATK, 1
per capita $3,400 attack hel regt.
Growth 1993e:-17.1% 1994e:-23.0% 1 with 2 mech div, 1 mech, 1 SSM, 1 arty, 1 SAM
Inflation 1993e: 4,735% I994e:891% bde, 1 ATK (res), 1 MRL (res), 1 attack hel regt.
Debt 1993: $4.1bn 1994: $7.1bn 1 with 1 TD, 1 ATK, 1 attack hel regt.
Def exp 1993e:krb 2,500bn ($824m) Southern Op Comd:
Defbdgt 1994: krb 16,823bn ($881 m) Comd tps: 2 mech div (1 trg), 1 air-mobile div, 1 arty
1995e:krb 39,215bn ($850m) div, I Spetsnaz, 1 SSM, 2 arty (1 res), 2 SAM bde.
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Russia
The Russian armed forces were still grappling with the problems of reorganisation following the
break-up of the Soviet Union and withdrawal from Eastern Europe, as well as a much-reduced
budget and manpower problems, when they were required to mount large-scale operations in
Chechnya. The Chechen crisis only made the Russians more determined that the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty be reinterpreted to allow them to deploy stronger forces in the
Caucasus. The prospect of NATO enlargement has also been a major concern for Russia.
Elimination of strategic nuclear weapons has continued and the reduction of CFE Treaty Limited
Equipment (TLE) is nearly complete.
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Chechnya
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the (then) Chechen-Ingush
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Russian Federation insisted on total independence,
led by Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev, who had been elected president of the Republic
in October. Although Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in November
1991, this was reversed by the Supreme Soviet and the only action taken against the breakaway
republic was an economic blockade. In 1994, a covert operation backed by the Russian Federal
Counter-intelligence Service (FSB), but fronted by Chechens opposed to Dudayev, began. This
was still unsuccessful after reinforcement by the Russian military. During an attack on the
Chechen capital, Grozny, on 26 November 1994, a number of Russian soldiers were captured and
publicly paraded, much to the surprise of their divisional commander, who did not know of their
secondment. It was probably this which proved the final straw for Yeltsin, who then decided on
military intervention and to overthrow the Dudayev regime.
The conduct of military operations in Chechnya by the Russian armed forces has been a
chapter of disaster which has led some commentators to suggest that NATO had totally
misassessed the competence and capability of Soviet armed forces in the years before the break-
up of the USSR. There are a number of reasons why operations were handled so badly; some of
these could have been avoided, others could not.
The operation caught the Russian forces, particularly the Army, at a very bad moment. In many
ways their situation was comparable to that of the British Army when it was decided to deploy an
armoured division to the Persian Gulf. The British were then in the middle of the 'Options for
Change' programme which included reducing the number of divisions in Germany from three to
one; totally reorganising the remaining division; and a series of unit amalgamations and
disbandments (most of these units were therefore well understrength as they awaited reorganisa-
tion). The changes imposed on the Russian Army by the end of the Cold War and the break-up
of the Soviet Union were on a far greater scale. Thirty-seven divisions had to be withdrawn from
Central Europe and the Baltic States; 57 divisions were handed over to Belarus and Ukraine; new
regulations granted exemption from conscript service to thousands of students; a number of
divisions were being reorganised into independent brigades or were disbanding; and thousands of
tanks, ACVs and artillery were being destroyed as required by the CFE Treaty. All units were
understrength, living conditions for many were deplorable and morale was understandably low.
Before the Coalition operation to retake Kuwait from Iraq in 1991, the British Army, like others,
had several months in which to absorb the extra manpower every unit needed and to train together.
The Russians had no such breathing space for their operation; the initial force was assembled in
a matter of days and deployed into Chechnya within a week, on 11 December 1994. To make
matters worse a veritable pot-pourri of units was assembled, presumably the most readily
available and up to strength, from every branch of the forces: a North Caucasian-based
mechanised division; airborne troops; naval infantry ;and OMON and ODON Ministry of Interior
troops - none of which had operated together before. As the campaign got under way more units
RUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS
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A r c t i c Ocean
Kaliningrad
(RUSSIA)
X
LITHUANIA^— \ V " ESTONIA
Northern MD
GE0 R G I A - ^ \
ARMENIA-^~\"
i ds/p
104 RUSSIA
deployed, but never more than a regiment for any one division (presumably taking with it, as the
British did in Kuwait, the bulk of their division's manpower). An early statement on casualties
revealed that, by 6 January 1995, units from at least five military districts (MDs) had been
deployed.
The operation had a number of unique features. It was the first large-scale use of Russian
troops on Russian soil against Russian citizens. It was the first time Russian soldiers had operated
under the cameras of the international media. This added to the political requirement to get the
operation over quickly, and so led to the disastrous decision to try and take Grozny with an
armoured dash for the Presidential palace when military common sense pointed to a systematic
and measured street-by-street approach. The attacking forces paid dearly for this major error of
judgement.
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Russian commanders also badly underestimated the strength and determination of Dudayev's
men. Before 1991, an armoured training centre had been based in Grozny. When this was
withdrawn a deal was brokered, allowing it to leave unhindered in return for handing over half
its weaponry to Chechen forces. From this the Chechens would have acquired over 100 tanks
(mainly T-54), about 20 BMP infantry fighting vehicles and over 50 artillery pieces, including
several BM-21 MRL. A large number of training aircraft, L-29 and L-39, were also left at
Khankala (Grozny East).
Following the capture of Grozny in early February 1995, Russian forces took the remaining
towns as the Chechens slowly withdrew into the hills. While fighting continued, peace talks,
arranged by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), began but broke
down on 25 May 1995. On 14 June a group of about 100 Chechen rebels raided Budennovsk in
the neighbouring Stavropol Territory, eventually capturing the hospital and holding some 1,000
hostages, including hospital staff and patients. The Army made two unsuccessful attempts to
recapture the hospital. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin negotiated an agreement
allowing the Chechens free passage back to Chechnya. They took 100 hostages with them who
were then released there on 20 June. Following a cease-fire, which came into effect on 23 June,
a new round of peace talks began on 28 June. On 23 July it was announced that a military
agreement had been reached which covered matters such as the exchange of prisoners, 'hot-line'
communications and disarmament.
The mishandling of the Chechen operations and the Budennovsk debacle led to the resignation
of several senior officers and the dismissal of others. President Yeltsin accepted the resignations
of Viktor Yerin, the Interior Minister, Sergey Stephashin, Head of the Federal Security Service,
and Nikolay Yegorov, Deputy Prime Minister for Nationalities, but not that of the Minister of
Defence, General Pavel Grachev. It was also announced that a new Army, the 58th, was to be
deployed to the Transcaucasus MD, and based at Vladikavkaz. In effect, this move creates a more
senior commander with a larger staff and infrastructure than the Corps HQ already located in the
MD, one of which will be absorbed into 58th Army HQ.
and control potential problems in the Caucasus. The Russians also face severe accommodation
problems as the bulk of their army units are required by the Treaty to be located in the Moscow
and Volga MDs, and the Russians wish to spread the load into the North Caucasus, described
by Grachev as the main base area for Russian Rapid Deployment Forces.
From a purely military perspective, the Russians undoubtedly have a case, as the situation has
radically changed since the Treaty was first signed. However, Russia's neighbours on the
southern flank are opposed to any change, although Ukraine also wants to be able to deploy more
TLE in the former Odessa MD. Most signatories oppose any change before the first review
conference due in May 1996 on the grounds that it could lead to the total unravelling of the
Treaty. A number of suggestions have been made to the Russians on how they could use flexibility
in the Treaty (such as redeploying ACVs to internal security forces and units of coastal defence
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and marine infantry which are not subject to Article V) to increase their strength without violating
it. In July, the Russians made a further submission to the CFE Joint Consultative Group,
suggesting the declaration of a zone in the Caucasus which would be excluded from the CFE (such
a zone exists in Turkey in the border region with Syria and Iraq).
Most countries have already achieved, or are very close to achieving, their reduction liabilities.
Russia has done so in respect of artillery and has only a further 700 other TLE left to be reduced
by the November 1995 deadline. Few countries have the will or the finance to fund increases in
armament procurement. It could therefore be argued that the CFE has served its purpose and is no
longer necessary. But scrapping it would also lose an essential component; that of verification and
transparency, essential for reducing regional tensions. It must be said that the CFE (and the OSCE
Vienna Document) inspections and observation of military activities will be the only way to gain
low-level intelligence on unit organisations, training standards, logistic preparations and weapon
systems not covered by the CFE but held by units subject to inspection.
Kaliningrad
Concern has been expressed in some quarters about the growing military strength in the
Kaliningrad region. The facts, as demonstrated by the CFE Treaty military information exchanges,
show that in some categories there has been a decline in numbers. Table 1 shows the unit and
weapon strength in Kaliningrad in 1990 and 1995. In 1990, Soviet forces in the three Baltic states
also included two motor rifle, one airborne, one coastal defence and two training divisions and some
11 air force, air defence and naval air regiments. All have now been withdrawn.
aircraft and aircraft spares which the Soviet Union relied on Ukrainian plants to manufacture.
Payment for these items could be made in terms of energy-debt forgiveness.
In February 1995, Kazakhstan and Russia signed some 15 separate military agreements. The
most important of these concerns the status of military personnel serving in the territory of the
other party. Russia will be able to use firing ranges in Kazakhstan and is developing cooperation
to allow unified forces to be formed in times of crisis. In a separate agreement, Russia has leased
its Baikonur missile launch centre where most Soviet, and Russian, space flights have originated.
Russia continues to support the government of Tajikistan in its fight against rebels on the border
with Afghanistan.The Russian Duma ratified an agreement with Estonia on social guarantees for
the 10,000 Russian pensioners who live in Estonia in July 1995. The Estonian parliament has not
yet ratified the agreement.
Future Reorganisation
Several statements have been made forecasting further reorganisation of the armed forces over the
next ten years. The most important change would be the appointment of a civilian Minister of
Defence in place of the traditional general. The General Staff, which would be responsible for
command and control of the forces, would then report directly to the President. The present five
services would be reduced to three with the Air Force, Air Defence Force and Strategic Rocket
Forces merging to form an Aerospace Force. The eight military districts would be reduced to six,
and the status of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets reduced. Manpower would be reduced to around
1.5 million initially and later to 1.2 million.
decided that conscripts who served in areas of military action should only serve for 18 months.
It is not clear what constitutes an area of military action - certainly service in Chechnya and
Tajikistan would qualify, but other peacekeeping tours, such as Moldova or Georgia, might not.
Accurately assessing manpower strengths is always difficult, even when much more informa-
tion is publicly available. It is never certain whether statements on Russian manpower concern
authorised or actual strengths. Recent statements include:
• 'The armed forces number 1,917,000' (General Pavel Grachev, Interfax, 6 May 1995).
• 'The armed forces were cut by 385,000 men in 1994 and would be cut by a further 217,000 in
1995' (Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, Military News, May 1995).
• '85% of the 209,000 men needed had been drafted by 7 June 1995; 60% of these would serve
in the armed forces, the remainder in the Border, Interior and Railroad forces' (Colonel
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A growing number of soldiers are on short contracts, but there are no up-to-date figures
available - the total could be as high as 300,000. There are 160,000 women now serving in the
armed forces. It is planned to recall some 12,000 reserve officers for active service during 1995
and 18,000 graduates, who previously would not have expected to serve, are to be called up each
year. To some extent, the shortage of manpower has been alleviated by the measures described
above and the continued reduction of the number of units to be manned.
Nuclear Forces
The elimination of strategic nuclear weapons has continued both in Russia and in the nuclear-
armed former Soviet Republics. In April 1995 it was reported by the Commander of Strategic
Rocket Forces that all nuclear warheads in Kazakhstan had been removed from their missiles and
transported back to Russia. Eighteen SS-25 ICBM remain in Belarus. These are due to be
transferred to Russia by Autumn 1996, although Russia plans to complete the transfer in 1995.
Belarus has confirmed that all nuclear warheads will have been transferred by the end of 1995.
The last SS-11 and SS-13 ICBM have been eliminated and only ten SS-17 remain. So far only
24 SS-18 in Russia have been eliminated, and only two of their silos destroyed (all SS-18 must
be eliminated under the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START II)). Ten
SS-19 have been eliminated and SS-25 transferred from Belarus have been deployed to Vypolzovo
(an SS-17 site), Drovyanya (SS-11) and Barnaul. There has been no change to the numbers and
deployment of either silo-based or train-mobile SS-24.
108 RUSSIA
There have been fewer changes to the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force. The December
1994 Memorandum of Understanding showed 45 SSBN, with a total of 684 countable missiles.
There are also two Yankee 1 SSBN which, although withdrawn from service, remain START-
countable. SSBN are no longer based at Olen'ya in the Kola peninsula.
There has been little change to the strategic bomber force. The number of Tu-95B/G has been
reduced from 45 to 24 (now all Tu-95G) and one additional Tu-160 Blackjack bomber has been
produced. Russia is negotiating with Ukraine to buy its 46 strategic bombers (mainly Blackjack
and Bear H).
The START II Treaty was presented to the Duma on 26 June for ratification.
Conventional Forces
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Ground Forces
The Leningrad MD has been renamed the Northern MD. The 1 lth Army in Kaliningrad is directly
subordinate to the General HQ of the ground forces. The 58th Army has been established in the
North Caucasus MD. Most changes in the order of battle noted in the last 12 months took place
east of the Urals. Ten motor rifle divisions have been disbanded, three of them converting to
independent motor rifle brigades. The machine gun/artillery division in the Kuril Islands has been
reduced to brigade status. Some new equipment has been produced while CFE elimination
continues. West of the Urals there have been the following increases: 140 T-80 tanks, 100 BTR-
80 APC, 30 BMD-3 airborne fighting vehicles, 110 2 S19152 SP guns, 130 2 A65 152mm towed
artillery and 25 9A52 300mm (Smerch) MRL. All these weapons feature strongly in Russian
military export efforts.
Naval Forces
Over the last 12 months there has been an increase in naval activity. In the first six months of 1995
some 14 naval exercises involving over 400 submarines, surface warships and support ships have
taken place. In April 1995 an exercise was held involving elements of all four fleets. Its aim appears
to have been to check operational capability and mobilisation readiness. Live firing of ballistic,
cruise and surface-to-air missiles has increased by 30%.
The long-standing dispute over division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and
Ukraine and the provision of shore facilities for Russia in the Crimea appear to have been
solved, although some details may not have been fully worked out yet. The Fleet's warships
are to be split equally between the two navies, but Ukraine only requires some 18.3% of the
whole and will hand over the other 31.7% to Russia in return for unspecified compensation.
The land-based components - coastal defence forces, naval infantry and naval aviation units
- are to be divided equally, based on the situation as of 3 August 1992. The division of the
Fleet was agreed at a summit meeting at Sochi on 9 June 1995. This did not address the
question of where the two fleets would be based, other than that Sevastopol would be the
main base and headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
Two Afcu/ct-class nuclear-powered submarines, a fourth Admiral Ushakov-class cruiser and
some corvettes and torpedo craft have been commissioned in the last 12 months. One of theAkula
which deployed to the Pacific is reliably reported to be armed with presumably a conventional
version of the Shkval underwater missile, claimed to have a speed of 200 knots. The aircraft
carrier Gorshkov, ten frigates, seven missile craft and about ten landing ships have been retired.
Large numbers of ships decommissioned earlier are being disposed of as scrap, mainly to South
Korea (which has bought two aircraft carriers), Minsk and Norovossiysk (some 50 submarines
and many others). India is still believed to be negotiating to buy the last remaining aircraft carrier,
the Kuznetsov.
The Russian Navy is much reduced, but could still pose a significant threat, particularly given
the recent revelation of its 200-knot submarine-launched underwater missile, Shkval.
RUSSIA 109
Considerable numbers of surface-to-air missiles have been retired, including some 500 SA-
2, 200 SA-3 and 500 SA-5 launchers. Numbers of SA-10, which has a limited anti-ballistic
missile capability, have risen by 250 to 1,750. The SA-10 is being widely marketed for export.
Defence Expenditure
In budgetary terms, 1994 seemed initially to promise a real increase in spending for the Russian
military after the uncertainties of 1992 and 1993. When the Federal Budget finally became law in
July 1994, after a prolonged contest between the military interest groups and the Finance Ministry,
the military received some 40.6tr roubles - well short of its request for r 87.8tr - but still 21 % of
the Federal Budget. Not only did the defence budget increase its proportion of the Federal Budget
compared to the two previous years (Table 3), but it appeared to represent a large nominal increase
over the 1993 budget (three- to four-fold) and out-turn (five- to six-fold). Expectations of high price
inflation undoubtedly played a part in the budget calculations, but by mid-1994 it was becoming
clear that inflation was running well below 1993 levels of about 900%. In the event it fell to about
300% by the end of the year. During 1994 the Finance Ministry continued to sequester authorised
budgetary funds in response to massive tax revenue shortfalls (only r48.3tr-or 36%-of budgeted
revenue was received by the Federal government in 1994), and the decline in inflation provided an
additionaljustification for these measures. As aresult, the Finance Ministry was able to claw back
some of the funds committed but not released for defence, so that actual allocations to the military
and defence industry fell short of authorisations by about 30% (reportedly some r 10.8tr). Between
January and September 1994 the military received just r 14.6tr (about 60% of authorised funds),
despite having committed procurement orders to industry. Thereafter, the government relaxed
monetary policy to pay some of its debts to the military and its suppliers.
Table 3: Official Defence Budget and Outlay, 1992-1995 (in current roubles bn)
Notes:
"The final adjusted value of the 1993 defence budget was r 8,327bn.
'' 1994 data for outlay and % of Federal government expenditure are provisional.
' IMF data cite a provisional outlay of r 28,000bn for 1994.
Source: Official budgets, Economic Review of the Russian Federation (IMF 1994, 1995)
In contrast to last year, the 1995 defence budget implies a reduction in spending -perhaps of as
much as one-third - when measured against the forecast for inflation. Much will depend on
110 RUSSIA
whether armed forces costs can be held down until lower inflation levels prevail. As part of the
1995 agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government is aiming for a
target inflation rate of 1 % a month on average in the second part of the year, and about 140% for
the year as a whole. The same programme calls for an end to Russian quotas for oil exports, which
will tend to drive up the domestic costs of fuel and oil derivatives. Compared with 1994, the 1995
budget allocations appear less likely to match spending at the current level of activities, and there
seems little likelihood that the target will be met. When the prolonged campaign in Chechnya is
taken into account, the prospect appears remoter still. This impression is reinforced by official
reports in May 1995 of the r 1.9tr cost of military operations in Chechnya for the period December
1994-March 1995, including Defence Ministry costs of more than r 1 tr, the Ministry for Internal
Affairs (r412 billion), and the Ministry for Emergencies (r 115 bn).
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Table 4: Main Expenditure Headings in the Official Defence Budget (current roubles bn)
1993 % 1994 % 1995 %
Personnel, O&M 1,556.3 50.0 22,105.0 54.4 21,981.8 45.3
Procurement 569.5 18.3 8,442.0 20.8 10,275.3 21.2
R&D 224.7 7.2 2,433.0 6.0 4,935.9 10.2
Infrastructure 514.2 16.5 4,778.0 11.8 6,138.2 12.6
Pensions 171.2 5.5 1,994.0 4.9 4,014.8 8.3
Nuclear, other 79.6 2.6 874.0 2.2 1,231.0 2.5
Total 115.5 100.0 40,626.0 100.0 48,577.0 100.0
Note: 1993 defence budget is that announced in May 1993 which was adjusted to a final figure of r 8,327bn in late 1993.
Source: Of ficial defence budget.
The military initially requested r 115tr and received r 48.6tr in the Federal Budget, which
became law at the end of March 1995. This allocation represented some 20% of the Federal Budget
- a marginal decline from the previous year (Table 3). The 1995 defence budget shows a nominal
20% increase over the 1994 budget and a 63% increase over the provisional 1994 out-turn.
According to the IMF, the inflation level is likely to fall to around 140% this year, and if this
forecast holds for armed forces expenses there could be a real decline in defence spending in 1995
unless the military is able to resist inflationary pressures within its own domain.
is to be increased from 18 months to two years, and that the rules on exemptions are to be
tightened considerably. This development reflects the view expressed by the Defence Ministry
and the General Staff that a volunteer army remains a distant prospect; there is little doubt that
the substantial incremental cost of contract service personnel has influenced this thinking.
Whatever the longer-term implications of reductions in manpower, the likelihood remains that
expenditure on the Chechnya campaign will overstretch the PO&M budget, in part because of
increased salaries and incentives payable to servicemen, and in part because the extra costs
associated with greater use of equipment, as well as equipment damage and write-offs.
As a proportion of the defence budget, allocations to Construction and Research and
Development (R&D) have increased over 1994. The construction (infrastructure) budget retains
its substantial share as the effort to improve service conditions for personnel continues. It
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accounts for some 13% of the 1995 budget - an increase over 1994 of its relative share, and a high
proportion by NATO standards. Since 1990, additional funds of over $5bn from the German
government have been available to support housing construction for servicemen returning from
former East Germany.
A significant feature in the 1995 budget is increased spending on R&D, reflecting the
consolidation of previously extra-budgetary R&D accounts into the defence vote. Whilst spending
on procurement is at about the same level as last year, R&D increases its proportion of the defence
fund by some two-thirds. No systematic detail in respect of individual R&D programmes nor their
costs is provided by the Defence Ministry. The same applies to procurement, which has retained
a similar proportion of the budget to last year. In general, although Russian procurement of major
weapons systems probably remains sizeable in comparison with the major European NATO states,
there is no doubt that it has fallen steeply from peak Soviet levels and is currently below US levels.
In the absence of any official data on unit production quantities, UK Ministry of Defence estimates
of the decline in military production of major weapons systems are shown in Table 5.
Table 6: Other Military Expenditure in the 1995 Federal Budget (current roubles bn)
Total Comment
Demilitarisation 2,404.6 Under the International Activity budget heading, to implement
START and CFE Treaty commitments.
Security Services 2,547.7 Foreign Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Services.
Internal Troops 1,441.7
Border Troops 2,331.1
Railway Troops 281.9
Roadbuilding Directorate 170.6 Part of the Ministry of Defence.
Defence Conversion 2,315.4 Including r915bn expenditure and rl,400bn loans.
Subsidies to Closed Subsidies to closed administrative regions with MoD and MIN ATOM
establishments.
Baikonur Lease 161.0 Baikonur Space Station in Kazakhstan.
1994 Debts to Industry 3,553.4 Excluding r l,333bn debt repaid in the defence budget.
Federal Industrial Estimated 25% of total industrial investment for dual-use aerospace
Investment 3,219.5 programmes.
Civil Defence and
Mobilisation 53.7
State Emergencies 3,076.0 Contingency funds for emergency programmes, including Chechnya.
Science and Technology Military and dual-use components estimated at 75% of budget.
Budget 4,545.0
Subtotal 27,144.8
Defence Budget 48,577.0
Total Military Budget 75,721.8
Federal Budget 248,344.3
% Federal Budget 30.5
Extra-budgetary funds for the Russian military effort present a separate issue. Under NATO
definitions of military expenditure, several military-related activities are not funded by the
Russian defence budget. Instead, they appear in the Federal Budget under the headings of other
ministries or else lie outside the Budget altogether. From 1992-94 the sources of funds outside the
Federal Budget were the Central Bank of Russia, which issued large credits to industry, and several
quasi-independent trusts, principal of which were the Pensions and Social Insurance Funds and smaller
funds devoted to conversion and R&D. The important feature of these trusts was that they were partly
administered on a regional and local basis beyond the control of the Finance Ministry, and were
independent of central government supervision. The 1995 Federal Budget Law has resulted in an
important change for the Central Bank which no longer has authority to issue un-budgeted credits.
Table 6 indicates military-related expenditure excluded from the 1995 defence budget and
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placed elsewhere in the Federal Budget. Some budgets are listed explicitly, and pose no
interpretative problems. Others, such as the science and technology budget, and the industrial
capital investment budget give no clues as to their military component, which has been estimated.
The IISS believes that Russia's military-related expenditure under NATO definitions but
excluded from the defence budget amounts to some r 27 tr (which may err on the conservative side).
With these assumptions the true figure for Russia's 1995 budget comes to nearly r 76tr, or over
30% of the Federal Budget.
In such uncertain circumstances it is unsurprising that independent estimates of Russian
military expenditure vary widely (Table 7). The far left column shows the official defence budget
converted to dollars at the average market exchange rate for the year. IMF statistics are based on
those of Goskomstat, but are adjusted. The IMF estimates defence spending as a proportion of
GDP - here using a narrow definition (i.e., the defence budget outlay) of between 4 and 5%. The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) adopts an intermediate position, citing
a figure of over 6% of GDP after allowing for extra-budgetary expenditure. At the top end of the
scale, NATO cites a figure of greater than 10% of GDP, while the US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) gives both a high dollar valuation and high proportion of GDP.
Table 7: Estimates of Russian Military Expenditure
Defence IMF SIPRI NATO US ACDA US ACDA
budget at estimates estimates estimates estimates estimates
market of defence of military of military of military of military
exchange rate expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure
$bn % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP ($bn) % of GDP
1991 83.9 n.a. >10 >12 260.0 10.3
1992 9.4 4.7 >6 >10 142.3 16.7
1993 13.8 4.4 >6 >10 113.8 14.6
1994 21.7 4.5 8-10 _ - _
1995 12.1 5.0 _
Note: Defence budget dollar conversions apply. Market exchange rates applicable at the time of budget finalisation.
Table 8 shows IISS estimates of Russia's military expenditure according to both official and
NATO definitions, using purchasing-power parity dollar conversions instead of market exchange
rates. (An explanation of purchasing-powerparity methodology is given inThe Military Balance
1994-1995, pp. 278-81.) Russia's real military expenditure for 1994-95 is likely to be in the
range $ 100-$ 11 Obn and represents 9-10% of GDP. It may be more. This level of spending could
be seen as extravagant and, given the country's economic performance, it may be unsustainable.
In any case, the Russian military will be hard pressed to remain within its budget in 1995, and
will inevitably call for more resources. But the government and the Duma are bound to press for
further contraction in military spending, justified on economic as well as security grounds.
RUSSIA 113
Taking the resource allocation trends within NATO for comparison, the Russian armed forces
do not seem under-resourced. Their problems may have more to do with efficiency, disorienta-
tion, low morale and perhaps unrealistic aspirations. It is unlikely that they will need to pursue
commercialisation like the Chinese, although Defence Minister Grachev is known to want the
Defence Ministry to control Russian arms exports. The outcome of elections in 1995 and 1996 for the
Duma and Presidency will be a further indication of Russia's intentions regarding military reform.
5 rocket armies, org in div, regt, bn and bty, launcher gp 1 armd recce bn; spt units).
with normally 10 silos (6 for SS-18) and one control 47 MRD (incl 6 trg) (3 motor rifle, 1 arty, 1 SAM regt;
centre; 12 SS-24 trains each 3 launchers. 1 indep tk, 1 ATK, 1 armd recce bn; spt units).
ICBM: 928: 5 ABD (each 3 para, 1 arty regt; 1 AA bn) (plus 1 trg div;
SS-17 Spanker (RS-16): 10 (at 1 field; mod 3/4 MIRV; status and location unknown).
all in Russia). 7 MG/arty div.
SS-18 Satan (RS-20): 222 (at 6 fields; mostly mod 4/5, 4 arty div incl 1 trg (no standard org: perhaps 4 bde (12
10 MIRV; 174 in Russia, 48 in Kazakhstan (without bn): 152mm SP, 152mm towed and MRL: plus ATK
warheads). bde).
SS-19 Stiletto (RS-18): 250 (at 4 fields; mostly mod 3, Some 47 arty bde/regt; no standard org: perhaps 4 bn: 2
6 MIRV; 160 in Russia, 90 in Ukraine). each of 24 152mm towed guns, 2 each of 24 152mm
SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22): 92 (10 MIRV; 10 silo, 36 train SP guns, some only MRL.
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13 Akula with T-65 HWT; plus SS-N-21. 11 Rezvyy (Krivak-U) with 1 x 4 SS-N-14 Silex SUGW,
4 Sierra with T-65 HWT; plus SS-N-21. 8x533mmTT,2xl2ASWRL;plus2xl00mmguns.
26 Victor-Ul with T-65 HWT; plus SS-N-15. 15 Bditelnyy (Krivak-l) (weapons as Rezvyy, but with 2
2 Victor-U with T-53 HWT. x twin 76mm guns).
4 Victor-] with T-53 HWT. 1 Neustrashimyy with 2 x 1 2 ASW RL.
SS: 55 (all with T-53 HWT): (Note: frigates listed below lie between 1,000 and 1,200
24 Kilo, 18 Tango, 10 Foxtrot, 3 Romeo. tonnes full-load displacement and are not counted in
OTHER ROLES: 15: official releases.)
SSN: 6: 60 Grisha-l, -III, -IV, -V, with 2 x 12 ASW RL, 4 x
3 Uniform, \Alfa, 1 EchoW experimental/trials, 2 Kan&ee. 533mm TT.
SS:9: 12 Parchim-W (ASW) with 2x12 ASW RL, 4 x 406mm
1 Beluga, 3 Bravo wpn targets, 1 Lima, 1 India ASTT.
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rescue, 1 X-Ray trials, 1 Loser SF. 3 Petya with ASW RL, 5 or 10 x 406mm ASTT.
IN STORE: probably some Foxtrot. PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 143:
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 150: CORVETTES: about 80:
CARRIERS: 1 Kuznetsov CVV (67,500t) capacity 20 about 49 Tarantul (ASUW), 3 -I, 17-11, both with 2
fixed wing ac (Su-33) and 8-10 ASW hel with 12 SS- x 2 SS-N-2C Styx; 29 -III with 2 x 2 SS-N-22
N-19 Shipwreck SSM, 4 x 6 SA-N-9 SAM, 8 CADS- Sunburn.
l,2RBU-12(notfullyop). 31 Nanuchka (ASUW) -I, -III and -IV with 2 x 3 SS-
CC: 25: N-9 Siren.
CGU: 4 Admiral Ushakov (ex-Kirov) (AAW/ASUW) MSL CRAFT: 21:
with 12x8 SA-N-6 Gramfc/e, 20 SS-N-19Shipwreck 8 Osa PFM with 4 x SS-N-2C.
SSM, 3 Ka-25/-27 hel for OTHT/AEW/ASW; plus 1 13 Matka PHM with 2 x 1 SS-N-2C.
with 1 x 2 130mm guns, 1 with 1 x 2 SS-N-14 Silex TORPEDO CRAFT: 29 Turya PHT with 4 x 533mm TT.
SUGW (LWT or nuc payload), 10 x 533mm TT. PATROL CRAFT: about 13:
CG:21: OFFSHORE: about 3 T-58/-43.
I Moskva (CGH) (ASW) with 18 Ka-25 hel (E45-75 COASTAL: 10:
LWT), 1 x 2 SUW-N-1; plus 2 x 2 SA-N-3 SAM. 7 Pauk PFC (ASW) with 2 x ASW RL, 4 x ASTT.
3 Slava (AAW/ASUW) with 8 x 8 SA-N-6 Grumble, 8 1 Babochka PHT (ASW) with 8 x ASTT.
x 2 SS-N-12 Sandbox SSM, 1 Ka-25/-27 hel (AEW/ 2 Mukha PHT (ASW) with 8 x ASTT.
ASW); plus 8 x 533mm TT, 1 x 2 130mm guns. MINE WARFARE: about 188:
I1 Udaloy (ASW) with 2 x 4 SS-N-14 Silex SUGW, 2 MINELAYERS: 3Pripyat(Alesha), capacity 300 mines.
x 12 ASW RL, 8 x 533mm TT, 2 Ka-27 hel; plus 2 (Note: most submarines and many surface combatants
x 100mm guns. are equipped for minelaying.)
1 Udaloy-ll with 8 x 4 SS-N-22 Sunburn, 8 x SA-N-9, MCM: about 185:
2 Cads-N-1,8 SA-N-11,10 x 533mm TT, 2 Ka-27 hel OFFSHORE: 33:
plus 2 x 100mm guns. 2 Gorya MCO.
4 Nikolayev (Kara) ( A S W ) w i t h 2 x 4 S S - N - 1 4 Silex 31 Natya-Iand -II MSO.
SUGW, 10 x 533mm TT, 1 Ka-25 hel; plus 2 x 2 COASTAL: about 87:
SA-N-3 Goblet (1 (Azov) with 3 x 8 SA-N-6, only 15 Yurka MSC.
1 x SA-N-3 and other differences). 2 Andryusha MSC (trials).
1 Admiral Zozulya (Kresta-l) (ASUW/ASW) with 2 About 70 Sonya MSC.
x2SS-N-3b5WrfodtSSM, 1 Ka-25 hel (OTHT), INSHORE: about 65:
10 x 533mm TT (flagship probably non-seagoing). 15 Vanya, about 10 MSI and 40 MSI(.
DDG: 22: AMPH: 49:
AAW/ASUW: 19: LPD: 3 Ivan Rogov with 4-5 Ka-27 hel: capacity 520
17 Sovremennvy with 2 x 4 SS-N-22 SunburnSSM, 2 tps, 20 tk.
x 1 SA-N-lGadfly SAM, 2 x 2 130mm guns, 1 Ka- LST: 29:
25 (B) hel (OTHT); plus 4 x 533mm TT. 22 Ropucha: capacity 225 tps, 9 tk.
1 Grozny (Kynda) (ASUW) with 2 x 4 SS-N-3b; plus 7 Alligator: capacity 300 tps, 20 tk.
1 x 2 SA-N-1 Goa SAM, 6 x 533mm TT. LSM: about 17 Polnocny (3 types): capacity 180 tps,
1 Sderzhannyy (mod Kashin) with 4 SS-N-2C Styx 6 tk (some adapted for mine warfare, but retain amph
SSM, 2 x 2 SA-N-1 SAM; plus 5 x 533mm TT. primary role).
ASW: 3 Komsomolets Ukrainyy (Kashin) w i t h 2 x 1 2 LCM: about 14 Ondatra.
ASW RL, 5 x 533mm TT; plus 2 x 2 SA-N-1 SAM (1 LCAC AND SES: about 59: incl 9 Pomornik, 14 Aist, 9
with trials fit 1 x SA-N-7). Tsaplya, \6Lebed, 2 Utenok, 6 Gus, 2 Orlan and 1 Utka
FF: 102: 'wing-in-ground-effect' (WIG) experimental.
RUSSIA 117
SURVEY/RESEARCH: about 225: incl some 40 naval, 50 ARTY: incl 130mm: SM-4-1.
civil AGOR; 90 naval, 35 civil AGHS; 10 space- SSM: 40 SS-C-\bSepal (similar to SS-N-3), SS-C-3,
associated ships (civil-manned). Styx, SS-C-4 reported.
MERCHANT FLEET (auxiliary/augmentation): about COASTAL DEFENCE: (5,000) (all units reserve status).
2,800 ocean-going vessels (17 in Arctic service), incl 2 coast defence div.
J25 ramp-fitted and ro-ro, some with rails for rolling 1 coast defence bde.
stock, 3 roll-on/float-off, 14 barge carriers, 48 passenger 2 arty regt.
liners, 500 coastal and river ships. 2 SAM regt.
EQPT:
NAVAL AVIATION: (e30,000); some 783 cbt ac; MBT: 350 T-64.
251 armed hel. AIFV: 450 BMP.
Four Fleet Air Forces; org in air div, each with 2-3 APC: 280 BTR-60/-70/-80, 400 MT-LB.
regt of HQ elm and 2 sqn of 9-10 ac each; recce, TOTAL ARTY: 364.
ASW, tpt/ utl org in indep regt or sqn. TOWED ARTY: 280: 122mm: 140 D-30; 152mm: 40
BBR:some 100: D-20, 50 2A65, 50 2A36.
5 regt with some 90 Tu-22M (AS-4 ASM). SP ARTY: 152mm: 48 2S5.
I regt with some 10 Tu-22. MRL: 122mm: 36BM-21.
FGA: 150: 70 Su-24, 50 Su-25,30 MiG-23/-27.
TRG: some 50: Tu-16*, Tu-26*, Tu-95*, Su-24, Su-
25*. Su-27*. NAVAL DEPLOYMENT:
ASW:ac: 151; hel: 238. NORTHERN FLEET (Arctic and Atlantic) (HQ
AC: 50 Tu-142, 36 11-38, 65 Be-12. Severomorsk):
HEL: 63 Mi-14, 75 Ka-25, 100 Ka-27. BASES: Kola Inlet, Motovskiy Gulf, Gremikha,
MR/EW: ac: some 55; hel: 20. Polyarnyy, Litsa Gulf, Ura Guba, Severodovinsk.
AC: incl 14 Tu-95,6 Tu-22,25 Su-24,7 An-12,3 11-20. SS: 109: strategic: 37 SSBN; tac: 71:14 SSGN, 35 SSN,
HEL: 20 Ka-25. 22 SS; other roles: 8.
MCM:25 Mi-14 hel. PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 47: incl 1 CVV, 8
CBT ASLT: 25 Ka-27 hel. cruisers, 9 destroyers, 29 frigates.
TPT: ac: 120 An-12, An-24, An-26; hel: 70 Mi-6/-8. OTHER SURFACE SHIPS: about 10 patrol and coastal
ASM: AS-4 Kitchen, AS-7 Kerry, AS-10 Karen, AS- combatants, 45 MCM, 10 amph, some 182 spt and misc.
II Kilter, AS-12 Kegler, AS-13 Kingbolt, AS-14 NAVAL AVIATION: 200 cbt ac; 64 armed hel.
Kedge. BBR: 60: 20 Tu-16, 40 Tu-22M.
COASTAL DEFENCE: e24,000 (incl Naval FTR/FGA: 95:8 MiG-23,27 MiG-27,58 Su-24/-25,2 Su-
Infantry, Coastal Artillery and Rocket Troops, Coastal 27.
Defence Troops). ASW: ac: 45: 5 Tu-142, 16 11-38, 24 Be-12; hel: 64
NAVAL INFANTRY (Marines): (some 15,000). (afloat): 14 Ka-25, 50 Ka-27.
1 inf div (7,000: 3 inf, 1 tk, 1 arty regt) (Pacific Fleet). MR/EW: ac: 37: 2 An-12, 20 Tu-16, 14 Tu-95, 1 11-20.
4 indep bde (1 reserve) (type: 3,000: 4 inf, 1 tk, 1 arty, hel: 5 Ka-25.
1 MRL, 1 ATK bn). MCM: 8 Mi-14 hel.
4 fleet SF bde: 2-3 underwater, 1 para bn, spt elm. CBT ASLT HEL: 10 Ka-27.
EQPT: C0MMS: 6 Tu-142.
MBT: 500: T-55, T-64,1-12, 100 T-80. TKR: 1 Tu-16.
LTTK: 120PT-76. NAVAL INFANTRY: 2 bde (80 MBT, 130 arty).
RECCE: 60 BRDM-2/Sagger ATGW. COASTAL DEFENCE: 1 Coastal Defence (360 MT-
APC: some 1,500: BTR-60/-70/-80, 250 MT-LB. LB, 134 arty), 1 SAM regt.
118 RUSSIA
BALTIC FLEET (HQ Kaliningrad): SS: 51: strategic: 18 SSBN; tac: 34: (5 SSGN, 14 SSN,
BASES: Kronshtadt, Baltiysk. 15 SS); other roles: 2 SS.
SS: 9: tac: 8: SS; other roles: 1 SS. PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 49:
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 23: incl 3 cruisers, incl 9 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 34 frigates.
2 destroyers, 18 frigates. OTHER SURFACE SHIPS: about 25 patrol and coastal
OTHER SURFACE SHIPS: about 65 patrol and coastal combatants, 53 MCM, 14 amph, some 181 spt and misc.
combatants, 55 MCM, 15amph,some 102 spt and misc. NAVAL AVIATION (Pacific Fleet Air Force) (HQ
NAVAL AVIATION: 195 cbt ac, 35 armed hel. Vladivostok): 170 cbt ac, 89 cbt hel.
FGA: 180: 5 regts: 26 Su-17, 72 Su-24, 28 Su-27, 70 BBR: 60: 2 regt with 60 Tu-26.
MiG-23. FGA: 40: 1 regt with 40 Su-17, Su-24, Su-25.
ASW:ac: 15: 15 Be-12; hel: 35: 3 Ka-25,22 Ka-27, 10 ASW: ac: 70: 20 Tu-142, 20 11-38, 30 Be-12; hel: 89:
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AIR: 1 hybbrregt(20:Tu-22M), 1 air army: 1 bbrdiv 6 attack hel regt, 6,000 MBT, 8,700 ACV, 5,800 arty/
(90Su-24), 1 ftrdiv(35Su-27, 110MiG-29), 1 FGA MRL/mor, 60 Scud, 200 attack hel.
regt (40 Su-25), 1 recce regt (55 Su-24/MiG-25), 2 AIR:bbr: 120Su-24;FGA: 100: Su-17,Su-25; ftrdiv:
trg regt: 180 L-39. In store: 260 MiG-23, 170 MiG- 85: MiG-29, Su-27; recce: 60: Su-17, Su-24.
27, 340 L-29. AD (Transbaykal and Far Eastern MD): 200 MiG-31,
AD: 4 regt: 60 MiG-23, 50 MiG-31, 30 Su-27 plus Su-27.
190 in store. SAM: 570.
SAM: 1,000.
VOLGA MD (HQ Kuybyshev (Samarra)): GROUPS OF FORCES:
GROUND: 68,000: 1 Army HQ, 2TD,2MRD (1 trg), TRANSCAUCASUS GROUP OF FORCES (HQ
1 ABD plus 1 arty bde/regt, 2 SSM, 2 SAM bde, 1 Tblisi, Georgia): (31,000) (excl peacekeeping forces).
ATK, 2 attack hel, 1 aslt tpt hel, 6 hel trg regt, 1,200
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ARMENIA:
MBT, 2,150 ACV, 640 arty/MRL/mor, 24 Scud, 18 GROUND: (9,000): 1 mil base with 1 MRD(-), 80
SS-21, 230 attack hel. MBT, 170 ACV, 100 arty/MRL/mors.
AIR: 2 ftr trg regt: 60 MiG-29, 24 Su-17, 10 Su-25, AD: 1 sqn MiG-23.
180 cbt ac in store. GEORGIA:
AD: 1 PVO Corps, 2 regt: 40 MiG-23, 5 MiG-25, 25 GROUND: (22,000): 3 mil bases with 2 M R D ( - ) , 200
MiG-31 plus 140 cbt ac in store. MBT, 570 ACV, 220 arty/MRL/mor.
NORTH CAUCASUS MD (HQ Rostov): AIR: 1 composite regt with some 35 ac: An-12, An-
GROUND: 58,000: 1 Army HQ, 3 Corps HQ, 2 MRD, 26; hel: Mi-8.
1 ABD, 2 AB, 3 MR bde, 1 Spetsnaz, 5 arty bde, 3
SSM, 5 SAM bde, 3 ATK, 2 attack hel, 1 aslt tpt hel FORCES IN OTHER FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS:
regt, 260 MBT, 1,200 ACV, 1,070 arty/MRL/mor,
MOLDOVA (Dniestr) (14th Army): (6,400): 1 ArmyHQ,
24 Scud, 66 attack hel.
1 MRD, 120 MBT, 170 ACV, 130 arty/MRL/mor.
AIR: 1 Air Army: 1 bbrdiv (85 Su-24), 1 FGAdiv(110 TAJIKISTAN:
Su-25), 1 ftr div (110 MiG-29), 1 recce regt (35 Su-24), GROUND: (12,000): 1 MRD, 180 MBT, 340 ACV,
2 trg centres, 5 trg regt: 30 Su-22, 15 Su-24, 10 Su-25,
180 arty/MRL/mor.
15 Su-27,20 MiG-29,410 L-39, plus 130 cbt ac in store.
TURKMENISTAN:
AD: 1 PVO Corps, 3 regt: 5 MiG-25, 60 Su-27; 1 trg
JOINT TURKMENISTAN/RUSSIAN FORCES:
centre, 4 regt: 164 MiG-23, 220 L-39.
GROUND: (11,000): 1 Corps HQ, 3 MRD (1 trg), 1 arty
SAM: 150.
bde, 530 MBT, 1,130 ACV, 530 arty/MRL/mor.
URAL MD (HQ Yekaterinburg):
GROUND: 2 TD(1 trg), 2 MRD, 2 arty bde/regt, 1 ATK
bde. 1,200 MBT, 1,200 ACV, 750 arty/MRL/mor. F O R C E S A B R O A D (other than in the former
AIR: 30 Su-24. Soviet republics or in the Group of Forces):
AD: 3 regt: 40 MiG-23, 25 MiG-31, plus in store 25 VIETNAM: (500); naval facility; SIGINT station.
MiG-23, HOSu-15. OTHER: Cuba some 800 SIGINT ande 10 mil advisers;
SAM: 100. Mongolia: E500 SIGINT; Syria 500; Africa: 100.
SIBERIAN MD (HQ Novosibirsk): PEACEKEEPING:
GROUND: 1 Corps HQ, 4 MRD, 1 arty div, 3 MR bde,
GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA: e3,000; 1 AB regt, 2 MR
3 arty bde/regt, 2 SSM, 2 SAM, 1 Spetsnaz bde, 1
bn. GEORGIA/SOUTH OSSETIA: 1 infbn.
ATK, 1 attack hel regt, 2,000 MBT, 3,500 ACV,
MOLDOVA/DNIESTR: 2 infbn.
2,200 arty/MRL/mor, 24 Scud, 40 attack hel.
UNITED NATIONS:
AIR: trg units: 275 L-39.
AD: 4 regt: 140: MiG-23, MiG-31. ANGOLA (UNAVEM): 10 plus 5 Obs. BOSNIA
TRANSBAYKAL M D (HQ Chita): (UNPROFOR): 491; 1 inf bn, 14 Obs and 3 civ pol.
GROUND: 3 Army HQ, 4 TD (1 trg), 6 M R D (1 trg), CROATIA (UNCRO): 926; 1 AB bn, 8 Obs and 20 civ
plus 2 MG/arty div, 1 arty div, 2 MR bde, 5 arty bde/ pol.GEORGIA: (UNOMIG) 3 Obs.HAITI: (UNMIH):
regt, 3 SSM, 1 AB, 1 Spetsnaz, 2 ATK, 3 SAM bde, 5 civ pol. IRAQ/KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 14 Obs.
2 attack hel regt, 3,000 MBT, 4,000 ACV, 4,000 arty/ MIDDLE EAST (UNTSO): 17 Obs. FYROM
MRL/mor, 24 Scud, 18-SS-21, 80 attack hel. (UNPREDEP): 1 civ pol. RWANDA (UNAMIR): 17
AIR: 1 air army, bbr: 80 Su-24, ftr 30 MiG-29; 75 Su- Obs. WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO): 30 Obs.
17/24.
FAR EASTERN MD (HQ Khabarovsk):
PARAMILITARY: 280,000.
GROUND: 4 Army, 1 Corps HQ, 3 TD (1 trg), 13 MRD
(2 trg), plus 5 MG/arty div, 1 arty div, 11 arty bde/ FRONTIER F O R C E S (directly subordinate to
regt, 2 AB, 5 SSM, 6 SAM, 1 Spetsnaz, 3 ATK bde, the President): 100,000, 6 frontier districts, Arctic,
120 RUSSIA
Palestinian Self-Rule
Both Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat are making
great efforts to reach agreement over the next stage of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and
the handover of responsibilities to the Palestinian National Authority. The programme agreed in
the Declaration of Principles signed on 13 September 1993 is well behind schedule. Although not
all details of the next stage have been agreed, it is clear that Israel intends to withdraw totally from
the northern Palestinian towns of Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya and Tulkarm. There would be partial
withdrawal and joint patrols in Ramallah and Bethlehem where Israeli settlers use the roads
through these towns. There would be no withdrawal from Hebron where a small enclave in the
town and the nearby Kiry at Arba are populated by Israeli extremists and an Israeli Army presence
is essential not only to protect them, but also to deter them from attacking the Arab population.
It had been confidently planned that an agreement on Israeli Defence Force (IDF) withdrawal
would be signed in Washington on 25 July 1995 to include provision for some 700 international
monitors to deploy in September and the IDF to withdraw at the beginning of November to be
replaced by 1,700 Palestinian police. However agreement had not been reached by the end of July.
The elections for the self-rule council were to be held before the end of November. Withdrawal
from Ramallah and Bethlehem is scheduled for November, but depends on the completion of
bypass roads. Until all Palestinian villages can be bypassed, the IDF will continue to patrol
122 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
through them. While any terrorism is unacceptable to Israel, the level of violence dropped
considerably after Islamic Jihad suicide bombers killed21 Israelis at Beit Lid on 22 January 1995,
but increased with another suicide bomb on a bus in Tel Aviv on 24 July. Israel has agreed to
transfer all remaining spheres of civil authority but detailed agreements still have to be reached.
Electricity and water are two of the most difficult areas to agree on. The Israeli Army has started
preparing for redeployment, which involves moving some training units into Israel and using their
bases for operational units, and constructing bypass roads to allow unhindered settler movement.
In Lebanon, Hizbollah has intensified its campaign against the IDF and the South Lebanese
Army (SLA) with some success. At least 23 Israeli soldiers were killed in Lebanon during 1994
and during the last three months of the year casualties inflicted onHizbollah were roughly equal
to those incurred by the IDF and SLA. This situation is likely to continue until an Israeli-Syrian
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peace treaty, which should contain provision for Syrian control of Hizbollah, is signed.
Iraq
On 7 October 1994, US officials revealed that two Iraqi Republican Guard divisions had moved
south, close to the border with Kuwait. The news came, after the move had been monitored for
several days, just as Iraqi Prime Minister Tariq Aziz was about to address the United Nations.
Kuwaiti forces mobilised and deployed to the border. The US reacted quickly, sending several
aircraft squadrons to bases in Saudi Arabia. The first US ground troops, equipped from the
stockpile maintained in Kuwait, arrived on 10 October. The UK also sent a marine battalion group
with artillery and six additional Tornado GR-1 FGA aircraft. The US reinforcement included
some 12,000 ground forces with two brigades of the 24th Mechanized Division (the US Marine
Expeditionary Force stood by for deployment, but did not in the event do so), the aircraft carrier
USS Washington, and some 50 extra combat aircraft plus tankers and transports. The UAE also
I sent naval and ground forces to Kuwait. By 12 October, Iraqi forces were being withdrawn and,
although allied deployment continued, the crisis was over. The US tabled a UN Resolution
forbidding future Iraqi southern deployments, but backed down from calling for a heavy-weapon
exclusion zone in southern Iraq. On 15 October, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 949
which condemned the Iraqi action, but only warned of serious consequences if it was repeated. Five
days later, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, warned Iraq that units north of the
32nd parallel on 20 September 1994 could no longer be deployed south of that line. The UN
Security Council has so far voted against lifting the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq, most
recently on 11 July 1995, on the grounds that Iraq has not yet revealed all the details of its biological
weapons (BW) programme and that many Kuwaiti citizens and much Kuwaiti military and civil
property are still unaccounted for. Iraq has now admitted that it had produced botulism and
anthrax B W agents and has handed over to UNSCOM a 530-page document said to detail its B W
programme. It has been reported that Russia has already signed contracts to develop the West
Qurno and North Rumaila oil fields when sanctions are lifted.
The level of political dissent within Iraq can perhaps be judged by the government's efforts to
have sanctions lifted. These include:
• The release of two Americans imprisoned for border crossing.
• The release of information on the BW programme.
• The decree releasing all political prisoners and dropping charges against Iraqis living abroad.
• The diplomatic campaign to re-enter the Arab world.
There have been several reports of unsuccessful mutinies in the Army. The defection of two of
Saddam Hussein's sons-in-law on 10 August 1995 was a serious blow to the regime. One, General
Hussein Kamel Hassan, who was head of the military industry, may reveal more about Iraq's
weapon-of-mass-destruction programme.
Iran remains, to some extent, isolated from the world. President Clinton imposed a total ban
on US trade with Iran at the end of April 1995, a move which has been supported only by Israel.
The US is concerned that Iran has embarked on a nuclear weapons programme, supports Islamic
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124 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
extremism and terrorism in a number of countries, opposes the Middle East process and may
threaten international shipping in the Straits of Hormuz. In June, Iran rejected the European
Union's offer of better relations in return for the end of thefatwa imposed on British author Salman
Rushdie. Norway recalled its Ambassador from Tehran on 3 July. There is a growing divergence
of views within Iran between the religious authorities and President Rafsanjani and his govern-
ment, essentially over who has ultimate authority. Relations between Iran and Iraq appear to be
improving and delegations have visited each other's capitals. Official talks, if established, would
focus on questions over prisoners still unaccounted for from the Iran-Iraq War and the support
given to opposition groups (such as the Iranian Mujahedin-e-Khalq, based in eastern Iraq, and
Iranian support for Iraqi Shi'i). There are also unresolved border questions.
The Gulf States have experienced some instability over the past 12 months. InQatar, the Amir,
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Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani, was peacefully deposed by his son, the Crown Prince, on 26
June 1995 while out of the country. The new ruler, who was quickly recognised by the other Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states, is known to want to solve the maritime dispute with Bahrain.
Qatar referred its claim to the Huwar islands to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which
ruled that it had jurisdiction, but there can be no progress without the agreement of both parties.
Bahrain will only accept Qatar's claim if its own claim against Qatar in the Zubarah area is dealt
with by the ICJ at the same time. In December 1994, while Bahrain was hosting an international
conference, it was the scene of violent protest as economic discontent was fuelled by Islamist
groups and at least 12 people died. The government has been criticised by Amnesty International,
but maintains that there have been far fewer deaths and arrests than Amnesty claims. Opposition
to the Saudi regime is becoming more vocal, but is divided over whether the whole Saud family
should be overthrown or whether a split in the family should be exploited.
Some progress has been made by Yemen in resolving its border disputes. On 3 June 1995,
Yemen and the Oman concluded a border agreement which returns to Yemen some 5,000km2 of
territory ceded to Oman in 1992 by the now-exiled former Vice-President Ali Salim al-Bid. Having
achieved this success, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih was able to visit Riyadh on 5 June with
some confidence. He agreed to renew the Treaty of Ta' if which defines a part of the common border
without amendment in the hope that Saudi Arabia would provide economic aid and allow Yemeni
workers to return to Saudi Arabia. However, as yet there has been no movement to resolve the
question of the undefined and disputed border east of Najran.
Talks between Algerian President Liamine Zeroual and Abassi Madani, the moderate leader
of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which had appeared to be going well, broke down in July
1995. The government maintains that the breakdown was caused by the insistence of the more
extreme opposition factions that imprisoned FIS leaders must be released before there can be an
end to violence. While the failure of the talks sets back any progress towards a settlement, it has
to some extent caused a rift between the FIS and the other opposition factions which the
government will hope to exploit. The death toll in the three-year civil war is now put at between
30,000 and 40,000, although the government argues for a much lower number.
United Nations efforts to identify and register those eligible in Western Sahara to vote in a
referendum continue to be obstructed by the Moroccan authorities. In April 1995, the UN
Secretary-General announced yet another postponement, this time of six months, with the start of
the transitional period considered unachievable until 1 January 1996 at the earliest. The Western
Saharans have threatened to resume the war, but have not yet done so.
Egyptian relations with Sudan deteriorated sharply following the attempted assassination of
Egypt's President Mubarak in Addis Ababa on 26 June 1995 when Sudan was initially accused
of being behind the attack. Tension heightened along the Halaib border area, where Egypt forced
the withdrawal of 70 Sudanese police from their posts, and shots were exchanged. Both sides
issued warnings to the other and the Sudanese threatened to abrogate the 1959 Nile Water Treaty.
Meanwhile an Egyptian group - 'the Islamic Group' - claimed responsibility for the assassina-
tion attempt. Terrorist activity by Muslim extremists has continued over the last 12 months with
an upsurge in the Minya Province of Upper Egypt in the first months of 1995.
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 12 5
mines, one of which has been visited by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials who
reported that they had found nothing inconsistent with a civil nuclear programme. China has
delivered an electromagnetic isotope separator, or calutron, which, while it could be used to
separate weapons-grade uranium, is, as reported by the IAEA, of a scale that could only produce
isotopes for medical purposes. Iranians have received training in nuclear physics at two institutes
in Pakistan, and also in the US and Europe.
Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA came into force in May 1994. Since then, IAEA inspectors have seen no evidence of a
weapons programme and congratulate Iran on its cooperation with the Agency which goes beyond
the obligations of the NPT.
President Clinton, at the May 1995 summit in Moscow, is reported to have shown Russian
President Boris Yeltsin intelligence regarding Iran's nuclear-weapons programme. While this was
sufficient to cause Yeltsin to halt plans to sell Iran a centrifuge-based enrichment plant, he would
not agree to halt the sale of the nuclear reactor. There are a number of estimates of how long it
would take for Iran to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons. While Israel and some in the US claim
that Iran is within three to five years of doing so, the general consensus tends more to a seven- to
ten-year ti me-frame.
Ballistic Missiles
The only new deployments of surface-to-surface missiles during the last 12 months are in Iran
where four more North Korean Scud-C launchers and 5 more CSS-8 (M-7) launchers have been
acquired. There are unconfirmed reports that No-Dong SSM bought from North Korea were
delivered, but The Military Balance considers this to be unlikely.
Military Developments
In Algeria, the 28 Mi-2 helicopters shown last year as belonging to the Gendarmerie are actually
part of the Air Force's inventory. Mauritania has commissioned a French OPV-54 (Aboubekr
Ben Amer) patrol craft. The Tunisian Navy has acquired three more Chinese Shanghai-class
(Gafsah) inshore patrol craft. The Egyptian Army has taken delivery of 150 more M-60 and 50
M-1 Abrams tanks, 600 YPR-765 infantry fighting vehicles and 76 122mm SP artillery. The Air
Force has acquired 24 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters and a further 30 F-16C fighters
(produced in Turkey). The Navy has leased two US Knox-class frigates.
The Israeli Navy has commissioned two more £i7a/-class and one more Romat-class missile
craft. The Army now has 9 MLRS in service with the artillery, and six more have been ordered.
Israel and the US reached agreement in May 1995 for the continued US funding for the next five
years of Israel's Arrow anti-tactical ballistic-missile system. An annual provision of $40m has
been reported, rather less than the amount sought by the Israelis. A series of test flights are
expected to take place shortly. On 5 April 1995, Israel launched the Ofek-3 satellite which is
confidently reported as having an intelligence collection capability. Lebanon has 16 UH-1H
utility helicopters not previously listed inThe Military Balance whose serviceability is doubtful.
126 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
The US is planning to provide a further 225 M-l 13 APCs. The Syrian Army has taken delivery
of 100 T-72 tanks, and the Air Force has received six Mashak basic training aircraft from Pakistan.
The Iranian Air Force has ten Swiss PC-6B liaison aircraft not previously listed. The
Revolutionary Guard naval forces have taken delivery of five Chinese Hudong-class missile
craft. The Navy expects to take delivery of its third Kilo-class submarine before the end of 1995,
and there have been reports of Iranian moves to acquire the use of naval facilities at Port Sudan.
The Army has taken delivery of about one-third of the 100 T-72 tanks ordered from Poland. There
are 200 more Chinese Type 69 tanks and 200 more BMP 1/2 than listed before. The number of
Chinese 107mm Type 63 MRL held is some 500. The first production of the Zufuqar-4 tank, an
Iranian built T-72, and of an indigenous APC, theBoraq are reported. There have been no reports
of Iraqi armaments acquisitions or of domestic production.
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The UAE Air Force has acquired seven Spanish CN-23M-100 and four Russian Ilyushin-16
transport aircraft. Seven AS-565 anti-submarine warfare helicopters have been ordered from
France. The Army has received its first two French Leclerc tanks; 45 of the total order of 396
should be delivered before the end of 1995.70 more BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles have also
been delivered. Army manpower strength has risen by 8,000. The UAE Navy has commissioned
a US Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. In Qatar, the Army has acquired 12 AMX-VCI infantry
fighting vehicles, 12 AMX-10RC reconnaissance vehicles and eight V-150 APC. The Air Force
has taken delivery of twoM/sfra/SAM launchers and has ordered MMimge 2000-5 fighters for
delivery by the end of 1997. The Navy has four fast patrol craft on order from Vospers of the UK
for delivery in 1995. TheKuwaiti Army's inventory has increased greatly with 60TOW ATGW
mounted on HMMVW, 76 BMP-3 and the first eight, of an order of 254,Desert Warrior infantry
fighting vehicles. An order has been placed ioxStarburst close air-defence systems worth £50m.
The Saudi Arabian Army now has 315 M-l Abrams tanks, an increase of 285, and 400 M-2
Bradley fighting vehicles (200 more than last year). The Navy has commissioned a third UK
Sandown (Al Jawf) coastal minesweeper and ordered two French La Fayette-class frigates.
Aircraft orders include 20 Hawk advanced trainers for delivery in 1996 and 20 PC-9 primary
trainers also from the UK. The delivery schedule for 48 Torna do IDS ordered in 1993 for delivery
in 1996 appears to have slipped by one to two years. A major reorganisation of theBahraini Army
is taking place with the formation of an armoured, an infantry and an artillery brigade and an
increase of 1,700 in manpower. 26 more M-60 tanks have also been acquired. The Navy has
commissioned a US Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. The Omani Air Force has withdrawn its
elderly Hunter FGA aircraft from service and taken delivery of eight moreHawk 203 aircraft. The
Army has acquired \8Challenger-2 tanks which will be delivered by the end of 1995,20Piranha
APCs and six G-6 155mm SP guns - a further 19 have still to be delivered. The Navy has ordered
three fast patrol craft from France.
Defence Spending
The IISS estimates that regional defence spending dropped from $44.5bn in 1993 to $42.7bn in
1994 in constant 1993 dollars. Budgetary data for 1995 indicate a further decline to $41 bn in 1995.
The region spends more on defence as a proportion of GDP than any other region, and the per
capita spending is also relatively high. GCC countries account for about half of the total.
Saudi Arabia's defence budget in 1995 is $13.2bn. The government has released defence
expenditure figures for 1992 ($15.4bn), 1993 ($16.5bn) and 1994 ($14.3bn) which reflect the
scale of Saudi weapons acquisitions and orders (over $30bn) in the aftermath of the war with Iraq.
Questions have been raised about the government's ability to pay for these arms purchases given
the prolonged fiscal and current-account deficits exacerbated by the squeeze on government
revenue following the sharp decline in the price of oil in 1993. These factors contributed to
contract renegotiations with major suppliers announced in 1994, which involved rescheduling
deliveries and payments due in 1994-95, but did not result in any programme cancellations. A
marked decline in new Saudi arms purchases in 1994 and 1995 has accompanied these
adjustments. However, there seems no reason why the existing substantial procurement
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 12 7
programme should not remain effective. In 1995, the government repaid the last tranche of the
$4.5bn war loan of 1991, and mid-1995 indications are that there has been a material
improvement in both the fiscal and current balance. High procurement spending is also evident
from the recent defence budgets of other GCC states. In 1995, Kuwait's budget drops from
$3.1bn in 1994 to $2.9bn, excluding supplementary expenditure of $232m for the 1994
deployment of coalition forces and $170m for joint exercises. Procurement amounts to $1.4bn.
The cost of UNIKOM was about $69m in 1994. UNSCOM's budget for 1995 amounts to $25m,
to which the GCC states are contributing $12m. In Oman, both the 1993 and 1994 out-turn were
higher than budget, with procurement the reason for the overspend. The defence budget for 1995
is $1.7bn, up from the 1994 figure of $1.6bn, but down from out-turn of $1.9bn. Actual UAE
spending levels are uncertain because no details of the defence budget are published in advance
and there are conflicting figures for past expenditure. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
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cite a figure of $1.6bn for 1993, whereas estimates attributed to the Central Bank cite $2.1bn for
1993 and a similar level for 1994.
Israel's defence budget for 1995 remains static in real terms at $6.7bn, and continues to be
supported by the largest individual allocation of US Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) - $3bn,
including $1.8bn for equipment. The cost of UNTSO in 1994 was about $29m. Syria's defence
spending accounts for one-quarter of public spending, and in 1995 the defence budget obtains a
small increase to £S40bn or an estimated $2.6bn. The cost of UNDOF in 1994 was about $30m.
In the case of Iran, there are discrepancies between the official spending reported to the IMF and
independent estimates. This variation has partly to do with the devaluation of the rial, which makes
for problems in dollar conversion, and partly to do with unreported extra-budgetary expenditure.
According to the IMF, 1993 out-turn was R1.8bn ($1.4bn at the average annualised exchange
rate) or 7% of public spending. The defence budget for 1994 was $2.3bn, and remains about the
same in 1995. Iraq's military spending is certain to be substantial by regional comparison, but
serious data limitations allow for order-of-magnitude estimates only .Egypt's defence budget for
1993 was $ 1.6bn, $ 1.8bn in 1994, and rises to $2bn in 1995. The budget continues to be supported
by the second largest individual allocation of US FMA - unchanged in 1995 at $2.1 bn including
$ 1.3bn for equipment. The cost of UNIFIL' s operation inLebanon during 1994 was some $ 142m.
In the case of Yemen, no reliable details are available on the military expenditure incurred as a
result of the 1994 civil war. The UN has estimated the costs of war damage at $200m, of which
$20m is required for emergency repair work. InNorth Africa, the cost of MINURSO in 1994 was
about $41 m. Algeria's defence budget has increased by a nominal 48%, and by some 12% in dollar
terms to $1.3bn.
It is not clear what economic repercussions for the GCC states will accompany any relaxation
of UN sanctions on Iraq's oil trade. Oil is the major source of government revenue for the GCC
states, and directly or indirectly determines the level of their arms purchases from foreign sources.
The larger GCC producers (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait) are members of the 12-nation
Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel - which seeks to optimise its
members' revenue by agreements on production quotas and prices. In 1994, OPEC supplied about
37% (about 24.8m barrels a day) of total global demand (about 67.9mb/d). Saudi Arabia has the
largest share of OPEC production quotas (almost one-third or about 8mb/d in 1994). In 1994,
UAE oil output was about 2.2mb/d, while that of Kuwait was about 1.9mb/d. Oil production in
Oman and Bahrain, which are not OPEC members, and Qatar, which is, amounted to about 1.3mb/
per day in 1994. In 1994, the combined oil output of the six GCC states amounted to about 13.5m/
per day-worth, valued at some $69bn for the year, or about one-fifth of global production. By
comparison, Iraq's quota, which was about 3.2mb/d in 1989 (capacity about 3.5mb/d), is
currently 600,000b/d and for domestic use only since Iraq rejected the UN offer in 1995 to export
oil worth some $2bn (up from the 1991 offer of $1.6bn) over six months to pay for food and
medical supplies, but also to pay war reparations and to fund continuing UN operations. It is
estimated that, on the lifting of sanctions, output could be raised to 2.6mb/d within a year and
thereafter to the level of the pre-Gulf War production capacity. The Iraqi government's ambition
128 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
it would probably lead to declining oil prices, a price war between OPEC and non-OPEC
producers, and conceivably one between OPEC member-states themselves (several of which are
already inclined to breach quota agreements). A third option arises if demand for oil increases,
since Iraqi output could be permitted to absorb much of the extra demand. Again, Saudi Arabia
- with a production capacity of lOmb/d against a quota of 8mb/d - may attempt to gain a share
of the extra demand.
For the Gulf States, the likely cost of each of these options will determine their bargaining stance
within OPEC. Assuming an eventual Iraqi quota of 3.5mb/d, a pro rata cut in GCC quotas at
existing OPEC aggregate production levels implies a revenue decline of 11-12% - probably
representing the least acceptable outcome for the large GCC producers. Alternatively, given a
decision to increase production despite static demand, the consequences for GCC oil revenue are
less predictable and would depend on actual pricing levels. Undoubtedly, the most favourable
outcome for the GCC states would be an increase in global demand which would absorb the extra
supply from Iraq.
1 inf bde (2 mech, 1 mot inf bn). Growth 1993: 3.0% 1994: 3.8%
1 arty 'bde' (1 hy, 2 med, 1 It, 1 MRL bty). Inflation 1993: 12.1% 1994: 8.2%
1 AD bn (2 SAM, 1 AD gun bty). Debt 1993: $40.6bn 1994: $40.0bn
EQPT: Def exp 1993: £E 8.35bn ($2.48bn)
MBT: 106M-60A3. Def bdgt 1994: £E9.20bn ($2.7lbn)
RECCE: 22 AML-90, SSaladin, ^Ferret, SShorland. 1995: £E 10.04bn ($2.96bn)
APC: some 10 AT-105 Saxon, 110 Panhard M-3, 115 FMA 1994: $2.lbn (FMF, IMET, Econ aid)
M-113A2. 1995: $2.lbn (FMF, IMET, Econ aid)
TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 8 It; 155mm: 28 M-198. 1996: $2.lbn (FMF, IMET, Econ aid)
SP ARTY: 203mm: 13 M-110. $1 = £ E 1993: 3.37 1994: 3.39
MRL: 227mm: 9 MLRS. 1995: 3.39
MOR: 81mm: 9; 120mm: 9. £E = Egyptian pound
ATGW: 15 BGM-71A TOW.
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NAVY: 700.
B A S E : Mina Sulman. TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
FF: 1 Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG. A C T I V E : 436,000 (some 222,000 conscripts).
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 10: Terms of service: 3 years (selective).
CORVETTES: 2 Al Manama (Ge Lurssen 62-m) with R E S E R V E S : 254,000: Army 150,000; Navy
2 x 2 MM-40 Exocet SSM, hel deck. 14,000; Air Force 20,000; AD 70,000.
MSL CRAFT: 4 Ahmad el Fateh (Ge Lurssen 45-m)
with 2 x 2 MM-40 Exocet.
PATROL CRAFT: 4: A R M Y : 310,000 (perhaps 200,000 conscripts).
2 Al Riffa (Ge Lurssen 38-m) PFI. 4 Military Districts, 2 Army HQ.
2 PFI( . 4 armd div (each with 2 armd, 1 mech, 1 arty bde).
SPT AND MISC: 4 Ajeera LCU-type spt. 7 mech inf div (each with 2 mech, 1 armd, 1 arty bde).
1 inf div (2 inf, 1 mech, 1 arty bde).
1 Republican Guard armd bde.
AIR F O R C E : 1,500; 24 cbt ac, 10 armed hel. 4 indep armd bde. 1 air-mobile bde.
FGA: 1 sqn with 8 F-5E, 4 F-5F. 2 indep inf bde. 1 para bde.
FTR: 1 sqn with 8 F-16C, 4 F-16D. 4 indep mech bde. 6 cdo gp.
TPT: 2 Gulfstream (1 -II, 1 -III; VIP), 1 Boeing 727. 15 indep arty bde.
HEL: 1 sqn with 12 AB-212 (10 armed), 4 Bo-105, 1 2 SSM bde (1 with FROG-1, with Scud-B).
UH-60L (VIP), 1 S-70A (VIP). EQPT:«
MSL: MBT: 3,500:840T-54/-55,260Ramsesll (mod T-54/
ASM: AS-12, AGM-65 Maverick. 55), 500T-62, 1,700 M-60 (600 M-60A1, 1,100 M-
AAM: AIM-9P Sidewinder, AIM-7F Sparrow. 60A3), e200MlAl Abrams.
RECCE: 300 BRDM-2, 112 Commando Scout.
PARAMILITARY: AIFV: 1,080: 220 BMP-1, 260 BMR-600P, some 600
YPR-765 (being delivered).
C O A S T GUARD (Ministry of Interior): e250; 1
APC: 3,834: 650 Walid, 165 Fahd/-30, 1,075 BTR-
PCI, some 20 PCI(, 2 spt/landing craft, 1 hovercraft.
50/OT-62, 1,900 M-113A2, 44 M-577.
POLICE (Ministry of Interior): 9,000; 2 Hughes 500,
TOWED ARTY: 971: 122mm: 36 M-31/37, 359 M-
2 Bell 412, 1 Bell 205 hel.
1938, 156 D-30M; 130mm: 420 M-46.
SP ARTY: 122mm: 76 SP 122 (delivery reported),
155mm: 200M-109A2.
EGYPT MRL: 122mm: 96 BM-11, 200 BM-2\/as-Saqr-\0/-
18/-36.
GDP 1993: £E 145.9bn($43.29bn): MOR: 82mm (some 50 SP); 107mm: some M-30 SP;
per capita $4,100 120mm: 1,800 M-43; 160mm: 60 M-160.
1994: £E 156.0bn ($46.15bn): SSM: launchers: 12 FROG-1, Saqr-ZQ (trials), 9 Scud-B.
per capita $4,500 ATGW: 1,400 AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2); 220
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 131
Milan; 200 Swingfire; 530 TOW (incl l-TOW, TOW- King Mk 47 (ASW, anti-ship); 9 SA-342 (anti-ship).
2A (with 52 on M-901 SP)).
RCL:107mm:B-lI. COASTAL DEFENCE (Army tps, Navy control):
AD GUNS: 14.5mm: 475 ZPU-2/-4; 23mm: 550 ZU- GUNS: 130mm: SM-4-1.
23-2, 117 ZSU-23-4 SP, 45 Sinai; 37mm: 150 M- SSM: Otomat.
1939; 57mm: 300 S-60, 40 ZSU-57-2 SP.
SAM: 2,000 SA-lfAyn as-Saqr, 20 SA-9, 26 M-54
SP Chaparral. AIR F O R C E : 30,000 (10,000 conscripts); 564
SURV: AN/TPQ-37 (arty/mor), RASIT (veh, arty). cbt ac, 103 armed hel.
UAV: R4E-50 Skyeye. FGA: 7 sqn:
2 with 42 Alpha Jet.
' Most Soviet eqpt now in store, incl MBT and some cbt ac. 2 with 44 Ch J-6.
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2 with 29 F-4E.
1 with 20 Mirage 5E2.
NAVY: el6,000 (incl e2,000 Coast Guards and
FTR: 21 sqn:
el2,000 conscripts). 2 with 28 F-16A.
B A S E S : Alexandria (HQ, Mediterranean), Port 6 with74MiG-21.
Said, Mersa Matruh, Safaqa, PortTewfig; Hurghada 6 with 113 F-16C.
(HQ, Red Sea). 3 with 53 Mirage 5D/E.
SS:4: 3 with 53 Ch J-7.
2 Sov Romeo with 533mm TTf. 1 with 18 Mirage 2000C.
2 Ch Romeo with Sub Harpoon and 533mm TT RECCE: 2 sqn with 6 Mirage 5SDR, 14 MiG-21.
(plus 2 undergoing modernisation). EW: ac: 2 C-130H (ELINT),4 Beech 1900 (ELINT);
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 7: hel: 4 Commando 2E (ECM).
DD: 1 El Fateh (UK 'Z') (trg) with 4 x 114mm guns, AEW: 5 E-2C.
5 x 533mm TT. ASW: 9 SA-342L, 5 Sea King 47 (with Navy).
FF:6: MR: 2 Beech 1900C surv ac.
2 El Suez (Sp Descubierta) with 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x TPT: 19 C-130H, 5 DHC-5D, 1 Super King Air, 3
2 ASW RL; plus 2 x 4 Harpoon SSM. Gulfstream III, 1 Gulfstream IV, 3 Falcon 20.
2 Al Zaffir (Ch Jianghu-l) with 2 x ASW RL; plus HEL: 15 sqn:
2 x CSS-N-2 (HY-2) SSM. ATTACK:4 sqn with 65 SA-342K (44 whhHOT, 30 with
2 Damyat (US Knox) with 8 Harpoon, 127mm 20mm gun), 24 AH-64A (to be delivered by end 95).
gun, 4 x 324mm TT. TAC TPT: hy: 14 CH-47C; med: 40 Mi-8,25 Commando
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 43: (5 -1 tpt, 17 -2 tpt, 3 -2B VIP), 2 S-70 (VIP); It: 12 Mi-
MSL CRAFT: 25: 4, 17 UH-12E (trg), 2 UH-60A, 3 AS-61.
6 Ramadan with 4 Otomat SSM. TRG: incl 4 DHC-5, 54 EMB-312, 15* F-16B, 6* F-
5 SovOsa-I with 4 x SS-N-2ASfy* SSM (plus 1 non-op). 16D, 36 Gumhuria, 16* JJ-6,40 L-29,48 L-39, 25* L-
6 6th October with 2 Otomat SSM. 59E, MiG-21U, 5* Mirage 5SDD, 3* Mirage 2000B.
2 Sov Komar with 2 x SSN-2A Sfyx (plus 2 non-op). MSL:
6 Ch Hegu (Komar-type) with 2 HY-2 SSM. ASM: AGM-65 Maverick, Exocet AM-39, AS-12,
PATROL CRAFT: 18: AS-30, AS-30L HOT.
8 Ch Hainan PFC with 4 x ASW RL. ARM: Armat.
6 Sov Shershen PFI; 2 with 4 x 533mm TT and AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AIM-7E/F/M Sparrow, AIM-9F/
BM-21 (8-tube) 122mm MRL; 4 with SA-N-5 L/P Sidewinder, R-530, R-550 Magic.
and 1 BM-24 (12-tube) 240mm MRL. RPV: 23 R4E-50 Skyeye, 32 Teledyne-Ryan 324
4 Ch Shanghai II PFI. Scarab.
MCM: 7:
3 Aswan (Sov ttirfoj) MSC.
4 AwioMf (Sov T-43 class) MSC. AIR DEFENCE COMMAND:80,ooo(50,ooo
AMPH: 3 Sov Polnocny LSM, capacity 100 tps, 5 tk, conscripts).
plus 11 LCU (some in reserve). 5 div: regional bde.
SPT AND MISC: 20: 100 AD arty bn.
7 AOT (small), 5 trg, 6 tugs, 1 diving spt, 1 Tariq (ex- 40 SA-2, 53 SA-3, 14SA-6bn.
UK FF) trg. 12btyIHAWK.
12 bty Chaparral.
NAVAL AVIATION: 14 armed Air Force \\e\\5Sea 14 bty Crotale.
132 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
EQPT: Gaza
AD GUNS: some 2,000:20mm, 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 13-17 18-22 23-32
85mm, 100mm. Men 44,400 38,200 58,600
SAM: some 738: some 360 SA-2,210 SA-3,60 SA-6, Women 43,000 37,200 58,200
72 I HAWK, 36 Crotale.
AD SYSTEMS: some 18 Amoun (Skyguard/RM-7F West Bank
Sparrow, some 36 twin 35mm guns, some 36 quad 13-17 18-22 23-32
SAM); Sinai-23 short-range AD (Dassault 6SD-20S Men 66,400 60,400 100,600
radar, 23mm guns, 'Ayn as-Saqr SAM). Women 62,200 56,000 91,800
UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 10 Obs plus 10 civ pol. PARAMILITARY:
BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 434; 1 infbnplus8Obs, 1 civ SECURITY FORCES: el6,500: incl Public
pol. CROATIA (UNCRO): 8 Obs, 31 civ pol. GEOR- Security (E7,000), Civil Police (£4,000), General
GIA (UNOMIG): 5 Obs. LIBERIA (UNOMIL): 3 Intelligence (3,000), Preventive Security (E2,500),
Obs. WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO): 12 Obs Presidential Security, Military Intelligence, Coastal
plus 11 civ pol. Police, Civil Defence, others reported; small arms, 45
APC allowed. Perhaps 12,000 more after next Israeli
withdrawal, Israel agrees to 2,000 more.
PARAMILITARY:
C O A S T GUARD: e2,000 (incl in Naval entry).
PATROL, INSHORE: 33: PALESTINIAN GROUPS:
12 Timsah PCI, 10 Swiftships, 5 Msrt, 6 Crestitalia All significant Palestinian factions are listed irrespective
PFI(, plus some 60 boats. of the countr(ies) where they are based. The faction leader
CENTRAL SECURITY FORCES (Ministry of is given after the full title. Str are est of the number of
Interior): 100,000; 110 Hotspur Hussar, Walid APC. active 'fighters'; these could be doubled perhaps
NATIONAL GUARD: 60,000; 8 bde (each of 3 bn; to give an all-told figure. In 1991, the Lebanon Armed
cadre status). Forces (LAF), backed by the Syrians, entered refugee
BORDER GUARD FORCES: 12,000; 19Border camps in southern Lebanon to disarm many Palestinian
Guard Regt. groups of their heavier weapons, such as tanks, artillery
and armoured personnel carriers. The LAF conducted
further disarming operations against Fatah Revolutionary
FOREIGN FORCES: Council (FRC) refugee camps in spring 1994.
PEACEKEEPING (MFO Sinai): some 1,900 from
Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, Hungary, P L O (Palestine Liberation Organisation; Leader: Yasser
Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Uruguay, the US. Arafat):
FATAH: Political wing of the PLO.
PNLA (Palestine National Liberation Army): 8,000.
GAZA AND JERICHO Based in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Iraq,
Sudan and Yemen. Effectively the mil wing of the PLO.
GDP 1994e:$2.4bn: Its units in various Middle East countries are closely
per capita $1,700 monitored by host nations' armed forces.
Gaza: $580m: P L F (Palestine Liberation Front; Leader: Al Abas):
per capita $900 £300-400. Based in Iraq. Tal al Yaqub faction: elOO-
West Bank: $1.82bn: 150. Based in Syria.
per capita $1,800 D F L P (Democratic Front for the Liberation ofPalestine;
Growth 1994e:0% Leader: Hawatmah): e500-600. Based in Syria, Leba-
Inflation 1994E:15% non, elsewhere. Abd Rabbu faction: el50-20. Based in
Debt 1994E:$0.0 Jordan.
Sybdgt 1994E:$84m 1995E:$90m P F L P (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine;
Leader: Habash): £800. Based in Syria, Lebanon,
Population:" West Bank and Gaza: el,944,000 (Israeli Occupied Territories.
7%); Gaza: £795,000 (Israeli £5,000); West Bank: P S F (Popular Struggle Front; Leader: Samir Ghansha):
El,149,000 (Israeli £ll%); Jericho only: £18,000 E600-700. Based in Syria.
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 133
ARAB LIBERATION FRONT: e500. Based in ARMY." 345,000 (perhaps 250,000 conscripts).
Lebanon and Iraq. 4 Army HQ.
4 armd div.
GROUPS OPPOSED TO THE PLO: 1 AB bde.
FATAH DISSIDENTS (Abu Musa gp): el,000. 7 inf div.
Based in Syria and Lebanon. 2 SF div (3 bde)
FRC (Fatah Revolutionary Council, Abu Nidal Group): Some indep armd, inf, cdo bde.
e300. Based in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, elsewhere. 5 arty gps.
PFLP (GC) (Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- EQPT:t
tine (General Command); Leader: Jibril): e600. MBT: 1,440, incl: 110T-54/-55,220ChType-59,150
T-62, 200 T-72, 250 Chieftain Mk 3/5, 150 M-47/-
PFLP (SC) (Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
48, 160 M-60A1, 200 Ch Type-69.
tine - Special Command): £50-100. Based in Lebanon,
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LT TK: 80 Scorpion.
Iraq, Syria. RECCE: 35 EE-9 Cascavel.
SAIQA (Leader: al-Khadi): el,000. Based in Syria. AIFV: 300 BMP-1, 100 BMP-2.
HAMAS: e300. Based in Occupied Territories. APC: 550: BTR-50/-60, M-l 13.
PIJ (Palestine Islamic Jihad):e35O all factions. Based in TOTAL ARTY: 2,948 (excl mor):
Occupied Territories. TOWED: 1,995:105mm: 130M-101Al;122mm:550
PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT: Abd al- D-30, 100ChType-54; 130mm: 1,000 M-46/Type-
Fatah Ghanim faction. Based in Syria: 59; 152mm: 30 D-20; 155mm: 15 WAC-21, 70 M-
114; 80 GHN-45; 203mm: 20 M-l 15.
PLA (Palestine Liberation Army): e4,500. Based in
SP: 289:122mm: 60 2S1; 155mm: 160 M-109;170mm:
Syria.
9 M-l978; 175mm: 30 M-l07; 203mm: 30 M-l 10.
MRL: 664: 107mm: 500 Ch Type-63; 122mm: 50
Hadid/Arash/Noor, 100 BM-21, 5 BM-11; 240mm:
IRAN 9 M-1985; 320mm: Oghab; 333mm: Shahin 1/-2;
355mm: Nazeat; Iran-130 reported.
GDP" 1993: r 93,801bn ($57.8bn): MOR: 3,500, incl: 60mm; 81mm; 82mm; 107mm:
per capita $4,900i 4.2-in M-30; 120mm.
1994e:r 104,641bn ($59.8bn): SSM: elO Scud-BI-C (210 msl), e25 CSS-8 (200 msl),
per capita $4,800i local manufacture msl reported under development.
Growth 1993: 1.8% 1994e:1.0% ATGW: TOW, AT-3 Sagger (some SP).
Inflation 1993: 22.3% 1994: 31.5% RL: 73mm: RPG-7.
Debt 1993: $20.6bn 1994: $20.0bn RCL: 75mm: M-20; 82mm: B-10; 106mm: M-40;
Def exp 1993e:r6,159bn ($4.86bn) 107mm: B - l l .
Def bdgt" 1994: r4,020bn ($2.3Obn) AD GUNS: 1,700:14.5mm: ZPU-2/-4;23mm: ZU-23
I995e:r4,300bn ($2.46bn) towed, ZSU-23-4 SP; 35mm; 37mm: M-l939, Ch
$1 = r 1993: 1,268 1994: 1,749 Type-55; 57mm: ZSU-57-2 SP.
1995: 1,750 SAM: SA-7.
r = rial AC: incl 50 Cessna (150, 180, 185, 310), 19 F-27, 8
Falcon 20.
• 1995 def bdgt includes r 2,180bn ($ 1.25bn) for procurement. HEL: 100 AH-1J (attack); 40 CH-47C (hy tpt); 130
Bell 214A, 35 AB-214C; 40 AB-205A; 90 AB-206;
Population: 64,805,000 (Shi'i 95%, Azeri 25%, 12 AB-212; 30 Bell 204; 5 Hughes 300C; 9 RH-53D;
Kurdish 9%, Gilaki/Mazandarani 8%, Sunni 4%) 10 SH-53D, 10 SA-319; 45 UH-1H.
13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 3,844,400 3,159,000 4,828,600 REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
Women 3,715,000 2,994,800 4,601,400 (Pasdaran Inqilab): some 120,000.
GROUND FORCES: some 100,000; grouped into
perhaps 13 inf, 2 armd div and many indep bde, incl inf,
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: armd, para, SF, arty (incl SSM), engr, AD and border
A C T I V E : 513,000 (perhaps 250,000 plus con- defence units, serveindepor with Army; limited numbers
scripts). of tk, APC and arty; controls Basij (see Paramilitary)
Terms of service: 24 months. when mob.
R E S E R V E S : Army: 350,000, ex-service volunteers. NAVAL FORCES: some 20,000; five island bases
(AI Farsiyah, Halul (oil platform), Sirri, Abu Musa,
134 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
MARINES: 3 bn.
IRAQ
AIR F O R C E : 30,000(incl 12,000 Air Defence); GDP 1993E:$18.0bn
some 295 cbt ac (probably less than 50% of US ac 1994e:$18.5bn
types serviceable); no armed hel. Growth 1993e:0% 1994e:l%
FGA: 9 sqn: Inflation 1993E: 170% 1994E:250%
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 135
Debt" 1993: $86bn 1994e:$90bn AD GUNS: E5,5OO: 23mm: ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-
Defexp 1993e:$2.6bn 1994e:$2.7bn 1939 and twin; 57mm: incl ZSU-57-2 SP; 85mm;
$1=D" 1993-1995:0.31 100mm; 130mm.
D = dinar SAM: SA-2/-3/-6/-7/-8/-9/-13/-14/-16, Roland.
SURV: RASIT (veh, arty), Cymbeline (mor).
" excl liabilities up to $80bn for Gulf War reparations.
* Informal market rates in June 1995: $1 =d 1,200-1,800.
NAVY: £2,500.
Population: 21,038,000 (Shi'i 60-65%, Sunni 32- B A S E S : Basra (limited facilities), Az Zubayr,
37%, Kurdish 17%, other Arab 5%) Umm Qasr (currently closed).
13-17 18-22 23-32 FF: 1 lbn Marjid (ex-Khaldoum) (trg) with 2 x
Men 1,293,000 1,063,000 1,562,600 ASTT.
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ATGW: 200 TOW (incl Ramta (M-113) SP), 780 TPT: 1 wing: incl 4 Boeing 707, 12 C-47,24 C-130H,
Dragon, AT-3 Sagger, 25 Mapats. 7IAI-201.
RL: 82mm: B-300. LIAISON: 2 Islander, 20 Cessna U-206, 8 Queen Air 80.
RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav; 106mm: 250 M-40A1. TRG: 80 CM-170 Tzukit, 10 Kfir TC2/7, 30 Super
AD GUNS: 20mm: 850: incl TCM-20, M-167 Vulcan, Cub, 10* TA-4H, 4* TA-4J, 4 Queen Air 80.
35 M-163 Vw/ean/M-48 Chaparral gun/msl sys- HEL:
tems; 23mm: 100 ZU-23 and 60 ZSU-23-4 SP; ATTACK: 39 AH-IF, 35 Hughes 500MD, 42 AH-64A.
37mm: M-39; 40mm: L-70. SAR: 2 HH-65A.
SAM: Stinger, 900 Redeye, 45 Chaparral. TPT: 42 CH-53D, 10 UH-60; 54 Bell 212, 39 Bell 206.
SURV: EL/M-2140 (veh), AN/TPQ-37 (arty), AN/ UAV: Scout, Pioneer, Searcher, Firebee, Samson,
PPS-15 (arty). Delilah.
MSL:
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pol.GEORGIA(UNOMIG): 9 Obs.HAITI(UNMIH):
EQPT: 146 civ pol. LIBERIA (UNOMIL): 8 Obs. FYROM
MBT: some 1,141: 270 M-47/-48A5 (in store), 218 (UNPREDEP): 1 Obs. RWANDA (UNAMIR): 3 civ
M-60A1/A3, 360 Khalidi'Chieftain, 293 Tariq pol. TAJIKISTAN (UNMOT): 5 Obs.
{Centurion).
LTTKS: 19 Scorpion.
RECCE: 150 Ferret. PARAMILITARY:
AIFV: some 35 BMP-2. PUBLIC SECURITY DIRECTORATE
APC: 1,100 M-l 13. (Ministry of Interior): el0,000; some Scorpion It tk,
TOWED ARTY: 115:105mm: 50 M-102; 155mm: 30 25 EE-11 Urutu, 30 Saracen APC.
M-l 14 towed, 10 M-59/M-1; 203mm: 25 M-l 15 CIVIL MILITIA 'PEOPLE'S ARMY': e200,000;
towed (in store). men 16-65, women 16-45.
SP ARTY: 370:105mm: 30 M-52; 155mm: 20 M-44,
220M-109A1/A2; 203mm: 100 M-l 10.
MOR: 81mm: 450 (incl 130 SP); 107mm: 50 M-30;
1 KUWAIT |
ARMY: el o.ooo.
2 mech bde (-). 1 reserve bde (-)
| LEBANON |
2 armd bde (-). 1 arty bde (-).
1 Amiri gd bde. 1 engr bde. GDP 1993e:LP 10,934bn ($6.28bn):
1 cdo bn. per capita $3,700
EQPT: 1994e:LP ll,918bn ($7.09bn):
per capita $3,800
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Population:: 5,410,000
PARAMILITARY: 13-17 18-22 23-32
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE (Ministry of Men 312,400 262,200 389,000
Interior) x 13,000 (incl Regional and Beirut Gendarmerie Women 300,800 252,200 366,800
coy plus Judicial Police); 30 Chaimite APC.
C U S T O M S : 5 armed boats.
MILITIAS: most militias, except Hizbollah and the TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
SLA, have been substantially disbanded and hy wpns A C T I V E : £8O,ooo.
handed over to the National Army. Terms of service: selective conscription, 1-2 years.
HIZBOLLAH ('Party ofGod';Shi'i, fundamentalist, R E S E R V E S : People's Militia, some 40,000.
pro-Iranian): £3,000 (-) active; total spt unknown.
EQPT: incl APC, arty, MRL, RL, RCL, ATGW (AT-
3 Sagger), AA guns. A R M Y : £50,000 (e25,000 conscripts).
SOUTH LEBANESE ARMY (SLA): e2,500 active 7 Military Districts.
(mainly Christian, someShi'i and Druze, trained, equipped 5 elite bde (regime sy force).
and supported by Israel, occupies the 'Security Zone' lOtkbn. 22 arty bn.
between Israeli border and area controlled by UNIFIL). 21 inf bn. 8 AD arty bn.
EQPT: 8 mech inf bn. 15 para/cdo bn.
MBT: 30 T-54/-55. 5 SSM bde.
APC: M-113, BTR-50. EQPT:
TOWED ARTY: 122mm: D-30; 130mm: M-46; MBT: 2,210 (incl 1,200 in store): l,6OOT-54/-55,35O
155mm: M-1950. T-62, 260 T-72.
MOR: 160mm: some. RECCE: 250 BRDM-2, 380 EE-9 Cascavel.
AIFV: 1,000 BMP-1.
APC: 750 BTR-50/-60, 100 OT-62/-64, 40 M-113,
FOREIGN FORCES: 100EE-11 Urutu.
UNITED NATIONS (UNIFIL): some 4,963; 6 inf bns: 1
TOWED ARTY: some 720: 105mm: some 60 M-101;
each from Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Nor-
122mm: 270 D-30, 60 D-74; 130mm: 330 M-46.
way, plus spt units from France, Italy, Norway, Poland.
IRAN: el50 Revolutionary Guard. SP ARTY: some 450: 122mm: 130 2S1; 152mm: 60
SYRIA: 30,000. 2S3, 80 DANA; 155mm: 160 Palmaria, 20 M-109.
BEIRUT: 1 corps HQ, 1 SF div HQ, elm 1 armd bde, MRL: some 700:107mm:Type 63; 122mm: 350 BM-
elm 5 SF regt. 21/RM-70, 300BM-11.
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 141
MOR: 82mm; 120mm: M-43; 160mm: M-160. 3 -25U, 15 Mirage F-1ED, 6 -BD.
SSM: launchers: 40 FROG-1, 80 Scud-B. COIN: 1 sqn with 30 J-l Jastreb.
ATGW: 3,000: Milan, AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM SP), RECCE: 2 sqn with 4 Mirage 5DR, 7 MiG-25R.
AT-4 Spigot. TPT: 9 sqn with 15 An-26,12 Lockheed (7 C-130H, 2 L-
RCL: 106mm: 220 M-40A1. 100-20, 3 L-100-30), 16 G-222, 20 11-76, 15 L-410.
AD GUNS: 600:23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP;30mm: ATTACK HEL: 40 Mi-25, 12 Mi-35.
M-53/59 SP. TPT HEL: hy: 18 CH-47C; med: 34 Mi-8/17; It: 30
SAM: SA-7/-9/-13, 24 quad Crotale. Mi-2, 11 SA-316, 5 AB-206.
SURV: RASIT (veh, arty). TRG: ac: 80 Galeb G-2; hel: 20 Mi-2; other ac incl 1
Tu-22, 150 L-39ZO, 20 SF-260WL.
MSL:
N A V Y : 8,000 (incl Coast Guard). ASM: AT-2 Swatter ATGW (hel-borne), AS-7, AS-9,
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' Excl $1.8bn military subsidy from GCC 1984-94, shared SPT: 2:
with Bahrain, and e$100m over 1990-99 from US Access 1 Al Sultana, 1 Al Mabrukah trg with hel deck (also
Agreement renewed in 1990. used in offshore patrol role).
Population: 1,881,000 (expatriates 27%)
13-17 18-22 23-32 AIR F O R C E : 4,100; 46 cbt ac, no armed hel.
Men 105,600 83,400 127,800 FGA: 2 sqn with 15 Jaguar S(O) Mk 1, 4 T-2.
Women 102,600 80,400 114,000 FGA/RECCE: \2Hawk2Q3.
COIN/TRG: 1 sqn with 11 * B AC-167 Mk 82, 7 BN-2
Defender, 4* Hawk 103.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: TPT: 3 sqn:
1 with3BAC-lll.
A C T I V E : 43,500 (incl Royal Household tps, and 2 with \5Skyvan 3M (7 radar-equipped, for MR), 3 C-130H.
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some 3,700 foreign personnel). HEL: 2 med tpt sqn with 20 AB-205,3 AB-206, 3 AB-
212, 5 AB-214.
TRG: 4 AS-202-18, 3 MFI-17B Mushshak.
A R M Y : 25,000 (regt are bn size). AD: 2 sqn with 28 Rapier SAM, Martello radar.
1 div, 2 bde HQ. MSL:
2 armd regt (3 tk sqn). ASM: Exocet AM-39.
1 armd recce regt (3 armd car sqn). AAM: AIM-9P Sidewinder.
4 arty (2 fd, 1 med (2 bty), 1 AD (2 bty)) regt.
8 inf regt (incl 3 Baluch).
1 inf recce regt (3 recce coy), 2 indep recce coy. R O Y A L HOUSEHOLD:6,500(inciHQstaff).
1 fd engr regt (3 sqn). Royal Guard bde: (5,000): 9 VBC-90 It tk, 14 VAB-
1 AB regt. VCI APC, 9 VAB-VDAA, Javelin SAM.
Musandam Security Force (indep rifle coy). 2SFregt: (1,000).
EQPT: Royal Yacht Squadron (based Muscat): (150):
MBT: 6 M-60A1, 43 M-60A3, 24 Qayid al-Ardh 1 Royal Yacht, 3,800t with hel deck.
(Chieftain Mk 7/-15), 18 Challenger 2 (delivery 1 Fulk Al Salamah tps and veh tpt with up to 2 AS-
complete by end 1995). 332C Puma hel.
1 Zinat Al Bihaar Dhow.
LT TK: 37 Scorpion.
Royal Flight: (250): ac: 2 Boeing-747 SP, 1 DC-8-
APC: 6 Spartan, 13 Sultan, 20 Piranha (being
73CF, 2 Gulfstream IV; hel: 3 AS-330, 2 AS-332C,
delivered). 1 AS-332L.
TOWED ARTY: 96:105mm: 42 ROF lt;122mm: 30 D-
30; 130mm: 12 M-46, 12 Type 59-1.
SP ARTY: 155mm: 6 G-6 (being delivered). PARAMILITARY:
MOR: 81mm: 54; 107mm: 20 4.2-in M-30. TRIBAL HOME GUARD (Firqat): 4,000.
ATGW: 18 TOW, 32 Milan (incl 2 VCAC).
POLICE COAST GUARD: 400; 15 AT-105
AD GUNS: 23mm: 4 ZU-23-2; 40mm: 12 Bofors L/60.
APC, some 18 inshore patrol craft.
SAM: Blowpipe, 28 Javelin, 34 SA-7.
POLICE AIR WING: ac: 1 Do-228, 2 CN 235M,
1 BN-2T Islander; hel: 3 Bell 205A, 6 Bell 214ST.
NAVY: 4,200.
B A S E S : Seeb (HQ), Wudam (main base), Raysut,
Ghanam Island, Alwi. QATAR
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 12:
MSL CRAFT: 4 Dhofar, 1 with 2 x 3 MM-40, 3 with 2
GDP 1993: R27.88bn ($7.66bn):
x 4 MM-40 Exocet SSM. per capita $16,000
PATROL CRAFT: 8: 1994e:R28.57bn($7.85bn):
2/4/5«.s/ira(FrP-400)with 1 x76mgun,2x406mmTT. per capita $15,800
2 Al Wafi (Brooke-Marine 37-m) PCI, ASeeb (Vosper Growth 1993: 0.5% 1994e:1.0%
25-m) PCI(. Inflation 1993: 3% 1994: 4%
AMPH: 2: Debt 1993E:$1.7bn 1994e:$1.9bn
1 Nasr el Bahr LSTt, capacity 240 tps, 7 tk, hel deck Def exp 1993e:R 1.2bn($33Om)
(in reserve). Def bdgt 1994e:R l.lbn($302m)
1 Al Munassir LST, capacity 200 tps, 8 tk, hel deck 1995e:R 1.2bn($326m)
(non-op, harbour trg). $1 =R 1993-95: 3.64
Plus craft: 3 LCM, 1 LCU. R = rial
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 145
MSL CRAFT: 9 A lSiddiq ( U S 5 8 - m ) P F Mwith 2 x 2 SAM: 141 Shahine, 128 MIM-23BI HAWK, AOCrotale.
Harpoon.
TORPEDO CRAFT: 3 Dammam: (Ge Jaguar) with 4 x
53.3mm TT (trg, incl 1 in reserve). NATIONAL G U A R D : 77,000 (57,000 active,
PATROL CRAFT: 17 US Halter Marine PCI( (some 20,000 tribal levies).
with Coast Guard). 2 mech inf bde, each 4 all arms bn.
MCM: 7: 6 inf bde.
3 Al Jawf (UK Sandown MCC). 1 ceremonial cav sqn.
4 Addriyah (US MSC-322) MCC. EQPT:
AMPH: craft only: 4 LCU, 4 LCM. LAV: 262 LAV-25.
SPTANDMISC:7: APC: 1,100 V-150 Commando (50% in store), 65
Piranha.
2 Boraida (mod FrDurance) AO with 1 or 2 hel, 3 ocean
tugs, 1 salvage tug, 1 Royal Yacht with hel deck. TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 40 M-102; 155mm: 30 M-198.
RCL: 106mm: M-40A1.
ATGW: TOW.
NAVAL AVIATION: 23 armed hel.
HEL: 21 AS-365N (4 SAR, 17 with AS-15TT ASM),
12 AS 332B/F (6 tpt, 6 with AM-39 Exocet). PARAMILITARY:
FRONTIER FORCE: 10,500.
MARINES: (3,000). C O A S T GUARD: 4,500; AAl Jouf PFl, about 30
1 inf regt (2 bn), with 140 BMR-600P. PCI(, about 20 hovercraft, 1 trg, 1 Royal Yacht (5,000t)
with 1 Bell 206B hel, about 350 armed boats.
AIR F O R C E : 18,000; 295 cbt ac, no armed hel. GENERAL CIVIL DEFENCE
FGA: 5 sqn: ADMINISTRATION UNITS: 10KV-107hel.
3 with 56 F-5E, 14 F-5F, 2 with 42 Tornado IDS. SPECIAL SECURITY FORCE: 500;UR-416 APC.
FTR: 6 sqn:
4 with78F-15C, 20F-15D.
2 with 24 Tornado ADV. FOREIGN FORCES:
RECCE: 1 sqn with 10*RF-5E (6 Tornado in FGA sqn). PENINSULAR SHIELD FORCE: e7,000; 1 inf
AEW: 1 sqn with 5 E-3A. bde (elm from all GCC states).
TKR: 8 KE-3A (tkr/tpt), 8 KC-130H. FRANCE: 130; 6Mi'rage2000C, 1 C 135FR, 1 N-262.
OCU: 2 sqn with 14* F-5B, 7* F-5F. US: Air Force units on rotational det, numbers vary
TPT: 3 sqn with 41 C-130 (7 -E, 34 -H), 8 L-100- (incl: F-15, F-16, F-117, C-130, KC-135, U-2 E-3),
30HS (hospital ac). 1 Patriot bn.
HEL: 2 sqn with 22 AB-205,25 AB-206B, 27 AB-212. UK: 6 Tornado GR-1A, 2 VC-10 (tkr).
TRG: 36 BAC-167 Mk-80/80A, 30* Hawk Mk 65, 30
PC-9, 1 Jetstream 31.
ROYAL FLT: ac: 1 Boeing-747SP, 1 Boeing-737-200, | SYRIA
4 BAe 125-800, 2 C-140,4 CN-235, 2 Gulfstream III,
2 Learjet 35, 6 VC-130H, 1 Cessna 310; hel: 3 AS-61,
AB-212,1 -S70. GDP 1993:" £S 398.5bn ($26.75bn):
MSL: per capita $6,000
ASM: AGM-65 Maverick, AS-15, AS-30,S<?a Eagle, 1993:" £S 429.0bn ($28.09bn):
Shrike AGM-45. per capita $6,200
ARM: ALARM. Growth 1993: 3.9% 1994E:3.0%
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 147
12M-114A1.57M-198.
PARAMILITARY: MOR: 81mm: 95; 107mm: 40 4.2-in.
GENDARMERIE (Ministry of Interior): 8,000. ATGW: 65 TOW (incl some SP), 500 Milan.
B A T H PARTY: Workers' Militia (People's Army). RL: 89mm: 300 LRAC-89, 300 3.5-in M-20.
RCL: 57mm: 140 M-18; 106mm: 70 M-40A1.
AD GUNS: 20mm: 100 M-55; 37mm: 15Type-55/-65.
FOREIGN FORCES: SAM: 48 RBS-70, 25 M-48 Chaparral.
UNITED NATIONS (UNDOF): 1,036; contingents SURV: RASIT (veh, arty).
from Austria (468), Canada (214) and Poland (354).
RUSSIA: e500 advisers, mainly AD.
N A V Y : e5,000 (e700 conscripts).
BASES: Bizerte, Sfax, Kelibia.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 23:
1 TUNISIA | MSL CRAFT: 6:
3 La Galite (Fr Combattante III) PFM with 8 MM-40
I
GDP 1993: D 14.69bn ($14.63bn): Exocet SSM.
per capita $5,200 3 Bizerte (Fr P-48) with 8 x SS-12 SSM.
1994: D 16.13bn($15.95bn): PATROL, INSHORE: 17:
per capita $5,400 5 Gafsah (Ch Shanghai) PFI, 2 Tazarka (UK Vosper
Growth 1993: 2.6% 1994: 4.4% 31-m) PCI, some 10 PCI(.
Inflation 1993: 4.3% 1994: 4.8% SPT AND MISC: 1 Salambo(VS Conrad) survey/trg.
Debt 1993: $8.7bn 1994: $8.0bn
Def exp" 1993: D232m($231m)
Def bdgt 1994: D228m($225m) AIR F O R C E : 3,500 (700 conscripts); 32 cbt ac,
1995: D242m ($262m) 7 armed hel.
FMA 1994: $0.5m(IMET) FGA: 15 F-5E/F.
1995: $0.8m(IMET) COIN: 1 sqn with 3 MB-326K, 2 MB-326L.
1996: $0.8m(IMET) TPT: 2 C-130B, 2 C-130H, 1 Falcon 20.
$1 = D 1993: 1.00 1994: 1.01 LIAISON: 2 S-208M.
1995: 0.92 TRG: 18 SF-260 (6-C, *12-W), 5 MB-326B.
D = dinar ARMED HEL: 5 SA-341 (attack) 2 HH-3 (ASW).
TPT HEL: 1 wing with 15 AB-205,6 AS-350B, 1 AS-
"Previous year entries included police and interior sy exp. 365, 6 SA-313, 3 SA-316, 2 UH-1H, 2 UH-1N.
AAM: AIM-9J Sidewinder.
Population : 9,031,000
13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 499,000 450,400 786,400 FORCES ABROAD:
Women 477,800 434,600 763,400 UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
CROATIA (UNCRO): 12 civ pol. RWANDA
(UNAMIR): 834 plus lOObs. WESTERN SAHARA
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: (MINURSO): 9 Obs.
A C T I V E : 35,500 (26,400 conscripts).
Terms of service: 12 months selective. PARAMILITARY:
NATIONAL POLICE: 13,000.
A R M Y : 27,000 (25,000 conscripts). NATIONAL GUARD: 10,000; incl Coastal Patrol
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 149
Debt 1993: $10.64bn 1994: $10.49bn B A S E S : Abu Dhabi (main base): Dalma, Mina
Defexp 1993: Dh 7.8bn ($2.1 lbn) Zayed, Ajman; Dubai: Mina Rashid, Mina Jabal, Al
Def bdgt 1994e: Dh 7.0bn ($ 1.91 bn) Fujairah; Ras al Khaimah: Mina Sakr; Sharjah: Mina
1995e:Dh6.9bn ($1.88bn) Khalid, Khor Fakkan.
$l=Dh 1993-95:3.67 FF: 1 Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG scheduled for
Dh = dirham lease from US in 1995.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 19:
Population: 1,830,000 (nationals 24%, expatriates CORVETTES: 2 Muray Jip (Ge Liirssen 62-m) with 2
76%, of which Indian 30%, Pakistani 16%, other x 2 MM-40 Exocet SSM, plus 1 SA-316 hel.
Asian 12%, other Arab 12%, European 1%) MSLCRAFT:8:
13-17 18-22 23-32 6 B a n Yas ( G e L i i r s s e n T N C - 4 5 ) w i t h 2 x 2 M M - 4 0
Men 82,600 72,000 140,400 Exocet SSM.
Women 79,200 63,400 79,400 2 Mubarraz (Ge Liirssen 45-m) with 2 x 2 M M - 4 0
Exocet SSM, plus 1 x 6 Sadral SAM.
PATROL, INSHORE: 9:
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: 6 Ardhana (UK Vosper 33-m) PFI, 3 Kawkab PCI(.
The Union Defence Force and the armed forces of the AMPH: craft only: 3 Al Feyi LCT, 1 LCM.
UAE (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah) SPTANDMISC:3:
were formally merged in 1976 and centred on Abu 1 div spt, 1 log spt, 1 tug.
Dhabi. Dubai still maintains its independence, and
other emirates a smaller degree of independence. AIR F O R C E (incl Police Air Wing): 3,500; 97
A C T I V E : 70,000 (perhaps 30% expatriates).
cbt ac, 42 armed hel. Flying hours: 110.
FGA: 3 sqn:
A R M Y : 65,000 (incl Dubai: 15,000) (being 1 with 9 Mirage 2000E.
reorganised). MoD (Dubai); GHQ (Abu Dhabi). 1 with 18 Hawk 102.
INTEGRATED: 1 with 14 Hawk Mk 63A (FGA/trg).
1 Royal Guard 'bde'. FTR: 1 sqn with 22 Mirage 2000 EAD.
1 armd bde. COIN: 1 sqn with 6 MB-326 (4 -KD, 2 -LD), 5 MB-339A.
1 mech inf bde. OCU:*7//awA:Mk61,*2MB-339A, *6Mirage 2000
2inf bde. DAD.
1 arty bde. RECCE: 8 Mirage 2000 RAD.
NOT INTEGRATED: TPT: incl 1 BN-2, 4 C-130H, 2 L-100-30,4 C-212, 7
2 inf bde (Dubai). CN-235M-100, 4 11-76 (on lease).
EQPT: HEL:
MBT: 133:95 AMX-30,36 OF-40 Mk 2 (Lion), ILeclerc. ATTACK: 5 AS-332F (anti-ship, 3 with Exocet AM-
LT TK: 76 Scorpion. 39), 10 SA-342K (with HOT), 7 SA-316/-319 (with
RECCE: 90 AML-90, 50 Saladin (in store), 20 Ferret AS-11/-12), 20AH-64A.
(in store). TPT: 2 AS-332 (VIP), 1 AS-350,26 Bell (-205:8; -206A:
AIFV: 18 AMX-10P, 330 BMP-3. 9; -206L: 5; -214: 4), 10 SA-330.
APC: 80 VCR (incl variants), 240 Panhard M-3, 60 SAR: 3 Bo-105.
EE-11 Urutu. TRG: 30 PC-7, 5 SF-260 (-TP: 4; -W: 1).
TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 62 ROF It; 130mm: 20 Ch MSL:
Type-59-1. ASM: HOT, AS-11/-12, Exocet AM-39, Hellfire,
150 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Central Asia
The separate civil wars in Afghanistan and on the Afghan-Tajikistan border continued unabated.
In Afghanistan, the appearance in January 1995 of a new major faction, Taleban - formed
primarily by religious students and organised in southern Afghanistan - both complicated and
increased the intensity of the civil war. Initially, Taleban was extremely successful. By March
1995 the group appeared to control the southern half of the country, threatening Kabul. In the
capital, Taleban soon found itself fighting elements of the forces of General Ahmad Shah Masud
and of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, halting their further advance. Taleban appears to have Pakistan's
backing, but hopes that the group would rise above Afghanistan's acknowledged factionalism
have not been realised. Throughout the last 12 months there have been numerous reports of
defections and groups changing sides. Taleban has not yet joined or allied itself to either of the
main factions, but the war is expected to continue between the Northern Farsi (Uzbek, Turkmen
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and Tajik) groups, and Taleban and the southern Pashtun groups.
On 16 December 1994, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 968 which established an
observer mission (UNMOT) for six months to monitor the cease-fire agreed to by the government
of Tajikistan and the Islamic opposition. The cease-fire has not been respected and fighting flared
up again in April 1995 when rebels based in Afghanistan made a series of raids along the Tajik
border. This prompted a strong response from Russian forces, including reported air attacks on
targets in Afghanistan. Peace talks took place at Almaty in June, but no agreement was reached
on how to integrate the opposition into the Tajik government.
In February 1995, Kazakhstan and Russia signed a number of cooperative agreements and
issued a joint declaration that they 'would begin to form unified armed forces'. This does not mean
a single armed force, but a close alliance whose forces would be unified when necessary to face
a common threat. The five former Soviet Central Asian states signed two Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) agreements: the Memorandum on Maintaining Peace and Stability in
March; and the Agreement on Creating a Joint Air Defence System in May. Also in May,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement protecting CIS external borders.
Southern Asia
In India it has been a relatively quiet year, although there is still no solution to the violence in
Kashmir. The worst incidence of violence occurred in May 1995 when, during a fight between the
Indian Army and Muslim militants, a holy shrine and several hundred homes were destroyed in
the Muslim town of Charar-e-Sharief, some 20 miles south-west of Srinagar. Both sides blame
the other for the shrine's destruction. After visiting Kashmir, Bhuvanesh Chaturvedi, Minister of
State in the Prime Minister's office, said on 3 July that the government was ready to hold
unconditional talks with 'anyone' to end the violence there.
In January .Myanmar's Army launched a major campaign against the Karen rebels, one of the
few groups still able to oppose the government. The Karen main stronghold of Manerplaw was
taken at the end of the month and another, Kawmoora, some three weeks later. The Karen
movement decided to stop attempting to control territory and to revert to guerrilla warfare instead.
Although a substantial number of arms were handed into the government, the fight continues with
some Karens escaping over the border to Thailand.
In Pakistan, there has been a major outbreak of communal violence in Karachi caused by the
Mohajiv Qaumi Movement formed by Urdu-speaking Muslims who migrated to Pakistan after
partition in 1947. So far, around 1,000 people have died and the city is virtually ungovernable.
In Sri Lanka, the ruling United National Party was defeated in elections in August 1994 and
was replaced by a coalition government led by Chandrika Kumaratunga' s People's Alliance. The
new government quickly eased the economic blockade on the region controlled by the Liberation
152 CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ASIA
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), lifted the state of emergency and invited the Tamil Tigers to peace
talks. But armed clashes continued until midnight on 7 January 1995 when a cease-fire agreed by
the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE, and monitored by Canadian, Dutch and Norwegian
officials, came into force. Later that month the LTTE dropped its demand for independence and
was willing to accept autonomy with Sri Lanka. The cease-fire ended when two naval patrol boats
were sunk by mines in Trincomalee harbour on 19 April. The following day the Tamil Tigers
attacked two army posts and the police rounded up some 1,000 Tamils across the country. In June
it was revealed that India was providing naval ships and maritime aircraft to prevent supplies from
reaching the LTTE across the Palk Strait. The worst incident in the renewed fighting occurred on 28
June when up to 1,000 LTTE raided the island of Mandaitivu, killing over 100 government soldiers.
Nuclear Developments
Kazakhstan has made good progress towards achieving non-nuclear status. Russia's Strategic
Rocket Forces announced that the transfer of nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan was completed
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Missile Proliferation
It is still unclear whether Pakistan has received either complete missiles, missile components or
technology fromChinafortheM-11 missile system, although US intelligence officials believe that
up to 30 missiles have been delivered to Lahore. Both China and Pakistan deny this. China also
refutes claims that the M-ll is covered by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
parameters (missiles which can carry a 500kg payload over 300km). They claim its range is 185
miles (296km) and its payload l,0001bs (453kg), but have accepted the US concept of 'inherent
capability'. There have been no reports in the last 12 months of tests oflndian ballistic missiles,
although development is thought to be continuing. It is now accepted that a regiment of short-range
(150km) Privthi SSM has been formed, but may not yet be operational. Although under
international pressure to end missile production, the Indian government declared on 9 May 1995
that there was no question of halting the programme.
(RAPID) have been formed which have both mechanised and infantry brigades. A missile
regiment armed with Privthi SSM has been formed, but it is not known how many launchers it
is equipped with nor when it will be fully operational. Army manpower strength is now
considered to be under one million. The number of tanks in service is much reduced, mainly
because several hundred have been withdrawn for upgrading, probably at the expense of
producing the Indian-designed Arjun. The Army was incorrectly shown as having 50 SA-11
SAM last year. The Navy has commissioned two more Vibhuti-cl&ss corvettes and acquired ten
more Do-228 maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The Navy has ambitious plans for the future,
including the indigenous production of nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier. The subma-
rine programme is still in the research and development phase, and the boat is not planned to be
operational until 2003-5. The aircraft carrier will also take some years to produce, and until then
the two current carriers will need extensive refits. As yet, no decision has been reached over
whether to buy the Russian carrier Gorshkhov or not. The Indian Defence Minister has said that
negotiations have been under way to buy six Russian frigates. The Air Force has formed an
additional MiG-27 FGA squadron and acquired 28 more aircraft. Ten MiG-29 aircraft (including
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two trainers) have been ordered and may be the first of a larger purchase. Refurbishment of the
MiG-21 force is considered essential, but as yet it has not been decided whether the contract
should be awarded to Russia or Israel.
During the last 12 months, Myanmar has taken delivery of 150 Chinese Type-85 APCs. There
have been unconfirmed reports of Chinese plans to construct a naval base at Hainggy i Island at the
mouth of the River Bassein south-west of the capital, and a SIGINT station on Great Coco Island
north of the Andamans. China is already involved in port improvements at Akyab, Kyaukpyu and
Mergui. It is conjectured that in return for Chinese naval rights in the Bay of Bengal, Myanmar
will receive a further package of arms, estimated to be worth $400m. Orders reportedly include
some 30 older aircraft (F-7, A-5), two Y-8 transport aircraft, six//aman-class coastal patrol boats
plus 20 helicopters, 60 armoured fighting vehicles and 50 artillery pieces (all unspecified).
The Pakistani Army has acquired 100 more Chinese Type-85 tanks, and the Navy has
commissioned two more Tariq (UK Amazonj-class frigates. Three French Agosta 90B subma-
rines are on order, the first to be built in France, the other two in Pakistan, and six more Type-
21 (Amazon-class) frigates have been ordered from the UK.
TheSri Lankan Army has acquired 15 BMP armoured fighting vehicles for training purposes,
the first of a much larger order- now postponed or cancelled - to be delivered. The Navy has lost
three patrol boats. In September 1994, the Sagarawardene was sunk by a Tamil Tiger suicide
squad, and in April 1995 two more were sunk by mines in Trincomalee harbour. The Tamil Tigers
have also shot down two Air Force transport planes, probably BAe 748 (Andover) aircraft.
Defence Spending
Expenditure by India and Pakistan in recent years accounts for about three-quarters of all
spending by the countries in this section, excluding the costs of the civil war in Afghanistan
which are not known. In 1995, India and Pakistan both increased their defence budgets by 6-7%
in real terms, and there are more substantial increases in the case of Sri Lanka and Myanmar.
India's defence budget for 1995 is R255bn ($8.1bn), a real increase of some 6% over the
enlarged 1994 out-turn of R235bn ($7.5bn). In recent years the Army has received about half of
the total defence budget (see Table 1). In 1995 its allocation is R124bn ($4bn). The Air Force
takes about 16% of the budget and in 1995 receives R41bn ($ 1.3bn). Funding for the Navy is the
lowest priority (about 12%), and in 1995 it receives Rl 5bn ($480m). This excludes certain items
in its budget, including procurement for which details are not yet available. Other funding is for
central Ministry of Defence (MoD) organisation, the Defence Ordnance Factories and pensions.
The Indian method of classifying defence expenditure follows the UK practice of including
operational spending under manpower and procurement costs, and consequently does not make use
of an Operations and Maintenance (O&M) heading. This funding may also be found under 'Other',
shown in Table 2. Funds for procurement, R&D and construction are classified as capital outlay.
154 CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ASIA
The largest part of the procurement budget is spent on aircraft and aero-engines ($740m in 1993
and$820min 1994). Capital spending on the naval fleet was $340m in 1993and$330min 1994.
MoD policy on weapons procurement generally reflects a continuing struggle between ends and
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means, exacerbated by supply problems and deteriorating terms of trade with Russia and other
former So viet states as they have increasingly demanded hard currency (in place of rupees). Some
policy shift is now becoming apparent towards long-term commitment to indigenous R&D and
production supported by foreign joint ventures rather than licensed production. Any move away
from licensed production is likely to require a sustained effort over the long term. Although Indian
experience with indigenous production has been mixed to date (generally programmes have run
up against technological and financial barriers and time-scales have consequently been compromised)
it has laid the foundation for an extensive defence industrial base.
Cost escalation in indigenous programmes has squeezed resources for buying new equipment
from foreign sources. According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA),
imports of defence equipment have declined sharply from their peak in 1988, when they amounted
to $4.3bn (at constant 1993 prices) to $2bn in 1990, $615 in 1992 and a provisional $ 10m in 1993.
Accumulating debt has been one factor in curtailing procurement from abroad. According to a
Ministry of Finance report, imported defence equipment accounted for about 9% of India's
external debt in 1993 - of which about 90% was owed to Russia in unrequited rupee credits, but
with a sizeable dollar-denominated component of almost $ lbn. Delays in development are another
factor which has held up several new production programmes. This has resulted in priority being
switched to spares provisioning and limited modernisation programmes in order to keep existing
equipment in service. While a less costly option than purchasing new weapons systems from
abroad, this policy is still relatively expensive in hard-currency terms, with over 80% of the $300-
500m annual budget reportedly sourced from abroad, and the MoD reportedly seeking to reduce
its dependence on Russia as its major supplier (some 75-80% of Indian defence equipment is of
Soviet origin and most was produced under licence in India).
In 1995, Pakistan's defence budget amounts to Rl 15bn ($3.7bn) - a real increase of some
7% over 1994. No other statistical details are released by the government. As a proportion of
CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ASIA 155
gross domestic product (GDP), defence expenditure is about three times that of India. According
to ACDA, arms imports in 1993 amounted to $430m. Sri Lanka's military expenditure is
increasing sharply as a result of the counter-insurgency operations against the Tamil Tigers. In
mid-1995, the government announced supplementary funding of R4.5bn ($90m) - almost one-
fifth of the 1994 budget - to cover additional costs of this campaign. Myanmar added K2.8bn
(about $108m at market exchange rates) of supplementary funds for the 1994 military budget,
while the defence budget for 1995 (K15.5bn or nearly $600m) has increased by 40% over 1994.
Budgetary information from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan has improved since 1994 with the publication by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) of external audits of government expenditure, including defence. However, lack of
transparency in military accounting, high inflation, and uncertainty over the purchasing power of
domestic currencies still create difficulties in estimating real expenditures. According to NATO,
these states appear to have adopted differing policies towards accepting financial responsibility
for the residual Russian armed forces on their territory. In general, defence expenditure has been
concentrated on manpower and O&M functions rather than on R&D and procurement. In
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Tajikistan, the projected cost for 1995 of UNMOT-the first UN operation in the Central Asian
republics of the former Soviet Union - is $7m.
1 Umar Farooq (UK Salisbury) with 1 x 3 Squid SHANTI BAHINI (Peace Force): e5,000. Chakma
ASW mor, 1 x 2 114mm guns. tribe, Chittagong Hills.
2 Abu Bakr (UK Leopard) with 2 x 2 1 1 4 m m guns.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 40:
MSL CRAFT: 8: | INDIA |
4 Durdarsha (Ch Huangfeng) with 4 x HY-2 SSM.
4 Durbar (Ch Hegu) PFM( with 2 x HY-2 SSM.
TORPEDO CRAFT: some 8 Ch Huchuan PFT( with 2 GDP 1993: Rs 7,863.6bn ($257.9bn):
x 533mm TT. per capita $1,200
PATROL, OFFSHORE: 1 Shaeed Ruhul Amin (UK 1994: Rs 8,478.0bn ($270.2bn):
Island) PCO (training role). per capita $1,300
PATROL, COASTAL: 5: Growth 1993: 3.5% 1994: 4.8%
2 Durjoy (Ch Hainan) with 4 x 5 ASW RL. Inflation 1993: 6.4% 1994: 10.2%
2 Meghna fishery protection. Debt 1993: $91.8bn 1994: $90.5bn
Defexp 1993: Rs 217.8bn ($7.14bn)
1 Shahjalal.
PATROL, INSHORE: 13: 1994e:Rs233.0bn($7.43bn)
Defbdgt 1994: Rs 230.0bn ($7.33bn)
8 Shahead Daulat (Ch Shanghai IT) PFI.
2 Karnaphuli, 2 Padma, 1 Bishkali PCI. 1995: Rs 255.0bn ($8.12bn)
RIVERINE: 5 Pabna(. FMA" 1994: $0.2m (IMET)
1995: $0.2m(IMET)
MCM: 5:
1996: $0.4m (IMET)
4 Shapla (UK River) MSI, 1 OH (Ch) MSI.
$1 =Rs 1993: 30.5 1994: 31.4
AMPH: 1 Shahamanat LCU; plus craft: 4 LCM, 3 LCVP.
1995: 31.4
SPTANDMISC:3: Rs = rupee
1 coastal tkr, 1 repair, 1 ocean tug.
" The cost of UNMOGIP in 1994 was $7m.
AIR F O R C E r t 6,500; 57 cbt ac, no armed hel.
Population: 934,228,000 (Muslim 11%, Sikh 2%)
FGA: 3 sqn with 17 J-6/JJ-6 (F-6/FT-6), 13 Q-5 (A-
5 Fantan). 13-17 18-22 23-32
FTR:2sqnwithl7J-7(F-7M),4MiG-21MF,2MiG-21U. Men 49,677,800 45,932,000 79,803,800
TPT: 1 sqn with 1 An-24,4 An-26,2 An-32, 1 DHC-3. Women 46,133,000 42,203,800 72,685,800
HEL: 3 sqn with 2 Bell 206L, 10 Bell 212, 7 Mi-8, 4
Mi-17, 3 UH-1N.
TRG: 20 Ch CJ-6, 8 CM-170,4* JJ-7 (FT-7), 4 MiG-
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
15UTI. A C T I V E : 1,145,000 (incl 200 women).
R E S E R V E S : Army 300,000 (first-line reserves
within 5 years of full-time service; a further 650,000
FORCES ABROAD: have commitment until the age of 50); Territorial Army
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: (volunteers) 160,000; Air Force 140,000; Navy 55,000.
ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 10 Obs plus 11 civ pol.
158 CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ASIA
8 Ghorpad (Sov Polnocny C) LSM, capacity 140 tps, HEL: 11 sqn with 74 Mi-8,50 Mi-17,10 Mi-26 (hy tpt).
6 tk (includes 2 in reserve). VIP: 1 HQ sqn with 2 Boeing 737-200, 7 BAe-748, 6
Plus craft: 7 Vasco da Gama LCU. Mi-8.
SPT AND MISC: 23: TRG: ac: 28 BAe-748 (trg/tpt), 7 Canberra (2 T54, 5
2 Deepak AO, 5 small AO, 1 Amba (Sov Ugra) sub TT18), 120 Kiran I, 56 Kiran II, 88 HPT-32, Hunter
spt, 1 div spt, 2 ocean tugs, 6 Sandhayak and 4 (20 F-56, 18 T-66), 14* Jaguar B(l), 7 MiG-29UB,
Mater AGHS, 1 Tir trg, 1 Sagardhwani AGOR. 44 TS-11 Mara; hel: 20 Chetak, 2 Mi-24, 2 Mi-35.
MSL:
NAVAL AVIATION: (5,000); 68 cbt ac, 75 armed ASM: AS-7Kerry, AS-1 IB (ATGW), AS-12, AS-30,
hel. Flying hours: some 180. Sea Eagle.
ATTACK: 2 sqn with 20SeaHarrierFRS Mk-51, 2T- AAM: AA-2 A toll, AA-7 Apex, AA-8 Aphid, AA-10
60 trg. A/amo, AA-11 Archer, R-550 Magic, Super 530D.
ASW: 6 hel sqn with 26 Chetak, 1 Ka-25, 10 Ka-28, SAM: 30 sqn: 280Divina V75SM/VK (S\-2),Pechora
32 Sea King Mk 42A/B. (SA-3), SA-3, SA-5.
MR: 3 sqn with 5 11-38, 8 Tu-142M Bear F, 20 Do-
228, 13 BN-2 Defender.
FORCES ABROAD:
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7 engr bde.
AIR FORCE: 200; no cbt ac, nor armed hel. 1 area comd (div).
TPT: ac: 1 BAe-748, ISkyvan, 1 Twin Otter, 2 Y-l 1; 3 armd recce regt.
hel: 2 AS-332 (Royal Flight), 1 Bell 206L, 3 SA- 7 indep armd bde.
316B Chetak,2 SA-330. 1 SF gp (3bn).
9 indep inf bde.
1 AD comd (3 AD gp: 8 bde).
FORCES ABROAD: Avn: 17 sqn: 7 ac, 8 hel, 1 VIP, 1 obs fit.
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: EQPT:
CROATIA (UNPROFOR 1): 896; 1 inf bn, plus 3 Obs, MBT:2,050+: 120 M-47,280 M-48A5.50T-54/-55,1,200
43 civ pol. HAITI (UNMIH): 414 plus 53 civ pol. Ch Type-59,200 Ch Type-69,200+ Ch Type-85.
LEBANON (UNIFIL): 666; 1 inf bn. APC: 850 M-113, 169 BTR-70 (UNPROFOR).
TOWED ARTY: 1,566: 85mm: 200 Ch Type-56;
105mm: 300 M-101,50 M-56 pack; 122mm: 200 Ch
PARAMILITARY: Type-60, 400 Ch Type-54; 130mm: 200 Ch Type-
POLICE FORCE: 28,000. 59-1; 155mm: 30 M-59, 60 M-114, 100 M-198;
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203mm: 26M-115.
SP ARTY: 240: 105mm: 50 M-7; 155mm: 150 M-
I PAKISTAN I 109A2; 203mm: 40 M-l 10A2.
MRL: 122mm: 45 Azar (Ch Type-83).
GDP 1993: Rs l,342bn ($47.7bn): M0R: 81mm: 500; 120mm: 225 AM-50, M-61.
per capita $2,100 SSM: 18 Hatf-X, Hatf-2 (under development).
1994: Rs l,565bn ($51.2bn): ATGW: 800: Cobra, TOW (incl 24 on M-901 SP),
per capita $2,200 Green Arrow (Ch Red Arrow).
Growth 1993: 1.9% 1994: 4.0% RL: 89mm: M-20 3.5-in.
Inflation 1993: 4.2% 1994: 12.5% RCL: 75mm: Type-52; 106mm: M-40A1.
Debt 1993: $26.1bn 1994: $27.4bn AD GUNS: 2,000+ incl: 14.5mm; 35mm: 200 GDF-
Def exp 1993: Rs 93.8bn ($3.3bn) 002; 37mm: Ch Type-55/-65; 40mm: M1,100 L/60;
Def bdgt 1994: Rs 101.9bn ($3.4bn) 57mm: Ch Type-59.
1995: Rs 115.3bn($3.7bn) SAM: 350 Stinger, Redeye, RBS-70, 500 Anza Mk-l/-2.
FMA" 1994: $2.5m (Narcs) SURV: RASIT (veh, arty), AN/TPQ-36 (arty, mor).
1995: $2.5m (Narcs) AC:
1996: $2.5m (Narcs) SURVEY: 1 Commander 840.
$1 = R s 1993: 28.1 1994: 30.6 LIAISON: 1 Cessna 421, 2 Commander 690, 80
1995: 30.9 Mashshaq, 1 F-27.
Rs = rupee OBS: 40 O-1E, 50 Mashshaq.
HEL:
"ThecostofUNMOGIPin 1994 was $7m. ATTACK: 20 AH-IF (TOW)-
TPT: 12 Bell 47G, 7 Bell 205,10 Bell 206B, 16 Mi-8, 6
Population: 129,704,000 (less than 3% Hindu) IAR/SA-315B, 23 IAR/SA-316, 35 SA-330,5 UH-1H.
13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 7,581,600 6,581,200 10,622,600
Women 6,905,600 5,849,600 9,482,800 N A V Y : 22,000 (incl Naval Air, el,200 Marines and
E2,000 Maritime Security Agency (see Paramilitary)).
B A S E : Karachi (Fleet HQ).
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: SS:9:
ACTIVE: 587,ooo. 2 Hashmat (FrAgosta) with 533mm TT (F-17 HWT),
Harpoon USGW.
R E S E R V E S : 513,000; Armye500,000: obligation
4 Hangor (Fr Daphne) with 533mm TT (L-5 HWT),
to age 45 (men) or 50 (officers); active liability for 8
Harpoon USGW.
years after service; Navy 5,000; Air Force 8,000.
3 SX-756 SSI SF Midget submarines.
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 11:
A R M Y : 520,000. DD: 3 Alamgir (US Gearing) (ASW) with 1 x 8
9 Corps HQ. ASROC; plus 2 x 3 ASTT, 2 x 2 127mm guns, 3 x
2 armd div. 2 Harpoon SSM and hel deck (1 trg).
9 corps arty bde. FF:8:
19 inf div. 6 Tariq ( U K Amazon) with 2 x 3 3 2 4 m m A S T T ; 1 x
164 CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ASIA
The two most serious developments in the region are North Korea's nuclear programme and the
rising tension in the South China Sea.
Regional Cooperation
In January 1995,Cambodia obtained observer status and candidate membership of the Association
of South-East Nations (ASEAN) when it agreed to adhere to its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
In July .Vietnam became a full member of ASEAN, following a decision first taken in July 1994.
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Sino-American Relations
Relations between China and the United States have also worsened. Trade disputes over
intellectual property rights have been settled temporarily, but Beijing has been unable to ensure
that all its citizens comply fully with the agreed terms. China was also unsuccessful in persuading
the US to grant it favourable terms for membership of the World Trade Organisation. Human-
rights issues also featured with China's arrest of Harry Wu, a former Chinese dissident with US
citizenship. Various other issues continued to aggravate Sino-American relations, including
China's continuing nuclear-weapon testing programme, uncertainty over its missile exports to
Pakistan and Chinese nuclear assistance to Iran. China's most vituperative response to US policy
came after the US Administration reversed in May 1995 its previous assurance that a visa would
not be granted to the President of Taiwan for a private visit to the United States.
The Koreas
In February 1995, North Korea demanded the withdrawal of the Polish delegation to the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission. The UN Forces Command protested, claiming that this was a
violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The other (originally communist) Czech delegation
which operated in North Korea had been expelled in 1993. More recently, North Korean troops
have openly violated the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). North Korea withdrew from the Military
EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 169
Armistice Commission (MAC) in April 1994 and persuaded the Chinese to withdraw in
September. In June 1995, the North Korean government informed the UN Command that it would
soon declare the Armistice Agreement null and void. These developments are striking when viewed
in the context of a seemingly more accommodating approach by North Korea on the nuclear issue.
Internal Conflicts
Clashes between Philippine security forces and the insurgent Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) continued throughout the second half of 1994 in the southern island of Mindanao. The
worst incident occurred in April 1995 when the MILF launched a major attack on the town of Ipil,
burning it down and killing over 40 people. In February 1995, MILF leaders claimed that they had
some 120,000 active supporters organised in six divisions but admitted that, as yet, only half were
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armed. This may be an exaggerated claim, but MILF strength is certainly more than Vice-Chief
of Staff General Alfredo Filler's claim of only 6,000. A Regional Army Commander covering
three of Mindanao's 17 provinces reported 5,000 MILF in his region alone. In Cambodia, the
Khmer Rouge continues to control some areas and to attack road and rail links.
On 5 June, a UN-sponsored meeting of East Timorese activists agreed on a common
declaration calling for respect of human rights, and to hold further meetings. This was the result
of an earlier meeting between Portugal, Indonesia and the UN in January 1995 when Indonesia
announced that it would withdraw two of its seven battalions stationed in East Timor. In May
1995,Papua New Guinea announced an amnesty for all concerned in the civil war in Bougainville.
Nuclear Developments
China has carried out three further nuclear tests since its test on 10 June 1994. The first of these
took place on 7 October 1994 and had an estimated yield of 40-150 kilotons. The second occurred
on 15 May 1995, only 48 hours after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had been
extended indefinitely. Its yield has also been estimated as being between 40 and 150 kilotons and
the explosion measured 5.8 on the Richter Scale. The third took place on 17 August, measured
5.6 on the Richter Scale and is estimated as having a yield of between 20 and 80 kilotons. Chinese
officials have said that more tests are planned before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
comes into force. While the continuation of Chinese testing was widely regretted, only Japan has
taken action, cutting grant aid to China.
France has decided to resume nuclear testing at the Muroroa site. Australia and New Zealand
have protested, freezing military cooperation and trade with France and Australia has withdrawn
its Ambassador in Paris. French commandos boarded a Greenpeace ship on 9 July 1995 which
had violated the 12-mile exclusion zone in the Pacific, ensuring maximum publicity for those
opposed to testing.
Missile Developments
It was reported in June 1995 that China had test-fired a new missile, said to be the DF-31,
reportedly propelled by solid fuel and fired from a mobile launcher. Its range has been estimated
CHINESE MILITARY REGIONS AND DISTRICTS
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as up to 8,000 km, bringing the US west coast and all of Europe within its scope. The CSS-5 (or
DF-21) 1,800km-range ballistic missile is coming into service, and up to ten are already believed
to have been operationally deployed. There are more CSS-4 (DF-5) ICBM deployed than the four
listed for some years in The Military Balance. Some sources suggest as many as ten, but The
Military Balance considers seven the correct number. In July 1995, China held a naval exercise
north of Taiwan which included firing ballistic missiles on two days. Taiwan has taken this as a
political display of Chinese strength.
On 20 February 1995,North Korea also tested a new ballistic missile. Whether this was a No-
Dong or a Taepo-Dong is not clear, but according to South Korean sources, the tested missile
could have a range of 1,500km, which suggests the latter. Although there has been one report that
North Korea has deployed six operational No-Dong mobile launchers, The Military Balance has
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Military Developments
Although Australian active Army strength has been reduced by some 4,000, it has acquired 12
more Rapier SAM launchers and four CH-47D Chinook transport helicopters. Australia is to
build 30 1,200-ton corvettes of which 18 are destined for Malaysia.
Fresh information has allowed a reassessment of the Chinese Army (PLA) order of battle. The
Navy has commissioned one more Ming-class and its first Kilo-class submarine; a second Kilo
is due to be delivered by the end of 1995. Just how many Kilos have been ordered is uncertain.
There will be no less than four, but the total could be much higher. The fourth J iangw ei-class
frigate, three more Houxin-class missile craft and two more Yukan-class and the first of a new
class, the Yuting, tank landing ships have been commissioned. Two Jiangnan-class frigates have
been retired. China has bought 15llyushin 76M transport aircraft from Uzbekistan, and China and
Pakistan are jointly developing the FC-1 combat aircraft which is planned to have a capability similar
to the US F-16. There is growing evidence that the Chinese Navy is now its paramount service.
The Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) has acquired ten MLRS and introduced 120mm
mortars and the Type-10 SAM. The Maritime SDF has commissioned its sixth Harushio-class
submarine and its second Kongo-class destroyer. Four 8,900-ton amphibious ships with a lift
capacity of 1,000 troops and tanks, and a helicopter and hovercraft capability, are to be built and
are intended to support peacekeeping operations. The first is due to be delivered in 1998. For the
second year running, orders for new aircraft and helicopters are large. The total for both 1994 and
1995 is: Army 63; Air Force 43; Navy 23. This includes four Boeing 767 -200 AWACS aircraft
for delivery in 1998 and 1999. The FS-X indigenous fighter programme continues with the first
model due to fly in 1995. The original planned buy of 130 aircraft may be scaled down because
of escalating cost.
The strength of theNorth Korean Air Force has been reassessed. It is now thought to have over
200 fewer aircraft than listed last year, but 30 more Mi-24 attack helicopters. The South Korean
Army has acquired 200 more KIFV (indigenous infantry fighting vehicles), 16 more Kooryong
130mm, 36 tube MRL and ten more AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters. The Navy has commissioned
its third Chang Bogo-class (German T-209/1200) submarine and one morePo Hang-class frigate,
and has eight more P-3C ASW aircraft. The Air Force has taken delivery of the first 12 of an order
for 120 F-16 aircraft.
The Republic of China, Taipei, Army has reduced its manpower strength by some 49,000
over the last 12 months. 20 M-60 tanks, 24 AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters and 12 OHSSDKiowa
armed scout helicopters have been acquired. The Navy has commissioned two more Cheng
Kung-class frigates and leased three/frzojc-class frigates from the US. The first Jin Chiang-class
missile craft, armed with four Hsiung Feng 1 SSM, has also been commissioned. It is planned
to order ten more of this class. Four US Aggressive-class off-shore minesweepers have been acquired.
The Air Force has retired 40 F-104 fighters and has added 38 more Ching-Kuo FGA/fighter aircraft
to its inventory; the first of this indigenously produced aircraft came into service in 1994. A squadron
172 EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA
of four E-2C Hawkeye AEW aircraft is now operational and four E-2D have been ordered.
The Thai Navy has commissioned one Naresuan-c\ass frigate, the first of two being built in
China, and has leased one USKnox-class frigate. The Navy has two more P-3AOrion maritime
aircraft, and is taking delivery of 14 A-7E Corsair maritime attack aircraft during July 1995. The
Air Force has retired its 15 A-37B COIN aircraft. It is reported that Cambodia is to take delivery
of 40 Czech T-55 tanks in the near future. Vietnam has acquired six Russian Su-27 air-defence
fighters. Fiji has taken delivery of two more Pacific Forum (Kulu-class) patrol craft built in Australia.
TheMalaysian Army has taken delivery of 69 more KIFV. The original buy of KIFV has been
deployed with the Malaysian battalion in Bosnia. The Navy has acquired a third US LST 511 and
has leased from the US a Newport-class tank landing ship, thereby doubling its amphibious
capability. The first of two UK-built frigates was launched in December 1994. The Air Force has
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taken delivery of 12 more Hawk 208 FGA aircraft. The last of 18 MiG-29 aircraft was delivered
in July 1995 and six CN 235 transport aircraft were ordered from Indonesia. In Singapore, the
first of sixFearless-class patrol ships has been launched; a second batch of six may be armed with
SSM. The second Swedish-designed (Landsort), Singaporean-built,figfi?0&-class mine-hunter has
been commissioned. There are suggestions that Singapore is to buy a number (four and six have
been mentioned) of redundant Type 206 submarines from Germany. Delivery is unlikely before
1997-98, and then only if agreement can be reached on performance guarantees and a support
package including training. The Brunei Army has recruited an extra 500 men. Indonesia has
acquired 26 British Scorpion light tanks plus eight APC variants. lAHawk 100/200 are on order
for delivery in 1996-97 and 20 MD3-160 trainers have been ordered from Malaysia.
Defence Spending
The Military Balance 1993-1994 included a loose wall-map with statistics showing the marked
rise in defence capability of several countries in the region since the 1985 benchmark. This trend
is set to continue in 1995. The IISS estimates that regional defence spending increased by about
9% in real terms between 1992 and 1994. For 1995, defence budgets denominated in national
currency show a 6% nominal rise before discounting for inflation. By comparison, the same
budgets show a 10% rise when measured in US dollars - the variation being a consequence of
currency appreciation (particularly that of the Japanese yen) against the US dollar.
The most dramatic case concerns Japan itself. Although the 1995 defence budget denomi-
nated in yen increases by less than 1 % over 1994, its dollar rises by over one-fifth at the April 1995
exchange rate (from $46bn to $56bn). By comparison, the 1995 defence spending of France and
the UK is $37bn and $34bn respectively. With the possible exception of Russia, Japan now spends
appreciably more on defence than any other country apart from the US. This first became apparent
in 1993 when Japan exceeded the defence expenditures of Germany, France and the UK, and since
then the spending gap measured in US dollars has quickly widened.
The weakness of the US dollar has been accompanied by a strengthening of several other
currencies (notably in New Zealand, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore). One of the
consequences of such currency appreciation is that the external purchasing power of defence
budgets increases. It would be incorrect, however, to see in these increasing levels of defence
expenditure an arms race threatening regional stability. In several cases, strong and sustained
economic performance has allowed for increased investment in non-offensive defence and
security. China is the possible exception, as a separate commentary suggests. The economic
growth trend in the immediate future is likely to be similar to recent years, and the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) projects strong regional economic perform-
ance over 1995-96, with only some moderation of recent very high rates.
China and the five countries with the most dynamic economies (South Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) have projected real growth rates of 6-10%, well above the
global trend for both industrialised and developing countries. The underlying upward regional
trend in defence spending is most marked for this grouping. In 1995, South Korea's defence
EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 173
budget increased from $ 13.3bn to $ 14.4bn. Malaysia's budget for 1995 is $2.4bn; final out-turn
figures for 1994 have not yet been released, but it is reported that the 1994 manpower budget was
cut by 6% to accommodate a 27% increase in the procurement budget for arms purchases.
Singapore, which increases its budget by over 20% from $3.1bn to $4.0bn, has the largest per
capita increase. Thailand's spending is to rise from $3.6bn to $4.0bn. Excluding the special
appropriations for F-16 and Mirage 2000 acquisition, Taiwan's budget declines from $9.9bn in
1994 to $9.6bn in 1995 before returning to the $9.9bn level in 1996.
Indonesia's budget increases from $2.3bn to $2.6bn with procurement rising from $530m to
$600m. The Philippines defence budget for 1995 is $ 1 bn, and is to be supplemented by funds from
the 15-year Armed Forces' Modernisation Plan. The first tranche of $1.9bn over the next five
years was approved in 1995.
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Despite the Japanese government's claim that defence spending amounts to no more than 1 % of
gross domestic product (GDP), some independent analysts believe that the defence budget excludes
items which would be classified as military expenditure under NATO definitions - and whose
inclusion would raise defence spending to around 1.5% of GDP. Categories of expenditure which may
qualify as military include pensions for the Japanese Imperial Army, dual-use Research and
Development in aerospace and other advanced technology sectors, and the Maritime Safety Agency.
SURV: RASIT (veh, arty); AN-TPQ-36 (arty, mor). TKR: 4 Boeing 707-32OC.
TPT: 7 sqn:
2with24C-130(-E: 12;-H: 12).
N A V Y : 15,000 (incl 900 Fleet Air Arm, l,950women). 1 with 5 Boeing 707 (4 fitted for air-to-air refuelling).
Maritime Comd, Support Comd, 6 Naval Area comd. 2 with 14 DHC-4 {Caribou).
B A S E S : Sydney, NSW (Maritime Comd HQ). Base 1 VIP with 5 Falcon-900.
for: 1 SS (on occasion), 3 DDG, 5 FF, 1 patrol, 1 1 with 10 HS-748 (8 for navigation trg, 2 for VIP tpt).
LST, 1 AOR, 2 LCT. TRG: 56 PC-9, 12 MB-326.
Cockburn Sound, WA. Base for: 4 SS, 3 FF, 3 SPT: 4 Dakota, 2 Nomad.
patrol, 1 survey, 1 AOR. AD: Jindalee OTH radar: 1 experimental, 3 planned.
Cairns, Qld. Base for: 5 patrol, 1 survey, 2 LCT. 3 control and reporting units (1 mobile).
Darwin, NT. Base for: 6 patrol, 1 LCT. MSL:
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MOR: 82mm: M-37; 120mm: M-43; 160mm: M-160. "Calculations of GDP using PPP give a larger GDP. An IMF
RL: Armbrust. studyestGDPat$l,413bnin 1991; other est for 1991 incl
RCL: 82mm: B-10; 107mm: B-l 1. $ 1,931 bn (World Bank) and $3,439bn (Penn World Table).
AD GUNS: 14.5mm: ZPU 1/-2/-4; 37mm: M-1939; * PPP est.
r
57mm: S-60. Def bdgt shows official figures converted at market ex-
SAM: SA-7. change rates.
° Inf div strength est 5,000. Population: 1,201,248,000 (Tibetan and other non-
Han 9%)
13-17 18-22 23-32
N A V Y : e2,ooo. Men 48,432,000 57,360,200 122,784,800
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 12: Women 45,199,200 53,777,600 114,525,800
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inf bde, 87 inf regt. Centre: Jinan MR (Shandong, Henan MD): 4 GA, 2 tk,
Avn: 7 hel regt. 13 inf, 1 arty div.
AB (manned by Air Force): 1 corps of 3 div. Spt tps, East: Nanjing MR (Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu,
incl 50 engr, 50 sigs regt. Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui MD): 3 GA, 2 tk, 11
EQPT: inf, 1 arty, 1 AD div.
MBT: some 7,500-8,000: incl 700 T-34/85, some T-
54,6,000 Type-59,200 Type-69I/-II (mod Type-59),
some Type-79, Type-80, Type-85 IIM. N A V Y : e260,000 (incl 25,000 Coastal Regional De-
LT TK: 1,200 Type-63 amph, 800 Type-62. fence Forces, 25,000 Naval Air Force, some 5,000
AIFV/APC: 4,500 incl Type-63, YW-531C, Type-85, Marines and some 40,000 conscripts).
some Type-77 (BTR-50), Type-90, WZ-523, WZ-551. SUBMARINES: 52:
STRATEGIC: 1 SSBN.
TOWED ARTY: 14,500: 100mm: Type-59 (fd/ATK);
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TAC: 50:
122mm: 6,000 Type-54, Type-60, Type-83, D-30;
130mm: 1,000 Types-59/-59-l; 152mm: Type-54, SSN: 5 Han with 533mm TT, 2 with 12 x C801 SSM.
1,400 Type-66, Type-83; 155mm: e30 WAC-21. SSG: 1 mod Romeo (Type ES5G), with 6 C-801 (Y J-
SP ARTY: 122mm: Type-54-1 (Type-531 chassis), 6, Exocet derivative) SSM; plus 533mm TT.
Type-85; 152mm: Type-83. SS: 44:
MRL: 3,800: 107mm: Types-63 towed /-81 SP (being 1 Kilo-c\ass (Type EKM 877) with 533mm.
replaced by 122mm) ;122mm: Type-81, Type-83;130mm: 10 imp Ming (Type ES5E) with 533mm TT.
Type-63, Type-70 SP, Type-82, Type-85; 140mm: BM- . About 33 Romeo (Type ES3B)f with 533mm TT
14-16; 273mm: Type-83; 284mm: Type-74 minelayer; (probably some 50 additional Romeo-c\ass non-op.)
320mm: WS-1; 425mm: Type-762 mine clearance. OTHER ROLES: 1 Golf (SLBM trials).
MOR: 82mm: Type-53 (incl SP); 120mm: Type-55 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 50:
(incl SP); 160mm: Type-56. DDG:18
SSM: M-9 (CSS-6/DF-15) (range 600km), M-ll 1 Luhu with 4 x 2 C-801 SSM, 1 x 2 100mm gun,
(CSS-7/DF-11) (range 120-150km). 2 Z-9A (Fr Dauphin) hel, plus 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x
ATGW: HJ-73 (Sagger-type), HJ-8 (TOW/Milan-type). 8 Crotale SAM.
RCL: 75mm: Type-52, Type-56; 82mm: Type-65. 2 mod Luda, 1 with 2 x 3 CSS-N-2 Hai Ying-2
RL:90mm:Type-51. (HY-2 Styx derivative) and 1 with 4 x 2 C-801
ATK GUNS: 57mm: Type-55; 76mm: Type-54; SSM, 1 x 2 130mm guns, 2 Z-9A (Fr Dauphin)
100mm: Type-73, Type-86. hel (OTHT), 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 8 Crotale SAM.
AD GUNS: 15,000: incl 23mm: (ZSU-23 type); 37mm: 15 Luda (Type-051) (ASUW) with 2 x 3 HY-2
Types-55/-65/-74, -63 twin SP; 57mm: Types-59, SSM, 2 x 2 130mm guns; plus 2 x 1 2 ASW RL.
-80 SP; 85mm: Type-56; 100mm: Type-59. FFG: 32:
SAM: HN-5, HN-5A/-C (SA-7 type); HQ-61 twin SP. 4 Jiangwei with 2 x 3 C-801 SSM, 2 x 5 ASW RL, 1
SURV: Cheetah (arty), Type-378 (veh), RASIT (veh, arty). x 2 100mm gun, 1 Z-9A (Fr Dauphin) hel.
HEL: 28 Mi-17, 20 S-70C-2, 25 Mi-8, 30 Z-9, 8 SA- About 26 Jianghu; 3 variants:
342 (with HOT), 24 S-70. About 21 Type I, with 4 x 5 ASW RL, plus 2 x 2
UAV: Chang Hong 1, ASN-104/105. HY-2 SSM, 2 x 100mm guns.
About 2 Type II, with 2 x 5 ASW RL, plus 2 x 2
HY-2, 2 x 2 100mm guns.
R E S E R V E S (undergoing major reorganisation on a
About 3 Type III, with 8 x C-801 SSM, 2 x 2
provincial basis): perhaps 900,000; E80 inf div.
100mm guns; plus 4 x 5 A S W RL.
2 Chengdu with 1 x 2 HY-2 SSM, 3 x 100mm guns.
D E P L O Y M E N T : (Group Army units only). PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: about 870:
North-East: ShenyangMR (Heilongjiang, Jilin.Liaoning MSL CRAFT: 220:
MD): 5 GA, 3 tk, 15 inf, 1 arty div. 1 Huang with 6 x C-801 SSM.
North: Beijing MR (Beijing, Tianjin Garrison, Nei 9 Houxin with 4 x C-801 SSM.
Monggol, Hebei, Shanxi MD): 6 GA, 2 tk, 20 inf, 2 Some 120 Huangfeng/Hola (Sov 0sa-/-type) with
arty, 2 AD div. 6 or 8 x C-801 SSM; some with 4 x HY-2.
West: Lanzhou MR (incl Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, About 90 Hegu/Hema( (Komar-Type) with 2 x HY-
Qinghai, Xinjiang, South Xingiang MD): 2 GA, 1 tk, 2 or 4 x C-801 SSM.
12 inf div. TORPEDO CRAFT: about 160:
South-West: Chengdu MR (incl Sichuan, Guizhou, 100 Huchuan, some 60 P-6, all < with 2 x 533mm TT.
Yunnan, Xizang MD): 2 GA, 7 inf, 1 arty div. PATROL: about 495:
South: Guangzhou MR (Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, COASTAL: about 100:
Guangxi, Hainan): 2 GA, 6 inf, 3 AB (AirForce) div. 4 Haijui with 3 x 5 ASW RL.
178 EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA
TPT: some 600, incl 18 B At Trident 1E/2E, 3011-14, 7 inf bn (incl 4 cadre).
10 11-18, 10 11-76, 50 Li-2, 300 Y-5, 25 Y-7, 25 Y-8 1 engr bn.
(sometkr), 15 Y-11,2 Y-12. EQPT:
HEL: some 190: incl 6 AS-332,4 Bell 214, 30 Mi-8, M0R:81mm: 12.
100 Z-5, 100 Z-6, 15 Z-8, 50 Z-9.
TRG: incl CJ-5/-6, HJ-5, J-2, JJ-2, JJ-4/-5/-6.
MSL: NAVY: 300.
AAM: PL-2/-2A, PL-5B Atoll-type, PL-7, PL-8. BASE: Suva.
ASM: C-601 subsonic ALCM (anti-ship, perhaps PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 9:
HY-2 SSM derivative); C-801 surface skimmer. 3 Kulu {Pacific Forum) PCI.
AD ARTY: 16 div: 16,000 35mm, 57mm, 85mm and 4 Vai (Is Dabur) PCI(.
100mm guns; 28 indep AD regts (100 SAM units 2 Levuka PCI(.
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with HQ-2/-2B, -2J (CSA-1), -61 SAM, SA-10). SPT AND MISC: 2:
1 Kiro (US Redwing-class) trg.
1 Cagidonu presidential yacht (trg).
FORCES ABROAD:
UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
MIDDLE EAST (UNTSO): 4 Obs. LIBERIA AIR WING:
(UNOMIL): 5 Obs. IRAQ/KUWAIT(UNIKOM): 15 1 AS-350 F-2, 1 SA-365N.
Obs. WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO): 20 Obs.
FORCES ABROAD:
PARAMILITARY: UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 8 Obs. EGYPT (MFO):
PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE (Ministry of 340; 1 inf bn(-). IRAQ/KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 7 Obs.
Defence): 600,000: 60 div, duties incl border and LEBANON (UNIFIL): 50; 1 inf bn. RWANDA
internal security (returned to PLA control June 1993). (UNAMIR): 1 Obs.
1 FIJI I I INDONESIA |
2inf bde(6bn).
CUSTOMS: about 72 PFI(, armed.
1 SF bn(-).
SEA COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (respon-
1 cbt spt regt (arty, AD).
sible to Department of Transport): 5 Kujang PCI, 4
EQPT: Golok PCI (SAR), plus boats.
LTTK: 100PT-76f.
RECCE: 14BRDM.
AIFV: 10 AMX-10 PAC-90. OPPOSITION:
APC: 24 AMX-10P, 60 BTR-50P. FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independ-
TOWED ARTY: 105mm: some LG-1 Mk II; 122mm: ent East Timor): FALINTIL mil wing with some 170
28 M-38. incl spt; small arms.
MRL: 140mm: 15 BM-14. FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT (OPM): perhaps
AD GUNS: 40mm, 57mm. 200-300 (100 armed).
FREE ACEH MOVEMENT (Gerakan Aceh
AIR F O R C E : 20,000; 73 cbt ac, no armed hel. Merdeka): 50 armed reported.
2 Air Operations Areas.
FGA: 4 sqn:
2 with 24 A-4 (22 -E, 2 TA-4H). JAPAN
1 with 11 F-16(7-A, 4-B).
1 with 14 I HAWK Mk 53 (FGA/trg). GDP 1993: ¥468,769bn ($4,216bn):
FTR: 1 sqn with 12 F-5 (8 -E, 4 -F). per capita $20,700
COIN: 1 sqn with 12OV-10F. 1994: ¥469,300bn ($4,592bn):
MR: 1 sqn with 3 Boeing 737-200. per capita $20,900
TKR:2KC-130B. Growth 1993: -0.2% 1994: 0.6%
TPT: 19 C-130 (-B: 9; -H: 3; -H-30: 7), 1 L100-30. Inflation 1993: 1.2% 1994: 0.7%
1 Boeing 707, 5 Cessna 401, 2 Cessna 402, 7 F-27- Publ Debt 1993: 75.1% 1994: 81.7%
400M, 1 F-28-1000, 10 NC-212, 1 Skyvan (survey), Def bdgt" 1994: ¥4,683.5bn ($45.8bn)
6 CN-235M. 1995: ¥4,723.6bn ($53.8bn)
HEL: 3 sqn: Request 1996: ¥4,860.6bn ($55.4bn)
1 with 12 S-58T. $1 = ¥ 1993: 111 1994: 102
2 with 2 Bell 204B, 10 Hughes 500, 12 NSA-330. 1995: 88
TRG: 4 sqn with 40 AS-202,2 Cessna 172,22 T-34C, ¥ = yen
6T-41D.
1
See regional commentary.
AIRFIELD DEFENCE: 4 bn Rapier.
Population: 125,213,000
13-17 18-22 23-32
FORCES ABROAD: Men 4,139,000 4,813,200 9,078, 200
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: Women 3,933,400 4,577,200 8,701, 800
BOSNIA(UNPROFOR):8Obs.CROATIA(UNCRO):
252 incl 16 Obs plus 13 ci v pol.GEORGIA(UNOMIG):
6 Obs. IRAQ/KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 6 Obs. FYROM TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
(UNPREDEP): 1 Obs plus 2 civ pol. A C T I V E : 239,500 (incl 160 Central Staffs
(reducing), 9,500 women).
182 EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA
4 trg bde (incl 1 spt); 2 trg regt. 3 Tachikaze with 1 x SM-l-MR; plus 1 x 8 ASROC,
5 engr bde. 2 x 3 ASTT, 2 x 127mm guns.
1 hel bde. 1 Amatsukaze with 1 x SM-l-MR; plus 1 x 8
5 ATK hel sqn. ASROC, 2 x 3 ASTT, 2 x 76mm guns.
EQPT: FRIGATES: 55 (incl 1 trg):
MBT: some 1,160: some 190 Type-61 (retiring), FFH: 24:
some 870 Type-74, some 100 Type-90. 2 Shirane with 3 x SH-60J ASW hel, 1 x 8
RECCE: some 80 Type-87. ASROC, 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2 x 127mm guns.
AIFV: some 40 Type-89. 2 Haruna with 3 x SH-60J hel, 1 x 8 ASROC, 2 x
APC: some 380 Type-60, some 310 Type-73, some 3 ASTT; plus 2 x 127mm guns.
200 Type-82. 8 A s a g i r i w i t h 1 SH-60J h e l , 1 x 8 A S R O C , 2 x 3
TOWED ARTY: some 500: 105mm: some 110 M-101; ASTT; plus 2 x 4 Harpoon SSM.
155mm: some 380 FH-70; 203mm: some 10 M-l 15. 12 H a t s u y u k i w i t h 1 SH-60J, 1x 8 ASROC, 2x3
SP ARTY: 310: 105mm: 20 Type-74; 155mm: 200 ASTT; plus 2 x 4 Harpoon SSM.
Type-75; 203mm: some 90 M-l 10A2. FF: 3 1 :
MRL: 130mm: some 70 Type-75 SP; 227mm: some 6 Abukuma with 1 x 8 ASROC, 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2
10 MLRS x 4 Harpoon SSM.
MOR: some 1,360, incl 81mm: 770 (some SP); 4 Takatsuki with 1 x 8 ASROC, 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 4
107mm: some 490 (some SP); 120mm: some 100. ASW RL; plus 2 x 127 mm gun.
SSM: some 50 Type-88 coastal. 3 Yamagumo with 1 x 8 ASROC, 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x
ATGW: some 220 Type-64, some 220 Type-79, some 4 ASW RL.
180 Type-87. 3 Minegumo with 1 x 8 ASROC, 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x
RL: 89mm: some 2,970. 4 ASW RL (2 trg, 1 trg support).
RCL: some 3,170: 84mm: some 2,720 Carl Gustav; 2 Yubari with 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 4 A S W RL; plus 2
106mm: some 450 (incl Type 60 SP). x 4 Harpoon SSM.
ADGUNS:90:35mm:some50twin,some40Type-87SP. 1 Ishikari with 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x 4 ASW RL; plus 2
SAM: 330 Stinger, some 60 Type 81, some 50 Type x 4 Harpoon SSM.
91, some 10 Type 93, some 200 I HAWK. 11 Chikugo with 1 x 8 ASROC, 2 x 3 ASTT.
AC: some20LR-l. 1 Katori (trg) with 2 x 3 ASTT, 1 x ASW RL.
ATTACK HEL: some 80 AH-IS. PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 6:
TPT HEL: 3 AS-332L (VIP), some 30 CH-47J, some
MSL CRAFT: 3 Ichi-Go Type PHM with 4 SSM-IB.
10 KV-107, some 180 OH-6D/J, some 130 UH-1H/J,
PATROL: 3 Jukyu-Go PCI(.
some TH-55 (trg).
MINE WARFARE: 39:
SURV: Type-92 (mor), J/MPQ-P7 (arty).
MINELAYERS: 1 Souya plus hel deck, 2 x 3 A S T T ,
also M C M spt/comd.
N A V Y (Maritime Self-Defense Force):43,700 (incl MCM:38:
el2,000 MSDF Air Arm and 3,000 women). 1 Hayase M C M cmd with hel deck, 2 x 3 A S T T ,
B A S E S : Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Ominato. plus minelaying capacity.
Fleet: Surface units org into 4 escort flotillas of 8 DD/FF 22 Hatsushima MCC.
each; 1 based at Yokosuka, 1 at Kare, 1 at Sasebo, 1 at 7 Uwajima MCC.
Maizuru. SS org into 2 flotillas based at Kure and Yokosuka. 3 Yaeyama MSO.
Remainder assigned to 10 regional/district units. 4 Nana-go MSI(.
SS: 18: 1 Fukue coastal MCM spt.
6 Harushio with 533mm TT (Jap Type-89 HWT) AMPH: 6:
EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 183
3 Miura LST, capacity 200 tps, 10 tk. (Ministry of Transport, no cbt role): 12,000.
3 Atsumi LST, capacity 130 tps, 5 tk.
PATROL VESSELS: some 328:
Plus craft: 2 Yura and 2 Ichi-Go LCM.
OFFSHORE (over 1,000 tons): 42, incl 1 Shikishima
SPTANDMISC: 19: with 2 Super Puma hel, 2 Mizuho with 2 Bell 212, 8
3 Towada AOE, 1 Sagami AOE (all with hel deck), Soya with 1 Bell 212 hel, 2 Izu, 28 Shiretoko and 1
2 sub depot/rescue, 2 Yamagumo trg, 2 trg spt, 8 Kojima (trg).
survey/experimental, 1 icebreaker. COASTAL (under 1,000 tons): 36.
INSHORE: about 250 patrol craft most(.
MSDF AIR ARM: (el2,000); 110cbtac,99 armed
MISC: about 90 service, 80 tender/trg vessels.
hel. Average annual flying hours for P-3 aircrew: 500.
AC: 5 NAMC YS-11 A, 2 Short Skyvan, 16 King Air,
7 Air Groups.
1 Cessna U-206G.
MR: 10 sqn (1 trg) with 100 P-3C.
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3 AD arty bde.
FORCES ABROAD: advisers in some 12 African 3 I HAWK bn (24 sites), 2 Nike Hercules bn (10 sites).
countries. 1 avn comd.
RESERVES: 1 Army HQ, 23 inf div.
EQPT:
PARAMILITARY: MBT: 2,050: 800 Type 88, 400 M-47, 850 M-48.
SECURITY TROOPS (Ministry of Public APC: some 2,460, incl 1,700 KIFV, 420 M-113, 140
Security): 115,000, incl border guards. M-577, 200 Fiat 6614/KM-900/-901.
WORKER/PEASANT RED GUARD: some TOWED ARTY: some 3,500:105mm: 1,700 M-101, KH-
3.8m. Org on a provincial/town/village basis. Comd 178; 155mm: M-53, M-l 14, KH-179; 203mm: M-l 15.
structure is bde - bn - coy - pi. Small arms with some SP ARTY: 1,000: 155mm: M-109A2; 175mm: M-
mor and AD guns (but many units unarmed).
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MARINES: (25,000).
FOREIGN FORCES:
US: 36,400. Army (27,500): 1 Army HQ, 1 inf div;
2 div, 1 bde.
Air Force (8,950): 1 Air Force HQ: 2 ftr wings: 90 cbt
spt units.
ac, 72 F-16, 6 A-10, 12 0A-10, 1 spec ops sqn with
EQPT:
5MH -53J, recce det with 3 U-2, 2 C-12.
MBT: 60 M-47.
APC: 60 LVTP-7.
TOWED ARTY: 105mm, 155mm. I LAOS I
SSM: Harpoon (truck-mounted).
GDP 1993: kip951bn($1.33bn):
per capita $2,000
AIR F O R C E : 53,000; 461 cbt ac, no armed hel.
1994: kip l,037bn($1.44bn):
8 cbt, 2 tpt wings. per capita $2,200
FGA: 8 sqn: Growth 1993: 6.1% 1994: 8.4%
2 with 60 F-16. Inflation 1993: 6.3% 1994: 6.7%
6 with 195 F-5A/E. Debt 1993: $2.0bn 1994: $2.0bn
FTR: 4 sqn with 130 F-4D/E. Def exp° 1993: kip 75.5bn ($105m)
COIN: 1 sqn with 23 A-37B. Def bdgt" 1994: kip 81.9bn ($114m)
FAC: 10O-2A. 1995e :kip 87.6bn($121m)
RECCE: 1 sqn with 18 RF-4C, 10 RF-5A. FMA 1994: $2.0m (Narcs)
SAR: 1 hel sqn, 15UH-6O. 1995: $2.2m (Narcs)
TPT: ac: 2 BAe 748 (VIP), 1 Boeing 737-300 (VIP), 1 1996: $2.0m (Narcs)
C-118, 10C-130H, 12CN-235Ml;hel:6UH-lH/N,6 $1 = kip 1993: 717 1994: 720
CH-47, 3 Bell-412, 3 AS-332, 3 VH-60. 1995: 725
TRG: 25* F-5B, 50 T-37, 25 T-41B, 18 Hawk Mk-67.
* Incl Public Security budget.
MSL:
ASM: AGM-65A Maverick, AGM-88 HARM. Population: 4,774,000 (Phoutheung 15%, Thai 20%
AAM: AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9Sidewinder, AIM-120 Hmong 10%)
AMR A AM. 13-17 18-22 23-32
SAM: Nike-Hercules I HAWK, Javelin, Mistral. Men 252,200 212,600 336,200
Women 248,800 210,800 335,800
FORCES ABROAD:
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
GEORGIA (UNOMIG) 6 Obs: INDIA/PAKISTAN ACTIVE: 37,000.
EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 187
Terms of service: conscription, 18 months minimum. Growth 1993: 8.3% 1994: 8.5%
Inflation 1993: 3.6% 1994: 3.7%
Debt 1993: $23.3bn 1994: $25.0bn
ARMY: 33,000. Def exp 1993e:r 6.8bn ($2.64bn)
4 Military Regions. Defbdgt 1994: r 5.37bn ($2.05bn)
5 inf div. 1995: r5.98bn ($2.41 bn)
7 indep inf regt. FMA: 1994: $0.3m (IMET)
5 arty, 9 AD arty bn. 1995: $0.5m(IMET)
3 engr (2 construction) regt. 1996: $0.6m(IMET)
65 indep inf coy. $1 = r 1993: 2.57 1994: 2.62
1 It ac liaison fit. 1995: 2.48
EQPT: r = ringgit
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2 Regional Comd: plus Fleet. HEL: 4 sqn with 33 S-61A, 20 SA-316A/B (liaison).
Area 1: Malayan Peninsula (west of 109°E). TRG: ac: 11* MB-339, 39 PC-7 (12* wpn trg); hel:
Area 2: Borneo Area (east of 109°E). 8SA-316, 6Bell47G, 4S-61.
B A S E S : Area 1: Lumut (Fleet HQ), Tanjong Gelang AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder.
(Area HQ), Kuantan, Woodlands (Singapore), trg base.
Area 2: Labuan (Area HQ), Sungei Antu (Sarawak), AIRFIELD DEFENCE: l sqn.
Sandakan (Sabah).
FF:4:
2 Kasturi ( F S - 1 5 0 0 ) with 2 x 2 A S W mor, d e c k FORCES ABROAD:
for Wasp h e l ; plus 2 x 2 M M - 3 8 Exocet S S M , 1 UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
x 100mm gun. ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 20 Obs, 20 civ pol. BOSNIA
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1 Hang Tuah (UK Mermaid) with 1 x 3 Limbo ASW (UNPROFOR): 1,547; 1 armd inf bn gp, plus 14 Obs.
mor, hel deck for Wasp; plus 1 x 2 102mm gun (trg). CROATIA (UNCRO): 12 Obs plus 24 civ pol. IRAQ/
1 Rahmat with 1 x 3 ASW mor, 1 x 114mm gun KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 7 Obs. LIBERIA (UNOMIL):
hel deck. 8 Obs. FYROM (UNPREDEP): 1 Obs. WESTERN
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 37: SAHARA (MINURSO): 14 Obs, 15 civ pol.
MSLCRAFT:8:
4 Handalan (Sw Spica) with 4 MM-38 Exocet SSM.
4 Perdana (Fr Combattante II) with 2 Exocet SSM. PARAMILITARY:
PATROL: 29: POLICE FIELD FORCE: 18,000;4bdeHQ:21 bn
OFFSHORE: 2 Musytari with 1 x 100mm gun, hel deck. (incl 2 Aboriginal, 1 cdo), 4 indep coy; Shorland armd
INSHORE: 27: cars, 140 AT-105 Saxon, SB-301 APC.
6 Jerong PFI, 3 Kedah, 4 Sabah, 14 Kris PCI. MARINE POLICE: about 2,100; 48 inshore patrol
MCM: 5: craft:
4 Mahamiru (mod It Lerici) MCO. 15 Lang Hitam (38-m) PFI.
1 diving tender (inshore). 6 Sangitan (29-m) PFI.
AMPH: 4: 27 PCI{, plus boats.
3 Sri Banggi (US LST-511) LST, capacity 200 POLICE AIR WING: ac: 4 Cessna 206, 7 PC-6;
tps, 16 tk (but usually employed as tenders to hel: 1 Bell 206L3, 2 AS-355F2.
patrol craft). AREA SECURITY UNITS (auxiliary Police Field
1 Sri Inderapura (US LST-1192) LST, capacity Force): 3,500 in 89 units.
400 troops, 10 tk. BORDER SCOUTS (in Sabah, Sarawak): 1,200.
Plus 33 craft: 5 LCM, 13 LCU, 15 LCP. PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER CORPS (RELA):
SPT AND MISC: 3: 168,000.
2 log/fuel spt, 1 survey. CUSTOMS SERVICE: 56 patrol craft: 6 Perak
(Vosper 32-m) armed PFI, about 50 craft(.
$1 = t
t = tugrik
1993: 312
1995: 431
1994: 413
1 NEW ZEALAND 1
Population: 2,497,000 (Kazakh 4%, Russian 2%, GDP 1993: $NZ 80.86bn ($43.,73bn):
Chinese 2%) per capita $15,200
13-17 75-22 23-32 1994: $NZ 84.09bn ($49 .94bn):
Men 140,800 125,000 200,200 per capita $15,500
Women 134,800 120,200 Growth 1993: 4.8% 1994: 3.0%
194,400
Inflation 1993: 1.4% 1994: 1.7%
Publ debt 1993: 50.1% 1994: 42.0%
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: Def exp 1993: $NZ 1.20bn ($651m)
Def bdgt 1994: $NZ915m($544m)
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P = peso SPTANDMISC: I I :
2 AOT (small), 1 repair ship, 3 survey/research, 3
" A 5-year supplementary procurement budget of $ 1.9bn spt, 2 water tkr.
for 1996-2000 was approved in 1995.
NAVAL AVIATION: 8 cbt ac, no armed hel.
Population: 69,209,000 (Muslim 4%, Chinese 2%) MR/SAR: ac: 8 BN-2A Defender, 1 Islander; hel: 11
13-17 18-22 23-32 Bo-105 (SAR).
Men: 3,839,800 3,406,200 5,677,600
Women: 3,704,400 3,279,000 5,529,600 MARINES: (8,500).
4 bde (10 bn).
EQPT:
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
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(breakaway from MNLF; Muslim): £6-10,000. AIFV: 225 M-l 13 with 20/30mm cannon.
MORO ISLAMIC REFORMIST GROUP APC: 650 M-l 13, 300 V-150 Commando.
(breakaway from MNLF; Muslim): 900. TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 650 M-101 (T-64); 155mm:
M-44,90 M-59,250 M-114 (T-65); 203mm: 70 M-l 15.
SP ARTY: 105mm: 100 M-l08; 155mm: 45 T-69,
110 M-109A2; 203mm: 60 M-l 10.
REPUBLIC OF CHINA MRL: 117mm: KF VI; 126mm: KFIH/IV towed and SP.
(TAIPEI) M0R: 81mm: M-29 (some SP); 107mm.
ATGW: 1,000: TOW (some SP).
RCL: 90mm: M-67; 106mm: 500 M-40AI/Type 51.
GNP 1993: $NT5,935bn($226bn): AD GUNS: 40mm: 400 (incl M-42 SP, Bofors).
per capita $10,500 SAM: 40 Nike Hercules, 100 HAWK, Tien Kung (Sky
1994: $NT 6,298bn ($240bn): Bow)-\l-2, some Chaparral.
per capita $11,100 AC: 20 O-l
Growth 1993: 6.3% 1994: 6.1%
HEL: 112 UH-1H, 42 AH-1W, 26 OH-58D, 12 KH-
Inflation 1993: 2.9% 1994: 4.1%
4, 7 CH-47, Hughes 500.
Debt 1990: $18.6bn 1994:" $0.0
MM: Mastiff III.
Def exp 1993*: $NT 317.9bn ($ 11.94bn)
1994": $NT 298.3bn ($11.27bn)
Defbdgt 1995: $NT 251.2bn ($9.55bn) DEPLOYMENT:
1996: $NT 261.2bn ($9.93bn) QUEMOY: 55,000.
$1 =$NT 1993: 26.6 1994: 26.2 MATSU: 18,000.
1995: 26.3
$NT = New Taipei dollar
N A V Y : 68,000 (incl 30,000 Marines).
"Taipei is a net creditor state. 3 Naval Districts.
'' Incl special appropriations for F-16 and Mirage 2000 acqui- BASES:Tsoying(HQ),Makung (Pescadores), Keelung.
sition: 1993 $NT 46.9bn; 1994 $NT 39.9bn. SS:4:
2 Hai Lung (Nl mod Zwaardvis) with 533mm TT.
Population: 21,178,000 (mainland Chinese 14%) 2 Hai Shih (US Guppy II) with 533mm TT (trg only).
13-17 18-22 23-32 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 38:
Men 1,015,200 931,800 1,874,400 DESTROYERS: 22:
Women 959,800 876,600 1,779,400 DDG: 7 Chien Yang (US Gearing) (Wu Chin III
conversion) with 10 x SM-1 MR SAM (boxed), plus 1
x 8 ASROC, 2 x 3 ASTT, plus 1 Hughes MD-500 hel.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: DD: 15:
ACTIVE: 376,000. 7 Fu Yang (US Gearing) (ASW); 5 with 1 Hughes
Terms of service: 2 years. MD-500 hel, 1 with 1 x 8 ASROC, all with 2 x 3
R E S E R V E S : 1,657,500: Army 1,500,000 with ASTT; plus 1 or 2 x 2 127mm guns, 3 or 5 Hsiung
some obligation to age 30; Navy 32,500; Marines Feng-I (HF-1) (Is Gabriel) SSM.
35,000; Air Force 90,000. 4 Po Yang (US Sumner)-\ with 1 or 2 x 2 127mm
guns; plus 2 x 3 ASTT; 5 or 6 HF-1 SSM, 2 with
1 Hughes MD-500 hel.
A R M Y : £240,000 (incl mil police). 4 Kun Yang (US Fletcher) with 2 or 3 x 127mm
3 Army, 1 AB Special Ops HQ. guns; 1 x 76mm gun; plus 2 x 3 ASTT with 5 HF-
lOinfdiv. 1 SSMt.
EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 193
FRIGATES: 16:
FFG: 4 Cheng Kung with 1 x SM-1 MR SAM, 2 S-70C AIR F O R C E : 68,000; 430 cbt ac, no armed hel.
hel, 2 x 3 ASTT plus 2 x 4 HF-II, 1 or 2 S-70C hel. Flying hours: 180.
FF: 12: FGA/FTR: 15 sqn:
5 Tien Shan (US Lawrence/Crosley), some with up to 6 10 with 275 F-5 (-B: 7; -E: 215; -F: 53).
40mm guns (fishing protection and transport 160 tps). 3 with 50 F-104 (models incl D/DJ, G, J and TF).
1 Tai Yuan (US Rudderow) with 2 x 3 ASTT; plus 2 with 40 Chung-Kuo (plus 10 Test).
2 x 127mm guns. RECCE: 1 sqnwith6RF-104G.
6 Chin Yang (US Knox) with 1 x 8 ASROC, 1 x AEW: 4 E-2T.
SH-2Fhel, 4 x ASTT; p\usHarpoon (fromASROC SAR: 1 sqn with 14 S-70.
launchers), 1 x 127mm gun. TPT: 8 sqn:
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PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 98: AC: 2 with 8 C-47, 1 C-118B, 1 DC-6B.
MSL CRAFT: 53: 3 with30C-119G.
2 Lung Chiang PFM with 2 x HF-1 SSM. 1 with 13C-130H(l EW).
1 Jinn Chiang PFM with 4 x HF-1 SSM. 1 VIP with 4 -727-100, 12 Beech 1900.
50 Hai Ou (mod Is Dvora){ with 2 x HF-1 SSM. HEL: 5 CH-34, 1 S-62A (VIP), 14 S-70.
PATROL, INSHORE: 45 (operated by marine police): TRG: ac: incl 59* AT-3A/B, 60 T-38A, 42 T-34C.
22 Vosper-type 32-m PFI, 7 PCI and about 16 PCI(. MSL:
MINE WARFARE: 16: ASM: AGM-65A Maverick.
MINELAYERS: nil, but Tai Yuan has capability. AAM: AIM-4DFa/con, AM-9i/PSidewinder, Shafrir,
MCM:16: Sky Sword II.
8 Yung Chou (US Adjutant) MSC.
4 (ex-US) Aggressive ocean-going minesweepers.
PARAMILITARY:
4 MSC converted from oil rig spt ships.
SECURITY GROUPS: 25,000:
AMPH:21:
National Police Administration (Ministry of Interior);
1 Kao Hsiung (US LST 511) amph comd.
Bureau of Investigation (Ministry of Justice); Military
14 Chung Hai (US LST 511) LST, capacity 16 tk,
Police (Ministry of Defence).
200 tps.
MARITIME POLICE: el,000 with about 38 armed
4 Mei Lo (US LSM-1) LSM, capacity about 4 tk.
patrol boats. Also man many of the patrol craft listed
1 Cheng Hai (US Cabildo) LSD, capacity 3 LCU
or 18LCM. under Navy.
1 Chung Cheng (US Ashland) LSD, capacity 3 CUSTOMS SERVICE (Ministry of Finance): 650;
LCU or 18LCM. 5 PCO, 2 PCC, 1 PCI, 5 PCI(; most armed.
Plus about 400 craft: 22 LCU, some 260 LCM, 120
LCVP. FOREIGN FORCES:
SPTANDMISC: 19: SINGAPORE: 4 trg camps.
3 spt tankers, 2 repair/salvage, 1 Wu Yi combat spt
with hel deck, 2 Yuen Feng and 2 Wu Kang attack tpt
with hel deck, 2 tpt, 7 ocean tugs. SINGAPORE
COASTAL DEFENCE: 1 SSM coastal def bn
with Hsiung Feng (Gabriel type). GDP 1993: S89.0bn ($55.1bn):
per capita $18,700
NAVAL AIR: 32 cbt ac; 22 armed hel. 1994: S97.9bn ($60.7bn):
per capita $19,700
MR: 1 sqn with 32 S-2 (-E: 25; -G: 7) (Air Force-
operated). Growth 1993: 9.9% 1994: 10.1%
Inflation 1993: 2.4% 1994: 3.6%
HEL: 12Hughes500MD,9S-70CASWDe/e/j<fer, 10 Debt 1990: $4.2bn 1993:" $0.0
S-70C(M)-l. Defexp 1993: S3,946m ($2.44bn)
1994: S4,679m ($2.9 lbn)
MARINES: (30,000). Def bdgt 1995: S5,627m ($4.02bn)
2 div, spt elm. FMA 1994: $0.0 lm (IMET)
EQPT: 1995: $0.02m (IMET)
AAV: LVTP-4/-5. 1996: $0.02m (IMET)
TOWED ARTY: 105mm, 155mm. $1 = S 1993: 1.62 1994: 1.53
RCL: 106mm. 1995: 1.40
194 EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA
FOREIGN FORCES:
LT TK: 154 Scorpion, 250 M-41, 106 Stingray.
NEW ZEALAND: 20: spt unit.
RECCE: 32 Shorland Mk 3.
US: 140: Navy (100); Air Force (40).
APC: 340 M-113, 150 V-150 Commando, 450 Ch
Type-85(YW-531H).
I THAILAND I TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 200 M-101/-101 mod, 12 M-
102,32 M-618A2 (local manufacture); 130mm: 15 Ch
GDP 1993:b3,088bn($122.0bn): Type-59; 155mm: 56 M-114, 62 M-198, 32 M-71.
per capita $6,200 MOR: 81mm, 107mm.
1994: b3,350bn ($132.4bn): ATGW: TOW, 300 Dragon.
per capita $6,600 RLM-72 LAW.
Growth 1993: 7.8% 1994: 8.5% RCL: 75mm: M-20; 106mm: 150 M-40.
Inflation 1993: 3.5% 1994: 5.4% AD GUNS: 20mm: 24 M-163 Vulcan, 24 M-167
Debt" 1993: $45.8bn 1994: $55.0bn Vulcan; 37mm: 122Type-74; 40mm: 80 M-l/M-42
Def exp 1993: b78.94bn ($3.12bn) SP, 28 L/70; 57mm: 24.
Def bdgt 1994: b 90.94bn ($3.62bn) SAM: Redeye, some Aspide.
1995e:b97.24bn($4.00bn) AC:
FMA 1994: $3.9m (IMET, Narcs) TPT: I Beech 99,4 C-47,10 Cessna 208,1 Short 330,
1995: $2.3m (IMET, Narcs) 1 Beech King Air.
1996: $3.1m (IMET, Narcs) LIAISON: 62 O-1A, 17 -E, 5 T-41A, 13 U-17A.
$1 = b 1993: 25.3 1994: 25.2 TRG: 16T-41D.
1995: 24.6 HEL:
b = baht ATTACK: 4 AH-1F.
TPT: 10 Bell 206, 9 Bell 212, 6 Bell 214, 70 UH-1H.
"Some reports cite a higher 1994 figure of $68bn. TRG: 36 Hughes 300C, 3 OH-13, 7 TH-55.
SURV: RASIT (veh, arty), AN-TPQ-36 (arty, mor).
Population: 60,460,000 (Chinese 14%, Muslims 4%)
13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 3,204,200 3,145,600 5,845,600 N A V Y : 66,000 (incl 1,150 Naval Air, 20,000 Ma-
Women 3,101,000 3,047,200 5,692,200 rines, Coastal Defence and Coast Guards, and 15,000
conscripts).
3 Fleets: 1st: East Thai Gulf; 2nd: West Thai Gulf;
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: 3rd: Andaman Sea.
ACTIVE: 259,000. 2 Naval Air Wings.
Terms of service: conscription, 2 years. B A S E S : Bangkok, Sattahip (Fleet HQ), Songkhla,
Phang Nga, Nakhon Phanom (HQ Mekong River Oper-
RESERVES: 200,000.
ating Unit), Trat.
FRIGATES: 10:
A R M Y : 150,000 (80,000 conscripts). FFG: 6:
4 Regional Army HQ, 2 Corps HQ. 1 Naresuan w i t h 2 x 4 Harpoon S S M , 8 c e l l Sea
1 armd div. Sparrow SAM, 1 x 127mm gun, 6 x 324mm TT,
1 cav (It armd) div (2 cav, 1 arty regt). 1 x SH-2F hel.
2 mech inf div. 2 Chao Phraya (Ch Jianghu-Ul) with 8 x C-801
7 inf div (incl Royal Guard, 5 with 1 tk bn) (1 to be SSM, 2 x 2 100mm guns; plus 2 x 5 A S W RL.
mech, 1 to be It). 2 Kraburil (Ch Jianghu-W type) with 8 x C-801
196 EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA
FTR: 5 regt with 125 MiG-21bis/PF. 4 AD arty bde: 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm,
ATTACK HEL: 25 Mi-24. 130mm; plus People's Regional Force:e 1,000 units.
MR: 4 Be-12. 6 radar bde: 100 sites.
ASW HEL: 8 Ka-25.
SURVEY: 2 An-30.
PARAMILITARY:
TPT: 3 regt: incl 12 An-2, 4 An-24, 30 An-26, 8 Tu-
LOCAL F O R C E S : some 4-5m, incl People's
134, 14 Yak-40.
Self-Defence Force (urban units), People's Militia
HEL: some 70, incl Mi-4, Mi-6, Mi-8. (rural units); these comprise: static and mobile cbt
TRG: 3 regt with 52 ac, incl L-39, MiG-21U, Yak- units, log spt and village protection pi; some arty,
18 mor and AD guns; acts as reserve.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll. BORDER DEFENCE C O R P S : e50,000.
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CARIBBEAN
Political Developments
The situation inHaiti has dominated events in the Caribbean over the last 12 months. In September
Downloaded by [Simon Fraser University] at 23:02 16 March 2015
1994, US President Bill Clinton despatched a mission - former President Jimmy Carter, General
Colin Powell, Senator Sam Nunn - to Haiti to negotiate the departure of General Raoul Cedras and
other leaders of the military junta. Although the mission was ultimately successful, the 82nd
Airborne Division was already airborne and a multinational force, predominantly from the US and
under US command, had deployed before agreement was reached. The force's main task was to
establish a secure and stable environment and to disarm the Haitian population. Seven Caribbean
Community and Common Market (CARICOM) nations formed a multinational unit which, joined
by three more states, has remained with the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). UNMIH has an
American commander. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to Haiti on 15 October 1994, and
the US handed over responsibility to UNMIH on 31 March 1995. Elections took place on 25 June
with a second round in some constituencies to take place on 13 August.
Military Developments
The Haitian Armed Forces (FADH) and Civil Police have been disbanded and their weapons
collected by the multinational force. As a short-term measure, an Interim Public Security Force
(JJPSF) has been formed but will be progressively demobilised as the new National Police Force is
recruited and trained. The IPSF, although working alongside UN Civilian Police, is seen by many as
the last remnant of the old regime as most of its 3,000 recruits are former FADH members. UNMIH
is mandated to transfer responsibility to the Haitian authorities by the end of February 1996.
CENTRAL AMERICA
Political Developments
The mandate of the UN Mission in ElSaIvador(ONUSAL)wasextendedforafurther six months
in October 1994 to 30 April 1995, when the mission ended. In Nicaragua, General Humberto
Ortega finally retired from the Army on 21 February 1995. Guatemala and Mexico are taking
steps to improve their military and political cooperation in the battle against their separate guerrilla
movements, both of which operate in their common border area. Mexico believes it can learn from
Guatemala's counter-insurgency experience, while Guatemala expects that the Guatemalan «
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) will no longer be free to operate in Mexico City.
In Mexico, the government has had to deal with a massive economic crisis and continued
problems in the Chiapas province. The financial crisis of late 1994 was caused by sharply
deteriorating balance-of-payments and fiscal deficits, probably as a result of rising internal
security costs and regional subsidies to alleviate poverty which threatened the government's ability
to meet its external debt repayments. An unprecedented rescue package was provided by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the US government which could amount
to some $50bn in loans and credit guarantees. A cease-fire arranged with the Ejercito Zapatista
de Liberation National (EZLN) has been successfully maintained despite lack of progress in
200 CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA
peace talks, and a large-scale military operation took place peacefully in February 1995 to
demonstrate that the Army could exercise full control in the area. A round of peace talks began in
April on how the Army would deploy and how the EZLN would be responsible for law and order.
Military Developments
There has been a major reorganisation of theMexican Marines. The previous organisation based
on security and police companies has been altered to one with a security battalion subordinate
to each of the 17 naval zones. The Marine paratroop brigade, which had no combat or service
support elements, has been retitled a regiment and has two battalions but no amphibious
capability. The Honduran Army is now 2,000 stronger with a total manpower of 16,000. The
reorganisation of the Nicaraguan Army into centrally controlled forces and territorial units is
nearly complete. The five regional commands control a total often infantry and one tank battalion.
The main elements are a special forces brigade with three battalions (previously there was only
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one SF battalion) and a light mechanised brigade with one tank, one mechanised infantry and one
armoured transport battalion and two artillery units (one with D-20, one with BM-21). There is
no longer a separate artillery brigade and manpower has been reduced by 3,500. There are now
an additional 40 BTR-60 APCs and the total of 64 is split between the mechanised and the
armoured transport battalion.
LATIN AMERICA
Political Developments
In January 1995, after a series of border incidents, fighting broke out betweenPeru andEcuador
in the Cenepa River valley. This has its origins in the 1941 war which resulted in Ecuador handing
over territory to Peru and has led to disputes ever since. Following the violence, both sides
reinforced the border region and mobilised reserves. President Alberto Fujimori of Peru, who
rejected Organisation of American States (OAS) and UN mediation, and President Duran Ballen
of Ecuador agreed to mediation by the four guarantors (US, Argentina, Brazil and Chile) of the
1942 Rio Protocol Treaty (which followed the 1941 war), who agreed to send 50 military officers
to form the Ecuador-Peru Military Observers Mission (MOMEP). Cease-fires were agreed to on
1 and 14 February, but have been continually violated. MOMEP's mandate to supervise the cease-
fire and monitor the withdrawal of both sides was to last for 90 days (until 10 June) and it
completed its deployment on 13 March. By the end of the 90-day period the separation and
demobilisation of troops in the border region had been achieved. In Peru, the Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path) guerrillas are still active despite government claims that they are on the brink of defeat.
A major development in the war against drugs in Colombia was the arrest on 11 June 1995
of the leader of the Cali cartel, Gilbert Orejuda, and the surrender a week later of Cali's military
leader, Henry Loaiza. Government security forces are making determined efforts to destroy the
poppy and coca crops mainly by aerial spraying. The guerrilla war waged by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continues, but in June 1995 the smaller opposition groups,
I
the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the People's Liberation Army (EPL), responded
positively to President Ernesto Samper's offer of talks. A relatively new development has been
the increasing number of attacks by the ELN and other guerrilla forces on Venezuelan military
posts. Venezuela increased its border surveillance activities in November 1994 and further
reinforced the frontier region with 5,000 more troops in March 1995 following the most serious
incident when eight Venezuelan Marines were killed. Venezuela has stressed that itsaction is not
hostile to Colombia, but any 'hot pursuit' operations might result in clashes between the two armies.
Military Developments
Conscription ended in Argentina on 1 January 1995. The number of armoured vehicles in the
Army has increased: there are now 200 TAM tanks (30 more than previously); 216 TAM infantry
fighting vehicles (50 more); and 111 MOWAGGrenadier APCs (30 more). TheBrazilian Navy
CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA 201
Force is expected to award a contract for ALX advanced trainer/light-attack aircraft prototypes
as the precursor to an order for as many as 100 aircraft. Manpower has been reduced in each of
the three services and overall by some 40,000. In Chile the Army has increased the number of its
Cardoen/MOWAG Piranha APCs by 100. The Navy has retired one Almirante Riveros-class
destroyer; a fourth Mica/W-class and four more Israeli Dabur-class (Grumete Diaz) PCC have
been brought into service. The Air Force has retired its very oldHunter FGA aircraft and is taking
delivery of lOMirage 5 (15 B A and 5 -BD) aircraft fromBelgium. The Air Force remains the only
one in South America allowed to operate US F-l 6 aircraft. However, US Department of Defense
ambitions to sell early-model F-16 aircraft and other advanced weaponry may induce a change in
US regional sales policy and encourage other states to modernise their inventories. The Air Force
has also acquired one converted Boeing 707 from Israel which will have an airborne early-warning
role. TheColombian Navy has retired its USCowrmey-class (Boyaca) frigate. ThePeruvian Air
Force has acquired eight more attack helicopters (Mi-24/-25). TheUruguayanArmy has acquired
60 Polish OT-64 SKOT APCs and 44 120mm mortars. New information has allowed a
reassessment of the Uruguayan Air Force. It has 36 combat-capable aircraft (not 24 as shown in
previous years): seven T-33A are in squadron service; 12 T-34A/B trainers are considered
combat-capable; while six AT-6 trainers have been disposed of.
Defence Spending
Under the impetus of democratisation and economic liberalisation, there have been some great
changes in the pattern and structure of military expenditure in the region over the last decade. First,
military spending is now more a function of economic strength than of military rule and civil war.
Second, priority has shifted from procurement to manpower and operations. The IISS estimates
that regional military expenditure in 1994 was $18.4bn and about 1.7% of regional gross
domestic product (GDP). By comparison, aggregate expenditure in 1985 was slightly higher at
$18.5bn (at constant 1993 prices), but represented nearly twice the proportion of GDP (3.1%).
It is worth noting that the precipitous reduction in Cuban military expenditure accounts for much
of the regional fall. Excluding Cuba, the aggregate spending level in 1994 is actually at similar
levels to the years of peak expenditure in the early and mid-1980s. The resilience of military
spending is due in part to improved economic performance resulting in higher fiscal revenues,
but is also evidence that the new set of national-security challenges confronting the region are
no less demanding in terms of military effort than of old.
Recent conflicts in the region have confirmed the high cost of modern warfare and military
intervention. According to official reports, the undeclared month-long border war in early 1995
between Ecuador and Peru cost Ecuador $250m and Peru in the region of $ 100-350m. In Mexico,
the Chiapas campaign has added at least $300m to annual military expenditure, and these extra
costs are set to persist in 1995. Military intervention through UN-sponsored operations is hardly
less expensive. The Haiti operation is said to have cost the US over $ 1 bn since October 1994. This
202 CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA
is a voluntary contribution, since these costs are not reimbursed by the UN. The projected cost
of UNMIH for 1995 ($258m) is less great, but still sizeable by comparison with Haiti's own
military expenditure in recent years. In El Salvador, the UN Security Council extended the
ONUSAL mandate in November 1994 for a final period to 30 April 1995. The operation cost some
$29min 1994.
Because of the residual influence of military hierarchies in the affairs of civil government, the
evidence on military expenditure should be treated with caution. In particular, assessment of the
real cost of the military effort is often difficult because of under-reporting. Similarly, several
governments tend, first, to classify paramilitary spending, military pensions and defence industrial
subsidies outside the defence budget without giving specific details under other budget headings
and, second, to withhold details of extra-budgetary accounts related, for example, to industrial and
commercial revenues for the military. If these revenues and expenditures were added to the official
figures, a rather different picture of regional spending would probably emerge. Two examples
illustrate the point. This year, The Military Balance has obtained information on Chile's military
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pensions and extra-budgetary military funding from industrial sources. When these are added to
the final expenditure figure, it increases by over two-thirds. In the case of Ecuador, the official
defence budget is said to be augmented by oil revenues and profits from commercial enterprises
run by the military as well as by contingency funds allocated from the executive budget. These
extra funds increase the defence budget by one-third. Unfortunately there is little systematic
information of this kind, and for want of hard evidence it can only be observed that some military
expenditures may be significantly higher than official figures indicate. Latin American inhibitions
over transparency have resulted in only six countries in 1993 responding to the annual UN
questionnaire on military expenditure.
For those countries which report military expenditure to the UN, some evidence of the
composition of the official defence spending is available. The table shows spending in the
constituent functions as a proportion of total expenditure for five countries in 1993. Despite the
statistical anomalies created by non-standardised classification of expenditure, the data provide
a clear indication of the priority attached to personnel and O&M expenditure, and the very small
proportions taken by procurement and R&D. Official 1994 data for Brazil show that this trend
continues. Personnel accounts for 72%, O&M 13%, and Procurement and R&D just 14%. It
should be added that these figures are difficult to reconcile with evidence on indigenous weapons
procurement and R&D (as opposed to imported arms and technology transfers) in the countries
concerned, and most probably exclude defence industrial subsidies and extra-budgetary funding.
In general the decline in procurement concerned foreign supply until the trend began to
reverse in 1994. Up to 1993, regional arms imports and exports declined sharply from typical
1980 levels. According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the mid-
1980s were the peak years for arms imports. In 1985, for example, arms worth some $5.7bn (at
constant 1993 prices) were imported into the region; by 1990 this figure had declined to $2.6bn;
and in 1993 arms imports were valued at $380m. A large part of the decline can be attributed to
the loss of Soviet influence and the curtailment of Soviet arms transfers. Since the latter often
involved grant, soft-loan or barter arrangements rather than hard currency, it is also probable that
the 1980s statistics overstate the prices actually paid by recipients. In two known cases -those
CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA 203
of Peru and Nicaragua -Russia is still seeking to recoup debt allegedly owed to the former Soviet
Union. Official arms exports (mostly involving Brazil, Argentina and Chile) have also declined
sharply since the 1980s. In the peak year of 1988, arms exports were worth $1.2bn; by 1993 the
value had declined to $60m.
Beginning in 1994, there has been an observable increase in arms purchases from both outside
and within the region. The momentum is being maintained in 1995. The increased activity is
primarily due to three factors. First, the Ecuador-Peru conflict, during which several Latin
American countries supplied arms mainly to Ecuador. Second, the re-emergence of Russia in the
Latin American arms market. Recent transactions have included 56 SA-18 SAM launchers for
Brazil, and supplies of weaponry and spare parts to Peru have resumed. Third, a modernisation
programme is under way in Brazil.
US aid to the region has fallen dramatically as a result of changing foreign-policy priorities
in the aftermath of the Cold War, particularly in respect of military equipment transfers. The
aggregate level of US assistance of all kinds has declined from $ 1,366m in 1992 (or 14% of all
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US bilateral aid) to $858m in 1995 (7%) and a request for $813m (8%) in 1996. Security and
military assistance has dropped from $775m in 1990 (of which $545m was security-related
economic aid and $218m equipment-related) to $268m in 1992 (of which $ 110m was equipment-
related and $84m for narcotics-related law enforcement) to $90m in 1995 (of which $53m is for
anti-drugs operations and $16m for equipment). In 1996 the budget request for regional military
assistance has grown to $ 170m, due almost entirely to a large increase for narcotics-related law-
enforcement funding ($ 150m).
This year the dollar GDP figures for several countries in the TOTAL ARMED FORCES: (ail services
Latin American region have been revised according to the
estimates of the Inter-American Development Bank, and in some
form combined Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force).
cases the dollar conversion rates are different from theaverage ACTIVE: 150.
exchange-rate values shown under the country entry. Conse- RESERVES: 75.
quently, dollar GDP figures may vary from those cited in The
Military Balance in previous years. Defence budgets and
expenditures have been converted at the dollar exchange rate ARMY: 125.
used for GDP and may also differ from figures in previous years.
NAVY: 25.
| ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA | B A S E S : St Johns.
PATROL CRAFT: 1 Swift PCI with 1 x 12.7mm, 2 x
GDP 1993: EC $1.05bn ($39Om): 7.62mm gun (plus 2 Boston Whalers, 1 boat).
per capita $4,700
1994e:EC$1.12bn($410m):
per capita $4,900 FORCES ABROAD:
Growth 1993: 3.4% 1994e:3.5% UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
Inflation 1992: 4.5% 1993: 7.0% HAITI (UNMIH):15.
Ext Debt 1992: $328m 1993: $309m
Def bdgt 1993e: EC $8.5m ($3.2m)
1994e:EC$8.8m ($3.3m) | ARGENTINA |
1995e:EC$9.Om($3.3m)
$1 =EC$ 1993: 2.70 1994: 2.70 GDP 1993: P 255.3bn ($181.9bn):
1995: 2.70 per capita $6,000
EC $ = East Caribbean dollar 1994: P 281.3bn ($200.3bn):
per capita $6,300
Population: 68,000 Growth 1993: 6.0% 1994: 4.7%
13-17 18-22 23-32 Inflation 1993: 10.6% 1994: 3.9%
Men 5,000 4,000 4,000 Debt 1993: $74.5bn 1994: $82.3bn
Women 5,000 4,000 6,000 Defexp 1993: P 4.25bn ($3.03bn)
1994: P 4.78bn ($3.09bn)
204 CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA
INSHORE: 3 Yellow Elder PFI, 1 Marlin, 6 Fenrick GDP 1993: $BZl,048m ($550m):
Sturrup (ex-USCG Cape Higgon Cl) PCI, 5 PCI(, per capita $2,400
plus some ex-fishing vessels and boats. 1994: $BZl,150m($570m):
MISC: 2:1 converted LCM (ex-USN), 1 small auxiliary. per capita $2,400
AC: 1 Cessna 404, 1 Cessna 421. Growth 1993: 3.5% 1994: 2.2%
Inflation 1993: 1.5% 1994: 2.3%
Debt 1993: $18m 1994: $21m
FORCES ABROAD: Def bdgt 1993e: $BZ20m ($ 10m)
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: 1994e:$BZ22m($llm)
HAITI (UNMIH): 36. 1995e:$BZ28m($14m)
FMA" 1994: $0.20m (FMF, IMET)
1995: $0.04m(IMET)
| BARBADOS 1996: $0.30m(IMET)
$1=$BZ 1993-95:2.00
GDP 1993: B$3.28bn ($1.73bn): $BZ = Belize dollar
per capita $5,300
1994: B$3.41bn ($1.84bn): "UKdefenceexpenditurein Belize was $55m in 1992-93, $51 m
in 1993-94 and $23m in 1994-95.
per capita $5,500
Growth 1993: 0.8% 1994: 4.0%
Population: 215,000
Inflation 1993: 1.2% 1994 0.1%
Debt 1993: $568m 1994 $620m 13-17 18-22 23-32
Defexp 1993e:B$25m($13m) Men 12,800 10,800 16,200
1994: B$26m($14m) Women 12,800 10,800 16,200
- 1995e: B$26m($ 14m)
$1 = B $ 1993-95: 2.01
B$ = Barbados dollar
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
ACTIVE: 1,050.
Population: 261,000 RESERVES: 700.
13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 11,000 12,200 25,000 ARMY: l.ooo.
Women 11,000 11,600 23,000
1 inf bn (3 inf, 1 spt, 1 trg, 3 Reserve coy).
EQPT:
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: MOR: 81mm: 6.
RCL: 84mm: 8 Carl Gustav.
ACTIVE: 610.
RESERVES: 430 MARITIME WING: 50.
PATROL CRAFT: 1 PCI(, plus some 8 armed boats and
ARMY: 500. 3 ramped lighters.
i
10 'div'; org, composition varies; comprise: NARCOTICS POLICE: some 600.
8 cav gp (5 horsed, 2 mot, 1 aslt); 1 mot inf 'regt'
with 2 bn; 22 inf bn (incl 5 inf aslt bn); 1 armd bn;
1 arty 'regt' (bn); 5 arty gp (coy); 1 AB 'regt' (bn); | BRAZIL
6 engr bn.
EQPT:
LT TK: 36 SK-105 Kuerassier. GDP 1993: R 14.1bn ($381.3bn):
RECCE: 24 EE-9 Cascavel. per capita $5,600
APC: 108: 50 M-l 13, 10 V-100 Commando, 1994: Rn.k. ($415.0bn):
24 MOWAG Roland, 24 EE-11 Urutu. per capita $6,000
TOWED ARTY: 75mm: 70 incl M-116 pack.E 10 Bofors Growth 1993: 4.1% 1994: 5.7%
M-1935; 105mm: 30 incl M-101, FH-18; Inflation 1993: 2,148% 1994: 2,669%
122mm: 36 Ch Type -54. Debt 1993: $132.7bn 1994: $134.9bn
MOR: 81mm: 50; 107mm: M-30. Def exp 1993: R 188m ($6.27bn)
208 CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA
2 Ceara (US Thomaston) LSD capacity 350 tps, 38 tk. 1 with 17C-115.
1 Duque de Caxais (US de Soto County LST), 1 (VIP) with ac: 1 VC-91, 12 VC/VU-93, 2 VC-96,
capacity 600 tps, 18 tk. 5 VC-97, 5 VU-9, 2 Boeing 737-200; hel: 3 VH-4.
1 Mattoso Maia (US Newport LST) capacity 400 tps, 7 (regional) with 7 C-115,86 C-95A/B/C, 6 EC-9 (VU-9).
500 tons veh, 3 LCVP, 1 LCPL. HEL: 6 AS-332 (armed), 8 AS-355, 4 Bell 206, 27
Plus some 49 craft: 3 LCU, 11 LCM, 35 LCVP. HB-350B.
SPT AND MISC: 26: LIAISON: 50 C-42, 3 Cessna 208, 30 U-42.
TRG COMD: ac: 38* AT-26, 97 EMB-110, 25 T-23,
1 MarajoAO, 1 Almirante G. MottakO, 1 repair ship,
98 T-25,63* T-27 (Tucano), 14* AMX-T;hel: 4 OH-
1 submarine rescue, 4 tpt, 9 survey/oceanography, 1
6A, 25OH-13.
Brasil trg, 5 ocean tugs, 3 buoy tenders (UK River).
CAL: 1 unit with 2 C-95, 1 EC-93, 4 EC-95, 1 U-93.
AAM: AIM-9B Sidewinder, R-530, Magic 2.
NAVAL AVIATION: (1,200); 33 armed hel.
ASW: 1 hel sqn with 7 SH-3A.
ATTACK: 1 with 5 Lynx HAS-21. FORCES ABROAD:
UTL: 2 sqn with 5 AS-332,12 AS-350 (armed), 9 AS- UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
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355 (armed). ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 30, incl 11 Obs plus 17 civ
TRG: 1 hel sqn with 13TH-57. pol. BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 14 Obs plus 1 civ pol.
ASM: AS-11, AS-12, Sea Skua. CROATIA (UNCRO): 19 Obs, 4 civ pol. FYROM
(UNPREDEP): 1 Obs.
MARINES: (15,000).
Fleet Force: PARAMILITARY:
1 amph div (1 comd, 3 inf bn, 1 arty gp). PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES (R): some
Reinforcement Comd: 385,600 in state mil pol org (State Militias) under
5 bn incl 1 engr, 1 SF. Army control and considered an Army Reserve.
Internal Security Force:
8+ regional gp.
EQPT:
RECCE: 6 EE-9 Mk IV Cascavel. CHILE
AAV: 12LVTP-7A1.
APC: 30 M-l 13, 5 EE-11 Urutu. GDP 1993: pCh 18,454bn($51.64bn):
TOWEDARTY:105mm:15M-101,I0L118;155mm: per capita $8,700
6M-114. 1994: P Ch21,918bn($55.31bn):
MOR: 81mm: incl 2 SP. per capita $9,200
RL: 89mm: 3.5-in M-20. Growth 1993: 6.3% 1994: 4.2%
RCL:106mm:8M-40Al. Inflation 1993: 12.1% 1994: 11.4%
AD GUNS: 40mm: 6 L/70 with BOFI. Debt 1993: $20.6bn 1994: $20.9bn
Defexp" 1993e:pCh628bn ($1.76bn)
1994e:pCh776bn($1.96bn)
AIR F O R C E : 50,000 (5,000 conscripts); 273 cbt
Def bdgt 1994: pCh 450bn ($1.14bn)
ac, 29 armed hel. 1995: pCh472bn ($1.17bn)
AD COMD: 1 gp. FMA 1994: $0.1m(IMET)
FTR: 2 sqn with 16 F-103E/D (Mirage IIIE/DBR). 1995: $0.1m(IMET)
TAC COMD: lOgp. 1996: $0.3m(IMET)
FGA: 3 sqn with 56 F-5E/-B/-F, 28 AMX. $1 =pCh 1993: 431 1994: 404
COIN: 2 sqn with 58 AT-26 (EMB-326). 1995: 404
RECCE: 2 sqn with 4 RC-95,10 RT-26,1 ILearjet 35 pCh = Chilean peso
Recce/VIP, 3 RC-130E.
UAISON/OBS: 7 sqn: 1 withac: 8T-27; 5 withac: 31 " Incl Codelco (state company) copper fund est to be 10% of
U-7; hel: 29 UH-1H (armed). earnings ($200m in 1993 and $216m in 1994) and extra-
MARITIME COMD: 4 gp. budgetary pension costs est to be $56Om in 1993 and $629m in
1994.
ASW (afloat): 1 sqn with S-2: 13; -A: 7; - E: 6.
MR/SAR:3 sqn with 11 EMB-110B, 20 EMB-111.
Population: 14,241,000
TPT COMD: 6 gp (6 sqn), plus 7 regional indep sqns:
1 with 9 C-130H, 2 KC-130H. 13-17 18-22 23-32
1 with4KC-137(tpt/tkr). Men 640,400 615,000 1,232,400
1 with 12C-91. Women 617,000 595,800 1,207,400
1 with 23 C-95A/B/C.
210 CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA
RIVERINE: 2 5 : 3 Arauca, 16 Juan Luciod, 6 Capitan tugs. GDP 1993: C l,069bn ($7.12bn):
AMPH: 8 Morrosquillo (ex-US) LCUS. per capita $6,100
SPT AND MISC: 4: 1994: C l,309bn ($7.64bn):
1 tpt, 2 research, 1 trg. per capita $6,500
Growth 1993: 6.3% 1994: 4.5%
MARINES: (8,800); 2 bde (each of 2 bn), 1 amph Inflation 1993: 9.8% 1994: 13.5%
aslt, I river ops (15 amph patrol units), 1 SF, 1 sy bn. Debt 1993: $3.9bn 1994: $3.8bn
No hy eqpt (to get EE-9 Cascavel recce, EE-11 Urutu Sybdgt" 1994: C 6.33bn ($37m)
APC). 1995: C 7.77bn ($47m)
FMA 1994: $0.10m (IMET)
NAVAL AVIATION: (100). 1995: $0.05m(IMET)
AC: 2 Commander, 2 PA-28, 2 PA-31. 1996: $0.20m (IMET)
HEL: 4 Bo-105. $1 = C 1993: 142 1994: 157
1995: 165
C = colon
AIR F O R C E : 7,300 (some 3,500 conscripts); 74
cbt ac, 75 armed hel. • No armed forces. Budgetary data are for border and maritime
AIR COMBAT COMD: policing and internal security.
FGA: 2 sqn:
1 with 13 Mirage 5. Population: 3,405,000
1 with \3Kfir(\] -C2, 2-TC2). 13-17 18-22 23-32
TAC AIR SPT COMD: Men 177,200 155,000 292,800
COIN: ac: 1 AC-47, 2 AC-47T, 3 IA-58A, 23 A-37B, Women 169,800 148,600 283,000
6 AT-27, 13 OV-10; hel: 5 Bell 212, 12 Bell 205, 2
Bell 412, 26 UH-1H, 2 UH-1B, 12 UH-60, 11 MD-
500ME, 2 MD-500D, 3 MD-530F. TOTAL SECURITY FORCES:
MIL AIR TPT COMD: 1 Boeing 707,7 C-I30B, 2 C- ACTIVE: 7,500 (Paramilitary).
130H, 1 C-l \7,2C47,2CASA2\2,2Bandeimnte, 1 F-28.
AIRTRGCOMD:ac:14T-27(r««zno),6T-34M,
CIVIL G U A R D : 4,300 (incl E400 Marines).
13 T-37, 8 T-41; hel: 2 UH-1B, 4 UH-1H.
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder, R-530. 2 Border Sy Comd (North, South).
5 border gd bn(-).
2 COIN bn.
FORCES ABROAD: 7 Civil Guard Comd (bn).
UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
EGYPT (MFO): 358. MARINES: (e400).
PATROL CRAFT, INSHORE: 7:
1 Isla del Coco (US Swift 32-m) PFI, 1 Astronauta
PARAMILITARY: Franklin Chang (US Cape Higgon) PCI, 5 PCI(; plus
NATIONAL POLICE FORCE: 87,000;ac: 2 C- about 10 boats.
47, 2 DHC-6, 9 Cessna (-152: 2; -206G: 6; -208: 1), AC: 4 Cessna 206, 1 Commander 680, 3 O-2 (surv),
I Beech C-99, 5 Turbo Thrush; hel: 12 Bell (-206L: 2 PA-23, 3 PA-28, 1 PA-31, 1 PA-34.
7; -212: 5), 21 UH-1H, 3 Hughes 500D. HEL: 2 Hughes 500E, 1 Hitler FH-1100.
CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA 213
RESERVES: el9infbn.
13-17 18-22 23-32 "The cost of UNMIH in 1994 was $5.3m and was borne by the
Men 41,600 41,800 80,400 participatingmember-states.ofwhichtheUSincurredexpenditure
Women 39,600 39,800 79,200 of$lbnfromOct 1994 to March 1995.
Population: 7,090,000
TOTAL ARMED FORCES (Combined 13-17 18-22 23-32
Guyana Defence Force): Men 389,800 348,800 558,200
ACTIVE: some 1,600. Women 383,200 345,000 564,000
R E S E R V E S : some 1,500 People's Militia (see
Paramilitary). TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
In 1994 the military government of Haiti was replaced
ARMY: 1,400 (incl 500 Reserves). by a civilian administration. The armed forces and
1 inf bn, 1 SF, 1 spt wpn, 1 engr coy. police have been disbanded and an Interim Public
Security Force (IPSF) of 3,000 formed. A National
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EQPT:
RECCE: 3 Shorland. Police Force of some 4,000 personnel is being formed.
TOWED ARTY: 130mm: 6 M-46. Equipment details shown represent the situation prior to
MOR: 81mm: 12 L16A1; 82mm: 18 M-43; 120mm: the change of administration.
18M-43. The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) has
deployed 6,106 troops and 874 civ pol to ensure
maintenance of a secure and stable environment leading
NAVY: Authorised: 30 plus 300 reserves. Actual: to free and fair elections, and to supervise the
17 plus 170 reserves. professionalisation of the armed forces and creation of
B A S E S : Georgetown, New Amsterdam. a separate national police force.
EQPT:
2 boats.
APC: 5 M-2, 6 V-150 Commando.
TOWED ARTY: 75mm: 5 M-l 16; 105mm: 4 M-101.
AIR F O R C E : 100; no cbt ac, no armed hel. MOR: 60mm: 36 M-2; 81mm: M-l.
TPT: ac: 1 BN-2A; hel: 1 Bell 206, 1 Bel 202. ATK GUNS: 37mm: 10 M-3A1; 57mm: 10 M-l.
RCL: 57mm: M-18; 106mm: M-40A1.
AD GUNS: 20mm: 6 TCM-20,4 other; 40mm: 6 M-l.
FORCES ABROAD:
UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
HAITI (UNMIH): 51. NAVY: (Coast Guard).
BASE: Port au Prince.
PATROL CRAFT: boats only.
PARAMILITARY:
GUYANA PEOPLE'S MILITIA (GPM): some 1,500.
AIR F O R C E : 5 cbt ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 5 Cessna 0-2/337.
HAITI TPT: 1 Baron, 1 DHC-6.
TRG: 3 Cessna 150, 3 Cessna 172, 5 SF-260TP, 1
Twin Bonanza.
GDP 1993: G 15.72bn ($1.69bn)
per capita $1,000
1994: G21.01bn($1.56bn):
per capita $925 HONDURAS
Growth 1993: -4.2% 1994: -10.6%
Inflation 1993: 18.9% 1994: 36.1% GDP 1993: L 22.44bn ($3.40bn):
Debt 1994: $773m 1994: $870m per capita $2,000
Defexp 1993e:G422m($33m) 1994: L 27.36bn ($3.35bn):
1994e:G453m($35m) per capita $2,100
Sy bdgt 1995E:G 893m ($47m) Growth 1993: 6.1% 1994: -1.4%
FMA" 1996: $7.4m (FMF, IMET) Inflation 1993: 10.8% 1994: 21.7%
Debt 1993: $3.9bn 1994: $4.2bn
$1 = G 1993: 12.8 1994: 13.0
Defexp 1993: L 329m ($50m)
1995: 19.0
Defbdgt 1994: L 355m ($44m)
G = gourde
1995E:L445m($49m)
CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA 219
1 Guanajuato with 2 x 102mm gun. TRG: ac: 20 CAP-10, 20 PC-7, 5 T-39 Sabreliner,
12 D-01 (US Admirable MSF), 3 with hel deck. 35* AT-33; hel: 10 MD 530F (SAR/paramilitary/trg).
PATROL, INSHORE: 44:
4 Halter XFPB (US).
4 Isla Coronada PFI. PARAMILITARY:
31 Quintana Roo (UK Azteca) PCI. RURAL IDEFENCE MILITIA (R):: 14,000.
3 Cafco (US Cape Higgon) PCI.
2 Punta (US Pom/) PCI.
PATROL, RIVER: 20(.
AMPH:
1 NICARAGUA 1
2 />flrt««>(US-511)LST. GDP 1993: Co ll.O2bn($1.89bn):
SPT AND MISC: 22: per capita $2,700
3 AOT, 1 PCI spt, 4 log spt, 6 ocean tugs, 5 survey, 1994: Co 12.22bn ($1.98bn):
1 Durango tpt, plus 2 other tpt. per capita $2,700
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OPPOSITION:
FRENTE NORTE: e 1,200 (former Contra rebels), PARAGUAY
perhaps 500 armed.
GDP 1993: Pg ll,992bn($5.72bn):
PANAMA per capita $3,800
1994: Pg 13,600bn ($6.07bn):
GDP 1993: B6.56bn ($6.56bn): per capita $3,900
per capita $5,800 Growth 1993: 4.1% 1994: 3.5%
1994: B6.99bn ($6.99bn): Inflation 1993: 18.2% 1994: 18.7%
per capita $6,100 Debt 1993: $1.6bn 1994: $1.6bn
Growth 1993: 5.4% 1994: 4.7% Def exp" 1993: Pg 154bn ($74m)
Inflation 1993: 0.5% 1994: 1.3% 1994: Pg 186bn ($83m)
Debt 1993: $6.8bn 1994: $6.9bn Def bdgt 1995: Pg239bn($107m)
Defexp 1993: B79m($79m) FMA 1994: $0.1m(IMET)
Sybdgt 1994: B86m ($86m) 1995: $0.1m(IMET)
1995: B91m ($91m) 1996: $0.2m (IMET)
$1 =B 1993-95: 1.0 $l=Pg 1993: 1,744 1994: 1,912
B = balboa 1995: 1,972
Pg = Paraguayan guarani
Population: 2,660,000
"Does not include extra-budgetary funds from military enterprises.
13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 138,000 134,800 236,600
Population: 4,940,000
Women 132,000 129,400 234,000 13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 267,200 233,200 398,400
TOTAL PUBLIC FORCES: Women 257,400 224,800 384,600
ACTIVE: n,800.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
NATIONAL POLICE FORCE: 11,000. ACTIVE: 20,300 (12,900 conscripts).
Presidential Guard bn (-). Terms of service: 12 months; Navy 2 years.
CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA 223
MOR: 81mm: incl some SP; 107mm: incl some SP; ASM: Exocet AM-39 (on SH-3 hel).
120mm: 300 Brandt, ECIA.
RCL: 106mm: M40A1. MARINES: (3,000).
AD GUNS: 23mm: 80 ZSU-23-2, 35 ZSU-23-4 SP; 1 Marine bde (5 bn, 1 recce, 1 cdo coy).
40mm:45M-l,80L60/70. EQPT:
SAM: SA-7, 120 SA-14/-16. RECCE: V-100.
AC: 1 Cessna 182, 2-U206, 1 -337, 1 Queen Air 65, APC: 15 V-200 Chaimite, 20 BMR-600.
3 U-10, 3U-17. MOR: 81mm; 120mm cl8 .
HEL: 2 Bell 47G, 2 Mi-6, 26 Mi-8, 14 Mi-17, 6 SA- RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav; 106mm: M-40A1.
315, 5 SA-316, 3 SA-318, 2 Agusta A-109. AD GUNS: twin 20mm SP.
ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 839 incl 10 Obs plus 9 civ 1 Ranger bde (6 Ranger bn).
pol. EGYPT (MFO): 64. GEORGIA (UNOMIG): 4 1 avn regt.
Obs. INDIA/PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP): 3 Obs. IRAQ/ RESERVES: e6 inf, 1 armd, 1 arty bn.
KUWAIT (UNIKOM): 6 Obs. LIBERIA (UNOMIL): EQPT:
3 Obs. RWANDA (UNAMIR): 26 Obs. TAJIKISTAN MBT: 70 AMX-30.
(UNMOT): 5 Obs. WESTERN SAHARA(MINURSO): LT TK: 75 M-18, 36 AMX-13, e50 Scorpion 90.
15 Obs plus 10 civ pol. RECCE: 10 AML-60/-90, 30 M-8.
APC: 25 AMX-VCI, 100 V-100, 30 V-150, 100
Dragoon (some with 90mm gun), 35 EE-11 Urutu,
PARAMILITARY:
TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 40 Model 56, 40 M-101;
GUARDIA DE GRANADEROS: 450. 155mm: 12M-114.
GUARDIA DE CORACEROS: 470. SP ARTY: 155mm: 5 M-109, 10 Mk F3.
COAST GUARD: the Prefecture Naval (PNN) is MRL: 160mm: 20 LAR SP.
part of the Navy. MOR: 81mm: 165; 120mm: 65 Brandt.
ATGW: AT-4, AS-11, 24 Mapats.
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i
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: AMPH: 4 Capana LST, capacity 200 tps, 12 tk.
A C T I V E : 79,000 (incl National Guard ande31,000 Plus craft: 2 LCU (river comd), 12 LCVP.
conscripts). SPT AND MISC: 3:
Terms of service: 30 months selective, varies by 1 log spt, 1 trg, 1 Punta Brava AGHS.
region for all services.
RESERVES: Army: e8,000. NAVAL AVIATION: (l,000);4cbtac,8armedhel.
ASW: 1 hel sqn (afloat) with 8 AB-212.
MR: 1 sqn with 4 C-212.
A R M Y : 34,000 (incl 27,000 conscripts). TPT: 2 C-212,1 DHC-7, 1 Rockwell Commander 680.
6 inf div. LIAISON: 1 Cessna 310,1 Cessna 402, 1 King Air 90.
1 armd bde. HEL: 2 Bell 47J.
1 cav bde.
7 inf bde (18 inf, 1 mech inf, 4 fd arty bn). MARINES: (5,000).
1 AB bde. 4infbn.
228 CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA
1 arty bn (3 fd, 1 AD bty). 707 (tkr); hel: 3 Bell 214, 4 Bell 412, 5 AS-332B, 2
1 amph veh bn. UH-1N.
1 river patrol, 1 engr, 2 para/cdo unit. PRESIDENTIAL FLT: 1 Boeing 737, 3 Falcon 20, 1
EQPT: Gulfstream II, 1 Gulfstream III, 1 Learjet 24D.
AAV: 11 LVTP-7 (to be mod to -7A1). LIAISON: 9 Cessna 182, 1 Citation I, 1 Citation II, 2
APC: 25 EE-11 Urutu, 10 Fuchs/Transportpanzer 1. Queen Air 65, 5 Queen Air 80, 5 Super King Air 200,
TOWED ARTY: 105mm: 18 Model 56. 9SA-316By4/o«e»e///.
AD GUNS: 40mm: 6 M-42 twin SP. TRG: 1 air gp: 12 EMB-312, *7 F-5 (1 CF-5D, 6 NF-
5B), 20 T-34.
AAM: R-530 Magic, AIM-9L Sidewinder, AIM-9P
COAST GUARD: (l.ooo). Sidewinder.
B A S E : La Guaira; operates under Naval Command AD GUNS: 20mm: some Panhard M-3 SP; 35mm;
and Control, but organisationally separate. 40mm: 114: Bofors L/70 towed, Breda towed.
PATROL, OFFSHORE: 3: SAM: 10 Roland.
2 Almirante Clemente (It FF type).
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Sub-Saharan Africa
On 2 June 1995, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) - which includes, in addition to the
states listed in this section of The Military Balance, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland, the
Comoros, and the North African states of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia, but not
Morocco - adopted a draft Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone treaty. Drafting of the treaty began in
1993 after the end of apartheid in South Africa. It is being submitted to the UN General Assembly
and, once approved, will be opened for signature. The draft includes a protocol (considered
stronger than the similar commitment in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)) under
which nuclear-armed states would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against African states. The
status of Diego Garcia, where US nuclear weapons are suspected of being stored, is a potential
problem.
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Only two African countries, Djibouti and the Comoros, have not signed the NPT. Angola,
Botswana, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and Sudan are non-signatories of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but only Lesotho, Mauritius and the Seychelles have
ratified it.
In general, there have been very few changes in either the order of battle or the manpower
strengths or weapons holdings of African states in the last 12 months. However, the instances listed
are significant when the overall armed strength of the country concerned is taken into account.
Central Africa
A Forum for the Promotion of Peace in Central Africa met in December 1994 in Brazzaville,
organised jointly by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO) and the Congo. An action plan was reportedly adopted for humanitarian intervention
and to establish a cooperative and security mechanism. A committee to take charge of the
reorganisation of security forces in Congo has been established.
230 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
In Chad, the government reached agreement with the Chadian National Front (FNT) on 12
October 1994 for a cease-fire and the integration of FNT members into the national army. In
Rwanda, the French Operation Turquoise force completed its withdrawal on 30 September 1994,
but it was some time later before the UN force (UNAMIR) completed its deployment. UNAMIR
now numbers just over 6,000, provided by 27 countries, including 3,662 troops and police from
12 African states. This is the largest UN force after those in Bosnia, Croatia and Haiti. The UN
has voted to cut the size of UNAMIR by about two-thirds by November 1995.
West Africa
In December 1994, the warring parties in Liberia agreed to a cease-fire starting at midnight on
28 December. There have, however, been numerous major violations of the cease-fire. The UN
Secretary-General has warned that the UN peacekeeping mission (UNOMJJL) may be withdrawn
if no agreement can be reached over the proposed joint council of state. Tanzania has withdrawn
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its troops from the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) and Uganda has also decided
to withdraw. In Niger, the government and Tuareg rebel Organisation of the Armed Resistance
(ORA) have signed an agreement providing for a cease-fire, a general amnesty, disarmament and
weapons collection, and the integration of ORA members into government service. InMali despite
earlier peace talks, the government attacked a Tuareg base in November 1994 and the rebels
responded with an attack on Timbuktu in January 1995. However, in June 1995 the Tuareg rebel
group, the Arab Islamic Front (FIAA), unilaterally declared an end to hostilities and peace talks
are expected shortly. The rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone released the
last of a number of European hostages on 20 April 1995. The government is unclear whether to
negotiate with the rebels, or to intensify the war effort in which it is supported by troops from
Guinea and Nigeria and, reportedly, a mercenary group of Gurkhas. In Nigeria, General Sani
Abacha, who took control of the country in November 1993, has continued to lead an increasingly
repressive regime. Mashood K. O. Abiola, the winner of the presidential election in June 1993,
remains in prison following his arrest in June 1994 and there seems to be little prospect of either
his release or his trial. In February 1994, the Abacha regime, suspecting that the Army was
planning a coup, made many arrests. Those arrested included General Olusegun Obasananjo, a
former president, and his deputy, retired Major General Shehu Yar Adua. It is rumoured that
Obasananjo has been secretly tried and given a long prison sentence. Abacha has said that he will
announce his programme to return the country to an elected civilian government on 1 October 1995.
Southern Africa
A peace agreement was signed in November 1994 byAngolan President Jose dos Santos and rebel
UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. After assurances from the Angolan Foreign Minister that 'this time
peace has come to stay' in February 1995, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 976
providing for a 7,000-strong force and observers to assist in the disengagement of forces, set up
a verification regime and a communications network, and start mine clearance. By the end of May,
some 2,000 troops had deployed, including logistic and communications units as well as one
infantry battalion. Nearly 350 military observers have been deployed to 50 sites in all six regions
of Angola. The United Nations peacekeeping force (ONUMOZ) withdrew fromMozambique in
January 1995. It had been planned to incorporate some 30,000 men from both the national army
and Renamo into the new Mozambique Democratic Armed Forces (FADM), but by February only
12,000 had agreed to join and President Joaquim Alberto Chissano announced that conscription
would be necessary. InSouth Africa, the armed forces have concentrated on integrating men from
Umkhontowe Sizwe (MK) (the military wing of the African National Congress), the Azanian
People's Liberation Army, the Zulu Inkatha movement and the armed forces of the Homelands into
the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), leaving its reorganisation, including the
numerous reserves, until integration is complete. Some 35,000 men have registered for service and,
by May 1995, 15,000 of these applications had been processed with 11,000 accepted.
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CENTRAL AFRICA
Atlantic
Ocean
SOUTHERN
AFRICA
1000 2000 km
I I
1000 miles
CAPE VERDE Islands fall within W E S T AFRICA;
MAURITIUS and SEYCHELLES fall within EAST A F R I C A .
232 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Military Developments
The number of MiG-23 aircraft in theEthiopian Air Force is six (not 18 as listed in The Military
Balance 1994-1995). The Kenyan Army has acquired 20 more AML-60/-90 armoured recon-
naissance vehicles. The Mauritius Navy will be taking delivery of a Chilean-built 1,650 ton
offshore patrol vessel probably in March 1996. TheTanzanian armed forces have been reduced
by 15,000 to some 35,000 in the last 12 months and are planned to reduce further to 25,000 in 1996.
The three divisional headquarters and three infantry brigades have been disbanded. Equatorial
Guinea has taken delivery of two SA-316 helicopters.
The Congolese Air Force has acquired two Mi-8 helicopters. The Air Force inventory for
Guinea has been reassessed. The Guinea-Bissau Navy has commissioned one inshore patrol
craft acquired from India. In Mali, the Air Force has acquired three AS-350 helicopters. A
Presidential Guard Brigade has been formed in Nigeria. The Army has 32 more Vickers Mark
3 tanks and six more 122mm APR-21 MRL. Sierra Leone has increased the manpower of its
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army by 7,000, virtually doubling its size; three new infantry battalions have been formed. The
Army now has one Mi-24 attack helicopter. 36 Scorpion armoured vehicles including variants
are being delivered to the Botswana Army and the Air Force has acquired two BN-2 Defender
COIN aircraft. TheMalawi Army has 2,000 fewer men than it had last year.Namibia has formed
an Air Wing which is equipped with five Cessna 337/02-A aircraft, two SA-315 and two SA-319
helicopters. There are now no conscripts in the South African National Defence Force which
is 131,000 strong and which will continue to grow before it is reduced to around 91,000 in about
three years' time. A decision to purchase four corvettes to give the Navy some reach has been
postponed. Two more battalions, one of commandos, have been formed in Zimbabwe. The
Army now has a total of 60 122mm RM-70 MRL, and has acquired 20 Eland 60 armoured
reconnaissance vehicles.
Defence Spending
The IISS estimates that regional military expenditure declined in real terms from some $8.6bn, 3%
of gross domestic product (GDP), in 1993 to about $8bn, or 2.6% of GDP, in 1994 (all at 1993
prices). The 1994 level is about one-fifth down by comparison with 1985 ($10bn and 3.6% of
GDP). Unlike in the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America,there has been little real GDP growth
over the same period (just 2.5% in 1986-94, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF))
to stimulate investment in defence and security, and GDP per capita has actually declined by 0.5%.
Three factors have determined the scale of military spending and its relative decline in recent
years. First, the large cost of civil war arising from high levels of military consumption with
concomitant economic and humanitarian costs. But spending has declined in recent years
because the incidence of civil war is less prevalent than before, although it remains a significant
cost for several countries. Second, while national-security costs in the region have declined, the
UN and its member-states have taken on a large financial burden as a result of regional
peacekeeping. In Mozambique, the cost of ONUMOZ in 1994 - its final year- amounted to about
$295m. Other costs for UN peacekeeping in 1994 were about $ 198m for UN AMIR (inclusive of
costs related to UNOMUR), some $862mfor UNOSOMII, about $36mfor UNOMIL (excluding
estimated ECOMOG costs of $ 15m which, for a 5,000-strong military force, compares favour-
ably with the UN's $36m for 70 Observers), and about $26m for UNAVEMII. UNAVEM III
seems likely to be another costly UN effort in the region. All told, the cost in 1994 of UN
peacekeeping operations and ECOMOG (about $1.4bn) added up to nearly one-fifth of regional
military expenditure. The latter has thus declined because there are fewer civil wars and because
the UN is increasing its financial contribution to regional security. A third reason concerns those
countries that have managed to disengage from civil war. The legacy of repressive regimes has
often meant unproductive and largely unaccountable military expenditure.
The impact of changing policy priorities - particularly in respect of economic development -
has led several countries to seek to reduce unproductive military spending - a frequent target for
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 233
the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programmes. These aim to reduce central government interven-
tion in the economy through a policy of liberalisation intended to promote the private sector,
improve economic competitiveness, particularly in the field of foreign trade, and thus create a more
robust regime in the balance of payments through which to reduce the burden of external debt.
Some countries, notably Kenya and Ghana, have adjusted strongly and are better placed to
increase investment in national security. Others are adjusting more slowly, including several of
the Francophone countries where government spending remains under tight constraints following
the 1994 devaluation of the Communaute francaise Africaine (CFA) franc.
From an accounting perspective, the lack of transparency in regional military expenditure
remains a problem. Few countries (in 1993 only Madagascar and Burkina Faso) report military
expenditure to the UN and only a slightly larger number (among them Ghana, Kenya and
Mauritius) allow the IMF to publish reasonably timely external audits. No recipient countries
reported to the UN Conventional Arms Register in 1993, although counterpart supplier data
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showed that Angola, Nigeria and Malawi had taken delivery of weapons systems in the qualifying
categories. About half the states in the region publish a defence budget for the coming or current
financial year, but in some cases provide information on recurrent expenditure only (manpower
and operations) and give no details of investment (equipment and construction). If the lack of
transparency is one reason to treat official figures on military spending with caution, another is
that military expenditure by opposition groups is not subject to systematic reporting for those
countries engaged in - or liable to engage in - civil war. In some cases - for example, Angola and
Somalia - the sums involved are likely to be considerable.
As a result of the incidence of civil war and weak government controls, systematic data on the
market for small arms, ammunition and explosives - the staple materiel of regional civil war -
are virtually non-existent. As there are only a small number of transactions in advanced
weaponry and technology, these are generally conspicuous. The real problem lies in identifying
the vast traffic in light weaponry and associated equipment. According to the US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACD A), arms sales to the region have declined sharply since 1987. In
that peak year recorded transfers amounted to some $6.1bn (at constant 1993 prices), reducing
to $1.7bn in 1990. In contrast, recorded transfers (excluding South Africa) to the region were
valued at $605m in 1991 and$240min 1993. It must be emphasised that these figures are unlikely
to capture much, if any, of the covert arms trade to the recent regional flashpoints, such as Angola,
Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan.
South Africa accounts for nearly half of military spending in Sub-Saharan Africa. The new
government has made more information available than its predecessor. In 1994 the defence
budget amounted to R12.1bn ($3.1bn) and was supplemented by R1.5bn ($419m) for the
amalgamation of the 'homeland' defence forces, R223m ($63m) for the integration of African
National Congress (ANC) personnel, and R385m ($108m) for the operations of the National
Peacekeeping Force - giving a total defence budget of R14.2bn ($4bn). Out-turn was some
R700m ($197m) less because of a government spending freeze. Equipment spending for 1994
amounted to R2.2bn ($619m) - 20% of the unsupplemented budget - and R&D R329bn ($93m
or 3%). The relatively low cost of indigenous procurement of advanced weaponry is illustrated
by figures released for the Cheetah-C multi-role fighter modernisation programme, which is
priced at R6.5bn ($ 1. 8bn) for 38 aircraft, and the Rooivalk attack helicopter programme - R1.2bn
($338m) for development. The attempt to sell the latter to the UK proved unsuccessful. Imported
defence equipment was valued at R833m ($235m) and exports at R519m ($ 146m). The defence
budget for 1995 is R9.8bn ($2.7bn) and the military are requesting release of a further R700m held
over from 1994 to bring the defence allocation up to R10.5bn ($3m).
234 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
1995e: 2,216
K = kwanzai ATTACK HEL: 28 Mi-25/35, 6 SA-365M (guns), 6
SA-342 (HOT).
• The cost of UNAVEM II was about $26m ir11994. TPT: 2 sqn with 8 An-26, 6 BN-2, 9 C-212,4 PC-6B,
2 L-100-20, 2 Boeing-707, 1 Gulf stream III.
Population: 10,636,000 HEL: 2 sqn with 30IAR-316,16 SA-316,16 Mi-8, 6
13-17 18-22 23-32 Mi-17, 5 SA-341.4SA-365.
Men 584,600 492,600 741,600 LIAISON: 5 An-2, 5 Do-27.
Women 586,200 497,000 758,000 TRG: 3 Cessna 172, 3 MiG-15UTI, 6* MiG-21U, 5*
Su-22, 6 Yak-11.
AD: 5 SAM bnt. 10 bty with 40 SA-2, 12 SA-3, 25
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: SA-6, 15 SA-8, 20 SA-9, 10 SA-13.
ACTIVE: e82,000. MSL:
ASM: HOT.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
ARMY: 75,000.
25 regts (armd, inf, engr, comd - str vary).
EQPT:t PARAMILITARY:
MBT: 100 T-34t, 100 T-54/-55, some T-62, T-72 INTERNAL SECURITY POLICE: 40,000.
reported.
LTTK:some 10 PT-76. OPPOSITION:
AIFV: 50+ BMP-1, some BMP-2 reported. UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola):
RECCE: some 40+ BRDM-2. e55,000.
APC: 100BTR-60/-152.
EQPT: captured T-34/-85, 70 T-55 MBT reported, misc
TOWED ARTY: 300: incl 76mm: M-1942 (ZIS-3);
APC (not in service); BM-21 122mm MRL; 75mm,
85mm: D-44; 122mm: D-30; 130mm: M-46.
76mm, 122mm, 130mm fd guns; 81mm, 82mm, 120mm
ASLTGUNS: 100mm: SU-100.
mor; 85mm RPG-7 RL; 75mm RCL; 12.7mm hy machine
MRL: 122mm: 50 BM-21; 240mm: some BM-24.
guns; 14.5mm, 20mm, ZU-23-2 23mm AA guns; Stinger,
MOR: 82mm: 250; 120mm: 40+ M-43.
SAM-7.
ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.
RCL: 500: 82mm: B-10; 107mm: B-l 1. FLEC (Front forthe Liberation of theCabindaEnclave):
AD GUNS: 200+: 14.5mm: ZPU-4; 23mm: ZU-23-2, claims 5,000, actual str e600; small arms only.
20 ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60
towed, 40 ZSU-57-2 SP. FOREIGN FORCES:
SAM: SA-7/-14. UNITED NATIONS (UNAVEM III): 1,969 tps, 341
mil obs and 212 civ pol from 33 countries.
NAVY: ei,5oo-2,ooo.
B A S E S : Luanda (HQ), Lobito, Namibe.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 10: | BENIN
MSL CRAFT: 6 Sov Osa-llt with 4 x SS-N-2 Styx SSM.
TORPEDO CRAFT: 4 Shershenj with 4 x 533mm HWT. GDP 1993: fr 569.2bn ($1.6bn):
PATROL, INSHORE 7: per capita $1,700
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 235
1994e:fr733.0bn($1.7bn):
per capita $1,700 BOTSWANA
Growth 1993: 3.6% 1994: 2.2%
Inflation 1993: 3.5% 1994: 26.0% GDP 1993: P 8.43bn ($2.8bn):
Debt 1993: $1.49bn 1994: $1.56bn per capita $5,000
Defexp 1993: fr 9.1bn ($26.0m) 1994: P9.11bn($2.9bn):
Def bdgt 1 994E: fr 10.9bn ($26.1 m) per capita $4,800
Growth 1993: -0.7% 1994: 20.0%
1995e: fr 12.1bn ($25.0m)
Inflation 1993: 14.3% 1994: 10.6%
FMA 1994: $0.1m (IMET) $ 1.5m (France)
Debt 1993: $674m 1994: $735m
1995: $0.1m(IMET)
Defexp 1993: P 415m ($ 129m)
1996: $0.2m(IMET) 1994: P615m($196m)
$1 =fr 1993: 283 1994: 555 Def bdgt 1994: P455m($145m)
1995: 484 1995e:P625m($200m)
fr = CFA franc FMA 1994: $0.4m (IMET)
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 16:06 13 October 2014
1995: $0.5m(IMET)
Population: 5,470,000 1996: $0.5m(IMET)
. 13-17 18-22 23-32 $1 = P 1993: 2.42 1994: 2.68
Men 316,400 249,600 365,600 1995: 2.72
Women 329,800 267,400 399,800 P = pula
Population: 1,483,000
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: 13-17 18-22 23-32
ACTIVE: 4,800. Men 88,800 75,200 109,400
Terms of service: conscription (selective), 18 months. Women 90,200 75,600 116,600
PARAMILITARY: PARAMILITARY:
GENDARMERIE: 2,500; 4 mobile coy. POLICE MOBILE UNIT: I,000(orginterritorial coy).
236 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
PARAMILITARY:
BURKINA FASO GENDARMERIE: 4,200.
SECURITY COMPANY (CRG): 250.
GDP 1993: fr 844bn ($2.51bn): PEOPLE'S MILITIA (R): 45,000 trained.
per capita $850
1994: fr l,003bn ($2.66bn):
Growth
Inflation
per capita $850
1993: 0.4%
1993: 0.5%
1994: 3.3%
1994: 31.2%
1 BURUNDI |
Base: Bujumbura. MSL CRAFT: 1 Bakassi (Fr P.48) PFM with 2 x 4 MM-
PATROL BOATS: 4 Huchuan (ChO26) PHT. 40 Exocet SSM.
PATROL, INSHORE: 1 L'Audacieux (Fr P.48) PFI.
RIVERINE: boats only, some 30 US Swift-3$ (not all
op), 6 SM 30/36 types.
I CAMEROON I AMPH: craft only: 2 LCM.
Def bdgt 1994e: fr 57.0bn ($103m) Boeing 707; hel: 3 Bell 206, 3 SE-3130, 1 SA-318,
1995e: fr 51.0bn ($105m) 3 SA-319, 1 AS-332, 1 SA-365.
FMA 1994: $0.1 m (IMET) $0.5m (France)
1996: $0.1m(IMET)
PARAMILITARY:
$1 =fr 1993: 283 1994: 555
GENDARMERIE: 9,000; 10 regional groups.
1995: 485
fr = CFA franc PATROL BOATS: about 10 US Swift-38 (incl in
Navy entry).
Population: 13,368,000
13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 760,600 635,000 941,000 CAPE VERDE
Women 759,000 638,000 958,600
GDP 1993: CV E 3O.3bn ($380m):
per capita $1,800
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: 1994: CVE32.1bn($392m):
ACTIVE: 23,600 (incl Gendarmerie). per capita $1,800
Growth 1993: 3.9% 1994: 3.2%
Inflation 1993: 10.6% 1994: 5.6%
A R M Y : 13,000. Debt 1993: $158m 1994: $178m
8 Military Regions each 1 inf bn under comd. Def exp 1993: CV E252m($3.1m)
Presidential Guard: 1 guard, 1 armd recce bn, 3 inf coy. Def bdgt 1994: CV E 288m ($3.5m)
1 AB/cdo bn. 1 arty bn (5 bty). 1995: CVE301m($3.8m)
5 inf bn (1 trg). 1 AA bn (6 bty). FMA 1993: $0.2m (IMET)
1 engr bn. 1995: $0.1m(IMET)
EQPT: 1996: $0.1 m (IMET)
RECCE: 8 M-8, Ferret, 8 V-150 Commando $1 = C V E 1993: 80.4 1994: 81.9
(20mm gun), 5 VBL. 1995: 80.4
AIFV: 14 V-150 Commando (90mm gun). CV E = Cape Verde escudo
APC: 21 V-150 Commando, 12 M-3 half-track.
TOWED ARTY: 34: 75mm: 6 M-l 16 pack; Population: 417,000i
105mm: 16M-101; 130mm: 12Type-59. 13-17 18-22 23-32
MOR: 81mm (some SP); 120mm: 16 Brandt. Men 24,600 20,000 35,800
ATGW: Milan. Women 25,200 21,600 39,800
RL: 89mm: LRAC.
RCL: 57mm: 13 Ch Type-52; 106mm: 40 M-40A2.
AD GUNS: 14.5mm: 18 Ch Type-58; 35mm: 18 TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
GDF-002; 37mm: 18 Ch Type-63. ACTIVE: ei,loo.
Terms of service: conscription (selective).
NAVY: ei,300.
B A S E S : Douala (HQ), Limbe, Kribi. ARMY: l.ooo.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 2: 2bn.
238 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
GENDARMERIE: 2,300;
3 Regional legions, 8 'bde'.
| CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
FOREIGN FORCES:
GDP 1993: fr 368.4bn ($1.14bn): FRANCE: 1,300; 1 inf bn gp, 1 armd cav sqn, 1
per capita $1,100 arty bty; 5 Jaguar, 2 C-160, 4 SA-330.
1994: fr497.3bn($I.21bn):
per capita $1,100
Growth 1993: -3.0% 1994: 2.5%
Inflation 1993: -2.1% 1994:35.0% CHAD
Debt 1993: $904m 1994: $973m
Def exp 1993e: fr 8.7bn ($27m) GDP 1993: fr339bn ($1.09bn):
Def bdgt 1994e:fr lO.Obn ($24m) per capita $750
I995e:fr 10.3bn($21m) 1994e:fr510bn($1.18bn):
FMA 1994: $0.2m (IMET) $2.5m (France) per capita $770
1995: $0.2m(IMET) Growth 1993: -3.7% 1994: 4.7%
1996: $0.1m(IMET) Inflation 1993: 2.1% 1994: 43.3%
$1 =fr 1993: 283 1994: 555 Debt 1993: $757m 1994: $843m
1995: 485 Def exp 1993: fr 9.9bn ($32m)
fr = CFA franc Def bdgt 1994e:fr 13.4bn($31m)
1995e:frl2.7bn($26m)
Population: 3,403,000 FMA 1994: $0.2m (IMET) $ 10m (France)
13-17 18-22 23-32 1995: $0.2m(IMET)
Men 175,800 167,200 252,600 1996: $0.1m(IMET)
Women 180,800 167,200 248,000 $1 =fr 1993: 283 1994: 555
1995: 485
fr = CFA franc
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
ACTIVE: 4,950 (incl Gendarmerie). Population: 6,448,000
Terms of service: conscription (selective), 2 years; 13-17 18-22 23-32
reserve obligation thereafter, term n.k. Men: 333,000 282,200 454,600
Women: 332,800 284,400 463,800
A R M Y : 2,500.
1 Republican Guard regt (2 bn). TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
1 territorial defence regt (bn). ACTIVE: £30,350 (incl Republican Guard).
1 combined arms regt (1 mech, 1 inf bn). Terms of service: conscription authorised.
1 spt/HQ regt.
1 Presidential Guard bn.
EQPT:f ARMY: e25,000 (being re-organised).
MBT:4T-55. 7 Military Regions.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 239
4, hel: 2SA-316.
LIAISON: 2 PC-6B, 5 Reims-Cessna FTB 337. 1 engr bn.
1 AB/cdo bn.
EQPT:t
FORCES A B R O A D : MBT: 25 T-54/-55, 15 Ch Type-59 (some T-34 in
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: store).
RWANDA (UNAMIR): 2 plus 5 civ pol. LT TK: 10 Ch Type-62, 3 PT-76.
RECCE: 25 BRDM-1/-2.
APC: M-3, 50 BTR (30 -60, 20 -152).
PARAMILITARY: TOWED ARTY: 76mm: M-1942; 100mm: 10 M-1944;
REPUBLICAN GUARD: 5,000. 122mm: 10 D-30; 130mm: 5 M-46; 152mm: some D-20.
GENDARMERIE: 4,500. MRL: 122mm: 8 BM-21; 140mm: BM-14-16.
MOR: 82mm; 120mm: 10 M-43.
RCL: 57mm: M-18.
OPPOSITION: ATK GUNS: 57mm: 5 M-1943.
WESTERN ARMED FORCES: str n.k. AD GUNS: 14.5mm: ZPU-2/-4; 23mm: ZSU-23-4
MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT AND SP; 37mm: 28 M-1939;57mm: S-60; 100mm: KS-19.
DEMOCRACY: str n.k.
NAVY:t B800.
FOREIGN FORCES: B A S E : Pointe Noire.
FRANCE: 800; 2 inf coy, AD arty units; 2 C-160 ac. PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 6:
PATROL, INSHORE: 6:
3 Marien N'gouabi PFI (Sp Barcelo 33-m)t
1 CONGO | 3 Sov Zhuk PFI(.
RIVERINE: boats only.
GDP 1993: fr 676bn ($2.86bn):
per capita $2,800 AIR F O R C E : t 1,200; 22 cbt ac, no armed hel.
1994: fr 926bn ($2.87bn):
FGA: 10MiG-17, 12 MiG-2I.
per capita $2,800
TPT: 5 An-24, 1 An-26, 1 Boeing 727, 1 N-2501.
Growth 1993: -1.5% 1994: -2.4%
Inflation 1993: 1.6% 1994: 40.3% TRG:4L-39, 1 MiG-15UTI.
Debt 1993: $5.01bn 1994: $5.29bn HEL: 2 SA-316, 2 SA-318, 1 SA-365, 2 Mi-8.
Defexp 1993e:fr 13.9bn ($59m)
4
1994e:fr 15.6bn($48m)
FORCES ABROAD:
Def bdgt 1995e:fr24.5bn($50m)
FMA 1993: $2 lm (France) UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
1994: $0.1m(IMET)$ 1.8m (France) ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 8 Obs. RWANDA
1995: $0.2m(IMET) $2.lm (France) (UNAMIR): 8 Obs.
1996: $0.2m(IMET)
$1 =fr 1993: 283 1994: 555
1995: 485 PARAMILITARY: 5,000:
fr = CFA franc GENDARMERIE: (2,000); 20 coy.
240 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
PEOPLE'S MILITIA: (3,000): being absorbed into PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 4:
national army. MSL CRAFT: 2 L' Ardent (Ft Auroux 40-m) with 4 x
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD: (forming). SS-12 SSM.
PATROL: 2 Le Vigilant (Fr SFCN 47-m) PCI.
AMPH: 1 L'Elephant (Fr Batral) LSM, capacity 140
I COTE D'lVOIRE | tps, 7 tk, hel deck, plus some 8 craft.
GDP 1993: fr 3,200bn ($8.84bn): AIR F O R C E : 700; 4 cbt ac, no armed hel.
per capita $1,600 FGA: 1 sqn with 4 Alpha Jet.
1994: fr4,419bn($9.19bn): TPT: 1 hel sqn with 1 SA-318, 1 SA-319, 1 SA-330,
per capita $1,600 4 SA-365C.
Growth 1993: -1.0% 1994: 2.0% PRESIDENTIAL FLT: ac: 1 F-28, 1 Gulfstream IV, 3
Inflation 1993: 2.9% 1994: 35.4% Fokker 100; hel: 1 SA-330.
Debt 1993: $19.2bn 1994: $20.2bn
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 16:06 13 October 2014
Def exp 1993e: EB 180m ($36m) Def exp 1993e:EB 755m ($119m)
Def bdgt 1994e: EB 234m ($39m) 1994: EB 700m ($ 109m)
1995e: EB 232m ($40m) Defbdgt 1995e:EB 115m($19m)
FMA 1994: $0.1m(IMET) FMA 1994: $0.3m (FMF.IMET)
1995: $0.2m(IMET) 1995: $0.3m(IMET)
1996: $0.3m(IMET) 1996: $0.3m(IMET)
$ = EB 1993:5.0 1994:6.0 $1 = E B 1993: 5.0 1994: 6.0
1995: 5.8 1995: 5.8
EB = Ethiopian birr EB = birr
Population: E3,574,000 (Tigray/Christian 50%, Population: 57,091,000 (Oromo 40%, Amhara, Tigray
Tigre, Kunama, Afar mainly Muslim 44%) 32%)
13-17 18-22 23-32 13-17 18-22 23-32
Men 209,800 175,800 267,800 Men 3,165,200 2,633,400 3,979,400
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 16:06 13 October 2014
Eritrea declared itself independent from Ethiopia on 27 Following the declaration of independence by Eritrea
April 1993. Demob of some Eritrean forces began in late in April 1993, est strength of Ethiopian armed forces
1993. Est strength of these forces is currently about is some 120,000. Most are former members of the
55,000 to be reduced to 35,000. A conscription period of Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) with maybe
18 months is authorised to incl 6 months mil trg. No info 10-15,000 from the Oromo Liberation Front. No
on div of mil assets between Ethiopia and Eritrea is info on div of mil assets between Ethiopia and
available. Eritrea holds some air and naval assets, but Eritrea is available, although close cooperation is
holdings of army assets are unknown. Close cooperation likely between the two countries. All ground and air
with Ethiopia is likely to continue to the possible extent force assets are listed under Ethiopia and naval
of sharing mil assets. Numbers given should be treated assets under Eritrea. Reports indicate that large
with caution. quantities of eqpt are in preservation. Est numbers
in service must be treated with caution.
NAVYlstrn.k.
B A S E S : Massawa, Assab, Dahlak. ARMYrt
FF: 1 Zerai Deres (Sov Petya-U) with 2 x ASW RL, MBT: e350 T-54/-55, T-62.
RECCE/AIFV/APC: e200, incl BRDM, BMP, BTR-60/
10 x 406mm TTf.
-152.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 13:
TOWED ARTY: 76mm: ZIS-3;85mm: D-44; 122mm:
MSL CRAFT: 1 Sov Osa with 2 x SS-N-2 Styx SSMf.
D-3O/M-3O; 130mm: M-46.
TORPEDO CRAFT: 1 Mot PFTt with 4 x 533mm TT.
MRL:BM-21.
PATROL, INSHORE: 5 PFI: 2 US Swiftships 32-m, 2
M0R:81mm: M-l/M-29; 82mm: M-1937; 120mm:
Sov Zhuk(, 1 Super Dvora PCF(.
M-1938.
MCM: 2:
ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.
1 Natya MSO, 1 Sonya MSC.
RCL: 82mm: B-10; 107mm: B-l 1.
AMPH: 2 Sov Polnocny LSM, capacity 100 tps, 6 tk.
AD GUNS: 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-
Plus craft: 3 LCT (1 Fr EDIC and 2 Chamo (Ministry 1939; 57mm: S-60.
of Transport)), 4 LCM. SAM: 20 SA-2, 30 SA-3, 300 SA-7, SA-9.
SPTANDMISC: 1 AOT.
AIR F O R C E l f 22 cbt ac, 18 armed hel.
Most of the Air Force is grounded. Air Force activity is
| ETHIOPIA
believed to be limited to reorganisation, some ground-
crew training and maintenance. Priority has been given
GDP 1993: EB 26.1bn($3.50bn): to helicopter and transport aircraft operations. Types and
per capita $410 numbers of remaining ac are assessed as follows:
1994: EB 27.4bn ($4.09bn): FGA: 16 MiG-21MF, 6 MiG-23BN.
per capita $420 TPT:2C-130B,4An-12,2DH-6,1 Yak-40(VIP),2Y-12.
Growth 1993: 13.7% 1994: 1.6% TRG: 14 L-39.
Inflation 1993: 3.5% 1994: 6.3% ATTACK HEL: 18Mi-24.
Debt 1993: $4.73bn 1994: $4.98bn TPT HEL: 21 Mi-8, 2 UH-1, 2 Mi-14.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 243
i
Population: 1,071,000
NAVY: E500
13-17 18-22 23-32
B A S E : Port Gentil (HQ). Men 56,600I 47,000 73,000
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 3: Women 55,800I 46,200 74,600
MSL CRAFT: 1 General Nazaire Boulingu PFM (Fr
42-m) with4SS-12SSM.
PATROL, COASTAL: 2 General Ba'Oumar (Fr P.400 TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
55-m). ACTIVE: 800.
AMPH: 1 President Omar Bongo (Fr Batrat) LSM,
244 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
GAMBIAN NATIONAL ARMY (GNA): 800. BASES: Sekondi (HQ, West); Tema (HQ, East).
Presidential Guard (reported). PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 4:
2 inf bn, engr sqn. PATROL, COASTAL: lAchimota (GeLiirssen 57-m) PFC.
MARINE UNIT: about 70. PATROL, INSHORE: 2 Dzata (Ge Lurssen 45-m) PCI.
BASE: Banjul.
PATROL, INSHORE: 4:
AIR F O R C E : 1,000; 18 cbt ac, no armed hel.
2 Gonjur (Ch Shanghai-U) PFI, 2 PFI(, boats.
COIN: 1 sqn with 4 MB-326K|\ 2 MB-339.
TPT:5Fokker(4F-27,1 F-28(VIP)); 1 C-2\2,6Skyvan.
1 GHANA |
HEL: 2 Bell 212 (VIP), 2 Mi-2, 4 SA-319.
TRG: 1 sqn with 12* L-29, 6 MB 326F.
1994e:C5,306bn($7.53bn):
per capita $2,000 UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
Growth 1993: 5.0% 1994: 3.8% BOSNIA (UNPROFOR): 13 Obs. CROATIA
Inflation 1993: 25.0% 1994: 34.2% (UNCRO): 17 Obs. LEBANON (UNIFIL): 784; 1
Debt 1993: $4.59bn 1994: $4.82bn inf bn. RWANDA (UNAMIR): 871 incl 35 Obs plus
Def exp 1994: C 39.5bn ($76m) 10 civ pol. WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO): 14
Def bdgt 1993: C 47.5bn ($82m) incl Obs plus 8 civ pol.
1995e:C55.8bn($53m)
FMA 1994: $0.5m (FMF, IMET)
1995: $0.2m(IMET) PARAMILITARY:
1996: $0.3m(lMET) PEOPLE'S MILITIA: 5,000: part-time force with
$1 = C 1993: 649 1994: 957 police duties.
1995: 1,047 PRESIDENTIAL GUARD: 1 inf bn.
C = cedi
1994e:fr957bn($2.2bn):
per capita $700 FORCES ABROAD:
Growth 1993: -0.8% 1994: 2.4% UN AND PEACEKEEPING:
Inflation 1993: -0.3% 1994: 25.8% ANGOLA (UNAVEM III): 10 Obs plus 9 civ pol.
Debt 1993: $2.65bn 1994: $2.82bn HAITI (UNMIH): 25 civ pol. RWANDA (UNAMIR):
Def exp 1993e: fr 16.3bn ($42m) 228 incl 30 Obs plus 10 civ pol.
Def bdgt 1994e:fr 19.4bn ($45m)
1995e:fr23.0bn($47m)
FMA 1994: $0.1 m (IMET) $2.0m (France) PARAMILITARY:
1995: $0.2m(IMET) GENDARMERIE: 1,800; 8 coy.
1996: $0.2m(IMET) REPUBLICAN GUARD: 2,000.
$1 =fr 1993: 283 1994: 555 MILITIA: 3,000.
1995: 485 NATIONAL POLICE: 1,000.
fr = CFA franc
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 16:06 13 October 2014
OPPOSITION:
Population: 9,833,000 (Tuareg 6-10%)
MOVEMENT FOR A UNITED FRONT OF
13-17 18-22 23-32
AZAOUAD (MFUA): £l,000 armed.
Men 537,800 444,600 672,400
Women 559,000 464,000 712,600
| MAURITIUS
TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services
form part of the Army): GDP 1993: R 54.93bn ($2.38bn):
ACTIVE: 7,350 per capita $12,000
Terms of service: conscription (incl for civil purposes), 1994: R60.61bn($2.57bn):
2 years (selective). per capita $12,400
Growth 1993: 5.4% 1994: 5.1%
Inflation 1993: 10.5% 1994: 7.4%
ARMY: 6,900. Debt 1993: $999nI 1994: $ 1,049m
2tk,4inf, 1 AB,2arty, 1 engr, 1 SFbn,2AD, 1 SAMbty. Def exp 1993: R 180 .lm($10.2m)
EQPT:f 1994: R202 .6m ($ 11.3m)
MBT: 21 T-34, T-54/-55 reported. Def bdgt 1995e: R 224 ,5m ($13.2m)
LTTK: 18 Type 62. FMA 1993: $0.07m (IMET)
RECCE: 20 BRDM-2. $1 =R 1993: 17.7 1994: 18.0
APC: 30 BTR-40, 10 BTR-60, 10 BTR-152. 1995: 17.0
TOWED ARTY: 85mm: 6 D-44; 100mm: 6 M-1944; R = rupee
122mm: 8 D-30; 130mm: M-46 reported.
MRL:122mm:2BM-21. Population: 1,133,000
MOR: 82mm: M-43; 120mm: 30 M-43. 13-17 18-22 23-32
AD GUNS: 37mm: 6 M-1939; 57mm: 6 S-60. Men 55,400 51,600 103,600
SAM: 12SA-3. Women 54,400 51,200 103,600
PARAMILITARY:
NAVY:f about 50.
B A S E S : Bamako, Mopti, Segou, Timbuktu.
SPECIAL MOBILE FORCE: 1,300.
6 rifle, 2 mobile, 1 engr coy, spt tp.
RIVER PATROL CRAFT: 3(.
EQPT:
APC: 10VAB.
AIR F O R C E : 400; 16t cbt ac, no armed hel. MOR: 81mm: 2.
FGA:5 MiG-17F. RL: 89mm: 4 LRAC.
FTR: 11 MiG-21. COAST GUARD: e500.
TPT: 2 An-2. 2 An-24, 2 An-26. PATROL CRAFT: 4:
TRG: 6 L-29, 1 MiG-15UTI, 4 Yak-11, 2 Yak-18, 1 1 Amar PCI, 1 SDB-3 PFI, 2 SovZhuk PCI(, plus boats.
SN-601 (VIP). MR: 2 Do-228-101, 1 BN-2T Defender, 3 SA-316B.
HEL: 2 Mi-4, 1 Mi-8, 3 AS-350. POLICE AIR WING: 2 Alouette III.
250 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
4 armed helf.
1996: $0.1m(IMET)$2m (France) FGA: 5 sqn with 43 MiG-21.
$] = M 1993: 3,874 1994: 6,039 TPT: 1 sqn with 5 An-26, 2 C-212.
1995: 7,010 HEL:
M = metical ATTACK: 4 Mi-24.
TPT: 5 Mi-8.
" lnclcostsofdemobprogrammeandneworgestat$31min 1993 TRG: 4 PA-32, 1 Cessna 182, 7 ZLIN-326.
and $ 19m in 1994. ADSAM:fSA-2, 10SA-3.
* The cost of ONUMOZ was about $327m in 1993 and about
$295m in 1994.
GENDARMERIE: 1,400.
COAST GUARD: el00. REPUBLICAN GUARD: 2,500.
B A S E : Walvis Bay. NATIONAL POLICE: 1,500.
PATROL: 3 PCO plus boats.
| NIGERIA _J
| NIGER |
GDP 1993: N 821.9bn ($37.25bn):
GDP 1993: fr 630bn ($2.23bn): per capita $1,400
per capita $1,000 1994: N830.1bn ($37.74bn):
1994e:fr897bn($2.30bn): per capita $1,400
per capita $1,000 Growth 1993: 2.6% 1994: 1.3%
Growth 1993: 1.4% 1994: 3.9% Inflation 1993: 57.2% 1994: 64.3%
Inflation 1993: -1.2% 1994: 36.7% Debt 1993: $32.53bn 1994: $33.44bn
Debt 1993: $1.70bn 1994: $1.80bn Def exp" 1993e:N 25,520m ($1.16bn)
Def exp 1993: fr6.2bn($21m) I 9 9 4 E : N 25,739m ($ 1.17bn)
Defbdgt 1994: fr 7.9bn ($20m) Defbdgt" 1995e:N 7,023m ($319m)
1995: fr 8.9bn ($22m) FMA 1993: $0.2m (IMET)
FMA 1994: $0.2m (IMET) $ 1.8m (France) $1 = N 1993: 22.1 1994: 22.0
1995: $0.2m(IMET) 1995: 22.0
N = naira
1996: $0.3m(IMET)
$1 =fr 1993: 283 1994: 555 • IMFextemal audits of Nigerian central gov exp have not been
1995: 485 published since 1987. Def exp est cited here include extra-
fr = CFA franc budgetary mil and paramil funding.
ARMY: 62,000.
1 armd div (2 armd bde). AIR F O R C E : 9,500; 92 cbt act, 15 armed helf.
1 composite div (I mot inf, 1 amph bde, 1 AB bn). FGA/FTR: 3 sqn:
2 mech div (each 1 mech, 1 mot inf bde). 1 with 20 Alpha Jet (FGA/trg).
1 Presidential Guards bde (2 bn). 1 with f6 MiG-21 MF, f4 MiG-21U, 112 MiG-2IB/FR.
1 AD bde. 1 with t l 5 . / a g « a r ( 1 2 - S N , 3 -BN).
div tps: each div 1 arty, 1 engr bde, 1 recce bn. COIN/TRG: 23 L-39MS, 12 MB-339AN.
ARMED HEL: tl5Bo-105D.
EQPT:
TPT: 2 sqn with 5 C-130H, 3 -H-30, 18 Do-128-6, 3
MBT: 210: 60 T-55t, 150 Vickers Mk 3. Do-228 (VIP), 5 G-222.
LTTK: 100 Scorpion. PRESIDENTIAL FLT: 1 Boeing 727, 1 Falcon, 2
RECCE: 20 Saladin, El20 AML-60, 60 AML-90, 55 Gulfstream, 1 BAe 125-700, 1 BAe 125-1000.
Fox, 75 EE-9 Cascavel. HEL: 4 AS-332, 2 SA-330.
APC: 10 Saracen, 300 Steyr 4K-7FA, 70 MOWAG TRG: ac:f 25 Bulldog; hel: 14 Hughes 300.
Piranha. MSL:
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 16:06 13 October 2014
i
2 Challenge (UK Tracker) PCI(.
GDP 1993: fr 1,518bn($3.99bn): AMPH: craft only: 1 LCT.
per capita $1,900
1994: fr l,540bn ($4.17bn):
per capita $1,900 AIR F O R C E : 650; 8 cbt ac, no armed hel.
Growth 1993: -2.6% 1994: 1.8% COIN: 1 sqn with 4 CM-170, 4 R-235 Guerrier.
Inflation 1993: -0.6% 1994: 32.3% MR/SAR: 1 EMB-111.
Debt 1993: $3.67bn 1994: $3.89bn TPT: 1 sqnwith6F-27-400M,2MH-1521, 1 Boeing
Defexp 1993: fr 35.8bn ($94m) 727-200 (VIP).
254 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
PARAMILITARY:
PARAMILITARY: NATIONAL GUARD: 1,000.
GENDARMERIE: 4,000; 12 VXB-170 APC. COAST GUARD: e500 incl 100 Air Wing ande80
CUSTOMS: 2 PCI{, boats. Marines.
BASE: Port Victoria.
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 16:06 13 October 2014
TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services " 1995 def bdgt is for July-Dec 1995.
form part of the Army):
Population: 4,707,000
13-17 18-22 23-32
ACTIVE: 300 Men 249,200 212,400 328,600
Women 247,200 212,200 332,800
ARMY: 300.
1 inf bn (3 coy).
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 255
NAVY: e2oo.
B A S E : Freetown. CLAN/MOVEMENT GROUPINGS:
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 3: ' S O M A L I L A N D ' (northern Somalia):
2 Ch Shanghai-Il PFI, 1 Swiftship 32-m PFI. Plus UNITED SOMALIA FRONT: sub-clan Issa.
some 3 modern boats. SOMALIA DEMOCRATIC FRONT: sub-clan
Gadabursi.
FORCES ABROAD: SOMALIA NATIONAL MOVEMENT: clan Isaq,
LIBERIA (ECOMOG): 700. 5-6,000, 3 factions (Tur, Dhegaweyne, Kahin).
UNITED SOMALI PARTY: sub-clan Dolbuhunta,
leader Abdi Hasai.
PARAMILITARY: SOMALIA:
STATE SECURITY DIVISION: 2,000. incl 1 SFbn. SOMALIA SALVATION DEMOCRATIC
FRONT: sub-clan Majerteen, 3,000, leaders 'Colonel'
Yusuf, Abshir Musa (loose alliance).
OPPOSITION:
UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS: (Somali National
REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT: el,000 Army) clan Hawije; Aideed Faction: leader Osman
with perhaps 300 active.
Hassan Ali al'Atto/Mohammed Farah Aideed, 10,000,
Habar Gadir sub-clan.
FOREIGN FORCES: Ali Mahdi Faction: leader Mohammed Ali Mahdi,
GUINEA: 300. I0,000(-), Marehan sub-clan.
NIGERIA : 1,000; I inf bn+. SOMALI NATIONAL FRONT: sub-clan Marehan,
2-3,000, leaders Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan, Hashi
Ganni, Warsame Hashi.
1 SOMALI REPUBLIC | SOMALI DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT: clan
Dighil and Rahenwein.
GDP 1993£:($810m):
SOMALI PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT: sub-clan
per capita $800 Ogaden, 203,000, leaders Ahmed Omar Jeso, Aden Nar
1994£:($864m): Gabiyu.
per capita $830
Growth 1993: -0.6% 1994: 3.7%
i
Inflation 1992: 10.5% 1993: 24.6% | SOUTH AFRICA
Debt 1993: $2.50bn 1994: $2.54bn
FMA" GDP 1993: R 383.lbn ($117.5bn):
$1 = S s h 1992-95: 2,620 per capita $5,900
S sh = Somali shillings 1994: R432.8bn($121.9bn):
per capita $5,900
"The costs of UNOSOM I and II for May 1992-February 1994 Growth 1993: 1.2% 1994: 2.5%
inclusive are $959m. The cost of UNOSOM II in 1994 was Inflation 1993: 9.8% 1994: 9.0%
about $862m, excl voluntary contributions from participating Debt 1993: $16.4bn 1994: $17.5bn
256 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FTR: 4 MiG-21, 3 MiG-23, 4 Ch J-6 (MiG-19). Terms of service: incl civil duties, 2 years.
MR:2C-212. RESERVES: Citizens' Militia: 80,000.
TPT: 5 An-24, 5 C-130H, 4 C-212, 3 DHC-5D, 6
EMB-110P, 1 F-27. 2 Falcon 20/50.
HEL: I sqn with 11 AB-412, 8 IAR/SA-330, 4 Mi-4, ARMY: 30,000+.
8 Mi-8, 2 Mi-24 (armed). 5 inf bde. 1 tk bde.
TRG: incl 4 MiG-15UTI*, 4 MiG-21 U*, 2 JJ-5*, 2 JJ-6*. 2 arty bn. 2 AD arty bn.
AD: 5 bty SA-2 SAM (18 launchers).
2 mor bn. 2 ATK bn.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
I engr regt (bn).
EQPT:t
PARAMILITARY: MBT: 30 Ch Type-59 (15 op), 35 T-54 (all non-op).
POPULAR DEFENCE FORCE: e5-10,000 LT TK: 30 Ch Type-62, 40 Scorpion.
active (to be 15,000), 60,000 reserve; mil wing of RECCE: 40 BRDM-2.
National Islamic Front. APC: 66 BTR-40/-152, 30 Ch Type-56.
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 16:06 13 October 2014
Population: 28,463,000
13-17 18-22 23-32
PARAMILITARY:
Men 1,597,400 1,295,400 1,949,400 POLICE FIELD FORCE: 1,400 in 18 sub-units
Women 1,684,400 1,351,000 2,124,800 incl Police Marine Unit.
POLICE AIR WING: ac: 1 Cessna U-206; hel: 2
AB-206A, 2 -B, 2 Bell 206L, 2 Bell 47G.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: POLICE MARINE UNIT: (100), boats only.
A C T I V E : e34,600 (reducing to 25,000 by 1996). CITIZENS' MILITIA: 80,000.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 259
1995: 485
fr = CFA franc
Population: 4,164,400
1 UGANDA |
" Estimates of the value of the zaire are unreliable due to its rapid
devaluation since 1990. The new zaire, equal to 3m old zaires,
PARAMILITARY:
was introduced in October 1993. GENDARMERIE: 21,000 (to be 27,000); 40 bn.
CIVIL GUARD: 10,000; some Fahd APC.
Population: 43,436,000
13-17 18-22 23-32
Men: 2,493,400 2,009,000 2,993,800 | ZAMBIA
Women: 2,478,200 2,009,000 3,020,200
GDP 1993: K l,440.7bn ($3.80bn):
per capita $600
TOTAL ARMED FORCES: 1994: K l,804.0bn($3.61bn):
A C T I V E : 49,100 (incl Gendarmerie). per capita $550
Growth 1993: 1.0% 1994: -7.4%
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 261
| ZIMBABWE
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
ACTIVE: 21,600. GDP 1993: $Z 35.1bn ($5.4bn):
per capita $1,900
1994: $Z 44.0bn ($5.5bn):
A R M Y : 20,000 (incl 3,000 reserves). per capita $2,000
3 bde HQ. Growth 1993: -2.6% 1994: 5.2%
1 arty regt. Inflation 1993: 27.6% 1994: 22.2%
9 inf bn (3 reserve). Debt 1993:$4.17bn 1994: $4.37bn
1 engr bn. Defexp" 1993: $Z 1,326m ($204m)
1 armd regt (incl 1 armd recce bn). 1994: $Z 1,532m ($193m)
EQPT: Defbdgt 1995: $Z 2,013m ($238m)
MBT: 10 T-54/-55, 20 Ch Type-59. FMA 1994: $0.2m (IMET)
LT TK: 30 PT-76. 1995: $0.3m(IMET)
RECCE: 88 BRDM-1/-2. 1996: $0.3m(IMET)
APC: 13 BTR-60. $1 = $ Z 1993: 6.50 1994: 8.15
TOWED ARTY: 76mm: 35 M-1942; 105mm: 18 Model 1995: 8.46
56 pack; 122mm: 25 D-30; 130mm: 18 M-46. $Z = Zimbabwe dollar
MRL: 122mm: 50BM-21.
MOR: 81mm: 55; 82mm: 24; 120mm: 14. ' Excl supplementary allocations approved in late FY1994.
ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.
RCL: 57mm: 12 M-18; 75mm: M-20; 84mm: Carl Population: 11,105,000
Gustav. 13-17 18-22 23-32
AD GUNS: 20mm: 50 M-55 triple; 37mm: 40 M- Men 668,400 550,600 876,400
1939; 57mm: 55 S-60; 85mm: 16 KS-12. Women 666,200 551,600 881,200
SAM: SA-7.
$m (1993 constant prices) $ per capita (1993 constant prices) c% of GDP i(000) (000) (000)
Country 1985 1993 1994 1985 1993 1994 1985 1993 1994 1985 1994 1994 1994
NATO
Belgium 5,409 3,805 3,843 549 379 382 3.0 1.8 1.7 91.6 63.0 228.8 n.a.
Denmark 2,747 2,701 2,667 537 523 513 2.2 2.0 1.9 29.6 27.0 70.0 n.a.
France 42,918 42,898 42,724 778 750 739 4.0 3.4 3.3 464.3 409.6 339.4 91.8
Germany 46,330 36,654 34,848 610 460 428 3.2 2.1 2.0 478.0 367.3 442.7 24.7
Greece 3,060 4,074 4,224 308 402 406 7.0 5.6 5.7 201.5 159.3 406.0 30.5
Italy 22,576 24,400 20,632 395 398 357 2.3 2.1 2.1 385.1 322.3 584.0 256.3
Luxembourg 84 117 120 229 307 301 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.8 n.a. 0.6
Netherlands 7,814 7,070 6,901 540 464 450 3.1 2.5 2.1 105.5 70.9 130.6 3.6
Norway 2,719 3,320 3,333 655 778 771 3.1 3.1 3.1 37.0 33.5 282.0 0.7
Portugal 1,610 2,360 2,221 157 225 225 3.1 2.6 2.6 73.0 50.7 210.0 49.8
Spain 9,900 7,870 7,416 256 199 187 2.4 1.7 1.6 320.0 206.5 498.0 72.6
Turkey 3,016 7,073 5,242 60 119 86 4.5 4.0 3.2 630.0 503.8 952.3 71.1
United Kingdom 41,891 35,100 33,861 741 606 583 5.2 3.7 3.4 327.1 254.3 376.2 n.a.
Total NATO Europe: 190,074 177,442 168,031 415 401 388 3.1 2.5 2.4 3,143.4 2,469.0 4,520.0 601.8
Canada 10,284 10,267 9,242 405 375 329 2.2 1.9 1.7 83.0 78.1 37.2 6.0
US 339,229 297,300 278,730 1,418 1,156 1,074 6.5 4.7 4.3 2,151.6 1,650.5 2,048.0 106.1
Total NATO: 539,587 485,008 456,002 477 446 427 3.3 2.6 2.5 5,378.0 4,197.6 6,605.2 713.9
Russia n.a. 107,900 106,927 n.a. 729 718 n.a. 9.3 9.6 n.a. 1,714.0 2,400.0 280.0
USSR 317,000 n.a. n.a. 1,144 n.a. n.a. 16.1 n.a. n.a. 5,300.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Europe
Albania 248 37 41 84 11 12 5.3 3.4 2.7 40.4 73.0 155.0 13.5
Armenia n.a. 62 69 n.a. 18 18 n.a. 2.8 3.1 n.a. 32.7 300.0 1.0
Austria 1,696 1,797 1,818 225 231 228 1.2 1.0 0.9 54.7 51.3 119.0 n.a.
Azerbaijan n.a. 305 245 n.a. 41 33 n.a. 8.0 8.7 n.a. 56.0 560.0 40.0
Belarus n.a. 661 479 n.a. 63 46 n.a. 2.4 2.2 n.a. 92.5 289.5 8.0
Bosnia n.a. 875 878 n.a. 206 204 n.a. 58.3 69.2 n.a. 110.0 100.0 n.a.
Bulgaria 7,632 317 274 852 36 33 14.1 2.9 2.5 148.5 101.9 303.0 34.0
Croatia n.a. 975 1,089 n.a. 205 229 n.a. 9.2 10.2 n.a. 105.0 190.0 45.0
Cyprus 114 492 359 172 684 495 3.6 7.8 5.4 10.0 10.0 88.0 4.0
Czech Republic n.a. 801 908 n.a. 78 88 n.a. 2.6 2.6 n.a. 92.9 240.0 11.4
Czechoslovakia 6,372 n.a. n.a. 411 n.a. n.a. 4.7 n.a. n.a. 203.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Estonia n.a. 77 80 n.a. 49 51 n.a. 3.9 3.8 n.a. 2.5 6.0 3.0
Finland 1,974 1,707 1,919 402 339 377 2.8 2.0 2.0 36.50 31.2 700.0 4.4
FYROM n.a. 30 32 n.a. 14 15 n.a. 1.9 2.2 n.a. 10.4 100.0 7.5
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Georgia n.a. 137 133 n.a. 25 23 n.a. 2.3 2.4 n.a. 10.2 250.0 5.0 o
Hungary 4,970 723 645 467 70 63 7.2 2.0 1.6 106.00 74.5 195.0 2.3
Ireland 420 572 607 118 163 172 1.8 1.2 1.2 13.70 13.0 16.2 n.a.
o
"0
Latvia n.a. 95 105 n.a. 36 40 n.a. 3.5 3.8 n.a. 2.6 18.0 4.3 73
Lithuania n.a. 130 137 n.a. 35 37 n.a. 3.8 3.9 n.a. 8.9 12.0 4.0
Malta 21 24 27 59 65 73 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.9 n.a. n.a. O
Moldova n.a. 32 38 n.a. 7 8 n.a. 2.7 3.8 n.a. 11.1 100.0 3.4
Poland 7,567 2,200 2,197 203 57 57 8.1 2.6 2.5 319.0 283.6 465.5 23.4 O
Romania 1,833 554 743 81 24 33 4.5 2.2 2.9 189.5 230.5 427.0 72.1 •n
Slovakia n.a. 266 301 n.a. 49 56 4.7 2.4 2.5 n.a. 47.0 122.0 4.0
o
m
Slovenia n.a. 205 283 160 104 142 3.8 1.6 2.1 n.a. 8.1 70.0 9.5 -n
Sweden 4,194 5,259 4,818 502 606 549 3.3 2.8 2.5 65.7 64.0 729.0 35.6 m
Switzerland 2,536 3,893 4,082 393 572 579 2.1 1.7 1.6 20.0 29.8 625.0 n.a. n
Ukraine n.a. 824 868 n.a. 16 17 n.a. 1.5 2.1 n.a. 517.0 1,000.0 66.0 TO
tn
FY/Serbia/Montenegro 4,390 2,800 2,927 190 266 275 3.8 22.8 23.1 241.0 126.5 400.0 n.a. X
Total Other Europe: 43,968 25,850 26,104 270 145 141 4.5 5.7 6.1 1,449.1 2,198.1 7,580.2 401.4 m
Middle East a
Algeria 1,252 1,360 1,249 57 50 44 1.7 2.9 2.7 170.0 121.7 150.0 41.2
Bahrain 198 251 246 476 475 439 3.5 5.5 5.5 2.8 8.1 n.a. 9.3 73
Egypt 3,394 2,477 2,641 70 45 47 7.2 5.7 5.9 445.0 440.0 254.0 374.0
Iran 18,689 1,977 2,237 419 34 37 36.0 3.4 3.8 305.0 513.0 350.0 45.0
Iraq 16,909 2,600 2,628 1,064 141 132 25.9 14.4 14.6 520.0 382.0 650.0 24.8
z
Israel 6,638 6,197 6,543 1,568 1,211 1,230 21.2 9.5 9.5 142.0 172.0 430.0 6.1
a
Jordan 791 439 422 226 97 96 15.9 7.8 7.1 70.3 98.6 35.0 10.0 F
Kuwait 2,360 3,110 3,009 1,380 2,032 2 ,019 9.1 13.1 12.2 12.0 16.6 23.7 5.0 H
Lebanon 263 275 301 99 71 75 9.0 4.4 4.4 17.4 44.3 n.a. 13.0 73
Libya 1,774 967 1,062 471 190 210 6.2 3.3 3.7 73.0 70.0 40.0 n.a.
Mauritania 68 36 35 40 17 16 6.5 2.8 2.7 8.5 15.7 n.a. 5.0 2
Morocco 842 1,086 1,197 38 40 44 5.4 4.0 4.3 149.0 195.5 150.0 42.0 >
Oman 2,834 1,920 1,854 1,771 951 991 20.8 16.7 15.9 2.5 42.9 n.a. 4.0 Z
Qatar 394 330 294 1,251 685 559 6.0 4.3 3.8 6.0 10.1 n.a. n.a. •a
O
Saudi Arabia 23,603 16,473 13,917 2,045 1,339 1,109 19.6 13.2 11.2 62.5 158.0 n.a. 15.5 r"Ti
Syria 4,577 2,383 2,358 436 172 168 16.4 8.9 8.6 402.5 408.0 400.0 8.0 73
Tunisia 548 231 219 77 27 25 5.0 1.6 1.4 35.1 35.5 n.a. 23.0
UAE 2,685 2,110 2,055 1,954 1,241 1,149 7.6 5.9 5.7 43.0 61.5 n.a. n.a.
Yemen 643 356 401 64 27 29 8.9 4.6 5.2 64.1 66.0 85.0 75.0
Total Middle East: 88,462 44,478 42,670 711 465 443 12.2 6.9 6.7 2,530.7 2,859.5 2,567.7 700.9 K)
ts:
Defence Expenditure Numbers Estimated Para-
c
in armed forces reservists military c
$m (1993 constant prices) $ per capita (1993 constant prices) % of GDP i(000) (000) (000)
Downloaded by [The University of Manchester Library] at 08:47 22 January 2015
Country 1985 1993 1994 1985 1993 1994 1985 1993 1994 1985 1994 1994 1994 n
O
Central Asia
Afghanistan 377 n.a. n.a. 21 n.a. n.a. 8.7 n.a. n.a. 47.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bangladesh 329 461 463 3 3 4 1.4 1.9 1.8 91.3 115.5 n.a. 55.0 2oo
India 8,230 7,142 7,321 11 8 8 3.0 2.8 2.8 1,260.0 1,265.0 1,305.0 906.7
Kazakhstan n.a. 429 404 n.a. 43 25 n.a. 2.4 3.5 n.a. 40.0 n.a. 34.50 O
Kyrgyzstan n.a. 51 48 n.a. 11 11 n.a. 1.5 1.4 n.a. 12.0 n.a. n.a. oo
Myanmar (Burma) 640 403 415 17 31 9 7.0 3.1 3.1 186.0 286.0 n.a. 85.3 O
Nepal 47 41 41 3 2 2 1.5 1.2 1.1 25.0 35.0 n.a. 28.0 TJ
Pakistan 2,728 3,337 3,426 28 27 27 6.9 7.0 6.9 482.8 587.0 313.0 277.0 D
m
Sri Lanka 300 498 504 19 28 28 3.8 4.8 4.7 21.6 126.0 10.7 70.2 ~a
Tajikistan n.a. 126 66 n.a. 22 11 n.a. 5.0 4.0 n.a. 3.0 n.a. 6.0 Z
Turkmenistan n.a. 74 63 n.a. 19 16 n.a. 1.2 1.1 n.a. 28.0 n.a. n.a. n
Uzbekistan n.a. 344 317 n.a. 16 14 n.a. 2.5 2.4 n.a. 45.0 n.a. 8.0 m
X
Total Central Asia: 12,650 12,905 13,080 15 14 13 4.6 2.8 2.7 2,113.7 2,542.5 1,628.7 1,470.7 -a
m
East Asia and Australasia z
Australia 7,155 7,448 7,275 454 417 401 3.4 2.6 2.3 70.4 61.6 29.4 n.a. H
Brunei 269 212 233 1,203 756 806 6.0 4.3 4.5 4.1 4.4 0.7 4.1
Cambodia n.a. 64 59 n.a. 7 6 n.a. 3.3 2.3 35.0 88.5 n.a. 220.0 70
China 26,083 27,390 27,680 25 23 23 7.9 5.4 5.6 3,900.0 2,930.0 1,200.0 1,200.0 m
Fiji 18 32 27 26 42 35 1.2 1.9 1.5 2.7 3.9 5.0 n.a. z
Indonesia 3,076 2,031 2,256 19 11 11 2.8 1.4 1.4 278.1 276.0 400.0 174.0
Japan 28,240 41,732 44,600 234 334 356 1.0 1.0 1.0 243.0 237.7 47.9 12.0 2
Korea, North 5,461 5,305 5,412 268 233 234 23.0 25.5 26.6 838.0 1,128.0 540.0 115.0 r
Korea, South 8,268 11,994 13,153 201 273 294 5.1 3.6 3.6 598.0 633.0 4,500.0 4.5 H
Laos 72 105 111 20 23 23 7.8 7.9 7.9 53.7 37.0 n.a. n.a. 70
Malaysia 2,318 2,642 2,652 149 137 135 5.6 4.1 3.9 110.0 114.5 58.3 25.8
Mongolia 45 10 17 23 4 8 9.0 1.7 2.8 33.0 21.3 140.0 10.0
New Zealand 849 651. 529 261 187 151 2.9 1.5 1.1 12.4 10.0 7.9 n.a. >
Papua New Guinea 47 87 53 13 21 12 1.5 1.7 I.I 3.2 3.8 n.a. n.a. •o
Philippines 623 749 855 11 11 13 1.4 1.4 1.4 114.8 106.5 131.0 40.5 O
Singapore 1,561 2,442 2,982 610 780 1,043 6.7 4.4 4.8 55.0 54.0 262.0 11.6
Taiwan 8,461 11,939 11,065 436 572 524 7.0 5.5 5.0 444.0 425.0 1,657.5 26.7 70
Thailand 2,462 3,118 3,313 48 54 56 5.0 2.6 2.6 235.3 256.0 200.0 161.5
Vietnam 3,154 720 837 51 10 12 19.4 4.1 5.7 1,027.0 572.0 3,000.0 50.0
Dominican Republic 67 108 112 10 15 15 1.1 1.1 1.1 22.2 24.5 n.a. 15.0 o
Haiti 41 33 34 7 5 5 1.5 2.0 2.2 6.9 7.3 n.a. n.a.
Jamaica 26 21 27 11 9 11 0.9 0.7 0.9 2.1 3.3 0.9 0.2
-a
>
Trinidad and Tobago 96 79 81 81 62 63 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.1 2.6 n.a. 4.8
Central America O
Belize 5 10 11 32 49 51 1.8 1.9 1.9 0.6 1.0 0.7 n.a. 2
Costa Rica 38 34 36 15 11 11 0.7 0.4 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.5
o
El Salvador 331 121 152 69 22 . 27 4.4 1.7 1.9 41.7 30.7 n.a. 5.9 aCTI
Guatemala 259 123 129 33 12 13 1.8 1.1 1.1 31.7 44.2 35.0 12.5 •n
Honduras 95 50 42 22 9 7 2.1 1.5 1.3 16.6 16.8 60.0 5.5 m
Mexico 1,631 1,617 1,694 21 18 18 0.7 0.7 0.7 129.1 175.0 300.0 14.0 n
Nicaragua 837 38 38 256 9 9 14.2 2.0 2.0 62.9 15.2 150.0 n.a. ra
Panama 118 83 85 58 33 33 2.0 1.2 1.2 12.0 0.7 n.a. 11.0 en
X
*v
m
Latin America 2
Argentina 4,758 3,026 3,262 156 91 97 3.8 1.7 1.7 108.0 69.8 377.0 31.2 aH
Bolivia 167 126 127 26 16 16 2.0 1.5 1.4 27.6 33.5 n.a. 30.6
Brazil 3,088 6,270 6,551 23 39 40 0.8 1.6 1.6 276.0 336.8 1,115.0 385.6
Chile 1,632 1,764 1,906 135 128 137 7.8 3.4 3.5 101.0 93.0 50.0 31.0 m
Colombia 557 1,232 1.178 20 36 34 1.6 2.5 2.3 66.2 146.4 60.7 79.0 >
Ecuador 373 498 589 40 45 53 1.8 2.8 3.2 42.5 57.5 100.0 0.4
Guyana 26 6 6 75 8 8 9.7 1.4 1.4 6.6 1.7 n.a. 1.5 2
Paraguay 79 74 81 21 16 17 1.3 1.4 1.4 14.4 16.5 45.0 8.0
Peru 842 770 730 45 33 31 4.5 2.1 1.8 128.0 115.0 188.0 62.6
Suriname 11 11 13 15 23 27 2.4 2.3 2.8 2.0 1.8 n.a. n.a. >
Uruguay 223 256 289 56 81 91 2.5 2.2 2.5 31.9 25.6 n.a. 1.2
Venezuela 1,083 1,029 925 63 49 43 1.3 1.7 1.6 49.0 79.0 8.0 23.0
••w
• >
'OWER
and Latin America: 18,546 17,839 18,423 65 37 37 3.1 ' 1.7 1.7 1,344.1 1,407.2 2,625.8 749.5
to
a\
Defence Expenditure Numbers Estimated Para-
in armed forces reservists military 00
$m (1993 constant prices) $ per capita (1993 constant prices) % of GDP (000) (000) (000)
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Country 1985 1993 1994 1985 1993 1994 1985 1993 1994 1985 1994 1994 1994 n
Sub-Saharan Africa o
Horn of Africa
Djibouti 42 28 25 124 50 42 7.9 6.8 6.2 3.0 8.4 n.a. 4.2 C/3
Eritrea n.a. 38 38 n.a. 12 13 n.a. 6.2 6.0 n.a. 70.0 n.a. n.a. o
Ethiopia 587 119 106 14 2 2 17.9 2.9 2.6 217.0 120.0 n.a. n.a.
Somali Republic 60 n.k. n.k. 11 n.k. n.k. 6.2 n.k. n.k. 62.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
z
o
•n
Sudan 494 305 298 37 11 11 3.2 3.9 3.5 56.6 118.5 n.a. 15.0
Central Africa m
Burundi
Cameroon
46
209
26
89
31
115
10
21
4
7
5
9
3.0
1.4
2.6
1.1
3.0
1.4
5.2
7.3
10.5
14.6
n.a.
n.a.
2.0
9.0 1n
Cape Verde 5 3 3 15 8 8 0.9 0.8 0.9 7.7 1.1 n.a. 0.5 m
m
Central African Republic 23 27 24 9 8 7 1.4 2.4 2.0 2.3 2.7 n.a. 2.3 x
Chad 49 32 30 10 5 5 2.9 2.9 2.6 12.2 25.4 n.a. 9.5
Congo 74 59 47 39 23 18 1.9 2.1 1.7 8.7 10.0 n.a. 6.7
Equatorial Guinea 4 3 2 11 6 5 2.0 1.7 1.4 2.2 1.3 n.a. 0.3 a
Gabon 104 129 118 104 105 93 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.4 3.2 n.a. 4.8 H
Rwanda 43 113 113 7 14 15 1.9 7.1 7.7 5.2 5.0 n.a. 1.2 c
Zaire 106 417 114 3 10 3 0.9 6.5 1.9 48.0 28.1 n.a. 31.0 m
73
East Africa
>
Kenya 336 179 180 17 7 6 3.1 2.2 2.2 13.7 24.2 n.a. 5.0 z
Madagascar 71 222 28 7 17 2 2.0 6.6 0.8 21.1 21.0 n.a. 7.5
Mauritius 3 10 11 24 8 10 1.7 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.3 n.a. n.a.
Seychelles 11 9 10 162 132 142 2.1 2.7 2.9 1.2 0.8 n.a. 1.0 >
Tanzania 184 90 103 8 3 4 4.4 3.2 3.5 40.4 49.6 85.0 1.4 73
Uganda 70 54 87 5 3 5 1.8 1.6 2.4 20.0 50.0 n.a. 0.5
West Africa Z
Benin 28 26 25 7 5 5 1.1 1.6 1.5 4.5 4.8 n.a. 2.5
Burkina Faso 45 61 42 6 6 4 1.1 2.4 1.6 4.0 5.8 n.a. 4.5 ^
Cote d'lvoire 100 98 68 10 7 5 0.8 1.1 0.8 13.2 8.4 12.0 7.8 m
Gambia 3 13 13 4 14 13 1.5 3.7 3.7 0.5 0.8 n.a. n.a.
Ghana 83 76 80 7 5 5 1.0 1.0 0.9 15.1 6.9 n.a. 5.8
Guinea 68 43 42 11 7 7 1.8 1.3 1.2 9.9 9.7 n.a. 9.6
Guinea-Bissau 14 9 8 16 8 8 5.7 3.7 3.3 8.6 7.3 n.a. 2.0
Liberia 37 35 34 17 12 14 2.4 2.6 2.5 6.8 5.0 n.a. n.a.
Mali 39 42 64 5 5 7 1.4 2.0 3.0 4.9 7.4 n.a. 7.8
Niger 16 21 20 2 2 2 0.5 0.9 0.9 2.2 5.3 n.a. 5.4
Nigeria 1,644 1,157 1,139 5 13 10 1.0 3.1 3.1 94.0 76.5 n.a. 12.0
Senegal 83 94 88 13 12 11 1.1 2.4 2.2 10.1 13.4 n.a. 4.0
Sierra Leone 7 19 35 2 4 8 1.0 2.7 4.4 3.1 6.2 n.a. 0.8 n
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Global Totals: 1 ,128,437 821,622 794,425 232 148 141 4.8 2.8 2.6 27,131.8 22,873.7 36,053.8 6,713.7 |
Z
"0
Notes: O
" See The Military Balance 1994-1995, pp. 278-281 for an explanation of ra
73
to
270
(The general problems of estimating and interpreting defence-economics data are discussed in The
Military Balance 1994-1995, pp. 278-81.)
Introduction
Few analysts outside the People's Republic of China (PRC) consider the official Chinese defence
budget to be a true measure of China's military spending. The uncertainty arises because the
Chinese government does not disclose how its defence budget is constituted beyond aggregate
figures for recurrent and capital spending - which gives little away. Consistent with this lack of
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transparency, China does not report its military expenditures to the UN in the standardised format.
Such secretive behaviour prompted US Defense Secretary William Perry in 1994 to urge the
Chinese to improve the transparency of their military accounting. The absence of reliable
information has resulted in widely disparate estimates of China's military spending ranging from
$20-140 billion.
The IISS estimates that Chinese military expenditure was over $28bn in 1994 - nearly four
times the official figure. The following analysis examines the evidence supporting this
conclusion: the enormity of China's Armed Forces and paramilitary and their increasing
modernisation since 1989; the strength of the economy and its implications in terms of both the
domestic purchasing power of the defence budget and the availability of extra hard currency for
foreign equipment and technology; and the falsification in military accounting whereby military-
related expenditure is listed under non-defence headings in the central-government budget, and
extra-budgetary revenue raised for military application by the regions and the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) is not registered at all.
A credibility problem arises primarily because of evidence of a shift in China's intentions and,
more obviously, its growing military capability. Although the military doctrine of active defence
provides little distinct indication of expansionist intentions, the shift beginning in 1979 from the
Maoist concept of a 'people's war' to that of 'local war' confirms some new thinking. The former
envisaged the final defeat of the enemy on Chinese soil after a global nuclear war, and in principle
involved the tactical yielding of Chinese territory to draw the enemy into defeat. In contrast, the
'local war' doctrine abandons the concept of global war and instead envisages 'localised' conflict
through which political objectives can be achieved without nuclear escalation. It might apply, for
example, in the case of a conflict with Taiwan or Vietnam over the Spratly Islands. As a
consequence of the new doctrine, rapid-reaction forces were formed and equipment modernisation
became a top priority.
If the growth in China's military capability were not so demonstrable, the significance of the
change in military doctrine could be exaggerated. That growing capability is also a function of an
increasingly powerful nuclear capability that aims for global reach, and a massive conventional
force, approximately twice the size of any other nation's force. The sheer size of the armed forces
(over 4 million including the paramilitary People's Armed Police (PAP)) renders official military
accounting implausible. A simple calculation shows that per capita spending amounts to less than
$2,000, compared to over $40,000 for Russia and about $ 160,000 for the US. The PLA ground
forces alone number over 2 million and are structured into three distinct parts. About 500,000
troops are selected for the best-equipped and trained units, which include at least six rapid-
deployment formations - the so-called 'fist' units. The second tier comprises supporting combat,
training and logistic units, while the balance comprises the service organisations engaged in
agriculture, construction and, increasingly, commercial activities. According to some estimates,
the PLA owns, administers and sometimes mans some 25,000 enterprises, distinct from the
defence industries that produce PLA weaponry and technical equipment under the management
of state ministries and are manned by a civilian work-force of 3-3.5 million.
CHINA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE 271
Increased momentum in the modernisation of weapon systems and military equipment also
warrants scepticism about the official defence budget. As far back as 1979, the Deng Xiaoping
regime identified defence as the fourth pillar of the 'Four Modernisations' programme, and this
policy was reaffirmed in 1985. But China's defence spending remained static during most of the
1980s, and it was not until the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis that the modernisation effort gained
momentum. Shortly after, the 1990-91 Gulf War provided further impetus, for the Chinese, like
others, could not afford to ignore the startling evidence about the nature of modern warfare. That
a renewed modernisation effort is under way is evident both from the purely indigenous R&D and
procurement programmes and the increasing numbers of programmes involving international
industrial cooperation (facilitated by the relaxation of post-Tiananmen sanctions). A range of
substantial industrial cooperation programmes, with Russian and Israeli suppliers, for example,
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are currently in progress. In the nuclear field, China continues to be the only nuclear state in addition
to France still testing nuclear devices and rejecting a ban on the production of fissile material.
New development programmes - the more visible elements of the modernisation process - are
said to include: a new generation of strategic weapons for launch from mobile ground (DF31 ,DF-
41) and submarine (JL-2) platforms; a new class of SSBN (Type 094); the indigenous fighter J-
10 (reportedly based on the defunct Israeli Lavi) and the FC-1 fighter joint venture with Pakistan
and Russia; the Lu/zw-class destroyer of which series production started in 1994; and the Type-
90 main battle tank. To claim, as the Chinese do, that the sizeable increases in the defence budget
do no more than compensate for inflation is hardly credible, for modernisation programme funding
remains unexplained. It is plausible that technological modernisation is being partly funded by
defence budget increases and masked by non-defence funds.
A second method for estimating the value of Chinese military expenditure is to measure the real
purchasing power of the defence budget. The official exchange rate fails to capture the real
purchasing power of the yuan in a largely autarkic defence economy and, coastal regions apart,
in a national economy little influenced by world prices for capital, labour, goods and services. The
intrinsic strength of the Chinese economy is better reflected in purchasing-power-parity (PPP)
estimates of gross domestic product (GDP). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) GDP
estimates for 1991 (which cite various analysts) ranged from $1.3-3.4bn, or 3-9 times the figure
of $379bn calculated using the official exchange rate. Using the IMF's own PPP estimate, annual
defence expenditure was between $23bn and $32bn from 1990-1995, while the World Bank
estimates expenditure at $37-52bn (Table 1). Despite the substantial differences, these estimates
yield a more credible value for the Chinese defence budget than an official exchange-rate
conversion predicts. They also show the real increase in the defence budget over the period and
bolster the argument that the increase is the result of modernisation costs rather than inflation.
A third reason to doubt official defence budget figures is the concealment of military
expenditure. Evidence of hidden military expenditure in other central, regional and local
272 CHINA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE
government budgets, and the extra-budgetary funds generated from the PLA's industrial and
commercial activities, support this proposition. These are the prima-facie grounds for the charge
that China is not revealing the extent of its military spending.
Budgetary falsification takes two forms: military expenditure not included in the central
go vernment' s defence budget; and operation of the 'three-thirds' principle, whereby responsibility
for raising revenue is shared by the three entities of central government, regional and local
government, and PLA units and enterprises. The central government budget provides the primary
indication of military funding outside the defence budget. The government includes the defence
budget under the heading, 'Building up National Strength', which may be one way of acknowl-
edging that the defence budget does not cover all military spending.
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Table 2: The 1995 Chinese Defence Budget and Expenditures for Building Up National Strength
infrastructure - is funded from the capital construction budget for Building up National Strength,
with more funds going to COSTIND via this route. Since analysts have reported that the individual
defence industries receive direct funding from the State Council, the construction budget may also
fund military-related activities of the State Commission for Science and Technology (CAST), and
of the main civilian ministries responsible for the defence industry.
It is not clear how the Chinese military account for arms purchases from foreign suppliers.
Analysts tend to see these as another major expenditure item that lies outside the defence budget.
Although the Chinese seek to trade on barter terms whenever possible, they have been forced to
spend hard currency on foreign weaponry and technology (typically from Russia and Israel in
recent years). These outlays appear greater than the proceeds from Chinese arms-sales exports
(especially in the light of their decline since the end of the Iran-Iraq War), though some analysts
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argue that they are funded by accumulated proceeds of past sales. Even if this applied in the past,
it is probable that arms purchases now require financing through an extra-budgetary account.
Funding for paramilitary organisations, like the PAP, is another military expenditure that does
not appear in the defence budget. The budgets of the PAP and other paramilitary forces, such as
the Customs Service and the maritime sections of the Public Security Ministry and Border Security
Force, are probably listed in the regular budget of Building up National Strength and attributed
to the Ministries of Public Security and State Security. The regions also play a role in funding the
PLA and the paramilitary; central government allocations forthe military subsume some military
funds transferred to and administered by the regions. But it also appears that the regions are partly
responsible for funding the PAP, as well as regional PLA regular units, reserves and part-time
standing militias.
The second form of budgetary falsification is achieved through the three-thirds principle
whereby the PLA has official sanction to raise revenue. Since 1979, central government revenue
as a proportion of GDP has dropped from 31.6% to an estimated 16.2% in 1994, while defence
as a proportion of central government spending declined from 17% to 9%. In the meantime, real
GDP has grown threefold, so that government revenue has actually increased by half. The high
rate of GDP growth has also provided greater commercial opportunities to the PLA. The value
of the PLA's own subsistence and revenue-earning activity is difficult to calculate and subject to
considerable speculation. Although some argue that it corrupts rather than contributes to the
Chinese military effort (and, in any case, should be excluded from calculations of real military
expenditure), the evidence suggests that the PLA is formally responsible for raising revenue to
cover a part of its operating expenditure, and that consequently, these funds should be included
in the calculation of military expenditure.
PLA revenues are derived from two types of activity. First, PLA units together with the
reserves and militia engage in farming and food production. The scale of these activities are such
that the PLA claimed a production surplus valued at yuan 700m in 1993 which could be sold
commercially after military needs had been met. Second, the PLA runs factories and service
organisations to meet its own supply requirements for construction and military equipment
(excluding weapons systems produced by the civilian-administered defence industries).
These activities are also claimed to generate profits for the PLA. Various sources confirm
both the proliferation of PLA commercial enterprises and the extent of their diversification
into non-military interests. The sum total of value-added activity performed by the PLA in
pursuit of its military needs and commercial interests is difficult to quantify. Some analysts
claim that the PLA's annual turnover for military and commercial activity is as large as the
total National Defence budget, while one press report claims that PLA revenue was in the order
of yuan 30bn ($3.6bn) in 1992. In evaluating the military implications of PLA enterprises
(and, hence, whether they should be considered in calculations of military expenditure), a
distinction should be made between those that promote military needs and those that do not,
and between profit-making activities and those effectively subsidised by the defence
budget.
274 CHINA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE
A 1994 study of the Chinese defence budget by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) attempts to disaggregate the components of Chinese military revenue and
expenditure (Table 3). SIPRI estimates the Chinese military revenue base for 1993 (as distinct
from the defence budget) at $45bn and net military spending at $36bn, providing evidence of
disaggregated expenditures included in and excluded from the official budget.
Local/regional government
Local contributions for regional forces 2.5
Pensions and demobilisation contributions 2.0
Militia levies 1.5
Subtotal (6.0)
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) estimates show an even higher level of
dollarexpenditure for 1993 ($56bn) than SIPRI. ACDA's estimate for the defence share of gross
national product (GNP) in 1993 (2.7%) is nearly double Chinese government estimates (about
1.5%). The variance between SIPRI and ACDA figures may be attributable to differing
assumptions about purchasing-power parity, as the SIPRI analysis does not use the PPP estimates.
ACDA comments on the exceptional difficulties of estimating yuan costs and converting them to
dollars, and cautions that comparative studies of Chinese military spending are subject to a wide
margin of error.
The IISS estimate of Chinese military expenditure in 1994 ($28.5bn) is nearly four times the
Chinese defence budget converted at the official rate (Table 4). The IISS estimation method
incorporates the three approaches already described: estimating relative (international) cost inputs
to the budget (mainly manpower and equipment); estimating the domestic purchasing power of the
defence budget; and estimating other military funding contained in central government non-
defence accounts and PLA extra-budgetary accounts. The IISS method combines a 'top-down'
and 'bottom-up' costing method. The latter involves the calculation of the costs of Chinese military
inputs (salaries, operations, R&D, procurement, infrastructure, pensions, etc.), which are derived
from equivalent NATO costs and take differences in quality into consideration. These are then
converted at USS-calculated PPP rates. The top-down method supplements the official defence
budget with conservative estimates of other funding, including the budget for Building Up
National Strength and the PLA's own revenue, and then applies the same PPP conversion rates.
The two independently calculated estimates are then reconciled into a final estimate. It should be
noted that these estimates are sensitive to the choice of PPP measure, and that there is no consensus
among economists on a single PPP yuan/$ rate. Consequently, using the estimates of either the
IMF or World Bank will alter the IISS estimates by a factor of up to 2 - making them compatible
CHINA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE 275
with those of SIPRI and ACDA. The IISS has selected a lower PPP measure because estimates
derived from costing defence inputs, particularly those applicable to R&D and procurement, are
difficult to reconcile with spending levels calculated with higher PPP estimates. In addition, the
IISS estimate takes into account that some 5-10% of Chinese military expenditure requires hard-
currency funding, to which market exchange rates, and not the higher PPP values, are applicable.
External (1.5)
R&D 3.0 11
Operations 11.4 40
Infrastructure/other 1.0 4
Total 28.5 100
Although the Chinese government still maintains that all Chinese military expenditure is
accounted in the defence budget and that its level is stable, if not actually in decline, there is a
consensus among independent analysts outside Chinaon two counts: Chinese military expenditure
is much higher than revealed by the Chinese defence budget; and its military expenditure has
increased sharply in real terms since 1989, allowing for inflation. The increase is largely
attributable to greater spending on salaries, operations and equipment modernisation. Moreover,
the rate of Chinese economic growth continues at such high levels that it would be imprudent to
assume that a plateau in military spending has been reached.
276
The first six months of 1995 were successful in the field of nuclear arms control. The US-Russian
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) Treaty came into force, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) made progress. However, China has continued to test nuclear weapons and France
announced a plan to resume testing from September 1995. These and other developments in the
control or proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of ballistic missiles are
reviewed in this section. Changes in national nuclear and missile forces are reflected in the relevant
national entry and are highlighted in the text preceding the relevant regional section.
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START I
On 16 November 1994, the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) adopted the law on Ukraine's
accession to the NPT. It added a number of reservations mainly concerning compensation for the
cost of dismantling weapons and the provision of assurances by the nuclear-weapon states.
However, these did not affect Ukraine's unconditional accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear state.
The final hurdle was cleared at Budapest on 5 December, where the Conference, now Organisation,
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit was being held, when US President Bill
Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and UK Prime Minister John Major signed an assurance
document and President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine signed the instruments of NPT ratification.
With this the START I Treaty came into effect, allowing verification of weapons elimination to
be implemented and clearing the way for the ratification of START II, signed by Russia and the
US in January 1993. START I requires each side to reduce their strategic forces to no more than
1,600 delivery vehicles armed with no more than 6,000 warheads. Information was released by all
states on their holdings of deployed strategic nuclear weapons as at 5 December 1994.
These figures are somewhat misleading as they refer to all weapons countable under START rules,
whether operational or not. For example, 156 of the US bombers were located at the Davis Monthan
elimination site and many of the ICBM have had their warheads and other components removed.
Counting rules have been interpreted differently. The high number of US ICBM is accounted for
by the US-held interpretation that a silo launcher must be considered to contain an ICBM, whether
or not a missile is actually deployed at that site, until the silo is destroyed. START I rules that data
regarding deployed nuclear forces may not be released to the public for three months after
notification. Memorandum of Understanding data is to be fully updated every six months, with the
next data as of 5 June 1995 but not releasable until 5 September 1995, too late for inclusion in this
edition of The Military Balance. The Military Balance has received some information on current
deployment and operational status which is shown in the relevant country entry, but this must not
be confused with Treaty-countable weapons.
START II
The START II Treaty signed by US President George Bush and President Yeltsin on 3 January
1993 has not yet been ratified. The Treaty has been presented to the Russian Duma for ratification
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 277
and the US Senate began formal hearings on ratification on 31 January 1995. START II requires
the US and Russia to have reduced their strategic warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500 by 2003.
The Treaty bans ICBM with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and
limits SLBM to 1,750 for each side. Counting rules for air-delivered warheads have been altered;
bombers will be attributed as having the number of warheads they are equipped to carry.
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East. While the NPT was extended
without condition, a number of principles and objectives were adopted. However, these are not
legally binding documents. Their main purpose is to allow pressure to be brought to bear on the
nuclear-armed states in respect of their commitment to nuclear disarmament. The documents are:
• 'Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty'.
• 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'. This stressed
the importance of achieving a CTBT no later than 1996 (and pending its entry into force
advocated that the nuclear-armed states should exercise utmost restraint); a ban on the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive use; the determined pursuit
of nuclear disarmament.
• The third document was a resolution, proposed by Russia, the US and the UK, which called for
the early accession of all states to the NPT and for Middle Eastern states to establish a Middle
East zone free of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems.
Since June 1994, the following states, most importantly Ukraine (allowingtheSTARTITreaty
toenterinto force), have acceded to theNPT: Algeria, Argentina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chile, Eritrea,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Kyrgyzstan, the Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Palau, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Only 13 countries have not
joined the NPT: the undeclared nuclear-weapon states of India, Israel and Pakistan, and Andorra,
Angola, Brazil, Comoros, Cuba, Djibouti, Oman, Serbia/Montenegro, the UAE and Vanuatu.
test site between September 1995 and May 1996. The reasons given for the tests were to collect
data to allow France to switch to simulated testing in future and to validate the warhead for the new
M-5 SLBM. US Secretary of Defense William Perry also advocated the resumption of US tests,
but this was opposed by the US Department of Energy (which is responsible for manufacturing US
nuclear weapons) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The US administra-
tion has now made it clear that testing will not be resumed. However, if the US had not extended
its moratorium there would have been some opportunity until 30 September 1996 when the Energy
and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1992 stipulates that no further US tests are to take
place unless another state conducts atest after this date. The Act allows atotal of five safety-related
and one reliability-related test per year. One of the safety-related tests can be carried out by the UK.
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destruction of weapons-grade material stockpiles. Progress is already being made in this respect,
with the US and Russia agreeing to allow inspection of each other's storage sites for dismantled
weapons material, the US agreement to purchase 500 tons of Russian HEU once it had been
converted to low-enriched uranium (LEU), and President Clinton's announcement that the US
would withdraw 200 tons of plutonium and HEU from the weapons stockpile. The plan for the US
to purchase Russian HEU has run into difficulties and so far only one token consignment of the
equivalent of under one ton has reached the US. The Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor
Mikhailov, has even threatened to cancel the agreement unless the US position changes. However,
the main problems, which appear to be over-pricing and the lack of agreement between the US
Enrichment Corporation, which would be marketing Russian LEU once it reaches the US, and the
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, were resolved at the time of US Vice-President Al Gore's
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meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in Moscow in June 1995.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
On 15 September 1994, the Arab League Council reaffirmed its previous resolution (of 27 March
1994) and called upon its member-states and the General Secretariat to pursue contacts at all levels
to make the Middle East a region free of all weapons of mass destruction. The call for a Middle
East zone free of WMD was reinforced by the resolution proposed by Russia, the US and the UK
and adopted at the NPT review conference. The UN General Assembly voted for a resolution
sponsored by Pakistan and Bangladesh to reaffirm its support for the concept of a nuclear-weapon-
free zone in South Asia. Only Bhutan, India and Mauritius voted against the resolution and there
were ten abstentions. On 25 March 1995, Cuba, in the presence of the Foreign Minister of Mexico,
the depository government, signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), but as yet has not deposited its instrument
of ratification. Cuba was the last regional state to sign the Treaty.
On 2 June 1995, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) unanimously adopted the draft of
a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Africa. The draft was submitted to the
United Nations on 26 June where it is expected to be approved by the General Assembly.
North Korea
The US and North Korea held negotiations in Geneva between 23 September and 21 October 1994
and signed an Agreed Framework. The key points were that North Korea would:
• not reprocess nor separate plutonium;
• not restart its 5MW reactor;
• freeze construction of two other reactors;
• close and seal its radiochemistry laboratory (considered to be a separation plant) and subject
it to IAEA inspections.
The spent fuel rods unloaded from the 5MW reactor in June 1994 were to remain stored in
the cooling pond until arrangements for its disposal outside North Korea had been arranged. In
return, the US committed itself to:
• organise an international consortium to finance and supply light-water reactors with an
approximate generating capacity of 2.000MW by 2003;
• conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
• provide alternative energy in the form of 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually.
Both sides agreed to work for a nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula and to strengthen the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. When a significant portion of the light-water
reactor is completed, but before nuclear components are delivered, North Korea will come into full
compliance with IAEA safeguards and allow inspections at facilities not covered by the agreed
i
freeze. North Korea sent an official letter on 2 November 1994 notifying the US that specific action
to freeze its nuclear activities had begun.
280 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The Agreed Framework soon ran into trouble when North Korea refused to accept light-water
reactors designed, built and installed by South Korea. The US was equally adamant, as South
Korea was mainly financing the project, that South Korean reactors must be accepted. Three
weeks of meetings were held in Kuala Lumpur in May and June 1995 and on 13 June a joint
statement was released by US Deputy Assistant Secretary, Thomas Hubbard, and North Korean
Vice-President, Kim Gye Gwan, agreeing that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organisation (KEDO) would finance and choose the reactor. Hubbard told the press that North
Korea understood that a South Korean reactor would be chosen and that the prime contractor
would also be South Korean.
Chemical Weapons
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By 1 June 1995, only 29 of the 159 signatory states had ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) leaving 32 states still to sign. The earliest the CWC could have come into force
was two years after it was opened for signature on 13 January 1993. It now needs a further 36
ratifications before coming into force. The Australia Group, an informal forum of states which
abide by an agreed set of export controls, now has 28 members and the Czech Republic, Poland
and Slovakia attended their first meeting in Paris on 29 November 1994. Little progress has been
made either by Russia or the US in the destruction of their large CW stocks. Destruction of US
CW agents continued at the Johnston Atoll facility, but the second facility to be developed at
Tooele, Utah, has been found to have numerous flaws. There is growing opposition to CW
incineration from local populations close to destruction plants. The first major terrorist use of CW
took place in Tokyo on 20 March 1995 when a weak version of the nerve gas sarin was released
at five separate points on the underground railway system. A religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo, is held
responsible for the attacks and raids on their premises discovered sufficient chemicals to produce
5.6 tons of sarin. There were four gas attacks again on railway targets in Japan on 4 July 1995,
two of which released cyanide gas. There have been no reports of copy-cat incidents elsewhere.
Biological Weapons
In September 1994, a special conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (B WC) states was
held to consider the final report of the VEREX group (an ad hoc group of governmental
verification experts). There was little agreement at this conference other than to establish another
ad hoc group to consider 'appropriate measures, including possible verification measures' and
to incorporate these into a legally binding protocol. BW verification is far more problematic than
that for CW. Sufficient BW agent for use by saboteurs can be produced in research laboratories
(which are not prohibited by CWC); BW agents must be produced before protective vaccines can
be made; all equipment and materials needed for BW production are 'dual use' in that they are
equally necessary for other legitimate purposes. Two sessions will be held by the new ad hoc
group in July and in November-Decemberl995.
Missiles
An analysis of the current deployment of ballistic missiles across the world is set out at pp. 281-
84. The composition of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a group of nations
which voluntarily impose mutually agreed export controls on missile technology and equipment,
has not altered in the last 12 months. There are 25 members, and six others have agreed to adhere
to the regime's criteria. The US is now satisfied that Russia is meeting its commitments and so
supports its immediate membership of the MTCR. Ukraine and China are also committed to the
MTCR criteria, but in May 1995 China suspended talks with the US on missile and nuclear issues
in protest against the granting of a US visa to the Taiwanese President.
281
Missile Proliferation
Proliferation, that is to say the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the
missiles capable of delivering them, is one of the world's greatest concerns. This analysis
examines the current deployment of ballistic missiles across the world and looks at the potential
of those known to be under development. It also comments on the efficacy of the regimes and
measures that have been used to attempt to curb missile proliferation.
Missiles are not the only way that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can be delivered. Both
the US and Russia maintain a force of strategic bombers and many NATO and Russian aircraft
can be nuclear-capable. Israel, while having its own Jericho missiles, has often expressed the
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opinion that more damage can be assured by aircraft attack than by missiles (an F-15E has an
11,000kg weapons load compared to the 1,000 kg of aScudSSM). At the height of the Cold War,
nuclear warheads could be delivered by a wide variety of weapon systems: artillery; free-flight
rockets; naval missiles and torpedoes; aircraft bombs; depth-charges; anti-aircraft missiles; and
atomic demolition mines. Iraq was found to have a stockpile of chemical weapon-filled Scud
missiles, aircraft bombs, artillery shells and multi-barrelled launcher rockets. Recently, chemi-
cal weapon (CW) agent was released on the Tokyo underground railway network.
Despite the plethora of delivery means, the ballistic missile, mainly on account of its range,
speed and cost relative to that of a manned aircraft, is afavoured delivery means for proliferating states
and is likely to remain so until a proven anti-ballistic missile defence system has been deployed.
Table 1: Operational Ballistic Missiles and Free-Flight Rockets (excluding Chinese, Russian
and US ICBM and all SLBM)
Range km Missile Designation Payload kgs Country of Origin In Service with
40 Oghab 300 Iran Iran
70 FROG-1 250 USSR Afghanistan, Bosnian
Serbs, Egypt, Libya,
N. Korea, Syria, Yemen
80 Hatf I 500 Pakistan Pakistan
120 SS-21 500 USSR Syria, Yemen
130 Lance 200 US Israel
130 Ching Feng 400 ROC Taipei ROC Taipei
135 ATACMS 450 US US
150 CSS-8/M-7 190 China China, Iran
150 Privthi 1,000 India India (Army)
250 Privthi 500 India India (Air Force)
280 CSS-7/M-11 800 China China (possibly supplied
to Pakistan)
300 Scud-B 1,000 USSR Afghanistan, Egypt,
Iran, Libya, N. Korea,
UAE, Yemen,
480 Hades 400 France France (in store)
500 Scud-C 700 North Korea Iran, N. Korea, Syria
500 SS-23 450 USSR —
600 CSS-6/M-9 500 China China (Syria suspected)
650 Jericho 1 500 Israel Israel
1,500 Jericho 2 500 Israel Israel
2,700 CSS-2 2,500 China China, Saudi Arabia
3,500 SSBS S-3D 1,700 France France
Note: FROG-1 and Scud-B also in service with Belarus, Bulgaria*, Czech Republic*, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and
Ukraine*. Those marked * also have SS-23.
282 MISSILE PROLIFERATION
Although there are a number of arms-control treaties and regimes aimed at eliminating and
restricting ballistic missiles, each is limited in the effect it has on the overall problem of missile
proliferation. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaties at present only limit the
ballistic missiles of Russia and the US and cover intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) (with
a range of over 5,500km) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) (with a range of over
600km). In May 1995, the Chinese tested a mobile missile which is reported to have a range of
8,000km. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty -which banned land-based ballistic and
cruise missiles, regardless of warhead role, with ranges between 500 and 5,500km -again applied
only to the US (and US dual-key missiles manned by the German Air Force) and the successor states
to the Soviet Union. Shortly after the Treaty came into force it was discovered that SS-23 mobile
missiles, which, if Soviet-held, would be covered by the Treaty, had been transferred earlier to
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several of the then Warsaw Pact countries and so were not covered by the INF. As Table 1 shows,
a number of states now possess INF category missiles and the number is likely to grow. The terms
of Iraq's cease-fire agreement bans Iraq from holding missiles with a range of over 150km, a
requirement endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991. Perhaps surprisingly,
the Syrian-Israeli 1973 armistice, while limiting men, tanks and artillery deployed 20km on either
side of the cease-fire line and banning surface-to-air missiles in the zone, did not include any
limitations on surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), despite Syria's use of these in the 1973 war.
The main tool to stem proliferation is supplier constraints; in the missile field this is the task
of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR is a group of 25 nations which
have been invited to work together on a set of agreed self-imposed export controls. A number
of other countries (Brazil, China, Israel, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Ukraine)
which have not yet been invited to join the MTCR have committed themselves to complying with
MTCR guidelines. The US has negotiated abilateral Memorandum of Understanding with Russia
(September 1993) and with Ukraine (April 1994) which formalise their commitment to the MTCR.
The US also held negotiations with China which would have led to the lifting of the sanctions
imposed by the US on China following China's supply of missile components to Pakistan. China
withdrew from these talks as a protest at the granting of a US visa to the President of the Republic
of China (Taipei).
The aim of the MTCR is to control the transfer of delivery vehicles (other than manned aircraft)
capable of delivering nuclear, CW or biological weapon (BW) warheads. The guidelines cover
both complete missile systems and relevant components and technology. The parameters for
control are missiles capable of carrying a payload of at least 500kg to a range of 300km or more.
The MTCR does not therefore ban the transfer of the Russian Scud-B nor, as the Chinese claim,
of their M-11 SSM.
The only alternative to control is, of course, active defence measures. The US is developing
a series of theatre missile defence programmes (see p. 16) and is looking to its allies to become
collaborative parties.
In earlier days countries obtained their missiles from the two superpowers, although the US
only provided these to NATO allies and Israel. On the other hand, the Soviet Union provided a
number of Middle Eastern countries (in addition to the Warsaw Pact) with Frag, SS-21 andScud
SSM. The longest-range missiles transferred were the US Pershing 1A (720km) (but kept under
dual-key control) and the Soviet SS-23 (500km). Neither France nor Israel, which both
developed their own missiles (S-3D and Jericho), have transferred these to other countries. India
and Pakistan are developing indigenous missile systems, primarily to deter each other, but in
India's case also to counter the Chinese missile threat. Missile development and production has
been abandoned by a number of countries, notably Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. There are
now only two known missile-exporting countries, China and North Korea. However, China has
pledged to follow the MTCR guidelines.
It is somewhat bizarre that the end of the Cold War has heightened perceptions of the missile
threat, but if the threat from the former Soviet Union has receded, that from other, perhaps less
MISSILE PROLIFERATION 283
deferrable, areas could result in a direct missile threat to North America and Europe. At present
no missiles owned by states other than the US, Russia or China (and French and British submarine-
launched missiles) can reach European or North American targets. However, that situation could
change in coming years. Currently, missile proliferation directly threatens three areas: the Middle
East; the Indian subcontinent; and North Korea's neighbours.
The Middle East has long faced the threat of missile attack. SSM were used in both the Iran-
Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War, and against Israel in 1973. In the first, Iraq launched 331 Scud
and modified Scud SSM at Iranian cities, while Iran responded by launching 86 similar missiles
plus 253 of the much shorter range (40km) Oghab SSM. During Operation Desert Storm, Iraq
fired 93 missiles at targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Neither country responded in kind, although
they could have done so: Israel with its Jericho series, and Saudi Arabia with its Chinese CSS-
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2 acquired in 1988. Iraq'sScuds were provided by Russia. A total of 819 missiles were delivered,
of which over 300 were modified to the al Hussein variant with a 600km range compared to the
basic Scud-B's 280km range, and ten were modified to the a/ Abbas (or al-Hijara) variant with
a range of 900km. All 819 missiles have been accounted for to the UN Special Committee
(UNSCOM), and all are considered to have been destroyed. Iran's SSM were originally Soviet
ScudB provided by Syria and Libya, but the majority were North Korean versions, most probably
financed by Iran and known as Scud-Mod B and Scud-C, the latter having a 600km range. Iran
can now manufacture its own Scud-C. Since 1992 there have been persistent rumours that Iran
is attempting to buy Chinese M-9 missiles and funding the North Korean No-Dong programme.
As yet, despite other use of CW in the region, CW has not been delivered by missile.
In many cases the Middle East range is not a problem. All of Israel and Kuwait are within
300km of potential hostile launch sites. In the Gulf, 300km-range SSM sited in Iran could reach
Al Jubayl and Dharhan (in Saudi Arabia), Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Muscat; San'a
in Yemen is within 300km of the Saudi border. Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Kirkuk and Basra
can be struck by much shorter range missiles. Other countries with short-range missiles (Scud,
SS-21 Frog) are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, the UAE and Yemen.
A number of ballistic and cruise missiles are being developed by India and Pakistan. At
present only the Indian Army's Privthi( 150km range with 1,000kg payload) and Pakistan's Hatf
1 (80km with 500kg payload) are known to be in service. Both countries have longer-range
missiles probably in the final stages of development. The Air Force version ofPnvf/iihas a range
of 250km with a 500kg payload. India's Agni is reported to have a planned range of up to 2,500km
with a payload greater than 1,000kg: it has been successfully test fired to 1,450km. Pakistan's
Hatf 2 could have a 280km range with a 500kg payload. While the Agni would reach all parts of
Pakistan, and China's strategic missile sites in Qinghai, neither Hatf SSM version could target
Delhi, nor could the Chinese M-ll. It has been suggested that Pakistan is also developing a
600km range Hatf "3. While China has pledged to abide by the MTCR guidelines and so cannot
sell its 600km range M-6 to Pakistan which would threaten Delhi, its long-term policy over
missile control is uncertain. India also has a cruise-missile programme, the Lakshya, but this is
more likely to be a reconnaissance UAV given its small, 200kg payload. However, the
technology is being developed.
North Korea causes the world the most concern. In addition to being strongly suspected of
having a nuclear-weapons programme, it is known to have tested theNo-Dong 1 SSM at a 500km
range, and on 20 February 1995 carried out another test with a missile travelling some 1,500km.
South Korea also has an active arms, including missile, export policy. The No-Dong 1 is
considered to be a further development on the Scud design and could have a range of more than
1,000km. Most analysts consider the No-Dong, estimated to have a 1,000kg payload, to be
relatively inaccurate with a circular error of probability (CEP) of 2,000-4,000 metres. There has
been one report, as yet unconfirmed, that North Korea has up to six No-Dong mobile launchers
operational. More worrying are reports released by the CIA and the US Department of Defense
that North Korea is developing a new series of SSM, not based on Scud technology. These have
been namedTaepo-Dong 1 and 2; one with a2,000km range, and the second with a3,500kmrange.
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Such missiles would require a much higher degree of technology than Scud follow-ons,
particularly regarding their engines, body strength (probably requiring an aluminium alloy) and
guidance systems. There are some doubts as to whether North Korea can meet all these
requirements and the Taepo-Dong series may still be some years away.
North Korean missile advances, and plans for new Chinese missiles reported in The Military
Balance 1994-1995, could provoke other East Asian states into developing their own missiles as
a counter-threat. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all have the technical capability to do so, and
indeed South Korea and Taiwan both have short-range missiles in service and Taiwan is believed
to be developing a missile (the Tien Ma) with a range variously reported as between 600 and
950km. Japan has only a space-launch vehicle programme which it test-fired successfully in
February 1994.
What can be done to halt missile proliferation? Obviously, global treaties banning weapons are
the ideal, but may be unrealistic, with some countries claiming that their national-security situation
precludes joining such a regime. Failing a global ban, aregional treaty could, in the first instance,
help to limit missiles (as the START Treaty limits US and Russian strategic missiles), if not to
ban them (on the lines of the INFTreaty). But it will certainly be necessary to solve the underlying
security problem in any region before expecting to see a weapons ban or limitation regime agreed
to. Greater transparency should also be sought through mechanisms such as the UN Conventional
Arms Register. Supplier controls (i.e., controls on export) at present offer the best answer to
proliferation, but even these are not a foolproof guarantee against proliferation.
Strategic Nuclear Forces: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine
Launchers Warheads/ Total Launchers Launcher Warheads/ Total Warhead Launchers Warheads/ Total Warhead
deployed launchers warheads deployed limit launchers warheads limit deployed launchers warheads limit
Total Ballistic Missiles 1,592 6,430 946 4,962 4,900 1,037 2,453
Bombers
ALCM-equipped Tu-95H16 57 16 912 50 400 40 16 640
TU-95H6 33 6 198 30 240 20 6 120
Tu-160 25 12 300 25 200 20 12 240
GRAND TOTAL 1,731 7,888 1,071 1,600 5,842 6,000 1,117 3,453 3,500
Many delivery systems are dual-capable; the total number in service are shown, even though a high proportion may not be assigned a nuclear role.
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Maximum aircraft loadings are given, although often fewer weapons may be carried. Some loadings differ from those under SALT/START counting rules.
All ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons (SSM and artillery) have been withdrawn to store in Russia and the US. Delivery systems of other states
are no longer listed. All sea-launched weapons (incl SLCM) other than SLBM have been withdrawn from ships, and air-delivered weapons from ships
and shore-based maritime air stations in the US, Russia and NATO. All former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons have been moved to Russia. No nuclear
warheads remain in Kazakhstan.
UNITED STATES
LAND-BASED
Strategic
ICBM
LGM-30F 1966 11,300 8.0 370 14 Mk HC;W-56 1.2MT Guidance and warheads removed.
Minuteman II
LGM-30G
Minuteman III 1980 12,900 11.5 220 531 3 x Mk 12AMIRV; W-78 335KT
LGM-118 1986 11,000 39.5 100 50 10xMk21 MIRV; W-87 300 or 400KT In mod Minuteman silos.
Peacekeeper (MX)
SEA-BASED
Strategic
SLBM
UGM-93A Trident C-4 1980 7,400 15 450 192 8 x Mk 4 MIRV; W-76 100KT Installed in 8 SSBN.
UGM-133A Trident D-5 1989 12,000 28 90 192 8 x Mk 5 MIRV; W-76/-88 3 00-475 KT Installed in 8 SSBN (W-88
production halted).
Tactical' (all nuclear warheads withdrawn from ships/submarines)
SLCM
BGM-109A Tomahawk* 1983 2,500 n.k. 80 TLAM-N; W-80 200KT 78 submarines, 66 surface
combatants have launchers
(350 warheads produced).
Year deployed Radius Max Weapon Launcher Max ordnance load' Remarks
of action speed load Total
(km)" (mach) (000 kg)
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AIR
Strategic
Long-range bombers"
B-52G 1959 4,600 0.95 29.5 0 Internal: 12 bombs (B-61/-83) or 8 148 ac awaiting conversion/
Harpoon elimination.
B-52H 1962 6,140 0.95 29.5 93 Attributed with 20 warheads: bombs, Plus 1 test ac.
SRAM or ALCM (8 internal, 12 external) 2
B-1B 1986 4,580 1.25 61.0 93 Internal: 16 SRAM or 16 B-61 bombs Plus 2 test ac. Not equipped for n
ALCM, and to be re-roled as
conventional bbrs. §
B-2A 1993 5,840 l(-) £18 Internal: 16 SRAM; or 8 SRAM plus Plus 6 test ac. o
8 B-61/-83 bombs; or 16 bombs
>
Tactical' a
Land-based m
F-111E/F 1967 1,750 2.2/2.5 13.1 95 3 bombs (B-61) Plus 3 in store. a
F-4E 1969 840 2.4 5.9 20 3 bombs (B-61) Plus some 216 in store. m
F-16 1979 550/930 2+ 5.4 1,253 1 bomb (B-61) Plus 347 in store.
m
70
Carrier-borne
A-6E 1963 1,250 0.9 8.1 127 3 bombs (B-61) m
F/A-18 1982 850 2.2 7.7 880 2 bombs (B-61) Incl 262 USMC. x
n
VI
Range Missile Munition/ Yield per
(km)" total warhead warhead1'
ALCM
AGM-86B' 1982 2,400 0.66 - 1,200 W-80 170-200KT
AGM-129 ACM 1991 3,000 n.k. 300 W-80 170-200KT Production limited to 460.
ASM
AGM-69A (SRAM) 1972 56 (low) 3.5 - 1,000 W-69 170KT
220 (high- altitude) to
oo
For notes, see p. 293.
to
BOMBS" 00
1
Type Yield per warhead ' Weapon stockpile Remarks oo
B-61 (strategic) 100-500KT(s) 900 In-flight yield selection and fusing, hard target penetration.
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Jaguar A 1974 850 1.1 4.75 157 1 or 2 AN-52 bombs Fr (93) (no longer in nuclear role),
UK (54 plus 16 in store).
Tornado IDS 1981 1,390 0.92 6.8 394 n.k. Ge (192), It (70 plus 21 in store),
UK (167 plus 21 in store).
Carrier-borne Z
Super Etendard 1980 650 0.98 2.1 38 ASMP Fr, plus 19 in store. n
Sea Harrier 1980 460-750 0.98 2.3 20 1 (or 2) WE-177 bombs UK, plus 15 in store. r
m
>
n
Range Munition/ Yield per
(km)" warhead warhead''
05
r
tn
ASM a
ASMP 1986 80 (low) 2 0.2 el 00 300KT Fr. m
250 (high)
Bombs m
AN-22 15, 300KT Fr.
WE-177 10, 200, 400KT UK
n
NUCLEAR-ARMED FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS m
Year Range Throw- CEP
deployed (km)" weight* (m)c
LAND-BASED
Strategic
ICBM
SS-17(RS-16) mod 3 1982 10,000 25.5 400 10 4 x MIRV 500KT Russia.
Spanker
to
00
to
Year Range Throw- CEP Launcher Munition/ Yield per
o
deployed (km)" weight6 (m)c total warhead warhead"7 Remarks
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SS-18(RS-20) mod 4 1982 11,000 88 250 10 x MIRV 500KT 48 Kazakhstan, 174 Russia.
222
Satan mod 5 _ £9,000 88 n.k. 10 x MIRV 750KT
SS-19(RS-18) mod 3 1982 10,000 43.5 300 250 6 x MIRV 550KT 160 Russia, 90 Ukraine.
Stiletto
SS-24 (RS-22) 1987-8 10,000 40.5 £200 92 10 x MIRV 100KT 36 rail-based, Russia; 56
Scalpel silo-based; 10 Russia,
46 Ukraine. Z
SS-25 (RS-12M) 1985-6 10,500 10 £200 354 single RV 750KT Road-mobile. 336 Russia, G
Sickle 18 Belarus. n
Artillery"
2A36 152mm towed 1978 27.0 n.k. 430 2-5 KT n
2S5 152mm SP 1980 27.0 n.k. 398 2-5KT ra
D-20 152mm towed 1955 17.4 n.k. 293 2KT
2S3 152mm SP 1972 27.0 n.k. 980 under 5KT
2S7 203mm SP 1975 18+ n.k. 105 2-5KT
2S4 240mm SP mor 1975 12.7 n.k. 9 n.k.
SAM
SH-11 mod Galosh 1983-4 320 _ — 36 n.k.
SH-08 Gazelle 1984 80 _ _ 64 10KT
SA-10 Grumble' 1981 100 _ _ 1,750 n.k. } Deployed Moscow Only
SA-5 Gammon' 1967 300 500 n.k.
For notes, seep. 293.
Year Range Throw- CEP Launcher Munition/
Category and type deployed (km)" weight* (m)' total ' warhead Yield Remarks
SEA-BASED
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Strategic
SLBM
SS-N-8 Sawfly mod 1 1972 7,800 11.0 1,500 single RV 800KT
mod 2 1973 9,100 11.0 900 ]\ 224 2MRV 800KT In 19SSBN.
SS-N-18 mod 1 1977 6,500 16.5 1,400 3MIRV 20 KT In 16SSBN.
Stingray mod 2 1977 8,000 16.5 900 [ 208 single RV 450KT 7 warheads originally
J
mod 3 1978 6,500 16.5 900 7MIRV 100KT attributed: in START, z
counted as 3. n
t-
SS-N-20 Sturgeon 1981 8,300 25.5 500 120 10MIRV 100KT In 6 SSBN. m
>
70
SS-N-23 Skiff 1985 8,300 28.0 900 112 4MIRV 100KT In 7 SSBN. n
>
Tactical (all warheads withdrawn from ships/submarines) >
CO
SLCM
r"
SS-N-3 Shaddock? 1962 450 - n.a. 4 — 350KT In 1 CG.
SS-N-7 Starbrighf 1968 n.a. n.a. 16 - 200KT In 2 SSGN. ea
SS-N-9 Siren' 1968-9 100 n.a. 186 - 200KT In 31 corvettes. o
SS-N-12 Sandbox 1973 550 n.a. 56 - 350KT In 1 SSGN, 3 CG. a
SS-N-19 Shipwreck' 1980 550 - n.a. 380 - 500KT In 12 SSGN, 4 CGN, 1 CVV <
1987 3,000 el28 200KT
m
SS-N-21 Sampson 150 - In 3 SSGN, 17 SSN (e4 per
SSN).
a
SS-N-22 Sunburn' 1981 400 n.k. 284 _ 200KT In 1 CG 17 DDG, 29 corvettes s
SS-NX-24 - n.k. el2 - n.k. In trials SSGN. n
m
ASW
SS-N-14 Silex* 1974 55 n.a. 226 1-5KT In 1 CGN, 15 CG, 26 frigates.
SS-N-15 Starfish 1982 45 n.k. n.k. about 5KT In 26 SSN.
Type 53-68 HWT 1970 14 - n.k. torpedo 20KT Usable from all 533mm TT.
Type 65 HWT 1981 50 - _ n.k. torpedo 20KT Usable from all 650mm TT.
Strategic
Long-range bombers
Tu-95 Bear A/B 5,690 0.9 11.3 2 Ukraine in store.
BearG 1956 5,690 0.9 11.3 45 4 bombs/1 and 2 AS-4 ASM Russia plus 8 test ac mark n.k.
Bear H6 33 6AS-15ALCM 28 Russia, 5 Ukraine.
BearH16 57 16AS-15ALCM 37 Russia, 20 Ukraine.
Tu-160 Blackjack 1988 7,300 2.3 16.3 25 12AS-15ALCM 6 Russia, 19 Ukraine plus 6 test ac.
Z
c
Medium-range bombers' n
Tu-22 Blinder 1962 1,500 1.4 10 10 1 AS-4 ALCM, 1 bomb 10 Navy (plus 60 in store). tn
Tu-22M Backfire 1974 4,430 1.92 12 220 1-2 AS-4/-16 ALCM, 2 bombs Incl 90 Navy (plus 30 in store). >
Tactical' n
Land-based
MiG-27 Flogser D/J 1971 390/600 1.7 4.5 50 2 bombs >
CO
Su-24 Fencer 1974 320/1,130 2.3 8 570 2 bombs Incl 70 Navy. ca
Maritime ASW' o
Tu-142 Bear F 1972 1,510 0.83 10 50 2 bombs 8 hrs endurance at radius of action.
11-38 May 1970 1,700 0.64 7 36 £2 bombs 8 hrs endurance at radius of action; <
rn
total endurance 15 hrs 73
Be-12 Mail 1965 600 0.5 10 65 2 bombs 8 hrs endurance at radius of action; <
total endurance 12 hrs to
Range Weapon n
(km)" total Yield" a
C/3
ALCM
AS-4 Kitchen 1962 300 3.3 n.k. n.k. 1MT
AS-6 Kingfish 1977 300 3 n.k. n.k. 350KT-1MT
AS-15 Kent 1984 1,600 0.6 n.k. n.k. 250KT
AS-16 Kickback 1989 200 n.k. n.k. n.k. 350KT
CHINA
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LAND-BASED
Strategic
ICBM
CSS-4 (DF-5) 1981 15,000 n.k. 7 single RV 5MT
CSS-3 (DF-4) 1978/9 7,000 n.k. 10 single RV 3MT
IRBM Z
c
CSS-2 (DF-3) 1970 2,700 n.k. 60 single RV 2MT . n
CSS-5 (DF-21) 1983 1,800 n.k. elO single RV 250KT m
>
SEA-BASED 7
n
Strategic >
SLBM >
CSS-N-3 (JL-1) 1983/42,:200-3,000 n.k. 12 e2MT Installed in 1 SSBN.
m
Radius Max Weapon Maximum a
m
of action speed load ordnance r
<
(km)0 (mach) (000kg) load m
AIR <
Strategic8
PI
Medium-range bombers
X
H-6 1968-9 2,180 0.91 9uptol45 £2 bombs n.k. incl 25 Navy. n
c
Chinese tactical nuclear weapons have been reported, but no details are available. m
CO
Sources: include Cochrane. Arkin and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. I (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, * CEP (circular error of probability) = the radius of a circle around a target within which there is a SOW probability
1984); Cochrane. Arkin. Norris and Hoenig. Nuclear Weapons Databook. vol. II (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. that a weapon aimed at that target will fall.
1987); Hansen. US Nuclear Weapons, The Secret History (New York: Orion, 1988); Bulletin of the Atomic * Yields vary greatly: figures given are estimated maxima. KT range = under 1MT; MT range = over 1MT. Yield, shown as
Scientists (various issues); Treaty between the US and USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 1-10KT, means the yield is between these limits. Yields shown as 1 or 10KT mean that either yield can be selected.
Offensive Arms: Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. V (Boulder. CO: Westview, * Dual-capable.
1
1994). Numbers cited are totals of theoretically nuclear-capable pieces. Not all will be certified for nuclear use. and in
practice relatively few are likely to be in a nuclear role at any one time. All artillery pieces Jisted arc dual-capable.
Notes; * It is not possible to give launcher numbers as the vertical launch system {VLS) can mount a variety of missiles in
* Ranges and aircraft radii of action in km; for nautical miles, multiply by 0.54. A missile's range may be reduced by any of its tubes.
up to 25 ft if max payload is carried. Radii of action for ac are in normal configuration, at optimum altitude, with a * All bombs have five option fusing: freefall airburst or surface burst, parachute retarded airburst or surface burst, and
standard warload. without in-flight refuelling. When two values are given, the first refers to a low-low-low mission retarded delayed surface burst.
profile and the second to a high-low-high profile. ' External loads are additional to internal loads. K)
* Throw-weight concerns the weight of post-boost vehicle (warhead(s). guidance systems, penetration aids and decoys). ' Except for French and UK national weapons, nuclear warheads held in US custody.
No definition of the term is given in the START Treaty document. Throw-weight is expressed in terms of kg (100s). * No nuclear warheads held on Canadian, Danish. Norwegian. Spanish or Portuguese territory.
294
This section provides a brief update on all arms-control developments, other than those concerning
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles for the period June 1994-July
1995.
equal numbers of certain armaments. The Treaty came into force on 17 July 1992 and the
elimination of equipment above Treaty limits is due to be completed by 17 November 1995. The
extent to which elimination has taken place will become known on 19 August (90 days before the
end of the reduction period) when signatories must notify their total holding of each type of treaty-
limited equipment (TLE). This notification comes just too late to be included in this edition of The
Military Balance, but data showing the position at the end of 1994 is set out on [page xx]. By the
end of 1994, all except two countries had completed the reduction of their combat aircraft and only
one still had more attack helicopters than its quota. Rather more ground-force equipment remained
to be eliminated although few countries had more than a couple of hundred of any one type of TLE
still to be destroyed. However, Romania had just over 2,000 TLE still to be eliminated. Belarus
had just over 1,000 TLE above its limit when President Aleksandr Lukashenka announced he was
suspending elimination on economic grounds.
The only other major problem likely to frustrate the full implementation of the Treaty is
Russia's stance on the flanks issue. This problem is discussed in detail on [page xx].
The Treaty's first review conference is to be held in May 1996, and it is hoped that Russia's
request for changes can be held over until then. New rules will have to be formulated to take
account of NATO enlargement, but otherwise there appears to be no inclination to expand or alter
the Treaty in any way.
i
Multilateral Export Controls
Progress will soon be made on establishing a follow-on body to the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) which was disbanded in March 1994 before agreement
296 OTHER ARMS-CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS
could be reached on a successor. Delay has been caused by disagreement over whether Russia
should be a founder-member, as France and the UK insist, or not. On 30 June 1995, the US and
Russia reached agreement on the cessation of Russian arms exports to Iran and the US dropped
its objection to Russia being a founder-member. In September in Paris, 23 nations will meet to
begin establishing a new regime.
summit in May 1995 when two new criteria for defining Theatre Missile Defences (TMD), which
are allowed under ABM, were agreed. 'TMD will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear
forces of the other side' and 'will not be tested to give such systems that capability'. While both
sides reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM Treaty, the technical details defining the difference
between TMD and strategic missile defence are far from agreed, and the US Congress fears this
demarcation process will constrain eventual deployments of strategic missile defences to protect
the US. The 1994 Defense Authorisation Bill (DAB) requires the US President to submit ABM
Treaty-related agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. A number of Senators reminded
President Clinton of the DAB and warned him of their objections to any strengthening of the ABM
Treaty before he went to Moscow. On 14 June, the US House of Representatives added $628
million to the Administration's request for missile-defence funding and directed the Administra-
tion to deploy an anti-missile system at the earliest practical date.
Mines
The UN estimates that there could be as many as 100 million land-mines in 64 countries which
kill or wound over 25,000 people a year. Many more mines are laid each year than international
efforts are currently managing to lift. Attempts to cope with the problem focus on two separate
objectives: demining; and negotiations to ban anti-personnel mines.
Demining
In December 1994, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling on member-states to
assist in mine clearance. The UN is supporting programmes for mine clearance in Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Mozambique and the former Yugoslavia, employing some 4,800. A major programme
is under way in Angola, but the operation in Somalia had to be withdrawn. Mine clearance now
features largely in the mandates for most new UN peacekeeping forces. The UN-sponsored a
conference on demining in Geneva from 5 to 7 July 1995 with two aims. First, it aimed to keep
the problems of demining in the public eye and called on governments to pledge money to the UN
Demining Trust Fund. However, only $21.6m was pledged against the target of $75m. Second,
it enabled demining experts from around the world to meet and discuss technical and organisa-
tional matters. During the last 12 months, the UN and other agencies lifted some 150,000 mines,
but during the same period perhaps as many as 2 million were laid in Bosnia and the North
Caucasus region of Russia.
Arms Control
At the moment, the use of land-mines is covered by the UN Convention on Prohibitions and
Restrictions on the use of certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effect (UNWC).
Protocol 11 of the UNWC lays down that land-mines and booby-traps should not be used
indiscriminately or against civilians (sadly, this is just how they are used most). Remote-delivered
OTHER ARMS-CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS 297
(i.e., sub-munitions weapons) mines must have a neutralising mechanism. After hostilities end,
information must be exchanged on the location of land-mines. Only 42 states (out of 185 UN
members) have ratified the UNWC. A UNWC review conference will be held in September 1995
at which land-mines will be given a high priority.
In December 1963, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution calling for a moratorium
on exporting land-mines. The US declared a moratorium on exporting anti-personnel mines in
1992 and extended this for three more years on 30 November 1993. Moratoria, of differing lengths
and conditions, have been introduced in the following countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Greece, Israel, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain and the UK.
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Conventional Forces in Europe to
00
Manpower and TLE: current holdings and CFE limits of the forces of the CFE signatories
(Current holdings are derived from data declared as at 15 December 1994 and so may differ from The Military Balance listing)
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Holding Limit Holding Limit Holding Limit Holding Limit Holding Limit Holding Limilt
Budapest/Tashkent : Group
Armenia 52,686 32,682 102 220 285 220 225 285 7 50 6 100
Azerbaijan 86,849 70,000 285 220 835 220 343 285 18 50 58 100
Belarus 98,525 100,000 2,348 1,800 3,046 2,600 1,579 1,615 78 80 348 260
Georgia' - 40,000 39 220 49 220 27 285 1 50 2 100
Moldova 11,899 20,000 0 210 190 210 129 250 0 50 27 50
Russia'' 998,811 1,450,000 6,696 6,400 11,806 11,480 6,240 6,415 872 890 3,283 3,450
Ukraine 475,822 450,000 4,768 4,080 5,187 5,050 3,407 4,040 270 330 1,276 1,090
Bulgaria 103,132 104,000 1,786 1,475 2,077 2,000 1,917 1,750 44 67 273 235
Czech Republic 67,702 93,333 1,011 957 1,451 1,367 893 767 36 50 215 230
Hungary 73,638 100,000 1,016 835 1,598 1,700 909 840 39 108 170 180
Poland 262,770 234,000 2,017 1,730 1,590 2,150 1,879 1,610 80 130 412 460
Romania 198,728 230,248 2,011 1,375 2,505 2,100 2,449 1,475 16 120 400 430
Slovakia 52,015 46,667 644 478 749 683 632 383 19 25 116 115
Peacekeeping Operations
UNITED NATIONS
If anything, the last 12 months have been even more depressing for UN peacekeepers than the
previous year. During this period the mission in Somalia has been abandoned, and there are
growing frustrations in -and serious consideration of withdrawal from- both Bosniaand Croatia.
But two missions have been completed successfully -those to El Salvador and Mozambique. One
new, though small, mission has been instituted to assist the peacekeepers of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) in Tajikistan, and deployment has begun on aremandated mission to
Angola. The UN has also assumed responsibility for the US-led multinational force in Haiti.
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lands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia,
Sweden, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Former Yugoslavia
United Nations Peace Force HQ
A series of UNSC Resolutions (981-983) were adopted on 31 March 1995 which, in addition to
extending the mandate for UN forces in the former Yugoslavia until 30 November 1995, altered
the name of the force in Croatia to the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
(UNCRO) and of that in the FYROM to the United Nations Preventative Deployment Force
(UNPREDEP). The headquarters controlling all three forces remains in Zagreb.
Strength: 7,506 plus 107 civil police (includes HQs at Zagreb and Pleso, Liaison Office in
Belgrade and units supporting all UN operations in the former Yugoslavia).
Composition:
Pleso: Finnish guard unit, Swedish HQ coy, Canadian log bn, French log bn, Netherlands sigs
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 303
authorised to control access to the UNPAs, to ensure that they remain demilitarised, and to monitor
the functioning of the local police to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of human
rights. Outside the UNPAs, UNCRO military observers will verify the withdrawal of all Yugoslav
Army (JA) and Serbian forces from Croatia, other than those disbanded and demobilised there.
When the UNSC renewed the mandate in October 1993, it also adopted Resolution 871 which
authorises UNPROFOR, 'in carrying out its mandate in the Republic of Croatia, acting in self-
defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to ensure its security and
freedom of movement'.
UNSC Resolution 981, which established UNCRO, added to the UN's tasks in Croatia that of
'assisting in controlling, by monitoring and reporting the crossing of military personnel,
equipment, supplies and weapons over international borders between Croatia and Bosnia
Herzegovina and Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)'.
Adopted on 28 April 1995, UNSC Resolution 990 authorised the deployment of 8,750 troops in
Croatia, some 5,000 fewer than were deployed at the time. By 1 June 1995, the forces had not been
reduced, nor had monitors been stationed on Croatia's borders. Following the Croat recapture of
western Slavonia and Krajina in August 1995, the UN began to withdraw some of its national
contingents.
Strength: 12,146 plus 418 civil police.
Composition:
Sector North: 3,532, inf bn from Denmark, Jordan, Poland and Ukraine. Sector South: 3,915,
inf bn from Canada, Czech Republic, Jordan, Kenya. Sector East: 1,731, inf bn from Belgium
and Russia. Sector West: 2,804, inf bn from Argentina, Jordan and Nepal.
The Resolution also authorised the deployment of 50 additional military observers. When it was clear
that UNPROFOR was not strong enough to deploy sufficient forces to the safe areas, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 844 authorising a reinforcement of 7,600 troops for their protection.
The Resolution reaffirmed the use of air power to protect UNPROFOR troops, if necessary.
On 9 February 1994, NATO, in compliance with a request from the UN Secretary-General,
issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian-Serbs: all heavy weapons had either to be withdrawn 20km
from Sarajevo or, if left within the area, placed under UN supervision. Any uncontrolled weapons
found in the area after midnight on 20 February, or weapons found anywhere else that had fired
on Sarajevo, would be subject to air attack. On the same day, the UN commander in Bosnia
arranged a cease-fire in Sarajevo that also included the withdrawal or control of the heavy weapons
of both sides and the interposition of UN troops between the two factions. On 18 March, the
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report was accepted. UN Resolution 795 authorised the deployment of an infantry battalion and
observers to monitor the FYROM' s borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
and also to act as a deterrent against attacks on the FYROM. On 18 June 1993, the Security
Council authorised the reinforcement of the Macedonian Command by the United States.
Strength: 1,127 plus 23 civil police.
Composition: 1 Nordic bn (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), 1 US bn.
Note: Strength figures taken from UNPF Fact Sheet, June 1995.
in July 1992. During the three years to 8 April 1995 when Sarajevo airport was closed to aid
flights, some 153,412 tons of stores had been delivered in 12,320 aircraft sorties, and over 900
sick and wounded had been flown out. Some 20 countries had contributed aircraft to the airlift.
In February 1993, the operation was extended to include parachute drops of supplies, originally
to the besieged Muslims in enclaves in eastern Bosnia (Gorazde, Srebenica, Zepa) and later to
other towns that road convoys could not reach (Maglaij, Mostar, Tarcin, Tesanj). Aircraft from
France, Germany and the US have flown 2,800 sorties dropping some 17,900 tons of stores.
Operation Deny Flight: UN Resolution 781 declared a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina in
October 1992 monitored by NATO early-warning aircraft. UNSC Resolution 816, adopted on 31
March 1993, authorised enforcement of the zone and action in the event of violations. NATO
aircraft were deployed to Italy and the operation began on 12 April 1993. UNSC Resolution 836
of 10 June 1993 extended UNPROFOR's mandate to include monitoring cease-fires in the safe
areas and authorised the use of air-power to support UNPROFOR in and around them, while
NATO agreed to provide the necessary air support. Land-based and carrier-borne aircraft from
France, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the US, together with aircraft from NATO's
multinational airborne early-warning force, have flown a total of 60,890 aircraft sorties between
12 April 1993 and 5 July 1995 consisting of 21,854 close air support; 21,334 air defence; and
19,942 reconnaissance, airborne early-warning, in-flight refuelling and other support sorties. The
composition of the force is given under Italy on p. 55.
Operation Sharp Guard: UN resolutions established an embargo on the provision of weapons and
military equipment to Yugoslavia (713 of 1991) and a general trade embargo, with the exception
of medical and food supplies, on Serbia and Montenegro (757 of 1992). UNSC Resolutions 787
of 1992 and 820 of 1993 authorised implementation and enforcement of the embargo. Until June
1993, two separate naval forces, one under NATO control and the other under the Western
European Union (WEU), enforced the embargo; now naval ships from 14 nations are operating
in the Adriatic as part of Combined Task Force 440, formed in June 1993. From 22 November
1992-1 June 1995,52,277 merchant vessels were challenged, 4,099 boarded and 1,137 diverted
and inspected in port. The forces currently deployed onOperation Sharp Guard are shown under
Italy on p. 55.
has been less cooperative and the Commission has been unable to obtain a credible account of
Iraq's past military biological activities. The Commission was able to report that the systems for
monitoring and verification were in place and the system was operational. It also reported that Iraq
had cooperated fully in setting up the monitoring systems. On 4 August 1995, Iraq handed over
a 530-page document concerning its biological-weapons programme, which UNSCOM specialists
are now examining.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for the nuclear aspects of
Iraq's disarmament and, since August 1994, it has maintained a permanent presence in Iraq. In
April 1995, the IAEA presented its seventh report on its monitoring and verification programme.
In the period from November 1994-May 1995, over 160 inspections took place, many on a no-
notice basis. Environmental monitoring is regularly conducted as well. The IAEA is confident that
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OTHER MISSIONS
Peacekeeping missions not under UN control are listed under this heading. Available information
on the mandates, strengths and compositions of ECOMOG in Liberia and the peacekeeping forces
deployed by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is still too insufficient to list here,
but known troop contributions are listed in the relevant countries' entries.
a monitoring mission, the IOPG was expanded and renamed the High Level Planning Group
(HLPG). The work of the HLPG has advanced well and a number of reconnaissance visits to
Nagorno-Karabakh have taken place. There is a provisional outline plan to establish a minimum
force of three battalions and three independent companies along the current line of contact
including the Lachin Corridor, and then to supervise the withdrawal of troops to the agreed
boundaries. No action has yet been taken to earmark forces for the mission, nor has a name for
the force been chosen. The delay in implementing the plan is due to a lack of consensus among the
parties on the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
the subsequent withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai. Its task is to verify force levels in the zones
in which forces are limited by the treaty, and to ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait
ofTiran.
Strength: 1,950.
Composition: Units from Australia (HQ unit), Colombia (inf), Fiji (inf), France (FW avn),
Hungary, Italy (naval coastal patrol), New Zealand (trg), Uruguay (engr and tpt), the US (inf and
log). Staff Officers from Canada and Norway.
(kg) (km)
Low High
Abbreviations:
Role: Armament:
BBR Bomber (exclus ively) AAM Air-to-air missile
CAS Close air support (battlefield operational) ALCM Air-launched cruise missile
FGA Ground attack aircraft, interdiction, counter-air ASM Air-to-surface missile
roles BMB Free-fall bomb
FTR Fighter, air defence/air superiority aircraft CBU Cluster bomb
LTATTK Weapons trainer, capable of employment in CNN Cannon
ground attack (normally in low-intensity GBM Guided bomb
operations) GUN Gun40mm/105mni i
MRCA Multi-role combat aircraft MG Machine gun
NUC Nuclear NUC BMB Free-fall nuclear bomb
STRIKE Aircraft with primary nuclear role RKT Rocket
STRATBBR Deployed in strategic nuclear role SMN Sea mines
SRAM Short-range air-to-ground missile
COMBAT AIRCRAFT: KEY CHARACTERISTICS 309
Notes:
* Cruising speed: Values shown arecruising speed for maximum range. This reflects normal operational practice. In the
low-level approach to a surface target, the speed selected (penetration speed) would represent a compromise between the
demands of safe operation of the aircraft and the need to confound air-defence radar and missiles. As long as the pilot is directly
controlling the aircraft, it is probable that penetration speed at heights of less than 61 metres will not greatly exceed 1,111 km/
hr. Maximum speed would be used in emergency only. Speeds are shown for low- and high-level operation where appropriate.
5
Performance: Entries under this heading indicate important aspects of the aircraft's capability. Examples are: the ability
to refuel in flight; vertical take-off; and landing performance.
* Equipment: Broad indications are given of the nature of equipment fitted to the various aircraft. Only categories of
equipment which are relevant to the performance of the primary task are shown.
(km/hr)
Low High
Abbreviations:
Performance: Equipment:
CARRIER Capable of operation from aircraft carriers ATV All light television
FR In-flight refuelling capability CWAS Computerised weapon-aiming system
ST Stealth DLK Data-link equipment
STOL Short take-off and landing ECM Electronic countermeasures (active)
STOVL Short take-off, vertical landing ESM Electronic support measures (passive)
Dash Capable of supersonic flight for a relativelji nR Imaging infra-red equipment
short ime INS Inertia! navigation system
VG Variable geometry ('swing-wing' aircraft) IR Infra-Red radiation detecting equipment
hrs Total Endurance, see note 3 above LSR Laser target-maker, or laser rangefinder
MMR Multi-mode fighter radar; navigation and
weapon-aiming functions
PDR Pulse-doppler radar; effective agaiast low-flying
fast targets
RDR Basic fighter radar, primarily for weapon-aiming
TFR Terrain-following/terrain-avoidance radar
310 COMBAT AIRCRAFT: KEY CHARACTERISTICS
Notes:
' Name: NATO designators for aircraft of Russian/Chinese manufacture are given in quotation marks (e.g. 'Fishbed').
1
Payload: For bomber and attack aircraft, weights are given for maximum warload, with stores on all external hard points.
For air defence aircraft, the numbers of air-to-air missiles which can be carried is shown.
5
Radius of action: The figures given are aircraft in normal configuration, with a standard warload, without in-flight refuel-
ling. When appropriate, data are given for performance at low altitude (less than 300 metres) and at high (more than 11,000
metres). For aircraft which are operated mainly in one or the other of these altitude bands, such as fighter aircraft (high altitude)
or fighter ground attack (low altitude), the appropriate single value is shown. When two values are given, the 'low' radius refers
to a low-low-low mission profile and the 'high' value to a high-low-high profile. The times in parentheses represent patrol
capability at the radius of action.
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Abbreviations:
Role: Armament:
BBR Bomber (exclusively) AAM Air-to-air missile
CAS Close air support (battlefield operational) ALCM Air-launched cruise missile
FGA Ground attack aircraft, interdiction, counter-air ASM Air-to-surface missi le
roles BMB Free-fall bomb
FTR Fighter, air defence/air superiority aircraft CBU Cluster bomb
LTATTK Weapons trainer, capable of employment i n CNN Cannon
ground attack (normally in low-intensity GBM Guided bomb
operations) GUN 40mm/105mm
MRCA Multi-role combat aircraft MG Machine gun
NUC Nuclear NDC Nuclear depth charge
STRIKE Aircraft with primary nuclear role NUC Nuclear
STRAT BBR Deployed in strategic nuclear role NUC BMB Free-fall nuclear bomb
RKT Rocket
SMN Sea mines
SRAM Short-range air-to-ground missile
COMBAT AIRCRAFT: KEY CHARACTERISTICS 311
Notes:
4
Cruising speed: Values shown are cruising speed for maximum range. This reflects normal operational practice. In the
low-level approach to a surface target, the speed selected (penetration speed) would represent a compromise between the
demands of safe operation of the aircraft and the need to confound air defence radar and missiles. As long as the pilot is directly
controlling the aircraft, it is probable that penetration speed at heights of less than 61 metres will not greatly exceed 1,111 km/
hr. Maximum speed would be used in emergency only. Speeds are shown for low- and high-level operation, where appropriate.
5
Performance: Entries under this heading indicate important aspects of the aircraft's capability. Examples are: the ability
to refuel in flight; vertical take-off and landing performance.
* Equipment: Broad indications are given of the nature of equipments fitted to the various aircraft. Only categories of
equipment which are relevant tothe performance of the primary task are shown.
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Abbreviations
Performance: Equipment:
CARRIER Capable of operation from aircraft carriers ATV All light television
FR In-flight refuelling capability CWAS Computerised weapon-aiming system
ST Stealth DLK Data-link equipment
STOL Short take-off and landing ECM Electronic countermeasures (active)
STOVL Short take-off, vertical landing ESM Electronic support measures (passive)
Dash Capable of supersonic flight fora relatively 1IR Imaging infra-red equipment
short time INS Inertial navigation system
VG Varianle geometry ('swing-wing' aircraft) IR Infra-red radiation detecting equipment
hrs Total endurance, see note 3 above LSR Laser target-maker, or laser rangefinder
MMR Multi-mode fighter radar; navigation and
weapon-aiming functions
PDR Pulse-doppler radar; effective against low-flying
fast targets
RDR Basic fighter radar, primarily for weapon-aiming
TFR Terrain-following/terrain-avoidance radar
312
can be more easily achieved with the availability of automatic-data-processing-assisted fire control and autonomous navigation systems.
6
Maximum range: This is given in metres and is the range achieved by the furthest-reaching projectile for that equipment,
often an RAP. It should be noted that RAP are only used when essential, as they are far more expensive than normal HE rounds.
7
Rates of fire: Two examples are given, in rounds per minute: one for sustained rates, which can be maintained for considerable
periods of time; and one for maximum or burst rates, which can only be sustained for short periods at intervals. For MRL we have
shown the number of tubes mounted and the time taken to reload aftera complete salvo has been fired; this data is marked with an asterisk.
* Ammunition natures: The abbreviations used are:
NUC = nuclear; HE = high-explosive; RAP = rocket-assisted projectile; FRAG = fragmentation; APGREN = anti-personnel grenade
(sub-munition); AP MINE = anti-personnel mine (sub-munition); ATK MINE = anti-tank mine (sub-munition); ERBS = extended-
range bomblet shell; CW = chemical warfare agent; HEAT = high-explosive anti-tank; HESH = high-explosive sqash-head; SMK
= smoke; ILL = illuminating; MKR = marker; ICM = improved conventional munition.
* Ammunition holdings: Ammunition holdings are only given on the SP chassis or the towing vehicle. Where dedicated ammunition
vehicles are provided foreach gun, the relevant holding is shown inbrackets. Holdings are often reinforced by 'dumping' particularly in
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i
318 DESIGNATIONS OF AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS
i
CH-54 Tarhe US Sikorsky KH-4 (Bell 47) Japan/US Kawasaki/
CH-113 (CH-46) Bell
320 DESIGNATIONS OF AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS
SA-330
MH-53 (CH-53) SA-341/-342 Gazelle France Aerospatiale
Mi-1 'Hare' Russia Mil SA-360 Dauphin France Aerospatiale
Mi-2 'Hoplite' Russia Mil SA-365 Dauphin II
Mi-4 'Hound' Russia Mil (SA-360)
Mi-6 'Hook' Russia Mil Scout {Wasp) UK Westland
Mi-8 'Hip' Russia Mil SE-3I30 (SA-318)
Mi-14 'Hate' Russia Mil SE-3I6 (SA-316)
Mi-17 'Hip' Russia Mil Sea King [SH-3] UK Westland
Mi-24 'Hind' Russia Mil SH-2 Sea Sprite US Kaman
Mi-25 'Hind' Russia Mil SH-3 {Sea King) US Sikorsky
Mi-26 'Halo' Russia Mil SH-34 (S-58)
Mi-28 'Havoc' Russia Mil SH-57 Bell 206
Mi-35 (Mi-25) SH-60 Sea Hawk (UH-60)
NAS-332 AS-332 Indon/ Nurtanio/ Sioux (Bell 47) UK Westland
France Aerospatiale TH-50 Esquilo (AS55O)
NB-412 Bell 412 Indon/US Nurtanio/ TH-55 Hughes 269
Bell TH-57 Sea Ranger
NBo-105 Bo-105 Indon/ Nurtanio/ (Bell 206)
Ge MBB TH-67 Creek (Bell 206B-3) Canada Bell
NH-300 (Hughes 300) Italy/US Nardi/MD UH-1 Iroquois (Bell 204/205)
NSA-330 (SA-330) Indon/ Nurtanio/ UH-12 (OH-23) US Hiller
France Aerospatiale UH-13 (Bell 47J)
OH-6 Cayuse VS MD UH-I9 (S-55)
(Hughes 369) UH-34T (S-58T)
OH-13 (Bell 47G) UH-46 (CH-46)
OH-23 Raven US Hiller UH-60 Black Hawk US Sikorsky
OH-58 Kiowa (Bell 206) (SH-60)
OH-58D (Bell 406) VH-4 (Bell 206)
PAH-1 (Bo-105) VH-60 (S-70)
Pnrtizan {Gazela, armed) Wasp {Scout) UK Westland
PZL-W3 Sokol Poland Swidnik We.isex (S-58) US/ Sikorsky/
RH-53 (CH-53) . UK Westland
S-55 {Whirlwind). US Sikorsky Whirlwind (S-55) US/ Sikorsky/
S-58 {Wessex) US Sikorsky UK Westland
S-61 SH-3 Z-5 [Mi-4] China Harbin
S-65 CH-53 Z-6 [Z-5] China Harbin
S-70 UH-60 US Sikorsky Z-8 [SA-321] China Changhe
S-76 US Sikorsky Z-9 [SA-365] China Harbin
ABBREVIATIONS
< under 100 tons ASW anti-submarine warfare EEZ exclusive economic zone
part of unit is detached/less AT tug ELINT electronic intelligence
than ATACMS army tactical missile elm element
+ . unit reinforced/more than system engr engineer
* training aircraft considered ATBM anti-tactical ballistic EOD explosive ordnance
as combat capable missile disposal
t serviceability in doubt ATGW anti-tank guided weapon eqpt equipment
e estimated ATK anti-tank ESM electronic support measures
' ' unit with overstated title/ Aust Australia est estimate(d)
ship class nickname avn aviation EW electronic warfare
AA(A) anti-aircraft (artillery) AW ACS airborne warning and exel excludes/excluding
AAM air-to-air missile control system exp expenditure
AAV amphibious armoured BB battleship FAC forward air control
vehicle bbr bomber fd field
AAW anti-air warfare
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